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gao_T-NSIAD-96-130 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-130_0 | Army National Guard Has Excess Combat Forces While Shortages Continue to Exist in Support Forces
Last week we reported that the Army National Guard’s combat forces far exceed projected requirements for two major regional conflicts. Combat Brigades’ Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Army adopted a new training strategy that was designed to prepare combat brigades to deploy within 90 days of mobilization. The adviser program’s efforts to improve training readiness were limited by factors such as (1) an ambiguous definition of the advisers’ role; (2) poor communication between the active Army, advisers, brigades, and other National Guard officials, causing confusion and disagreement over training goals; and (3) difficult working relationships. We also reported that it was highly uncertain whether the Guard’s mechanized infantry and armor brigades could be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization. Dedicated Continental Air Defense Is No Longer Needed
The continental air defense mission evolved during the Cold War to detect and intercept Soviet bombers attacking North America via the North Pole. The Air Force reduced its dedicated Air National Guard force from 180 to 150 aircraft. On the basis of a force of 150 aircraft, the office estimated a total savings of about $1.8 billion from fiscal years 1997 through 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the readiness of armed forces reserve components.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) reserve components provided crucial support and combat functions in the Persian Gulf War and in various peacekeeping operations; (2) the Army National Guard's combat forces far exceed projected force requirements for two major regional conflicts, while the Army has critical shortages in support functions; (3) none of the enhanced brigades that it reviewed achieved the training proficiency that the Army required for deployment within 90 days of mobilization; (4) active-duty advisers assigned to National Guard brigades were limited by an ambiguous definition of their role, poor management communication, and difficult working relationships; (5) it is uncertain that the Guard's mechanized infantry and armor brigades could deploy within 90 days after mobilization; (6) while it has found that a dedicated continental air defense force is no longer necessary to defend North America against a long-range air threat, the Air Force has only reduced its dedicated Air National Guard force for this mission from 180 aircraft to 150 aircraft; and (7) eliminating continental air defense units and assigning their missions to existing units could save $1.8 billion from fiscal years 1997 through 2000. |
gao_GGD-97-116 | gao_GGD-97-116_0 | Our intention in selecting this sample was to include departments and independent agencies that (1) employed a large number of federal civilian personnel, (2) varied in the nature and extent of their experience with flexiplace, and (3) permitted examination of any variances in flexiplace policies and efforts to promote flexiplace. Although flexiplace is a management option, OPM recognized that under 5 U.S.C. In response to the Climate Change Action Plan, the PMC developed the National Telecommuting Initiative Action Plan in January 1996. The plan, developed by an Interagency Telecommuting Working Group cochaired by DOT and GSA, calls for increasing the number of federal telecommuters to 60,000 by the end of fiscal year 1998. This goal represents about 3 percent of the federal civilian workforce, a percentage roughly equivalent to conservative estimates of participation in the private sector. Some policies limited participation to employees who were medically disabled or in a specific occupation. Of the 21 policies we reviewed, 14 applied to personnel either within (1) headquarters, (2) a specific federal region, (3) more than one federal region, or (4) specific DOD locations. Policy Limitations Affected Flexiplace Participation
Although about 47,000 (47 percent) of the nearly 99,100 employees at the 26 locations we visited were covered by formal flexiplace policies, about 28,000 of these employees were in effect excluded from participation because of limitations within policies. Flexiplace Use Appears to Have Increased
A survey completed in July 1996 by the PMC’s Interagency Telecommuting Working Group indicated that telecommuting had increased since the completion of the flexiplace pilot in 1993. According to agency officials, employees reported that writing, reading, telephoning, and computer work were the most common tasks accomplished while on flexiplace. Other Barriers to Implementing Flexiplace Also Cited by Agency Officials
Although never cited as the largest barrier to implementing flexiplace, a lack of adequate equipment was identified as a barrier by 12 of the 28 agency officials and 4 of the 9 union representatives we interviewed. Other jobs, such as air traffic controller and janitor, were site-dependent and could not be performed at alternative work sites. Five of the agency officials and one of the union representatives we interviewed said that the handling of sensitive data was a barrier. Few Operational Difficulties Were Attributed to Flexiplace
Agency officials reported few operational difficulties as a result of flexiplace arrangements. Specifically, we agreed to (1) describe federal efforts to promote flexiplace; (2) review federal agencies’ policies and the extent to which they permit flexiplace; (3) determine the extent to which federal employees have used flexiplace, as well as the characteristics of these employees and the work they have done under flexiplace; (4) ascertain whether agencies and federal employees’ unions have identified any barriers that inhibit flexiplace implementation; and (5) determine whether agencies believe that flexiplace has caused any operational difficulties, including abuse of flexiplace. We chose GSA because of its lead role in promoting flexiplace through establishing telecenters, and we selected DOT because it promoted flexiplace to reduce transportation-associated pollution. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the implementation of flexiplace since the completion of the pilot, focusing on: (1) federal efforts to promote flexiplace; (2) federal agencies' policies and the extent to which they permit flexiplace; (3) the extent to which federal employees have used flexiplace, as well as the characteristics of these employees and the work they have done under flexiplace; (4) whether agencies and federal employees' unions have identified any barriers that inhibit flexiplace implementation; and (5) whether agencies believe that flexiplace has caused operational difficulties, including abuse of flexiplace.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), General Services Administration (GSA), and Department of Transportation (DOT) have assumed lead roles in promoting flexiplace; (2) in addition, DOT and GSA provide leadership for an interagency working group formed as part of the National Telecommuting Initiative Action Plan in January 1996; (3) a goal of the plan is to increase the number of federal flexiplace participants by the end of fiscal year 1998 to 60,000 or about 3 percent of the federal civilian workforce, a percentage roughly equivalent to conservative estimates of telecommuting in the private sector; (4) DOT also promotes flexiplace and distributes flexiplace literature to the general public as part of its effort to decrease transportation-associated congestion and pollution; (5) the 21 policies GAO reviewed varied in their coverage, generally applying to personnel within individual departmental and independent agencies, one or more federal regions, or specific Department of Defense locations; (6) because of limitations within these policies, however, about 28,000 of the employees covered by flexiplace policies were, in effect, excluded from flexiplace participation; (7) limitations restricted participation to the medically disabled or members of a certain occupation; (8) in contrast, despite the absence of formal policies at five locations GAO visited, some of the managers there permitted flexiplace; (9) flexiplace use appears to have increased since OPM's 1993 estimate of 3,000 to 4,000 participants; (10) a survey completed in July 1996 by the President's Management Council estimated that there were 9,000 telecommuting participants; (11) agency officials told GAO that most flexiplace participants' occupational categories were professional in nature, such as engineer, attorney, management and program analyst, and computer specialist; (12) according to agency officials, writing, reading, telephoning, and computer work were the most common tasks performed by flexiplace participants; (13) agency officials and union representatives identified management resistance as the greatest barrier to implementing flexiplace programs; (14) they also recognized that some jobs do not lend themselves to flexiplace arrangements and cited other barriers, such as a lack of computers at alternative work sites, the handling of sensitive data, employee reluctance or indifference with regard to participation, and the lack of a formal flexiplace policy; and (15) agency officials believed that few operational arose from flexiplace. |
gao_GAO-09-16 | gao_GAO-09-16_0 | To qualify for the 8(a) program, a firm must be at least 51 percent owned and controlled by an individual who meets SBA’s criteria of socially and economically disadvantaged. In a subsequent review, agency ratings showed improvement, with four agencies receiving the lowest rating. SBA Analyzes Such Factors as Prior-Year Goal Achievement of Agencies and Potential Impacts on Meeting Government-wide Goals to Set Agencies’ Contracting Goals
SBA is required to report on contracting goal achievements of federal agencies in an effort to meet the statutory government-wide goal of awarding 23 percent of contracting dollars to small businesses and goals established for four socioeconomic categories (see table 1). SBA Developed a Scorecard to Evaluate Small Business Contracting Efforts of Agencies
For fiscal year 2006, SBA began using a Small Business Procurement Scorecard to help monitor agencies’ small business contracting efforts, including plans and progress in meeting the goals, and to bring greater attention to goal achievement (see fig. 2). 3). Resource Constraints Limit Ability of SBA Staff to Advocate for, Review, and Monitor Small Business Contracting at Federal Agencies
Resource constraints limit the ability of SBA staff to carry out some of their core responsibilities. More specifically, PCRs review federal agency acquisitions and recommend small business set- asides; can dispute a procurement through informal or formal means with the agency’s procurement officials in instances where an agency does not accept the recommended set-aside; conduct surveillance reviews, which monitor small business contracting at recommend procurement strategies to federal agencies to maximize small business participation in federal contracts; and counsel and train small businesses on obtaining federal contracts. Furthermore, the SBA IG found in fiscal year 2006 that less than half of the 2,200 large prime contractors were monitored and only 24 percent of those monitored had been reviewed on-site. As a result, SBA has reduced assurance that PCRs and CMRs are ensuring that federal agencies increase their share of federal contracts for small business or are effectively monitoring contracting activity at the federal agencies. Second, SBA staff said that the recent emphasis on meeting the long-standing statutory requirement to complete annual reviews of 100 percent of 8(a) firms—which are time- and resource-intensive—has diminished their ability to conduct business development activities. Delays in completing annual reviews also could result in potentially noncompliant firms receiving contracts. SBA staff conduct surveillance reviews by reviewing contract files and interviewing agency officials. Further, SBA officials could not explain why reviews for the 8(a) program had not been conducted. As a result, SBA has reduced assurance that agencies have complied with procurement laws and regulations for 8(a) contracts. Consequently, some participants that are not adequately informed about the program’s purpose and requirements may have unrealistic expectations of the program and be unprepared to fulfill their responsibilities, such as providing documentation for annual reviews. However, SBA has not yet implemented changes that its IG recommended for the review process in 2006; notably, that the agency regularly conduct surveillance reviews at the federal agencies with which it has partnership agreements to ensure compliance with regulations for 8(a) contracting. As part of such an assessment, SBA could review the size of the 8(a) portfolio for all business development specialists and determine what mechanisms can be used to prioritize or redistribute their workload; in a timely manner, develop and implement its proposed plan for creating tools that would assist in the provision of business development assistance for 8(a) firms; and develop a timetable for planned changes to the termination process to ensure that staff monitoring 8(a) participants can carry out terminations from the program in a timely manner. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the actions the Small Business Administration (SBA) takes to set small business contracting goals and the extent to which federal agencies have achieved their small business goals in recent years, we reviewed pertinent legislation, guidance issued by SBA, our prior reports, and SBA’s Small Business Procurement Scorecard for fiscal years 2006 and 2008. We also analyzed the SBA field office directory for the six area offices and identified the number of procurement center representatives (PCR) and commercial market representatives (CMR) in the agency as of August 2008. To examine SBA’s overall administration of the 8(a) business development program, we reviewed and analyzed 8(a) program regulations, SBA’s procedures for administering the program, and previous SBA Inspector General (IG) reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration (SBA) helps small businesses gain access to federal contracting opportunities and helps socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses, known as 8(a) firms, by providing management and contracting assistance. SBA negotiates agency-specific goals to ensure that the federal government meets the statutory goal of awarding 23 percent of contract dollars to small businesses. GAO was asked to (1) describe how SBA sets small business contracting goals and the extent to which federal agencies met these goals; (2) examine the role of SBA staff in supporting small business contracting at selected federal agencies; and (3) examine SBA's overall administration of the 8(a) program. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed SBA guidance and SBA Inspector General (IG) reports, interviewed SBA and other federal officials, and conducted site visits and file reviews at four SBA locations.
What GAO Found
SBA reviews prior year goal achievement and other factors to set individual contracting goals necessary for federal agencies to achieve the governmentwide goal of awarding 23 percent of federal contract dollars to small businesses. Individual agency results varied in fiscal years 2000 through 2006, although the agencies collectively achieved or came close to the 23 percent goal. In fiscal year 2006, SBA began using a scorecard to help monitor agencies' small business contracting efforts. Of the 24 agencies rated, half received the lowest rating (for failing to meet at least two contracting goals and other criteria). SBA later reviewed agency progress in implementing small business procurement plans and many agencies improved their ratings. SBA staff advocate, review, and monitor small business contracting at federal agencies, but resource constraints have limited the ability of staff to fulfill these responsibilities. SBA's procurement center representatives (PCR) work with federal agencies by reviewing proposed acquisitions, recommending contract set-asides, and performing surveillance reviews (which monitor small business contracting at federal agencies). As of August 2008, SBA had 59 PCRs, with many responsible for multiple agencies. SBA has recognized that more PCRs are needed, but has not developed a formal plan to align staff resources with program objectives. Resource constraints also affected SBA's commercial market representatives (CMR), who monitor subcontracting plans. For fiscal year 2006, the SBA IG reported that CMRs monitored less than half of the 2,200 large prime contractors. These resource constraints reduced assurances that SBA can monitor contracting effectively. SBA's administration of the 8(a) business development program is challenged by several factors, including some participants not understanding the program's purpose and requirements, its staff's diminished ability to conduct business development activities, an inefficient process to terminate firms, and a lack of routine surveillance reviews specific to the program. While SBA has controls in place to determine if firms are eligible to enter the program, firms do not have to participate in an information session or complete an assessment that rates their suitability for the program. Thus, some firms may have entered the program with unrealistic expectations or not clearly understood program requirements. SBA officials said that an emphasis on completing annual reviews of 100 percent of 8(a) firms, which are time intensive, and an inefficient termination process for noncompliant 8(a) firms diminished the time its business development specialists had for providing business development assistance. Delays in terminating firms also could result in noncompliant firms obtaining contracts. Finally, in 2006, the SBA IG recommended that SBA regularly conduct surveillance reviews for the 8(a) program. However, SBA has not yet implemented this recommendation. As a result, SBA has reduced assurances that agencies have complied with monitoring requirements for the 8(a) program. |
gao_GAO-06-66 | gao_GAO-06-66_0 | Our probability sample of 93 contracts was drawn from a total of 597 DOD award- and incentive-fee contracts that were active from fiscal years 1999 through 2003 and had at least one contract action coded as cost-plus-award-fee, cost-plus-incentive-fee, fixed-price award-fee, or fixed-price-incentive valued at $10 million or more during that time. Award and Incentive Fees Are Not an Effective Tool for Achieving DOD’s Desired Acquisition Outcomes
DOD has not structured and implemented award-fee contracts in a way that effectively motivates contractors to improve performance and achieve acquisition outcomes. DOD practices—such as routinely paying its contractors nearly all of the available award fee, amounting to billions of dollars, regardless of whether the acquisition outcomes fell short of, met, or exceeded expectations; rolling an estimated $669 million in unearned or withheld award fees to future evaluation periods; and paying a significant portion of the available fee for what award-fee plans describe as “acceptable, average, expected, good, or satisfactory” performance—all lessen the motivation for the contractor to strive for excellent performance. DOD may also be diluting the motivational effectiveness of award fees by paying significant amounts of fee for satisfactory performance. We found two notable examples in which DOD’s Missile Defense Agency attempted to hold contractors accountable for program outcomes. Other programs have utilized different fee strategies to focus the contractor’s attention on specific acquisition outcomes. However, contracting officials have stated that there are few mechanisms to share lessons learned and innovative practices outside the local level. According to DOD contracting and program officials, contractors overran or were expected to overrun the target price on 52 percent of the 27 incentive-fee contracts in our sample. In addition, DOD did not assess the results of the study. In the longer term, DOD can improve its use of award and incentive fees by (5) developing a mechanism for capturing award- and incentive-fee data within existing data systems, such as the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval system; (6) developing performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of award and incentive fees as a tool for improving contractor performance and achieving desired program outcomes; and (7) developing a mechanism to share proven incentive strategies for the acquisition of different types of products and services with contracting and program officials across DOD. However, given that the department paid out an estimated $8 billion in award fees on the contracts in our study population regardless of outcomes, we believe that a reasonable investment in ensuring that these funds are well-spent in the future is warranted. | Why GAO Did This Study
Collectively, the Department of Defense (DOD) gives its contractors the opportunity to earn billions of dollars through monetary incentives--known as award fees and incentive fees. These fees are intended to motivate excellent contractor performance in areas deemed critical to an acquisition program's success, with award fees being appropriate when contracting and program officials cannot devise objective incentive fee targets related to cost, technical performance, or schedule. GAO was asked to determine whether award and incentive fees have been used effectively as a tool for achieving DOD's desired acquisition outcomes. To do this, GAO selected a probability sample of 93 contracts from the study population of 597 DOD award- and incentive-fee contracts that were active and had at least one contract action valued at $10 million or more from fiscal year 1999 through 2003.
What GAO Found
The power of monetary incentives to motivate excellent contractor performance and improve acquisition outcomes is diluted by the way DOD structures and implements incentives. While there were two examples in our sample in which the Missile Defense Agency attempted to link award fees directly to desired acquisition outcomes, such as demonstrating a capability within an established schedule, award fees are generally not linked to acquisition outcomes. As a result, DOD has paid out an estimated $8 billion in award fees to date on the contracts in our study population, regardless of outcomes. The following selected programs show this disconnect. When DOD programs did not pay all of the available award fee, DOD gave contractors on an estimated 52 percent of award-fee contracts at least a second opportunity to earn an estimated $669 million in initially unearned or deferred fees. GAO believes these practices, along with paying significant amounts of fee for "acceptable, average, expected, good, or satisfactory" performance, undermine the effectiveness of fees as a motivational tool and marginalize their use in holding contractors accountable for acquisition outcomes. They also serve to waste taxpayer funds. Incentive fees provide a clearer link to acquisition outcomes; however, a majority of the 27 contracts with cost incentives that GAO reviewed failed or are projected to fail to complete the acquisition at or below the target price. Despite paying billions in fees, DOD has little evidence to support its belief that these fees improve contractor performance and acquisition outcomes. The department has not compiled data, conducted analyses, or developed performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of award and incentive fees. In addition, when contracts have utilized different fee strategies to focus the contractor's attention on specific acquisition outcomes, contracting officials have stated that DOD has few mechanisms to share lessons learned and innovative practices outside the local level. |
gao_GAO-02-947T | gao_GAO-02-947T_0 | While there are no federal requirements or standards specific to the operation of federal ombudsman offices, the Administrative Conference of the United States recommended in 1990 that the President and the Congress support federal agency initiatives to create and fund an external ombudsman in agencies with significant interaction with the public. In addition, several professional organizations have published relevant standards of practice for ombudsmen. Issues Raised by EPA’s Reorganization of the Ombudsman Function
In our July 2001 report, we recommended, among other things, that EPA modify its organizational structure so that the function would be located outside of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, whose activities the national ombudsman was charged with reviewing. However, if EPA omits these responsibilities from the position within the OIG, then it will not have established an “ombudsman” as the function is defined within the ombudsman community. For example, under EPA’s reorganization, the national ombudsman will not be able to exercise independent control over budget and staff resources, even within the general constraints that are faced by federal agencies. According to EPA, the Inspector General has the overall responsibility for the work performed by the OIG, and no single staff member—including the ombudsman—has the authority to select and prioritize his or her own caseload independent of all other needs. According to our discussions with officials from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and the OIG, the investigative aspects of the ombudsman function will be assigned to the OIG, but it appears that the regional ombudsmen will respond to inquiries and have a role in informally resolving issues between the agency and the public before they escalate into complaints about how EPA operates. Finally, including the national ombudsman function within the Office of the Inspector General raises concerns about the effect on the OIG, even if EPA defines the ombudsman’s role in a way that avoids conflict with the Inspector General Act. | What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) hazardous waste ombudsman was first established within the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response as a result of the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Over time, EPA expanded the national ombudsman's jurisdiction to include Superfund and other hazardous waste programs managed by the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, and, by March 1996, EPA had designated ombudsmen in each of its 10 regional offices. Although the national ombudsman's activities ranged from providing information to investigating the merits of complaints, in recent years, the ombudsman played an increasingly prominent role through his investigations of citizen complaints. Pending legislation would reauthorize an office of the ombudsman within EPA. In November 2001, the EPA Administrator announced that the national ombudsman would be relocated from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and would address concerns across the spectrum of EPA programs. Although there are no federal requirements or standards specific to the operation of ombudsman offices, several professional organizations have published standards of practice relevant to ombudsmen who deal with inquiries from the public. If EPA intends to have an ombudsman function that is consistent with the way the position is typically defined in the ombudsman community, placing the national ombudsman within the OIG does not achieve that objective. The national ombudsman, as the position is currently envisioned, still will not be able to exercise independent control over the budget and staff resources needed to implement the function. Prior to the reorganization, the national ombudsman could independently determine which cases to pursue; however, according to EPA, the Inspector General has the overall responsibility for the work performed by the Office, and no single staff member has the authority to select and prioritize his or her own caseload independent of all other needs. Finally, placing the ombudsman in the OIG could also affect the activities of the Inspector General. |
gao_GAO-08-518 | gao_GAO-08-518_0 | The program is to provide satellite development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite data processing. In addition, a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), was planned to be launched several years before the first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk associated with launching new sensor technologies and to ensure continuity of climate data with NASA’s Earth Observing System satellites. This decision approved a cost increase of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline cost and delayed the launch of NPP and the first 2 satellites by roughly 3 to 5 years. Major Restructuring Activities Have Been Completed, but Key Activities Remain
The program office has completed major activities associated with restructuring NPOESS, but key supporting activities remain—including obtaining approval of key acquisition documents. During the past year, the program redefined the program’s deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiated the NPOESS contract. Without executive approval of key acquisition documents, the program lacks the underlying commitment necessary to effectively manage a tri-agency program. Moving forward, risks remain in completing the testing of key sensors and integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, in resolving interagency disagreements on the appropriate level of system security, and in revising estimated costs for satellite operations and support. The program office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems could affect the program’s overall schedule and cost. These issues delayed VIIRS delivery to the NPP contractor by 8 months. Agencies Have Undertaken Preliminary Steps to Restore Key Sensors, but Lack Timely Plans to Ensure Long-Term Data Continuity
NASA, NOAA, and DOD have taken preliminary steps to restore the capabilities of selected climate and space weather sensors that were degraded or removed from the NPOESS program by prioritizing the sensors, assessing options for restoring them, and making decisions to restore two sensors in order to mitigate near-term data gaps. However, the agencies have not yet developed plans to mitigate the loss of these sensors on a long-term basis. Until such plans are developed, the agencies may lose their windows of opportunity for selecting cost-effective options or they may resort to an ad hoc approach to restoring these sensors. Lacking plans almost 2 years after key sensors were removed from the NPOESS program, the agencies face increased risk of gaps in the continuity of climate and space environment data. The Nunn-McCurdy restructuring decision removed four sensors and degraded the functionality of four other sensors that were to provide these data. However, agency executives have still not signed off on key acquisition documents that were to be completed in September 2007, and one critical sensor has experienced technical problems and schedule delays that have led program officials to delay the NPP launch date by about 8 months. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program office’s progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2) assess the status of key program components and risks, (3) identify how much notice the program office would need if agency sponsors outside the program choose to restore the eliminated or degraded sensors to the NPOESS program, and (4) assess plans of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for obtaining the environmental data originally planned to be collected by NPOESS sensors, but then eliminated under the restructuring. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a triagency acquisition--managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--that has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program by reducing the number of satellites and sensors, increasing estimated costs to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years. Among other objectives, GAO was asked to evaluate progress in restructuring the acquisition, assess the status of key program components and risks, and assess NASA's, NOAA's, and DOD's plans for obtaining the data originally planned to be collected by NPOESS sensors, but eliminated by the restructuring. To do so, GAO analyzed program and contractor data, attended program reviews, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The program office has completed most of the major activities associated with restructuring the NPOESS acquisition, but key activities remain to be completed. In the past year, the program redefined the program's deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiated the NPOESS contract. However, agency executives have not yet finalized selected acquisition documents (including the tri-agency memorandum of agreement). Without the executive approval of key acquisition documents, the program lacks the underlying commitment needed to effectively manage a tri-agency program. Over the past year, the NPOESS program has continued to make progress in completing development activities, but key milestones have been delayed and multiple risks remain. Specifically, poor workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip in the expected delivery of a technologically complex imaging sensor that is critical to weather and climate observations. This later delivery caused a corresponding 8-month delay in the expected launch date of a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). This demonstration satellite is intended to provide on-orbit experiences that can be used to reduce risks on NPOESS satellites and to provide interim weather and climate observations should predecessor weather and climate satellites begin to degrade or fail. Moving forward, risks remain in completing the testing of key sensors, integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and ensuring sufficient system security. The program office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems could affect the program's overall schedule and cost. When the NPOESS restructuring decision removed four climate and space environment sensors from the program and reduced the functionality of four others, the program was directed to restore a limited version of one sensor and to restore the seven others if funded by entities outside the program office. NOAA, NASA, and DOD have taken preliminary steps to restore the capabilities of selected sensors by prioritizing the sensors, assessing options for restoring them, and making decisions to mitigate near-term data gaps by adding two sensors to the NPP satellite. However, the agencies have not yet developed plans to mitigate the loss of these and other sensors on a long-term basis. Until such a plan is developed, the agencies may lose windows of opportunity for selecting cost effective options or they may resort to an ad hoc approach to restoring these sensors. Almost 2 years have passed since key sensors were removed from the NPOESS program; further delays in establishing a plan could result in gaps in the continuity of climate and space environment data. |
gao_GAO-08-496T | gao_GAO-08-496T_0 | In this regard, FISMA requires that agencies implement information security programs that, among other things, include ● periodic assessments of the risk; ● risk-based policies and procedures; ● subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems, as appropriate; ● security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; ● periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually; ● a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies; ● procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security ● plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations. Agencies Report Progress in Performing Control Activities
Federal agencies continue to report progress in implementing key information security activities. The President’s proposed fiscal year 2009 budget for IT states that the federal government continues to improve information security performance relative to the certification and accreditation of systems and the testing of security controls and contingency plans. According to the budget, in 2007 the percentage of certified and accredited systems rose from 88 percent to 92 percent. Even greater gains were reported in testing of security controls—from 88 percent of systems to 95 percent of systems— and for contingency plan testing—from 77 percent to 86 percent. 2). Most agencies did not implement controls to sufficiently prevent, limit, or detect access to computer networks, systems, or information. However, agencies did not always configure network devices and services to prevent unauthorized access and ensure system integrity, patch key servers and workstations in a timely manner, or segregate incompatible duties to different individuals or groups so that one individual does not control all aspects of a process or transaction. Agencywide Security Programs Were Not Fully Implemented
An underlying cause for information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies is that they have not yet fully or effectively implemented all the FISMA-required elements for an agencywide information security program. Consequently, federal systems and information are at increased risk of unauthorized access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information, as well as inadvertent or deliberate disruption of system operations and services. Opportunities Exist for Enhancing Federal Information Security
In prior reports, GAO and IGs have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies for actions necessary to resolve prior significant control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. ● The Information Systems Security Line of Business: The goal of this initiative is to improve the level of information systems security across government agencies and reduce costs by sharing common processes and functions for managing information systems security. Opportunities also exist to enhance policies and practices related to security control testing and evaluation, FISMA reporting, and the independent annual evaluations of agency information security programs required by FISMA. We also previously reported that OMB’s reporting guidance and performance measures did not include complete reporting on certain key FISMA-related activities. As a result, OMB and the Congress lack information that could identify governmentwide issues regarding patch management. In summary, agencies have reported progress in implementing control activities, but persistent weaknesses in agency information security controls threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of federal information and information systems, as illustrated by the increasing number of reported security incidents. Opportunities exist to improve information security at federal agencies. OMB and certain federal agencies have initiated efforts that are intended to strengthen the protection of federal information and information systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Information security is especially important for federal agencies, where the public's trust is essential and poor information security can have devastating consequences. Since 1997, GAO has identified information security as a governmentwide high-risk issue in each of its biennial reports to the Congress. Concerned by reports of significant weaknesses in federal computer systems, Congress passed the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, which permanently authorized and strengthened information security program, evaluation, and annual reporting requirements for federal agencies. GAO was asked to testify on the current state of federal information security and compliance with FISMA. This testimony summarizes (1) agency progress in performing key control activities, (2) the effectiveness of information security at federal agencies, and (3) opportunities to strengthen security. In preparing for this testimony, GAO reviewed prior audit reports; examined federal policies, guidance, and budgetary documentation; and analyzed agency and inspector general (IG) reports on information security.
What GAO Found
Over the past several years, federal agencies consistently reported progress in performing certain information security control activities. According to the President's proposed fiscal year 2009 budget for information technology, the federal government continued to improve information security performance in fiscal year 2007 relative to key performance metrics established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The percentage of certified and accredited systems governmentwide reportedly increased from 88 percent to 92 percent. Gains were also reported in testing of security controls - from 88 percent of systems to 95 percent of systems - and for contingency plan testing - from 77 percent to 86 percent. These gains continue a historical trend that GAO reported on last year. Despite reported progress, major federal agencies continue to experience significant information security control deficiencies. Most agencies did not implement controls to sufficiently prevent, limit, or detect access to computer networks, systems, or information. In addition, agencies did not always manage the configuration of network devices to prevent unauthorized access and ensure system integrity, patch key servers and workstations in a timely manner, assign duties to different individuals or groups so that one individual did not control all aspects of a process or transaction, and maintain complete continuity of operations plans for key information systems. An underlying cause for these weaknesses is that agencies have not fully or effectively implemented agencywide information security programs. As a result, federal systems and information are at increased risk of unauthorized access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information, as well as inadvertent or deliberate disruption of system operations and services. Such risks are illustrated, in part, by an increasing number of security incidents experienced by federal agencies. Nevertheless, opportunities exist to bolster federal information security. Federal agencies could implement the hundreds of recommendations made by GAO and IGs to resolve prior significant control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. In addition, OMB and other federal agencies have initiated several governmentwide initiatives that are intended to improve security over federal systems and information. For example, OMB has established an information systems security line of business to share common processes and functions for managing information systems security and directed agencies to adopt the security configurations developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and Departments of Defense and Homeland Security for certain Windows operating systems. Opportunities also exist to enhance policies and practices related to security control testing and evaluation, FISMA reporting, and the independent annual evaluations of agency information security programs required by FISMA. |
gao_GAO-05-880T | gao_GAO-05-880T_0 | Audit Results
In our audit of the fiscal year 2004 financial statements for SEC, we found the financial statements as of and for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2004, including the accompanying notes, are presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; SEC did not have effective internal control over financial reporting (including safeguarding of assets), but had effective control over compliance with laws and regulations that could have a material effect on the financial statements as of September 30, 2004; and no reportable noncompliance with laws and regulations we tested. We issued an unqualified, or clean, opinion on the SEC’s financial statements. This means that the financial statements and accompanying notes present fairly, in all material respects, SEC’s financial position as of September 30, 2004, and, as well, certain other financial information that the statements must provide: net cost, changes in net position, budgetary resources, financing, and custodial activities for the year then ended. We found three material weaknesses in internal control and thus issued an adverse opinion on internal control—stating that SEC management did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting and the safeguarding of assets as of September 30, 2004. This conclusion on SEC’s internal controls did not affect our opinion on SEC’s financial statements. This is because during the audit process SEC made the adjustments identified during the audit as necessary for the fair presentation of its financial statements. We also found that SEC maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over compliance. SEC’s lack of formalized processes, documented procedures, and quality assurance checks, significantly delayed the reporting of fiscal year 2004 financial results, consumed significant staff resources, caused audit inefficiencies, and resulted in higher financial statement preparation and audit costs. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government requires that controls over the financial statement preparation process be designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of the balances and disclosures reported in the financial statements and related notes in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, including the maintenance of detailed support that accurately and fairly reflect the transactions making up the balances in the financial statements and disclosures. SEC’s difficulties in the area of financial statement preparation are exacerbated because SEC’s financial management system is not set up to generate the user reports needed to perform analyses of accounts and activity on a real-time basis leading to SEC’s staff-intensive and time- consuming efforts to prepare financial statements. Office of Management and Budget Circular No. Thus, our auditors performed additional testing over SEC’s financial statement balances related to penalties and disgorgements. To address internal control weaknesses over disgorgements and penalties, we recommended that SEC 1. implement a system that is integrated with the accounting system or that provides the necessary input to the accounting system to facilitate timely, accurate, and efficient recording and reporting of disgorgement and penalty activity; 2. review the disgorgement and penalty judgments and subsequent activities documented in each case file by defendant to determine whether individual amounts recorded in the case-tracking system are accurate and reliable; 3. implement controls so that the ongoing activity involving disgorgements and penalties is properly, accurately, and timely recorded in the case-tracking system and the accounting system; 4. strengthen coordination, communication, and data flow among staff of SEC’s Division of Enforcement and Office of Financial Management who share responsibility for recording and maintaining disgorgement and penalty data; and 5. develop and implement written policies covering the procedures, documentation, systems, and responsible personnel involved in recording and reporting disgorgement and penalty financial information. SEC agrees with our findings in this area and has begun efforts to strengthen internal controls. Our review of SEC’s information system general controls found that the commission did not effectively implement controls to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of its financial and sensitive information. SEC did not have a comprehensive monitoring program for routine review, audit, or monitoring of system user-access activities. In its fiscal year 2004 FISMA report, SEC’s OIG reported that the commission had several weaknesses in information security and was not substantially in compliance with information security requirements contained in FISMA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to the Accountability for Tax Dollars Act of 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is required to prepare and submit to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget audited financial statements. GAO agreed, under its audit authority, to perform the initial audit of SEC's financial statements. GAO's audit was done to determine whether, in all material respects, (1) SEC's fiscal year 2004 financial statements were reliable, (2) SEC's management maintained effective internal control over financial reporting and compliance with laws and regulations, and (3) SEC's management complied with applicable laws and regulations. Established in 1934 to enforce the securities laws and protect investors, the SEC plays an important role in maintaining the integrity of the U.S. securities markets. GAO was asked by the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, to present the results of its May 26, 2005, report, Financial Audit: Securities and Exchange Commission's Financial Statements for Fiscal Year 2004 (GAO-05-244).
What GAO Found
The SEC's first ever financial audit was performed by GAO for fiscal year 2004. In reporting on the results of the audit, GAO issued an unqualified, or clean, opinion on the financial statements of the SEC. This means that SEC's financial statements presented fairly, in all material respects, its financial position as of September 30, 2004, and the results of operations for the year then ended. However, because of material internal control weaknesses in the areas of preparing financial statements and related disclosures, recording and reporting disgorgements and penalties, and information security, GAO issued an adverse opinion on internal controls, concluding that SEC did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2004. However, SEC did maintain, in all material respects, effective internal control over compliance with laws and regulations material in relation to the financial statements as of September 30, 2004. In addition, GAO did not find reportable instances of noncompliance with laws and regulations it tested. It is important to remember that GAO's opinions on SEC's financial statements and internal controls reflect a point in time. SEC prepared its first complete set of financial statements for fiscal year 2004 and made significant progress during the year in building a financial reporting structure for preparing financial statements for audit. However, GAO identified inadequate controls over SEC's financial statement preparation process including a lack of sufficient documented policies and procedures, support, and quality assurance reviews, increasing the risk that SEC management will not have reasonable assurance that the balances presented in the financial statements and related disclosures are supported by SEC's underlying accounting records. In addition, GAO identified inadequate controls over SEC's disgorgements and civil penalties activities, increasing the risk that such activities will not be completely, accurately, and properly recorded and reported for management's use in its decision making. GAO also found that SEC has not effectively implemented information system controls to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of its financial and sensitive data, increasing the risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or loss of the data, possibly without detection. The risks created by these information security weaknesses are compounded because the SEC does not have a comprehensive monitoring program to identify unusual or suspicious access activities. SEC agreed with our findings and is currently working to improve controls in all these areas. |
gao_GAO-07-818 | gao_GAO-07-818_0 | Without performing annual determinations, an essential management control, FSA cannot identify estates being kept open primarily for the purpose of receiving these payments and be assured that the payments are proper. In particular, FSA did not conduct any program eligibility determinations for 73, or 40 percent, of estates that required a determination from 1999 through 2005. Sixteen of these 73 estates received more than $200,000 in farm program payments and 4 received more than $500,000 during this period. FSA also approved eligibility on the basis of insufficient explanations for keeping the estate open. Furthermore, some FSA field offices approved program payments to groups of estates that were kept open after 2 years without any apparent review. Because FSA Does Not Have Appropriate Management Controls, It Cannot Be Assured That It Is Not Making Payments to Deceased Individuals
FSA cannot be assured that millions of dollars in farm program payments it made to thousands of deceased individuals from fiscal years 1999 through 2005 were proper because FSA does not have appropriate management controls, such as computer matching, to verify that it is not making payments to deceased individuals. Of the $1.1 billion in farm payments, 40 percent went to individuals who had been dead for 3 or more years, and 19 percent went to individuals who had been dead for 7 or more years. The complex nature of some types of farming entities, in particular, corporations and general partnerships, increases the potential for improper payments. Large farming operations are often structured as corporations or general partnerships with other entities embedded within these entities. For example, as shown in table 4, 8,575 deceased individuals received payments through general partnerships from 1999 through 2005. Furthermore, of the 172,801 deceased individuals identified as receiving farm program payments, 5,081 received more than one payment because (1) they were a member of more than one entity, or (2) they received payments as an individual and were a member of an entity. First, it relies on the farming operation to self-certify that the information provided is accurate and that the operation will inform FSA of any operating plan changes, which would include the death of an operation’s member. Such notification would provide USDA with current information to determine the eligibility of the entity to receive the payments. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide reasonable assurance that FSA does not make improper payments to estates and deceased individuals, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of the Farm Service Agency to instruct FSA field offices to conduct all annual estate eligibility determinations as required; implement management controls, such as matching payment files with the Social Security Administration’s Death Master File, to verify that an individual receiving farm program payments has not died; and determine if improper program payments have been made to deceased individuals or to entities that failed to disclose the death of a member, and if so, recover the appropriate amounts. Specifically, we evaluated the extent to which FSA (1) follows its regulations that are intended to provide reasonable assurance that farm program payments go only to eligible estates and (2) makes improper payments to deceased individuals. Appendix IV: U.S. Department of Agriculture Estate Eligibility Reviews, by State, Program Years 1999 through 2005
Table 5 shows the variation by state in FSA’s conduct of eligibility determinations from 1999 through 2005 for the 181 estates in our sample. | Why GAO Did This Study
Farmers receive about $20 billion annually in federal farm program payments, which go to individuals and "entities," including corporations, partnerships, and estates. Under certain conditions, estates may receive payments for the first 2 years after an individual's death. For later years, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) must determine that the estate is not being kept open for payments. As requested, GAO evaluated the extent to which USDA (1) follows its regulations that are intended to provide reasonable assurance that farm program payments go only to eligible estates and (2) makes improper payments to deceased individuals. GAO reviewed a nonrandom sample of estates based, in part, on the amount of payments an estate received and compared USDA's databases that identify payment recipients with individuals the Social Security Administration listed as deceased.
What GAO Found
USDA has made farm payments to estates more than 2 years after recipients died, without determining, as its regulations require, whether the estates were kept open to receive these payments. As a result, USDA cannot be assured that farm payments are not going to estates kept open primarily to obtain these payments. From 1999 through 2005, USDA did not conduct any eligibility determinations for 73, or 40 percent, of the 181 estates GAO reviewed. Sixteen of these 73 estates had each received more than $200,000 in farm payments, and 4 had each received more than $500,000. Also, for the 108 reviews USDA did conduct, GAO identified shortcomings. For example, from 1999 through 2005, 69 of the 108 estates did not receive annual reviews for every year of payments received, and some USDA field offices approved groups of estates for payments without reviewing each estate. Furthermore, 20 estates that USDA approved for payment eligibility had no documented explanation for keeping the estate open. USDA cannot be assured that millions of dollars in farm payments are proper. It does not have management controls to verify that it is not making payments to deceased individuals. For 1999 through 2005, USDA paid $1.1 billion in farm payments in the names of 172,801 deceased individuals (either as an individual recipient or as a member of an entity). Of this total, 40 percent went to those who had been dead for 3 or more years, and 19 percent to those dead for 7 or more years. Most of these payments were made to deceased individuals indirectly (i.e., as members of farming entities). For example, over one-half of the $1.1 billion payments went through entities from 1999 through 2005. In one case, USDA paid a member of an entity--deceased since 1995--over $400,000 in payments for 1999 through 2005. USDA relies on the farming operation's self-certification that the information provided is accurate and that the operation will inform USDA of any changes, such as the death of a member. Such notification would provide USDA with current information to determine the eligibility of the entity to receive the payments. The complex nature of some farming operations--such as entities embedded within other entities--can make it difficult for USDA to avoid making payments to deceased individuals. |
gao_GAO-08-883T | gao_GAO-08-883T_0 | Most Afghan National Police Units Are Rated as Not Capable of Performing Their Mission
After an investment of more than $6 billion, Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, no police unit (0 of 433) was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission and more than three-fourths of units rated (334 of 433) were assessed as not capable (see table 3). Nonetheless, the results of Defense’s census raise questions about the reliability of the nearly 80,000 number of police reportedly assigned. Several Challenges Impede Development of Capable Police Forces
Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to build a capable police force. Although this effort is too new to fully assess, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put the initiative at risk. Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training, Evaluation, and Verification of Police on Duty
According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and to verify that police are on duty. 1). Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and Attacks
Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of law is a prerequisite for effective policing. New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun, but Limited Mentor Coverage Is a Risk Factor
Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and began a new initiative called Focused District Development in November 2007 to address them. Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, Detailed Plan for Completing and Sustaining the ANSF
In our June 2005 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF that contain several elements, including milestones for achieving stated objectives and a sustainability strategy. Recurrent Coordination Difficulties Have Arisen in the Absence of a Coordinated Plan
In February 2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according to Defense officials, is intended to meet GAO’s 2005 recommendation for detailed plans to complete and sustain the ANSF. Although Defense and State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of State. State also did not contribute to the development of this document and has not developed a plan of its own. Limited Milestones Hinder Assessment of Progress
Defense’s 5-page document developed in response to our 2005 recommendation contains few milestones, including no interim milestones that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP. Without interim milestones against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if this status represents what the United States intended to achieve after 3 years of increased efforts and an investment of more than $6 billion in the program. For instance, the completion dates for development of the ANP stated in monthly status reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008 fluctuated from December 2008 to March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month period when the completion date was reported as “to be determined.”
Similarly, although Defense’s newly adopted Focused District Development initiative to reconstitute the uniformed police involves considerable resources and is expected to last 4 to 5 years at a minimum, no interim milestones or consistent end date for the effort are identified in Defense’s 5-page document, monthly status reports, or briefings that outline the effort. Furthermore, without an end date and milestones for the U.S. effort to complete and sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission—one that U.S. military officials stated may extend beyond a decade. State also expressed concerns about conditioning future appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. We continue to believe that a coordinated, detailed plan that outlines agency roles and responsibilities and includes clear milestones is essential to ensuring accountability of U.S. efforts and facilitating assessment of progress. 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2005, the Department of Defense (Defense), with support from the Department of State (State), has directed U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Police (ANP) into a force capable of enforcing the rule of law and supporting actions to defeat insurgency, among other activities. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop a capable ANP; (2) challenges that affect the development of a capable ANP; and (3) GAO analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which comprise the ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA). This statement is based on a concurrently issued GAO report titled Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008).
What GAO Found
Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of more than $6 billion, no Afghan police unit (0 of 433) is assessed by Defense as fully capable of performing its mission and over three-fourths of units (334 of 433) are assessed at the lowest capability rating. In addition, while the ANP has reportedly grown in number to nearly 80,000 personnel, concerns exist about the reliability of this number. Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP forces. First, the shortage of police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty. Second, the ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages and quality. Third, the ANP faces a difficult working environment, including a weak Afghan judicial sector and consistent problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks by insurgents. Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and, in November 2007, began a new initiative called Focused District Development--an effort to train the police as units--to address them. This effort is too new to fully assess, but the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put the effort at risk. Despite a 2005 GAO recommendation calling for a detailed plan and a 2008 congressional mandate requiring similar information, Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, milestones for completing and sustaining the ANSF, and a sustainment strategy. In 2007, Defense produced a 5-page document intended to address GAO's 2005 recommendation. However, the document does not identify the role or involve the participation of State--Defense's partner in training the ANP. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In the absence of a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly defines agency roles and responsibilities, a dual chain of command exists between Defense and State that has complicated the efforts of mentors training the police. Defense's 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no interim milestones that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP. Without interim milestones, it is difficult to know if current ANP status represents what the United States intended to achieve by 2008. In addition, Defense's 5-page document lacks a sustainment strategy. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission. |
gao_GAO-05-838T | gao_GAO-05-838T_0 | Next, it required agencies that occupy GSA-controlled buildings to pay rent to GSA, which is to be deposited in the revolving fund to be used for GSA real property services. Figure 1 illustrates the process for planning, approving, and constructing a courthouse project. The judiciary pays rent to GSA for the use of the courthouses, which GSA owns, and the proportion of the judiciary’s budget that goes to rent has increased as the judiciary’s space requirements have grown. GAO’s Courthouse Construction Work Has Focused on Costs, Planning, and Courtroom Sharing
Our work in the 1990s showed that decision makers within GSA and the judiciary had wide latitude in making choices that significantly affected costs. The judiciary’s 5-year plan did not reflect all of the judiciary’s most urgently needed projects. However, the judiciary has since made some of our recommended changes. We also found that the judiciary did not compile data that would allow it to determine how many and what types of courtrooms it needs. As a result, some courthouses had more expensive features than others. GSA and the judiciary said that since 1996, they have also taken several actions to improve the courthouse construction program, including developing priority lists of locations needing additional space (the 5-year plan), revising the Design Guide, and placing greater emphasis on cost consciousness in its courthouse construction guidance for GSA. In 1989, we found that FBF’s inability to generate sufficient revenue in the past was due, in large part, to restrictions imposed on the amount of rent GSA could charge federal agencies, and we recommended in 1989 that Congress remove all rent restrictions and not mandate any further restrictions. Rent Restrictions Have Historically Contributed to Large Repair Backlogs
As part of our series on high-risk issues facing the federal government, we have reported that GSA has struggled over the years to meet the requirements for repairs and alterations identified in its inventory of owned buildings. By 2002, its estimated backlog of repairs had reached $5.7 billion. We have reported that adverse consequences of the backlog included poor health and safety conditions, higher operating costs associated with inefficient building heating and cooling systems, restricted capacity to modernize information technology, and continued structural deterioration resulting from such things as water leaks. We reported that FBF has not historically generated sufficient revenue to address the backlog. Our Ongoing Work on the Judiciary’s Request for an Exemption from Rent Payments to FBF
In December 2004, the judiciary requested that the GSA Administrator grant a $483 million permanent, annual exemption from rent payments— an amount equal to about 3 times the amount of all other rent exclusions combined. This exemption would equal about half of the judiciary’s $900 million annual rent payment to GSA for occupying space in federal courthouses. According to GSA data, the judiciary increased the owned space it occupies by 15 percent from 2000 to 2004. 2. What impact would a permanent rent exemption have on FBF? Our work is still underway, but our past work on related issues shows that rent exemptions have been a principal reason why FBF has accumulated insufficient money for capital investment. During our work, we reviewed past GAO work on federal real property and courthouse construction issues, analyzed AOUSC and GSA documents, and interviewed AOUSC and GSA officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last 20 years, GAO has compiled a large body of work on courthouse construction and federal real property. The General Services Administration (GSA) owns federal courthouses and funds related expenses from its Federal Buildings Fund (FBF)--a revolving fund used to finance GSA real property services, including the construction and maintenance of federal facilities under GSA control. The judiciary pays rent to GSA for the use of these courthouses, and the proportion of the judiciary's budget that goes to rent has increased as its space requirements have grown. In December 2004, the judiciary requested a $483 million permanent, annual exemption from rent payments to GSA to address budget shortfalls. In this testimony, GAO (1) summarizes its previous work on courthouse construction and (2) provides information on FBF and GAO's ongoing work on the federal judiciary's request for a permanent, annual rent exemption of $483 million from rent to GSA.
What GAO Found
GAO's courthouse construction work to date has focused primarily on courthouse costs, planning, and courtroom sharing. In the 1990s, GAO reported that wide latitude among judiciary and GSA decision makers in choices about location, design, construction, and finishes often resulted in expensive features in some courthouse projects. The judiciary has since placed greater emphasis on cost consciousness in the guidelines for courthouse construction that it provides to GSA. Related to planning, GAO also found in the 1990s that long-range space projections by the judiciary were not sufficiently reliable, and that the judiciary's 5-year plan did not reflect all of the its most urgently needed projects. The judiciary has made changes to improve its planning and data reliability. During previous work, GAO also found that the judiciary did not track sufficient courtroom use data to gauge the feasibility of courtroom sharing. GSA has been unable to generate sufficient revenue through FBF over the years and thus has struggled to meet the requirements for repairs and alterations identified in its inventory of owned buildings. By 2002, the estimated backlog of repairs had reached $5.7 billion, and consequences included poor health and safety conditions, higher operating costs, restricted capacity for modern information technology, and continued structural deterioration. GSA's inability to generate sufficient revenue in the past has been compounded by restrictions imposed on the rent GSA could charge federal agencies. Consequently, GAO recommended in 1989 that Congress remove all rent restrictions and not mandate any further restrictions, and the most restrictions have been lifted. Some narrowly focused rent exemptions, many of limited duration, still exist today, but together they represent roughly a third of the $483 million permanent exemption the judiciary is currently requesting from GSA. The judiciary has requested the exemption, equaling about half of its annual rent payment, because of budget problems it believes that its growing rent payments have caused. GSA data show that GSA-owned space, occupied by the judiciary, has increased significantly. GAO is currently studying the potential impact of such an exemption on FBF, but past GAO work shows rent exemptions have been a principal reason why FBF has accumulated insufficient money for capital investment. |
gao_GAO-12-911 | gao_GAO-12-911_0 | DOD’s Preferred Option Generally Retains Command Structures and Includes a Shared Service Concept
DOD’s preferred option would create a defense health agency that would assume the responsibility for shared services in the MHS with military hospitals remaining under the control of the services while other potential options represent larger scale changes. In addition, DOD’s preferred option would include implementing a shared services concept, which was common to all of its governance options; however, DOD did not develop a business case analysis that would provide a data-driven rationale for implementing the concept. DOD Did Not Present a Business Case Analysis for Its Shared Services Concept
DOD did not present a business case analysis for proceeding with its shared services concept common to all of the proposed governance structures, including an estimate of costs to merge shared services functions, operational savings to be accrued, or the likely timeframe in which this service consolidation would achieve savings. At the time, we recommended that DOD needed to demonstrate a sound business case, including an analysis of benefits, costs, and risks, for proceeding with its seven initiatives, and DOD concurred with our recommendation. this concept, it did not estimate potential savings from consolidating common services. Further, DOD has not developed a business case analysis for its shared services concept since it was first proposed in 2006. Task Force officials stated that the internal 90-day deadline required by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the Task Force to complete its report did not allow for a detailed analysis of implementation costs or a more thorough review of possible cost savings, and that this time period also limited the practicality of more detailed analysis. However, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which required a report on MHS governance options to be submitted to the congressional defense committees, was passed approximately 3 months after the Task Force completed its review and contained no specific deadline for DOD to submit its report. However, DOD could have conducted additional analysis before submitting its report to the congressional defense committees. DOD Limited Its Assessment of the Options’ Strengths and Weaknesses to a Qualitative Process
DOD used a qualitative process to support its assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the 13 potential governance options presented in its report, but did not balance this support with quantitative data. DOD’s Assessment Gathered Significant Qualitative Information from Internal Stakeholders, but Did Not Provide Support for the Quantitative Elements Included in Its Criteria
DOD used a deliberative and qualitative approach to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 13 potential governance structures presented in its report that included developing and applying criteria to each of the 13 In establishing the MHS review, the governance options it developed.Deputy Secretary of Defense prescribed that the review should assess potential governance options based on their fulfillment of the following criteria:
Provision of high-quality, integrated medical care for servicemembers
Maintenance of a trained and ready deployable medical force to support combatant commanders;
Achievement of significant cost-savings through, for example, elimination of redundancies, increased interoperability, and other means of promoting cost-efficient delivery of care. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide decision makers with more complete information on the total cost impact of the various governance structures to help determine the best way forward, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to:
Develop a comprehensive cost analysis for the MHS governance structures including estimates of implementation costs and cost savings in additional areas such as health care operations and infrastructure changes as well as an improved estimate of personnel savings,
Develop a business case analysis and strategy for the implementation of its shared services concept, Improve its evaluation of the potential governance structures’ strengths and weaknesses by including quantitative data when available, and a specific assessment of the degree to which the options meet the criteria Trained and Ready Medical Force and Quality Beneficiary Care. We disagree with DOD and believe that more comprehensive cost analysis will help to distinguish the differences among the costs and benefits of the options. Third, DOD’s estimate of personnel cost savings used several potentially flawed assumptions, and as a result, we determined DOD’s estimate to be unreliable. In its comments, DOD noted that it is committed to the MHS governance changes agreed to by the Department leadership in 2012 that are presented in its report in response to Section 716 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. As we noted, Section 716 required DOD to submit a report to the congressional defense committees to include, among other things, a description of the alternative MHS governance options developed and considered by the Task Force; an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each option; and an estimate of the cost savings, if any, to be achieved by each option. Appendix II: Detailed Description of the Potential Governance Structures and DOD’s Assessment of Their Strengths and Weaknesses
DOD’s task force report provided the following detailed description, cost savings estimates, and strengths and weaknesses of the governance structures2 it identified as potential options for its Military Health System (MHS). It would also create central control of the Military Treatment Facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, the cost of the MHS has grown substantially and is projected to reach nearly $95 billion by 2030 according to the Congressional Budget Office. As health care costs consume an increasingly large portion of the defense budget, current DOD leadership and Congress have recognized the need to better control these costs. Section 716 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 required DOD to submit a report analyzing potential MHS governance options under consideration, and also required GAO to submit an analysis of these options. In response to this mandate, GAO determined the extent to which DOD's assessment provides complete information on cost implications and the strengths and weaknesses of potential MHS governance options. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed DOD's governance report along with supporting documents, and interviewed Task Force members.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) assessment of potential governance options for its Military Health System (MHS) did not provide complete information on the options' total cost impact and their strengths and weaknesses. As part of DOD's assessment, it identified 13 potential governance options for the MHS and included a limited analysis of the options' estimated costs savings and their strengths and weaknesses. All of the options would create a shared services concept to consolidate common services, such as medical logistics, acquisition, and facility planning, under the control of a single entity. DOD selected an option that would create a defense health agency to, among other things, assume the responsibility for creating and managing shared services, and leave the longstanding military chain of command intact with the services in control of the military hospitals. The National Defense Authorization Act (Act) for Fiscal Year 2012 required DOD to submit a report to congressional committees that would, among other things, estimate the cost savings and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each option. Using key principles derived from federal guidance, including cost estimating and economic analysis documents, GAO determined that DOD could have provided more information on cost implications and strengths and weaknesses in its report to Congress. Specifically, DOD did not (1) estimate implementation costs and comprehensive cost savings; (2) include a business case to support consolidating common services; or (3) include supporting quantitative data in its analysis of the options' strengths and weaknesses.
DOD's cost analysis for its potential MHS governance options was limited In that it did not include implementation costs and only estimated personnel costs savings based on some potentially flawed assumptions, such as not using representative salaries to estimate personnel savings.
DOD did not develop a business case analysis and an implementation strategy for its proposed shared services concept. A business case analysis would, among other things, define the services to be consolidated, cost to implement and efficiencies to be achieved and could support DOD's assertion that implementing shared services could achieve efficiencies. DOD approved a shared services concept two other times since 2006, but it has yet to develop a business case analysis that would provide a data-driven rationale for implementing the concept.
DOD used a qualitative process with input from internal experts to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the potential governance structures. However, it did not balance this support with quantitative data as its criteria for assessing the strengths and weaknesses specified. DOD officials stated that they did not provide comprehensive cost estimates or quantitative analysis of the options because an internal 90-day deadline to report back to the Deputy Secretary of Defense did not allow enough time. However, the act requiring DOD to report to Congress was enacted subsequent to DOD's own internal assessment and did not establish a specific deadline. As a result, DOD could have taken time to conduct a more comprehensive analysis before submitting its report.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop (1) a comprehensive cost analysis for its potential MHS governance options, (2) a business case analysis and strategy for implementing its shared services concept, and (3) more complete analyses of the options' strengths and weaknesses. DOD concurred with developing a business case analysis for its shared services concept. DOD did not concur with the other 2 recommendations, stating that further analysis would not alter its conclusions. GAO disagrees and believes that more comprehensive analysis will help to distinguish the differences among the costs and benefits of the options. |
gao_T-RCED-97-212 | gao_T-RCED-97-212_0 | From 1993 until 1996 the Secretary deferred the land-transfer decision while (1) the Bureau completed a first supplement to the April 1991 environmental impact statement, (2) the National Academy of Sciences reviewed seven technical issues related to the Ward Valley site, and (3) Interior negotiated, with the state, the terms of a public hearing on the proposed facility and the land-transfer agreement. Interior Primarily Relied on Scientific Reports and Public Concerns in Deciding on a Second Supplement
When Interior announced in February 1996 that it would prepare the second supplement, it cited the Academy’s May 1995 report and new information about the migration of radioactive elements in the soil from the former disposal facility at Beatty as its basis for preparing the supplement. Although Interior also said it would address “nearby Indian sacred sites” in the supplement, it did not identify any such sites or sources of information on this issue. Thereafter, Interior relied on information obtained from the public, including environmental groups, Native Americans, and others, to select 10 more issues to address in the supplement and to expand the issue of sacred Indian sites to include a variety of issues pertaining to Native Americans. New Information on the Beatty Facility
In 1994 and 1995, the Geological Survey detected tritium and another radioactive element in the soil adjacent to a disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste located at Beatty, Nevada. Most of the Current Issues Were Previously Considered
Except for the Academy’s report and the new information about the Beatty facility, all of the issues that Interior will address in the second supplement had been considered earlier in the state’s licensing proceeding; in the state’s and the Bureau’s joint environmental impact statement; and in the Bureau’s first supplement of September 1993. The effect of the Ward Valley facility on Native Americans in the region is one example of an issue that had been addressed earlier by the state and the Bureau. Interior’s Reasons for the Supplement Are to Provide a Public Forum and Determine Site Suitability
The reasons Interior gave for its decision to prepare a second supplement were the impasse over land-transfer conditions and the age of the original environmental impact statement. Two other reasons for the second supplement, however, have shaped Interior’s actions on the Ward Valley issue for several years; specifically, Interior believes that it should provide a forum for resolving public concerns and independently determine if the site is suitable for a disposal facility. Consequently, California and US Ecology have sued Interior over, among other things, whether Interior has exceeded its authority with respect to radiological safety issues. . . responsibility under federal law regarding the suitability of the site. Whether an independent determination is within Interior’s discretion will be decided in the courts. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the proposed transfer of federal land in Ward Valley, California to the state for use as a low-level radioactive waste disposal site, focusing on: (1) what sources of information the Department of the Interior relied on in deciding to prepare a second supplemental environmental impact statement and in selecting issues to address in the supplement; (2) whether the selected issues had been considered in earlier state or federal proceedings and, if so, whether they are being reconsidered on the basis of significant new information; and (3) what Interior's underlying reasons were for preparing the supplement.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Interior cited a May 1995 report on the Ward Valley site by the National Academy of Sciences and information developed by its U.S. Geological Survey in 1994 and 1995 about the migration of radioactive elements in the soil from a former disposal facility at Beatty, Nevada, as its basis for preparing the second supplement; (2) it also stated that it would address nearby Indian sacred sites in the supplement; (3) after obtaining and analyzing information from the public, including environmental groups, Native Americans, and others, Interior decided to address 10 more issues in the supplement and to expand the issue of sacred Indian sites to include a variety of issues pertaining to Native Americans; (4) eleven of the 13 issues that Interior is addressing in the second supplement had been considered in California's licensing process and in previous environmental impact statements prepared by the state and Interior's Bureau of Land Management; (5) the other two issues, the findings and recommendations of the Academy and the information on the Beatty facility, are new; (6) the reasons cited by Interior for preparing a second supplement were an impasse with California over land-transfer conditions and the 5 years that had passed since the original environmental impact statement was issued in April 1991; (7) two other reasons, however, have shaped Interior's action on the Ward Valley issue over the last several years; (8) specifically, Interior believes that it should provide a forum for resolving public concerns and independently determine if the site is suitable for a disposal facility; (9) it should be noted that California has met all of the state's procedural and substantive requirements for licensing the proposed facility; (10) consequently, the state and US Ecology, the company licensed by the state to construct and operate the disposal facility, have sued Interior to determine, among other things, if Interior exceeded its authority regarding radiological safety matters, such as independently deciding on the site's suitability; and (11) thus, whether or not an independent determination of the site's suitability is within Interior's discretion will be decided in the courts. |
gao_GAO-09-568 | gao_GAO-09-568_0 | DOD has made progress in transforming its language and regional proficiency capabilities, but continues to lack a comprehensive strategic plan. Significant Organizational Change Requires a Sound Strategic Plan
Our prior work and the work of others has shown that implementing significant organizational change—as DOD is attempting to do with language and regional proficiency transformation—requires a comprehensive, integrated strategic plan that sets a clear direction for transformation efforts and includes measurable performance goals and objectives and funding priorities that are linked to goals. DOD officials acknowledge that they are at a point in their language and regional proficiency transformation efforts where a strategic plan is needed. DOD officials expect to complete this plan in September 2009; however, the issue date has not yet been determined. Until DOD has an approved and comprehensive strategic plan or set of linked plans that sets a direction for transformation efforts and includes measurable performance goals and objectives, it will be difficult for DOD to provide direction to the military services as they develop their approaches to language and regional proficiency transformation. DOD Has Not Fully Identified Gaps in Language and Regional Proficiency to Effectively Assess Risks
In response to the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, DOD is in the process of developing a strategic management tool, called the Language Readiness Index, so that it can determine potential gaps and assess risk by matching its inventory of skills to its requirements for these skills. This will enable DOD to determine potential gaps and assess risk to its ability to conduct current military operations, as well as risk to its ability to conduct potential future military operations. For regional proficiency, DOD does not have an inventory of the skills of service members or DOD civilians because it lacks a mechanism to assess and validate these skills. DOD Lacks Validated Methodologies to Determine Language and Regional Proficiency Requirements
While DOD has a process to identify its language and regional proficiency requirements, DOD lacks a transparent, validated methodology to aid combatant commanders, DOD components, and defense agencies in identifying those language and regional proficiency requirements that DOD then uses to identify potential capability gaps through its strategic management tool. However, in the absence of a validated methodology, estimates of requirements have differed widely by combatant command. For example, as of February 2008, U.S. Pacific Command’s requirements outnumbered the requirements of all other combatant commands combined. DOD has two assessments under way that DOD officials expect may assist them in developing a validated methodology for determining their language and regional proficiency requirements, but neither of these efforts has yet resulted in a validated methodology. The risk assessment process, as discussed in our prior work, helps decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that alternatives can be designed and implemented to mitigate the effects of the risk. Without (1) establishing a mechanism to assess the full range of regional proficiency capabilities within the military force and civilian workforce and incorporating it into the strategic management tool and (2) developing a transparent, validated methodology to aid combatant commanders, DOD components, and defense agencies in identifying language and regional proficiency requirements for all communities and at all proficiency levels, DOD cannot determine capability gaps, assess risk effectively, and inform its strategic planning for language and regional proficiency transformation. Moreover, in the absence of a complete inventory and consistently identified requirements for the type and number of language and regional proficiency skills it needs, DOD is not in a position to properly assess gaps in its capabilities and appropriately assess risk so that it can make informed decisions about the future direction, scope, and nature of its efforts and investments in support of transforming its language and regional proficiency capabilities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has established a strategic plan to guide efforts to transform its language and regional proficiency capabilities, we analyzed DOD’s Defense Language Transformation Roadmap as the department’s key document for guiding the transformation of language and regional proficiency capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Violent extremist movements and ongoing military operations have prompted the Department of Defense (DOD) to place greater emphasis on improving language and regional proficiency, which includes cultural awareness. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a strategic plan to guide its language and regional proficiency transformation efforts and (2) obtained the information it needs to identify potential language and regional proficiency gaps and assess risk. To conduct this assessment, GAO analyzed DOD's Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, reviewed the military services' strategies for transforming language and regional proficiency capabilities, and assessed the range of efforts intended to help identify potential gaps.
What GAO Found
DOD has made progress in transforming its language and regional proficiency capabilities over the last 5 years but continues to lack a comprehensive strategic plan to guide this transformation effort. Prior work has shown that implementing significant organizational change--as DOD is attempting to do with language and regional proficiency transformation--requires a comprehensive, integrated strategic plan that sets a clear direction for transformation efforts and includes measurable performance goals and objectives as well as funding priorities that are linked to goals. In February 2005, DOD published the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, which it has used as its key document to guide language and regional proficiency transformation. While DOD has goals, objectives, and a governance structure, GAO found that not all objectives are measurable, linkages between these goals and DOD's funding priorities remain unclear, and DOD has not identified the total cost of its planned transformation efforts. DOD officials acknowledge they are at a point in their efforts where a strategic plan is needed and are in the process of developing one; however, the issue date has not been determined. In the absence of an approved plan, it will be difficult for DOD to guide the military services as they develop their approaches to language and regional proficiency transformation. Furthermore, it will be difficult for DOD and Congress to assess progress toward a successful transformation. DOD lacks the comprehensive regional proficiency inventory and validated language and regional proficiency requirements that it would need to identify gaps and assess risk to its ability to conduct military operations. Risk assessment helps decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that alternatives can be designed and implemented to mitigate risk. DOD is in the process of developing a management tool designed to match its inventory of language and regional proficiency skills to requirements for these skills so that DOD can identify potential gaps. While DOD has developed an inventory of its language capabilities, it does not yet have an inventory of its regional proficiency capabilities because DOD lacks an agreed upon way to assess and validate these skills. Also, although DOD has a process to identify its language and regional proficiency requirements, it lacks a transparent, validated methodology to aid combatant commanders, DOD components, and defense agencies in identifying these requirements. In the absence of a validated methodology, estimates of requirements have differed. For example, as of February 2008, U.S. Pacific Command's requirements outnumbered the requirements of all other combatant commands combined. DOD has two assessments under way, which DOD officials expect may assist them in developing a validated methodology for determining their requirements. These efforts are in the early stages of planning and, while they have a scope, it may not take into account the full range of requirements, such as non-warfighting activities. Overall, without a complete inventory and a validated methodology, DOD cannot effectively assess risk and make informed investment decisions in its language and regional proficiency capabilities. |
gao_GAO-09-795T | gao_GAO-09-795T_0 | Background
As of the time of this hearing, the CDFI Fund in the Department of the Treasury has authorized $21 billion of the $26 billion in tax credit authority to be awarded between 2001 and 2009 to CDEs that manage NMTC investments in low-income community development projects. Since we issued the report on which this statement is based, the CDFI Fund announced on May 27, 2009 an additional 32 NMTC awards to 2008 applicants totaling $1.5 billion under authority granted by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). According to our analysis, minority CDEs received three of these awards totaling $135 million. Non-minority CDEs received the other 29 of these awards totaling about $1.4 billion. Minority Entities Have Received Proportionately Fewer Awards Than Non-Minority Entities
From 2005 through 2008, minority-owned CDEs were successful with about 9 percent of the NMTC applications that they submitted to the CDFI Fund and received about $354 million of the $8.7 billion for which they applied, or about 4 percent. By comparison, non-minority CDEs were successful with about 27 percent of their applications and received $13.2 billion of the $89.7 billion for which they applied, or about 15 percent. The CDFI Fund’s process for making NMTC awards takes place in two phases. To identify challenges minority and non-minority CDEs face in obtaining NMTC allocations, we interviewed representatives from minority and non- minority CDEs, and we analyzed CDFI Fund application data. When controlling for factors we could, our analysis also shows that minority status is associated with a lower probability of receiving an allocation. It is not clear from our analysis why minority status is associated with a lower probability of obtaining an allocation or whether any actions taken or not taken by the Department of the Treasury or the CDFI Fund contributed to this statistical relationship. According to CDFI Fund officials, the CDFI Fund has conducted outreach intended to reach all CDEs that may have an interest in applying for NMTCs and CDFI Fund staff have given presentations to industry associations, such as the New Markets Tax Credit Coalition; the National Bankers Association (NBA), an industry organization that represents minority-owned banks; and at FDIC conferences targeted to minority- owned institutions. The CDFI Fund also provides a written debriefing to each CDE that does not receive an allocation to assist the CDE in future application rounds. External stakeholders, including representatives from industry associations we identified, hold conferences and offer varying degrees of assistance to CDEs submitting competitive NMTC applications. In addition, a fourth option would be for Congress to direct the Department of the Treasury and the CDFI Fund to explore options for providing technical assistance in applying for and using NMTC allocations to minority CDEs. Although these options could increase the amount of NMTC authority awarded to minority CDEs, in part because we could not definitively identify the reasons why minority CDEs have scored lower on the NMTC application than non-minority CDEs, the options may not address the underlying reasons for lower minority CDE success. As I noted earlier, the more detailed findings and conclusions of our review of minority CDEs’ participation in the New Markets Tax Credit program can be found in our recently issued report (GAO-09-536). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund in the Department of the Treasury has awarded $21 billion of the $26 billion in New Markets Tax Credits (NMTC) authorized to be awarded to Community Development Entities (CDE) between 2001 and 2009. CDEs use the NMTC to make qualified investments in low-income communities. Recent congressional interest has focused on participation by minority CDEs. This testimony is based on a recent GAO report (GAO-09-536). As requested, the report (1) identified the number of minority and non-minority CDEs that applied to the CDFI Fund and received NMTC awards, (2) explained the process by which the CDFI Fund makes awards and summarized application scores, (3) described challenges minority and non-minority CDEs face in applying for and receiving awards and, (4) identified efforts the CDFI Fund and others have taken to assist minority CDEs in applying for awards. GAO analyzed CDFI Fund application data and interviewed officials from minority and non-minority CDEs, the CDFI Fund, and industry groups.
What GAO Found
From 2005 through 2008, minority-owned CDEs were successful with about 9 percent of the NMTC applications that they submitted to the CDFI Fund and received about $354 million of the $8.7 billion for which they applied, or about 4 percent. Non-minority CDEs were successful with about 27 percent of their applications and received $13.2 billion of the $89.7 billion for which they applied, or about 15 percent. Since GAO issued the report on which this statement is based, the CDFI Fund made 32 NMTC awards totaling $1.5 billion under authority provided in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Minority CDEs received 3 of those awards, totaling $135 million. The CDFI Fund relies primarily on its scoring of applications to determine which CDEs receive awards. As the figure shows, minority CDEs received lower scores than non-minority CDEs in each of the four application sections. Although a CDE's resources and experience in applying are important factors in a CDE's success rate with the NMTC program, when controlling for factors that GAO could measure, minority status is associated with a lower probability of receiving an allocation. It is not clear from GAO's analysis why this relationship exists or whether any actions taken or not taken by the Department of the Treasury contributed to minority CDEs' lower probability of success. Characteristics associated with minority status of some CDEs for which data are unavailable may affect this relationship. If Congress views increased participation by minority CDEs as a goal for the NMTC program, options, such as providing certain preferences in the application process that may benefit minority CDEs, could be considered. The CDFI Fund provides assistance that is available to all CDEs applying for awards, including a written debriefing to CDEs that do not receive awards detailing some of the weaknesses in the applications. Other stakeholders, including industry associations and consultants, hold conferences and offer services to help CDEs submit competitive applications. Should Congress view additional assistance to minority CDEs as important to increasing minority CDEs' participation in the NMTC program, it could consider requiring the CDFI Fund to provide assistance to minority CDEs. |
gao_HEHS-95-24 | gao_HEHS-95-24_0 | Our review focused on (1)whether the CSE program has the essential management tools in place at the federal level that a program needs to fulfill its mission; (2) how well the federal office, OCSE, has fulfilled its role in fostering the development of state CSE programs; and (3) what state CSE programs are doing to overcome barriers hampering CSE efforts. In addition, we examined implications of welfare reform proposals and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) for the CSE program. Under the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 (P.L. In addition, some of the welfare reform proposals would add to OCSE’s responsibilities by requiring it to establish and operate national databases for support orders and other information. AFDC collection efforts, therefore, drive state performance. New York Office of Child Support Enforcement officials expressed similar sentiments about their state legislature’s goals. The child support enforcement work group is focusing on common training needs and federal-state communication. Some States Have Developed Their Own Program Monitoring Strategies
Some states have developed their own internal audit procedures and monitoring systems to ensure compliance with federal standards and provide more timely performance evaluation for program management. These barriers include (1) increasingly complex and growing workloads coupled with resource constraints, (2) limited computer system capacity, (3) dispersed program control and lack of uniform procedures, (4) lack of legislative support, and (5) inadequate communication between the AFDC and CSE programs. These strategies include hiring more staff and increasing the use of (1) administrative rather than judicial processes, (2) innovative enforcement techniques, (3) automation, and (4) contracts with the private sector. As program mission and caseload have expanded over time, OCSE has continued to lack some important management tools, including a clearly articulated program mission, programwide planning and goal-setting, and a means to measure progress toward goals. Such a reengineering could not only help federal-state program relations but also serve as a means for OCSE and state program staff to obtain accurate and consistent performance data—key management data that could help OCSE and states as they seek to better serve the families that depend on CSE efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the national child support enforcement (CSE) program, focusing on: (1) whether the federal government has essential management tools in place to fulfill the program's mission; (2) how well the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) has fulfilled its role in fostering the development of state CSE programs; (3) state efforts to overcome barriers hampering enforcement efforts; and (4) the implications of welfare reform proposals and the impact of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the federal CSE program lacks a well-articulated mission, programwide planning and goal-setting, and accurate program performance data to guide program management; (2) as a GPRA pilot agency, OCSE has initiated management improvements to better serve the states and families by including stakeholders, establishing long-term goals, and focusing on program results; (3) OCSE has almost eliminated the technical support and training it provides to state programs because of declining resources; (4) various organizational and staff changes have created problems in communications between federal and state CSE officials; (5) OCSE audit and data collection efforts are insufficient to provide needed information on program results; (6) some states have set up their own audit procedures and monitoring systems; (7) common barriers hampering state enforcement efforts include increasing workloads, inadequate resources and computer systems, lack of control over local units, state legislatures' failure to support state program initiatives, inadequate client information, and nonstandardized procedures; (8) to overcome program impediments, some states have augmented their staffs with volunteers, introduced administrative procedures in place of judicial procedures, contracted with private collection agencies, improved automation, and used innovative enforcement techniques; and (9) many welfare reform proposals would expand child support enforcement missions and restructure program funding, but OCSE may have trouble implementing changes unless it strengthens its leadership and program management. |
gao_GAO-07-654 | gao_GAO-07-654_0 | Significant Opportunities Exist for Incorporating Energy Efficiency Measures into Gulf Coast Reconstruction Efforts, Which Could Reduce Energy Expenditures
The anticipated rebuilding and repairing of residential and commercial structures in the Gulf Coast creates an important opportunity for incorporating energy efficiency improvements that could produce long- term energy cost savings. We estimated that newer building codes and standards could significantly reduce energy expenditures for residential and commercial buildings in Louisiana and Mississippi, depending on the rebuilding efforts in these states. The Scope and Status of the Reconstruction Efforts Create Significant Opportunities to Reduce Energy Expenditures through New Building Codes and Standards
The sheer magnitude of the reconstruction effort creates a tremendous opportunity for incorporating energy efficiency improvements into rebuilt homes and buildings. This rebuilding creates an opportunity for these states to make wide-scale improvements to their building stock, especially the older vintage housing in the areas. Since these planning efforts are evolving, now is an opportune time to consider fully incorporating energy efficiency improvements in the reconstruction efforts. Furthermore, Louisiana’s and Mississippi’s recent adoption of newer and more energy efficient building codes creates a unique opportunity for rebuilding all of the destroyed and severely damaged homes in a manner that could result in significant energy cost savings for these two states. Second, states will face serious challenges ensuring compliance with newer building codes, thereby potentially limiting energy cost savings opportunities from being realized. Availability of a Skilled Construction Workforce Trained to Meet Newer Building Codes and Standards May Limit Energy Cost Savings
The shortage of a skilled construction workforce capable of sustaining the rebuilding and repairing of destroyed and damaged homes in Louisiana and Mississippi may limit the energy cost savings that can be achieved by rebuilding to the newly adopted building codes. Energy Efficiency May Be a Low Priority When Consumers Consider Rebuilding or Repairing Destroyed and Damaged Homes
According to state officials, home builders, and non-profit organizations in Louisiana and Mississippi, consumers who desire to return to their homes face difficult financial questions regarding compensation payments, the higher costs of construction and insurance, and the availability of employment, which may make decisions about energy efficiency a low priority. HUD and DOE Are Providing Funding and Educational Resources to Encourage Gulf Coast States to Incorporate Energy Efficiency in Rebuilding
Because the rebuilding of the Gulf Coast is largely a state and local matter, HUD and DOE have played a supportive role in promoting energy efficient rebuilding. More specifically, HUD and DOE have provided financial and educational resources that can encourage the incorporation of energy efficiency in the reconstruction of the Gulf Coast. In addition both agencies have broader national programs that may assist Louisiana and Mississippi in incorporating energy efficiency improvements during their rebuilding. HUD also has actions that were planned or under way prior to the Gulf Coast hurricanes that are designed to improve the energy efficiency of the nation’s public housing stock and that could potentially benefit the Gulf Coast states. DOE Is Providing Energy Efficiency Training and Education to Consumers and State and Local Officials
In its capacity as the nation’s lead agency on energy efficiency issues, DOE’s primary role in the Gulf Coast reconstruction has been to support states by provide training and education to state and local officials, private industry, and consumers. DOE has taken other actions to encourage parties involved in the rebuilding process to consider energy efficiency. State Energy Program (SEP): DOE’s SEP provides grants to the states to design and carry out their own renewable energy and energy efficiency programs. DOE expertise as well as HUD and DOE resources may prove invaluable to states and consumers as they make decisions about building code training and enforcement, energy efficiency construction practices, and purchasing energy efficient appliances and equipment. HUD had no comments on the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
During our review, our objectives were to (1) analyze the extent of opportunities for incorporating energy efficiency improvements and realizing energy cost savings in the Gulf Coast reconstruction, (2) discuss potential challenges to realizing energy cost savings during the reconstruction, and (3) describe the role of Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) in promoting energy efficiency in the rebuilding of the Gulf Coast. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following several hurricanes in 2005, the need to rebuild and repair destroyed and damaged homes and buildings in the Gulf Coast region may create opportunities for making energy efficiency improvements and realizing energy cost savings. While numerous federal agencies are involved in the recovery process, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) interact with the states on a regular basis regarding matters of energy efficiency. This report, initiated under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States, examines (1) the extent of opportunities for incorporating energy efficiency improvements in the Gulf Coast reconstruction, (2) potential challenges to realizing the energy cost savings during the reconstruction, and (3) the role of HUD and DOE in promoting energy efficiency in the rebuilding of the Gulf Coast. GAO limited the scope of its work to Louisiana and Mississippi since these states experienced the majority of the hurricane damage. GAO assessed opportunities for incorporating energy efficiency measures by conducting site visits and interviewing federal, state government officials; home builders; and energy efficiency experts. GAO also worked with a DOE national laboratory to develop energy cost savings estimates. GAO is making no recommendations.
What GAO Found
Reconstruction in the Gulf Coast creates a significant opportunity for incorporating energy efficiency improvements that could produce long-term energy costs savings in residential and commercial buildings. The sheer magnitude of the reconstruction effort and Louisiana's and Mississippi's recent adoption of more energy-efficient building codes makes this an opportune time for incorporating energy efficiency improvements in the rebuilding efforts. In partnership with a DOE national laboratory, GAO analyzed energy cost savings opportunities and estimated that adopting these newer building codes could reduce residential energy costs in these two states by at least $20 to $28 million per year, depending on the extent of the rebuilding efforts in these states. Furthermore, the analysis also showed that annual energy expenditures for commercial buildings--hospitals, schools, offices, and retail buildings--built to newer energy standards could be about 7 to 34 percent lower than buildings built to older standards. There also are opportunities for consumers to make additional energy efficiency improvements to both building types by replacing old, damaged equipment. There are three substantial challenges to realizing the energy cost savings opportunities presented by the Gulf Coast reconstruction: (1) the shortage of a skilled construction workforce, and specifically, the shortage of workers trained to meet the newer building codes; (2) the lack of trained building code inspectors to ensure compliance with newer building codes in Louisiana and Mississippi; and (3) the difficult financial issues facing consumers, such as the sufficiency of insurance and other compensation payments, that may make decisions about energy efficiency a low priority. States have efforts under way to address many of these challenges and it will take time and sustained commitment for them to be successful. The rebuilding of the Gulf Coast is largely a state and local matter, but HUD and DOE have played a supportive role in promoting energy efficient rebuilding. HUD and DOE have provided financial and educational resources that can encourage energy efficient rebuilding, and both agencies have broader national programs that may support energy efficiency improvements in the rebuilding of the Gulf Coast. HUD has made $16.7 billion in funding available for general rebuilding purposes, such as restoring damaged housing, and allows states to determine how to spend these funds, including using them for energy efficient improvements. HUD also has several national initiatives that may directly improve the energy efficiency of the public housing stock in Gulf Coast states. DOE has sponsored education and training on energy efficiency issues to state and local officials, private industry, and consumers in Louisiana and Mississippi. As part of its nationwide effort to assist all states with energy efficiency initiatives, DOE provides grants to states to design and carry out their own energy efficiency programs. DOE's energy expertise as well as HUD and DOE resources may prove valuable to the states and consumers as they make decisions about energy efficient rebuilding in the Gulf Coast. |
gao_GAO-15-676 | gao_GAO-15-676_0 | On cutaways, a bus body is manufactured and mounted on a chassis built by another manufacturer. The Number of Bus Manufacturers Has Declined, but Bus Production Has Remained Constant
The Number of Heavy- duty Manufacturers Has Declined
Over the last decade, the number of heavy-duty transit bus manufacturers in the U.S. has declined due to business failures and consolidation. At least two companies started producing buses—two companies not identified in 2004 each produced about 4 percent of the cutaway buses in 2013. Excluding buses purchased with funds from the Recovery Act, the number of buses procured by transit agencies annually varied slightly from 2009 through 2013 (see table 2). FTA Funds Bus Procurements through Grant Programs and Provides Oversight and Guidance to Transit Agencies
FTA provides support for public transportation by awarding federal funding—about $11 billion in 2013—to transit agencies in the form of grants. Specifically, from fiscal years 2009 to 2013, the most recent year data are available, obligations made by FTA to transit agencies for bus procurement increased (see table 3). For example, transit agencies and others used approximately $1.7 billion provided by the Recovery Act for procuring 7,544 buses from 2009 to 2010. Transit Agencies Are Responsible for Complying with FTA’s Bus Procurement Requirements
When using federal funds from FTA to procure buses, transit agencies must comply with a range of federal requirements that include government-wide requirements, such as complying with the ADA, as well as FTA-specific requirements, such as providing a local funding match for federal grants. For example, FTA conducts triennial reviews of transit agencies receiving Urbanized Area grant funds. Without updated guidance, transit agencies may not be able to purchase buses as efficiently as possible; for example, they may need to spend additional time researching the guidance or they may have to repeat a required step in the procurement process. FTA also provides technical assistance and training on bus procurement. A 2006 FTA report concluded that “the greatest challenges cited by both transit agencies and bus manufacturers were related to bus procurement and contracting.” As discussed previously, to identify and understand procurement challenges faced by transit agencies, we conducted six discussion groups with officials of 36 rural and urban transit agencies. In addition to the challenges above, some transit agency officials in our discussion groups cited challenges that specifically affect rural, urban small and medium-sized agencies:
Participants in four groups noted that the procurement process is difficult and resource intensive. In the past, entities other than federal agencies have been authorized to purchase items through GSA. According to FTA and GSA officials, both agencies have explored the feasibility of establishing a process to allow transit agencies to procure buses through GSA and both agencies support the concept. However, GSA officials told us that Congress would have to authorize transit agencies to purchase through GSA. Neither agency has submitted a legislative proposal to Congress. In 2013, transit agencies used over $1 billion of federal funding to purchase buses. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that transit agencies have appropriate and current guidance to assist them when procuring transit buses, we recommend that the Administrator of FTA update its Best Practices Procurement Manual and assess its other related guidance identified in this report and update that guidance as needed. To provide a more efficient and cost-effective way for transit agencies to procure transit buses while complying with federal procurement requirements, we recommend that the Administrator of FTA, in conjunction with the Administrator of the General Services Administration, submit a legislative proposal to Congress that would authorize transit agencies that are recipients of FTA grants to access GSA sources of supply for the purchase of transit buses. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the characteristics of the U.S. transit bus market, including manufacturing capacity and the production of new buses; (2) the federal role in transit bus procurement, including funding, procurement requirements, and oversight and guidance; and, (3) the views of selected transit agencies on challenges, if any, that they face when procuring new buses and any federal actions that could address those challenges. To determine the characteristics of the U.S. transit bus market, we reviewed FTA’s Annual Statistical Summaries from fiscal years 2009 to 2013, the latest year data are available, and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) Statistical Summaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Buses are critical to the nation's public transportation services. According to data from FTA's National Transit Database, buses carry more passengers than all other modes combined. FTA provides grants to transit agencies to buy buses. When making these purchases, agencies must comply with a range of federal requirements. GAO was asked to review the transit bus market and federal role in bus procurement.
This report examines (1) the characteristics of the U.S. transit bus market, (2) the federal role in transit bus procurement, and (3) views of selected transit agencies on challenges, if any, agencies face when procuring new buses and federal actions that could address those challenges. GAO reviewed FTA's National Transit Database data from 2004 and 2013 and applicable federal law, regulations, and grant documents; conducted six discussion groups with representatives of 36 rural and urban transit agencies; and interviewed FTA and GSA officials, national transit industry organizations, and transit bus manufacturers.
What GAO Found
Overall, the number of manufacturers of transit buses has declined in recent years, but bus production has remained constant. Transit agencies purchase over 5,000 buses per year—about half are heavy-duty buses and half are smaller buses called “cutaways” because they consist of a bus body on top of a chassis built by another manufacturer. The number of firms that produce most heavy-duty transit buses declined from 10 in 2004 to 4 in 2013, the latest year data were available, due to business failures and consolidation. In contrast, the number of firms that produce most cutaways increased over the same time frame from 13 to 15. The number of buses procured annually by transit agencies from 2009–2013, using grant funds other than American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) funds, ranged from 4,670 to 5,652. Transit agencies and others used Recovery Act funds to purchase 7,544 more buses in 2009 and 2010.
The amount of Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) grant funding that transit agencies used for bus procurement increased from $794 million in 2009 to $1.3 billion in 2013. Also, agencies spent $1.7 billion in funds from the Recovery Act on buses from 2009 to 2010. FTA oversees transit agencies by requiring them to certify their compliance with a range of federal requirements and by periodic reviews. FTA also provides bus procurement guidance and technical assistance. However, GAO found that some resources provided by FTA, such as its Best Practices Procurement Manual , reference obsolete FTA documents. Without updated guidance, transit agency officials may not be able to purchase buses as efficiently as possible because they may need to spend additional time researching the guidance or to repeat a required step in the procurement process.
Transit agency officials GAO spoke with identified a range of challenges they face when procuring buses. Those challenges include difficulties in complying with federal procurement requirements. For example, officials reported that it is time consuming to comply with a requirement to certify that at least 60 percent of the bus's components are made in the U.S. because the agency must conduct pre- and post-award reviews of bus manufacturers. Transit agency officials in four of six discussion groups also identified the procurement process as difficult and resource-intensive, particularly for those transit agencies that do not purchase buses each year and may lack procurement capacity. Transit agency officials in four of six discussion groups stated these challenges could be addressed by allowing agencies access to General Services Administration's (GSA) sources of supply. Purchasing through GSA could allow agencies to decrease the time they spend on bus procurements since GSA would be responsible for ensuring that vehicles comply with federal procurement requirements. Further, purchasing through GSA could result in lower prices for buses, given GSA's ability to purchase vehicles well below the dealer invoice. According to FTA and GSA officials, both agencies have explored the feasibility of establishing a process to allow transit agencies to procure buses through GSA, but neither agency has developed a legislative proposal requesting that Congress grant authority to allow transit agencies to do so. In the past, nonfederal entities, such as state and local governments, have been authorized to purchase items through GSA.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends FTA update its Best Practices Procurement Manual , assess its other related guidance, and update that guidance as needed. GAO also recommends FTA work with GSA to develop a legislative proposal to authorize transit agencies that receive relevant FTA grants to access GSA sources of supply for the purchase of transit buses. FTA and GSA agreed with our recommendations |
gao_HEHS-96-157 | gao_HEHS-96-157_0 | Restricting our analysis to only those fiscal year 1994 inspections in which the company was assessed a significant proposed penalty of $15,000 or more, we found 261 federal contractors had violated the Occupational Safety and Health Act.Because some of the 261 federal contractors owned more than one worksite, we identified a total of 345 inspections, representing 16 percent of all inspections closed in fiscal year 1994 in which a significant proposed penalty was assessed for OSHA violations (see fig. $38 Billion Awarded Primarily From Defense Department
These federal contractors received $38 billion in contracts in fiscal year 1994. Nearly 5 percent received more than $500 million each in federal contracts in fiscal year 1994. However, it is possible, particularly given the size of some federal contractors, that at least some violations occurred at worksites other than those with contract activity. 5). 6.) 7). 8). Also, contractors might be more attentive to their safety and health practices if OSHA were to give inspection priority to those high-hazard workplaces operated by federal contractors. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to (1) determine how many companies receiving federal contracts have also been assessed penalties for violations of occupational safety and health regulations, (2) describe the characteristics of these contractors and their contracts, (3) describe the kinds of violations for which these contractors were cited, and (4) identify ways to improve contractor compliance with workplace safety and health requirements. Using FPDS, we examined total contract dollars awarded by each federal agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined federal contractors' compliance with federal occupational safety and health regulations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) federal contracts are awarded to employers violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA); (2) in fiscal year (FY) 1994, 261 federal contractors received penalties of at least $15,000 for violating OSHA regulations; (3) 5 percent of these contractors received more than $500 million in federal contracts; (4) contract violations typically occurred at worksites with fewer than 500 employees and at manufacturing plants; (5) federal contractors received $38 billion in contract dollars for FY 1994; (6) most of the contract violations involved companies' failure to protect their workers from electrical hazard or injury; (7) the actual penalties assessed during contractor worksite inspections totalled $10.9 million; (8) in 8 percent of those inspections, the contractor received a penalty of at least $100,000; (9) some of the federal contractors participated in the OSHA Voluntary Compliance Program; (10) OSHA contracting and debarring officials use safety and health compliance information to make their award decisions; and (11) federal contractors would be more attentive to their safety and health practices if OSHA gave greater priority to those high-hazard workplaces operated by federal contractors. |
gao_GGD-98-5 | gao_GGD-98-5_0 | Mortgage-Backed Securities
MBS are debt securities that are created from residential mortgages. The activities of dealers marketing OTC derivatives that are determined to be futures are subject to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) oversight. Most OTC derivatives are not considered to be securities or futures by the dealers offering them. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To address congressional concerns associated with sales practices for OTC derivatives, MBS, and structured notes, our objectives were to analyze (1) the federal sales practice requirements applicable to these products and the dealers marketing them; (2) the extent of end-user satisfaction with sales practices, product use, and related disputes and the costs of these disputes; (3) the views of end-users and dealers on the nature of their relationship and responsibilities; (4) the actions dealers and end-users have taken to reduce the potential for sales practice disputes; and (5) the actions regulators have taken to address sales practice issues. In addition, we reviewed the sales practice guidance provided by federal bank regulators for their examiners and the dealers they oversee. To analyze the actions that regulators have taken to address sales practice issues, we interviewed federal financial market regulators. Federal Sales Practice Requirements Vary by Product and Dealer
The federal sales practice requirements designed to protect end-users of OTC derivatives vary, depending, in part, on whether the specific product in question is a security, a futures contract, or neither product. State Statutory and Common Law Claims Would Be Asserted in Disputes Involving OTC Derivatives That Are Not Subject to Federal Laws
To the extent that OTC derivatives are not covered by either the federal securities or commodities laws, an end-user alleging sales practice misconduct by a dealer would need to seek relief by asserting primarily state statutory or common law claims, such as fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. MBS and Structured Notes Are Typically Subject to the Securities Laws
MBS and structured notes are typically considered to be securities and subject to the federal securities laws, except when exempted from specific provisions. Securities, futures, and insurance firms typically conduct their nonsecurities and nonfutures OTC derivatives marketing in affiliates not subject to direct federal oversight, although some individual transactions may be subject to oversight. Review of regulatory and other data indicated that cases involving sales practice disputes were not widespread. Most End-Users Were Generally Satisfied With Dealer Sales Practices
According to our 1995 survey of a wide range of U.S. organizations, most end-users were generally satisfied with the sales practices of the dealers that marketed OTC derivatives, MBS, and structured notes to them. 6). However, end-users’ views on counterparty relationships differed from those reflected in voluntary guidance issued by two groups of dealer representatives. In contrast to banking regulators, the regulatory authority of SEC and CFTC does not extend to the unregulated affiliates of the firms they otherwise regulate. 3). Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions
Although OTC derivatives are subject to sales practice requirements that vary, depending on the dealer or specific product involved, our survey found that most end-users of these products were generally satisfied with the sales practices of dealers with whom they did business. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the sales practices for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and structured notes, focusing on the: (1) federal sales practice requirements applicable to these products and the dealers marketing them; (2) extent of end-user satisfaction with sales practice, product use, and related disputes and the costs of these disputes; (3) views of end-users and dealers on the nature of their relationship and responsibilities; (4) actions dealers and end-users have taken to reduce the potential for sales practice disputes; and (5) actions regulators have taken to address sales practice issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the extent to which OTC derivatives are subject to federal sales practice requirements intended to protect end-users varies, depending, in part, on whether they are considered to be securities, futures, or neither; (2) when they are considered to be securities or futures, their sale is covered by the federal securities or commodities laws, and they are regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), respectively; (3) to the extent that these products are not securities or futures, end-users with sales practice disputes would need to seek redress against a dealer by asserting primarily state statutory or common law claims; (4) in contrast to most OTC derivatives, MBS and structured notes are typically securities and, thereby, subject to the federal securities laws, except when exempted from specific provisions; (5) the extent to which sales practice requirements apply to the dealers marketing OTC derivatives in the United States also varies, depending on whether the dealer offering them is regulated; (6) when OTC derivatives are marketed by banks, they are subject to supervisory guidance issued by federal bank regulators; (7) securities, futures, and insurance firms, unlike banks, typically market OTC derivatives that they consider to be neither securities nor futures from affiliates that are not subject to any direct federal financial regulatory oversight, although some individual transactions may be subject to such oversight; (8) although sales practice requirements vary by product and dealer, according to GAO's survey, most end-users were generally satisfied with the sales practices of the dealers with whom they entered transactions; (9) GAO's survey also found that relatively few organizations reported using OTC derivatives; (10) GAO's review of regulatory and public records, covering 1993 through 1996, indicated that cases involving actual or alleged deficiencies in dealer sales practices were limited in number; (11) however, the dealers and end-users involved in these cases often experienced significant costs; (12) although generally satisfied with dealer sales practices, end-users' views on the nature of counterparty relationships sometimes differed from those of dealers; (13) in addition, bank regulators have taken certain actions to address sales practice issues; and (14) although SEC and CFTC do not directly regulate the affiliates that securities and futures firms use to conduct their OTC derivatives activities, SEC and CFTC worked with the most active of these firms to produce one of two sets of voluntary guidance. |
gao_GAO-13-810T | gao_GAO-13-810T_0 | Background
Many DOD organizations, collectively known as the missing persons accounting community, have a role in accounting for the missing, as discussed below. PACOM exercises authority over the Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command (JPAC), which is responsible for conducting operations in support of achieving the missing persons accounting mission. The past conflict accounting section of the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory conducts DNA analyses of remains of missing persons from past military conflicts for JPAC and its laboratory component, the Central Identification Laboratory, and maintains the past conflict accounting family reference sample database, to include processing of all DNA references. Accounting Community’s Fragmented Organizational Structure Exacerbates Weaknesses in Leadership
The department’s response to the accounting-for goal established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 brought into sharp relief longstanding disputes that have not been addressed by top- level leaders, and have been exacerbated by the accounting community’s fragmented organizational structure. As I will describe in more detail later in this statement, leadership from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Pacific Command have been unable to resolve disputes between community members in areas such as roles and responsibilities and developing a community-wide plan to meet the statutory accounting- for goal. Further, the accounting community is fragmented in that the community members belong to diverse parent organizations under several different chains of command. With accounting community organizations reporting under different lines of authority, no single entity has overarching responsibility for community-wide personnel and other resources. DOD Guidance Does Not Clearly Articulate Roles and Responsibilities for All Accounting Community Organizations
While DOD is working to revise its existing guidance and develop new guidance, the roles and responsibilities of the various members of the missing persons accounting community are not all clearly articulated in existing DOD directives or instructions. We have previously reported on the need for collaborating agencies to work together to define and agree on their roles and responsibilities. DOD has established several directives and instructions related to the missing persons accounting program. However, none of this guidance clearly delineates the specific roles and responsibilities of all the organizations comprising the missing persons accounting community in the four key areas that we examined for our July 2013 report: (1) equipment and artifact identification and analysis, (2) research and analysis, (3) investigations, and (4) family outreach and external communications. Disagreements over roles and responsibilities where the guidance is broad or vague enough to support different interpretations has led to discord, lack of collaboration, and friction among the community’s members, and particularly between DPMO and JPAC. Development of Community-wide Plan Is Impeded by a Fragmented Approach to Planning and Disputes among Community Members
While DOD has made some progress in drafting a community-wide plan to increase its capability and capacity to meet the statutory accounting-for goal, as of June 2013 DOD had not completed a community-wide plan. We have previously reported that overarching plans can help agencies better align their activities, processes, and resources to collaborate effectively to accomplish a commonly defined outcome. However, our July 2013 report found that community-wide planning to meet the accounting-for goal established by Congress has been impeded by disputes and by a lack of coordination among members of the missing persons accounting community, with DPMO and JPAC developing two competing proposed plans, neither of which encompassed the entire accounting community. In response to a December 2009 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense directing the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs to begin planning to meet the accounting-for goal, USD Policy and PACOM allowed the development of these two competing proposed plans for obtaining additional funding and resources to meet the mandated capability and capacity. As of May 2013, the JPAC plan, which does not incorporate the larger accounting community, is DOD’s only plan to increase capability and capacity to account for missing persons. Moreover, there is no community-wide process to provide resources for the missing persons accounting mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's findings and recommendations about DOD's missing persons accounting mission from our recently issued report, DOD's POW/MIA Mission: Top-Level Leadership Attention Needed to Resolve Longstanding Challenges in Accounting for Missing Persons from Past Conflicts. DOD reports that more than 83,000 persons are missing from past conflicts in Vietnam, Korea, the Cold War, the Persian Gulf, and World War II. Since the early 1970s, DOD has identified the remains of and accounted for approximately 1,910 persons. Several DOD components and organizations, collectively known as the missing persons accounting community, have a role in accounting for missing persons. Between 2002 and 2012, DOD accounted for an average of 72 persons each year. In 2009, Congress established an accounting-for goal in Section 541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This act required the Secretary of Defense to provide such funds, personnel, and resources as the Secretary considers appropriate to increase significantly the capability and capacity of DOD, the Armed Forces, and commanders of the combatant commands to account for missing persons, so that the accounting community has sufficient resources to ensure that at least 200 missing persons are accounted for annually, beginning in fiscal year 2015.The law also added all World War II losses to the list of conflicts for which DOD is responsible, thus increasing from about 10,000 to 83,000 the number of missing persons for whom DOD must account.
In 2012, in a committee report to accompany a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the House Armed Services Committee mandated that GAO review DODs efforts to increase its capability and capacity to account for missing persons. GAO will focus on three key issues identified in the report, specifically: (1) the accounting communitys organizational structure, (2) the lack of clarity regarding community members roles and responsibilities, and (3) DODs planning to meet the statutory accounting-for goal.
What GAO Found
The department's response to the accounting-for goal established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 brought into sharp relief longstanding disputes that have not been addressed by top-level leaders, and have been exacerbated by the accounting community's fragmented organizational structure. Leadership from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Pacific Command have been unable to resolve disputes between community members in areas such as roles and responsibilities and developing a community-wide plan to meet the statutory accounting-for goal. Further, the accounting community is fragmented in that the community members belong to diverse parent organizations under several different chains of command. With accounting community organizations reporting under different lines of authority, no single entity has overarching responsibility for community-wide personnel and other resources.
While the Department of Defense (DOD) is working to revise its existing guidance and develop new guidance, the roles and responsibilities of the various members of the missing persons accounting community are not all clearly articulated in existing DOD directives or instructions. GAO has previously reported on the need for collaborating agencies to work together to define and agree on their roles and responsibilities. DOD has established several directives and instructions related to the missing persons accounting program. However, none of this guidance clearly delineates the specific roles and responsibilities of all the organizations comprising the missing persons accounting community in the four key areas that GAO examined for the July 2013 report: (1) equipment and artifact identification and analysis, (2) research and analysis, (3) investigations, and (4) family outreach and external communications. Disagreements over roles and responsibilities where the guidance is broad or vague enough to support different interpretations has led to discord, lack of collaboration, and friction among the community's members, and particularly between the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) and Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command (JPAC).
While DOD has made some progress in drafting a community-wide plan to increase its capability and capacity to meet the statutory accounting-for goal, as of June 2013 DOD had not completed a community-wide plan. GAO has previously reported that overarching plans can help agencies better align their activities, processes, and resources to collaborate effectively to accomplish a commonly defined outcome. However, GAO's July 2013 report found that community-wide planning to meet the accounting-for goal established by Congress has been impeded by disputes and by a lack of coordination among members of the missing persons accounting community, with the DPMO and JPAC developing two competing proposed plans, neither of which encompassed the entire accounting community. |
gao_T-GGD-98-14 | gao_T-GGD-98-14_0 | GSA’s April 28 draft strategic plan contained all the six components required by the Results Act. However, the draft plan generally lacked clarity, context, descriptive information, and linkages among the components. GSA has since made a number of improvements, and the six components better achieve the purposes of the Act. However, additional improvements would strengthen the September 30 plan as it evolves over time. The strategies component is an improvement over the prior version but would benefit from a more detailed discussion of how each goal will actually be accomplished. Although the key external factors component in the September 30 plan is clearer and provides more context, the factors are not clearly linked to the general goals and objectives. The program evaluations component provides a listing of the various program evaluations that GSA used, but it does not include the required schedule of future evaluations. Although the plan does a much better job of setting forth GSA’s statutory authorities, this addition could be further improved by linking the different authorities to either the general goals and objectives or the performance goals. The plan also refers to three related areas—crosscutting issues, major management problems, and data reliability—but the discussion is limited and not as useful as it could be in trying to assess the impact of these factors on meeting and measuring the goals. This is especially true for major management and data reliability problems, which can have a negative impact on measuring progress and achieving the goals. Requirements Under the Results Act
strategies) to achieve the goals and objectives and the various resources needed; (4) a description of the relationship between the long-term goals/objectives and the annual performance plans required by the Act; (5) an identification of key factors, external to the agency and beyond its control, that could significantly affect achievement of the strategic goals; and (6) a description of how program evaluations were used to establish and revise strategic goals and a schedule for future program evaluations. Strategic Plan Can Be Further Improved
As we discussed in our July 7, 1997, report on the draft plan, the September 30 plan continues to have general goals and objectives that seem to be expressed in terms that may be challenging to translate into quantitative or measurable analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its observations on the General Services Administration's (GSA) September 30, 1997, strategic plan.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GSA's April 1997 draft strategic plan contained all six components required by the Government Performance and Results Act; (2) however, the draft plan generally lacked clarity, context, descriptive information, and linkages among the components; (3) GSA has since made a number of improvements, and the six components now better achieve the purposes of the act; (4) however, additional improvements would strengthen the September 30 plan as it evolves over time; (5) the September 30 plan continues to have general goals and objectives that seem to be expressed in terms that may be challenging to translate into quantitative analysis; (6) the strategies component is an improvement over the prior version but would benefit from a more detailed discussion of how each goal will actually be accomplished; (7) although the external factors in the September 30 plan are clearer and provide more context, the factors are not clearly linked to the general goals and objectives; (8) the program evaluations component provides a listing of the various program evaluations that GSA used, but it does not include a required schedule of future evaluations; (9) although the plan does a much better job of setting forth GSA's statutory authorities, this addition could be further improved by linking the different authorities to either the general goals and objectives or the performance goals; (10) the plan also refers to three related areas--crosscutting issues, major management problems, and data reliability--but the discussion is limited and not as useful as it could be in articulating how these issues might affect successful accomplishment of goals and objectives; and (11) this is especially true for major management and data reliability problems, which can have a negative impact on measuring progress and achieving the goals. |
gao_GAO-05-60 | gao_GAO-05-60_0 | If CMS accepts a specialty society’s submission, the data are blended with the existing SMS data used to estimate that specialty’s practice expense payments, although for some nonphysician specialties that were not represented in the original AMA survey, the supplemental data replace the existing SMS data. AMA stated that the PEAC process was concluded in March 2004 because the PEAC had completed its work of reviewing most services. Certain Aspects of CMS’s Review Are Problematic
Although a review of specialty-provided supplemental data from surveys on total practice expenses is necessary to protect against the risk of bias inherent in a voluntary submission process, because of certain aspects of its review, CMS may not be accepting the best available supplemental practice expense data. Review of Supplemental Data Is Necessary
A review of supplemental data submissions is necessary because medical specialty societies voluntarily gather and submit these data, and the data are not audited or verified before being used to establish fees. CMS has established review criteria regarding the data collection method and the respondents to help guard against any perceived or actual bias in the estimates based on these data. In 2002, CMS also reviewed a data submission to determine whether the reported values were reasonable, as a test for accuracy. The PEAC’s process for developing estimates became increasingly systematic from its inception in 1999, and its recommendations were widely accepted by specialty societies and AMA as leading to improved resource estimates for individual services. CMS implemented almost all of the PEAC-recommended estimates, but it has modified certain original estimates and PEAC- recommended estimates. However, CMS did not always use adequate supporting data or explain the rationale for its changes, which has reduced some physician specialties’ confidence in the PEAC process and the resulting estimates. Some of these changes were to estimates that conflicted with Medicare coverage rules or to make estimates consistent across services. For other changes, however, CMS did not always use adequate supporting evidence. CMS officials told us they are in the process of obtaining a contract to collect total practice expense data from the major physician and nonphysician specialties, although it has not provided specifics. CMS has indicated that the ongoing AMA committee—the RUC—will develop resource estimates for new and revised services. Although CMS officials told us that they believe they can complete data collection and review by 2007 as required, they did not identify nor outline a plan to implement the actions needed to ensure that CMS will be able to comply with the mandate to update the fee schedule at least every 5 years. Data sources CMS used to refine the fee schedule no longer exist or are insufficient. Conclusions
CMS’s collaboration with physician specialty societies to update total practice expense estimates and resource estimates for individual services has helped ensure the appropriateness of fees and physician acceptance of Medicare’s payment approach. In addition, CMS’s deviation from its own process in evaluating resource estimates for individual services has caused some physician and specialty societies to question the soundness of the process and CMS’s decision making. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve and update the physician fee schedule, we recommend that the CMS Administrator take the following three actions: Consistently assess the accuracy of all supplemental data submissions on total practice expenses, modify the assessment of representativeness such that the data submitted by specialties better reflect the variation in practice expenses within a specialty, and adjust the precision requirement so that supplemental data submissions that would improve the information currently used to set fees are accepted. Develop and implement a plan to update the fee schedule in a timely manner with representative data on total practice expenses and the resources for individual services so that the fees appropriately reflect changes in medical services and the costs of their delivery. Our concern with the precision requirement is that in applying it CMS may reject data that are more representative than data it currently uses. CMS indicated that it was in the process of obtaining a contract to collect data for future updates to the practice expense portion of the physician fee schedule and that the RUC would continue to be involved in developing practice expense resource estimates for new or revised individual services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare's payments for the costs physicians incur in operating their practices are based on two sets of estimates: total practice expenses and resource estimates for individual services. Total practice expense estimates were derived from American Medical Association (AMA) physician surveys, which the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) refines with supplemental data submitted by medical specialty societies. Resource estimates for individual services were developed by expert panels and refined by CMS with recommendations from another expert panel. In response to a mandate in the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, GAO evaluated CMS's processes for updating total practice expense and resource estimates and whether CMS will have the data necessary to update the fee schedule at least every 5 years as mandated by law.
What GAO Found
CMS reviews supplemental data from medical specialties on total practice expenses to determine whether it should use the data, but aspects of CMS's review may result in its not utilizing the best data. CMS's review is necessary because it helps protect against perceived or actual bias in the estimates. Risk of bias exists because only specialties that believe their Medicare fees are too low are likely to submit supplemental data, and the data are not audited. CMS, however, may still use certain data submissions that are not representative of physician practices within a specialty. CMS also may reject some data that are more representative of a specialty's total practice expenses than the data currently used for that specialty. In addition, CMS reviewed a 2002 data submission for accuracy, which is an important additional check, yet when the data did not meet the accuracy test, CMS did not reject the data. CMS has not stated whether it will review the accuracy of all supplemental data submissions. Stakeholders such as specialty societies and AMA said the expert panel improved resource estimates for individual services because of the rigor of its evaluation process. CMS and specialty societies generally accepted the panel's estimates because the panel represented a broad range of specialties and its collaborative evaluation process became increasingly systematic. CMS implemented almost all of the panel's estimates but appropriately changed some estimates that conflicted with Medicare coverage rules and changed others to make them consistent across services. In modifying other estimates, however, CMS did not always rely on adequate data or explain its rationale. Certain physician groups told GAO that this had diminished their confidence in the process for updating Medicare's fees, and physicians' confidence in the process is important to ensure their continued participation in Medicare. CMS does not have a plan for developing and using appropriate data for the mandated review of the fee schedule. CMS reported that it is in the process of obtaining a contract to collect practice expense data from the major physician and nonphysician specialties but did not provide specifics. A plan for the data collection is important for several reasons. Data sources that had been used no longer exist or are insufficient. The AMA physician survey that provided total practice expense data was last conducted in 1999 and was modified in 2000 such that it no longer collected the necessary data. Data submitted voluntarily by specialties to update these estimates are not an appropriate substitute for a systematic data collection effort. In addition, the expert panel that reviewed resource estimates for individual services completed its work in its final meeting in March 2004. CMS indicated that an ongoing AMA committee would continue to develop estimates for new and revised services. While CMS officials told GAO they believe CMS can complete the review of the fee schedule as required by 2007, without a specific plan CMS cannot ensure that it will be able to collect the data and update the fee schedule in a timely manner. |
gao_GAO-11-43 | gao_GAO-11-43_0 | Comprehensive Policies, Use of Secure Technologies, Risk-Based Approach, Training, and Monitoring Among Leading Practices for Deploying and Monitoring Secure Wireless Networks
Leading practices for deploying and monitoring secure wireless networks include comprehensive policies, configuration controls, training, and other practices as described in table 4. Employ a Centralized Wireless Management Structure That Is Integrated with the Existing Wired Network
Security experts agreed that a centralized wireless management structure that is integrated with the management of the existing wired network can provide a more effective means to manage the wireless infrastructure and the information security program as a whole. Experts also noted the importance of continuously monitoring the wireless network for rogue access points and client devices. Agencies Have Acted to Secure Wireless Networks, but Additional Steps Are Needed to Effectively Mitigate Security Challenges
Agencies have taken several steps to address the security of their wireless networks; however, these steps have not been fully and comprehensively applied across the government. Specifically, application was inconsistent among the agencies for most of the following leading practices: Most agencies developed policies that reflected NIST guidelines and leading practices, but gaps existed in these policies, particularly with respect to dual-connected laptops and use of mobile devices on international travel. All agencies required a risk-based approach for management of wireless technologies. Many agencies used a decentralized structure for management of wireless, limiting the potential standardization that centralized management can provide, and guidance on centralization is limited. The five agencies where we did detailed testing generally securely configured wireless access points, but they had numerous weaknesses in laptop and smartphone configurations. Most agencies were missing key elements related to wireless security in their security awareness training. Twenty agencies required encryption, and eight of these agencies specified that a VPN must be used during remote access; four agencies did not require encryption. Many agencies had insufficient practices for monitoring or conducting security assessments. Existing governmentwide guidance and oversight efforts do not fully address agency implementation of the leading practices. Finally, 1 agency did not address mobile device security in its annual training. Until OMB, DHS, NIST, and individual agencies take steps to fully implement leading security practices, federal wireless networks will remain at increased vulnerability to attack, and information on these networks is subject to unauthorized access, use, disclosure, or modification. We also recommend that the Secretary of Commerce instruct the Director of NIST to develop and issue guidelines in the following four areas: technical steps agencies can take to mitigate the risk of dual connected laptops, governmentwide secure configurations for wireless functionality on laptops and for smartphones such as BlackBerries, appropriate ways agencies can centralize their management of wireless technologies based on business need, and criteria for selection of tools and recommendations on appropriate frequencies of wireless security assessments and recommendations for when continuous monitoring of wireless networks may be appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) identify leading practices and state-of-the-art technologies for deploying and monitoring secure wireless networks and (2) assess agency efforts to secure wireless networks, including vulnerability to attack. Based on the initial data collected from scans at the headquarters and field locations, we chose 5 of the 24 agencies at which to complete additional detailed wireless security testing, specifically, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security Administration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past several years, federal agencies have rapidly adopted the use of wireless technologies for their information systems. In a 2005 report, GAO recommended that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in its role overseeing governmentwide information security, take several steps to help agencies better secure their wireless networks. GAO was asked to update its prior report by (1) identifying leading practices and state-of-the-art technologies for deploying and monitoring secure wireless networks and (2) assessing agency efforts to secure wireless networks, including their vulnerability to attack. To do so, GAO reviewed publications, guidance, and other documentation and interviewed subject matter experts in wireless security. GAO also analyzed policies and plans and interviewed agency officials on wireless security at 24 major federal agencies and conducted additional detailed testing at these 5 agencies: the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security Administration.
What GAO Found
GAO identified a range of leading security practices for deploying and monitoring secure wireless networks and technologies that can help secure these networks. The leading practices include the following: (1) comprehensive policies requiring secure encryption and establishing usage restrictions, implementation practices, and access controls; (2) a risk-based approach for wireless deployment and monitoring; (3) a centralized wireless management structure that is integrated with the management of the existing wired network; (4) configuration requirements for wireless networks and devices; (5) incorporation of wireless and mobile device security in training; (6) use of encryption, such as a virtual private network for remote access; (7) continuous monitoring for rogue access points and clients; and (8) regular assessments to ensure wireless networks are secure. Agencies have taken steps to secure their wireless networks, but more can be done to improve security and to limit vulnerability to attack. Specifically, application was inconsistent among the agencies for most of the following leading practices: (1) Most agencies developed policies to support federal guidelines and leading practices, but gaps existed, particularly with respect to dual-connected laptops and mobile devices taken on international travel. (2) All agencies required a risk-based approach for management of wireless technologies. (3) Many agencies used a decentralized structure for management of wireless, limiting the standardization that centralized management can provide. (4) The five agencies where GAO performed detailed testing generally securely configured wireless access points but had numerous weaknesses in laptop and smartphone configurations. (5) Most agencies were missing key elements related to wireless security in their security awareness training. (6) Twenty agencies required encryption, and eight of these agencies specified that a virtual private network must be used; four agencies did not require encryption for remote access. (7) Many agencies had insufficient practices for monitoring or conducting security assessments of their wireless networks. Existing governmentwide guidelines and oversight efforts do not fully address agency implementation of leading wireless security practices. Until agencies take steps to better implement these leading practices, and OMB takes steps to improve governmentwide oversight, wireless networks will remain at an increased vulnerability to attack. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-81 | gao_T-HEHS-98-81_0 | I provides a more detailed list of requirements for burial at Arlington and at other national cemeteries.) Trends in Waiver Decisions
Our review of Army files indicated that since 1967, 196 waivers for burial in Arlington have been granted, while at least 144 documented waiver requests have been denied. About 63 percent of the 196 waivers granted involved burial of an individual in the same grave site as someone already interred or expected to be interred. Process for Considering Waiver Requests
Most waiver requests have been handled through an internal Army review process involving officials responsible for the administration of Arlington. In addition, the Army waiver review process is not followed in all cases, particularly in those cases in which the President makes a waiver decision. Public Knowledge of the Waiver Process
Although a waiver process exists, it has not been formally established in regulatory policy. But others persist in their efforts and may contact a high-level government official, such as a congressional or administration official, in order to pursue their request. Our review of the records for waiver cases decided during the tenure of the current superintendent showed that although the bases for waiver decisions were frequently cited by the superintendent and the Assistant Secretary of the Army, this was not always the case for decisions made by the Secretary of the Army and was rarely the case for presidential waiver decisions. While there is a legal basis for the Secretary of the Army and the President to make waiver decisions and to adopt procedures for doing so, this authority is not explicit. Eliminating the Secretary’s and the President’s authority to grant waivers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the waiver process for burials in Arlington National Cemetery, focusing on: (1) the trends in waiver decisions; (2) whether legal authority exists to grant waivers; (3) the process used in making waiver decisions; and (4) the criteria applied in the decisionmaking.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since 1967, 196 waivers have been granted for burial at Arlington cemetery, and at least 144 documented requests have been denied; (2) of the granted waivers, about 63 percent involved burial of individuals in the same grave site as someone already interred, or expected to be interred; (3) although the Secretary of the Army has no explicit statutory or regulatory authority to grant waivers, it is legal for the Secretary to do so, in part, because of the general legal authority of the Secretary for administering Arlington; (4) GAO found that most waiver requests have been handled through an internal Army review process involving officials responsible for the administration of Arlington; (5) however, this process is not followed in all cases; (6) for example, in the case of presidential waiver decisions, the Army process is generally bypassed; (7) in addition, this process is not widely known or understood, which in some cases has appeared to provide advantages to those who were persistent enough to pursue a waiver request or who were able to obtain the assistance of high-level government officials; and (8) while those responsible for making waiver decisions appear to apply some generally understood criteria, these criteria, which are not formally established, are not always consistently applied or clearly documented. |
gao_GAO-12-576 | gao_GAO-12-576_0 | Progress Made in Completing Early Design, but Milestones Were Completed Late and Development Costs Have Increased
While the GOES-R program has made progress in completing its early design and is nearing the end of the design phase for its flight and ground system components, it completed key design milestones later than planned. Recent technical problems with the instruments and spacecraft, as well as a significant modification to the ground project’s development plan, have delayed the completion of key reviews and led to increased complexity for GOES-R’s development. In addition to the delays, the technical and programmatic challenges experienced by GOES-R’s flight and ground projects have led to increased costs for its development contracts. Despite these problems, program officials report that planned launch dates and cost estimates for the first two satellites have not changed, and that approximately $1.2 billion is currently in reserve to manage future delays and cost growth. Despite recent delays in program milestones, NOAA still expects to meet an October 2015 launch date for the first satellite in the series by utilizing planned schedule reserves. At completion of the GOES-R program’s preliminary design review in February 2012, the program reported that it was within its thresholds because it had maintained 20 percent of planned remaining development costs as reserve for the flight project, 32 percent of planned remaining development costs for the ground project, and 10 percent of planned remaining development costs for the program office. GOES-R Schedules Are Not Fully Reliable, Contributing to Milestone and Potential Launch Date Delays
The success in management of a large-scale program depends in part on having an integrated and reliable schedule that defines, among other things, when work activities and milestone events will occur, how long they will take, and how they are related to one another. While the GOES-R program has adopted certain scheduling best practices at both the programwide and contractor levels, unresolved weaknesses also exist, some of which have contributed to current program milestone delays and a replanning of the Core Ground System’s schedule. Until the program’s scheduling weaknesses are corrected, it may experience additional delays to its key milestones. This initiative is intended to address a program-recognized need to conduct a schedule risk analysis (related to best practice 8). Program documentation indicates that with the current launch readiness date of October 2015, plus an on-orbit testing period, there is a 37 percent chance of a gap in the availability of two operational GOES-series satellites at any one time, assuming a normal lifespan for the satellites currently on-orbit. This could result in the need for NOAA to rely on older satellites that are not fully functional. NOAA has established policies and procedures for effective risk management for GOES-R. For example, the program has documented a strategy for managing risks that includes important elements, such as relevant stakeholders and their responsibilities and the criteria for evaluating, categorizing, and prioritizing risks. The Program Has Not Fully Implemented Its Risk Management Process or Adequately Mitigated Key Risks
While the program has a well-defined risk management process, this process has not been fully implemented. In addition, the program did not always document its risk handling strategies and time frames and did not always provide adequate rationale for its decision to close risks. However, the program has used approximately 30 percent of its reserves over the last 3 years and significant portions of development remain for major components—including the spacecraft and Core Ground System. Unless NOAA assesses the reserve allocations across all of the program’s development efforts, it may not be able to ensure that its reserves will cover ongoing challenges as well as unexpected problems for the remaining development of all four satellites in the series. Until program officials diligently execute all of the program’s defined risk management practices and integrate these with improvements in the management of reserves and schedules, the program is at risk of exceeding cost and schedule targets and further slipping launch dates for satellites in the GOES-R series. NOAA concurred with our second recommendation to address shortfalls that we identified in schedule management practices and stated that the program will continue to bring down the number of errors in the schedules and improve the fidelity of the program’s integrated master schedule. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) progress in developing the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) program, (2) evaluate whether the agency has a reliable schedule for executing the program, and (3) determine whether the program is applying best practices in managing and mitigating its risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The GOES-R series is a set of four satellites intended to replace existing weather satellites that will likely reach the end of their useful lives in about 2015. NOAA estimates the series to cost $10.9 billion through 2036. Because the transition to the series is critical to the nations ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting, GAO reviewed NOAAs management of the GOES-R program.
Specifically, GAO was asked to (1) assess NOAAs progress in developing the GOES-R satellite program, (2) evaluate whether the agency has a reliable schedule for executing the program, and (3) determine whether the program is applying best practices in managing and mitigating its risks.
GAO analyzed program management, acquisition, and cost data; evaluated contractor and program-wide schedules against best practices; analyzed program documentation including risk management plans and procedures; and interviewed government and contractor staff regarding program progress and challenges.
What GAO Found
The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) program has made progress by completing its early design milestones and is nearing the end of the design phase for its spacecraft, instrument, and ground system components. While the program continues to make progress, recent technical problems with the instruments and spacecraft, as well as a significant modification to the ground projects development plan, have delayed the completion of key reviews and led to increased complexity for the development of GOES-R. The technical and programmatic challenges experienced by the flight and ground projects have led to a 19-month delay in completing the programs preliminary design review. Nevertheless, program officials report that its planned launch date of October 2015 for the first satellite has not changed. While the program reports that approximately $1.2 billion is currently in reserve to manage future delays and cost growth, significant portions of development remain for major components. As a result, the program may not be able to ensure that it has adequate resources to cover ongoing challenges as well as unexpected problems for the remaining development of all four satellites.
The success in management of a large-scale program depends in part on having a reliable schedule that defines, among other things, when work activities and milestone events will occur, how long they will take, and how they are related to one another. To its credit, the program has adopted key scheduling best practices and has recognized certain scheduling weaknesses. It has also recently instituted initiatives to automate its integrated master schedule, correct integration problems among projects, and assess schedule confidence based on risk. However, unresolved schedule deficiencies remain in its integrated master schedule and the contractor schedules that support it, which have contributed to a re-plan of the schedule of the ground system and to the potential for delays to satellite launch dates. The program recently determined that the likelihood of the first satellite meeting its planned October 2015 launch date is 48 percent. Based on this planned launch date, the program reports that there is a 37 percent chance of a gap in the availability of two operational GOES-series satellites, which could result in the need for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to rely on older satellites that are not fully functional. Until its scheduling weaknesses are addressed, it will be more difficult for the program to know whether its planned remaining development is on schedule.
NOAA has established policies and procedures that conform with recognized risk management best practices. For example, the program has documented a strategy for managing risks that includes important elements, such as relevant stakeholders and their responsibilities and the criteria for evaluating, categorizing, and prioritizing risks. However, while the program has a well- defined risk management process, it has not been fully implemented. For example, the program has not provided adequate or timely evaluations for potential risks, did not always provide adequate rationale for the decision to close a risk, and has at least two critical risks in need of additional attention. Until all defined risk management practices are diligently executed and critical risks adequately mitigated, the GOES-R program is at risk of exceeding cost and schedule targets, and launch dates could slip.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to NOAA to assess and report reserves needed over the life of the program, improve the reliability of its schedules, and address identified program risks. NOAA concurred or partially concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-383 | gao_GAO-07-383_0 | As a result, we recommended that CMS adjust payments for transports in rural counties with particularly low population density to help ensure Medicare beneficiaries’ access to ambulance services in those areas. Costs per Transport Were Highly Variable, Reflecting Differences in Certain Provider Characteristics
Costs of ground ambulance transports were highly variable across providers without shared costs; an average ambulance transport ranged from a low of $99 to a high of $1,218 during 2004, the year for which we gathered data. Providers’ Reported Costs per Transport Were Highly Variable
Providers’ average costs for a ground ambulance transport varied from $99 to $1,218—a range of more than $1,100—across providers without shared costs in 2004. Average Payments under the National Fee Schedule Will Be Greater Than Average Historical Payments, but Providers’ Expected Medicare Margins Will Vary Greatly
Average ambulance national fee schedule payments in 2010 are estimated to be 3 percent higher overall than payments in 2001, after adjusting for inflation and assuming that providers bill the maximum amounts allowed. We cannot assess whether providers without shared costs will break even, lose, or profit on average under the ambulance national fee schedule in 2010 after all of the MMA temporary payment provisions have expired, because the 95 percent confidence interval surrounding the average Medicare margin spans from negative 14 percent to positive 2 percent. However, across all providers without shared costs, we estimate that 39 to 56 percent will have average Medicare payments above their average costs per transport under the ambulance national fee schedule even after all of the MMA provisions expire. Medicare Beneficiaries’ Use of Ambulance Transports Increased from 2001 to 2004, Except in Super-Rural Areas
Nationally, the use of ambulance transports by Medicare beneficiaries increased by 16 percent, from 2001, the year before the transition to the national fee schedule began, to 2004, the year we studied. However declining utilization coupled with potentially negative Medicare margins in super- rural areas, which could be exacerbated when the MMA provisions expire, raise questions as to whether Medicare payments will be adequate to support beneficiary access in super-rural areas. As we discussed in the report, ambulance providers that could not separately report the costs of the ambulance portion of their business were excluded because their cost data were determined to be unreliable. Through our analyses, we determined that the costs reported by providers that shared costs with other institutions or offered other services appeared to be unreliable. In our regression analysis of the cost information for providers without shared costs, we found that those with fewer transports per year generally had higher costs per transport than those with more transports. We then used the results from this regression analysis to predict the average costs per transport across all providers without shared costs, based on five key provider characteristics: (1) total transports per year, (2) percentage of BLS Medicare transports, (3) percentage of Medicare transports in rural and super-rural areas, (4) number of ambulance transports per staffed hour, and (5) amount of revenue derived from local tax support. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, Medicare implemented a national fee schedule designed to standardize payments for ambulance services. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) required GAO to study ambulance service costs. GAO examined providers' costs of ground ambulance transports in 2004 and factors that contributed to cost differences; average Medicare ambulance payments expected under the national fee schedule in 2010 and how those payments will relate to providers' costs per transport; and changes that occurred in Medicare beneficiaries' use of ambulance transports from 2001 to 2004. GAO estimated costs of ambulance transports based on a nationally representative survey of 215 ambulance providers that did not share costs with nonambulance services. Providers that shared costs with other institutions or services and could not report their costs for ambulance services separately, such as fire departments, were excluded because their reported costs appeared unreliable. GAO used its survey, Medicare claims, and other data for its analyses.
What GAO Found
Costs of ground ambulance services were highly variable across providers that did not share costs with nonambulance services in 2004, reflecting differences in certain provider and community characteristics. Costs per transport among these providers varied from $99 per transport to $1,218. Providers without shared costs that had higher costs per transport typically had fewer transports per year, a greater percentage of transports in which more than a basic medical intervention occurred, more transports in super-rural areas (rural counties with lowest population density), lower productivity--measured as number of transports furnished per staffed hour, and a greater percentage of revenues from local tax support. Average payments under the national fee schedule in 2010 are expected to be higher than historical payments, but providers' Medicare margins will vary greatly. GAO could not assess whether, on average, providers without shared costs would break even, lose, or profit under the national fee schedule, because the average Medicare margin for providers without shared costs was estimated to fall from negative 14 percent to positive 2 percent. However, GAO estimated that approximately 39 to 56 percent of providers without shared costs would have average Medicare payments above their average cost per transport under the national fee schedule in 2010. From 2001 to 2004, utilization of ambulance transports per beneficiary increased 16 percent overall. However, use declined by 8 percent in super-rural areas. Declining utilization coupled with potentially negative Medicare margins in super-rural areas, which could be exacerbated when the MMA temporary payment provisions expire, raise questions as to whether Medicare payments will be adequate to support beneficiary access in super-rural areas. |
gao_GAO-14-464T | gao_GAO-14-464T_0 | For example, consistent with law, presidential policies stress the importance of coordination between the government and industry to protect the nation’s cyber critical infrastructure. Within DHS, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) is responsible for working with public and industry infrastructure partners and leads the coordinated national effort to mitigate risk to the nation’s infrastructure through the development and implementation of the infrastructure protection program. Observations on Key Factors in DHS Implementation of Its Partnership Approach
Our prior work has found that DHS and its partners have taken a number of steps intended to improve the security of our critical infrastructure. Specifically, our work has identified three key factors that can affect the implementation of the partnership approach used by DHS: (1) recognizing and addressing barriers to sharing information; (2) sharing the results of DHS assessments with industry and other stakeholders; and (3) measuring and evaluating the performance of DHS’s partnership efforts. Identifying barriers to industry sharing information with federal partners. In a July 2010 report examining, among other things, government stakeholders’ expectations for cyber-related, public- private partnerships we identified some barriers to industry’s sharing of cyber threat information with federal partners.of the government entities we contacted reported that industry partners were mostly meeting their expectations in several areas, including sharing timely and actionable cyber threat information, though the extent to which this was happening varied by sector. Among other issues, we found that industry partners did not want to share their sensitive, proprietary information with the federal government. We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts to implement these recommendations. Sharing Results of DHS Assessments with Industry and Other Stakeholders
Another important factor for DHS’s implementation of its partnership approach is sharing information on the results of its security assessments and surveys with industry partners and other stakeholders. DHS security surveys and vulnerability assessments can provide valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of assets and can help asset owners and operators that participate in these programs make decisions about investments to enhance security and resilience. In our May 2012 report, we found that, among other things, DHS shares the results of security surveys and vulnerability assessments with asset owners or operators.security survey and vulnerability assessment results could be enhanced by the timely delivery of these products to the owners and operators and that the inability to deliver these products in a timely manner could undermine the relationship DHS was attempting to develop with these industry partners. We recommended, and DHS concurred, that it develop time frames and specific milestones for managing its efforts to ensure the timely delivery of the results of security surveys and vulnerability assessments to asset owners and operators. Critical infrastructures rely on networked computers and systems, thus making them susceptible to cyber-based risks. We also reported that DHS had been working to conceptualize how it can develop a product or products using multiple sources—including RRAP reports—to more widely share resilience lessons learned to its critical infrastructure partners, including federal, state, local, and tribal officials. Taking a systematic approach to gathering feedback from industry owners and operators and measuring the results of these efforts could help focus greater attention on targeting potential problems and areas needing improvement. In April 2013, we examined DHS’s Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program and assessed, among other things, the extent to which DHS has communicated and worked with owners and operators to improve security. Specifically, we reported that DHS had increased its efforts to communicate and work with industry owners and operators to help them enhance security at their facilities since 2007. However, despite increasing its efforts to communicate with industry owners and operators, we also found that DHS had an opportunity to obtain systematic feedback on its outreach. We recommended that DHS explore opportunities and take action to systematically solicit and document feedback on facility outreach. DHS concurred with our recommendation and reported that it had actions underway to review alternatives, including possibly revising its security survey and vulnerability assessment follow-up tool, to address this recommendation. However, more needs to be done to accelerate the progress made in bolstering the cybersecurity posture of the nation. The administration and executive branch agencies need to fully implement the hundreds of recommendations made by GAO and agency inspectors general to address cyber challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal efforts to protect the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber threats has been on GAO's list of high-risk areas since 2003. Critical infrastructure is assets and systems, whether physical or cyber, so vital to the United States that their destruction would have a debilitating impact on, among other things, national security and the economy. Recent cyber attacks highlight such threats. DHS, as the lead federal agency, developed a partnership approach with key industries to help protect critical infrastructure.
This testimony identifies key factors important to DHS implementation of the partnership approach to protect critical infrastructure.
This statement is based on products GAO issued from October 2001 to March 2014. To perform this work, GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and directives as well as policies and procedures for selected programs. GAO interviewed DHS officials responsible for administering these programs and assessed related data. GAO also interviewed and surveyed a range of other stakeholders including federal officials, industry owners and operators, industry groups, and cybersecurity experts.
What GAO Found
GAO's prior work has identified several key factors that are important for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to implement its partnership approach with industry to protect critical infrastructure. DHS has made some progress in implementing its partnership approach, but has also experienced challenges coordinating with industry partners that own most of the critical infrastructure.
Recognizing and Addressing Barriers to Sharing Information. Since 2003, GAO has identified information sharing as key to developing effective partnerships. In July 2010, GAO reported some barriers affecting the extent to which cyber-related security information was being shared between federal and industry partners. For example, industry partners reported concerns that sharing sensitive, proprietary information with the federal government could compromise their competitive advantage if shared more widely. Similarly, federal partners were restricted in sharing classified information with industry officials without security clearances. GAO recommended that DHS work with industry to focus its information-sharing efforts. DHS concurred and has taken some steps to address the recommendation, including sponsoring clearances for industry.
Sharing Results of DHS Assessments with Industry. GAO has found that DHS security assessments can provide valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of critical assets and drive industry decisions about investments to enhance security. In a May 2012 report, GAO found that DHS was sharing the results of its assessments with industry partners, but these results were often late, which could undermine the relationship DHS was attempting to develop with these partners. GAO recommended that DHS develop time frames and milestones to ensure the timely delivery of the assessments to industry partners. DHS concurred and reported that it has efforts underway to speed the delivery of its assessments.
Measuring and Evaluating Performance of DHS Partnerships . GAO's prior work found that taking a systematic approach to gathering feedback from industry owners and operators and measuring the results of these efforts could help focus greater attention on targeting potential problems and areas needing improvement. In an April 2013 report, GAO examined DHS's chemical security program and assessed, among other things, the extent to which DHS has communicated and worked with industry owners and operators to improve security. GAO reported that DHS had increased its efforts to communicate and work with industry to help them enhance security at their facilities. However, GAO found that DHS was not obtaining systematic feedback on its outreach. GAO recommended that DHS explore opportunities and take action to systematically solicit and document feedback on industry outreach. DHS concurred and reported that it had taken action to address the recommendation.
However, the cyber security of infrastructure remains on GAO's high-risk list and more needs to be done to accelerate the progress made. DHS still needs to fully implement the many recommendations on its partnership approach (and other issues) made by GAO and inspectors general to address cyber challenges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS in prior reports to strengthen its partnership efforts. DHS generally agreed with these recommendations and reports actions or plans to address many of them. GAO will continue to monitor DHS efforts to address these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-497T | gao_GAO-10-497T_0 | Background
The Recovery Act provided DOE more than $43.2 billion, including $36.7 billion for projects and activities and $6.5 billion in borrowing authority. DOE Obligated 70 Percent and Reported Expenditures of 7 Percent of its Recovery Act Funds as of February 28, 2010
As of February 28, 2010, DOE reported that it had obligated $25.7 billion (70 percent) and reported expenditures of $2.5 billion (7 percent) of the $36.7 billion it received under the Recovery Act for projects and activities (see table 1). By comparison, as of December 31, 2009, the department reported it had obligated $23.2 billion (54 percent) and reported expenditures of $1.8 billion (4 percent). The percentage of Recovery Act funds obligated varied widely across DOE program offices. Several program offices—Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, the Energy Information Administration, Environmental Management, and Science—had obligated more than 85 percent of their Recovery Act funds by February 28, 2010, while other program offices—Fossil Energy, the Loan Guarantee Program, and the Western Area Power Administration—had obligated less than a third of their Recovery Act funds by that time. Federal Requirements and Other Factors Affected the Timing of Project Selection and Starts
Officials from DOE and states that received Recovery Act funding from DOE cited certain federal requirements and other factors that had affected their ability to implement some Recovery Act projects. In particular, DOE officials reported that Davis-Bacon requirements and the National Environmental Policy Act affected the timing of some project selection and starts, while state officials reported that the National Historic Preservation Act affected their ability to select and start Recovery Act projects. DOE’s Weatherization Assistance Program became subject to the Davis-Bacon requirements for the first time under the Recovery Act after having been previously exempt from those requirements. Nevertheless, DOE officials also told us that several program offices—including Loan Guarantee, Fossil Energy, Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and the Power Marketing Administrations—will likely have projects that significantly impact the environment and will therefore require environmental assessments or environmental impact statements. Likewise, officials from the Michigan Department of Human Services told us that NHPA requires that weatherization projects receiving federal funds undergo a state historic preservation review. These officials estimated that 90 percent of the homes scheduled to be weatherized would need a historic review. For example: Newness of programs. Because some Recovery Act programs were newly created, in some cases, officials needed time to establish procedures and provide guidance before implementing projects. Staff capacity. Officials from DOE stated that they would need to hire a total of 550 staff—both permanent and temporary—to carry out Recovery Act-related work. For example, the department needed to hire six new staff members to oversee and manage the program. State, Local, or Tribal Issues. In our recently issued report on factors affecting the implementation of Recovery Act projects, we noted that the economic recession affected some states’ budgets, which, in turn, affected states’ ability to use some Recovery Act funds. GAO Has Ongoing Work on DOE Recovery Act Programs
In a report issued yesterday, we discussed recipient reporting in DOE’s Weatherization Assistance Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act)--initially estimated to cost $787 billion in spending and tax provisions--aims to promote economic recovery, make investments, and minimize or avoid reductions in state and local government services. The Recovery Act provided the Department of Energy (DOE) more than $43.2 billion, including $36.7 billion for projects and activities and $6.5 billion in borrowing authority, in areas such as energy efficiency and renewable energy, nuclear waste clean-up, and electric grid modernization. This testimony discusses (1) the extent to which DOE has obligated and spent its Recovery Act funds, and (2) the factors that have affected DOE's ability to select and start Recovery Act projects. In addition, GAO includes information on ongoing work related to DOE Recovery Act programs. This testimony is based on prior work and updated with data from DOE.
What GAO Found
As of February 28, 2010, DOE reported it had obligated $25.7 billion (70 percent) and reported expenditures of $2.5 billion (7 percent) of the $36.7 billion it received under the Recovery Act for projects and activities. For context, as of December 31, 2009, DOE reported that it had obligated $23.2 billion (54 percent) and reported expenditures of $1.8 billion (4 percent). The percentage of Recovery Act funds obligated varied widely across DOE program offices and ranged from a high of 98 percent in the Energy Information Administration to a low of 1 percent for the Loan Guarantee Program Office. None of DOE's program offices reported expenditures of more than a third of their Recovery Act funds as of February 28, 2010. Officials from DOE and states that received Recovery Act funding from DOE cited certain federal requirements that had affected their ability to implement some Recovery Act projects. For example: (1) Davis Bacon Requirements. Officials reported that Davis-Bacon requirements had affected the start of projects in the Weatherization Assistance Program because the program had previously been exempt from these requirements. (2) National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). DOE officials told us that NEPA may affect certain projects that are likely to significantly impact the environment, thereby requiring environmental assessments or environmental impact statements. (3) National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). Officials from the Michigan Department of Human Services told us that about 90 percent of the homes scheduled to be weatherized under the Weatherization Assistance Program would need a historic review. Additionally, DOE and state officials told us that (4) Newness of programs. In some cases, because some Recovery Act programs were newly created, officials needed time to establish procedures and provide guidance before implementing projects. (5) Staff capacity. DOE officials also told us that they experienced challenges in hiring new staff to carry out Recovery Act work. Also, District of Columbia officials told us they needed to hire 6 new staff members to oversee and manage the weatherization program. (6) State, local, or tribal issues. The economic recession affected some states' budgets, which also affected states' ability to use some Recovery Act funds, such as difficulty providing matching funds. |
gao_GAO-07-632T | gao_GAO-07-632T_0 | Background
US-VISIT is a large, complex governmentwide program intended to collect, maintain, and share information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States; identify foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials; detect fraudulent travel documents, verify visitor identity, and determine visitor admissibility through the use of biometrics (digital fingerprints and a digital photograph); and facilitate information sharing and coordination within the immigration and border management community. We reported, for example, that the program’s acquisition management process had not been established, and that US-VISIT lacked a governance structure. Our site visits, interviews with US-VISIT and CBP officials, and the work of others suggest that both before and after US-VISIT entry capability was installed at land POEs, these facilities faced a number of challenges— operational and physical—including space constraints complicated by the logistics of processing high volumes of visitors and associated traffic congestion. A Biometric Exit Capability is being Tested at Air and Sea POEs, But Operational Concerns Need to be Addressed
Although US-VISIT is pilot testing a biometric exit capability for air and sea POEs, it is not currently available at all ports. The major constraint to performing biometric verification upon exit at this time, in the US-VISIT Program Office’s view, is that the only proven technology available would necessitate mirroring the processes currently in use for US-VISIT at entry. The US-VISIT Program Office concluded in January 2005 that the mirror-imaging solution was “an infeasible alternative for numerous reasons, including but not limited to, the additional staffing demands, new infrastructure requirements, and potential trade and commerce impacts.”
US-VISIT officials told us that they anticipated that a biometric exit process mirroring that used for entry could result in delays at land POEs with heavy daily volumes of visitors. DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how the agency intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program. In February 2007, US-VISIT officials told us that this plan had been forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. DHS Continues to Face Longstanding US-VISIT Management Challenges and Future Uncertainties
Our work and other best practice research have shown that applying disciplined and rigorous management practices improves the likelihood of delivering expected capabilities on time and within budget. Until these recommendations are fully implemented, the program will be at greater risk of not optimally meeting mission needs and falling short of meeting expectations. According to the program’s Chief Strategist, an immigration and border management strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 to show how US- VISIT is aligned with DHS’s organizational mission and to define an overall vision for immigration and border management. According to program officials, this future vision is to be delivered through a number of planned mission capability enhancements. For example, over the last 4 years, DHS has committed over $160 million to evaluate and operate exit pilots at selected air, sea, and land POEs. Because US-VISIT will likely continue to have an impact on land POE facilities as it evolves—especially as new technology and equipment are introduced—it is important for US-VISIT and CBP officials to have sufficient management controls for identifying and reporting potential computer and other operational problems that could affect the ability of US-VISIT entry capability to operate as intended. With respect to DHS’s effort to create an exit verification capability, developing and deploying this capability at land POEs has posed a set of challenges that are distinct from those associated with entry. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes GAO's work on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program at air, sea, and land ports of entry (POE). US-VISIT is designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land POEs. These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify identities, and record arrival and departure. This testimony addresses DHS's efforts to (1) implement US-VISIT entry capability, (2) implement US-VISIT exit capability, and (3) resolve longstanding management challenges that could impair DHS's ability to effectively implement the US-VISIT program. GAO analyzed DHS and US-VISIT documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders.
What GAO Found
DHS is operating US-VISIT entry capabilities at most POEs and has begun to work to move from 2 to 10 fingerprint biometric capabilities and expand electronic information sharing with stakeholders. Of particular note is the fact that a US-VISIT biometric-based entry screening capability is operating at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 land POEs. While US-VISIT has improved DHS's ability to process visitors and verify identities upon entry, we found that management controls in place to identify and evaluate computer and other operational problems at land POEs were insufficient and inconsistently administered. Although US-VISIT has conducted various exit demonstration projects at a small number of POEs, a biometric exit capability is not currently available. According to program officials, this is due to a number of factors. For example, at this time the only proven technology available for biometric land exit verification would necessitate mirroring the processes currently in use for entry at these POEs, which would create costly staffing demands and infrastructure requirements, and introduce potential trade, commerce, and environmental impacts. Further, a pilot project to examine an alternative technology at land POEs did not produce a viable solution. By statute, DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how it intended to fully implement a comprehensive, biometric entry/exit program, but DHS had not yet reported how it intended to do so, or use nonbiometric solutions. DHS continues to face longstanding US-VISIT management challenges and future uncertainties. For example, DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to strategically fit with other land border security initiatives and mandates and could not ensure that these programs work in harmony to meet mission goals and operate cost effectively. DHS had drafted a strategic plan defining an overall immigration and border management strategy but, as of February 2007, the plan was under review by the Office of Management and Budget. Further, critical acquisition management processes need to be established and followed to ensure that program capabilities and expected mission outcomes are delivered on time and within budget. These processes include effective project planning, requirements management, contract tracking and oversight, test management, and financial management. Until these issues are addressed, the risk of US-VISIT continuing to fall short of expectations is increased. |
gao_GAO-11-810 | gao_GAO-11-810_0 | CMS Has Data on the Quality of Care at LTCHs, but Currently the Data Are Limited
Although CMS collects some data on the quality of care at LTCHs, the data are currently limited. In addition, current survey results in OSCAR and ASSURE may be incomplete because these databases do not always accurately identify (1) which survey organization is responsible for surveying each LTCH or (2) whether a facility is, in fact, an LTCH. Second, CMS does not currently collect data for quality measures because LTCHs are not yet required to report them. CMS Has No Detailed Prior Survey Data and Incomplete Current Survey Results on the Majority of LTCHs
Because TJC only recently began submitting detailed survey data to CMS, ASSURE has no prior data and limited current data—surveys conducted since July 2009—for TJC-surveyed LTCHs, which constitute a majority (about 80 percent) of such hospitals. We found that there were 447 LTCHs listed in OSCAR or ASSURE as of fiscal year 2010. CMS Does Not Require LTCHs to Report Data on Quality Measures, but Will Do So Beginning in 2014
CMS currently does not have quality measures for LTCHs because LTCHs were not required to report on the quality measures developed for most ACHs in 2003 or later. While LTCHs are not currently reporting on quality measures, under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) enacted in 2010, they must begin doing so by 2014. CMS Oversight of Survey Activities at LTCHs Is Limited
CMS and its regional offices’ oversight of state survey agency and AO survey activities in LTCHs is limited because two of its oversight strategies—performance measures and selection of hospitals for traditional validation surveys—focus on hospitals in general rather than LTCHs specifically. CMS’s third oversight strategy—collection and analysis of survey data—is also limited because the agency does not utilize all of the available data to identify weaknesses in the survey process that may require further investigation. CMS’s Performance Measures for Survey Activities Do Not Focus on LTCHs
None of the performance measures that CMS uses to assess the survey activities of state survey agencies and AOs focus specifically on LTCHs. One of CMS’s performance measures for state survey agencies examines the timeliness of state surveys. LTCHs Are Not Systematically Included in the Hospital Validation Survey Sample, and Results from Complaint Validation Surveys Are Not Always Shared with TJC
CMS does not systematically include 1 percent of AO-surveyed LTCHs— fewer than five—in its sample of traditional hospital validation surveys conducted by state survey agencies. By recognizing and adjusting for limitations in these databases, we identified several areas where the data may assist CMS in more effectively overseeing survey activities at LTCHs. CMS has data on complaint validation surveys conducted in LTCHs that could provide information on how effectively states triage and conduct complaint surveys at TJC-surveyed LTCHs. We found several weaknesses in the availability of data on the quality of care in LTCHs. Although CMS conducts traditional validation surveys in hospitals in general as a means for assessing the effectiveness of an AO’s survey activities, CMS cannot assure that LTCHs are systematically included in their review; when such surveys have been conducted in LTCHs, CMS has not separated out the LTCH surveys from surveys of all other hospitals and so is unable to identify whether there may be areas of concern specific to AO survey activities in LTCHs. Improve the accuracy of the databases that track LTCH survey results working with AOs and state survey agencies to develop a complete and accurate list of the LTCHs that they each survey and an approach to ensuring that the list is updated in a timely manner, and expanding the OSCAR database to include the results of all LTCH surveys, such as those conducted by TJC, which are currently stored in the separate ASSURE database. TJC agreed with most of our recommendations, but disagreed with the recommendation related to traditional validation surveys, that is, state oversight surveys at AO-surveyed LTCHs. HHS said that it intends to: reinforce existing CMS policy on sharing information with AOs and work with regional offices to enhance compliance, explore an option to increase its traditional validation survey sample for hospitals, which would permit the inclusion of a stratified sample of LTCHs annually, explore the differences in survey workload and resource allocation, which it characterized as definitely meriting attention, while working with regional offices to clarify the policy for triaging complaint surveys at AO-surveyed LTCHs and for referring certain complaints to the appropriate AO, and review the available data to determine to what extent it can be used to develop additional AO performance measures for evaluating quality of care at hospitals, including LTCHs. Appendix I: Condition-Level Deficiencies Cited at Long-Term and Acute Care Hospitals During Routine and Complaint Surveys
This appendix presents the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) data on the results of surveys at long-term care hospitals (LTCH). In the course of our analyses, we identified some data limitations, which we discussed with both CMS and The Joint Commission (TJC). | Why GAO Did This Study
Allegations about quality-of-care problems have raised questions about the oversight of long-term care hospitals (LTCH), which provide care to individuals with multiple acute or chronic conditions. Medicare pays for about 80 percent of LTCH patient care. To ensure compliance with federal quality standards, accrediting organizations (AO) and state survey agencies under contract with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) conduct routine and complaint surveys. One AO, The Joint Commission (TJC), surveys most LTCHs. In a November 2010 report, GAO compared oversight of LTCHs to that of other facilities. In this report, GAO examined the extent to which CMS collects data about LTCHs' quality of care and oversees LTCH survey activities. To do this work, GAO analyzed CMS data on the results of LTCH surveys and discussed oversight activities with both CMS and AO officials. GAO assessed the reliability of the survey data and took steps to ensure that the data presented were reliable.
What GAO Found
CMS collects some data on the quality of care at LTCHs, but the data are limited for several reasons. First, CMS does not have detailed data on the results of surveys conducted by TJC prior to 2009 and has limited data on current surveys because TJC did not begin submitting detailed data to CMS until July 2009. CMS does have prior year and current survey data for state-surveyed LTCHs--about 16 percent of LTCHs. In addition, current survey results in CMS's databases may be incomplete because these databases do not always accurately identify (1) the organization responsible for surveying each LTCH and (2) whether a facility is, in fact, an LTCH. As of fiscal year 2010, CMS data showed a total of 447 LTCHs, but GAO identified 18 LTCHs incorrectly categorized in one CMS database as having been surveyed by state survey agencies. GAO also found 56 LTCHs either misidentified as acute care hospitals or missing from another CMS database that contains information on LTCHs surveyed by accrediting organizations. Second, CMS does not currently collect data on quality measures--information used to evaluate how health care is delivered--from LTCHs because, unlike other types of hospitals, LTCHs are not yet required to report them. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act enacted in 2010 requires LTCHs to report quality measures by 2014. CMS's oversight of state survey agency and AO survey activities of LTCHs is limited. Two of CMS's three oversight approaches do not focus on LTCHs specifically, but on hospitals in general. First, CMS established performance measures--expectations regarding survey activities or the reporting of survey results--for survey organizations, but reports the results of its assessments for hospitals in general rather than for LTCHs specifically. Second, state survey agencies conduct surveys annually in AO-accredited hospitals--known as validation surveys--to assess the effectiveness of the AO surveys, but have not systematically included some LTCHs in the sample of hospitals subject to validation surveys. Additional validation surveys are done based on complaints. State survey agencies conducted more than 1,000 validation surveys over a 5-year period based on complaints in LTCHs that had been surveyed by TJC. CMS does not refer such complaints to TJC for investigation. As a result, TJC conducted few complaint surveys. Although CMS has instructed its regional offices to provide TJC with the results of these surveys, GAO found that these data were not always shared. CMS's third oversight approach--collection and analysis of data on the results of survey organizations' activities--has not utilized all the available data to identify problems that may require further investigation. GAO identified several potential areas where the data may assist CMS in more effectively overseeing survey activities at LTCHs, such as how effectively states triage and conduct complaint validation surveys.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS strengthen its oversight of LTCHs by improving available data on quality of care and by improving oversight of LTCH survey activities. HHS concurred with all of the recommendations. TJC agreed with most of them, but disagreed with the value of state oversight surveys of AO-surveyed LTCHs. We continue to believe that such surveys are an important part of CMS oversight of LTCH survey activities. |
gao_GAO-08-632 | gao_GAO-08-632_0 | Specifically, these reports highlighted: inadequate policies in place and insufficient oversight of and knowledge among regents concerning executive compensation, trust and federal pay systems, leave for senior executives, conflicts of interest regarding service on for-profit boards, travel expenses, event expenses, activities of SBV, and internal financial controls; a lack of critical information and relationships necessary to bring forward important issues and concerns and to support vigorous deliberation and well-reasoned decision making on the part of the Board, such as lack of access for senior management to the Board, too much control within the Secretary’s office regarding the information available to the Board and the Board’s agenda, and a lack of transparency and connection to stakeholders within the Smithsonian (such as museum directors and advisory boards) and to the public at large; and IRC’s finding that there was insufficient action on the part of the Board to demand critical information needed to conduct adequate oversight of the Smithsonian, which was linked to a number of issues, such as unclear roles and expectations for citizen, congressional, and ex-officio regents; a lack of engagement and participation by some regents; unclear responsibilities of Board committees and a lack of critical committees; a lack of diversity of skills and expertise needed to conduct adequate oversight; inflexible size and structure of the Board; and a lack of accountability of regents with regard to their performance and to fulfilling their fiduciary duties. Board Has Implemented Some Executive and Ethics Reforms, and Has Begun a Review of Policies and Internal Controls, but Implementation Challenges Remain
The Board has implemented several executive reforms to address concerns about executive compensation, benefits, and expenses, and has established an overarching code of ethics applicable to everyone associated with the Smithsonian, but development of policies and internal controls for broader operational matters such as travel, event expenses, and contracting is still under way. Implementation of New Policies and Procedures Will Be Challenging
Effectively implementing the new policies and procedures developed during these review efforts is likely to depend on effectively training Smithsonian staff at all levels and on effectively establishing accountability, both of which may be challenging for the Smithsonian. Board Has Implemented Reforms to Improve Information and Transparency; Efforts to Enhance Communication Are Not Fully Implemented
The Board has completed the actions it proposed for improving its access to information and making its operations more transparent, but actions to improve communication and relationships with stakeholders are not fully implemented. However, the team has taken a number of steps thus far. Board Has Taken Actions to Clarify Roles and Responsibilities and Studied Possible Changes in Its Composition, but Establishing Accountability Remains a Challenge
The Board has largely completed the actions it proposed for clarifying regents’ responsibilities and studying possible changes in its size and structure, but actions for assessing Board performance are still being developed. The Board has not yet developed a process for assuring transparency and accountability in selecting nonregents and using them to enhance governance. The Board is developing a self-assessment process to examine its performance, but it is not clear how the Board will hold regents accountable in the event of performance problems. The Board does not currently have plans to conduct a broader evaluation of its governance reform efforts after a suitable period of implementation to determine if they have been effective in addressing the governance and accountability breakdowns that occurred. Given the extent and pace of changes occurring at the Smithsonian, as well as other transformations of the institution, including the hiring of a new Secretary and significant reforms to SBV, among other things, it is likely that many governance reforms will not be completely implemented for some time, and the effectiveness of some reforms will only be evident over a longer period of implementation. To assess the Board’s efforts at improving communication with other stakeholders, we reviewed GAO’s work on federal agency communication strategies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Smithsonian Institution's governing body, the Board of Regents (Board), has developed a set of actions to address governance and accountability breakdowns that came to light in 2007. These actions were aimed at problems in three main areas: (1) executive compensation, benefits, ethics, and operational policies and controls; (2) flow of information to the Board, transparency of Board operations, and relationship with stakeholders; and (3) the Board's responsibilities, structure, and performance. GAO was asked to assess the extent of the Board's progress in each of these areas. GAO obtained information and data from the Board's regents, Smithsonian executives, and other stakeholders and also analyzed other organizations whose boards had faced similar governance challenges.
What GAO Found
The Board has implemented several reforms related to executive compensation and benefits, but the development of policies for broader operational matters such as travel, event expenses, and contracting is still under way. Actions implemented include a revised salary range for the Smithsonian's Secretary-elect and a unified compensation policy for other executives. The Smithsonian is reviewing policies related to travel and other matters, including internal controls. Effectively implementing the new policies and procedures developed during these reviews is likely to depend on effectively training staff and establishing accountability, both of which may be challenging due to a level of standardization and requirements that did not exist before. The Board has completed the actions it proposed for improving its access to information and making its operations more transparent, but actions to improve communication and relationships with stakeholders are less far along. The Board now has avenues for obtaining information directly from senior officials rather than through the Office of the Secretary, and it has taken such steps as creating a Web page to better publicize its operations and decisions. The Board is studying how to improve links with its 30 advisory boards and has developed an overall strategy for communicating with the larger network of stakeholders, but neither action is far enough along to assess its potential for addressing past problems. The Board has largely completed the actions it proposed for clarifying regents' responsibilities and studying possible changes in its size and structure, but actions for assessing Board performance are still being developed. The Board altered its committee structure but decided that more fundamental changes in its size and composition were unnecessary. To provide further expertise where necessary under the existing structure, the Board is encouraging the addition of nonregents to committees. Thus far, however, the Board has not developed a process for assuring transparency and accountability in selecting nonregents and using them to enhance governance. The Board is also developing a self-assessment process, but it remains to be seen how the Board will hold regents accountable if they neglect their duties. Given the extensiveness of actions taken and still under way, it is likely that the effectiveness of some changes will only be evident over a longer time. The Board does not currently have plans to conduct a broader evaluation of its governance reform actions after such time has passed to determine if the actions taken have addressed governance and accountability problems which led to its reform actions. |
gao_GAO-15-369 | gao_GAO-15-369_0 | 2). SBA’s regional offices were established shortly after the agency was created in 1953. These offices, which are managed by politically appointed administrators, play a part in supervising the district offices and promoting the President’s and SBA Administrator’s messages throughout the region. SBA Faces Ongoing Organizational Challenges
Despite long-standing organizational challenges affecting program oversight and human capital management that we and others have identified, SBA has not documented an assessment of its overall organizational structure, which could provide information on how best to address these challenges. Since its last major reorganization in 2004, the agency has continued to face long-standing organizational and workforce challenges, including complex overlapping responsibilities among offices, poor communication between headquarters and district offices in the administration of programs, and persistent skill gaps, especially in field offices. These challenges can affect SBA’s ability to deliver its programs consistently and effectively, especially in a climate of resource constraints. But its response has been limited to making incremental (piecemeal) changes to some of its divisions to, among other things, consolidate functions or change reporting relationships and offering employees early retirement in an attempt to address skill gaps. SBA told us that it has assessed its organizational structure but did not provide documentation of the results of the assessment. In 2012, the agency committed to assessing and revising its organizational structure to meet current and future SBA mission objectives. SBA officials told us the contractor completed its assessment in March 2015 and that SBA had completed its assessment of the contractor’s work. These gaps were primarily in district offices, which are supervised by regional offices. We also report on these issues in a related, soon-to-be-released report on SBA’s management and make recommendations as appropriate. Closing Regional Offices Would Have a Limited Effect on SBA’s Budget, but the Impact on Operations Is Less Clear
Because regional office costs represent a relatively small part of SBA’s overall costs, closing them would have a limited budgetary effect. However, it would be important to assess the feasibility of these options and weigh the related costs and benefits before deciding on a course of action. Given that these costs constituted less than 1 percent of SBA’s approximately $1 billion appropriation for that year, closing the regional offices would have a limited budgetary effect. The bulk of regional office costs went to compensation and benefits, which totaled $4.5 million in fiscal year 2013. Closing Regional Offices Could Impact SBA Operations
Over half of the headquarters (Office of Field Operations), regional, and district office managers (18 of 32) we interviewed cited challenges that could result if regional offices were to close and their functions were transferred to headquarters and district offices, but a few nonmanagement staff (6 of the 28) offered different views. Thus, the managers were concerned that without regional offices, district offices would be challenged to address such workload issues. Fourth, six headquarters, regional, and district managers we interviewed said that SBA would experience challenges in promoting SBA’s message without the regional offices. Thirteen headquarters, regional, and district officials emphasized that as political appointees, regional administrators played a greater role than district directors, who are career officials, in explaining and amplifying the President’s and SBA Administrator’s message and priorities. Three district officials said that they could coordinate directly with headquarters instead of coordinating with the regional offices. We recognize that the regional administrators and other staff in the regional offices provide a number of services for SBA. However, if closures were to occur, there are options available to address these challenges. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) examines any challenges associated with the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) organizational structure; (2) describes the specific responsibilities of the regional offices; and (3) discusses the budgetary effects of closing the regional offices and SBA managers’ and staff’s views on other possible effects of closures. Specifically, to obtain perspectives from SBA district office officials, we selected a nonrandom, purposive sample of 10 of the 68 district offices, 1 from each SBA region to provide national coverage. In conducting this review, we focused on the role of regional offices. A related, soon-to-be-released GAO report addresses a range of SBA management issues. We also examined documentation on changes to SBA's organizational structure from fiscal year 2005 to 2014 (the period after SBA’s last major reorganization in 2004). | Why GAO Did This Study
SBA was created in 1953, and its regional offices were established shortly thereafter. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the agency downsized the staff and responsibilities of the regional offices. These offices, which are managed by politically appointed administrators, are currently responsible for supervising SBA's district offices and promoting the President's messages throughout the region. GAO was asked to review SBA's current organizational structure, with a focus on the regional offices. Among other objectives, this report (1) examines challenges related to SBA's organizational structure and (2) discusses the budgetary effects of closing the regional offices and SBA managers' and staff's views on other possible effects of closures.
GAO reviewed documentation on changes to SBA's organizational structure from fiscal years 2005-2014 (following SBA's last major reorganization in 2004); analyzed data on fiscal year 2013 regional budgets (the most recent data SBA provided); and interviewed a total of 60 SBA officials at headquarters, all 10 regional offices, and a nongeneralizable sample of 10 of the 68 district offices (one from each region reflecting a variety of sizes).
What GAO Found
While long-standing organizational challenges affected program oversight and human capital management, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has not documented an assessment of its overall organizational structure that could help determine how to address these challenges. SBA currently has a three-tiered organizational structure—headquarters offices, 10 regional offices, and 68 district offices. SBA's last major reorganization was in 2004, when it moved loan processing from district offices to specialized centers and assigned district offices new duties, such as small business counseling. But the agency has continued to face long-standing organizational and workforce challenges, including complex overlapping responsibilities among headquarters and regional offices and skill gaps in district offices (which are supervised by regional offices). These challenges can affect SBA's ability to deliver its programs consistently and effectively, especially in a climate of resource constraints. SBA's response has been limited to (1) making incremental changes to some of its divisions such as consolidating functions or changing reporting relationships and (2) offering employees early retirement. SBA committed to assessing and revising its organizational structure in 2012 but has not yet documented this effort. Although a contractor studied SBA's organizational structure in March 2015 and SBA stated it had completed its assessment of the contractor's work as of August 2015, it has not provided documentation of this assessment. In a related, soon-to-be-released report on SBA's management, GAO assesses the agency's organizational structure and makes recommendations as appropriate.
Closing SBA's 10 regional offices, as some have suggested, would have a limited effect on SBA's budget, but the impact on operations is less clear. Compensation and benefits—totaling $4.5 million in fiscal 2013—were the largest costs of regional offices, which together had other administrative costs totaling about $235,000 and were co-located with district offices. Because these costs constituted less than 1 percent of SBA's approximately $1 billion appropriation in 2013, closing the regional offices would have a limited budgetary effect. But over half of the SBA managers GAO interviewed (18 of 32) said that closing regional offices could pose operational challenges. First, headquarters, regional, and district managers said that eliminating the 10 regional administrators would require one headquarters office to supervise 68 district directors. Second, regional and district officials were concerned that SBA would lose the overall regional perspective and ability to balance workloads within regions. Third, headquarters, regional, and district managers explained that the agency would be challenged to promote SBA's message without regional offices. They emphasized the role that regional administrators play in explaining and amplifying the President's and SBA Administrator's messages and priorities. However, a few (6 of 28) nonmanagement staff GAO interviewed disputed the importance of regional administrators, some stating that district offices could coordinate directly with headquarters offices. GAO recognizes that regional administrators and offices provide a number of services for SBA. If closures were to occur, there are options available to address these challenges. However, it would be important to carefully assess the feasibility of these options and weigh the related costs and benefits before deciding on a course of action.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. However, in a related, soon-to-be-released report examining SBA management issues, GAO assesses organizational structure and makes recommendations as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-277 | gao_GAO-07-277_0 | Most Agencies Have Marking and Publicizing Policies, Regulations, and Guidelines
Most of the agencies we reviewed involved in foreign assistance activities have established some marking policies, regulations, and guidelines. USAID has established the most detailed policies, regulations, and guidelines for marking and publicizing its assistance. However, USDA, DOD, HHS, Treasury, and MCC efforts in this area have been more limited. State Policy Allows Program Managers and Ambassadors Discretion for Marking and Publicizing Assistance
According to State officials, State’s policy provides that department program managers and country ambassadors use their discretion to determine when it is appropriate to mark and publicize U.S. foreign assistance. Foreign Assistance Marking Efforts and Publicity Have Varied
To increase awareness of U.S. assistance abroad, key agencies that we reviewed used various methods to mark and to publicize some of their activities and exercised flexibility in deciding when it was appropriate to do so. These agencies used different methods of marking, or visibly acknowledging, their assistance, including applying graphic identities or logos on such things as publications and project signage. In addition, agencies generally used embassy public affairs offices for publicizing, or disseminating information about, the source of their assistance and, in some cases, augmented these efforts with their own publicity methods. In some cases, the markings used do not convey that the donor is a U.S. entity or that the United States is the source of the foreign assistance. To enhance publicity of its foreign assistance programs, USAID has also, as mentioned earlier, established a network of communications specialists to increase awareness of these programs in the host country. First, little reliable work has been done to assess the impact of U.S. assistance on foreign citizens’ awareness of that assistance. Second, although the newly appointed DFA has begun to develop governmentwide guidance for marking and publicizing all U.S. foreign assistance, it is unclear to what extent this policy will be implemented by agencies whose foreign assistance programs are not under State’s direct authority. The United States Lacks Governmentwide Guidance for Marking and Publicizing Its Assistance
While some agencies have established policies, regulations, and guidelines on marking and publicizing U.S. foreign assistance, we found that USAID missions and all federal agencies and presidential initiatives providing assistance overseas have not received clear and consistent direction on marking and publicizing U.S. foreign assistance. To enhance U.S. marking and publicity efforts, and to improve the information used to measure the impact of U.S. marking and publicizing programs, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with other U.S. executive agencies, develop a strategy, which appropriately utilizes techniques such as surveys and focus groups, to better assess the impact of U.S. marking and publicity programs and activities on public awareness. | Why GAO Did This Study
The negative perceptions of the United States associated with U.S. foreign policy initiatives have underscored the importance of the United States presenting a complete portrayal of the benefits that many in the world derive from U.S. foreign assistance efforts. Congress has expressed concerns that the United States has frequently understated or not publicized information about its foreign assistance programs. As requested, this report (1) describes the policies, regulations, and guidelines that agencies have established to mark and publicize foreign assistance; (2) describes how State, USAID, and other agencies mark and publicize foreign assistance; and (3) identifies key challenges that agencies face in marking and publicizing foreign assistance.
What GAO Found
Most of the agencies we reviewed involved in foreign assistance activities have established some marking and publicity requirements in policies, regulations, or guidelines. USAID has the most detailed policies and regulations relating to marking and publicity. USAID has also established a network of communications specialists at its missions to publicize its assistance efforts and has issued communications guidelines to promote that assistance. According to State officials, its policy is to allow its program managers and ambassadors to use their discretion when determining which programs and activities to mark or publicize. USDA, DOD, HHS, Treasury, and MCC have also established some policies for marking and publicizing assistance, though these policies vary in their level of formality and detail. To increase awareness of U.S. assistance abroad, key agencies that we reviewed used various methods to mark and publicize some of their activities and exercised flexibility in deciding when it was appropriate to do so. These agencies used different methods of marking, or visibly acknowledging, their assistance. In addition, agencies generally used embassy public affairs offices for publicizing, information about the source of their assistance and, in some cases, augmented these efforts with their own publicity methods. We identified some challenges to marking and publicizing U.S. foreign assistance, including the lack of (1) a strategy for assessing the impact of marking and publicity efforts on increasing the awareness of U.S. foreign assistance and (2) governmentwide guidance for marking and publicizing U.S. foreign assistance. First, although some agencies conduct surveys in recipient countries that primarily capture information on public opinion of the United States, little reliable work has been done to assess the impact of U.S. assistance on foreign citizens' awareness of the source of U.S. provided assistance. Second, while the newly appointed Director of Foreign Assistance has begun to address the issue of developing a governmentwide policy for marking and publicizing all U.S. foreign assistance, it is unclear to what extent this policy will be implemented by agencies whose foreign assistance programs are not under DFA's direct authority. |
gao_GAO-03-544T | gao_GAO-03-544T_0 | Other mission areas, most notably drug interdiction, have declined substantially as a percentage of the operating budget. Security Emphasis Continues to Affect Levels of Effort in Some Missions
The emphasis the Coast Guard placed on security after September 11th has had varying effects on its level of effort among all of its missions, as measured by the extent to which multiple-mission resources (cutters, other boats, and aircraft) are used for a particular mission. Other missions, such as search and rescue and aids to navigation remained at essentially the same levels as they were before September 11th. However, the level of effort for other missions, most notably the interdiction of illegal drugs and fisheries enforcement, is substantially below pre-September 11th levels. Coastal security has seen the most dramatic increase from pre-September 11th levels. For example, during the first quarter of 2003, the level of effort in this area was 28 percent higher than it was for the comparable period in 1998. Although search and rescue boats and buoy tenders were used to perform homeland security functions immediately after September 11th, their doing so did not materially affect the Coast Guard’s ability to carry out its search and rescue or aids to navigation missions. The reduced level of effort dedicated to these two missions is likely linked to the Coast Guard’s inability to meet its performance goals in these two areas. Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request Will Not Substantially Alter Current Levels of Effort
The Coast Guard’s budget request for fiscal year 2004 does not contain initiatives or proposals that would substantially alter the current distribution of levels of effort among mission areas. Significant Challenges Raise Concerns About Coast Guard’s Ability to Accomplish Its Diverse Missions
Despite the billion-dollar (19 percent) budget increase it has received over the past 2 years, the Coast Guard faces fundamental challenges in attempting to accomplish everything that has come to be expected of it. Given the funding levels for the project, these conversions and upgrades have been slowed. Some New Homeland Security Duties Are Not Fully Factored into the Coast Guard’s Distribution of Resources
A second challenge is that the Coast Guard has been tasked with a myriad of new homeland security requirements since the fiscal year 2004 budget request was formulated and will have to meet many of these requirements by pulling resources from other activities. Several Types of Actions Needed to Address Challenges
In previous work, we have examined some of the implications of the Coast Guard’s new operating environment on the agency’s ability to fulfill its various missions. One important effort that has received relatively little attention, in the understandable need to first put increased homeland security responsibilities in place, is the development of a plan that proactively addresses how the Coast Guard should manage its various missions in light of its new operating reality. But it is important to complete this plan and address in it key elements and issues so that it is both comprehensive and useful to decision makers who must make difficult policy and budget choices. The Coast Guard needs a plan that will help the agency, the Congress, and the public understand and effectively deal with trade-offs and their potential impacts in such circumstances. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11th attacks decidedly changed the Coast Guard's priorities and markedly increased its scope of activities. Homeland security, a long-standing but relatively small part of the Coast Guard's duties, took center stage. Still, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other missions important to the nation's interests, such as helping stem the flow of drugs and illegal migration, protecting important fishing grounds, and responding to marine pollution. For the past several years, the Coast Guard has received substantial increases in its budget to accommodate its increased responsibilities. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's most recent level of effort on its various missions and compare them to past levels, analyze the implications of the proposed 2004 budget for these levels of effort, and discuss the challenges the Coast Guard faces in balancing and maximizing the effectiveness of all its missions.
What GAO Found
The most recent levels of effort for the Coast Guard's various missions show clearly the dramatic shifts that have occurred among its missions since the September 11th attacks. Predictably, levels of effort related to homeland security remain at much higher levels than before September 11th. Levels of effort for two major nonsecurity missions--search and rescue and aids to navigational--are now relatively consistent with historical levels. By contrast, several other missions--most notably fisheries enforcement and drug interdiction--dropped sharply after September 11th and remain substantially below historical levels. Although the Coast Guard has stated that its aim is to increase efforts in the missions that have declined, continued homeland security and defense demands make it unlikely that the agency, in the short run, can deliver on this goal. The 2004 budget request contains little that would appear to substantially alter the existing levels of effort among missions. The initiatives in the proposed budget relate mainly to enhancing homeland security and search and rescue missions. Although the 2004 budget request represents a sizeable increase in funding (9.6 percent), the Coast Guard still faces fundamental challenges in meeting its new security-related responsibilities while rebuilding its capacity to accomplish other missions that have declined. Given the likely constraints on the federal budget in future years, it is important for the Coast Guard to identify the likely level of effort for each of its missions; lay out a plan for achieving these levels; and tie these levels to measurable outputs and goals, so that the agency and the Congress can better decide how limited dollars should be spent. |
gao_GAO-15-148 | gao_GAO-15-148_0 | Since that time, DOD has made moderate progress in addressing weaknesses in its supply chain management. For example, in our February 2013 High Risk report we found that DOD had begun developing a strategy to coordinate efforts to improve asset tracking and in-transit visibility. DOD’s Asset Visibility Strategy and Implementation Plans Contain Most, but Not All, of the Key Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic Plan, and DOD Is Taking Steps to Address the Missing Information
In January 2014, DOD issued its Strategy and implementation plans for improving asset visibility, which included five of the seven key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan and partially included the other two elements—resources and investments and key external factors. The Strategy includes 22 SEPs developed by the components that outline initiatives intended to improve asset visibility. Specifically, we determined that the Strategy fully includes a comprehensive mission statement; a problem definition, scope, and methodology; goals and objectives; activities, milestones, and performance measures; and organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. These officials further noted it was DOD’s intent to capture and publish costs and external factors during regular updates to the Strategy. DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Asset Visibility, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Fully Address GAO’s High- Risk Criteria
DOD has taken steps to improve its asset visibility, and we found that the department has fully met one of the five criteria for removal from the High- Risk List—leadership commitment—and partially met the other four, as shown in table 2. DOD’s 2014 Strategy represents its corrective action plan and provides goals and objectives as well as SEPs detailing specific initiatives for improving asset visibility. Therefore, we recommended that the department develop a strategy for total asset visibility that included, among other things, goals and performance measures to gauge improvement. Until DOD demonstrates that implementation of the initiatives will result in measurable outcomes and progress towards achieving the goals and objectives in the Strategy, it may be limited in its ability to demonstrate sustained progress in implementing corrective actions and resolving the high-risk area. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has a comprehensive strategy and implementation plans for improving asset visibility, including in-transit visibility, we reviewed DOD’s Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility (the Strategy) and its implementation plans. To evaluate any improvements made to asset visibility that would meet criteria for removal from the High-Risk List (referred to as high-risk criteria), we reviewed DOD’s Strategy and the supporting execution plans (SEP), and we discussed with the components the initiatives they had implemented or were in the process of implementing to improve asset visibility. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO designated DOD's supply chain management as a high-risk area and in July 2011 found that limitations in asset visibility make it difficult to obtain timely and accurate information on assets that are present in a theater of operations. In 2013, GAO found that DOD had made moderate progress in addressing weaknesses in its supply chain management and identified several actions that DOD should take to strengthen asset visibility, including completing and implementing its strategy for coordinating efforts to improve asset visibility across the department.
This report examined the extent to which DOD has (1) a comprehensive strategy and implementation plans for improving asset visibility; and (2) made improvements in asset visibility that meet GAO's criteria for removal from the High-Risk List. GAO reviewed DOD's 2014 Strategy and initiatives for improving asset visibility and evaluated DOD's actions to improve asset visibility against GAO's criteria for determining and removing high risk designations.
What GAO Found
In January 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued its Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility ( Strategy ) and supporting execution plans (SEP), which included five of the seven key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan and partially included the other two elements. For example, the Strategy fully includes a comprehensive mission statement; a problem definition, scope, and methodology; goals and objectives; activities, milestones, and performance measures; and organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. However, 4 of the 22 SEPs, which outline initiatives intended to improve asset visibility, did not address resources and investments and key external factors. DOD officials told GAO that this information would be added during regular updates to the Strategy . Since the Strategy was issued, DOD components have begun updating the SEPs to include informationsuch as costs and key external factorsthat had been missing from the SEPs included in the Strategy .
DOD has taken steps to improve its asset visibility, and GAO's assessment is that the department has fully met one of the five criteria for removal from the High-Risk List—leadership commitment—and partially met the other four, as shown below.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends four actions to improve DOD's management of asset visibility. The actions include, among other things, that DOD include information in its S trategy and SEPs on elements used to develop cost estimates; clearly link performance measures for the initiatives and the Strategy's goals and objectives; and demonstrate that the initiatives are resulting in measurable outcomes and progress toward meeting the goals and objectives in the Strategy . DOD agreed with all the recommendations. |
gao_OCE-98-238 | gao_OCE-98-238_0 | The Washington Convention Center Authority Act of 1994 (1994 Act) authorizes WCCA to construct, maintain, and operate the new convention center, as well as maintain and operate the existing convention center. The current master plan calls for constructing a new convention center at Mount Vernon Square, the legislatively preferred site, located at Ninth Street and Mount Vernon Place, Northwest. We also identified project cost components not included in the GMP and who would be responsible for those costs. We reviewed historical information on studies performed on alternative site consideration by the District and independent consultants and WCCA’s comparative analysis of costs to construct the new convention center at the Mount Vernon Square site and the alternative Northeast No. We requested comments on a draft of this report from WCCA and the District of Columbia Government. Table 1 compares current cost estimates with the estimates included in our September 1997 report. Project costs increased $58 million, from $650 million to $708 million, and nonconstruction reserves have increased the financing-related costs by about $51 million, from $87 million to $138 million for a current total funding requirement of $846 million. Risks External to the GMP
In addition to the potential for incurring building and site costs in excess of the GMP amount, WCCA is responsible for the remaining project costs that are not covered by the GMP, which are noted in table 1. WCCA has reduced the project costs for the fixtures, furnishings, and equipment component by about $17.7 million in anticipation of negotiating arrangements with vendors to provide certain equipment and services, such as a heating and cooling plant, communications, and food services equipment. According to WCCA officials, this arrangement has been done at other convention centers. Contingency to Cover Project Risks
The project budget includes two contingency amounts: (1) a $10 million construction contingency contained in the GMP earmarked for cost increases that are the responsibility of the construction manager and (2) a $30 million project contingency earmarked for cost increases both inside and outside the GMP for which WCCA is responsible. About $616 million, or 73 percent, is expected to be derived from revenue bonds supported by dedicated taxes. Assuming the estimated project costs are substantially accurate, the financing plan projections, including the projected growth in dedicated tax revenues, seem reasonable; however, until the federal funding is approved in an adopted 1999 budget, and until WCCA signs contracts with vendors, there is a risk to the financing plan of about $53 million. Since May 1997, WCCA has proposed several changes to its financing plan. These changes would allow WCCA to borrow more money to finance the project. Framework for Evaluating Dedicated Tax Financing
Since the majority (73 percent) of the funds to finance the project are expected to come from bonds supported by dedicated taxes, our review of the financing plan considers some of the key factors rating agencies use to rate dedicated tax financing for convention center projects: (1) breadth of the tax base, (2) historical performance of the revenue stream, (3) the underlying strength of the economy, and (4) the absence of legislative risk. This contrasts with a decline of an average annual rate of over 2 percent per year during the previous 3 years. If these grants are not received, WCCA’s $30 million project contingency outside of the GMP would not be sufficient to cover these estimated costs. WCCA’s financing plan includes $110 million from dedicated tax collections. The bond proceeds would be deposited in a construction fund. Reserve Requirements. Copies will be made available to others upon request. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Washington Convention Center Authority's (WCCA) efforts to arrange for financing and constructing a new convention center in the District of Columbia, focusing on the: (1) estimated cost of this project, including the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) for constructing the new convention center, and the risk exposure for both the contractor and the District; and (2) financing plan, including proposed changes to the revenue base, history of dedicated tax collections, projections for future revenues, and sufficiency to cover the GMP and other project costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) WCCA is proceeding with efforts to build a new convention center at Mount Vernon Square at a cost WCCA officials estimate to be $650 million; (2) this estimate has not changed since GAO reported on this project in September 1997; (3) however, GAO's latest review of the project identified an additional $58 million in project costs which--because WCCA expects them to be funded through federal grants or moved into future operating costs--are not included in WCCA's total project costs; (4) these costs raise the project's cost estimate to $708 million, excluding reserve requirements and financing costs of $138 million; (5) the majority of the estimated project costs are covered in a $500.6-million GMP for construction; (6) the GMP lays out 22 different cost components and sets limits on financial risks to the construction manager, Clark/Smoot; (7) areas of risk are not included in the $500.6-million price; (8) an estimated $207 million in other project-related activities will be or have been contracted for separately; (9) WCCA's current financing plan to cover predevelopment, construction, reserves and operation of the convention center calls for about $846 million; (10) seventy-three percent of the funds needed to finance the project are expected to be derived from revenue bonds supported by dedicated taxes; (11) changes from the previous financing plan include increasing the term of the bonds as well as the dedicated taxes to allow WCCA to borrow more money for the project; (12) WCCA received $44 million in dedicated taxes in 1997, and WCCA has projected collections to increase at 1 percent per year over the next several years; (13) these and other factors will be looked at by WCCA's consultants, rating agencies, and bond insurers who will evaluate the financing package and determine its ability to cover the GMP and other project costs; (14) risks associated with the financing package could affect the rating of the bonds and accordingly, the interest rate; (15) although WCCA plans to address an $18-million reduction in its construction budget by negotiating arrangements with vendors to provide equipment and services, to date there are no executed contracts to cover these arrangements; and (16) the site selection process for the convention center has a long history and numerous studies have consistently identified Mount Vernon Square a preferred site. |
gao_GAO-07-727T | gao_GAO-07-727T_0 | Since the mid-1980s, about $107 billion has been spent, and over the next 5 years, another $49 billion is expected to be invested. To enable MDA to field and enhance a missile defense system quickly, the Secretary of Defense, in 2002, directed a new acquisition strategy. To carry out its mission, MDA is fielding missile defense capabilities in 2-year increments known as blocks. This block is expected to provide protection against attacks from North Korea and the Middle East. For example, in fiscal year 2006, funding for the nine BMDS elements collectively accounted for 72 percent of MDA’s research and development budget. We examined the current status of MDA’s quality assurance program by visiting various contractor facilities and holding discussions with MDA officials, such as officials in the Office of Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance. MDA Has Made Progress with Block 2006, but Scope Has Been Reduced and Costs Have Gone Up
MDA made progress during fiscal year 2006, but it will not achieve the goals it set for itself in March 2005. One year after establishing its Block 2006 goals, the agency informed Congress that it planned to field fewer assets, reduce performance goals, and increase the block’s cost goal. MDA is generally on track to meet its revised quantity goals, but the performance of the BMDS cannot yet be fully assessed because there have been too few flight tests conducted to anchor the models and simulations that predict overall system performance. During the first year of Block 2006, MDA continued to improve the BMDS by enhancing its performance and fielding additional assets. For example, the GMD element completed its first successful intercept attempt since 2002. The test was also notable because it was an end-to-end test of one engagement scenario, the first such test that the program has conducted. With the exception of the GMD interceptors, MDA is on track to deliver the revised quantities. MDA also reduced the performance expected of Block 2006 commensurate with the reduction in assets. However, insufficient data are available to determine whether MDA is on track to meet the new goal. While MDA reduced Block 2006 quantity and performance goals, it increased the block’s cost goal from about $19.3 billion to approximately $20.3 billion. MDA’s Flexibility Makes Oversight and Accountability More Difficult
Because the BMDS has not formally entered the system development and demonstration phase of the acquisition cycle, it is not yet required to apply several important oversight mechanisms contained in certain acquisition laws that, among other things, provide transparency into program progress and decisions. On the other hand, MDA operates with considerable autonomy to change goals and plans, making it difficult to reconcile outcomes with original expectations and to determine the actual cost of each block and of individual operational assets. Over the years, a framework of laws has been created that make major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned outcomes and cost, give decision makers a means to conduct oversight, and ensure some level of independent program review. MDA can make decisions faster than other major acquisition programs because it does not have to wait for higher-level approvals or independent reviews. Because MDA uses research and development funds to manufacture assets, it is not required to fully fund those assets in the year of their purchase. MDA considers the cost of deferred work, which may be the delayed delivery of assets or other work activities, as a cost of the block in which the work is performed even though the work benefits or was planned for a prior block. MDA expanded its teaming approach in 2006 to another problem supplier and reports that many systemic solutions are already underway. During fiscal year 2006, MDA’s audits continued to identify both quality control weaknesses and quality control procedures that contractors are addressing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the next 5 years the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) expects to invest $49 billion in the Ballistic Missile Defense System's (BMDS) development and fielding. MDA's strategy is to field new capabilities in 2-year blocks. In January 2006, MDA initiated its second block--Block 2006--to protect against attacks from North Korea and the Middle East. Congress requires GAO to assess MDA's progress annually. GAO's March 2007 report addressed MDA's progress during fiscal year 2006 and followed up on program oversight issues and the current status of MDA's quality assurance program. GAO assessed the progress of each element being developed by MDA, examined acquisition laws applicable to major acquisition programs, and reviewed the impact of implemented quality initiatives.
What GAO Found
During fiscal year 2006, MDA fielded additional assets for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), enhanced the capability of some assets, and realized several noteworthy testing achievements. For example, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element successfully conducted its first end-to-end test of one engagement scenario, the element's first successful intercept test since 2002. However, MDA will not meet its original Block 2006 cost, fielding, or performance goals because the agency has revised those goals. In March 2006, MDA reduced its goal for fielded assets to provide funds for technical problems and new and increased operations and sustainment requirements; increased its cost goal by about $1 billion--from $19.3 to $20.3 billion; and reduced its performance goal commensurate with the reduction of assets. MDA may also reduce the scope of the block further by deferring other work until a future block because four elements incurred about $478 million in fiscal year 2006 budget overruns. With the possible exception of GMD interceptors, MDA is generally on track to meet its revised quantity goals. But the deferral of work, both into and out of Block 2006, and inconsistent reporting of costs by some BMDS elements, makes the actual cost of Block 2006 difficult to determine. In addition, GAO cannot assess whether the block will meet its revised performance goals until MDA's models and simulations are anchored by sufficient flight tests to have confidence that predictions of performance are reliable. Because MDA has not entered the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition cycle, it is not yet required to apply certain laws intended to hold major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned outcomes and cost, give decision makers a means to conduct oversight, and ensure some level of independent program review. MDA is more agile in its decision-making because it does not have to wait for outside reviews or obtain higher-level approvals of its goals or changes to those goals. Because MDA can revise its baseline, it has the ability to field fewer assets than planned, defer work to a future block, and increase planned cost. All of this makes it hard to reconcile cost and outcomes against original goals and to determine the value of the work accomplished. Also, using research and development funds to purchase operational assets allows costs to be spread over 2 or more years, which makes costs harder to track and commits future budgets. MDA continues to identify quality assurance weaknesses, but the agency's corrective measures are beginning to produce results. Quality deficiencies are declining as MDA implements corrective actions, such as a teaming approach designed to restore the reliability of key suppliers. |
gao_GAO-06-245T | gao_GAO-06-245T_0 | Costly Financial Products With Features Inappropriate for Military Members Raise Sales Practice Concerns
A limited number of insurance companies and broker-dealers are under investigation for deceptive sales practices to target military members with financial products that have features that reduce their benefit to service members. Although most service members already receive considerable low-cost life insurance as part of their government benefits, state insurance regulators we contacted said that at least six insurance companies have been selling a hybrid insurance product that combines life insurance coverage with a side savings fund to thousands of service members at installations across the United States and around the world. These products provide additional death benefits but are significantly more expensive than other life insurance coverage available to service members. However, the products being marketed by these insurance companies require a long series of payments to result in significant benefits to their purchasers. This occurs because of the large premiums due in the early years on this type of policy, and because the accumulated value of the savings fund for this product was modest. In the report we prepared for this committee, we identified at least 17 lawsuits or administrative actions that had been taken against companies that market primarily to military members. Regulators and other organizations are also examining whether the sellers of these products are misrepresenting information on the forms used to initiate pay allotments to deduct the payments for the products directly from the service members’ pay. In addition, insurance regulators in some states are currently reviewing whether these combined insurance and savings products that are being sold to military members comply with all applicable state insurance laws and regulations. Companies also Selling Service Members a Mutual Fund Product with Features that Reduce Its Benefit to Most Military Members
Large numbers of service members, including officers, were also purchasing a unique securities product, known as a contractual plan, with features that reduce its benefit to military members. However, if a purchaser of one of these plans stops making regular investments earlier, the effective sales charge can be much higher. Firms marketing contractual plans have again been accused of inappropriate sales practices. In December 2004, SEC and NASD sanctioned the largest broker-dealer marketing these plans to service members after alleging that the firm’s marketing materials were misleading. Lack of DOD Complaint Sharing Hampered Regulators’ Ability to Identify Problems Involving Sales to Military Members
Additional actions by Congress, DOD, and regulators also appear warranted to improve the effectiveness of insurance and securities regulators in overseeing sales of financial products to military members. In addition to conducting routine examinations, insurance and securities regulators use complaints from financial firms’ customers as an indicator that problems involving particular products, or the practices of particular firms, exist. The securities regulators’ ability to detect problems was also hampered by the lack of standardized data on the extent to which customers were completing contractual plans. In our June 2005 report, we recommended that DOD create a database of all violations of its solicitation policy. DOD has not, as of yet, issued this new directive. This DOD official also acknowledged that more coordination could be done to ensure that both military installation personnel and financial regulatory staff understand how additional sharing could appropriately occur To ensure that financial regulators have critical information that they need to identify problematic products and sales practices, the report we prepared for this committee recommends that Congress direct DOD to develop mechanisms to overcome any barriers and coordinate with its installation personnel and with financial regulators on ways to share additional information about problematic financial firm practices and service member concerns. Appendix I: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Pay Allotments for Insurance for Military Members
As a result of a report we issued in June 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) has agreed with our recommendations to improve aspects of its oversight of insurance purchases by military members. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, a series of media articles alleged that financial firms were marketing expensive and potentially unnecessary insurance or other financial products to members of the military. GAO's report for this committee examined (1) features and marketing of certain insurance and securities products being sold to military members and (2) how financial regulators and the Department of Defense (DOD) were overseeing the sales of insurance and securities products to military members. GAO also examined issues relating to DOD's oversight of insurance sales for a report issued in June 2005.
What GAO Found
A limited number of firms accused of using deceptive sales practices are targeting costly financial products to military members with features that reduce their benefits to military purchasers. Although some service members benefited from a product that combines insurance with a savings component, the additional coverage was more expensive than the low-cost government insurance almost all service members already receive. One feature reducing these products' benefits was that if the service member ever stopped making payments and did not request a refund, the accumulated savings is used to continue the life insurance coverage. With military members often leaving the service within a few years, most stopped their payments and likely failed to amass any savings from their purchase. Various regulatory and other actions have been taken against the insurance companies that sell these products in the past and new investigations are underway in 14 states over whether these companies have failed to clearly identify the products as insurance as required by law or whether the products' features comply with all state insurance requirements. A small number of broker-dealers were also marketing a securities product--the mutual fund contractual plan--that has largely disappeared from the civilian marketplace. Although potentially providing returns equivalent to other products if steady payments are made over a long period, these contractual plans proved more expensive to most military purchasers than other widely available alternative products because many military members stopped making payments in the first few years. In addition, the largest broker-dealer selling contractual plans has already been sanctioned by regulators for using misleading marketing materials and examinations into the practices of other firms marketing this product are also underway. A lack of routine complaint sharing by DOD prevented financial regulators from identifying inappropriate sales to military service members earlier. Although insurance regulators in some states review sales activities periodically, most rely on complaints to indicate that potentially problematic sales are occurring, particularly since no appropriateness or suitability standards exist for insurance. Securities regulators' efforts were also hampered by the lack of complaint sharing from DOD personnel. Because sharing with financial regulators can be complicated by privacy regulations and potential legal restrictions, DOD personnel at individual installations generally resolved matters involving product sales with companies directly. However, in light of the problems identified in our June 2005 report and the report issued for this committee, DOD has efforts underway to revise its solicitation policies regarding such sales, and has reviewed ways in which it can legally share additional information with financial regulators. However, DOD has not yet issued these new policies or coordinated with military installation personnel or with regulators on appropriate ways that additional sharing could occur. |
gao_GAO-14-432 | gao_GAO-14-432_0 | To determine the extent to which Promise grants enabled collaboration at the local level, we used GAO’s prior work on enhancing collaboration in interagency groups as criteria. We received responses from all 48 grantees. 1). Types of Grants
The Promise program relies on a two-phase strategy for awarding grants, which includes both one-year planning grants and three- to five-year implementation grants. Education’s Grant Strategy Aligns with Promise Goals, but Education Has Not Clearly Communicated Expectations for Planning Grants
Grant Requirements Enabled Education to Identify Organizations with Potential to Coordinate Student Services
The planning and implementation grant activities that Education developed for the Promise program generally align with Education’s goal of significantly improving the educational and developmental outcomes of children and youth in the nation’s most distressed communities. According to Education officials, the planning grant award process enabled them to identify community-based organizations in distressed neighborhoods with the potential to effectively coordinate the continuum of services for students living in the neighborhood. Through a separate competition, Education identified organizations that application reviewers determined were most ready to implement their plans. However, Education did not communicate clearly to planning grantees about the probability of receiving an implementation grant and its expectations for grantees to continue their efforts without implementation funding. 4). Some grantees also said there was a disconnect between the planning and the implementation grant application processes. Education officials told us that they viewed the planning grant activities as useful in themselves. For example, they told us that the planning process offers rich data and begins the process of bringing together partners and breaking down silos. However, Education did not require grantees to have matching funds in-hand before submitting their applications. Promise Neighborhoods Program Coordinates with Some Programs with Related Goals but Has No Inventory of Related Programs
Promise Program Coordinates Closely with Some Related Federal Programs to Align Grants
In an effort to target its resources and align the Promise program goals with those of other place-based initiatives, the Promise program coordinates closely with a limited number of federal programs within Education and with other federal programs as part of the White House Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (NRI).The NRI is an interagency coordinating body that aligns place-based programs run by HUD, HHS, Justice, and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) (see fig. 5). In coordinating within Education and with NRI, Education’s efforts are focused on ensuring that grants are mutually reinforcing. These coordination activities include aligning goals, developing common performance measures where there are common purposes, and sharing technical assistance resources in areas where programs address similar issues or fund similar activities. However, Education has not developed an inventory of federal programs that could contribute to Promise program goals that it could share with planning and implementation grantees and use to make its own decisions about coordination across agencies. Further, Education lacks complete information to inform decisions about future federal coordination efforts and identify potential fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. Education requires implementation grantees to report annually on their performance using 15 indicators. In addition, Promise grantees are required to develop a longitudinal data system to collect information on the individuals served, services provided in the cradle-to-career continuum, and the related outcomes.are expected to use the longitudinal data to evaluate their programs on an Grantees ongoing basis and make adjustments to their strategies and services, as discussed later in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, Education stated it must first conduct a systematic examination of the reliability and validity of the data to determine whether it can be used for a descriptive study and a restricted-use data set. Grantees Collaborate to Deliver a Range of Services
Grantees and partners provided examples of how they have collaborated through the Promise grant to deliver services and supports that are intended to improve educational and developmental outcomes. 2. 3. Develop a plan to use the data collected from grantees to conduct a national evaluation of the program. The survey included questions about the clarity and helpfulness of the application and peer review process, challenges sustaining efforts after the end of the planning grant, coordination of federal resources, collaboration with local organizations and associated challenges, the extent to which local coordination reduced duplication, overlap and fragmentation, if at all, the mechanisms organizations use to track the results of their efforts, the results of the grants, and the helpfulness of Education’s guidance and resources for the program. We also interviewed Education officials and technical assistance providers, as well as other experts who have worked with Promise grant applicants, such as the Promise Neighborhoods Institute. To determine how well the structure of Education’s Promise Neighborhoods grant program aligns with program goals and how Education selected grantees, using Education’s goals for the Promise program as criteria, we reviewed Education reports on place-based strategies; relevant Federal Register notices; and application guidance and training materials, including both the guidance available to applicants and to the peer reviewers regarding the technical evaluation/grant selection process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Education's Promise Neighborhoods program is a competitive grant program with goals to improve educational and developmental outcomes for children in distressed neighborhoods. The grants fund community-based organizations' efforts to work with local partners to develop and evaluate a cradle-to-career continuum of services in a designated geographic footprint. As it is one of several federal programs using this model GAO was asked to review the program.
This report examines: (1) the extent to which Education's strategy for awarding grants aligns with program goals; (2) how Education aligns Promise Neighborhoods efforts with other related programs; (3) how Education evaluates grantees' efforts; and (4) the extent to which grants have enabled collaboration at the local level, and the results of such collaboration.
GAO reviewed Federal Register notices, applications, and guidance; surveyed all 48 grantees on the application process, coordination of resources, collaboration, and early results; visited 11 grantees selected based on geography and grant type; and interviewed Education officials and technical assistance providers.
What GAO Found
The Department of Education (Education) used a two-phase strategy for awarding Promise Neighborhoods (Promise) grants, and aligned grant activities with program goals. Education awarded 1-year planning grants to organizations with the potential to effectively align services for students in their respective neighborhoods. Planning grants were generally intended to enhance the grantees' capacity to plan a continuum of services. Through a separate competition, Education awarded 5-year implementation grants to organizations that demonstrated they were most ready to implement their plans. However, Education did not communicate clearly to grantees about its expectations for the planning grants and the likelihood of receiving implementation grants. As a result, some grantees experienced challenges sustaining momentum in the absence or delay of implementation grant funding.
The Promise program coordinates with related federal efforts primarily through a White House initiative that brings together neighborhood grant programs at five federal agencies. The Promise program's efforts are focused on ensuring that grants are mutually reinforcing by aligning goals, developing common performance measures, and sharing technical assistance resources. While Promise grantees incorporate a wide range of federal programs in their local strategies, Education coordinates with a more limited number of federal programs. Officials told us that they do this to avoid spreading program resources too thin. Further, Education did not develop an inventory of the federal programs that share Promise goals, a practice that could assist grantees; help officials make decisions about interagency coordination; and identify potential fragmentation, overlap, and duplication.
Education requires Promise grantees to develop information systems and collect extensive data, but it has not developed plans to evaluate the program. Specifically, implementation grantees must collect data on individuals they serve, services they provide, and related outcomes and report annually on multiple indicators. However, Education stated it must conduct a systematic examination of the reliability and validity of the data to determine whether it will be able to use the data for an evaluation. Absent an evaluation, Education cannot determine the viability and effectiveness of the Promise program's approach.
The Promise grant enabled grantees and their partners to collaborate in ways that align with leading practices GAO previously identified for enhancing collaboration among interagency groups including establishing common outcomes, leveraging resources, and tracking performance. For example, Education required grantees to work with partners to develop common goals and a plan to use existing and new resources to meet identified needs in target areas. Grantees were also required to leverage resources by committing funding from multiple sources. Implementation grantees were required to collect and use data to track performance. Some planning grantees used a leading collaborative strategy not required by Education that produced early benefits. For example, several grantees and partners told us they completed easily achievable projects during the planning year to help build momentum and trust. Grantees told us that collaboration yielded benefits, including deeper relationships with partners, such as schools, as well as the ability to attract additional funding. However, grantees also said they faced some challenges collaborating with partners, particularly in overcoming privacy concerns related to data collection.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education communicate grant expectations more clearly, identify federal resources that can contribute to the program's goals, and develop a strategy for evaluation. In commenting on a draft of this report, Education outlined the steps it will take to respond to recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-954SP | gao_GAO-03-954SP_0 | A number of these challenges were created by the significant reduction in the size of GAO undertaken in the mid-1990s. The agency’s ability to operate in an efficient, effective, and economical manner and meet the ever-changing and increasingly complex needs of the Congress could be seriously compromised if GAO’s human capital challenges were not effectively addressed. 3. Although GAO has made progress in improving its human capital profile, there is still work to do. GAO has found this flexibility to be a critical component in its efforts to ensure that the agency maintains the skills and knowledge necessary to address the many highly complex areas of interest to the Congress. At this meeting the Comptroller General solicited the views of senior staff on extending provisions of Public Law 106-303. In the final analysis, the agency’s efforts to maximize its value allow us to better serve the Congress and the American people. | What GAO Found
Leading public organizations here and abroud have found that strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece of any serious change management initiative and effort to transform the culture of government agancies. GAO is not immune to these challenges facing the federal government. Over the past 3 years, however, we have made considerable progress toward addressing a number of our major human capital challenges through various initiatives. While many of the initiatives were administrative in nature, the additional flexibilities that the Congress authorized in Public Law 106-303 have helped to ensure that we have the right staff, with the right skills, in the right locations to better meet the needs of the Congress and the American people. |
gao_GAO-06-780 | gao_GAO-06-780_0 | EPA Applied, at Least in Part, about Two-thirds of the Recommendations to Its Particulate Matter Health Benefit Analysis in the Proposed Rule
The January 2006 regulatory impact analysis on particulate matter represents a snapshot of an ongoing EPA effort to respond to the National Academies’ recommendations on developing estimates of health benefits for air pollution regulations. Specifically, the agency applied, at least in part, approximately two-thirds of the recommendations—8 were applied and 14 were partially applied—by taking steps toward conducting a more rigorous assessment of uncertainty for proposed air pollution regulations by, for example, evaluating the different assumptions about the link between human exposure to particulate matter and health effects and discussing sources of uncertainty not included in the benefit estimates. In response, EPA devoted significant resources to applying an alternative technique called expert elicitation in a multiphased pilot project. In addition to the uncertainty underlying the causal link between exposure and premature death that EPA analyzed, other key uncertainties can influence the estimates. EPA Plans to Address Some of the Remaining Recommendations in the Final Rule and Has Research and Development Under Way to Address Others
EPA did not apply the remaining 12 recommendations to the analysis for various reasons. EPA officials viewed most of these recommendations as relevant to its health benefit analyses and, citing the need for additional research and development, emphasized the agency’s commitment to continue to respond to the recommendations. According to a senior EPA official, insufficient resources impeded the agency’s progress in applying the recommendations. This official cited limited availability of skilled staff, time, and other resources to conduct the required analyses and research and development. EPA did not believe the state of scientific knowledge on relative toxicity was sufficiently developed at the time it prepared the draft regulatory impact analysis to include this kind of analysis. However, EPA is sponsoring research on this issue. The officials also said that EPA intends to include in the executive summary of the regulatory impact analysis supporting the final rule a summary table that describes key analytical information. EPA has not directly addressed this recommendation. In particular, the agency will need to ensure that it allocates resources to needed research on emerging issues, such as the relative toxicity of particulate matter components; assessing which sources of uncertainty have the greatest influence on benefit estimates; and estimating other benefits, such as environmental improvements. The agency’s draft regulatory impact analysis illustrates that estimates of health benefits can be highly uncertain. In fact, EPA officials viewed these estimates as so uncertain that they chose to not present them in the executive summary of the regulatory impact analysis. While EPA officials said they expect to reduce the uncertainties associated with the health benefit estimates in the final particulate matter analysis, robust uncertainty analysis will nonetheless be important for decision makers and the public to understand the likelihood of attaining the estimated health benefits. To the extent EPA continues to make progress addressing the Academies’ recommendations, decision makers and the public will be able to better evaluate the basis for EPA’s air regulations. Officials from the Office of Policy Analysis and Review within EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation noted in their technical comments that the report provides a fair and balanced representation of EPA’s efforts to apply the National Academies’ recommendations to the draft particulate matter regulatory impact analysis. We note that this report does identify, as appropriate, EPA’s research and development efforts for recommendations EPA did not apply to the draft particulate matter analysis, its plans to apply some additional recommendations to the final particulate matter regulatory impact analysis, and the agency’s responses to recommendations in prior rule- making analyses of air programs. Scope and Methodology
We were asked to determine whether and how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) applied the National Academies (Academies) recommendations in its estimates of the health benefits expected from the January 2006 proposed revisions to the particulate matter national ambient air quality standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
A large body of scientific evidence links exposure to particulate matter--a widespread form of air pollution--to serious health problems, including asthma and premature death. Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) periodically reviews the appropriate air quality level at which to set national standards to protect the public against the health effects of particulate matter. EPA proposed revisions to these standards in January 2006 and issued a draft regulatory impact analysis of the revisions' expected costs and benefits. The estimated benefits of air pollution regulations have been controversial in the past. A 2002 National Academies report generally supported EPA's approach but made 34 recommendations to improve how EPA implements its approach. GAO was asked to determine whether and how EPA applied the Academies' recommendations in its estimates of the health benefits expected from the January 2006 proposed revisions to the particulate matter standards. GAO examined the draft analysis, met with EPA officials, and interviewed members of the National Academies' committee. In providing technical comments on the report, EPA officials said it was fair and balanced and noted the agency's progress in addressing recommendations via research and development and other analyses.
What GAO Found
EPA has begun to change the way it conducts and presents its analyses of health benefits in response to recommendations from the National Academies. Specifically, EPA applied, at least in part, 22--or about two-thirds--of the Academies' recommendations to its health benefit analysis of proposed revisions to particulate matter standards. For example, in response to some of the recommendations, EPA took steps toward conducting a more rigorous assessment of uncertainty by, for instance, evaluating how benefits could change under different assumptions and discussing sources of uncertainty not included in the benefit estimates. In one case, EPA applied an alternative technique, called expert elicitation, for evaluating uncertainty by systematically gathering expert opinion about the uncertainty underlying the causal link between exposure to particulate matter and premature death. Consistent with the National Academies' recommendation to assess uncertainty by developing ranges of estimates and specifying the likelihood of attaining them, EPA used expert elicitation to develop ranges of reductions in premature death expected from the proposed revisions. EPA officials said that ongoing research and development efforts will allow the agency to gradually achieve more progress in applying the recommendations. We note that robust uncertainty analysis is important because estimates of health benefits can be highly uncertain, as the draft regulatory impact analysis for particulate matter illustrates. EPA viewed the estimates in this analysis as so uncertain that it chose not to present them in the executive summary. For various reasons, EPA has not applied the remaining 12 recommendations to the analysis, such as the recommendation to evaluate the impact of using the simplifying assumption that each component of particulate matter is equally toxic. EPA officials viewed most of these recommendations as relevant to its health benefit analyses and, citing the need for additional research and development, emphasized the agency's commitment to continue to respond to the recommendations. For example, EPA did not believe that the state of scientific knowledge on the relative toxicity of particulate matter components was sufficiently developed to include in the January 2006 regulatory impact analysis, and the agency is currently sponsoring research on this issue. In addition, a senior EPA official said that insufficient resources impeded the agency's progress in applying the recommendations, citing, in particular, the limited availability of skilled staff, time, and other resources to conduct the required analyses and research and development. EPA officials also said that some of the recommendations the agency did not apply to the draft analysis, such as one calling for a summary table describing key analytical information to enhance transparency, will be applied to the analysis supporting the final rule. To the extent that EPA continues to make progress addressing the Academies' recommendations, decision makers and the public will be better able to evaluate the basis for EPA's air regulations. |
gao_GAO-11-506T | gao_GAO-11-506T_0 | GAO Identified 47 Federal Employment and Training Programs, and Most Overlapped with at Least One Other Program
For fiscal year 2009, we identified 47 federally funded employment and training programs administered across nine agencies, primarily the Departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services (HHS) (for a list of programs and agencies, see appendix I). Almost all programs overlap with at least one other program, but differences may exist in eligibility, objectives, and service delivery. Forty- four of the 47 programs, which include broad multipurpose block grants, overlap with at least one other program, in that they provide at least one similar service to a similar population. WIA’s Structure Provides the Opportunity to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication
Congress passed WIA partly in response to concerns about fragmentation and inefficiencies in federal employment and training programs. Thirteen Categories of Employment and Training Programs Must Provide Services Through the One- Stop System
Under WIA, sixteen different categories of programs, administered by four federal agencies, must provide services through the one-stop system, according to Labor officials. Increasing Colocation of Services in One-Stop Centers and Consolidating State Administrative Structures May Increase Efficiencies
One-stop centers required under WIA provide an opportunity for a broad array of federal employment and training programs—both required and optional programs—to coordinate their services and avoid duplication. We recently recommended that the Secretaries of Labor and HHS work together to develop and disseminate information that could inform such efforts, including information on state initiatives to consolidate program administrative structures and state and local efforts to colocate additional programs at one-stop centers. As part of this effort, we recommended that Labor and HHS examine the incentives for states and localities to undertake such initiatives and, as warranted, identify options for increasing them. Congress Needs Better Information on Program Performance to Address Fragmentation, Overlap, and Potential Duplication in Employment and Training Programs
Making informed decisions about where to invest scarce resources requires information about what’s working and what’s not but, despite improvements, performance data do not provide a complete picture of the employment and training system. We have made a number of recommendations regarding the performance management systems of the key employment and training programs, and Labor has made some progress addressing our concerns. Information about the effectiveness of these programs can also help guide policymakers and program managers in making decisions about how to improve, coordinate, or consolidate existing programs. In conclusion, removing and preventing unnecessary duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among federal employment and training programs is clearly challenging. Our work highlights two key areas where congressional oversight could facilitate progress: Enhancing program evaluations and performance information; and Fostering state and local innovation in integrating services and consolidating administrative structures. As the nation rises to meet its current fiscal challenges, GAO will continue to assist Congress and federal agencies in identifying actions needed to address these issues. Appendix I: Federally Funded Employment and Training Programs by Agency, Fiscal Year 2009
Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. Workforce Investment Act: Labor Has Made Progress in Addressing Areas of Concern, but More Focus Needed on Understanding What Works and What Doesn’t. Multiple Employment Training Programs: Overlap Among Programs Raises Questions About Efficiency. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the findings from our recent work on fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication in federally funded employment and training programs and our prior work on the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA). We recently issued two reports addressing fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication in federal programs--one that outlined opportunities to reduce potential duplication across a wide range of federal programs and another that focused more specifically on employment and training programs. This work and our larger body of work in the area will help government policymakers address the rapidly building fiscal pressures facing our nation's government--pressures that stem, in part, from our mounting debt and sustained high unemployment. Our work to examine fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication in employment and training programs has a long history. As early as the 1990s we issued a series of reports that raised questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of the federally funded employment and training system, and we concluded that a structural overhaul and consolidation of these programs was needed. Partly in response to these concerns, Congress passed WIA. The purpose of WIA, in part, was to transform the fragmented employment and training system into a coherent one, establishing a one-stop system that serves the needs of job seekers and employers. Since WIA was enacted, we have issued numerous reports that have included recommendations regarding many aspects of WIA, such as performance measures and accountability, one-stop centers, and training, among other topics. GAO's work has continued to find fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication in employment and training programs. The area is characterized by a large number of programs with similar goals, beneficiaries, and allowable activities that are administered by multiple federal agencies. Fragmentation of programs exists when programs serve the same broad area of national need but are administered across different federal agencies or offices. Program overlap exists when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries. Overlap and fragmentation among government programs or activities can be harbingers of unnecessary duplication. Given the challenges associated with fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication, careful, thoughtful actions will be needed to address these issues. This testimony discusses (1) what GAO has found regarding fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in federal employment and training programs, (2) the role that WIA activities can play in addressing these conditions, and (3) what additional information could help Congress minimize fragmentation, overlap, and duplication among these programs.
What GAO Found
In summary, for fiscal year 2009, GAO identified 47 federally funded employment and training programs administered across nine agencies. Almost all of these programs overlap with at least one other program in that they provide at least one similar service to a similar population, but differences may exist in eligibility, objectives, and service delivery. WIA's structure provides the opportunity to reduce overlap and duplication because it requires that several of these programs provide services through the one-stop system, but they need not be on-site. Increasing colocation at one-stop centers, as well as consolidating state workforce and welfare administrative agencies could increase efficiencies, and several states and localities have undertaken such initiatives. To facilitate further progress in increasing administrative efficiencies, we recommended that the Secretaries of Labor and Health and Human Services (HHS) work together to develop and disseminate information about such efforts. Sustained congressional oversight is pivotal in addressing issues of fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication. Specifically, Congress could explore opportunities to enhance program evaluations and performance information and foster state and local innovation in integrating services and consolidating administrative structures. |
gao_GAO-06-1121T | gao_GAO-06-1121T_0 | Students from low-income families who attend schools receiving Title I funds that have missed AYP goals for 3 consecutive years are eligible for SES. SES Participation Has Increased As Districts Have Taken Steps to Improve Access, but Challenges Remain
SES participation increased between 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, as districts have taken multiple actions to encourage participation, such as offering services on or near the school campus or at various times. Despite districts’ efforts, challenges to increasing participation remain, such as notifying parents in a timely and effective manner and ensuring there are providers to serve certain areas and students. 1). For example, districts reported that most students receiving services were among the lower achieving students in school. Some districts collaborated with providers to notify parents. Specifically, providers aligned their curriculum with district instruction primarily by hiring district teachers and communicating with the teachers of participating students. While providers have taken steps to deliver quality services and establish positive relationships with districts, both providers and districts experienced contracting and coordination difficulties. In part because SES is often delivered in school facilities, providers and officials in the districts and schools we visited reported that involvement of school administrators and teachers can improve SES delivery and coordination. States are Increasing SES Monitoring though it Remains A Challenge, and Many Continue to Struggle with Developing Meaningful Evaluations
While state monitoring of SES had been limited, more states reported taking steps to monitor both district and provider efforts to implement SES in 2005-2006. In addition to state efforts to monitor providers, districts have also taken a direct oversight role, and their monitoring activities similarly increased during this time. Further, we found that no state had produced a report that provided a conclusive assessment of this effect. Education conducts SES monitoring in part through reviews of policy issues brought to the department’s attention and structured compliance reviews of states and districts, and provides SES support through guidance, grants, research, and technical assistance. 3). Specifically, 85 percent of states and an estimated 70 percent of districts needed additional assistance with methods for evaluating SES, and over 60 percent also needed assistance with developing data systems. For example, several state and district SES coordinators expressed interest in Education’s pilot program that allowed two districts in needs improvement status to act as SES providers in exchange for their expansion of student access to SES providers and collection of achievement data to determine SES program effectiveness. The other SES pilot allowed four districts in Virginia to offer SES instead of school choice in schools that have missed state performance goals for 2 years and are in their first year of needs improvement. Finally, we also recommended that Education require states to collect and submit information on the amount spent by districts to provide SES and the percentage of districts’ Title I funds that this amount represents and provide states with technical assistance and additional guidance on how to evaluate the effect of SES on student academic achievement. Related GAO Products
No Child Left Behind Act: Education Actions Needed to Improve Local Implementation and State Evaluation of Supplemental Educational Services. GAO-06-758. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) requires districts with schools receiving Title I funds that have not met state performance goals for 3 consecutive years to offer low-income students enrolled in these schools supplemental educational services (SES), such as tutoring. This testimony discusses early implementation of SES, including (1) how SES participation changed in recent years; (2) how providers work with districts to deliver services; (3) how states monitor and evaluate SES; and (4) how the Department of Education (Education) monitors and supports SES implementation. This testimony is based on an August 2006 report (GAO-06-758). For this report, GAO used the best available data on participation and obtained more recent information on other SES implementation issues through a state survey and a district survey, as well as visits to four school districts and interviews with providers.
What GAO Found
SES participation increased from 12 to 19 percent between school years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. Most students receiving services were among the lower-achieving students in school. District actions to increase participation have included greater efforts to notify parents and offering services on school campuses and at various times. However, timely and effective notification of parents remains a challenge, as well as attracting providers to serve certain areas and students, such as rural districts or students with disabilities. SES providers took steps to align their curriculum with district instruction and communicate with teachers and parents, though the extent of their efforts varied. For example, providers reported their efforts to communicate with the teachers of participating students, but some providers did not have any contact with teachers in about 40 percent of districts. Both providers and district officials experienced challenges related to contracting and coordination of service delivery. In part because SES is often delivered in school facilities, providers and officials in the districts and schools GAO visited reported that involvement of school administrators and teachers can improve SES delivery. State monitoring of district and provider efforts to implement SES had been limited in past years; however, more states reported conducting on-site reviews and other monitoring activities during 2005-2006. Districts have also increased their oversight role. While oversight has increased, many states struggle with how to evaluate whether SES providers are improving student achievement. While a few states have completed evaluations, none provides a conclusive assessment of SES providers' effect on student academic achievement. Education conducts SES monitoring in part through policy oversight and compliance reviews of states and districts, and provides SES support through written guidance, grants, and technical assistance. Education monitoring found uneven implementation and compliance with SES provisions, and states and districts reported needing SES policy clarification and assistance in certain areas. For example, 85 percent of states reported needing assistance with methods for evaluating SES. Many states also voiced interest in Education's pilot programs that increase SES flexibility, including the recently expanded pilot allowing certain districts identified as in need of improvement to act as providers. |
gao_GAO-05-240 | gao_GAO-05-240_0 | Permit Coverage under Phase I Has Been Obtained by a Small Fraction of Total Oil and Gas Activities
A small fraction of total oil and gas construction activities have sought permit coverage under Phase I of EPA’s storm water program. Although there is currently no centralized storm water permit database that tracks storm water permit coverage nationwide, our review of Phase I storm water permit data for three major oil and gas producing states— Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas—confirmed that permit coverage has been obtained for only a small number of oil and gas construction activities, compared with the thousands of drilling activities occurring in those states. Three hundred four of the 433 activities for which permit coverage was obtained in the most recent 12-month period—about 70 percent—were for pipeline construction activities. Another key oil and gas construction activity in these states was oil and gas well drilling, with 72 of the 433 permits—about 17 percent—involving drilling activities. Fifty-six percent of these drilling activities disturbed between 5 and 8 acres of land. Industry officials must decide whether or not they will apply for permit coverage, and some may have applied for storm water permit coverage on few occasions because they broke their construction activities—which taken together would exceed 5 acres—into what they believed were distinct projects that disturbed less than 5 acres each. Most Oil and Gas Construction Activity Will Likely Be Affected by Phase II, but the Financial and Environmental Implications of Phase II Are Difficult to Quantify
EPA, industry and state government representatives agree that Phase II permit coverage will be required for most oil and gas construction activities, but the actual number of activities that will be affected by the rule is unknown. Most Oil and Gas Construction Activities Will Likely Be Required to Obtain Storm Water Permit Coverage under Phase II, but the Actual Number of Activities That Will Be Affected by the Rule Is Unknown
EPA, industry and state government representatives agree that most oil and gas construction activities will disturb 1 acre or more of land and, as such, will have to obtain permit coverage under the Phase II rule. Phase II May Lead to Additional Costs that Are Difficult to Quantify
The Phase II rule may lead to additional costs for industry and federal agencies, but these costs are difficult to quantify. EPA Has Not Completed Its Assessment of the Number of Oil and Gas Sites Impacted by Phase II or Its Financial and Environmental Implications
Almost 2 years after delaying the implementation of Phase II for oil and gas activities in order to study and evaluate the impact on the industry, EPA initiated an analysis of the rule but has not completed the study, quantified the number of activities affected, or determined its potential financial and environmental implications. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report provides information about (1) oil and gas construction activities for which permits have been obtained under Phase I and (2) oil and gas construction activities that are likely to be affected by Phase II and its financial and environmental implications. | Why GAO Did This Study
To prevent pollutants from entering storm water runoff, the Clean Water Act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Storm Water Program requires controls for construction activities that disturb land. Phase I of this program requires permitting for construction activities that disturb 5 acres or more, while Phase II requires permitting for activities disturbing between 1 and 5 acres. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) extended the Phase II compliance date for discharges associated with oil and gas construction activities until March 2005 to analyze the impact of Phase II on the oil and gas industry. GAO was asked to provide information about oil and gas construction activities--such as well drilling and pipeline construction--affected by Phase I and likely to be affected by Phase II, as well as Phase II's financial and environmental implications.
What GAO Found
A small fraction of total oil and gas construction activities have been permitted under Phase I of EPA's storm water program. Phase I storm water permit data for three of the six largest oil and gas producing states--Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas--showed that 433 construction activities were permitted under Phase I over the most recent 12 months for which data were available. About 70 percent, 304 of the 433, were oil and gas pipeline activities, most of which were much larger than the 5 acre criterion under Phase I. About 17 percent, 72 of the 433, were drilling activities. In comparison, these three states reported drilling an average of about 10,000 wells for each of the past 3 years. Industry must decide whether to seek permit coverage, and it has sought to have its drilling activities permitted on few occasions because it has determined that most drilling activity involves distinct projects that disturb less than 5 acres each. In states we reviewed, there were few reported compliance problems associated with oil and gas construction activities. While it appears that most oil and gas construction activities may have to be permitted under Phase II, the actual number of activities that could be affected is uncertain, and the financial and environmental implications are difficult to quantify. The oil and gas construction activities affected by the rule may lead to increased financial costs for the oil and gas industry and federal agencies implementing the rule. Many of the potential costs stem from meeting permit requirements to review the impact of construction activities on endangered species, although this impact would be site specific and difficult to quantify. Potentially offsetting these costs, the rule may lead to additional environmental protections that are difficult to quantify, such as decreased levels of sediment in water and benefits for endangered species and their habitat. After delaying implementation of this rule for oil and gas construction activities for 2 years to study the impact of Phase II, EPA is analyzing the impact but, as yet, has not quantified the number of activities affected or the potential financial and environmental implications. |
gao_AIMD-98-84 | gao_AIMD-98-84_0 | Instead, the Forest Service agreed to a three-party effort (the Forest Service, USDA’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), and the IG) to correct the problems identified in the fiscal year 1995 IG audit report. On December 23, 1994, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer purchased a new accounting system, the Foundation Financial Information System (FFIS), to implement USDA-wide. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to monitor and report on the Forest Service’s (1) implementation of a new financial accounting system, (2) correction of certain accounting deficiencies, (3) resolution of key staffing and financial management organizational issues, and (4) commitment to achieving financial accountability. To assess the status of the Forest Service’s (1) effort to improve the reliability of its accounting and financial data and (2) its commitment to improvement, we reviewed the Forest Service’s financial health monitoring reports, the Forest Service’s Financial Management Strategy and Action Plan, project management plans, and other documents outlining improvement initiatives and their status. However, the pilot units experienced many problems, primarily related to transferring data from other feeder systems to the new FFIS system. Unforeseen problems also have precluded the pilot units from using FFIS to produce other critical budgetary and financial reports that the Congress and the agency need to track obligations, assets, liabilities, revenues, and costs. These problems occurred, in part, because budgetary information had not yet been brought forward from the old accounting system, which is no longer functional in the pilot units. The overall problems with the system implementation are reflective of the lack of complete integrated testing of the system, including its reporting capability, prior to implementation in the pilot units. If these problems are not resolved, FFIS cannot be successfully implemented in the remaining units as scheduled on October 1, 1998. The version of FFIS purchased in 1994 and piloted in October 1997 is not Year 2000 compliant. Some Accounting Deficiencies Corrected but Others Remain
The Forest Service has corrected some of the accounting deficiencies identified in the IG’s fiscal year 1995 audit report, but many of the serious shortcomings that we reported on in December 1996 still remain. Therefore, as we reported in December 1996, the Forest Service continues to be exposed to mismanagement and misuse of these assets. In addition, the Forest Service still lacks supporting records (a subsidiary ledger system) to substantiate, at a detailed level, amounts the agency owes to others (accounts payable) or is owed by others (accounts receivable). The Forest Service still has not concluded its evaluation of the agency’s overall financial management structure and workload requirements at all levels. The Forest Service’s autonomous structure may hinder top management’s ability to get all Regional Fiscal Directors to participate. Conclusions
While corrective measures are underway, few of the problems reported by the IG in the fiscal year 1995 audit report and that we analyzed in our initial report to you have been fully resolved. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Forest Service's efforts to correct the financial problems identified in the Department of Agriculture (USDA) Inspector General's (IG) audit report on its fiscal year (FY) 1995 financial statements, focusing on the Forest Service's: (1) implementation of a new financial accounting system; (2) correction of certain accounting deficiencies; (3) resolution of key staffing and financial management organizational issues; and (4) commitment to achieving financial accountability.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Forest Service has taken some positive steps to address the accounting deficiencies cited in the IG's FY 1995 audit report; (2) however, serious problems have been encountered in the initial implementation of the new financial accounting system; (3) while the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) and the Forest Service piloted the Foundation Financial Information System (FFIS) in three units as scheduled on October 1, 1997, problems with FFIS processing data and transferring data between FFIS and other feeder systems have hampered the implementation efforts; (4) also, the pilot units have not been able to use FFIS to produce certain critical budgetary and accounting reports that track the Forest Service's obligations, assets, liabilities, revenues, and costs; (5) these problems occurred because: (a) while most individual components of the system were tested, a complete integrated test was not accomplished prior to implementation; (b) the FFIS reporting mechanism, which was not fully tested prior to implementation, was not functioning properly; (c) certain report specifications and calculations were incorrect; and (d) budget balances had not yet been brought forward from the old accounting system, which is no longer functional for the pilot units; (6) failure to correct these problems will jeopardize successful implementation of FFIS in the remaining Forest Service units; (7) the Forest Service's ability to produce reliable financial reports hinges on successful operation of the new system; (8) the version of FFIS purchased by the UDSA OCFO in December 1994 is not year 2000 compliant; (9) the Forest Service has corrected some of the accounting deficiencies cited in the IG's 1995 audit report, it continues to have certain accounting problems, in addition to those related to the FFIS system, that will hamper its ability to produce reliable financial information and could expose the agency to mismanagement and misuse of its assets; (10) the Forest Service still lacks supporting records to substantiate, at a detailed level, amounts the agency either owes or is owed by others; (11) the Forest Service has not yet completed an evaluation of its financial management structure and workload requirements at all levels; (12) the Forest Service's top management has taken some steps to correct the financial problems reported by the IG in the FY 1995 audit report; and (13) however, the Forest Service's autonomous organizational structure may hinder top management from making needed improvements by FY 1999. |
gao_GAO-04-637 | gao_GAO-04-637_0 | Scope and Methodology
To describe the applicable procedures, definitions, and exclusions for identifying federal mandates in statues and rules under UMRA, we reviewed the act, other related guidance documents, and CBO and OMB reports on the implementation of UMRA. Parallel to the information on statutes provided by CBO, we focused on identifying two sets of final rules—those that were identified as containing federal mandates at or above UMRA’s threshold and those that were not but included provisions affecting nonfederal parties that might be perceived by those parties as potential “unfunded mandates.” To determine whether the statutes and final rules we examined were perceived by affected parties as potentially having “unfunded mandate” implications, we shared them with the following national organizations representing nonfederal levels of government: National Association of Counties, National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), National Governors Association, the National League of Cities, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. In 2001 and 2002, 5 of the 377 statutes enacted were identified as containing provisions that were federal mandates exceeding the thresholds. For 24 of those examples, this was because their estimated direct costs were below the thresholds. Cost Estimates May Not Be Feasible or Complete
Developing a cost estimate for federal mandates must be feasible, and their direct costs must meet or exceed applicable cost thresholds for CBO to identify them as such under UMRA. 2). Nevertheless, at least 29 of the 65 rules appeared to have significant financial impacts on affected nonfederal parties of $100 million or more in any year. However, there are four additional restrictions to the identification of federal mandates in rules (i.e., in an UMRA statement): UMRA’s requirements do not apply to provisions in rules issued by independent regulatory agencies. Agencies Identified Few Final Rules Published in 2001 and 2002 as Containing Federal Mandates
Federal agencies identified 9 of the 122 major and/or economically significant final rules that federal agencies published in 2001 or 2002 as containing federal mandates under UMRA (see fig. 3). Most Often Rules with Financial Effects on Nonfederal Parties Did Not Trigger UMRA’s Requirements Because They Did Not Require Expenditures at or Above UMRA’s Threshold
Of the 113 major and/or economically significant rules not identified as including federal mandates under UMRA, we determined that 48 contained no new requirements that would impose costs or have a negative financial effect on state, local, and tribal governments or the private sector. Describe the applicable procedures, definitions, and exclusions for identifying federal mandates in statutes and rules under UMRA. 2. Identify statutes and final rules that contained federal mandates under UMRA. Provide examples of statutes and final rules that were not identified as federal mandates, but that affected parties might perceive as “unfunded” mandates, and the reasons these statutes and rules were not federal mandates under UMRA. As agreed with your staff, we focused on statutes enacted and final rules published during 2001 and 2002 to address the second and third objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) was enacted to address concerns about federal statutes and rules that require state, local, and tribal governments or the private sector to expend resources to achieve legislative goals. UMRA generates information about the nature and size of potential federal mandates to assist Congress and agency decision makers in their consideration of proposed legislation and rules. However, concerns about actual or perceived federal mandates continue. To provide information and analysis regarding UMRA's implementation, GAO was asked to (1) describe the applicable procedures, definitions, and exclusions under UMRA for identifying federal mandates in statutes and rules, (2) identify statutes and final rules that contained federal mandates under UMRA, and (3) provide examples of statutes and final rules that were not identified as federal mandates, but that affected parties might perceive as "unfunded mandates," and the reasons these statutes and rules were not federal mandates under UMRA. GAO focused on statutes enacted and final rules issued in 2001 and 2002 to address the second and third objectives.
What GAO Found
UMRA generally requires congressional committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to identify and estimate the costs of federal mandates contained in proposed legislation and federal agencies to do so for federal mandates contained in their rules. Identification of mandates is a complex process with multiple definitions, exclusions, and cost thresholds. Also, some legislation and rules may be enacted or issued via procedures that do not trigger UMRA reviews. In 2001 and 2002, 5 of 377 statutes enacted and 9 of 122 major or economically significant final rules issued were identified as containing federal mandates at or above UMRA's thresholds. Of the other federal actions in those 2 years, at least 43 statutes and 65 rules contained new requirements on nonfederal parties that might be perceived as "unfunded mandates." For 24 of those statutes and 26 of those rules, CBO or federal agencies had determined that the estimated direct costs or expenditures would not meet or exceed applicable thresholds. For the remaining examples of statues, most often UMRA did not require a CBO review prior to their enactment. The remaining rules most often did not trigger UMRA because they were issued by independent regulatory agencies. Despite the determinations made under UMRA, some statutes and rules not triggering UMRA's thresholds appeared to have potential financial impacts on affected nonfederal parties similar to those of the actions that were identified as containing mandates at or above the act's thresholds. |
gao_GAO-17-94 | gao_GAO-17-94_0 | As a result, since 2010, EPA has used its waiver authority to deviate from the statutory target volumes and has reduced the volume requirement for cellulosic biofuel every year, citing inadequate domestic supply, among other things (see fig.2). EPA’s responsibilities for the RFS also include determining companies’ compliance with the RFS. Limited Production of Advanced Biofuels Makes the RFS Unlikely to Meet Its Goals
It is unlikely that the goals of the RFS—to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and expand the nation’s renewable fuels sector—will be met as envisioned because there is limited production of advanced biofuels to be blended into domestic transportation fuels and limited potential for expanded production by 2022. For example, the cellulosic biofuel blended into transportation fuel in 2015 was less than 5 percent of the statutory target of 3 billion gallons. The shortfall of advanced biofuels is the result of high production costs, despite years of federal and private research and development efforts. According to several experts we interviewed, the investments and development required to make these fuels more cost-effective, even in the longer run, are unlikely in the current investment climate, in part because of the magnitude of investment and the expected long time frames required to make advanced biofuels cost-competitive with petroleum-based fuels. The RFS Has Relied on Corn-Starch Ethanol, Which in Higher Blends Is Incompatible with Existing Infrastructure and Offers Comparatively Small Greenhouse Gas Reductions
In the absence of advanced biofuels, most of the biofuel blended under the RFS to date has been conventional corn-starch ethanol, which achieves smaller greenhouse gas emission reductions than advanced biofuels. This criticism focuses on whether the model accurately accounts for all greenhouse gas emissions in the corn-starch ethanol production process. Experts Suggested Multiple Federal Actions That Could Incrementally Encourage Investment in Advanced Biofuels and Increase Compatibility of Infrastructure with Higher Ethanol Blends
While advanced biofuels are not likely to be produced in sufficient quantities to meet the statutory targets, experts identified actions that they suggested could incrementally improve investment in advanced biofuels and may lead to greater volumes of these fuels being produced and used in the longer term. These experts told us that investment in cellulosic biofuels could be encouraged, in part, by maintaining the Second Generation Biofuel Producer Tax Credit consistently, rather than allowing it to periodically lapse and be reinstated. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to provide information on (1) whether the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) is expected to meet its goals, (2) expert views on any federal actions that could improve the RFS framework, and (3) policy alternatives experts suggested to better meet the goals of the RFS in the future. Finally, this report drew from a companion report, GAO-17-108, that examined federal research and development in advanced biofuels and related issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The RFS generally mandates that domestic transportation fuels be blended with increasing volumes of biofuels through 2022, with the goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and expanding the nation's renewable fuels sector while reducing reliance on imported oil. Annual targets for the volumes of biofuels to be blended are set by statute. EPA oversees the program and is responsible for adjusting the statutory targets through 2022 to reflect expected U.S. industry production levels, among other factors, and for setting biofuel volume targets after 2022. Biofuels included in the RFS are conventional (primarily corn-starch ethanol) as well as various advanced biofuels (including cellulosic ethanol and biomass-based diesel). Advanced biofuels emit fewer greenhouse gases than petroleum and corn-starch ethanol.
GAO was asked to review challenges to the RFS and their possible solutions. This report provides information on whether the RFS is expected to meet its goals, as well as expert views on any federal actions that could improve the RFS framework, among other things. GAO worked with the National Academy of Sciences to identify experts on issues related to the RFS. GAO interviewed these experts and analyzed their responses. This report also drew on published studies, and a companion report, GAO-17-108 , that examined federal research and development in advanced biofuels and related issues. EPA generally agreed with the report.
What GAO Found
It is unlikely that the goals of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)—reduce greenhouse gas emissions and expand the nation's renewable fuels sector—will be met as envisioned because there is limited production of advanced biofuels to be blended into domestic transportation fuels and limited potential for expanded production by 2022. Advanced biofuels achieve greater greenhouse gas reductions than conventional (primarily corn-starch ethanol), while the latter accounts for most of the biofuel blended under the RFS. As a result, the RFS is unlikely to achieve the targeted level of greenhouse gas emissions reductions. For example, the cellulosic biofuel blended into the transportation fuel supply in 2015 was less than 5 percent of the statutory target of 3 billion gallons. In part as a result of low production, EPA has reduced the RFS targets for advanced biofuels through waivers in each of the last 4 years (see figure). According to experts GAO interviewed, the shortfall of advanced biofuels is the result of high production costs, and the investments in further research and development required to make these fuels more cost-competitive with petroleum-based fuels even in the longer run are unlikely in the current investment climate.
Experts cited multiple federal actions that they suggested could incrementally improve the investment climate for advanced biofuels. For example, some experts told GAO that maintaining a consistent tax credit for biofuels, rather than allowing it to periodically lapse and be reinstated, could reduce uncertainty and encourage investment in advanced biofuels. |
gao_HEHS-97-52 | gao_HEHS-97-52_0 | As the agency administering title IV programs, the Department of Education is responsible for issuing guidance to implement the law, monitoring colleges’ compliance with its requirements, and issuing two reports: a compilation of exemplary campus security practices and a report to the Congress on campus crime statistics. 2416 and S. 2065—introduced in the 104th Congress would have required more detailed and current campus security records to be made accessible to the public. The Department Has Been Slow to Monitor Compliance and Report to the Congress
Department implementation of the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act’s reporting requirements has included issuing regulations; disseminating policy guidance to colleges; providing technical assistance to colleges and outreach to campus law enforcement organizations; and, to a limited extent, checking whether colleges have prepared crime statistics reports and what procedures they have used for disseminating the reports. However, because of resource constraints, the Department has only recently expanded its monitoring efforts by initiating program reviews that specifically address compliance with the act’s reporting requirements. Monitoring Compliance Has Been Slow, and Some Problems Remain
Although the Department began issuing guidance to colleges on complying with the law in 1991, guidance for monitoring program compliance came much more slowly. Required Report to the Congress Was Late
Although the Department issued a required report on exemplary campus security practices in September 1994, the Department was more than 1 year late in issuing a report on campus crime statistics to the Congress. Citing limited resources to perform such a review, the Department postponed issuing the report until February 1997. As a result, colleges are not reporting data uniformly. In 60 percent of the reports we reviewed, colleges had difficulty complying with the reporting requirement for sex-related offenses. Excluding Information on Crimes Reported to Local Police
Although the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act requires that crime statistics include on-campus occurrences reported to local police, our interviews with college officials and review of their statistical reports suggest that colleges vary in their inclusion of incidents reported to local police. Three of the eight states (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee) have laws specifically requiring campus safety authorities to maintain daily logs open to public inspection. Many also include some type of provision protecting witnesses, informants, or information that might jeopardize an ongoing investigation. Provisions of State Open Campus Crime Record Laws
Names and addresses of arrested persons and charges against them Exempts from disclosure incidents involving certain types of handicapped persons, which are to be separately maintained (continued)
Public and private campuses (under the state’s Campus Security Act, private colleges’ police departments are public agencies for the limited purpose of crime enforcement)
Records must be open, if kept; the intent is not to impose a new recordkeeping requirement (continued)
Names and addresses of persons arrested Information specifically not required unless otherwise provided by law: names of persons reporting, victims, witnesses, or uncharged suspects or other information related to investigation (continued)
Identification required is not specified. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the progress made under the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act, focusing on: (1) how the Department of Education has implemented and monitored compliance with the act; (2) the kinds of problems, if any, colleges are having in complying with the act; and (3) the requirements of state laws related to public access to police records on reported crimes on campuses.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although colleges are having difficulty complying with the act, the Department only recently began a systematic effort to monitor compliance; (2) starting in 1991, the Department of Education issued policy guidance to colleges for implementing the law's crime reporting requirements; (3) since that time, the Department has also provided technical assistance to individual colleges upon request; (4) although the Department began issuing implementing guidance to colleges less than 1 year after the law was passed, the Department has only recently begun to develop procedures for its program reviewers and auditors that systematically address monitoring compliance with these requirements; (5) moreover, citing resource limitations, the Department delayed preparing a report on campus crime statistics for which the law prescribed a September 1995 issuance date; (6) the Department issued the report in February 1997; (7) at the campus level, colleges are finding it difficult to consistently interpret and apply some of the law's reporting requirements; (8) for example, GAO's analysis showed considerable variation in colleges' practices for deciding which incidents to include in their reports and what categories to use in classifying certain crimes; (9) areas of difficulty included deciding how to include incidents reported to campus officials other than law enforcement officers, interpreting federal requirements for reporting sexual offenses, and reporting data on hate crimes; (10) federal legislation proposed in the 104th Congress would have augmented available information on campus crime by requiring that campus police records be open to the campus community; (11) similar laws exist in eight states; (12) three laws contain a specific requirement that colleges maintain daily logs; (13) most laws protect the identity of victims and informants from disclosure and ensure that any information that might jeopardize an ongoing investigation also remains confidential; (14) the state laws vary in many details, such as whether identification of juvenile offenders is required and whether noncompliance by the college can result in penalties; and (15) these laws differ from the 1990 act in requiring year-round access to campus police reports rather than annual summary statistics. |
gao_GAO-07-48 | gao_GAO-07-48_0 | Network and Nonnetwork Civilian Providers Under TRICARE
TRICARE beneficiaries can choose to obtain health care through MTFs or through civilian providers, which includes providers who belong to the TRICARE provider network as well as nonnetwork providers who agree to accept TRICARE beneficiaries as patients. Requirements in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004 Related to Nonenrolled TRICARE Beneficiaries
The NDAA for fiscal year 2004 directed DOD to monitor nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries’ access to care under the TRICARE Standard option and to designate a senior official to take the actions necessary to ensure access to care for nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries. TMA and Its MCSCs Use Various Methods to Evaluate Access to Care That Indicate Sufficient Access for Nonenrolled TRICARE Beneficiaries
TMA and its MCSCs use various methods for evaluating access to care, and according to TMA and MCSC officials, the resulting measures indicate that access to care is generally sufficient for nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries. Of the remaining 86 percent accepting new patients, the percent that would accept nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries as new patients averaged 80 percent for all 20 states. According to the MCSCs, while their methods for evaluating access to care were not designed to evaluate access specifically for nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries, they do provide some information that they use to monitor the availability of both network and nonnetwork civilian providers for this population, which is one component of access to care. Various Factors Impede Providers’ Acceptance of Nonenrolled TRICARE Beneficiaries, and TMA and MCSCs Have Different Ways to Address Them
TMA, MCSCs, and provider representatives have cited various factors as impediments to civilian providers’ willingness to accept nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries as patients, and TMA and its MCSCs have different ways to address them. Some impediments are specific to TRICARE, including concerns about reimbursement rates and administrative issues, and TMA and its MCSCs have specific ways to address these issues. Other impediments—such as providers’ practices being at maximum patient capacity and provider shortages in certain locations—are not specific to TRICARE and are therefore inherently more difficult for TMA and the MCSCs to address. In 2000, TMA used this waiver authority to uniformly increase reimbursement rates for network and nonnetwork civilian providers in rural Alaska, and in 2002 TMA implemented this same waiver for network and nonnetwork civilian providers in Anchorage. Locality waivers may be used to increase rates for specific medical services in specific areas where access to care has been severely impaired. For example, the initial round of TMA’s civilian provider survey found that 14 percent of providers in the 20 states surveyed were not available to accept any new patients, including TRICARE patients, privately insured patients, or patients who were paying for their own care. NDAA Responsibilities for Nonenrolled TRICARE Beneficiaries’ Access to Care Are Being Carried Out by TMA and the MCSCs, but Were Not Formally Designated to a Senior Official
Various TMA offices, including the TROs, and the MCSCs are carrying out the responsibilities that are outlined in the NDAA for fiscal year 2004 to take actions to ensure nonenrolled beneficiaries’ access to care, such as educating civilian providers and recommending reimbursement rate adjustments—though these responsibilities were not formally designated to a single, senior official. However, DOD disagreed with our finding that it had not formally designated a senior official to ensure nonenrolled beneficiaries’ access to care, including adequate participation by nonnetwork providers, as required by the NDAA for fiscal year 2004. Specifically, this report describes (1) how TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) and its managed care support contractors (MCSC) evaluate nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries’ access to care and the results of these evaluations; (2) the impediments to civilian provider acceptance of nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries, and how they are being addressed; (3) how DOD has implemented the fiscal year 2004 NDAA requirements to take actions to ensure nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries’ access to care. Appendix III: Civilian Provider Survey Instrument
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2004 directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to monitor nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries’ access to care under the TRICARE Standard option. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) provides health care through its TRICARE program. Under TRICARE, beneficiaries may obtain care through a managed care option that requires enrollment and the use of civilian provider networks, which are developed and managed by contractors. Beneficiaries who do not enroll may receive care through TRICARE Standard, a fee-for-service option, using nonnetwork civilian providers or through TRICARE Extra, a preferred provider organization option, using network civilian providers. Nonenrolled beneficiaries in some locations have reported difficulties finding civilian providers who will accept them as patients. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2004 directed GAO to provide information on access to care for nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries. This report describes (1) how DOD and its contractors evaluate nonenrolled beneficiaries' access to care and the results of these evaluations; (2) impediments to civilian provider acceptance of nonenrolled beneficiaries, and how they are being addressed; and (3) how DOD has implemented the NDAA fiscal year 2004 requirements to take actions to ensure nonenrolled beneficiaries' access to care. To address these objectives, GAO examined DOD's survey results and DOD and contractor documents and interviewed DOD and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
DOD and contractor officials use various methods to evaluate access to care, and according to these officials, their methods indicate that access is generally sufficient for nonenrolled beneficiaries. For example, in its 2005 survey of civilian providers DOD found that 14 percent of civilian providers surveyed in 20 states were not accepting new patients from any health plan. Of those accepting new patients, about 80 percent would accept nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries as new patients. DOD's contractors use various methods to monitor access to care. While these methods were not designed specifically to evaluate access for nonenrolled beneficiaries, they provide information that allows contractors to monitor the availability of both network and nonnetwork civilian providers for this population. According to contractor officials, their measures indicate that nonenrolled beneficiaries' access to care is sufficient overall. DOD, its contractors, and beneficiary and provider representatives cited various factors as impediments to network and nonnetwork civilian providers' acceptance of nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries and ways to address them. These impediments include concerns specific to TRICARE, including reimbursement rates and administrative issues, as well as issues not specific to TRICARE, such as providers without sufficient practice capacity for additional patients. DOD and its contractors have specific ways to address impediments related to reimbursement rates and administrative issues, but issues that are not specific to TRICARE are more difficult to resolve. For example, DOD has authority to increase reimbursement rates for network and nonnetwork civilian providers in areas where access to care has been impaired. Furthermore, other impediments not specific to TRICARE, such as provider practices at capacity and few providers in geographically remote locations, cannot be readily resolved and create access difficulties for all local residents, including TRICARE beneficiaries. Various DOD offices as well as DOD's contractors are already carrying out the responsibilities outlined by the NDAA for fiscal year 2004--such as educating civilian providers and recommending reimbursement rate adjustments--actions that help ensure nonenrolled beneficiaries' access. However, a senior official was not formally designated to have responsibility for these mandated actions. DOD commented on the report, stating that GAO's approach was insightful, but disagreeing with GAO's finding that a senior official was not formally designated to be responsible for taking actions to ensure TRICARE beneficiaries' access to care as outlined in the NDAA. DOD said that an existing directive designating a senior official to serve as program manager for TRICARE met this requirement. However, the directive does not specifically designate an official responsible for ensuring access as specified in the NDAA. Nor did DOD take other actions to designate that a senior official have such responsibilities. |
gao_RCED-98-39 | gao_RCED-98-39_0 | Primarily during the 1950s, these tribes received some compensation for their losses. Secondary Approach Relies on Tribe’s 1954 Request
The consultant’s secondary approach, which relies on the tribe’s 1954 request for compensation, is generally consistent with the alternative approach we proposed in our 1991 report except that it provides a single figure rather than a range for additional compensation. In addition, it includes an amount for rehabilitation as well as for damages. Consultant Developed a Single Estimate Rather Than a Range for Additional Compensation
In our 1991 report, we suggested that, for Fort Berthold and Standing Rock, the Congress consider a range of additional compensation based on the present value of the difference between the amount that each tribe requested and the amount that it received. Specifically, he subtracted the $10.5 million authorized in 1954 (excluding administrative expenses) from the tribe’s $23.5 million settlement proposal and, using the prime rate, adjusted the $13.0 million difference to its 1996 value, thereby arriving at a second estimate of $279.1 million. Consultant’s Estimate Included an Amount for Rehabilitation
In contrast to the consultant’s primary approach, which calculates an amount only for damages, the secondary approach covers both damages and rehabilitation. With this adjustment, the secondary approach would include the same factors as the primary approach. However, the adjusted second estimate of $119.2 million would no longer support the first estimate of $300.7 million. Our Analysis Calculates Separate Ranges for Damages, Rehabilitation, and Administrative Expenses
To provide the Congress with more detailed information for deciding on an appropriate amount for additional payment, we calculated separate ranges for damages, rehabilitation, and administrative expenses, using the categories of payment authorized for the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe in 1954 (see table 2). The corporate bond rate, which produced the upper value, indicates how much the tribe might have earned by investing the same additional payment in bonds issued by the private sector. The need for and amount of any additional payment to the tribe for any of the items shown in table 2 is a policy question for the Congress to decide. September 16 Construction of the Oahe dam begins. On the basis of the consultant’s analysis, the tribe is requesting about $300 million in additional compensation. GAO Comments
1. 4. 6. 7. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed a private consultant's economic analysis of compensation due to the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe for the construction of the Oahe dam on tribal lands.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the consultant's primary approach, which produced an estimate of $300.7 million in additional compensation, relies on questionable assumptions about the value of the tribe's losses in the 1950s; (2) the consultant's secondary approach, which produced an estimate of $279.1 million, was used to support the primary approach; (3) like the approach GAO proposed in 1991, it uses the tribe's 1954 request as a basis for calculating additional compensation; (4) however, it provides a single figure for additional compensation, rather than a range such as GAO proposed in 1991; (5) in addition, it includes an amount for rehabilitation as well as an amount for damages, while the primary approach provides only for damages; (6) neither of the consultant's approaches includes an amount for administrative expenses; (7) the extent to which the tribe should receive additional compensation for damages--and whether the tribe should receive additional payments for rehabilitation and administrative expenses--is a policy question for Congress to decide; (8) to provide Congress with information for such decision-making, GAO used its 1991 approach to calculate ranges for damages ($32.3 million to $120.1 million), rehabilitation ($45.8 million to $170.1 million), and administrative expenses ($0.1 million to $0.5 million); (9) specifically, for each of these factors, GAO subtracted the amounts that the tribe received from the amounts that it requested (or paid, in the case of administrative expenses) and multiplied the resulting differences by the inflation rate, thereby obtaining the lower value for each range; (10) similarly, GAO multiplied these differences by the corporate bond rate to obtain the upper value for each range; and (11) through this approach, GAO calculated separate ranges for Congress to consider in deciding on the type and amount of any additional payments. |
gao_GAO-16-461T | gao_GAO-16-461T_0 | Our ongoing work on NASA’s major projects includes assessments of 18 major NASA projects. NASA Cost and Schedule Performance and Implementation of Best Practices
Our ongoing work indicates that NASA has made progress over the past 5 years in a number of key acquisition management areas, but it faces significant risks in some of its major projects. On the positive side, the cost and schedule performance of NASA’s portfolio of major projects in development has improved and most current projects are adhering to their committed cost and schedule baselines. In addition, NASA has maintained recent improvements in the implementation of key product development best practices, which can help reduce risk in projects. Our preliminary results indicate that although NASA’s overall performance has improved, its portfolio of major projects continues to experience cost and schedule growth and development risks in major projects, such as Orion and the Space Launch System, warrant the committee’s continued attention. NASA has rebaselined a major project each year for 8 out of the last 9 years. Management Challenges
NASA’s portfolio is composed of a few large projects that face a lot of pressures and challenges. We agree with the challenges identified by the Inspector General and our ongoing and prior work has highlighted additional areas where it will be important for NASA to continue its efforts to reduce acquisition risk, including implementing project management tools, demonstrating sustained cost and schedule performance, and developing plans that will help the agency appropriately direct future investments. Implementation of Management Tools
As part of our ongoing work, we found that NASA is taking steps to improve its project management tools but has not yet fully implemented best practices. NASA has made progress implementing earned value management (EVM) analysis—a key project management tool—but the agency has not yet fully implemented a formal EVM surveillance plan in accordance with best practices. NASA has made progress rolling out EVM at its centers and is supporting these efforts with training, including classroom and online training to projects at its various centers. Sustained Cost and Schedule Performance
A key management challenge that NASA faces is whether the improvement in the cost and schedule performance we have seen in the agency’s overall portfolio of major projects can be translated to new, large projects that have been recently baselined and added to the portfolio. These additions include its human spaceflight projects, which includes the Space Launch System, Orion, and Exploration Ground Systems program that is developing systems and infrastructure to support assembly, test, and launch of the Space Launch System and Orion. Long-Term Planning and Stability
Our ongoing and prior work has also found that NASA has established cost and schedule baselines for the Space Launch System, Orion, and Exploration Ground Systems, but the baselines provide little visibility into long-term planning and costs. However, the document does not provide additional details on future exploration missions, making it difficult to understand NASA’s vision for what type and how many missions it will take to get to Mars. NASA has yet to take action on this recommendation. The Space Leadership Preservation Act of 2015
The various provisions of the act being discussed today propose changes in NASA’s leadership structure and long-term contracting authorities, among other areas. In closing, I would like to emphasize that achieving stability through leadership and contracting changes may offer benefits, but one of the most important factors in achieving stability is a sound business case that balances the necessary resources—technologies, design knowledge, funding, and time—needed to transform a chosen concept into a product. | Why GAO Did This Study
The proposed Space Leadership Preservation Act of 2015, which includes provisions related to NASA's leadership structure, budget development, and contracting authorities, would affect the way NASA develops its vision for space exploration and executes the projects that implement it. It could also have implications for NASA's acquisition management, which is an area on GAO's High Risk list. In March 2015, GAO found that projects continued a general positive trend of limiting cost and schedule growth, maturing technologies, and stabilizing designs, but that NASA faced several challenges that could affect its ability to effectively manage its portfolio.
This statement provides our preliminary observations on (1) the cost and schedule performance of NASA's portfolio of major projects and the implementation of product development best practices on these projects and (2) management challenges. This statement also provides observations on the proposed legislation. This statement is based on ongoing work to be published in March 2016 and GAO's February 2015 High Risk Update, as well as GAO's extensive prior body of work on NASA's major acquisitions.
What GAO Found
GAO's ongoing work indicates that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has made progress over the past 5 years in a number of key acquisition management areas, but it faces significant risks in some of its major projects. On the positive side, the cost and schedule performance of NASA's portfolio of major projects in development has improved and most current projects are adhering to their committed cost and schedule baselines. In addition, NASA has maintained recent improvements in the implementation of key product development best practices, which can help reduce risk in projects. Although NASA's overall performance has improved, GAO's preliminary results show that NASA has rebaselined a major project for each year 8 out of the last 9 years, which means the projects experienced significant cost or schedule growth. This often occurs as projects prepare to begin system assembly, integration, and test; nine projects will be in that phase of development in 2016, including the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) and Space Launch System, which are human spaceflight programs with significant development risks.
As NASA continues its efforts to reduce acquisition risk, GAO's ongoing and prior work highlights three areas of management challenges that, if addressed, will help the agency appropriately direct future investments:
Implementing Management Tools. NASA has continued to implement improved project management tools to manage acquisition risks, but these efforts have not always been consistent with best practices in areas such as cost estimating or fully addressed GAO's prior recommendations. For example, NASA has made progress rolling out earned value management (EVM)—a key project management tool—at its centers but has not implemented formal EVM surveillance, which is considered a best practice by both NASA and GAO.
Demonstrating Sustained Cost and Schedule Performance. A key management challenge that NASA faces is whether the improvement in the cost and schedule performance GAO has seen in the agency's overall portfolio of major projects can be translated to large, recently baselined projects that have been added to the portfolio. This includes its human spaceflight projects, which are at critical points of implementation.
Long-Term Planning and Stability. NASA has established cost and schedule baselines for Space Launch System, Orion, and Exploration Ground Systems—a program that is developing systems and infrastructure to support assembly, test, and launch of the Space Launch System and Orion—but the baselines provide little visibility into long-term planning and costs. NASA recently issued a strategy for its journey to Mars, but the document does not provide details on future exploration missions making it difficult to understand NASA's vision for what type and how many missions it will take to get to Mars.
The proposed Space Leadership Preservation Act of 2015 is aimed, in part, at achieving greater stability at NASA. From an acquisition perspective, GAO's prior work indicates that one of the most important factors for achieving stability is having a sound business case that balances program requirements and resources, such as technology, funding, and time.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement, but has made recommendations in prior related reports, which NASA has not yet fully addressed. |
gao_GAO-03-275 | gao_GAO-03-275_0 | However, obligated funds may be spent over a period of 5 additional years, as bills for goods and services are received and paid. Navy Did Not Properly Account for Large Portion of Unliquidated Operating Obligations
An estimated two-thirds of the Navy’s unliquidated operating obligations valued at $50,000 or more from the fiscal years 1997-99 operating appropriations was not properly accounted for. Specifically, we estimated that $929 million of the $1.4 billion in unliquidated operating obligations was not properly accounted for. As shown in table 1, $452 million of the unliquidated operating obligations was no longer needed for its original purpose. These funds could have been used for other permissible purposes of the same appropriation and fiscal year, such as contract modifications. Finally, $489 million in unliquidated operating obligations was properly accounted for and still needed for the original purpose. The Navy failed to deobligate an estimated $452 million that was no longer needed for the original obligated purpose. The Navy had also not properly accounted for an estimated $147 million in unliquidated operating obligations due to expenditures that were not properly matched to a specific obligation recorded in the Navy’s records— problem disbursements. Navy Did Not Fully Adhere to DOD Review Regulations
The Navy did not fully adhere to DOD regulations to review all unliquidated operating obligations, including those obligations valued at $50,000 or more three times per year and those obligations valued at less than $50,000 once every year. As a result, the Navy did not know how much money was tied up in unliquidated operating obligations that could potentially be used for other permissible needs. The Navy did not utilize internal control activities necessary to ensure that fund managers performed thorough obligation reviews in accordance with DOD regulations. The large dollar value of unliquidated Navy obligations that were not properly accounted for contributes to inaccuracies in the Navy’s budget and financial reports, and subsequently leads to inaccuracies in federal financial statements and the President’s budget. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of Navy to: adhere to DOD unliquidated operating obligation review regulations; and better apply existing internal control activities to ensure adherence to these regulations, and to hold fund managers accountable for the accuracy and completeness of their reviews. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the Navy’s unliquidated operating obligations were (1) properly accounted for and (2) periodically reviewed in accordance with DOD regulations. For our review, we selected unliquidated operating obligations for fiscal years 1997-99. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of September 30, 2001, the Navy's operating appropriations had $2.1 billion in unliquidated--or unpaid--funds that were obligated during fiscal years 1997-99. Unliquidated obligations that are no longer needed to pay for goods and services tie up funds that could be used for other permissible purposes. In addition, inaccurate obligation data result in misstatement of budgetary information. Because of the large dollar value, we examined the Navy's management of unliquidated obligations. Specifically, we reviewed a statistically representative sample of the Navy's $1.4 billion in unliquidated operating obligations valued at $50,000 or more for fiscal years 1997-99 to determine whether these obligations were (1) properly accounted for and (2) reviewed in accordance with DOD regulations.
What GAO Found
We estimated that $929 million of the $1.4 billion in unliquidated operating obligations valued at $50,000 or more for fiscal years 1997-99 was not properly accounted for (see table). Specifically, the Navy failed to deobligate $452 million of unliquidated operating obligations that was no longer needed and potentially available for other permissible purposes, such as contract modifications. In addition, $147 million of unliquidated operating obligations was inaccurately recorded because of problem disbursements--payments not properly matched to the correct obligation. A further $330 million was inaccurately recorded due to unresolved errors, such as bills that were not processed properly. The remaining $489 million in unliquidated operating obligations was properly accounted for and still needed for the original purpose. An estimated two-thirds of the unliquidated operating obligations over $50,000 were not properly accounted for as a result of the Navy's failure to review such obligations three times each year as required by DOD regulations. In addition, the Navy did not fully adhere to the regulation that unliquidated operating obligations of any value be reviewed at least once each year. Consequently, the Navy did not know how much money was tied up in unliquidated operating obligations that could potentially be used for other appropriate needs, and its budgetary reports to Congress and financial statements were inaccurate. Navy fund managers chose to selectively review their operating obligations, citing obstacles such as difficulties in obtaining accurate payment and billing data and the extensive length of time needed to review large numbers of obligations. Further, the Navy did not apply existing internal control activities to ensure that fund managers performed obligation reviews in accordance with DOD regulations, nor did it hold fund managers accountable for the accuracy and completeness of the reviews. |
gao_GAO-11-555T | gao_GAO-11-555T_0 | When MDA was established in 2002, it was granted exceptional flexibility in setting requirements and managing the acquisition, in order that its BMDS be developed as a single program, using a capabilities-based, spiral upgrade approach to quickly deliver a set of integrated defensive capabilities. However, the flexibility also came at the expense of transparency and accountability. Specifically, a BMDS cost, schedule, and performance baseline does not have to be established or approved by anyone outside MDA. In addition, while most major defense acquisition programs are required by statute to obtain an independent verification of cost estimates, MDA has only recently developed cost estimates for selected assets and plans to work with the DOD Office of the Director for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to develop independent cost estimates for more MDA elements. Further, assessments of a system’s suitability and effectiveness in combat have only been accomplished, with limitations, for the currently deployed Aegis BMD weapon system. Numerous Strategy Changes Have Exacerbated Transparency and Accountability Challenges
MDA has employed at least three strategies to acquire and deploy missile defense systems, which has exacerbated transparency and accountability challenges. From its inception in 2002 through 2007, MDA developed missile defense capability in 2-year increments, known as blocks, each built on preceding blocks intended to enhance the development and capability of the BMDS. Changing the acquisition strategy is problematic because each time it is changed, the connection is obscured between the old strategies’ scope and resources and the new strategy’s rearranged scope and resources. Implementing a knowledge-based acquisition strategy consistent with DOD acquisition regulations, and ensure that items are not manufactured for fielding before their performance has been validated through testing. DOD has committed to take action on many of these recommenda While agreeing with our recommendations to enhance baseline reporting, there are differences in MDA’s perspectives on such issues as sunk costs and changes in unit cost. MDA Has Recently Made Significant Progress in Increasing Transparency and Accountability
In 2010, MDA made significant progress in implementing some of these recommendations by finalizing a new baseline phase review process in which the agency set detailed baselines for several BMDS elements, or portions of elements, for the first time. Specifically, MDA established resource, schedule, test, operational capacity, technical, and contract baselines for several BMDS components. It reported these to Congress in its June 2010 BMDS Accountability Report. MDA also identified three phases of development where baselines are approved—technology development, product development, and initial production phases—and specified the key knowledge that is needed at each phase. In another key step, approval of the product development and initial production baselines will be jointly reviewed by the Director of MDA and the respective service acquisition executive, as a number of missile defense systems are expected to eventually transition to the military services for operation. We reported last year that MDA extensively revised the test plan to address these concerns. We concluded in this year’s report that it is a highly concurrent effor with significant cost, schedule and performance risk. In the urgency to deploy assets to meet the Presidential directive to field an initial capability by 2004, assets were built and deployed before developmental testing was completed. | Why GAO Did This Study
In order to meet its mission, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing a highly complex system of systems--land-, sea-, and spacebased sensors, interceptors, and battle management. Since its initiation in 2002, MDA has been given a significant amount of flexibility in executing the development and fielding of the ballistic missile defense system. GAO was asked to testify on its annual review of MDA and on progress made to improve transparency and accountability. This statement is based on our March 2011 report.
What GAO Found
When MDA was established in 2002, it was granted exceptional flexibility in setting requirements and managing the acquisition, in order to meet a Presidential directive to deliver an initial defensive capability in 2004. However, the flexibility also came at the expense of transparency and accountability. For example, unlike certain other Department of Defense (DOD) major defense acquisition programs, a cost, schedule, and performance baseline does not have to be established or approved outside MDA. In addition, while most major defense acquisition programs are required by statute to obtain an independent verification of cost estimates, MDA has only recently developed cost estimates for selected assets and plans to work with DOD's Office of the Director for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to develop independent cost estimates for more MDA elements. Further, assessments of a system's suitability and effectiveness in combat have only been accomplished, with limitations, for the currently deployed Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense weapon system. Since its inception, MDA has employed at least three different strategies to acquire and deploy missile defense systems. Because these changes involved different structures for reporting cost, schedule, and performance data, they have exacerbated transparency and accountability challenges--each time a strategy changes, the connection between the old and new strategy planned scope and resources is obscured. In 2010, MDA made significant progress in addressing previously reported concerns about transparency and accountability. Specifically, MDA : (1) Established resource, schedule, test, operational capacity, technical, and contract baselines for several missile defense systems. It reported these to Congress in its June 2010 BMDS Accountability Report. (2) Identified three phases of development where baselines are approved-- technology development, product development, and initial production phases--and specified the key knowledge that is needed at each phase. (3) Established processes for reviewing baselines and approving product development and initial production jointly with the military services that will ultimately be responsible for those assets. GAO also reported last year that MDA extensively revised the test plan to increase its robustness and ability to inform models and simulations for assessing missile defense performance. While it is clear that progress has been made in terms of implementing new acquisition reviews and reporting detailed baselines, there remain critical gaps in the material reported, particularly the quality of the underlying cost estimates needed to establish baselines. Moreover, GAO still has concerns about realism in test planning and acquisition risks associated with the rapid pace of fielding assets. These risks are particularly evident in MDA's efforts to develop systems to support a new approach for missile defense in Europe as well as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. GAO does not make new recommendations in this testimony but emphasizes the importance of implementing past recommendations, including: (1) Establishing and reporting complete, accurate, reliable cost information. (2) Strengthening test planning and resourcing. (3) Following knowledge-based acquisition practices that ensure sufficient knowledge is attained on requirements, technology maturity, design maturity, production maturity and costs before moving programs into more complex and costly phases of development. DOD has committed to take action on many of our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-33 | gao_GAO-08-33_0 | One of the key surveillance systems employed by SROs monitors the markets for insider trading. OCIE administers SEC’s nationwide examination and inspection program. As part of these inspections, OCIE takes steps to assess SRO surveillance systems, reviews SRO policies and procedures for investigating potential violations and disciplining violators of rules and laws, and reviews samples of SRO case files to determine whether SRO staff were complying with the policies and procedures. We discuss OCIE’s process for targeting their routine inspections later in this report. OCIE also conducts special inspections of SRO regulatory programs, as warranted. Special inspections typically originate from a tip or need to follow up on past inspection findings and recommendations. 1). Finally, OCIE currently does not formally track the implementation status of inspection recommendations, which ranged as high as 29 in the inspections that we reviewed. By not establishing written guidance for conducting inspections of SRO enforcement and other regulatory programs, OCIE may be limiting its ability to ensure that its inspection processes and products are subject to basic quality controls in such areas as examination planning, data collection, and report review. By not considering the work and work products of SRO internal audit functions in its inspection planning process, OCIE examiners may be duplicating SRO efforts, causing regulatory burden, or missing opportunities to direct examination resources to other higher-risk or less- examined program areas. Without a formal tracking system, OCIE management must rely on staff’s availability and ability to recall recommendation-related information, which may be reliable when discussing an individual inspection, but may limit OCIE management’s ability to efficiently generate and evaluate trend information, such as patterns in the types of deficiencies found or the implementation status of recommendations across SROs, or over time. These officials said that they expect to use this spreadsheet until the previously described OIT projects are implemented in 2008. SRO Advisories and Referrals Have Increased, as Have Related SEC Investigations and Enforcement Actions, but Information Systems for Advisories and Referrals Have Limitations
Enforcement receives advisories and referrals, which undergo multiple stages of review and may lead to opening an investigation, through an electronic system in OMS. From fiscal years 2003 to 2006, OMS received an increasing number of advisories and referrals from SROs, such as NYSE and NASD, most of which involved insider trading. 2). Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance SEC oversight of SROs, we recommend that the SEC Chairman take the following three actions: establish a written framework for conducting inspections of SRO enforcement programs to help ensure a reliable and consistent source of information on SRO inspection processes, minimum standards, and quality controls; and, as part of this framework, broaden current guidance to SRO inspection staff on the use of SRO internal audit reports to direct examiners to consider the extent to which they will rely on reports and reviews of internal and external audit and other risk- management systems when planning SRO inspections; ensure that Market Regulation makes certain that SROs include in their periodic risk assessment of their IT systems a review of the security of their enforcement-related databases, and that Market Regulation reviews the comprehensiveness and completeness of the related SRO- sponsored audits of their enforcement-related databases; and as part of the agency’s ongoing efforts to improve information ensure that any software developed for tracking SRO inspections includes the ability to track and report SRO responses to and implementation status of OCIE inspections recommendations and consider system improvements that would allow Enforcement staff to electronically access and search all information in advisories and referrals submitted by SROs and generate reports that would facilitate monitoring and analysis of trend information and case activities. Scope and Methodology
To discuss the overall structure of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) inspection program—more specifically, its approach to inspections of self-regulatory organizations’ (SRO) surveillance, investigative, and enforcement programs (enforcement programs)—we reviewed and analyzed documentation of all 11 inspections that SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) completed from March 2002 through January 2007 of enforcement programs related to the former NASD and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). To describe the SRO referral process and recent trends in referral numbers and related SEC investigations, and evaluate SEC’s information system for advisories and referrals, we observed a demonstration from Enforcement staff on the capabilities of their IT systems, analyzed data from SEC’s SRO Referral Receipt System (SRO system) and Case Activity Tracking System (CATS), and interviewed Enforcement, NASD, and NYSE staff to determine how SEC manages the processes for receiving SRO referrals and conducting subsequent investigations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Self-regulatory organizations (SRO) are exchanges and associations that operate and govern the markets, and that are subject to oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Among other things, SROs monitor the markets, investigate and discipline members involved in improper trading, and make referrals to SEC regarding suspicious trades by nonmembers. For industry self-regulation to function effectively, SEC must ensure that SROs are fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities. This report (1) discusses the structure of SEC's inspection program for SROs, (2) evaluates certain aspects of SEC's inspection program, and (3) describes the SRO referral process and evaluates SEC's information system for receiving SRO referrals. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed SEC inspection workpapers, analyzed SEC data on SRO referrals and related investigations, and interviewed SEC and SRO officials.
What GAO Found
To help ensure that SROs are fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities, SEC's Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) conducts routine and special inspections of SRO regulatory programs. OCIE conducts routine inspections of key programs every 1 to 4 years, inspecting larger SROs more frequently, and conducts special inspections (which arise from tips or the need to follow up on prior recommendations or enforcement actions) as warranted. More specifically, OCIE's inspections of SRO surveillance, investigative, and disciplinary programs (enforcement programs) involve evaluating the parameters of surveillance systems, reviewing the adequacy of policies and procedures for handling the resulting alerts and investigations, and reviewing case files to determine whether SRO staff are complying with its policies and procedures. GAO identified several opportunities for SEC to enhance its oversight of SROs through its inspection program. First, although examiners have developed processes for inspecting SRO enforcement programs, OCIE has not documented these processes or established written policies relating to internal controls over these processes, such as supervisory review or standards for data collection. Such documentation could strengthen OCIE's ability to provide reasonable assurances that its inspection processes and products are subject to key quality controls. Second, OCIE officials said that they focus inspections of SRO enforcement programs on areas judged to be high risk. However, this risk-assessment process does not leverage the reviews that SRO internal and external auditors performed, which could result in duplication of SRO efforts or missed opportunities to direct examination resources to other higher-risk or less-examined programs. OCIE officials told us that they plan to begin assessing SRO internal audit functions in 2008, including the quality of their work products, which would allow OCIE to assess the usefulness of these products for targeting its inspections. Finally, OCIE currently does not formally track the implementation status of SRO inspection recommendations; rather, management consults with staff to obtain such information as needed. Without formal tracking, OCIE's ability to efficiently and effectively generate and evaluate trend information, such as patterns in the types of deficiencies found or the implementation status of recommendations across SROs, or over time, may be limited. SEC's Division of Enforcement uses an electronic system to receive referrals of potential violations from SROs. These referrals undergo multiple stages of review and may lead Enforcement to open an investigation. From fiscal years 2003 to 2006, SEC received an increasing number of advisories and referrals from SROs, many of which involved insider trading. However, SEC's referral receipt and case tracking systems do not allow Enforcement staff to electronically search all advisory and referral information, which may limit SEC's ability to monitor unusual market activity, make decisions about opening investigations, and allow management to assess case activities, among other things. |
gao_GAO-16-236 | gao_GAO-16-236_0 | Figure 3 shows the number of reports submitted by contractors and government agencies in each fiscal year. Most of these reports were submitted in 2011 and 2012, when some DOD and contractor officials we spoke with said that congressional attention to counterfeit parts prompted contractors to examine their inventory and identify previously undetected counterfeit parts. Aspects of Implementation Have Limited GIDEP’s Effectiveness as an Early Warning System for Counterfeit Parts
Several aspects of DOD’s implementation of its mandatory reporting requirement for suspect counterfeit parts in GIDEP have limited GIDEP’s effectiveness as an early warning system to prevent counterfeit parts from entering the defense supply chain. First, DOD has not established an oversight function to ensure that defense agencies are reporting suspect counterfeit parts as required. As a result, reports may not be submitted in a timely manner. Third, defense agencies typically limit access of suspect counterfeit GIDEP reports to government agencies, so industry is not aware of the potential counterfeiting issues identified. DOD Lacks a Standardized Process for Determining When to Report Suspect Counterfeit Parts in GIDEP
There is no standardized process for establishing how much evidence is needed before reporting suspect counterfeit parts in GIDEP, and DLA applies a more stringent standard than other defense agencies and contractors we reviewed. Some defense agencies and contractors have established practices that allow them to meet GIDEP’s 60-day reporting requirements. DOD’s Counterfeit Prevention Policy does not include guidance about when limiting access to suspect counterfeit parts GIDEP reports is appropriate. Conclusions
The DOD supply chain is vulnerable to the risk of counterfeit parts—which can have serious consequences. To effectively identify and mitigate this risk, DOD and its defense contractors need data on the existence of counterfeit parts in their supply chain; whether those be suspected or confirmed counterfeit. Specifically, DOD plans to issue a new Instruction on GIDEP in fiscal year 2017, covering the identification of roles and responsibilities for submitting GIDEP reports and oversight; the level of evidence needed to report a part as suspect counterfeit in GIDEP; and the use of GIDEP, including guidance for when access to GIDEP reports should be restricted to government only. Specifically, DOD stated that it agrees with informing contractors on how their counterfeit detection and avoidance systems will be assessed; however, it does not agree with prescribing specific counterfeit detection and avoidance system implementation details. We continue to believe it is important that DOD strengthen its communication with the contractors and as our recommendation indicated, for DOD to clarify the criteria by which it will assess contractor’s counterfeit detection and avoidance systems —which is different than providing specific implementation details. Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the use of the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) to report suspect counterfeit parts, from fiscal years 2011 through 2015; (2) the effectiveness of GIDEP reporting as an early warning system for counterfeit parts; (3) the extent to which DOD has assessed defense contractors’ systems for detecting and avoiding counterfeit parts; and (4) key ongoing efforts by selected government and industry organizations to improve the detection and reporting of counterfeit or suspect counterfeit parts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DOD supply chain is vulnerable to the risk of counterfeit parts, which have the potential to delay missions and ultimately endanger service members. To effectively identify and mitigate this risk, DOD began requiring its agencies in 2013 and its contractors in 2014, to report data on suspect counterfeit parts. A Senate report included a provision for GAO to review DOD's efforts to secure its supply chain from counterfeit parts. This report examines, among other things, (1) the use of GIDEP to report counterfeits, (2) GIDEP's effectiveness as an early warning system, and (3) DOD's assessment of defense contractors' systems for detecting and avoiding counterfeits.
GAO analyzed data from GIDEP for fiscal years 2011 through 2015; reviewed DOD policies, procedures, and documents; and met with agency officials and seven selected contractors based on dollar value from contracts that included a new counterfeit clause.
What GAO Found
Department of Defense (DOD) agencies and contractors submitted 526 suspect counterfeit parts reports in the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. These were submitted primarily by contractors. Defense agencies and contractor officials explained that congressional attention to counterfeit parts in 2011 and 2012 led to increased reporting, and that the lower number of reports in more recent years is partly the result of better practices to prevent the purchase of counterfeit parts.
Number of Suspect Counterfeit Reports for Fiscal Years 2011–2015
Several aspects of DOD's implementation of its mandatory GIDEP reporting for suspect counterfeit parts have limited GIDEP's effectiveness as an early warning system.
First, DOD is not conducting oversight to ensure that defense agencies are reporting as required. As a result, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), for example, may be underreporting suspect counterfeit parts in GIDEP.
Second, there is no standardized process for establishing how much evidence is needed before reporting suspect counterfeit parts in GIDEP and DLA applies a significantly more stringent standard than, for example, the Navy. Consequently, reports may not be submitted in a timely manner.
Third, defense agencies typically limit access of suspect counterfeit GIDEP reports to government agencies, so industry is not aware of the potential counterfeiting issues identified. DOD policy does not include guidance about when access to these reports should be limited.
All seven contractors GAO spoke with have established systems to detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts; however, DOD has not finalized how these systems will be assessed. Contractors are seeking additional clarification on how to meet some of DOD's requirements. Until DOD clarifies criteria for contractors on how their systems will be evaluated, it cannot fully ensure these systems detect and avoid electronic counterfeit parts, as required.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD oversee its defense agencies' reporting efforts, develop standard processes for when to report a part as suspect counterfeit, establish guidance for when to limit access tor GIDEP reports, and clarify criteria to contractors for their detection systems. DOD agreed with the 3 recommendations on GIDEP reporting, but partially agreed with the recommendation to clarify criteria, stating it did not agree with providing specific implementation details. GAO continues to believe clarifying criteria is important, which is different than specific implementation details. |
gao_GAO-02-176T | gao_GAO-02-176T_0 | The states reported a variety of operational and maintenance problems, such as operators turning off leak detection equipment. However, only 19 states physically inspect all of their tanks at least once every 3 years—the minimum that EPA considers necessary for effective tank monitoring. The remaining 22 states do not inspect all tanks, but instead generally target inspections to potentially problematic tanks, such as those close to drinking water sources. Some Tanks Continue to Leak Even After They Have Been Upgraded, Although the Extent of this Problem is Unknown
In fiscal year 2000, EPA and the states confirmed a total of more than 14,500 leaks or releases from regulated tanks, although the Agency and many of the states could not verify whether the releases had occurred before or after the tanks had been upgraded. In closing, the states and EPA cannot ensure that all regulated tanks have the required equipment to prevent health risks from fuel leaks, spills, and overfills or that tanks are safely operated and maintained. | Why GAO Did This Study
Contaminated soil or water resulting from leaks at underground storage tanks can pose serious health risks. In 1984, Congress created the Underground Storage Tank (UST) program to protect the public from potential leaks. Under the program, the Environmental Protection Agency required tank owners to install new leak detection equipment and new spill-, overfill-, and corrosion-prevention equipment.
What GAO Found
GAO found that about 1.5 million tanks have been permanently closed since the program was created, but more than half of the states do not inspect all of their tanks often enough to meet the minimum rate recommended by EPA--at least once every three years. States reported that even tanks with the required leak prevention and detection equipment continue to leak, although the full extent of the problem is unknown. |
gao_GAO-13-626T | gao_GAO-13-626T_0 | Elder Financial Exploitation Can Take Many Forms
Older adults are being financially exploited by strangers who inundate them with mail, telephone, or Internet scams; unscrupulous financial services providers; and untrustworthy in-home caregivers (see table 1 for more details). For example:
Mass marketing scams: Local law enforcement authorities in the four states we visited indicated that investigating and prosecuting the growing number of cases involving interstate and international mass marketing fraud, which often targets older adults, is particularly difficult for them. Interstate or international mass marketing scams include “grandparent scams,” which persuade victims to wire money to bail “grandchildren” out of jail or pay their expenses, and foreign lottery scams that require victims to pay sizeable sums before they can receive their winnings. Exploitation by financial services professionals: Older adults may consult with a variety of financial professionals, such as financial planners, broker-dealers, and insurance agents. However, older adults, similar to other consumers, may lack the information to make sound decisions about choosing a financial services provider and protecting their assets from exploitation. Exploitation by in-home caregivers: Local officials cited exploitation by in-home caregivers—who range from personal care aides who provide non-medical assistance to home health aides who may check an older adult’s vital signs—as a type of abuse that is difficult to prevent, in part because these older adults may rely on and trust their caregivers. Federal Agencies Are Helping States Combat Exploitation in Various Ways
We identified a number of ways the federal government was supporting or could further support state and local efforts to combat elder financial exploitation. Local law enforcement officials we met with indicated it is not clear how they should obtain the federal support they need to respond to interstate and international mass marketing fraud cases. In our November 2012 report, we recommended that the Attorney General conduct outreach to state and local law enforcement agencies to clarify the process for contacting the federal government in these cases and the ways in which the federal government could provide support. Federal agencies have made some efforts to provide safeguards to prevent exploitation by financial services professionals, which was cited as a challenge by public officials in all four states we visited. This program provides grants to states to conduct background checks for employees of long-term care facilities and providers, such as home health agencies and personal care service providers. Other federal efforts are broader in scope rather than focusing on a particular type of elder financial exploitation, such as those covering public awareness, banks, collaboration among agencies, and data collection. At the federal level, each of the seven federal agencies we reviewed independently produces educational materials that could help prevent elder financial exploitation. In our November 2012 report, we recommended that the federal government take a more strategic approach to its efforts to increase public awareness of elder financial exploitation. Our November 2012 report recommended that CFPB develop a plan to educate bank staff on elder financial exploitation. Yet due to the nature of elder financial exploitation, collaboration can be an effective means to facilitate case investigation and prosecution. We identified a number of local initiatives to help bridge the gap between social services and criminal justice agencies. We maintain the importance of our recommendation to FTC. However, preventing and responding to elder financial exploitation also calls for a more cohesive and deliberate national strategy. This is an opportune time for the federal government to be looking at elder financial exploitation, because the Elder Justice Act of 2009 has established the Elder Justice Coordinating Council (EJCC)—a group of federal agency heads charged with setting priorities, coordinating federal efforts, and recommending actions to ensure elder justice nationwide—which has recently begun to examine these issues. To this end, in our November 2012 report we recommended that the EJCC develop a written national strategy for combating elder financial exploitation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Elder financial exploitation is the illegal or improper use of an older adult's funds or property. It has been described as an epidemic with society-wide repercussions. While combating elder financial exploitation is largely the responsibility of state and local social service, criminal justice, and consumer protection agencies, the federal government has a role to play in this area. GAO was asked to testify on the different forms elder financial exploitation can take and the ways federal agencies can help combat it. This testimony is based on information in a report issued in November 2012 (see GAO-13-110). To obtain this information, GAO interviewed public officials in California, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania--states that had large elderly populations and initiatives to combat financial exploitation; officials from seven federal agencies; and experts in this field. GAO also reviewed federal strategic plans and other relevant documents, research, laws, and regulations.
What GAO Found
Older adults are being financially exploited by strangers who inundate them with mail, telephone, or Internet scams; unscrupulous financial services professionals; and untrustworthy in-home caregivers. Local law enforcement authorities in the four states GAO visited indicated that investigating and prosecuting the growing number of cases involving interstate and international mass marketing fraud--such as "grandparent scams," which persuade victims to wire money to bail "grandchildren" out of jail or pay their expenses--is particularly difficult. In addition, older adults, like other consumers, may lack the information needed to make sound decisions when choosing a financial services provider. As a result, they can unknowingly risk financial exploitation by those who use questionable tactics to market unsuitable or illegal financial products. Local officials also noted that it is difficult to prevent exploitation by in-home caregivers, such as home health or personal care aides, individuals older adults must rely on.
GAO identified several ways the federal government is, or could be, supporting state and local efforts to combat elder financial exploitation.
With regard to mass marketing scams, GAO has recommended that the Department of Justice reach out to law enforcement authorities in states to clarify how they can obtain the federal assistance needed to handle interstate or international mass marketing fraud.
To help prevent exploitation by financial services professionals, the Securities and Exchange Commission links to a public website where the qualifications of individual financial services providers can be found, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has issued guidance on how best to convey this information to older adults.
To prevent exploitation by in-home caregivers, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services provides grants that fund background checks for employees of agencies that provide these services.
Other federal efforts are broader in scope and help combat all types of elder financial exploitation. For example, each of the seven federal agencies GAO reviewed has independently undertaken activities to increase public awareness of this exploitation; however, GAO has recommended that the federal government develop a more strategic approach to these efforts. Further, recognizing the importance of collaboration among those interacting with older adults, GAO has recommended measures to educate bank staff on how to identify potential exploitation and improve collaboration among social service and law enforcement agencies, among others, as they respond to reports of exploitation. GAO has also noted the need for more data on the extent and nature of elder financial exploitation, some of which can be collected from consumer complaints filed with federal agencies. Finally, preventing and responding to elder financial exploitation calls for a more cohesive and deliberate national strategy. To this end, GAO has recommended that the Elder Justice Coordinating Council--a group of federal agency heads charged with setting priorities and coordinating federal efforts to combat elder abuse nationwide--develop a written national strategy for combating elder financial exploitation.
What GAO Recommends
In its November 2012 report, GAO made multiple recommendations to federal agencies, and the agencies generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-200 | gao_GAO-08-200_0 | Recent examinations of registered advisers raised concerns in areas such as disclosure, reporting and filing, personal trading, and asset valuation. The banking regulators also monitor hedge fund-related activities at the institutions under their jurisdiction. For instance, in recent years regulators conducted targeted examinations and horizontal reviews that have focused on areas such as stress testing, leverage, liquidity, due diligence, and margining practices as well as overall credit risk management. In fiscal year 2006, RADAR identified a number of hedge fund-related risk areas, which although not exclusive to hedge funds require additional regulatory attention, including the following: soft dollars (e.g., paying for a hedge fund’s office space without disclosing market manipulation (e.g., the dissemination of false information to inflate the price of a stock); hedge fund custody and misappropriation (e.g., theft of hedge fund assets by its advisers); complexity of hedge fund products and suitability (e.g., inadequacy of policies and procedures to assess the complexity of financial instruments and the suitability of products for investors); prime brokerage relationships (e.g., potential conflicts of interest where prime brokers give hedge fund clients—who often pay large dollar amounts of commissions—priority over non-hedge fund clients regarding access to information/research); performance fees (e.g., incorrect calculation of performance fees); hedge fund valuation (e.g., inadequate policies and procedures to ensure that asset valuations are accurate); fund of funds’ conflicts of interest (e.g., conflicts of interest between fund of funds advisers and their recommendation to a fund of hedge fund to invest in certain hedge funds); insider trading (e.g., trading on nonpublic information); and hedge fund suitability (e.g., inadequate policies and procedures to ensure the financial qualification of investors). Bank regulators largely rely on their oversight of hedge fund-related activities at those regulated entities that transact with hedge funds in their efforts to mitigate the potential for hedge funds to contribute to systemic risk. Since 2004, regulators have increased their attention to these activities. Regulated entities have the responsibility to practice prudent risk management standards, but prudent standards do not guarantee prudent practices. As such, it will be important for regulators to show continued vigilance in overseeing banks’ hedge fund- related activities. For instance, large hedge funds use multiple prime brokers, making it unlikely that any single broker would have all the data needed to assess a client’s total leverage. An example can be found in the Amaranth case. Regulators told us that from their examinations of regulated entities that transact business with hedge funds as creditors and counterparties, they have observed that hedge fund disclosure and risk management practices have improved since LTCM. Third, some regulators have expressed concerns that some creditors and counterparties may have relaxed their counterparty credit risk management practices for hedge funds, which could weaken the effectiveness of market discipline as a tool to limit the exposure of hedge fund managers. Regulators View Hedge Fund Activities as Potential Sources of Systemic Risk and Are Taking Measures to Enhance Market Discipline and Prepare for Financial Disruptions
Financial regulators and industry observers remain concerned about the adequacy of counterparty credit risk management at major financial institutions because it is a key factor in controlling the potential for hedge funds to become a source of systemic risk. The PWG also has established two private sector committees to identify best practices to address systemic risk and investor protection issues and has formalized protocols to respond to financial shocks. Despite Intensified Market Discipline, Concerns about Hedge Funds Creating Systemic Risk Remain
Financial regulators believe that the market discipline imposed by investors, creditors, and counterparties is the most effective mechanism for limiting the systemic risk from the activities of hedge funds (and other private pools of capital). Instead, regulators have taken a risk-focused and principles-based approach by monitoring counterparty risk management practices across regulated entities and issuing guidance to help strengthen market discipline. We view these initiatives as positive steps taken to address systemic risk. However, it is too soon to evaluate their effectiveness. All except for FDIC and OTS provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate. To address the second objective (market discipline), we interviewed relevant market participants (such as investors, creditors, and counterparties), and regulatory officials, to get their opinions on (1) how market participants impose market discipline on hedge funds’ risk taking and leveraging (and whether they have improved since 1998); (2) the type and frequency of information such participants would need from hedge fund advisers to gauge funds’ risk profiles and internal controls to make informed initial and ongoing investment decisions; and (3) the extent to which hedge fund disclosures to market participants have improved since the 1998 near failure of the large hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management. According to one regulator and an industry source, pension plans are attracted to various hedge fund investment strategies, depending on their portfolio composition. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1998 near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a large hedge fund--a pooled investment vehicle that is privately managed and often engages in active trading of various types of securities and commodity futures and options--the number of hedge funds has grown, and they have attracted investments from institutional investors such as pension plans. Hedge funds generally are recognized as important sources of liquidity and as holders and managers of risks in the capital markets. Although the market impacts of recent hedge fund near collapses were less severe than that of LTCM, they recalled concerns about risks associated with hedge funds and they highlighted the continuing relevance of questions raised over LTCM. This report (1) describes how federal financial regulators oversee hedge fund-related activities under their existing authorities; (2) examines what measures investors, creditors, and counterparties have taken to impose market discipline on hedge funds; and (3) explores the potential for systemic risk from hedge fund-related activities and describes actions regulators have taken to address this risk. In conducting this study, GAO reviewed regulators' policy documents and examinations and industry reports and interviewed regulatory and industry officials, and academics. Regulators only provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO has incorporated into the report as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Under the existing regulatory structure, the Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission can provide direct oversight of registered hedge fund advisers, and along with federal bank regulators, they monitor hedge fund-related activities conducted at their regulated entities. Since LTCM's near collapse, regulators generally have increased reviews--by such means as targeted examinations--of systems and policies of their regulated entities to mitigate counterparty credit risks, including those involving hedge funds. Although some examinations found that banks generally have strengthened practices for managing risk exposures to hedge funds, regulators recommended that they enhance firmwide risk management systems and practices, including expanded stress testing. Regulated entities have the responsibility to practice prudent risk management standards, but prudent standards do not guarantee prudent practices. As such, it will be important for regulators to show continued vigilance in overseeing hedge fund-related activities. According to market participants, hedge fund advisers have improved disclosures and transparency about their operations since LTCM as a result of industry guidance issued and pressure from investors and creditors and counterparties (such as prime brokers). But market participants also suggested that not all investors have the capacity to analyze the information they receive from hedge funds. Regulators and market participants said that creditors and counterparties have generally conducted more due diligence and tightened their credit standards for hedge funds. However, several factors may limit the effectiveness of market discipline or illustrate failures to properly exercise it. For example, because most large hedge funds use multiple prime brokers as service providers, no one broker may have all the data necessary to assess the total leverage of a hedge fund client. Further, if the risk controls of creditors and counterparties are inadequate, their actions may not prevent hedge funds from taking excessive risk. These factors can contribute to conditions that create systemic risk if breakdowns in market discipline and risk controls are sufficiently severe that losses by hedge funds in turn cause significant losses at key intermediaries or in financial markets. Financial regulators and industry participants remain concerned about the adequacy of counterparty credit risk management at major financial institutions because it is a key factor in controlling the potential for hedge funds to become a source of systemic risk. Regulators have used risk-focused and principles-based approaches to better understand the potential for systemic risk and respond more effectively to financial shocks that threaten to affect the financial system. For instance, regulators have collaborated to examine some hedge fund activities across regulated entities. The President's Working Group has taken steps such as issuing guidance and forming two private sector groups to develop best practices to enhance market discipline. GAO views these as positive steps, but it is too soon to evaluate their effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-14-178 | gao_GAO-14-178_0 | Test Program Contracts Constitute Small Portion of Commercial Buying Activity, but Components Do Not Monitor or Assess Its Use
Federal agencies’ use of the commercial item test program represents a relatively small portion of all commercial buying activity. In fiscal year 2011, of the $90 billion agencies obligated on new awards for commercial items and services, federal agencies obligated $1.9 billion or about two percent using the test program based on data reported in FPDS-NG. We identified significant variation in test program use between and within the components we reviewed which agency and component officials attributed to a variety of factors including the types of goods and services being acquired, the complexity of the acquisition, and the existence of other contracting approaches. Similarly, within the Coast Guard, the Aviation Logistics Center used the test program for 139 of 370 new commercial awards; in contrast, the Coast Guard’s Headquarters Contract Operations used the test program for only 3 of 164 new awards. Coast Guard officials explained that the nature of the products and services purchased by the Aviation Logistics Center—including parts and services for aircraft maintenance, upgrades, and repair—lends itself to using the test program. For example, based on data reported in FPDS-NG, the Army Materiel Command’s Mission Installation Contracting Command- Fort Knox reported that it used the test program for 2 of 538, less than 1 percent, of new commercial awards in fiscal year 2011 that fell within test program thresholds. Test Program Can Reduce the Time to Award Contracts with Manageable Risk
The test program contracts we reviewed were generally awarded more quickly and with less administrative burden than had the contracts been awarded using negotiated procedures and generally did not incur risks above those experienced on other federal acquisition efforts. Further, contracting officers generally documented their efforts to identify commercial sources, but nevertheless awarded 16 of the 26 test program contracts noncompetitively. While these awards were justified and approved in accordance with federal regulations when required, our work and that of others has found that noncompetitive contracting poses risks of overspending because these awards lack a direct market mechanism to help establish pricing. DOD regulations require a written and approved commercial item determination in some cases to mitigate risks associated with misapplication of the commercial item definition; neither DHS nor DOI have a similar requirement. Based on our review of the test program contracts, the use of the test program reduced contracting lead time and administrative burdens in comparison to the agencies’ estimated lead times for awarding contracts using negotiated procedures. Test Program Does Not Generally Introduce Additional Risk When Internal Controls Are in Place
According to officials from the agencies and components we reviewed, test program contracts are reviewed using existing internal controls and standard contract review processes, which are often based on dollar thresholds. As we found in 2006, improper classification of an item as commercial can leave the government vulnerable to accepting prices that may not be the best value if the item is not sold in numbers sufficient for the government to determine the reasonableness of the vendor’s prices as the government is precluded from requesting certified cost or pricing information for commercial items. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase the potential benefits from using the test program and mitigate potential risks, we are making the following two recommendations:
We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and the Interior collect and assess data to determine whether their agencies are using the simplified procedures authorized by the test program to the maximum extent practicable, as required by the FAR. DHS and DOI both disagreed, noting they questioned the value of such an assessment and that current procedures were adequate. This report addresses (1) the extent to which federal agencies have used the test program, and (2) its benefits and risks, if any. To determine the extent to which federal agencies have used the test program, we analyzed data on contract actions awarded using the authority from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG). Based on obligations reported for fiscal year 2011, we determined that the departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and the Interior (DOI) were the largest dollar users of the test program, collectively accounting for 74 percent of test program obligations. To assess the extent to which agencies used the test program, we analyzed the number of new awards for commercial items and services in fiscal year 2011 that fell within the test program thresholds of $150,000 to $6.5 million (based on the estimated value at award) and identified the percentage that used the test program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies rely on the commercial marketplace for a range of goods and services. In 1996, Congress authorized the use of simplified acquisition procedures for commercial items now valued up to $6.5 million under the Test Program for Certain Commercial Items. The test program is currently authorized until January 2015. However, due to a lack of reliable data, Congress has had limited insights into the actual use and benefits of the test program.
The House Armed Services Committee report that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to report on the use of the authority provided under the test program. This report addresses (1) the extent to which federal agencies have used the test program, and (2) its benefits and risks, if any. DOD, DHS, and DOI accounted for 74 percent of test program use in fiscal year 2011 based on data reported in FPDS-NG. For five components within these three agencies, GAO assessed data, reviewed regulations and agency policies, analyzed 26 of the largest test program contracts, and interviewed contracting officials.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies use the test program for a relatively small portion of all commercial items and services bought. In fiscal year 2011, of the $90 billion agencies obligated on new awards for commercial items and services, federal agencies obligated $1.9 billion or about 2 percent using the test program, based on data reported in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG). Within the largest reported users of the test program--the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and the Interior (DOI)--the five components GAO reviewed used the test program for about 9 percent of obligations, and 12 percent of the components' new commercial awards that fell within test program thresholds in fiscal year 2011. Agency officials cited the types of goods and services being acquired, the complexity of the acquisition, and the existence of other contracting approaches as factors affecting test program use. For example, the Coast Guard's Aviation Logistics Center used the test program for 139 of 370 new awards that fell within test program thresholds, whereas its Headquarters Contract Operations used the test program for only 3 of 164 new awards. Coast Guard officials explained that the commercial nature of the parts and services bought by the Aviation Logistics Center lends itself to using the test program, while the headquarters office used existing contracts, which can be another means to fulfill recurring needs for commercial supplies such as information technology services. DOD, DHS, and DOI officials acknowledge that they do not collect or assess data to determine whether the test program is used to the maximum extent practicable. As such, its limited use may indicate missed opportunities.
GAO found that the test program reduced contracting lead time and administrative burdens and generally did not incur additional risks above those on other federal acquisition efforts for those contracts GAO reviewed. GAO compared agencies' estimated timeframes for awarding contracts using negotiated procedures--which officials reported would be used in the absence of the test program--with actual lead times for eight competitively awarded test program contracts and found that test program contracts were generally awarded in fewer days. For example, the Army awarded a $1.3 million contract for blast barriers and bunkers in 20 days, about 160 days less than suggested by command guidance. According to officials from the agencies and components GAO reviewed, test program contracts are reviewed using existing internal controls and standard contract review processes. GAO found that contracting officers generally documented their efforts to identify commercial sources, but 16 of the 26 test program contracts GAO reviewed were awarded noncompetitively. While these awards were justified and approved in accordance with federal regulations when required, GAO and others have found that noncompetitive contracting poses risks of not getting the best value because these awards lack a direct market mechanism to help establish pricing. In some cases, DOD requires contracting officers to prepare a determination that the acquisition meets the commercial item definition. Neither DHS nor DOI have a similar requirement, potentially increasing their risks. Not ensuring the proper classification of an item as commercial can leave the government vulnerable to accepting prices that may not be the best value.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) DOD, DHS, and DOI collect and assess data to evaluate program use; and (2) DHS and DOI require a commercial item determination for certain acquisitions to better manage risk. DOD concurred, but DHS and DOI did not, stating that current procedures were adequate. GAO maintains that both recommended actions are still warranted for DHS and DOI. |
gao_GAO-16-257T | gao_GAO-16-257T_0 | In this role, the office is responsible for (1) developing a national drug control policy, (2) developing and applying specific goals and performance measurements to evaluate the effectiveness of national drug control policy and National Drug Control Program agencies’ programs, (3) overseeing and coordinating the implementation of the national drug control policy, and (4) assessing and certifying the adequacy of the budget for National Drug Control Programs. ONDCP and Other Federal Agencies Have Not Achieved 2010 Strategy Goals; ONDCP Has Established a Mechanism to Monitor Progress
Our 2013 Analysis Found Lack of Progress toward Achieving National Strategy Goals; ONDCP’s 2015 National Strategy Shows Progress Still Needed
In our March 2013 report, we found that ONDCP and other federal agencies had not made progress toward achieving most of the goals articulated in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy. In the Strategy, ONDCP established seven goals related to reducing illicit drug use and its consequences by 2015. As we reported in March 2013, our analysis showed that of the five goals for which primary data on results were available, one showed progress and four showed either no change or movement away from the 2015 goals. According to data available to date, the Strategy shows progress toward achieving one goal, no progress on three goals, and mixed progress on the remaining three goals. Overall, none of the goals in the 2010 Strategy have been fully achieved. ONDCP Established a System to Monitor Progress toward Goals
In March 2013, we reported that ONDCP established the PRS to monitor and assess progress toward meeting Strategy goals and objectives and issued a report (the PRS report) describing the system with the 2012 Strategy update. At that time, the system was still in its early stages and ONDCP had not issued its first report on the results of the system’s performance measures. We also reported that these plans should help increase accountability for improving results and enhance the system’s effectiveness as a mechanism to monitor progress toward Strategy goals and objectives and assess where further action is needed to improve progress. ONDCP Has Assessed the Extent of Overlap and Duplication across Federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment Programs and Identified Opportunities for More Coordination
ONDCP has assessed the extent of overlap and potential for duplication across federal drug abuse prevention and treatment programs and identified opportunities for increased coordination, as we recommended in March 2013. ONDCP concurred with our recommendation and has implemented it. In July 2014, ONDCP published an assessment of drug abuse prevention and treatment programs in its fiscal year 2015 Budget and Performance Summary, which was released with the annual Strategy. The assessment found that these programs generally serve distinct beneficiaries in distinct settings, which helps prevent overlap and duplication. However, ONDCP found that programs that provide drug abuse prevention and treatment services to support efforts to address homelessness would benefit from greater coordination. ONDCP Does Not Hold HIDTAs Accountable for Coordination and Has Not Assessed Opportunities to Help Reduce Potential Overlap
Our April 2013 report found that ONDCP, DHS, and DOJ did not hold HIDTAs or the four other types of field-based information sharing entities we reviewed—Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Intelligence Groups, RISS centers, and state and major urban area fusion centers—accountable for coordinating with one another or assessing opportunities for further enhancing coordination to help reduce the potential for overlap and achieve efficiencies. Specifically, we found that while the five types of field-based entities have distinct missions, roles, and responsibilities, their activities can overlap. Similarly, our April 2013 report found that ONDCP, DHS, and DOJ had not assessed opportunities to implement practices that were identified as enhancing coordination. Since our April 2013 report, the agencies have taken steps to address them. In July 2015, the subcommittee met and agreed to modify its 2015 work plan to address the collection, analysis, and reporting of data pertaining to field-based information sharing entities. ONDCP Has Connected the Systems That Deconflict Operations, Reducing Risks to Officer Safety and Inefficiencies
ONDCP has connected each of the systems that HIDTAs use to deconflict operations, an action that can reduce risks to officer safety and inefficiencies. Accordingly, we recommended that the Director of ONDCP work with the appropriate HIDTA officials to develop milestones and time frames for actions needed to make SAFETNet interoperable in order to prevent unnecessary delays in reducing risks to officer safety and lessening the burden on law enforcement agencies that are currently using multiple systems to notify agencies when they are conducting conflicting enforcement actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
ONDCP is responsible for coordinating the implementation of drug control policy across the federal government and funds HIDTAs that aim to support the disruption and dismantlement of drug-trafficking and money-laundering organizations.
This statement addresses the extent to which ONDCP (1) has achieved Strategy goals and has mechanisms to monitor progress, (2) has assessed overlap and potential duplication across federal drug abuse prevention and treatment programs and identified coordination opportunities, (3) holds HIDTAs accountable for coordination with other field-based information sharing entities and has assessed opportunities for coordination, and (4) has connected existing systems to coordinate law enforcement activities.
This statement is based on a March 2013 report ( GAO-13-333 ), an April 2013 report ( GAO-13-471 ), and selected updates as of November 2015. For the updates, GAO analyzed ONDCP documents on progress toward Strategy goals and drug abuse prevention and treatment programs and contacted ONDCP and HIDTA officials.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in March 2013 that the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and other agencies had not made progress toward achieving most of the goals in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy (the Strategy) and ONDCP had established a new mechanism to monitor and assess progress. In the Strategy, ONDCP established seven goals related to reducing illicit drug use and its consequences to be achieved by 2015. As of March 2013, GAO's analysis showed that of the five goals for which primary data on results were available, one showed progress and four showed no progress. GAO also reported that ONDCP established a new monitoring system intended to provide information on progress toward Strategy goals and help identify performance gaps and options for improvement. At that time, the system was still in its early stages, and GAO reported that it could help increase accountability for improving progress. In November 2015, ONDCP issued its annual Strategy and performance report, which assess progress toward all seven goals. The Strategy shows progress in achieving one goal, no progress on three goals, and mixed progress on the other three goals. Overall, none of the goals in the Strategy have been fully achieved.
ONDCP has assessed the extent of overlap and potential for duplication across federal drug abuse prevention and treatment programs and identified opportunities for increased coordination, as GAO recommended in March 2013. According to ONDCP's July 2014 assessment, these programs generally serve distinct beneficiaries in distinct settings, which helps prevent overlap and duplication. However, ONDCP found that programs that provide drug abuse prevention and treatment services to address homelessness would benefit from greater coordination. ONDCP noted that it was taking steps to address this issue.
GAO reported in April 2013 that ONDCP-funded High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers and four other types of field-based information sharing entities had overlapping analytical and investigative support activities. However, ONDCP and the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ)—the federal agencies that oversee or provide support to the five types of field-based entities—were not holding entities accountable for coordination or assessing opportunities to implement practices that could enhance coordination, reduce unnecessary overlap, and leverage resources. ONDCP agreed with GAO's recommendations to work with DHS and DOJ to develop measures and assess opportunities to enhance coordination of field-based entities. Since July 2015, the agencies have worked through an interagency committee to make plans for collecting data on field-based collaboration, but have not yet fully addressed GAO's recommendations.
ONDCP has connected each of the systems that HIDTAs use to coordinate law enforcement activities, as GAO recommended in April 2013. Specifically, GAO reported in 2013 that HIDTAs and Regional Information Sharing System centers operated three systems that duplicate the same function—identifying when different law enforcement entities may be conducting a similar enforcement action, such as a raid at the same location—resulting in some inefficiencies. In May 2015, ONDCP completed connecting all three systems, which helps reduce risks to officer safety and potentially lessens the burden on law enforcement agencies that were using multiple systems.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made prior recommendations to ONDCP to assess overlap in drug prevention and treatment programs; develop measures and assess opportunities to enhance coordination of field-based entities; and connect existing coordination systems. ONDCP concurred and reported actions taken or underway to address them. GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-16-99 | gao_GAO-16-99_0 | Envisioned as a laboratory-in-a-box, the autonomous detection system would automatically collect air samples, conduct analysis to detect the presence of biothreat agents every 4 to 6 hours, and communicate the results to public health officials via an electronic network without manual intervention. DHS’s April 24, 2014, ADM announced the cancellation of the Gen-3 acquisition and made Gen-2 the official program of record for aerosol biological threat detection. DHS Cannot Make Informed Decisions about Upgrades or Enhancements Because It Lacks Reliable Information about Gen-2’s Capability to Detect an Attack
DHS lacks reliable information about BioWatch Gen-2’s technical capabilities to detect a biological attack and therefore lacks the basis for informed cost-benefit decisions about possible upgrades or enhancements to the system. However, these studies have not directly and comprehensively assessed the capabilities of the Gen-2 system. DHS Has Not Developed Performance Requirements That Would Allow Conclusions about Gen-2’s Ability to Detect Attacks
DHS commissioned four key tests of Gen-2’s technical performance characteristics, but has not developed and validated performance requirements that would enable it to interpret the test results and draw conclusions about the ability of an array of detectors in an operational environment to detect attacks. In particular, they said that these modeling and simulation studies support their assertion that the Gen-2 system can detect catastrophic attacks, defined as attacks large enough to cause 10,000 casualties. Limitations and Uncertainties in Test Results
We found limitations and uncertainties in the four key tests of the Gen-2 system’s performance characteristics—in particular, in the use of test chambers instead of operational environments and the use of simulants in place of live biothreat agents. As noted earlier, it is not possible to test the BioWatch system directly by releasing live biothreat agents into the air in operational environments. When comparing DHS’s actions and decisions regarding the planned acquisition and testing of Gen-3, we found that DHS’s actions partially aligned with these best practices. This led to the cancellation of the Gen-3 acquisition in April 2014. Practice 6: Test to Build in Resilience, Especially in the Development Stages
DHS’s Actions Partially Aligned with Best Practice 6 DHS performed some testing that could help build resilience into the system during Phase I testing, but it could improve resilience testing with more rigorous methods. DHS took steps to refine the sensitivity requirement for Gen- 3, but it was the modeling study, rather than the developmental testing protocol, that led to the change. 3. By applying the lessons learned that DHS identified as a result of evaluating the Gen-3 acquisition, as well as those identified through application of these best practices for testing, DHS can continue to engage in a continuous cycle of improvement for its testing and acquisition of detection technologies as it considers upgrades or enhancements to the Gen-2 system. Further, an autonomous detection system would have to address several likely challenges, including minimizing possible false positives, securing a networked detection and communication system, and operating under various environmental conditions. According to DHS officials, autonomous detection is among the technologies being considered. Clean-up effort reduction is thus uncertain because of an attack’s unpredictability. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that biosurveillance-related funding is directed to programs that can demonstrate their intended capabilities, and to help ensure sufficient information is known about the current Gen-2 system to make informed cost-benefit decisions about possible upgrades and enhancements to the system, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and other relevant officials within the Department to not pursue upgrades or enhancements to the current BioWatch system until OHA: establishes technical performance requirements, including limits of detection, necessary for a biodetection system to meet a clearly defined operational objective for the BioWatch program by detecting attacks of defined types and sizes with specified probabilities; assesses the Gen-2 system against these performance requirements to reliably establish its capabilities; and produces a full accounting of statistical and other uncertainties and limitations in what is known about the system’s capability to meet its operational objectives. We stated that (1) the modeling and simulation studies did not incorporate specific, best available test results (for example, particular estimates of the system’s limits of detection) to draw specific conclusions about the BioWatch Gen-2 system’s capability to detect attacks of defined types and sizes, and (2) the modeling and simulation studies did not incorporate uncertainties in the empirical test results that are important for understanding the precision or confidence in the modeling and simulation results. If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact Tim Persons at (202) 512-6412 or [email protected] or Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or [email protected]. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to discuss: (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the technical capability of the currently deployed system (Gen-2) to detect a biological attack; (2) the extent to which DHS adhered to best practices for developmental testing during Gen-3 Phase I, and what lessons can be learned; and (3) the most mature technology for an autonomous detection system, as well as what the potential benefits and likely challenges would be if DHS were to pursue an autonomous detection system for the BioWatch program in the near future. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS's BioWatch program aims to provide early indication of an aerosolized biological weapon attack. Until April 2014, DHS pursued a next-generation autonomous detection technology (Gen-3), which aimed to enable collection and analysis of air samples in less than 6 hours, unlike the current system (Gen-2), which requires manual intervention and can take up to 36 hours to detect the presence of biological pathogens. DHS is taking steps to address the capability gap that resulted from the cancellation of Gen-3 by exploring other technology upgrades and improvements to the Gen-2 system.
GAO was asked to review (1) the technical capabilities of the currently deployed BioWatch system, (2) the Gen-3 testing effort, and (3) characteristics of autonomous detection as a possible option to replace the current BioWatch system. GAO analyzed key program documents, including test plans, test results, and modeling studies. GAO assessed Gen-3 testing against best practices, reviewed relevant literature, and discussed the BioWatch program and testing efforts with key agency officials and national laboratories staff.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lacks reliable information about BioWatch Gen-2's technical capabilities to detect a biological attack and therefore lacks the basis for informed cost-benefit decisions about upgrades to the system. DHS commissioned several tests of the technical performance characteristics of the current BioWatch Gen-2 system, but has not developed performance requirements that would enable it to interpret the test results and draw conclusions about the system's ability to detect attacks. Although DHS officials said that the system can detect catastrophic attacks, which they define as attacks large enough to cause 10,000 casualties, they have not specified the performance requirements necessary to reliably meet this operational objective. In the absence of performance requirements, DHS officials said computer modeling and simulation studies support their assertion. However, none of these studies were designed to incorporate test results from the Gen-2 system and comprehensively assess the system against the stated operational objective. Additionally, DHS has not prepared an analysis that combines the modeling and simulation studies with the specific Gen-2 test results to assess the system's capabilities to detect attacks. Finally, we found limitations and uncertainties in the four key tests of the Gen-2 system's performance. Because it is not possible to test the BioWatch system directly by releasing live biothreat agents into the air in operational environments, DHS relied on chamber testing and the use of simulated biothreat agents, which limit the applicability of the results. These limitations underscore the need for a full accounting of statistical and other uncertainties, without which decision makers lack a full understanding of the Gen-2 system's capability to detect attacks of defined types and sizes and cannot make informed decisions about the value of proposed upgrades.
The actions and decisions DHS made regarding the acquisition and testing of a proposed next generation of BioWatch (Gen-3) partially aligned with best practices GAO previously identified for developmental testing of threat detection systems. For example, best practices indicate that resilience testing, or testing for vulnerabilities, can help uncover problems early. While DHS took steps to help build resilience into the Gen-3 testing, future testing could be improved by using more rigorous methods to help predict performance in different operational environments. DHS canceled the Gen-3 acquisition in April 2014, but GAO identified lessons DHS could learn by applying these best practices to the proposed Gen-2 upgrades.
According to experts and practitioners, the polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which detects genetic signatures of biothreat agents, is the most mature technology to use for an autonomous detection system. DHS is considering autonomous detection as an upgrade to Gen-2, because according to DHS, it may provide benefits such as reduction in casualties or clean-up costs. But the extent of these benefits is uncertain because of several assumptions, such as the speed of response after a detection, that are largely outside of DHS's control. As a result, the effectiveness of the response—and the number of lives that could be saved—is uncertain. Further, an autonomous detection system must address several likely challenges, including minimizing possible false positive readings, meeting sensitivity requirements, and securing information technology networks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DHS not pursue upgrades or enhancements for Gen-2 until it reliably establishes the system's current capabilities. GAO also recommends DHS incorporate best practices for testing in conducting any system upgrades. DHS generally concurred with GAO's recommendations.
or Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or [email protected] . |
gao_GAO-04-658 | gao_GAO-04-658_0 | How OSHA responds to complaints has changed over time. OSHA conducts on-site inspections for alleged serious violations or hazards and makes phone/fax inquiries for allegations of a less serious nature. OSHA considers serious violations or hazards to be those that allege conditions that could result in death or serious physical harm. Only the employer reporting the greatest amount of time believed that the time he invested was inappropriate given the nature of the alleged hazard. Erroneous Information Can Affect OSHA Hazard Assessments
More than half of the 20 nonsupervisory compliance officers we interviewed told us that complainants’ limited knowledge of workplace hazards and their reasons for filing complaints can affect the quality of the information they provide, which, in turn, can affect OSHA’s determination of the hazard’s severity. Of the 52 OSHA officials we interviewed, 23 said the extent to which they remind complainants of the penalty for providing false information is “little or none at all.” Furthermore, several officials said complainants report hazards based on a perceived violation; therefore, they doubted a hazard that turned out to be invalid would result in a penalty. Although Consistent Handling of Complaints Is a Key OSHA Principle, Practices in Some Area Offices Varied
OSHA’s policy for responding to complaints requires compliance officers to address complaints in a systematic and timely manner; however, we found practices used by area offices to respond to complaints varied considerably. In addition, while OSHA requires its regional administrators to annually audit their area office operations, some administrators do not, and further, for those who do, OSHA does not have a mechanism in place to review the results and address problems on an agencywide level. Complaints Have, to Some Extent, Drawn OSHA to Serious Hazards at Worksites
To some extent, complaints have drawn OSHA compliance officers to sites with serious hazards. From Fiscal Year 2000 to 2001, Half the Worksites Inspected for Complaints Had Serious Violations
OSHA compliance officers found serious violations in half of the worksites they inspected when responding to complaints alleging serious hazards according to OSHA’s data for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 combined. These are hazards that pose a substantial probability of injury or death. Conclusion
Since 1975, OSHA has had to balance two competing demands: the need to use its inspection resources efficiently and the need to respond to complaints about alleged hazards that could seriously threaten workers’ safety and health. When OSHA conducts inspections of complaints based on incomplete or erroneous information, it potentially depletes inspection resources that could have been used to inspect or investigate other worksites. With better information, OSHA could better conserve its inspection resources, minimize the burden on employers, and further enhance the agency’s credibility in the eyes of employers. Some variation in how OSHA officials respond to complaints is inevitable, particularly considering that there are 80 area offices with as many as 16 compliance officers in each office. Our conclusions are based on site visits to 3 area offices processing large numbers of complaints, reviews of case files in those offices, interviews with 52 OSHA officials—area directors, assistant area directors, and compliance officers— who represented 42 of OSHA’s 80 area offices, interviews with officials in all 10 of OSHA’s regional offices, interviews with the director of the Office of Enforcement, interviews with officials in 13 states that have their own safety and health programs, analysis of data on complaints from OSHA’s Integrated Management Information System, analysis of BLS data on injuries and illnesses, interviews with 15 employees whose companies were the subject of complaints, interviews with 6 employees who filed complaints, and the review of agency documents related to the complaint process. Occupational Safety and Health: Federal Agencies Identified as Promoting Workplace Safety and Health. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, OSHA receives thousands of complaints from employees alleging hazardous conditions at their worksites. How OSHA responds to these complaints--either by inspecting the worksite or through some other means--has important implications for both the agency's resources and worker safety and health. Responding to invalid or erroneous complaints would deplete inspection resources that could be used to inspect or investigate other worksites. Not responding to complaints that warrant action runs counter to the agency's mission to protect worker safety and health. Considering OSHA's limited resources, and the importance of worker safety, GAO was asked: (1) What is OSHA's current policy for responding to complaints in a way that conserves its resources, (2) how consistently is OSHA responding to complaints, and (3) to what extent have complaints led OSHA to identify serious hazards?
What GAO Found
In general, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) responds to complaints according to the seriousness of the alleged hazard, a practice that agency officials say conserves inspection resources. OSHA officials usually conduct on-site inspections for alleged hazards that could result in death or serious injury. For less serious hazards, OSHA officials generally investigate by phoning employers and faxing them a description of the alleged hazard. Employers are directed to provide the agency with proof of the complaint's resolution. OSHA officials said the availability of both options allows them to manage resources more effectively when responding to complaints. However, many agency officials we interviewed said some complainants provide erroneous information about the alleged hazard, which can affect the agency's determination of the hazard's severity. For example, some complainants lack the expertise to know what is truly hazardous and, as a result, file complaints that overstate the nature of the hazard. Others, particularly disgruntled ex-employees, may have ulterior motives when filing complaints and misrepresent the nature of the hazard. In the 42 area offices where we conducted interviews (there are 80 area offices), OSHA officials described practices for responding to complaints that varied considerably. For example, the degree to which supervisors participated in decisions about which complaints would result in inspections and which would not varied across offices. While OSHA requires annual audits that would identify the extent to which its area offices are correctly employing the complaint policies, some regions are not conducting these audits, and agency officials have told us that OSHA does not have a mechanism in place to address agencywide problems. To some extent complaints direct inspection resources where there are serious hazards. At half the worksites OSHA inspected in response to complaints, compliance officers found serious violations--those that posed a substantial probability of injury or death, according to OSHA's own data for fiscal years 2000-2001. |
gao_GAO-17-258 | gao_GAO-17-258_0 | Federally facilitated marketplaces. Implementation. CMS Offered Assistance to Transitioning States, but Selected States Encountered Challenges in Their Efforts
CMS offered various types of assistance to states transitioning to a different marketplace IT platform, including to the two selected states that transitioned to the federal platform—Hawaii and Oregon. States’ officials reported costs of approximately $84.3 million, collectively, to transition to the federal platform. The two states’ transition efforts included making changes to their Medicaid systems and the states mainly relied on Medicaid matching funds from CMS to do this. Further, the two states encountered challenges during their transitions. These challenges were related to accelerated transition time frames, difficulties reassigning functional marketplace responsibilities, delays in receiving approvals and decisions needed from CMS, and trouble accessing historical consumer data in previous marketplace IT systems developed by vendors. Delays in receiving approvals from CMS. CMS Assisted Selected States with Their Sustainability Plans, but Did Not Always Ensure Reporting Was Complete and Risk Assessment Processes Were Fully Defined
CMS had processes in place to assist the selected states’ with their efforts to financially sustain the development and operations of their marketplaces, including supporting IT systems. Nevertheless, although CMS took steps to ensure that the states submitted annual financial audit reports, the agency did not ensure the states followed regulations and guidance, which decreased CMS’s visibility into state marketplace sustainability and could increase sustainability risks. CMS uses financial audit reports and sustainability plans to create sustainability risk assessments and conduct consults for each state-based marketplace. However, CMS did not consistently monitor the performance of IT systems for Minnesota and New York—the two selected states that operated state-based marketplace systems. Specifically, CMS did not ensure that the two states had developed, updated, and followed performance measurement plans. In addition, it did not conduct reviews to analyze the operational performance of the selected states’ marketplace IT systems against an established set of performance parameters to evaluate whether the states were performing in an efficient and effective manner. As for IT metrics that were collected from the states, CMS did not link these metrics to performance measurement goals or establish targets for performance. However, CMS guidance for states transitioning to the federal platform was not documented and finalized until after two states had already initiated their transitions. CMS’s guidance includes steps to monitor the performance of state- based marketplace IT system operations, including the collection of related IT performance metrics such as electronic enrollments and website traffic volume. As a result, CMS has been limited in its ability to determine whether state marketplace IT systems are performing efficiently and effectively and to provide early warning of potential problems for the overall state marketplace IT systems’ service delivery to consumers. HHS concurred with our second and third recommendations which, respectively, called for CMS to ensure that all state-based marketplaces provide required annual financial audit reports that are in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, and ensure that the marketplace IT self-sustainability risk assessments are based on fully defined measurable terms, a clear categorization process, and a defined response to high risks. HHS partially concurred with our fourth recommendation that CMS ensure that states develop, update, and follow performance measurement plans that allow the states to continuously identify and assess the most important IT metrics for their state marketplaces. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to: (1) describe what actions the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has taken, if any, to assist states that have chosen to transition to a marketplace IT platform different from the one they originally used and identify the costs and challenges for states in making this transition; (2) assess what actions CMS has taken to assist selected states’ plans to ensure that the development and operations of marketplace IT systems can be financially self-sustained; and (3) assess the steps that CMS has taken to monitor the performance of the states’ marketplace IT systems. This included Minnesota and New York—which operated state-based marketplace IT systems— and did not include Hawaii and Oregon—which relied on the federal marketplace IT platform operated by CMS and did not collect system performance metrics. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required the establishment of health insurance exchanges—or marketplaces—to allow consumers to compare, select, and purchase health insurance plans. States can elect to establish a state-based marketplace, or cede this authority to CMS to establish a federally facilitated marketplace. Some states had difficulties with the rollout and operation of their marketplaces, and some states that struggled with IT implementation are now using the federal marketplace IT platform.
GAO was requested to review CMS's and states' actions to implement the marketplaces. This report (1) describes CMS's actions to assist states that have chosen to transition to a different marketplace IT platform and identify costs and challenges those states incurred in making this transition; (2) assesses CMS's actions taken to assist selected states to ensure that the development and operations of marketplace IT systems can be financially self-sustained; and (3) assesses CMS's steps to monitor the performance of the states' marketplace IT systems. GAO reviewed documentation from CMS and four states selected based on different types of marketplaces, federal grants provided, and enrollment numbers, and interviewed CMS and the states' officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has offered assistance through providing periodic oversight and issuing regulation and guidance to states transitioning from state-based marketplaces to the federally based marketplace IT platform, including two states that GAO reviewed—Hawaii and Oregon—that had made that transition. While CMS provided these states with assistance, documented CMS transition guidance was not finalized until after the two states had completed their transition. The two states incurred costs of approximately $84.3 million, collectively, to transition to the federal platform. The two states' transition efforts included making changes to their Medicaid systems, with these states mainly relying on Medicaid matching funds from CMS to do this. While the selected states successfully transitioned, they encountered challenges during their transitions, due to accelerated transition time frames, difficulties reassigning marketplace responsibilities, delays in receiving approvals from CMS, and trouble accessing historical consumer data in previous vendor-developed marketplace IT systems.
CMS took steps to assist Hawaii and Oregon, as well as two states that GAO selected for review that operated state-based marketplaces, Minnesota and New York, in developing plans for marketplace IT system sustainability. CMS assisted these four states by consulting with the states' officials and providing oversight of their sustainability plans, financial audit reports, and risk assessments. However, CMS did not fully ensure the states provided complete sustainability plans and financial audit reports. Further, CMS did not base its risk assessments on fully defined processes. These weaknesses limit CMS's oversight and assurance that it can be informed of the state marketplaces' sustainability efforts.
Although CMS established a process to monitor the performance of state-based marketplaces, CMS did not consistently follow its processes. For example, CMS did not ensure that the two selected states, Minnesota and New York, had developed, updated, and followed their performance measurement plans. Also, CMS did not conduct reviews to analyze the operational performance of these states' marketplace IT systems against an established set of parameters. Further, while CMS collected IT performance metrics from the two states, such as the number of electronic enrollments and website traffic volume, it did not link state metrics to goals or establish targets for performance. These weaknesses limit CMS's ability to determine if states' marketplace systems are performing efficiently, effectively, and to provide early warnings of potential problems (see table).
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS take six actions: ensure that states provide complete sustainability plans; complete financial audit reports; fully define its risk assessment process; complete updated performance measurement plans; align metrics with goals; and conduct operational analysis reviews. HHS concurred with two, partially concurred with two, and did not concur with two of GAO's recommendations, which GAO continues to believe are valid. |
gao_GAO-12-464T | gao_GAO-12-464T_0 | DHS Could Take Actions to Reduce Overlap and Potential Unnecessary Duplication and Achieve Cost Savings
Overlap and Potential Unnecessary Duplication at DHS
Our March 2011 and February 2012 reports identified 6 areas across DHS where overlap or potential unnecessary duplication exists, and 17 specific actions that the department or Congress could take to address these areas. Of these 11 actions, 1 has been fully addressed, 4 have been partially addressed, and the remaining 6 have not been addressed. In our March 2011 report, we suggested that DHS or Congress take 11 actions to either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collection. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the cost-savings and revenue enhancing areas that we reported on in March 2011 and February 2012. DHS Can Improve the Efficiency and Effectiveness of its Operations by Continuing to Address Themes That Have Impacted its Progress
Our work at DHS has identified three key themes—leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise, implementing and integrating management functions for results, and strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts—that have impacted the department’s progress since it began operations. While DHS is one of a number of entities with a role in securing the homeland, it has significant leadership and coordination responsibilities for managing efforts across the homeland security enterprise. DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts. However, DHS needs to take additional action to forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and utilization of information, which has affected its ability to effectively satisfy its missions. For example, in July 2010, we reported that the expectations of private-sector stakeholders have not been met by DHS and its federal partners in areas related to sharing information about cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure. acquisition and information technology management policies and controls, to provide enhanced guidance on investment decision making. DHS needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress in addressing its challenges, as these issues have contributed to schedule delays, cost increases, and performance problems in major programs aimed at delivering important mission capabilities. After initiating a departmentwide assessment of the program, the Secretary of Homeland Security froze program funding and, at the completion of the assessment in January 2011, the Secretary decided to end the Secure Border Initiative Network as originally conceived after investing nearly $1 billion in the program. Moving forward, addressing these management challenges will be critical for DHS’s success, as will be the integration of these functions across the department to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness. Doing so should better equip DHS to adapt and respond to new threats in a sustainable manner as it works to address existing ones. Further, while DHS has made progress, additional actions are needed to strengthen partnerships with stakeholders, improve its management processes and share information, and enhance its risk management and performance- measurement efforts to enhance effectiveness and achieve efficiencies throughout the department. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed within each individual product. | Why GAO Did This Study
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to profound changes in government agendas, policies, and structures to confront homeland security threats facing the nation. Most notably, DHS began operations in 2003 with missions that included preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, reducing the nations vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing damages from attacks. DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees, and has an annual budget of almost $60 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 1,200 products on DHSs operations in such areas as transportation security and emergency management, among others. Moreover, GAO has reported that overlap and fragmentation among government programs, including DHS, can cause potential unnecessary duplication, and reducing it could save billions of tax dollars annually and help agencies provide more efficient and effective services. As requested, this testimony addresses (1) opportunities for DHS to reduce potential unnecessary duplication in its programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue, and (2) crosscutting and management issues that have affected DHSs implementation efforts. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued from March 2011 through February 2012.
What GAO Found
In March 2011 and February 2012, GAO reported on 6 areas where the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Congress could take action to reduce overlap and potential unnecessary duplication, and 9 areas to achieve cost-savings. Of the 22 actions GAO suggested be taken in March 2011 to address such issues, 2 were fully implemented, 14 were partially implemented, and 6 have not been addressed. GAOs February 2012 report identified 18 additional actions to address overlap, potential duplication, and costs savings.
In September 2011, GAO reported on three key themes that should be addressed to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of DHSs operations.
Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise. DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts among its stakeholders. However, DHS needs to take additional action to forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and utilization of information, which has affected its ability to effectively satisfy its missions, such as sharing information with private sector stakeholders on cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure.
Implementing and integrating management functions for results. DHS has enhanced its management functions, and has plans to further strengthen the management of the department. However, DHS has not always effectively executed or integrated these functions, which has contributed to schedule delays, cost increases, and performance issues in a number of programs aimed at delivering important mission capabilities, such as border security technologies.
Strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts. While progress has been made, limited strategic and program planning and limited assessment to inform approaches and investment decisions have contributed to DHS programs not meeting strategic needs in an efficient manner, such as the lack of risk based plans for deploying aviation security technologies.
What GAO Recommends
While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO previously made about 1,600 recommendations to DHS. The department has addressed about half of them, has efforts to address others, and has taken action to strengthen its operations. |
gao_HEHS-95-69 | gao_HEHS-95-69_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, asked GAO to assess (1) the reasons why experts advocate a comprehensive approach to community revitalization, (2) the challenges to implementing these efforts, and (3) the ways the federal government might support comprehensive approaches. Researchers said that such an approach is feasible because community organizations and an infrastructure to support them have evolved over the last several decades. Comprehensive Efforts Are Community-Based
Community-based efforts focus on a specific neighborhood and involve those affected by the problems in shaping strategies to improve conditions in the neighborhood. Conclusions
In response to the interrelated problems in distressed communities and out of dissatisfaction with the results of community development efforts over the past several decades, community development experts, foundations, government agencies, and community development organizations are turning to the comprehensive approach. They emphasize that the conditions in these neighborhoods cannot be quickly reversed. Comprehensive Approaches Are Difficult to Implement
Many challenges confronted the four organizations we studied as they attempted to improve conditions in their neighborhoods. They also faced the daunting task of concurrently managing a diverse set of programs to address housing, economic development, and social service needs. Leaders of these organizations said that, to sustain their organization, they have concentrated on building support among diverse groups of residents, gaining access to multiple funding sources, collaborating with other organizations, and developing a cadre of experienced staff. Recent Federal Initiatives May Aid Communities Taking a Comprehensive Approach
Historically, coordination has been limited across and within the federal departments and agencies that have responsibility for programs intended to assist distressed communities. Agencies have tended not to collaborate with each other for a variety of reasons, including concerns about losing control over program resources. If fully implemented, these efforts could help the federal government become more supportive of comprehensive revitalization efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the multifaceted approaches that community-based nonprofit organizations in Boston, Detroit, Pasadena, and the District of Columbia have taken to improve conditions in their distressed urban neighborhoods, focusing on the: (1) reasons development experts and practitioners advocate a comprehensive approach; (2) challenges community organizations will face implementing a comprehensive approach; and (3) difficulties the federal government may have in supporting comprehensive approaches.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) community development experts advocate a comprehensive approach to address the complex and interrelated problems of distressed neighborhoods; (2) practitioners in the four locations reviewed believe that a comprehensive approach is feasible because community organizations and supporting networks are already present; (3) conditions in distressed neighborhoods cannot be quickly reversed and evaluating the results of community outreach efforts will be difficult because these efforts are not easily quantifiable; (4) community-based nonprofit organizations must overcome community skepticism, inadequate resident participation, a complex funding system, and the difficulties in managing a diverse set of concurrent housing, economic development, and social service programs to improve conditions in their neighborhoods; (5) organization leaders believe that to sustain their efforts they need to concentrate on building residents' support, gain access to multiple funding sources, and develop an experienced staff; (6) federal departments and agencies have not coordinated their efforts to assist distressed communities because they have separate missions and concerns about losing control over their resources; and (7) recent federal initiatives to consolidate programs could help the federal government become more supportive of comprehensive community development efforts. |
gao_GAO-04-786 | gao_GAO-04-786_0 | Background
States are responsible for developing licensing criteria and health and safety requirements and conducting enforcement activities to ensure providers comply with them and thereby protect the safety and health of children in child care settings. While the federal government’s role is limited in this area, the states must certify that they have safety and health requirements in place and procedures to ensure providers comply with all applicable requirements to receive federal CCDF funds. The Child Care and Development Block Grant statute that underlies the CCDF requires states to designate a lead agency and to establish state plans that commit to establishing and enforcing licensing requirements and health and safety standards for child care providers. Most states conducted compliance inspections at least once a year, which met or exceeded the recommended level for all types of providers. The Number of States Exempting Some Family Child Care Remained about the Same
According to the data reported through state surveys and NCCIC, one less state exempted family child care providers-–sole caregivers who care for children in a private residence other than the child’s—than were exempted from health and safety requirements in 1999. In 1999, 39 states exempted some family child care providers from regulation, and by 2003, 38 states were exempting some of these types of providers. Many Inspection Staff Are Organized by Geographic Location, and Technology Is Used in Most Parts of the Licensing and Inspection Process
While 43 states assigned staff to a geographic location, those states using this broad method varied in the specifics of such assignments. Nineteen states also reported assigning staff based on specific job task, such as responding to complaints. Some states used multiple criteria to organize their staff; these states frequently first assigned staff based on geographic location and then relied on secondary criteria, such as type of child care facility. Forty-five states reported using technology to assist them with many aspects of licensing and enforcement activities. Promising Practices in Technology, Rating Systems, and Training
States we visited have adopted a number of promising practices to assist in their child care licensing and enforcement activities. First, some states used technology in ways that allowed them to streamline their licensing and enforcement processes and to manage parent and provider information particularly effectively. Rating Systems Helped Parents Choose Child Care and Offered Providers Incentives to Improve and Maintain the Quality of Child Care
Florida, North Carolina, and Oklahoma have implemented rating systems to tie the level of reimbursement to a provider’s quality. The use of technology has also increased in the states for state licensing staff, providers, and parents. With the information we gathered through these expert interviews, we identified and conducted site visits in four states—Delaware, Florida, North Carolina, and Oklahoma—to provide examples of promising practices in licensing and enforcement. Child Care: State Efforts to Enforce Safety and Health Requirements. GAO/HEHS-00-28, January 24, 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government requires states that receive funds from the Child Care and Development Fund to establish basic health and safety requirements. The federal government also requires states receiving federal funds for child care to have procedures in place to ensure that providers being paid with grant dollars comply with the applicable safety and health requirements. Because of the significant federal role in paying for child care services and congressional concerns about the way in which states ensure the safety and health of children in child care settings, we were asked to follow up on our prior report, Child Care: State Efforts to Enforce Safety and Health Requirements (GAO/HEHS-00-28, Jan. 24, 2000). This report (1) identifies changes in states' licensing and enforcement activities for various types of licensed and nonlicensed providers since 1999, (2) describes the ways child care licensing agencies organize inspection staff and use technology, and (3) provides examples of promising practices in state child care licensing and enforcement activities. To obtain data, we surveyed state licensing officials in 2004 about their 2003 activities, interviewed experts and made site visits to four states--Delaware, Florida, North Carolina and Oklahoma.
What GAO Found
State efforts in the licensing and oversight of child care facilities are generally about the same as they were in 1999, except that the median caseload of the number of facilities per inspector dropped from 118 to 110 in 2003. We found that in 2003, 38 states exempted all family child care providers from being regulated, compared with 39 states in 1999. Most states conducted compliance inspections at least once a year, meeting or exceeding the recommended level for all types of providers. Many states organized inspection staff by geography and used technology in many parts of the inspection process. Forty-three states reported assigning staff to geographic locations throughout the state. States also assigned staff based on specific job task and type of child care facility the staff would inspect. Many states used multiple criteria to assign staff. Forty-five states reported using technology to assist them with many aspects of licensing and enforcement functions, such as maintaining statistics on families and providers. States have adopted a number of promising practices to assist their child care licensing and enforcement activities. These practices include the use of technology to streamline licensing and enforcement processes and manage parent and provider information, rating systems to aid parents in selecting the appropriate child care for their child and to offer providers incentives to improve and maintain the quality of their care, and working with other organizations to train providers and parents. |
gao_NSIAD-96-212 | gao_NSIAD-96-212_0 | On the basis of our preliminary examination of the issues, the results of an expert panel on the Bank that we convened in September 1995, and discussion with the staffs of the requesters’ committees, we focused our review on the Bank’s role in enhancing the flow of international private investment capital into developing countries, the extent to which Bank projects achieve their development objectives, the Bank’s progress in reforming its operations to improve effectiveness, and the extent to which Bank activities are aligned with U.S. foreign policy goals. 2.1). Bank projects have had a much greater rate of success in building physical infrastructure than in transforming the underlying structure of developing economies. World Bank Reform Efforts
The Bank has taken a number of steps in recent years to improve IDA and IBRD portfolio performance. Bank efforts are enhancing the environment for private sector investment. We also found that the Bank did not appear to displace private foreign investment in developing countries, except in a limited number of markets with substantial private sector involvement. To ensure that Bank reforms have the desired impact, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury monitor and periodically report to the Congress measurable indicators of progress, such as the extent to which (1) the Bank allocates financing to those countries that make Bank-advocated policy and market reforms, (2) projects substantially achieve policy and market reform objectives, (3) project design problems decrease, and (4) implementation problems are identified and resolved early in the project cycle. Chapter 5 reports that the Bank’s overall efforts, both lending and nonlending, support U.S. foreign policy goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the World Bank, focusing on the: (1) Bank's role in enhancing the flow of private investment capital into developing countries; (2) extent to which Bank projects achieve their development objectives; (3) Bank's progress in reforming its operations to improve effectiveness; and (4) extent to which the Bank supports U.S. foreign policy goals.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although there is evidence that the World Bank has displaced private sources of capital in a limited number of markets, nearly 90 percent of private-sector representatives surveyed said that the Bank enhances the environment for private investment in developing countries by reducing risk; (2) Bank projects have had their greatest rate of success in building physical infrastructure, but have had significant difficulty in achieving other objectives, such as policy and market reform; (3) the Bank's reform efforts to improve project performance have had mixed results thus far; (4) promising steps have been taken, such as directing lending to countries that adopt Bank-recommended policy and market reforms, but clear improvements in project design and portfolio management are not yet evident; and (5) the United States has played a leading role in shaping the Bank's agenda, and Bank projects often support U.S. foreign policy goals. |
gao_HEHS-95-29 | gao_HEHS-95-29_0 | 1). 2 and 3). Regarding economic factors, many of the experts we spoke with said that the intense price-competitive dynamics of the garment industry have fostered a willingness among manufacturers and contractors to break labor laws. WHD Has Acted to Coordinate Sweatshop Enforcement
WHD has made some progress in coordinating enforcement activities in garment industry sweatshops, but problems remain. Labor’s efforts are impeded because of legal and administrative limitations and the varying regulatory priorities of federal and state labor departments. However, IRS is starting to develop its enforcement efforts around certain market segments, particularly types of taxpayers or businesses. Although WHD officials say that they do refer some cases to IRS, they also report receiving little information in return. Coordination With State Labor Departments
We found that WHD coordination with state labor departments varied widely, depending on the emphasis the state placed on combating sweatshop working conditions. To address this and other compliance deficiencies, since March 1992, WHD has begun working with garment industry manufacturers to raise the level of voluntary compliance with federal labor laws. 4). WHD efforts involve educating the garment manufacturers on their own employment-related responsibilities and those of the contractors who depend on the manufacturers’ production orders. Conclusions
Sweatshop working conditions remain a major problem in the U.S. garment industry, according to the experts contacted. Such efforts minimize regulation and permit WHD to better allocate its scarce enforcement resources. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on sweatshops in the U.S. garment industry, focusing on: (1) the number of sweatshops in existence; and (2) whether the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has taken any action to enforce labor laws in garment industry sweatshops.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the number of sweatshops in the U.S. garment industry has increased since 1989 due to Fair Labor Standards Act enforcement and recordkeeping weaknesses, the lack of enforcement resources, and the price-competitive nature of the garment industry which gives manufacturers and contractors incentives to break labor laws; (2) although Labor has attempted to coordinate its enforcement efforts, legal and administrative limitations have constrained these actions; (3) although WHD refers some sweatshop operations to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), it receives little information in return because IRS is legally prohibited from sharing certain information; (4) WHD coordination with state labor departments varies widely depending on states' emphasis on combatting sweatshop working conditions; (5) since 1992, WHD has attempted to supplement its enforcement efforts by encouraging garment manufacturers to voluntary oversee its contractors and educating garment manufacturers on their employment-related responsibilities; and (6) WHD voluntary compliance efforts could reduce the amount of regulation required and permit WHD to better allocate its enforcement resources. |
gao_GGD-96-119 | gao_GGD-96-119_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) how the Postal Service collects, disseminates, and uses NCOA program data to provide mailers with accurate change-of-address information and (2) whether the Postal Service adequately oversees the release of NCOA data in accordance with privacy provisions of relevant federal laws. Thus, Postal Service officials said they believe that the NCOA program does not violate the prohibition in the Privacy Act against the unauthorized disclosure of an individual’s “name and address.”
Privacy Provisions of the Licensing Agreement
Postal Service officials said they believe that the NCOA licensing agreement, with its conditions and performance provisions, helps to ensure that federal privacy guarantees are not compromised through the operation of the NCOA program. The Postal Service has set a high standard for the performance of licensees’ address-matching software. Further, the modification requires the Postal Service to terminate the license of any licensee that fails three consecutive audits. The Postal Service did not terminate the license of any of the 10 licensees who failed successive process audits during 1992. However, the Postal Service failed to respond to these proposed advertisements. Finally, we found that the Postal Service had not clearly communicated, through licensees, to licensees’ customers, the restrictions on the use of NCOA data to create or maintain new-movers lists. Recommendations
To strengthen oversight of the NCOA program, we recommend that the Postmaster General require the NCOA program office to develop and implement written oversight procedures, which should include (1) the responsibilities and timetables for using seed records to help verify that licensees release new addresses only as a result of accurate name and address matching; (2) requirements to obtain and review licensees’ NCOA-related proposed advertisements, document the review, and notify licensees of the results within the time period prescribed in the licensing agreement; and (3) requirements for systematically recording all NCOA-related complaints received, including actions taken to resolve complaints; and in addition, enforce all provisions of the licensing agreement, including (1) conducting at least the prescribed minimum number of licensee audits, currently three per contract year; and (2) suspending or terminating, as appropriate, licensees that fail two consecutive audits or that are determined to be in noncompliance with other terms or conditions of the licensing agreement. Unless the Postal Service implements and attempts to enforce these limitations, it cannot ensure that use of NCOA-derived data is limited to the purpose for which it was gathered. U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the U.S. Postal Service's oversight of the National Change of Address (NCOA) program, focusing on: (1) how the Postal Service collects, disseminates, and uses NCOA data; and (2) whether the Postal Service adequately oversees the release of NCOA data in accordance with privacy laws.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Postal Service uses 24 licensees to collect and disseminate address-correction information; (2) the licensees provide address services to other private firms and organizations in accordance with standard licensing agreements; (3) the Postal Service has been unable to prevent, detect, or correct potential breaches in the licensing agreement; (4) the Postal Service audits the software that licensees use to match their mailing lists with NCOA files, reviews NCOA advertisements that licensees propose to use, and investigates complaints concerning the NCOA program; (5) Postal Service officials believe that the NCOA licensing agreement helps to ensure that federal privacy guarantees are not compromised through the operation of the NCOA program; (6) the Postal Service has not expressed a clear and consistent position regarding the use of NCOA data to create new-movers lists; (7) the Postal Service failed to terminate the license of any licensee that failed successive process audits in 1992; (8) the NCOA program office is not terminating licensees that fail to maintain address-matching software or enforcing the performance standards prescribed in the license agreements; and (9) the Postal Service needs to enforce these limitations to ensure that the use of NCOA-derived data is limited to the purpose for which it was intended. |
gao_GGD-96-188 | gao_GGD-96-188_0 | As a result, IRS has not made adequate progress in correcting its management and technical weaknesses. IRS plans to complete an electronic filing strategy by October 31, 1996. In addition, IRS faces several challenges in implementing its customer service vision. Finally, TSM projects and reengineering efforts must be integrated. Developing the Capacity to Make Sound Technology Investments
IRS information systems need to be better managed as investments, and strategic information management practices are not yet fully in place. While IRS has recognized the need to match the scope of TSM projects with its capabilities and is beginning to scale back its TSM investment to projects it is more capable of managing, IRS’ investment process is not yet complete. We have reported the following. IRS has not yet established an effective organizational structure to consistently manage and control systems modernization organizationwide. However, IRS has not yet set the time frames for several measures necessary to build a technical foundation for TSM. We found that IRS’ selection of the Department of Commerce’s National Technical Information Service (NTIS) to develop Cyberfile was not based on sound analysis. We are encouraged that Treasury is taking a more active role in overseeing IRS’ efforts to improve its business operations. It gave the Commission a broad, sweeping charter for reviewing: present IRS practices, especially its organizational structure, paper and return processing activities, infrastructure, and collection process; what is required for (1) making returns processing “paperless,” (2) modernizing IRS operations, (3) improving the collections process without major increases in personnel or funding, (4) improving taxpayer accounts management, (5) improving accuracy of information requested by taxpayers in order to file returns, and (6) changing the culture of IRS to make it more efficient, productive, and customer oriented; whether IRS could be replaced with a quasi-governmental organization with tangible incentives for managing programs and activities, and for modernizing its activities; and whether IRS could perform other collection, information, and financial service functions of the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed opportunities to improve the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) business operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) because IRS has not fully corrected its management and technical weaknesses, Congress has limited funding for tax systems modernization (TSM) to critical systems; (2) IRS needs to develop an effective business vision implementation strategy that includes performance measures; (3) IRS plans to complete its electronic filing strategy by October 1996, but it has not fully addressed implementation of its customer service vision or integration of its TSM projects with its reengineering efforts; (4) IRS needs to develop the capacity to make sound information technology investments; (5) IRS needs to build a technical foundation for its TSM information systems projects, invest sole TSM management control in one official, and improve its contracting process; (6) IRS needs to address serious financial management problems, particularly those concerning its revenues, tax refunds, accounts receivables, nonpayroll operating expenses, and available appropriations; (7) IRS, the Department of the Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress must ensure that IRS follows through on recommended management improvements; (8) Congress has provided a framework to monitor IRS progress in improving its management operations and modernizing its tax return processing system; and (9) the National Commission on Restructuring IRS will have a principle role in evaluating IRS operations and recommending organizational, management, and operating changes. |
gao_GAO-06-60 | gao_GAO-06-60_0 | Agencies’ Available Data Provides Limited Insight in Overall USERRA Compliance and Employer Support
DOL, DOJ, OSC, and DOD have formal and informal USERRA complaint data, and some employer support figures. DOL’s formal complaint numbers show a possible relationship with the level of reserve component usage and the number of complaints. DOD data indicate that some employers are exceeding USERRA requirements; however, these data have limitations. Furthermore, data from a DOD survey indicate that most servicemembers do not seek assistance for their USERRA problems, which indicates that complaint data alone cannot fully explain USERRA compliance or employer support. It will be several years before the ESGR can identify any meaningful trends in informal complaint numbers because the ESGR has only 1 full year of informal complaint data in its central database. Because informal complaint figures have not been captured annually, agencies cannot know whether informal complaints have been increasing, decreasing, or remaining steady. Agencies Have Conducted Educational Outreach, but Efficiency and Effectiveness of Outreach Has Been Hindered by Lack of Employer Information
Agencies have taken actions to educate hundreds of thousands of servicemembers and employers about USERRA, but the efficiency and effectiveness of agency outreach actions are hindered by a lack of employer information. Efficiency and Effectiveness of Employer Outreach Efforts Are Hindered by Lack of Employer Information
Agencies have been restricted in their ability to efficiently and effectively target educational outreach actions to employers who actually have servicemember employees, because only limited employer information is available. As of August 2005, about 40 percent of DOD’s Ready Reserve members had not entered their civilian employer information into DOD’s database. Without complete information about the full expanse of servicemember employers, the federal agencies conducting outreach efforts have no assurance that they have informed all servicemember employers about USERRA rights, benefits, and obligations. Agencies’ Ability to Efficiently and Effectively Address Complaints Hampered by Incompatible Data Systems, Reliance on Paper Files, and Lack of Visibility
A segmented process with incompatible data systems hampers agencies’ abilities to efficiently and effectively address servicemembers’ complaints and report results as intended by USERRA. Due to the incompatibility of agency systems and the lack of visibility across agencies, we were not able to track the entire elapsed time that servicemembers wait to have their complaints fully addressed. We analyzed the processing times and elapsed times for the 52 complaints that had been closed and reopened two or more times and found substantial differences between the figures. As a result, the system recorded the average processing time as 103 days. Periodic, projectable surveys of the servicemembers who are covered by USERRA could provide DOD, DOL, DOJ, and OSC with a means to determine whether or not USERRA compliance and employer support is improving and thus, USERRA’s purpose—to minimize employment disadvantages that can result from service in the uniformed service—is being achieved. However, DOD has not taken steps to enforce its requirement for National Guard and Reserve members to enter and maintain their civilian employer data. This slows the complaint resolution process. The creation, maintenance, and transfer of these paper files add to complaint processing times and the time servicemembers wait to have their complaints addressed. For this report, we used results from the May 2004 survey that showed at least 72 percent of the Selected Reserve members who had experienced USERRA-related problems never filed a complaint, informal or formal, to seek assistance in resolving the problem. Scope and Methodology
To assess whether the federal agencies that support or enforce USERRA have data that indicates the level of compliance with USERRA, we gathered and analyzed data from DOL, DOD, DOJ, and OSC. We discussed the agency data related to USERRA compliance or employer support, along with the practices and methods used to collect these data, with responsible officials from the Department Of Labor, Washington, D.C.; Department Of Labor, Veterans Employment and Training Service, Field Offices in Memphis, TN, and Norfolk, VA; and regional offices in Philadelphia, PA; and Atlanta, GA; Department Of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, D.C.; and Regional Offices in Philadelphia, PA, and Atlanta, GA; Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Office of Special Counsel, Washington, D.C.; Department Of Defense, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, Arlington, VA; and Department Of Defense, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, Customer Service Center, Millington, TN. Reemployment ? This outreach effort is focused on leaders in industries that employ significant numbers of reserve component members. 1. 2. a. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) of 1994 protects millions of people, largely National Guard and Reserve members, as they transition between their federal duties and their civilian employment. The act is intended to eliminate or minimize employment disadvantages to civilian careers that can result from service in the uniformed services. This report examines the extent to which the Departments of Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), Justice (DOJ), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) have achieved this purpose, specifically, the extent to which the agencies (1) have data that indicate the level of compliance with USERRA, (2) have efficiently and effectively conducted educational outreach, and (3) have efficiently and effectively addressed servicemember complaints.
What GAO Found
Whether or not overall USERRA compliance has changed is difficult to firmly establish; however, the agencies that support or enforce USERRA have collected formal and informal complaint data and some employer support figures that provide limited insights into compliance. For example, DOL's formal complaint numbers show a possible relationship with the level of the use of the reserve components and the number of complaints. DOD data show that some employers exceed USERRA requirements, but these data have limitations. DOD has only 1 full year of informal complaint data, so it will be several years before DOD can identify any meaningful trends in informal complaints. Because informal complaint figures have not been captured on a consistent basis, agencies lack the data necessary to identify total complaint trends. Furthermore, data from a 2004 DOD survey showed that at least 72 percent of National Guard and Reserve members with USERRA problems never sought assistance for their problems. This raises questions as to whether complaint numbers alone can fully explain USERRA compliance or employer support. Some recently added employment questions on DOD's periodic surveys, if continued, offer the potential to provide insight into compliance and employer support issues. DOD, DOL, and OSC have educated hundreds of thousands of employers and servicemembers about USERRA, but the efficiency and effectiveness of this outreach is hindered by a lack of employer information. DOD's reserve component members who can be involuntarily called to active duty are required to enter their civilian employer information into a DOD database but the services have not enforced this requirement and as of August 2005, about 40 percent of the members had not entered the required information. Without information about the full expanse of servicemember employers, federal agencies have conducted general outreach efforts but have been limited in their ability to efficiently and effectively target educational outreach efforts to employers who actually have servicemember employees. Agency abilities to efficiently and effectively address servicemember complaints are hampered by incompatible data systems, a reliance on paper files, and a segmented process that lacks visibility. The systems that DOD, DOL, DOJ, and OSC use to track USERRA complaints are not compatible. As a result, data collection efforts are sometimes duplicated, and DOL relies on its paper files when transferring or reviewing complaints. This slows the transfer of complaints and limits the ability of DOL managers to conduct effective, timely oversight of complaint files. Furthermore, segmented responsibilities and lack of visibility have led agencies to focus on outputs rather than results. For example, agencies measure complaint processing times but not the elapsed time servicemembers actually wait to have their complaints fully addressed. GAO analysis of 52 complaints that had been closed and reopened two or more times found that recorded processing times averaged 103 days but the actual elapsed times that servicemembers waited to have their complaints fully addressed averaged 619 days. |
gao_HEHS-96-4 | gao_HEHS-96-4_0 | The hold harmless provision requires the Secretary of Labor to reserve for the national sponsors a funding amount sufficient to maintain the 1978 activity level. These statutes have required that no more than 22 percent of the SCSEP appropriation be allocated to the state governments. For the 1994 program year, for example, $234.5 million of the total appropriation of $410 million was subject to the hold harmless provision and distributed accordingly. The Department would not be required to hold harmless the 1978 state-by-state levels. Scope and Methodology
To identify Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP) grants for program years 1993-94, we reviewed grant applications, the Older Americans Act (OAA), and Labor’s regulations that relate to grant awards and to title V. We also reviewed prior studies, audits, and reports on SCSEP, including those by Labor’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). 55%/45% state sponsors 2,236,065 55%/45% national sponsors 55%/45% total (continued)
National Sponsors’ Administrative Costs Placed in the Category of Other Enrollee Costs
For program year 1994, most of the national sponsors allocated administrative costs to the category of other enrollee costs rather than the administrative category, which has an Older Americans Act (OAA) limit of 15 percent. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. In January 1984, Labor once again requested another equitable distribution report. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO examined the Department of Labor's (DOL) Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP), focusing on: (1) DOL process for awarding SCSEP grants; (2) the extent to which DOL equitably distributes SCSEP funds; and (3) SCSEP administrative costs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in order to maintain 1978 activity levels, the Older Americans Act (OAA) requires DOL to award SCSEP grants to national sponsors and those with proven track records; (2) of the $410 million in SCSEP appropriations for program year 1994, $234.5 million was distributed under the 1978 activity level provision; (3) DOL's use of the 1978 allocation pattern severely limited its ability to achieve equitable distribution among states; (4) appropriations statutes have overriden the title V funding provision to require that no more than 22 percent of SCSEP appropriations be allocated to state governments; and (5) in program year 1994, national sponsors' administrative costs exceeded the 15-percent limit due to administrative expenses being charged to another cost category. |
gao_GAO-04-726 | gao_GAO-04-726_0 | For fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the United States provided a total of approximately $3.3 billion, making Colombia the fifth largest recipient of U.S. assistance since fiscal year 2002. Nonmilitary Assistance Programs Have Begun to Show Intended Results, but Progress May Not Be Sustainable
A key component of U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Colombia has involved providing nonmilitary assistance for programs to promote legitimate economic alternatives to the cultivation of coca and opium poppy; assist Colombia’s vulnerable groups, particularly internally displaced persons; and strengthen the country’s democratic, legal, and security institutional capabilities. Each of the three U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs has begun to produce results envisioned in 2000 when U.S. funding for Plan Colombia was approved. Furthermore, the USAID/Colombia mission estimated that implementing such a comprehensive alternative development program could involve assisting as many as 136,600 families and cost up to $4 billion over 3 years. The U.S. vulnerable groups program has provided assistance to many internally displaced persons and others, but program beneficiaries may not receive all of the services they need, and State and USAID do not track individuals after they receive assistance. While these services address a significant need, a relatively small number of beneficiaries will receive them. Management and Financial Challenges Continue to Complicate Project Implementation
Although the U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs are beginning to achieve some of the results originally envisioned, Colombia and the United States must address management and financial challenges. USAID has not yet maximized the mutual benefits of its programs, and State and USAID have not coordinated their assistance programs to internally displaced persons. State, Justice, and USAID have not established timelines, nor have State or USAID developed an overall strategy for turning programs over to the Colombian government or to the private sector. A number of domestic and foreign factors have limited the Colombian government’s ability to contribute more resources. Particular attention should be placed on establishing a coordination mechanism between State and USAID to facilitate internally displaced persons’ transition from emergency aid to longer-term assistance. Scope and Methodology
To identify the objectives of each program; determine the programs’ reported accomplishments; as well as the factors, if any, limiting their implementation, we analyzed project design documents, including funding documents and contracts and grant agreements, describing the projects from State, Justice, and USAID; reviewed project documentation, including progress reports and other documents prepared by the grantees and contractors implementing the projects; interviewed cognizant contractor and grantee officials both in Washington, D.C., and Colombia; and interviewed State, Justice, and USAID officials responsible for program oversight and implementation both in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá. Throughout this report, we acknowledge the many obstacles that the U.S. government faces in reaching its nonmilitary assistance objectives, including Colombia’s long-standing conflict and limited financial resources. As such, we recognize that establishing a formal mechanism for transitioning beneficiaries of the vulnerable groups program from emergency to longer-term assistance is not an easy task. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2000, the U.S. government has provided a total of $3.3 billion to Colombia, making it the fifth largest recipient of U.S. assistance. Part of this funding has gone toward nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, including programs to (1) promote legitimate economic alternatives to coca and opium poppy; (2) assist Colombia's vulnerable groups, particularly internally displaced persons; and (3) strengthen the country's democratic, legal, and security institutional capabilities. GAO examined these programs' objectives, reported accomplishments, and identified the factors, if any, that limit project implementation and sustainability. We also examined the challenges faced by Colombia and the United States in continuing to support these programs.
What GAO Found
Although U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs have begun to produce some results, individual projects reach a relatively small number of beneficiaries, face implementation challenges, and may not be sustainable. For example, projects designed to promote legitimate economic alternatives to illicit crop cultivation have helped about 33,400 families. However, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated in 2000 and 2001 that as many as 136,600 families needed assistance, and these projects face implementation obstacles, such as difficulty marketing licit products and operating in conflictive areas. U.S. assistance to Colombia's vulnerable groups has provided support to many internally displaced persons, but these program beneficiaries do not receive all of the assistance they need, and there is no systematic way for beneficiaries to transition from emergency aid to longer-term development assistance. The U.S. government has made some progress toward facilitating democratic reform in Colombia, but projects face certain obstacles, such as limited funding and security constraints. Despite the progress made by the three nonmilitary assistance programs, Colombia and the United States continue to face long-standing management and financial challenges. The Colombian government's ability to contribute funds for nonmilitary assistance programs is limited by a number of domestic and foreign factors, and Colombia's longstanding conflict poses additional challenges to implementing and sustaining nonmilitary assistance efforts. The U.S. government has not maximized the mutual benefits of its nonmilitary assistance programs and has not established a mechanism for vulnerable groups to transition from emergency aid to longer-term assistance. Furthermore, the Departments of State and Justice and USAID have not established timelines for achieving their stated objectives, nor have State and USAID developed a strategy to turn programs over to the Colombian government or to the private sector. |
gao_GAO-01-710T | gao_GAO-01-710T_0 | The fees that attorneys representing DI applicants can charge are limited by law and must be approved by SSA. However, once MCS determines the amount of the past-due benefits owed the claimant, a series of manual steps is performed to handle the attorney’s fee payment. Conclusions
Inefficiencies in the current process increase both the time it takes to pay the attorney fees and the costs of administration. One segment of attorney fee processing—the fee approval process—was substantially simplified in 1991. Systems support could streamline the second segment of the processing—the fee payment—thus lowering the annual administrative costs and cutting processing time. If SSA automated this final segment of the fee processing, it could help improve customer service for both claimants and their attorneys. | What GAO Found
To ensure that people claiming disability insurance program benefits can obtain legal representation at a fair price, the Social Security Administration (SSA) is required to regulate the fees that attorneys charge people to represent their disability claims before the agency. Balancing the needs of the claimants with those of their attorneys, the law limits the amount of fees that attorneys can charge claimants, but also guarantees that those fees will be paid from the claimants' past-due benefits. Inefficiencies in the current process increase both the time it takes to pay the attorney fees and the cost of administration. One segment of attorney fee processing--the fee approval process--was substantially simplified in 1991. Systems support could streamline the second segment of the processing--the fee payment--thus lowering the annual administrative costs and cutting processing time. Automation of this final segment of the fee process could help improve customer service for both claimants and their attorneys. |
gao_GAO-15-37 | gao_GAO-15-37_0 | DOE’s Requirements and Guidance for Analysis of Alternatives
DOE’s mandatory requirements and optional guidance for identifying, analyzing, and selecting alternatives when conducting AOAs also apply to NNSA. DOE’s guides suggest summarizing a planned approach to conduct an analysis of alternatives; considering at least three viable alternatives for analysis, including one that represents the status quo; developing cost estimates that are explicit ranges instead of point estimates; including life-cycle cost estimates of the alternatives being considered; quantifying the benefits of alternatives over their life cycle; adjusting life-cycle cost and benefit estimates for risk; considering various selection criteria for the alternatives; weighting the selection criteria for relative importance; and comparing alternatives using net present value.The guidance suggests that, at the end of the analysis, the AOA team present the recommended alternative based on the preceding analysis in an integrated form, summarizing why an alternative is preferred and supporting the recommendation of the preferred alternative with facts from the analysis. NNSA program offices. We identified these best practices by (1) compiling and reviewing commonly mentioned AOA policies and guidance used by different government and private-sector entities and (2) incorporating experts’ comments on our draft set of practices to develop a final set of practices. DOE’s AOA Requirements and Guidance Do Not Conform to Best Practices
Neither DOE’s AOA requirements nor its guidance conform to best practices and, therefore, DOE does not have assurance that applying these requirements and guidance may lead to reliable AOAs. DOE’s requirements do not fully or substantially meet best practices in any of the four AOA categories, and they conform to only 1 of the 24 best practices we identified—the practice of having the customer define functional requirements based on the mission need. DOE’s requirements combined with guidance conform to 9 of 24 best practices. Selecting a preferred alternative. DOE and NNSA officials told us that unreliable AOAs are a risk factor for major cost increases and schedule delays for NNSA projects. As we previously reported, federal standards for internal control related to risk assessment call for agency management to assess the risks faced entity-wide and at the activity level, and that once risks have been identified, management should decide what actions should be taken to mitigate them.developing a reliable AOA process, DOE may not be successful in mitigating the risk it has identified related to this process. NNSA’s AOAs for Three Recent Projects Did Not Conform to Best Practices and Did Not Consistently Follow Certain DOE Guidance
For three recent projects, our analysis found that NNSA did not conform to most of the best practices in conducting the AOAs,concerns about the reliability of these AOAs. NNSA conformed to 11 of 24 best practices when conducting this AOA. As noted above, DOE has one requirement that conforms to best practices, the best practice of defining functional requirements based on the mission need. NNSA followed this requirement for all three AOAs we reviewed. DOE and NNSA officials acknowledge that unreliable AOAs are a risk factor for major cost increases and schedule delays for NNSA projects. Developing reliable AOAs is particularly important at this time because NNSA has recently reassessed or is in the process of reassessing alternatives for all its major construction projects, after spending billions of dollars on designing and partially constructing these projects. Without a process to develop reliable AOAs, NNSA may continue on this path and continue to have limited assurance that it is selecting alternatives that best meet its mission needs and will not result in major cost increases and schedule delays in the future. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify and describe best practices for the analysis of alternatives (AOA) process, we first searched for a source of generally accepted best practices that we could use as criteria for comparison with the Department of Energy’s (DOE) AOA process, but we could not identify a single source that was broadly recognized by government and private- sector entities and that could serve as the definitive source of best practices for the AOA process. We also sent a request to subject-matter experts, including experts from DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and various other government or private-sector entities, to help us identify further relevant information. the Association for the To determine the extent to which DOE’s requirements and guidance for conducting an AOA conform to AOA best practices, we first identified the process NNSA is required to follow when conducting an AOA. In addition, as part of this objective, we determined the extent to which NNSA conformed to certain DOE requirements and guidance—those DOE requirements and guidance that conformed to best practices—in conducting the AOAs for these projects. These practices can be applied to a wide range of activities in which an alternative must be selected from a set of possible options, and to a broad range of capability areas, projects, and programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
NNSA manages numerous programs that require the design and construction of one-of-a-kind facilities. NNSA's selection of preferred alternatives for these projects is governed by DOE requirements and guidance related to conducting an AOA. In recent years, NNSA has incurred substantial cost increases and schedule delays for such projects.
GAO was mandated to review the AOA process applied by NNSA. This report (1) identifies and describes AOA best practices, (2) determines the extent to which DOE requirements and guidance for conducting an AOA conform to AOA best practices, and (3) determines the extent to which NNSA conformed to best practices and followed certain DOE requirements and guidance in conducting the AOAs for recent NNSA projects.
To do this work, GAO examined relevant AOA guidance from the public and private sectors and DOE's AOA requirements and guidance, sought input from AOA experts, and interviewed agency officials. GAO reviewed three AOAs that NNSA completed or was scheduled to complete between November 2010 and September 2014.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 24 best practices for analysis of alternatives (AOA)—a process that is a key first step in capital asset acquisition. The process entails identifying, analyzing, and selecting a preferred alternative to best meet the mission need by comparing the operational effectiveness, costs, and risks of potential alternatives. Because no single set of best practices for AOAs was broadly recognized by government and private-sector entities, GAO developed a set of practices by reviewing AOA policies and guidance used by seven public and private-sector entities with experience in the AOA process, and verified these practices with subject matter experts. These best practices include, among other things, defining functional requirements based on mission need, conducting the AOA without a predetermined solution, including the status-quo alternative, and conducting an independent review of the entire AOA process. These practices can be applied to a wide range of activities, projects, and programs.
The Department of Energy's (DOE) requirements and guidance—found in the agency's orders and associated guides—for conducting an AOA do not conform to the 24 best practices GAO identified. Therefore, DOE does not have assurance that applying these requirements and guidance may lead to reliable AOAs. GAO's review of DOE's requirements for AOAs found that they conform to only 1 of the 24 best practices: the practice of defining functional requirements based on mission need. GAO's review of DOE's requirements combined with associated guidance—which includes nonmandatory approaches for meeting requirements—found that they conform to 9 of the 24 best practices. For example, DOE's guidance suggests identifying and considering at least three viable alternatives, including the status quo—a best practice that is not included in the requirements. Federal standards for internal control related to risk assessment call for agency management to decide on actions to mitigate identified risks. Without developing a reliable AOA process, DOE may not be successful in mitigating the risk it has identified related to this process.
DOE's requirements and guidance for AOAs also apply to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency in DOE. For three recent NNSA projects that GAO reviewed, NNSA did not conform to most of the best practices GAO identified for conducting AOAs, therefore, raising concerns about the reliability of these AOAs. Specifically, for the three projects' AOAs, NNSA conformed to 6, 8, and 11 of the 24 identified best practices, respectively. For all three projects, NNSA consistently followed the one DOE requirement that conformed to a best practice—to define functional requirements based on mission need. DOE and NNSA officials acknowledge that unreliable AOAs are a risk factor for major cost increases and schedule delays for NNSA projects. As GAO has previously reported, NNSA has spent billions of dollars designing and partially constructing projects with an estimated cost of $750 million or more, only to later reassess alternatives. Without a process to develop reliable AOAs, NNSA may continue on this path and continue to have limited assurance that it is selecting alternatives that best meet its mission needs and will not result in major cost increases and schedule delays in the future.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE incorporate best practices into its AOA requirements. DOE agreed with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-954 | gao_GAO-08-954_0 | At the highest level, data are in a format that a computer can understand and operate on, whereas at the minimum type of interoperability, the data are in a format that is viewable, so that information is available for a human being to read and interpret. Not all data require the same level of interoperability. This guidance is codified in an interoperability specification for each use case that integrates the standards. DOD and VA Are Currently Sharing Health Information at Different Levels of Interoperability, but More Work Remains to Share All Health Information
DOD and VA have established and implemented mechanisms for electronic sharing of health information, some of which is exchanged in computable form, while other information is viewable only. Currently, the types of computable health data being exchanged are limited to outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy data. Further, although VA’s health information is all captured electronically, many DOD medical facilities continue to rely on paper records. According to the departments’ officials, the DOD/VA Information Interoperability Plan (targeted for approval in August 2008) is to address these and other issues and define tasks required to guide the development and implementation of interoperable, bidirectional, and standards-based electronic health records and capabilities for military and veteran beneficiaries. DOD and VA Have Adopted Standards to Allow Sharing and Are Taking Steps to Follow Federal Standards, Which Continue to Evolve
DOD and VA have agreed upon numerous common standards that allow them to share health data, which include standards that are part of current and emerging federal interoperability specifications. Continuing their historical involvement in efforts to agree upon standards for the electronic exchange of clinical health information, the departments are also participating in recent ongoing standards-related initiatives led by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (within the Department of Health and Human Services). The departments’ efforts to share data and to be involved in standardization activities are important mechanisms for ensuring that their electronic health records are both interoperable and aligned with emerging standards and specifications. DOD and VA Have Taken Steps to Establish the Joint Interagency Program Office, but the Office Does Not Yet Have Permanent Leadership, Staff, or Facilities
To accelerate the departments’ ongoing interoperability efforts, Congress included provisions establishing a joint interagency program office in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Under the act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs were required to jointly develop schedules and benchmarks for setting up the DOD/VA Interagency Program Office, as well as for other activities for achieving interoperable health information (that is, establishing system requirements, acquisition and testing, and implementation of interoperable electronic health records or capabilities). However, the effort to set up the program office is still in its early stages. The positions of Director and Deputy Director are not yet permanently filled, permanent staff have not yet been hired, and facilities have not yet been designated for housing the office. However, if the plan includes the essential elements needed to guide the departments in achieving their long-term goal of seamless sharing of health information, it could improve the prospects for the successful achievement of this goal. In view of the short timeframes, without a fully established program office and a finalized implementation plan with set milestones, the departments may be challenged in meeting the required date for achieving interoperable electronic health records and capabilities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the progress of the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to date on developing electronic health records systems or capabilities that allow for full interoperability of personal health care information between the departments, we reviewed our previous work on DOD and VA efforts to develop health information systems, interoperable health records, and interoperability standards to be implemented in federal health care programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) are required to accelerate the exchange of health information between the departments and to develop systems or capabilities that allow for full interoperability (generally, the ability of systems to use data that are exchanged) and that are compliant with federal standards. The act also established a joint interagency program office to act as a single point of accountability for the effort, whose function is to implement such systems or capabilities by September 30, 2009. Further, the act required that GAO semi-annually report on the progress made in achieving these goals. For this first report, GAO describes the departments' progress to date in sharing electronic health information, developing electronic health records that comply with federal standards, and setting up the joint interagency program office. To do so, GAO reviewed its past work, analyzed agency documentation, and conducted interviews with agency officials.
What GAO Found
DOD and VA are sharing some, but not all, electronic health information at different levels of interoperability. Specifically, pharmacy and drug allergy data on about 18,300 patients who receive care from both departments are exchanged at the highest level of interoperability--that is, in computable form; at this level, the data are in a standardized format that a computer application can act on (for example, to provide alerts to clinicians of drug allergies). In other cases, data can be viewed only--a lower level of interoperability that still provides clinicians with important information. However, not all electronic health information is yet shared, and information is still captured on paper at many DOD medical facilities. According to the departments, a DOD/VA Information Interoperability Plan (targeted for approval in August 2008) is to address these and other issues and define tasks required to guide the development and implementation of an interoperable electronic health record capability. If properly developed and implemented, the plan could help the departments achieve the goal of seamless sharing of health information. DOD and VA have agreed upon numerous common standards that allow them to share health data, which include standards that are part of current and emerging federal interoperability specifications. This collaboration provided the essential foundation for the departments to begin sharing computable health data. The departments are currently participating in recent initiatives led by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (within the Department of Health and Human Services) that are aimed at promoting the adoption of federal standards and broader use of electronic health records. These initiatives include identifying relevant existing standards, identifying and addressing overlaps and gaps in the standards, and developing interoperability specifications and certification criteria based on these standards. The involvement of the departments in these activities is an important mechanism for aligning their electronic health records with emerging federal standards. In establishing the joint interagency program office, Congress directed the departments to develop an implementation plan for setting up the office and carrying out related activities (such as validating and establishing requirements for interoperable health capabilities). The departments' effort to set up the program office is still in its early stages. Leadership positions in the office are not yet permanently filled, staffing is not complete, and facilities to house the office have not been designated. Further, the implementation plan is currently in draft, and although it includes schedules and milestones, dates for several activities have not yet been determined (such as implementing a capability to share immunization records), even though all capabilities are to be achieved by September 2009. Without a fully established program office and a finalized implementation plan with set milestones, the departments may be challenged in meeting the required date for achieving interoperable electronic health records and capabilities. |
gao_GAO-10-62 | gao_GAO-10-62_0 | Under FECA, the federal workers’ compensation program, benefits may be provided to the survivors of federal civilian employees who die as a result of work-related injuries and illnesses. For Most Recent Survivors, DIC Replaced Between 35 and 55 Percent of the VA Disability Compensation or Military Pay Previously Paid to the Veteran or Servicemember
For more than half the survivors who began collecting benefits in fiscal years 2004-2008, DIC replaced between 35 and 55 percent of the VA disability compensation or military pay previously paid to the veteran or servicemember. Most of the DIC recipients in this group survived a totally disabled veteran or a low- to mid-grade enlisted servicemember, such as an Army sergeant. veteran would have received $2,823 per month in VA compensation in 20 and, after his death, the surviving spouse would have received $1,154 month—the basic flat-rate DIC payment—for a replacement rate of 41 percent. This prior income can include VA disability compensation and military pay, which cease upon the death of the veteran or servicemember. On the low end of the replacement scale, for about 1 of 10 survivors DIC replaced less than 35 percent of the veteran’s prior disability compensation or the servicemembers’ military pay. Many were survivors of veterans who received relatively low VA compensation prior to their death because they were considered partially disabled. For example, a veteran with a spouse and a 30 percent rated disability received $421 per month in VA disability compensation in 2009. 4). DIC Benefits Are Generally Higher Than Survivor Benefits Paid by Federal Retirement Programs, but Are Usually Lower Than Federal Workers’ Compensation Survivor Benefits
The amount paid by DIC to survivors of disabled veterans and servicemembers is generally higher than the amount paid by CSRS and FERS retirement programs to survivors of comparably paid federal employees. Such comparisons are difficult, however, because DIC provides a flat rate payment while CSRS and FERS survivor payments are determined by the salary and years of employment of the deceased employee. As a result, there is a range of payment amounts for survivors of federal employees. When we looked at veterans/servicemembers and federal employees with comparable pay and experience, we found that for most survivors, DIC provides higher benefits than the federal retirement programs because it gives more money to survivors of lower-paid individuals. 7.) Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review focused on (1) the extent to which Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) replaces Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability compensation or active duty military pay lost due to the death of a veteran or servicemember, and (2) how DIC benefits compare to benefits for survivors of civilian federal employees. Analysis of VA Data on DIC Recipients
We obtained and analyzed data from VA’s Benefits Delivery Network (BDN) data system on all survivors who received DIC payments in September 2008, the last month of fiscal year 2008. These data included information on individual DIC recipients, such as the recipient’s age and the level of DIC payments the recipient received. To determine the extent to which DIC replaces military pay lost due to the death of a servicemember on active duty, we estimated the pay of the servicemember prior to death. Similarly, we calculated survivor benefits for servicemembers who died on active duty and for federal employees with comparable years of service and pay at the time of death. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) program provides monthly payments to the survivors of those who died as a result of a service-connected disability or while on active duty in the military. In fiscal year 2008, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) paid over $4.7 billion to about 354,000 survivors, replacing a portion of income lost with the death of the veteran or servicemember. The Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act of 2008 directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study the DIC program and the levels of payments it provides. This report addresses (1) the extent to which DIC replaces VA disability compensation or active duty military pay lost due to the death of a veteran or servicemember, and (2) how DIC benefits compare to benefits for survivors of civilian federal employees. GAO obtained and analyzed data on DIC payments, VA disability compensation, and military pay rates. GAO also obtained information on survivor benefits under federal employee retirement and workers' compensation programs. GAO did not include in its analysis other sources of income survivors may receive, such as Social Security, private pensions, and life insurance. Lastly, GAO interviewed officials from VA and groups representing veterans, servicemembers, and their survivors.
What GAO Found
For more than half of survivors who recently began collecting DIC, the benefit replaced between 35 and 55 percent of the VA disability compensation or estimated military pay lost due to the death of a veteran or servicemember. Because DIC provides generally flat payments, the rate at which it replaced lost income varied according to the amount of prior income, such as VA disability compensation. The most common survivor was an older female spouse of a totally disabled veteran who, in 2009, received $1,154 per month--the base DIC payment--compared with $2,823 per month paid in VA disability compensation to the disabled veteran prior to death. In these cases, DIC replaced 41 percent of prior compensation. There were, however, DIC recipients at the far ends of the scale. For example, for surviving spouses of mid-ranked officers who died on active duty, the flat rate DIC payment represented 19 percent of prior military pay; for survivors of partially disabled veterans who had received relatively low VA disability compensation, the flat rate DIC payment sometimes represented more than 100 percent of prior compensation. When comparing survivor benefits for DIC with those for comparably paid civilian federal employees, DIC benefits are generally higher than survivor benefits paid by federal retirement programs, but lower than those paid by federal workers' compensation. The DIC program's flat payment structure differs from federal programs in which payment amounts are based on employee salaries and years of employment. We found that for most survivors, DIC provides higher benefits than the federal retirement programs because it gives more money to survivors of lower paid individuals, who comprise the majority of DIC recipients. In contrast, DIC payments are almost always less than workers' compensation payments for survivors of federal employees who die as a result of job-related injuries. For comparable employees, the salary levels of nearly all servicemembers in 2009 would result in higher survivor payments under workers' compensation than under the DIC program. |
gao_GAO-13-229 | gao_GAO-13-229_0 | Estimate of National Medicaid Improper Payments Did Not Consider Revised Individual State Error Rates
CMS’s PERM methodology for reporting a national Medicaid program improper payment estimate is statistically sound and meets OMB requirements. Procedures Used in National Error Rate Calculation Did Not Consider Updates to State- Level Rates
Although the CMS PERM methodology is statistically sound, CMS did not have procedures for considering the impact of any revisions to state-level error rates in calculating the national error rate after the cutoff date for each of the 3 measurement years. OMB has identified as a best practice that agencies should establish a policy for handling unscheduled corrections to data, such as including threshold criteria identifying conditions under which data will be corrected and redisseminated. Because the national error rate is based on 3 years of data and corrections to the 2 years of older data after the cutoff date are not officially recognized by CMS, the entire 3-year cycle could be affected. Deficiencies in CMS’s Guidance and Monitoring Impair Efficient and Effective Medicaid Program Improper Payments Reductions
CMS and state agencies developed CAPs that were generally responsive to identified payment errors. Nonpayment Errors Not Addressed in All State CAPs
State CAPs did not always address errors identified during PERM reviews that did not have a payment error amount associated with them. Therefore, it did not result in a dollar difference but could have under other circumstances. Although these nonpayment errors did not result in improper payment amounts, they represent internal control deficiencies that could have prevented eligible beneficiaries from receiving Medicaid benefits or may result in improper payments in future years if not addressed. Clear, consistent written guidance and instructions on all required elements for CAPs would assist the states in submitting complete CAPs, and increase the likelihood that CMS has the information necessary for analyzing the progress and effectiveness of state CAPs. Oversight through continuous monitoring helps ensure that actions are taken to effectively work toward reducing improper payments. Given the importance of providing HHS management, OMB, and the Congress with accurate information on the extent of improper payments in federal programs, it is imperative that CMS ensure that its reported estimates of Medicaid improper payments are reliable. Further, ensuring that states have clear written guidance for developing corrective action plans is key to CMS’s ability to oversee states’ corrective action processes. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to ensure the accuracy of reported improper payment estimates for the Medicaid program, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the CMS Administrator to take the following action:
Update PERM Medicaid improper payment reporting procedures to provide for considering any corrections to state-level improper payment error data subsequent to the cutoff date that would have a significant impact on any of the 3 years used to develop the rolling average for the reported national Medicaid improper payment estimate. To help ensure that corrective action strategies effectively address identified types of improper payments and reduce Medicaid improper payments in a cost-effective manner, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the CMS Administrator to take the following three actions:
Revise the PERM Manual to provide that states (1) analyze all deficiencies, negative case errors, technical errors, and minimal dollar errors identified in PERM reviews to determine if any corrective actions, if cost effective, are needed to prevent such errors in the future and (2) document the results of their analysis. Finalize draft policies and procedures to clarify specific CMS officials’ roles and responsibilities for monitoring states’ corrective actions to ensure, at a minimum, that (1) the CAPs contain all of the required elements and completely address errors identified in the PERM reviews and (2) states are making progress on implementing corrective actions. HHS cited a number of actions already taken and other initiatives planned or under way related to our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine the extent to which (1) the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) methodology for estimating Medicaid improper payments follows Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and produces reasonable national and state-level estimates and (2) corrective action plans (CAP) have been developed to reduce Medicaid payment error rates and whether these plans addressed the types of payment errors identified. To further determine the extent to which CMS’s methodology for estimating Medicaid improper payments follows OMB guidance and produces reasonable national and state-level estimates, we compared the following components of CMS’s methodology for estimating the fiscal year 2011 payment error rate with related OMB guidance: (1) sampling methods, including the sample size, sample selection, sample representation, and precision of the estimates, and (2) statistical methods used to estimate the error rates and precision. Appendix III: State Error Rates for the Department of Health and Human Services’ Fiscal Year 2011 Reporting of Medicaid Improper Payments
According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), states’ Medicaid improper payment error rates identified through the Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) program may vary because of multiple factors related to differences in how states implement and administer their programs and should be considered in the context of these differences and operational realities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid has the second-highest estimated improper payments of any federal program that reported such data for fiscal year 2011. Also, the Congress has raised questions about reporting and corrective actions related to the Medicaid program's improper payments. The objectives of this report were to determine the extent to which (1) CMS's methodology for estimating Medicaid improper payments follows OMB guidance and produces reasonable national and state-level estimates and (2) corrective action plans have been developed to reduce Medicaid payment error rates and whether these plans address the types of payment errors identified. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed CMS's policies and procedures against federal guidance and standards for estimating improper payments and developing related corrective actions to address errors. GAO also reviewed the results of all state-level reviews and conducted site visits at selected states that either received relatively large amounts of Medicaid payments or had varying rates of estimated improper payments, including states with possible best practices. GAO also met with cognizant CMS officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) methodology for estimating a national improper payment rate for the Medicaid program is statistically sound. However, CMS's procedures did not provide for updating state data used in its methodology to recognize significant corrections or adjustments after the cutoff date. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires that federal agencies establish a statistically valid methodology for estimating the annual amount of improper payments in programs and activities susceptible to significant improper payments. CMS developed the Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) program in order to comply with improper payment estimation and reporting requirements for the Medicaid program. Under the PERM methodology, CMS places states in one of three cycles, and each year one of the cycles reports new state-level data based on the previous year's samples. CMS then calculates the national Medicaid program improper payment estimate using these new data for one-third of the states and older data for the other two-thirds of the states. CMS's estimated national improper payment error rate for fiscal year 2011 for the Medicaid program was 8.1 percent, or $21.9 billion. However, CMS's procedures did not provide for considering revisions to state-level Medicaid program error rates used in the CMS methodology for calculating its national Medicaid program error rate. Because corrections to the 2 years of older data after the cutoff date are not officially recognized by CMS, the entire 3-year cycle could be affected. OMB has identified as a best practice that agencies should establish a policy for handling unscheduled corrections to data. Until CMS establishes procedures for considering changes to initially reported state-level error rates that would be significant to the national error rate, CMS is impaired in its ability to ensure that its reported estimate of the extent of national Medicaid improper payments is reliable.
CMS and state agencies developed corrective action plans (CAP) related to identified PERM payment errors. However, GAO identified the following areas where improvements were needed in CMS's written guidance to states on CAPs to ensure efficient and effective actions to reduce improper payments.
CMS's PERM Manual did not clearly identify the circumstances under which states should consider, and if cost effective include, nonpayment errors (such as certain coding errors that could have but did not result in a payment error) and minimal dollar errors in their CAPs.
The PERM Manual and the associated website did not provide complete and consistent information on the required elements to include in a state CAP.
CMS guidance did not clearly delineate CMS officials' roles and responsibilities for conducting oversight of (1) state CAP submissions to ensure that they contained all of the required elements and adequately addressed errors identified in the PERM reviews and (2) states' progress in implementing CAP corrective actions.
Although the nonpayment errors identified in PERM reviews did not result in improper payments, the underlying issues may result in improper payments in future years if not addressed. Also, complete information in state CAPs is necessary for CMS to analyze the progress and effectiveness of the CAPs. Further, clear accountability for continuous monitoring helps ensure that actions are taken to effectively reduce Medicaid improper payments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations to help improve CMS's reporting of estimated Medicaid improper payments and its related corrective action process. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with GAO's recommendations and cited a number of actions under way and planned. |
gao_GAO-14-54 | gao_GAO-14-54_0 | Medical directors use existing VA processes, including the credentialing and privileging process, to monitor contract providers. Reviewed Contracts Included Performance Requirements, but Lacked Complete Detail Needed to Hold Contractors Accountable in Some Cases
We found that all 12 contracts we reviewed from the four VAMCs we visited contained performance requirements consistent with VA acquisition policy. For this category, the Seattle VAMC cardiothoracic contract had detailed performance requirements, but the Minneapolis VAMC cardiothoracic contract did not contain a statement describing the provider’s responsibilities for the reporting of and response to adverse events and patient complaints, a component we assessed within the clinical practice standards category.In addition, the Nashville VAMC specialty care contract for the services of a psychiatrist had limited detail because it did not contain requirements for the clinical contractor’s privileges to be renewed at the beginning of each new contract term, and received a partial rating in the medical record documentation category because the contract did not contain performance requirements for the timely entry of information into VA’s electronic medical record. Type of provider or care. Business processes. Absent available tools, such as standard templates for common types of contracts—including those for CBOCs, specialty care, and temporary clinical providers—VA cannot reasonably ensure that critical requirements for contract providers’ performance are consistently included in VA clinical contracts and are standardized across VAMCs. CORs Reported that Heavy Workloads and Inadequate Training Make It Difficult to Effectively Monitor Contract Providers’ Performance
During our review of 12 clinical contracts at four VAMCs, CORs reported two challenges that may compromise VA’s monitoring of contractors’ performance—the heavy workload associated with the COR position and the lack of adequate training for CORs. Most CORs at the four VAMCs we visited reported that they had other primary duties—including managing staff—that required them to approach their COR responsibilities as a collateral duty. The majority of these CORs said that one of their greatest challenges is not having adequate time to fulfill their COR duties and responsibilities and that the demands of their primary positions prevented them from fully monitoring clinical contractors’ performance. We found that VA’s current guidance related to COR responsibilities does not include any information on how VAMCs are to determine the feasibility of whether a COR’s workload—including both COR and primary position responsibilities—will allow them to carry out their tasks as CORs for monitoring contract provider performance. Included little information on monitoring responsibilities. VA officials told us that, while the Procurement Operations Office sets a goal to review COR files from two network contracting offices each month, since implementing the program in March 2013 these reviews have been completed in only four network contracting offices and none of these four offices have received feedback on the outcomes of these reviews as of August 2013. Without a robust monitoring system in place, VA cannot reasonably assure that all CORs in all VAMCs are maintaining the proper records of their efforts to monitor the activities of clinical contractors caring for veterans. While VA has undertaken efforts to provide supplemental training to CORs on clinical contracts, this additional training fails to address how CORs should monitor clinical contracts and instead focuses on the development of contracts. Finally, VA Central Office currently provides limited oversight of clinical contract monitoring activities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the monitoring and oversight of clinical contracts, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following five actions:
Develop and disseminate tools, such as standard templates, for the most common types of clinical contracts in VA’s health care system. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This appendix describes the information and methods we used to examine: (1) the extent to which the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) establishes complete performance requirements for clinical contractors; (2) the extent to which VA clinical contracts include clear and measurable performance standards for assessing whether or not clinical contractors met the acceptable quality levels defined in selected contracts; (3) challenges VA staff encounter in monitoring clinical contractors’ performance; and (4) the extent to which VA Central Office provides oversight of VA staff responsible for monitoring clinical contracts. To identify VAMCs for our site visits, we:
Selected VAMCs that were located in different Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) to ensure that our selected VAMCs varied in their geographic locations and reported to different VISN management officials;
Ensured that our selected VAMCs had a variety of active clinical contracts in place to allow for a variety of COR perspectives on clinical contractor monitoring; and
Selected at least one VAMC from each of VA’s three Service Area Offices (SAO)—the regional contract management entities created to oversee the activities of the 21 network contracting offices and the contracting officers (CO) and supervisors that work within them. We also verified these categories with officials from the Medical Sharing Office, Procurement Operations Office, and Procurement Audit Office to ensure they were an accurate reflection of performance requirements that should be included in VA clinical contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA must frequently contract with non-VA health care providers so that clinical providers are available to meet veterans' health care needs. While recent studies have disclosed problems with VA's development of contracts for clinical services, there has been little scrutiny of how VA monitors and evaluates the care contract providers give to veterans.
GAO was asked to review VA's efforts to monitor clinical contractors working in VA facilities. This report examines the extent to which VA establishes complete performance requirements for contract providers, challenges VA staff encounter in monitoring contract providers' performance, and the extent to which VA oversees VAMC staff responsible for monitoring contract providers.
GAO reviewed VA acquisition regulations and other guidance. In addition, GAO visited four VAMCs that varied in geographic location and selected a nongeneralizable sample of three types of clinical contracts from each of the four VAMCs to review. GAO discussed how VAMC and VISN staff monitor and oversee these contracts and reviewed contract monitoring documentation.
What GAO Found
All 12 contracts GAO reviewed from the four Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) medical centers (VAMC) visited contained performance requirements consistent with VA acquisition policy. However, the performance requirements lacked detail in six categories: type of provider or care; credentialing and privileging; clinical practice standards; medical record documentation; business processes; and access to care. GAO identified these categories from reviews of VA acquisition regulations, VA policies, and hospital accreditation standards; and VA officials verified that these six categories were an accurate reflection of performance requirements that should be in VA clinical contracts. GAO found, for example, one VAMC cardiothoracic contract that had detailed performance requirements while another VAMC's cardiothoracic contract did not contain a statement describing the contract provider's responsibilities for reporting and responding to adverse events and patient complaints. GAO also found that contracting officials lack tools, such as standard templates, that provide examples of the performance requirements that should be included in common types of clinical contracts. Such tools would help ensure consistency in requirements across contracts.
Contracting officer's representatives (COR) cited two main challenges in monitoring contract providers' performance--too little time to monitor clinical contractors' performance effectively and inadequate training. Most of the 40 CORs at the four VAMCs in GAO's review said that their clinical contract monitoring duties were a collateral duty and that they had other primary responsibilities, such as serving as a business manager or administrative officer for a specialty clinic within the VAMC. GAO found that, on average, each of these 40 CORs spent about 25 percent of their time monitoring an average of 12 contracts. CORs said the demands of their primary positions at times prevented them from fully monitoring contract providers' performance. Further, VA's current guidance related to COR responsibilities does not include any information on how VAMCs are to determine the feasibility of whether a COR's workload--including both COR and primary position responsibilities--will allow them to carry out their tasks as CORs for monitoring contract provider performance. GAO also found that current VA COR training programs focus on contracts that buy goods, not clinical services, and include little information on monitoring responsibilities. CORs questioned the usefulness of the COR training VA uses to prepare them for monitoring clinical contracts.
VA Central Office conducts limited oversight of COR and contract monitoring activities. VA Central Office reviews of COR clinical contractor monitoring activities are limited to a small number of annual file reviews that focus on verifying the presence of required documentation only and do not assess the quality of CORs' monitoring activities. Since implementing the program in March 2013 these reviews have been conducted in 4 of 21 network contracting offices and as of August 2013 none of the 4 offices has received feedback on these reviews. Without a robust monitoring system, VA cannot ensure that all CORs in its VAMCs are properly monitoring, evaluating, and documenting the performance of contract providers caring for veterans.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA develop and disseminate standard templates that provide examples of performance requirements for clinical contracts, revise guidance for CORs to include workload information, modify COR training, and improve the monitoring and oversight of clinical contracts. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-694 | gao_GAO-03-694_0 | Enhance the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet U.S. defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological superiority at lower costs. These decisions are made before weapons or technologies are approved for transfer. It also aims to assess how U.S. technological advantage can be maintained. Process to Determine the Releasability of Advanced Weapons and Technologies Is Inherently Complex
The process governing the release of advanced weapons and technologies is inherently complex because it involves multiple, multilevel reviews by various U.S. government entities and individuals with varying perspectives. Multiple Reviews Are Conducted
A foreign government’s request for the transfer of an advanced weapon or technology is directed to the military department that is responsible for the particular weapon or technology. In addition to the military departments’ reviews and the NDPC exception process, special committee processes are set up to review requests for sensitive technologies that may be included in a proposed transfer. Varying Perspectives and Broad Guidance Governing Potential Transfers Add to the Complexity of the Review Process
The multilayered reviews involved in the process for determining the releasability of an advanced weapon or technology can be particularly complex because individual entities and decision makers have varying perspectives. According to NDPC members, the broad criteria allow for a certain level of flexibility that is needed in determining whether an advanced weapon should be released to a foreign country. Technological Advantage and Various Safeguards Are Considered When Determining Releasability
One criterion NDPC must consider when determining the releasability of advanced weapons and technologies is that the transfer must be consistent with U.S. military and security objectives. In addition, factors outside of U.S. control can diminish the effectiveness of certain individual safeguards. For example, the United States may stop providing spare parts to former allies, but these countries may obtain needed parts through other means, such as “cannibalizing” parts from other weapons or obtaining parts from other countries at a higher cost through the “grey market.” Some DOD officials told us that while certain individual safeguards may not be as effective as desired, they consider various safeguards for each proposed transfer to ensure technological advantage is maintained. DOD’s centralized database contains some of this information, as well as historical case data; however, it is not always complete, up-to-date, or easy to access. However, the National Disclosure Policy System that was used to make decisions during the last 4 years contained data only for decisions made during that time period. However, according to some NDPC members, this information is used by the State Department primarily for nonproliferation purposes and is not provided to NDPC. For example, NDPC officials said that in a recent instance an intelligence agency discovered that a country requesting the release of an advanced weapon system did not have the security capabilities to protect U.S. classified military information, but did not provide this information to NDPC during the review process. Recommendations for Executive Actions
To ensure that NDPC members have complete and accurate information in a centralized database that facilitates coordination and decision making on the potential release of advanced weapons and technologies, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the NDPC Executive Secretariat to evaluate the accuracy and effectiveness of the upgraded National determine with NDPC members the additional capabilities, such as inclusion of CIA risk assessments, needed for the upgraded National Disclosure Policy System, and work with the DOD Policy Automation Directorate to address user comments and technical problems related to the upgraded system as they arise. To ensure that useful and timely information is available for making informed release decisions, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the NDPC Executive Secretariat to work with CIA to prioritize risk assessments that need to be updated, establish a schedule for performing these assessments, and systematically distribute the assessments to NDPC members through the automated system or other means; develop a plan to be used as a business case for determining the appropriate level of resources required to conduct needed security surveys or if a survey cannot be conducted, ensure that an alternative analysis of or information on the foreign government’s security capability is made available to NDPC members; and identify what additional information, such as end-use monitoring reports, would be useful to NDPC members, and establish a mechanism for requesting this information from appropriate sources, and systematically distribute it to NDPC members. To determine if U.S. technological advantage is considered and protected in the review process, we reviewed selected weapons transfers records, including pertinent initial country requests; military department, Joint Staff, and other National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) members’ input and positions on the requests; and limitations and conditions included in the final committee positions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The heightened visibility of advanced U.S. weapons in military conflicts has prompted foreign countries to seek to purchase such weaponry. In 2001, transfers of U.S. weapons and technologies to foreign governments totaled over $12 billion. The potential loss of U.S. technological advantage has been raised as an issue in recently approved transfers of advanced military weapons and technologies--such as military aircraft that were reported in the media to contain superior radar and avionics than those in the Department of Defense's (DOD) inventory. GAO looked at how releasability of advanced weapons is determined, how U.S. technological advantage is considered and protected, and what information is needed to make informed decisions on the potential release of advanced weapons.
What GAO Found
Before transfers are approved, the U.S. government must first determine if classified weapons or technologies are releasable to the requesting country according to the National Disclosure Policy (NDP). The process for determining releasability is complex. A foreign government's request is first reviewed by the military department that owns the requested weapon or technology. In cases where the request exceeds NDP's approved classification level, the military department forwards the request to the National Disclosure Policy Committee for its review. For some sensitive technologies, such as stealth, the case is also forwarded to a special committee for review. The process requires coordination among different U.S. government entities--including DOD, the military departments, the State Department, and the intelligence community--which have varying perspectives. Adding to this complexity, determinations of releasability are governed by broad guidance, which allows latitude in interpreting the unique circumstances of each proposed transfer. In determining the releasability of advanced weapons and technologies, a number of factors are considered, including how U.S. technological advantage would be affected. To protect U.S. technological advantage, safeguards--such as lowering the capability of a transferred weapon and withholding sensitive information on how the system operates--are considered for proposed transfers. However, the effectiveness of some individual safeguards may be limited. For example, one safeguard--the ability of the United States to deny spare parts to former allies--may not be effective if these countries are able to obtain spare parts through other means. While certain individual safeguards may not be as effective as desired, DOD officials said they consider various safeguards to ensure technological advantage is maintained. Information needed to assess releasability is not always complete, up-to-date, or available. For example, DOD's centralized National Disclosure Policy System database that was used to make decisions during the last 4 years only contained information for that time period. DOD has recently deployed an upgrade to the system, but has not yet determined its effectiveness. Other information, such as Central Intelligence Agency risk assessments--which provide counterintelligence information and risks involved in releasing advanced weapons to a foreign country--are often outdated or nonexistent. Finally, some intelligence information that could have a direct bearing on whether an advanced weapon or technology should be released is prepared for other purposes and is not provided to decision makers involved in releasability determinations. |
gao_GAO-03-594T | gao_GAO-03-594T_0 | The Coast Guard’s installations range from small boat stations providing search and rescue and other services to marine safety offices that coordinate security and other activities in the nation’s largest ports. The Coast Guard’s Emphasis on Security Continues to Affect Its Levels of Effort in Some Missions
The emphasis the Coast Guard placed on security after September 11th has had varying effects on its level of effort among all of its missions, as measured by the extent to which multiple-mission resources (cutters, other boats, and aircraft) are used for a particular mission. The most current available data show that some security-related missions, such as migrant interdiction and coastal security, have grown significantly since September 11th. Other missions, such as search and rescue and aids to navigation remained at essentially the same levels as they were before September 11th. However, the level of effort for other missions, most notably the interdiction of illegal drugs and fisheries enforcement, is substantially below pre-September 11th levels. Recently, the Coast Guard Commandant stated that the Coast Guard intends to return the level of resources directed to law enforcement missions (drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and fisheries enforcement) to 93 percent of pre-September 11th levels (using a baseline of the 8 quarters prior to September 11, 2001) by the end of 2003 and 95 percent by the end of 2004. Significant Challenges Raise Concerns about Coast Guard’s Ability to Accomplish Its Diverse Missions
The Coast Guard faces fundamental challenges in balancing resource use among its missions and accomplishing everything that has come to be expected of it. Some New Homeland Security Duties Are Not Fully Factored into the Coast Guard’s Distribution of Resources
The Coast Guard has also been tasked with a myriad of new homeland security requirements, but funding to implement them is not provided in either the enacted fiscal year 2003 budget or the fiscal year 2004 budget request. Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), signed into law in November 2002, the Coast Guard must accomplish a number of security- related tasks within a matter of months and sustain them over the long term. Transition to Homeland Security Poses Additional Challenges
The creation of DHS is one of the largest, most complex restructurings ever undertaken, and the Coast Guard, as one of many agencies joining the department, faces numerous challenges, including organizational, human capital, acquisition, process and technology issues. These studies have produced a number of recommendations, such as shifting some responsibilities to other agencies. A comprehensive blueprint or strategy is needed for setting and assessing levels of effort and mission performance. One important effort that has received relatively little attention, while the Coast Guard has understandably put its homeland security responsibilities in place, is the development of a plan that proactively addresses how the Coast Guard should manage its various missions in light of its new operating reality. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard is one of 22 agencies being placed in the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). With its key roles in the nation's ports, waterways, and coastlines, the Coast Guard is an important part of enhanced homeland security efforts. But it also has important nonsecurity missions, such as search and rescue, fisheries and environmental protection, and drug and migrant interdiction. GAO has conducted a number of reviews of the Coast Guard's missions and was asked to testify about the Coast Guard's most recent level of effort for its various missions and the major operational and organizational challenges facing the agency during its transition into the newly created DHS.
What GAO Found
Data on the most recent levels of effort for the Coast Guard's various missions show clearly the dramatic shifts that have occurred among its missions since the September 11, 2001, attacks. Predictably, levels of effort related to homeland security remain at much higher levels than before September 11th. Other missions, such as search and rescue, have remained at essentially the same levels. In contrast, several other missions--most notably fisheries enforcement and drug interdiction--dropped sharply after September 11th and remain substantially below historical levels. Continued homeland security and military demands make it unlikely that the agency, in the short run, can increase efforts in the missions that have declined. Further, the fiscal year 2004 budget request contains little that would substantially alter the existing levels of effort among missions. The Coast Guard faces fundamental and daunting challenges during its transition to the new department. Delays in the planned modernization of cutters and other equipment, responsibility for new security-related tasks as directed under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), and mandatory responses to unexpected events, such as terrorist attacks or extended terror alerts, will have an impact on the Coast Guard's ability to meet its new security-related responsibilities while rebuilding its capacity in other missions. Also, as one of the agencies being merged into the new department, the Coast Guard must deal with a myriad of organizational, human capital, acquisition, and technology issues. The enormity of these challenges requires the development of a comprehensive blueprint or strategy that addresses how the Coast Guard should balance and monitor resource use among its various missions in light of its new operating reality. |
gao_GAO-16-500 | gao_GAO-16-500_0 | The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) is responsible for overseeing drugs and certain therapeutic biologics. Nonetheless, FDA officials acknowledged the growing need for strategic planning across the medical product centers to improve center collaboration and address emerging issues, but said that it may not require a separate strategic plan. For example, officials said that collaboration could help the centers develop more effective clinical trials, improve their decision-making, and improve the quality of evidence and clarity of guidance. FDA officials said that they did not structure the SIMP as a strategic plan, because they thought it would be duplicative of other FDA strategic plans; however, we found that none of these other plans comprehensively describes FDA’s long-term plan for addressing key issues amongst the centers, as summarized below:
FDA has an overarching strategic priorities document that includes strategic goals and objectives for medical product activities. This document describes a broad level of activities, but does not specifically discuss strategies across the centers. The absence of a documented long-term plan for medical product oversight may hinder FDA’s efforts to address emerging issues that require center collaboration, such as access to quality data and developing requirements for combination products. Also, the absence of a documented strategy is inconsistent with leading practices for strategic planning based on prior GAO work. Documenting a strategic plan for medical products—whether it occurs in a freestanding document or as part of existing documents the centers are already using—would also enable FDA to oversee its activities in a consistent and transparent manner, help the agency communicate its priorities to key stakeholders, and help align its activities to support mission-related outcomes. FDA had fully implemented about a third of the efficiency initiatives and most of the workforce development initiatives prior to the SIMP’s issuance in 2013. FDA’s Strategic Integrated Management Plan Included User Fee and Center Initiatives to Improve Efficiency, About a Third of Which Were Implemented Prior to the Plan’s Issuance
We found that FDA grouped the SIMP’s 30 efficiency initiatives into three themes: (1) business modernization, (2) process improvement, and (3) smarter regulation. We found that FDA fully implemented about a third of the 30 efficiency initiatives within the 12 to 18 months prior to the SIMP’s issuance in July 2013, and implemented another half of the initiatives since then. As of March 2016, the remaining initiatives had yet to be fully implemented, the majority of which are related to developing data standards for electronic submissions or efforts to move to an electronic review process. FDA Included Different Types of Workforce Development Initiatives for Each Center, and Most Initiatives Were Implemented Prior to the Strategic Integrated Management Plan’s Issuance
We found that FDA included 19 workforce development initiatives in the SIMP—11 training initiatives, 7 recruitment initiatives, and 1 retention initiative. By March 2016, FDA implemented 2 additional workforce development initiatives, bringing the total to 17 initiatives. For the SIMP’s workforce development initiatives, FDA identified mechanisms to assess most of the 19 initiatives, and each center’s approach to assess training is different. FDA Identified Formal and Informal Mechanisms to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Just Over Half of Its Efficiency Initiatives
FDA stated that the agency had assessed or has plans to assess just over half of the 30 efficiency initiatives for effectiveness, although these plans are generally not described in the SIMP. For five initiatives, FDA officials identified formal measures of effectiveness that were not described in the SIMP. The officials explained that these initiatives are assessed through periodic user fee program reports or center strategic goals. FDA officials told us that, for the remaining 13 effectiveness initiatives in the SIMP, they are either exploring effectiveness measures or do not have plans to measure effectiveness. FDA Identified Mechanisms to Assess Most of the Workforce Development Initiatives, including Centers’ Different Approaches to Assess Training
FDA identified mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of 12 of the 19 workforce development initiatives. FDA officials described the mechanisms in place to assess the effectiveness of 4 of the 7 recruitment initiatives described in the SIMP. However, FDA has faced longstanding challenges in carrying out the many responsibilities necessary for the oversight of medical products. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that FDA can effectively coordinate and integrate its medical product centers’ programs and emerging issues, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Commissioner of FDA to engage in a strategic planning process to identify challenges that cut across the medical product centers and document how it will achieve measurable goals and objectives in these areas. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Appendix III: Size and Characteristics of FDA and Medical Product Center Workforce, Fiscal Years 2012 to 2015
We analyzed Food and Drug Administration (FDA) data on the agency’s workforce population and attrition for fiscal years 2012 to 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
FDA—an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—has faced challenges in carrying out its responsibilities to ensure the safety and efficacy of medical products sold in the United States. In 2012, Congress required FDA to develop a SIMP for the three centers overseeing medical products that identifies initiatives for improving efficiency, initiatives for workforce development, and measures for assessing the progress of these initiatives. FDA issued the SIMP in July 2013.
GAO was asked to examine FDA's implementation of the SIMP. In this report, GAO (1) evaluates the extent to which the SIMP serves as a strategic planning document, (2) describes the types of plan initiatives, and (3) describes the mechanisms FDA has to evaluate the effectiveness of its plan initiatives. GAO analyzed FDA documents and spoke to FDA officials to assess the SIMP's development and use, along with the implementation status and evaluation mechanisms used for the SIMP's initiatives. GAO also assessed FDA's plan against leading practices for strategic planning. Finally, GAO analyzed FDA workforce data on hiring and attrition for fiscal years 2012 to 2015.
What GAO Found
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) developed a strategic integrated management plan (SIMP) for its three centers that oversee medical products (biologics, drugs, and medical devices); however, GAO found that the plan does not incorporate leading practices for strategic planning or document a comprehensive strategy for the centers. FDA officials explained that circumstances at the time of the SIMP's development, including leadership gaps, limited FDA's ability to structure the plan into an effective strategic planning document. While officials said they use a variety of other key documents for strategic planning—such as agency-level and initiative-specific plans—these other plans also do not describe a long-term strategy for addressing key issues that cut across medical product centers. For example, these other FDA documents do not describe the agency's plans for collaboration between the centers that could benefit certain initiatives, improve their decision-making, and improve the quality of evidence and clarity of guidance. FDA officials acknowledged the growing need for strategic planning across the medical product centers to improve center collaboration and address emerging issues. The absence of a comprehensive long-term plan for medical product oversight may hinder FDA's efforts to address emerging issues that require center collaboration, such as access to quality data. Fully documenting such a strategy, either in a separate plan or through existing documents, would help the agency identify measurable goals and objectives for the centers that align with its mission and help communicate its priorities to key stakeholders.
In the SIMP, FDA compiled mostly preexisting initiatives to improve the efficiency of each center's activities and develop its workforce. GAO found that for improving efficiency, FDA selected 30 initiatives that it grouped into three different themes—smarter regulation, process improvement, and business modernization. FDA had fully implemented a third of the initiatives prior to the SIMP's issuance in 2013; another half were implemented by March 2016. As of this date, the remaining initiatives had yet to be fully implemented. For workforce development, FDA included 19 recruitment, retention, and training initiatives, which generally reflected differences in center activities. FDA implemented 15 initiatives prior to the SIMP's issuance and 2 additional initiatives since then. Of the remaining initiatives, 1 was terminated and, as of March 2016, FDA was in the process of implementing the other initiative.
Although not generally reported in the SIMP, FDA officials identified mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of the majority of the initiatives included in the plan. Of the 30 efficiency initiatives, FDA officials identified 8 that have formal evaluations (such as third-party assessments) and 9 that are assessed informally (such as by gathering feedback). For the remaining 13, officials said they are either exploring effectiveness measures or have no plans to assess them because they consider it to be unnecessary or impractical. FDA identified mechanisms to assess 12 of the 19 workforce development initiatives, including through recruitment performance metrics and surveys of training participants. For 4 initiatives, the centers each use different approaches to assess training. For the remaining 3 initiatives, FDA either is developing a mechanism or described past assessment activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct FDA to engage in a strategic planning process to identify challenges that cut across the medical product centers, and document how it will achieve measurable goals and objectives in these areas. HHS agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-43 | gao_GAO-10-43_0 | TSA, Coast Guard, and the Maritime Industry Implemented a Number of Measures to Facilitate Enrollment, Activation, and Compliance but Implementation Efforts Were Affected by the Lack of Planning for Potential System Failures
TSA, the Coast Guard, and the maritime industry took several steps to meet the compliance date and address implementation related challenges in an effort to avoid negatively impacting the flow of commerce, but experienced challenges in enrolling transportation workers and activating their TWIC cards. Although no major disruptions to port facilities or commerce occurred, TSA data shows that some workers experienced delays in receiving TWICs. Based on lessons learned from its early experiences with enrollment and activation, TSA and its contractor took steps to prepare for a surge in TWIC enrollments and activations as local compliance dates approached. As a result of these efforts, TSA reported enrolling 1,121,461 workers in the TWIC program, or over 93 percent of the estimated 1.2 million users, by the April 15, 2009, deadline. Finally, a power failure on October 21, 2008, occurred at the TWIC data center at Annapolis Junction, Maryland—a government facility that processes TWIC data. As a result of this failure, (1) credential activations were halted until late November 2008 and several TWIC compliance dates originally scheduled for October 31, 2008 were postponed; and (2) the failure affected TSA’s ability to reset the PINs (i.e., provide users with new PINs) on 410,000 TWIC cards issued prior to the power failure. If all 410,000 affected TWIC cards need to be replaced, it could cost the government and industry up to approximately $26 million. While preparing to initiate the development of a disaster recovery plan in the next year and a system to support disaster recovery by 2012 is a positive step, until such plans and system(s) are put in place, TWIC systems remain vulnerable to similar disasters. Challenges in Program Scheduling and Evaluation May Hinder the TWIC Reader Pilot’s Usefulness
Although TSA has made significant progress in incorporating best practices into TWIC’s schedule for implementing the reader pilot program, weaknesses continue that limit TSA’s ability to use the schedule as a management tool to guide the pilot and accurately identify the pilot’s completion date. DHS Does Not Hav Sound Evaluation Approach to Ensure Information Collected to the Inform Congress and Card Reader Rule Is Complete, Accurat Representative of Deployment Conditions
Shortfalls in TWIC pilot planning have presented a challenge for TS Coast Guard in ensuring that the pilot is broadly representative of deployment conditions, and will yield the information needed to inform Congress and a card reader rule aimed at defining how TWICs will be used with biometric card readers. This is in part because an evaluation plan th at fully identifies the scope of the pilot and the methodology for collecting and analyzing the information resulting from the pilot has not been developed. Performance standards. However, TSA and Coast Guard officials have not identified how information collected outside of the pilot is to be used as part of the evaluation methodology. TSA officials stated that they are planning to develop a disaster recovery plan in fiscal year 2010 and disaster recovery system by 2012. To help ensure that the TWIC pilot schedule can be reliably used to guide e the pilot and identify the pilot’s completion date, we recommend that th y for the Transportation Security Administration direct Assistant Secretar the TWIC program office, in concert with pilot participants to take the following action: fully incorporate best practices for program scheduling in the pilot schedule to help ensure that (1) all pilot activities are captured; (2) sufficient resources are assigned to all activities; (3) the duration of all activities are established and agreed upon by all stakeholders; (4) a schedule risk analysis is conducted to determine a level of confidence in meeting the planned completion date planned activities within scheduled deadlines; and (5) the schedule is correctly updated on a periodic basis. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This review examined the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) and Coast Guard’s overall progress in implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. and (2) What management challenges, if any, do TSA, Coast Guard, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) face in executing the TWIC pilot test for informing Congress and the card reader rule? To identify the steps taken by TSA, the Coast Guard, and the maritime industry to meet the April 15, 2009, TWIC compliance date, and address related challenges, we reviewed program documentation on the status of TWIC enrollment and activation as well as implementation efforts from both TSA and the Coast Guard. We also interviewed U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program, which is managed by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard, requires maritime workers who access secure areas of transportation facilities to obtain a biometric identification card to access these facilities. A federal regulation set a national compliance deadline of April 15, 2009. TSA is conducting a pilot program to test the use of TWICs with biometric card readers in part to inform the development of a second TWIC regulation. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to evaluate TSA's and the Coast Guard's progress and related challenges in implementing TWIC, and to evaluate the management challenges, if any, TSA, Coast Guard, and DHS face in executing the TWIC pilot test. GAO reviewed TWIC enrollment and implementation documents and conducted site visits or interviewed officials at the seven pilot program sites.
What GAO Found
TSA, Coast Guard, and the maritime industry took a number of steps to enroll 1,121,461 workers in the TWIC program, or over 93 percent of the estimated 1.2 million users, by the April 15, 2009, national compliance deadline, but experienced challenges that resulted in delays. TSA and the Coast Guard implemented a staggered compliance approach whereby each of 42 regions impacted by TWIC were required to meet TWIC compliance prior to the national compliance date. Further, based on lessons learned from its early experiences with enrollment and activation, and to prepare for an expected surge in TWIC enrollments and activations as compliance dates approached, TSA and its contractor increased the number of stations available for TWIC enrollment and activation. While 93 percent of users were enrolled in TWIC by the compliance date, TSA data shows that some workers experienced delays in receiving TWICs. Among reasons for the delays, a power failure in October 2008 occurred at the government facility that processes TWIC data. The power failure resulted in credential activations being halted until late November 2008, and the inability to set new personal identification numbers (PIN) on 410,000 TWICs issued prior to the power failure. While TSA officials stated that they are taking steps to develop a disaster recovery plan by next year and a system to support disaster recovery by 2012, until such a plan and system(s) are put in place, TWIC systems remain vulnerable to similar disasters. While the full cost of this power failure is unknown, based on TSA provided figures, it could cost the government and industry up to approximately $26 million to replace all affected TWIC cards. While TSA has made progress in incorporating management best practices to execute the TWIC pilot, TSA faces two management challenges in ensuring the successful execution of the pilot test aimed at informing Congress and the development of the second TWIC regulation. First, TSA has faced challenges in using the TWIC pilot schedule to guide the pilot and accurately identify the pilot's completion date. TSA has improved its scheduling practices in executing the pilot, but weaknesses remain, such as not capturing all pilot activities in the schedule, that may adversely impact the schedule's usefulness as a management tool and for communicating with pilot participants in the maritime industry. Second, shortfalls in TWIC pilot planning have hindered TSA and Coast Guard's efforts to ensure that the pilot is broadly representative of deployment conditions and will yield the information needed--such as information on the operational impacts of deploying biometric card readers and their costs--to accurately inform Congress and the second rule. This is in part because these agencies have not developed an evaluation plan that fully identifies the scope of the pilot and specifies how the information from the pilot will be analyzed. The current evaluation plans describe data collection methods but do not identify the evaluation criteria and methodology to be used in analyzing the pilot data once collected. A well-developed, sound evaluation plan would help TSA and the Coast Guard determine how the data are to be analyzed to measure the project's performance. |
gao_GAO-01-674T | gao_GAO-01-674T_0 | However, this same study noted that changes in family structure and welfare policies can significantly mitigate the impact of an economic downturn on caseloads. State officials told us that there is concern that accumulating unspent TANF balances might signal that the funds are not needed and that they have been under considerable pressure to spend their TANF balances more quickly to avoid the accumulation of large unspent balances in the U.S. Treasury. States have accumulated a portion of their own funds in general purpose rainy day funds, but welfare would have to compete with other claims for these dollars when these dollars are released from state treasuries. Therefore, federal policymakers lack reliable information to help assess states’ plans for economic contingencies, whether the levels of available funds are adequate, and whether all states have access to these funds. Design of Federal Contingency Mechanisms Is Complex and Restrictive
While the ability to carry forward TANF balances is likely viewed as the principle mechanism by which states can prepare for a rainy day, PRWORA also created two safety-net mechanisms for states to access additional federal resources in the event of a recession or other emergency—the $2 billion Contingency Fund for State Welfare Programs (Contingency Fund) and the $1.7 billion Federal Loan Fund for State Welfare Programs (Loan Fund). Options to Increase States’ Incentives to Save
There are other options that could strengthen states’ incentives to save. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses states' plans for operating their Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs in the event of an economic downturn.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the data available on the levels and adequacy of states' reserves is insufficient and misleading. Furthermore, most states have done little planning for economic contingencies. Many states cite obstacles to saving money for possible economic downturns. Although TANF funds can be set aside in a budgetary reserve, state officials said that they are concerned that the accumulation of unspent TANF funds might signal that the funds are not needed. Another option for states would be to save their own funds in a general purpose rainy day account, but state officials said that welfare would have to compete with other state priorities when these funds are released from state treasuries. There are now federal contingency mechanisms for states to access additional federal resources in the event of a recession or other emergency--the Contingency Fund for State Welfare Programs and the Federal Loan for State Welfare Programs. However, states generally found these programs too complex and restrictive, and would most likely find other ways to sustain their welfare programs. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-123 | gao_T-AIMD-98-123_0 | Substantial Loan Write-Offs Occurred in Recent Years
Under Department of Justice (DOJ) authority, during fiscal year 1996 and through July 31, 1997, RUS wrote off about $1.5 billion of loans to rural electric cooperatives. The most significant write-offs relate to two G&T loans. Additional Losses From Financially Stressed G&T Loans Are Probable in the Short Term
It is probable that RUS will have additional loan write-offs and therefore that the federal government will incur further losses in the short term from loans to borrowers that have been identified as financially stressed by RUS management. At the time of our review, RUS reports indicated that about $10.5 billion of the $22.5 billion in G&T debt was owed by 13 financially stressed G&T borrowers. Some Losses From Loans Considered Viable Are Probable in the Future
In addition to the financially stressed loans, RUS had loans outstanding to G&T borrowers that were considered viable by RUS but may become stressed in the future due to high costs and competitive or regulatory pressures. We believe it is probable that the federal government will eventually incur losses on some of these G&T loans. We believe the future viability of these G&T borrowers will be determined based on their ability to be competitive in a deregulated market. The relatively high average production costs indicate that the majority of G&Ts may have difficulty competing in a deregulated market. As with the financially stressed borrowers, some of the G&T borrowers considered viable by RUS at the time of our work had high debt costs because of investments in uneconomical plants. In the short term, G&Ts will likely be shielded from competition because of the all-requirements wholesale power contracts between the G&T and their member distribution cooperatives. Wholesale rates under these contracts are set by a G&T’s board of directors with approval from RUS. In states whose commissions regulate cooperatives, the cooperatives must file requests with the commissions for rate increases or decreases. As discussed above, denials of requested rate increases by state commissions culminated in several G&Ts filing for bankruptcy. These commissions may deny a request for a rate increase if they believe such an increase will have a negative impact on the region. According to RUS officials, some commissions have denied rate increases to cover the costs of projects that the commissions had previously approved for construction. Therefore, G&Ts with high costs may be likely candidates to default on their RUS loans, even without direct competitive pressures. And finally, RUS has loans outstanding to G&T borrowers that are currently considered viable by RUS that may become stressed in the future due to high production costs and competitive or regulatory pressures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Rural Utilities Service's (RUS) electric loan portfolio and the potential for future losses to the federal government from these loans, focusing on: (1) substantial write-offs of loans to rural electric cooperatives; (2) likely additional losses to the federal government from loans to financially stressed borrowers; and (3) the potential for future losses from viable loans that may become stressed in the future due to high production costs and competitive or regulatory pressures.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under Department of Justice authority, during fiscal year (FY) 1996 and through July 31, 1997, RUS wrote off about $1.5 billion of loans to rural electric cooperatives; (2) the most significant write-offs relate to two generation and transmission (G&T) loans; (3) it is probable that RUS will have additional loan write-offs and therefore that the federal government will incur losses in the short term from loans to borrowers that have been identified as financially stressed by RUS management; (4) at the time of GAO's review, RUS reports indicated that about $10.5 billion of the $22.5 billion in G&T debt was owed by 13 financially stressed G&T borrowers; (5) in addition to the financially stressed loans, RUS had loans outstanding to G&T borrowers that were considered viable by RUS but may become stressed in the future due to high costs and competitive or regulatory pressures; (6) GAO believes it is probable that the federal government will eventually incur losses on some of these G&T loans; (7) GAO also believes the future viability of these G&T borrowers will be determined based on their ability to be competitive in a deregulated market; (8) relatively high average production costs indicate that the majority of G&Ts may have difficulty competing in a deregulated market; (9) as with the financially stressed borrowers, some of the G&T borrowers considered viable by RUS at the time of GAO's work had high debt costs because of investments in uneconomical plants; (10) in the short term, G&Ts will likely be shielded from competition because of the all-requirements wholesale power contracts between the G&T and their member distribution cooperatives; (11) wholesale rates under these contracts are set by a G&T's board of directors with approval from RUS; (12) in states whose commissions regulate cooperatives, the cooperative must file a request with the commission for a rate increase or decrease; (13) these commissions may deny a request for a rate increase if they believe such an increase will have a negative impact on the region; (14) denials of requested rate increases by state commissions culminated in several G&Ts filing bankruptcy; (15) according to RUS officials, some commissions have denied a rate increase to cover the cost of projects that the commission had previously approved for construction; and (16) therefore, G&Ts with high costs may be likely candidates to default on their RUS loans, even without direct competitive pressures. |
gao_GAO-16-25 | gao_GAO-16-25_0 | Background
IDEA Part B authorizes federal grants to states to help them meet the excess costs of providing special education and related services to students with disabilities. Introduced various administrative changes, including raising the amount of federal grant funds that states may set aside for administration and other state-level activities, and permitting states to use these funds for paperwork reduction, among other things; eliminating the requirement for benchmarks and short-term objectives in IEPs, and requiring that states identify in writing to LEAs and Education any state requirements that are not mandated by IDEA, and that they minimize requirements that LEAs and schools are subject to under IDEA. Education Has Implemented Provisions of IDEA Designed to Reduce Paperwork, but States Have Been Reluctant to Use Them
States Saw Little Benefit in Participating in Pilot Programs
Education took several steps to design and implement two pilot programs, the Paperwork Waiver Program and Multi-Year IEP Program. Despite Education’s efforts, no state applied to participate in either of the pilot programs. Some States and Local Districts Used Federal Model Forms Primarily to Help Develop Their Own Forms
Although some states have adopted some of the model forms Education developed pursuant to the 2004 reauthorization’s attempt to reduce paperwork, they have used other model forms primarily as a reference tool to develop their own state forms. Stakeholders Had Mixed Views on the Effects of Other Paperwork Reduction Provisions
Views on the effects of other IDEA provisions related to paperwork reductions are mixed, based on our conversations with focus group participants, representatives of education stakeholder organizations, and state and local officials in Arkansas and New York. For example, several focus group participants and stakeholders differed in their views of a provision allowing states to use set-aside funds for certain authorized state-level administrative activities, including paperwork reduction activities. Stakeholders Said Additional State and Local Requirements Contribute to Burden, but Differed on the Burdens and Benefits of Federal Requirements
States and Localities Described Additional Requirements that Contribute to Administrative and Paperwork Burden
State and local officials with whom we spoke widely agreed that nonfederal IDEA-related requirements were burdensome. This example, however, highlights the difficulty in determining what state-imposed requirements should be reported. Our focus group results are consistent with previous findings from a GAO review of federal education requirements in which education stakeholders identified two IDEA requirements— processing IEPs and collecting and reporting performance data to Education—as being among the more burdensome for states and districts. Aside from their views on IDEA requirements they regard as particularly burdensome, stakeholders across all 9 focus groups acknowledged that administrative tasks and paperwork play an important role in helping ensure accountability and transparency in the special education process, among other benefits. Participants across the educator focus groups also reported that paperwork and administrative tasks take time away from the classroom and other important tasks, such as academic planning and performing assessments. Education and States Stated that They Have Adopted Computer Technology and Other Steps that Reduce Administrative Burdens, but These Efforts Have Limitations
Computer Technology and Data Systems Have Reportedly Helped Ease Some Administrative Burdens Related to Special Education Requirements
Some participants in all of our focus groups said that computer technology and the availability of electronic data sets have reduced administrative burdens associated with IDEA. It includes data required by IDEA and is comprised of six data collections. Some focus group participants said that using amended or draft IEPs (rather than creating completely new IEPs) can reduce burden. Communication strategies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) what Education and states have done to implement selected provisions of the law to help minimize the burden associated with administrative and paperwork requirements under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), (2) stakeholder views about IDEA’s administrative and paperwork requirements, and (3) the steps Education and others have taken to minimize IDEA-related burden. To address our first objective, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and published studies. We interviewed officials from Education and organizations representing education stakeholder groups, including special education administrators at the state and district levels, parents of students with disabilities, and educators. To identify specific provisions of the 2004 IDEA reauthorization intended to reduce the burden associated with administrative and paperwork requirements, we reviewed a Congressional Research Service analysis of the law as well as the results of our literature search. These site visits provided opportunities to understand and document local efforts to manage administrative requirements and to speak with parents about how they perceive special education procedures. Parents were informed of these meetings by the local districts, and attendance was voluntary. We selected these organizations to provide a range of views on the benefits and burdens of IDEA requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
When IDEA was reauthorized in 2004, it included provisions to reduce administrative and paperwork requirements to address concerns about burden. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to reduce burden related to meeting IDEA requirements for educating children with disabilities. Congress provided about $11.5 billion in grants in fiscal year 2015 under IDEA Part B to help states and local districts defray the costs of special education services for nearly 6.6 million students ages 3 to 21.
This report examines (1) what Education and states have done to implement selected IDEA provisions intended to reduce burden, (2) stakeholder views about IDEA's administrative and paperwork requirements, and (3) steps that Education and others have taken to minimize IDEA-related burden.
GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; held nongeneralizable focus groups with state and local administrators and educators from 37 states; visited schools in Clinton, Arkansas and Rochester, New York; and interviewed officials from Education and stakeholder organizations. GAO selected focus group participants, site visit locations, and organizations to highlight a range of demographic and geographic characteristics and obtain perspectives from a variety of stakeholders.
What GAO Found
In response to the 2004 reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)—the primary federal law governing education of children with disabilities—the Department of Education (Education) attempted to reduce administrative burden by creating pilot programs and publishing model paperwork forms, but states have used these tools sparingly. Specifically, Education created pilot programs allowing states to use multi-year rather than annual individualized education programs (IEP) to describe services to meet each student's needs, and to waive certain federal paperwork requirements. However, no state applied for these pilots, citing a perceived lack of benefit, and inadequate funding to implement and evaluate the pilots. As required by law, Education also published templates, known as model forms, to help states streamline the process of preparing IEPs and comply with parent notice requirements in IDEA. Although some states and school districts adopted at least one of these model forms, they have used others primarily as a starting point to develop their own forms. State and district officials told GAO this allowed them to meet federal as well as state and local requirements, and provided better protection against potential litigation. Stakeholders were mixed in their views about the effects of other provisions intended to reduce administrative burden. For example, several stakeholders viewed a provision allowing states to use more grant funds for paperwork reduction activities as helpful; others said the effect of a provision eliminating benchmarks and short-term objectives for IEPs was largely negligible.
Stakeholders across 9 focus groups—3 each with state administrators, local administrators, and educators—said that state-imposed requirements contribute to the administrative and paperwork burden, but their views on the burdens and benefits of federal IDEA requirements varied somewhat. For example, in focus groups, educators expressed concerns about monitoring and documenting student progress, while local and state administrators expressed concerns, respectively, about IEP implementation and federal reporting requirements. Consistent with prior research, many educators in these focus groups estimated they spend roughly one to two hours daily on administrative tasks, and expressed concern about this taking time away from the classroom. Despite perceived burdens, stakeholders widely acknowledged that IDEA's requirements play an important role in accountability. For example, educators said the requirements provide information about student strengths and limitations that help them assist the student, while state administrators said requirements aid planning and program development.
Education, states, and school districts have reduced administrative burdens by adopting new technology and using certain resource strategies. For example, several state administrators said Education's electronic data submission system has made it easier to complete federally-required state performance plans. During fall 2014, Education launched a new electronic reporting system intended to, among other things, consolidate data collections and ease data entry. Some schools and districts have also adopted resource strategies, such as hiring data clerks to reduce administrative burdens, but these strategies can be costly.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations at this time. |
gao_GAO-03-517 | gao_GAO-03-517_0 | Many of these activities are concentrated around the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Texas. One-Quarter of All Refuges Have Past or Present Oil and Gas Activities
About one-quarter, or 155, of the 575 refuges (538 refuges and 37 wetland management districts) that constitute the National Wildlife Refuge System have past or present oil and gas activities—exploration, drilling and production, transit pipelines, or some combination of these (see table 1). In total, we identified 4,406 oil and gas wells within 105 refuges. The remaining 2,600 wells did not produce oil, gas, or water during the last 12 months; many of these were plugged and abandoned or were dry holes. The 1,806 active oil and gas wells on refuge lands were roughly 1 percent of the approximately 148,750 active onshore oil and gas wells in the United States in 2001. Over the years, new environmental laws and improved industry practices and technology have reduced some of the most detrimental effects of oil and gas activities; however, some harm to refuges continues to occur and some effects from earlier events have not been reversed and continue to diminish refuge resources. In addition, oil and gas operators have taken steps, in some cases voluntarily, to reverse damages resulting from oil and gas activities, but operators have not consistently taken such steps and the adequacy of these steps is not known. Oil and Gas Activities Have, to Varying Degrees, Diminished Refuge System Resources
Available studies, anecdotal information, and our observations show that some refuge resources have been diminished to varying degrees by spills of oil, gas, and brine and through the construction, operation, and maintenance of the infrastructure necessary to extract oil and gas. FWS Management and Oversight of Oil and Gas Activities Varies Widely
FWS’s management and oversight of oil and gas activities varies widely from refuge to refuge. However, FWS has not approved this draft guidance. Ensure that staff are adequately trained to oversee oil and gas activities. As part of the process of improving the framework for managing and overseeing oil and gas activities on national wildlife refuges, we further recommend that the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service work with the Department of the Interior’s Office of the Solicitor to (1) determine FWS’s existing authority to issue permits and set reasonable conditions regarding outstanding mineral rights, reporting the results of its determination to Congress, and (2) seek from Congress, in coordination with appropriate Administration officials, including those within the Executive Office of the President, any necessary additional authority over such rights, and over reserved mineral rights, so that FWS can apply a consistent and reasonable set of regulatory and management controls over all oil and gas activities occurring on national wildlife refuges to protect the public’s surface interests. Fish and Wildlife Service. Fish and Wildlife Service
GAO’s Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 95-million acre National Wildlife Refuge System contains federal lands devoted to the conservation and management of fish, wildlife, and plant resources. While the federal government owns the surface lands in the system, in many cases private parties own the subsurface mineral rights and have the legal authority to explore for and extract oil and gas. GAO was asked to determine the extent of oil and gas activity on refuges, identify the environmental effects, and assess the Fish and Wildlife Service's management and oversight of oil and gas activities.
What GAO Found
About one-quarter (155 of 575) of all refuges have past or present oil and gas activity, some dating to at least the 1920s. Activities range from exploration to drilling and production to pipelines transiting refuge lands. One hundred five refuges contain a total of 4,406 oil and gas wells--2,600 inactive wells and 1,806 active wells. The 1,806 wells, located at 36 refuges and many around the Gulf Coast, produced oil and gas valued at $880 million during the last 12 month reporting period, roughly 1 percent of domestic production. Thirty-five refuges contain only pipelines. The Fish and Wildlife Service has not assessed the cumulative environmental effects of oil and gas activities on refuges. Available studies, anecdotal information, and GAO's observations show that the environmental effects of oil and gas activities vary from negligible, such as from buried pipelines, to substantial, such as from large oil spills or from large-scale infrastructure. These effects also vary from the temporary to the longer term. Some of the most detrimental effects of oil and gas activities have been reduced through environmental laws and improved practices and technology. Moreover, oil and gas operators have taken steps, in some cases voluntarily, to reverse damages resulting from oil and gas activities. Federal management and oversight of oil and gas activities varies widely among refuges--some refuges take extensive measures, while others exercise little control or enforcement. GAO found that this variation occurs because of differences in authority to oversee private mineral rights and because refuge managers lack enough guidance, resources, and training to properly manage and oversee oil and gas activities. Greater attention to oil and gas activities by the Fish and Wildlife Service would increase its understanding of associated environmental effects and contribute to more consistent use of practices and technologies that protect refuge resources. |
gao_GAO-09-366T | gao_GAO-09-366T_0 | Defense Has Obtained Weapons for ANSF through U.S. Procurement and International Donations
During fiscal years 2002 through 2008, the United States spent approximately $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces in order to transfer responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan government. As part of this effort, Defense—through the U.S. Army and Navy—purchased over 242,000 small arms and light weapons, at a cost of about $120 million. As illustrated in figure 1, these weapons include rifles, pistols, shotguns, machine guns, mortars, and launchers for grenades, rockets, and missiles. In addition, CSTC-A has reported that 21 other countries provided about 135,000 weapons for ANSF between June 2002 and June 2008, which they have valued at about $103 million. This brings the total number of weapons Defense reported obtaining for ANSF to over 375,000. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in Kabul, which is a joint service, coalition organization under the command and control of Defense’s U.S. Central Command is primarily responsible for training and equipping ANSF. As part of that responsibility, CSTC-A receives and stores weapons provided by the United States and other international donors and distributes them to ANSF units. In addition, CSTC-A is responsible for monitoring the use of U.S.-procured weapons and other sensitive equipment. Desertion in the Afghan National Police has also resulted in the loss of weapons. In the report we are releasing today we make several recommendations to help improve accountability for weapons and other sensitive equipment that the United States provided to ANSF. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the GAO report on accountability for small arms and light weapons that the United States has obtained and provided or intends to provide to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Given the unstable security conditions in Afghanistan, the risk of loss and theft of these weapons is significant, which makes this hearing particularly timely. This testimony today focuses on (1) the types and quantities of weapons the Department of Defense (Defense) has obtained for ANSF, (2) whether Defense can account for the weapons it obtained for ANSF, and (3) the extent to which ANSF can properly safeguard and account for its weapons and other sensitive equipment.
What GAO Found
During fiscal years 2002 through 2008, the United States spent approximately $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces in order to transfer responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan government. As part of this effort, Defense--through the U.S. Army and Navy--purchased over 242,000 small arms and light weapons, at a cost of about $120 million. These weapons include rifles, pistols, shotguns, machine guns, mortars, and launchers for grenades, rockets, and missiles. In addition, CSTC-A has reported that 21 other countries provided about 135,000 weapons for ANSF between June 2002 and June 2008, which they have valued at about $103 million. This brings the total number of weapons Defense reported obtaining for ANSF to over 375,000. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in Kabul, which is a joint service, coalition organization under the command and control of Defense's U.S. Central Command is primarily responsible for training and equipping ANSF.3 As part of that responsibility, CSTC-A receives and stores weapons provided by the United States and other international donors and distributes them to ANSF units. In addition, CSTC-A is responsible for monitoring the use of U.S.-procured weapons and other sensitive equipment. |
gao_GAO-11-376 | gao_GAO-11-376_0 | For Seven Foods, the Commodity Program’s Specifications Related to Microbial Contamination Are More Stringent Than Federal Regulations for Those Foods in the Commercial Marketplace
For 7 of the approximately 180 commodity foods offered to schools, USDA’s commodity program has established purchasing specifications with respect to microbial contamination that are more stringent than the federal regulations for the same foods available in the commercial marketplace. For example, the commodity program will not purchase raw ground beef that tests positive for Salmonella. On the other hand, USDA regulations for commercially available raw ground beef tolerate the presence of a certain amount of Salmonella. Officials of USDA’s commodity program told us that more-stringent standards are needed for certain foods in the commodity program because commodity foods go to school-age children as well as populations, such as very young children, who are considered at a higher risk than the general population for serious complications from foodborne illnesses. While most of the poultry items the commodity program provides to schools are precooked, the program does provide raw, whole chickens cut into eight pieces to schools. Some Other Large Purchasers of Raw Ground Beef Have Similar, More- Stringent, Purchasing Specifications, Although Certain Details Differ
The seven large purchasers of raw ground beef we interviewed (six large private-sector purchasers—including grocery store chains and quick- service restaurants—and one large federal purchaser) relied on purchasing specifications related to microbial contamination for raw ground beef production, process oversight, and testing that were the same or substantially similar to those used by USDA’s commodity program, with variation in such things as the number or placement of required antimicrobial interventions designed to reduce microbial contamination. These purchasing specifications are more stringent than federal regulatory requirements. The committee was also asked by USDA to compare the commodity program’s purchasing specifications to those used by other large purchasers of raw ground beef. School Districts Must Follow Certain Food Safety Practices to Participate in Federally Funded School Meal Programs
To participate in federally funded school meal programs, federal regulations require all school districts to, among other things, develop written food safety plans and obtain food safety inspections of their schools. Officials in nine of the school districts we interviewed said that greater knowledge of these differences might affect their future purchasing decisions. Program officials told us they selected products for more- stringent specifications for the seven commodity foods based on their views of the safety risk associated with different types of food; that they developed these specifications through informal consultation with a variety of groups and individuals; and that they did not document this process. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen USDA’s oversight of the safety of food purchased by its commodity program and served in federal school meal programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture instruct the commodity program to take the following three actions: develop a systematic and transparent process to determine whether foods offered by the program require more-stringent specifications related to microbial contamination, including steps to: identify pathogens, strains of pathogens, or other foods that merit more-stringent specifications; document the scientific basis used to develop the specifications; and review the specifications on a periodic basis; share information with school districts in a more explicit form regarding the foods covered by more-stringent purchasing specifications related to microbial contamination to enable districts to make more informed choices; and issue more specific guidance to states and school districts regarding the applicability of the regulatory requirement for food safety inspections to schools that do not prepare food. USDA and HHS also provided technical comments. Specifically, we assessed (1) the extent to which federal purchasing specifications related to microbial contamination for food in the commodity program differ from federal regulations for the same foods available in the commercial marketplace; (2) the extent to which the commodity program’s purchasing specifications related to microbial contamination for raw ground beef differ from those imposed by large federal and private-sector purchasers; and (3) examples of standards and practices that exist at the state and school district level to help ensure that food procured by schools is not contaminated by pathogens. We interviewed officials from each of these purchasers and gathered documentation regarding their purchasing specifications for boneless beef and ground beef. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through its commodity program, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides commodity foods at no cost to schools taking part in the national school meals programs. Commodities include raw ground beef, cheese, poultry, and fresh produce. Like federal food safety agencies, the commodity program has taken steps designed to reduce microbial contamination that can result in severe illness. GAO was asked to review (1) the extent to which the program's purchasing specifications related to microbial contamination differ from federal regulations, (2) the extent to which specifications for raw ground beef differ from those imposed by some other large purchasers, and (3) examples of schools' practices to help ensure that food is not contaminated. GAO compared the program's purchasing specifications to federal regulations for food sold commercially, gathered information from seven large purchasers of ground beef, and interviewed officials in 18 school districts in five states, selected in part because of their purchasing practices.
What GAO Found
For 7 of the approximately 180 commodity foods offered to schools, USDA's commodity program has established purchasing specifications with respect to microbial contamination that are more stringent than the federal regulations for the same foods in the commercial marketplace. For example, the commodity program will not purchase ground beef that tests positive for Salmonella bacteria, while federal regulations for commercially available ground beef tolerate the presence of a certain amount of Salmonella. Program officials told GAO that more-stringent specifications are needed for certain foods they purchase because they go to populations, such as very young children, at a higher risk for serious complications from foodborne illnesses. However, the program has not developed more-stringent specifications for some pathogens and foods that have been associated with foodborne illness, such as raw, whole chickens cut into eight pieces that the program provides to schools. Program officials told GAO they selected products for more-stringent specifications based on their views of the safety risk associated with different types of food; developed these specifications through informal consultation with a variety of groups; and did not document the process they used. The commodity program's purchasing specifications related to microbial contamination for raw ground beef at various processing stages are generally similar to those of some other large purchasers. The specifications used by both the commodity program and these large purchasers are more stringent than federal regulations. USDA's commodity program has several purchasing specifications related to microbial contamination for raw ground beef production, process oversight, and testing. For example, the program requires beef suppliers to take actions to reduce the level of pathogens at least twice while beef carcasses are processed. Some large purchasers of raw ground beef have purchasing specifications similar to the commodity program, although they differ in certain details. For example, of the seven large purchasers that GAO interviewed, five said they require their beef suppliers to take between two and seven actions to reduce pathogen levels on beef carcasses. While all school districts must follow certain food safety practices to participate in federally funded school meal programs, school districts that GAO interviewed have also implemented a number of additional food safety practices. Federal regulations require school districts to develop written food safety plans and to obtain food safety inspections of their schools, among other things. In addition, some of the school districts GAO interviewed have established purchasing specifications related to microbial contamination or food safety for food they purchase in the commercial marketplace, among other things. Nevertheless, few of the district officials GAO interviewed were aware that the commodity program's purchasing specifications for seven products are more stringent than federal regulatory requirements. Officials from half of the districts GAO interviewed said that greater knowledge of these differences would affect their future purchasing decisions by enabling them to make more informed choices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that USDA strengthen its oversight of food purchased by its commodity program, by establishing a more systematic and transparent process to determine whether additional specifications should be developed related to microbial contamination. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and provided technical comments. |
gao_GAO-05-459 | gao_GAO-05-459_0 | Report small business subcontracting achievements. As a result, the percent of total subcontracting dollars going to small businesses appeared larger than if the contractors had been following SBA’s reporting guidelines. Because contractor-reported data does not provide a true picture of the contractors’ performance, the department cannot meaningfully use the data to monitor performance and determine whether the contractors are providing small business subcontractors with the maximum practicable opportunity to provide goods and services to the facility management contractors, as required by the policy set out by the Small Business Act. Contractor-Reported Data on Small Business Subcontracting Achievements Frequently Overstated Performance
The contractor-reported data that DOE uses to monitor facility management contractors’ performance in small business subcontracting generally showed that contractors exceeded their annual small business subcontracting goals in fiscal years 2001 through 2004. However, in fiscal year 2004, all 34 of the contractors’ reported achievements incorrectly excluded other types of subcontracts, beyond what SBA guidelines allow (see table 2). As a result, the percentage of total subcontracted dollars going to small businesses appeared larger than it actually was. False impression that DOE was meeting its small business subcontracting goals. As a result, DOE officials were not inclined to closely monitor facility management contractors’ subcontracting practices or to fully address known problems with the achievement data. Oversight Responsibilities for the Small Business Subcontracting Program Were Not Clearly Defined or Integrated
DOE officials did not address problems with the small business subcontracting program, in part, because the various headquarters and field organizations that must work together to provide oversight of the small business subcontracting program did not do so effectively. Effective oversight was not happening, in part, because DOE guidance does not clearly define the roles, responsibilities, and needed interaction of the various headquarters and field organizations involved. The guidance also states that the contracting officer is responsible for ensuring that facility management contractors comply with the SBA guidelines on which subcontracts may be excluded from their subcontracting goals and achievements. To ensure that DOE has useful data for managing its small business subcontracting program and for measuring and comparing contractors’ performance in pursuing the maximum practicable opportunity for small business subcontracting, we recommend the Secretary of Energy direct the appropriate officials responsible for DOE’s Small Business Office and procurement organizations to use, for internal management purposes, data on facility management contractors’ annual small business subcontracting achievements calculated as a percentage of the obligated dollars facility management contractors received that year on their contract with DOE. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
We determined (1) the usefulness of the data reported by the Department of Energy’s (DOE) facility management contractors for monitoring contractor performance in small business subcontracting and (2) the actions that DOE has taken to address any problems identified with its facility management contractors’ small business subcontracting efforts. Of that amount, over $2.1 billion went to small businesses, accounting for nearly two-thirds of the almost $3.3 billion in subcontract dollars that the 34 contractors directed to small businesses that year. We acknowledge in the draft report and highlights page that DOE had taken steps to address the problems with contractor-reported data, including issuing clarifying information in 2002 and additional guidance in March 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal policy requires that small businesses receive the maximum practicable subcontracting opportunity for providing goods and services to large businesses that contract directly with federal agencies. The Department of Energy (DOE) annually directs almost $20 billion to the 34 "facility management contractors" of which $3.3 billion was redirected to small business subcontractors in fiscal year 2004. DOE negotiates annual small business subcontracting goals with individual contractors and monitors their achievements. GAO was asked to (1) determine the usefulness of the data that DOE uses to monitor subcontracting performance and (2) discuss the actions that DOE has taken to address any problems with the contractors' subcontracting efforts.
What GAO Found
DOE's facility management contractors' small business subcontracting achievements--reported as a percentage of their total subcontracted dollars--are not useful for monitoring purposes because the reported data overstates subcontracting achievements in two ways: (1) All of the contractor-reported data incorrectly excluded some large-business subcontracts, beyond what federal reporting guidelines allow. Excluding these subcontracts made the percentage of subcontracted dollars going to small businesses appear larger than it would have, if such subcontracts were not incorrectly excluded. If these subcontracts had been included, some contractors said it was likely they would have requested lower goals. (2) Even when all relevant subcontracts are included, the contractor-reported data can still overstate contractors' subcontracting achievements. Because a contractor could decide to subcontract only a small amount of its total federal contract, the portion of subcontracted dollars going to small businesses could, by comparison, appear misleadingly large. As a result, contractor-reported data is not useful to DOE in determining its contractors' actual small business subcontracting achievements or adequately assessing whether small businesses are receiving maximum practicable subcontracting opportunities. DOE has not taken adequate steps to address known problems with the contractor-reported data. Because the data showed that the department was meeting its subcontracting goals, DOE officials were not inclined to closely monitor contractors' practices for calculating their subcontracting goals and achievements. DOE officials were aware in 2002 that the contractors were not following federal guidelines on which subcontracts to include when developing goals. DOE's Small Business Office did provide clarifying information on the requirements, but DOE officials failed to ensure that the guidelines were being followed, and problems continued. In March 2005, DOE issued additional guidance, but it is uncertain whether DOE will ensure that the guidance is followed. These oversight problems occurred, in part, because DOE has not clearly defined the roles, responsibilities, and needed interaction of the various headquarters and field organizations that collectively oversee the contractors' small business subcontracting efforts. |
gao_GAO-09-131 | gao_GAO-09-131_0 | The Army also considered DOD’s strategic plan as it restructured to a brigade-based force. The Army Has Made Progress Establishing Modular Units but Does Not Have a Plan That Links Funding and Results to Guide Its Efforts to Equip and Staff the Modular Force
The Army is making progress establishing modular units, but does not have a transparent results-oriented plan with clear milestones to guide efforts to fully equip and staff the modular force. Further, the Army’s equipment and personnel plans depend on some assumptions related to rehabilitating equipment used in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and related to recruitment and retention that may be uncertain, given the current pace of operations. According to a key 2004 Army Task Force Modularity study, the success of modular design rests in part on the availability of key enablers that are required for modular brigade combat teams to function as planned. Without providing a detailed plan for equipment and staffing that links funding with results, the congressional decision makers will not have information to track the Army’s progress toward equipping and staffing its forces. Army Projects That It Will Meet Overall Equipment and Personnel Requirements but Faces Challenges in Meeting These Goals
The Army’s equipping and staffing projections indicate that the Army will have enough equipment and personnel to meet aggregate equipping and staffing requirements by 2012. Decision makers may not be fully informed of the Army’s equipment status because the Army has not developed a comprehensive equipment and personnel plan that details the equipment the Army has in its inventories as compared with the equipment required for units to operate effectively in their modular designs and that sets milestones against which to measure the Army’s progress equipping and staffing the modular force with key enablers. The Army Has Not Fully Evaluated the Capabilities of the Modular Force across the Full Spectrum of Conflict
The Army uses a variety of approaches in testing unit designs and capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive evaluation of modular forces. Testing the modular force is intended to determine whether modular units are capable of performing potential missions across the full spectrum of conflict—and therefore needs to be as realistic as possible. First, the Army has not fully assessed the effectiveness of its support units because it has not completed the doctrine that would define how modular support units will train, be sustained, and support the fight. Second, the Army has been testing the capability of modular forces primarily at unconstrained design levels, not the authorized level of personnel and equipment units that the Army actually plans to provide. To support ongoing operations, the Army has focused its testing and evaluation efforts thus far on conducting ongoing counterinsurgency operations. As operations have continued, the target date for rebuilding the Army has slipped considerably and is now more than a decade away. Lacking an analysis of the capabilities of the modular force at authorized levels—which represents what the Army actually plans to have—the Army will not be in a position to realistically assess whether the capabilities that it is fielding can perform mission requirements. To ensure that Congress is kept informed about the progress in implementing modular designs across the Army’s operating forces and the capabilities of the modular force and associated risks from personnel and equipment shortfalls, it should consider revising section 323 Public Law 109-364 to require the Army to report on the status of its transition to modularity to include assessments of (1)the status of development of doctrine for how support forces will train, be sustained, and fight, (2) capabilities of modular units with expected personnel and equipment and risks associated with any shortfalls against required resources. Without the benefit of a clear plan and milestones against which to assess progress, the Army cannot assure Congress that it is on a path to restore readiness or when it will have the equipment and personnel it needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Amid ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army embarked in 2004 on a plan to create a modular, brigade-based force that would be equally capable as its divisional predecessor in part because it would have advanced equipment and specialized personnel. GAO has previously reported that restructuring and rebuilding the Army will require billions of dollars for equipment and take years to complete. For this report, GAO assessed the extent to which the Army has (1) developed a plan to link funding with results and (2) evaluated its modular force designs. GAO analyzed Army equipment and personnel data, key Army reports, planning documents, performance metrics, testing plans, and funding requests. GAO also visited Army Training and Doctrine Command, including selected Army proponents and schools; Army Reserve Command; and the National Guard Bureau.
What GAO Found
The Army will have established over 80 percent of its modular units by the end of 2008 but does not have a results-oriented plan with clear milestones in place to guide efforts to equip and staff those new units. The Army has been focused on equipping and staffing units to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the equipment and personnel level of non-deployed units has been declining. The Army now anticipates that modular units will be equipped and staffed in 2019--more than a decade away--but has provided few details about what to expect in the interim. And while the Army projects that it will have enough equipment and personnel in the aggregate, its projections rely on uncertain assumptions related to restoring equipment used in current operations, as well as meeting recruiting and retention goals while simultaneously expanding the Army. Further, GAO's detailed analysis of Army data shows that the Army could face shortfalls of certain modern equipment. Such items are important because the success of the modular design rests in part on obtaining key enablers needed for modular units to function as planned, such as equipment to provide enhanced awareness of the battlefield. GAO has previously reported that the Army lacks a funding plan that includes interim measures for equipping and staffing the modular force, making it difficult to evaluate progress. Without a plan for equipment and staffing that links funding with results and provides milestones, the Army cannot assure decision makers when modular units will have the required equipment and staff in place to restore readiness. Finally, without this plan the Army risks cost growth and further timeline slippage in its efforts to transform to a more modular and capable force. The Army uses several approaches in testing unit designs and capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive assessment of modular forces. Testing the force is intended to determine whether modular units are capable of performing missions across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army has focused its testing efforts on combat units conducting ongoing counterinsurgency operations. However, gaps in the Army's testing could affect its forces' ability to deliver needed capabilities. First, the Army has not fully assessed the effectiveness of its support units because the doctrine that would define how modular support units will train, be sustained, and support the fight has not been completed. This doctrine provides a benchmark to measure the effectiveness of support units. Further, the Army has not assigned a focal point the responsibility for integrating assessments across activities, such as equipping and training. Second, the Army tested the capability of modular designs primarily unconstrained by resources, not at the level of personnel and equipment that the Army plans to provide units. Lacking an analysis of the capabilities of the modular force at levels that it plans to have, the Army will not be in a position to realistically assess whether the capabilities that it is fielding can perform mission requirements. |
gao_GAO-13-272 | gao_GAO-13-272_0 | Medicare-participating hospitals are required to accept CHS program patients at rates no higher than the rates paid by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Medicare program, while federal and tribal CHS programs pay physicians and other nonhospital providers at either their billed charges or at reduced rates an IHS area office or tribal CHS program negotiates with them. IHS’s Federal CHS Program Primarily Paid Physicians at Their Billed Charges, Which Were Significantly Higher than What Medicare and Private Insurers Would Have Paid
More than 80 percent of IHS’s federal CHS program payments to physicians for services provided in 2010 were paid to noncontracted physicians at billed charges, rather than to contracted physicians at negotiated, reduced rates. With the exception of uninsured patients, who are expected to pay providers at billed charges, other public and private payers typically pay providers at lower rates.$62.5 million that federal CHS programs paid physicians, they paid about $50.5 million (about 81 percent) to noncontracted physicians at billed charges and about $12.1 million (19 percent) to contracted physicians at negotiated, reduced rates. IHS’s federal CHS program payments to physicians for services provided in 2010 were higher than what we estimate Medicare and private insurers would have paid for these same services. IHS’s federal CHS programs paid, in total, two times what we estimate Medicare would have paid for the same physician services provided in 2010. Specifically, of the $62.5 million in total payments for services provided in 2010, the federal CHS programs could have saved an estimated $31.7 million if they paid physicians what Medicare would have paid for the same services. Further, savings for the overall CHS program may be even higher, as this analysis does not include payments for other types of nonhospital services paid by the federal CHS programs, as well as payments by tribally operated CHS programs, which receive over half of annual CHS program funding and have also been found to pay for nonhospital services above the Medicare rates. The federal CHS programs’ contracts with physicians were sometimes for negotiated rates that exceeded what Medicare would have paid. However, 8 of the 10 physicians said total CHS program payments constituted 10 percent or less of the total payments they received from all payers. Physicians We Interviewed Identified Both Advantages and Concerns with Capping CHS Program Payments at Medicare Rates
The 10 physicians we interviewed identified advantages of capping CHS program payments for nonhospital services, including physician services, at Medicare rates, but also expressed concerns about the effect of such a cap on their finances. Most Hospitals We Interviewed Indicated Little Negative Effect from the Current MLR Requirement, as They Already Had CHS Program Contracts to Be Paid at Medicare Rates
Officials from most of the nine hospitals that we interviewed indicated that the MLR requirement has had little or no financial effect on their hospital. Officials from two hospitals indicated that the MLR requirement reduced their payment rate. IHS and Tribal Officials Said the MLR Requirement Allowed Them to Expand Access and Said That a Similar Cap for Nonhospital Services Could Have Similar Benefits
IHS and tribal officials we interviewed said that setting payments for hospital services at MLRs (as required by statute) allowed the CHS program to reduce payments and expand access to care. The MLR requirement required these hospitals to accept Medicare rates. However, IHS headquarters officials told us that they would not be able to implement a cap for nonhospital services, including physician services, unless the agency received explicit statutory authority to do so, because the current law requiring MLRs is limited to hospital services. Some tribal officials indicated that a cap on nonhospital services at Medicare rates could save them money. If trends in payments for other types of nonhospital services and the tribal CHS programs are similar to the payments for the federal CHS program physician services that we examined, we estimate that savings from capping all nonhospital services paid by federal and tribal CHS programs at Medicare rates could be significantly higher. These savings could be used to pay for some of the many services that the CHS program is unable to fund each year. Recommendation for Executive Action
Should the Congress decide to cap payments for physician and other nonhospital services made through IHS’s CHS program, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Director of IHS to monitor CHS program patient access to physician and other nonhospital care in order to assess how any new payment rates may benefit or impede the availability of care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Indians and Alaska Natives. When care at an IHS-funded facility is unavailable, IHS's CHS program pays for care from external providers. Hospitals are required to accept Medicare rates from federal and tribal CHS programs, while physicians and other nonhospital providers are paid at either billed charges or negotiated, reduced rates. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires GAO to compare CHS program payment rates with those of other public and private payers. GAO examined (1) how payments to physicians by IHS's federal CHS programs compare with what Medicare and private health insurers would have paid for the same services, (2) physicians' perspectives about how a cap on payment rates could affect them, (3) hospitals' perspectives about how the MLR requirement affected them, and (4) IHS and tribal officials' perspectives about the MLR requirement and a potential cap on nonhospital services. GAO compared 2010 physician claims data for federal CHS programs with the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule and claims from private insurers. GAO also spoke to a nongeneralizable sample of 10 physicians and 9 hospitals that interacted frequently with IHS and spoke to IHS and tribal officials where these providers practiced.
What GAO Found
The Indian Health Service's (IHS) federal contract health services (CHS) programs primarily paid physicians at their billed charges, which were significantly higher than what Medicare and private insurers would have paid for the same services. IHS's policy states that federal CHS programs should purchase services from contracted providers at negotiated, reduced rates. However, of the almost $63 million that the federal CHS programs paid for physician services provided in 2010, they paid about $51 million (81 percent) to physicians at billed charges and about $12 million (19 percent) to physicians at negotiated, reduced rates. Payments for other types of nonhospital services followed similar trends, with about $40 million out of $52 million (77 percent) paid at billed charges. GAO estimated that IHS's federal CHS programs paid two times as much as what Medicare would have paid and about one and a quarter times as much as what private insurers would have paid for the same physician services provided in 2010. If federal CHS programs had paid Medicare rates for these services, they could have used an estimated $32 million in savings to pay for many of the services that IHS is unable to fund each year. Savings for the overall CHS program may be even higher, as this analysis does not include other types of nonhospital services or the CHS program funding that goes to tribal CHS programs, which the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Inspector General found also paid for nonhospital care above Medicare rates.
Although the 10 physicians GAO interviewed were among those most frequently paid by federal CHS programs, 8 said their CHS program payments constituted 10 percent or less of their total payments. Some physicians identified ways that capping CHS program payments for nonhospital services, including physician services, at Medicare rates could benefit the CHS program and physician practices. However, other physicians were concerned that reducing payment rates to Medicare levels could negatively affect their practices.
Seven of nine hospitals GAO interviewed said the Medicare-like rates (MLR) required by statute had little negative effect, generally because they already had contracts with the CHS program to be paid Medicare rates. While two hospitals previously paid by the CHS program at or near billed charges said they were financially affected by the MLR requirement, both said it had not affected their delivery of care to CHS program patients.
IHS and tribal officials GAO interviewed said the MLR requirement for hospital services generated savings that allowed CHS programs to expand access to health care. They said that a cap on nonhospital service payments, including physician services, could have benefits and challenges. Most IHS officials indicated that it was unlikely they could negotiate many more contracts. Some tribal officials said that some physicians might think Medicare rates were too low and decide to no longer accept tribal patients, although they agreed that a cap at these rates could save money. IHS officials noted, however, that they would not be able to implement a cap for nonhospital services, including physician services, unless the agency received explicit statutory authority to do so.
HHS stated in its comments that it concurred with GAO's conclusions and recommendation and added that imposing a cap at Medicare rates would allow IHS to fund additional services.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider capping CHS program payments for nonhospital services, including physician services, at rates comparable to other federal programs. Should Congress cap payments, we recommend HHS direct IHS to monitor access to care. |
gao_GAO-09-792 | gao_GAO-09-792_0 | The implementing regulations have not yet been promulgated. Civilian Agencies’ Use of Schedule BPAs for Services Has Increased Significantly, but DOD Data Issues Preclude an Accurate Picture of Total Government Use
We estimate that the federal government obligated between $3.7 billion and $7.9 billion by placing orders under schedule BPAs during fiscal year 2008. Although orders under schedule BPAs (for goods and services) comprised only about 2.3 percent of civilian agencies’ reported obligations during fiscal year 2008, usage of schedule BPAs by civilian agencies has grown substantially over time, by 382 percent from fiscal year 2004 to 2008 ($659 million to $3.2 billion). Unlike civilian agencies, DOD does not use the available fields in FPDS-NG to distinguish its schedule BPAs from its traditional BPAs and indefinite delivery contracts. A contracting officer at the Food Safety and Inspection Service stated that she can place orders under a single award BPA without further competition in less time than would be needed to meet the competition requirements for ordering directly from a GSA schedule contract. Agencies Did Not Take Full Advantage of Opportunities for Competition
Agencies in our sample competed BPAs when establishing them—meaning that, for purposes of this report, contracting officers considered more than one vendor—64 percent of the time. When orders are placed under GSA schedule contracts, the FAR allows contracting officers to limit the number of vendors they consider, which includes considering only one vendor. However, we also found examples of justifications for awarding BPAs directly to one vendor that are not specifically mentioned in the FAR, some of which may not conform with sound procurement policy. Frequent Use of Single Award BPAs Resulted in Lack of Competition of Orders
The FAR allows a contracting officer to decide whether to award a BPA to a single vendor or to multiple vendors for the same requirement. One of the single award BPAs, established in 2004, for which we found no evidence of competition had an estimated amount of nearly $60 million. Agencies frequently received discounts from GSA schedule prices if they requested them when establishing BPAs. The agencies in our review infrequently requested discounts when placing orders. In some cases, agencies had negotiated discounts when establishing the schedule BPAs and were also able to obtain further discounts for orders. Agencies Generally Did Not Comply wit the Annual Review Requirement and Missed Oppo for Savings
Few Contracting Officers Conducted Complete Annual Reviews
Contracting officers conducted annual reviews that addressed all of the required FAR elements for only 19 of the 320 BPAs in our sample that required an annual review. For some of the BPAs in our sample, the BPA amount originally estimated had been exceeded, but because annual reviews were not conducted, agencies missed opportunities to obtain discounts. Although the Navy considered more than one schedule vendor when placing the order, this situation still involves a potential CICA violation because the underlying schedule contract had expired by the time the order was placed and it is not clear that statutory requirements for full and open competition were otherwise met. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following three recommendations to the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy: To ensure that federal agencies take greater advantage of the opportunities that competition provides under schedule BPAs: take steps to amend the FAR to clarify when establishing a schedule BPA using the limited source justifications of the FAR, including when to only one vendor, is or is not appropriate; and consider including in the pending proposed FAR rule that implements the provisions of section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2009 an amendment to FAR 8.4 specifying that the requirement to place on a competitive basis any order above the simplified acquisition threshold (generally $100,000) under multiple award contracts also applies to orders under single and multiple award BPAs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The overall focus of this review was agencies’ use of blanket purchase agreements (BPA) established under the General Administration Service’s (GSA) schedules program. Our objectives were to determine: (1) the extent to which agencies use schedule BPAs, what they buy with them, and why agencies use them; (2) whether agencies are competing BPAs and the orders under them; (3) whether agencies are taking advantage of opportunities for savings by seeking discounts when using these BPAs; and (4) whether agencies are conducting the required annual reviews. We used the EDA, DOD’s online contract retrieval system, to review the BPAs. We reviewed BPA files to determine whether the requirement was competed when the BPA was established and when an order was placed by determining whether more than one vendor had been contacted. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) allows agencies to establish blanket purchase agreements (BPA) under the General Services Administration's (GSA) Schedules Program, where contracts are awarded to multiple vendors for commercial goods and services and made available for agency use. BPAs are agreements between agencies and vendors with terms in place for future use; funds are obligated when orders are placed. When establishing BPAs under schedule contracts, agencies must follow procedures regarding the number of vendors considered, request discounts, and conduct annual reviews in accordance with requirements. This report assesses selected agencies' use of schedule BPAs and evaluates whether they considered more than one vendor when establishing BPAs and placing orders under them, took opportunities for savings, and conducted annual reviews. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed a sample of 336 schedule BPAs and 352 fiscal year 2007 orders and met with officials.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2008, civilian agencies obligated $3.2 billion under schedule BPAs--up 383 percent from fiscal year 2004. GAO estimates that DOD's obligations ranged from $0.5 to $4.7 billion, placing total obligations in 2008 between $3.7 and $7.9 billion. GAO was unable to determine more fully DOD's obligations because DOD does not utilize fields in the federal procurement data system to distinguish schedule BPAs from other BPAs. DOD has begun to take actions to address this issue. Civilian agencies' use of BPAs for services grew significantly faster--475 percent--than their overall services contracting between 2004 and 2008. Contracting officers use BPAs for flexibility and speed, noting, for example, advantages in disaster response preparation and when funding for a fiscal year is unknown. Of the BPAs GAO reviewed, 64 percent had been competed--meaning, for purposes of this report, that more than one vendor was considered--when established. For 12 percent of BPAs that had not been competed, contracting officers provided a variety of justifications, some of which appear inconsistent with sound procurement policy. The FAR is not clear about justification requirements for BPAs awarded with limited competition, including to one vendor. Also, the majority of BPAs had been awarded to a single vendor, which resulted in a lack of competition when placing orders because the FAR does not currently require competition of orders under single award BPAs. Multiple award BPAs--awarded to more than one vendor for the same requirement--provide an opportunity to benefit from further competition when placing orders, but many contracting officers placed orders directly with one vendor without further competition. Congress recently enhanced competition requirements for multiple award contracts, but the application of this requirement to schedule BPAs has not yet been established. Some of the BPAs GAO reviewed had lengthy durations, exceeding 5 years. GAO found no evidence that agencies sought discounts when 47 percent of the BPAs reviewed were established. In the other cases, some contracting officers explicitly requested, or even demanded, discounts, while others merely encouraged them. Agencies frequently received discounts when they requested them. For instance, the Justice Department was able to save $20 million under a BPA where the contracting officer requested and received discounts. However, at times, such opportunities were missed when discounts were not requested, even when the estimated amount of the BPA was in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Contracting officials rarely conducted the required annual reviews. The reviews for only 19 of the 320 BPAs that required them addressed all of the FAR elements. By not conducting annual reviews, agencies miss opportunities for savings and can run the risk of violating competition requirements. One contracting officer was unaware that the underlying GSA schedule contract had expired, and orders continued to be placed under the BPA--a potential violation of the Competition in Contracting Act. |
gao_GAO-11-873 | gao_GAO-11-873_0 | The DHS Office of Policy consolidated the study groups’ recommendations into a draft QHSR report and obtained and incorporated feedback on the draft report from other federal agencies and stakeholder groups, including the stakeholders listed in the 9/11 Commission Act, with which DHS was to consult in conducting the QHSR. DHS issued the final QHSR report in February 2010. In obtaining input from these stakeholders, DHS used a variety of mechanisms, such as multiagency working groups, solicitation of homeland security research papers, and a web-based forum, referred to as the National Dialogue, as shown in table 1. We obtained comments from 63 stakeholders who DHS consulted with through these mechanisms. Time Constraints, Nonfederal Stakeholder Participation, and Definition of Stakeholders’ Roles Hindered QHSR Consultations
DHS consulted with a range of stakeholders through various mechanisms, but DHS officials and stakeholders identified challenges that hindered DHS’s consultation efforts in conducting the QHSR. In response to our request for comments on the QHSR process, 16 stakeholders noted concerns regarding the time frames they had for providing input into the QHSR or BUR. Nine DHS stakeholders, for example, responded that in their view, the limited time available for development of the QHSR did not allow DHS to have as broad and deep an engagement with stakeholders as DHS could have experienced if more time had been allotted to stakeholder consultations. However, the department faced challenges in obtaining feedback from nonfederal stakeholders. In responding to our request for comments, 9 stakeholders commented that DHS consultations with nonfederal stakeholders, such as state, local, and private sector representatives, could be enhanced. Given the significant role that state and local governments and the private sector play in homeland security efforts, which is acknowledged by DHS in the QHSR report, examining mechanisms, such as those proposed by QHSR stakeholders or used by components, could help DHS include a broader segment of these representatives during the QHSR process and better position DHS to consider and incorporate, as appropriate, nonfederal concerns and capabilities related to homeland security in the next QHSR. DHS officials stated that DHS solicited comments from other federal departments and state, local, and tribal governments on the role and responsibility descriptions for each of these entities listed in the QHSR report. DHS Plans to Implement a National Risk Assessment as Part of the Next QHSR
Through the QHSR, DHS identified various threats confronting homeland security but did not conduct a risk assessment for the QHSR. DHS has called for the use of national risk assessments for homeland security but did not conduct such an assessment as part of the 2010 QHSR. DHS officials stated that at the time DHS conducted the QHSR, DHS did not have a well-developed methodology or the analytical resources to complete a national risk assessment that would include likelihood and consequence assessments. In recognition of a need to develop a national risk assessment methodology, the QHSR National Risk Assessment Study Group was created as part of the QHSR process. DHS Developed BUR Monitoring Mechanisms and Measures but Could Strengthen Its Prioritization Efforts by Using Risk Information
DHS Prioritized Its BUR Initiatives but Could Benefit from Considering Risk Information in Future Efforts
DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information as one of these factors. First, the implementation mechanisms or initiatives to be prioritized based on risk information should be comparable in terms of the nature of the risks addressed. Consideration of risk information could help strengthen DHS’s prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the QHSR, including determining which initiatives or programs should be implemented in the short or longer term and the resources required for implementation. 4). Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen DHS’s planning, management, and execution of the next QHSR, we recommend that the DHS Assistant Secretary for Policy take the following three actions: Provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR process to help ensure that stakeholders are provided the time needed to review QHSR documents and provide input into the review, and build this time into the department’s project planning for the next QHSR. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
The objectives for this report were to evaluate the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (1) consulted with stakeholders in developing the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) strategy; (2) conducted a national risk assessment to develop the QHSR; and (3) developed priorities, plans, monitoring mechanisms, and performance measures for implementing the QHSR and Bottom-Up Review (BUR) initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States continues to face a range of evolving threats, such as the 2010 attempted attack on the nation's air cargo system, that underscore why homeland security planning efforts are crucial to the security of the nation. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide a comprehensive examination of the U.S. homeland security strategy every 4 years. In response, DHS issued its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report in February 2010 and a Bottom-Up Review (BUR) report in July 2010, to identify initiatives to implement the QHSR. As requested, this report addresses the extent to which DHS (1) consulted with stakeholders in developing the QHSR, (2) conducted a national risk assessment, and (3) developed priorities, plans, monitoring mechanisms, and performance measures for implementing the QHSR and BUR initiatives. GAO analyzed relevant statutes and DHS documents on the QHSR and BUR processes and, in response to a request for comments on the processes, received comments from 63 of the 85 federal and nonfederal stakeholders it contacted. Their responses are not generalizable, but provided perspectives on the processes.
What GAO Found
DHS solicited input from various stakeholder groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS officials, stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of the QHSR noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder consultations and outreach to nonfederal stakeholders. DHS consulted with stakeholders--federal agencies; department and component officials; state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; academics; and policy experts-- through various mechanisms, such as the solicitation of papers to help frame the QHSR and a web-based discussion forum. DHS and these stakeholders identified benefits from these consultations, such as DHS receiving varied perspectives. However, stakeholders also identified challenges in the consultation process. Sixteen of 63 stakeholders who provided comments to GAO noted concerns about the time frames for providing input into the QHSR or BUR. Nine DHS stakeholders, for example, responded that the limited time available for development of the QHSR did not allow DHS to have as deep an engagement with stakeholders. Further, 9 other stakeholders commented that DHS consultations with nonfederal stakeholders, such as state, local, and private sector entities, could be enhanced by including more of these stakeholders in QHSR consultations. In addition, reports on the QHSR by the National Academy of Public Administration, which administered DHS's web-based discussion forum, and a DHS advisory committee comprised of nonfederal representatives noted that DHS could provide more time and strengthen nonfederal outreach during stakeholder consultations. By providing more time for obtaining feedback and examining mechanisms to obtain nonfederal stakeholders' input, DHS could strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations and be better positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders' input during future reviews. DHS identified threats confronting homeland security in the 2010 QHSR report, such as high-consequence weapons of mass destruction and illicit trafficking, but did not conduct a national risk assessment for the QHSR. DHS officials stated that at the time DHS conducted the QHSR, DHS did not have a well-developed methodology or the analytical resources to complete a national risk assessment that would include likelihood and consequence assessments--key elements of a national risk assessment. To develop an approach to national risk assessments, DHS created a study group as part of the QHSR process that developed a national risk assessment methodology. DHS officials plan to implement a national risk assessment in advance of the next QHSR, which DHS anticipates conducting in fiscal year 2013. DHS developed priorities, plans, monitoring mechanisms, and performance measures, but did not consider risk information in making its prioritization efforts. DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information as one of these factors, as called for in GAO's prior work and DHS's risk management guidance, because of differences among the initiatives that made it difficult to compare risks across them, among other things. Consideration of risk information during future implementation efforts could help strengthen DHS's prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the QHSR, including assisting in determinations of which initiatives should be implemented in the short or longer term.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that for future reviews, DHS provide the time needed for stakeholder consultations, explore options for consulting with nonfederal stakeholders, and examine how risk information could be considered in prioritizing QHSR initiatives. DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-768 | gao_GAO-05-768_0 | Others, however, see a more limited government role and argue that government officials should focus their efforts on addressing regulatory provisions that may interfere with the development of SSS operations. For the two operations we examined, the effect of these potential obstacles varied. General reluctance to try new modes. Port infrastructure. For example, DOT has not thoroughly assessed key issues, such as the potential impact of federal involvement in developing SSS on the competitive balance among all transportation modes; lessons learned from new SSS services, such as the Gulf Coast and Northeast services that we examined; and obstacles and mitigating actions necessary to developing SSS, particularly with respect to the reluctance by shippers and logistics providers to using this option. The Complexities of the Transportation System and Growing Fiscal Constraints Present Challenges for State and Local Decision Makers
Improving the efficiency of the nation’s surface transportation system is a particularly complex challenge because it encompasses many modes— water, highway, transit, and rail—on systems owned, funded, and operated by both the public and private sectors. A Public Investment Approach Can Help Public Decision Makers Guard against an Inefficient Use of Public Resources
As calls for increased transportation investments come amid growing concerns about the size of federal and state budget deficits, state and local decision makers must guard against any waste of limited public resources when making transportation investment decisions. Using the work of transportation experts and our own experience in evaluating freight mobility projects, we have developed a public investment approach to guide public decisions about freight improvement projects. As can be seen in figure 4, this approach encourages public decision makers to consider four steps: (1) establish a rationale for public involvement in a project, (2) develop a systematic framework to evaluate the merits of projects, (3) determine the level and type of public support to be provided, and (4) evaluate projects to ensure that intended benefits have been achieved. However, there is no federal or other mechanism that would require its use or even ensure that it is considered in evaluating transportation investment decisions. DOT has made the development and implementation of SSS a national priority for enhancing freight mobility and has undertaken numerous activities but has not articulated a clear rationale for what the federal role, if any, should be. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine why short sea shipping (SSS) is being considered as an alternative method for transporting freight and factors that may affect its viability as an approach, we conducted a literature review of reports and studies related to freight transportation issues; interviewed freight transportation stakeholders representing all levels of government; interviewed private-sector stakeholders involved in various aspects of the freight transportation system; and examined two existing SSS operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
A dramatic increase in freight moving on the nation's highways and rail lines, coupled with growing congestion and infrastructure limitations, has prompted DOT to explore new mobility-enhancing options like short sea shipping (SSS)--transporting freight by water between domestic ports, either along the coast or on inland waterways. This report describes (1) why SSS is being considered and factors affecting its viability, (2) the department's role in the development of this option, and (3) issues that should be considered by public transportation decision makers when making investment decisions about this option or other types of projects for addressing freight mobility challenges. This report is based on a review of pertinent studies, federal activities, and an examination of two new SSS operations.
What GAO Found
Transportation experts have cited numerous benefits, such as congestion mitigation, for developing short sea shipping, but they have also noted numerous obstacles, such as shippers' reluctance to try a different mode for transporting their cargo, that impede its development. Absent in-depth information on the benefits and obstacles, opinions vary on how to proceed. Some stakeholders favor extensive public involvement, including federal funding for projects while others see a more limited public role, such as addressing regulatory provisions that may interfere with its development. The two new services GAO examined provide insights--but no clear answers--about the viability of this approach. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has made short sea shipping a high-priority option to enhance freight mobility and has drafted a policy proposal to provide potential federal funding. So far, the department's efforts have been too narrowly focused. Before determining that federal funding should be applied to its development, a thorough understanding of key issues is required, such as the potential effect of federal involvement on the competitive balance among all transportation modes, lessons to be learned from recent start-up services, and actions that could mitigate identified obstacles, particularly with respect to reluctance to use this option. Public transportation decision makers are also actively considering short sea shipping in the context of a range of other options to address freight mobility challenges in their jurisdictions. Improving freight mobility, however, is a particularly complex challenge because the freight transportation system encompasses many modes on systems owned, funded, and operated by both the public and private sectors. In light of growing budget deficits, public decision makers must guard against waste of limited public resources when making investment decisions. This report contains a four-step approach for helping public decision makers define the rationale for public involvement, assess the merits of projects, determine the appropriate level and type of public support, and evaluate project results. |
gao_GAO-07-161 | gao_GAO-07-161_0 | States Reported Changes as Well as Improvements in Reading Instruction Since the Inception of Reading First
States reported that there have been a number of changes and improvements in reading instruction since the implementation of Reading First. There has been an increased emphasis on the five key components of reading, assessments, and professional development with more classroom time being devoted to reading activities. However, according to publishers we interviewed, there have been limited changes to instructional material. Publishers Reported Making Few Changes to Reading Programs, and States Reported Adopting a Variety of Approaches to Select Reading Programs
Three of the four major publishers of reading programs we spoke with reported that they had not made significant changes to the content of their reading programs as a result of Reading First. States Awarded Reading First Sub- Grants to School Districts Using a Variety of Different Criteria, and Some States Reported Difficulties with Implementation
States varied in how they exercised their flexibility to set additional eligibility and award criteria as allowed by the Reading First program, and some states reported difficulty with implementing key aspects of the Reading First program while other states did not. Of these districts, nearly 2,100 applied for and nearly 1,200 received Reading First sub-grants in the states’ first school year of funding. After applying eligibility criteria, Education reported that states determined that over 3,400 school districts were eligible to apply for Reading First sub- grants for states’ first school year of funding, or about 20 percent of all school districts nationwide. 3). Education Provided a Wide Range of Guidance, Assistance, and Oversight, Generally Satisfying State Officials, but Education Lacked Controls to Guard against Mandating or Endorsing Curricula and Did Not Provide Written Monitoring Procedures
Education officials provided states a wide variety of guidance, assistance, and oversight, but Education lacked written procedures to guide its interactions with the states and provided limited information on its monitoring procedures. Education’s guidance and assistance included written guidance, preparatory workshops, feedback during the application process, and feedback from monitoring visits. For example, according to state officials, Education officials and contractors made suggestions to some states to adopt or eliminate certain reading programs, assessments, or professional development providers. For example, officials from four states reported receiving suggestions from Education or its contractors to adopt specific reading programs or assessments. We also found that while Education officials laid out an ambitious plan to annually monitor every state, they failed to develop written procedures guiding its monitoring visits. As a result, states did not always understand monitoring response procedures, timelines, and expectations. Recommendations
In addition to addressing the IG’s recommendations to develop internal (1) policies and procedures to guide program managers on when to solicit advice from General Counsel and (2) guidance on the prohibitions imposed by section 103(b) of the DEOA, we recommend that, in order to ensure that the department complies with statutory prohibitions against directing, mandating, or endorsing state and local curricular decisions, the Secretary of Education also establish control procedures to guide departmental officials and contractors in their interactions with states, districts, and schools. (2) What criteria have states used to award Reading First sub-grants to districts, and what, if any, difficulty did states face in implementing the program? We conducted a Web- based survey of the Reading First Directors in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Reading First program was designed to help students in kindergarten through third grade develop stronger reading skills. This report examines the implementation of the Reading First program, including (1) changes that have occurred to reading instruction; (2) criteria states have used to award sub-grants to districts, and the difficulties, if any, states faced during implementation; and (3) the guidance, assistance, and oversight the Department of Education (Education) provides states. GAO's study is designed to complement several studies by Education's Inspector General (IG) in order to provide a national perspective on some of the specific issues being studied by the IG. For this report, GAO administered a Web-based survey to 50 states and the District of Columbia, and conducted site visits and interviews with federal, state, and local education officials and providers of reading programs and assessments.
What GAO Found
States reported that there have been a number of changes to, as well as improvements in, reading instruction since the implementation of Reading First. These included an increased emphasis on the five key components of reading (awareness of individual sounds, phonics, vocabulary development, reading fluency, and reading comprehension), assessments, and professional development with more classroom time being devoted to reading activities. However, according to publishers we interviewed, there have been limited changes to instructional material. Similarly, states report that few changes occurred with regard to their approved reading lists. States awarded Reading First sub-grants using a variety of different eligibility and award criteria, and some states reported difficulties with implementing key aspects of the program. After applying federal and state eligibility and award criteria, Education reported that over 3,400 districts were eligible to apply for sub-grants in the states' first school year of funding. Of these districts, nearly 2,100 applied for and nearly 1,200 districts received Reading First funding. Education officials made a variety of resources available to states during the application and implementation processes, and states were generally satisfied with the guidance and assistance they received. However, Education developed no written policies and procedures to guide Education officials and contractors in their interactions with state officials and guard against officials mandating or directing states' decisions about reading programs or assessments, which is prohibited by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) and other laws. Based on survey results, some state officials reported receiving suggestions from Education officials or contractors to adopt or eliminate certain reading programs or assessments. Similarly, the IG reported in September 2006 that the Department intervened to influence a state's and several school districts' selection of reading programs. In addition, while Education officials laid out an ambitious plan for annual monitoring of every state's implementation, they did not develop written procedures guiding monitoring visits and, as a result, states did not always understand monitoring procedures, timelines, and expectations for taking corrective actions. |
gao_GAO-12-79 | gao_GAO-12-79_0 | Agencies Foster Green Building in the Nonfederal Sector through More Than 90 Initiatives, Primarily for Energy Conservation or Efficiency
We identified 94 federal initiatives that foster green building in the nonfederal sector; these initiatives, implemented by 11 agencies, vary in how they foster green building, including which elements of green building they foster, whether fostering green building is a primary purpose of the initiative, what types of assistance they provide, and what groups are expected to benefit. We examined the 94 initiatives by (1) the type of green building elements they foster, (2) whether they foster green building directly or indirectly as part of a broader effort, (3) the type of assistance they provide, and (4) the recipients expected to directly benefit from the assistance. According to our analysis of questionnaire responses, about three- quarters of the 94 initiatives foster green building through more than one element, including 21 initiatives across seven agencies that foster green building through all six green building elements. The Overall Results of Federal Green Building Initiatives in the Nonfederal Sector Are Unknown
About one-third of the federal initiatives we identified have green building goals and performance measures; therefore, the overall results of most initiatives and their related investments are unknown. Agency officials provided several reasons for not having performance information on the results of most green building initiatives for the nonfederal sector. Agencies Have Begun to Collaborate to Assess Results for Some Initiatives, but without Apparent Governmentwide Collaboration to Assess Overall Results
We identified some instances in which agencies are collaborating on specific initiatives, including establishing compatible procedures and adopting common performance measures for assessing results. Agencies and programs working collaboratively can often achieve more public value than when they work in isolation. According to these officials, HUD has collaborated with EPA on the adoption of the Energy Star standard in HUD programs. Without such an effort, agencies may be missing opportunities to, among other things, reach agreement on governmentwide goals and measures for assessing the overall progress of their efforts to foster green building in the nonfederal sector. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help assess the results of investments in individual federal initiatives to foster green building in the nonfederal sector, as well as their combined results, we recommend that the Secretaries of Energy and of Housing and Urban Development work with the Administrator of EPA in leading an effort with other agencies that are implementing green building initiatives to collaborate on identifying performance information, such as shared goals and common performance measures, for green building initiatives for the nonfederal sector. USDA also provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify current initiatives by federal agencies to foster green building in the nonfederal sector and (2) determine what is known about the results of these initiatives on fostering green building in the nonfederal sector. For the purposes of this review, the nonfederal sector includes private, state, local, and tribal entities. We identified at least one initiative at each of the following 11 agencies: the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Education, Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Transportation (DOT), and the Treasury (Treasury); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the National Institute of Standards and Technology; and the Small Business Administration. b) Executive Order? i) Technical assistance?............................... .............................................. b)
Individual property owners or renters?.... ......................... f) State governments? | Why GAO Did This Study
Economic, environmental, and health concerns have spurred interest in "green building"--construction and maintenance practices designed to make efficient use of resources, reduce environmental problems, and provide long-term financial and health benefits. Federal laws and executive orders direct agencies to meet green building standards in federal buildings and to foster green building in the nonfederal sector; the latter includes private, state, local, and tribal entities and accounts for the majority of the nation's buildings. GAO was asked to (1) identify current initiatives by federal agencies to foster green building in the nonfederal sector and (2) determine what is known about the results of these initiatives. As part of the review, GAO sent questionnaires to the 11 agencies implementing the initiatives identified, including the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); examined agency documents; and spoke with agency officials. GAO did not report funding data because officials stated that agencies do not track many green building funds separately.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 94 federal initiatives--implemented by 11 agencies--that foster green building in the nonfederal sector. About two-thirds of these initiatives are implemented by HUD (29 initiatives), EPA (18), and DOE (17). According to GAO's analysis of agency questionnaire responses, the initiatives vary in how they foster green building in the following ways: (1) Elements fostered. All initiatives foster at least one of six green building elements GAO identified. Three-quarters foster more than one element, and 21 initiatives across 7 agencies foster all six elements. (2) Direct or indirect fostering. Over two-thirds (64) of the initiatives foster green building directly, and the rest foster green building as part of a broader effort that is focused not primarily on green building but on other purposes, such as expanding the supply of affordable housing for low-income elderly. (3) Type of assistance. The initiatives provide multiple types of assistance, mostly through grants (47 initiatives) and technical assistance (45). (4) Recipients expected to benefit. The direct beneficiaries identified by agencies range from individual property owners and renters to state governments. About one-third of the initiatives have green building goals and performance measures; however, the overall results of most initiatives and their related investments are unknown. For example, according to HUD officials, to measure the results of the Green Retrofit Program for Multifamily Housing, HUD analyzes energy consumption data before and after retrofitting properties. Other agency officials reported various reasons for not having goals and measures, such as challenges in gathering reliable performance data. GAO identified some instances in which agencies have begun to collaborate to assess results but did not identify governmentwide collaboration on initiatives for the nonfederal sector. As GAO has reported, agencies and programs working collaboratively can often achieve more public value than when they work in isolation. Agencies with green building initiatives for the nonfederal sector may be missing opportunities to, among other things, reach agreement on governmentwide goals and measures for assessing the overall progress of their green building efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE, HUD, and EPA lead an effort to collaborate with other agencies on assessing the results of federal green building initiatives for the nonfederal sector. DOE, HUD, and EPA generally agreed with the recommendation, and HUD and other agencies provided technical clarifications, which GAO incorporated into the report as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-01-804 | gao_GAO-01-804_0 | Conclusion
The District’s fiscal year 2000 performance report is an improvement over the previous year’s in that it meets some of the statutory requirements that the previous report did not. However, the extensive changes that the District made to its fiscal year 2000 performance goals during the fiscal year undermine the usefulness of the resulting report because the District did not include critical information needed by Congress and other stakeholders. Such information, identifying how, when, and why specific goals were altered and the decision-making and accountability implications of those changes, is important to Congress and others so that they can have confidence in the validity and completeness of the reported performance data. In addition, the report does not cover all significant activities of the District government. Sustained progress is needed to address the critical performance and other management challenges that the District faces. The District recognizes the shortcomings with its performance management efforts and has stated a commitment to addressing them. The effective implementation of the various initiatives underway in the District is vital to the success of the District’s efforts to create a more focused, results- oriented approach to management and decision-making—an approach that is based on clear goals, sound performance and cost information, and a budget process that uses this information in allocating resources. | What GAO Found
The District of Columbia's fiscal year 2000 performance report is an improvement in that it meets some of the statutory requirements that the previous year's report did not. However, the extensive changes that the District made to its fiscal year 2000 performance goals during the fiscal year undermine the report's usefulness because the District did not include critical information needed by Congress and other stakeholders. Such information, identifying how, when, and why specific goals were altered and the decision-making and accountability implications of those changes, is important to Congress and others so that they can have confidence in the validity and completeness of the reported performance data. Also, the report does not cover all significant activities of the District government. Sustained progress is needed to address the critical performance and other management challenges that the District faces. The District recognizes the shortcomings with its performance management efforts and has stated a commitment to addressing them. The effective implementation of the various initiatives underway in the District is vital to the success of the District's efforts to create a more focused, results-oriented approach to management and decision-making--an approach that is based on clear goals, sound performance and cost information, and a budget process that uses this information in allocating resources. |
gao_GAO-05-897 | gao_GAO-05-897_0 | DOE improved its ability to compare laboratories’ costs in fiscal year 1997, when it began requiring contractors to report all functional support costs, regardless of how they were classified. Functional support cost data facilitate comparisons of laboratories’ costs because they are intended to include all costs that support laboratory missions, regardless of whether a particular laboratory has classified the support costs as direct or indirect. Two DOE Laboratories’ Indirect Cost Rates Have Increased and Three Have Decreased, but These Rates Are Not Comparable across Laboratories
From fiscal years 2000 through 2004, indirect cost rates increased at two laboratories operated by DOE contractors and decreased at three. While functional support cost rates facilitate improved analysis of laboratory costs, several DOE and contractor officials told us that the definitions for some categories are somewhat unclear, leading to confusion in how to categorize certain costs. The laboratory’s indirect cost rate cannot be compared with those of DOE laboratories without a detailed understanding of differences in (1) contract provisions and other requirements; (2) how contractors classify costs as direct or indirect; and (3) research missions and activities, such as the added costs at the DOE laboratories associated with safety requirements for handling radioactive and other hazardous materials. DOE and Its Contractors Have Taken Actions to Reduce Indirect and Other Support Costs, but Opportunities Exist for Further Reductions
DOE and its contractors have numerous efforts under way to reduce indirect and other support costs; however, we identified several efforts that could be strengthened to further reduce costs. DOE Is Increasingly Using Contractual Incentives to Encourage Cost Savings but Is Expanding a Key Program without Evaluating Its Effectiveness
Recently, NNSA has taken several actions to improve business operations and achieve support cost savings through contractual incentives. For example, the Los Alamos contract’s performance measures that focused on business operations increased from about 28 percent in fiscal year 2002 to 40 percent in fiscal year 2005. DOE did not require prompt action to adjust benefits at the three laboratories that exceeded the benchmarked value. Furthermore, while DOE has begun to address the $1.9 billion backlog of deferred maintenance to reduce long-term costs and improve the safe, efficient, and reliable operation of equipment and buildings, only Lawrence Livermore and Sandia have demonstrated sustainable approaches that successfully reduced their backlogs. DOE, however, does not require laboratories to have such programs, and some laboratories have not instituted one. To assess the efforts of DOE and its laboratory contractors to reduce support costs and identify additional opportunities for savings, we visited each of the five laboratories to interview senior managers and obtain supporting documentation, interviewed DOE officials, and examined prior GAO and DOE Inspector General reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2004, about two-thirds of the Department of Energy's (DOE) $26.9 billion in spending went to 28 major facilities--laboratories, production and test facilities, and nuclear waste cleanup and storage facilities. DOE spent about $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2004 to support the mission of its five largest laboratories. GAO was asked to examine (1) recent trends in indirect and functional support cost rates for these five laboratories, noting key differences in how contractors classify costs, and (2) the efforts of DOE and its contractors to reduce indirect and other support costs and identify additional opportunities for savings.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 2000 through 2004, laboratory-reported rates for indirect costs--those not charged directly to a specific program--increased at two laboratories and decreased at three. However, indirect cost rates cannot be compared across laboratories because contractors classify different portions of support costs as indirect. To facilitate analysis, DOE requires the laboratories to report what it called "functional support costs," or costs that support missions, regardless of whether they are classified as direct or indirect costs. Using this measure, three laboratories' rates--that is, functional support costs divided by total costs--increased and two laboratories' rates decreased over the 5-year period. While functional support cost rates improved comparability, several DOE and contractor officials said that the definitions for some categories of support costs, such as "facilities management," are unclear, leading to confusion and inconsistent reporting. DOE and its contractors have initiated several steps to reduce indirect and other support costs but can take additional actions to improve their implementation. First, DOE's laboratory contracts have increasingly included incentives to encourage cost reductions. In fiscal year 2004, for example, the National Nuclear Security Administration began an "award-term" pilot program that allows a contractor to earn extra contract years based on performance and cost-saving achievements. However, DOE is expanding use of this incentive without evaluating it. Second, DOE requires its contractors to benchmark employee benefits and to reduce benefits if they exceed the benchmark, but DOE did not promptly enforce these requirements at one laboratory and exempted two others. Third, DOE has begun to address a $1.9 billion backlog of deferred maintenance to reduce long-term costs. However, without a more rigorous approach, the backlog will persist well into future decades. Lastly, while some laboratories have used process improvement programs to streamline business processes and reduce costs, others do not have such programs, nor are they required to have them. |
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