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gao_GAO-02-201 | gao_GAO-02-201_0 | It plans to procure 482 Crusader systems—each system consisting of a self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer and a resupply vehicle. Lighter-weight Crusader May Not Significantly Improve Strategic Deployability
The Army has made considerable progress over the past 2 years in redesigning the Crusader to substantially reduce its size and weight. Army officials told us that, if carrying two Crusaders on a C-17 aircraft is not feasible, they will still accept the Crusader system because it is a much more capable system than the current self-propelled howitzer system, the Paladin. Apparent Overlap of Crusader and Future Combat Systems Programs Creates Uncertainties
The Army’s current schedule to begin fielding the Crusader system and its replacement, the Future Combat Systems, in the same fiscal year—2008— represents a potential risk of investing in duplicative systems to fulfill the same missions. Because all the technologies needed for the Future Combat Systems may not be mature enough to be put into systems, the Army is planning to develop the initial version of the Future Combat Systems with less than its full capabilities and then upgrade it in a number of steps, called blocks, as the required technologies mature. Conclusions
Moving into product development without demonstrating critical technologies in an operational environment increases the risk of cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. As currently planned, the majority of the critical Crusader technologies will have been demonstrated in a relevant environment but not the important operational environment. Finally, to ensure the Army does not invest in two weapon systems that will meet the same artillery missions at the same time, we recommend that the secretary of defense direct the secretary of the army to determine, based on available data, the potential capabilities and schedule of the initial version of the Future Combat Systems and the implication of those capabilities and schedule on the Crusader’s utility to the Army before making the decision on beginning the Crusader’s system development and demonstration—currently scheduled for April 2003. To assess the Crusader program’s ability to meet the Crusader reduced weight requirements and improve the Crusader system’s strategic deployability, we analyzed the Army’s plans and requirements for reducing the weight of the Crusader and requested that the Army perform an analysis of the improvement in strategic deployability that the reduced weight Crusader system would provide compared to the original weight Crusader system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army wants an artillery system with greater firepower, range, and mobility than its current self-propelled howitzer. In 1994, the Army began to develop the Crusader, an advanced artillery system consisting of a self-propelled 155-millimeter howitzer and a resupply vehicle. The Department of Defense (DOD) will decide next year whether the Crusader program should enter its system development and demonstration stage, which will require the commitment of major resources.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Crusader program has made considerable progress in developing key technologies and reducing its size and weight. However, more progress and knowledge is needed to minimize the risk of cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. The Crusader program will likely enter product development with most of its critical technologies less mature than best practices recommend. Most of the Crusader's critical technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant environment but not in the more demanding operational environment. Although the Army is reducing the Crusader's weight so that two vehicles can be deployed on a C-17 aircraft, the deployability advantage gained does not appear significant. The reduction in the Crusader system's weight would only decrease the number of C-17 flights needed to transport two complete systems and support equipment from five to four flights. A lighter system offers several other benefits, and knowing the magnitude of the deployability advantage of reduced weight would allow the Army to make better decisions on trade offs. An apparent overlap exists between the Crusader's and the Future Combat Systems' capabilities and schedules. The Army expects the Future Combat Systems to meet the same artillery missions as the Crusader and eventually replace it. The current schedules for initial fielding of the Future Combat Systems and the Crusader system occur in the same year, 2008. The extent of this apparent overlap depends more on the Future Combat Systems than the Crusader because less is known about the Future Combat Systems' technologies. |
gao_GGD-99-101 | gao_GGD-99-101_0 | That is, because agency accounting systems did not specifically track crime technology assistance, we included only amounts that could be reasonably estimated by agency officials or by our reviews of agency information. Grant Programs Were the Major Type of Federal Assistance
As table 1 shows, for the three federal agencies we reviewed, single- purpose grants ($255.1 million) and multipurpose grants ($746.3 million) were the major type of crime technology assistance provided to state and local law enforcement agencies during fiscal years 1996 through 1998. Of these two agencies, Justice was the more significant provider, with an estimated $146.6 million in assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies, or about 90 percent of the $162.5 million total during fiscal years 1996 through 1998. Of these, 14 were provided by one Treasury component—the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), which accounted for $13.4 million (84 percent) of Treasury’s $15.9 million total assistance in this category. Appendix V provides further details about ONDCP’s technology transfer program. Specifically, for fiscal years 1996 through 1998, Senator DeWine requested that we identify the types and amounts of such assistance provided by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Byrne Formula Grants
Byrne Formula Grants may be used for a total of 26 purpose areas, 8 of which could involve crime technology. Responses from the three agencies indicated that only ONDCP had an established, relevant in-kind transfer program (see app. Table II.1: Estimated Obligations of Department of Justice Single-Purpose Grants for Crime Technology Provided to State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, Fiscal Years 1996 Through 1998 Dollars in thousands Component and program 1996 1997 1998 Drugfire Local Law Enforcement Block Grants Program: Technical assistance and training allocation National White Collar Crime Center State Identification Systems Grants Program Subtotal Bureau of Justice Statistics National Criminal History Improvement Program National Sex Offender Registry State Justice Statistics Program for Statistical Analysis Centers Subtotal National Institute of Justice Counterterrorism Technology Program Crime Act 1-Percent Set-Aside (funded by Local Law Enforcement Block Grants Program) Forensic DNA Laboratory Improvement ProgramScience and Technology Programs (funds from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services) Southwest Border States Anti-Drug Information System Subtotal Office of Justice Programs Improved Training and Technical Automation Grants $117,873.6 The DNA Laboratory Improvement Program is a joint program with the FBI. Crime Technology Assistance (Support Services and Systems) Provided by the Department of the Treasury
Overview of Department of the Treasury Support Services and Systems
Department of the Treasury components provided crime technology assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies in the form of access to, and use of, specialized support services and systems, such as computerized databases and forensics laboratories. As shown, Treasury’s crime technology assistance for fiscal years 1996 to 1998 totaled about $15.9 million. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the crime technology assistance provided by the federal government to state and local law enforcement agencies for fiscal years 1996 through 1998, focusing on the types and amounts of assistance provided by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) identifiable crime technology assistance provided by DOJ, Treasury, and ONDCP to state and local law enforcement agencies during fiscal years 1996 through 1998 totalled an estimated $1.2 billion; (2) this total is conservative because--given that these federal agencies are not required to, and do not specifically track crime technology assistance separately in their accounting systems--GAO included only amounts that could be identified or reasonably estimated by agency officials or GAO; (3) this estimate was particularly conservative regarding multipurpose grants, which by design can be used for a variety of purposes; (4) further, regarding applicable support services and systems, GAO did not include personnel costs; (5) the large majority of identified crime technology assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies--$1.0 billion or about 85 percent of the estimated $1.2 billion total during fiscal years 1996 through 1998--was grants, all of which were administered by DOJ; (6) the three largest crime technology assistance grants during the 3 fiscal years were the: (a) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services' Making Officer Redeployment Effective grants ($466.1 million); (b) Bureau of Justice Assistance's Byrne Formula Grants ($188.0 million); and (c) the Bureau of Justice Statistics' National Criminal History Improvement Program ($147.2 million); (7) support services and systems was estimated to be the second largest category of crime technology assistance provided to state and local law enforcement agencies; (8) in this category, DOJ was the major provider, with an estimated $146.6 million in assistance compared to Treasury's $15.9 million; (9) regarding in-kind transfers, responses from the three agencies GAO reviewed indicated that only ONDCP had an established, relevant program; and (10) ONDCP's technology transfer program totalled an estimated $13.0 million in assistance during fiscal year 1998, the first year of the program's existence. |
gao_GAO-02-722 | gao_GAO-02-722_0 | NTSB later also recommended that information about the pilot’s driving record be checked with the National Driver Register (NDR). The act, which took effect on February 6, 1997, requires that air carriers conduct background checks on all pilot applicants. Actions to Comply with Background Check Requirements Are Increasing, but Compliance Is Not Always Complete or Timely
Efforts to comply with PRIA have increased since the act took effect in February 1997, but compliance is not always complete or timely. Required Requests for Pilot Records Increased, but Available Data Are Not Adequate to Determine the Extent of Compliance
As discussed in chapter 1, PRIA, as amended, requires hiring carriers to request and review information for the past 5 years on a pilot applicant’s qualifications, performance, and training. According to our analyses of FAA and NDR databases and carriers’ responses to our surveys, the number of requests for background checks increased steadily from 1997 through 2000. FAA Oversight of PRIA Implementation Has Been Limited
FAA has taken limited steps to oversee PRIA implementation and to monitor this program as part of its broader responsibility for aviation safety. In addition, FAA has not issued PRIA regulations because it has allocated its regulatory resources to other priorities. As previously discussed, FAA is responsible for overseeing PRIA’s implementation and has the authority to issue regulations or establish procedures for carriers to maintain the records needed for FAA to monitor and enforce compliance with the act. Furthermore, FAA believes that it should focus its regulatory resources on higher aviation-safety priorities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist FAA in overseeing the implementation of PRIA and to enable FAA to determine whether carriers have conducted the required background checks on pilots before making final hiring decisions on pilots, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to update FAA’s advisory circular on PRIA to (1) clarify which records to include in PRIA files that are forwarded to hiring carriers and which records to exclude and (2) have carriers put in place a system that will allow the carriers and FAA to check compliance with all PRIA requirements, especially whether required pilot background checks have been completed for pilots hired; incorporate information on PRIA’s Web site that informs pilots of their rights, including the right to review and correct their records under PRIA; revise the Air Carrier and Other Records Request form (FAA Form 8060- 11) to conform with the law’s provisions for notification, review, and correction of records by pilots; and incorporate information on PRIA into the handbooks, inspection guidance, and training for FAA’s operations inspectors. Both groups of carriers found information from other sources, such as the job interview, the carrier’s flight evaluation of the pilot, and the results of the carrier’s training program, more helpful. | What GAO Found
The Pilot Records Improvement Act, enacted on October 9, 1996, responded to seven fatal commercial air carrier accidents that were attributed, in part, to errors by pilots who had been hired without background checks. The act, which took effect on February 6, 1997, requires air carriers, before making final hiring decisions, to obtain information for the past 5 years on a pilot applicant's performance, qualifications, and training from the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), employers, and the National Driver Register (NDR). The act also includes provisions to protect pilots' rights. FAA oversees compliance with the act and has broad responsibility for overseeing aviation safety. According to GAO's analyses of FAA and NDR databases and carriers' responses to GAO's surveys, compliance with the act has generally increased since it went into effect, but compliance is not always complete or timely. The available data are not adequate to determine industrywide compliance. According to their responses to GAO's surveys, carriers are not always aware of the act's requirements for protecting pilots' rights. FAA has taken limited steps to oversee compliance with PRIA. Under the act and its broad responsibility for aviation safety, FAA can issue implementing regulations, develop guidance, conduct inspections to monitor carriers' compliance, and initiate enforcement actions when it finds evidence of noncompliance. FAA has not issued regulations because it regards the act as self-implementing and believes that its regulatory resources should be reserved for higher agency priorities. Although FAA provided guidance for carriers, it was slow to update the guidance after the act was amended. Although they generally found records useful in making hiring decisions, carriers were divided in their opinions on whether the records were worth the cost. However, both groups of carriers found information from other sources, such as the job interview, the carrier's flight evaluation of the pilot, and the results of the carrier's training program, more helpful. |
gao_GAO-07-545T | gao_GAO-07-545T_0 | Our nation has built a vast transportation system of roads, airways, railways, pipelines, transit, and waterways that facilitate commerce and improve our quality of life. There is a human cost: over 44,000 people are killed in transportation- related accidents and over 2.5 million are injured each year. The transportation system is under considerable strain from these factors, and this strain is expected to increase as the demand to move people and goods grows resulting from population growth, technological change, and the increased globalization of the economy. The Department of Transportation implements national transportation policy and administers most federal transportation programs. For fiscal year 2008, the President’s budget requested $67 billion to carry out these and other activities. The department carries out some activities directly, such as employing more than 15,000 air traffic controllers to coordinate air traffic to make certain that planes stay a safe distance apart. However, the vast majority of its activities are not under its direct control. In other cases—notably most freight railways and pipelines—the infrastructure is owned and operated by private companies and the Department of Transportation regulates the safety of their transportation operations. Transportation Challenges Facing Congress and the Department of Transportation
In our view, Congress and the Department of Transportation face four major transportation challenges—financing the nation’s transportation system, improving mobility, improving safety, and managing the transformation of the air traffic control system. Financing the Nation’s Transportation System
The efficiency of the nation’s transportation infrastructure is threatened by increasing demand for transportation services, and revenue from traditional funding mechanisms may be unable to keep pace at current tax rates. 2.) Freight traffic is projected to grow substantially, putting strain on ports, highways, railroads, and airports, but current public planning and financing impede strategies to address capacity investment, and industry’s ability to fund its capacity increases to meet growth is largely uncertain. Congestion across modes—estimated to cost $200 billion per year—is significant and is projected to worsen. 3.) Of particular concern is the limited progress in improving safety on our nation’s roads, where about 95 percent of all transportation fatalities occur. Projected increases in congestion across modes, as a result of population and economic growth, could cause a deterioration in transportation safety in the future despite vigorous efforts to reduce accidents. FAA has had systemic management and acquisition problems that have led us to designate its air traffic control modernization program as high-risk since 1995. Despite its progress, as the key implementer of NextGen, FAA needs to institutionalize improvements made and continuously improve. In particular, both are confronted with an impending shortage of skilled people that threatens to have serious short- and long-term consequences. In recent years, the department has made significant progress in managing its finances, including substantial improvements in FAA’s financial management systems and practices. For fiscal year 2006, the department received a qualified opinion on its financial statements and the auditors cited two material internal control weaknesses. Appendix I: Ongoing GAO Work Related to Transportation Challenges
Description (expected completion)
Airport capital development funding (early 2007)
Federal role in overseeing and funding railroad bridge and tunnel projects (mid 2007)
JayEtta Hecker (202) 512-2834 [email protected] (mid 2007)
The Federal Transit Administration’s New Starts program (mid 2007)
The Federal Transit Administration’s implementation and oversight of the New Freedom program (TBD)
Operational, capacity, and safety issues associated with the Airbus A380 (early 2007)
Introduction of very light jets into the national airspace system (mid 2007)
Approaches to the efficient use of existing transportation infrastructure (mid 2007)
Freight bottlenecks (late 2007)
Public-private partnerships in transportation (late 2007)
Restructuring the federal-aid highway program (TBD)
Trends and performance of state contracting with the private sector (TBD)
Port preparedness and mobility of goods during natural disasters (early 2007)
Katherine Siggerud (202) 512-2834 [email protected] mobility challenges (mid 2007)
Corporate Average Fuel Economy program policy options (mid 2007)
Surface transportation compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (late 2007)
The public safety impact of the Transportation Security Administration’s modifications to the prohibited items list (early 2007)
Implementation progress of the Uniform Carrier Registration program (TBD)
Description (expected completion)
Operational, capacity, and safety issues associated with the Airbus A380 (early 2007)
Administration (late 2007)
Identification of motor carriers that pose a high risk for crashes (mid 2007)
Susan Fleming (202) 512-2834 [email protected] monitoring of unsafe motor carriers (mid 2007)
Safety standards for older drivers (early 2007)
Emerging trends in and challenges to preventing highway fatalities (late 2007)
Next generation air transportation system Survey of Joint Planning and Development Office stakeholders (mid 2007)
Gerald Dillingham (202) 512-2834 [email protected] modernization program (mid 2007)
The Federal Aviation Administration’s financial management efforts (mid 2007)
Highway transit funding authority (mid 2007)
Security and emergency preparedness and response Research and development of aviation passenger checkpoint screening technologies (mid 2007)
Cathleen Berrick (202) 512-3404 [email protected] commercial vehicles (TBD,b)
Port preparedness and mobility of goods during natural disasters (early 2007)
Katherine Siggerud (202) 512-2834 [email protected] transit agencies (TBD) report my not be pblicly ilble t thi time because it my contin ecrity enitive informtion. Other products can be found at GAO’s Website at www.gao.gov. | Why GAO Did This Study
A safe, efficient, and convenient transportation system is integral to the health of our economy and quality of life. Our nation's vast transportation system of airways, railways, roads, pipelines, transit, and waterways has served this need, yet it is under considerable strain from (1) increasing congestion, (2) the large costs to maintain and improve it, and (3) the human cost of over 44,000 people killed and over 2.5 million injured each year in transportation-related accidents. The Department of Transportation implements national transportation policy and administers most federal transportation programs. For fiscal year 2008, the department has requested $67 billion to carry out these and other activities. While the department carries out some activities directly, such as employing about 15,000 air traffic controllers to make certain that planes stay a safe distance apart, it does not have direct control over the vast majority of activities that it funds, such as local decisions on the priority and placement of airports, public transit, and roads. In other cases, such as railways and pipelines, the infrastructure is owned and operated by industry. This statement presents GAO's views on major transportation challenges facing Congress and the department. It is based on GAO products, including recommendations made, and the products of others.
What GAO Found
Financing mechanisms for the nation's transportation system are under stress. Our nation's transportation infrastructure is threatened by increasing demand for transportation services, and revenue from traditional funding mechanisms for the nation's highway and aviation systems may be unable to keep pace at current tax rates. In addition, freight traffic is projected to grow substantially, but current planning and financing mechanisms impede public strategies to address needs. Our nation's mobility is threatened because the nation's infrastructure is under great strain. Congestion across modes (e.g., aviation, highways, and rail) is expected to worsen. However, funding by mode and the lack of performance-related goals result in little assurance that funds are being channeled to the most critical mobility concerns and that intermodal approaches can be integrated into the transportation system. Improvements in transportation safety are needed to reduce the number of deaths and injuries from transportation accidents--about 95 percent of which occur on our nation's roads. Increases in congestion across modes as a result of population and economic growth could cause deterioration in transportation safety despite departmental and state efforts to reduce accidents. The transition from the current air traffic control system to a broader and modernized system will be one of the department's most complex undertakings. In previous years, FAA has faced systemic management and acquisition problems that led us to designate its air traffic control modernization program as high risk. While the agency has made significant progress in recent years, a key challenge going forward will be to institutionalize these improvements and to continually improve. In addition, the department and the transportation sector face persistent human capital challenges due to an impending shortage of skilled people to meet changing transportation needs. Furthermore, despite recent improvements in financial management, the department received a qualified opinion on its 2006 financial statements. Finally, the department is working to clarify its role in transportation security and emergency preparedness and response. |
gao_GAO-17-127 | gao_GAO-17-127_0 | Background
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is tasked with providing human resources, leadership, and support to federal agencies to manage their human capital functions. The Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) system is OPM’s primary repository for human capital data to support these efforts. Internal Controls and Data Reliability
OPM relies on agencies and service centers to ensure that the data they submit are timely, accurate, complete, and compiled in accordance with OPM standards. Underlying requirements for data standards and data quality efforts are the standards for internal control which apply to all executive branch government functions. Because the EHRI payroll database has potential to be used for accountability, research, and data-driven human resource management and policy decision making, making it available would support OPM’s strategic and open data goals. Specifically, (1) OPM used EHRI payroll data to calculate rough estimates of official time—paid time that employees spend on union-related activities—for its 2009 to 2012 reports to Congress; (2) we made similar use of EHRI payroll data to estimate use of official time in selected federal agencies in a 2014 report, which revealed limitations in OPM’s method of estimating the governmentwide costs of official time; (3) we used EHRI payroll data in a 2014 review that found inconsistencies in how agencies recorded and reported the use of administrative leave; and (4) we used EHRI payroll data in 2016 to report on the use of administrative leave at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). OPM has taken specific steps to make these other human resources-related data available, but has not taken any of these steps for the EHRI payroll database. EHRI Payroll Data Have the Potential to Support Human Resource Analytics and Decision Making
Our review of the literature and interviews with OPM officials suggest that key elements in the EHRI payroll data have the potential to be used to understand a variety of human capital outcomes in the federal government. This is because the EHRI payroll data were designed to provide standardized, governmentwide information by pay period regarding actual pay, incentive pay, telework and leave hours, and numerous other data elements related to federal work activities and compensation. Internal Control Weaknesses Increase the Risk of EHRI Payroll Data Reliability Issues
While OPM internal controls provide some assurance of the reliability of EHRI payroll data, weaknesses in the design or implementation of certain control activities and monitoring controls for the EHRI payroll database increase the risk of reliability issues that may limit OPM’s ability to fully leverage the data in support of its mission. (For selected results of electronic testing of the data, see appendix I.) This was due, in part, to inadequate monitoring controls, which are described in more detail below. As designed, these user controls are intended to provide reasonable assurance that control objectives will be achieved if OPM monitors them. Data Reliability Issues Limit OPM’s Ability to Fully Leverage EHRI Payroll Data in Support of Its Mission
While OPM’s internal controls provide some assurance of the reliability of some of the EHRI payroll data, the weaknesses in control activities (controls for completeness, accuracy, and validity of information processing and appropriate documentation) and monitoring controls (ongoing during normal operations) may increase the risk for data reliability issues to arise and persist in the EHRI payroll data. While data collection and storage is not without cost, EHRI’s centralized, standardized, and comprehensive features offer the promise of efficient, cost effective, and more precise analytics. Recommendations for Executive Action
GAO is making five recommendations to the Director of OPM. GAO recommends that the Director of OPM take the following action to support its strategic and open data goals: Improve the availability of the EHRI payroll data—for example, by preparing the data for analytics, making them available through online tools such as FedScope, and including them among the EHRI data sources on the OPM website and Data.gov. | Why GAO Did This Study
OPM is tasked with supporting federal agencies' human capital management activities, which includes ensuring that agencies have the data needed to make staffing and resource decisions to support their missions. The EHRI system is OPM's primary data warehouse to support these efforts. The payroll database—one of the four databases in the EHRI system—became operational in 2009. Payroll data provide information on federal employees' pay and benefits and how they allocate their time, as reflected in hours charged to work activities and use of leave. EHRI data are essential to governmentwide human resource management and evaluation of federal employment policies, practices, and costs. The ability to capitalize on this information is dependent, in part, on the reliability of the collected data.
GAO undertook this review to examine the extent to which (1) EHRI payroll data have supported OPM's strategic and open data goals and (2) internal controls are in place to assure the reliability of the data. GAO reviewed literature, interviewed officials and reviewed documents from OPM and the payroll Service Centers, compared OPM's data quality processes to GAO's Standards for Internal Control , and performed electronic tests of the payroll data.
What GAO Found
The Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) payroll data are not fully supporting the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) strategic and open data goals. This is because OPM has not taken the steps necessary to make the data widely available for use by other agencies and researchers. EHRI payroll data are intended to provide a centralized, standardized, and comprehensive source of pay and leave related data across the federal government. In this capacity, these data have the potential to provide a more efficient, cost effective, and precise data source for federal agencies and researchers who wish to assess human resources and policy decision making across the federal government. Because these data are not widely available, federal agencies and researchers must rely on other proxy sources for payroll data, which are more limited in the scope of analysis they can provide or the level of detail needed for data-driven human capital studies.
Although some elements of the data are sufficiently reliable for general use, weaknesses in OPM's internal controls for the EHRI payroll data will need to be addressed to enhance the reliability of other data elements. As shown in the table below, GAO's assessment of key internal control activities that are critical to ensuring the reliability of the EHRI payroll data found a number of areas where there is insufficient assurance that the control objective will be achieved. These weaknesses increase the risk of data errors, incomplete data fields, and ineffective monitoring of the EHRI payroll data. Unless OPM takes steps to correct these internal control weaknesses, it will be unable to fully leverage these data to meet its mission and allow others to make full use of these data for their research needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations, including that OPM improve the availability of its payroll data and implement additional internal control activities to better ensure data reliability.
OPM agreed with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-285 | gao_GAO-11-285_0 | Resources. 2.) ETA’s Research Areas Generally Reflect Key Issues, but Some Studies Are of Limited Usefulness
Experts Thought ETA’s 2007 to 2012 Research Plan Reflected Key Areas, but They Also Suggested New Ones for Future Research
Our expert panel generally considered ETA’s research areas to be the right ones for the period the research plan covered. Of the estimated $96 million that supported the 58 research reports published between January 2008 and March 2010, more than half—about $56 million—funded research that addressed these two research areas. Four of these reports were designed to demonstrate what works and for whom. In several studies we examined that cost $1 million or more, we found that, for a number of reasons, ETA’s research studies were limited in their usefulness and in their ability to inform policy and practices. For example, in a study of the Prisoner Re-entry Initiative, shortcomings in the data collection phase limited the strength of the findings and, as a result, limited the study’s opportunity to influence policy directions. Members of our expert panel stressed the importance of ETA incorporating varied methodological approaches into its future research proposals to best position the agency to address key employment and training issues. In 2010, acknowledging the need for better and more rigorous evaluations to inform its policy, Labor established the Chief Evaluation Office to oversee the department’s research and evaluation efforts. Moreover, ETA’s process is missing some critical elements that are needed to ensure that the current improvements become routine practices. ETA’s process lacks a formal provision requiring consultation with the newly established Chief Evaluation Officer at important points in the research process. Beyond ETA’s process for conducting research, current research practices fall short of ensuring research transparency and accountability—essential elements of a sound research and evaluation program. In our previous report, we noted that ETA’s research and evaluation center lacked a specific mechanism to insulate it from undue influence. ETA Has Recently Included More Random Assignment Studies in Its Research Program
ETA has recently begun to include more rigorous studies in its ongoing research. Some of ETA’s ongoing research studies face challenges in recruiting sample sizes large enough to meet the studies’ objectives. ETA Has Improved the Availability of Its Research but There Are Opportunities to Improve Its Search Page and Dissemination Methods
ETA Has Improved the Timeliness of Its Disseminated Research
ETA has recently improved the timeliness with which it disseminates its research reports. ETA Has Improved Its Research Database but Lacks Plans for Assessing the Usability of Its Search Page
In 2010, ETA updated its online, Web-based search page in order to improve the usability of its research database—the primary tool for making ETA research available to policymakers and the general public. Labor officials told us they have taken other steps, as well, in efforts to improve its Web-based search page. Although these changes have the potential to improve the usability of ETA’s database, Labor has not developed a formal plan for assessing the overall effectiveness of its Web-based search page, including user satisfaction. Beyond posting reports to its database, ETA also distributes hard copies of some of its research reports. In addition to electronic distribution, ETA also organizes various presentations to disseminate its research findings. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve ETA’s research program, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor require ETA to take the following three actions: Formally incorporate into its research process the routine involvement of the Chief Evaluation Officer at key milestones, including at the development of ETA’s annual research agenda and spending priorities, as well as at the early stages of developing specific research projects. Regarding our recommendation for ETA to develop a mechanism to enhance the transparency and accountability of its research program, officials cited several steps they are taking to improve the program, including involving outside experts in the development of their 5-year research plan and establishing advisory and peer review groups to review major evaluations. Labor agrees with this recommendation. Specifically, we answered the following research questions: (1) To what extent do ETA’s research priorities reflect key national employment and training issues and how useful were the studies funded under them? (2) What steps has ETA taken to improve its research program? (3) How has ETA improved, if at all, the availability of its research since our last review in January 2010 and what other steps could ETA take to further ensure its research findings are readily available? Appendix IV: Characteristics of Research Studies Disseminated between January 2009 and March 2010 That Cost $1 Million or More
Other (comparison v. treatment group using propensity score matching)
Increasing the labor market participation of underutilized populations characteristics collected before the intervention, but these were not used to make comparisons)
Integration of the workforce and regional economic development network analysis)
Integration of the workforce and regional economic development network analysis )
Experimental (randomized control trials)
Increasing the labor market participation of underutilized populations collected on characteristics upon entry and outcome characteristics collected after completion)
Appendix V: Delphi Phase I and Phase II Questionnaires
Appendix VI: Experts Who Agreed to Participate in GAO’s Delphi Panel
Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration, George Washington University Abt Associates Inc.
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
W.E. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help guide the nation's workforce development system, the Department of Labor's (Labor) Employment and Training Administration (ETA) conducts research in areas related to job training and employment. Building upon our earlier work, GAO examined the following: (1) To what extent do ETA's research priorities reflect key national employment and training issues and how useful were the studies funded under them? (2) What steps has ETA taken to improve its research program? (3) How has ETA improved the availability of its research since our last review in January 2010? To answer these questions, GAO reviewed ETA's research reports disseminated between January 2008 and March 2010 costing $1 million or more, as well as ongoing studies costing $2 million or more. GAO also convened a virtual expert panel, interviewed Labor and ETA officials, and reviewed relevant documents.
What GAO Found
ETA's 2007 to 2012 research plan generally addressed key employment and training issues, but some studies were limited in their usefulness. Most experts on our panel reported that the areas in ETA's plan reflected key national employment and training issues at least to a moderate extent. ETA invested most of its research and evaluation resources in the areas of Unemployment Insurance and increasing labor market participation of underutilized groups. Of the $96 million that ETA invested in the 58 research reports we reviewed, more than half--or about $56 million--funded studies in these two areas. The methodological approaches and statistical procedures researchers used in the studies we reviewed were generally consistent with the questions posed, but the studies were not always useful for informing policy and practice. For example, in one study, shortcomings in the data collection phase limited the strength of the findings. Experts suggested that ETA include more varied and rigorous methodologies in its future research projects. They also reported that future research should address additional areas, including a focus on employment and training approaches that work and for whom. Labor and ETA have taken steps to improve the way research is conducted, but additional actions are needed. In acknowledging the need for more rigorous evaluations to inform its policies, Labor recently established the Chief Evaluation Office to oversee departmentwide research and evaluation efforts. In addition, ETA made changes to some of its research practices. For example, ETA has begun involving outside experts in developing its research plan. Despite these improvements, ETA's process lacks critical elements needed to ensure that current improvements become part of its routine practices. For example, ETA's process lacks a formal provision to consult with the newly established Chief Evaluation Officer at important points in the research process. Moreover, ETA's current research practices fall short of ensuring research transparency and accountability--essential elements of a sound research program. For example, its research and evaluation center lacks safeguards to protect it from undue outside influence. ETA has recently begun efforts to increase the rigor of its research designs, but has faced design and implementation challenges. For example, some of ETA's ongoing research studies face challenges in recruiting large enough sample sizes to meet the studies' objectives. ETA has improved the availability of its research findings, but it lacks a plan for assessing the usability of its Web-based search page--the primary tool for making ETA's research publicly available. ETA recently improved the timeliness with which it disseminates its research reports, decreasing the average number of days to release its reports to the public from 804 days in 2008 to 76 days in 2009. ETA has taken steps to update its online, Web-based search page. However, the agency has not developed a formal plan for assessing the overall effectiveness of its Web-based search page, including user satisfaction. In addition to its research database, ETA uses a variety of other methods to disseminate its research, including providing its research reports at conferences and internal briefings. Experts suggested that ETA consider other effective dissemination methods, such as publishing a one-page summary of research findings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ETA formally include the Chief Evaluation Officer in its research process, create a mechanism to enhance the transparency and accountability of its research program, and develop a plan to ensure that research reports are accessible through its Web-based search page. Labor agreed with our recommendations and noted its ongoing efforts to improve its research program. While these efforts are important, GAO stresses the need for additional actions to fully address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-1071 | gao_GAO-02-1071_0 | 1.) Major STARS Project Changes Make Comparisons of Costs and Schedules Difficult
The current STARS program is not the program that FAA contracted for in 1996. When FAA awarded the contract in September 1996, it estimated that STARS would cost $940 million and be implemented at 172 facilities by 2005. The maintenance technicians also identified differences between STARS and its backup system that made it difficult to monitor the system. Figure 3 provides the schedule for when each version of STARS became or is scheduled to become operational at the first facility. FAA Has Changed Its Official Estimates Twice
Since 1996, FAA acquisition executives have approved two changes to the cost and schedule estimates for STARS. FAA Officials Said They Plan to Follow Agency Policy in Testing STARS and Addressing Software Problems but Acknowledge that Challenges Remain
FAA responded to the DOT IG’s concerns about the agency’s plans for deploying STARS at Philadelphia by stating that FAA plans to follow its policy for testing STARS and addressing critical software problems. While the Memphis terminal facility has fewer and less complex air traffic control operations than more congested facilities, such as the one in Philadelphia, FAA changed its plans because meeting the commitment to deploy STARS in Philadelphia would not allow enough time to test STARS first in Memphis. Changes in the Schedule for Deploying STARS Led FAA to Implement Interim Projects
Because FAA was not able to deploy STARS according to its original schedule, under which some terminals would have received the new equipment by 1998, FAA implemented several interim projects. Under these projects, FAA replaced failing equipment with new software, radar displays, and other hardware so that the terminals could continue operating while STARS was delayed. The cost for Common ARTS and the ARTS color displays attributable to STARS delays was around $90.5 million. | What GAO Found
Since September 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been developing the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) project to replace the outdated computer equipment that air traffic controllers currently use in some facilities to control air traffic within 5 to 50 nautical miles of an airport. Comparing the currently projected cost and deployment schedule for STARS with the original cost and schedule is difficult because the program presently bears little resemblance to the program envisioned in 1996. FAA has officially changed the cost, schedule, and requirements for STARS twice. In October 1999, FAA estimated the cost for its new approach at $1.4 billion, with a schedule to begin deploying STARS in 2002 at 188 facilities and complete installation at all facilities by 2008. The second change occurred in March 2002, when FAA lowered its estimate from $1.4 billion to $1.33 billion, reduced the number of facilities receiving STARS from 188 to 74, and changed the date to complete installation at all facilities from 2008 to 2005. FAA responded to the Department of Transportation Inspector General's concerns about the agency's plans for deploying STARS in Philadelphia by stating that it plans to follow its policy for testing STARS and addressing critical software problems. Because the FAA changed the date for deploying STARS at the first facility from 1998 to 2002, it had to implement interim systems to allow it to continue to meet demands for air traffic services. Specifically, it had to replace radar displays and other hardware that were difficult to maintain and had limited capacity to accommodate software that would allow FAA to add new features. FAA documents show the cost to implement these interim solutions when STARS was delayed was $90.5 million. |
gao_GAO-04-472 | gao_GAO-04-472_0 | Effect of Undocumented Aliens on Hospitals’ Uncompensated Care Costs Is Uncertain
The impact of undocumented aliens on hospitals’ uncompensated care costs remains uncertain. Determining the number of undocumented aliens treated at a hospital is challenging because hospitals generally do not collect information on patients’ immigration status and because undocumented aliens are reluctant to identify themselves. Although about 70 percent of hospitals responded to the survey, only 39 percent provided sufficient information to evaluate the relationship between uncompensated care levels and the proportion of care provided to patients without a Social Security number. Some Federal Funding Has Been Available but Not for All Undocumented Aliens or Hospitals
Some federal funding has been available to assist with hospitals’ costs of treating undocumented aliens, but this funding has not covered care of all undocumented aliens or all hospital services, and not all hospitals receive it. First, Medicaid provides some coverage for eligible undocumented aliens, such as low-income children and pregnant women. New Federal Funding Will Be Available Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005
The recently enacted Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 appropriated additional funds, beginning in fiscal year 2005, for payments to hospitals and other providers for emergency medical services furnished to undocumented and certain other aliens. By September 1, 2004, the Secretary is required to establish a process for providers to request payments under the statute. Homeland Security Is Usually Not Responsible for Hospital Costs of Aliens Needing Emergency Medical Care Who Are Encountered by Border Patrol and Port-of-Entry Officials
Both Border Patrol agents and U.S. port-of-entry officials come into contact with people needing emergency medical assistance whom they refer or allow to enter for care, but in most situations, Homeland Security is not responsible for the resulting costs of emergency medical assistance. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that funds appropriated by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 are not improperly spent, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in establishing a payment process, develop appropriate internal controls to ensure that payments are made to hospitals and other providers only for unreimbursed emergency services for undocumented or certain other aliens as designated in the statute. In all, the 10 states comprised an estimated 78 percent of the population of undocumented aliens in the United States in 2000. To determine the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security) for covering the medical costs of sick or injured aliens encountered by Border Patrol agents, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and legal opinions and interviewed Border Patrol officials in headquarters, in the nine sectors along the U.S.-Mexican border, and in the Miami sector. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials about their encounters with sick or injured aliens at sea. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 7 million undocumented aliens lived in the United States in 2000, according to Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates. Hospitals in states where many of them live report that treating them can be a financial burden. GAO was asked to examine the relationship between treating undocumented aliens and hospitals' costs not paid by patients or insurance. GAO was also asked to examine federal funding available to help hospitals offset costs of treating undocumented aliens and the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security) for covering medical expenses of sick or injured aliens encountered by Border Patrol and U.S. port-of-entry officials. To conduct this work, GAO surveyed 503 hospitals and interviewed Medicaid and hospital officials in 10 states. GAO also interviewed and obtained data from Homeland Security officials.
What GAO Found
Hospitals generally do not collect information on their patients' immigration status, and as a result, an accurate assessment of undocumented aliens' impact on hospitals' uncompensated care costs--those not paid by patients or by insurance--remains elusive. GAO attempted to examine the relationship between uncompensated care and undocumented aliens by surveying hospitals, but because of a low response rate to key survey questions and challenges in estimating the proportion of hospital care provided to undocumented aliens, GAO could not determine the effect of undocumented aliens on hospitals' uncompensated care costs. Federal funding has been available from several sources to help hospitals cover the costs of care for undocumented aliens. The sources include Medicaid coverage for emergency medical services for eligible undocumented aliens, supplemental Medicaid payments to hospitals treating a disproportionate share of low-income patients, and funds provided to 12 states by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. In addition, the recently enacted Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 appropriated $1 billion over fiscal years 2005 through 2008 for payments to hospitals and other providers for emergency services provided to undocumented and certain other aliens. By September 1, 2004, the Secretary of Health and Human Services must establish a process for hospitals and other providers to request payments under the statute. Border Patrol and U.S. port-of-entry officials encounter aliens needing medical attention under different circumstances, but in most situations, Homeland Security is not responsible for aliens' hospital costs. The agency may cover medical expenses only for those people in its custody, but border officials reported that sick or injured people they encounter generally receive medical attention without being taken into custody. |
gao_GAO-16-268T | gao_GAO-16-268T_0 | The continued deterioration in USPS’s financial condition is due primarily to two factors. USPS reported that the most significant factor contributing to the decline in First-Class Mail volume is the continued migration toward electronic communication and transaction alternatives—a migration USPS expects to continue for the foreseeable future. 2. USPS reported that its key operating expenses grew in fiscal year 2015—notably salary increases for unionized employees, as well as additional work hours, in part due to a 14.1 percent growth in shipping and packages, which are more labor intensive to process. Compensation and benefits comprise close to 80 percent of total USPS expenses. At the end of fiscal year 2015, USPS’s $125 billion in unfunded liabilities and outstanding debt represented a $7.4 billion increase from the previous year. USPS Will Remain Unlikely to Fully Make Required Retiree Health and Pension Payments
USPS will remain unlikely to fully make its required retiree health and pension payments in the near future. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, USPS’s payments will be restructured as it will no longer be required to make fixed prefunding payments, but will be required to start making annual payments based on actuarial determinations of the following component costs: a 40-year amortization schedule to address the unfunded liabilities for postal retiree health benefits, the “normal costs” of retiree health benefits for current employees, and a 27-year amortization schedule to address the unfunded liabilities for postal pension benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). As table 1 below shows, in fiscal year 2017, USPS will be required to make an estimated total of $11.3 billion in payments for retiree health and pension benefits under CSRS and FERS—about $4.6 billion more than what USPS paid in fiscal year 2015 for these benefit programs. In addition to declining mail volumes and increased expenses, USPS’s ability to make its required payments for these retirement programs will be further challenged due to:
Expiration of a temporary rate surcharge: USPS reported that it generated $2.1 billion in additional revenue during fiscal year 2015 and $1.4 billion in additional revenue in fiscal year 2014 as a result of a 4.3 percent “exigent” surcharge that began in January 2014. No new major cost-savings initiatives planned. Large unfunded liabilities for postal retiree health and pension benefits— which were $78.9 billion at the end of fiscal year 2015—may ultimately place taxpayers, USPS employees, retirees and their beneficiaries, and USPS itself at risk. As we have previously reported, funded benefits protect the future viability of an enterprise such as USPS by not saddling it with bills later after employees have retired. Further, since USPS retirees participate in the same health and pension benefit programs as other federal retirees, if USPS ultimately does not adequately fund these benefits and if Congress wants these benefits to be maintained at current levels, funding from the U.S. Treasury, and hence the taxpayer, would be needed to continue the benefit levels. Alternatively, unfunded benefits could lead to pressure for reductions in benefits or in pay. Congress Faces Difficult Choices to Address USPS’s Financial Condition
USPS’s financial situation leaves Congress with difficult choices and trade-offs to achieve the broad-based restructuring that will be necessary for USPS to become financially sustainable. USPS’s ability to make its required retiree health and pension payments requires a decrease in expenses or increase in revenues, or both. The level of postal services and the affordability of those services: USPS’s growing financial difficulties combined with vast changes in how people communicate provide Congress with an opportunity to consider what postal services will be needed in the 21st century. Compensation and benefits in an environment of revenue pressures: Key compensation and benefits costs have increased and continue to increase for USPS employees, while demand for USPS’s main revenue source, mail and First-Class Mail in particular, has declined and continues to decline. There is no statutory requirement for USPS’s financial condition to be considered in arbitration. USPS’s dual role of providing affordable universal service while remaining self-financing: As an independent establishment of the executive branch, USPS has long been expected to provide affordable, quality, universal delivery service to all parts of the country while remaining self-financing. The status quo is not sustainable. Appendix I: U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS is a critical part of the nation's communication and commerce, delivering 154 billion pieces of mail in fiscal year 2015 to 155 million delivery points. However, USPS's mission of providing prompt, reliable and efficient universal services to the public at risk due to its poor financial condition. USPS's net loss was $5.1 billion in fiscal year 2015, which was its ninth consecutive year of net losses. At the end of fiscal year 2015, USPS had $125 billion in unfunded liabilities, mostly for retiree health and pensions, and debt—an amount equal to 182 percent of USPS's revenues.
In July 2009, GAO added USPS's financial condition to its list of high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. USPS's financial condition remains on GAO's high-risk list. In previous reports, GAO has included strategies and options for USPS to generate revenue, reduce costs, increase the efficiency of its delivery operations, and restructure the funding of USPS pension and retiree health benefits. GAO has also previously reported that Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a comprehensive package of actions to improve USPS's financial viability.
This testimony discusses (1) factors affecting USPS's deteriorating financial condition, (2) USPS's ability to make required retiree health and pension payments, and (3) choices Congress faces to address USPS's financial challenges. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's work over the past 5 years that examined USPS's financial condition—including its liabilities—and updated USPS financial information for fiscal year 2015.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial condition continues to deteriorate as a result of trends including:
Declining mail volume : First-Class Mail—USPS's most profitable product—continues to decline in volume as communications and payments migrate to electronic alternatives. USPS expects this decline to continue for the foreseeable future.
Growing expenses: Key USPS expenses continue to grow, such as salary increases and work hours due in part to growth in shipping and packages, which are more labor-intensive. Compensation and benefits comprise close to 80 percent of USPS's expenses.
USPS's financial condition makes it unlikely it will be able to fully make its required retiree health and pension payments in the near future. In fiscal year 2015, USPS was required to make $12.6 billion in retiree health and pension payments, but it only made $6.7 billion in payments as it did not make a required retiree health payment of $5.7 billion. USPS's required payments will be restructured in fiscal year 2017, with estimated payments totaling $11.3 billion—$4.6 billion more than what USPS paid in fiscal year 2015. USPS's ability to make these required payments will be further challenged due to:
Expiration of a temporary rate surcharge: This surcharge on most postal rates effective January 2014, which has generated $3.6 billion in additional annual revenues through September 2015, is expected to expire April 2016.
No new major cost savings initiatives are planned.
Large unfunded liabilities for postal retiree health and pension benefits—which were $78.9 billion at the end of fiscal year 2015—may ultimately place taxpayers, USPS employees, retirees, and their beneficiaries, and USPS itself at risk. As we have previously reported, funded benefits protect the future viability of an enterprise such as USPS by not saddling it with bills later after employees have retired. Further, since USPS retirees participate in the same health and pension benefit programs as other federal retirees, if USPS ultimately does not adequately fund these benefits, and if Congress wants these benefits to be maintained at current levels, funding from the U.S. Treasury, and hence the taxpayer, would be needed to continue the benefit levels. Alternatively, unfunded benefits could lead to pressure for reductions in benefits or in pay.
Congress faces difficult choices and tradeoffs to address USPS's financial challenges. The status quo is not sustainable. Considerations for Congress include the (1) level of postal services provided to the public and the affordability of those services, (2) compensation and benefits for USPS employees and retirees in an environment of revenue pressures, and (3) tension between USPS's dual roles as an independent establishment of the executive branch required to provide universal delivery service and as a self-financing entity operating in a businesslike manner. |
gao_GAO-05-555 | gao_GAO-05-555_0 | Pilot Program for DOD Use of VA’s CMOP
During fiscal year 2003, DOD and VA conducted a pilot program to assess the feasibility of dispensing outpatient refill prescriptions for DOD beneficiaries using a VA CMOP. DOD Could Realize Financial Savings and Nonmonetary Benefits by Using VA’s CMOP
DOD could achieve savings by taking advantage of VA’s generally lower drug prices if it used the VA CMOP to dispense its outpatient pharmacy refill prescriptions. However, achieving savings would require closing MTF outpatient pharmacy refill operations to offset CMOP administrative expenses. In addition to demonstrating that financial savings are possible, the pilot produced nonmonetary benefits such as providing high-quality service as indicated by measurements of beneficiary satisfaction and rates of accurate and timely distribution of drugs, reducing automobile traffic congestion and pharmacy wait times, and freeing DOD resources for its core mission of supporting military readiness. If the three MTFs had been able to achieve the same savings per prescription and had fully utilized the pilot for all their outpatient refill prescriptions in fiscal year 2003—including those dispensed through the CMOP and those dispensed at the MTFs—drug cost savings during fiscal year 2003 could have been about $1.5 million. Use of CMOP Provided Nonmonetary Benefits to DOD
The pilot also produced nonmonetary benefits. While DOD’s use of the CMOP is a significant opportunity for DOD to achieve savings and expand its sharing of resources with VA, there are other cost implications that could become important if MTF refill operations were closed with the expectation that beneficiaries would use the CMOP. Specifically, rather than obtaining drugs from the CMOP, beneficiaries might choose instead to obtain their drugs from a more costly option for DOD, such as retail pharmacies. Any cost increases will challenge DOD to find more efficient ways to manage its pharmacy benefits program, such as by encouraging beneficiaries to choose the most cost-effective options for where they obtain their drugs. VA concurred with our draft report. Although cost savings through the CMOP are dependent on closing MTF outpatient pharmacy refill operations, we noted in the draft report that MTFs could continue to dispense outpatient refill prescriptions at MTF main pharmacies. Finally, DOD stated that we assumed that current options are more costly for DOD than having beneficiaries obtain their drugs from the CMOP, and that this was a subjective conclusion. And, as noted in the draft report, the CMOP’s drug costs and administrative costs were lower than the drug and administrative costs for DOD’s TRICARE Mail Order Pharmacy. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address our objective, we compiled information on the operations of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Consolidated Mail Outpatient Pharmacy (CMOP) pilot program, and we compared the costs of purchasing and dispensing drugs at the CMOP that dispensed drugs for the pilot with the costs at the pilot military treatment facilities (MTF). To compile information on the pilot program and on related aspects of DOD’s and VA’s pharmacy programs, we conducted site visits, reviewed program documentation, and interviewed DOD and VA officials responsible for purchasing and dispensing drugs. To compare the administrative costs of dispensing refill prescriptions at the CMOP with the costs at MTFs participating in the pilot, we collected cost information from program officials and evaluated it to ensure that it was comparable to the costs from the other sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
There has been long-standing congressional interest in whether the Department of Defense (DOD) could use the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Consolidated Mail Outpatient Pharmacy (CMOP) system as a cost-effective alternative to beneficiaries picking up outpatient refill prescriptions at DOD military treatment facilities (MTF). To evaluate this possibility, DOD and VA conducted a pilot program in fiscal year 2003 in which a VA CMOP provided outpatient pharmaceutical refill services to DOD beneficiaries served through three MTFs. GAO was asked to estimate cost savings that could be achieved if DOD used VA's CMOP instead of MTF pharmacies for outpatient refill prescriptions, and what other benefits were achieved at the three pilot sites. To estimate potential cost savings and determine what other benefits were achieved, GAO reviewed pilot and pharmacy program documentation and interviewed DOD and VA officials responsible for purchasing and dispensing drugs. GAO also compared drug and administrative costs of dispensing outpatient refills through the fiscal year 2003 pilot program with the costs of dispensing the refills at the three DOD MTFs that participated in the pilot.
What GAO Found
DOD could achieve savings if it used VA's CMOP to dispense its outpatient refill prescriptions by taking advantage of VA's generally lower drug prices. Based on the drugs dispensed through the pilot, GAO estimated that the three MTFs that participated in the CMOP pilot program in fiscal year 2003 could have saved about $1.39 per prescription in drug costs, or a total of about $1.5 million, if the MTFs moved all their refill prescriptions to the CMOP. However, while DOD saved money on drug costs at the pilot MTFs, these savings were offset because DOD paid administrative costs for refill operations twice--first to pay VA for the administrative costs charged by the CMOP and second to maintain outpatient pharmacy refill operations at the MTFs. Consequently, achieving savings would require closing MTF outpatient pharmacy refill operations to offset CMOP administrative expenses. In addition to demonstrating that financial savings are possible, the pilot produced nonmonetary benefits. MTF officials reported benefits such as reduced automobile traffic congestion and shorter pharmacy waiting times because many civilian beneficiaries at the pilot sites no longer came to MTFs to pick up refill prescriptions. Further, DOD beneficiaries who participated in the pilot program reported satisfaction with the CMOP's accurate and timely distribution of pharmaceuticals. There are other potential cost implications for DOD if it decides to close MTF outpatient refill pharmacies and move the workload to the VA CMOP. Because DOD beneficiaries are allowed to choose among various options for obtaining drugs, they would be able to obtain their drugs from retail pharmacies and DOD's mail order pharmacy instead of the CMOP. These options, however, are more costly for DOD than having beneficiaries obtain their drugs from the CMOP. Consequently, if DOD closes the outpatient refill pharmacies at the pilot sites with the expectation that beneficiaries would use the CMOP and they did not, DOD's costs could increase. Any cost increases will challenge DOD to find more efficient ways to manage its pharmacy benefits program, such as by encouraging beneficiaries to choose the most cost-effective options for where they obtain their drugs. We provided a draft of this report to VA and DOD for comment. VA said that it concurred with the draft report and DOD said that it was technically accurate but neither explicitly concurred nor nonconcurred. |
gao_GAO-03-587 | gao_GAO-03-587_0 | Medicaid Buy-In Program Designed to Expand Coverage for Working Individuals with Disabilities
The Ticket to Work Medicaid Buy-In builds on an earlier effort to expand Medicaid eligibility for individuals with disabilities who desire to work. States may establish their own income and asset standards or elect to have no standards at all. 1.) Nearly half of individuals with disabilities who reported having health insurance obtained coverage through public sources, such as Medicaid and Medicare. States’ Buy-In Programs Expanded Eligibility and Increased Cost Sharing for More Workers with Disabilities
The 12 states that opted to implement the Ticket to Work Medicaid Buy-In program as of December 2002 set income and asset levels for eligibility that provided new opportunities for working individuals with disabilities to secure and maintain Medicaid coverage. In addition to expanding income eligibility and asset limits, all states took advantage of the flexibility of the statute to charge premiums or copayments to ensure that Buy-In participants shared in the cost of their health care coverage. Twelve States Expanded Medicaid Eligibility Levels for Working Individuals with Disabilities
Across the 12 states that opted to implement Ticket to Work Medicaid Buy-In programs, all set eligibility requirements that expanded eligibility for working individuals with higher incomes or more assets than usually allowed under their Medicaid programs. In these 11 states, the spend-down income eligibility levels ranged from 15 percent to 100 percent of the FPL. Average monthly premiums ranged from $26 to $82, with nearly half of the states setting premiums from $40 to $60. Participants in 8 of the 12 states also were required to pay copayments for health care services, such as $0.50 to $3 for an office visit or prescription drugs. In 7 of these states, copayments were the standard cost-sharing requirements for Medicaid. Buy-In Participants in Four States Generally Had Prior Medicaid Coverage and Worked in Low-Wage Jobs
In the four states in which we conducted more detailed work— Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, and New Jersey—Buy-In programs enrolled many individuals who previously were enrolled in Medicaid, often in eligibility categories with more restrictive income limits, such as the medically needy category. As of December 2002, these states had not formally analyzed whether Buy-In participants withdrew from private health insurance coverage prior to obtaining Medicaid coverage. In addition, CMS expects to complete an extensive study of states’ experiences for 2001 and 2002 with the Buy-In programs authorized under both the BBA and the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 in the fall of 2003 and to report its findings in 2004. We will send copies of this report to the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 7 million individuals with disabilities rely on medical and supportive services covered by Medicaid. However, if working-age individuals with disabilities desire to increase their self-sufficiency through employment, they could jeopardize their eligibility for Medicaid coverage, possibly leaving them without an alternative for health insurance. In an effort to help extend Medicaid coverage to certain individuals with disabilities who desire to work, Congress passed the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. This legislation authorizes states to raise their Medicaid income and asset eligibility limits for individuals with disabilities who work. States may require that working individuals with disabilities "buy in" to the program by sharing in the costs of their coverage--thus, these states' programs are referred to as a Medicaid Buy-In. The act also required that GAO report on states' progress in designing and implementing the Medicaid Buy-In. GAO identified states that operated Buy-In programs as of December 2002 and analyzed the income eligibility limits and cost-sharing provisions established by those states. GAO also assessed the characteristics of the Buy-In participants in four states that were among the most experienced in implementing the program.
What GAO Found
As of December 2002, 12 states had implemented Medicaid Buy-In programs under the authority of the Ticket to Work legislation, which was effective October 1, 2000, enrolling over 24,000 working individuals with disabilities. These states used the flexibility allowed by the legislation to raise income eligibility and asset limits as well as cost-sharing fees. Across the 12 states, income eligibility levels ranged from 100 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) in Wyoming to no income limit in Minnesota, with 11 states setting income eligibility limits at twice the FPL or higher. In addition to increasing income and asset levels, these states required participants to buy in to the program by charging premiums, ranging from $26 to $82 a month, and co-payments, generally ranging from $0.50 to $3 for office visits and prescription drugs. In detailed analysis of four states--Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, and New Jersey--GAO found that most Buy-In participants had prior insurance coverage by Medicaid and Medicare, few had prior coverage by private health insurance, and many earned low wages--most making less than $800 per month. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services noted that it expects to report in 2004 on its current study of states' experiences in 2001 and 2002 with the Medicaid Buy-In programs. |
gao_GAO-06-177 | gao_GAO-06-177_0 | Summary of Findings
The roles of certain key federal officials initially involved in the advisory board’s review of the dose reconstructions may not have been sufficiently independent and actions were taken to replace these officials. Nonetheless, continued diligence by HHS is required to prevent such problems from recurring as new candidates are considered for these roles. Initially, the project officer assigned responsibility for reviewing the monthly progress reports and monitoring the technical performance of the contractor was also a manager of the NIOSH dose reconstruction program being reviewed. In addition, the designated federal officer for the advisory board, who is responsible for scheduling and attending board meetings, was the director of the dose reconstruction program being reviewed. The progress of the contracted review of NIOSH’s site profiles and dose reconstructions has been hindered by the complexity of the work. Specifically, in the first 2 years, the contractor spent almost 90 percent of the $3 million that had been allocated to the contract for a 5-year undertaking. Various adjustments have been made in the review approach in light of the identified complexities, which were not initially understood. However, further improvements could be made in the oversight and planning of the review process. With regard to reviewing special exposure cohort petitions, the advisory board has asked for and received the contractor’s assistance, expanded its charge, and acknowledged the need for the board to review the petitions in a timely manner. The board has reviewed eight petitions as of October 2005, and the contractor assisted with six of these by reviewing the site profiles associated with the facilities. The contractor will play an expanded role by reviewing some of the other submitted petitions and NIOSH’s evaluation of those petitions and recommending to the advisory board whether the petitioning group should be added to the special exposure cohort. The contractor will also develop procedures for the advisory board to use when reviewing petitions. While NIOSH is generally required by law to complete its review of a petition within 180 days of determining that the petition has met certain initial qualification requirements, the advisory board has no specified deadline for its review of petitions. Appendix I: Briefing Slides
Introduction
• For the last several decades, the Department of Energy and its
predecessor agencies and contractors have employed thousands of individuals in secret and dangerous work in the atomic weapons industry. The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) of 2000 compensates individuals who have developed cancer or other specified diseases related to on-the-job exposure to radiation and other hazards at these work sites. Under Subtitle B, determining a claimant’s eligibility for compensation involves developing estimates of the likely radiation levels a worker was exposed to based on information such as exposure records. These estimates are referred to as “dose reconstructions” and are developed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). NIOSH also compiles information in “site profiles” about the radiation protection practices and hazardous materials used at various plants and facilities, which assist NIOSH in completing the dose reconstructions. Their claims are paid without completing exposure estimates. The law also allows the Secretary, HHS, to designate additional groups of employees as members of the special exposure cohort. For quality control and to raise public confidence in the fairness of the
claims process, EEOICPA created a citizen’s advisory board of scientists, physicians, and employee representatives—the President’s Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health (advisory board). Members of board serve part-time, and the board has limited staff support. The advisory board is tasked with reviewing the scientific validity and quality of NIOSH’s dose reconstructions and advising the Secretary of HHS. The board has the flexibility to determine the scope and methodology for this review. Key Questions
We focused our work on three questions: Are the roles of key federal officials involved in the review of NIOSH’s dose reconstructions sufficiently independent to assure the objectivity of the review? Have the agency’s management controls and the advisory board’s oversight been sufficient to ensure that the contract to review site profiles and dose reconstructions is adequately carried out? Multiple Entities and Officials Involved in the Review of NIOSH’s Dose Reconstructions
(HHS) (CDC)
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (PGO)
Designated federal officer (since 12/04)
Project officer (since 12/04)
Office of Compensation Analysis and Support (OCAS)
Designated federal officer (prior to 12/04)
Project officer (prior to 12/04) (SC&A)
Roles of HHS and CDC
HHS The Secretary of HHS has overall responsibility for the advisory board, as
delegated by the President, and is tasked by executive order with providing administrative services, funds, facilities, staff, and other necessary support services to assist the advisory board in carrying out its responsibilities. The Advisory Board Is Using the Contractor’s Work in Reviewing Special Exposure Cohort Petitions
The advisory board is using the contractor’s work in reviewing special
exposure cohort petitions. Nonetheless, the advisory board has discussed the fact that special exposure cohort petition reviews have required more time and effort to reach a recommended decision than originally estimated and that the advisory board needs to manage its workload in order to reach timely decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the last several decades, the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies and contractors have employed thousands of individuals in secret and dangerous work in the atomic weapons industry. In 2000, Congress enacted the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act to compensate those individuals who have developed cancer or other specified diseases related to on-the-job exposure to radiation and other hazards at these work sites. Under Subtitle B, determining the eligibility of claimants for compensation is a complex process, involving several federal agencies and a reconstruction of the historical evidence available. The Department of Labor must consider a claimant's case based on records of his or her employment and work activities, which are provided by the Department of Energy. Labor considers the compensability of certain claims by relying on estimates of the likely radiation levels to which particular workers were exposed. These "dose reconstructions" are developed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). NIOSH also compiles information in "site profiles" about the radiation protection practices and hazardous materials used at various plants and facilities, which helps complete the dose reconstructions. Because certain facilities are known to have exposed employees to radiation while keeping few records of individuals' exposure, their employees have been designated under the law as members of a "special exposure cohort," and their claims may be paid without individual dose reconstructions. The law also allows the Secretary of HHS to add additional groups of employees to the special exposure cohort. For quality control and to raise public confidence in the fairness of the claims process, the compensation act also created a citizen's advisory board of scientists, physicians, and employee representatives--the President's Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health. Members of the board serve part-time and the board has limited staff support. The advisory board is tasked to review the scientific validity and quality of NIOSH's dose reconstructions and advise the Secretary of HHS. The board has the flexibility to determine the scope and methodology for this review. We assessed how well the advisory board's review and the contracted work with SC&A are proceeding. We focused on three questions: (1) Are the roles of key federal officials involved in the review of NIOSH's dose reconstructions sufficiently independent to assure the objectivity of the review? (2) Have the agency's management controls and the advisory board's oversight been sufficient to ensure that the contract to review site profiles and dose reconstructions is adequately carried out? and (3) Is the advisory board using the contractor's expertise in reviewing special exposure cohort petitions?
What GAO Found
The roles of certain key federal officials initially involved in the advisory board's review of the dose reconstructions may not have been sufficiently independent and actions were taken to replace these officials. Nonetheless, continued diligence by HHS is required to prevent such problems from recurring as new candidates are considered for these roles. Initially, the project officer assigned responsibility for reviewing the monthly progress reports and monitoring the technical performance of the contractor was also a manager of the NIOSH dose reconstruction program being reviewed. In addition, the designated federal officer for the advisory board, who is responsible for scheduling and attending board meetings, was the director of the dose reconstruction program being reviewed. The progress of the contracted review of NIOSH's site profiles and dose reconstructions has been hindered by the complexity of the work. Specifically, in the first 2 years, the contractor spent almost 90 percent of the $3 million that had been allocated to the contract for a 5-year undertaking. Various adjustments have been made in the review approach in light of the identified complexities, which were not initially understood. However, further improvements could be made in the oversight and planning of the review process. With regard to reviewing special exposure cohort petitions, the advisory board has asked for and received the contractor's assistance, expanded its charge, and acknowledged the need for the board to review the petitions in a timely manner. The board has reviewed eight petitions as of October 2005, and the contractor assisted with six of these by reviewing the site profiles associated with the facilities. The contractor will play an expanded role by reviewing some of the other submitted petitions and NIOSH's evaluation of those petitions and recommending to the advisory board whether the petitioning group should be added to the special exposure cohort. The contractor will also develop procedures for the advisory board to use when reviewing petitions. While NIOSH is generally required by law to complete its review of a petition within 180 days of determining that the petition has met certain initial qualification requirements, the advisory board has no specified deadline for its review of petitions. However, the board has discussed the fact that special exposure cohort petition reviews have required more time and effort than originally estimated and that the advisory board needs to manage its workload in order to reach timely decisions. |
gao_GAO-16-638 | gao_GAO-16-638_0 | Large and Medium Urban Transit Providers Are Sharing ITS Data
Transit providers are now making some of the data collected from their ITS technologies, such as GIS, computer-aided dispatch, automatic vehicle location, and automatic passenger counters, available to the public, a concept which is known as “open data.” A 2015 Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) study on open data found an increasing number of transit providers have begun making their schedule and real-time operational data available to the public since 2010. In addition to sharing data with the public, the large and medium urban transit providers in our review reported that they share data with regional transportation stakeholders to support multimodal planning and management. Large and Medium Urban Transit Providers Reported Using Advanced Technologies
As we have described above, the large and medium urban transit providers are deploying the majority of the core transit ITS technologies in our review; however, some of the transit providers described using more innovative types or features of these technologies. Most Small Urban and Rural Transit Providers Are Not Using Other ITS Technologies, Primarily because of Technology Costs or Perceived Lack of Need
Although about half of small urban and rural transit providers reported using the three aforementioned technologies, based on our survey results, we estimate that most small urban and rural transit providers are not using each of five other technologies in our review: maintenance management systems, traveler information systems, automatic passenger counters, electronic fare payment, and transit signal priority. Such combinations of technologies can lead to precise information on ridership behavior that can contribute to benefits such as more efficient routing and scheduling. Officials from 11 of the large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us that it can be difficult to quantify the benefits of using ITS technologies for a number of reasons, such as that it may be difficult to identify a unit of measurement for enhanced safety or greater staff efficiency, for example. Complex systems such as electronic fare payment and transit signal priority may involve multiple entities, including neighboring transit providers and cities, among others. DOT Supports ITS Deployment Through a Variety of Training and Technical Assistance Resources, but Providers’ Use of These Resources Is Limited
DOT Offers a Number of Resources to Promote and Support ITS Technologies
The JPO and FTA provide a variety of information resources related to transit ITS deployment. To help inform them of the transit community’s resource needs, JPO officials told us that they coordinate with officials from FTA and transit industry groups, such as APTA and CTAA, and consider other information, such as relevant research and ITS deployment information from DOT’s ITS deployment survey of state and local transportation agencies. Including the deployment of ITS by small urban and rural transit providers in its ITS monitoring efforts may provide the JPO with information to customize ITS resources to address the challenges faced by this transit community. DOT could improve the awareness and applicability of these resources through greater use of leading practices for successfully encouraging the adoption of new technologies. Without greater efforts from DOT to make the transit community more aware of federal ITS resources and tailor these resources to the needs of smaller providers, transit providers may be missing information that could help them make the most informed ITS deployment decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve access to and awareness and applicability of ITS resources for ITS deployment, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the ITS JPO, in coordination with FTA, to take the following two actions: develop a strategy to raise awareness of JPO’s training, technical assistance, and knowledge resources for transit ITS deployment in the transit community, and include ITS adoption by small urban and rural transit providers in ITS monitoring efforts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses: (1) the extent to which selected transit providers in large urban areas use Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS); (2) the extent to which transit providers in small urban and rural areas use ITS; (3) the benefits and challenges transit providers experience in deploying ITS; and (4) the extent to which transit providers have utilized the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) resources to promote and support ITS. Administration of Survey and Quality Assurance
We developed a questionnaire to obtain information about transit providers’ use of ITS technologies. To identify the benefits and challenges that transit providers in large urban, small urban, and rural areas are experiencing from deploying ITS, we interviewed JPO and FTA officials, industry associations, officials from public transit stakeholders in our site visits, and 31 transit providers in large urban areas, surveyed transit providers in small urban and rural areas, and reviewed published research on ITS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Public transit providers are adopting electronics and information-processing applications called ITS to help improve operations and service. ITS technologies can play an important role in facilitating multimodal choices in a rapidly changing transportation environment. This report describes: (1) the extent to which selected transit providers in large urbanized areas are using ITS, (2) the extent to which transit providers in small urban and rural areas are using ITS, (3) the benefits and challenges these transit providers experience in deploying ITS, and (4) the extent to which transit providers have utilized DOT resources to promote and support ITS.
GAO reviewed DOT's ITS deployment data and ITS studies; interviewed DOT officials and public transit stakeholders; conducted three site visits, selected based on geographic dispersion and DOT recommendations; interviewed 31 transit providers serving large urbanized areas selected for geographic dispersion and use of multiple transit modes; and conducted a national survey of small urban and rural transit providers to obtain information on ITS technologies used.
What GAO Found
Selected large and medium urban transit providers have deployed most Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) technologies, such as automatic vehicle location (AVL) and electronic fare payment. Most of these providers reported sharing data collected from ITS with the public or regional transportation providers to enable technology innovations and improve regional planning. Large and medium urban transit providers have also deployed advanced types of ITS technologies, such as smart phone applications to provide passengers with travel information and mobile ticketing. GAO estimates that small urban and rural transit providers are using security systems, computer-aided dispatch, AVL, and geographic information systems to, among other things, monitor safety and security and improve record-keeping and billing capabilities. However, most small urban and rural transit providers are not using other ITS technologies—such as automatic passenger counters or electronic fare payment—due to the cost of the technologies or because there is no perceived need.
Transit providers GAO surveyed and interviewed reported various benefits from ITS including improved scheduling and routing, on-time performance and schedule adherence, and customer satisfaction. In addition, many large and medium urban transit providers reported that using combinations of technologies can increase benefits. By using technologies such as AVL and electronic fare payment together, for example, transit providers can obtain more precise ridership information, which can further improve their planning. However, transit providers GAO interviewed and surveyed noted that it can be difficult to quantify the benefits of using ITS technologies because, as reported by large and medium urban providers, it may be difficult to identify a unit of measurement, such as for greater staff efficiency, or attribute benefits to either ITS deployment or a specific technology. Transit providers also face an assortment of deployment challenges, including competing for funding internally with state-of-good-repair needs, reluctance from the transit workforce and leadership to embrace ITS technologies, coordinating deployment across regional agencies, and integrating technologies purchased from different vendors.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) offers a variety of information resources to support ITS deployment, but few of the transit providers interviewed or surveyed reported using these resources. DOT officials, selected large and medium transit providers, and other public transit stakeholders told GAO that the transit community may not be using these resources because transit providers lack sufficient staff and the information provided may not reflect the transit community's needs. Additionally, DOT does not include small urban and rural transit providers in its ITS deployment survey, a tool officials said is used in designing information resources. DOT could improve the awareness and applicability of ITS resources by developing a strategy to raise awareness of DOT's resources available to the transit community and monitoring the adoption of ITS by transit providers in small urban and rural areas. Without greater efforts from DOT to make the transit community more aware of federal ITS resources and to tailor these resources to the needs of smaller providers, transit providers may be missing information that could help them make the most informed ITS deployment decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation develop a strategy to raise awareness of federal resources for ITS deployment in the transit community and include ITS adoption by small urban and rural transit providers in ITS-monitoring efforts. DOT agreed with the recommendations and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated. |
gao_GAO-10-643 | gao_GAO-10-643_0 | Restrictions on Issuance of U.S. Federal law permits the Secretary of State to deny or revoke the issuance of passports only in certain circumstances, including, but not limited to, when the individual is subject to a criminal court order, condition of probation, or condition of parole, any of which forbids departure from the United States and the violation of which could result in the issuance of a federal warrant of arrest, including a warrant issued under the Federal Fugitive Felon Act; is over $2,500 delinquent in child support; is delinquent in certain State debts; has an outstanding felony warrant; has an outstanding foreign felony warrant; is subject to an extradition request that has been presented to a foreign country; has been declared legally incompetent; used a passport or crossed an international border to commit an act based on which the individual was subsequently convicted of certain drug trafficking crimes, but only during the period the individual is imprisoned or on parole or supervised release; or used a passport or crossed an international border to commit an act based on which the individual was subsequently convicted under the federal “sex tourism” statute, but only during the period the individual is imprisoned or on parole or supervised release. The Department of State Issued Thousands of Passports to Registered Sex Offenders in Fiscal Year 2008
About 4,500 registered sex offenders were issued a passport in fiscal year 2008. The NSOR data also indicated that about 50 registered sex offenders who were issued passports either lived outside of the United States or their whereabouts were unknown. Further, at least 12 individuals were landlords in the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Section 8 housing program during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 while they were registered sex offenders. At the time of their criminal offenses, many of them held positions of public trust—for example, health care provider, school teacher, religious layman, law enforcement official, federal employee, and owner of HUD Section 8 houses. Other cases involve registered sex offenders who owe child support or are currently in prison or whose whereabouts are unknown according to the NSOR. Finally, another individual has illegally failed to register with the police department as a sex offender for several years. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and State for comment. DOJ stated that it did not have comments on the report. State’s assessment of the details of our case studies as “graphic” is the result of the nature of the criminal acts of the passport recipients; the offenses are directly relevant to our objective to develop case studies of passport recipients who are sex offenders. Appendix I: Additional Examples of Registered Sex Offenders Who Were Issued U.S. The offender stated that he used the passport to travel to Japan for business. In the bathroom, the offender engaged in inappropriate sexual contact. To be accurate and balanced, the title should read: “Existing U.S. Law Allows Passports to Be Issued to Registered Sex Offenders, Although GAO Found No Evidence That Sex Offenders Used Their Passports to Travel Abroad to Commit Sex Offenses.”
The Secretary of State has responsibility for issuing passports to U.S. nationals and may only deny an application for a passport if there is a legal basis for denial. As noted above, we currently have limited authority to deny passports to certain sex offenders. | Why GAO Did This Study
A U.S. passport allows the owner to travel freely both in and out of the country. Although passport recipients typically travel internationally for business or leisure, some passport recipients are using their passports to commit nefarious illegal activities outside this country. Specifically, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has documented cases of U.S. passport holders engaging in sex acts with children in foreign countries. Federal statutes authorize the Secretary of State to deny issuance of a passport in certain circumstances, such as for a conviction for international drug trafficking or arrearages in child support. GAO was asked to (1) determine, to the extent possible, the number of passport recipients who are registered sex offenders and (2) develop case study examples of passport recipients who are registered sex offenders. To do so, GAO compared fiscal year 2008 passport data from the Department of State (State) to data in DOJ's National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR). GAO also interviewed State officials. GAO selected 30 sex offenders, primarily based on geography, and performed investigations. In response to a draft of this report, DOJ had no comments. State expressed concerns about the presentation of some findings. State's comments are addressed within the report.
What GAO Found
State issued U.S. passports to thousands of registered sex offenders during fiscal year 2008. Currently, State has no statutory authority to deny passports to registered sex offenders, except those convicted of sex tourism. GAO's analysis of data provided by State and DOJ indicates that of over 16 million U.S. passports issued in 2008, about 4,500 were issued to registered sex offenders. This estimate is likely to be understated because of data limitations in the passport and NSOR databases. From analysis of the NSOR, GAO also found that about 50 of these registered sex offenders either lived outside of the United States or the offender's whereabouts were not known. GAO also found that at least 30 of these registered sex offenders were federal employees during fiscal year 2008. GAO judgmentally selected 30 sex offenders for investigation. At the time of the criminal offense, many of these offenders held positions of public trust, such as health care provider, school teacher, religious layman, law enforcement official, National Aeronautics and Space Administration engineer, and owner of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Section 8 program single-family houses. GAO's investigation also found that State issued passports to individuals who were residing in prison or delinquent in child support or whose whereabouts were unknown according to the NSOR. Finally, GAO's investigation found that one individual has illegally failed to register with the police department as a sex offender for several years. |
gao_RCED-96-226 | gao_RCED-96-226_0 | As a four-state body, the Council is neither a federal nor a state agency, and it has some flexibility in developing its own operating policies and procedures. Council’s Program Activities Are Consistent With Congressional Direction, but New Conditions May Reshape Its Role
The Council’s energy planning, conservation, and fish and wildlife efforts have been consistent with the goals and direction laid out in the act and other congressional direction. Past Efforts Are Closely in Line With Act’s Requirements
The act directed the Council to prepare a regional conservation and electric power plan within 2 years of its establishment and at least every 5 years thereafter. The Council also produces and distributes various other publications that provide information on electricity, fish and wildlife, and related topics. New Forces May Affect Council’s Future Activities and Role
The Northwest region’s changing electricity market now makes it difficult to develop the long-term plans that have typified the Council’s efforts to date. In 1980, the power planning concerns facing the Northwest were potential electricity shortages, the rising cost of electricity, and competition for the low-cost electricity provided by BPA. Likewise, changing conditions are affecting the Council’s role in fish and wildlife planning. The Council has proposed steps to improve the evaluation of the program, including (1) requiring that all but proven mitigation measures have a monitoring and evaluation component, (2) making more frequent and formal reviews of the implementation of its plan, and (3) tying funding for program measures to participation in monitoring and evaluation efforts. Although the Council’s by-laws required major personnel actions and other policy changes to be approved by the Council or the Council chairman, the members had traditionally focused on power and fish and wildlife program issues and left the oversight of most central office business activities to the chairman. Greater public oversight of the Council’s business operations could help protect this credibility. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council's business practices, focusing on whether the: (1) Council's program activities are consistent with congressional direction; and (2) Council is exercising adequate oversight of its business operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Council's energy planning and wildlife efforts are consistent with the goals of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act; (2) the Council has prepared four long-range regional conservation and electric power plans to meet its conservation and electricity needs; (3) the Council has distributed various other publications on electricity, fish and wildlife, and related topics for public comment; (4) it is difficult to make long-range plans for the Northwest region's electricity market due to significantly lower electricity costs, and increasing deregulation and competition within the market; (5) the governors of four Northwest states have convened a comprehensive review of the Northwest energy system to determine how changing conditions within the electricity industry are affecting the Council's role in fish and wildlife conservation; (6) the Council has proposed improving the evaluation of its fish and wildlife mitigation efforts by requiring unproven mitigation measures to have a monitoring and evaluation component, making more frequent and formal reviews of its conservation and electric power plan, and tying funding for program measures to participation in monitoring and evaluation efforts; (7) oversight of the Council's business operations have shifted to the Council chairman and executive director and as a result Council members receive limited information concerning the Council's operating policies and procedures; and (8) the Council could improve its credibility by making its policies and decisions a matter of public record. |
gao_GAO-06-312 | gao_GAO-06-312_0 | The farm bill establishes three tiers or levels of participation. In part, this reflects CSP’s newness. Estimates of CSP Costs Generally Increased because of Better Information on Program Implementation and Changes to the Time Frames Covered by the Estimates
Various factors explain why CBO and OMB estimates of CSP costs generally have increased over time. Of most importance, CBO and OMB officials indicated that little information was available regarding how the program would be implemented at the time of its inception in May 2002. In addition, increases in estimated CSP costs also can be attributed to revising the time frames on which the estimates were based. In early May 2002, just before the farm bill’s enactment, CBO estimated CSP costs to be $2 billion for the same 10-year period. OMB’s estimate for these years was $4.049 billion. While USDA’s NRCS has established several cost control measures under this statutory authority, its efforts to restrict program spending could be improved by addressing (1) weaknesses in internal controls used to ensure the accuracy of program payments and (2) inconsistencies in the wildlife resource criteria used by NRCS state offices to determine producer eligibility for Tier III, the highest CSP payment level. The Farm Bill Provides USDA Authority to Control CSP Costs
The farm bill establishes some eligibility requirements for CSP but gives USDA the authority to establish additional requirements that would enable it to control CSP costs, even absent legislative caps on CSP funding. For example, NRCS restricts CSP participation by limiting program enrollment each year to producers in specified, priority watersheds. For example, as authorized in the statute, CSP can reward producers for conservation actions that they have already taken, whereas other programs generally provide assistance to producers to encourage them to take new actions intended to address conservation problems on working lands or to idle or retire environmentally sensitive land from production. In addition, NRCS does not have a comprehensive process to preclude or identify such duplicate payments. In addition, other farm bill provisions reduce potential duplication by prohibiting certain payments from being made through CSP. CSP regulations and procedures also provide financial incentives for enhancements. As indicated in the table, the farm bill allows cost-share payments for the adoption of conservation practices that could be implemented through any of these programs, creating the possibility that a producer could receive duplicate payments for the same conservation practice under CSP and another program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve NRCS’s implementation of the Conservation Security Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of NRCS to take the following four actions: Review and field check each NRCS state office’s wildlife habitat assessment criteria to ensure that states use consistent criteria and achieve the habitat benefits intended by the national guidance; Include a reference to the national guidance for wildlife habitat assessment criteria in NRCS’s Conservation Programs Manual; Develop a comprehensive process, such as an automated system, to review CSP contract applications to ensure that CSP payments, if awarded, would not duplicate payments made by other USDA conservation programs; and Develop a process to efficiently review existing CSP contracts to identify cases where CSP payments duplicate payments made under other programs and take action to recover appropriate amounts and to ensure that these duplicate payments are not repeated in fiscal year 2006 and beyond. Specifically, we determined (1) why Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) cost estimates for CSP generally increased over time; (2) what authority USDA has to control CSP costs and what cost control measures are in place; and (3) what legislative and regulatory measures exist to prevent duplication between CSP and other USDA conservation programs, and what duplication, if any, has occurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Conservation Security Program (CSP)--called for in the 2002 farm bill and administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS)--provides financial assistance to producers to reward past conservation actions and to encourage further conservation stewardship. CSP payments may be made for structural or land management practices, such as strip cropping to reduce erosion. CSP has raised concerns among some stakeholders because CSP cost estimates generally have increased since the 2002 farm bill's enactment. For example, the Congressional Budget Office's estimate increased from $2 billion in 2002 to $8.9 billion in 2004. GAO determined (1) why CSP cost estimates generally increased; (2) what authority USDA has to control costs and what cost control measures exist; and (3) what measures exist to prevent duplication between CSP and other USDA conservation programs and what duplication, if any, has occurred.
What GAO Found
Various factors explain why estimates of CSP costs generally increased since the 2002 farm bill's enactment. Of most importance, little information was available regarding how this program would be implemented at the time of its inception in 2002. As more information became available, cost estimates rose. In addition, the time frames on which the estimates were based changed. While the initial estimates covered years in which the program was expected to be nonoperational or minimally operational, subsequent estimates did not include these years. The farm bill provides USDA general authority to control CSP costs, including authority to establish criteria that enable it to control program participation and payments and, therefore, CSP costs. For example, NRCS restricts participation by limiting program enrollment each year to producers in specified, priority watersheds. NRCS also has established certain CSP payment limits at levels below the maximum allowed by the statute. However, efforts to control CSP spending could be improved by addressing weaknesses in internal controls and inconsistencies in the wildlife habitat assessment criteria that NRCS state offices use, in part, to determine producer eligibility for the highest CSP payment level. Inconsistencies in these criteria also may reduce CSP's conservation benefits. The farm bill prohibits duplicate payments for the same practice on the same land made through CSP and another USDA conservation program. Various other farm bill provisions also reduce the potential for duplication. For example, as called for under the farm bill, CSP may reward producers for conservation actions they have already taken, whereas other programs generally provide assistance to encourage new actions or to idle or retire environmentally sensitive land from production. In addition, CSP regulations establish higher minimum eligibility requirements for CSP than for other programs. However, despite these legislative and regulatory provisions, the possibility that producers can receive duplicate payments remains because of similarities in the conservation actions financed through these programs. In addition, NRCS does not have a comprehensive process to preclude or identify such duplicate payments. In reviewing NRCS's payments data, GAO found a number of examples of duplicate payments. |
gao_GAO-07-225T | gao_GAO-07-225T_0 | DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but Additional Work Is Needed to Guide Security Investments
DHS component agencies have taken a variety of steps to assess the risk posed by terrorism to U.S. passenger rail systems. TSA has also begun to assess risks to the passenger rail system. Until all three assessments of passenger rail systems—threat, criticality, and vulnerability—have been completed, and until TSA determines how to use the results of these assessments to analyze and characterize the level of risk (high, medium, or low), it will be difficult to prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment decisions about protecting them. As of January 2007, TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of the passenger rail system. This framework is intended to help the private sector and state and local governments develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk and vulnerability across infrastructure types and across entire economic sectors, develop consistent terminology, and foster consistent results. Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail Security
In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security conducted by the FTA and FRA before and after September 11, 2001, TSA issued security directives to passenger rail operators after the March 2004 terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent that these directives were based on industry best practices and expressed confusion about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. For example, TSA has tested rail security technologies, developed training tools for rail workers, and issued a proposed rule in December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. The memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOT had been recently updated to include specific agreements between TSA and FTA and FRA to delineate security-related roles and responsibilities, among other things, for passenger rail and mass transit. FRA has also taken a number of actions to enhance passenger rail security since September 11, 2001. TSA Has Taken Other Actions to Strengthen the Security of the Passenger Rail System and Coordinate Its Efforts with Other Federal Agencies
In January 2007, TSA provide us an update on additional actions they had taken to strengthen passenger rail security. In response to a previous recommendation we made, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop procedures by which the two departments could improve their cooperation and coordination for promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods throughout the transportation system. Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used in the United States
While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail systems are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are implementing, we identified three foreign practices that were not currently in use among the U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted as of September 2005, nor were they performed by the U.S. government. No U.S. federal agency has compiled or disseminated information on research and development and other best practices for U.S. rail operators. Implementing covert testing, random screening, or a government- sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best practices in the U.S. could pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges because of the differences between the U.S. and these foreign nations. TSA has not yet completed its methodology for determining how the results of threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments will be used to identify and prioritize risks to passenger rail and other transportation sectors. GAO-05-851. | Why GAO Did This Study
The July 2005 London subway bombings and July 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai, India dramatically revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems worldwide to terrorist attack and demonstrated the need for increased focus on the security of these systems. This testimony, which is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 report on passenger rail security (GAO-05-851) and selected program updates obtained in January 2007 provides information on (1) how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system; (2) actions TSA and other federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of U.S. rail systems; and (3) rail security practices implemented by domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators.
What GAO Found
The DHS Office of Grants and Training has conducted risk assessments of passenger rail systems to identify and protect rail assets that are vulnerable to attack, such as stations and bridges. TSA has also begun to conduct risk assessments of passenger rail assets. While TSA has begun to establish a methodology for analyzing and characterizing risks, as of January 2007, the agency has not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of the U.S. passenger rail system. Until TSA does so, the agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investments. DHS has also begun developing a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across different transportation sectors. However, until this framework is finalized, it may not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly. After September 11, 2001, the Department of Transportation initiated a number of efforts to improve passenger rail security. After its creation, TSA also took a number of actions, including issuing rail security directives, testing rail security technologies, developing training tools for rail workers, and issuing a proposed rule in December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's directives were based on industry best practices and expressed confusion about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. DHS and DOT also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that delineated the two departments' respective roles and responsibilities for promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods throughout the transportation system. TSA has recently completed specific agreements with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to further delineate security-related roles and responsibilities for passenger rail. U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators GAO visited have also taken actions to secure their rail systems. Most had implemented customer security awareness programs, increased security personnel, increased the use of canines to detect explosives, and enhanced employee training programs. GAO also observed security practices among foreign passenger rail systems that are not currently used by U.S. rail operators or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats. While introducing these security practices in the U.S may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they warrant further examination. TSA has reported taking steps to identify foreign best practices for rail security. |
gao_GAO-15-618 | gao_GAO-15-618_0 | EPA Met Few Performance Goals in Its 2009–2013 Grants Management Plan for Various Reasons
Of the 17 performance goals in its 2009–2013 grants management plan, EPA fully met 2, partially met 6, and did not meet 1, according to our review of EPA grants management performance data. For the remaining 8 performance goals, which span all five strategic goals, EPA did not measure its performance. According to OGD responses to our standard set of questions, of the 8 performance goals not measured, EPA did not measure 5 because it redirected some of its grants management resources to managing American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) funds. Under ARRA, EPA more than doubled its grants awards from $3.7 billion in fiscal year 2008 to $9.8 billion in 2009. For five performance goals, EPA and OGD reported that not meeting or not measuring the goals did not affect EPA’s grants management activities because the agency either mitigated the potential negative effect of missing the performance goal, or the negative effect was minimal, according to our analysis of OGD responses and supporting documents (see app. For three performance goals, not measuring them led to the absence of agencywide data on compliance with directives intended to ensure that grant funds achieve the desired results of protecting human health and the environment, according to OGD responses to our standard set of questions and supporting documents. Inefficient processes. Delayed process for awarding grants. Delayed training and policy implementation. EPA’s 2016–2020 Draft Grants Management Plan Partially Follows Selected Leading Practices for Federal Strategic Planning but Omits Key Information
As of May 2015, EPA’s November 2014 version of its draft 2016–2020 grants management plan partially follows four selected leading practices for federal strategic planning that we identified from prior GAO work and OMB guidance (see table 4). However, as of May 2015, the agency does not yet link these goals to an overarching mission statement. Ensure leadership accountability. Develop and use performance measures. We have previously found that a primary purpose of federal strategic planning is to improve federal agency management.practices for federal strategic planning, EPA could have better assurance that it has established a framework to effectively manage and assess efforts to accomplish its grants management strategic and performance goals, without reducing the plan’s flexibility, and that may help the agency address its long-standing grants management weaknesses. However, two key challenges hamper EPA’s efforts to monitor directives agencywide: (1) most of its regional offices rely on paper files and (2) its IT systems have limited reporting and analytical capabilities. First, 8 of its 10 regional offices document their compliance with grants management directives in paper files, according to EPA officials. with grants management directives generally requires paper file reviews, which agency officials described as resource-intensive. In 2009 and 2011, EPA deployed two web-based reporting systems to pull certain information from its databases for analysis; however, as of June 2015, EPA used these tools to monitor 8 percent (17 of 212) of its requirements. EPA incorporated these strategies into its 2009–2013 plan and made some progress toward achieving its strategic goals. To build on its progress, EPA has developed a draft 2016–2020 grants management plan which, as of May 2015, partially follows several leading strategic planning practices but has not yet included certain key elements, such as defining strategies that address management challenges that may threaten EPA’s ability to meet long-term goals and identifying the resources, actions, and time frames needed to meet these goals. EPA also currently plans to adopt an updated grants management system by 2017, and it has incorporated addressing potential IT improvements as part of its draft 2016–2020 plan. However, EPA has had similar plans to improve its IT system since 2009 but has not done so because the systems the agency initially identified either did not meet its needs or were too expensive, resulting in a need to identify and analyze alternative systems. By using existing web-based tools more effectively until it implements its new IT system, EPA can better monitor agencywide compliance with grants management directives. Until the new IT system is implemented, develop ways to more effectively use existing web-based tools to better monitor agencywide compliance with grants management directives. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the extent to which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) met the performance goals in its 2009–2013 grants management plan; (2) the extent to which EPA’s 2016–2020 draft grants management plan follows selected leading practices for federal strategic planning; and (3) the progress, if any, EPA has in made in monitoring compliance with grants management directives agencywide. We then compared the 212 requirements to the requirements tracked in EPA’s agencywide grants management systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2014, EPA disbursed about $4.6 billion in grants through its headquarters and 10 regional offices to states and others, in part to implement laws. In 2006, GAO identified weaknesses in EPA's grants management program, including the absence of goals, and made recommendations to address them. As part of its response to GAO's 2006 recommendations, EPA issued a 2009-2013 grants management plan.
GAO was asked to follow up on its 2006 review. This report examines (1) the extent to which EPA met the goals in its 2009–2013 plan, (2) the extent to which its draft 2016–2020 plan follows relevant leading practices for strategic grants management planning, and (3) the progress EPA has made since 2006 in monitoring agencywide compliance with grants directives.
GAO analyzed EPA's 2009–2013 plan and obtained EPA officials' responses to a standard set of questions regarding progress in achieving the goals; compared the draft 2016–2020 plan to four leading strategic planning practices relevant to grants management; compared 212 requirements from relevant grants directives to requirements tracked in EPA's grants management systems; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Of the 17 performance goals in its 2009–2013 grants management plan, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fully met 2, partially met 6, and did not meet 1. EPA did not measure its progress for the other 8 goals. EPA officials provided several reasons for meeting relatively few of the performance goals and not measuring the others. For example, according to officials, EPA did not measure progress for some goals because it redirected resources from achieving grants management goals to managing American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 grants, under which EPA more than doubled its grants in 2009. For 5 goals where EPA either did not meet the goal or did not measure performance, officials reported that there was no impact on the grants management program because EPA took mitigating actions or the negative effect of missing the goal was minimal. However, for 10 goals, GAO found a negative effect of EPA not measuring or partially meeting the goals, including an absence of data on compliance with policies, inefficient processes that increased workload, delayed processes for awarding grants, and delayed training and policy implementation.
As of May 2015, EPA's draft 2016–2020 grants management plan partially follows four relevant leading practices for federal strategic planning that GAO identified from prior work and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. Specifically, the draft plan
sets 5 strategic goals but has yet to link them to an overarching mission statement,
includes strategic objectives but has yet to define strategies to address management challenges or identify resources needed to achieve the goals,
ensures leadership accountability for just 1 of the 5 strategic goals, and
includes 11 performance measures but has so far only one measurable target.
By fully incorporating these leading practices, EPA could have better assurance that it has established an effective framework to guide and assess its efforts to meet its grants management goals and help address long-standing grants management weaknesses.
EPA has made progress monitoring grants management directives agencywide since GAO's 2006 report. For instance, EPA electronically tracks unspent grant funds and the timely submission of grantee reports. However, two key challenges hamper EPA's efforts to monitor such directives. First, 8 out of 10 regional offices use paper files to document compliance with grants management directives, so monitoring these offices' compliance requires resource-intensive manual file reviews. Second, the limited reporting and analysis capabilities of its IT systems leave EPA without agencywide information for most of the 212 directive requirements GAO reviewed. Although EPA deployed two web-based reporting tools to pull data from its IT system, it uses them to track 8 percent, or 17, of the 212 grants directive requirements GAO reviewed, making it difficult for managers to compare actual performance to expected results agencywide. EPA plans to fully implement an updated IT system by 2017, but it has had similar plans since 2009 and has not yet done so. By developing ways to more effectively use existing web-based tools until it implements its new IT system, EPA could better monitor compliance with grants management directives agencywide.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that EPA fully follow leading strategic planning practices in its draft 2016–2020 plan and develop ways to more effectively use its web-based tools for monitoring compliance with directives. EPA generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-882T | gao_GAO-16-882T_0 | Marketplaces are required by PPACA to verify application information to determine eligibility for enrollment and, if applicable, determine eligibility for the income-based subsidies or Medicaid. If there is an application inconsistency, the marketplace is to determine eligibility using the applicant’s attestations and ensure that subsidies are provided on behalf of the applicant, if qualified to receive them, while the inconsistency is being resolved. In terms of concentration in the private health-insurance market, in December 2014 we reported that, from 2010 through 2013, enrollment in most states was concentrated among the largest issuers in each of the three types of health-insurance markets: the large-group market (under which individuals obtain coverage through a group plan maintained by large employers), the small-group market (under which individuals obtain coverage through a group plan maintained by small employers), and the individual market (coverage sold directly to individual consumers other than in connection with a group health-plan). The Marketplaces Approved Subsidized Coverage for the 2015 Coverage Year for 17 of 18 of our Fictitious Applicants
Our undercover testing for the 2015 coverage year found that the health- care marketplace eligibility determination and enrollment process for qualified health-plans—that is, coverage obtained from private insurers— was vulnerable to fraud. The federal Marketplace or selected state-based marketplaces approved each of 10 fictitious applications we made for subsidized health-plans. Although 8 of these 10 fictitious applications failed the initial online identity-checking process, all 10 were subsequently approved. Four applications used Social Security numbers that, according to the Social Security Administration, have never been issued, such as numbers starting with “000.” Other applicants obtained duplicate enrollment or obtained coverage by claiming that their employer did not provide insurance that met minimum essential coverage. For eight additional fictitious applications, initially made for Medicaid coverage, we were approved for subsidized health-care coverage in seven of the eight cases, through the federal Marketplace and the two selected state-based marketplaces. The Marketplaces Approved Subsidized Coverage for the 2016 Coverage Year for all 15 of Our Fictitious Applicants, Even Those Who Had Not Filed Required Tax Returns
Our undercover testing for the 2016 coverage year found that the health- care marketplaces’ eligibility determination and enrollment processes continued to be vulnerable to fraud. The marketplaces initially approved coverage and subsidies for our 15 fictitious applications, including 1 application for Medicaid, made through the federal Marketplace in Virginia and West Virginia and through the state marketplace in California. However, three applicants were unable to put their policies in force because their initial payments were not successfully processed. For four applications, to obtain 2016 subsidized coverage, we used identities from our 2014 testing that had previously obtained subsidized coverage. The 2016 coverage year was the first year in which verification was required to ensure that applicants who previously received a specific type of federal subsidy under the act had filed a federal tax return. This was a condition for these applicants to retain this benefit in 2016. None of the four fictitious applicants had filed a 2014 tax return but all were approved for the 2016 subsidies. Marketplace officials told us that they allowed applicants to attest to filing taxes if information from the IRS indicated that the applicant did not file tax returns. Marketplace officials said one reason they allow attestations is the time lag between when tax returns are filed and when they are reflected in IRS’s systems. CMS officials said they are rechecking the 2014 tax-filing status and will remove subsidies for applicants that have not filed a 2014 tax return. In response to our findings, the Department of Health and Human Services stated that it continues to strengthen marketplace controls. Health-Insurance Markets Remained Concentrated in Most States in 2014, While Issuer Participation Generally Decreased
We found that enrollment in private health-insurance plans remained concentrated among a small number of issuers in most states in 2014, including in the newly established exchanges. On average, in each state, 11 or more issuers participated in each of three types of markets— individual, small-group, and large-group—from 2011 through 2014. However, in most states, the 3 largest issuers in each market had at least an 80 percent share of the market during the period. Enrollment through these exchanges was generally more concentrated among a few issuers than was true for the overall markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA provides for the establishment of health-insurance marketplaces through which private issuers can sell qualifying health-care coverage, and makes subsidies available to enrollees who meet certain income and other requirements. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the estimated cost of subsidies and related spending under the act is $56 billion for fiscal year 2017, and totaling $866 billion for fiscal years 2017–2026.
GAO issued three reports in September 2016 that examined (1) enrollment controls for health-care coverage obtained through the health-insurance marketplaces, and (2) private health-insurance market concentration. This testimony summarizes those reports' findings .
For its undercover testing of the 2015 coverage year, GAO submitted fictitious applications for subsidized coverage through the federal Marketplace in New Jersey and North Dakota, and through state-based marketplaces in Kentucky and California. For the 2016 coverage year, GAO submitted fictitious applications through the federal Marketplace in Virginia and West Virginia, and through the state-based marketplace in California. The results of these undercover tests, while illustrative, cannot be generalized to the full population of enrollees. To review market concentration, GAO examined data reported by issuers to CMS for fiscal years 2011 through 2014, the latest data available.
In response to GAO's findings, the Department of Health and Human Services stated that it continues to strengthen marketplace controls.
What GAO Found
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) requires health-insurance marketplaces to verify application information, such as citizenship or immigration status and household income, to determine eligibility for enrollment and, if applicable, eligibility for income-based subsidies. While inconsistencies between the information provided by the applicant and by government sources are being resolved, marketplaces must determine eligibility using an applicant's attestations and ensure subsidies are provided, if the applicant is qualified to receive them. GAO's undercover testing for the 2015 and 2016 coverage years found that the federal and selected state health-care marketplace's eligibility determination and enrollment process were vulnerable to fraud.
For the 2015 coverage year, for example, the federal and selected state marketplaces approved each of 10 fictitious applications GAO made for subsidized health-plans. Although 8 of these 10 fictitious applications failed the initial online identity-checking process, all 10 were subsequently approved. Four applications used Social Security numbers that, according to the Social Security Administration, have never been issued. Other applicants obtained duplicate enrollment or obtained coverage by claiming that their employer did not provide insurance that met minimum essential coverage.
For the 2016 coverage year, the federal and selected state marketplaces initially approved subsidies for 15 fictitious applications. However, three fictitious applicants were unable to put their policies in force because their initial payments were not successfully processed. GAO focused its testing on the remaining 12 applications. For 4 of the 12 applications, GAO used identities from its 2014 testing that had previously obtained subsidized coverage. The 2016 coverage year was the first year in which verification was required to ensure that applicants who previously received a specific type of federal subsidy under the act had filed a federal tax return. This was a condition for these applicants to retain this benefit in 2016. None of the four fictitious applicants had filed a 2014 tax return, but all for were approved for the 2016 subsidies. Marketplace officials told GAO that they allowed applicants to attest to filing taxes if information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicated that the applicant did not file tax returns. Marketplace officials said one reason they allow attestations is the time lag between when tax returns are filed and when they are reflected in IRS's systems. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) officials said they are rechecking 2014 tax-filing status and will remove subsidies for applicants that have not filed a 2014 tax return.
GAO's review of concentration in the private health-insurance market found that enrollment was concentrated among a small number of health insurance companies (issuers) in most states in 2014, including in the newly established exchanges. On average, in each state and the District of Columbia, 11 or more issuers participated in each of three types of markets—individual, small-group, and large-group—from 2011 through 2014. However, in most states, the 3 largest issuers in each market had at least an 80 percent share of the market during the period. Enrollment through the exchanges was generally more concentrated among a few issuers than was true for the overall markets. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-205 | gao_T-AIMD-98-205_0 | Progress in Addressing Year 2000 Continues at Slow Pace
As our chart illustrates, since May 1997 OMB and the government’s 24 largest departments and agencies have reported slow progress in achieving Year 2000 compliance of their mission-critical information systems. In May 1997, OMB reported that about 21 percent of the government’s mission-critical systems (1,598 of 7,649) were Year 2000 compliant. A year later—as of last month—these departments and agencies reported a total of 2,914 systems as compliant—about 40 percent of the 7,336 mission-critical systems in their current inventories. Also of concern is that OMB, the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion, and the Congress lack sufficient information with which to judge the progress of systems to be replaced. Agencies will also need a significant amount of time for essential end-to-end testing of multiple systems that have individually been deemed Year 2000 compliant. In response to our recommendation, the Chair stated that agencies are currently developing such plans and obtaining independent verification and validation for their systems. For example, the report submitted by the U.S. Accordingly, we recommended that the Chair require agencies to develop contingency plans for all critical core business processes. On April 30 he stated that the Council would be working with several agencies, including the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), to examine options for ensuring an adequate number of qualified people to perform Year 2000 work. In summary, as the amount of time to the turn of the century shortens, the magnitude of what must be accomplished becomes more daunting. Greater leadership and coordination of disparate efforts is essential if government programs are to meet the needs of the public 19 months from now. The Conversion Council must play a central role in ensuring that agency action not only stays on track, but accelerates significantly. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the results of the most recent reports submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the slow progress made by the federal government in achieving year 2000 compliance; and (2) what needs to be done now to minimize disruptions to critical services.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in May 1997, OMB reported that about 21 percent of the government's mission-critical systems were year 2000 compliant; (2) a year later, these departments and agencies reported a total of 2,914 systems as compliant--about 40 percent of the 7,336 mission-critical systems in their current inventories; (3) OMB, the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion, and Congress lack sufficient information with which to judge the progress of systems to be replaced; (4) agencies will also need a significant amount of time for essential end-to-end testing of multiple systems that have individually been deemed year 2000 compliant; (5) the Council implemented a number of GAO's recommendations for minimizing year 2000 risks, including: (a) requiring federal agencies to establish priorities for their mission-critical business process; (b) requiring agencies to develop plans for the testing and independent verification and validation of their systems; (c) requiring agencies to provide information on their year 2000 progress; (d) issuing OMB guidance on the development of business continuity and contingency plans; and (e) examining various options for ensuring that an adequate number of qualified people are hired to perform year 2000 work; (6) as the amount of time to the turn of the century shortens, the magnitude of what must be accomplished becomes more daunting; (7) greater leadership and coordination of disparate efforts is essential if government programs are to meet the needs of the public 19 months from now; and (8) the Conversion Council must play a central role in ensuring that agency action not only stays on track, but accelerates significantly. |
gao_GAO-04-807 | gao_GAO-04-807_0 | 1). 2). Many Domestic and Foreign Research Reactors Are Still Using Weapons-Usable Uranium Even Though They Could Operate on Low Enriched Uranium
According to Argonne’s analysis, conversion to LEU fuel is technically feasible for 35 of the 66 research reactors worldwide that still use HEU fuel. Eight U.S. research reactors, including 6 university reactors, could convert to LEU fuel, but according to DOE officials, DOE has not provided the funding to convert them. According to Argonne officials, of the 20 foreign research reactors that currently use U.S.-origin HEU fuel, 14 do not have plans to convert to LEU because they generally have a sufficient supply of HEU and either do not want to incur the additional cost of conversion or do not have the necessary funding. According to Argonne officials, only 1 of 7 Russian-supplied research reactors that could use LEU fuel is scheduled to convert. Technical Setbacks in Developing New Fuels Limit Progress in Converting the Largest Remaining Research Reactors
Technical setbacks in developing new LEU fuels have postponed the conversion of 31 research reactors worldwide that cannot use currently available LEU fuels until 2010 at the earliest. As a result, Argonne has delayed completion of dispersion fuel until 2010 and may recommend that DOE cancel further development altogether if solutions cannot be found. Additional testing could reveal problems that have not yet surfaced. Using Low Enriched Uranium for Medical Isotope Production Is Feasible, but Concerns over Cost Could Limit Its Use
The reactor conversion program has demonstrated the potential for using LEU to produce medical isotopes on a small scale, but large-scale producers are concerned that the cost of conversion could be prohibitive. With assistance from the reactor conversion program, one reactor in Argentina used for the production of medical isotopes converted from HEU to LEU in 2003. DOE and NRC Are Addressing Security at Foreign and Domestic Research Reactors
Research reactor operators at most reactors we visited said that security had been improved because of DOE or NRC efforts. However, DOE and NRC have recognized the need to further improve security at research reactors throughout the world, including in the United States, and are engaged in separate efforts to assess research reactor security and its effectiveness. We also observed areas where further improvement could be made. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to further reduce the use of HEU in research reactors in the United States and abroad, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the following three actions: consider placing a higher priority on converting the six remaining university research reactors in the United States that can use currently available LEU fuel; once a reactor has been converted, place a high priority on removing the HEU fuel and transporting it to the appropriate DOE facility; and evaluate the costs and benefits of providing additional incentives to foreign research reactors that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel to convert to LEU, particularly to reactor operators that are willing to convert but do not have sufficient funding to do so. In its comments, State questioned DOE’s cost estimate for converting U.S. research reactors where conversion to LEU fuel is currently feasible. However, we did not evaluate the effectiveness of the security at research reactors or DOE and NRC efforts to improve security. 3.) This category does not include the cost of purchasing LEU fuel for research reactors. Development of LEU for medical isotope production includes activities associated with testing and analyzing LEU materials to replace HEU in the production of medical isotopes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nuclear research reactors worldwide use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel and for the production of medical isotopes. Because HEU can also be used in nuclear weapons, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program is developing low enriched uranium (LEU), which would be very difficult to use in weapons, to replace HEU. To date, 39 of the 105 research reactors in the United States and abroad targeted by DOE have converted to LEU fuel. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of the remaining research reactors in converting to LEU fuel, (2) DOE's progress in developing new LEU fuels for reactors where conversion is not yet technically feasible, (3) DOE's progress in developing LEU for the production of medical isotopes, and (4) the status of DOE and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to improve security at research reactors.
What GAO Found
Currently, conversion to LEU fuel is technically feasible for 35 of the 66 research reactors in DOE's program that still use HEU fuel, but most do not have plans to convert. In the United States, 8 research reactors, including 6 university research reactors, have not converted because DOE has not provided the necessary funding. Of the 20 foreign research reactors that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel, 14 do not have plans to convert because they have a sufficient supply of HEU fuel and either do not want to incur the additional cost of conversion or do not have the necessary funding. Finally, only 1 of 7 Russian-supplied research reactors that could use LEU fuel is scheduled to convert. Conversion to LEU fuel is not technically feasible for 31 research reactors worldwide that still use HEU fuel. DOE has experienced technical setbacks in fuel development that have postponed the conversion of the 31 reactors until 2010 at the earliest. One fuel failed unexpectedly in testing, and DOE may cancel further development, depending on the results of additional tests. Initial testing of another LEU fuel produced positive results, but additional testing is required and the fuel will not be developed until 2010 at the earliest. Separately from the development of LEU fuel, DOE is developing LEU to replace HEU in the production of medical isotopes. DOE has not yet completed the work that would enable conversion of large-scale medical isotope production to LEU. One reactor has converted to LEU for smallscale production. However, large-scale producers are concerned that the cost of converting to LEU could be prohibitive. DOE and NRC have taken steps to improve security at foreign and U.S. research reactors. While operators at most research reactors we visited said that security had been upgraded through DOE or NRC efforts, we observed areas where further improvements could be made. Recognizing the possible need for further improvements, DOE and NRC are engaged in separate efforts to assess and improve security. |
gao_RCED-97-98 | gao_RCED-97-98_0 | 1.) DOE Has a Technical Basis for Most but Not All of Its National Security Plutonium
The nation’s 99.5-metric-ton inventory of plutonium is divided into two categories—that which is allocated for national security (46.8 metric tons) and that which is designated as excess (52.7 metric tons). The national security plutonium is further allocated among several subcategories. According to DOE officials, DOE reviewed its existing plutonium inventory records to determine how much of its weapons-grade plutonium was needed for national security. All weapons-grade plutonium that was in the custody of DOD in the active and inactive stockpile and some of the weapons-grade plutonium assigned to and managed by DOE’s Defense Programs organization was categorized as needed for national security. The remainder of the national security plutonium, managed by DOE, is allocated to the strategic reserve and to mutual defense and research and development programs. DOD determines the types and numbers of weapons it wants to support national security needs, and DOE determines how much plutonium is needed for the required warheads and for their support. Unstable Excess Plutonium Is Costly to Manage
From fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2002, DOE expects to spend about $18.8 billion on plutonium management and related activities at the eight sites responsible for managing most of its plutonium. These costs include about $10.5 billion for plutonium inventory management and about $8.3 billion for plutonium-related waste management and site cleanup. The inventory management costs include about $8.7 billion for excess plutonium and about $1.8 billion for national security plutonium. In contrast, the costs of managing national security plutonium will continue as long as the United States requires plutonium for its nuclear weapons. DOE’s Storage and Conversion Plan Faces Long-Term Costs and Uncertainties
In addition to the current and near-term costs of managing plutonium from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2002, DOE expects to incur long-term costs, through about 2023, for storing and converting excess plutonium to safer forms that will ultimately be disposed of in a permanent underground repository. This estimate is based on DOE’s January 1997 record of decision, which details the Department’s plan for storing and converting excess plutonium to forms that are difficult to reuse in nuclear weapons and are suitable for permanent disposal. Facility Uncertainties
Questions about facilities also pose uncertainties, most of which stem from the immaturity of the conversion technologies. The plutonium that the Department of Energy (DOE) produced is held in several physical forms, including metals, oxides, solutions, residues, and scraps. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this assignment were to (1) review how much plutonium the United States allocated for national security, how much was designated as excess, and how DOE determined these amounts; (2) review DOE’s estimates of the current and near-term costs for managing plutonium; and (3) review DOE’s estimates of the long-term costs for managing plutonium. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) management of its plutonium inventory, focusing on: (1) how much plutonium the United States allocated for national security needs, how much it designated as excess, and how DOE determined these amounts; (2) DOE's estimates of the current and near-term costs for managing plutonium; and (3) DOE's estimates of the long-term costs for managing plutonium.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the United States allocated 46.8 metric tons of its 99.5 metric-ton plutonium inventory for national security purposes and designated the remaining 52.7 metric tons as excess; (2) to determine how much plutonium was needed for national security, DOE reviewed its plutonium inventory database; (3) in general, the plutonium in the custody of the Department of Defense and some of the plutonium managed by DOE's Defense Programs (the organization responsible for supporting the nation's nuclear weapons) was categorized as needed for national security purposes; (4) the remaining plutonium managed by Defense Programs and other DOE organizations was categorized as excess to national security needs and will ultimately be disposed of; (5) the national security plutonium is further divided into several subcategories; (6) DOE has a technical basis to support the need for the amounts of plutonium it holds in most of its national security needs, but not for the plutonium it holds for reliability replacement warheads and strategic reserves; (7) from fiscal year (FY) 1995 through FY 2002, DOE expects to spend about $18.8 billion on plutonium management and related activities; (8) these costs consist of about $10.5 billion for plutonium inventory management activities, including approximately $1.8 billion for national security plutonium and $8.7 billion for excess plutonium; (9) DOE expects to spend another $8.3 billion for plutonium-related waste management and site cleanup activities; (10) the costs of managing excess plutonium are about four times greater than the costs of managing national security plutonium because much of the excess plutonium is held in unstable forms and requires special management activities, such as handling, processing, and packaging; (11) national security plutonium is generally contained in more stable forms, such as metals and weapons components, and therefore requires less management; (12) DOE also expects to spend over $3 billion for longer-term plutonium storage and conversion activities through about 2023; (13) this estimate is based on DOE's plans for storing the excess plutonium and converting it to forms that will make it more difficult to reuse in nuclear weapons; and (14) however, DOE's cost and schedule estimates are subject to many uncertainties, a number of which stem from the relative immaturity of the planned conversion technologies. |
gao_GAO-04-143 | gao_GAO-04-143_0 | In total, Medicaid cost almost $258 billion in fiscal year 2002, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that fiscal year 2003 spending will double by 2012. Medicaid supports the care of an even larger share of nursing home residents, paying at least in part for the services provided to approximately two in three residents nationwide. Nursing home providers filed a number of federal lawsuits contesting the adequacy of states’ payment rates. State Nursing Home Payment Methods Link Rates to Costs, Encourage Efficiency, and Typically Target Funds to Direct Resident Care
Recognizing the importance of spending Medicaid dollars effectively, the 19 states we reviewed have designed methods to develop nursing home payment rates that include incentives for homes to deliver care efficiently, operate economically, and concentrate resources on direct resident care. This add-on is based on CNA salaries and Medicaid nursing home utilization. States Update Payment Rates to Reflect Changing Costs
To reflect changes in nursing homes’ costs, 17 of the 19 states we reviewed regularly calculate new payment rates or adjust existing rates for inflation. State Fiscal Pressures Generally Have Not Affected Medicaid Payment Rates to Nursing Homes, but Future Changes Remain Uncertain
Recent state fiscal pressures have not resulted in widespread reductions in Medicaid payment rates to nursing homes in most states we reviewed, although all of these states modified how they pay nursing homes from fiscal years 1998 through 2004. Further, in nearly three-quarters of the states we reviewed, nursing home per diem rates grew, on average, by an amount that exceeded the SNF market basket index for state fiscal years 2001 through 2003, similar to the years immediately following the repeal of the Boren Amendment. To avoid making significant changes to nursing homes’ payment rates, many states reported that they relied on existing resources, such as budget stabilization funds and tax increases, to generate additional funding. Even with recent temporary federal fiscal relief, however, officials in some states suggest that nursing home payment reductions are possible in the future. However, the extent to which states changed specific features of their payment methods generally remained constant during this time, with varying effects on payment rates to individual homes within states. In addition, despite each of the 19 states experiencing recent fiscal pressure, only 4 states—Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Texas— explicitly cut the per diem rates paid to all nursing homes at some point during state fiscal years 1998 through 2004, and the rate reduction was for less than 1 year in 2 of these states. Sixteen of the 19 states we reviewed reported using alternative funding sources, such as tobacco settlement, budget stabilization, cigarette tax increases, and Medicaid trust funds to deal with their states’ budgetary pressures. As previously noted, at least six of these states reduced or froze their nursing home payment rates at some point during the past 2 fiscal years. All states generally agreed with our characterization of their respective nursing home payment methods and, when necessary, provided clarifying or technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In addition, we obtained oral comments on a draft of this report from representatives of two nursing home associations, the American Health Care Association (AHCA) and the American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging (AAHSA). We also interviewed national representatives of AHCA and AAHSA and consultants and experts in the field of Medicaid nursing home payment. To determine how state fiscal pressures have affected Medicaid programs with regard to nursing home payment rates and methods, we collected per diem rates from state fiscal years 1998 through 2003, fiscal year 2003 being the most current year for which per diem rates were available, and information about changes made to nursing home payment methods from state fiscal years 1998 through 2004. Appendix III: Changes to Nursing Home Payment Methods or Rates in 19 States
Officials in the states we reviewed identified changes to payment rates or to the methods their respective Medicaid programs use to determine nursing home payment rates from state fiscal years 1998 through 2004 (see table 12). Nursing Workforce: Recruitment and Retention of Nurses and Nurse Aides Is a Growing Concern. | Why GAO Did This Study
Almost half of all Americans over the age of 65 will rely on nursing home care at some point in their lives, and two in three nursing home residents have their care covered at least in part by Medicaid. Under Medicaid, states set nursing home payment rates and the federal government reimburses a share of state spending. According to the most recently available data, Medicaid nursing home expenditures exceed $43 billion, and total Medicaid spending for fiscal year 2003 is expected to double by 2012. Such projections of increased Medicaid spending come as most states are confronting their third consecutive year of fiscal pressure. According to the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), in fiscal year 2003, 30 states collected less revenue than they budgeted for, and 37 states reduced enacted budgets by almost $14.5 billion. In light of concerns about the adequacy of nursing home resources, GAO was asked to examine how state Medicaid programs determine nursing home payment rates and whether these payment methods or rates have changed given recent state fiscal pressures. GAO interviewed state and nursing home industry officials in 19 states and obtained documentation about nursing home payment rates and methods, including state methods to determine nursing home per diem rates for fiscal years 1998 through 2004.
What GAO Found
Recognizing the large share of Medicaid spending that is allocated to nursing homes and the importance of spending their Medicaid dollars effectively, the 19 states GAO reviewed have designed multifaceted approaches to setting nursing home payment rates. All of these states base payment rates on homes' actual costs and most develop rates specific to each home. These payment methods also generally incorporate incentives to achieve certain goals, such as promoting efficiency or encouraging homes to target spending toward resident care. States typically update payment rates regularly to reflect changes in nursing homes' costs due to factors such as inflation or residents' changing care needs. Although each of the 19 states experienced recent fiscal pressure, states' nursing home payment rates have remained largely unaffected. Any future changes, however, remain uncertain. During fiscal years 1998 through 2004, only 4 of these states--Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Texas--cut the per diem rates paid to all nursing homes at some point, and in 2 of these states, the rate reduction was for less than 1 year. Two other states--Connecticut and Oregon--also froze nursing home per diem rates for a portion of this period. In addition, all 19 states modified the methods they use to determine nursing home payment rates during this time, such as changing ceilings on payment rates; however, irrespective of shifting fiscal pressure, the extent to which states changed specific features of their payment methods generally remained constant, with varying effects on payment rates to individual homes within states. Further, in over three-quarters of these states, nursing home per diem rates grew, on average, by an amount that exceeded the skilled nursing facility market basket index, the index used by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to measure changes in the price of nursing home goods and services for Medicare, from fiscal years 1998 through 2003. Many states were able to avoid making significant changes to nursing home payment rates by relying on existing resources, such as tobacco settlement and budget stabilization funds, and increasing revenue by imposing cigarette or nursing home provider taxes. Even with these alternative funding sources and recent temporary federal fiscal relief, however, officials in some states suggest that nursing home payment reductions are possible in the future. GAO received comments on a draft of this report from Medicaid officials in the 19 states reviewed, who generally agreed with the characterization of their respective nursing home payment methods. GAO also received technical comments from representatives of two organizations that represent the nursing home industry. |
gao_HEHS-96-198 | gao_HEHS-96-198_0 | VA facilities also purchase health care from other public and private providers under certain conditions, such as medical emergencies. Not only has VA been able to meet the demands for hospital care through use of existing VA and community beds, but there is also significant excess hospital capacity in VA, DOD, and community facilities. Such an increase in market share appears unlikely because the veteran population in the service area is projected to decrease by about 25 percent between 1995 and 2010. However, network and NCHCS officials told us, and we observed during our visits, that these clinics operate inefficiently, in part, because of space constraints, such as the lack of sufficient numbers of examining rooms. The remaining 23 percent went to other VA hospitals, primarily Palo Alto and San Francisco. Existing Hospitals Have Hundreds of Unused Beds
Over 3,300 excess hospital beds exist in and near the areas that would be served by the proposed Travis project. As discussed above, community hospitals in the Fairfield area have occupancy rates of around 40 percent and those in the Sacramento area, about 68 percent. Veteran Population Near Travis May Not Be Large Enough to Support Proposed Clinic
The number of veterans traditionally targeted by VA—primarily veterans with low incomes or service-connected disabilities—living near the Travis Air Force Base does not appear to be large enough to support an outpatient clinic as large as the one planned. Because VA does not have an outpatient clinic at Travis and no physicians’ offices are available to VA, physicians’ options are limited. Opportunities Exist to Expand Use of Community Hospitals Close to Veterans’ Homes
Thousands of unused beds are available in community hospitals in northern California. In the approximately 4 years since VA’s decision to build a replacement hospital at Travis Air Force Base was made, significant changes in the availability of beds in community hospitals have occurred. In addition, the Sierra Pacific Network director has established a task team consisting of facility directors to study the best way to deliver care in the network. Conclusions
VA’s plans to establish a 243-bed medical center at Travis Air Force Base—which include construction of 170 new hospital beds, renovation and expansion of existing Air Force support areas, and construction of an 85,000-visit outpatient clinic—are not justified on the basis of the current and expected workload and the availability of lower-cost alternatives. First, VA is meeting veterans’ needs with existing facilities. NCHCS clinics in Sacramento, Oakland, and Martinez, while crowded and operating at less than full efficiency, are meeting inpatient and outpatient needs and turning away no veterans. VA has many more efficient alternatives to serve northern California veterans. Recommendation to the Congress
We recommend that the Congress deny VA’s request for funds to construct additional hospital beds at Travis Air Force Base, given the availability of cost-effective alternatives to meet the health care needs of veterans in the NCHCS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) planned construction of an outpatient clinic and additional bed space at the David Grant Medical Center at Travis Air Force Base, focusing on whether: (1) the project could be adequately justified; and (2) there are cost-effective alternatives to planned hospital construction.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) construction of additional hospital beds and an outpatient clinic as large as VA proposes at Travis Air Force Base is unnecessary; (2) significant changes have occurred in the health care marketplace and in the way VA delivers health care in the 4 years since the project was planned, but VA plans have not been revised accordingly; (3) these changes alone have resulted in over 3,300 unused hospital beds in northern California hospitals, including beds in VA, Air Force, and community hospitals; (4) in addition, the veteran population in the service area is expected to drop by about 25 percent between 1995 and 2010; (5) VA has not considered the likely negative effects the additional beds could have on other hospitals in northern California, particularly those community hospitals in the Solano County area surrounding Travis Air Force Base that have occupancy rates of around 40 percent; (6) data GAO obtained show that VA is currently meeting the health care needs of veterans served by the Northern California Health Care System; (7) with VA hospitals at Palo Alto, San Francisco, and Travis operating below capacity, VA clinics have no trouble placing patients needing hospital care; (8) also, while VA's four clinics in the area intended to be served by the Travis hospital are operating at close to full capacity, three have turned away no veterans needing hospital or outpatient care; (9) in addition, the clinics have effectively used community hospitals for medical emergencies; (10) VA officials pointed out, and GAO's visits confirmed, that space constraints, such as the lack of sufficient numbers of examining rooms, prevent them from operating as efficiently as they could otherwise; (11) GAO identified several more efficient alternatives that are available to VA if increased demand for hospital care should materialize; (12) VA officials in the Sierra Pacific Network are currently studying the best way to meet veterans' future health care needs; and (13) network officials are considering options to make better use of VA facilities and increase the use of private and other public facilities. |
gao_GAO-01-705T | gao_GAO-01-705T_0 | Previous FDA efforts to address the problem of inadequate pediatric testing and drug labeling information had been unsuccessful. In 1997, the Congress recognized the importance of learning more about how drugs work in children by including in FDAMA a financial incentive for pharmaceutical manufacturers and drug sponsors to conduct pediatric studies and submit the results to FDA. The drug is in a class or for an indication for which additional therapeutic or diagnostic options are needed for pediatric patients. Officials at NICHD, which has conducted many pediatric drug studies, said costs vary depending on the number of children participating and type of drug being studied. Studies Have Led to Better Labeling and Infrastructure
Research conducted under the pediatric exclusivity provision is providing new and useful information about whether and how drugs work in children. As of April 1, 2001, labels for 18 of the 28 drugs granted marketing extensions had been changed to incorporate findings from research conducted to obtain the extensions. Second, the law provides no incentive to conduct pediatric research on drugs for which patents and marketing exclusivity have expired. We found a difference of opinion on whether a marketing extension should be contingent on label changes. | What GAO Found
Children fall ill with many of the same diseases as adults and are often treated with the same drugs. However, only about 25 percent of drugs used today have been labeled for pediatric patients. The lack of pediatric testing and labeling can place children at risk of under- or overdosing, and the lack of age-appropriate formulations, such as liquids or chewable tablets, can result in improper administration of drugs. The pediatric exclusivity provision of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 has successfully encouraged drug sponsors to generate needed information on how drugs work in children. A wide range of drugs are being studied in many therapeutic areas. The infrastructure for conducting pediatric trials has also been greatly strengthened, which should help to support continued progress. Although several drug labels have been changed to incorporate findings from research done under the pediatric exclusivity provision, label changes typically occur long after the Food and Drug Administration has granted the extension of market exclusivity. In addition, there continues to be little incentive to conduct pediatric research on off-patent drugs. |
gao_GAO-02-618T | gao_GAO-02-618T_0 | Abusive tax schemes that are generally used by individuals fall into four major categories. Nevertheless, IRS’s February 2002 estimate of $20 billion to $40 billion in tax dollars at risk from offshore schemes may grow as IRS learns more about the extent of the problem. Expanded IRS Efforts to Identify and Control Tax Schemes
No one individual or office could provide an agencywide perspective on IRS’s strategy, goals, objectives, performance measures, or program results, for its efforts to address abusive tax schemes. Consequently, a clear and consistent picture of IRS’s efforts was difficult to obtain. Limited data also suggest that these enhanced efforts have helped IRS convict more promoters and users of abusive schemes over the past 3 years, which IRS has publicized through enhanced communication strategies. IRS Faces Substantial Challenges; Lacks Means to Assess Progress
IRS has tried to develop a better understanding of the potential breadth of the problem of abusive tax schemes involving individual taxpayers and the steps needed to coordinate and manage numerous efforts to combat abusive tax schemes. To date, however, IRS has not provided information on its staff year investments in combating abusive tax schemes and has not established performance goals and measures that IRS and Congress can use to gauge whether these efforts are achieving desired results. Furthermore, based on the limited data available, IRS appears to be realizing some increased success in convicting those involved in schemes, publicizing these results, and uncovering previously hidden major offshore compliance problems. | What GAO Found
Estimating the extent of abusive tax schemes used by individual taxpayers is difficult because they are often hidden. Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) believes that the number and dollar consequences of these schemes has grown recently. IRS estimates that 740,000 taxpayers used abusive schemes in tax year 2000. IRS caught $5 billion in improper tax avoidance or tax credit and refund claims, but estimates that another $20 to $40 billion went undetected. Recent developments suggest that the number of individuals using an abusive tax scheme involving offshore accounts may be greater than estimated and potential lost revenues may be higher than estimated. Because no one individual or office could provide an agencywide perspective on IRS's strategy, goals, objectives, performance measures, or program results, it is difficult to provide a clear picture of IRS's efforts to address abusive tax schemes. IRS has created new offices, reemphasized and reorganized earlier efforts, and plans to assign at least 200 additional staff to its efforts. Limited data suggest that IRS's enhanced efforts have helped to successfully convict those promoting and taking advantage of abusive schemes, publicize these results, and uncover previously hidden major offshore compliance problems. The number of possible abusive tax schemes, however, could outstrip IRS's audit resources. Furthermore, identifying and handling these cases will require better coordination on IRS's part. IRS has not yet developed a way to track the resources used to combat abusive schemes, nor has it developed goals and measures to assess its progress. |
gao_T-RCED-98-191 | gao_T-RCED-98-191_0 | Lack of Equivalency Authority Diminishes FDA’s Ability to Protect U.S. Consumers
To ensure the safety of meat and poultry imports, FSIS has a statutory mandate to require that each country wishing to export meat and poultry products to the United States demonstrate that it has an equivalent food safety system. As a result, FDA must rely primarily on selecting and testing import samples at ports of entry to ensure that foods are safe. Given the ineffectiveness of port-of-entry inspections, FDA cannot realistically ensure that unsafe foods are kept out of U.S. commerce. Even if FDA could inspect more shipments at ports of entry than it currently does, such an approach would still provide little assurance that imported foods are picked, processed, and packed under sanitary conditions because inspectors have no assurance that the exporting country has an effective food safety system. An equivalency requirement would allow FDA to share the burden of ensuring safety with the exporting country and allow it to make better use of limited resources. Agencies Could More Effectively Target Resources to Inspect Unsafe Foods
FSIS and FDA use computer systems to review information on each import shipment and to help identify the import shipments requiring inspector action. However, neither agency’s system takes maximum advantage of available data to target those imported foods posing the greater health risks. As a result, importers aware of FDA’s inaction could evade FDA’s inspections by incorrectly describing the contents of a shipment. Weaknesses in Import Controls Allow the Entry of Unsafe Products
In addition to the problems associated with FDA’s system for selecting food shipments for inspection, several weaknesses in its controls over imported products enable some importers or their representatives to sell unsafe foods in the United States. According to Customs inspectors, some importers, to ensure their products appear to meet U.S. requirements, share shipments that have already been tested and proven to be in compliance—a practice referred to as “banking.” FDA says it lacks the explicit authority to place restrictions on which laboratories importers can use to test products. Importers of FDA-regulated foods generally retain possession of import shipments until FDA releases them and must make the shipments available for FDA’s inspection if requested. The results of this investigation are consistent with the findings in our 1992 report on pesticides, which found that 60 percent of the perishable foods and 38 percent of the nonperishable foods that FDA found to be adulterated with illegal pesticides were released into U.S. markets, or not returned to Customs for destruction or reexport as required. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed: (1) findings from its recent report in which it pointed out how limitations in the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) authority and approach for regulating imported foods adversely affect its ability to ensure food safety; (2) how FDA and the Food Safety and Inspection Service's (FSIS) procedures for selecting shipments to review result in the ineffective targeting of inspection resources; and (3) how weaknesses in FDA's and Customs Service's controls allows unscrupulous importers to market unsafe products.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FDA lacks the legal authority to require that countries exporting foods to the United States have food safety systems equivalent to U.S. systems, an authority that FSIS has and uses to share the burden of ensuring safe foods with the exporting countries; (2) without such authority, FDA must rely primarily on its port-of-entry inspections, which covered less than 2 percent of shipments in 1997, to detect and bar unsafe foods; (3) such an approach has been widely discredited as an effective protective measure; (4) both FDA and FSIS could make better use of their inspection resources by using available health risk information to target shipments for inspection that pose the highest food safety risk; (5) FDA could further improve the use of resources by clarifying its communications to inspectors about which shipments to select and by taking enforcement action when importers are found to inaccurately describe the contents of shipments; (6) with such improvements, FDA could better ensure that it is using its scarce resources to identify the foods posing greater risks; (7) FDA's procedures for ensuring that unsafe imported foods do not reach U.S. consumers are vulnerable to abuse by unscrupulous importers; (8) under current procedures, FDA generally allows importers to retain control over shipments until the agency grants their release; (9) if importers move shipments into domestic commerce without a FDA release, FDA has no effective means of compelling importers to return the shipments for inspection, destruction, or reexport; (10) when FDA requires an importer to provide evidence that a suspect shipment is safe, the agency allows the importer to select the laboratory that picks the samples to be tested and that conducts the tests; and (11) FDA's and Custom's principal deterrent for ensuring that importers comply with U.S. requirements is uneven and uncertain. |
gao_GAO-09-347 | gao_GAO-09-347_0 | Most hospitals with emergency departments are located in metropolitan areas, and the majority of emergency department visits occurred in metropolitan areas of the United States. Hospitals Continue to Divert Ambulances
National data show that the diversion of ambulances continues to occur, but that the percentage of hospitals that go on diversion and the average number of hours hospitals spend on diversion varied by year. Wait Times Have Increased and in Some Cases Exceeded Recommended Time Frames
National data from NCHS indicate that wait times in the emergency department have increased and in some cases exceeded recommended time frames. For emergent patients, the average wait time to see a physician increased from 23 minutes to 37 minutes, more than twice as long as recommended for their level of acuity. Boarding Continues to Be Reported, but National Data on Boarding Have Been Limited
More than 25 percent of the 197 articles we reviewed discuss the practice of boarding patients in emergency departments, and officials we interviewed noted that the practice of boarding continues. Additionally, other factors—a lack of access to primary care, a shortage of available on- call specialists, and difficulties transferring, admitting, or discharging psychiatric patients—have also been reported as contributing to crowding. Articles and Subject- Matter Experts Have Reported a Lack of Access to Inpatient Beds as the Main Factor Contributing to Crowding
Of the 77 articles we reviewed that discussed factors contributing to crowding, 45 articles reported a lack of access to inpatient beds as a factor contributing to emergency department crowding, with 13 of these articles reporting it was the main factor contributing to crowding. One of the reasons that emergency departments are unable to move admitted patients to inpatient beds may be due to competition between emergency department admissions and scheduled hospital admissions— for example, for elective surgical procedures—which we also reported on in 2003. In 2006, IOM reported that hospitals might prefer scheduled admissions over admissions from the emergency department because emergency department admissions are considered to be less profitable. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
HHS provided comments on a draft of this report, which are included in appendix V. In its comments, HHS noted that the report demonstrates that emergency department wait times continue to increase and frequently exceed national standards. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. To examine information available since 2003 about three indicators of emergency department crowding and the factors that contribute to crowding, we conducted a literature review. In examining information made available since 2003 about indicators and factors of crowding during our literature review, we analyzed articles for what was reported on the effect of crowding on patient quality of care and proposed strategies to address crowding. We searched these databases for articles with key words in their title or abstract related to emergency department crowding, or indicators and factors of crowding, such as versions of the word “crowding,” “emergency department,” “diversion,” “wait time,” and “boarding.” We also included articles published on or between January 1, 2003, and August 31, 2008, that were identified as a result of our interviews with federal officials, professional and research organizations, and subject-matter experts. Specifically, this appendix presents the following information from the National Center for Health Statistics’ (NCHS) National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS): for 2003 through 2006 (the only years for which data were available from NCHS), the percentage of emergency department visits by wait time to see a physician (table 12), average and median wait times to see a physician by patient acuity level (figure 6), average wait times to see a physician by payer type, hospital type, and geographic region (table 13), and average wait times by the hospitals’ percentage of visits in which patients left before a medical evaluation (table 14); and for 2001 through 2006, the percentage of visits by emergency department length of stay (table 15), the average and median length of stay by patient acuity level (figure 7), the average length of stay in the emergency department by payer type, hospital type, and geographic region (table 16); and average length of stay by the hospitals’ percentage of visits in which patients left before a medical evaluation (table 17). | Why GAO Did This Study
Hospital emergency departments are a major part of the nation's health care safety net. Of the estimated 119 million visits to U.S. emergency departments in 2006, over 40 percent were paid for by federally-supported programs. These programs--Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program--are administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). There have been reports of crowded conditions in emergency departments, often associated with adverse effects on patient quality of care. In 2003, GAO reported that most emergency departments in metropolitan areas experienced some degree of crowding (Hospital Emergency Departments: Crowded Conditions Vary among Hospitals and Communities, GAO-03-460). For example, two out of every three metropolitan hospitals reported going on ambulance diversion--asking ambulances to bypass their emergency departments and instead transport patients to other facilities. GAO was asked to examine information made available since 2003 on emergency department crowding. GAO examined three indicators of emergency department crowding--ambulance diversion, wait times, and patient boarding--and factors that contribute to crowding. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed national data; conducted a literature review of 197 articles; and interviewed officials from HHS and professional and research organizations, and individual subject-matter experts.
What GAO Found
Emergency department crowding continues to occur in hospital emergency departments according to national data, articles we reviewed, and officials we interviewed. National data show that hospitals continue to divert ambulances, with about one-fourth of hospitals reporting going on diversion at least once in 2006. National data also indicate that wait times in the emergency department increased, and in some cases exceeded recommended time frames. For example, the average wait time to see a physician for emergent patients--those patients who should be seen in 1 to 14 minutes--was 37 minutes in 2006, more than twice as long as recommended for their level of urgency. Boarding of patients in the emergency department who are awaiting transfer to an inpatient bed or another facility continues to be reported as a problem in articles we reviewed and by officials we interviewed, but national data on the extent to which this occurs are limited. Moreover, some of the articles we reviewed discussed strategies to address crowding, but these strategies have not been assessed on a state or national level. Articles we reviewed and individual subject-matter experts we interviewed reported that a lack of access to inpatient beds continues to be the main factor contributing to emergency department crowding, although additional factors may contribute. One reason for a lack of access to inpatient beds is competition between hospital admissions from the emergency department and scheduled admissions--for example, for elective surgeries, which may be more profitable for the hospital. Additional factors may contribute to emergency department crowding, including patients' lack of access to primary care services or a shortage of available on-call specialists. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS noted that the report demonstrates that emergency department wait times are continuing to increase and frequently exceed national standards. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-09-140 | gao_GAO-09-140_0 | For example, rent and utilities could be considered either administrative expenses or indirect costs. HRSA reports that the cap only applies to grantees’ administrative expenses; there is no cap on indirect costs. Required audits assist HRSA in providing financial oversight of some Part D grantees’ spending. Part D Grantees Reported Providing a Range of Services, and Most Reported That the Administrative Expense Cap Did Not Change These but Had a Negative Effect on Programs
Grantees reported providing a range of medical and support services to women, infants, children, and youth infected with HIV/AIDS, as well as support services for affected family members. The majority of survey respondents reported that they have not made any changes to the services they provide to their clients in response to the cap, which, according to HRSA, was meant to maximize the amount of federal funds spent on services for Part D clients. However, four grantees reported increasing services and three grantees reported reducing client services. In addition, all eight of the HRSA project officers we interviewed reported that they were aware of only minor or no changes to the services that their Part D grantees provided in response to the administrative expense cap. However, about half (41 of the 83) of the grantees that responded to the survey reported that not all of their administrative expenses for the Part D program were covered by the 10 percent allowance. Part D Grantees Report Planned Administrative Expenses and Indirect Costs to HRSA but Will Provide Additional Information in Fiscal Year 2009
Part D grantees report planned administrative expenses and indirect costs to HRSA in their grant applications, which the agency uses to oversee grantees’ compliance with the Part D program. Starting in fiscal year 2009, HRSA will require Part D grantees to report more detailed information, including administrative expenses, at the beginning and end of each fiscal year. However, 60 of the 83 grantees reported in our survey that they had federally approved indirect cost rates and that, with these rates, they charged to their Part D grants an average of 10 percent for indirect costs in addition to the 10 percent allowed for administrative expenses. HRSA Took Multiple Steps to Implement the Administrative Expense Cap, but Grantees’ Experiences Implementing the Cap Varied
To implement the fiscal year 2007 administrative expense cap, HRSA reported revising its grant application guidance, approving grants with the condition that the grantee comply with the cap, and developing training for both its staff and grantees to implement the administrative expense cap. The fiscal year 2007 grant application guidance stated that “a grantee may not use more than 10 percent of amounts received under a grant award under Part D for administrative expenses.” That guidance also defined administrative expenses as the CARE Act does as “funds that are to be used by grantees for grant management and monitoring activities, including costs related to any staff or activity unrelated to services and indirect costs.”
HRSA included additional revisions related to the administrative expense cap in the fiscal year 2008 grant application guidance and plans to provide grantees with further guidance in the fiscal year 2009 application. Some grantees reported that HRSA’s guidance was helpful when implementing the administrative expense cap. Some Grantees Indicated a Need for Additional Guidance on the Administrative Expense Cap, and HRSA Officials Reported Revising the Guidance in Response to Feedback
Some grantees reported seeking more detailed guidance about what should be considered an administrative expense. In addition, 16 of the 83 survey respondents sought guidance from sources other than HRSA on administrative expenses and the cap, such as from the AIDS Alliance for Children, Youth & Families. Agency Comments
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of the report, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We examined the administrative expense cap, which took effect in fiscal year 2007, placed on grants for family-centered medical and support services for women, infants, children, and youth with HIV/AIDS and their families (Part D grants) under the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990 (CARE Act). Specifically, we examined (1) the services that Part D grantees provide and what effect, if any, the administrative expense cap has had on those services and on grantee programs; (2) how Part D grantees report on administrative expenses, indirect costs, and compliance with the administrative expense cap; and (3) how the Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) implemented the Part D administrative expense cap and grantees’ views on that implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990 (CARE Act) makes federal funds available to assist those infected and affected by HIV/AIDS. Through the CARE Act, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), awards grants (known as Part D grants) to provide services to women, infants, children, and youth with HIV/AIDS and their families. These grantees incur administrative expenses and indirect costs, such as rent and utilities. The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment and Modernization Act of 2006 (RWTMA), which took effect in fiscal year 2007, capped at 10 percent the amount that Part D grantees could spend on administrative expenses. According to HRSA, there is no cap on indirect costs, but grantees must have an indirect cost rate to use funds for indirect costs. RWTMA directed GAO to examine Part D spending. In this report GAO describes (1) the services that Part D grantees provide and what effect, if any, the administrative expense cap has had on those services and on grantee programs; (2) how Part D grantees report on administrative expenses, indirect costs, and compliance with the cap; and (3) how HRSA implemented the cap and grantees' views on that implementation. GAO surveyed all Part D grantees, interviewed selected grantees, reviewed Part D grant applications and guidance, and interviewed HRSA officials.
What GAO Found
Part D grantees reported in our survey that they provide a range of services to clients, and the majority of these grantees reported that they have not made changes to services in response to the administrative expense cap implemented in fiscal year 2007. These services included both medical services, such as outpatient health services, as well as support services, such as child care. The majority of the 83 grantees that responded to our survey reported that the cap has not affected the services they provide. However, 4 grantees reported increasing services and 3 grantees reported reducing client services in response to the cap. In addition, the majority of grantees also reported that the cap has had a negative effect on their Part D programs, even if it has not changed client services, because it has, for example, made it necessary for clinical staff to perform administrative tasks. In addition, about half of the grantees reported that not all of their Part D administrative expenses were covered by the 10 percent allowance. Part D grantees report planned administrative expenses and indirect costs to HRSA and, starting in fiscal year 2009, HRSA will require additional reporting. In their grant applications, Part D grantees provide HRSA with budgets that include administrative expenses and indirect costs. Grantees must then update HRSA on any changes to that information, and some provide the results of independent financial audits. Starting in fiscal year 2009, HRSA will require all Part D grantees to report more detailed budget information at both the beginning and end of each year. In fiscal year 2007, the first year of the administrative expense cap, grantees reported to HRSA that they were in compliance with the cap. Grantees with approved indirect cost rates could include expenses such as rent and utilities in their indirect costs rather than in their administrative expenses and so were able to spend more than 10 percent of their Part D grants on such expenses. Beginning in fiscal year 2007, HRSA took multiple steps to implement the administrative expense cap but, while some grantees reported that HRSA's guidance on how to implement the cap was helpful, others reported difficulties in implementing the cap due to unclear guidance from HRSA. HRSA reported revising its grant application guidance and developing training for both its staff and grantees in response to the cap. HRSA also included additional revisions related to the administrative expense cap in the fiscal year 2008 grant application guidance and plans to provide grantees with further guidance in the fiscal year 2009 application. While some grantees reported that HRSA's guidance was helpful, others reported receiving conflicting information. In the first year of the cap, some grantees also indicated a need for additional guidance on the administrative expense cap and reported that they sought such guidance from sources other than HRSA. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of the report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_AIMD-98-56 | gao_AIMD-98-56_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) analyze the extent to which financial deficiencies detailed in the auditors’ reports may adversely impact the ability of Navy and DOD managers and congressional officials to make informed programmatic and budgetary decisions, (2) provide examples of other issues of interest to budget and program decisionmakers that can be identified by reviewing the financial statements, and (3) describe the additional financial data that, if complete and accurate, could be used to support future decision-making when the Navy implements accounting standards that are effective beginning with fiscal years 1997 and 1998. Budget Development Is Undermined by Lack of Accurate Inventory Data
The Naval Audit Service report on the results of its financial audit of the Navy’s fiscal year 1996 financial statements disclosed numerous problems with inventory data reported by the Navy, including the following. However, the auditors found that information on $7.8 billion in inventories, including those on board ships was not included in the Navy’s year-end financial statements. “Defense Finance and Accounting Service Operating Locations processed 110 duplicate or erroneous vendor payments for the Department of the Navy. These financial deficiencies adversely affect not only the Navy’s DBOF financial reporting but also its ability to achieve the goal of operating on a break-even basis. As a result of the failure to collect reimbursement, the Department of Navy used Operation and Maintenance, Navy funds to support the Army requirements. Therefore, this $5,793,496 represents potential funds that can be put to better use.” This means that the Navy’s operation and maintenance appropriation requirements are less than previously recognized because the Navy will not be required to pay these “invalid liabilities.”
Implications of Financial Statement Disclosures
Despite the shortcomings in the Navy’s financial statements, we were able to identify several financial issues that may be of interest to budget and program managers. Specifically, even with the acknowledged deficiencies in the Navy’s financial data, some areas raise questions about whether future budget resources may be needed or whether there may be opportunities to reduce resource requirements. While information on the status of the Navy’s use of its resources is currently available, it has not been audited. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reported on the programmatic and budgetary implications of the financial data deficiencies enumerated by auditors' examination of the Department of the Navy's fiscal year 1996 financial statements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the extent and nature of the Navy's financial deficiencies identified by auditors, including those that relate to supporting management systems, increase the risk of waste, fraud, and misappropriation of Navy funds and can drain resources needed for defense mission priorities; (2) critical weaknesses identified include the following: (a) information on $7.8 billion in inventories on-board ships was not included in Navy's year-end financial statements; (b) failure to follow prescribed procedures for controlling Navy's cash account with Treasury contributes to continuing disbursement accounting problems; (c) until duplicate and erroneous vendor payments were identified and collected as a result of financial audit, the Navy not only paid too much for goods and services but, more importantly, was unable to use these funds to meet other critical programmatic needs; and (d) breakdowns in the controls relied on to prevent or detect material financial errors mean that the Navy cannot tell if its business-type support operations are operating on a break-even basis as intended; (3) although the Navy's 1996 financial statements--its first effort to prepare comprehensive financial statements--did not include all required information and were not verifiable, they still provided data GAO could use to identify several financial issues that may be of interest to budget and program managers; (4) for example, footnote disclosures on the Navy's accounts receivable and unexpended appropriations raise questions about whether future budget resources may be needed or whether there may be opportunities to reduce resource requirements; (5) when the findings presented in the auditors' reports are corrected, the financial statements themselves and related notes can become an excellent source of information on the financial condition and operations of the Navy; and (6) also, if properly implemented, new accounting standards that require information such as data on asset disposal costs and deferred maintenance will provide the Navy and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service with an opportunity to improve the extent and usefulness of information that is currently available to support program decision-making and accountability in these areas. |
gao_GAO-07-268 | gao_GAO-07-268_0 | Using this methodology, GSA estimated that it would need a total of $151.5 million for a 30-month transition, most of which would be used to reimburse agencies’ transition costs. The analysis was not sufficiently accurate because it is largely based on the assumption that agencies will transition 76 percent of the services acquired under the current FTS2001 contracts to a different provider under Networx—an intentionally conservative scenario that GSA program officials believe is unlikely to occur. Further, the analysis has not been updated after a nearly 2-year delay in the contract award. While GSA appears to have included all pertinent costs, it may have double-counted a cost, calling into question the comprehensiveness of its analysis. In addition, GSA did not document significant assumptions and data. While an intentionally conservative approach minimizes the risk that GSA would have inadequate funds to pay for committed transition costs, it increases the risk that GSA will retain excess funds that could be used for other purposes. However, according to program officials, the 76 percent “transition traffic factor” is intentionally conservative and represents a worst-case scenario that is unlikely to occur. However, it did not document significant assumptions. GSA did not validate its analysis against an independent cost estimate or perform an uncertainty analysis. GSA Does Not Have a Policy to Ensure That Cost Estimates Are Sound
The weaknesses in GSA’s analysis can be attributed in part to the lack of a policy requiring cost estimates to be developed using best practices. As of fiscal year-end 2006, GSA accumulated approximately $142 million in a reserve dedicated to costs associated with the transition from FTS2001 to Networx. By varying the transition traffic factor, our analysis indicates that the $142 million already retained should be adequate to cover expected expenses 96 percent of the time. The merger of the IT and General Supply Funds provides GSA with additional flexibility, further reducing the need to retain the entire amount of the estimate. With Networx contracts scheduled to be awarded starting in March 2007, GSA will soon be in a position to reassess its main assumption, the transition traffic factor, and the resulting level of funding needed to meet anticipated commitments. Despite the weaknesses in its analysis, GSA has accumulated adequate funding to support its anticipated commitments related to the Networx transition. Our analysis indicates that it is highly unlikely that GSA will need more than the $142 million it has already accumulated. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the soundness of the analysis the General Services Administration (GSA) used to derive the estimate of funding that would be required for the transition and (2) whether GSA will have accumulated adequate funding to pay for its transition management costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The General Services Administration (GSA) and its customer agencies are preparing to transition new governmentwide telecommunications contracts known as the Networx program. GSA estimated the costs for which it is responsible to be $151.5 million. This report addresses (1) the soundness of the analysis GSA used to derive the estimate of funding that would be required for the transition and (2) whether GSA will have accumulated adequate funding to pay for transition costs. In performing this work, GAO reviewed cost estimation best practices, analyzed relevant GSA documents, and performed an uncertainty analysis on GSA's estimate.
What GAO Found
GSA did not use sound analysis when estimating the amount of funding needed to meet its transition-related commitments. Specifically, its analysis was not sufficiently accurate, comprehensive, documented, or validated. A primary weakness is that the estimate is largely based an assumption--known as the transition traffic factor--that 76 percent of the services provided under the current contracts would be moved to a different provider under the Networx contracts. However, according to program officials, this assumption is intentionally conservative and represents a worst-case scenario that is unlikely to occur. Additionally, GSA may have double-counted a cost and did not update its analysis to reflect a nearly 2-year delay. Finally, GSA did not document significant assumptions and data sources used in its analysis, or validate it. These weaknesses can be attributed in part to the lack of a cost estimation policy that reflects best practices. While GSA's intentionally conservative approach minimizes the risk that it would have inadequate funds to pay for committed transition costs, it increases the risk that GSA will retain excess funds that could be used for other purposes. GSA has accumulated adequate funding to support its anticipated transition costs. As of fiscal year-end 2006, GSA had approximately $142 million in a transition reserve. GAO analysis of the estimate indicates it is unlikely that GSA will need more than it has already accumulated to fund the transition. Specifically, the $142 million already retained will be adequate to cover anticipated costs 96 percent of the time. The recent merger of two GSA funds gives the agency additional flexibility that reduces its need to accumulate the entire $151.5 million it estimated would be needed. With Networx contracts scheduled to be awarded starting in March 2007, GSA will soon have the information necessary to reassess the main assumption underlying its estimate--the transition traffic factor--and address the weaknesses GAO identified. Once this has been accomplished, GSA can reevaluate the funding needed to meet anticipated commitments. |
gao_GAO-05-573T | gao_GAO-05-573T_0 | GAO designated DHS’s transformation as high-risk in January 2003based on three factors. First, DHS faced enormous challenges in implementing an effective transformation process, developing partnerships, and building management capacity because it had to effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees specializing in various disciplines— including law enforcement, border security, biological research, computer security, and disaster mitigation—into one department. Second, DHS faced a broad array of operational and management challenges that it inherited from its component legacy agencies. Finally, DHS’s national security mission was of such importance that the failure to effectively address its management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizen’s health and safety, and our economy. Overall, our designation of DHS’s transformation as a high-risk area and its inclusion on the 2003 High-Risk List was due to the failure to transform the diverse units into a single, efficient, and effective organization would have dire consequences for our nation. DHS Management Challenges
DHS faces a number of management challenges to improving its ability to carry out its homeland security missions. Among these challenges, which are discussed in more detail in the following sections, are providing focus for management efforts, monitoring transformation and integration, improving strategic planning, managing human capital, strengthening financial management infrastructure, establishing an information technology management framework, managing acquisitions, and coordinating research and development. This is important not only to DHS itself, but also to the nation’s homeland security efforts, because, in addition to managing its own organization, DHS plays a larger role in managing homeland security and in coordinating with the activities of other federal, state, local, and private stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a key role in coordinating the nation's homeland security efforts with stakeholders in the federal, state, local, and private sectors. While GAO has conducted numerous reviews of specific DHS missions, such as border and transportation security and emergency preparedness, this testimony addresses overall DHS management issues. This testimony addresses (1) why GAO designated DHS's transformation as a high-risk area; and (2) the specific management challenges facing DHS.
What GAO Found
GAO designated DHS's transformation as a high-risk area in 2003, based on three factors. First, DHS faced enormous challenges in implementing an effective transformation process, developing partnerships, and building management capacity because it had to transform 22 agencies into one department. Second, DHS faced a broad array of operational and management challenges that it inherited from its component legacy agencies. Finally, DHS's failure to effectively address its management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences for our national security. Overall, DHS has made some progress, but significant management challenges remain to transform DHS into a more efficient organization while maintaining and improving its effectiveness in securing the homeland. Therefore, DHS's transformation remains a high-risk area. DHS faces a number of management challenges to improve its ability to carry out its homeland security missions. Among these challenges are providing focus for management efforts; monitoring transformation and integration; improving strategic planning; managing human capital; strengthening financial management infrastructure; establishing an information technology management framework; managing acquisitions; and coordinating research and development. |
gao_GAO-09-875T | gao_GAO-09-875T_0 | Background
Countries can take varying approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Since energy use is a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions, policies designed to increase energy efficiency or induce a switch to less greenhouse-gas-intensive fuels, such as from coal to natural gas, can reduce emissions in the short term. In the long term, however, major technology changes will be needed to establish a less carbon- intensive energy infrastructure. To that end, a U.S. policy to mitigate climate change may require facilities to achieve specified reductions or employ a market-based mechanism, such as establishing a price on emissions. Several bills to implement emissions pricing in the United States have been introduced in the 110th and 111th Congresses. These bills have included both cap-and-trade and carbon tax proposals. Some of the proposed legislation also include measures intended to limit potentially adverse impacts on the international competitiveness of domestic firms. Estimating Competitiveness Effects
Estimating the effects of domestic emissions pricing for industries in the United States is complex. For example, if the United States were to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, production costs could rise for many industries and could cause output, profits, or employment to fall. However, the magnitude of these potential effects is likely to depend on the greenhouse gas intensity of industry output and on the domestic emissions price, which is not yet known, among other factors. Within these industries, adverse competitiveness effects could arise through an increase in imports, a decrease in exports, or both. For example, the U.S. emissions price and the emissions price in other countries are key variables that will help to determine the impact of emissions pricing on domestic industries. Potentially Vulnerable Industries
Two key indicators of potential vulnerability to adverse competitiveness effects are an industry’s energy intensity and trade intensity. Proposed U.S. legislation specifies that (1) either an energy intensity or greenhouse gas intensity of 5 percent or greater; and (2) a trade intensity of 15 percent or greater be used as criteria to identify industries for which trade measures or rebates would apply. Most of the industries that meet these criteria fall under 4 industry categories: primary metals, nonmetallic minerals, paper, and chemicals. However, there is significant variation in specified vulnerability characteristics among different product groups (“sub-industries”). The energy and trade intensity for all primary metal products is denoted by the “x” in figure 1. Among the primary metals sub-industry examples shown in figure 2, the types of energy used also vary. | Why GAO Did This Study
Countries can take varying approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Since energy use is a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions, policies designed to increase energy efficiency or induce a switch to less greenhouse-gas-intensive fuels, such as from coal to natural gas, can reduce emissions in the short term. In the long term, however, major technology changes will be needed to establish a less carbon-intensive energy infrastructure. To that end, a U.S. policy to mitigate climate change may require facilities to achieve specified reductions or employ a market-based mechanism, such as establishing a price on emissions. Several bills to implement emissions pricing in the United States have been introduced in the 110th and 111th Congresses. These bills have included both cap-and-trade and carbon tax proposals. Some of the proposed legislation also include measures intended to limit potentially adverse impacts on the international competitiveness of domestic firms.
What GAO Found
Estimating the potential effects of domestic emissions pricing for industries in the United States is complex. If the United States were to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, production costs could rise for certain industries and could cause output, profits, or employment to fall. Within these industries, some of these adverse effects could arise through an increase in imports, a decrease in exports, or both. However, the magnitude of these potential effects is likely to depend on the greenhouse gas intensity of industry output and on the domestic emissions price, which is not yet known, among other factors. Estimates of adverse competitiveness effects are generally larger for industries that are both relatively energy- and trade-intensive. In 2007, these industries accounted for about 4.5 percent of domestic output. Estimates of the effects vary because of key assumptions required by economic models. For example, models generally assume a price for U.S. carbon emissions, but do not assume a similar price by other nations. In addition, the models generally do not incorporate all policy provisions, such as legislative proposals related to trade measures and rebates that are based on levels of production. Proposed legislation suggests that industries vulnerable to competitiveness effects should be considered differently. Industries for which competitiveness measures would apply are identified on the basis of their energy and trade intensity. Most of the industries that meet these criteria are in primary metals, nonmetallic minerals, paper, and chemicals, although significant variation exists for product groups (sub-industries) within each industry. Additional variation arises on the basis of the type of energy used and the extent to which foreign competitors' greenhouse gas emissions are regulated. To illustrate variability in characteristics that make industries vulnerable to competitiveness effects, we include illustrations of sub-industries within primary metals that meet both the energy and trade intensity criteria; examples that met only one criterion; and examples that met neither, but had significant imports from countries without greenhouse gas pricing. |
gao_GAO-01-437 | gao_GAO-01-437_0 | The inventory of historic properties should include all properties that are listed on or eligible for the National Register of Historic Places to ensure that the military services have visibility over all historical properties. In addition, a complete inventory would ensure that the services are properly recording real property transactions, ensure the accuracy of reporting on real property required to be included in annual financial statements, and provide an improved basis for long-term planning of facility maintenance and repair. At the same time, composite data on the costs of maintaining historic structures is not readily available. | What GAO Found
Available information indicates that the Defense Department lacks an accurate inventory of historic properties. The inventory of historic military properties should include all properties that are listed on or eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. A complete inventory would ensure that the services are properly recording real property transactions, ensure the accuracy of reporting on real property required to be included in annual financial statements, and provide an improved basis for long-term planning for facility maintenance and repair. At the same time, composite data on the costs of maintaining historic structures are not readily available. |
gao_GAO-07-463 | gao_GAO-07-463_0 | Background
Anesthesia services are generally administered by anesthesia practitioners, such as anesthesiologists and CRNAs. 2). For all 41 payment localities, Medicare payments were lower than private payments by an average of 67 percent. In 2004, the average Medicare payment for a set of seven anesthesia services was $216, and the average private payment for the same set of anesthesia services was $658. Overall Supply of Anesthesiologists and CRNAs Combined Was Not Correlated with Payment Differences for Anesthesia Services or Concentration of Medicare Beneficiaries
In 2004, there was no correlation between the overall supply of anesthesia practitioners—that is, the total number of both anesthesiologists and CRNAs per 100,000 people—and either the difference between Medicare and private payments for anesthesia services or the concentration of Medicare beneficiaries in the Medicare payment localities included in our analyses. However, when we examined the supply of anesthesiologists and CRNAs separately, we found correlations between practitioner supply and payment differences and practitioner supply and beneficiary concentration. Specifically, we found that in 2004, the supply of CRNAs tended to decrease as the difference between Medicare and private payments for anesthesia services increased in 41 Medicare payment localities. We also found that in 2004, the supply of anesthesiologists tended to decrease as the concentration of Medicare beneficiaries increased across 87 Medicare payment localities, while the supply of CRNAs tended to increase as the concentration of Medicare beneficiaries increased across these Medicare payment localities. We found that the supply of anesthesiologists and the supply of CRNAs were each correlated with the concentration of Medicare beneficiaries across 87 payment localities in 2004. Compensation of Anesthesia Practitioners Was Reported to Compare Favorably with Other Practitioners, and Anesthesiology Residencies and Nurse Anesthesia Graduates Have Increased
For 2005, compensation for anesthesia practitioners was reported to compare favorably to that of other physicians and nonphysician practitioners, according to information from medical group practices from across the country that responded to a survey of MGMA member organizations. The 2005 median annual compensation for general anesthesiologists—approximately $354,240—was over 10 percent higher than the median annual compensation for specialists and over twice the compensation for generalists. For example, the MGMA-reported median annual compensation for CRNAs was over 40 percent higher than the MGMA-reported median annual compensation for either nurse midwives or nurse practitioners and over 35 percent higher than the MGMA-reported median annual compensation for physician assistants. The number of anesthesiology residency positions offered through the NRMP and the number of nurse anesthesia graduates have increased in recent years. CMS stated that our study provides a good summary of information collected from a variety of sources on anesthesia payments and the supply of anesthesia practitioners but was concerned that our analysis of payment differences for anesthesia services did not include four of the top five Medicare anesthesia services in terms of Medicare payments. Difference in Medicare and Private Payments for Anesthesia Services
To examine the extent to which Medicare payments for anesthesia services were lower than private payments across Medicare payment localities in 2004, we used anesthesia service claims data from two billing companies that bill and track payments from private payers and Medicare and calculated payments by payer for services provided by anesthesiologists alone at the Medicare payment locality level. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005 Medicare paid over $1.4 billion for anesthesia services. These services are generally provided by anesthesia practitioners, such as anesthesiologists and certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs). A government-sponsored study found that Medicare payments for anesthesia services are lower than private payments. Congress is concerned that this difference may create regional discrepancies in the supply of anesthesia practitioners, and asked GAO to explore this issue. GAO examined (1) the extent to which Medicare payments for anesthesia services were lower than private payments across Medicare payment localities in 2004, (2) whether the supply of anesthesia practitioners across Medicare payment localities in 2004 was related to the differences between Medicare and private payments for anesthesia services or the concentration of Medicare beneficiaries, and (3) compensation levels for anesthesia practitioners in 2005 and trends in graduate training. GAO used claims data from two anesthesia service billing companies that bill private insurance payers and Medicare to calculate payments by payer for seven anesthesia services in 41 Medicare payment localities. GAO also used data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and other sources to determine practitioner supply and Medicare beneficiary concentration in 87 Medicare payment localities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that in 2004 average Medicare payments for a set of seven anesthesia services provided by anesthesiologists alone were 67 percent lower than average private insurance payments in 41 Medicare payment localities--geographic areas established by CMS to account for geographic variations in the relative costs of providing physician services. In 2004, there was no correlation between the overall supply of anesthesia practitioners--that is, the total number of both anesthesiologists and CRNAs per 100,000 people--and either the difference between Medicare and private insurance payments for anesthesia services or the concentration of Medicare beneficiaries in the Medicare payment localities included in GAO's analyses. However, when GAO examined the supply of anesthesiologists and CRNAs separately, GAO found correlations between practitioner supply and payment differences and practitioner supply and beneficiary concentration. Specifically, GAO found that in 2004, the supply of CRNAs tended to decrease as the difference between Medicare and private insurance payments for anesthesia services increased in 41 Medicare payment localities. GAO also found that in 2004 the supply of anesthesiologists tended to decrease as the concentration of Medicare beneficiaries increased across 87 Medicare payment localities, while the supply of CRNAs tended to increase as the concentration of Medicare beneficiaries increased across these Medicare payment localities. For 2005, compensation for anesthesia practitioners was reported to compare favorably with other practitioners, according to information from medical group practices from across the country that responded to a survey of Medical Group Management Association (MGMA) member organizations. The 2005 median annual compensation for general anesthesiologists--approximately $354,240--was over 10 percent higher than the median annual compensation for specialists and over twice the compensation for generalists. For 2005, MGMA-reported median annual compensation for CRNAs-approximately $131,400--was over 40 percent higher than the MGMA-reported median annual compensation for either nurse midwives or nurse practitioners and over 35 percent higher than the MGMA-reported median annual compensation for physician assistants. The number of anesthesiology residency positions offered through the National Resident Matching Program and the number of nurse anesthesia graduates have increased in recent years. CMS stated that the study provided a good summary of information collected from a variety of sources on anesthesia payments and the supply of anesthesia practitioners. |
gao_GAO-04-250 | gao_GAO-04-250_0 | However, at their fifth ministerial conference held in Cancun, Mexico, from September 10 to 14, 2003, WTO ministers were neither able to achieve these goals nor bridge wide differences on individual negotiating issues. The Doha Round promised to be the most comprehensive round of global trade negotiations yet, involving a commitment to further liberalize trade, update trade rules, and further integrate developing countries into the world economy. For example, many developing nations consider agriculture their number one priority and have been unwilling to make offers to open up their services markets until they see more progress on agricultural reform. Differences on Key Issues Remain Unresolved after the Cancun Ministerial
The Cancun Ministerial Conference failed to resolve substantive differences on key issues: agriculture (including cotton), the “Singapore issues,” market access for nonagricultural goods, services, and development issues that included special and differential treatment for developing countries. However, several WTO members indicated that the reforms were not ambitious enough. The United States and other developed countries were pushing for substantial cuts in tariffs and wanted the high overall tariffs of key developing countries like India and Brazil to come down. The failure to make progress in resolving the major substantive issues at Cancun left the Doha Round in limbo and resulted in a major setback that will make attaining an overall world trade agreement by January 1, 2005, more difficult, according to WTO Director General Supachai and key WTO member country representatives. Several Factors Cited in the Talks’ Collapse
According to government officials, trade negotiations observers, authoritative reports, and GAO observations and analysis, several other factors contributed to the Cancun meeting’s collapse. Competing visions and goals for the Doha Round, particularly between developed and developing countries, and a high-profile initiative on cotton, fueled North-South tensions. Meanwhile, the WTO’s cumbersome decision-making process did not lend itself to building consensus. No Agreed Starting Point for Discussion
Adding to the complexity of the task, the Cancun ministerial began without an agreed-upon text as a starting point for discussion. The Chairman’s text did not mention the elimination of subsidies but instead suggested that West African countries diversify out of cotton. Additional GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance and the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means asked us to analyze (1) the overall status of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) negotiations on the eve of the WTO’s ministerial conference at Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003; (2) the key issues for the Cancun Ministerial Conference and how they were dealt with at Cancun; and (3) the factors that influenced the outcome of the Cancun Ministerial Conference. It includes frameworks for modalities in agriculture and nonagricultural market access as well as proposed modalities on each of the Singapore issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Trade ministers from 146 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), representing 93 percent of global commerce, convened in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003. Their goal was to provide direction for ongoing trade negotiations involving a broad set of issues that included agriculture, nonagricultural market access, services, and special treatment for developing countries. These negotiations, part of the global round of trade liberalizing talks launched in November 2001 at Doha, Qatar, are an important means of providing impetus to the world's economy. The round was supposed to be completed by January 1, 2005. However, the Cancun Ministerial Conference ultimately collapsed without ministers reaching agreement on any of the key issues. GAO was asked to analyze (1) the divisions on key issues for the Cancun Ministerial Conference and how they were dealt with at Cancun and (2) the factors that influenced the outcome of the Cancun Ministerial Conference.
What GAO Found
Ministers attending the September 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference remained sharply divided on handling key issues: agricultural reform, adding new subjects for WTO commitments, nonagricultural market access, services (such as financial and telecommunications services), and special and differential treatment for developing countries. Many participants agreed that attaining agricultural reform was essential to making progress on other issues. However, ministers disagreed on how each nation would cut tariffs and subsidies. Key countries rejected as inadequate proposed U.S. and European Union reductions in subsidies, but the U.S. and EU felt key developing nations were not contributing to reform by agreeing to open their markets. Ministers did not assuage West African nations' concerns about disruption in world cotton markets: The United States and others saw requests for compensation as inappropriate and tied subsidy cuts to attaining longer-term agricultural reform. Unconvinced of the benefits, many developing countries resisted new subjects--particularly investment and competition (antitrust) policy. Lowering tariffs to nonagricultural goods offered promise of increasing trade for both developed and developing countries, but still divided them. Services and special treatment engendered less confrontation, but still did not progress in the absence of the compromises that were required to achieve a satisfactory balance among the WTO's large and increasingly diverse membership. Several other factors contributed to the impasse at Cancun. Among them were a complex conference agenda; no agreed-upon starting point for the talks; a large number of participants, with shifting alliances; competing visions of the talks' goals; and North-South tensions that made it difficult to bridge wide divergences on issues. WTO decision-making procedures proved unable to build the consensus required to attain agreement. Thus, completing the Doha Round by the January 2005 deadline is in jeopardy. |
gao_GAO-11-383 | gao_GAO-11-383_0 | As shown in figure 3 , FEMA announced in March 2010 that TFER would not continue past the pilot stage, but allowed the pilot states to draw down the remaining TFER funds and continue to complete initiatives started under TFER through August 2011. FEMA Implemented Some, but Not All Elements of Sound Management Practices in Its Administration of the TFER Pilot Program, and Does Not Have Policy Guidance on Developing Pilot Programs
FEMA developed program objectives and a data collection plan—elements of sound management practices—but did not implement other elements of sound management practices, such as documenting standards for determining the program’s success and did not always follow its stated processes and procedures for TFER. However, officials in four states reported that it would have been helpful if FEMA had provided more guidance on plan development. FEMA Took Steps to Collect and Analyze Data from States to Evaluate TFER, but Did Not Always Include Elements of Sound Management Practices
FEMA developed a data collection plan but did not reliably collect data for the pilot evaluation, and FEMA did not develop a data analysis plan to describe how it would track TFER’s performance and evaluate its effectiveness based on standards to determine program performance. FEMA administered the TFER pilot program, but other key stakeholders in federal disaster response, such as the pilot states and DOD, could benefit from the results of FEMA’s evaluation of the TFER pilot program. In the absence of this, FEMA does not have a systematic approach for designing, administering, and evaluating such programs. By developing and implementing policy guidance that includes sound management practices, FEMA could be better positioned to ensure its pilot programs meet their intended goals. All Pilot States Have Made Progress in Addressing the Pilot Program Objectives, but No State Has Fully Addressed All Three Objectives
All five states have taken steps to follow FEMA’s TFER Information Package and TFER Evaluation Criteria document to address the TFER pilot program’s three objectives—develop plans, build relationships, and document lessons learned—and these efforts are ongoing. Second, all five states built relationships with stakeholders, including FEMA and state agencies, but coordination with DOD—specifically, with the Defense Coordinating Officers and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers—was limited. Two of Five States Have Made Substantial Progress in Developing Plans, and TFER Planners in All States Reported Using FEMA’s Planning Process to Develop Initiatives that Fill Gaps in State Catastrophic Planning
Four of the states are developing plans and all five pilot states reported they are using the planning process outlined in FEMA’s CPG 101. All Five States Made Progress in Building Relationships with Stakeholders such as FEMA and State Agencies, but Coordination with Federal Military Stakeholders Was Limited
relevant stakeholders. All Five Pilot States Have Made Some Progress in Documenting Lessons Learned, but Four States Have Not Exercised Plans to Evaluate TFER’s Effectiveness
All states have documented lessons learned to date, but four states have not exercised TFER plans to determine their effectiveness in the event of an emergency. For example, all five states considered the pilot a success; Hawaii, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and West Virginia officials reported that TFER allowed their states to conduct catastrophic planning that otherwise would not have occurred, and Washington reported that TFER advanced its catastrophic and emergency logistics planning by at least 2 years. Conclusions
Hurricane Katrina highlighted gaps in the nation’s preparedness to respond effectively to catastrophic incidents. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify the extent to which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) followed sound management practices in developing, administering, and evaluating the Task Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER) pilot program, we analyzed program guidance and other key documents including the TFER Pilot Information Package and the Guidance and Application Kit. We conducted site visits to all five participant states from June through September 2010. Our assessment of the extent to which each state addressed FEMA’s stated objectives for the TFER pilot is presented in appendix IV. 1. Please provide copies of completed / draft plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 highlighted gaps in the nation's preparedness to respond effectively to catastrophic incidents. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) designed the Task Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER) pilot program to advance and integrate state and federal catastrophic planning efforts. TFER, first envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), ran from September 2008 to September 2010, and FEMA provided the five participating states--Hawaii, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Washington, and West Virginia--with $350,000 each to develop plans, build relationships with stakeholders, and document lessons learned (i.e., TFER's stated objectives). As requested, GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) FEMA followed sound management practices in designing, administering, and evaluating TFER and (2) the five participating states satisfied TFER's stated objectives. GAO analyzed FEMA guidance, such as the TFER Pilot Information Package, conducted site visits to all five participant states, and met with relevant FEMA and DOD officials, to evaluate FEMA's management of TFER and the states' implementation of it.
What GAO Found
FEMA developed program objectives and procedures for administering the TFER pilot, but did not develop other elements of sound management practices in designing, administering, and evaluating pilot programs that GAO identified from its prior work and social science literature. FEMA developed objectives for the pilot, but did not document standards for determining the pilot's success. FEMA also provided resources such as funding, training, and support, but FEMA did not always follow the procedures it established for TFER. For example, FEMA did not consistently conduct biweekly conference calls with the states, and four states reported that it would have been helpful if FEMA provided more guidance. FEMA did not develop a data analysis plan, which could have better ensured FEMA collected data on the extent to which the pilot states coordinated with key stakeholders and provided reasonable assurance that FEMA conducted a systematic assessment of TFER using comparable data across the five pilot states. In Spring 2010, FEMA announced TFER would not continue past the pilot stage before evaluating TFER on its merits in strengthening and advancing state catastrophic planning, but FEMA allowed the states to draw down the remaining TFER funds and continue to complete initiatives started under TFER through August 2011. GAO previously reported in April 2009 that FEMA faced challenges in assessing pilot program data, and FEMA officials reported the agency does not have pilot program policy guidance. In the absence of this, FEMA lacks a systematic approach to developing, administering, and evaluating pilot programs. FEMA could better ensure other pilot programs meet their intended goals by developing policies and guidance that include sound management practices. All five states have taken steps to follow FEMA's guidance to address TFER's objectives, but no state has fully addressed them all. First, two of the five states have completed draft catastrophic plans, and all five states reported following FEMA's planning process. Second, all five states built relationships with stakeholders such as state agencies and FEMA, but state officials said coordination with DOD--a key federal stakeholder who may be called upon to assist in disaster response--was limited. State officials reported not coordinating with DOD because they did not have draft plans for DOD officials to review. Third, all states have documented lessons learned to date, but four states have not exercised TFER plans to determine their effectiveness in the event of an emergency.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA develop policies and guidance that follow sound management practices for future pilot programs, and share TFER results with stakeholders. FEMA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-691T | gao_GAO-12-691T_0 | Background
The four major federal land management agencies—BLM, the Forest Service, FWS, and NPS—manage their land and resources in accordance with their respective missions and authorities. For our 2011 report, we examined over 100 data elements that fall into three broad categories: (1) information on federal land and the resources the agencies manage, (2) revenues generated from selected activities on federal land, and (3) information on federal land subject to selected land use designations. The five agencies may collect other data related to land management that were not included in this review. Federal land use designations. Extent to Which Data Elements Are Collected by the Five Agencies Varied
The five agencies varied in the extent to which they collected the over 100 land and resources, revenue, and federal land use designation data elements that we queried them about. These 4 elements related to total surface acres managed, total acres managed within each state, the number of special use permits generated for filming activities on federal land, and the number of cultural and historic sites listed on the National Register of Historic Places. In contrast, none of the agencies collected information for 33 data elements that we asked them about, such as the percent of total acres under oil, gas, or coal leases that have surface disturbance or where the surface disturbance has been reclaimed, or information on the potential quantities of oil, gas, and coal resources on federal land. Agency officials cited various reasons why their agencies did not collect certain information, such as they believed another federal agency collected it, it was inconsistent with the agency’s mission, or they lacked the authority or resources to do so. Approximately Three- Quarters of the Data Elements Collected Are Stored in a Primary Agency Data System
When information was collected by the five agencies, it was more often stored in a primary agency data system—a centralized electronic data system maintained at an agencywide level—than in other formats. For example, we queried each agency about 57 federal land and resources data elements, and while the number of data elements each agency collected varied significantly, ranging from 3 to 22, the majority of the information that was collected was stored in a primary agency data system. BLM collected 22 federal land and resource data elements, and 15 of these elements were stored in a primary agency data system. Similarly, we asked each agency about 35 specific revenue data elements, and again while the number of data elements each agency collected varied significantly, ranging from 6 to 22, the majority of the information that was collected was stored in a primary agency data system. Less than Half of the Agency Data Stored in Primary Agency Data Systems Were Assessed to Be Potentially Reliable
We assessed the potential reliability of the data elements that the five agencies collected and determined that less than half of the data elements stored in a primary agency data system were potentially reliable. Generally, we assessed data elements as potentially reliable when information about the completeness and accuracy of a specific data element provided high assurance of its reliability. It is important to note that we assessed the potential reliability of these data elements for a given period of time, and additional analysis would be needed to determine the reliability of specific data elements for specific purposes. Reasons why these data were found to be potentially unreliable included concerns about the accuracy and completeness of the data and internal controls for data quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government manages about 650 million acres, or 29 percent, of the 2.27 billion acres of U.S. land. Four land management agenciesthe Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the National Park Service (NPS) in the Department of the Interior (Interior), and the Forest Service, in the Department of Agriculturemanage about 95 percent of these federal acres. Interiors Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) manages another 1 percent of these acres. The five agencies collect certain data to help manage federal lands under their jurisdiction.
This testimony summarizes GAOs findings from G AO-11-337, a report issued in April 2011. In this report, GAO reviewed the extent to which the five agencies collect certain federal land and resource data (referred to as data elements), how these data elements are stored, and their potential reliability. GAO included over 100 data elements at each agency in its analysis. These elements can be categorized as information on (1) federal land and the resources the five agencies manage, (2) revenues generated from selected activities on these lands, and (3) federal land subject to selected land use designations, such as wilderness areas.
What GAO Found
The five agencies varied in the extent to which they collected the over 100 land and resources, revenue, and federal land use designation data elements that GAO asked them about. Specifically, all five agencies collected data on four basic data elements, which related to total surface acres managed, total acres managed within each state, the number of special use permits generated for filming activities on federal land, and the number of cultural and historic sites listed on the National Register of Historic Places. In contrast, none of them collected information for 33 other data elements, such as the percent of total acres under oil, gas, or coal leases that have surface disturbance or where the surface disturbance has been reclaimed, or information on the potential quantities of oil, gas, and coal resources on federal land. Agency officials cited various reasons why the agencies did not collect certain information, such as believing another federal agency collected it, it was inconsistent with the agencys mission, or they lacked the authority or resources to do so.
When an agency collected information, it was usually stored in a primary agency data systema centralized electronic data system maintained at an agencywide level. For example, GAO queried each agency about 57 federal land and resources data elements, and while the number of data elements each agency collected varied significantly, ranging from 3 to 22, the majority of the information that was collected was stored in a primary agency data system. Similarly, GAO asked each agency about 35 specific revenue data elements, and again while the number of data elements each agency collected varied significantly, ranging from 6 to 22, the majority of the information that was collected was stored in a primary agency data system. When the agencies collected information but did not store it in a primary agency data system, it was available in other formats such as paper files, land use plans, or other agency documents and files that may have been located in multiple field locations.
GAO assessed the potential reliability of the data elements that the five agencies collected and determined that less than half of the data elements stored in a primary agency data system were potentially reliable. Generally, data elements were assessed as potentially reliable when information about the completeness and accuracy of a specific data element provided high assurance of its reliability. It is important to note that GAO assessed the potential reliability of these data elements for a given period of time, and additional analysis would be needed to determine the reliability of specific data elements for specific purposes. Among the reasons some of these data were assessed to be potentially unreliable were insufficient information about the accuracy and completeness of data elements and lack of internal controls for data quality.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made no recommendation in its 2011 report and is making no new recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-03-409 | gao_GAO-03-409_0 | However, the act limited the agencies’ initial penalty adjustments to 10 percent of the penalty amounts. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to determine (1) whether, as of June 30, 2002, agencies with penalties covered by the Inflation Adjustment Act had made the required penalty adjustments and (2) whether provisions in the act have prevented agencies from keeping their penalties in pace with inflation. As of June 2002, 16 of 80 federal agencies with civil penalties covered by the act had not adjusted any of their penalties for inflation. Also, 19 of the 64 agencies that made initial adjustments had not made required subsequent adjustments for eligible penalties, and several other agencies made the adjustments incorrectly. When the Inflation Adjustment Act was enacted in 1996, Congress did not give any federal agency the authority or responsibility to monitor agencies’ compliance with the act or to provide guidance to agencies on how the act should be implemented. The resultant “inflation gap” cannot be corrected under this statutory authority through subsequent adjustments and, in fact, grows with each adjustment. Also, the act’s requirements on how the penalty adjustments should be calculated and rounded prevents agencies from capturing all of the inflation that occurs between adjustments, and can prevent agencies from increasing certain penalties until inflation increases by 45 percent or more. CPI Lag Reduces Amount of Inflation That Can Be Considered
When determining whether adjustments to their penalties are permitted, the Inflation Adjustment Act requires agencies to compare the CPI from June of the year preceding the adjustment with the CPI in June of the year in which the penalty was “last set or adjusted pursuant to law.” Therefore, if an agency made its first round of penalty adjustments in October 1996 and examined those penalties in October 2000 to determine if further adjustments were warranted, the agency would have to compare the CPI for June 1996 with the CPI for June 1999—not the most current CPI data available or even the most recent June CPI data. Conclusions
Civil monetary penalties are an important element of regulatory enforcement. Suitably severe maximum penalties allow agencies to punish willful and egregious violators appropriately and serve as a deterrent to future violations. Therefore, at recent rates of inflation, agencies may not be able to readjust their penalties for 15 years or more after their initial adjustments. More than 100 of these exempted penalties have declined in value by 50 percent or more since Congress last set them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Civil penalties are an important element of regulatory enforcement, allowing agencies to punish violators appropriately and to serve as a deterrent to future violations. In 1996, Congress enacted the Inflation Adjustment Act to require agencies to adjust certain penalties for inflation. GAO assessed federal agencies' compliance with the act and whether provisions in the act have prevented agencies from keeping their penalties in pace with inflation.
What GAO Found
As of June 2002, 16 of 80 federal agencies with civil penalties covered by the Inflation Adjustment Act had not made the required initial adjustments to their penalties. Nineteen other agencies had not made required subsequent adjustments, and several other agencies had made incorrect adjustments. The act does not give any agency the authority to monitor compliance or to provide guidance to agencies. More important, several provisions of the act have prevented some agencies from fully adjusting their penalties for inflation. One provision limited the agencies' first adjustments to 10 percent of the penalty amounts, even if the penalties were decades old and hundreds of percent behind inflation. The resultant "inflation gap" can never be corrected under the statute and grows with each subsequent adjustment. Also, the act's calculation and rounding procedures require agencies to lose a year of inflation each time they adjust their penalties, and can prevent some agencies from making adjustments until inflation increases by 45 percent or more (i.e., 15 years or more at recent rates of inflation). Finally, the act exempts penalties under certain statutes from its requirements entirely. Consequently, more than 100 exempted penalties have declined in value by 50 percent or more since Congress last set them. |
gao_GAO-04-233 | gao_GAO-04-233_0 | The United States has already begun negotiating four more bilateral or subregional FTAs with Central America, the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), Australia, and Morocco. FTAs.) Country readiness. Economic/Commercial benefit. Benefits to the broader trade liberalization strategy. Compatibility with U.S. interests. Congressional/Private-sector support. U.S. government resource constraints. As illustrated below, the FTA selections made to date in 2002-03 primarily reflect U.S. trade strategy, foreign policy, and foreign economic goals. Central American Free Trade Agreement. The Administration Has Enhanced Its Interagency Process for Assessing Potential FTA Partners
The selection of FTA partners has evolved from a limited high-level consultation to a more systematic and deliberative process involving more U.S. officials. USTR keeps the Congress apprised of potential FTA partners and routinely considers the Congress’s views in making selections. Each group in turn is to use decision papers to assess potential FTA partners and make recommendations for consideration at the next level, all the way up to the President. Recommendation for Executive Action
In light of USTR’s limited resources and management systems to track those resources, we recommend that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative work with other key trade agencies to develop more systematic data and plans for allocating staff and resources across the full U.S. trade agenda, including FTAs and other negotiating priorities. State and Treasury did not provide comments. In response, we (1) provided information about the factors that influence the selection of FTA partners and described how they were developed; (2) analyzed the interagency process for selecting FTA partners, including how the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) coordinates the views of key agencies and consults with the Congress and business and nongovernmental groups; and (3) assessed how the executive branch makes decisions regarding the availability and allocation of resources to FTAs and other trade priorities, such as the regional talks of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the multilateral talks at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Considerations in FTA Partner Selection in FTA Partner Selection
USTR highlighted several reasons why Australia was selected as an FTA partner in 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
Free trade agreements (FTA) involve trade liberalization between the United States and selected countries or regions and are also expected to provide economic and other benefits. GAO was asked to review how potential FTA partners are selected, in view of the increased number of FTAs and their growing importance to U.S. policy. Specifically, GAO (1) provided information about the factors influencing the selection of FTA partners, (2) analyzed the interagency process for selecting FTA partners, and (3) assessed how the executive branch makes decisions about the availability and allocation of resources to FTAs.
What GAO Found
The Trade Representative used 13 factors in selecting four potential FTA partners in 2002 (Australia; the Central American Free Trade Area, a subregional group of five Central American countries; the Southern Africa Customs Union of five countries; and Morocco). Subsequently, selected executive branch agencies decided to use six broad factors--country readiness, economic/commercial benefit, benefits to the broader trade liberalization strategy, compatibility with U.S. interests, congressional/private-sector support, and U.S. government resource constraints. These decisions are not mechanical, and the factors cited most often regarding the selected FTA partners primarily reflect U.S. trade strategy, foreign policy, and foreign economic development goals. The interagency process for selecting FTA partners now involves four interagency groups that use decision papers to assess potential FTA partners and make recommendations that eventually go to the president. This new process is more systematic and inclusive than the process previously used. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) reports that it routinely considers the Congress's views in making selections. Decisions about FTA partners are made with little systematic data or planning regarding trade-offs with other trade priorities, even though FTAs are resource intensive. USTR staff and travel funds are heavily committed to FTAs, and USTR relies on specialists at other agencies as well. As more FTAs are contemplated, existing mechanisms may prove inadequate to the task of aggressively pursuing a bilateral FTA agenda while remaining engaged in regional and multilateral forums. |
gao_GAO-09-749 | gao_GAO-09-749_0 | The requirement for no fewer than 1,200 full-time-equivalent staff, including 900 full-time law enforcement staff in DHS’s 2008 appropriations act was effective for 2008. This same requirement for FPS was included in DHS’s fiscal year 2009 appropriations act, and FPS met this staffing level in April 2009, with 1,239 employees on board, including 929 law enforcement staff, by hiring 187 new LESOs. However, officials told us that FPS was not able to meet the July 31, 2008, mandate because of the challenges related to shifting its priorities from downsizing its workforce to increasing it to comply with the mandate, inexperience working with DHS’s shared service center, and delays in its candidate screening process. According to FPS, depending on class availability, it expects to have all new hire and converted LESOs fully trained by September 2009. FPS Does Not Have A Strategic Human Capital Plan to Guide Its Current and Future Workforce Planning Efforts
FPS currently does not have a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts. Additionally, the lack of a current human capital plan has contributed to inconsistent approaches in how FPS regions and headquarters are managing human capital activities for the agency. FPS officials in three of the five of the regions we visited said they implement their own strategies for managing their workforce, including processes for performance feedback, training, and mentoring. FPS’s Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) system is intended to address some of these concerns, but this project has met with numerous delays, and according to FPS officials, data will not be available until fiscal year 2011. FPS’s Customers Have Mixed Views on Its Services
FPS Customers Generally Had Mixed Views about Its Law Enforcement and Physical Security Services, but Some Could Not Evaluate FPS Services
On the basis of our generalizable survey of building security committee chairs and designated officials in facilities protected by FPS, we found that FPS customers had mixed views about the law enforcement and physical security services they paid FPS to provide. Overall, survey results showed that 58 percent were satisfied or very satisfied with FPS’s current level of service, 7 percent were dissatisfied, 18 percent were neutral, and 17 percent were not able to comment on FPS’s current level of service. However, our survey also showed that some of FPS’s customers could not evaluate specific services. Our survey also suggests that the communication between FPS and its customers about roles and responsibilities is unclear, in part because on average one third of FPS’s customers could not comment on how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with FPS’s level of communication on its services, as shown in table 3. Respondents that provided comments on our survey indicated they could not evaluate FPS’s services mainly because they had little to no interaction with FPS. FPS Does Not Have Complete and Accurate Customer Contact Data to Increase Customer Awareness about Services
Although FPS is responsible for the protection of over 9,000 facilities owned and leased by GSA, it does not have complete and accurate contact data for the customers in these facilities who are responsible for working with FPS to identify security issues and implement security standards for their facility, typically the building security committee chair or a designated official. While FPS acknowledges that it needs to improve customer service and has developed some initiatives to increase customer education and outreach, it will continue to face challenges implementing these initiatives without complete and accurate customer contact information. Recommendations for Executive Action
To facilitate effective strategic management of its workforce, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of FPS to take the following actions: improve how FPS headquarters collects data on its workforce’s knowledge, skills, and abilities to help it better manage and understand current and future workforce needs, and use these data in the development and implementation of a long-term strategic human capital plan that addresses key principles for effective strategic workforce planning, including establishing programs, policies, and practices that will enable the agency to recruit, develop, and retain a qualified workforce. Specifically, our objectives were to provide information (1) on the extent that FPS has hired and trained new staff to address its mandated staffing levels, (2) on the extent that FPS has developed a strategic human capital plan to manage its current and future workforce needs, and (3) on the satisfaction of FPS’s customers with its services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Protective Service (FPS), as part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for providing security services to about 9,000 federal facilities. In recent years, FPS downsized its workforce from 1,400 to about 1,000 full-time employees. In 2008, GAO expressed concerns about the impact that downsizing had on FPS's mission, and in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 Congress mandated FPS maintain no fewer than 1,200 employees. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) FPS has hired and trained new staff to address its mandated staffing levels, (2) FPS has developed a strategic human capital plan to manage its current and future workforce needs, and (3) FPS's customers are satisfied with the services it provides. To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant laws and documents, interviewed officials from FPS and other federal agencies, and conducted a generalizable survey of FPS's customers.
What GAO Found
FPS did not meet its fiscal year 2008 mandated deadline of increasing its staffing level to no fewer than 1,200 full-time employees by July 31, 2008. This same mandate relating to FPS's staffing was included in DHS's fiscal year 2009 appropriations act. Although FPS currently has over 1,200 employees on board, it did not meet this mandate until April 2009, because of challenges in shifting its priorities from downsizing its workforce to increasing it, inexperience working with DHS's hiring processes, and delays in the candidate screening process. Also, not all of FPS's new law enforcement security officers have completed all required training. According to FPS officials, it expects to have all new hires fully trained by September 2009. FPS does not have a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts, including effective processes for training, retention, and staff development. Instead, FPS has developed a short-term hiring plan that does not include key human capital principles, such as determining an agency's optimum staffing needs. The lack of a human capital plan has contributed to inconsistent approaches in how FPS regions and headquarters are managing human capital activities. For example, FPS officials in some of the regions GAO visited said they implement their own procedures for managing their workforce, including processes for performance feedback, training, and mentoring. Additionally, FPS does not collect data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities. These elements are necessary for successful workforce planning activities, such as identifying and filling skill gaps and succession planning. FPS is working on developing and implementing a data management system that will provide it with these data, but this system has experienced significant delays and will not be available for use until 2011 at the earliest. On the basis of GAO's generalizable survey of FPS customers, customers had mixed views about some of the services they pay FPS to provide. Survey results showed that 58 percent were satisfied, 7 percent were dissatisfied, 18 percent were neutral, and 17 percent were not able to comment on FPS's overall services. The survey also showed that many of FPS's customers did not rely on FPS for services. For example, in emergency situations, about 82 percent of FPS's customers primarily rely on other agencies such as local law enforcement, while 18 percent rely on FPS. The survey also suggests that the roles and responsibilities of FPS and its customers are unclear, primarily because on average about one-third of FPS's customers, i.e., tenant agencies, could not comment on how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with FPS's level of communication on its services, partly because they had little to no interaction with FPS officers. Although FPS plans to implement education and outreach initiatives to improve customer service, it will face challenges because of its lack of complete and accurate contact data. Complete and accurate contact information for its customers is critical for information sharing and an essential component of any customer service initiative. |
gao_GAO-12-113 | gao_GAO-12-113_0 | The Navy’s Study May Not Provide a Sufficient Basis for a Sound, Long-Term Acquisition Program
The Radar/Hull Study may not provide a sufficient analytical basis given the magnitude of the Navy’s acquisition decision, including up to 43 destroyers (22 of which will be in the Flight III configuration and 21 in a later Flight IV configuration, and both may require significant ship redesign), a new radar, and major combat system upgrades. Other than assessing the BMD capability that Aegis currently possesses and the absence of BMD capability in TSCE, the Navy evaluated Aegis and TSCE by focusing on the amount of new software code that it estimated would be required to integrate the radars and to effectively perform IAMD and the costs and risks involved in this development. Radar/Hull Study Did Not Include a Robust Trade-off Analysis to Inform a Sound Decision
The Radar/Hull Study did not include a robust trade-off analysis for the variants studied to support the Navy’s DDG 51 selection decision, which is currently planned to result in an acquisition of 22 modified Flight III DDG 51s and a further 21 modified DDG 51s known as Flight IV. Restart Ships are Costlier than Recent DDG 51s and Face a Challenging Combat System Upgrade
According to the Navy and shipbuilders, the changes to the restarted DDG 51’s hull and mechanical systems appear less substantial than previous modifications to earlier DDG 51s. Although the Navy plans to install and test this upgrade on an older DDG 51 (DDG 53) prior to installation on DDG 113, delays in these efforts could pose risks to a timely delivery in support of DDG 113 and ability to mitigate risk. Even if current testing goes as planned, the Navy has not planned for realistic operational testing necessary to ensure that the Aegis upgrades are capable of performing IAMD against multiple ballistic and cruise missile targets. Combat System Upgrade Has Faced Delays, and Key Testing Is Undefined
A major change for the restart ships is a significant upgrade to the Aegis combat system currently under way. Contractor officials told us that they plan to deliver the combat system hardware to the shipyard for installation on DDG 113 in May 2013. While the Navy is pursuing a thoughtful approach to AMDR development, it faces several significant technical challenges that may be difficult to overcome within the Navy’s current schedule. Further, the Navy’s choice of DDG 51 as the platform for AMDR limits the overall size of the radar to one that will be unable to meet the Navy’s desired (objective) IAMD capabilities. Navy Acquisition Approach for Flight III Not Commensurate with Risks
Costs of the lead Flight III ship will likely exceed current budget estimates. Beginning in 2019, the Navy will face significant constraints on its shipbuilding account as it starts procuring new ballistic missile submarines to replace the current Ohio class. The Navy currently estimates that this program will cost approximately $80.6 billion in procurement alone, with production spanning over a decade. Given the potential technology, design, and construction risks, and level of the investment, the current level of program oversight for DDG 51 Flight III may not be sufficient. Conduct a thorough AOA in accordance with DOD acquisition guidance for its future surface combatant program to include: (a) a range of representative threat environments developed in concert with the intelligence community; (b) results of its ongoing Flight III studies and full cost estimates in advance of awarding DDG 51 Flight III production contracts; (c) implications of the ability of the preferred ship to accommodate new technologies on future capabilities to determine the most suitable ship to carry AMDR and meet near-term IAMD requirements and provide a path to far-term capabilities; (d) implications on future fleet composition; and (e) an assessment of sensor netting—conducted in consultation with MDA and other cognizant DOD components—to determine the risks inherent in the sensor netting concept, potential current or planned programs that could be leveraged, and how sensor netting could realistically be integrated with the selected future surface combatant to assist in conducting BMD. We believe that this recommendation remains valid. To help ensure that the department makes a sound investment moving forward, Congress should consider directing the Secretary of Defense to: 1. require the Navy to submit a thorough, well-documented AOA for the its future surface combatant program that follows both DOD acquisition guidance and the elements outlined in our first recommendation prior to issuing solicitations for any detail design and construction contracts of DDG 51 Flight III ships; 2. elevate the ACAT status of the DDG 51 Flight III to an ACAT ID level if the decision is made to continue pursuing the program; and 3. include the lead DDG 51 Flight III ship in a multi-year procurement request only when the Navy has adequate knowledge about ship design, cost, and risk. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The overall objectives of this review were to assess (1) the Navy’s determination of the most appropriate platform to meet current and future surface combatant requirements; (2) the differences in cost, schedule, and design of the restart DDG 51 destroyers compared with previous ships, and the risks associated with the restart; and (3) the feasibility of the Navy’s plans for maturing and integrating new technologies into the future DDG 51 ships. We also reviewed the Operational Requirements Document for the DDG 1000 and the draft Capability Definition Document for the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). | Why GAO Did This Study
After nearly a decade and almost $10 billion in development on Zumwalt class destroyers, the Navy changed its acquisition approach from procuring Zumwalts to restarting production of Arleigh Burke class destroyers (DDG 51) and building a new version, known as Flight III. As requested, GAO reviewed the Navys plans for DDG 51 and missile defense capabilities by (1) evaluating how the Navy determined the most appropriate platform to meet surface combatant requirements; (2) identifying and analyzing differences in design, cost, and schedule of the restart ships compared with previous ships; and (3) assessing the feasibility of Navy plans for maturing and integrating new technologies and capabilities. GAO analyzed Navy and contractor documentation and interviewed Navy, contractor, and other officials.
What GAO Found
The Navy relied on its 2009 Radar/Hull Study as the basis to select DDG 51 over DDG 1000 to carry the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) as its preferred future surface combatanta decision that may result in a procurement of up to 43 destroyers and cost up to $80 billion over the next several decades. The Radar/Hull Study may not provide a sufficient analytical basis for a decision of this magnitude. Specifically, the Radar/Hull Study:
focuses on the capability of the radars it evaluated, but does not fully evaluate the capabilities of different shipboard combat systems and ship options under consideration,
does not include a thorough trade-off analysis that would compare the relative costs and benefits of different solutions under consideration or provide robust insight into all cost alternatives, and
assumes a significantly reduced threat environment from other Navy analyses, which allowed radar performance to seem more effective than it may actually be against more sophisticated threats.
The Navys planned production schedules of the restart DDG 51 ships are comparable with past performance and officials told us that hull and mechanical systems changes are modest, but these ships will cost more than previous DDG 51s. A major upgrade to the ships combat system software also brings several challenges that could affect the restart ships, due in part to a key component of this upgrade that has already faced delays. Further delays could postpone delivery to the shipyard for the first restart ship, and could also jeopardize the Navys plan to install and test the upgrade on an older DDG 51 prior to installation on the restart ships. This first installation would serve to mitigate risk, and if it does not occur on time the Navy will be identifying, analyzing, and resolving any combat system problems on the first restart ship. Further, the Navy does not plan to fully test new capabilities until after certifying the upgrade as combat-ready, and has not planned for realistic operational testing necessary to fully demonstrate its integrated cruise and ballistic missile defense performance.
The Navy faces significant technical risks with its new Flight III DDG 51 ships, and the current level of oversight may not be sufficient given these risks. The Navy is pursuing a reasonable risk mitigation approach to AMDR development, but it will be technically challenging. According to Navy analysis, selecting the DDG 51 hullform to carry AMDR requires significant redesign and reduces the ability of these ships to accommodate future systems. This decision also limits the radar size to one that will be at best marginally effective and incapable of meeting the Navys desired capabilities. The Navy may have underestimated the cost of Flight III, and its plan to include the lead ship in a multiyear procurement contract given the limited knowledge about the configuration and the design of the ship creates potential cost risk. Finally, the current level of oversight may not be commensurate with a program of this size, cost, and risk and could result in less information being available to decision makers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, including requiring the Navy to conduct thorough analyses of alternatives for its future surface combatant program and conduct realistic operational testing of the integrated missile defense capability of the DDG 51s upgrade, ensuring that the Navy does not include the lead Flight III ship in a multiyear procurement request, and raising the level of oversight for this program. DOD agreed with the recommendations to varying degrees, but generally did not offer specific actions to address them. GAO believes all recommendations remain valid and has included matters for congressional consideration to ensure the soundness of the Navys business case. |
gao_HEHS-98-158 | gao_HEHS-98-158_0 | 1). Thus, a discussion of SSA’s organizational culture and its impact on the financial integrity of the SSI program is addressed in chapter 2. We reported in 1987 that SSA’s agencywide operations had been heavily influenced by an organizational culture or value system that placed a greater emphasis on processing and paying claims than on controlling program costs or improving operational efficiency. But SSI program direction and problem resolution have been hindered by SSA’s continued reluctance to take a leadership role in SSI policy development before major program crises occur and the subsequent tendency to react to these crises through a series of often ad hoc and piecemeal initiatives. Program direction has been further impaired by a strategic planning process that has not sufficiently focused on the specific characteristics and needs of the SSI program and its recipients. Recent examples of SSA’s management approach include its reluctance to develop policy options to address problems associated with assessing the SSI eligibility of children and substance abusers, helping SSI recipients enter the workforce, and determining recipient living arrangements. SSA’s reluctance to take a more proactive policy development role was also evident in regard to the recent debate surrounding SSI eligibility for drug addicts and alcoholics (DA&A). We have also documented SSA’s reluctance to play a leadership role in devising a return-to-work plan. As required by the Results Act, SSA developed and submitted its current strategic plan in 1997. Without a comprehensive strategy or plan for addressing specific SSI program problems, it is uncertain whether SSA will focus adequately on those areas that put SSI at the greatest risk or that corrective actions will be sustained over time. To a large extent, these long-standing problems and SSA’s inability to address them are attributable to an ingrained organizational culture that has historically placed a greater value on quickly processing and paying SSI claims than on controlling program costs, and a management approach that has been reluctant to address SSI program problems requiring long-term solutions and/or legislative change. However, our work suggests that SSA has not yet maximized its research and policy development role, nor has it developed adequate SSI program plans to serve as a blueprint for managing the program more strategically, focusing long-term program priorities and defining specific program goals. In implementing the Results Act, SSA recently committed to developing an SSI action plan in fiscal year 1998. However, we do not agree with SSA’s objection to developing specific performance measures to hold managers accountable for thoroughly verifying recipient information and combatting program fraud and abuse. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on the management problems associated with the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to a great extent, SSA's inability to address its most significant long-standing SSI problems is attributable to two underlying causes: (a) an organizational culture or value system that places a greater priority on processing and paying claims than on controlling program expenditures; and (b) a management approach characterized by SSA's reluctance to fulfill its policy development and planning role in advance of major program crises; (2) SSA's organizational culture has traditionally valued quickly processing and paying SSI benefit claims more highly than controlling program expenditures by ensuring that only eligible individuals receive benefits; (3) other important financial controls such as aggressively pursuing the recovery of overpaid funds and combatting SSI fraud have also often received inadequate attention; (4) SSI problem resolution and program direction have also been hindered by SSA's hesitance to take a leadership role in SSI research and policy development, and its tendency to react to resulting crises through a series of ad hoc initiatives; (5) SSA's management approach was most evident regarding its reluctance to play a leadership role in recent policy debates surrounding SSI eligibility for children and substance abusers, and its failure to devise a comprehensive strategy to help SSI recipients return to work; (6) program direction has been further impaired by SSA's reluctance to develop agencywide plans that adequately focus on the specific characteristics and needs of the SSI program and its recipients; (7) SSA's current plans do not adequately communicate SSI priorities, goals, and objectives to staff; (8) reversing how the SSI program has traditionally operated will require sustained and expanded attention to developing and promoting tighter payment controls, increasing SSA's role in SSI research and policy formulation, and a willingness to define a long-term vision and strategy for improving program performance; (9) recently, SSA has initiated several measures aimed at improving the financial integrity of the SSI program; (10) as required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, SSA also intends to develop a comprehensive SSI Action Plan in fiscal year 1998, which will serve as a blueprint for long-term program operations; and (11) however, such a plan has not yet been developed, and decisive action is needed to ensure that SSA will focus on those program areas that pose the greatest management challenges and that corrective actions will be implemented and sustained over time. |
gao_GAO-04-852 | gao_GAO-04-852_0 | Background
The growth in state prekindergarten programs has occurred for various reasons, but three frequently cited reasons are (1) evidence of the importance of early childhood to later development, (2) the high rate of labor force participation by mothers of young children, and (3) increased concern over school readiness and subsequent achievement. NIEER estimated that about 80 percent of children served by state prekindergarten programs were four-year-olds. Selected States Designed Expanded Prekindergarten Programs to Enroll Children Voluntarily at No Direct Cost to Parents, but Differed in Geographic Breadth and Other Key Features
In the four states visited—Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma—we found some similarities in prekindergarten programs. All four states’ prekindergarten programs were provided at no direct cost to parents—regardless of family income—and were offered on a voluntary basis; children’s enrollment was not mandatory. In addition, each program emphasized preparation for school and incorporated the delivery of prekindergarten services by community-based organizations as well as schools. The states also varied in their requirements for lead teachers, and two of the five state programs (New Jersey’s Abbott and Oklahoma) required teachers to be certified in early childhood education. In Oklahoma, local school districts received about $1,743 per child (54 percent of the full-day rate), and over half of the four-year-olds participating in the state’s prekindergarten program were enrolled in half-day programs during the 2002-03 school year. Some Program Features Had Potential Implications for Children’s Participation and Other Early Childhood Programs
Some prekindergarten design features had implications for children’s participation and early childhood programs in the four states we visited. Transportation and Program Hours May Have Implications for Participation
Program features, which varied across states and school districts, may have affected participation, particularly for children of low-income and working families. None of the four states required prekindergarten providers to transport all participating children. Officials from one Oklahoma school district told us that the combination of a half-day program coupled with the lack of transportation to and from the prekindergarten program reduced the participation of children from low-income and working families. Some providers who collaborated with the state prekindergarten programs in Georgia, New Jersey, and New York told us that they expanded their centers to serve more children of all ages—as some parents enrolled the younger siblings of their prekindergarten children in the same child care center. For example, in Georgia and New York, some Head Start grantees who provided prekindergarten services stated they were better able to serve children by leveraging state prekindergarten and Head Start funds. Few Data Available to Determine the Impact of State Prekindergarten Programs on Availability and Prices of Child Care
While some community-based providers were initially apprehensive about the potential impact of the widespread availability of states’ prekindergarten programs on the market for child care, we found few data to support this concern. For example, perhaps the number of providers would have increased even more had prekindergarten programs not been expanded. Some Data Have Been Collected on Outcomes for Participating Children
Some data have been collected on outcomes for participating children, but little is known about outcomes for their families. One study focused on the Tulsa School District and found that children who participated in the Tulsa prekindergarten program had significantly higher scores on several school readiness measures than children who did not participate in the program. Given that states have limited resources, an opportunity exists to engage community-based providers such as Head Start grantees and other early education and care providers in the coordinated delivery of additional prekindergarten services. | Why GAO Did This Study
For nearly 40 years, the federal government has played a role in providing early childhood development programs for children of low-income families through Head Start and other programs. Since 1980, the number of states with preschool programs has also significantly increased. While most of these programs have targeted children at risk of school failure, more recently, interest has grown in expanding these limited programs because of the growing concern about children's readiness for school and subsequent achievement. It has also been fueled by new research on early brain development that suggests the importance of early education and by the high rate of mothers in the workforce and their need for early childhood services. In this context, questions have arisen about how the various programs are coordinated and what lessons have been learned from broad-based state preschool efforts. This work focused on four states that have expanded their preschool programs to serve more children. In these states, GAO addressed (1) how prekindergarten programs were designed and funded, (2) the potential implications of these program features for children's participation and other programs that serve four year-olds, and (3) the outcome data that have been collected on participating children and families. To gather this information, GAO conducted site visits in four states--Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma.
What GAO Found
The expanded prekindergarten programs in Georgia, Oklahoma, New York, and New Jersey had some similarities in their design features. For instance, programs were offered at no direct cost to parents, regardless of family income, and each state incorporated some level of collaboration with community-based providers such as Head Start and large child care facilities. Some key differences in their design features also existed. For example, Georgia and Oklahoma had statewide programs providing prekindergarten services to over half of their four-year olds, while New York's and New Jersey's programs were more geographically targeted. States and school districts also varied in offering full- or half-day prekindergarten programs. States also varied in teacher qualifications, the percentage of prekindergarten children served by community-based providers, funding methods, and in the amount of funding per child. Some program features had potential implications for the participation of children and for early childhood programs. For example, none of the four states required providers to transport all children to and from prekindergarten, and many children were enrolled in half-day programs, which officials believed might have limited the participation of children from low-income and working families. Collaborations between programs and community-based organizations generally permitted rapid program expansion and were viewed as beneficial to early childhood programs. Finally, we found few data to determine the impact of state prekindergarten expansion on the availability or prices of child care. While some data were available on outcomes for children who participated in prekindergarten programs, less was known about their impacts on families. For example, a study in Oklahoma showed that children who participated made significant gains on several school readiness measures relative to a comparison group of unenrolled children. However, none of the four states had measured effects on families, such as parents' work effort. |
gao_GAO-11-87 | gao_GAO-11-87_0 | Recovery Act JAG Funds Are Awarded in Different Ways and Recipients Report Using Their Awards to Support Law Enforcement and Corrections Activities among Other Things
Recipients of Recovery Act JAG funding receive their money in one of two ways—either as a direct payment from BJA or as a pass-through from an SAA—and they reported using their funds primarily for law enforcement and corrections. According to state officials from our sample states, more than half of the funding that localities received as pass-through awards from their SAAs was obligated specifically for law enforcement and corrections support, while about a quarter of the funds that recipients of direct awards received was dedicated exclusively to law enforcement. Regardless of the source, officials in states and localities reported using Recovery Act JAG funds to preserve jobs and activities that without Recovery Act JAG funds would have been cut or eliminated; however, expenditure rates across states in our sample showed considerable variation. As of June 30, 2010, the SAAs and the directly funded localities in our sample expended over $270.7 million or about 26.4 percent of the total amount awarded. State Administering Agencies Cited Challenges Meeting Quarterly Recovery Act Reporting Time Frames
A majority of the SAA officials we interviewed said that workload demand and personnel shortages made meeting Recovery Act mandated deadlines within the prescribed reporting period difficult. States Reported Sharing Information and Promising Practices in a Variety of Ways and DOJ Encouraged This through a Number of Programs
All of the SAAs we contacted (14 of 14) reported that they generally shared Recovery Act JAG information, promising practices, or lessons learned with other states and localities using a variety of techniques. By including key attributes of successful performance measurement systems into its performance measure revisions, DOJ could facilitate accountability, be better positioned to monitor and assess results, and subsequently improve its grants management. For example, our analysis found that 1 of DOJ’s measures associated with evaluating personnel activities is the “percent of departments that report desired efficiency.” However, for this measure, DOJ’s guidance based on the definition provided in the performance measure lacks key data elements that would make the measure more clear—namely, which departments should be included in the measure or how states and localities should interpret “desired efficiency.”
In addition, officials we interviewed from 9 of the 14 SAAs in our sample stated that DOJ’s Recovery Act JAG performance measures were unclear. As a result, the Texas state data collection tool revised the performance measure for better context and asked for the “the number of other forms of training conducted during the reporting period and paid with ARRA JAG funds.”
Other state officials from Michigan and Georgia cited challenges in understanding what is being asked by the 13 measures listed under the activity type, “state and local initiatives.” In particular, one of these states noted confusion and lack of clarity related to the measure, “number of defined groups receiving services,” since in many instances their initiatives were associated with equipment purchases, and it would be difficult to determine who and how many benefited from a new computer system or the acquisition of new ammunition, for example. DOJ officials acknowledged that they have not verified the accuracy of states’ and localities’ self-reported performance data. In addition, by establishing a mechanism to verify accuracy of self-reported data, DOJ can better ensure reliability of information that is reported. By addressing attributes consistent with promising performance measurement practices as it works to revise its performance measures, DOJ could be better positioned to determine whether Recovery Act JAG recipients’ programs are used to support all seven JAG program purposes and are meeting DOJ and Recovery Act program goals. Recommendations
Recognizing that DOJ is already engaged in efforts to refine its Recovery Act JAG performance measures in the PMT, we recommend that the Acting Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance take the following two actions to better monitor Recovery Act JAG program performance and demonstrate results through use of this instrument: in revising the department’s Recovery Act JAG performance measures consider, as appropriate, key attributes of successful performance measurement systems, such as clarity, reliability, linkage, objectivity, and measurable targets; and develop a mechanism to validate the integrity of Recovery Act JAG recipients’ self-reported performance data. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report addresses the following four questions: (1) How are Recovery Act Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) funds awarded and how have recipients in selected states and localities used their awards? (2) What challenges, if any, have Recovery Act JAG recipients reported in complying with Recovery Act reporting requirements? (3) To what extent do states share promising practices related to the use and management of Recovery Act JAG funds, and how, if at all, does the Department of Justice (DOJ) encourage information sharing? To identify the extent to which DOJ’s performance measurement approach is consistent with promising practices to assess progress, we interviewed representatives from the 14 SAAs and 62 localities and asked them about their experience with the Performance Measurement Tool (PMT). | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) awarded nearly $2 billion in 4-year Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) funds to state and local governments for criminal justice activities. As requested, GAO examined: (1) how Recovery Act JAG funds are awarded and how recipients in selected states and localities used their awards; (2) challenges, if any, selected recipients reported in complying with Recovery Act reporting requirements; (3) the extent to which states shared promising practices related to use and management of funds, and how, if at all, DOJ encouraged information sharing; and (4) the extent to which DOJ's JAG Recovery Act performance measures were consistent with promising practices. GAO analyzed recipient spending and performance data submitted as of June 30, 2010; interviewed officials in a nonprobability sample of 14 states and 62 localities selected based on the amount of their awards, planned activities, and their reported project status; assessed 19 JAG performance measures against a set of key attributes; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Recipients of Recovery Act JAG funding in the 14 states GAO reviewed received more than $1 billion either through direct allocations from DOJ or through an indirect "pass-through" of funds that states originally received from the department. These recipients reported using their funds for a variety of purposes, though predominantly for law enforcement and corrections, which included equipment purchases or the hiring or retaining of personnel. More than half of the funding that state administering agencies (SAA) passed-through to localities was reported to be specifically for law enforcement and corrections activities, while localities receiving direct awards more often reported planning to use their funds for multiple types of criminal justice activities. Officials in all 14 states and 19 percent of localities in GAO's sample (12 of 62) said that without Recovery Act JAG funding, support for certain ongoing local law enforcement programs or activities would have been eliminated or cut. Overall, about $270 million or 26 percent of Recovery Act JAG funds had been reported as expended as of June 30, 2010, but the expenditure rates of funds awarded through SAAs showed considerable variation, ranging from 5 to 41 percent of SAA's total awards. State officials cited challenges in meeting quarterly Recovery Act reporting time frames. Officials from the majority of states in GAO's sample said that workload demands and personnel shortages made meeting Recovery Act deadlines within the prescribed reporting period difficult; however, all states reported that they were able to do so. States reported sharing information and promising practices related to JAG activities in a variety of ways and DOJ encouraged this sharing through a number of programs. More than half of state agencies in GAO's sample generally reported sharing promising practices or lessons learned on topics, such as grant management and administration, with other states and localities through participating in law enforcement and government association conferences, DOJ training, and Web postings, among other methods. DOJ established new performance measures to assess the Recovery Act JAG program and is working to refine them; however, these measures lack key attributes of successful performance assessment systems that GAO has previously identified, such as clarity, reliability, a linkage to strategic or programmatic goals, and objectivity and measurability of targets. Including such attributes could facilitate accountability and management's ability to meaningfully assess and monitor Recovery Act JAG's results. DOJ officials acknowledge that weaknesses exist and they plan to improve their performance measures. For example, the department already took initial steps to incorporate feedback from some states with regard to clarifying the definitions of some performance measures; however, its assessment tool lacks a process to verify the accuracy of the data that recipients self-report to gauge their progress. By including attributes consistent with promising practices in its performance measures, DOJ could be better positioned to determine whether Recovery Act JAG recipients' programs are meeting DOJ and Recovery Act goals. In addition, by establishing a mechanism to verify the accuracy of recipient reports, DOJ can better ensure the reliability of the information that recipients provide.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ (1) continue to revise Recovery Act JAG performance measures and consider, as appropriate, including key attributes of successful performance measurement systems, and (2) develop a mechanism to validate the integrity of self-reported performance data. DOJ concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-521 | gao_GAO-13-521_0 | Since 1994, the COPS Office has awarded roughly $14 billion to advance community policing through its various grant programs. Nearly Half of CHP Funding In the Past 5 Years Was Awarded to Grantees in Six States, and Award Amounts Varied Considerably in Certain Years
As the interactive map in figure 2 illustrates, CHP grant awards were distributed throughout the United States from fiscal years 2008 through 2012. The interactive map can be accessed here: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-521 As figure 3 illustrates, 48 percent of the funding was awarded to grantees in six states—California, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas. For grantees awarded the same number of officers, differences were driven mainly by variation across grantees’ respective entry-level officer salaries and benefits—the only costs CHP allows. However, this variation was more prominent during years when salary and benefit levels were not statutorily capped: 2009 through 2011. Thus, during the period 2009 through 2011, grantees with higher officer salary and benefit levels generally received more CHP funding relative to other CHP grantees to hire, rehire, or prevent layoffs for the same number of officers. The COPS Office’s CHP Application Collects Information Required by Statute, but Could Be Further Enhanced by Clarifying that CHP- Funded Officers Are Required to Be Engaged in Community Policing Activities
The CHP application solicits information from applicants in accordance with statute, but the COPS office may realize benefits by revising the application to clarify for applicants that CHP-funded officers are required to be the personnel specifically engaged in the community policing activities described on the application. Revising the application to clarify for applicants that CHP-funded officers are required to be the personnel specifically engaged in the community policing activities described on the application, consistent with best practices, would better position the COPS office to ascertain from applicants how these particular officers’ activities would advance community policing. The COPS Office’s Monitoring Process Assesses How Grantees Are Using CHP Funds to Advance Community Policing, but Could Be Improved through Additional Monitoring Guidance
The COPS Office Takes a Risk-Based Approach to Grant Monitoring and Has Processes to Monitor How Grantees Are Using Funds
To help ensure that grantees are implementing the activities and meeting the financial requirements they committed to in their respective applications, the COPS Office is required to monitor at least 10 percent of its open, active grant funding annually. According to the Domestic Working Group’s guide for improving grant accountability, it is important that agencies identify, prioritize, and manage potential at-risk grantees. However, for the remaining 5 of 21 grantees, we found that the monitors did not document their assessments of supplanting issues, and it was not clear how they reached conclusions regarding potential supplanting. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, the documentation of agency activities is a key element of accountability for decisions. By enhancing the COPS Office’s monitoring guidance, such as its standards or operations manual, to require monitors to document the results of their supplanting analysis in the on-site monitoring reports for instances where the determination is made that no supplanting has occurred, the COPS Office could be better positioned to ensure that monitors are consistently assessing supplanting and that CHP funding is supplementing and not replacing state and local funding. In addition, we found that while the COPS Office has developed standards and an operations manual for monitors to use in assessing the potential for supplanting, the COPS Office’s monitoring standards and operations manual do not require monitors to document their analysis and conclusions in instances in which the determination is ultimately made that supplanting has not occurred. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further enhance the accountability of the CHP, the Attorney General should direct the COPS Office Director to take the following two actions: 1. revise the CHP application to clarify for applicants that CHP-funded officers are required to be the personnel specifically engaged in the community policing activities described on the application; and 2. enhance the COPS Office’s guidance, such as its monitoring standards or operations manual, by requiring monitors to document the results of their supplanting analysis in on-site monitoring reports for instances where the determination is made that no supplanting has occurred. Specifically, the COPS Office disagreed with the statements that (1) the 2012 CHP application does not specifically ask applicants to explain how CHP-funded officers will be deployed in community policing and that (2) less than 20 percent of the applications funded in 2010, 2011, and 2012 contained evidence showing how additional CHP-funded officers would be deployed to community policing. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report answers the following questions: (1) From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, in what areas of the country was the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Hiring Program (CHP) funding disbursed and to what extent did award amounts vary during this period? (2) To what extent does the COPS Office’s grant application collect information about how applicants plan to use CHP-funded officers to advance community policing? (3) To what extent does the COPS Office’s monitoring process assess whether grantees are using funds to advance community policing? Specifically, we used elements of the CHP authorizing statute and key best practices for grant management to develop a data collection instrument we used to review all applications from a sample of 103 out of the 841 grants awarded during fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since its 1994 inception, the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) COPS Office has awarded roughly $14 billion in grants to support the advancement of community policing, which is a policing approach that proactively addresses the conditions that give rise to public safety issues, such as crime and social disorder. GAO was asked to review key grant management practices within the COPS Office. This report focuses on the largest of its programs--CHP, which awards grants to law enforcement agencies to hire law enforcement officers, rehire officers who have been laid off, or prevent scheduled officer layoffs. This report addresses: (1) From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, in what areas of the country was CHP funding disbursed and to what extent did award amounts vary during this period? (2) To what extent does the COPS Office's grant application collect information about how applicants plan to use CHPfunded officers to advance community policing? (3) To what extent does the COPS Office's monitoring process assess whether grantees are using funds to advance community policing?
GAO examined budget data and monitoring reports for 55 grantees, interviewed agency officials, and evaluated CHP applications from a systematic random sample of 103 CHP grants awarded from fiscal years 2010 through 2012.
What GAO Found
Nearly half of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Hiring Program (CHP) funding from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 was awarded to grantees in six states, and award amounts varied considerably in certain years. During this period, state, county, and city law enforcement agencies nationwide received CHP grant awards to hire or rehire officers to advance community policing, with 48 percent of the funds awarded to grantees in California, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas. For grantees awarded the same number of officers, differences were driven mainly by variation across grantees' respective entry-level officer salaries and benefits. Variation in grantee award amounts were more prominent during 2009, 2010, and 2011, when salary and benefit levels were not statutorily capped, and grantees with higher officer salary and benefit levels generally received more CHP funding relative to other CHP grantees for the same number of officers.
The COPS Office's CHP application collects information required by statute from grant applicants, but could be further enhanced by revising the application to clarify for applicants that CHP-funded officers are required to be the personnel specifically engaged in the community policing activities described on the application. The application asks applicants to provide information on how they plan to implement community policing agency-wide, but does not specifically ask applicants to explain how CHP-funded officers will be deployed in community policing--the primary statutory purpose of the CHP program. According to GAO analysis of a systematic random sample of 103 CHP-funded applications, GAO estimated that less than 20 percent of the applications funded in 2010, 2011, and 2012 contained evidence showing how additional officers would be deployed in community policing. The Domestic Working Group's guide for grant accountability recommends that agencies require applicants to include information describing, among other things, their approach for using the funds and the specific activities that are crucial to the success of the program. Revising the application to clarify for applicants that CHP-funded officers are required to be the personnel specifically engaged in the community policing activities described on the application, consistent with best practices, would better position the COPS office to ascertain from applicants how these particular officers' activities would advance community policing.
The COPS Office's risk-based approach to monitoring assesses how grantees are using funds to advance community policing, but could be improved through additional monitoring guidance. The authorizing statute for the COPS grant programs contains a prohibition against supplanting-- using federal funds to replace state or local funds. The COPS Office developed standards and an operations manual for monitors to use in assessing the potential for supplanting. For 5 of the 21 grantees at risk for supplanting, GAO found that the monitors did not document their analyses of supplanting and it was not clear how they reached conclusions regarding supplanting. The manual requires monitors to document their supplanting analysis in instances in which supplanting is identified, but does not have this requirement for nonsupplanting. According to internal control standards, the documentation of agency activities is a key element of accountability for decisions. By enhancing the COPS Office's monitoring guidance to require monitors to document their results where the determination is made that supplanting has not occurred, the COPS Office may be better positioned to ensure that monitors are consistently assessing supplanting and that CHP funding is supplementing and not replacing state and local funding.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the COPS Office revise and clarify the CHP application and enhance guidance to require monitors to document their analysis results of non-supplanting in monitoring reports. The COPS Office generally concurred with the recommendations and described actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-08-549T | gao_GAO-08-549T_0 | In response to these problems, the D.C. Council (the legislative branch of the D.C. government) approved the 2007 Reform Act, which significantly altered the governance of the D.C. public schools. The new facilities office is responsible for modernization and maintenance of D.C. public schools. Early Initiatives Are Focused on Broad Management Reforms and Establishing a Foundation for Long- Term Improvements
The early efforts to improve D.C. public schools have focused largely on broad management reforms and other activities that lay the foundation for long-term improvements, such as developing new data systems, a school consolidation plan, academic priorities, and improving school facilities. Management reforms included the transfer of many functions from DCPS to the new offices of state superintendent and facilities. According to District officials, moving state-level education and facility functions out of DCPS should give the Chancellor more time to focus on issues that directly affect student achievement. Furthermore, moving state functions out of DCPS is intended to allow more effective oversight of the District’s education programs. The management reforms also included specific human capital initiatives, such as new central office personnel rules and new systems for evaluating central office and state employee performance that are designed to improve office efficiency. Prior to the Reform Act, there was no clear separation of funding, reporting, and staffing between local and state functions within DCPS. The Reform Act also created a new facilities office to improve the conditions of DCPS school facilities. Other Activities, Such as Developing New Data Systems, a School Consolidation Plan, and Academic Priorities, Have Begun to Lay the Foundation for Long-Term Improvements
Both the state superintendent’s office and DCPS are working to improve their data systems to better track and monitor the performance of students, teachers, and schools. In February 2008, DCPS completed its preliminary school consolidation (closing) plan that identified over 20 schools for closure over the next several years in an effort to provide more resources to the remaining schools. The director of the office told us that he found that school heating and plumbing systems were inoperable, roofs leaked, and floors needed replacing. In addition, he told us that many schools were in violation of District fire codes with exit doors locked from the inside for security. To address the backlog and ongoing facilities needs, the new office undertook several programs this summer and early fall. D.C. Mayor Has Begun to Develop a Framework for Accountability
The Mayor and education officials have introduced a performance-based process designed to establish accountability for their school reform efforts. This process includes weekly meetings to track progress and accomplishments across education offices and annual performance plans for these offices, including the D.C. Department of Education’s plan. The Deputy Mayor for Education told us that the department reviews the individual annual performance plans of education offices to ensure they are aligned and not working at cross-purposes. While developing a long-term strategic plan takes time, it is useful for entities undergoing a major transformation, such as the D.C. public school system. A strategic plan, and the process of developing one, helps organizations look across the goals of multiple offices and determine whether they are aligned and connected or working at cross-purposes. Conclusions
The problems in the D.C. public school system are long-standing. Without a plan that sets priorities, implementation goals, and timelines, it may be difficult to measure progress over time and determine if the District is truly achieving success. Given that leadership changes, a strategic education plan would provide a road map for future district leaders by explaining the steps taken, or not taken, and why. Recommendation to the Mayor of the District of Columbia
To help ensure the long-term success of the District’s transformation of its public school system, we recommend that the Mayor direct the D.C. Department of Education to develop a long-term districtwide education strategic plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to long-standing problems with student academic performance, the condition of school facilities, and the overall management of the D.C. public school system, the D.C. Council approved the Public Education Reform Amendment Act of 2007 (Reform Act). The Reform Act made major changes to the operations and governance of the D.C. public school system, including giving the Mayor authority over public schools, including curricula, personnel, and school facilities. While other large urban school districts have transferred governance of schools to their mayors, D.C. is unique because it functions as both local and state offices for many education responsibilities. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) the status of the District's efforts to reform its public school system, and (2) what the District has done to establish accountability for these efforts. To address these issues GAO reviewed documents, interviewed District education officials and interviewed principals from nine D.C. public schools.
What GAO Found
The early efforts to improve D.C. public schools have focused largely on broad management reforms and other activities that lay the foundation for long-term improvements to the D.C. public school system. The broad management reforms included the transfer of many functions from D.C. public schools (DCPS) into the new office of the state superintendent, which could allow for more effective oversight of the District's education programs. Prior to the Reform Act, there was no clear separation of funding, reporting, and staffing between local and state functions. A new facilities office was also created to improve the conditions of DCPS school facilities. Moving state-level education and facilities functions out of DCPS is intended to give the head of DCPS, called the Chancellor, more time to focus on issues that directly affect student achievement. The management reforms also included specific human capital initiatives such as new DCPS central office personnel rules and new systems for evaluating central office and state-level employee performance. In addition, both the State Superintendent and the Chancellor are working to improve their data systems to better track and monitor the performance of students, teachers, and schools. DCPS also completed its school consolidation plan that identified over 20 schools for closure over the next several years. In addition, the school facilities office is working to address the backlog of repairs. The director of the facilities office told us that he found that school heating and plumbing systems were inoperable, roofs leaked, and floors needed replacing. In addition, he said many schools were in violation of District fire codes. To address the backlog and ongoing facilities needs, the new office undertook several repair programs this summer and early fall. The D.C. Mayor and education officials have introduced a performance-based process designed to establish accountability for their school reform efforts. This process includes weekly meetings to track progress and accomplishments across education offices. In addition, the Mayor's office required agencies to develop and follow annual performance plans. D.C. Department of Education officials told us that they review the individual performance plans of District education offices, such as DCPS and the state superintendent's office, to ensure they are aligned and not working at cross-purposes. However, the department has yet to develop a long-term districtwide education strategy that could integrate the work of these offices, even though it included the development of such a strategy in its 2007-2008 performance plan. While developing a strategic plan takes time, it is useful for entities undergoing a major transformation, such as the D.C. public school system. A strategic plan helps organizations look across the goals of multiple offices and identify if they are aligned and connected or working at cross-purposes. Without a plan that sets priorities over time, implementation goals, and timelines, it may be difficult to measure progress over time and determine if the District is truly achieving success. In addition, given that leadership changes, a strategic plan would provide a road map for future District leaders by explaining the steps taken, or not taken, and why. |
gao_GAO-08-831 | gao_GAO-08-831_0 | DOD Is Making Progress in Developing the ORS Concept to Meet Warfighter Needs, but the Concept Is in the Early Stages of Development and Not Commonly Understood
DOD has taken several steps to develop the ORS concept to meet warfighter needs; however, the concept is still in the early stages of its development and not commonly understood by all members of the warfighter and national security space communities. DOD has developed a process for converting warfighter needs into formal requirements and identifying potential ORS solutions. In spite of this progress, common understanding of the ORS concept is lacking because DOD has not clearly defined key elements of the ORS concept and has not effectively communicated the concept to key stakeholders. Since the Joint ORS Office was established in May 2007, it has developed a process that converts warfighter needs into formal requirements and potential ORS solutions. DOD also issued an Implementation Plan in April 2008 and continues to develop further ORS guidance. Our prior work examining successful organizational transformations shows the necessity to communicate clearly defined goals and specific objectives to key stakeholders. Initial ORS planning documents—the Plan for ORS and the Initial Concept of Operations—are broad and lack the specificity needed to guide the ORS concept, according to some members of the warfighter and national security space communities. Additionally, DOD has not communicated well with the intelligence community regarding the ORS concept. Officials from the National Security Agency said that they are very concerned about the lack of consultation that has been done with the intelligence community regarding the ORS concept. DOD Plans to Integrate ORS into Existing DOD and Intelligence Processes and Architecture, but Has Not Identified How It Will Accomplish This
DOD has recognized the need to integrate the ORS concept into the warfighter and national security space communities’ processes and architecture, but it has not yet determined specific steps for achieving integration. However, integrating space systems is a complex activity that involves many entities inside DOD and the intelligence community and may take more time to accomplish than expected. Senior ORS officials have told us that the ORS concept is still too new to begin its integration, but combatant command and intelligence community officials are concerned about how the ORS concept will be integrated into their existing processes for submitting warfighter needs and processing ISR data. According to the 1999 DOD Space Policy, an integrated national security space architecture that addresses defense and intelligence missions shall be developed to the maximum extent feasible in order to eliminate programs operating in isolation of one another and minimize unnecessary duplication of missions and functions and to achieve efficiencies. DOD has acknowledged that the ORS concept needs to be integrated and one of the goals in the ORS Implementation Plan is to integrate the ORS concept into the existing space architecture between 2010 and 2015. Given the complex environment of the warfighter and national security space communities, changes that affect one organization can have an effect on integrating national security space systems, and may take longer than anticipated. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept is being developed to support warfighter needs and the extent to which DOD has a plan that integrates ORS into existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture, we reviewed and analyzed ORS planning documents, the ORS concept of operations, and ORS processes for meeting warfighter needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) operational dependence on space has placed new and increasing demands on current space systems to meet commanders' needs. DOD's Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept is designed to more rapidly satisfy commanders' needs for information and intelligence during ongoing operations. Given the potential for ORS to change how DOD acquires and fields space capabilities to support the warfighter, this report discusses to what extent DOD (1) is developing ORS to support warfighter requirements and (2) has a plan that integrates ORS into existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture. GAO reviewed and analyzed ORS planning documents, the ORS concept of operations, and processes for meeting warfighter needs and also interviewed defense and intelligence community officials who are involved with the ORS concept.
What GAO Found
DOD is making some progress in developing the ORS concept, but whether it will meet warfighter requirements is unclear, principally because the concept is in the early stages of development and not commonly understood by all members of the warfighter and national security space communities. Our prior work examining successful organizational transformations shows the need to communicate to stakeholders often and early and to clearly define specific objectives. Since the Joint ORS Office was established in May 2007, it has developed a process for converting warfighter needs into formal requirements and identifying potential ORS solutions. Moreover, DOD issued the ORS Implementation Plan in April 2008 and is also developing new ORS guidance documents. However, GAO found disparity in stakeholder understanding of the ORS concept within the warfighter and national security space communities. This disparity exists because DOD has not clearly defined key elements of the ORS concept and has not effectively communicated the concept with key stakeholders. For example, initial ORS planning documents are broad and lack the specificity needed to guide the ORS concept, according to some members of the warfighter and national security space communities. Moreover, officials from the intelligence community were concerned about DOD's lack of consultation and communication with them regarding the ORS concept. Without having a well-defined and commonly understood concept, DOD's ability to fully meet warfighter needs may be hampered. DOD has acknowledged the need to integrate ORS into existing DOD and intelligence community processes and architecture, but it has not fully addressed how it will achieve this integration. The 1999 DOD Space Policy states that an integrated national security space architecture that addresses defense and intelligence missions shall be developed to the maximum extent feasible in order to minimize unnecessary duplication of missions. DOD plans to begin integrating any new ORS processes or systems that are developed for ORS sometime between 2010 and 2015. However, integrating national security space systems can be a complex activity, involving many entities within DOD and the intelligence community. GAO previously reported that DOD's existing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) processes activities already face significant integration challenges, and adding new ORS systems into the existing ISR enterprise will increase the challenges of an already complex and challenging environment. Given the concept's immaturity, members of the national security space community have raised concerns about how the ORS concept will be integrated with existing DOD and intelligence processes and architecture, and voiced concerns about being burdened by an additional new requirements process specific to ORS. Nonetheless, as GAO described earlier, DOD is developing a process unique to ORS for submitting ORS warfighter requirements. The complexity of the national security space environment calls for DOD to begin to adequately plan integration of the ORS concept now to help ensure that DOD avoids the risk of duplicative efforts and wasted resources. |
gao_GAO-11-324 | gao_GAO-11-324_0 | Changes to Ticket Program Regulations
Due to low participation rates by both ticket holders and ENs—in 2005, we reported less than 1 percent of 9.5 million ticket holders had assigned their tickets to an EN or VR and 386 of 1,164 contracted ENs were accepting tickets—SSA revised the Ticket program regulations in 2008 (see table 1). More Ticket Holders and Employment Networks Participating, but Participation Rate Remains Low
More Ticket Holders Assigned Their Tickets Since 2008 Regulatory Changes, but They Remain a Small Share of Those Eligible
The number of eligible ticket holders assigning their tickets to ENs increased from about 22,000 in fiscal year 2007, prior to the 2008 changes in regulations, to more than 49,000 as of July 2010. During this time, ENs accepting at least one ticket also increased from 752 to 1,086. Additionally, ENs receiving ticket payments from SSA more than doubled, from 206 in fiscal year 2007 to 460 as of July 2010, and total payments grew substantially, from $3.8 million in fiscal year 2007 to $13 million as of July 2010. In fiscal year 2009, 20 ENs representing 1.2 percent of all SSA-contracted ENs and 1.9 percent of those ENs accepting tickets received 71 percent of total ticket payments. Employment Networks Vary in Service Approaches, but Increasingly Focus on the Employed or Ready to Work
ENs receiving among the largest payment amounts from SSA provide a range of services, including assistance with job search and retention. The 2008 regulatory changes more explicitly allow ENs to pay ticket holders and we found increasing numbers of ENs sharing SSA ticket payments with ticket holders who have sufficient earnings to qualify the EN for payment. In addition to the shared payment approach which targets ticket holders already working, two “employer-driven” service approaches which target ticket holders who are ready to work have also accounted for a greater share of SSA payments to ENs among those with the largest payment amounts: the direct employment approach, in which the EN itself employs ticket holders, and the staffing approach, in which the EN primarily works with employers to develop and identify jobs for ticket holders, similar to a staffing agency. SSA Lacks Adequate Management Tools for Evaluating Ticket Holders and Employment Networks to Ensure Program Integrity and Effectiveness
SSA Has Not Consistently Monitored Ticket Holders’ Timely Progress Toward Self-Supporting Employment
Since 2005, SSA has not consistently monitored or enforced the timely progress of ticket holders who assign their tickets to ENs and VRs in order to assess whether they should continue to be exempt from medical continuing disability reviews (CDR)—a key tool for assessing continuing eligibility for benefits. SSA Has Not Developed Performance Measures for Employment Networks
SSA has not developed performance measures for contracted ENs to assess their success in helping assigned ticket holders obtain and retain employment and reduce dependence on disability benefits. SSA’s Approval Process for Employment Networks Lacks Systematic Mechanisms to Ensure Quality
SSA’s process for approving ENs to serve ticket holders lacks systematic tools to ensure quality, such as requiring all applicants to submit a comprehensive business plan for how their services will help ticket holders obtain and retain employment and reduce dependency on benefits, and providing clear and specific written criteria to SSA staff who review qualifications of applicants. Recommendations for Executive Action
To inform assessments of the program’s cost and effectiveness and enhance SSA’s oversight and monitoring of ENs and ticket holders, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security take the following four actions: prioritize and carry through with a study of participating ticket holders’ exits from the rolls since revisions to the program’s regulations took effect in 2008; adopt a strategy for compiling and using data on trends in employment network service provision to determine whether service approaches, such as sharing SSA ticket payments with ticket holders, are consistent with program goals of helping ticket holders find and retain employment and reduce dependency on benefits; for example, SSA could revise existing tools to compile information on service approaches used by all ENs; develop a strategy to ensure on-time completion of timely progress reviews of ticket holders and take steps to ensure the accuracy of information used to make timely progress determinations; and move forward to develop EN performance measures consistent with the requirements of the Ticket law. SSA also offered alternative language for the wording of two other recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our review focused on (1) ticket holder and employment network (EN) participation over time, (2) service approaches used by ENs, and (3) the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) policies and processes for evaluating ticket holders and ENs. We judgmentally selected ENs who advertised paying a portion of the ticket payment to ticket holders or providing financial incentives to employers, or whose services were unclear. The full transcripts of these three calls are provided below. What’s that? This is ? And still receive the benefits of both Ticket to Work and—and—disability? | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Administration (SSA) pays billions of dollars in Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income to people with disabilities. The Ticket to Work program, established in 1999, provides eligible beneficiaries (ticket holder) with a ticket they may assign to approved service providers, called employment networks (EN). ENs are to provide services to help ticket holders obtain and retain employment and reduce dependence on SSA benefits. ENs receive payments from SSA once a ticket holder has earnings exceeding a set threshold. Due to low participation, SSA changed program regulations in 2008 to provide ENs and ticket holders with more incentives to participate. GAO examined (1) changes in ticket holder and EN participation over time, (2) the range of service approaches used by ENs, and (3) SSA's efforts to evaluate ticket holders and ENs to ensure program integrity and effectiveness. GAO analyzed SSA data, policies, and procedures, and interviewed representatives of 25 ENs, disability advocacy organizations, and SSA.
What GAO Found
More ticket holders and ENs are participating in the Ticket to Work program since SSA revised regulations in 2008, but the overall participation rate remains low. Ticket holders assigning their tickets to ENs increased from about 22,000 in fiscal year 2007 to more than 49,000 as of July 2010. However, less than 1 percent of all ticket holders assigned their tickets to ENs and SSA has not yet studied whether regulatory changes enabled more ticket holders to obtain employment and exit the benefit rolls. During this time, ENs approved to serve ticket holders increased from 1,514 to 1,603, and SSA's ticket payments to ENs increased from $3.8 million to $13 million. However, 20 ENs, or less than 2 percent of those currently participating, have received the majority of total ticket payments from SSA. GAO found that ENs provide a range of services, including job search and retention assistance. Since the 2008 regulatory changes, which explicitly allowed ENs to pay ticket holders, an increasing number used service approaches such as sharing SSA's government-funded ticket payments with ticket holders. These ENs target ticket holders already working or ready to work, and accounted for a substantial and growing share of payments from SSA. Three ENs among those with the largest payment amounts reported providing limited or no direct services beyond passing back a portion of ticket payments to ticket holders who had sufficient earnings to qualify the ENs for payment. These ENs received a total of over $4 million in SSA payments-- nearly one-third of all SSA payments--in fiscal year 2009. Two of these ENs passed back 75 percent of SSA's ticket payments to ticket holders and kept the other 25 percent. The extent of these trends is unknown because SSA does not collect sufficient information on service approaches across all ENs. SSA lacks adequate management tools to systematically evaluate ticket holders and ENs. Since 2005, SSA has not consistently monitored or enforced ticket holders' progress toward self-supporting employment--a regulatory requirement. Ticket holders who show progress are generally exempt from medical reviews to determine their continued eligibility for benefits. Lack of systematic monitoring of timely progress has both program integrity and cost implications, such as the potential for ineligible beneficiaries to continue receiving benefits. During the course of GAO's review, SSA was beginning to resume the progress reviews, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of these efforts. Moreover, SSA has not developed performance measures for approved ENs, as required by law, that can be used to assess their success in helping ticket holders obtain and retain employment and reduce dependency on disability benefits. Without such measures, multiple ENs communicate to ticket holders how to work and keep full disability benefits, despite the fact the ultimate goal of the Ticket program is to reduce dependence on benefits (to hear audio excerpts of GAO's calls with selected ENs, see http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-324 ). Finally, SSA's EN approval process lacks systemic tools to ensure quality and clear and specific criteria for reviewing EN qualifications.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending SSA take several steps, such as compiling service trend data and monitoring ticket holders' progress, to enhance program oversight. SSA agreed with two recommendations and offered alternative language for the other two to reflect actions it considers planned or under way. |
gao_RCED-97-156 | gao_RCED-97-156_0 | In the interim, EPA established the Planning, Budgeting, Accountability, and Analysis Work Group composed of employees on temporary assignment, to begin to develop the new system. EPA’s New Office Is Being Formed to Develop an Integrated System
Although approved by the Administrator in January 1997, EPA’s new Office of Planning, Analysis, and Accountability will not be fully staffed until July 1997. 1.) Such data are also needed to identify and respond to emerging problems before significant damage is done to the environment. A major technical challenge in developing and using environmental measures is to be able to scientifically establish a direct cause-and-effect relationship between a program’s activities and changes in environmental conditions. In a March 1990 response to our report, EPA said that the new Administrator had made managing for environmental results a major policy and operational focus for the agency and was initiating a strategic planning, budgeting, and accountability effort to improve the agency’s ability to protect human health and the environment. The goals of that effort were very similar to those of the system being proposed today. These elements describe the organizational, informational, and procedural capabilities that EPA needs to improve and integrate its management processes. Even given this much time, the agency will have difficulty obtaining the scientific and environmental data and developing and reaching agreement on the appropriate environmental measures of its programs’ and its own performance called for by the new system. National environmental performance partnership agreements with the states to set out expectations for their contribution to achieving national environmental and agencywide goals and measures for assessing their performance in achieving these goals. Specifically, the Chairmen asked us to review the status of EPA’s efforts to (1) establish a new planning, budgeting, and accountability office and develop and implement an integrated system and (2) ensure that the system uses comprehensive scientific and environmental data and appropriate environmental measures. They also asked us to discuss EPA’s previous efforts to implement this type of system and to identify elements of an effective system that could be used as benchmarks to gauge progress in this current effort. To determine the status of EPA’s efforts to establish the new office and to develop and implement an integrated system, we reviewed relevant documents on EPA’s plans, target dates for these efforts, and actions taken; the staffing provided for the Planning, Budgeting, Accountability, and Analysis Work Group that was set up until the new planning, budgeting, and accountability organization could be established; and the status of the new office’s approval and staffing. To identify elements that could be used as benchmarks for monitoring EPA’s progress in implementing an integrated planning, budgeting, and accountability system, we reviewed the findings and recommendations of the NAPA report on EPA, the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act, our prior reviews of EPA, and other external and internal EPA studies and evaluations to identify key elements of an effective planning, budgeting, and accountability system for EPA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) efforts to: (1) establish a new office that would develop and implement an integrated planning, budgeting, and accountability system for the agency; and (2) ensure that the agency has comprehensive scientific and environmental data and appropriate environmental measures of progress for use in strategic planning, budgeting, and accountability. GAO also reviewed EPA's previous efforts to implement this type of system and identified elements of an effective system that could be used as benchmarks to gauge progress in this current effort.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in January 1997, the EPA Administrator approved the organizational structure and staffing for a new office, called the Office of Planning, Analysis, and Accountability, which is responsible for developing and implementing an integrated planning, budgeting and accountability system; (2) earlier, in March 1996, EPA had established a work group, composed of employees on temporary assignment, to begin developing the new system; (3) although the work group was never fully staffed and made limited progress in developing the system, it developed a conceptual framework that the new office is beginning to implement; (4) members of the work group were temporarily assigned to the new office, which will not be fully staffed before July 1997; (5) EPA faces long-term challenges to obtain the scientific and environmental information needed to fully support its new system; (6) although much scientific and environmental information has already been collected, many gaps exist, and the data are often difficult to compile because different data collection methods have been used; (7) likewise, much effort is still needed to identify, develop, and reach agreement on a comprehensive set of environmental measures to link the agency's activities to changes in human health and environmental conditions; (8) currently, EPA has to rely mainly on administrative measures, such as the number of permits issued or inspections made, to measure its performance or success; (9) EPA has been trying since the early 1970s to revise its management systems to better manage for results; (10) in the early 1990s, for example, EPA announced a strategic planning, budgeting, and accountability effort that was very similar to the system being proposed today; (11) however, such efforts proved to be difficult and fell short of EPA's expectations; (12) EPA's current plans are no less complex and challenging; (13) given this complexity, GAO identified various elements of an effective planning, budgeting, and accountability system that EPA can use as benchmarks to monitor its progress as it works to implement its plans for an integrated system; (14) these elements describe organizational, informational, and procedural capabilities needed to improve and integrate EPA's management processes; and (15) EPA also needs performance partnership agreements with the states to set out expectations for their contributions to meeting national environmental and agencywide goals and to specify measures for assessing their performance. |
gao_GAO-03-612T | gao_GAO-03-612T_0 | Key Practices for Effective Performance Management
We identified specific practices that leading public sector organizations both here in the United States and abroad have used in their performance management systems to create a clear linkage—“line of sight”—between individual performance and organizational success. Federal agencies should consider these practices as they develop and implement the modern, effective, and credible performance management systems with the adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms in place, needed to effectively link pay to performance. The key practices include the following. Link pay to individual and organizational performance. The most prominent change in human capital management that we implemented as a result of the GAO Personnel Act of 1980 was a broadbanded pay-for-performance system. As a result of GAO's implementation of its new competency-based performance management system and other changes to key human capital programs, GAO has been able to achieve greater dispersion in its performance appraisals and merit pay decisions. IRS anticipates that the complete redesign and implementation of the performance management systems will take about 5 years. However, agencies should be required to demonstrate to OPM’s satisfaction that they have modern, effective, credible, and validated performance management systems in place before they are allowed to use broadbanding or related pay for performance initiatives. In summary, there is widespread agreement that the basic approach to federal pay is broken and we need to move to a more market- and performance-based approach. Doing so will be essential if we expect to maximize the performance and assure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. Reasonable people can and will debate and disagree about the merits of individual reform proposals. However, all should be able to agree that a performance management system with adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms in place, must serve as the fundamental underpinning of any fair, effective, and appropriate results-oriented pay reform. The practices that have been used by leading organizations in developing and using their performance management systems to link organizational goals to individual performance and create a line of sight between an individual’s activities and organizational results show the way in how to implement performance management systems with the necessary attributes. | Why GAO Did This Study
There is widespread agreement that the basic approach to federal pay is broken and that it needs to be more market- and performance-based. Doing so will be essential if the federal government is to maximize its performance and assure accountability for the benefit of the American people. While there will be debate and disagreement about the merits of individual reform proposals, all should be able to agree that a performance management system with adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms in place, must serve as the fundamental underpinning of any fair, effective, and appropriate pay reform. At the request of the Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization, House Committee on Government Reform, GAO discussed the key practices for effective performance management that federal agencies should consider as they develop and implement performance management systems as part of any pay reform.
What GAO Found
The need for results-oriented pay reform is one of the most pressing human capital issues facing the federal government today. To implement results-oriented pay reform, commonly referred to as "pay for performance," agencies must have modern, effective, credible, and validated performance management systems that are capable of supporting pay and other personnel decisions. Pay for performance works only with adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms in place, to ensure its fair, effective, and responsible implementation. Modern performance management systems are the centerpiece of those safeguards and accountability. Most federal agencies are a long way from meeting this test. All too often, agencies' performance management systems are based on episodic and paper intensive exercises that are not linked to the strategic plan of the organization and have only a modest impact on the pay, use, development, and promotion potential of federal workers. Leading organizations, on the other had, use their performance management systems to accelerate change, achieve desired organizational results, and facilitate two-way communication throughout the year so that discussions about individual and organizational performance are integrated and ongoing. Effective performance management systems are not merely used for once- or twice-yearly individual expectation setting and ratings processes, but are tools to help the organization manage on a day-to-day basis. GAO identified key practices leading public sector organizations both here in the United States and abroad have used in their performance management systems to link organizational goals to individual performance and create a "line of sight" between an individual's activities and organizational results. These practices can help agencies develop and implement performance management systems with the attributes necessary to effectively support pay for performance. |
gao_HEHS-96-38 | gao_HEHS-96-38_0 | However, amounts in plans organized under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 457(b) (hereinafter referred to as 457 plans) bear additional risk because salary deferrals to 457 plans are assets of the sponsoring employer that may be used for nonplan purposes and which are subject in the event of bankruptcy to the claims of general creditors. Federal income tax is postponed until employees begin to receive their account balances, usually at retirement or when they are no longer employed by the plan’s sponsor. With the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,state and local government employers who had not previously established 401(k) plans were prohibited from establishing new 401(k) plans, but existing plans could continue. Despite concerns raised by representatives of state and local governments, among others, the rationale for this exclusion was that allowing public employees to have access to both 401(k) plans and 457 plans would be “inappropriately duplicative.”
Only employees of and independent contractors providing service to state and local government and tax-exempt organizations may participate in 457 plans. Provisions of 457 Plans Disadvantage Participants
Section 457 plans are substantially different from 401(k) and 403(b) plans. The plan accounts can only be transferred to another eligible 457 plan if the new government employer will accept the transfer. Amounts deferred under section 457 cannot be rolled over to an IRA and have tax deferred on the distribution as can 401(k) and 403(b) plan funds. In contrast, separating participants in 401(k) and 403(b) plans are not required to declare a date for benefits to begin. The maximum total deferral a participant can make to a 401(k) or 403(b) plan is governed by the maximum deferral allowed under section 457 when a participant actually makes deferrals under a 457 plan. Further, those deferred amount limits are not indexed for inflation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of public pension funding, focusing on how plans established under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 457 differ from plans created under IRC sections 401(k) and 403(b).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) most state and local government employees are covered under section 457 plans because the Tax Reform Act of 1986 prohibited state and local governments from establishing plans under sections 401(k) and 403(b); (2) section 457 plan participants risk losses if sponsoring governments go bankrupt or the deferred monies are mismanaged or lost; (3) section 457 does not require sponsoring governments to maintain deferred monies to pay future benefits; (4) section 457 plan participants risk losses because sponsoring governments may view deferred monies as available for public use; (5) while funds enrolled in section 401(k) and 403(b) plans can be transferred to investment retirement accounts (IRA) when the employee leaves state or local government employment, amounts payable from section 457 plans can only be rolled over into other section 457 plans; (6) section 457 plan participants must declare a fixed date for when they will begin receiving their benefits shortly after retiring or leaving employment; (7) according to IRS, the transfer of section 457 plan deferrals into IRA or allowing plan participants to change their distribution dates would create a taxable event or be incompatible with the plan's tax deferred condition of government ownership; (8) section 457 plans allow a lower maximum annual employee deferral and employer contribution than section 401(k) and 403(b) plans, and are not indexed; and (9) new legislation could increase the section 457 plan deferral and contribution limit and index section 457 plans to inflation. |
gao_GAO-04-418T | gao_GAO-04-418T_0 | Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, established in 1935, authorizes funds to states to provide a wide array of services to prevent the occurrence of abuse, neglect, and foster care placements. Subpart 1 funds are intended for services that are directed toward the accomplishment of the following purposes: (1) protect and promote the welfare of all children; (2) prevent or remedy problems that may result in the abuse or neglect of children; (3) prevent the unnecessary separation of children from their families by helping families address problems that can lead to out-of-home placements; (4) reunite children with their families; (5) place children in appropriate adoptive homes when reunification is not possible; and (6) ensure adequate care to children away from their homes in cases in which the child cannot be returned home or cannot be placed for adoption. States Spend IV-B Funds on A Variety of Services, With Subpart 2 Focusing More on Prevention
In our September 2003 report on Title IV-B, we found that states use these funds to provide a wide variety of services to prevent the occurrence of abuse, neglect, and foster care placements, as well as services to help children in foster care and their parents; however, relatively few subpart 1 dollars are used to provide family support and family preservation services, while the majority of subpart 2 funds are used for these purposes. According to our survey data for fiscal year 2002, states spent subpart 1 funds most frequently on the salaries of child welfare agency staff, administration and management expenses, CPS services, and foster care maintenance payments. In addition, states reported using about 11 percent of their subpart 2 funds for adoption support and preservation services. Staff and Data Issues Affect States’ Ability to Protect Children From Abuse and Neglect
Child welfare agencies face a number of issues related to staffing and data management that impair their ability to protect children from abuse and neglect. In particular, low salaries hinder agencies’ ability to attract potential child welfare workers and to retain those already in the profession. According to these caseworkers, high turnover rates and staffing shortages leave remaining staff with insufficient time to establish relationships with children and families and make the necessary decisions to ensure safe and stable permanent placements. Furthermore, our July 2003 report found that states face challenges developing appropriate information systems needed to track abuse or neglect reports and monitor children in foster care. In addition, several factors affect states’ ability to collect and report reliable adoption, foster care, and child abuse and neglect data, including insufficient caseworker training, inaccurate and incomplete data entry, and technical challenges reporting the data. We found that several factors affect states’ ability to collect and report reliable data to HHS on children served by state child welfare agencies. Improvements in HHS’S Oversight of Child Welfare Programs Could Help States Overcome Some Challenges
HHS plays a role in helping states implement their child welfare programs, but in some cases, additional federal oversight or technical assistance could help states provide more effective services. In terms of child welfare funding, HHS focuses its programmatic oversight on the overall child welfare system in each state and provides relatively little oversight specific to Title IV-B subpart 1. HHS’s role in assisting states overcome the child welfare workforce challenges is limited to partial federal reimbursement for training expenses and management of discretionary grant programs, such as the Child Welfare Training Program. HHS Offers Assistance to Help States Develop SACWIS and Improve Their Data, but States Report Ongoing Challenges with Some of HHS’s Efforts
In response to some of the challenges states face in developing SACWIS and collecting and reporting child welfare data, HHS has conducted on-site reviews of information systems and provided technical assistance from a variety of sources. We recommended in our September 2003 report on Title IV-B that the Secretary of HHS provide the necessary guidance to ensure that HHS regional offices monitor states’ use of Title IV-B subpart 1 funds for compliance with statutory restrictions on the use of these funds. HHS disagreed with our second recommendation, stating that it believes that its level of oversight is commensurate with the scope and intent of the program and minimizes states’ reporting requirements. To improve the reliability of state-reported child welfare data, we recommended in our July 2003 SACWIS report that the Secretary of HHS consider, in addition to HHS’s recent efforts to improve AFCARS data, ways to enhance the guidance and assistance offered to states to help them overcome the key challenges in collecting and reporting child welfare data. Child Welfare: HHS Could Play a Greater Role in Helping Child Welfare Agencies Recruit and Retain Staff. | Why GAO Did This Study
Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, comprised of two subparts, is the primary source of federal funding for services to help families address problems that lead to child abuse and neglect and to prevent the unnecessary separation of children from their families; however, a number of challenges exist that impair states' ability to deliver and track these services. This testimony is based on findings from three reports issued in 2003 and addresses the following: (1) states' use of Title IV-B funds in providing a wide array of services to prevent the occurrence of abuse, neglect, and unnecessary foster care placements, as well as in providing other child welfare services; (2) factors that hinder states' ability to protect children from abuse and neglect; and (3) the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) role in helping states to overcome these challenges. Findings are based on multiple methodologies, including a survey to child welfare directors on states' use of Title IV-B funds; an analysis of nearly 600 exit interview documents completed by staff who severed their employment from 17 state, 40 county, and 19 private child welfare agencies; and a survey of all 50 states and the District of Columbia regarding their experiences in developing and using information systems and their ability to report data to HHS. In each case, GAO also conducted multiple site visits to selected states and interviewed child welfare experts and HHS headquarters and regional officials.
What GAO Found
States use of Title IV-B funds to provide a wide variety of services to prevent the occurrence of abuse, neglect, and foster care placements, as well as to provide other child welfare services. According to GAO's Title IV-B survey data for fiscal year 2002, states spent about 60 percent of subpart 1 funds on the salaries of child welfare agency staff, administration and management expenses, and child protective services, while about 10 percent were used to provide family support and family preservation services. In comparison, states spent about 62 percent of their subpart 2 funds on family support and preservation services. Child welfare agencies face a number of challenges related to staffing and data management that impair their ability to protect children from abuse and neglect. Low salaries hinder agencies' ability to attract potential child welfare workers and retain those already in the profession. According to caseworkers GAO interviewed, high turnover rates and staffing shortages leave remaining staff with insufficient time to establish relationships with families and make the necessary decisions to ensure safe and stable permanent placements. States also face challenges developing appropriate information systems needed to track abuse or neglect reports and monitor children in foster care. In addition, several factors affect states' ability to collect and report reliable adoption, foster care, and child abuse and neglect data, including insufficient caseworker training, inaccurate and incomplete data entry, and technical challenges reporting the data. HHS plays a role in helping states overcome some of the challenges they face in operating their child welfare programs, but additional oversight or technical assistance could assist states in meeting the needs of children served by child welfare agencies. HHS's oversight of Title IV-B focuses primarily on states' overall child welfare systems and outcomes, but the agency provides relatively little oversight specific to Title IV-B subpart 1. In addition, HHS plays a limited role in states' workforce activities by offering partial reimbursement for training expenses and managing discretionary grant programs. The agency monitors states' information systems development and data reporting, but despite the availability of technical assistance, states reported ongoing challenges reporting reliable data. In the related reports, GAO made several recommendations to HHS. GAO recommended that HHS provide the necessary guidance to ensure that regional offices monitor states' use of Title IV-B subpart 1 and to consider gathering additional information on its use. GAO also recommended that HHS take actions that may help child welfare agencies address recruitment and retention challenges. Last, GAO recommended that HHS consider ways to enhance the guidance and assistance offered to help states overcome key data challenges. HHS generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations, except that it noted that its level of oversight of Title IV-B was commensurate with the program's scope and intent. |
gao_GAO-07-608 | gao_GAO-07-608_0 | Community-Based Health Care Initiative
In March 2004, in conjunction with MRP, the Army also implemented CBHCI. As a result, most reserve component soldiers who request to be retained on active duty to receive medical treatment or evaluation, did not experience delays in obtaining MRP orders and therefore have not experienced significant gaps in pay and benefits. In response to our prior work in this area, the Army has fully implemented 17 of the 22 recommendations we made in our previous report and partially implemented 2 recommendations aimed at improving training for reserve component soldiers in the MRP program and the Army personnel responsible for managing these soldiers. Significant Improvements to Processes and Guidance Result in Fewer Pay Problems
In response to our previous work related to ADME, the Army has implemented a more streamlined, customer-friendly process for requesting MRP orders, implemented comprehensive guidance intended to effectively manage injured and ill reserve component soldiers, provided a more effective means of tracking injured and ill reserve component soldiers in the MRP program, addressed the issues we identified previously related to the Army’s capacity to house and manage injured and ill reserve component soldiers, and developed performance measures to evaluate MRP. As a result, the wounded national guardsman stated his family’s medical benefits were temporarily disrupted for approximately 2 weeks until the MRP order was processed. Among other things, the guidance now provides specific organizational responsibilities for administering MRP; an order distribution list covering the command and control, pay, personnel, and medical eligibility functions; eligibility criteria for being retained on active duty, including guidelines for extension of orders beyond 1 year; criteria that clearly establish priorities for where a soldier may be attached for medical care (i.e., medical facility has the specialties and the capacity needed to treat the soldier, proximity to soldiers’ residence); minimum eligibility criteria for soldiers applying for MRP and ADME avenues through which eligible soldiers may apply for MRP and ADME; a list and examples of the specific documentation required to retain or extend active duty orders for the purpose of medical treatment or evaluation; and a list of the entitlements available for injured reserve component soldiers and their dependents. Lack of Integrated Systems Continues to Be a Challenge
The three recommendations from our prior work that the Army has not yet addressed were all aimed at improving the Army’s order-writing, pay, personnel, and medical eligibility systems. These actions are part of a continuing Army-wide systems integration challenge that affects all soldiers, including those in the MRP program. The lack of integrated pay, personnel, and other systems can also cause problems when soldiers are released from active duty but still have time left on their MRP orders. The Army Lacks the Data Needed to Determine Whether It Is Effectively Managing the Additional Risks Associated with CBHCI
Although the Army has identified several factors associated with CBHCI that put soldiers at greater risk of being retained on active duty longer than medically necessary, the Army currently lacks the data needed to determine whether it is effectively managing this risk. According to the Army’s metrics, soldiers treated by civilian providers through CBHCI are, on average, retained on active duty 117 days longer than soldiers treated at MTFs—which could indicate that the Army is not managing the added risks associated with CBHCI. According to the Army’s CBHCI selection criteria, soldiers whose injuries are expected to be treated within 60 days are not eligible to participate in CBHCI, causing the metrics for soldiers treated at MTFs to be skewed lower than those for soldiers treated through CBHCI. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine whether the Army’s Medical Retention Processing (MRP) program has resolved the issues we identified previously with the Active Duty Medical Extension (ADME) program, we reviewed applicable policies, procedures, and program guidance; observed MRP operations; and interviewed appropriate agency officials. We also relied on the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government to provide a framework for assessing the Army’s MRP program and its Community-Based Health Care Initiative (CBHCI). | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2005, GAO reported that weaknesses in the Army's Active Duty Medical Extension (ADME) process caused injured and ill Army National Guard and Reserve (reserve component) soldiers to experience gaps in pay and benefits. During the course of GAO's previous work, the Army implemented the Medical Retention Processing (MRP) program in May 2004 and Community-Based Health Care Initiative (CBHCI) in March 2004. CBHCI allows reserve component soldiers on MRP orders to return home and receive medical care through a civilian health care provider. As directed by congressional mandate, GAO determined whether (1) MRP has resolved the pay issues previously identified with ADME and (2) the Army has the metrics it needs to determine whether it is effectively managing CBHCI program risks. GAO's scope did not include the medical, facilities, or disability ratings issues recently reported by the media at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.
What GAO Found
The Army's MRP program has largely resolved the widespread delays in order processing that were associated with ADME. As a result, injured and ill reserve component soldiers retained on active duty through MRP have not experienced significant gaps in pay and benefits. The Army has addressed 17 of the 22 recommendations GAO made previously, which include developing comprehensive guidance for retaining injured and ill reserve component soldiers on active duty, providing a more effective means of tracking the location of soldiers in the MRP program, addressing problems related to inadequate administrative support for processing active duty retention orders, and developing performance measures to evaluate MRP. Of the five recommendations the Army has not fully implemented, two are related to providing adequate training to reserve component soldiers in the MRP program and Army personnel responsible for managing the program and three deal with improving the Army's order-writing, pay, personnel, and medical eligibility systems. Although the Army has issued a soldiers' handbook for soldiers in the MRP program and developed a biannual training conference for Army personnel responsible for managing these soldiers, the Army lacks consistent, Army-wide training standards for injured reserve component soldiers in the MRP program and Army personnel responsible for managing the program. Because of an Army-wide system integration challenge that affects all soldiers, not just those in the MRP program, information is not always updated in the order-writing, pay, personnel, and medical eligibility systems as it should be. As a result, 7 of the 25 randomly selected soldiers GAO interviewed reported that their families' medical benefits were temporarily disrupted when they transitioned to MRP orders. The lack of integrated systems also caused overpayment problems when soldiers were released from active duty but still had time left on their MRP orders. Over a nearly 3-year period, GAO estimates that the Army overpaid these soldiers by at least $2.2 million. Although, according to the Army, soldiers participating in CBHCI are at greater risk of being retained on active duty longer than medically necessary, the Army currently lacks the data needed to determine whether it is effectively managing this risk. According to the Army's metrics, soldiers treated by civilian providers through CBHCI are, on average, retained on active duty 117 days longer than soldiers treated at military treatment facilities (MTF). According to the Army, the metrics for soldiers treated at MTFs are skewed lower because of the Army's CBHCI selection criteria-- which exclude soldiers whose injuries or illnesses are expected to be treated within 60 days. However, until the Army obtains more comparable information for the patient populations treated through CBHCI and MTFs, the Army cannot reliably determine whether it is effectively managing the program's risk. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-128 | gao_T-AIMD-00-128_0 | Concluding Remarks
Mr. Chairman, as the federal government moves to fully embrace the digital age and focuses on electronic government initiatives, leadership in the management of the government’s information resources is of paramount importance. Yet, as our study shows, as a single individual, a CIO cannot ensure the successful implementation of information management reforms. Rather, the CIO must be buttressed by the full support of agency heads, the commitment of line managers, clearly defined roles and responsibilities, effective measures of performance, highly skilled and motivated IT professionals, and a range of other factors. The practices and key characteristics defined in our CIO guide can put agencies on the right path toward incorporating these ingredients. Moreover, they can help agencies and their CIOs to identify and correct underlying IM weaknesses that have undermined their modernization initiatives. They can even help ensure that agencies will be well positioned to take advantage of cutting-edge technologies in order to transform service delivery and performance. However, implementing the practices alone is not enough. To achieve real success, agency executives as well as the Congress must provide sustained support and attention to facilitating CIO effectiveness and addressing any structural challenges facing CIOs. Using this support, CIOs themselves must be now focused on results— making sure that IT investments make their agencies more innovative, efficient, and responsive. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the role of chief information officers (CIO) in the federal government.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as the federal government moves to fully embrace the digital age and focuses on electronic government initiatives, leadership in the management of the government's information resources is of paramount importance; (2) yet a CIO, alone, cannot ensure the successful implementation of information management reforms; (3) rather, the CIO must be buttressed by the full support of agency heads, the commitment of line managers, clearly defined roles and responsibilities, effective measures of performance, highly skilled and motivated information technology (IT) professionals, and a range of other factors; (4) the practices and key characteristics defined in GAO's CIO guide can put agencies on the right path toward incorporating these ingredients; (5) moreover, they can help agencies and their CIOs to identify and correct underlying information management weaknesses that have undermined their modernization initiatives; (6) they can even help ensure that agencies will be well positioned to take advantage of cutting-edge technologies in order transform service delivery and performance; (7) however, implementing the practices alone is not enough; (8) to achieve real successes, agency executives as well as Congress must provide sustained support and attention to facilitating CIO effectiveness and addressing any structural changes facing CIOs; and (9) using this support, CIOs themselves must be now focused on results--making sure that IT investments make their agencies more innovative, efficient, and responsive. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-99 | gao_T-HEHS-96-99_0 | 3.) As used by VA, current services encompasses maintaining the currently funded workload, including services to veterans in both the mandatory and discretionary care categories and services to nonveterans. Resources Needed to Meet Needs of Veterans in Mandatory Care Category Are Overstated
The resources VA facilities will need over the next 7 to 10 years to provide hospital and certain outpatient care to veterans in the mandatory care category are, in our view, overstated for the following reasons:
VA did not adequately consider the impact of the declining veteran population on future demand for inpatient hospital care. 4.) VA should be able to further reduce its resource needs by billions of dollars over the 7-year period through improved efficiency and resource enhancements. During the past 5 to 10 years, GAO, VA’s IG, VHA, the Vice President’s National Performance Review, and others identified numerous opportunities to use lower-cost methods to deliver veterans’ health care services, consolidate underused or duplicate processes to increase efficiency, reduce nonacute admissions and days of care in VA hospitals, close underused VA hospitals, and enhance VA revenues from services sold to nonveterans and care provided to veterans. VA has actions planned or under way to take advantage of many of these opportunities. When they are fully operational, these facilities could save about $74 million a year. Unlike private sector hospitals and providers, VA facilities and providers bear little financial risk if they provide (1) expensive medically inappropriate care or (2) services not covered under a veteran’s VA benefits. Because it is at little risk, the VA system does not have a strong incentive to operate efficiently. Unlike private health insurance, however, the VA system does not guarantee the availability of covered services. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed ways in which the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) could operate more efficiently and reduce resources needed to meet its mandatory care obligations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA has overstated its resource needs to meet its mandatory care obligations because its projections do not reflect the expected decline in the veteran population or the amount of discretionary care it provides, overstate workloads, and include uncovered services, service expansions, and services to nonveterans; (2) VA could save billions of dollars by completing its planned efficiency improvements, which include using lower-cost methods, consolidation of underused or duplicate processes, reducing VA hospitals' nonacute admissions and days of care, closing or converting underused hospitals, and enhancing VA revenues from veteran and nonveteran care; (3) traditionally, VA has not given managers incentives to improve operating efficiency; (4) veterans may be denied care because VA facilities bear little risk when they provide inappropriate care and do not guarantee the availability of covered services; and (5) VA is implementing efficiency incentives, such as performance accountability, authority to realign services, and capitation funding, and its reorganization of its health care facilities into service networks could reduce overall costs. |
gao_GAO-11-592 | gao_GAO-11-592_0 | On March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) was signed into law. Provider Audit. Consists of subactivities to address improper payments in Medicare Parts C and D. CMS began this activity in fiscal year 2006. Increased MIP Funding and Contractor Consolidation Have Enabled CMS to Expand the Program from Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 2010
CMS used increased funding it received in fiscal years 2006 through 2010 to expand MIP. Increased Funding Enabled CMS to Provide Additional Support to Existing Program Integrity Activities and Fund New Oversight Activities
CMS received additional MIP funding during fiscal years 2006 through 2010 that was used to support new activities or existing activities not previously supported by MIP. 1.) Not All MIP Officials Connect MIP Activities with CMS’s Goals of Reducing Improper Payments; Data Used to Calculate ROI Are Flawed
Although CMS measures MIP effectiveness by using the improper payment rates for the Medicare fee-for-service, Part C Medicare Advantage, and Part D prescription drug programs, CMS officials with direct responsibility for MIP generally do not connect the MIP activities and the CMS goals of reducing improper payments. These goals and related measures are particularly important because, as part of the Accountable Government Initiative, the President set goals for federal agencies to reduce overall improper payments by $50 billion and recapture at least $2 billion in improper contract payments and overpayments to health providers by the end of 2012. Although CMS has established these GPRA goals as an important way to measure the effectiveness of MIP, our interviews with CMS officials with direct responsibility for MIP activities indicate that these officials generally do not connect MIP activities with the CMS goals of reducing improper payments. The statements by agency officials indicate that CMS has not clearly communicated to its staff the relationship between the daily work of conducting MIP activities and the agency’s higher-level performance measures for improper payment reduction. CMS Added MIP Performance Goals for Fiscal Year 2012 and Is Developing Other Metrics Based on PPACA Requirements, but Their Linkage to Measures Used by MIP Activity Managers Is Not Clear
In its FY 2012 Online Performance Appendix, CMS added two new MIP performance goals to the goals related to the improper payment rate for Medicare fee-for-service, Part C, and Part D, but it is also not clear how they link with performance measures currently used by MIP activity managers. CMS Calculates ROI for Most MIP Activities, but the Data CMS Uses in Its Calculation Have Flaws
PPACA requires CMS to report annually on the use of funds for MIP and the effectiveness of the use of those funds. One way that CMS measures program effectiveness is through calculation of ROI. CMS Considers a Variety of Factors, Including Potential Effect on Improper Payments, When Allocating Funding
Decisions about recommendations for how MIP funding should be allocated among the various activities and subactivities are based on a variety of factors. It is difficult to determine the factors CMS considers when allocating MIP funds beyond those listed in the budget request documents. As the CMS program with the goal to reduce Medicare’s improper payments, MIP will be central to the agency’s effort to reduce the Medicare improper payment rates. As we noted in our 2006 report, ROI is a useful method for assessing the effectiveness of MIP activities. Currently, the data used to calculate the ROI are flawed because the ROI calculations are not updated beyond the end of a fiscal year to account for changes in MIP expenditure data, and CMS does not currently have a way to account for the exact amount of MIP funds MACs spend on individual MIP activities. Expeditiously completing this task and ensuring that final expenditure data are used to update ROI calculations will be essential to ensuring reliability in ROI reporting. To enhance accountability and sharpen the focus of the agency on reducing improper payments, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS clearly communicate to staff the linkage between GPRA and PPACA performance measures related to the reduction in improper payments and other measures used to determine the performance of MIP activities. Cases of potential fraud are referred to the Department of Health and Human Services’ OIG. Appendix III: Contractor Types Performing Medicare Integrity Program Activities for Fiscal Year 2010
Comprehensive
Benefit Integrity includes subactivities designed to deter and detect Medicare fraud by conducting data analysis of claims. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare program makes about $500 billion in payments per year and continues to have a significant amount of improper payments--almost $48 billion in fiscal year 2010. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) Medicare Integrity Program (MIP) is designed to identify and address fraud, waste, and abuse, which are all causes of improper payments. MIP's authorizing legislation provided funding for its activities and subsequent legislation provided additional funding. GAO was asked to report on how effectively CMS is using MIP funding to address Medicare program integrity. GAO examined (1) how CMS used MIP funding to support the program's activities from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, (2) how CMS assesses the effectiveness of MIP, and (3) factors CMS considers when allocating MIP funding. GAO analyzed CMS budget and other documents, interviewed CMS officials, and examined the agency's method of calculating return on investment (ROI), a performance measure used by CMS to measure the effectiveness of MIP activities.
What GAO Found
CMS used the increase in total MIP funding received, from $832 million in fiscal year 2006 to $1 billion in fiscal year 2010, to expand MIP's activities. The additional funding supported oversight of Medicare Part C (Medicare benefits managed through private plans) and Part D (the outpatient prescription drug benefit) and agency efforts to examine the claims of Medicare beneficiaries who also participate in Medicaid--a joint federal-state health care program for certain low-income individuals. CMS officials also reported that CMS was able to move some funding from activities, such as provider audit, to other activities because of savings achieved from consolidating contractors. The largest percentage increase from this redistribution went to benefit integrity activities, which aim to deter and detect Medicare fraud through proactive data analysis and coordination with law enforcement. Although CMS has reported that the agency measures MIP's performance with goals related to reductions in the improper payment rates for Medicare fee-forservice, Part C, and Part D, CMS officials with direct responsibility for MIP generally do not connect measurements of effectiveness of MIP activities with the CMS goals of reducing improper payments. These goals to reduce improper payments, which were reported as goals previously and for fiscal year 2012, are particularly important in light of the President's Accountable Government Initiative, which aims to reduce overall improper payments by $50 billion by the end of 2012. In interviews with GAO, CMS officials with direct responsibility for implementing MIP activities generally did not connect the measurement of effectiveness of MIP activities with these CMS goals to reduce improper payments and instead cited other measures of effectiveness. This suggests that CMS has not clearly communicated to its staff the relationship between the daily work of conducting MIP activities and the agency's improper payment reduction performance goals. Because MIP will be central to CMS's efforts to reduce Medicare improper payments, MIP staff need to understand how their work supports these goals. In addition, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires CMS to report annually on the use of funds for MIP and the effectiveness of the use of those funds. One way that CMS already measures MIP effectiveness is ROI, which CMS calculates as savings from an activity in relation to expenditures. CMS calculates ROI for most of its MIP activities, but the data it uses have two flaws. First, ROI calculations are not updated when program expenditure data, a key component in the ROI calculation, are updated, which may lead to an incorrect ROI. Second, CMS does not have reliable information to determine the amount of MIP spending by activity for one type of contractor that received about 22 percent of total MIP funding in fiscal year 2010. It will be important for CMS to correct these flaws to ensure reliability in ROI reporting. CMS considers a variety of factors when allocating MIP funding. Based on a review of the documents submitted to justify funding of specific MIP activities, CMS may consider the prior year's funding level, the consequence of not funding, and the performance goal that the activity is intended to meet.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS communicate the linkage between MIP activities and the goals for reducing improper payments and that CMS expeditiously improve the reliability of data used to calculate ROI. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GGD-95-189 | gao_GGD-95-189_0 | Table 1 summarizes the current recordkeeping and reporting requirements for cashier’s checks. In addition, they agreed that imposing additional recordkeeping requirements, such as one that would specifically require financial institutions to retrieve copies of cashier’s checks by customer name or account number, would not add to the effectiveness of the current BSA recordkeeping requirements. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with the Committees, we limited the scope of our review to (1) identifying current recordkeeping requirements and (2) determining the views of federal government and financial industry officials on the need for additional recordkeeping requirements for financial institutions issuing cashier’s checks. To familiarize ourselves with how cashier’s checks are issued and to identify recordkeeping and reporting requirements imposed on financial institutions issuing cashier’s checks, we reviewed pertinent provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act, relevant federal rules and regulations, and published material such as financial and legal industry reports on BSA compliance. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement and a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the current recordkeeping requirements for cashier checks; and (2) whether federal government and financial industry officials believe that additional recordkeeping requirements should be imposed on those financial institutions issuing cashier checks.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requires financial institutions issuing or exchanging cashier's checks to: (1) file a currency transaction report for financial transactions over $10,000; (2) capture and retain purchaser information for transactions between $3,000 to $10,000; (3) retain copies of cashier's checks for amounts over $100; and (4) maintain a record of certain check transactions exceeding $100. In addition, GAO found that federal government and financial industry officials believe that the current recordkeeping and reporting requirements are sufficient, and imposing additional requirements would not add to the effectiveness of the current BSA recordkeeping requirements. |
gao_GAO-12-697 | gao_GAO-12-697_0 | VA’s Program Remains Vulnerable to Fraud and Abuse as a Result of a Lack of Inventory Control and Potentially Ineligible Firms Listed in VetBiz
VA has made numerous conflicting statements about its progress verifying firms listed in VetBiz under the more-thorough process the agency implemented in response to the 2010 Act. With regard to our previous work, VA has taken some positive action to enhance its fraud prevention efforts by establishing processes in response to 6 of 13 recommendations we issued in October 2011. VA has also begun action on some remaining recommendations. VA officials told us that the agency prioritized its verification under the process implemented in response to the 2010 Act by reviewing (1) new applications for firms that had previously only self-certified in VetBiz (i.e., firms that had not been reviewed under the processes VA created for the 2006 Act or 2010 Act); (2) new firms that had initially applied for verification after the 2010 Act, to include reprocessing any firms that were denied through the new requirements and subsequently requested reconsideration; and (3) applications for firms initially verified in VetBiz under the process VA chose to implement for the 2006 Act. In one communication, VA stated that as of February 2011, VA’s 2006 Act verification process had been discontinued, and all new verifications would use the process implemented in response to the 2010 Act going forward. Our analysis shows that as of April 1, 2012, 3,717 of the 6,178 SDVOSBs (60 percent) listed as eligible in VetBiz had yet to be verified using the more-thorough verification process. Of these 3,717 firms listed as eligible on April 1, 2012, 134 received a total of $90 million in new VA SDVOSB sole-source or set- aside contract obligations during the 4-month period from November 30, 2011, to April 1, 2012. Further, the report noted VA’s document-review process under the 2006 Act “in many cases was insufficient to establish control and ownership… in effect allowed businesses to self-certify as a veteran-owned or service-disabled veteran-owned small business with little supporting documentation.” The report goes on to state that VA’s failure to maintain “accurate and current” information in the VetBiz database also exacerbated problems in the verification process. However, VA has not developed and implemented procedures for conducting unannounced site visits to contract performance locations and interviews with contracting officials. Until VA develops procedures on removing SDVOSB contracts from ineligible firms, the SDVOSB program is at risk for ineligible firms to abuse the program and retain contracts obtained through fraud and abuse. No Action Has Been Taken to Improve Government-wide SDVOSB Fraud- Prevention Controls
No action has been taken to improve government-wide SDVOSB fraud- prevention controls as the program continues to remain a self-certification program. Because federal law does not require it, SBA does not verify firms’ eligibility status, nor does it require that firms submit supporting documentation. Such an action is supported by the fact that VA maintains the database identifying which individuals are service-disabled veterans and is consistent with VA’s mission of service to veterans. After its review of DOD contracts awarded from October 2009 to July 2010, the OIG reported that $1.9 million in SDVOSB contracts went to firms that were not registered in CCR as SDVOSBs and $340.3 million went to contractors that potentially misstated their SDVOSB status. To address the vulnerabilities within the government-wide program caused by reliance on a self-certification process, we suggested in 2009 that Congress consider providing VA with the authority and resources necessary to expand its SDVOSB eligibility verification process to all contractors seeking to bid on SDVOSB contracts government-wide. However, such action should not be undertaken until VA demonstrates that its verification process is successful in reducing the SDVOSB program’s vulnerability to fraud and abuse. Recommendations for Executive Action
To minimize potential fraud and abuse in VA’s SDVOSB program and provide reasonable assurance that legitimate SDVOSB firms obtain the benefits of this program, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs ensure that all firms within VetBiz have undergone its 2010 Act verification process. In addition, five new case studies developed for this report highlight instances of fraud and abuse. Our report’s characterization of the Veterans Small Business Verification Act (2010 Act), part of the Veterans’ Benefits Act of 2010, is correct and we did not make associated changes to the report. These firms received approximately $16 million in VA SDVOSB set-aside and sole-source contract obligations from October 2010 to December 2011. Our report states that VA has made progress in the area of fraud- awareness training. Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Preliminary Information on Actions Taken by Agencies to Address Fraud and Abuse and Remaining Vulnerabilities. Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Fraud Prevention Controls Needed to Improve Program Integrity. | Why GAO Did This Study
The SDVOSB program provides federal contracting opportunities to business-owning veterans who incurred or aggravated disabilities in the line of duty. SBA administers the government-wide program, while VA maintains databases of veterans and SDVOSBs and oversees its own contracts. GAO has reported several times since 2009 that both programs were vulnerable to fraud and abuse and recommended improvements. In October 2010, Congress passed the Veterans Small Business Verification Act (2010 Act), part of the Veterans Benefits Act of 2010, to provide tools to VA to more-thoroughly validate firms eligibility before listing them in VetBiz, the database used by VA contracting officials to award SDVOSB contracts.
GAO was asked to assess (1) VAs progress in addressing remaining vulnerabilities to fraud and abuse in its SDVOSB program and (2) actions taken by SBA or other federal agencies to improve government-wide SDVOSB fraud-prevention controls. GAO reviewed agency documentation and interviewed agency officials. GAO also investigated cases of alleged fraud and abuse. GAO did not project the extent of fraud and abuse in the program.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) program remains vulnerable to fraud and abuse. VA has made inconsistent statements about its progress verifying firms listed in VetBiz using the more-thorough process the agency implemented in response to the Veterans Small Business Verification Act (2010 Act). In one communication, VA stated that as of February 2011, all new verifications would use the 2010 Act process going forward. However, as of April 1, 2012, 3,717 of the 6,178 SDVOSB firms (60 percent) listed as eligible in VetBiz had not been verified under the 2010 Act process. Of these 3,717 firms, 134 received $90 million in new VA SDVOSB set-aside or sole-source contract obligations from November 30, 2011, to April 1, 2012. While the 2010 Act did not include a deadline for verification using the more-thorough process, the presence of firms that have only been subjected to the less-stringent process that VA previously used represents a continuing vulnerability. VAs Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that the less-stringent process was in many cases insufficient to establish control and ownership and in effect allowed businesses to self-certify as SDVOSBs with little supporting documentation. VA has taken some positive action to enhance its fraud prevention efforts by establishing processes in response to 6 of 13 recommendations GAO issued in October 2011, including conducting unannounced site visits to high-risk firms and developing procedures for referring suspicious SDVOSB applications to the OIG. VA has also begun action on some remaining recommendations, such as providing fraud awareness training and removing contracts from ineligible firms, though these procedures need to be finalized.
Regarding the government-wide SDVOSB program, no action has been taken by agencies to improve fraud-prevention controls. Relying almost solely on firms self-certification, the program continues to lack controls to prevent fraud and abuse. The Small Business Administration (SBA) does not verify firms eligibility status, nor does it require that they submit supporting documentation. While SBA is under no statutory obligation to create a verification process, five new cases of potentially ineligible firms highlight the danger of taking no action. These firms received approximately $190 million in SDVOSB contract obligations. In one case, a firm found ineligible by VA continued to self-certify as an SDVOSB and received about $860,000 from the General Services Administration and the Department of Interior. Further, the Department of Defense (DOD) OIG reported in 2012 that DOD provided $340 million to firms that potentially misstated their SDVOSB status. To address these vulnerabilities, GAO previously suggested that Congress consider providing VA with the authority necessary to expand its SDVOSB eligibility verification process government-wide. Such an action is supported by the fact that VA maintains the database identifying which individuals are service-disabled veterans and is consistent with VAs mission of service to veterans. However, the problems GAO identified with VAs verification process indicate that an expansion of VAs authority to address government-wide program problems should not be undertaken until VA demonstrates that its process is successful in reducing its own SDVOSB programs vulnerability to fraud and abuse.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA take steps to ensure that all firms within VetBiz have undergone the 2010 Act verification process. VA generally concurred with the recommendation but expressed concern about how specific report language characterized its program. GAO made some changes to the report but continues to believe that the program remains vulnerable to fraud and abuse. |
gao_GAO-08-1053 | gao_GAO-08-1053_0 | SSA Has Used Its Demonstration Authority to Initiate Several Projects Since 1998, but Efforts Have Yielded Limited Information
Over the last decade, SSA has initiated 14 demonstration projects to test policy and program changes, of which SSA has completed 4, cancelled 5, and had 5 projects in progress as of August 2008. In total, SSA had spent about $155 million on these demonstration projects as of April 2008, and officials anticipate spending another $220 million in the coming years on those projects currently in progress. However, these projects have yielded limited information for influencing program and policy decisions. We found that SSA did not conduct impact evaluations for two of its completed projects and cancelled five projects prior to conducting formal evaluations; thus, limited information is available. Demonstration Projects Have Yielded Limited Information to Influence Program and Policy Changes
Despite using its demonstration authority to examine various issues, SSA’s demonstration projects have yielded limited information for influencing program and policy decisions. Furthermore, SSA intended to evaluate the impacts of policies and programs being tested in five other projects but could not do so because the significant challenges those projects faced led SSA to cancel them in the early stages. While they have the potential to yield reliable results, it is too early to tell whether they will ultimately be useful for informing DI and SSI policy and program changes. SSA Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Projects but Continues to Lack Management Controls
SSA has taken steps to improve its demonstration projects, in part by applying more rigorous methodologies than it did for the projects SSA initiated prior to 1998; however, it has not fully implemented GAO’s recommendations from 2004 and does not have written policies and procedures in place to ensure that projects are routinely reviewed and effectively managed so that they yield reliable information about their impacts. On the basis of our assessment, we determined that 11 of the 12 projects’ designs were strong or reasonable when assessed against professional research standards (see table 3). To further improve the demonstration projects’ planning and methodological rigor, SSA has used external research professionals to work with the agency on the design, implementation, or evaluation of 12 of the 14 projects. SSA also appointed new program management in 2007. In addition to not fully addressing our prior recommendations, SSA does not have written policies and procedures governing how it should review and operate its demonstration program. In addition, we found that SSA does not have written procedures for its project officers to follow as they design, implement, and evaluate its demonstration projects. Such procedures could be used to ensure that standard research practices, such as conducting pilot phases and including internal and external stakeholders, are applied when planning and implementing the demonstration projects. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how SSA has used its current demonstration authority, we reviewed legislation authorizing the Social Security Administration (SSA) to conduct Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) demonstration projects, prior GAO report and SSA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reports, and reports to Congress on the demonstration authority. SSA implemented the project in 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1980, Congress has required the Social Security Administration (SSA) to conduct demonstration projects to test the effectiveness of possible changes to its Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs that could decrease individuals' dependence on benefits or improve program administration. However, in 2004, GAO reported that SSA had not used its demonstration authority effectively. This follow-up report assesses (1) how SSA has used its demonstration authority to test DI and SSI program changes and what information these efforts have yielded and (2) what steps SSA has taken to improve the planning and management of its demonstration projects. To do this, GAO reviewed documents related to SSA's demonstration project management and the steps it took to implement the recommendations in the 2004 report, as well as the projects' designs, evaluations, and costs. GAO also interviewed officials from SSA, its contractors and project sites, and disability experts.
What GAO Found
Over the last decade, SSA has initiated 14 demonstration projects under its authority to test possible DI and SSI policy and program changes; however, these projects have yielded limited information for influencing program and policy decisions. Of the 14 projects, SSA has completed 4, cancelled 5, and had 5 projects in progress as of June 2008. In total, SSA spent about $155 million on its projects as of April 2008, and officials anticipate spending another $220 million in the coming years on those projects currently under way. Yet, these projects have yielded limited information on the impacts of the program and policy changes they were testing. SSA did not conduct impact evaluations for two of its completed projects, and intended to evaluate five other projects, but could not do so because significant challenges led SSA to cancel them. SSA officials believe the five projects currently under way will yield useful information, but it is too early to tell. SSA has taken steps to improve its demonstration projects but continues to lack management controls to ensure that the projects yield reliable information for making disability policy decisions. SSA has used methodological designs that GAO determined were strong or reasonable when assessed against professional research standards for 11 of its 14 projects. SSA has also used external research professionals to work with the agency on the design, implementation, or evaluation of 12 of the projects, and appointed new program management to oversee its demonstration program. However, as of August 2008, SSA had not fully implemented the recommendations GAO made in 2004 and did not have written policies and procedures governing how it should review and operate its demonstration project program. Specifically, SSA does not have written policies and procedures for its managers and project officers to follow as they design, implement, and evaluate its demonstration projects. Absent such protocols, SSA did not always apply standard research practices, such as conducting pilot phases or obtaining sufficient stakeholder input, which led to data limitations and project cancellations. |
gao_GAO-15-494T | gao_GAO-15-494T_0 | DEA Has Not Effectively Administered the Quota Process
We found significant weaknesses involving DEA’s management of the quota process for controlled substances. Similarly, DEA has not proposed APQs on or before May 1, as required by its regulations, for any year from 2001 through 2014. DEA officials attributed the agency’s lack of compliance with its required time frames to inadequate staffing of the Quota Unit. DEA officials said the agency has not been able to find candidates with the right skills who are also able to pass the background checks required for employment, and offers to qualified candidates have been declined. Despite these challenges, DEA officials said that they expect the agency will be compliant with its CSA time frames in the future because of changes made to the quota process in 2011, specifically the reorganization of the Quota Unit and moving to an electronic system for the quota process (YERS/QMS). While manufacturers are ultimately responsible for what they manufacture with the quota authorized by DEA, their decisions are made within the confines of the amount and timing of quota granted by DEA. Additionally, we found that DEA’s weak internal controls jeopardize the agency’s ability to effectively manage the quota process. DEA does not have adequate controls to ensure the reliability of YERS/QMS, which it uses to track manufacturers’ quota applications and record its quota decisions. However, the agency does not have systematic quality checks, such as periodic comparisons of YERS/QMS records to source documents, to ensure that the data are accurate or the checks it has in place are sufficient. The lack of systematic data checks is also concerning because we estimate that 44 percent of YERS/QMS records in 2011 and 10 percent in 2012 had errors. DEA officials said that 2011 was the first year manufacturers applied for quota electronically and they expected data from 2012 and beyond to be more accurate. We also found that DEA lacks critical management information because it does not have performance measures related to setting quotas or ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply of controlled substances, nor does it monitor YERS/QMS data to assess its performance. guidance on how to conduct these activities. Specifically, we recommended that DEA (1) strengthen its internal controls of YERS/QMS, (2) establish performance measures related to quotas, (3) monitor and analyze YERS/QMS data, and (4) develop internal policies for processing quota applications and setting aggregate, annual, and supplemental quotas. Lack of Effective Coordination May Hinder the Ability of DEA and FDA to Address Future Drug Shortages
Our report also identified several barriers that may hinder DEA and FDA from effectively coordinating with each other during a quota-related drug shortage. One barrier is that DEA and FDA sometimes disagree about whether a shortage exists because the two agencies define shortages differently. Although there has not been a reported shortage of a drug containing a controlled substance caused by quotas since FDASIA’s enactment in 2012, the law requires the agencies to coordinate certain efforts to address such a shortage if one occurs. Finally, both agencies stated that they were subject to restrictions on exchanging the proprietary information they receive from drug manufacturers, which may be helpful to prevent or address shortages of drugs containing controlled substances. The agencies had been working for more than 2 years on developing a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) to facilitate the sharing of such information. It establishes procedures regarding the exchange of proprietary and other sensitive information between FDA and DEA in both written and verbal communications. Our report included a recommendation that DEA expeditiously establish formal policies and procedures to facilitate coordination with FDA as directed by FDASIA, including a specific time frame in which it will be expected to respond to FDA’s requests to expedite shortage-related quota applications. We also made two additional recommendations to both DEA and FDA to strengthen their abilities to respond to shortages of drugs containing controlled substances. We recommended that the two agencies promptly update the MOU, and that has now been accomplished. HHS agreed with the two recommendations we made to FDA. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the last decade, shortages of drugs containing controlled substances, such as narcotics and stimulants, have increased nationwide, preventing providers and patients from accessing essential medications for treatment. Controlled substances are regulated by DEA because of the potential for abuse and addiction. DEA is responsible for preventing diversion of controlled substances, and also focuses on ensuring that an adequate and uninterrupted supply of these substances is available for legitimate medical and other needs.
(1) DEA’s administration of the quota process, and (2) coordination activities between DEA and FDA to prevent and mitigate shortages of drugs containing controlled substances. For the report, GAO analyzed data from 2011 and 2012 from YERS/QMS, which is the official record for the quota process. GAO interviewed officials from DEA, FDA, and drug manufacturers. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and documents. To update selected information in March and April 2015, GAO reviewed documentation and contacted FDA officials.
What GAO Found
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has not effectively administered the quota setting process by which it limits the amount of certain controlled substances available for use in the United States. Each year, manufacturers apply for quotas of controlled substances in order to make certain drugs. DEA, however, has not responded to those applications within the time frames required by its regulations for any year from 2001 through 2014. DEA officials attributed this lack of compliance to inadequate staffing, stating that the agency has been unable to find qualified candidates who are able to pass the necessary background checks and that offers to qualified candidates have been declined. Manufacturers cited late quota decisions as causing or exacerbating some shortages of their drugs.
Additionally, DEA’s weak internal controls jeopardize the agency’s ability to effectively manage the quota process. For instance, agency officials said that DEA conducts some data checks to ensure the accuracy of its data in its Year-End Reporting and Quota Management System (YERS/QMS), but it has no systematic quality checks to ensure the quota data are accurate. GAO estimates that 44 percent of YERS/QMS records in 2011 and 10 percent in 2012 had errors. DEA officials said that 2011 was the first year manufacturers applied for quota electronically and they expected data from 2012 and beyond to be more accurate.
DEA also lacks critical management information because it does not have performance measures related to setting quotas, and it does not monitor YERS/QMS data to assess its performance. Moreover, DEA does not have reasonable assurance that the quotas it sets are in accordance with its requirements and cannot ensure continuity of its operations, as it does not have protocols, policies, training materials, or other documentation to manage the quota process.
The Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) contains provisions that require DEA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to coordinate certain efforts to address shortages of certain drugs caused by quotas. Despite this, the agencies have not established a sufficiently collaborative relationship. For example, DEA and FDA sometimes disagree about what constitutes a drug shortage. DEA also has no policies or procedures on how to coordinate with FDA to address shortages caused by quota. Given such barriers to coordination, DEA and FDA cannot effectively address shortages of drugs subject to quota. Additionally, both agencies stated that they were subject to restrictions on exchanging proprietary information, which may be helpful to address drug shortages. DEA and FDA had been working since 2012 to develop a new memorandum of understanding (MOU), which was finalized in March 2015. According to the MOU, the two agencies will still need to develop a plan to share such information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. For GAO-15-202 , GAO recommended that DEA should take five actions to improve its management of the quota process: (1) strengthen its internal controls of YERS/QMS, (2) establish performance measures related to the quota process, (3) monitor and analyze YERS/QMS data, (4) develop internal policies for setting quotas, and (5) expeditiously establish formal policies and procedures to facilitate coordination with FDA as directed by FDASIA. Additionally, in GAO-15-202 , GAO recommended that DEA and FDA should take two actions to strengthen their ability to respond to shortages of drugs containing controlled substances: (1) promptly update their MOU (which has now been accomplished), and (2) specifically outline information the agencies will share and time frames for doing so. DEA neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO’s recommendations. HHS agreed with the applicable recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-99-2 | gao_HEHS-99-2_0 | While some people with HIV or AIDS are covered by private medical insurance, many others are either uninsured or have limited prescription drug coverage and must rely on one or a combination of federal and state programs and assistance programs offered by manufacturers of HIV and AIDS treatment drugs. The remainder (less than half) of the individuals with AIDS rely on sources other than ADAPs, VA, DOD, or Medicaid to finance their drug therapy. (For more detail on each state’s financial criteria for Medicaid and ADAP eligibility, see app. Recent Federal and State Spending on HIV and AIDS Drugs Through Medicaid and ADAPs Has Increased
The care of HIV and AIDS patients for all types of treatment, including drugs, involves a variety of programs funded by the federal government, states, and private payers, but the largest share of federal funding is through the Medicaid program. In fiscal year 1997, total federal spending on medical care, including inpatient and outpatient services and prescription drugs, for individuals with AIDS or HIV was estimated at $4.8 billion. Federal Spending for HIV/AIDS Drugs Has Increased Rapidly
We estimate that a substantial proportion of federal spending for AIDS or HIV medical care—at least one-sixth—is for prescription drugs, primarily through Medicaid and the ADAPs. Federal ADAP Funding Accounts for Most CARE Act Increases
Over the past several years, overall federal funding for the CARE Act has increased more than 50 percent, from about $760 million in 1996 to about $1.2 billion in 1998. II for state contributions.) Developing such estimates by insurance coverage or payer source is difficult. An Increasing Number of Medicaid Beneficiaries With AIDS Will Likely Seek Combination Drug Therapy
Although there are a number of FDA-approved drugs for the treatment of HIV, at least half of the people with AIDS in the United States are estimated to be receiving therapies that combine a protease inhibitor with other drugs. These drugs are also available for individuals who are HIV positive but do not have AIDS, but data on this population are of insufficient quality to pinpoint the number of HIV cases receiving combination drug therapy. They estimated that of the total number of people in the United States with AIDS or who are HIV positive, 50 percent would be on combination therapy in 1997 and 60 to 65 percent in 1998. Some states have cut costs by restricting patient access to ADAPs and implementing other emergency measures. Impact of New Therapies on Public Programs Is Difficult to Assess, but Effects on Programs Would Likely Vary
As discussed, it is not possible to accurately project the number of patients who will be on combination drug therapy in the future. Many factors—such as the long-term effectiveness of current therapies, evolving standards of care, and new research developments—influence future demand and cost. Long-Term Impact of Drug Therapies Would Influence Demand and Associated Costs
Rapid advances in HIV and AIDS treatment have occurred in the last 2 years. For Medicaid, reductions in hospitalizations could, in the short-term, offset the costs associated with HIV and AIDS combination drug therapy. Although insurance coverage for the estimated 410,000 to 660,000 individuals who are HIV positive but have not developed AIDS is unknown, ADAPs are the most likely to see increases in the number of individuals who are uninsured or underinsured and seeking funding for combination drug therapy in 1998. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the potential implications for federal and state budgets from the increased use of combination drug therapies for patients with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunedeficiency syndrome (AIDS), focusing on: (1) federal and state spending on HIV and AIDS drug treatment, by major programs, over the last several years; (2) the estimated number of people with AIDS and HIV on combination drug therapy who are covered by Medicaid or other publicly funded programs, and measures that have been taken to stretch the resources in the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act; and (3) the potential impacts of new drug therapies on federal and state government outlays.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while state governments and private payers share in the financing of medical care for people with HIV and AIDS, the federal government currently funds more than half the cost of such care; (2) for fiscal year (FY) 1998, estimated federal spending on treatment for individuals with AIDS or HIV is expected to total over $5 billion, an increase of about 5 percent over FY 1997; (3) GAO estimates that a substantial portion of federal spending for AIDS or HIV medical care--at least one-sixth--is for prescription drugs, primarily through Medicaid and funding under title II of the CARE Act for states' AIDS Drug Assistance Programs (ADAP); (4) with recent research developments in HIV and AIDS treatment, the demand for federal and state funding for HIV and AIDS treatment is expected to increase; (5) more than half of the 240,000 people with AIDS in the United States are estimated to be receiving combination drug therapies that include a protease inhibitor and other drugs; (6) of the AIDS patients on Medicaid, GAO estimates that at least 67,500 are receiving combination drug therapy in 1998; (7) data on the number of individuals who are HIV positive but do not have AIDS are insufficient, so it is difficult to develop reliable estimates of the total number of Medicaid- and ADAP-eligible individuals who would likely qualify for and seek combination drug therapy; (8) however, some ADAPs report that a great majority of their clients will receive combination therapy in 1998; (9) ADAPs have taken several steps to stretch available funds and thereby maximize the number of clients they are able to serve; (10) other factors--such as evolving standards of care, the long-term effectiveness of current therapies, and new research developments--also influence projections of the impact of new drug therapies on federal and state government programs; (11) although the effect of the demand for the new combination therapies is difficult to estimate, ADAPs will likely experience greater financial pressure than Medicaid in caring for individuals with AIDS or HIV who seek assistance; (12) this is in part because Medicaid primarily provides coverage for those individuals whose HIV infection has progressed to AIDS, and there are some indications that Medicaid costs for drug therapy might be offset by reductions in hospitalizations; (13) in contrast, ADAPs cover drug costs for both AIDS and others who are HIV positive, and who have fixed incomes; and (14) since ADAPs only cover drugs, cost offsets are not as likely to occur. |
gao_RCED-96-2 | gao_RCED-96-2_0 | Mixed Results in Avoiding Foreclosures Permanently
We forecast, on the basis of historical data on the disposition of program loans, that about 35,400 (52 percent) of the 68,695 borrowers accepted into the program since fiscal year 1989 will eventually lose their homes through foreclosure. For the remaining loans (48 percent), we forecast that borrowers will pay off the loans and avoid foreclosure by either selling their homes or refinancing their mortgages, often after remaining in the program for a lengthy period of time. 2). The program also allows 3 years of reduced or suspended mortgage payments. FHA borrowers’ premiums pay for these losses, not the U.S. Treasury. These options include directing HUD to shorten the 36-month relief period, set a time limit on eliminating delinquencies, and accept into the program only those borrowers who can afford half or more of their mortgage payments. The options, such as requiring borrowers to pay more in monthly mortgage payments, would reduce but not eliminate the program’s additional losses. The assignment program would have to require borrowers to begin full mortgage payments within a few months after entering the program in order to nearly eliminate the additional losses incurred by the program. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about the rising number of loans assigned to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and their financial impact, the Chairman, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, asked us to determine whether the mortgage assignment program (1) helps borrowers avoid foreclosure, (2) reduces the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) losses, and (3) can be improved to reduce losses. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) mortgage assignment program: (1) helps borrowers avoid foreclosure; (2) reduces the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) foreclosure losses; and (3) can be improved to reduce such losses.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) HUD mortgage assignment program helps borrowers avoid immediate foreclosure, but is not successful in helping borrowers avoid foreclosure or retain their homes on a long-term basis; (2) about 52 percent of the 68,700 borrowers in the mortgage program will lose their homes through foreclosure, and the remaining borrowers will pay off their loans after the sale or refinancing of their homes; (3) the mortgage assignment program has not reduced FHA foreclosure losses, since FHA incurs additional costs under the program which more than offset the costs from saving some loans from foreclosure; (4) FHA will incur losses of more than $1.5 billion for those borrowers accepted into the mortgage program since fiscal year 1989; (5) although FHA borrowers' premiums pay for these additional losses, it is more difficult for the single-family insurance program to remain self-sufficient; (6) options that would reduce additional program losses include reducing the 3-year relief period provided to borrowers, setting a time limit on eliminating delinquencies, and accepting borrowers that can pay half or more of their mortgage payment; and (7) FHA would have to require borrowers to begin full mortgage payments within a few months after entering the program to eliminate additional program losses. |
gao_AIMD-96-170 | gao_AIMD-96-170_0 | IRS’ Business Vision
In 1992, IRS developed a new business vision for 2001 that was designed to address critical longstanding problems with its programs, such as the lack of accurate and readily accessible information on taxpayers, their accounts, and IRS operations, which are due in part to an antiquated tax return processing system that relies on labor-intensive, error-prone methods to process over 200 million, primarily paper, tax returns annually; taxpayers’ frustration in dealing with IRS as they seek to resolve tax law or account questions (these frustrations revolve around very low levels of telephone accessibility, confusing and hard-to-understand notices, and the need to repeatedly call or correspond with IRS to resolve tax issues); and a stagnant level of taxpayer compliance and a sizable inventory of accounts receivable. During the past 4 years, IRS has made some progress in modernizing its operations to reflect its business vision, but the differences between IRS’ current operations and those proposed in its vision are great. Although IRS has taken some steps to increase the number of electronic returns filed, it does not have a comprehensive business strategy to reach its electronic filing goal of 80 million filings by 2001. IRS has identified which five centers will specialize in paper processing and has consolidated the processing of paper information returns and Federal Tax Deposit coupons in those centers with the rollout of the Service Center Recognition Image Processing System (SCRIPS). However, SCRIPS is performing well below IRS’ original expectations. IRS Faces Several Challenges in Implementing Its Customer Service Vision
The second part of IRS’ business vision is to improve service to taxpayers and improve its efficiency in using resources. A key IRS goal is to resolve 95 percent of taxpayer inquiries after one contact. IRS’ strategy for improving customer service includes consolidating work units, changing work processes, and increasing the use of or implementing new information systems. Early in 1995, IRS implemented a networking capability among the 10 service centers so that employees could have access to IDRS data nationwide. It is this latter group that IRS must deal with in its efforts to collect delinquent taxes. IRS’ inventory of tax debt includes delinquent debts that may be up to 10 years old. IRS must clearly define its business needs and determine the most cost-effective means for meeting those needs to ensure that it makes effective use of funds provided for information technology projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to make its organization, operations, and processes more effective and efficient and improve customer service.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during the past 4 years, IRS has made some progress in modernizing its operations to reflect its business vision; (2) although IRS has taken some actions to increase the number of electronic returns filed, it does not have a comprehensive strategy to reach its electronic filing goal by 2001; (3) IRS has consolidated the processing of paper returns in those centers with the Service Center Recognition Image Processing System (SCRIPS), but SCRIPS is performing well below IRS original expectations; (4) IRS faces several challenges in implementing its customer service vision; (5) a key IRS goal is to resolve 95 percent of taxpayer inquiries after one contact; (6) IRS strategy for improving customer service includes consolidating work units, changing work processes, and implementing new information systems; (7) IRS expects that 45 percent of all taxpayers' calls will be resolved through interactive telephone systems by 2000; (8) IRS has implemented a networking capability among its 10 service centers for employees to gain access to taxpayer data nationwide; (9) IRS must deal with its limited ability to collect delinquent taxes and manage its accounts receivable; (10) IRS inventory of tax debt includes delinquent taxes up to 10 years old; and (11) IRS must clearly define its business needs and determine the most cost-effective means for meeting those needs. |
gao_GAO-14-800 | gao_GAO-14-800_0 | HRSA supplements its staff with contractors that perform grantee monitoring activities such as conducting site visits to monitor compliance with grant requirements, or financial audits and reviews. HRSA Has Developed Guidance for Staff on Grantee Monitoring, but Bureau-Level Guidance Did Not Address All of the Key Components of Monitoring
HRSA began systematically developing guidance for the key staff responsible for grantee monitoring in 2012. Specifically, HRSA issued the first agency-wide guidance written primarily for project officers in November 2012, and it required each of the bureaus to develop more detailed guidance for project officers by the end of 2012. In addition, HRSA is in the process of developing new guidance and revising existing guidance for grants management specialists and financial integrity staff in OFAM. To assist the bureaus in systematically developing their SOPs, HRSA provided the bureaus with a template outlining the minimum components to be included in their documents and established a workgroup to facilitate implementation of the SOPs across the agency. In addition to SOPs, HRSA officials described other sources of guidance developed by the bureaus, such as site visit guides, policy notices, frequently asked questions, checklists, and templates.and supervisors we interviewed generally found the guidance on grantee Project officers monitoring to be helpful, and one project officer who had been with HRSA for over 10 years stated that the level of guidance provided to project officers has significantly improved in recent years. Guidance for OFAM staff. Bureau-Level Guidance Did Not Address All of the Key Components of Grantee Monitoring
While HRSA’s bureaus have developed bureau-level guidance for project officers on monitoring of grantees, we found that the bureaus’ SOPs did not address all of the key components of grantee monitoring identified by HRSA. Because the SOPs do not include the level of detail specified by HRSA in the template, there is an increased possibility that project officers will not conduct, or appropriately document, all of the required monitoring activities, which puts HRSA at greater risk for having incomplete or ineffective grantee monitoring. HRSA Implemented Agency-Wide Training Programs for Grantee Monitoring Staff Beginning in 2013; Bureau-Level Training Varied
Since 2013, HRSA has implemented agency-wide training programs for key staff responsible for monitoring grantees, including a project officer certification program and a training program for grants management specialists. Both the new and experienced project officer training includes courses that cover material related to grantee monitoring. In addition to agency-wide training programs, the bureaus provided their own training—such as training on specific grant programs—to varying degrees. HRSA Has Four Main Methods for Overseeing Its Staff’s Monitoring of Grantees
HRSA has four main methods for overseeing project officers, grants management specialists, and financial integrity staff that are responsible for monitoring its grantees—supervisors reviewing information in, and reports from, EHB; participating in staff interactions with grantees; communicating regularly with staff; and conducting performance appraisals. HRSA also uses its annual performance appraisal process to hold its staff accountable for their grantee monitoring responsibilities. HRSA Has Several Mechanisms in Place Designed to Ensure Contractors That Monitor Grantees Are Qualified and to Oversee Their Work
HRSA has several mechanisms in place designed to ensure that HRSA contractors that conduct grantee monitoring activities are qualified and to oversee the work performed by these contractors. HRSA officials told us that the agency’s process for awarding contracts is designed to ensure the contractors that conduct grantee monitoring activities are qualified. For all 13 contracts that HRSA identified as including grantee monitoring activities in fiscal year 2013, the personnel proposed by contractors were a factor in HRSA’s evaluation and selection of the contractors. For some contracts, HRSA identified specific qualifications required for contractor staff. HRSA officials reported several mechanisms they use to oversee contractors’ work, including regular communications with contractors, the review of contractors’ deliverables, and the collection of feedback from project officers and grantees on contractor performance. Conclusions
HRSA uses a large portion of its appropriations—over 80 percent in fiscal year 2013—to award grants to external entities. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure complete and effective monitoring of grantees, we recommend that the Administrator of HRSA develop a process, either at the agency or bureau level, to ensure that bureaus’ SOPs address all of the key components of grantee monitoring as established by the agency. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2013, HRSA awarded over $6 billion in grants, which accounted for over 80 percent of the agency's appropriations. HRSA's workforce—its staff and contractors— is responsible for monitoring the agency's grantees to ensure they are financially sound, using federal funds appropriately, and in compliance with program requirements. In recent years, GAO has reported on weaknesses in HRSA's monitoring of certain grant programs and made recommendations for the agency to improve grantee monitoring.
GAO was asked to review HRSA's oversight mechanisms for its grantee monitoring workforce. This report examines (1) the extent to which HRSA has developed guidance for staff who monitor grantees; (2) the extent to which it implemented training for this staff; (3) HRSA's oversight of its staff; and (4) its practices to ensure contractors who conduct grantee monitoring activities are qualified and carry out their work as appropriate. GAO reviewed HRSA training documentation and guidance related to grantee monitoring and interviewed HRSA officials. GAO also reviewed the contracts that HRSA identified as including grantee monitoring activities in fiscal year 2013.
What GAO Found
In 2012, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) began systematically developing guidance for the key staff involved in grantee monitoring—project officers in its programmatic bureaus and grants management specialists and financial integrity staff in its Office of Federal Assistance Management (OFAM). Specifically, HRSA issued the first agency-wide guidance written primarily for project officers in November 2012 and is in the process of developing new guidance and revising existing guidance for staff in OFAM. Additionally, HRSA required each of the bureaus to develop more detailed guidance for project officers by the end of 2012. To assist the bureaus in systematically developing this guidance, HRSA provided a template outlining the minimum components to be included in the documents. While all of HRSA's bureaus developed guidance for their project officers, GAO found that the bureaus' guidance did not address all of the key components of grantee monitoring identified by HRSA, such as components related to conducting site visits. Although HRSA conducted reviews of the bureaus' guidance, these reviews were not sufficient to ensure that the guidance addressed all required grantee monitoring components. Consequently, there is an increased possibility that project officers will not conduct, or document, all the monitoring activities required by HRSA, which puts the agency at risk for incomplete or insufficient grantee monitoring.
Since 2013, HRSA has implemented agency-wide training programs for key staff responsible for conducting monitoring of grantees—a project officer certification program, which the majority of project officers have completed, and a career development program for grants management specialists. Both programs include courses that cover material related to grantee monitoring. In addition to these training programs, the bureaus and OFAM offer formal and informal training related to grantee monitoring, such as training on specific grant program requirements.
HRSA has four main methods for overseeing its staff's monitoring of grantees. According to HRSA officials, supervisors
review information in, and reports from, HRSA's online system for documenting grantee monitoring activities, such as staff's assessments of grantee compliance;
regularly communicate with staff in one-on-one and other meetings; and
conduct annual performance appraisals to hold staff accountable for their monitoring responsibilities.
Additionally, HRSA has mechanisms in place to ensure that the contractors that conduct grantee monitoring activities are qualified, including reviewing staffing proposals prior to awarding the contract, requiring contractor staff to have specific qualifications, and requiring training for contractor staff. To oversee contractors' work, HRSA staff regularly communicate with the contractors, review their deliverables, and obtain feedback from project officers and grantees on contractor performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HRSA develop a process to ensure that the guidance developed by its bureaus addresses all of the key components of grantee monitoring as established by the agency. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendation and said HRSA has begun to take action to implement it. |
gao_RCED-96-165W | gao_RCED-96-165W_0 | The national park system is at a crossroads. ABSTRACT: This testimony discusses GAO’s December 1992 transition series report entitled Natural Resources Management Issues (GAO/OCG-93-17TR). Natural Resources Management Issues. September 10, 1992. Recreation Concessioners Operating on Federal Lands. July 13, 1992. FINDINGS: GAO found that: (1) between October 1987 and June 1990, fish and wildlife activities involving Forest Service staff participation totalled over $202 million; (2) such activities included revegetation of streamside areas, fencing installation, and erosion control projects to maintain or improve fish and wildlife habitat or provide for the recovery of endangered species; (3) of the $202 million, $154.6 million came from congressional appropriations to the national forest system and the remaining $47.8 million came from such outside sources as state and local governments; (4) from fiscal year (FY) 1988 through FY 1989, outside funding for fish and wildlife activities directly involving Service staff increased from about $14.7 million to about $16.7 million and totalled about $16.4 million for the first 9 months of FY 1990; and (5) financial support from outside sources included $32.1 million in cost-sharing arrangements between the Service and outside sources, $15.7 million in work performed by the Service but paid for by outside sources, and $14.7 million for activities in which the Service was not involved. Rangeland Management: Current Formula Keeps Grazing Fees Low. March 12, 1991. Mineral Resources: Hardrock Mining Reclamation. May 11, 1995. January 31, 1991. Forest Service: Factors Affecting Timber Sales in Five National Forests. Financial Management: Native American Trust Fund Management Reform Legislation. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. | What GAO Found
GAO published a list and abstracts of its natural resources-related reports and testimony issued from January 1991 through December 1995, regarding such issues as: (1) land and natural resources management; (2) the National Park System; (3) national forests; (4) concessioners; (5) recreation activities; (6) financial management; (7) endangered species and wildlife conservation; (8) wetlands conservation; (9) fisheries; (10) wilderness areas; (11) grazing fees and rangeland management; (12) mine reclamation; (13) oil and mineral production and transport; (14) water resources, quality, and pollution control; (15) timberlands and timber sales; and (16) Native Americans and tribal lands. |
gao_GAO-16-648 | gao_GAO-16-648_0 | To promote the efficient and economical use of federal government real property, in 2004 the President issued Executive Order 13327 establishing the Federal Real Property Council (FRPC) composed of senior management officials from specified executive branch departments and agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act), including GSA, and chaired by OMB. To meet this directive, GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy established the Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) to be a government-wide real property inventory database. Twenty-five Federal Entities That Reported Having Independent Leasing Authority Are Not Members of FRPC or Consistently Tracked in FRPP
There Is No Comprehensive List of Federal Entities with Independent Leasing Authority
According to GSA officials and OMB staff, neither GSA nor OMB maintains a comprehensive list of federal government entities with independent leasing authority and neither is required to do so. Other non- FRPC member entities have submitted data to the FRPP inconsistently. Twenty-five Federal Entities That Reported Having Leasing Authority Are not Members of the FRPC, Creating Gaps in Data
In our survey, 25 federal entities that are not members of the FRPC reported having independent authority to lease offices and warehouses. Of those entities, 19 reported using their authority to lease domestic offices and warehouses. However, the FRPP’s incomplete data set reduces its effectiveness as an oversight and accountability mechanism for entities with independent leasing authority. For Various Reasons, the 37 Selected Independent Lease Rates Were Often Comparable to or Lower Than Matched GSA and Private Sector Rates
In our sample, the lease rates of most of the 37 independent leases we selected for review were less costly or comparable to matched GSA and private sector rates. 2.) For example, GSA leases could include clauses with higher— and thus possibly more expensive—energy conservation, security, and seismic safety requirements. We looked at 19 leases in the National Capital Region and found that 16 (84 percent) were comparable to or less costly than matched private-sector lease rates. In addition to leading practices, federal entities must follow all applicable laws related to real property management. However, we found the extent to which the lease files contained documented evidence that the sub-practices were being used varied. The extent to which lease files documented alignment with the leading practices varied by entity, but none of the lease files contained evidence of full alignment with all the leading practices. In most of the 30 selected leases we reviewed, more office space was leased per employee on average than the GSA recommended target of 150 rentable square feet per employee. Though not required, non-FRPC member entities may also benefit from the leading practices shared at the FRPC to modify their internal policies to meet utilization targets for the space they lease. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase the completeness of information on the federal government’s real property holdings and improve the coordination among federal entities that lease real property, we recommend that the Deputy Director of the OMB—as chair of the FRPC—establish efficient methods for: including data from non-FRPC member entities in the FRPP, and increasing collaboration between FRPC member and non-member entities, including sharing leading real-property management practices. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: (1) what is known about which federal entities have independent leasing authority and their use of this authority to lease office and warehouse space, (2) how selected independent leases compare to General Services Administration (GSA) and private sector leases in terms of cost, and (3) to what extent selected federal entities with independent leasing authority have leasing policies and practices that align with leading government leasing practices. The survey also asked the federal entity to complete additional descriptive information about the amount of domestic office and warehouse space and associated annual rent cost as of October 1, 2015, for the space that each entity independently leased. The four leading practices we developed were: assess needs, plan ahead, ensure best value, and analyze and document the budget effects of the lease. | Why GAO Did This Study
GSA leases real property on behalf of many federal tenants, but some federal entities have statutory independent leasing authority.
GAO was asked to review federal entities with independent leasing authority. This report examines (1) what is known about which federal entities have independent leasing authority and their use of this authority; (2) how selected independent leases compare to GSA and private sector leases in terms of cost; and (3) to what extent selected entities have leasing policies and practices that align with leading government practices. GAO conducted a survey of 103 federal entities identified in previous GAO work; selected eight entities for their diversity in size and mission, and visited 37 leased office and warehouse locations; analyzed leases and lease files for the 37 locations; reviewed applicable laws, policies, and guidance; and interviewed GSA, OMB, and officials from the selected entities.
What GAO Found
There is no comprehensive list of federal entities with independent leasing authority. The Federal Real Property Council (FRPC), chaired by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), was established in 2004 through executive order to coordinate and share leading practices in real property management among federal agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990. The General Services Administration (GSA) was directed to create a database intended to be a comprehensive inventory of federal facilities, which resulted in the Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP). However, federal entities that are not members of the FRPC are not required to submit data to the FRPP and few do so. Of the 103 federal entities that GAO surveyed, 52 reported having independent authority to lease office and warehouse space. As of October 1, 2015, these 52 entities leased 944 domestic offices and 164 warehouses. Twenty-five of those entities are not members of the FRPC and therefore not required to submit their real property data to the FRPP despite leasing 243 offices and warehouses. As such, the FRPP's incomplete data set reduces its effectiveness as an oversight and accountability mechanism for entities with independent leasing authority.
GAO's review of the costs of 37 selected independent leases found that the rates of most were less costly or comparable to matched GSA leases. When independent leases have lower costs, it may be attributed in part to: (1) GSA's using standardized lease documents that include clauses with higher energy conservation, security, and seismic requirements, and (2) independent leases' having fewer space modifications, more periods of free rent, and private sector real-estate professionals negotiating with potential owners. Most of the independent leases were also less costly or comparable to matched private sector leases, particularly in the National Capital Region.
GAO reviewed the extent to which eight selected federal entities had policies that incorporated leading government leasing practices and found that six had policies that generally conformed to these practices. However, none of the lease files contained evidence that the practices were consistently followed. For example, 88 percent of the entities' lease files lacked evidence of ensuring best value by documenting advertisements to seek bids to fill their space needs, and 77 percent lacked evidence that entities effectively planned ahead by documenting the factors they used to evaluate lease offers. In addition, the average of all leases we analyzed for space-use more than doubled GSA's recommended target of 150 rentable square feet per employee for office space. It may help federal entities conform to leading practices and meet utilization targets for the space they lease if they can benefit from the coordination and leading real-property management practices shared at the FRPC.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB should establish efficient methods to: include data from non-FRPC members to the FRPP and increase collaboration between FRPC and non-FRPC entities. OMB concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-1119T | gao_GAO-06-1119T_0 | Mental health services are provided for a range of conditions such as depression, PTSD, and substance abuse disorders. However, some medical center officials reported that they did not use all allocated funds for plan initiatives by the end of the fiscal year, due in part to the length of time it took to hire new staff. VA Allocated Approximately $53 Million Directly to Medical Centers and Certain Offices
VA headquarters allocated about $53 million directly to medical centers and certain offices based on proposals submitted for funding and other approaches targeted to specific initiatives related to the mental health strategic plan in fiscal year 2005. VA headquarters developed and solicited submissions from networks for specific initiatives to be carried out at their individual medical centers through requests for proposals (RFPs). VA Allocated $35 Million through Its General Resource Allocation System to Its Health Care Networks on a Retrospective Basis
VA allocated $35 million for mental health strategic plan initiatives in fiscal year 2005 through its general resources allocation system to its health care networks, according to VA headquarters officials. However, because network and medical center officials we interviewed did not know that funds had been allocated for mental health strategic plan initiatives through VA’s general resource allocation system, nor did VA headquarters notify networks and medical centers throughout VA of this retroactive allocation, it is likely that some of these funds were not used for plan initiatives. VA Did Not Allocate About $12 Million Planned for Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives
VA did not allocate the approximately $12 million remaining of the $100 million planned for mental health strategic plan initiatives in fiscal year 2005 because, according to VA headquarters officials, there was not enough time during the fiscal year to allocate the funds through the RFP process or other approaches targeted to specific initiatives. Medical Center Officials Reported Using Allocations for Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives, but Not Using All Funds Allocated for Plan Initiatives
Officials we interviewed from seven medical centers in four networks reported using funds allocated to them for mental health strategic plan initiatives through RFPs and other targeted approaches, but they said that some of these funds were not used for plan initiatives in fiscal year 2005. Officials said they used funds allocated to provide new mental health services and to provide more of existing services included in plan initiatives. For example, two medical centers used funds to increase the number of mental health providers available at CBOCs. One of those medical centers also implemented a new 6-week PTSD day treatment program in which veterans live in the community but come to the medical center daily for counseling, group therapy, and other services. As of September 20, 2006, VA Had Allocated $158 Million of the $200 Million Planned for Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives in Fiscal Year 2006, but Some Officials Were Uncertain If All Funds Would Be Used for Plan Initiatives
As of September 20, 2006, VA headquarters had allocated $158 million of the $200 million to be used for VA mental health strategic plan initiatives in fiscal year 2006 by using several approaches. About $92 million of these funds was allocated directly to medical centers and certain offices to support new mental health strategic plan initiatives for fiscal year 2006. VA also allocated about $66 million to support the recurring costs of the continuing mental health initiatives that were funded in fiscal year 2005. The remaining $42 million had not been allocated as of September 20. Medical Center Officials Reported Using Allocations for Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives, but Were Uncertain Whether All Funds Allocated Would Be Used for Plan Initiatives
Officials from seven medical centers we interviewed in May and June of 2006 reported using funds allocated to them through RFPs and other approaches to support new 2006 mental health initiatives and to continue to support the initiatives first funded in fiscal year 2005. Officials at some medical centers reported that they did not anticipate problems using all of the funds they had received in fiscal year 2006. In May 2006, officials at two medical centers that we interviewed said that they did not know whether they would receive additional funds through RFPs to spend in fiscal year 2006, and as a result they were uncertain whether they would be able to use all of their fiscal year 2006 funds for plan initiatives by the end of the fiscal year. VA intended to allocate $100 million for plan initiatives in fiscal year 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides mental health services to veterans with conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance abuse disorders. To address gaps in services needed by veterans, VA approved a mental health strategic plan in 2004. VA planned to increase its fiscal year 2005 allocations for plan initiatives by $100 million above fiscal year 2004 levels. VA also planned to increase its fiscal year 2006 allocations for plan initiatives by $200 million above fiscal year 2004 levels--composed of $100 million for continuation of fiscal year 2005 initiatives and an additional $100 million identified in the President's fiscal year 2006 budget request. GAO was asked to provide preliminary information on VA's allocation and use of funding for mental health strategic plan initiatives in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. A report on this work will be issued later in the fall of 2006. GAO reviewed VA reports and documents on mental health strategic plan initiatives and conducted interviews with VA officials from headquarters, 4 of 21 health care networks, and 7 medical centers. VA delegates decision making to its health care networks for most budget and management responsibilities regarding medical center operations, and medical centers receive most of their resources from the networks.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2005, VA headquarters allocated $88 million of the $100 million VA officials intended for mental health strategic plan initiatives. VA allocated about $53 million directly to medical centers and certain offices based on proposals submitted for funding and other approaches targeted to specific initiatives. VA solicited submissions from networks for specific initiatives to be carried out at their individual medical centers through requests for proposals (RFPs). In addition, VA headquarters officials said that VA allocated $35 million for this purpose through VA's general resource allocation system to its 21 health care networks on a retrospective basis. VA made this decision several months after resources had been provided to the networks through the general allocation system. Moreover, VA did not notify network and medical center officials that these funds were to be used for plan initiatives. Health care network and medical center officials interviewed told GAO that they were not aware these allocations had been made. As a result, it is likely that some of these funds were not used for plan initiatives. Moreover, VA did not allocate the approximately $12 million remaining of the $100 million for fiscal year 2005 because, according to VA officials, there was not enough time during the fiscal year to do so. Medical center officials said they used the funds allocated directly to their medical centers for plan initiatives that included new mental health services and more of the services they already provided. For example, two medical centers used funds allocated to them through RFPs or other targeted approaches to increase the number of mental health providers at community based outpatient clinics. One of those medical centers also started a new 6-week PTSD day treatment program. However, some medical center officials reported that they did not use all funds allocated for plan initiatives by the end of fiscal year 2005, due in part to the length of time it took to hire new staff. In fiscal year 2006, as of September 20, 2006, VA headquarters had allocated $158 million of the $200 million planned for mental health strategic plan initiatives. VA allocated about $92 million of these funds directly to medical centers and certain offices to support new initiatives, using RFPs and other targeted funding approaches. VA also allocated about $66 million to support recurring costs of the continuing initiatives from the prior fiscal year. As of September 20, 2006, about $42 million of the $200 million for fiscal year 2006 had not been allocated. Officials from seven medical centers we interviewed reported that they had used funds for plan initiatives, such as the creation of a new intensive mental health case management program. Officials at some medical centers reported that they did not anticipate problems using all of the funds allocated to them through RFPs and other targeted approaches in fiscal year 2006. However, officials at other medical centers were less certain that they would use all of these funds for plan initiatives by the end of fiscal year 2006. GAO discussed the information in this statement with VA officials who agreed that the data are accurate, and provided updated data which are incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-902T | gao_GAO-03-902T_0 | Challenges Related to Cargo Processing
BCBP has undertaken efforts to focus its enforcement on selecting and inspecting the highest-risk incoming cargo, while enabling legitimate cargo to be cleared in a timely manner. These efforts pose a range of challenges, from the availability of threat assessments and actionable intelligence to the capability of nonintrusive inspection technology to detect potentially harmful contraband. But additional challenges remain, including the need to improve its evolving trade compliance program and acquire a new trade processing system. Although BCBP has made some progress in implementing initiatives that are designed to improve the efficiency of its regulation of commercial activities, additional challenges remain, particularly in view of the new and heightened emphasis on terrorism. Challenges Related to Immigration Control
To prevent illegal entry of individuals into the United States between the ports of entry, BCBP has deployed significant resources but estimates significantly more are needed. Continued implementation of the southwest border strategy faces a range of challenges, including meeting hiring goals and obtaining needed approvals to deploy fencing and technology to implement its strategy while simultaneously addressing emerging concerns over illegal entry along the northern border, mitigating the negatives affects the strategy may have on communities that experience an increase in illegal alien traffic, and responding to continuing concerns over the safety of aliens who cross in remote and desolate areas. At our nation’s ports, BCBP faces an array of challenges, including improving inspectors’ ability to verify the identity of travelers and whether they can be admitted into the country, unifying and enhancing inspector training, and complying with the congressional mandate to implement a system to track the entry and exit of all aliens. The Border Patrol currently has about 9,500 agents deployed along the southwest border. Preventing Illegal Entry at Ports of Entry
Our recent work at ports of entry and our ongoing work specifically at land border ports, indicate that BCBP inspectors continue to face challenges that those from their predecessor agencies also faced in balancing the need to identify violators of immigration and other laws while facilitating the movement of lawful travelers. Today, I will touch on several issues relating to the inspection of entry documents, inspector training, intelligence information needs of the field, and BCBP plans for implementing the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology system, known as the U.S. VISIT system. Responsibility for implementing U.S. VISIT now resides in the Border and Transportation Security directorate. Challenges Related to Implementing and Transforming DHS
We designated implementation and transformation of the new Department of Homeland Security as high risk based on three factors. First, the implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous undertaking that will take time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner. Second, components to be merged into DHS—including those that now form BCBP—already face a wide array of existing challenges, some of which we have described in this statement. Finally, failure to effectively carry out its mission would expose the nation to potentially very serious consequences. In the aftermath of September 11, invigorating the nation’s homeland security missions has become one of the federal government’s most significant challenges. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Balancing our nation's security and commercial needs is a longstanding issue that is especially important in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that changed the nation's security environment. Addressing this challenge now falls principally to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Border and Transportation Security directorate. Within this directorate, responsibility has been assigned primarily to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP). BCBP consists of the inspections component of the former U.S. Customs Service; the Border Patrol and Inspections component of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a former component of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Achieving the balance between security and commercial needs is greatly affected by BCBP's commercial and border and immigration control workload. Regarding commercial workload, in fiscal year 2002, the former U.S. Customs Services processed 24.9 million trade import entries valued at over $1.1 trillion and collected $23.8 billion in duties and fees; it also processed about 6 million cargo containers arriving at U.S. sea ports. While the cargo workload has stabilized somewhat as a result of the recent global economic slowdown, it is likely to begin growing again, when an economic recovery is underway at some point in the future, thus exacerbating the challenges BCBP faces. Regarding border and immigration control workload, in fiscal year 2002, inspectors at over 300 ports of entry inspected nearly 450 million travelers while the Border Patrol apprehended nearly 960,000 aliens trying to enter the U.S. illegally between the ports of entry.
What GAO Found
With respect to cargo, BCBP has attempted to select and inspect the highest-risk incoming cargo, while enabling legitimate cargo to be cleared in a timely manner. These efforts pose a range of challenges, from the availability of threat assessments and actionable intelligence to the capability of nonintrusive inspection technology to detect potentially harmful contraband. BCBP has made some progress in implementing initiatives that are designed to improve the efficiency of its regulation of legitimate commercial activities. But, additional challenges remain, including the need to improve its trade compliance program and to successfully implement its new trade processing information system. BCBP also faces many challenges with respect of preventing illegal entry by individuals into the United States. These challenges impact BCBP's ability to detect and deter illegal entry between ports of entry and to identify those individuals who should not be permitted entry at the ports. BCBP is faced with continuing to implement its southwest border strategy while simultaneously addressing emerging concerns over illegal entry along the northern border, mitigating the negatives affects the strategy may have on communities, and responding to continuing concern over the safety of aliens who cross in remote and desolate areas. At our nation's borders, the challenges include detecting false admissibility documents, unifying and enhancing inspector training, and providing timely intelligence to the field, and successfully implementing the new entry-exit system. In our recent Performance and Accountability series report, we designed implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk based on three factors. First, the implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous undertaking that will take time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner. Second, components to be merged into DHS, including those forming BCBP, already face a wide array of existing challenges, some of which are described in this statement. Finally, failure to effectively carry out its mission would expose the nation to potentially very serious consequences. |
gao_GAO-10-702 | gao_GAO-10-702_0 | HUD and Others Have Used Data to Estimate the Extent of Homelessness, but Estimates Have Limitations
Despite the limitations discussed above, HUD uses data from point-in-time counts to estimate the number of those experiencing homelessness on a single night in January. However, this estimate does not include people who do not meet the definition of homelessness for HUD’s programs but do meet definitions of homelessness for other programs. For example, HUD’s counts would not include families living with others as a result of economic hardship, who are considered homeless by Education. Data from Mainstream Programs Could Improve Understanding of Homelessness, but Programs Have Not Consistently Collected Information on Housing Status
Federally-funded mainstream programs, whose primary purpose is to provide a range of services and funds to low-income households, often provide these services and funds to those who are experiencing or have experienced homelessness or to those defined as being at risk of becoming homeless. However, these programs have not consistently collected data on homelessness and housing status. Finally, agencies have not always consistently collected or analyzed data on housing stability or homelessness because these are not the primary purposes of their programs. Definitional Differences and Data and Methodological Issues in Research Studies Hinder Development of Comprehensive Understanding of Factors Associated with Homelessness
Definitional Differences and Measurement Issues in Research Studies Make Analysis of Factors Associated with Homelessness Difficult
The 45 research studies analyzing factors associated with homelessness that we reviewed used different definitions or measurements of homelessness, although many of the studies used definitions or measures that were more closely affiliated with the McKinney-Vento Individual definition than with the broader McKinney-Vento Children and Youth definition (see appendix II for a list of the 45 studies). Definitional Issues Have Posed Challenges for Service Providers and Make Collaborating at Local and Federal Levels More Difficult
Definitional Differences Limited Providers’ Ability to Serve Certain Populations Effectively
Among the majority of the advocates, government officials, service providers, and researchers we interviewed that identified differences in definitions of homelessness as an important barrier to providing services, several noted that families and youths living in some precarious situations were not eligible for federal assistance under a narrow definition of homelessness. In part because of data limitations, researchers have collected data on narrowly defined samples that may not be useful for understanding homelessness more generally or do not often consider structural factors, such as area poverty rates, which may be important in explaining the prevalence and causes of homelessness. Such guidance may allow these and other agencies on the Interagency Council on Homelessness to collaborate more effectively to provide coordinated services to those experiencing homelessness. 2. Determine whether the benefits of using this common vocabulary to develop and implement guidance for collecting consistent federal data on housing status for targeted homelessness programs, as well as mainstream programs that address the needs of low-income populations, would exceed the costs. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, and Justice and the Executive Director of the Interagency Council for their review and comment. Although we recommend that the agencies work through the council to address this recommendation, decisions about individual program data collection will necessarily be made by the agency overseeing the program. Although HHS did not comment explicitly on our second recommendation, they did provide comments on data collection. Education, HHS, and HUD also provided technical comments which we addressed as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to (1) assess the availability, completeness, and usefulness of data on homelessness collected by federal programs; (2) assess the extent to which research identifies factors associated with homelessness; and (3) analyze how differences in the definitions of homelessness and other factors, such as the level of agency collaboration, may impact the effectiveness of programs serving those experiencing homelessness. We also reviewed regulations and government reports across a number of programs specifically targeted to address issues related to homelessness as well as mainstream programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Head Start, and Public Housing, that often provide services to people experiencing homelessness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Multiple federal programs provide homelessness assistance through programs targeted to those experiencing homelessness or through mainstream programs that broadly assist low-income populations. Programs' definitions of homelessness range from including primarily people in homeless shelters or on the street to also including those living with others because of economic hardship. GAO was asked to address (1) the availability, completeness, and usefulness of federal data on homelessness, (2) the extent to which research identifies factors associated with experiencing homelessness, and (3) how differences in definitions and other factors impact the effectiveness of programs serving those experiencing homelessness. GAO reviewed laws, agency regulations, performance and planning documents, and data as well as literature on homelessness, and spoke with stakeholders, such as government officials and service providers, about potential barriers.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies, including the Departments of Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), collect data on homelessness. However, these data are incomplete, do not track certain demographic information well over time, and are not always timely. HUD collects data and estimates the number of people who are homeless on a given night during the year and the number who use shelters over the course of the year; these estimates include the people who meet the definition of homelessness for HUD's programs, but do not include all of those who meet broader definitions of homelessness used by some other agencies' programs. For example, HUD's counts would not include families living with others as a result of economic hardship, who are considered homeless by Education. Data from federally-funded mainstream programs such as HHS's Temporary Assistance for Needy Families could improve agencies' understanding of homelessness, but these programs have not consistently collected or analyzed information on housing status because this is not their primary purpose. Because research studies GAO reviewed often used different definitions of homelessness, relied on data collected at a point-in-time, and focused narrowly on unique populations over limited geographical areas, the studies cannot be compared or compiled to further an understanding of which factors are associated with experiencing homelessness. Furthermore, although researchers GAO interviewed and most studies noted the importance of structural factors such as area poverty rates, and those that analyzed these factors found them to be important, few studies considered them. Most of the studies analyzed only the association of individual-level factors such as demographic characteristics, but these studies often did not consider the same individual-level factors or agree on their importance. Many of the government officials, service providers, advocates, and researchers GAO interviewed stated that narrow or multiple definitions of homelessness have posed challenges to providing services for those experiencing homelessness, and some said that having different definitions made collaborating more difficult. For example, some said that persons in need of services might not be eligible for programs under narrower definitions of homelessness or might not receive services for which they were eligible because of confusion created by multiple definitions. Different definitions of homelessness and different terminology to address homelessness have made it difficult for communities to plan strategically for housing needs and for federal agencies such as Education, HHS, and HUD to collaborate effectively to provide comprehensive services. As long as agencies use differing terms to address issues related to homelessness, their efforts to collaborate will be impeded, and this in turn will limit the development of more efficient and effective programs. Commenting on a draft of this report, HHS and HUD raised concerns about its treatment of homelessness data. We characterize and respond to those comments within the report.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education, HHS, and HUD (1) develop a common vocabulary for homelessness; and (2) determine if the benefits of collecting data on housing status in targeted and mainstream programs would exceed the costs. To the extent that the agencies explicitly addressed the recommendations in their comments, they agreed with them. |
gao_GGD-95-123 | gao_GGD-95-123_0 | Finance and Administration is also responsible for developing annual budgets and serving as the liaison with the Office of Management and Budget. Human Resource Management System Nearing Initial Implementation
By February 1995, OFHEO had substantially completed the design of its human resource management system (called the Performance Evaluation Management System, or PEMS) and established milestones for pilot testing the system. OFHEO has worked with HUD to meet its immediate needs, but OFHEO is still uncertain as to whether HUD can meet its accounting and financial systems requirements. OFHEO has used HUD’s accounting and financial systems since its inception but experienced various difficulties. OFHEO has not determined whether to continue using HUD systems, create and maintain its own, or contract those functions out to another federal agency. OFHEO has met most of its legislated requirements, including making determinations of the enterprises’ capital adequacy during the transition period prior to the release of the risk-based capital standards. For example, OFHEO did not meet the legislatively mandated deadline for issuing final regulations establishing the risk-based test of the enterprises’ capital adequacy.OFHEO has established intermediate milestones and now expects to publish proposed stress test regulations in late 1995 and final regulations in 1996. OFHEO Established Its Examination and Regulatory Oversight Function, but Has Been Unable to Meet Its Workplan
OFHEO has established its examination function, adopting a general examination methodology and setting out a 2-year workplan. OFHEO completed its first on-site examinations, focusing on the enterprises’ use of off-balance sheet financial derivatives, in November 1994. By the end of fiscal year 1994, OFHEO had hired the majority of its RACS staff and completed the design, purchase, and installation of the computer hardware and software (called the Research Systems Environment, or RSE) needed to establish the financial simulation modeling capability to run the stress test. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the status of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight's (OFHEO) development, focusing on OFHEO progress in designing and instituting key management systems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) OFHEO has made considerable progress toward setting up its key management systems; (2) as of February 1995, OFHEO had most of its administrative structure in place with 53 of its 65 authorized staff, and had prepared for the implementation of its human resource management system; (3) although OFHEO has defined its financial and accounting system requirements and has worked with the Department of Housing and Development (HUD) to meet its immediate accounting and administrative needs, it is having difficulties using HUD systems; (4) OFHEO has not decided whether to continue to use HUD systems, create and maintain its own systems, or contract out its accounting and administrative functions to another federal agency; (5) OFHEO has begun its mission-related programs, established the fundamentals of its examination function, adopted an overall examination framework, and set a 2-year workplan; (6) OFHEO has completed its first on-site examination of the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and the design, purchase, and installation of computer software to support its financial research; (7) OFHEO has not met its legislative deadline to complete final regulations establishing the enterprises' risk-based capital stress test, but it has adopted intermediate milestones and expects to publish the regulations in 1996; and (8) although OFHEO staff is having difficulties meeting its 2-year workplan, OFHEO has generally met its legislative reporting requirements. |
gao_AIMD-98-35 | gao_AIMD-98-35_0 | Identify and secure the necessary resources. To assess Air Force headquarters efforts to manage and oversee the Year 2000 computer problem, we (1) met with the Air Force Communications and Information Center officials and Year 2000 focal points, (2) obtained and analyzed documents issued by these offices that describe organizational structure and responsibilities for carrying out the Air Force Year 2000 program, and (3) reviewed the Air Force’s Year 2000 Guidance Package to assess the level of guidance, roles, and responsibilities, and target milestone dates for the Year 2000 effort. Further, we obtained and analyzed the Air Force Year 2000 inventory data to determine (1) the number of systems owned and operated by Air Force organizations and (2) the status of Air Force systems in their Year 2000 efforts, proposed strategy, and the number of systems reporting to be compliant. This group has focused on such matters as sharing lessons learned, eliminating duplicative efforts, sharing resources, and tracking component progress. Prioritizing systems for conversion or replacement according to their mission impact. These devices rely on either microprocessors or microcontroller chips that may be vulnerable to Year 2000 problems. As a result, it has revised reporting requirements to facilitate better reporting on the part of its components. Key Issues Need Prompt Attention for the Air Force to Solve Its Year 2000 Problem
Even though the Air Force is entering the next phases of its Year 2000 correction effort, it has yet to complete several critical assessment steps, which are designed to ensure that it is well-positioned to deal with the later, and more difficult, phases of Year 2000 correction. The Air Force Audit Agency audit should help the Air Force complete these steps; however, this work will be carried out only at selected sites and it will not provide the comprehensive and continued oversight that is needed to ensure that the Air Force can handle unforeseen problems and delays. Moreover, others have not yet addressed the interface issue. For example, none of the five weapon system program offices we surveyed had fully determined the actual impact or program status of their system interfaces. If implemented, these agreements could ensure that information can be transferred even when components take conflicting approaches to their interfaces. For these reasons, it is critical that Air Force headquarters ensure that components are taking time now to assess their testing needs and that the Air Force is well-positioned to provide components with additional testing facilities and tools. Contingency plans also establish a series of checkpoints that allow the agency to identify performance problems early enough to correct them. The Air Force pointed out that it is working with components to develop Year 2000 contingency plans as part of the renovation and validation phases. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Air Force's program for solving its year 2000 computer systems problem, focusing on the: (1) status of the Air Force's efforts to oversee its Year 2000 program; and (2) appropriateness of the Air Force's strategy and actions for ensuring that the problem will be successfully addressed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as with other military services, the Air Force is taking a decentralized approach to year 2000 correction--that is, it is relying heavily on its components to identify and correct year 2000 problems affecting their own systems; (2) however, in providing oversight for this effort, the Air Force must ensure that all of its systems have been accounted for and that component actions are successful; (3) it must also be well-positioned to make the resource tradeoff decisions that are inevitable in any year 2000 effort and to address conflicts between component approaches toward identifying and correcting interfaces; (4) further, it must be able to provide additional resources, such as testing facilities, that may be necessary to correct and validate systems; (5) the Air Force has taken a number of positive actions toward fulfilling its year 2000 oversight responsibilities; (6) for example, it is taking inventory of its systems and prioritizing them for conversion or replacement, and it has issued extensive guidance on dealing with the year 2000 problem; (7) it has also established a year 2000 working group comprised of focal points from the components which aims to eliminate duplicative efforts, share resources, and track component progress; (8) at the same time, the Air Force has not yet adequately addressed several critical issues that would ensure that it is well-positioned to deal with the later, and more difficult, phases of year 2000 correction; (9) GAO's review revealed that some components are failing to plan for the testing phase of their year 2000 effort and develop contingency plans; (10) GAO also found that some components are taking conflicting approaches toward determining the actual impact or the program status of their system interfaces; (11) if components and the Air Force do not promptly address and take consistent action on these issues, they may well negate any success they may have in making systems within their control year 2000 compliant; and (12) while the Air Force has enlisted the services of the Air Force Audit Agency to help address some of these concerns, this work needs to be backed by comprehensive and continued Air Force oversight in order to ensure that it can address unforeseen problems and delays in the next, more difficult phases. |
gao_GAO-07-42 | gao_GAO-07-42_0 | DOE Has Missed All Rulemaking Deadlines at a Cost of Billions in Forgone Energy Savings
DOE has missed all 34 of the rulemaking deadlines that have come due for the 20 product categories with deadlines, completing 11 of these rules late and not yet completing the remaining 23. LBNL estimates that delays in setting minimum energy efficiency standards for four categories of consumer products that DOE believes use the most energy will cost the nation at least $28 billion in forgone energy savings by 2030. For rules that have been completed, delays ranged from less than 1 year to about 10 years; and incomplete rules are as much as 15 years late. As the table shows, only three product or equipment categories—clothes washers; refrigerators, refrigerator-freezers, and freezers; and small furnaces—have had all their rules completed. However, LBNL staff provided us with estimates of delays for the four categories of consumer products that DOE believes use the most energy—refrigerators and freezers, central air conditioners and heat pumps, water heaters, and clothes washers. DOE’s Plan Lays Out an Approach to Clearing the Backlog, but It Is Unclear Whether the Plan Is Addressing Root Causes of Delays
According to DOE’s January 2006 report to Congress, the department has identified four causes of delays in its efficiency standards rulemaking: (1) an overly ambitious schedule set in statute; (2) the sequential nature of the rulemaking process; (3) the consequences of the Process Rule, which the report states that DOE adopted in 1996 to address concerns about its analyses and stakeholder involvement; and (4) DOE’s internal document review and clearance process. DOE has not developed the program management data it needs to identify bottlenecks in the rulemaking process. Such plans also provide a basis for accountability. While the DOE plan calls for a sixfold increase in workload, it does not increase program staffing and contractor budgets in the same proportion. However, because DOE management could not provide data to conclusively document the reasons for the substantial delays, or the data provided by DOE as contained in internal work logs were inadequate to determine causality, and because representatives of the various DOE offices could not agree on the root causes, we turned to a well-recognized process for identifying causes in complex situations—a Delphi panel. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Method
Our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which DOE has met its statutory obligations to issue rules on minimum energy efficiency standards for consumer products and industrial equipment and (2) whether DOE’s plans are likely to clear the backlog of required rulemakings and whether these plans could be improved. To address these objectives, we reviewed the statutory requirements and deadlines for developing energy efficiency standards for consumer products and industrial equipment, program information available on DOE’s Web site, information provided by program staff, and DOE’s January 2006 and August 2006 reports to Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) sets energy efficiency standards through the rulemaking process for certain consumer product categories, such as kitchen ranges, and industrial equipment, such as distribution transformers. Congress reported in 2005 that DOE was late in setting standards and required DOE to report every 6 months on the status of the backlog. GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOE has met its obligations to issue rules on minimum energy efficiency standards for consumer products and industrial equipment and (2) whether DOE's plan for clearing the backlog will be effective or can be improved. Among other things, GAO convened an expert panel on energy efficiency standards to identify causes and effects of delays and assess DOE's plans.
What GAO Found
DOE has missed all 34 congressional deadlines for setting energy efficiency standards for the 20 product categories with statutory deadlines that have passed. DOE's delays ranged from less than a year to 15 years. Rulemakings have been completed for only (1) refrigerators, refrigerator-freezers, and freezers; (2) small furnaces; and (3) clothes washers. DOE has yet to finish 17 categories of such consumer products as kitchen ranges and ovens, dishwashers, and water heaters, and such industrial equipment as distribution transformers. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimates that delays in setting standards for the four consumer product categories that consume the most energy--refrigerators and freezers, central air conditioners and heat pumps, water heaters, and clothes washers--will cost at least $28 billion in forgone energy savings by 2030. DOE's January 2006 report to Congress attributes delays to several causes, including an overly ambitious statutory rulemaking schedule and a lengthy internal review process. In interviews, however, DOE officials could not agree on the causes of delays. GAO's panel of widely recognized, knowledgeable stakeholders said, among other things, that the General Counsel review process was too lengthy and that DOE did not allot sufficient resources or make the standards a priority. However, GAO could not more conclusively determine the root causes of delay because DOE lacks the program management data needed to identify bottlenecks in the rulemaking process. In January 2006, DOE presented to Congress its plan to bring the standards up to date by 2011. It is unclear whether this plan will effectively clear DOE's backlog because DOE does not have the necessary program management data to be certain the plan addresses the root causes. The plan also lacks critical elements of an effective project management plan, such as a way to ensure management accountability for meeting the deadlines. Finally, the plan calls for a sixfold increase in workload with only a small increase in resources. DOE plans to manage the workload through improved productivity. |
gao_RCED-99-108 | gao_RCED-99-108_0 | The U.S. government maintains these agreements to support and encourage international cooperation in science and technology. In this report, we categorize the international S&T agreements into four types: (1) government-level bilateral agreements between the U.S. government and the government of another country, (2) agency-level bilateral agreements between a U.S. agency and a research agency of a foreign country that are related to a government-level agreement and provide additional details that define how each agency will cooperate, (3) agency-level bilateral agreements between a U.S. agency and a research agency of a foreign country that are not related to a government-level agreement, and (4) agency-level multilateral agreements between a U.S. agency and research agencies of international organization and/or of two or more foreign countries. Number of International S&T Agreements
During fiscal year 1997, the seven agencies we reviewed participated in 575 international S&T agreements. Fifty-seven countries participated in bilateral agreements, while 8 international organizations and 10 groups of organizations and/or countries participated in multilateral agreements. Most S&T Agreements Result in Research Projects or Other Research-Related Activities
More than 90 percent of the international S&T agreements active in fiscal year 1997 resulted in research projects or other research-related activities. The percentage of agency agreements resulting in projects or other activities during this time ranged from 61 percent at the National Institutes of Health to 98 percent at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In total, 93 percent of the agency agreements, 506 in all, resulted in projects or other research-related activities such as consultations among scientists and exchanges of data and/or personnel. Agencies’ officials told us that some agreements did not result in projects because the participating agencies of either country changed their S&T priorities or were unable to fund projects after negotiating an agreement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the U.S. government's international science and technology (S&T) agreements that support and encourage international cooperation in research and development, focusing on the: (1) number of international S&T agreements active during fiscal year (FY) 1997; and (2) number of these agreements that resulted in research projects or other activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during FY 1997, the 7 agencies GAO reviewed participated in 575 international science and technology agreements with 57 countries, 8 international organizations, and 10 groups of organizations or countries; (2) 54 of the agreements were between the U.S. government and the government of another country; (3) the remaining 521 agreements were signed by representatives of an U.S. agency and representatives of an agency of a foreign government(s) or international organization; (4) more than 90 percent of the international science and technology agreements resulted in research projects or other research-related activities, such as consultations among scientists and exchanges of data and personnel; (5) the percentage of agency agreements that resulted in projects and other activities ranged, by agency, from 61 percent at the National Institutes of Health to 98 percent at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and (6) agencies' officials told GAO that changes in either country's science priorities or inability to fund projects after negotiating an agreement are frequently the reasons some agreements do not result in research projects. |
gao_GAO-07-115 | gao_GAO-07-115_0 | It was not until December 2005 that, as a result of the joint requirements process, an agreement was reached. One issue the agreement has not resolved is the lack of a clear definition for volume of fire. According to the Marine Corps, volume of fire, defined as large quantities of munitions delivered over time or simultaneously to suppress or destroy a target, is also necessary to immobilize or destroy the enemy and enable maneuver. The inability to quantify requirements for volume of fire also affects the ability of the Navy to develop systems to meet the Marine Corps’s needs. Development of the Extended Range Munition has been delayed by nearly 11 years due to technical and programmatic challenges, resulting in cost growth of over 550 percent from initial estimates. The primary reason for this reduced capability is that the Navy’s concept for the Zumwalt class destroyer promised revolutionary performance at an unrealistically low cost. Currently, the Navy plans to field the Extended Range Munition on 32 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, which will be supplemented with 7 Zumwalt class ships carrying long-range land-attack munitions. Further analysis by the Navy and the Department of Defense will determine whether these technologies are feasible and if these systems are needed. Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt Class Destroyer Offer Significant Naval Surface Fire Support Capability, but Cannot Meet All the Needs of Future Warfighters
In December 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed and validated the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document, which describes some of the fire support needs of the warfighter for the next decade as well as the gaps that exist in meeting these needs. The document lists the gaps in order of priority as 1) the ability to transmit and receive targeting information to enable command and control of fire support, 2) engaging moving targets in poor weather, 3) providing fire support when collateral damage or casualties in friendly forces is a concern, and 4) providing volume fires to achieve suppression of enemy targets. However, they do not provide enough additional capability to close any of the four gaps. The Navy, through its Surface Warfare Division, has already begun the analysis for the three engagement gaps presented in the initial capabilities document. Any attempt to close this gap could have consequences for systems developed to engage targets, as they rely on the command and control architecture for target assignment and information. Third, because of challenges posed by the development of the Extended Range Munition and the Zumwalt class destroyer, the Navy is now in a position in which it will rely more heavily on Extended Range Munition to provide fire support than originally planned. In order to ensure that the systems providing naval surface fire support are aligned with the requirements and operating concepts of the forces they assist, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy to provide the Chief of Naval Operations’s Expeditionary Warfare Division, as the division charged with establishing capabilities and requirements for naval surface fire support and liaison to the Marine Corps, a formal role in developing requirements, determining capabilities, and managing resources for Navy systems responsible for providing naval surface fire support. To assess the Navy’s progress in developing and fielding the Extended Range Munition, the Zumwalt class destroyer, and future systems for naval surface fire support, we analyzed key program documentation including performance requirements, cost estimates, budget submissions, acquisition strategies, development and demonstration contracts, and testing plans and results. To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from the Navy’s Surface Warfare and Expeditionary Warfare Divisions; the Marine Corps’s Combat Development Command and Plans, Policies, and Operations offices; the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems; and the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer program offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the mid-1990s, the Navy and Marine Corps have studied ways to better protect landing forces. As new operational concepts evolved, the Marine Corps identified requirements for naval surface fire support and the Navy began developing two systems to meet these needs--the Extended Range Munition for existing classes of ships and the future Zumwalt class destroyer. GAO was asked to address (1) whether requirements for fire support have been established and (2) the Navy's progress on the Extended Range Munition, Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. GAO also analyzed whether these Navy systems fulfill the requirements and whether gaps remain. To address these objectives GAO analyzed key documents on requirements and programs and held discussions with officials from the Navy and Marine Corps as well as other interested organizations.
What GAO Found
In December 2005, more than a decade after the Navy and Marine Corps began to formulate requirements, agreement was reached on the capabilities needed for naval surface fire support. However, quantifiable measures are still lacking for volume of fire--the delivery of a large quantity of munitions simultaneously or over a period of time to suppress or destroy a target. Until further quantifiable requirements are set for volume of fire, it is difficult to assess whether additional investment is necessary or the form it should take. The Navy's Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have cost more, taken longer to develop and field than anticipated, and will deliver fewer capabilities than originally promised. Largely due to technical challenges, the Extended Range Munition is expected to exceed the original cost estimate for development by 550 percent, and the Navy has delayed delivery of initial capability by 11 years. The munition's path for development and fielding remains uncertain as key technologies and munition design have not been adequately demonstrated. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently assumed oversight of the program, and while a comprehensive review has not yet been held, there are ongoing studies that could assist such a review. The Navy has reduced Zumwalt class land attack munitions by 50 percent and cut ship quantities from 32 to 7. The primary reason for reduced capabilities are cost pressures created by the Navy's original concept of revolutionary performance at an unrealistically low cost. The Navy plans to begin construction of the first two ships in the Zumwalt class in fiscal year 2008. The recent study of future fire support needs approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council identifies four capability gaps: command and control of fire support; engaging moving targets in poor weather; engaging targets when collateral damage is a concern; and engaging targets that require a large volume of fire. The analysis that forms the basis of the joint study contends that while the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer offer significant capabilities in some scenarios, they do not provide enough capability to meet all fire support needs. The Navy, through its surface warfare directorate, has begun analyzing the three engagement gaps, but the Navy has not chosen an organization to analyze the gap in command and control, which is essential for target assignment and information. Any attempts to accept the risks or invest in programs to fill remaining gaps should also involve the expeditionary warfare directorate as the Marine Corps representative. The expeditionary warfare directorate does not have a formal role in developing requirements, determining capabilities, and managing resources for systems that provide naval surface fire support. |
gao_GAO-16-356 | gao_GAO-16-356_0 | The mission packages provide the majority of the ship’s combat capability. In this report, we asked Congress to consider restricting funding for LCS construction in 2016 and beyond until the Navy submitted an acquisition strategy for the frigate that was approved by the Secretary of Defense; a plan to upgrade the existing LCS and an analysis of the cost and engineering feasibility and risks of doing so; and report on the results of a rough water trial report for both variants. The task force was directed to consider new and existing ship design options, to include modified LCS design options. Secretary of Defense Directed Program Truncation
In December 2015, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy in which he stated that the Navy would build no more than 40 LCS and frigates, down from the prior planned 52, and directed the Navy to buy 8 fewer of these ships over the next 5 years than planned. Defining Capability Concepts
The task force initially produced 192 “capability concepts” for an SSC. However, certain cost assumptions made by the task force may have overstated the minor modified LCS’ relative affordability as compared to other options. Navy Prioritized Speed with Which Minor Modified LCS Could Start Production
In a November 2014 memo in which it recommends selecting a minor modified LCS, senior Navy leadership also highlighted the speed with which they believe a minor modified LCS based frigate could be fielded as a deciding factor in its deliberations, as well as a desire to maintain stability in the LCS industrial base and vendor supply chain. According to the fiscal year 2017 President’s budget, the frigate program will cost over $8 billion through fiscal years 2019-2025 for ship construction. The acquisition strategy does not provide details on the nature of these reviews, including requirements and timing. As the Navy pivots from LCS to the frigate—which is expected to provide some enhanced capabilities over the current LCS—there are many unknowns with regards to cost and the design of the frigate, and sufficient oversight structures are not yet defined. Further, the planned oversight of the frigate program could be enhanced by requiring the Navy to develop key oversight documents related to cost, capability, and schedule; at the most basic level, these would include an independent cost estimate, an acquisition program baseline, and a plan to incorporate the frigate into SARs. Matters for Congressional Consideration
Congress should consider not funding any requested LCS in fiscal year 2017 because of unresolved concerns with lethality and survivability; the Navy’s ability to make needed improvements; and the current schedule performance of the shipyards. DOD concurred with one of our recommendations and partially concurred with one. DOD noted that the department already plans to conduct annual OSD- level reviews of the LCS and frigate program, stating that coordinating future program reviews with key acquisition decisions is standard practice. To examine how the Navy arrived at its preferred solution of a modified Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) for its future small surface combatant (SSC) and the extent to which the Navy’s solution will address survivability and lethality concerns, we analyzed relevant Navy, DOT&E and CAPE studies and reports and the Navy’s draft frigate requirements documentation. To address any potential risks associated with the Navy’s approach to acquiring the frigate, we assessed Navy-provided weight reduction initiatives and descriptions of frigate upgrades. | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2014, the Secretary of Defense cited concerns with the combat capabilities of the LCS—a small surface combatant (SSC) consisting of a ship and reconfigurable mission packages built by two shipyards as different variants, with 26 LCS delivered or under contract. The Secretary directed an assessment of alternatives for a SSC. A Navy task force analyzed new and existing designs, including modified LCS concepts.
The House report for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to analyze the Navy's study and the implications for future procurement. This report examines: (1) how the Navy arrived at its preferred solution, and (2) the potential risks associated with the Navy's approach to acquiring the SSC and continued procurement of LCS, among other objectives. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed the task force study and other documentation, and interviewed task force, Navy, and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials.
What GAO Found
The Navy's task force studied a number of options to improve upon known shortfalls in Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) lethality and survivability. It found that neither LCS variant with minor modifications met the Navy's desired capabilities without further tradeoffs. After briefing senior Navy leadership, the task force was directed to further examine the LCS options, which required it to alter or in some cases reduce some capabilities. In late 2014, the Navy recommended (and the Secretary of Defense approved) procuring both variants of a minor modified LCS, designating it a “frigate.” The Navy prioritized this option because of its relatively lower cost and quicker ability to field, as well as the ability to upgrade remaining LCS, over making more significant capability improvements. GAO's analysis found the planned frigate will not provide much greater capability in some areas than LCS and that some cost assumptions may have overstated this option's affordability.
As the Navy pivots from LCS to the frigate program, which is estimated to cost more than $8 billion for ship construction alone, its approach would require Congress to appropriate funding with key unknowns. The table outlines GAO's observations on the Navy's acquisition strategy.
Of note, the industrial base considerations that have factored into prior LCS decisions are less compelling, as both yards will be building LCS currently under contract through fiscal year 2021. Finally, there are no current plans for official DOD milestone reviews of the frigate program, which is a major acquisition program based on its anticipated costs. In addition, the Navy does not plan to develop key frigate program documents or to reflect frigate cost, schedule, and performance information in the annual Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) submitted to Congress. Without adequate oversight, federal funds may not be effectively spent.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider not funding any requested LCS in fiscal year 2017 and should consider requiring the Navy to revise its acquisition strategy for the frigate. GAO also recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD) align reviews to precede key acquisition decisions and enhance oversight by requiring the frigate program to develop key program documents and to report on the frigate separately in the SAR. The department concurred with the first recommendation and partially concurred with the second. |
gao_GAO-03-42 | gao_GAO-03-42_0 | Despite the sharp increase in the capitalization threshold, almost all of the surveyed agencies responded that they maintained property records for PP&E not capitalized on the balance sheet, for purposes of safeguarding PP&E, supporting agency operations, or fulfilling external reporting requirements. Federal Capitalization Thresholds Differ Significantly from the Private Sector
Federal capitalization thresholds are significantly higher than those reported by the 12 private sector entities we surveyed. We found that the agency capitalization thresholds for personal property ranged from $3,000 to $200,000, and in some cases were 40 times higher than the maximum levels reported by the private sector participants. Useful lives for real property at the surveyed federal agencies ranged from 5 to 100 years, which is a wide range that encompasses numerous and varying types of real property. The useful life policies within the federal government were generally similar to those found in the private sector. The few differences that we identified between federal agency and private sector useful lives are due to the different types of assets owned by the survey participants rather than any systemic differences in the useful life policies. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) what are the federal government’s current capitalization threshold practices for PP&E and how such federal government policies compare to those practices being applied to PP&E in the private sector and (2) what are the useful life policies within the federal government and how they compare to those used in the private sector. | What GAO Found
In passing the 1990 Chief Financial Officers Act and a range of other financial management reform legislation, Congress has sought to overcome the historical lack of reliable, useful, and timely information with which to make informed decisions, measure and control costs, manage for results, and ensure financial accountability on an ongoing basis. Reported capitalization threshold levels at the 14 agencies GAO surveyed ranged from zero to $250,000. Despite the sharp increase in the capitalization threshold, all but one of the 14 agencies responded that they maintained property records for the government's general property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) not capitalized on the balance sheet, citing safeguarding of PP&E and supporting agency operations as the key reasons for maintaining such information. Federal capitalization thresholds are significantly higher than those reported by the private sector entities GAO surveyed. In some cases, the federal capitalization thresholds for real property were up to 50 times higher than those noted in the private sector. In contrast to the wide variance between federal agency and private sector capitalization threshold policies, federal agency useful life policies were generally similar to those found in the private sector. Estimated useful life classifications within the federal government ranged from 2 years to 40 years for personal property and 5 years to 100 years for real property. GAO did identify several differences attributable to the variety of assets owned by the entities that participated in its survey, rather than any systematic differences in useful life classifications. |
gao_GAO-06-168 | gao_GAO-06-168_0 | Opinion on Financial Statements
The financial statements and accompanying notes present fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, the Foundation’s financial position as of September 30, 2004, and 2003, and the results of its activities and its cash flows for the fiscal years then ended. We reported on this matter during our audit of the Foundation’s fiscal year 2003 financial statements. Specifically, section 104(c)(1) of the Congressional Award Act, as amended (2 U.S.C. The Foundation’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern
The Foundation incurred losses (decreases in net assets) of almost $168,000 and $6,000 in fiscal years 2004 and 2003, respectively. Net assets as of September 30, 2004 were approximately $42,000. In order to fulfill these responsibilities, we examined, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements; assessed the accounting principles used and significant estimates made evaluated the overall presentation of the financial statements and notes; read unaudited financial information for the Foundation for fiscal year obtained an understanding of the internal control related to financial reporting (including safeguarding assets) and compliance with laws and regulations; tested relevant internal control over financial reporting and compliance and evaluated the design and operating effectiveness of internal control; and tested compliance with selected provisions of the Congressional Award Act, as amended. We did not test compliance with all laws and regulations applicable to the Foundation. We performed our work in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. Presented below are the Foundation's expenses by functional classification for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2004, and 2003. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report presents our opinion on the financial statements of the Congressional Award Foundation for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2004, and 2003. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Congressional Award Foundation. This report also presents (1) our opinion on the effectiveness of the Foundation's related internal control as of September 30, 2004, and (2) our conclusion on the Foundation's compliance in fiscal year 2004 with selected provisions of laws and regulations we tested. We conducted our audit pursuant to section 107 of the Congressional Award Act, as amended (2 U.S.C. 807), and in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
We have audited the statements of financial position of the Congressional Award Foundation (the Foundation) as of September 30, 2004, and 2003, and the related statements of activities and statements of cash flows for the fiscal years then ended. We found (1) the financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, although substantial doubt exists about the Foundation's ability to continue as a going concern; (2) the Foundation did not have effective internal control over financial reporting (including safeguarding assets) and compliance with laws and regulations; and (3) a reportable noncompliance with one of the laws and regulations we tested. |
gao_GAO-14-618T | gao_GAO-14-618T_0 | Background and Discussion of How the United States Compares with Other Countries
According to forum participants, nanomanufacturing is an emerging megatrend that will bring diverse societal benefits and new opportunities—potentially creating jobs through disruptive innovation. Comparison for Nanotechnology R&D: Two Indicators
According to experts, the United States likely leads in nanotechnology R&D today but faces global-scale competition—which one forum participant described as a “moon race.” Two indicators of how the U.S. compares with other countries are R&D funding levels and scientific publications. semiconductors. Key Challenges Facing U.S. Nanomanufacturing
According to forum participants and experts interviewed, challenges to U.S. competitiveness in nanomanufacturing include U.S. funding gaps, significant global competition, and lack of a U.S. vision for nanomanufacturing, among others. Thus, U.S. innovators may encounter two support gaps, which participants termed: the Valley of Death (the lack of funding or investment for the middle stages of developing a technology or product), and the Missing Middle (a similar lack of adequate support for the middle stages of developing a process or an approach to manufacture the new product at scale). The Missing Middle occurs during analogous stages of the manufacturing-innovation process, as illustrated below (fig.2). Vision for Nanomanufacturing
Multiple forum participants said that the United States lacks a vision or However, one explained strategy for a nanomanufacturing capability.that such a strategy could be designed by (1) proceeding from a vision or goal to the examination of the social, technological, economic, environmental, and political elements of the relevant systems and their interactions with one another; (2) understanding the basic science, engineering, and manufacturing involved; and (3) consulting the full range of stakeholders. Other Competitiveness Challenges
Forum participants described further challenges to U.S. competitiveness in nanomanufacturing, including the earlier loss of an industry, as discussed above for lithium-ion batteries—or even extensive prior offshoring in some industries, which can be important, in part because, as one participant said: “when we design here ship abroad, we lose this shop- floor-innovation kind of mentality” and threats to U.S. intellectual property on the part of some other countries or entities within those countries—which occur with respect to both university research and private R&D on, for example, manufacturing processes. Some Key Policy Issues Concerning Nanomanufacturing
Forum participants suggested the need to address policy issues in U.S. research funding, challenges to U.S. competitiveness in nanomanufacturing, and other areas, including environmental, health, and safety (EHS) issues. CNSE is designed as a unique research, development, prototyping, and educational public-private partnership for advancing nanotechnology. The United States leads in some areas of nanomanufacturing, but faces increasing international competition. Challenges specific to U.S. competitiveness include, among others: possible weaknesses associated with prior extensive offshoring in the U.S. funding gap known as the Missing Middle, some U.S. industries, and the lack of a national vision and strategy for the United States to lead or sustain a high level of competitiveness in global nanomanufacturing markets in the years ahead. (Based on the Lux Research report, The Recession’s Ripple Effect on Nanotech: State of the Market Report. 2014. GAO-14-181SP. Persons, Timothy M. 2013. “Global Investment Profile in Nanotechnology— Comparing U.S. to Selected Economies.” Slide presentation at the Comptroller General Forum on Nanomanufacturing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nanotechnology has been defined as the control or restructuring of matter at the atomic and molecular levels in the size range of about 1–100 nanometers (nm); 100 nm is about 1/1000th the width of a hair.
The U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), begun in 2001 and focusing primarily on R&D, represents a cumulative investment of almost $20 billion, including the request for fiscal year 2014. As research continues and other nations increasingly invest in R&D, nanotechnology is moving from the laboratory to commercial markets, mass manufacturing, and the global marketplace. Today, burgeoning markets and nanomanufacturing activities are increasingly competitive in a global context—and the potential EHS effects of nanomanufacturing remain largely unknown.
GAO was asked to testify on challenges to U.S. competitiveness in nanomanufacturing and related issues. Our statement is based on GAO's earlier report on the Forum on Nano-manufacturing, which was convened by the Comptroller General of the United States in July 2013 (GAO 2014; also referred to as GAO-14-181SP ). That report reflects forum discussions as well as four expert-based profiles of nano-industry areas, which GAO prepared prior to the forum and which are appended to the earlier report.
What GAO Found
Forum participants described nanomanufacturing as an emerging set of developments that will become a global megatrend: a technological revolution that is now in its formative phases but that many knowledgeable persons—in science, business, and government—expect to burgeon in the years ahead, bringing new opportunities, “disruptive innovation,” jobs creation, and diverse societal benefits. They said that the United States likely leads in sponsorship and overall quality of nanotechnology R&D today as well as some areas of nanomanufacturing—for example, nanotherapeutic drug development and the design of semiconductor devices. But they cautioned that the United States faces global-scale competition and is struggling to compete in some industry areas (notably, advanced batteries). Challenges facing U.S. nanomanufacturing include (1) a key U.S. funding gap in the middle stages of the manufacturing-innovation process, as illustrated below; (2) lack of commercial or environmental, safety, and health (EHS) standards; (3) lack of a U.S. vision for nanomanufacturing; (4) extensive prior offshoring in some industries, which may have had unintended consequences; and (5) threats to U.S. intellectual property.
Key actions identified by our experts to enhance U.S. nanomanufacturing competitiveness include one or more of the following: (1) strengthen U.S. innovation by updating current innovation-related policies and programs, (2) promote U.S. innovation in manufacturing through public-private partnerships, and (3) design a strategy for attaining a holistic vision for U.S. nanomanufacturing.
Key policy issues identified by our experts include the development of international commercial nanomanufacturing standards, the need to maintain support for basic research and development in nanotechnology, and the development of a revitalized, integrative, and collaborative approach to EHS issues. |
gao_HEHS-97-18 | gao_HEHS-97-18_0 | To respond to this request, we addressed the following questions:
How have SNF costs and use grown in relation to hospital use? Do patients in SNFs granted exceptions receive appropriate care? To address whether HCFA’s RCL exception process ensures that SNFs granted exceptions actually furnish atypical services, we reviewed HCFA’s statutory authority and responsibilities for establishing and administering Medicare’s SNF RCL exception process and HCFA’s regulations and guidance to intermediaries for reviewing exception requests filed by SNFs. To assess whether the care Medicare beneficiaries received in SNFs granted exceptions was appropriate, we asked officials in the SNFs we visited to identify a universe of their Medicare patients who they believed needed or likely needed more intense or complex care. SNF Use Increased as Hospital Length of Stay Decreased
The average length of hospital stay for Medicare patients has gone down since the prospective payment system (PPS) was introduced in 1983. At the same time, SNF use has gone up, indicating that some substitution of SNF care for hospital care has occurred under PPS. Average length of hospital stay has decreased more for those patients whose diagnoses are more likely to lead to a SNF admission. Moreover, for patients with these diagnoses, hospitals with a SNF unit saw even larger decreases in average length of stay than hospitals without a SNF unit. Table 2.1 shows for fiscal years 1983 through 1995 the number of discharges from hospitals and admissions to SNFs along with the average length of stay in each setting. Patients and Services Appear Similar in SNFs With and Without Exceptions
Because SNFs with exceptions are supposed to be furnishing atypical services, they might be expected to have a higher proportion of patients requiring more nursing assistance or more complex care than SNFs without exceptions. Patients in Both Groups Were Similar in Several Characteristics We Examined
When comparing data about the characteristics of residents in SNFs that received exceptions and SNFs that did not, we found that facilities in both groups care for some Medicare patients who required complex care. Therefore, treating a higher proportion of Medicare patients will usually get a SNF past the benchmarks, but this does not mean the patients require atypical services. This was an expected result of Medicare’s hospital PPS. Almost all exception requests claim that routine costs are higher than the RCL because the SNF provides atypical services. Moreover, the patient-specific information submitted with exception requests is not used to evaluate them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the growth of skilled nursing facility (SNF) costs and SNF use in relation to hospital use; (2) the characteristics of Medicare SNF patients and the types of services they receive in SNFs being paid higher than normal amounts compared to other SNFs, as well as whether patients in such facilities receive appropriate care; and (3) whether the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) process for assessing requests for higher payments ensures that only SNFs furnishing atypical services are granted exceptions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) SNF use has increased since 1983 when the Medicare hospital prospective payment system (PPS), which pays a predetermined amount per hospital discharge, was introduced and gave hospitals a financial incentive to shorten lengths of stay; (2) the average length of hospital stay for Medicare patients has decreased from 10 days in 1983 to 7.1 days in 1995, indicating that, as expected, some substitution of SNF care for hospital care has occurred; (3) the average length of hospital stay decreased more for those Medicare patients whose diagnoses were more likely to lead to a SNF admission, such as hip fractures, than for Medicare patients as a whole; (4) considering patients with these types of diagnoses, hospitals with SNF units saw larger decreases in the average patient length of stay than did hospitals without SNF units; (5) the increasing number of SNFs granted routine cost limit (RCL) exceptions and the resulting additional payments, almost $100 million in fiscal year 1995, has contributed to the growth in Medicare SNF costs; (6) contrary to expectation, GAO did not find that SNFs with exceptions had a higher proportion of patients requiring complex care than SNFs without exceptions; (7) patients identified as requiring complex care by the medical records GAO reviewed, and who reside in SNFs granted exceptions, were generally provided appropriate care; (8) HCFA's review process for RCL exception requests does not ensure that SNFs actually provide atypical services to their Medicare patients; (9) HCFA's exception screening benchmarks basically take into account only whether requesting SNFs treat a higher than average proportion of Medicare patients; and (10) the patient-specific information obtained from requesting SNFs is generally not used to assess whether the Medicare beneficiaries need or receive atypical services. |
gao_GAO-02-883T | gao_GAO-02-883T_0 | Background
Federal, state, and local government agencies have differing roles with regard to public health emergency preparedness and response. The President’s proposal transfers control over many of the programs that provide preparedness and response support for the state and local governments to a new Department of Homeland Security. Reorganization Has Potential to Improve Coordination
The consolidation of federal assets and resources in the President’s proposed legislation has the potential to improve coordination of public health preparedness and response activities at the federal, state, and local levels. New Department’s Control of Essential Public Health Capacities Raises Concern
The President’s proposal to shift the responsibility for all programs assisting state and local agencies in public health emergency preparedness and response from HHS to the new department raises concern because of the dual-purpose nature of these activities. Therefore, we are concerned about the transfer of control over the programs, including priority setting, that the proposal would give to the new department. We recognize the need for coordination of these activities with other homeland security functions, but the President’s proposal is not clear on how the public health and homeland security objectives would be balanced. The transfer of the HHS medical response programs has the potential to reduce overlap among programs and facilitate response in times of disaster. We are also concerned about the broad control the proposal grants to the new department for public health preparedness programs. Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. | What GAO Found
Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and the subsequent anthrax incidents, there has been concern about the ability of the federal government to prepare for and coordinate an effective public health response to such events. More than 20 federal departments and agencies carry some responsibility for bioterrorism preparedness and response. Emergency response is further complicated by the need to coordinate actions with agencies at the state and local level, where much of the response activity would occur. The President's proposed Homeland Security Act of 2002 would bring many of the federal entities with public health preparedness and response responsibilities into one department to mobilize and focus assets and resources at all levels of government. The proposed reorganization has the potential to repair the fragmentation in the coordination of public health preparedness and response at the federal, state, and local levels. In addition to improving overall coordination, the transfer of programs from multiple agencies to the new department could reduce overlap among programs and facilitate response in times of disaster. However, there are concerns about the proposed transfer of control from the Department of Health and Human Services to the new department for public health assistance programs that have both basic public health and homeland security functions. Transferring control over these programs, including priority setting, to the new department has the potential to disrupt some programs that are critical to basic public health responsibilities. The President's proposal is not clear on how both the homeland security and the public health objectives would be accomplished. |
gao_GAO-17-10 | gao_GAO-17-10_0 | According to DOD, the speed of technical innovation and the complexity of advanced weapon systems, such as the F-35, are creating an increasing demand for specialized intelligence mission data to provide information for sensors and automated processes supporting the warfighter. DOD Has Certifications for Intelligence and Acquisition Personnel and the Air Force and Army Have Developed Certifications for Personnel Who Provide Intelligence Support to Acquisition Programs
Neither USD(I) certifications for the defense intelligence workforce nor USD(AT&L) certifications for the defense acquisition workforce include a certification specific to those personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs. The Services and USD(AT&L) Have Developed Some Training for Personnel Providing Intelligence Support to Acquisition Programs, but Cannot Ensure Personnel Are Trained to Carry Out Duties
The services have developed varying levels of training for the personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition programs in the absence of certifications required by DOD for these personnel. Without requiring certifications for personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition programs, DOD has no assurance that these personnel are qualified and prepared to carry out their duties. DOD Has Multiple Efforts Underway to Improve Processes and Procedures for Integrating Intelligence into Major Defense Acquisition Programs but Faces Challenges Prioritizing Intelligence Mission Data Needs
As of July 2016, DOD had multiple efforts underway to improve processes and procedures for integrating intelligence into major defense acquisition programs. DOD’s Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force Identified the Need for, but DOD Has Not Required Prioritization of, Intelligence Mission Data
Officials from USD(AT&L), USD(I), and Joint Staff stated that while there have previously been other weapon systems with intelligence mission data shortfalls, such as the F-22 and F-18G, the F-35’s greater reliance on intelligence mission data and concerns regarding the service intelligence centers’ ability to produce the needed data brought the problem to the forefront. That presentation of information does not convey a prioritization of what the weapon system most needs to perform its mission. Without specific DOD guidance requiring intelligence mission data prioritization, new processes and procedures such as those developed by the task force and the services may not be fully implemented. With no required process to prioritize intelligence mission data, the intelligence community may continue to process requests for intelligence mission data as they are received, and thus weapon systems may not have the intelligence mission data they need to successfully perform their missions once operational. DOD Is Developing New Tools for Integrating Intelligence into Acquisition Programs but Faces Challenges in Development and Implementation
As of July 2016, DOD was developing new tools to better integrate intelligence into acquisition programs. Without effectively communicating such information to potential users, DIA may not receive useful feedback as it develops the tool, and concerns regarding timeliness, usability, and redundancy may not be effectively addressed. As a result, DOD may use funds unnecessarily to develop a tool that is not needed. Fourth, without conducting an assessment of the need for and defining requirements for development of its proposed Acquisition Intelligence Support Assessment tool, DOD may be using funds to unnecessarily develop a tool that is not needed or, if needed, may not be fully implemented or sustained once operational. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 includes a provision that we review the processes and procedures for the integration of intelligence into the defense acquisition process. This report evaluates, for major defense acquisition programs, the extent to which DOD has (1) processes and procedures for certifying and training personnel assigned to provide intelligence support to acquisition programs; (2) efforts to improve processes and procedures for integrating intelligence into its acquisition programs; and (3) efforts to develop new tools for integrating intelligence into its acquisition programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has reported that it expects to invest $1.6 trillion on acquiring 80 major defense acquisition programs, many of which depend on intelligence input both during the acquisition process and to effectively perform missions once deployed. The complexity of advanced weapon systems, such as the F-35, is creating increasing demand for intelligence mission data—such as radar signatures—for sensors and processes supporting warfighters.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 includes a provision that GAO review intelligence integration into DOD acquisitions. This report evaluates, for major defense acquisition programs, the extent to which DOD has (1) processes and procedures for certifying and training personnel providing intelligence input into acquisition programs; (2) efforts to improve processes and procedures for integrating intelligence into its acquisitions; and (3) efforts to develop tools to integrate intelligence into its acquisitions. GAO compared certification and training to relevant guidance; reviewed relevant documents to identify intelligence inputs and the provision of intelligence input into acquisition programs; and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed certifications and training for acquisition and intelligence personnel, but it does not have certifications for certain personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition programs. These personnel help integrate threat information on foreign capabilities and intelligence mission data—technical intelligence such as radar signatures and geospatial mapping data—into acquisition programs. DOD uses certifications to determine that an employee has necessary education, training, and experience. The lack of certifications for personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs has led to the services developing varying levels of training: the Air Force certifies and requires training specific to providing intelligence support, the Army offers training that is not required, and the Navy has no formal training. Without certifications for personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs, DOD does not have assurance that these personnel are prepared to carry out their duties.
DOD has multiple efforts underway to improve processes and procedures for integrating intelligence into its acquisitions but does not require prioritization of intelligence mission data, which would identify those data most needed for a weapon system to perform its mission. A task force DOD created in 2015 to better integrate intelligence into acquisition programs identified the need for prioritization and proposed processes and procedures for doing so. Without department-wide requirements to prioritize intelligence mission data, new processes and procedures such as those developed by the task force may not be fully implemented and weapon systems could be deployed without the intelligence mission data they need to perform their missions.
DOD is developing two tools for integrating intelligence into major defense acquisition programs. One tool to share threat information lacks a communication plan to obtain feedback from users to better ensure its effectiveness. Without user feedback, DOD may not receive useful information to develop the tool. The other tool is for acquisition programs to communicate their intelligence needs to the intelligence community, though the services did not identify a need for the tool and there is no mechanism to fund its implementation and operation. Without assessing the need for such a tool or plans or funding for implementation and operation, DOD may be using funds unnecessarily to develop an unneeded tool.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD create certifications and training for intelligence support personnel, require that intelligence mission data be prioritized, develop a communication plan for a threat information tool, and determine the need to develop another tool. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-589 | gao_GAO-10-589_0 | State’s Development Process Resulted in Cards That Generally Meet Standards and Guidance for International Travel Documents, but Improvements Could Be Made
State’s designs for the first and second generation passport card and the second generation BCC generally meet standards and guidance for international travel documents and DHS policies for travel credentials and, in general, the recommended security features that are not included are compensated for by other security features or would not greatly increase the security of the cards. Moreover, State tested and evaluated the security and durability of only prototypes of the passport card, which did not include the personalization printing or background artwork. Without fully evaluating the impact of the issues and recommendations on the security and performance of the cards and testing and evaluating the final designs for the first and second generation passport card and second generation BCC, State does not have a complete understanding of the cards’ overall security and performance. In addition, the cards include many security features recommended as a best practice. While State addressed most of the issues raised and recommendations made during evaluation and testing of the prototype passport card, it either did not address some of the issues and recommendations or did not document its reasons for not doing so. State began issuing the second generation passport card in mid-April 2010. State agreed with the recommendation and has taken steps to address it. Limitations in the Use of Technology and Inspection Time Restrict the Use of Security Features in the Inspection of Passport Cards and BCCs
Officers in primary inspection—the first and most critical opportunity at U.S. ports of entry to identify individuals seeking to enter the United States with fraudulent travel documents—are unable to take full advantage of the security features in passport cards and BCCs due to the limited use of technology in primary inspection. For example, CBP provided training to inspection officers on the passport card and second generation BCC prior to their issuance and provides continuing information to officers on document fraud. As State continues to update its travel documents, we continue to believe that State and DHS need to fully implement our prior recommendation to improve training of its officers on new documents prior to their issuance, which includes the provision of exemplars so that they can be used during training to better familiarize officers with the look and feel of the cards. However, State did not fully assess or test the security features incorporated on the passport card or the second generation BCC. More fully conducting testing of the passport card and BCC and addressing identified problems would provide State with a fuller understanding of the overall security and performance of the cards and greater assurance that its cards have been produced with adequate security. However, the conduct of training without passport card or BCC exemplars at the POEs we visited along the Northern border indicates that improvements are still needed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure the designs for the passport card and BCC physical security features adequately mitigate the risk of fraudulent use, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following two actions to improve the development process when conducting future redesigns or updates to the passport card or BCC: Fully address any issues or problems encountered during testing, including the documentation of reasons for not addressing any of them. To determine how CBP officers use the security features of passport cards and second generation BCCs to prevent fraudulent use at land ports of entry, we interviewed officials from CBP and reviewed CBP policies, procedures, guidance, and training documents regarding the inspection of travelers presenting passport cards and second generation BCCs for the purpose of entry to the United States, including the use of the cards’ physical security features and cardholder information retrieved from CBP border inspection systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In July 2008, the Department of State (State) began issuing passport cards as a lower-cost alternative to passports for U.S. citizens to meet Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative requirements. In October 2008, State began issuing the second generation border crossing card (BCC) based on the architecture of the passport card. GAO was asked to examine the effectiveness of the physical and electronic security features of the passport card and second generation BCC. This report addresses: (1) How effectively State's development process--including testing and evaluation--for the passport card and second generation BCC mitigates the risk of fraudulent use? (2) How are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers using the cards' security features to prevent fraudulent use at land ports of entry? To conduct this work, GAO evaluated the security features of passport cards and second generation BCCs against international standards and guidance and results from testing and evaluation and observed the inspection of these cards at five land ports of entry (POE).
What GAO Found
State developed a passport card and second generation BCC that generally meet standards and guidance for international travel documents and include numerous, layered security features that, according to document security experts in the Department of Homeland Security, provide adequate security against fraudulent use. While following standards and guidance helps to ensure the security of these documents, State's development process could be improved. State addressed most problems identified during evaluation and testing; however, it did not address some of the resulting issues and recommendations or did not document its reasons for not doing so. In addition, State tested and evaluated the security of only prototypes of the passport card, which did not include key features such as the background artwork, personalization features, and other security features that were added or changed for the final passport card. Moreover, State did not test the security of the second generation BCC or the updated passport card expected to be issued in the second quarter of 2010. Fully testing the passport card and BCC and addressing identified problems would provide State a more complete understanding of the overall security and performance of its cards and a greater assurance that its cards are adequately secure. CBP officers in primary inspection--the first and most critical opportunity to identify individuals seeking to enter the United States with fraudulent travel documents--use a variety of methods to identify fraudulent documents, but are unable to take full advantage of the security features in passport cards and BCCs because of time constraints, limited use of technology in primary inspection, and the lack of sample documents for training. While CBP has deployed technology tools for primary inspectors to use when inspecting passport cards and BCCs, it could still make better usage of fingerprint data to mitigate the risk of imposter fraud with BCCs, the most common type of fraud. In addition, although CBP provided training on security features of the passport card and second generation BCC to inspecting officers prior to their issuance, the conduct of training without sample passport cards or second generation BCCs at the Vermont POEs visited by GAO indicate that improvements are still needed. State and DHS need to fully implement GAO's prior recommendation to improve training on new documents prior to their issuance, including the provision of exemplars to be used during training to better familiarize officers with the look and feel of the actual documents.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State fully address any problems found during testing and evaluation, including documenting the reasons for not addressing any of them, and test and evaluate the security features on the cards as they will be issued. State agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-233 | gao_GAO-03-233_0 | The agencies and ISACs selected for our review were specifically requested by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce as consistent with its jurisdiction for specific agencies and for the industry sectors for which these agencies have responsibilities. We performed this work at the four agencies—HHS, Energy, Commerce, and EPA—and for the five ISACs associated with key sectors of our economy—telecommunications, information technology, electricity, oil and gas energy, and water supply. PDD 63 called for a range of actions intended to improve federal agency security programs, improve the nation’s ability to detect and respond to serious computer-based and physical attacks, and establish a partnership between the government and the private sector. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is intended to provide an initial framework for both organizing and prioritizing efforts to protect our nation’s cyberspace. However, over 4 years after PDD 63 was issued, the agencies have not completed the fundamental processes of identifying their critical assets and their dependencies on other public- and private-sector assets. ISACs’ Progress in Implementing PDD 63- Suggested Activities Is Mixed
In addition to specific requirements for federal agencies, PDD 63 encouraged the voluntary creation of ISACs and suggested other activities for them to undertake in order to effectively gather, analyze, and disseminate information to and from infrastructure sectors and the federal government. Serving as a clearinghouse for information within and among the various sectors. Three reported that although they maintain such a library, it is available only to the private sector because of concerns that, if made available to the government, the information could be released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Our analyses also identified an external coordination challenge with GSA, which may often be responsible for protecting agency facilities or buildings that house critical assets. The five ISACs have made progress in establishing ISAC operations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To (1) help ensure the identification and adequate protection of critical agency cyber-based and physical assets and (2) reinforce management’s commitment to prioritize the protection of critical infrastructure throughout agencies, we recommend that the Secretaries of Commerce, Energy, and Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency all direct their respective CIOs and chief infrastructure assurance officers to work together, as appropriate, to: coordinate with CIAO to set milestones to complete their Project Matrix analyses that will identify each agency’s critical cyber, physical, and other assets and the dependencies of these assets on other government operations and privately owned critical infrastructures; require, concurrently with the identification of critical assets and their dependencies, that vulnerability assessments be conducted or updated where warranted, to appropriately consider (1) the specific assets identified as critical national assets and their dependencies, (2) both cyber and physical vulnerabilities of these assets, and (3) changes in the threat environment, particularly as reflected by recent terrorist activity and in warnings by the Office of Homeland Security and NIPC; ensure that remediation plans for correcting identified critical asset vulnerabilities are developed, specifying corrective actions and the time lines, responsibilities, and funding for their implementation; and that cyber-related actions are also reflected in the agency’s information security corrective-action plans, and that updates are reported to OMB; ensure that agency continuity-of-operations plans are prepared or updated to incorporate critical assets and, according to the CIAO criterion, that they provide for the reconstitution of these assets within 72 hours of a successful infrastructure attack or disruption; routinely track and monitor the status of vulnerability assessments, corrective actions, and other security efforts related to critical assets, such as the development of continuity-of-operations plans; and provide an annual status update to help support budget requests and other reporting requirements, such as those of the Government Performance and Results Act and the Federal Information Security Management Act; formally apprise the General Services Administration when facilities or buildings for which it has protective responsibilities house agency- critical assets identified through the Project Matrix process; and use Project Matrix plans and results to help prioritize and prepare budget justifications for resources needed to identify and protect the agency’s own critical infrastructures. | Why GAO Did This Study
The explosive growth of computer interconnectivity is transforming the workings of our nation, its government, and its critical infrastructures. But with the enormous benefits of this interconnectivity comes a threat: both physical and cyber assets are potentially vulnerable to computer-based attack. In response, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63, May 1998) called for a range of actions to improve the nation's ability to detect and respond to serious infrastructure attacks. For specific agencies under the Committee on Energy and Commerce's jurisdiction and for private-sector organizations for which these agencies have responsibilities, GAO was asked, among other things, to assess their progress and challenges in undertaking critical infrastructure protection (CIP) activities.
What GAO Found
Federal efforts to protect our nation's critical public and private infrastructures have had mixed progress. GAO examined four specific agencies--the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Energy, and Commerce, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)--and found that the agencies have made progress in implementing several PDD 63 requirements, such as appointing chief information assurance officers and preparing initial CIP plans. However, none of the agencies has fully implemented all requirements, including the fundamental processes of identifying agency assets that are critical to the nation and determining their dependencies on other public and private assets, as well as assessing these assets' vulnerabilities. In addition, although most agencies have tentatively identified their critical assets, these efforts could take years to complete given the current pace and estimated time and resource needs. GAO also examined private-sector groups known as Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) for five specific industry sectors--information technology, telecommunications, energy, electricity, and water supply. PDD 63 suggested voluntary ISAC creation to, among other things, serve as mechanisms for information sharing between infrastructure sectors and the government. In response, ISACs have been established and are serving as clearinghouses for their sectors to share information. For other suggested activities, such as establishing baseline statistics on computer security incidents, progress is mixed. Both the agencies and the ISACs identified challenges and obstacles to undertaking CIP activities. Agency-identified challenges included coordinating security efforts for critical assets with the General Services Administration, which may often be responsible for protecting agency facilities that house critical assets. The ISACs identified obstacles to information sharing, both between the sectors and the government and within the sectors. In particular, they noted concerns that information reported to the government could be subject to public release under the Freedom of Information Act. |
gao_GAO-07-1071 | gao_GAO-07-1071_0 | production.) Economic Impact Analysis Screening Process Identifies Projects for Detailed Analysis
Ex-Im’s economic impact analysis screening process is designed to identify projects with the most potential to adversely impact U.S. industry; Ex-Im then conducts a detailed analysis of those projects. Ex-Im’s Charter Specifies Some Analytic Screens, Ex-Im Introduced Others
Ex-Im screens applications for economic impact on the basis of several characteristics, some that Ex-Im’s charter explicitly requires, others that Ex-Im established exercising its discretion under the charter. This screen removes the bulk of applications from economic impact analysis. The remaining applications are subject to detailed analysis. Ex-Im compiles its findings, along with its conclusion regarding whether the project will negatively impact the U.S. economy, in a memorandum to the board of directors. The components of this analysis include (1) an assessment of whether the foreign product potentially supported by Ex-Im financing will be in surplus on world markets—which Ex-Im terms as being “in oversupply,” (2) an estimate of U.S. production that could be displaced by competition with the increased foreign production, and (3) the net impact on U.S. trade flows. This net economic impact assessment provides the type of analysis that, according to a senior Ex-Im official, could be informative to a board of directors’ decision to exercise its discretion in approving applications where, for example, foreign production could compete with U.S. producers and represents 1 percent or more of U.S. production. Ex-Im Approved Most Projects Applicable for Economic Impact Review between Fiscal Years 2003 and 2005
Between fiscal years 2003 and 2005, Ex-Im approved financing for about two-thirds of the projects that involved foreign production of a exportable good, and that, therefore, were applicable for economic impact review. In addition, Ex-Im’s internal controls could be strengthened to better ensure that the identification process and analysis is conducted consistently and accurately. Ex-Im officials stated that requests for financing $10 million or less would generally be too small to increase foreign production by 1 percent or more of U.S. production. Second, we identified a $9.8 million export of mining equipment that would allow a foreign company to produce an estimated 1.73 percent of production in a U.S. industry. Detailed Analysis Has Challenges and Certain Limitations
Determining the economic impact of a project is an inherently challenging process; however, we identified limitations in certain assumptions Ex-Im makes to estimate potential costs to U.S. producers, and in how it characterizes the net effect of its financing on the trade balance. In addition, Ex-Im could increase the process’s transparency by referencing its list of sensitive sectors in its procedures and publishing the detailed analyses’ outcomes. Second, Ex-Im does not currently publicize the results of its detailed economic impact analyses. First, while Ex-Im has the discretion to use screens to identify applications for further review and to allocate its staff resources effectively, the effectiveness of Ex-Im’s $10 million screen is uncertain because Ex-Im has not conducted an analysis to determine the extent to which it identifies projects that could meet the statutory definition of substantial injury. To improve the public transparency of the economic impact process for interested and affected parties, we also recommend that the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States take the following three steps: Clarify publicly available procedures by including more information regarding Ex-Im’s methodology for analyzing applications, such as defining how it incorporates “oversupply” determinations in its analysis and what measures it uses and specifying under what conditions “proportionality” would be used. In this report, we reviewed (1) Ex-Im’s overall policies and procedures for determining economic impact; (2) the extent to which Ex-Im’s procedures provide for the identification and appropriate analysis of applications that could potentially cause adverse economic impact; and (3) the extent to which its policies, procedures, and decisions are transparent to interested and affected parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im) to encourage U.S. exports. Congress has directed Ex-Im to consider the economic impact of its work and not to fund activities that will adversely affect U.S. industry. In this context, GAO reviewed (1) Ex-Im's policies and procedures for determining economic impact, (2) the extent to which Ex-Im appropriately identifies and analyzes projects that could cause adverse economic impact, and (3) the extent to which Ex-Im's process is transparent. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed Ex-Im's procedures, data on projects applicable for the economic impact process, and detailed economic impact analyses. GAO also interviewed Ex-Im and reviewing agency officials and industry representatives.
What GAO Found
Congress requires Ex-Im to assess whether a project requesting its financial support will negatively impact U.S. industry. Ex-Im uses a screening process to identify projects with the most potential to have an adverse economic impact, and then subjects the identified projects to detailed analysis. A negative finding could result in a denial of Ex-Im support. The screens--either explicitly required by Ex-Im's charter or introduced under the bank's statutory authority--include whether (1) the financed project will increase foreign production, (2) there are trade measures against the resulting product, (3) the resulting product is "undersupplied," (4) the requested financing is over $10 million, and (5) the financed project will increase foreign production by 1 percent or more of U.S. production. Between fiscal years 2003 and 2005, this screening process identified 20 projects (out of 771 applicable) that required a detailed economic impact analysis. In the detailed analysis, Ex-Im assesses whether the resulting product would be in surplus on world markets or in competition with U.S. production. Between fiscal years 2003 and 2005, Ex-Im approved most projects applicable for economic impact analysis, totaling approximately $6.1 billion in approved financing. GAO found challenges and areas for improvement in the screening and detailed analysis of projects for economic impact. The effectiveness of the $10 million screen, introduced under Ex-Im's statutory authority, is uncertain. Ex-Im has not determined whether it removes from review those projects that could meet the statutory definition of substantial injury (producing 1 percent or more of U.S. production in an industry). For example, a $9.9 million financing request that would allow a foreign company to produce an estimated 3.5 percent of U.S. production was screened out of the analysis. GAO also found that Ex-Im could improve some methods it uses in its detailed analyses, such as how it estimates displaced production. In addition, GAO found that Ex-Im could clarify how it characterizes the effect of its financing on the U.S. trade balance. Finally, GAO found that Ex-Im could strengthen the internal controls it uses to ensure that the screening process and detailed analysis are conducted consistently and accurately. GAO also found limitations in the transparency of Ex-Im's economic impact process. While Ex-Im publicly posts its procedures, they contain areas of ambiguity. For example, the procedures do not define the term "oversupply." Also, Ex-Im has not provided all public comments to the board of directors. GAO identified two practices--referencing in the procedures the list of sectors likely to require extra scrutiny and publicizing final economic impact conclusions--that would increase the predictability of the process. |
gao_GAO-12-256 | gao_GAO-12-256_0 | Crop insurance premium subsidies are not payments to farmers, but they can be considered a financial benefit. As shown in table 1, premium subsidies reached $7.4 billion in 2011. A Limit on Crop Insurance Subsidies Would Lower Program Costs
According to our analysis of RMA data for 2011, the federal government would have achieved savings in the crop insurance program by limiting premium subsidies for crop insurance participants, as payments are similarly limited for other farm programs. A decision to limit or reduce premium subsidies to achieve cost savings raises other considerations, such as the potential effect of such a limit on the financial condition of large farms and on program participation. Alternatively, recent studies—noting the rising cost of premium subsidies—have proposed reducing premium subsidy rates for all participating farmers to achieve savings.subsidy rate for 2010 and 2011 had been reduced by 10 percentage points—from 62 percent to 52 percent—for all participating farmers, the annual cost savings for those years would have been about $759 million and $1.2 billion, respectively. For example, if a limit of $40,000 per farmer for both premium subsidies and administrative expense subsidies had been applied to the crop insurance program for 2011, up to 52,693 farmers (6 percent of all participating farmers) would have seen their subsidies reduced, at an annual savings of up to nearly $1.8 billion to the federal government. In addition, we identified considerations associated with either limiting premium subsidies to large farmers or reducing premium subsidy rates for all farmers. Private insurance. RMA Has Not Maximized the Use of Data Mining Tools, Largely Because of Competing Priorities
Since 2001, RMA has used data mining tools to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in the crop insurance program by either farmers or insurance agents and adjusters, but it has not maximized their use to realize potential additional savings, largely because of competing compliance review priorities. The value of identifying farmers with anomalous claim payments may be undermined, however, by the fact that FSA does not complete all field inspections, and neither FSA nor RMA has a process to ensure that the results of all completed inspections are accurately reported, in accordance with USDA’s written procedures. If FSA does not complete all field inspections requested by RMA, not all farmers who have had anomalous claim payments will be subject to a review, increasing the likelihood that fraud, waste, or abuse may occur without detection. RMA generally does not provide insurance companies with field inspection results for most FSA inspections—that is, those for fields in good condition—but provides them with the field inspection results for a small portion of the farmers—those with crops in worse condition than their peers. Past cases have revealed that some farmers may harvest a high-yielding crop, hide the sale of that crop, and report a loss to receive an insurance payment. As a result, insurance companies may not have information that could help them identify claims that should be denied. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in the federal crop insurance program, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of RMA and the Administrator of FSA, as appropriate, to take the following four actions:
For the list of farmers with anomalous claim payments, encourage the completion of FSA county office inspections during the growing season by requiring FSA state offices to monitor the status of their completion. Maximize the use of the list of farmers with anomalous claim payments by, for example, ensuring that insurance companies receive the results of all FSA field inspections in a timely manner and directing insurance companies to review the results of all completed FSA field inspections before paying claims that occur after inspections showed the crop was in good condition. Furthermore, the Administration’s budget for fiscal year 2013 and the Congressional Budget Office each proposed a reduction in premium subsidies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the effect on program costs of applying limits on farmers’ federal crop insurance subsidies, as payment limits are applied to other farm programs, and (2) the extent to which the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has used data mining tools to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in the crop insurance program. We selected $40,000 as an example of a potential subsidy limit because it is the payment limit for direct payments. Many participants in the crop insurance program also participate in other farm programs that are administered by USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA). Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers the federal crop insurance program with private insurance companies. In 2011, the program provided about $113 billion in insurance coverage for over 1 million policies. Program costs include subsidies to pay for part of farmers premiums. According to the Congressional Budget Office, for fiscal years 2013 through 2022, the program costsprimarily premium subsidieswill average $8.9 billion annually.
GAO determined the (1) effect on program costs of applying limits on farmers premium subsidies, as payment limits are set for other farm programs, and (2) extent to which USDA uses key data mining tools to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in the program. GAO analyzed USDA data, reviewed economic studies, and interviewed USDA officials.
What GAO Found
If a limit of $40,000 had been applied to individual farmers crop insurance premium subsidies, as it is for other farm programs, the federal government would have saved up to $1 billion in crop insurance program costs in 2011, according to GAOs analysis of U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) data. GAO selected $40,000 as an example of a potential subsidy limit because it is the limit for direct payments, which provide fixed annual payments to farmers based on a farms crop production history. Had such a limit been applied in 2011, it would have affected up to 3.9 percent of all participating farmers, who accounted for about one-third of all premium subsidies and were primarily associated with large farms. For example, one of these farmers insured crops in eight counties and received about $1.3 million in premium subsidies. Had premium subsidies been reduced by 10 percentage points for all farmers participating in the program, as recent studies have proposed, the federal government would have saved about $1.2 billion in 2011. A decision to limit or reduce premium subsidies raises other considerations, such as the potential effect on the financial condition of large farms and on program participation.
Since 2001, USDA has used data mining tools to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse by either farmers or insurance agents and adjusters but has not maximized the use of these tools to realize potential additional savings. This is largely because of competing compliance review priorities, according to GAOs analysis. USDAs Risk Management Agency (RMA), which is responsible for overseeing the integrity of the crop insurance program, has used data mining to identify farmers who received claim payments that are higher or more frequent than others in the same area. USDA informs these farmers that at least one of their fields will be inspected during the coming growing season. RMA officials told GAO that this action has substantially reduced total claims. The value of identifying these farmers may be reduced, however, by the fact that USDAs Farm Service Agency (FSA)which conducts field inspections for RMAdoes not complete all such inspections, and neither FSA nor RMA has a process to ensure that the results of all inspections are accurately reported. For example, RMA did not obtain field inspection results for about 20 percent and 28 percent of these farmers, respectively, in 2009 and 2010. As a result, not all of the farmers RMA identified were subject to a review, increasing the likelihood that fraud, waste, or abuse occurred without detection. Field inspections were not completed, in part because FSA state offices are not required to monitor the completion of such inspections. In addition, RMA generally does not provide insurance companies with FSA inspection results when crops are found to be in good condition, although USDAs Inspector General has reported this information may be important for followup. Past cases have revealed that some farmers may harvest a high-yielding crop, hide its sale, and report a loss to receive an insurance payment. Furthermore, RMA has not directed insurance companies to review the results of all completed FSA field inspections before paying claims that are filed after inspections show a crop is in good condition. As a result, insurance companies may not have information that could help them identify claims that should be denied.
What GAO Recommends
To reduce crop insurance program costs, Congress should consider limiting premium subsidies for individual farmers, reducing subsidies for all farmers, or both. GAO also recommends, in part, that USDA encourage the completion of field inspections. In commenting on a report draft, USDA did not agree that Congress should consider limiting premium subsidies, but GAO believes that when farm income is at a record high and the nation faces severe fiscal problems, limiting premium subsidies is an appropriate area for consideration. USDA agreed with encouraging the completion of field inspections. |
gao_GAO-08-1154T | gao_GAO-08-1154T_0 | Background
NextGen is a multidecade, multiagency effort to transform the current ATC system to the next generation air transportation system by moving from relying largely on ground-based radars to using precision satellites; digital, networked communications; and an integrated weather system. Often characterized as “curb to curb,” NextGen involves every aspect of air transportation, from arrival at the airport to departure from the destination airport, and it is expected to increase the safety and enhance the capacity of the air transport system. JPDO was charged with coordinating the research activities of the federal partner agencies with the goal of developing a 20-year R&D agenda for NextGen. This requirement led JPDO to develop initial versions of the Concept of Operations, Enterprise Architecture, and IWP. It is JPDO’s plan for achieving NextGen. Have the Views of Industry and Air Traffic Controllers Been Adequately Incorporated in NextGen Planning Documents? Some stakeholders expressed concern that JPDO and FAA did not include their input in planning documents and other products. FAA and JPDO have established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder views. However, given the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the evolution of opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe that stakeholders will continue to differ on how adequately their views have been incorporated in NextGen planning. Is the Current Version of IWP Sufficiently Detailed for Effective Use in Overseeing and Managing NextGen? Senior JPDO officials expect subsequent versions of IWP to include cost information and more detail on which programs are responsible for completing particular actions. How Confident Should Congress Be that IWP Will Provide a Sufficient Basis for Achieving NextGen’s Goals? The research, development, and testing activities set out in the current IWP do not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to be confident that the goals of NextGen will be achieved. However, the enhanced information that is planned for inclusion in the upcoming version will provide a firmer basis for congressional confidence. However, additional issues that are not part of the current plan will have to be addressed to achieve NextGen goals, such as obtaining the necessary funding, establishing the infrastructure to support the scope of needed R&D, and filling the gap that may exist between basic research and the research needed to bring technologies far enough along for transfer to industry for further development. Can JPDO Continue to Be Viewed as an “Honest Broker” in Light of FAA’s Recent Restructuring? We recognized that JPDO needed to counter the perception that it was a proxy for ATO and, as such, was not able to act as an “honest broker” between ATO and the partner federal agencies, but we also understood that JPDO must continue to work with ATO and its partner agencies in a partnership in which ATO is the lead implementer of NextGen. Finally, it is too early to tell if the reorganization of FAA’s management structure addresses concerns that stakeholders have expressed about the fragmentation of management responsibility for NextGen activities. What Needs to Be Done to Move JPDO from Proposing R&D to Articulating a Clear R&D Program with Defined and Prioritized Tasks? To articulate a clear R&D program with defined and prioritized tasks, JPDO must continue to collaborate with its partner agencies—FAA, NASA, DOD, DHS, and Commerce—to identify and prioritize the R&D needed for NextGen. What Metrics Should Congress Use to Evaluate the Progress of NextGen? The first, an infrastructure challenge, is to implement NextGen plans for a new configuration of ATC facilities and enhanced runway capacity. To manage the implementation of NextGen, FAA will need staff with technical skills, such as systems engineering and contract management expertise. | Why GAO Did This Study
To prepare for forecasted air traffic growth, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in partnership with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is planning and implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new, satellite-based air traffic management system that is expected to increase the safety and enhance the capacity of the air transport system. NextGen will replace the current radar-based air traffic control (ATC) system. Within FAA, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is responsible for implementing the transition to NextGen, and ATO's Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) is coordinating efforts to plan for this transition, including developing a 20-year research and development (R&D) agenda for NextGen. JPDO has drafted three basic planning documents for NextGen--a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan (IWP). This testimony responds to six questions about NextGen and JPDO raised by the House Committee on Science and Technology, and addresses two related challenges identified by GAO. The statement is based on recent related GAO reports and testimonies, including a report issued today that reflects GAO's analysis of interviews with 25 key NextGen stakeholders about progress and challenges involved in the transition to NextGen.
What GAO Found
Have the Views of Industry and Air Traffic Controllers Been Adequately Incorporated in NextGen Planning Documents? FAA and JPDO have established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder views. However, given the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the evolution of opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe that stakeholders will continue to differ on how adequately their views have been incorporated in NextGen planning. Is the Current Version of IWP Sufficiently Detailed for Effective Use in Overseeing and Managing NextGen? No. The current version lacks some needed information, but the next version, to be released this month, is to contain more detail, including schedule information, and is automated and searchable, making it more user friendly and useful for oversight. How Confident Should Congress Be that IWP Will Provide a Sufficient Basis for Achieving NextGen's Goals? The current plan does not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to be confident. The upcoming version will provide a firmer basis for confidence, but additional R&D issues that are not part of the plan will have to be addressed, including technology transfer issues. Can JPDO Continue to Be Viewed as an "Honest Broker" in Light of FAA's Recent Restructuring? The restructuring made JPDO a component of ATO rather than an independent office, but other federal agencies are reportedly still cooperating with JPDO, suggesting that they continue to view it as an honest broker. However, it is too early to tell if the restructuring addresses stakeholders' concerns about the fragmentation of management responsibility for NextGen activities. What Needs to Be Done to Move JPDO from Proposing R&D to Articulating a Clear R&D Program with Defined and Prioritized Tasks? The move is underway. JPDO needs to continue collaborating with its partner agencies to identify and prioritize R&D and leverage their R&D programs. It is too soon to assess the results of steps JPDO and the partner agencies have taken thus far. What Metrics Should Congress Use to Evaluate the Progress of NextGen? Schedule information in the upcoming version of IWP and cost information in the subsequent version will help provide Congress with metrics for evaluating NextGen's progress. Additional Infrastructure and Human Capital Challenges Identified by GAO. NextGen's implementation further depends on FAA's reconfiguring and maintaining its ATC facilities, expanding runways, and hiring staff with the engineering and contract management skills needed to provide oversight. |
gao_GAO-06-15 | gao_GAO-06-15_0 | Background
Although there is no commonly accepted definition for collaboration, for the purpose of this report we define it as any joint activity by two or more organizations that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the organizations act alone. OMB has also singled out VA and DOD resource sharing for increased attention through its PMA initiative. While collaboration among federal agencies can take many different forms, the practices generally consist of two or more agencies defining and articulating a common outcome; establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to achieve the outcome; identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources; agreeing upon agency roles and responsibilities; establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of collaborative efforts; reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts through agency performance management systems. Running throughout these eight practices are a number of factors such as leadership and trust that are necessary elements for a collaborative working relationship. As such, they can negotiate and set wildland fire management policy for their respective departments. GPRA and OMB’s Management Tools Offer Opportunities to Foster Greater Collaboration among Federal Agencies
GPRA, with its focus on strategic planning, the development of long-term goals, and accountability for results, provides a framework that Congress, OMB, and executive branch agencies can use to consider the appropriate mix of long-term strategic goals and strategies needed to identify and address federal goals that cut across agency boundaries. A governmentwide performance plan could provide a broader perspective of the federal government’s goals and strategies to address issues that cut across different federal agencies, including redundancy and other inefficiencies in how the government does its business. Moreover, we have recommended Congress amend GPRA to require a governmentwide strategic plan to provide a framework for identifying long-term goals and strategies for addressing crosscutting issues. In addition to the role it could play in implementing GPRA, OMB could also use its PMA (President’s Management Agenda) and PART (Program Assessment Rating Tool) tools to foster greater federal agency collaboration. In conducting PART assessments of federal agency programs, OMB considers, among other things, whether the program coordinates and collaborates effectively with related programs and whether duplication exists. Our prior work has shown that many issues cut across more than one agency and their actions are not well coordinated. Options for doing this could involve expanding the PMA initiatives and standards to include either an additional governmentwide initiative focused on improving collaboration across federal agencies or additional agency initiatives focused on specific areas in need of improved collaboration; expanding the standards for the PMA’s strategic management of human capital initiative to reflect the need for agencies to hold individuals accountable, through their performance management systems, for coordinating and collaborating within and across organizational boundaries in order to help the agencies achieve their mission, goals, and outcomes; and supplementing the PART guidance on interagency coordination with information about the collaboration practices in this report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify key practices that can help enhance and sustain collaboration as well as federal agency collaborative efforts that illustrate these practices, we reviewed academic literature and prior GAO and Congressional Research Service reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government faces a series of challenges in the 21st century that will be difficult, if not impossible, for any single agency to address alone. Many issues cut across more than one agency and their actions are not well coordinated. Moreover, agencies face a range of barriers when they attempt to work collaboratively. This report identifies key practices that can help enhance and sustain agency collaboration. GAO also considered how the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) address collaboration among agencies. To illustrate these practices, we selected the Healthy People, wildland fire management, and Departments of Veterans Affairs and Defense's health resource sharing collaborations.
What GAO Found
Collaboration can be broadly defined as any joint activity that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the organizations act alone. Agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by engaging in the eight practices identified below. Running throughout these practices are a number of factors such as leadership, trust, and organizational culture that are necessary elements for a collaborative working relationship: define and articulate a common outcome; establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; identify and address needs by leveraging resources; agree on roles and responsibilities; establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries; develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management systems. GAO has previously reported that GPRA, with its focus on strategic planning, the development of long-term goals, and accountability for results, provides a framework Congress, OMB, and executive branch agencies can use to consider the appropriate mix of long-term strategic goals and strategies needed to identify and address issues that cut across agency boundaries. In addition, to provide a broader perspective on the federal government's goals and strategies to address issues that cut across agencies, we previously recommended that (1) OMB develop a governmentwide performance plan as required by GPRA and (2) Congress consider amending GPRA to require a governmentwide strategic plan. OMB, through the President's Management Agenda (PMA), has emphasized improving government performance through governmentwide and agency-specific initiatives. One of these focuses specifically on improving coordination, but only between the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Defense for health programs and systems. However, many other areas that cut across agency boundaries would benefit from greater OMB focus and attention, including information sharing for homeland security, which GAO recently designated as a high-risk area. OMB has also used its Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) diagnostic tool to determine, among other things, whether individual programs duplicate other efforts and if agencies coordinate and collaborate effectively with related programs. The PART tool provides general guidance for assessing effective program coordination and collaboration, but does not discuss practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration, such as those described and illustrated in this report. |
gao_GAO-08-740 | gao_GAO-08-740_0 | Warfighter Involvement Process Has Helped the Missile Defense Agency Address Some Capability Needs but the Process Faces Key Limitations
U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005 to identify and address the combatant commands’ ballistic missile defense capability needs, but the process has yet to overcome key limitations to its effectiveness. However, even as U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency move forward with the process, they have not finalized the implementation guidance needed to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities; have not yet established effective methodologies for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing combatant command needs; and have not involved senior civilian DOD leadership to adjudicate potential differences among the combatant commands’ priorities and provide a departmentwide perspective about how to best allocate resources. As a result, DOD is at risk of not addressing the combatant commands’ missile defense needs if improvements are not made that establish an effective and well documented process and provide a DOD-wide perspective when prioritizing these needs. When the Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency in 2002, DOD lacked a process for the agency to consider the combatant commands’ priorities as it developed ballistic missile defenses. Although the Warfighter Involvement Process has not yet fully evolved, Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command officials believe the agency has generally been responsive to the combatant commands’ capability needs. However, the U.S. Strategic Command and Missile Defense Agency officials agreed that the lists prepared to date have not provided enough specific detail to inform the Missile Defense Agency about how to best address the commands’ needs when developing new capabilities. Lacking the involvement of senior civilian DOD officials in reviewing the commands’ priorities, the Missile Defense Agency has not benefited from receiving a broader, departmentwide perspective on which of the commands’ needs were the most significant. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s process for identifying and addressing combatant command priorities for ballistic missile defense capabilities, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in conjunction with the Director, Missile Defense Agency, to take the following two actions: 1. complete and publish the implementation guidance needed to clearly define each organization’s roles and responsibilities for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing combatant command capability needs for ballistic missile defenses, and review and update such guidance, as needed, as DOD’s process continues to evolve; and 2. establish effective methodologies for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing combatant command capability needs for ballistic missile defenses. Further, to provide the Missile Defense Agency with feedback as to how well it has addressed the combatant commands’ priorities in preparing future funding plans, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in conjunction with the other combatant commands, to prepare an assessment of the Missile Defense Agency’s funding plans compared to the commands’ priorities, and provide the assessment to the Director, Missile Defense Agency. However, it is not clear how DOD intends to implement these recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the Missile Defense Agency to develop and deploy globally integrated ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies. To deliver an operational capability as quickly as possible, the agency was not subject to traditional DOD requirements and oversight processes. While directed to work closely with the combatant commands, the agency was not required to build missile defenses to meet specific operational requirements. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD has developed a process that identifies, prioritizes, and addresses overall combatant command priorities as the Missile Defense Agency develops ballistic missile defense capabilities. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed relevant documents and visited several combatant commands, the Missile Defense Agency, Joint Staff, and other DOD organizations.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken some steps to address the combatant commands' ballistic missile defense needs, but it has not yet established an effective process to identify, prioritize, and address these needs, or to provide a DOD-wide perspective on which priorities are the most important. U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency created the Warfighter Involvement Process in 2005. Although the process is still evolving, the Missile Defense Agency has addressed some combatant command capability needs. However, even as they move forward with the process, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not yet overcome three interrelated limitations to the process's effectiveness. First, U.S. Strategic Command and the Missile Defense Agency have not put into place the approved and complete guidance needed to implement the Warfighter Involvement Process, which would clearly define each organization's respective roles and responsibilities for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing the combatant commands' capability needs. This has left the combatant commands without an agreed-upon mechanism for influencing agency investments. Second, the Missile Defense Agency has lacked clear information about how to best address the commands' needs, and until recently has not clearly communicated how it has adjusted its investments in response to these needs. Without such information, the commands have not been able to provide feedback to the Missile Defense Agency about how well the agency has addressed their priorities in its funding plans. Third, senior civilian DOD leadership has not been involved in adjudicating potential differences among the commands' priorities. Instead, U.S. Strategic Command has consolidated and submitted the commands' prioritized capability needs to the Missile Defense Agency without first vetting these priorities though senior civilian DOD officials with departmentwide responsibilities for assessing risk and allocating resources. As a result, the Missile Defense Agency has not benefited from receiving a broader, departmentwide perspective on which of the commands' needs were the most significant. DOD has established a new board to advise senior Office of the Secretary of Defense officials on ballistic missile defense priorities; however, whether this board will be involved in reviewing or adjudicating differences among the commands' priorities is unclear. Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command officials stated that the Warfighter Involvement Process is evolving. However, unless and until they overcome these interrelated limitations, DOD remains at risk of not effectively providing the combatant commands with the missile defense capabilities they need. |
gao_GAO-10-540 | gao_GAO-10-540_0 | Controls over Grant Application Review and Award Process Need Improvement
LSC controls over reviewing and awarding grants are intended to help ensure the fair and equitable consideration of applicants. Grant Application Evaluations and Decisions Lacked Supporting Documentation
LSC’s grant application evaluation process and basis for the resulting decisions were not clearly documented, including key management discussions in the evaluation-making process. Therefore, this lack of documentation of the factors considered in making these decisions increases the risks that grantee application evaluation and funding decisions may not consider all key, relevant information and makes it difficult to describe the basis for decisions later. Grant Application Evaluation Process Lacked Requirements for Managerial Review
LSC has no requirement for carrying out and documenting OPP Director managerial review and approval of competitive grant evaluations or renewals by the OPP primary staff reviewers. These control weaknesses hinder LSC’s ability to effectively oversee its grantees’ compliance with LSC regulations and limits its ability to ensure grantees are visited according to their relative risk levels and that any compliance issues are identified and resolved in a timely manner. We also noted that LSC has an overall goal that provides for grantee site visits at least once every 3 years; however, LSC did not have procedures detailing how identified risks factors are to be used in a risk-based determination of which grantees should receive site visits by either OPP or OCE personnel. For example, LSC’s plan did not include metrics to measure performance in the following core LSC activities related to its key grant awards or monitor grantee program performance and grantee compliance with respect to: identifying and targeting LSC’s own resources to address the most pressing civil legal needs of low-income individuals in the nation, and ensuring that grantees use the funding they receive to serve the low- income population throughout the nation. In addition, not all measures in LSC’s strategic plan were linked to specific LSC components. Specifically, LSC did not (1) systematically assess short- and long-term workload and staffing needs in relation to the corporation’s strategic goals and objectives, (2) provide required performance reviews for OPP staff in 3 of the 6 years we reviewed and for OCE staff in 2 of the 6 years we evaluated, or (3) provide formal training for current and incoming staff on internal controls. Without the employee performance appraisals for all of its staff, LSC has limited its opportunities to encourage high performance, identify training needs, and communicate with staff. Lacking effective contract approval and fund availability controls, LSC is at increased risk of improper contract awards and undetected budget shortfalls. Two contracts that did not follow LSC’s approval process resulted in an unplanned budgetary adjustment for fiscal year 2009. However, several key recommendations related to LSC’s grantee oversight responsibilities remain to be fully implemented. A weak control environment limits LSC’s ability to effectively manage its grant award and grantee performance oversight responsibilities. In the near term, it will be important for LSC leadership to direct immediate action to address the continuing weaknesses, as well as those identified in our current review. For the long term, LSC will need to focus on monitoring the sustained commitment to an effective overall system of internal controls necessary to achieve a solid basis for effectively accomplishing its core mission of enabling the grantees to provide legal services to individuals who otherwise could not afford such services. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our reporting objectives were to determine the extent to which the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) properly implemented key internal controls in awarding grants and overseeing grantee program performance; measured its performance in awarding grants and overseeing grantees; evaluated staffing needs for grant awards management and grantee performance oversight; and followed appropriate budget execution processes for awarding contracts related to grants award and grantee performance and oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) was created as a private, nonprofit corporation to support legal assistance for low-income individuals on civil legal matters, primarily through federal grants and is primarily funded through federal appropriations. Effective internal controls over grant awards and oversight of grantees' performance are critical to LSC's mission. GAO and the LSC Inspector General have previously reported weaknesses and made recommendations. GAO's objectives for this report were to determine the extent to which LSC (1) implemented key internal controls in awarding and overseeing grantees, (2) measured its performance, (3) evaluated staffing needs, and (4) adhered to its budget execution processes. GAO analyzed key records and prior recommendations as well as interviewed LSC officials regarding LSC's internal control and performance frameworks, staffing, and contract processes.
What GAO Found
Although LSC's controls over reviewing and awarding grants are intended to help ensure fair and equitable consideration, they need improvement. Final award and fund decisions are documented and approved; however, LSC's grant application evaluation process and associated decisions were not documented, including key management discussions in the evaluation process. This lack of documentation of factors considered in making these decisions increases the risk that grantee application evaluation and funding decisions may not consider all key relevant information and makes it difficult to describe the basis for decisions later. In addition, LSC has no requirement for carrying out and documenting managerial review and approval of competitive grant evaluations or renewals, limiting its ability to identify gaps or incompatible data in applications. Although LSC has efforts underway to ensure it visits all grantee sites at least once every 3 years, LSC did not consistently or explicitly document the application of risk criteria when selecting which grantees to visit, complete timely site visit reports, or track the recommendations from the site visits. These weaknesses hindered LSC's ability to effectively oversee grantees. LSC is not required to follow the Government Performance and Results Act but has developed a Strategic Directions document with some performance measures. However, these measures do not reflect all of LSC's core activities and are not linked to its two primary offices for awarding and overseeing grants. Therefore, LSC cannot effectively measure its performance in several key dimensions, such as identifying and targeting resources in addressing the most pressing civil legal needs of low-income individuals across the nation. LSC has not systematically assessed its long-term staffing needs to achieve strategic goals and objectives, which could help ensure it has the staff capabilities needed to meet its short- and long-term goals. LSC has not consistently provided performance reviews for all of its staff, limiting opportunities to encourage high performance, identify training needs, and communicate with staff. At times, LSC did not adhere to its budget execution process in awarding contracts supporting its key grant-making responsibilities. Because officials did not follow LSC's approval controls for two contracts and there was a breakdown in tracking funds, LSC had a budget shortfall of $70,000 in 2009. Missing or flawed internal controls limit LSC's ability to effectively manage its grant award and grantee performance oversight responsibilities. Although LSC has taken steps to address all 17 GAO recommendations identified in prior work, several have yet to be fully addressed. In the near term, it will be important for LSC leadership to address both current and continuing weaknesses. For the long term, LSC will need to focus on strengthening its overall system of internal controls in order to establish a solid basis for effectively accomplishing its core mission. |
gao_GAO-07-360 | gao_GAO-07-360_0 | Background
JSF is a joint, multinational acquisition program for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight cooperative international partners. The program has experienced delays in several key events including delays in the start of the flight test program, manufacturing and delivery of the first development aircraft, and delays in the testing of critical missions systems. These delays reduce the amount of time available for completing flight testing and development activities. Total Program Cost Estimates Have Increased
JSF program cost estimates have increased by $31.6 billion since the program’s decision to rebaseline in fiscal year 2004. The net effect of the JSF program cost increases is that DOD will pay more per aircraft than expected when the program was rebaselined. Design and Manufacturing of Development Aircraft Has Been a Major Source of Delay
The program has completed manufacturing of its first development aircraft and manufacturing data indicates that the program did not meet its planned labor hour goals. Major design modifications can cause substantial and costly changes in the manufacturing process. The JSF Program Projects Key Performance Parameters Will Be Met Based on Modeling and Simulations
Currently, the JSF program estimates that by the time the development program ends the aircraft design will meet all but one of its key performance parameters. Meeting the full interoperability required is currently dependent on other capabilities being developed outside the JSF program. The degree of concurrency between development and production in the JSF program’s acquisition strategy still includes significant risks for cost and schedule overruns or late delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. The flight test program will also hinge on the delivering aircraft with the expected capabilities. Challenges Created by Continued Concurrent Development and Production
The concurrency between development and production in DOD’s acquisition strategy for JSF did not substantially change as a result of the program’s rebaseline in fiscal year 2004. While some concurrency may be beneficial to efficiently transition from the development stage of a program to production, the JSF is currently planned to be significantly more concurrent than the F-22A program that failed to deliver the warfighting capability on time and at predicted costs. Unprecedented Funding Requirements Could Challenge Program Execution
To execute its current plan, the JSF program must obtain unprecedented levels of annual funding—on average over $12.6 billion annually in acquisition funds over the next 2 decades. DOD’s approval to enter low-rate initial production this year committed the program to this high risk strategy. It would also make cost and schedule more predictable and lessen the risk to DOD’s production investment. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program--a multinational acquisition program for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight cooperative international partners--is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most expensive aircraft acquisition program. DOD currently estimates it will spend $623 billion to develop, procure, and operate and support the JSF fleet. The JSF aircraft, which includes a variant design for each of the services, represents 90 percent of the remaining planned investment for DOD's major tactical aircraft programs. In fiscal year 2004, the JSF program was rebaselined to address technical challenges, cost increases, and schedule overruns. This report--the third mandated by Congress--describes the program's progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals since rebaselining and identifies various challenges the program will likely face in meeting these goals in the future.
What GAO Found
The JSF program has delivered and flown the first development aircraft. However, cost and schedule goals established in the fiscal year 2004 rebaselined program have not been met. Total JSF program acquisition costs (through 2027) have increased by $31.6 billion and now DOD will pay 12 percent more per aircraft than expected in 2004. The program has also experienced delays in several key events, including the start of the flight test program, delivery of the first production representative development aircraft, and testing of critical missions systems. Delays in the delivery of initial development aircraft were driven by incomplete engineering drawings, changes in design, manufacturing inefficiencies, and parts shortages. Despite these delays, the program still plans to complete development in 2013, compressing the amount of time available for flight testing and development activities. Also, the program projects it will meet all but one key performance requirement--line of sight communications--that is currently dependent on other capabilities being developed outside the JSF program. Accurately predicting JSF costs and schedule and ensuring sufficient funding will likely be key challenges facing the program in the future. JSF continues to pursue a risky acquisition strategy that concurrently develops and produces aircraft. While some concurrency may be beneficial to efficiently transition from development to production, the degree of overlap is significant on this program. Any changes in design and manufacturing that require modifications to delivered aircraft or to tooling and manufacturing processes would result in increased costs and delays in getting capabilities to the warfighter. Low-rate initial production will begin this year with almost the entire 7-year flight test program remaining to confirm the aircraft design. Confidence that investment decisions will deliver expected capability within cost and schedule goals increases as testing proves the JSF will work as expected. The JSF program also faces funding uncertainties as it will demand unprecedented funding over the next 2 decades--more than $12.6 billion a year on average through 2027. |
gao_GAO-13-723 | gao_GAO-13-723_0 | CTP is the FDA center with primary responsibility for executing this regulatory responsibility, and its offices conduct work in several areas, including reviewing submissions for new tobacco products to determine if such products can be legally marketed in the United States, and responding to meeting requests from manufacturers and other entities. CTP reviews submissions made by manufacturers through one of three pathways:
Substantial Equivalence (SE) pathway: Manufacturers make a submission under the SE pathway if either (1) a new tobacco product has the same characteristics as a predicate tobacco product—that is, a product commercially marketed in the United States on February 15, 2007, or a product previously found by CTP to be substantially equivalent; or (2) the new tobacco product has different characteristics from a predicate tobacco product, but does not raise different questions of public health. Requests for Meetings with CTP Offices
The Tobacco Control Act does not require CTP to conduct meetings with outside entities, but CTP officials reported that they are valuable because they increase knowledge of tobacco regulation among public health groups, promote compliance among manufacturers, and clarify information needed for new tobacco product submissions. Manufacturers have requested meetings with OS to discuss their new tobacco product submissions, as well as study protocols and other scientific issues. Tobacco User Fees
The Tobacco Control Act requires FDA to assess user fees on manufacturers of FDA-regulated tobacco products based on their market share and specifies that the tobacco user fees can only be applied toward FDA activities that relate to the regulation of tobacco products. CTP Finished Initial, but Not Final, Review Steps for Most Submissions, and Lacks Time Frames for its Review Process
As of January 7, 2013, the vast majority of new tobacco product submissions FDA received from manufacturers were made under the SE pathway. For the majority of provisional SE submissions, CTP took over a year and a half to complete these initial review steps. In late June 2013, CTP made a final decision on 6 of the 3,788 SE submissions, finding that 2 of the products were substantially equivalent and that 4 were not; the remaining submissions were still undergoing CTP review. Several factors contributed to the significant amount of time it took for review of new tobacco product submissions, according to officials from CTP and tobacco manufacturers. CTP concluded that the new tobacco products in two of the submissions were substantially equivalent and that the products in the four other submissions were not. CTP officials said that there were three reasons for placing a higher priority on its review of regular SE submissions over provisional SE submissions: (1) tobacco products in provisional SE submissions could remain on the market legally (unless and until CTP issued an order of not substantially equivalent), (2) FDA received a large number of provisional SE submissions on March 21, 2011 (the day before the statutory deadline for submitting provisional SE submissions), making it impractical to prioritize reviews by the date the submission was received, and (3) CTP required time to assess which approach to reviewing provisional submissions would be the most effective at addressing the public health burden of tobacco use. Yet without time frames, CTP is limited in its ability to evaluate policies, procedures, and staffing resources in relation to its review process and this, in turn, limits CTP’s ability to reasonably assure efficiency and effectiveness. CTP Granted More Meetings Than It Denied
As of January 7, 2013, CTP’s offices had responded—granted, denied, or transferred—to over 93 percent of the meeting requests they received through January 7, 2013. requested meetings in order to provide information to CTP that may be useful for CTP’s work. For example, in OP, the number of days from the date a meeting request was received to the date a meeting was held ranged from 3 days to almost five months, with half of the responses to meeting requests taking more than about 1.5 months. FDA Spent Less than Half of the User Fees Collected and CTP Spent Less than Planned
As of the end of fiscal year 2012, FDA had spent less than half of the $1.1 billion in tobacco user fee funds collected (46 percent) from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2012, leaving more than $603 million (54 percent) unspent. CTP continued to spend less than planned for fiscal year 2012. Specifically, they reported that the time it took to award contracts resulted in CTP not spending the funds that the center planned to spend for a given fiscal year. However, most of the planned $200 million total was not awarded until the first quarter of fiscal year 2013.officials told us that both contracts were not awarded at these amounts in fiscal year 2011 or 2012 as planned because CTP and FDA spent significant amounts of time to determine the structure of the contract as FDA had never conducted a public education campaign of this magnitude. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve CTP’s ability to operate efficiently, achieve effective results, and plan appropriately, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Commissioner of FDA to establish performance measures that include time frames for making final decisions on SE submissions and Exemption from SE submissions, and monitor FDA’s performance relative to those time frames, such as evaluating whether staff are performing reviews of these submissions efficiently and effectively. HHS also provided additional information on CTP activities in its comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2009, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act granted FDA, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), authority to regulate tobacco products such as cigarettes. The act requires that tobacco manufacturers submit information to be reviewed by FDA in order to market new tobacco products and established tobacco user fees to fund FDA's tobacco-related activities. The act represents the first time that FDA has had the authority to regulate tobacco products.
Manufacturers have raised concerns about the progress of CTP, the FDA center established by the act to implement its provisions. GAO was asked to examine CTP's review of new tobacco product submissions, responses to meeting requests, and use of funds. This report examines (1) the status of CTP's reviews of new tobacco product submissions; (2) how CTP responded to manufacturers' and other entities' meeting requests, and the length of time CTP took to hold the meetings; and (3) the extent to which FDA has spent its tobacco user fee funds. GAO analyzed data regarding submissions received by FDA as of January 7, 2013; reviewed data on meeting requests, spending plans, and amounts obligated; and interviewed CTP and tobacco industry officials.
What GAO Found
As of January 7, 2013, the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Center for Tobacco Products (CTP) had finished initial, but not final, review steps for most of about 3,800 submissions for new tobacco products (those not on the market on February 15, 2007). Ninety-nine percent of the submissions received by FDA were made under the substantial equivalence (SE) pathway. CTP determines whether the new tobacco product in an SE submission has the same characteristics as a predicate tobacco product (a product commercially marketed in the United States on February 15, 2007, or previously found by FDA to be substantially equivalent) or has different characteristics that do not raise different questions of public health. Initial review steps include CTP's determination of whether the new product is a type regulated by FDA and whether the submission is missing information. For most SE submissions, CTP took more than a year and a half from the date a submission was received to the date these initial steps were completed. Of the 3,788 SE submissions, 3,165 were received by FDA prior to a statutory deadline (March 22, 2011) allowing the product to be marketed unless CTP finds that they are not substantially equivalent. SE submissions received after that date cannot be marketed until CTP determines they are substantially equivalent. In late June 2013, CTP made a final decision on 6 of the 3,788 SE submissions, finding that 2 of the products were substantially equivalent and that 4 were not; the remaining submissions were still undergoing CTP review. CTP officials and manufacturers told GAO that several factors (such as CTP requests for additional information from manufacturers for submissions and having to hire and train new staff) impacted the time it took CTP to review SE submissions. While CTP is working to address these factors by, for example, disseminating information to manufacturers to improve submission quality and developing training for staff, CTP does not have performance measures that include time frames for making final decisions on submissions by which to assess its progress. Without time frames, CTP is limited in its ability to evaluate policies, procedures, and staffing resources in relation to its review process and, in turn, is limited in its ability to reasonably assure efficiency and effectiveness.
A variety of outside entities (such as manufacturers) have requested meetings with CTP to discuss new tobacco product submissions, public health activities, and other issues, and four CTP offices have received meeting requests. Those offices granted more meetings (72) than they denied (22) of all the meeting requests they received through January 7, 2013. The number of calendar days from the date a meeting was requested to the date it was held ranged from 1 to 262 days, and the averages among the four offices ranged from 51 to 97 days.
FDA spent (obligated) less than half of the nearly $1.1 billion in tobacco user fees it collected from manufacturers and others through the end of fiscal year 2012; $603 million of these user fees remained unspent and, thus, remained available to CTP. CTP spent substantially less than planned in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. CTP had planned on spending a total of $611 million for fiscal year 2012; instead, the center spent $272 million for that year. CTP officials told GAO that the time it took to award contracts contributed to the center spending less than planned. For example, CTP planned to award a $145 million contract in fiscal year 2012 for a public health education campaign, but most of that amount was not awarded until the first quarter of fiscal year 2013.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA establish performance measures that include time frames for making decisions on new tobacco product submissions and that the agency monitor performance relative to those time frames. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-202 | gao_GAO-17-202_0 | Figure 1 shows photos of ADVs in U.S. waterways. See appendix I for selected highlights of the 30 coastal state’s ADV-related laws. Federal ADV Response Guided by Authority, Interagency Agreements and Funding
Federal Response Authorities Outlined in Federal Laws and Regulations, the National Contingency Plan, and Interagency Agreements
Federal laws, the National Contingency Plan (NCP), and interagency agreements, delineate federal authorities and roles for responding to maritime pollution and navigation threats, including those posed by ADVs. Federal agencies have also established interagency agreements to further guide their authority and respective roles for responding to navigation and pollution threats posed by ADVs. For example, In 2012, the Coast Guard and USACE headquarters signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to improve their efficiency and effectiveness for determining whether an obstruction is a navigation hazard and for the marking and removal of sunken vessels and other navigation obstructions. The following highlights responsibilities of the Coast Guard, EPA, USACE, NOAA, and FEMA, as outlined in federal law, the NCP, and interagency agreements. Figure 2 shows the circumstances in which federal agencies generally respond to ADV-related incidents in U.S. waterways as Federal On-scene Coordinators, or through funding ADV removal by state, local, tribal, and nonprofit organizations, based on their respective authorities outlined in the NCP, federal laws, and interagency agreements. Federal Agencies Reported Exercising Authorities within Funding Constraints
Federal agencies reported they generally did not have funding to support actions beyond responding to ADVs posing navigation, pollution and public health threats, nor were they required to do so by federal law or agency policy. Federal Agencies Track their Responses to Pollution and Navigation Threats, but ADVs are Not Specifically Tracked Federal Agencies Track Pollution and Navigation Threat Responses, but Do Not Specifically Track Responses to ADVs
Federal agencies with ADV-related authorities maintain data on their responses to and associated expenditures for responding to pollution and navigation threat incidents in U.S. waterways, which in some instances involved ADVs. States Reported Varying Actions to Address ADVs
Many States Reported Data on ADVs Identified and Removed and Related Expenditures
More than half of the states responding to our survey reported data on the number of ADVs they had identified and removed in their states in an almost three-year period. Table 3 shows the reported ADV-related expenditures for each of these states. State Perspectives on Addressing ADVs
The 28 coastal states that responded to our survey also reported various perspectives on factors that affect their ability to address ADVs in their state including authority and funding issues, challenges with disposing ADVs, and concerns with federal actions. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and the EPA. We received technical comments that we have incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix III: Estimated Federal Abandoned and Derelict Vessel (ADV) Expenditures, Fiscal Years 2005 through 2015
According to our analysis of Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) data and case documentation, federal agencies expended at least $58 million from fiscal years 2005 through 2015 to respond to about 2,000 incidents in which ADVs posed navigation or pollution threats. | Why GAO Did This Study
ADVs can block navigable U.S. waterways and pose threats to the environment, and public health and safety, as fuel and hazardous material can leak into the water as the vessels deteriorate. Multiple federal agencies have responsibility for responding to ADV-related incidents, while states may also address ADVs through their own laws and policies. GAO was asked to review actions federal and state agencies have taken to address ADVs in U.S. waterways. This report examines (1) key factors that guide how federal agencies respond to ADVs; (2) the extent federal agencies track ADVs and their expenditures for responding to them; and (3) actions states have taken to address ADVs and the factors they cite as affecting their efforts.
GAO reviewed federal laws and policies which guide ADV-related actions for the Coast Guard, EPA, USACE, NOAA, and FEMA, and analyzed these agencies' ADV-related caseload and expenditure data for fiscal years 2005 through 2015, the most current available data. GAO interviewed agency headquarters and field-based officials in four states, selected for their geographic diversity and varying state laws and actions regarding ADVs. GAO also surveyed 30 coastal states regarding their ADV-related actions, expenditures and challenges.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies respond to abandoned and derelict vessels (ADV) in accordance with federal law, interagency agreements, and funding availability. Federal laws and the National Contingency Plan—the government's blueprint for responding to oil and hazardous substance releases—establish federal agency roles for leading a response to an ADV-related incident based on various factors, such as the type of ADV threat posed and its location (see fig. below). Interagency agreements have also helped to guide federal ADV response efforts. For example, the Coast Guard and Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) signed an agreement in 2012 outlining their procedures for responding to navigation hazards, including sunken vessels. Agencies reported they generally did not have funding to support actions beyond responding to ADVs posing navigation hazards in federally-maintained waterways and pollution and public health threats, nor were they required to do so by federal law or agency policy.
Key Federal Agency Responses to Abandoned and Derelict Vessels
The Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), USACE, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) maintain data on responses to, and associated expenditures for, pollution and navigation threat incidents in U.S. waterways, which sometimes have involved ADVs. GAO analysis determined that these agencies expended at least $58 million on ADV response from fiscal year 2005 through 2015. Over two thirds of these expenditures were associated with two ADV-response cases, in 2008 and 2011.
The 28 coastal states that responded to GAO's survey reported on their various ADV-related actions and perspectives on factors affecting their ability to address ADVs—including limitations on their state authority and insufficient funding.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Agencies provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-05-410 | gao_GAO-05-410_0 | Special uses permits regulate the amount, kind, time, and place of the proposed activity. In addition, it has been required by law to collect costs and location fees associated with filming activities for almost five years. The Park Service Has Specific Policy Guidance for Issuing Permits and Recovering Costs for Special Park Uses
The Park Service developed specific policy guidance for issuing permits and recovering costs for special park uses. Park Service Guidance Includes Requirement to Recover Costs
Park Service policy guidance generally requires park units to recover costs associated with managing special park uses, including special event and commercial filming and still photography activities, unless cost recovery is prohibited by law or otherwise exempted. For example, the policy states that recoverable costs include the time charged by a park ranger to visit the site of the event, such as a festival held on park grounds, to monitor that the terms and conditions of the permit are met. Inconsistent Application of Special Park Uses Guidance Has Resulted in Some Park Units Not Fully Identifying and Recovering Costs, Thereby Decreasing Resources Available to the Parks
At five of the six parks we visited, we found failure to adhere to the Park Service’s policy to recover from permittees the cost to either administer or monitor permits for special events and for commercial filming and still photography activities. National Capital Parks-Central charged no administration fees for permitting special uses. For example, during fiscal year 2003, this park management unit did not assess any administrative fee for permits issued for special events, filming, and still photography, as required by Park Service policy unless prohibited by law or otherwise exempted. In fiscal year 2003, this park unit issued a total of about 40 permits for special events and for commercial filming and still photography. Officials at Blue Ridge, Golden Gate, and Yellowstone explained they had not updated their hourly monitoring fees either because of a high workload at some park units or because updating fees was given a low priority at other park units. Delays in Implementing the Law to Collect Location Fees for Commercial Filming and Still Photography Have Resulted in Forgone Revenues
Delays in implementing the May 2000 legislation requiring the Secretary of the Interior to establish a fee schedule for commercial filming and still photography have resulted in significant annual forgone revenues for the Park Service. If the law requiring the Park Service’s officials to collect location fees for commercial filming and still photography had been implemented, GAO estimates that, for the reported permitted activity in fiscal year 2003, the agency would have collected revenues of about $1.6 million (unadjusted for inflation). However, the law has not been implemented. Because our review was limited to six park units, the extent to which other park units are not consistently applying existing cost recovery guidance is unclear. 108-108 prohibited the use of appropriated funds in fiscal year 2004 for special event permits on the Mall, unless the permit “expressly prohibits the erection, placement, or use of structures and signs bearing commercial advertising.” The law still allowed for recognizing the sponsors of special events, providing “the size and form of the recognition shall be consistent with the special nature and sanctity of the Mall and any lettering or design identifying the sponsor shall be no larger than one-third the size of the lettering or design identifying the special event.” As a result of this legislation, the Park Service has drafted policy guidance to restrict “the size, scale, scope and location of corporate logos and script.” In addition, National Capital Parks-Central officials now require permit applicants to provide detailed lists of planned signage along with a scaled replica of each sign to the Park Service for approval at least 30 days in advance of an event. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Park Service routinely issues permits for special park uses, such as special events or commercial filming and still photography. However, the National Football League's use of the National Mall to launch its 2003 season raised questions about whether permitting such events was consistent with existing policies and law and whether all applicable fees for permitting special park uses were being collected. GAO (1) identified applicable policy guidance for issuing special uses permits for special events and for commercial filming and still photography, (2) assessed the extent to which this guidance was applied during fiscal year 2003, and (3) determined the extent to which the Park Service implemented the requirement to collect location fees for commercial filming and still photography.
What GAO Found
The Park Service has developed policy guidance for issuing permits for special events and for commercial filming and still photography activities. This policy guidance includes general criteria about the terms and conditions as to when and where specific types of activities can take place and requires park units to recover applicable costs associated with administering and monitoring special park uses. Recovery of costs associated with filming activities is required by law. Recoverable costs include, for example, the time charged by a park ranger to visit the site of the event, such as a festival held on park grounds, to monitor that the terms and conditions of the permit are met. During fiscal year 2003, park units did not consistently apply Park Service guidance for permitting special events and for commercial filming and still photography, and often did not identify and recover costs associated with permitting such activities, thereby decreasing financial resources available to the parks. Of the six park units we visited, one did not charge fees for processing applications; one only recovered monitoring costs associated with some of its permits; and three others had not updated, for several years, hourly charges to reflect current higher costs for personnel time for administering and monitoring permitted activities. For example, National Capital Parks-Central officials charged no administrative fees for the estimated 1,400-plus permits issued for special events and for filming and still photography in fiscal year 2003. Officials said that park units had not updated fees because of regional policy and a high workload or because updating the fees was given low priority. The Park Service has not implemented a law enacted almost 5 years ago to collect location fees for commercial filming and still photography, resulting in significant annual forgone revenues. The agency has not implemented the law because of delays in reviewing the proposed regulations at the Department of Justice and a lack of agreement among the Interior agencies about the fee schedule and how it is to be applied. We estimated the Park Service would have collected about $1.6 million in location fee revenues in fiscal year 2003, if the requirement to collect such fees had been implemented. |
gao_GAO-05-673 | gao_GAO-05-673_0 | Background
The judiciary and GSA are responsible for managing the multibillion-dollar federal courthouse construction program, which is designed to address the judiciary’s long-term facility needs. Actual Costs of Courthouse Projects Can Vary Significantly from Estimates Provided to Congress, and Changes Are Not Consistently Explained
The actual costs for courthouse construction projects completed since fiscal year 1998 varied from the estimates provided to Congress at the design and construction phases. For many projects, the estimated cost and proposed building size changed between the design and construction phases, but GSA often did not indicate that these changes had occurred or explain the reasons for them in the prospectuses and fact sheets it supplied to Congress. For the 32 projects that had a total cost estimate provided to Congress at the construction phase, the actual cost exceeded the estimate by an average of 5 percent and ranged from 25 percent below to 52 percent above the estimated cost. Changes in Scope and Postponement of Planned Construction Start Dates Resulted in Cost Changes for Selected Projects
For the seven projects we reviewed in detail, changes in scope and the postponement of planned construction start dates resulted in differences between estimated and actual project costs. Changes made to the U.S. Marshals’ Design Guide increased the costs of projects in Cleveland, Albany, and Denver. Postponing Construction and Changes in Local Market Conditions Contributed to Changes in Project Costs
Postponing the start of construction and changes in local market conditions contributed to changes in costs for five of the seven projects we reviewed. These strategies included value engineering, modified contracting methods, and a variety of approaches for involving and communicating with tenant agencies. Project managers also used value engineering as the primary method to reduce costs to meet the budget when the initial construction bids exceeded the project’s budget. The most common change for all seven projects was substituting less expensive materials for more expensive materials that were originally called for in the design. Change orders on a project may increase the time needed to construct the building and increase the cost of construction. GSA project managers used a variety of strategies, such as regular meetings and courtroom mock-ups, to identify changes prior to construction, to involve tenant agencies in planning the courthouse projects, and to keep them informed about the progress of the projects. Such a practice would be consistent with our past work on leading practices in capital decision making. Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to (1) compare estimated and actual costs for recently completed courthouse projects, (2) identify factors that contributed to differences between the estimated and actual costs of selected projects, and (3) identify strategies that were used to help control the costs of selected projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
The General Services Administration (GSA) and the federal judiciary are in the midst of a multibillion-dollar courthouse construction initiative aimed at addressing the housing needs of federal district courts and related agencies. From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2005, Congress appropriated approximately $4.5 billion for 78 courthouse construction projects. GAO (1) compared estimated and actual costs for recently completed courthouse projects and determined what information GSA provided to Congress on changes to proposed courthouse projects, (2) identified factors that contributed to differences between the estimated and actual costs of seven projects selected for detailed review, and (3) identified strategies that were used to help control the costs of the seven selected projects.
What GAO Found
The actual costs of courthouse construction projects exceeded the estimated costs submitted to Congress at the design and construction phases by an average of 17 percent and 5 percent, respectively, and the reasons for the cost changes were not consistently explained. The actual costs were closer to the estimates provided at the construction phase, but the actual cost still varied widely from the estimate for some projects. Both the estimated cost and the proposed building size often changed between the two funding requests. GSA did not always indicate that changes had occurred or explain the reasons for the changes. Including this information would be consistent with leading practices in capital decision making. For the seven projects GAO reviewed in detail, most cost changes resulted from changes to the project's scope or from postponing the start of construction. For example, scope changes called for by security requirements and revisions to the U.S. Marshals Service's Design Guide increased the costs of some projects. Postponing the start of construction also increased costs because of inflation and changes in local market conditions. Factors that led to postponing construction included difficulties with site acquisition and GSA receiving funding later than anticipated. GSA used several strategies to help reduce or control costs for the seven projects, including value engineering, modified contracting methods, and involving tenant agencies. Value engineering was used during design on all projects, and in some cases, resulted in the use of less expensive materials to finish the courthouse interiors, but in other cases resulted in changes that could increase the long-term cost of operating the buildings. Some project managers used modified contracting methods to control costs by reducing the time between the design and construction phases. Project managers also used a variety of approaches for involving tenant agencies in decisions about the building design and informing them about the progress of the project. |
gao_GAO-15-710 | gao_GAO-15-710_0 | MAOs can initiate contracts with providers at any point during the year and can also terminate contracts with network providers at any point. For MA Network Adequacy, CMS Uses Robust Travel Time and Distance Criteria; Other Programs Include Provider Availability Standards
Through its network adequacy criteria, CMS requires that MAOs have enough providers in their networks to ensure that enrollees can access care within specific travel time and distance maximums. However, contracting with a certain number and type of providers may not be the same as true provider availability—measured by appointment wait times, providers accepting new patients, or how often a provider practices at a particular location. CMS Established County- Based Time and Distance Criteria for Determining Minimum Number of Providers Constituting an Adequate MA Network
Since 2011, CMS has defined an adequate MAO network as meeting two criteria: a minimum number of providers and maximum travel time and distance to those providers. One beneficiary advocacy group we interviewed described the MA network adequacy criteria as acceptable and appropriate parameters for the program. In addition, recent health care research we examined and representatives of medical associations we spoke with have suggested that provider availability is a key element for measuring access to care, which most network-based programs have broadly incorporated into federal standards, state standards, or both. CMS Applies Its Network Adequacy Criteria to Very Few MAO Provider Networks Each Year and Grants Permanent Exceptions to Its Criteria
One of CMS’s key MA oversight responsibilities is to ensure that MAOs maintain a network of providers sufficient to meet the needs of all their enrollees. However, CMS limits its annual application of its network adequacy criteria to only those provider networks in counties that MAOs propose to enter in the upcoming year—less than 1 percent of all networks. To facilitate its review of these networks, CMS has established standardized data collection via an automated system. CMS’s Reviews of MAO Network Adequacy Reach Less than 1 Percent of County-Based Provider Networks Each Year
While CMS has established criteria defining network adequacy, the agency does not ensure that every network is meeting its current requirements. For contract years 2013 through 2015, the agency reviewed over 9,000 proposed networks. Beyond these system- generated reports, CMS does little else to assess the accuracy of the HSD data that MAOs submit. However, CMS does not check the HSD data against other data sources to identify inconsistencies and other indications of error. Because a plan’s network providers and enrollees change from year to year, the lack of regular review means CMS cannot be assured that MAO networks continue to be adequate, providing sufficient access for enrollees. CMS Relies on Complaints Reported to the Agency to Identify Network Adequacy Issues Not Disclosed by MAOs
CMS relies on complaints it receives to identify any problems related to network changes that are not identified through MAO self-disclosure, but does not routinely review complaints made to MAOs directly or data on out-of-network service utilization. CMS Has Not Set Information Requirements for Notices MAOs Send to Enrollees Regarding Provider Terminations and Options for Care
CMS requires that MAOs make a good faith effort to give enrollees advance written notice when a provider contract is terminated, but has not established information requirements for those notices. Yet, the rules and processes the agency has put in place— which lack certain elements used in other managed care programs and outlined in federal internal controls—cannot reasonably ensure that MAO networks continue to meet the needs of MA enrollees. As a result, provider networks may appear to regulators and beneficiaries as more robust than they actually are if not all providers are open for business. Unless CMS verifies provider information submitted by MAOs and periodically requires evidence of compliance, for example every 3 years, the agency cannot be confident that MAOs are meeting network adequacy criteria. Also, unlike some beneficiary communication and plan marketing materials, MAO notification letters are not subject to any minimum information requirements. Without greater standardization, the agency cannot ensure that MAO communications are clear, accurate, and complete, and MA enrollees remain at risk of receiving potentially confusing information. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve its oversight of network adequacy in MA, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS augment MA network adequacy criteria to address provider verify provider information submitted by MAOs to ensure validity of the Health Services Delivery data; expand network adequacy reviews by requiring that all MAOs periodically submit their networks for assessment against current Medicare requirements; and set minimum requirements for MAO letters notifying enrollees of provider terminations and require MAOs to submit sample letters to CMS for review. HHS concurred with our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
MAOs contract with a network of providers to manage health care delivery to their enrollees. MAOs can initiate or terminate contracts with providers at any time for any reason. Recently, some MAOs have been narrowing their provider networks, prompting concerns about ensuring enrollee access to care and CMS's oversight of MAO compliance with network adequacy criteria.
GAO was asked to review how CMS ensures adequate access to care for MA enrollees. This report examines (1) how CMS defines network adequacy and how its criteria compares with other programs, (2) how and when CMS applies its criteria, (3) the extent to which CMS conducts ongoing monitoring of MAO networks, and (4) how CMS ensures that MAOs inform beneficiaries about terminations. GAO reviewed CMS and other guidance on network adequacy, federal regulations, and standards for internal control. GAO also interviewed CMS officials and representatives of medical associations and beneficiary advocacy groups, and analyzed CMS data on oversight of MAO provider networks for contract years 2013 through 2015.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsible for overseeing the Medicare Advantage (MA) program—Medicare's private plan alternative. Since 2011, CMS has defined an adequate MA provider network as meeting two criteria: a minimum number of providers and maximum travel time and distance to those providers. To reflect local conditions, the requirements are specific to different county types and a range of provider types. However, the MA criteria do not reflect aspects of provider availability, such as how often a provider practices at a given location. In contrast, other network-based health programs use provider availability measures to assess network adequacy. For example, federal Medicaid managed care rules address providers' ability to accept new patients and TRICARE criteria address appointment wait times for active duty servicemembers. Without taking availability into account, as is done in some other programs, MA provider networks may appear to CMS and beneficiaries as more robust than they actually are.
CMS applies its network adequacy criteria narrowly. Rather than assessing all county-based provider networks against its criteria, CMS limits its annual application of the criteria to provider networks in counties that MA organizations (MAO)—private organizations that offer one or more health benefit plans—propose to enter in the upcoming year. From 2013 through 2015, CMS's reviews accounted for less than 1 percent of all networks. To facilitate its review of these networks, CMS has established standardized data collection via an automated system. However, CMS does little to assess the accuracy of the network data in applications MAOs submit, even though the submissions contain the same data elements as in provider directories, which have been shown to be inaccurate in a number of government and private studies. Until CMS takes steps to verify MAO provider information, as outlined in federal internal control standards, the agency cannot be confident that MAOs meet network adequacy criteria.
For established provider networks, CMS does not require MAOs to routinely submit updated network information for review, but may learn of any adequacy issues through its broader oversight of MAOs. CMS recently required that MAOs disclose efforts to significantly narrow provider networks, allowing MAOs to determine when such disclosure is necessary. CMS also relies on complaints it receives to identify any problems related to network changes that are not otherwise identified. However, contrary to internal control standards, CMS does not measure ongoing MAO networks against its current MA criteria. Because a plan's providers may change at any time, CMS cannot be assured that networks continue to be adequate and provide sufficient access for enrollees until the agency collects evidence of compliance on a regular basis.
While CMS requires that MAOs give enrollees advance notice when a provider contract is terminated, the agency has not established information requirements for those notices and does not review sample notices sent to enrollees. This lack of scrutiny appears inconsistent with the agency's oversight of other Medicare beneficiary communications and with internal controls. Without a minimum set of required information elements and a check on adherence to them, the agency cannot ensure that MAO communications are clear, accurate, and consistent.
What GAO Recommends
The Administrator of CMS should augment oversight of MA networks to address provider availability, verify provider information submitted by MAOs, conduct more periodic reviews of MAO network information, and set minimum information requirements for MAO enrollee notification letters. HHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-589T | gao_GAO-07-589T_0 | DOD and VA Have Taken Actions to Facilitate the Transfer of Servicemembers but Experienced Problems in Exchanging Health Care Information
In our June 2006 report, we found that DOD and VA had taken actions to facilitate the transition of medical and rehabilitative care for seriously injured servicemembers who were being transferred from MTFs to PRCs. DOD and VA reported that as of December 2005 two of the four PRCs had real-time access to the electronic medical records maintained at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and only one of the two also had access to the records at the National Naval Medical Center. According to PRC officials, obtaining additional medical information in this way, rather than electronically, is very time consuming and often requires multiple phone calls and faxes. DOD was concerned that VA’s efforts may conflict with the military’s retention goals. While VA tries to prepare servicemembers for a transition to civilian life, VA’s outreach process may overlap with DOD’s process for evaluating servicemembers for a possible return to duty. In our report, we concluded that instead of working at cross purposes to DOD goals, VA’s early intervention efforts could facilitate servicemembers’ return to the same or a different military occupation, or to a civilian occupation if the servicemembers were not able to remain in the military. In this regard, the prospect for early intervention with vocational rehabilitation presents both a challenge and an opportunity for DOD and VA to collaborate to provide better outcomes for seriously injured servicemembers. DOD Screens Servicemembers for PTSD after Deployment, but DOD and VA Face Challenges Ensuring Further PTSD Services
In our May 2006 report, we described DOD’s efforts to identify and facilitate care for OEF/OIF servicemembers who may be at risk for PTSD. DOD health care providers review completed questionnaires, conduct face-to-face interviews with servicemembers, and use their clinical judgment in determining which servicemembers need referrals for further mental health evaluations. Using data provided by DOD, we found that 22 percent, or 2,029, of the 9,145 OEF/OIF servicemembers in our review who may have been at risk for developing PTSD were referred by DOD health care providers for further mental health evaluations. According to DOD officials, not all of the OEF/OIF servicemembers with three or four positive responses on the screening questionnaire need referrals. However, at the time of our review DOD had not identified the factors its health care providers used to determine which OEF/OIF servicemembers needed referrals. Although OEF/OIF servicemembers may obtain mental health evaluations or treatment for PTSD through VA when they transition to veteran status, VA may face a challenge in meeting the demand for PTSD services. As a result, VA medical facility officials estimated that follow-up appointments for veterans receiving care for PTSD could be delayed. VA officials estimated the delays to be up to 90 days. Problems Related to Military Pay Have Resulted in Debt and Other Hardships for Hundreds of Sick and Injured Servicemembers
As discussed in our April 2006 testimony, problems related to military pay have resulted in overpayments and debt for hundreds of sick and injured servicemembers. We found that hundreds of battle-injured servicemembers were pursued for repayment of military debts through no fault of their own, including at least 74 servicemembers whose debts had been reported to credit bureaus and private collections agencies. In our 2005 testimony about Army National Guard and Reserve servicemembers, we found that poorly defined requirements and processes for extending injured and ill reserve component servicemembers on active duty have caused servicemembers to be inappropriately dropped from active duty. For some, this has led to significant gaps in pay and health insurance, which has created financial hardships for these servicemembers and their families. VA and DOD Health Care: Efforts to Provide Seamless Transition of Care for OEF and OIF Servicemembers and Veterans. VA and Defense Health Care: More Information Needed to Determine If VA Can Meet an Increase in Demand for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of March 1, 2007, over 24,000 servicemembers have been wounded in action since the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), according to the Department of Defense (DOD). GAO work has shown that servicemembers injured in combat face an array of significant medical and financial challenges as they begin their recovery process in the health care systems of DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). GAO was asked to discuss concerns regarding DOD and VA efforts to provide medical care and rehabilitative services for servicemembers who have been injured during OEF and OIF. This testimony addresses (1) the transition of care for seriously injured servicemembers who are transferred between DOD and VA medical facilities, (2) DOD's and VA's efforts to provide early intervention for rehabilitation for seriously injured servicemembers, (3) DOD's efforts to screen servicemembers at risk for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and whether VA can meet the demand for PTSD services, and (4) the impact of problems related to military pay on injured servicemembers and their families. This testimony is based on GAO work issued from 2004 through 2006 on the conditions facing OEF/OIF servicemembers at the time the audit work was completed.
What GAO Found
Despite coordinated efforts, DOD and VA have had problems sharing medical records for servicemembers transferred from DOD to VA medical facilities. GAO reported in 2006 that two VA facilities lacked real-time access to electronic medical records at DOD facilities. To obtain additional medical information, facilities exchanged information by means of a time-consuming process resulting in multiple faxes and phone calls. In 2005, GAO reported that VA and DOD collaboration is important for providing early intervention for rehabilitation. VA has taken steps to initiate early intervention efforts, which could facilitate servicemembers' return to duty or to a civilian occupation if the servicemembers were unable to remain in the military. However, according to DOD, VA's outreach process may overlap with DOD's process for evaluating servicemembers for a possible return to duty. DOD was also concerned that VA's efforts may conflict with the military's retention goals. In this regard, DOD and VA face both a challenge and an opportunity to collaborate to provide better outcomes for seriously injured servicemembers. DOD screens servicemembers for PTSD but, as GAO reported in 2006, it cannot ensure that further mental health evaluations occur. DOD health care providers review questionnaires, interview servicemembers, and use clinical judgment in determining the need for further mental health evaluations. However, GAO found that 22 percent of the OEF/OIF servicemembers in GAO's review who may have been at risk for developing PTSD were referred by DOD health care providers for further evaluations. According to DOD officials, not all of the servicemembers at risk will need referrals. However, at the time of GAO's review DOD had not identified the factors its health care providers used to determine which OEF/OIF servicemembers needed referrals. Although OEF/OIF servicemembers may obtain mental health evaluations or treatment for PTSD through VA, VA may face a challenge in meeting the demand for PTSD services. VA officials estimated that follow-up appointments for veterans receiving care for PTSD may be delayed up to 90 days. GAO's 2006 testimony pointed out problems related to military pay have resulted in debt and other hardships for hundreds of sick and injured servicemembers. Some servicemembers were pursued for repayment of military debts through no fault of their own. As a result, servicemembers have been reported to credit bureaus and private collections agencies, been prevented from getting loans, gone months without paychecks, and sent into financial crisis. In a 2005 testimony GAO reported that poorly defined requirements and processes for extending the active duty of injured and ill reserve component servicemembers have caused them to be inappropriately dropped from active duty, leading to significant gaps in pay and health insurance for some servicemembers and their families. |
gao_GAO-06-559T | gao_GAO-06-559T_0 | A well- defined, comprehensive strategic plan for the NCR is essential for assuring that the region is prepared for the risks it faces. One of the ONCRC mandates is to coordinate with federal, state, local, and regional agencies and the private sector in NCR on terrorism preparedness to ensure adequate planning, information sharing, training, and execution of domestic preparedness activities among these agencies and entities. NCR Has Not Produced a Strategic Plan
Although work has continued on a NCR strategic plan for the past 2 years, a completed plan is not yet available to guide decision making such as assessment of NCR’s strategic priorities and funding needs and aid for NCR jurisdictions in ascertaining how the NCR strategic plan complements their individual or combined efforts. In May 2004, we recommended that the Secretary of DHS work with the NCR jurisdictions to develop a coordinated strategic plan to establish goals and priorities to enhance first responder capacities that can be used to guide the use of federal emergency preparedness funds, and the department agreed to implement this recommendation. These documents include a November 18, 2005, NCR Plenary Session PowerPoint presentation containing information on NCR strategic goals, objectives, and initiatives; a February 1, 2006, National Capital Region Target Capabilities and NCR Projects Work Book; the March 2, 2006, District of Columbia and National Capital Region Fiscal Year 2006 Homeland Security Grant Application Program and Capability Enhancement Plan; the March 2, 2006, National Capital Region Initiatives; and the Fiscal Year 2006 NCR Homeland Security Grant Program Funding Request Investment Justification, submitted to DHS in March 2006. According to ONCRC officials, a complete strategic plan is awaiting integration of additional information that in some cases is not yet complete. NCR Strategic Planning Should Reflect Both National and Regional Priorities and Needs
NCR strategic planning should reflect both national and regional priorities and needs. The other four documents that ONCRC represents as constituting the NCR strategic plan were developed in response to federal requirements under the National Preparedness Goal and to support the NCR’s federal funding application. The NCR’s strategic plan should provide the framework for guiding the integration of DHS requirements into the NCR’s overall efforts. In earlier work we have identified characteristics that we consider to be desirable for a national strategy that may be useful for a regional approach to homeland security strategic planning. Our preliminary review indicates that as the ONCRC fleshes out the November 18 PowerPoint presentation into an initial, complete strategic plan, improvements might be made in (1) initiatives that will accomplish objectives under the strategic goals, (2) performance measures and targets that indicate how the initiatives will accomplish identified strategic goals, (3) milestones or time frames for initiative accomplishment, (4) information on the resources and investment for each initiative, and (5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination, and integration and implementation plans. However, the majority of the presentation’s performance measures and targets are process- or output-oriented and may not match the desired result of the initiative. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress asked GAO to provide comments on the National Capital Region's (NCR) strategic plan. GAO reported on NCR strategic planning, among other issues, in May 2004 and September 2004, testified before the House Committee on Government Reform in June 2004, and testified before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia in July 2005. In this testimony, we addressed completion of the NCR strategic plan, national and regional priorities, and strengthening any plan that is developed.
What GAO Found
Among its other statutory responsibilities, the Office of National Capital Region Coordination is charged with coordinating with NCR agencies and other entities to ensure adequate planning, information sharing, training, and execution of domestic preparedness activities among these agencies and entities. In May 2004 and again in July 2005, we recommended that the ONCRC complete a regional strategic plan to establish goals and priorities for enhancing first responder capacities that could be used to guide the effective use of federal funds. Although work has continued on a NCR strategic plan for the past 2 years, a completed plan is not yet available. According to NCR officials, completion of the plan requires integrating information and analyses from other documents completed or nearly completed, and a plan may not be available before September or October of 2006. The NCR's strategic planning should reflect both national and regional priorities and needs. The majority of the individual documents ONCRC provided to us as representing components for its strategic plan were developed in response to Department of Homeland Security fiscal year 2006 grant guidance to support the NCR's fiscal year 2006 grant application. It is appropriate and necessary that the NCR address national priorities, but the NCR's strategic plan should not be primarily driven by these requirements. It should integrate national and regional priorities and needs. A well-defined, comprehensive strategic plan for the NCR is essential for assuring that the region is prepared for the risks it faces. A November 18, 2005, NCR PowerPoint presentation describes the NCR's vision, mission, goals, objectives, and priority initiatives. That presentation includes some elements of a good strategic plan, including some performance measures, target dates, and cost estimates. A completed NCR strategic plan should build on the current elements that the NCR has developed and strengthen others based on the desirable characteristics of a national strategy that may also be useful for a regional approach to homeland security strategic planning. As it completes its strategic plan, the NCR could focus on strengthening (1) initiatives that will accomplish objectives under the NCR strategic goals, (2) performance measures and targets that indicate how the initiatives will accomplish identified strategic goals, (3) milestones or timeframes for initiative accomplishment, (4) information on the resources and investments for each initiative, and (5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination, and integration and implementation plans. |
gao_GAO-05-869 | gao_GAO-05-869_0 | While the agencies’ grazing programs are similar in that they offer private ranchers access to federal lands and vegetation for their livestock, agencies manage their grazing programs under different authorities and for different purposes. The agency uses grazing as a tool to manage habitat. Federal Agencies Spent at Least $144 Million on Grazing Activities, Although Some Agencies Do Not Track Expenditures for Grazing on Federal Lands
Federal agencies spent at least $144.3 million in direct and indirect expenditures to support grazing activities on federal lands in fiscal year 2004. Federal Agencies Collected About $21 Million in Grazing Receipts in Fiscal Year 2004—Less Than One-Sixth of the Expenditures Needed to Manage Grazing
The 10 federal agencies collected a total of about $21 million from fees charged for their grazing permits and leases in fiscal year 2004—less than one-sixth of the expenditures needed to manage grazing; the largest amount of funds, $17.5 million, was collected by BLM and the Forest Service. BLM and the Forest Service Collected About $17.5 Million in Grazing Receipts in Fiscal Year 2004, Distributed About $4.8 Million to States and Counties, and Deposited About $3.7 Million to the General Fund of the Treasury and Almost $8.8 Million to Range Improvement Funds
BLM and the Forest Service collected about $17.5 million, or 83 percent, of all grazing receipts federal agencies collected in fiscal year 2004. Grazing Fees Charged by Federal Agencies, Western States, and Private Ranchers Varied Widely, Depending on the Purpose of the Fee and the Approach Taken to Set It
Fees charged in 2004 by the 10 federal agencies, as well as state land agencies and private ranchers, varied widely, depending on the purpose for which the fees were established and the approach to setting the fee. As a result, the fee produced by the formula is generally lower than the fees charged by the other agencies, states, and private ranchers. In effect, the fee is adjusted to reflect ranchers’ ability to pay. Of the 15 state agencies charging fees, 6 agencies used competitive methods to determine the fair market value of their lands in fiscal year 2004; 6 used appraised prices or formulas to estimate the fair market value of their lands; and 3 used only formulas that do not start with a market price. The Purpose of the BLM and the Forest Service Fee in Western States Is Not to Recover Expenditures or to Charge Market Value; Different Purposes Would Result in Different Fees
As we noted in our 1991 report on the BLM and Forest Service grazing fee, fees can vary depending on the purposes for which they are charged. If the purpose of the fee were to recover expenditures and if each agency were to charge a fee that recovered its expenditures, BLM would have had to charge up to $7.64 per AUM, and the Forest Service would have had to charge up to $12.26 per AUM in 2004, according to our analysis of the agencies’ estimated expenditures and the number of AUMs billed (7.6 million AUMs for BLM and 6.1 million AUMs for the Forest Service). DOE also did not provide official written comments but provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Commerce and Justice did not have comments on the draft report. In general, the department stated that the report accurately recognizes that differences in resource conditions and legal requirements can cause variations in livestock grazing fees and pointed out the difficulty in capturing the costs of grazing programs. The Forest Service neither agreed nor disagreed with the findings in the report. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We provided information on the (1) extent of livestock grazing on, and program purposes for, land managed by 10 federal agencies; (2) amount spent in fiscal year 2004 by these agencies and other federal agencies that have grazing-related activities, to manage livestock grazing on public lands; (3) total receipts collected for grazing privileges by the 10 federal agencies with grazing programs and the amounts disbursed to counties, states, or the federal government; and (4) grazing fees charged by the 10 federal agencies, western states, and private ranchers, and the reasons for any differences among the fees. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation); the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Forest Service; the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Army, Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), Air Force and Navy; and the Department of Energy (DOE). To determine the extent of grazing on land managed by the agencies, we obtained agency data for 2004 on acres and animal unit months (AUM). Current Fee for BLM’s and the Forest Service’s Western States
In 2004, the grazing fee for lands managed by BLM and the Forest Service’s 16 western states was $1.43 per AUM—or the amount of forage needed to sustain a cow and her calf for 30 days. The department manages more than 9.3 million acres of land, of which more than 8.3 million acres were allocated for grazing in fiscal year 2004. The board sets the grazing fee using a formula based on livestock market factors. GAO/AIMD-98-11. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ranchers pay a fee to graze their livestock on federal land. Grazing occurs primarily on federal land located in the western states managed by 10 federal agencies. Generally, the fee is based on animal unit months (AUM)--the amount of forage that a cow and her calf can eat in 1 month. For most federal land, the fee per AUM is established by a formula. Advocates argue that grazing uses federal land productively and that the grazing fee is fair. Opponents argue that grazing damages public resources and that grazing fees are too low. GAO was asked to determine the (1) extent of, and purposes for, grazing in fiscal year 2004 on lands 10 federal agencies manage; (2) amount federal agencies spent in fiscal year 2004 to manage grazing; (3) total grazing receipts the 10 agencies collected in fiscal year 2004 and amounts disbursed; and (4) fees charged in 2004 by the 10 agencies, western states, and ranchers, and reasons for any differences. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of the Interior and the Forest Service neither agreed nor disagreed with the findings. The Forest Service stated that the report accurately described the purpose of the grazing fee. The Army and Air Force and the Department of Energy provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The departments of Commerce and of Justice responded that they did not have comments.
What GAO Found
The 10 federal agencies managed more than 22.6 million AUMs on about 235 million acres of federal lands for grazing and land management in fiscal year 2004. Of this total, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service managed more than 98 percent of the lands used for grazing. The agencies manage their grazing programs under different authorities and for different purposes. For BLM lands and western Forest Service lands, grazing is a major program; the eight other agencies generally use grazing as a tool to achieve their primary land management goals. In fiscal year 2004, federal agencies spent a total of at least $144 million. The 10 federal agencies spent at least $135.9 million, with the Forest Service and BLM accounting for the majority. Other federal agencies have grazing-related activities, such as pest control, and spent at least $8.4 million in fiscal year 2004. The 10 federal agencies' grazing fees generated about $21 million in fiscal year 2004--less than one-sixth of the expenditures to manage grazing. Of that amount, the agencies distributed about $5.7 million to states and counties in which grazing occurred, returned about $3.8 million to the Treasury, and deposited at least $11.7 million in separate Treasury accounts to help pay for agency programs, among other things. The amounts each agency distributed varied, depending on the agencies' differing authorities. Fees charged in 2004 by the 10 federal agencies, as well as state land agencies and private ranchers, vary widely. The grazing fee BLM and the Forest Service charge, which was $1.43 per AUM in 2004, is established by formula and is generally much lower than the fees charged by the other federal agencies, states, and private ranchers. The other agencies, states, and ranchers generally established fees to obtain the market value of the forage. The formula used to calculate the BLM and Forest Service grazing fee incorporates ranchers' ability to pay; therefore the current purpose of the fee is not primarily to recover the agencies' expenditures or to capture the fair market value of forage. As a result, BLM's and the Forest Service's grazing receipts fell short of their expenditures on grazing in fiscal year 2004 by almost $115 million. The BLM and Forest Service fee also decreased by 40 percent from 1980 to 2004, while grazing fees charged by private ranchers increased by 78 percent for the same period. If the purpose of the fee were to recover expenditures, BLM and the Forest Service would have had to charge $7.64 and $12.26 per AUM, respectively; alternately, if the purpose were to gain a fair market value, the agencies' fees would vary depending on the market. Differences in resources and legal requirements can cause fees to vary; however, the approaches used by other agencies could close the gap in expenditures and receipts or more closely align BLM and Forest Service fees with market prices. The purpose of the grazing fee is, ultimately, for the Congress to determine. |
gao_GAO-06-645 | gao_GAO-06-645_0 | Background
In September 2004, four major hurricanes and storms, including Ivan and Jeanne, caused extensive damage in the Caribbean, particularly in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti. U.S. However, although USAID reduced targets, in part because of cost increases for these projects in all three countries, USAID contractors did not complete many of them by December 31, 2005—in particular, new housing construction—and required extensions to finish these projects. USAID Expended Majority of Recovery Funds within 1 Year
As of December 31, 2005, USAID had expended approximately 77 percent of the $92.4 million that it allocated for recovery efforts in the three countries. In addition, USAID contractors encountered various construction-related challenges, such as shortages of materials and labor, and difficulty in fulfilling USAID requirements. Severe Weather Delayed Program Activities in Jamaica and Haiti
Hurricanes and heavy rains in 2005 affected the progress of USAID reconstruction and recovery activities in Jamaica and Haiti. Coordination challenges in Grenada. In addition, the agency has not issued guidance that incorporates lessons learned from designing and implementing its prior recovery and reconstruction programs. However, our recent interviews with USAID staff and contractors, as well as previous GAO work, suggests that in agreeing to the December 31, 2005, deadline, USAID faced a trade-off in trying to complete a broad spectrum of activities within the 1-year time frame and ensure that activities supported through these programs have the intended impact in helping beneficiaries recover, rebuild, and find jobs in the postdisaster environment and can be sustained by host government staff after the programs end. USAID Did Not Implement Some Prior Staffing Recommendations and Encountered Challenges Related to Use of Management Firm
USAID did not adopt several prior recommendations that could have helped it to more rapidly hire and transfer staff in response to recovery and reconstruction needs, and as a result of hiring Wingerts Consulting to quickly staff the Hurricane Ivan Program in Grenada and Jamaica, the agency encountered additional challenges. According to USAID’s Regional Inspector General, USAID staff, and contractors, the agency’s decision to hire Wingerts Consulting to oversee the program in Grenada and Jamaica led to additional challenges. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better facilitate USAID’s ability to design and implement future disaster recovery programs and address its previously documented recurring staffing challenges, we recommend that the USAID Administrator take the following two actions: Develop disaster recovery and reconstruction program guidance that incorporates lessons learned from the Hurricane Ivan Recovery and Reconstruction Program and Tropical Storm Jeanne Recovery Program as well as previous disaster recovery programs. In this report, we (1) review the recovery and reconstruction activities in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, including the status of activities as of December 31, 2005; (2) identify factors that affected USAID’s ability to implement and complete the programs within the 1-year time frame; and (3) assess USAID’s use of guidance and application of lessons learned from similar previous programs as well as its efforts to draw lessons from the current programs. This approach was adopted in the Caribbean programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan and Tropical Storm Jeanne passed through the Caribbean, taking lives and causing widespread damage in several countries. After initial U.S. emergency relief, in October 2004 Congress appropriated $100 million in supplemental funding, primarily for Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti, which were significantly affected. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), leader of the U.S. recovery programs, agreed, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, to complete the programs by December 31, 2005, giving the agency a 1-year time frame. GAO was asked to (1) review the nature and status of the programs in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti as of December 31, 2005; (2) identify factors that affected the programs' progress; and (3) assess USAID's use of guidance and lessons learned from previous similar programs and efforts to draw lessons from the current programs.
What GAO Found
As of December 31, 2005, USAID had spent about 77 percent of funds allocated for assistance in Grenada, Jamaica, and Haiti and completed many disaster recovery activities, such as providing business and agriculture grants. However, the agency significantly reduced its targets for building and repairing houses, in part because of cost increases, and granted contractors extensions to complete some of these projects. Severe weather delayed the progress of recovery activities in Jamaica and Haiti--for example, two hurricanes in the summer of 2005 disrupted Jamaican housing repairs. In addition, difficulty coordinating activities with the Grenadian and Jamaican governments hampered housing construction. Further, other construction-related challenges--for example, shortages of cement--delayed projects in Grenada and Jamaica. Finally, frequent security problems in Haiti hindered contractors' progress. USAID has not issued guidance that incorporates lessons learned from previous recovery and reconstruction programs, such as ways to mitigate challenges commonly faced in rebuilding after disasters. USAID staff inexperienced with disaster recovery efforts said that this made it difficult to design and implement the programs. Further, in agreeing to complete the programs within 1 year, USAID faced challenges in designing a broad spectrum of activities that would help rebuild residents' lives and that could be sustained after the programs ended. In addition, the agency did not adopt recommendations from GAO and USAID reviews of past recovery programs that could have helped it more rapidly hire and transfer staff for the Caribbean programs. Although the agency contracted with a management firm to quickly staff its program in Grenada and Jamaica, this led to additional challenges, such as confusion about the management firm's roles and responsibilities in relation to USAID staff and other contractors. USAID staff and contractors are recording lessons learned from the programs in each country. |
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