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gao_NSIAD-98-20 | gao_NSIAD-98-20_0 | The purpose of this policy is to reduce the government’s risk of financial exposure in the event a contractor fails to perform. Air Force supplemental guidance includes a standard contract clause allowing contracting officers to use their discretion in determining the amount to be withheld. At the Naval Sea Systems Command and the Naval Air System Command (NAVAIR) procurement and contracting officials agreed that amounts withheld should directly relate to the anticipated cost of work to be performed by a contractor after delivery. In July 1997, AFMC revised this clause and left the determination of the amount withheld to the contracting officer’s discretion. Inadequate Withholds Result in Contractors Being Paid for Work Not Completed
Our review of four selected acquisition programs indicated that each of the services conditionally accepted nonconforming items, with the expectation that the contractors would correct known deficiencies and complete unfinished work. When conditionally accepting nonconforming items, each of the services paid contractors the billing prices, assuming 100-percent completion, less some amount that was withheld for nonconforming or unfinished work. The services differed in how they determined the withhold amounts, but in each case, the amounts were less than the estimated costs to correct known deficiencies and complete unfinished work. However, the amount withheld was significantly less than the estimated cost to correct known deficiencies and finish other incomplete work. Program officials told us that the withhold policy implemented in the C-17 program was not intended to cover the estimated cost and profit of the work remaining to be done by the contractor after conditional acceptance. Our review indicated that the cost and profit to correct deficiencies and complete unfinished work for production lots III and IV exceeded the $47 million withheld by about $61 million, based on the contractor’s estimates of the cost of the aircraft at completion, or about $127 million, based on DCMC’s estimates of the cost of aircraft at completion. In July 1995, the program office modified the contract’s conditional acceptance clause to require an additional withhold amount on program year 1 and 2 vehicles. At the time of our review, the contractor had generally completed work and corrected deficiencies identified at the time of conditional acceptance. Although the contracting officer withheld payment for the above noted work, he did not withhold for other deficiencies. As a result, the services’ withholding practices are inconsistent and contractors are being paid for work not completed at the time of delivery. We also spoke with the DOD Director of Defense Procurement and with acquisition and contracting officials from the Departments of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency located in Washington, D.C., to determine their policies and procedures for accepting temporarily nonconforming items. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Air Force's procedures for payment to contractors for work not completed at the time of delivery, focusing on whether: (1) this situation occurred in other programs; and (2) additional guidance was needed to avoid paying contractors for work not done at the time of delivery.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its review of four selected Air Force, Army, and Navy acquisition programs showed that each of the services accept items conditionally; (2) however, federal and Department of Defense (DOD) regulations do not provide guidance to contracting officers for determining amounts to be withheld from payments in these cases; (3) there is no consensus among Office of the Secretary of Defense and service officials as to what policy should govern payments at the time of conditional acceptance; (4) some officials agreed that the amount withheld should reflect the estimated cost and profit associated with the work to be done by a contractor after delivery while others indicated that contracting officers should have discretion to withhold whatever amount they determine appropriate; (5) the extent of service guidance ranged from the Army providing no guidance to standard Air Force and Navy contract clauses that leave determining the amount to be withheld to the contracting officer's discretion; (6) such guidance does not ensure that the amount withheld reflects the estimated cost and profit to correct known deficiencies and perform other incomplete work; (7) as a result, it lacks the safeguards necessary to reduce the government's risk of financial exposure and is inconsistent with the policy of paying only for completed work; (8) GAO's review of the four selected acquisition programs showed that when items were conditionally accepted, each of the services paid contractors the billing price, assuming 100-percent completion, less some amount for nonconforming or unfinished work; (9) in general, the amounts withheld were less than the costs to correct known deficiencies and complete unfinished work and resulted in contractors being paid for work that had not been performed at the time of conditional acceptance; (10) for example, the estimated price to correct known deficiencies and complete unfinished work on two C-17 production contracts exceeded the amounts withheld by about $61 million, based on the contractor's cost estimates, or $127 million based on the cost estimates used by the Defense Contract Management Command in administering the contract; (11) the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program accepted five systems with six conditional waivers for which no money was withheld; (12) program officials told GAO that they believed the contractor would correct the deficiencies; and (13) the program office was not able to provide an estimate of the potential cost of this work. |
gao_GAO-04-254 | gao_GAO-04-254_0 | Missile Defense Agency Actions Taken or Planned to Address DOT&E Recommendations
The August 2000 DOT&E report summarized the progress, up to that date, of the National Missile Defense program and the adequacy of testing in the context of a deployment decision. A detailed assessment indicating whether actions have been initiated by MDA and what their timing is relative to the September 2004 initial defensive capability date can be found in our June 2003 classified report on this subject. Operational Realism
The recommendations on operational realism reflect limitations of the current test range. DOT&E called for an expansion of engagement conditions and suggested adding more intercept regions and launch locations to achieve new intercept geometries, higher closing velocities, and longer ranges flown by the interceptor during flight testing. By September 2004, one of the five new intercept regions, north of Reagan Test Site, will have been exercised. DOT&E’S Recommendations on Ground Testing
The 13 ground testing recommendations formulated by DOT&E in its August 2000 report are focused concerns encompassing four areas: (1) realistic testing of kill vehicle functions in a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HWIL) facility, (2) ground-based lethality testing, (3) development of the system-level simulation known as the Lead System Integrator Integration Distributed Simulation (LIDS), and (4) Operations in a Nuclear Environment (OPINE) testing of kill vehicle components. In general, DOT&E’s recommendations on ground testing are not being addressed. Although an initial test capability had been planned for the 2004 time frame, testing at the Arnold Engineering facility has been deferred beyond Block 2004 based on Test Bed funding constraints. MDA has not yet scheduled “pop quiz” testing in relation to kill vehicle’s capability to perform target discrimination. MDA initiated and continues to fund analysis programs for investigating promising technical concepts to improve its capabilities against enemy countermeasures. On December 16, 2002, the President directed DOD to begin fielding the first increment of the multi-element ballistic missile defense system in 2004. MDA cannot at this time formulate a credible assessment of system-level effectiveness, because critical components like the Cobra Dane radar and interceptor boosters have yet to be developed and tested in a flight test environment, and no initial defensive capability is available for a system-level demonstration and evaluation. The capabilities of the Cobra Dane radar will not be demonstrated in flight testing before September 2004. However, interceptors will not be launched out of Fort Greeley in IFT-14 and IFT-15 (the remaining integrated flight tests to be conducted before September 2004). II for a reprinted version of DOD’s comments.) | Why GAO Did This Study
In August 2000, the Defense Department's (DOD) Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), made 50 recommendations on a test program for a system to defeat long-range ballistic missile threats against the United States. DOD's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to begin fielding the system by September 2004. GAO examined (1) how MDA addressed DOT&E's recommendations and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of the system to be fielded by September 2004. GAO issued a classified report on this subject in June 2003. This unclassified, updated version reflects changes in MDA's test schedule.
What GAO Found
MDA is addressing most of DOT&E's recommendations on flight testing but will not complete many actions before September 2004. For example, DOT&E recommended removing flight test range limitations by adding more intercept regions and launch locations to add greater realism to its tests. MDA is expanding the test range infrastructure to add five intercept regions and target and interceptor launches out of new locations. By September 2004, one of the regions will be tested. MDA is generally not addressing DOT&E's proposals on ground testing. For example, although MDA had begun upgrading a ground facility to provide a realistic testing environment for the interceptor, MDA deferred testing at the facility to fund other priorities. Finally, MDA is addressing DOT&E's recommendations on discrimination--the system's ability to find an enemy warhead among decoys--by funding analysis programs. Predictions of how well the system will defeat long-range ballistic missiles are based on limited data. No component of the system to be fielded by September 2004 has been flight-tested in its deployed configuration. Significant uncertainties surround the capability to be fielded by September: MDA will not demonstrate in flight tests a critical radar called Cobra Dane before that date or conduct a system-level demonstration, and has yet to test its three-stage boosters as part of a planned intercept. |
gao_GAO-11-881 | gao_GAO-11-881_0 | DHS Continues to Implement and Strengthen Its Mission Functions, but Key Operational and Management Challenges Remain
Since DHS began operations in March 2003, it has developed and implemented key policies, programs, and activities for implementing its homeland security missions and functions that have created and strengthened a foundation to achieve its potential as it continues to mature. DHS implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas. Specifically: DHS issued strategic and operational plans to guide its homeland security efforts, such as the QHSR, which provided a strategic framework for homeland security, and the National Response Framework, which is built upon coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation, linking all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. DHS successfully hired, trained, and deployed workforces, such as a federal screening workforce at airports nationwide. DHS created new programs and offices, or expanded existing ones, to implement key homeland security responsibilities, such as establishing the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team to, among other things, coordinate the nation’s efforts to prepare for, prevent, and respond to cyber threats to systems and communications networks. However, our work has shown that more work remains for DHS to address weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts and to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. For example, DHS did not sufficiently define what capabilities and benefits would be delivered, by when, and at what cost for US-VISIT—which is to verify the identities of foreign visitors entering and exiting the United States by storing and processing biometric and biographic information—and has not yet reached a decision on deploying an exit capability. DHS subsequently canceled this program. These accomplishments are especially noteworthy given that the department has had to work to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department while implementing its missions—a difficult undertaking for any organization and one that can take years to achieve even under less daunting circumstances. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
This report addresses the following question: What progress has the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) made in implementing its mission functions since it began operations; what work, if any, remains; and what crosscutting and management issues have affected DHS’s implementation efforts? This report is based primarily on work that we have completed since DHS began its operations in March 2003, with an emphasis on reports issued since 2008 to reflect our most recent work, supplemented by DHS Office of Inspector General (IG) reports and updated information and documentation provided by the department in July and August 2011. As part of these responsibilities, TSA performs or oversees the performance of security operations at the nation’s more than 460 commercial airports.Key elements that comprise aviation security include: the aviation security workforce, including hiring, training, and deploying a screening workforce; passenger prescreening—comparing passenger information to the Selectee and No Fly lists; passenger checkpoint screening, including using staff, policies and procedures, and technology to address potential vulnerabilities; checked baggage screening, including deploying explosives detection systems and other technologies to screen baggage for explosives; air cargo screening, which involves using staff, policies and procedures, and technology to screen domestic and high-risk international inbound air cargo transported on passenger aircraft; and security of airports, including airport perimeter security and access controls. Additionally, TSA does not yet have a mechanism to verify the accuracy of domestic and inbound air cargo screening data. Appendix IV: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats
What This Area Includes
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leads federal interagency coordination and planning for emergency response to catastrophic events such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents in the United States, and is responsible for assessing the risks posed by various CBRN agents. However, work remains in implementing the global nuclear detection strategy, and DHS faced difficulties in developing new technologies to detect radiological and nuclear materials. For example, ICE took action to address a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States, and lacks measures for assessing its progress in addressing overstays. It is also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery Framework, intended to provide a model to identify and address challenges that arise during the disaster recovery process. We also reported that FEMA awards certain preparedness grants based on a reasonable risk methodology. However, more work remains in FEMA’s efforts to assess capabilities for all-hazards preparedness, provide long-term disaster recovery assistance, and strengthen alert systems. In September 2007, DHS issued the National Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based preparedness as a systematic effort that includes sequential steps to first determine capability requirements and then assess current capability levels. As a companion to the Guidelines, FEMA issued a Target Capabilities List, designed to provide a national-level generic model of capabilities defining all-hazards preparedness. DHS concurred with our recommendation. GAO. GAO. Border Security: DHS's Visa Security Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide. GAO. U.S. Emergency Preparedness and Response
GAO. GAO. GAO. Efficacy of DHS Grants Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The events of September 11, 2001, led to profound changes in government policies and structures to confront homeland security threats. Most notably, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in 2003 with key missions that included preventing terrorist attacks from occurring in the United States, and minimizing the damages from any attacks that may occur. DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 1,000 products on DHS's operations in such areas as border and transportation security and emergency management, among others. As requested, this report addresses DHS's progress in implementing its homeland security missions since it began operations, work remaining, and issues affecting implementation efforts. This report is based on GAO's past and ongoing work, supplemented with DHS Office of Inspector General reports, with an emphasis on reports issued since 2008. GAO also analyzed information provided by DHS in July and August 2011 on recent actions taken in response to prior work.
What GAO Found
Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. As it continues to mature, however, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. DHS's accomplishments include developing strategic and operational plans; deploying workforces; and establishing new, or expanding existing, offices and programs. For example, DHS (1) issued plans to guide its efforts, such as the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which provides a framework for homeland security, and the National Response Framework, which outlines disaster response guiding principles; (2) successfully hired, trained, and deployed workforces, such as a federal screening workforce to assume security screening responsibilities at airports nationwide; and (3) created new programs and offices to implement its homeland security responsibilities, such as establishing the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team to help coordinate efforts to address cybersecurity threats. Such accomplishments are noteworthy given that DHS has had to work to transform itself into a fully functioning department while implementing its missions--a difficult undertaking that can take years to achieve. While DHS has made progress, its transformation remains high risk due to its management challenges. Examples of progress made and work remaining include: Border security. DHS implemented the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program to verify the identities of foreign visitors entering and exiting the country by processing biometric and biographic information. However, DHS has not yet determined how to implement a biometric exit capability and has taken action to address a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States (individuals who legally entered the country but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission). Aviation security. DHS developed and implemented Secure Flight, a program for screening airline passengers against terrorist watchlist records. DHS also developed new programs and technologies to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo. However, DHS does not yet have a plan for deploying checked baggage screening technologies to meet recently enhanced explosive detection requirements, a mechanism to verify the accuracy of data to help ensure that air cargo screening is being conducted at reported levels, or approved technology to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container. Emergency preparedness and response. DHS issued the National Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based preparedness, and a Target Capabilities List to provide a national-level generic model of capabilities defining all-hazards preparedness. DHS is also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery Framework, and awards preparedness grants based on a reasonable risk methodology. However, DHS needs to strengthen its efforts to assess capabilities for all-hazards preparedness, and develop a long-term recovery structure to better align timing and involvement with state and local governments' capacity. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. DHS assessed risks posed by CBRN threats and deployed capabilities to detect CBRN threats. However, DHS should work to improve its coordination of CBRN risk assessments, and identify monitoring mechanisms for determining progress made in implementing the global nuclear detection strategy. GAO's work identified three themes at the foundation of DHS's challenges. This report contains no new recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-70 | gao_GAO-16-70_0 | U.S. Table 1 shows total and travel obligations for the judiciary from fiscal years 2003 through 2014. Judges’ NCR Travel Policies
Judiciary travel regulations require judges to report their NCR travel. Judges’ Reported NCR Travel Costs Averaged $8.8 Million per Year, but AOUSC Does Not Collect Specific Information on the Direct Costs to the Judiciary
Judges’ Reported Annual NCR Travel Costs Ranged from $7.2 Million to $10.2 Million for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2014
Annual NCR travel costs averaged $8.8 million per year, with a range of $7.2 million to $10.2 million for fiscal years 2003 through 2014. However, because of limitations we identified in the data in the NCR travel-reporting system, we were not able to determine the extent to which those reported costs were paid using judiciary funds rather than other federal or private sources as discussed below. Collection of NCR Travel Data Does Not Allow AOUSC to Readily Identify Judiciary’s NCR Travel Costs
While AOUSC tracks the costs of all official travel paid for by the judiciary in its accounting system of record, AOUSC’s NCR travel-reporting system does not collect judges’ information in a way that enables it to determine the costs to the judiciary rather than to private entities and other federal agencies. We found that data fields for entering information in the Judges’ Non-Case-Related Travel Reporting System about the name of funder of NCR travel lacked controls to standardize responses. Specifically, when users entered data on the name of the funder of NCR travel, they did not consistently record whether NCR travel was paid for by a court or judicial agency versus other federal agencies or private entities. According to AOUSC officials, as of November 2015, AOUSC has not decided to change the way the Judges’ Non-Case-Related Travel Reporting System collects judges’ NCR travel information, but is considering making improvements to the system to better collect judges’ NCR travel information, including collecting the judiciary’s costs of judges’ NCR travel. According to the 2015 Strategic Plan for the Federal Judiciary, Issue 6, the Judiciary’s Relationships with the Other Branches of Government, the judiciary must provide Congress timely and accurate information about issues affecting the administration of justice and demonstrate that the judiciary has a comprehensive system of oversight and review. By improving its travel-reporting system, AOUSC officials would be able to better collect required NCR travel information from judges and identify and report the costs to the judiciary of judges’ NCR travel in response to congressional member requests. The Judiciary Spent $11.5 Million on Conferences Costing over $100,000 and Followed Policies for Conference Planning and Administration
The Judiciary Spent $11.5 Million on Conferences Costing over $100,000 in Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014, and Is Taking Steps to Improve Its Cost Reporting
In accordance with judiciary policy on conference planning and administration, AOUSC issued publically available reports on conferences spending across all courts and judicial agencies for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 for conferences costing over $100,000. These reports indicated that the judiciary spent $11.5 million on 61 conferences costing over $100,000 in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Specifically, the judiciary spent $4.6 million in fiscal year 2013 and $6.9 million in fiscal year 2014 for these conferences. The Judiciary Followed Its Policies for Conference Planning and Administration
We sampled 8 conferences held in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 costing over $100,000. Our results cannot be generalized to all conferences costing over $100,000 conducted by the judiciary. However, our analysis provides insights into the judiciary’s compliance with its conference policies. The 8 conferences we sampled followed judiciary policy guidance for conference planning and administration including cost considerations, management considerations and internal controls, and site selection. Officials who planned the 8 conferences we sampled provided examples of how they considered these various cost considerations and employed various strategies to reduce administrative, conferee travel, lodging, meeting room, and technology costs. On the basis of our review, conference planners for the 8 conferences we sampled performed cost comparisons of at least two potential conference sites and provided documentation of the alternative sites considered and the rationale used for selecting the conference site as required. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better report information to Members of Congress on judiciary NCR travel costs, the Director of AOUSC should improve its data collection system to collect and identify NCR travel costs paid by the judiciary. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal judiciary consists of a system of courts that has the critical responsibility of ensuring the fair and swift administration of justice in the United States. Employees and judges within the judiciary travel for a variety purposes, including attending conferences for training and conducting judicial administration. For judges, travel not directly related to adjudicating cases has been termed NCR travel.
GAO was asked to review the judiciary's costs of judges' NCR travel and conferences. This report examines the following: (1) What has been the cost of judges' NCR travel from fiscal years 2003 through 2014 and to what extent does the judiciary collect information on its costs for judges' NCR travel? (2) How much did the judiciary spend on all conferences over $100,000 for its employees in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, and to what extent did selected conferences conform to judiciary policy on conferences? GAO analyzed judges' NCR travel data from fiscal years 2003 through 2014, reviewed procedures for collection of NCR travel information, and interviewed judiciary officials. GAO reviewed judiciary policy for conference planning and administration, information from a non-generalizable sample of eight conferences, and interviewed judicial officials responsible for planning the conferences.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2003 through 2014, judges have used a separate system to report their non-case-related (NCR) travel costs paid for by government and private sources. These NCR travel costs averaged $8.8 million per year. However, while the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) tracks the costs of all official travel in its accounting systems of record, the NCR system does not collect specific information on the direct costs to the federal judiciary for judges' NCR travel. GAO found that AOUSC's data collection system for judges' NCR travel information lacked controls to standardize responses to accurately record whether NCR travel was paid for by a court or judicial agency versus other federal agencies or private entities. As a result of these limitations in the NCR travel data, GAO was not able to determine the extent to which those reported costs were paid using judiciary funds rather than other federal or private sources. According to AOUSC officials, as of November 2015, AOUSC has not decided to change the way the Judges' Non-Case-Related Travel Reporting System collects judges' NCR travel information, but is considering making improvements to the system to better collect judges' NCR travel information, including collecting the judiciary's costs of judges' NCR travel. According to the 2015 Strategic Plan for the Federal Judiciary, the judiciary must provide Congress timely and accurate information about issues affecting the administration of justice. By improving the system, AOUSC officials would be able to better collect required NCR travel information from judges and identify and report the judiciary's costs for judges' NCR travel in response to future congressional member requests.
The judiciary spent $11.5 million on 61 conferences costing over $100,000 in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. AOUSC began collecting information on judiciary conference spending across all courts and judicial agencies in fiscal year 2013 for conferences costing over $100,000. This information was used to develop publically available reports and indicated the judiciary spent $4.6 million in fiscal year 2013 and $6.9 million in fiscal year 2014 for conferences costing over $100,000.
The judiciary followed its policies for conference planning and administration. GAO sampled 8 conferences from the 61 conferences held in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 costing over $100,000 and determined the extent to which those conferences conformed to judiciary policy on conference planning and administration. GAO's results cannot be generalized to all conferences costing over $100,000 conducted by the judiciary, but do provide insight into the judiciary's compliance with its conference policies. Conference planners for the 8 conferences GAO sampled followed judiciary policy for conference planning and administration including (1) cost considerations— suggested strategies to reduce administrative, conferee travel, lodging, meeting room, and technology costs— (2) management considerations and internal controls: judiciary requirements for internal controls and management oversight of conference planning and implementation— and (3) conference site selection— a requirement to perform cost comparisons of at least two potential conference sites and document alternative sites considered and the rationale used for selecting the conference site.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends AOUSC improve its data collection system to collect and identify judges' NCR travel costs paid by the judiciary. AOUSC agreed with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-06-980 | gao_GAO-06-980_0 | Validity of DTS Economic Analysis Questionable
Our analysis of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that two key assumptions used to estimate cost savings were not based on reliable information. Two primary areas represented the majority of the over $56 million of estimated annual net savings DTS was expected to realize— personnel savings and reduced CTO fees. Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel with the full implementation of DTS, but rather the shifting of staff to other functions. Also, as part of the Navy’s overall evaluation of the economic analysis, program officials stated that “the Navy has not identified, and conceivably will not recommend, any personnel billets for reduction.” Finally, the Naval Cost Analysis Division (NCAD) October 2003 report on the economic analysis noted that it could not validate approximately 40 percent of the Navy’s total costs, including personnel costs, in the DTS life-cycle cost estimates because credible supporting documentation was lacking. Savings Associated with Reduction of CTO Fees Are Unknown
According to the September 2003 economic analysis, DOD expected to realize annual net savings of $31 million through reduced fees paid to the CTOs because the successful implementation of DTS would enable the majority of airline tickets to be acquired with either no or minimal intervention by the CTOs. Rather, the sole support provided by the PMO-DTS was an article in a travel industry trade publication. The article was not based on information related to DTS, but rather on the experience of one private sector company. The September 2003 DTS economic analysis did not undertake an assessment of the effects of the uncertainty inherent in the estimates of benefits and costs, as required by DOD and OMB guidance. Because an economic analysis uses estimates and assumptions, it is critical that a sensitivity analysis be performed to understand the effects of the imprecision in both underlying data and modeling assumptions. Presently, the reported DTS utilization is based on a DTS Voucher Analysis Model that was developed in calendar year 2003 using estimated data, but over the years has not been completely updated with actual data. This lack of accurate and pertinent utilization data hinders management’s ability to monitor its progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system, as well as to provide consistent and accurate data to Congress. Besides the memorandums, DOD is taking other actions to increase DTS utilization as the following examples illustrate. The following examples highlight the concerns raised by the military service officials. Air Force DTS program officials stated that DTS releases did not appear to be well tested prior to implementation. While these actions are a positive step forward, they do not address the fundamental problem that DTS’s requirements are still ambiguous and conflicting—a primary cause of the previous problems. Providing Complete Flight Information Has Been a Continuing Problem
In our earlier testimony and report, we noted that DOD did not have reasonable assurance that the flights displayed met the stated DOD requirements. For example, DOD has retained a requirement to display 25 flights for each inquiry. Until DOD improves DTS requirement management practices, it will not have this assurance. Furthermore, the shift of DTS to BTA, which makes DTS an enterprisewide endeavor, should help in making DTS the standard integrated, end-to-end travel system for business travel. Equally important, however, will be the department’s ability to resolve the long-standing difficulties that DTS has encountered with its requirements management and system testing. DOD’s response indicated that the Defense Travel Management Office is currently procuring commercial travel services for DOD worldwide in a manner that will ensure evaluation of cost effectiveness for all services. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the reasonableness of the key assumptions made by DOD to arrive at the net annual estimated savings of over $56 million shown in the September 2003 economic analysis addendum, we (1) ascertained if the economic analysis was prepared in accordance with the prescribed standards, (2) analyzed two key assumptions that represent the largest dollar savings for the DTS program, and (3) analyzed the supporting documentation related to these two assumptions to determine whether the assumptions were valid. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) began an effort to implement a standard departmentwide travel system. The Defense Travel System (DTS) is envisioned as DOD's standard end-to-end travel system. This report is a follow-up to GAO's January 2006, report which highlighted DTS implementation problems. Because of continued congressional interest in DTS, GAO initiated this follow-up audit under the Comptroller General's statutory authority. GAO determined whether (1) two key assumptions made in the September 2003 economic analysis were reasonable, (2) DOD is taking action to ensure full utilization of DTS and gathering the data needed to monitor DTS utilization, and (3) DOD has resolved the previously identified problems with DTS flight information. To address the above objectives, GAO (1) reviewed the September 2003 DTS economic analysis, (2) analyzed DTS utilization data, and (3) analyzed DTS flight information.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that the two key assumptions used to estimate annual net savings were not based on reliable information. Two cost components represent the majority of the over $56 million in estimated net savings--personnel savings and reduced commercial travel office (CTO) fees. In regard to the personnel savings, GAO's analysis found that the $24.2 million of personnel savings related to the Air Force and the Navy was not supported. Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel, but rather the shifting of staff from the travel function to other functions. The Naval Cost Analysis Division stated that the Navy will not realize any tangible personnel cost savings from the implementation of DTS. In regard to the CTO fees, the economic analysis assumed that 70 percent of all DTS airline tickets would either require no intervention or minimal intervention from the CTOs, resulting in an estimated annual net savings of $31 million. However, the sole support provided by the DTS program office was an article in a trade industry publication. The article was not based on information related to DTS, but rather on the experience of one private sector company. Furthermore, the economic analysis was not prepared in accordance with guidance prescribed by OMB and DOD. DOD guidance stated that the life-cycle cost estimates should be verified by an independent party, but this did not occur. The economic analysis did not undertake an assessment of the effects of the uncertainty inherent in the estimates of benefits and costs. Because an economic analysis uses estimates and assumptions, it is critical that the imprecision in both the underlying data and assumptions be understood. Such an assessment is referred to as a sensitivity analysis. DOD acknowledged that DTS is not being used to the fullest extent possible, but lacks comprehensive data to effectively monitor its utilization. DOD's utilization data are based on a model that was developed in calendar year 2003. However, the model has not been completely updated to reflect actual DTS usage. The lack of accurate utilization data hinders management's ability to monitor progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system. GAO also found that the military services have initiated actions that are aimed at increasing the utilization of DTS. Finally, GAO found that DTS still has not addressed the underlying problems associated with weak requirement management and system testing. While DOD has acted to address concerns GAO previously raised, GAO found that DTS's requirements are still ambiguous and conflicting. For example, DTS displaying up to 25 flights for each inquiry is questionable because it is unclear whether this is a valid requirement. Until DOD improves DTS's requirement management practices, the department will not have reasonable assurance that DTS can provide the intended functionality. |
gao_NSIAD-95-160 | gao_NSIAD-95-160_0 | The COEA concluded that a 155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun system with an advanced propellant and precision-guided munitions in combination with the Tomahawk missile was the most cost-effective NSFS option. In the interim, the Navy has decided to upgrade its existing 5-inch, 54-caliber guns and develop a 5-inch precision-guided munition. In December 1994, the Chief of Naval Operations approved the Navy’s revised NSFS plan, and in January 1995, directed the Naval Sea Systems Command to (1) initiate upgrades to the 5-inch, 54-caliber gun to deliver precision-guided munitions; (2) develop a 5-inch precision-guided munition with an initial operational capability before fiscal year 2001; and (3) scale back liquid propellant gun technology efforts. According to the Navy, it will need about $246 million in research and development funds between fiscal years 1996 and 2001 for the revised NSFS program. As a result, the Navy’s research and development program is underfunded by about $86 million. The Navy did not perform a supplemental analysis to its original COEA before it decided to restructure the NSFS program. The Navy is currently conducting a supplemental analysis to evaluate near-term alternatives for NSFS. It is not clear whether a supplemental analysis that considered all gun options—5 and 8 inch and 155 millimeter—against the Marine Corps’ new distance requirements would support the Navy’s decision to upgrade the 5-inch gun because (1) larger guns firing advanced projectiles with more payload can attack more targets than smaller, 5-inch guns and (2) the original COEA found that the rankings of the eight most cost-effective systems were not sensitive to range. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's upgrade of its surface ships' guns to determine whether the Navy has chosen the most cost-effective system for improving naval surface fire support (NSFS).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Navy did not sufficiently analyze its needs before deciding on the upgrade of its 5-inch, 54-caliber guns and the development of a 5-inch precision-guided munition; (2) the Navy determined that the most cost-effective system to meet NSFS needs by fiscal year (FY) 2003 would be a 155-millimeter, 60-caliber gun with an advanced propellant and precision-guided munitions in combination with the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile; (3) although it initially proposed to develop the guns at a cost of about $360 million, the Navy has decided to limit the program to upgrading existing guns and developing precision-guided munitions to meet the reduced funding level; (4) the Navy estimates that research and development (R&D) costs for the 5-inch guns will be about $246 million; (5) the Navy R&D budget has a $86-million shortfall that will be corrected in FY 1997; (6) the Marine Corps has revised its minimum NSFS range requirement to reflect the Navy's restructured gun program; and (7) the Navy is conducting a supplemental analysis to evaluate near-term alternatives for NSFS, but it is unclear whether this analysis will support the Navy's decision to upgrade the 5-inch gun. |
gao_GAO-06-284 | gao_GAO-06-284_0 | Initially, security requirements were filled at military installations with active duty and reserve component personnel. Army’s Approach for Acquiring Contract Security Guards Relies Mostly on 8(a) Sole-Source Contracts
The Army has awarded two sole-source contracts, totaling almost $495 million, to 8(a) ANC firms to acquire the bulk of its contract guards, even though contracting officials pointed out that using competed GSA Schedule contracts would have been just as fast and less costly. We found that the Army hired an inexperienced contractor to help refine the performance work statement, failed to monitor certain subcontracting limitations under 8(a) contracts, and turned again to the 8(a) sole-source contracts in a third acquisition phase despite knowing that its competed contracts for the same services, awarded in the second acquisition phase, had cost 25 percent less than the initial 8(a) sole-source contracts. Since the Army’s contract security guard program began in 2003, the Army has devoted almost twice as many contract dollars to sole-sourcing under the 8(a) program as it has to full and open competition. As of December 2005, more than $200 million has been subcontracted under the Army’s guard contracts. The combined effect of these weaknesses has put the Army at risk of staffing its gates with contract security guards who are not qualified for the job and in fact has resulted in applicants with criminal histories, including felons, being employed as guards. In April 2005, the Army found that 61 guards had been put to work at one installation even though they had records relating to criminal offenses, about two dozen of which involved felonies or domestic violence and abuse cases. Lax Oversight and Training Irregularities Raise Doubts About the Adequacy of the Guards’ Training
The Army may not have in place adequately trained contract security guards protecting its installations because contractors are given responsibility to conduct nearly all of the training; and neither IMA nor Army installation personnel provide sufficient oversight to know whether training is actually conducted in accordance with contractual provisions, training records are accurate and complete, and contractors are adhering to standards. The Army requires that the contractors conduct training in these 19 areas before the guards are put to work and annually thereafter. In 2005, an investigation discovered that contractor personnel at one installation had falsified training records relating to firearms qualification. The installation required the guards to be requalified in firearms, which cost the Army over $7,000. Continued Need for Award Fees Is Questionable
The Army’s strategy of using award fees to motivate contractors has resulted in over $18 million in fee payouts for complying with the basic contractual requirements—not for exceeding what the contract requires. The Army’s practice of routinely paying its contractors nearly the entire available award fee creates an environment where contractors expect to receive most of the available fee, regardless of acquisition outcomes. Army Performance Monitors Not Consistently Complying with Award-Fee Plan
Among the criteria used to rate the contractors’ performance are the results of on-site inspections of the guards. We found that at over half of the 11 Army installations we visited, the government monitors rated performance without having conducted all of the required inspections. The report, “Department of Defense Installation Security Guard Requirement Assessment and Plan,” was delivered to Congress on November 22, 2005. The report states that “local security checks and National Agency Checks are performed on all prospective employees.” As we found during our review of the Army’s guard program, weaknesses in the screening process have led to unscreened personnel guarding the gates, and the checks had not been performed on all contract guards. Direct IMA to take the following four actions: monitor the status of DOD’s revised antiterrorism standards and implement them into Army policy for screening of contract security guards as deemed suitable, direct installations to use the Army’s Crime Records Center and the National Crime Information Center databases to supplement initial screening (local agency check) of contract security guards until the new standards are in effect, issue a standardized recordkeeping format for contractors to show that the guards have met all training requirements, and require installation performance monitors to review training files to ensure that initial training certification is achieved as well as subsequent annual recertification. We reviewed Defense Contract Management Agency analysis on the Alaska Native corporation (ANC) firms. We also reviewed federal regulations pertaining to ANCs under the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Business Development Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increased security requirements and a significant number of active duty and reserve personnel sent overseas to support the war on terror left the Department of Defense (DOD) with fewer military personnel to rely on to protect domestic installations. To correct this shortage, Congress is temporarily allowing DOD to use contract security guards to fulfill roles previously performed by military employees. The U.S. Army has awarded contracts worth nearly $733 million to acquire contract guards at 57 Army installations, an investment far greater than those made by other DOD services so far. The requesters asked GAO to assess how the Army has been managing and overseeing its acquisition of security guard services, particularly with regard to the Army's (1) acquisition strategy, (2) employment screening, (3) training of contract guards, and (4) award fee process. This report also discusses DOD's mandated November 2005 report to Congress on the contract guard program.
What GAO Found
The Army's three-phased approach for acquiring contract security guards has relied heavily on sole-source contracts, despite the Army's recognition early on that it was paying considerably more for its sole-source contracts than for those awarded competitively. The Army has devoted twice as many contract dollars--nearly $495 million--to its sole-source contracts as to its competed contracts and has placed contract security guards at 46 out of 57 installations through sole-sourcing. These sole-source contracts were awarded to two Alaska Native corporation firms under the Small Business Administration's 8(a) Business Development Program. Congress has provided these firms with special advantages in the 8(a) program. During initial planning, the Army worked with a contractor who had not performed guard services before to refine the contract performance work statement. The Army's procedure for screening prospective contract guards is inadequate and puts the Army at risk of having ineligible guards protecting installation gates. The Army found that, at two separate installations, a total of 89 guards were put to work even though they had records relating to criminal offenses, including cases that involved assault and other felonies. Thorough background checks lag far behind the rate at which contract guards are put to work, and the initial screening process relies on prospective guards to be honest when filling out job application forms. In response to an earlier GAO report, DOD agreed to revise its antiterrorism standards to put into place a better mechanism for verifying the trustworthiness of contractors. The Army has given its contractors the responsibility to conduct most of the training of contract guards, and the Army cannot say with certainty whether training is actually taking place and whether it is being conducted according to approved criteria. GAO found that there is no requirement for the Army to certify that a contract guard has completed required training and that Army performance monitors do not conduct oversight of training as a matter of course. GAO also found missing or incomplete training records at several installations. At three installations, guards were certified by the contractor before training had been completed. An investigation discovered that at one installation, contractor personnel had falsified training records; the Army subsequently paid the contractor over $7,000 to re-qualify the guards. The Army has paid out more than $18 million in award fees, but the fees are based only on compliance with basic contractual requirements, not for above-and-beyond performance. Over the life of the contract guard program, the Army has paid out almost 98 percent of the available award fees. The practice of routinely paying contractors nearly the entire available award fee has created an environment in which the contractors expect to receive most of the available fee, regardless of acquisition outcomes. GAO found that many Army performance monitors were not conducting all of the required inspections of contractor activity in order to rate performance. |
gao_GAO-13-112 | gao_GAO-13-112_0 | PAEA, enacted in 2006,transferred all responsibility for costs related to CSRS military service credit from USPS back to the U.S. Treasury, both retroactively and prospectively; this included all CSRS military service costs for postal employees since the inception of the Postal Service in 1971; established the PSRHBF to begin prefunding the health benefits of current and future postal retirees and transferred about $20 billion of “start-up” funds into the PSRHBF ($3 billion from the discontinued CSRS escrow—as USPS’s annual CSRS payment was suspended—and $17 billion from the surplus in the CSRS fund); required USPS to make annual payments ranging from $5.4 billion to $5.8 billion per year into the PSRHBF from fiscal years 2007 through 2016 to begin prefunding its retiree health benefit liability; and required OPM to calculate the remaining unfunded liability in 2017 and each subsequent year, and to calculate an amortization payment based on an amortization period that extends to 2056 or, if later, 15 years from the then-current fiscal year. For fiscal year 2012, USPS had a net loss of almost $16 billion, which included $11.1 billion for required PSRHBF prefunding payments Furthermore, USPS’s future financial outlook that USPS did not make.is bleak as it projects further declines in mail volume and revenue by fiscal year 2020. This interest would have reduced USPS’s future unfunded liabilities for these benefits. Because of USPS’s financial difficulties, however, USPS has not made all of its required prefunding payments. Under PAEA, USPS is still responsible for contributing an additional $33.9 billion to the PSRHBF by fiscal year 2017 as shown in table 1, including $11.1 billion that USPS has defaulted on over the past 2 years. While the PSRHBF balance covered about 49 percent of USPS’s retiree health benefit liability at fiscal year-end 2012, USPS’s deteriorating financial outlook will make it difficult under current requirements for USPS to continue prefunding the remaining unfunded liability in the short term, and possibly to continue funding the remaining unfunded liability over the next several decades, as required under PAEA. USPS’s Future Payments and Unfunded Liabilities Vary Widely Based on Approaches to Fund Retiree Health Benefits
We considered current law (PAEA) requirements against five alternative approaches for funding the costs of retiree health benefits, each of which involves tradeoffs that could impact USPS’s short-term cash flow, its future financial condition, different generations of postal ratepayers, and over a million postal employees and retirees. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, the current law switches to an “actuarial approach” for the remaining funding, under which USPS’s share of premium payments for existing retirees and beneficiaries is paid from the PSRHBF rather than by USPS, and USPS makes annual payments to the PSRHBF consisting of two components: 1. the actuarially determined cost of future benefits attributable to employee service during the fiscal year (known as the annual “normal cost”), and 2. the actuarially determined amount that, as calculated by OPM, would be projected to fully fund the remaining unfunded liability over an amortization period ending in the later of fiscal year 2056 or 15 years subsequent to the then-current fiscal year. The House Bill (H.R. The Senate Bill (S. 1789) differs from current law, the House Bill, and the Administration Approach in three key aspects. The existing fund would be left to grow with interest, with no other cash inflow or outflow. Given that USPS is intended to be a self-sustaining entity funded almost entirely by postal revenue, we have previously stated that USPS should prefund its retiree health benefit liability to the maximum extent that its finances permit. Size of the annual payment and the unfunded liability. While private sector, state and local government, and other federal entities generally are not required to prefund these benefits, most are required to recognize the future costs of these benefits on an accrual basis as they are earned, rather than when they are paid, in their financial reporting. USPS’s recent defaults on its retiree-health- prefunding payments and its inability to borrow now that it has reached its $15 billion borrowing limit create an even more urgent need for congressional action. We noted in our report that none of the funding approaches will be viable unless USPS has the ability to make the required payments, and that a comprehensive package of actions is needed to improve USPS’s financial viability. While our report did not examine comprehensively the reasons for other entities’ prefunding decisions, we noted that although prefunding is not required, a number of private, state, local, and federal entities have elected to prefund some percentage of their retiree health benefits, as follows:
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) reported that 126 of the 296 companies in the S&P 500 that offered “other post-employment benefits” (OPEB) prefunded some percentage of the associated liabilities; the USPS OIG reported that 38 percent of Fortune 1000 companies that offer retiree health benefits prefund them, at a median funding level of 37 percent;
18 states and 13 of the 39 largest local governments had set aside at least a combined $25 billion in assets to cover their OPEB liabilities; and the Department of Defense prefunds its retiree health benefits for Medicare-eligible retirees and beneficiaries, with a 100 percent target funding percentage, and that this fund, which was started in 2002 in reaction to rapidly rising health care costs, had assets of $166 billion as of fiscal year-end 2010. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the status and financial outlook of the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund (PSRHBF), (2) analyzes how alternative proposals for funding retiree health benefits could affect future USPS payments and unfunded liabilities, and (3) determines key considerations for policymakers assessing the alternative proposals or other approaches. To determine the impact on USPS payments and unfunded liabilities under alternative approaches to fund retiree health benefits, we analyzed and compared current funding requirements and five alternatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
PAEA required USPS to prefund its future retiree health benefits as part of comprehensive postal reform by establishing the PSRHBF along with an initial target period to fund the unfunded liability in 50 years. This requirement included annual payments to this fund from 2007 to 2016 of between $5.4 billion to $5.8 billion. USPS, its employee groups, and others have argued that this prefunding requirement is a major source of USPS's financial woes--reported by USPS as contributing $32 billion toward its $41 billion of net losses over the past 6 years. USPS defaulted on the last 2 years of PSRHBF payments totaling $11.1 billion.
As requested, this report addresses the (1) status and financial outlook of the PSRHBF, (2) impact on future annual USPS payments and unfunded liabilities of alternative approaches, and (3) key considerations for policymakers. GAO reviewed and summarized PSRHBF financial data and analyzed and compared current law requirements with five alternative approaches by developing projections based on OPM and USPS data.
What GAO Found
The Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund (PSRHBF) covered about 49 percent of the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) $94 billion retiree health benefit liability at fiscal year-end 2012. USPS's deteriorating financial outlook, however, will make it difficult to continue the current prefunding schedule in the short term, and possibly to fully fund the remaining $48 billion unfunded liability over the remaining 44 years of the schedule on which the 2006 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) was based. The liability covers the projected benefits for about 471,000 current postal retirees and a portion of the projected benefits for about 528,000 current employees; it does not cover employees not yet hired. Under PAEA, USPS is responsible for contributing an additional $33.9 billion to the PSRHBF by fiscal year 2017, including the $11.1 billion USPS has defaulted on over the past 2 years. PAEA also requires the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to calculate the remaining unfunded liability in 2017 and develop an initial 40-year amortization payment schedule. USPS, however, projects further declines in mail volume and revenues that may continue to limit its ability to prefund the remaining retiree health benefit liability.
GAO's analysis of maintaining current law requirements compared to five alternative approaches showed differing impacts on USPS's future annual payments and unfunded liabilities. For example, three of the approaches--1) the Administration's Approach, 2) Senate Bill (S. 1789) and 3) "Pay-as-You-Go" (no prefunding)--would reduce USPS's annual payments in the short term, thereby easing its immediate cash flow problems and financial losses. However, these approaches would increase USPS's unfunded liability, sometimes substantially, and require larger payments later. Deferring funding could increase costs for future ratepayers and increase the possibility that USPS may not be able to pay for some or all of its liability. Conversely, a fourth approach--the House Bill (H.R. 2309)--and the current law requirement would reduce USPS's unfunded liabilities more aggressively but may result in significantly higher USPS financial losses in the near future. If USPS stopped prefunding and let the existing fund grow with interest, the unfunded liability is projected to significantly increase. Under a fifth approach, if USPS stopped prefunding and used the existing fund to pay current and future premiums, the fund is projected to be exhausted by 2026. Private sector, state, local, and other federal entities are not required to prefund these benefits, though some do so to a limited extent, and most are required to recognize the future costs in their financial reporting.
GAO identified several key considerations including: (1) the rationale and consequences of prefunding such benefits; (2) trade-offs affecting USPS's financial condition, such as sizes of the annual payments and unfunded liability; (3) fixed versus actuarially determined payments; (4) targeted funding levels; and (5) assumption criteria. USPS is intended to be a self-sustaining entity funded almost entirely by postal ratepayers, but its financial losses are challenging its sustainability. GAO has testified that USPS should prefund its retiree health benefit liabilities to the maximum extent that its finances permit, but none of the funding approaches may be viable unless USPS has the ability to make the payments. USPS's default on its last two required PSRHBF payments and its inability to borrow further make the need for a comprehensive package of actions to achieve sustainable financial viability even more urgent.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this report, as it has already reported on strategies and options for USPS to achieve sustainable financial viability. |
gao_GAO-02-881 | gao_GAO-02-881_0 | Background
In recent years, Congress passed legislation that modified the visa program for foreign workers who enter the country with H-1B visas to work in specialty occupations. The American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (P.L. To fund these programs, it assessed a $500 fee on employers for each person for whom they submitted an application for an H-1B visa. The remaining 23 percent of the funds is to be used for other activities. WIA seeks to create a workforce investment system that connects employment, education, and training services to better match workers to labor market needs. Skill Grants Offer Training with Flexible Service Delivery While Scholarship Grants Offer Education through Degree Programs
Skill grantees use the grant program to offer training through a variety of service delivery options to people whose skills need to be upgraded; scholarship grantees use the scholarship program to offer traditional degree programs in mathematics, computer science, and engineering to low-income students. Skill Grant and Scholarship Grants Designed to Meet Workforce Needs, Though the Skill Levels for Which They Train Varies
The skill grant training is based on local workforce needs and addresses occupations both below and at the bachelor’s degree level required for H-1B visas, whereas the scholarship program’s training is on the basis of national workforce needs and the jobs that many H-1B visa holders fill. National Efforts Not Coordinated to Strategically Address High-Skill Needs, but Local Coordination Shows Promise
While federal programs and initiatives are not coordinated to strategically address the national need for high-skill workers, local skill grant programs are more coordinated, though Labor has provided limited assistance to enhance these local efforts. Agency Comments
The Department of Labor, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Commerce commented on a draft of this report (see apps. Computer Science, Engineering and Mathematics Scholarships– grants to postsecondary schools that distribute the funds as scholarships for academically talented, low-income students in computer science, computer technology, engineering, engineering technology, or mathematics. | What GAO Found
In recent years, U.S. employers have complained of shortages of workers with higher-level skills in information technology, the sciences, and other fields. To find workers with these skills, employers often turn to foreign workers who enter the United States with H-1B visas to work in specialty occupations. Despite the recent economic downturn, employers report that they continue to need higher-skilled workers. Congress passed the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 to create a system connecting employment, education, and training services to better match workers to labor market needs. In 1998, Congress passed legislation raising limits on the number of high-skilled workers entering the United States and imposing a $500 fee on employers--which was later raised to $1000--for each foreign worker for whom they applied. Most of the money collected is to be spent on training that improves the skill of U.S. workers. The National Science Foundation (NSF) receives 22 percent of the funds to distribute as scholarship grants to post-secondary schools that distribute the funds as scholarships for low-income students in computer science, engineering, and mathematics degree programs. The grantees operating skill grant programs use the flexibility allowed by the Department of Labor to administer training through a variety of service delivery options to individuals whose skills need to be upgraded, whereas NSF's scholarship grant programs provide scholarships to low-income students for college degree programs. The training offered by the skill grant programs is based on local workforce needs, although sometimes for lower-skill jobs than those filled by H-1B visa holders, and the scholarship program's training is based on national workforce needs and the types of jobs that many H-1B visa holders fill. Although federal initiatives are not coordinated to strategically address high-skill needs at a national level, local skill grant programs increased coordination, though Labor provided limited assistance to enhance these efforts. |
gao_GAO-06-526T | gao_GAO-06-526T_0 | NTIA manages spectrum for federal government users and acts for the President with respect to spectrum management issues. FCC Has Adopted Several Market-Based Mechanisms for Commercial Uses
To promote the more efficient use of spectrum, FCC is incrementally adopting market-based approaches to spectrum management. In addition, in 1994, FCC instituted auctions to assign certain spectrum licenses. Finally, FCC has taken steps to facilitate greater secondary market activity, which may provide an additional mechanism to promote the more efficient use of spectrum. FCC Has Introduced Some Flexibility in the Spectrum Allocation Process but Allocation Remains Largely a Command-and- Control Process
FCC currently employs largely a command-and-control process for spectrum allocation. However, FCC has provided greater operational and technical flexibility within certain frequency bands. Market-Based Mechanisms Have Not Been Adopted for Federal Government Use of Spectrum
In some countries, spectrum managers have adopted market-based mechanisms to encourage the efficient use of spectrum by government agencies. In the United States, NTIA has not adopted incentive-based fees for federal government users of spectrum; rather, NTIA applies fees that recover only a portion of the cost of administering spectrum management. Additionally, adopting market-based mechanisms for government use of spectrum might be difficult or undesirable in some contexts because of the primacy of certain government missions, the lack of flexibility in use of spectrum for some agencies, and the lack of financial incentives for government users. NTIA does not currently have the authority to impose fees on government users that exceed its spectrum management costs. For example: Primacy of certain federal government missions. The most frequently cited options include (1) extending FCC’s auction authority, (2) reexamining the distribution of spectrum— such as between commercial and government use—to enhance the efficient and effective use of this important resource, and (3) ensuring clearly defined rights and flexibility in commercially licensed spectrum bands. There was no consensus on these options for improvements among stakeholders we interviewed and panelists on our expert panel, except for extending FCC’s auction authority. Given the success of FCC’s use of auctions and the overwhelming support among industry stakeholders and experts for extending FCC’s auction authority, we suggested that the Congress consider extending FCC’s auction authority. In February 2006, the Congress extended FCC’s auction authority to 2011 with the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. The Current Framework for Spectrum Management May Pose Barriers to Reform
Under the current management framework, neither FCC nor NTIA has been given ultimate decision-making authority over all spectrum use or the authority to impose fundamental reform, such as increasing the reliance on market-based mechanisms. FCC manages spectrum for nonfederal users while NTIA manages spectrum for federal government users. As such, FCC and NTIA have different perspectives on spectrum use. The current spectrum management framework may pose a barrier to spectrum reform because neither FCC nor NTIA has ultimate authority to impose fundamental reform and these stakeholder conflicts cross the jurisdictions of both FCC and NTIA. As such, contentious and protracted negotiations arise over spectrum management issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The radio-frequency spectrum is used to provide an array of wireless communications services that are critical to the U.S. economy and various government missions, such as national security. With demand for spectrum exploding, and most useable spectrum allocated to existing users, there is growing concern that the current spectrum management framework might not be able to respond adequately to future demands. This testimony, which is based on previous GAO reports, provides information on (1) the extent to which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has adopted market-based mechanisms for commercial use, (2) the extent to which market-based mechanisms have been adopted for federal government users of spectrum, (3) options for improving spectrum management, and (4) potential barriers to spectrum reform.
What GAO Found
FCC is incrementally adopting market-based approaches for managing the commercial use of spectrum. Market-based mechanisms can help promote the efficient use of spectrum by invoking the forces of supply and demand. For example, although FCC currently employs largely a command-and-control process for spectrum allocation, it has provided greater flexibility within certain spectrum bands. In addition, FCC began using auctions to assign spectrum licenses for commercial uses in 1994. Finally, FCC has taken steps to facilitate greater secondary market activity, which may provide an additional mechanism to promote the efficient use of spectrum. While some countries have adopted market-based mechanisms to encourage the efficient use of spectrum by government agencies, the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has not adopted similar mechanisms for federal government use in the United States. NTIA imposes fees designed to recover only a portion of its cost to administer spectrum management, rather than fees that would more closely resemble market prices and thus encourage greater spectrum efficiency among government users; currently, NTIA does not have authority to impose fees that exceed its spectrum management costs. However, adopting market-based mechanisms for federal government use of spectrum might be difficult or undesirable in some contexts because of the primacy of certain government missions, the lack of flexibility in use of spectrum for some agencies, and the lack of financial incentives for government users. Industry stakeholders and experts have identified a number of options for improving spectrum management. The most frequently cited options include (1) extending FCC's auction authority, (2) reexamining the use and distribution of spectrum, and (3) ensuring clearly defined rights and flexibility in commercial spectrum bands; there was no consensus on these options, except for extending FCC's auction authority. Given the success of FCC's use of auctions and the overwhelming support for extending FCC's auction authority, GAO suggested that the Congress consider extending FCC's auction authority beyond 2007. Congress extended FCC's auction authority to 2011 with the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. The current spectrum management framework may pose barriers to reform, since neither FCC nor NTIA has been given ultimate decision-making authority over all spectrum use, or the authority to impose fundamental reform, such as increasing the reliance on market-based mechanisms. Under the divided management framework, FCC manages spectrum for nonfederal users, including commercial uses, while NTIA manages spectrum for federal government users. As such, FCC and NTIA have different perspectives on spectrum use. Further, spectrum management issues and major reform cross the jurisdictions of both agencies. Thus, contentious and protracted negotiations arise over spectrum management issues. |
gao_GAO-07-395T | gao_GAO-07-395T_0 | FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act. Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. The Post-Katrina Reform Act includes provisions that address each of these issues. The nation’s experience with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care and sheltering. GAO Recommendations Stress Changes in Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability
In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the nation's most destructive hurricane prior to Katrina, we recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. We also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. However, there is little information available on the extent to which these changes are operational and they also have not yet been tested in a major disaster. As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional Attention
In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight. He suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic events. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance. The Post- Katrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy changes to respond to these findings and challenges. Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 stipulates major changes to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve the agency's preparedness for and response to catastrophic disasters. For example, the act establishes a new mission for and new leadership positions within FEMA. As GAO has reported, DHS faces continued challenges, including clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective response while also protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony discusses the extent to which DHS has taken steps to overcome these challenges This testimony summarizes earlier GAO work on: (1) leadership, response capabilities, and accountability controls; (2) organizational changes provided for in the Post-Katrina Reform Act; and (3) disaster management issues for continued Congressional attention.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. GAO analysis showed improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, development of necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response with the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. Improved capabilities were needed for catastrophic disasters--particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and sheltering. Effectively implementing the provisions of the Post-Katrina Reform Act will address many of these issues, and FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas. But their operational impact in a major disaster has not yet been tested. As a result of its body of work, GAO's recommendations included that DHS (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership; (2) direct that more robust and detailed operational implementation plans support the National Response Plan (NRP); (3) provide guidance and direction for all planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in making its investment decisions. We also recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take action to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. In his oversight letter to Congress, the Comptroller General suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild from catastrophic events. Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance. |
gao_GAO-05-262 | gao_GAO-05-262_0 | SEC relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial operations and store the sensitive information it collects. SEC Information System Controls Were Not Effective
SEC did not effectively implement information system controls to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of its financial and sensitive information. Specifically, the commission did not consistently implement effective electronic access controls, including user account and passwords, access rights and permissions, network security, and audit and monitoring of security-relevant events to prevent, limit, and detect access to its critical financial and sensitive systems. In addition, weaknesses in other information system controls, including physical security, segregation of computer functions, application change controls, and service continuity, further increase the risk to SEC’s information systems. As a result, sensitive data—including payroll and financial transactions, personnel data, regulatory, and other mission critical information—are at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or loss, possibly without being detected. Comprehensive Information Security Program Is Not Fully Implemented
A key reason for SEC’s weaknesses in information system controls is that it has not fully developed and implemented a comprehensive agency information security program to provide reasonable assurance that effective controls are established and maintained and that information security receives sufficient management attention. These elements include: a central information security management structure to provide overall information security policy and guidance along with oversight to ensure compliance with established policies and reviews of the effectiveness of the information security environment; periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of the harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; security awareness training to inform personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems, of information security risks and their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures; and at least annual testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices relating to management, operational, and technical controls of every major information system identified in agencies’ inventories. SEC’s information system control weaknesses were symptomatic of its weak security program. Nonetheless, the commission has not yet developed clearly defined roles and responsibilities for this group. Such a program is critical to providing SEC with a solid foundation for resolving existing information security problems and continuously managing information security risks. SEC has taken some action to improve security management, including establishing a central security management function, appointing a senior information security officer to manage the program, and initiating actions to correct the specific weaknesses summarized in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. As part of the audit of SEC's fiscal year 2004 financial statements, GAO assessed the effectiveness of the commission's information system controls in protecting the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of its financial and sensitive information.
What GAO Found
SEC has not effectively implemented information system controls to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of its financial and sensitive data. Specifically, the commission had not consistently implemented effective electronic access controls, including user accounts and passwords, access rights and permissions, network security, or audit and monitoring of security-relevant events to prevent, limit, and detect access to its critical financial and sensitive systems. In addition, weaknesses in other information system controls, including physical security, segregation of computer functions, application change controls, and service continuity, further increase risk to SEC's information systems. As a result, sensitive data--including payroll and financial transactions, personnel data, regulatory, and other mission critical information--were at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or loss, possibly without detection. A key reason for SEC's information system control weaknesses is that the commission has not fully developed and implemented a comprehensive agency information security program to provide reasonable assurance that effective controls are established and maintained and that information security receives sufficient management attention. Although SEC has taken some actions to improve security management, including establishing a central security management function and appointing a senior information security officer to manage the program, it had not clearly defined roles and responsibilities for security personnel. In addition SEC had not fully (1) assessed its risks, (2) established or implemented security policies, (3) promoted security awareness, and (4) tested and evaluated the effectiveness of its information system controls. As a result, SEC did not have a solid foundation for resolving existing information system control weaknesses and continuously managing information security risks. |
gao_GAO-11-770 | gao_GAO-11-770_0 | The IG Act also provides protections to the independence of the IGs while keeping both their agency heads and the Congress fully and currently informed about particularly flagrant problems and deficiencies within their agencies through a 7-day process specified by the act. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the IG Act with provisions to enhance the independence of IGs in DFEs with boards or commissions. The Reform Act also included a provision intended to provide additional IG independence through the transparent reporting of their budgets. Also, the IG Act includes a provision addressing the qualifications and expertise of the IGs by specifying that each IG appointment is to be without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigation. For our discussion of the independence of the IGs, we summarized information from the responses to our survey questions about the implementation of selected provisions in the Reform Act, the IG Act, and the Dodd-Frank Act that are intended to enhance IG independence. Regarding the effect of Dodd-Frank Act provisions to enhance independence, we obtained the views of the 26 DFE IGs with boards or commissions on whether their independence was enhanced by these provisions designating their boards and commissions as DFE heads rather than individual chairmen, and the requirement for the concurrence of a two-thirds majority of the board or commission for removal of an IG. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the IG Council. The IGs reported pay that was at the specified levels required by the Reform Act for IGs appointed by the President and consistent with those of other senior- level officials as required for DFE IGs, thus helping to maintain IG independence and enhance their relative stature within their agencies by increasing their fixed compensation and eliminating discretionary compensation that could create a conflict of interest; having access to independent legal counsel reporting to an IG instead of an agency management official, thus helping to ensure the independence of legal advice available to the IG; and rarely using 7-day letters as a way to independently inform agency heads and the Congress of serious problems concerning agency operations because such issues were resolved without the need for such a letter. The results from our survey show that all the IGs established by the IG Act reported having access to a legal counsel that is organizationally independent, and none of the IGs rely on the general counsel offices of their agencies. IGs in DFEs with Boards and Commissions Generally Responded That the Dodd-Frank Act Provisions Enhance Independence
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act amending the IG Act are intended to provide an additional degree of independence to those IGs in DFEs with boards or commissions. IG Budget Amounts Are Not Always Identified in the President’s Budget Submissions
The Reform Act amended the IG Act to require that IG budget requests include certain information and be separately identified in the President’s budget submission to the Congress. In addition, IG effectiveness was demonstrated in their efforts to help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. IGs Reported Significant Measurable Accomplishments
In their annual report to the President, the IGs established by the IG Act identified billions of dollars in savings and cost recoveries and other accomplishments resulting from their work in fiscal year 2009. As part of this report for fiscal year 2009, these IGs identified $43.3 billion in potential savings from audits and investigations; and reported over 5,900 criminal actions, 1,100 civil actions, 4,460 suspensions or debarments, and over 6,100 indictments resulted from their work. Based on this information, the potential dollar savings reported by these IGs represent a return on investment of approximately $18 for every IG dollar spent when compared to total IG fiscal year 2009 budget appropriations of $2.3 billion. For example, the IGs assisted in the oversight of expenditures authorized by the Recovery Act by reporting on preventive measures taken to help reduce the vulnerability of Recovery Act disbursements to fraud, waste, and abuse. As of June 2011, the Recovery Board reported that the IGs received over 7,000 complaints of wrongdoing associated with Recovery funds, opened over 1,500 investigations, and completed over 1,400 reviews of activities intended to improve the use of Recovery Act funds. Expertise
The 62 federal IGs responding to our survey reported information on their expertise and qualifications including the backgrounds, academic degrees, and professional certifications. The council commented that the draft provided useful information on the independence, activities, and accomplishments of the federal inspectors general and, as such, will contribute to a greater understanding of the work of the IGs in providing oversight to a wide range of government programs. Appendix II: Designated Federal Agencies with Inspectors General1
IGs established by the IG Act of 1978, as amended, with appointment by the agency head. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) required GAO to report on the relative independence, effectiveness, and expertise of the inspectors general (IG) established by the IG Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act), including IGs appointed by the President with Senate confirmation and those appointed by their agency heads in designated federal entities (DFE). GAO was also required to report on the effect that provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act have on IG independence. The objectives of this report are to provide information as reported by the IGs on (1) the implementation of provisions intended to enhance their independence in the IG Reform Act of 2008 (Reform Act), the IG Act, and the Dodd-Frank Act; (2) their measures of effectiveness, including oversight of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) funds; and (3) their expertise and qualifications in areas specified by the IG Act. GAO relied primarily on responses to its survey received from 62 IGs established by the IG Act. GAO also obtained information from the President's fiscal year 2011 budget, the IGs' annual report to the President for fiscal year 2009, and the IGs' semiannual reports to the Congress. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In comments on a draft of this report, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (IG Council) stated the report contributes to a greater understanding of the work of the IGs in providing oversight to a wide range of government programs..
What GAO Found
Information from the 62 IGs in offices established by the IG Act and GAO's analysis showed that the IGs had (1) taken actions to implement statutory provisions intended to enhance their independence; (2) reported billions of dollars in potential savings and other measures of effectiveness, including actions taken to help prevent fraud in the distribution of Recovery Act funds; and (3) a range of expertise and qualifications in the areas specified by the IG Act. With respect to independence, the IGs reported that (1) statutory provisions regarding IG compensation have been implemented where applicable, thereby maintaining the independence of their work and enhancing their relative stature within their agencies; (2) they had access to independent legal counsel who reports to an IG instead of an agency management official; (3) only one IG used a statutory provision for IGs to report particularly flagrant problems through the agency head to the Congress in 7 days because issues are generally resolved before the report is needed; and (4) of the affected 26 DFE IGs, 14 responded that their independence was enhanced by the Dodd-Frank Act provision that changed the designation of agency head from the chair to the entire board or commission, and 20 responded that their independence was enhanced by the provision requiring a two-thirds majority vote for IG removal. Also, the IGs' budgets were not always identified separately in the President's fiscal year 2011 budget submission as required by the Reform Act provision intended to enhance the IGs' budget independence through transparent reporting. The IG Council is currently reviewing the matter. The IGs reported various measures of effectiveness. The IGs reported potential savings of about $43.3 billion resulting from their fiscal year 2009 audits and investigations. Given the IGs' fiscal year 2009 budget authority of about $2.3 billion, these potential savings represent about an $18 return on every dollar invested in the IGs. The IGs also reported about 5,900 criminal actions, 1,100 civil actions, 4,400 suspensions and debarments, and 6,100 indictments as a result of their work. In addition, the IGs reported enhanced effectiveness through additional actions taken to help prevent fraud in their agencies. For example, in fiscal year 2009 the Recovery Act created a requirement for the IGs to provide oversight of the economic stimulus funds disbursed by their agencies, and established the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board of IG members to help carry out this oversight. As of June 2011, the IGs reported over 1,500 investigations opened, over 1,400 reviews completed, and over 2,000 training sessions provided to detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in the use of Recovery Act funds. With respect to expertise, the IGs reported having backgrounds, academic degrees, and certifications in a range of areas related to their statutory responsibilities. The IGs reported backgrounds and academic degrees in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, and investigations. In addition, the IGs, particularly the DFE IGs, reported numerous professional certifications related to their responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-13-7 | gao_GAO-13-7_0 | Some Users Lack Incentives and Face Barriers to Sharing Spectrum
Some Users Lack Economic Incentives to Share Spectrum
While federal spectrum users often share spectrum among themselves, they may have little economic incentive to otherwise use spectrum efficiently, including sharing it with nonfederal users. In the case of federal spectrum users, obtaining new spectrum assignments may be difficult, so an agency may have an incentive to conserve and use the spectrum it currently has assigned to it or currently shares efficiently, but the extent of that incentive is likely weaker than if the agency had to pay market price for all of its spectrum needs. Several Barriers Can Deter Users from Sharing Spectrum
Federal agencies will not risk mission failure, particularly when there are security and public safety implications. FCC and NTIA officials, as well as other agency officials and an industry stakeholder, told us that sharing federal spectrum can be costly for both the nonfederal and federal users seeking to share for the following reasons:
Users may find that mitigation of potential interference can be costly in terms of equipment design and operation. Users May Be Unable to Easily Identify Spectrum Available for Sharing
Besides lacking incentives and overcoming other barriers, users may also have difficulty identifying spectrum available for sharing because data on available spectrum is incomplete or inaccurate, and information on some federal spectrum usage is not publicly available. Incentives and Opportunities to Share Spectrum Could Be Expanded
Federal advisors and experts we spoke with identified several options that could provide incentives and opportunities for more efficient spectrum use and sharing, by federal and nonfederal users, which include, among others: (1) assessing spectrum fees; (2) expanding the availability of unlicensed spectrum; (3) identifying federal spectrum that can be shared and promoting sharing; (4) requiring agencies to give more consideration to sharing and efficiency; (5) improving and expediting the spectrum- sharing process; and (6) increasing the federal focus on research, development and testing of technologies that can enable sharing, and improve spectral efficiency. As previously mentioned, with the exception of fees for frequency assignments, federal users incur no costs for using spectrum and have few requirements for efficient use. Expanding Unlicensed Use
According to stakeholders, unlicensed use is a valuable complement to licensed use and more spectrum could be made available for unlicensed use. Spectrum for unlicensed use can be used efficiently and for high value applications, like Wi-Fi, for example. As a result, we recommended that FCC and NTIA jointly develop accepted models and methodologies to assess the impact of new technologies on overall spectrum use and that NTIA determine how to provide incentives to agencies to use spectrum more efficiently. Improving and Expediting the Spectrum-Sharing Process
FCC and NTIA have taken some actions to potentially reduce the amount of time and even the need for some potential rulemakings associated with spectrum sharing, but stakeholders and experts we interviewed suggested that more could be done to expedite the process. Regardless, any such changes to how spectrum is currently managed and regulated would need to be carefully studied with respect to potential benefits and costs. Similarly, the Wireless Spectrum Research and Development’s Senior Steering Group is conducting workshops regarding the development of a national wireless test environment. If these processes continue to be lengthy and unpredictable, federal and nonfederal users may continue to be reluctant to share spectrum. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better identify the most feasible incentives to promote spectrum efficiency and sharing, we recommend that the NTIA Administrator and the FCC Chairman jointly take the following three actions:
Report their agencies’ views and conclusions regarding spectrum usage fees to the relevant congressional committees, specifically with respect to the merits, potential effects, and implementation challenges of such a fee structure, and what authority, if any, Congress would need to grant for such a structure to be implemented. Our draft report also recommended that the agencies jointly study (1) actions that could help spur research and development and (2) regulatory changes that might improve the spectrum-sharing process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The increasing popularity of wireless devices that use spectrum, combined with federal spectrum needs for national defense and other public safety activities, have created concerns that a "spectrum crunch" is looming. However, there is also evidence that at any given time or place, spectrum lies fallow or is only intermittently used. In an effort to use spectrum as efficiently as possible, advisory groups and others have proposed solutions to share spectrum.
This requested report examines (1) what factors prevent users from sharing spectrum more frequently and (2) what actions the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the National Communications Information Administration (NTIA), and others can take to encourage more sharing and efficient spectrum use. GAO reviewed plans and documents from FCC and NTIA regarding their management of nonfederal and federal spectrum-sharing activities, respectively. GAO also interviewed federal and commercial spectrum users, industry and academic experts, and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Some spectrum users may lack incentive to share spectrum or otherwise use it efficiently, and federal agencies and private users currently cannot easily identify spectrum available for sharing. Typically, paying the market price for a good or service helps to inform users of the value of the good and provides an incentive for efficient use. Federal agencies, however, pay only a small fee to the NTIA for spectrum assignments and therefore have little incentive to share spectrum. Federal agencies also face concerns that sharing could risk the success of security or safety missions, or could be costly in terms of upgrades to more spectrally efficient equipment. Nonfederal users, such as private companies, are also reluctant to share spectrum. For instance, license holders may be reluctant to encourage additional competition, and companies may be hesitant to enter into sharing agreements that require potentially lengthy and unpredictable regulatory processes. Sharing can be costly for them, too. For example, nonfederal users may be required to cover all interference mitigation costs to use a federal spectrum band, which might include multiple federal users. Sharing can also be hindered because information on federal spectrum use is lacking and information regarding some federal spectrum use may never be publicly available, a situation that makes it difficult for users to identify potential spectrum for sharing.
Federal advisors, agency officials, and experts have identified several options that could provide greater incentives and opportunities for more efficient spectrum use and sharing by federal and nonfederal users. These options include, among other things: considering spectrum usage fees to provide economic incentive for more efficient use and sharing; identifying more spectrum that could be made available for unlicensed use, since unlicensed use is inherently shared; encouraging research and development of technologies that can better enable sharing; and improving and expediting regulatory processes related to sharing. However, these options involve implementation challenges. For example, setting spectrum usage fees for federal users may not result in creating the proper incentives, because agency budgets might simply be increased to accommodate their current use. While new technologies that overcome some of the inherent challenges with sharing spectrum are being developed, proving those technologies under real-world conditions can be difficult, and few incentives exist at the federal level to encourage such technology development. Finally, FCC and NTIA have taken some actions to potentially reduce the amount of time and even the need for potential rulemakings sometimes associated with spectrum sharing, but stakeholders and experts suggested that more could be done to expedite the approval process, such as automating some steps and developing better capabilities to track the status of spectrum-sharing applications. However, any changes to federal regulatory processes related to spectrum management and sharing would need to be carefully studied with respect to potential benefits and costs.
What GAO Recommends
FCC and NTIA should jointly (1) report to Congress on the potential merits and effects of a spectrum fee, (2) determine how to best promote spectrum research and development, and (3) evaluate what regulatory changes might improve the spectrum sharing process. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings but identified ongoing efforts that address the recommendations. GAO has modified the recommendations as described further in the report. |
gao_GAO-08-562T | gao_GAO-08-562T_0 | However, conflict in the DRC has continued. Table 1 shows the Act’s 15 U.S. policy objectives for the DRC, linked to the five categories of assistance—humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resource management, governance, and security. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, about 70 percent of U.S. funding for the DRC was allocated for programs that would support the Act’s emergency humanitarian and social development objectives and about 30 percent was allocated for programs and activities that would support the Act’s economic, governance, and security objectives (see fig. Seven U.S. agencies—USDA, DOD, HHS, DOL, State, Treasury, and USAID—allocated about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for aid to the DRC in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, with State and USAID providing the majority of these funds (see fig. Humanitarian. Economic and natural resource management. These challenges include (1) an unstable security environment, (2) weak governance and widespread corruption, (3) mismanagement of natural resources, and (4) lack of basic infrastructure. Further, weak governance and corruption in the DRC have hindered efforts to reform the security sector and hold human rights violators accountable. Further, mismanagement of the DRC’s natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption. Moreover, the DRC’s lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in humanitarian, developmental, and governance programs. U.S. Efforts to Assess Overall Progress toward Achieving the Act’s Policy Objectives
Although U.S. agencies monitor their efforts in the DRC, the U.S. government has not established a process to assess overall progress toward achieving the Act’s policy objectives in the DRC. The lack of a governmentwide process for assessing its overall progress in the DRC limits the U.S. government’s ability to ensure that it has allocated its resources in the most effective manner. To ensure a basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations for assistance in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or multilateral actions, we recommended in December 2007 that the Secretary of State, through the Director of Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the other U.S. agencies implementing programs and activities in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the extent to which the U.S. government as a whole is making progress in achieving the Act’s policy objectives. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For our December 2007 report, we identified (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the objectives of the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), (2) major challenges hindering accomplishment of these objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing these objectives. To identify U.S. programs and activities that support the Act’s objectives, we analyzed policy, planning, budget, and programming documents describing U.S. policies and programs in the DRC provided by key U.S. agencies—the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and the Treasury; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We also met with representatives from each of these agencies, the National Security Council (NSC), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and other organizations with expertise on DRC- related issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the last decade, conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)--one of the world's poorest countries--led directly or indirectly to the deaths of an estimated 5.4 million Congolese. A U.S.-supported peace process began in 2001, and the country's first democratically elected president in 40 years was inaugurated in 2006. However, conflict in the country has continued. In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress established 15 U.S. policy objectives that address humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resource management, governance, and security concerns in the DRC. The Act mandated that GAO review U.S. programs in the DRC that support these policy objectives. In this testimony, based on its December 2007 report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's objectives, (2) major challenges hindering the accomplishment of the objectives. For its report, GAO obtained and analyzed program documents for seven U.S. agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Labor (DOL), State, and the Treasury and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also met with officials of these agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) active in the DRC.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, seven agencies allocated a total of about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70 percent of these funds supported the Act's humanitarian and social development objectives and about 30 percent supported its economic and natural resource management, governance, and security objectives. Agencies' programs and activities included, for example, USAID's provision of emergency supplies, food, and water and sanitation improvements to vulnerable populations; Treasury's provision of interim debt relief; and State's provision of training and other assistance for professionalizing members of the DRC's military. Several major, interrelated challenges--an unstable security environment, weak governance, mismanagement of natural resources, and lack of basic infrastructure--have impeded efforts to achieve the Act's policy objectives. For instance, weak and abusive DRC security forces have worsened humanitarian and social problems, forcing U.S. and NGO staff to curtail some efforts. At the same time, corruption and other governance problems have impeded efforts to reform the security sector and hold human rights violators accountable. Meanwhile, mismanagement of natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption, and a lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in humanitarian, developmental, and governance programs. The U.S. government has not established a process to assess overall progress toward the Act's policy objectives. As a result, it cannot be assured that it has allocated U.S. resources in the most effective manner. In its December 2007 report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of State work with the heads of the other agencies implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the U.S. government's overall progress in achieving the Act's policy objectives. State agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_T-NSIAD-97-216 | gao_T-NSIAD-97-216_0 | These objectives were to (1) provide a secure environment for the people of Bosnia; (2) create a unified, democratic Bosnia that respects the rule of law and internationally recognized human rights, including cooperating with the war crimes tribunal in arresting and bringing those charged with war crimes to trial; (3) ensure the rights of refugees and displaced persons to return to their prewar homes; and (4) rebuild the economy. U.S. and other officials view progress on this issue as central to the achievement of the Dayton Agreement’s objectives. This policy has been implemented by all three ethnic groups during and after the war. The biggest obstacle to progress in economic reconstruction and economic institution building has been the lack of cooperation among Bosnia’s political leaders in implementing infrastructure projects and economic institutions that would unite the ethnic groups within the Federation and across the two entities. Issues Emphasized During June 1997 Visit to Bosnia
During our June 1997 visit to Bosnia, numerous U.S. and international officials involved in trying to help implement the Dayton Agreement emphasized four areas as being critically important to the agreement’s success: (1) the urgent need to arrest Radovan Karadzic; (2) the upcoming municipal elections, specifically the potentially contentious installation of municipal governments in areas that had a different ethnic composition before the war; (3) the outcome of the arbitration decision over control of Brcko; and (4) the need for a continued international military force, along with a U.S. component, in Bosnia after SFOR’s mission ends in June 1998. According to international observers, however, these efforts to remove Karadzic from power did not work; instead, he has effectively retained his control and grown in popularity among people in Republika Srpska. During our June 1997 fieldwork in Bosnia, many officials with whom we spoke were unequivocal in their opinion that Radovan Karadzic must be arrested or otherwise removed from the scene in Bosnia as soon as possible. They told us that Karadzic, a leader who is not accountable to the electorate, is blocking international efforts to work with the more “moderate” Bosnian Serb political leaders in implementing the Dayton Agreement. Issues Related to Municipal Elections
Bosnia’s municipal elections are scheduled to be held on September 13 and 14, 1997. In June 1997, the High Representative, the coordinator of the civilian aspects of the peace operation, stated that Brcko will signal to the rest of the world the extent to which progress is being made in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. First, some background on the Brcko arbitration process. At Dayton, Bosnia’s political leaders were unable to agree on which ethnic group would control the strategically important area in and around the city of Brcko. As in other parts of Republika Srpska, Bosnian Serb political leaders refuse to cooperate with IPTF in restructuring their police in accordance with democratic policing standards. U.S. participation in such an effort could push the final cost significantly higher than the current $7.8 billion estimate. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed international efforts to promote an enduring peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Agreement.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the internationally-supported peace operation in Bosnia, part of a longer-term peace process, has helped that country take important first steps toward achieving the Dayton Agreement's goals; (2) progress has been made in establishing some political and economic institutions, and economic recovery has started in the Federation; (3) nevertheless, the transition to a unified, democratic government that respects the rule of law has not occurred, due principally to the failure of Bosnia's political leaders to fulfill their obligations under the Dayton Agreement and to promote political and social reconciliation; (4) very few refugees and displaced persons have crossed ethnic lines to return to their prewar homes, primarily due to resistance from political leaders of all three major ethnic groups; (5) virtually all of the limited progress on the civil aspects has resulted from strong international pressure on these often resistant political leaders; (6) during GAO's June 1997 visit, nearly every international and U.S. official with whom GAO spoke, including senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officers, were adamant that Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian Serb who was indicted by the war crimes tribunal, must be arrested or otherwise removed from Bosnia; (7) most were unequivocal on this matter, and stated that he retains political power and influence over political figures in Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb entity; (8) so far, according to these officials, he has seen fit to block every significant move toward reconciliation; (9) other key issues identified as being critically important to the Dayton Agreement's success include the municipal elections scheduled for September 13 and 14, 1997, specifically the potentially contentious installation of some newly-elected municipal governments, the outcome of the arbitration decision concerning which ethnic group will control the strategically important city of Brcko in Republika Srpska, and the issue of whether an international military force, including the U.S. military, should remain in Bosnia after the current NATO-led mission ends in June 1998; (10) however, even if President Plavsic wins the political struggle with more hardline Bosnian Serb political leaders, GAO believes that full implementation of the Dayton Agreement--in other words, full political and social reconciliation in Bosnia--will remain a long and difficult process; and (11) the total estimated cost for U.S. participation in the operation has risen to $7.8 billion. |
gao_GAO-08-284 | gao_GAO-08-284_0 | During fiscal year 2006, OWCP made over $1.8 billion in wage-loss-compensation payments to injured federal employees (“claimants”) and processed approximately 20,000 new wage loss claims. OWCP Lacks an Effective Strategy for Managing the Risks of Improper FECA Compensation Payments
OWCP has not established an effective strategy for managing improper FECA payments. The agency does not sufficiently emphasize preventing, detecting, and recovering improper payments. OWCP Does Not Emphasize Preventing, Detecting, or Recovering Improper Payments
For the past 5 years, none of the national goals established for the FECA program have addressed improper payments but have focused primarily on improving service delivery. Labor estimated that the FECA program made $703,000 in improper payments in fiscal year 2006 based on a review of claims files for a sample of all payments made during the year and determined that the program had a low risk of improper payments because this estimate did not exceed $10 million and 2.5 percent of program payments—the threshold that federal guidance defines as high risk. However, these data provide comprehensive information on the FECA program’s risk of improper payments that is useful in managing the program. In addition, overpayments occurred because OWCP’s administrative payment processing deadlines prevented claims examiners from quickly canceling some payments after being notified of changes in claimants’ eligibility status. OWCP Relies on Claimants to Provide Key Eligibility Information
The FECA program is vulnerable to improper payments because it relies on claimants to report key eligibility information, such as when they return to work at their agencies or earn wages from other employment, and does not verify that the data are timely or accurate. From our review of claims files from a sample of the overpayments identified by OWCP in 2006, we estimated that about 11 percent of all of OWCP’s 2006 overpayments occurred because claimants did not immediately notify OWCP when they returned to work. At present, OWCP does not have legislative authority to access the database. In our reviews of OWCP’s 2006 improper payments, we found that both overpayments and underpayments were caused by inaccurate pay rate information provided by claimants’ employing agencies. OWCP Does Not Ensure the Recovery of FECA Overpayments
OWCP does not sufficiently ensure the timely recovery of FECA overpayments and misses some opportunities for recovering them. We also recommend that the Secretary direct OWCP to take steps to reduce common causes of improper payments, such as requiring agencies to report to OWCP when a FECA claimant returns to work and provide incentives for agencies to notify OWCP quickly; ensuring that its data match with SSA’s death records is conducted regularly and consistently and that it includes individuals who are receiving survivor death benefits; taking steps to ensure that wage-loss-compensation payments for claimants covered by the current federal retirement system are appropriately reduced by the amount of their SSA benefits that are attributable to their federal service; considering ways to reduce the time it takes to process automated determining what additional training claims examiners may need to improve payment accuracy; and exploring options for improving information sharing between OWCP and employing agencies so that OWCP can make accurate payments and agencies can help identify payment errors. These reviews are conducted on a district office basis, with samples drawn from each office’s universe of claims files. 1. 3. Without such data matches, Labor cannot begin to identify overpayments made when claimants do not report earnings. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2006, the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) program paid over $1.8 billion in wage loss compensation to federal employees who were unable to work after being injured on the job. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO examined (1) how effectively the Department of Labor's (Labor) Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) manages the risk of improper FECA compensation payments; (2) what vulnerabilities to improper payments, if any, exist in OWCP's procedures for making FECA wage loss payments; and (3) how well OWCP ensures the recovery of identified FECA overpayments. To address these issues, GAO reviewed OWCP documents, analyzed data obtained from OWCP, reviewed a random and projectable sample of FECA claims files, visited five OWCP district offices, and interviewed OWCP headquarters and district officials.
What GAO Found
OWCP has not established an effective strategy for managing improper payments in the FECA program. The agency does not sufficiently emphasize preventing, detecting, and recovering improper payments. None of the performance goals for the program addresses improper payments. Further, OWCP does not collect the information it needs to accurately assess the FECA program's risk of improper payments, such as information on their magnitude and causes. Without such data, it cannot focus on the most vulnerable areas. The FECA program is vulnerable to improper payments for several reasons. First, OWCP relies on unverified, self-reported information from claimants that is not always timely or correct. From a review of a sample of claims files for overpayments identified by OWCP in 2006, GAO found that many occurred because claimants did not inform OWCP in a timely manner when they returned to work. Further, because OWCP generally does not require claimants' self-reported earnings to be verified and does not systemically match its data on FECA claimants with earnings data from other federal agencies, it may fail to identify cases of unreported earnings. An obstacle to conducting such matches, however, is that OWCP does not have the legal authority to access the database maintained by another federal agency with the most current earnings data. In addition, from GAO's file reviews, GAO found that both overpayments and underpayments were caused by OWCP errors and that many overpayments occurred when OWCP's payment-processing deadlines prevented payments from being quickly canceled when claimants returned to work or died. Finally, OWCP does not ensure that overpayments are collected in a timely manner and misses some opportunities for recovering overpayments, such as deducting them from claimants' subsequent FECA payments. |
gao_GAO-16-331 | gao_GAO-16-331_0 | We previously found that more than half of all DI overpayments are paid to beneficiaries earning above program limits. SSA policy is to obtain repayment within 36 months, but it may approve longer repayment periods after reviewing an individual’s income, expenses, and assets. Civil Monetary Penalties and Administrative Sanctions
SSA can take several actions against individuals who knowingly mislead SSA or make false statements to obtain benefits, and these actions serve as deterrents against potential fraud and abuse. SSA Is Missing Opportunities to Improve Recovery of Disability Insurance Overpayments
SSA Relies on Withholding Benefits to Recover Most Overpayments
In fiscal year 2015, SSA identified about $1.2 billion in new DI overpayment debt and recovered about $857 million, of which 78 percent was collected by withholding some or all of beneficiaries’ monthly benefits (see fig. Gaps Exist in SSA’s Guidance, Oversight, and Verification of Information Related to Withholding Plans
Despite SSA’s heavy reliance on withholding benefits to recover debt, we found gaps in SSA’s guidance, oversight, and verification of information related to establishing withholding plans. Officials told us that one change they are considering is to make the minimum monthly withholding amount 10 percent of an individual’s monthly benefit instead of the current $10 minimum, but SSA is in the early stages of studying this option and does not yet have time frames for implementing such a change. We estimate this option would increase scheduled collections by $276 million over 5 years and reduce the median scheduled time to fully recover all beneficiary overpayments from 3.4 years to 2.3 years. SSA Lacks Reliable Data and Oversight to Know Whether Penalties and Sanctions Are Used Effectively
SSA Lacks Reliable Data to Track and Tools to Collect Penalties
SSA’s OIG has in recent years increased its use of penalties against individuals who knowingly mislead the agency, according to SSA’s Office of Counsel to the Inspector General (OCIG), which is responsible for imposing penalties. According to its plans, SSA hopes to: by fiscal year 2018, assign penalties a unique transaction code to be able to track them through the collection process; and by fiscal year 2020 unbundle penalties from other debts owed by an individual in its ROAR database—which is used to track debts and collections—in order to allow remittances to be directly applied to penalties as opposed to an individual’s cumulative debt. A recent OIG audit highlighted the difficulty that SSA has in collecting delinquent penalties. The majority of that amount (approximately $920,000) was associated with individuals not receiving benefits and with whom SSA had no ongoing collection actions—the same category of individuals who could be targeted with external collection tools. According to officials, SSA drafted a regulation for implementing these options; however, the regulation is still undergoing internal review and SSA does not yet have time frames for implementing these options. Moreover, the agency determined it is prohibited by statute from referring delinquent penalties for collection through other tools, such as federal salary offset, credit bureau reporting, and assessing interest. Nevertheless, SSA has not explored pursuing legislative authorities to use these tools. SSA Recently Changed Its Sanctions Procedures, but Weaknesses Persist
SSA collaborated with OIG to change its sanctions procedures in 2013 in an effort to more consistently impose sanctions across the agency. SSA cannot reasonably ensure sanctions are imposed as appropriate: SSA officials told us that they could not provide us with reliable data on the disposition of sanction cases. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure effective and appropriate recovery of DI overpayments and administration of penalties and sanctions, we recommend the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration take the following 8 actions:
Clarify its policy for assessing the reasonableness of expenses used in determining beneficiaries’ repayment amounts to help ensure that withholding plans are consistently established across the agency and accurately reflect individuals’ ability to pay. Pursue additional debt collection tools for collecting delinquent penalties. However, it disagreed with requiring supervisory review of repayment plans. SSA agreed with our recommendations to improve its ability to track penalties and sanctions, and noted that it is developing workload tracking tools for both, which it expects to implement in fiscal year 2016, and is in the planning stages of an overpayment redesign effort said that should result in more complete, accurate, and timely data for penalties. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In conducting our review of how the Social Security Administration (SSA) recovers Disability Insurance (DI) overpayments and oversees civil monetary penalties and administrative sanctions, our objectives were to examine (1) how and to what extent SSA is recovering DI overpayments, and (2) SSA’s procedures for imposing penalties and sanctions, and how often they are used. Recovery of DI Overpayments
To determine how SSA recovers DI overpayments, we reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, and SSA policies and procedures. Our estimates are based on withholding amounts and overpayments as of the end of fiscal year 2015 and the assumption that everyone will continue to pay based on the current schedule. Appendix II: Additional Information on DI Overpayments
This appendix provides more information about individuals repaying DI overpayments by having a portion of their monthly benefits withheld— notably, the relationship between their monthly benefit payments and the amount of benefits withheld. Throughout this report, the benefit levels we report are SSA’s “monthly benefit amount,” which is the amount due to beneficiaries before withholding or other adjustments. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA's DI program provides cash benefits to millions of Americans who can no longer work due to a disability. While most benefits are paid correctly, beneficiary or SSA error can result in overpayments—that is, payments made in excess of what is owed. In fiscal year 2015, SSA detected $1.2 billion in new overpayments, adding to growing cumulative debt. Further, when individuals inappropriately obtain benefits in certain situations, SSA can levy penalties or withhold benefits for a period of time. GAO was asked to study the use of these actions, and SSA efforts to recover overpayments.
This report examined how and to what extent SSA recovers overpayments, and imposes penalties and sanctions. GAO analyzed data on existing DI overpayments and repayment amounts at the end of fiscal year 2015 to determine the effect of potential improvements in recovery methods on collection amounts; and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, policies, and studies.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2015, the Social Security Administration (SSA) recovered $857 million in Disability Insurance (DI) overpayments that it erroneously made to beneficiaries; however, SSA is missing opportunities to recover more. More than three-fourths of the recovered overpayments in fiscal year 2015 were collected by withholding all or a portion of a beneficiary's monthly benefits. SSA's policy is to set withholding repayment amounts based on a beneficiary's income, expenses, and assets, but its policy regarding which expenses are reasonable is not clear. Moreover, SSA cannot know if repayment periods and amounts are consistently determined due to a lack of oversight, such as supervisory review or targeted quality reviews. Further, SSA lacks concrete plans for pursuing other debt recovery options, while GAO's analysis suggests that some options could potentially increase collections from individuals having their benefits withheld. For example, about half of withholding plans at the end of fiscal year 2015 extended beyond SSA's standard 36-month time frame, and could be shortened. Making the minimum monthly repayment 10 percent of a beneficiary's monthly benefit, instead of the current $10 minimum, would shorten the median length of all scheduled withholding plans by almost a third (from 3.4 years to 2.3 years) and result in an additional $276 million collected over the next 5 years.
While SSA officials reported an increase in recent years in the amount of civil monetary penalties imposed, SSA currently lacks reliable data to effectively track the disposition of penalties and administrative sanctions. For example, SSA cannot readily track the amounts ultimately collected from penalties, which are fines imposed by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and collected by SSA. Further, SSA currently has only two paths for collecting on penalties—withholding benefits and voluntary payment. A recent OIG audit found that the majority of uncollected penalty amounts it reviewed were from individuals who were not receiving SSA benefits and with whom SSA had no ongoing collection actions. SSA determined it is able to use certain alternative collection tools, such as wage garnishment, but only recently began drafting regulations to use them, and the regulations are still undergoing internal review. In addition, SSA lacks and had not explored obtaining authority to use other tools for collecting penalties that it uses for collecting overpayments—such as credit bureau reporting. Related to administrative sanctions, SSA could not provide reliable data on how often it imposes sanctions, a punishment in which benefit payments are temporarily stopped. SSA's process of manually entering sanctions information into a database may be subject to errors or omissions. Regional officials said this can result in incomplete information and staff not taking appropriate action on cases. SSA changed its procedure in 2013 to direct that all potential sanctions first be reviewed for potential prosecution or civil monetary penalties, but SSA's lack of reliable data prevents it from determining whether this new procedure achieved the intended effect of more consistent application of sanctions. In an internal evaluation of its procedures, SSA identified weaknesses with how sanctions decisions are tracked and communicated, but it is in the early stages of deciding how to address them. The shortcomings in SSA's use of penalties and sanctions potentially diminish the deterrent value of these actions against individuals who may fraudulently obtain benefits.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making eight recommendations to SSA, including: clarify its policy and improve oversight related to debt repayment plans, pursue additional recovery options for overpayments and penalties, and improve its ability to track penalties and sanctions. SSA agreed with seven, but disagreed with a recommendation on debt recovery options. GAO maintains the options merit exploration, as discussed further in the report. |
gao_GAO-12-37 | gao_GAO-12-37_0 | Multiple Stakeholders Have Responsibility for Security
Coast Guard Is the Lead Federal Agency
As the lead federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard has broad responsibilities for ensuring the security of OCS facilities and deepwater ports. For example, staff at Coast Guard headquarters oversee and develop policies and procedures for field staff to follow when conducting security inspections of offshore energy infrastructure and to assist affected owners and operators so that they can comply with maritime security regulations. Coast Guard Could Further Ensure the Security of OCS Facilities by Improving Its Process for Managing Security Inspections
Coast Guard Actions to Ensure Security
The Coast Guard has taken actions to ensure the security of OCS facilities in the Gulf of Mexico, within which all OCS facilities are presently located. For example, the Coast Guard conducted about one-third of annual inspections of OCS facilities from 2008 through 2010 (see table 1). The Coast Guard does not have procedures in place to help ensure that its field units conduct security inspections of OCS facilities annually in accordance with its guidance. Inconsistent Documentation and Database Limitations
In addition to challenges in the Coast Guard’s inspection efforts, inconsistent documentation of security inspections as well as limitations in the MISLE database—the database in which security inspection results are recorded—hinder the Coast Guard’s ability to manage the offshore security inspection program or analyze inspection data needed for making management decisions about OCS facilities. Actions Are Needed to Further Ensure the Security of Deepwater Ports
Coast Guard Actions to Ensure Security
The Coast Guard has taken actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports that are similar to actions it has taken to ensure the security of OCS facilities. The Coast Guard has also reviewed and approved deepwater port operations manuals for the three deepwater ports that, among other things, must include deepwater port security plans that are comparable to the security plans required for OCS facilities pursuant to 33 C.F.R. Coast Guard Could Improve the Security of Deepwater Ports by Conducting Security Inspections
The Coast Guard has conducted only one security inspection of a deepwater port from 2008 through 2010. While deepwater port operators are required to develop security plans as part of their operations manuals, which are to be approved by the Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard acknowledges that its mandate to verify the effectiveness of security plans applies to deepwater ports where an incident may meet the definition of a transportation security incident, the Coast Guard has not implemented procedures for conducting inspections to verify the effectiveness of the deepwater port security plans on annual basis. Additionally, the Coast Guard is aware of potential risks regarding MODUs and is conducting a study designed to help determine whether additional actions could better ensure the security of offshore energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico, including MODUs. Gaining a fuller understanding of the security risks associated with MODUs could better inform Coast Guard decisions and potentially improve the security of these facilities. Because it is not complying with its established maritime security requirements, the Coast Guard may not be adequately meeting one of its stated goals of reducing the security risk and mitigating the potential results of an act that could threaten the security of personnel, the OCS facility, the environment, and the public. We also found limitations in the MISLE database which make it difficult for Coast Guard managers to determine if security inspections were conducted when reviewing the data, and current guidance does not describe policies and procedures that would fully address these limitations. By addressing some of these inconsistencies and other limitations, Coast Guard managers could more easily summarize data, identify issues related to OCS facilities, and use the data as a management tool to inform decision making. Although the Coast Guard has conducted only one security inspection of a deepwater port from 2008 through 2010, Coast Guard officials have recognized the importance of conducting annual security inspections of deepwater ports and are planning to update guidance to require such inspections and to address the way in which such inspections are to be conducted. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the Coast Guard’s efforts to ensure the security of OCS facilities and deepwater ports, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following three actions: Develop policies and procedures to monitor and track annual security inspections for OCS facilities to better ensure that such inspections are consistently conducted. DHS and the Coast Guard concurred with the findings and recommendations in the report, and DHS stated that the Coast Guard is taking actions to implement our recommendations. We used this database to address the objectives on what the Coast Guard has done to ensure the security of Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities and deepwater ports, and what additional actions, if any, are needed. part 106 but were not included on the Coast Guard list. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congressional interest in the security of offshore energy infrastructure has increased because of the lives lost and the substantial damages that resulted from the Deepwater Horizon incident in April 2010. The U.S. Coast Guard--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the lead federal agency for maritime security, including the security of offshore energy infrastructure. The Coast Guard oversees two main types of offshore energy infrastructure--facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and deepwater ports. GAO was asked to examine (1) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of OCS facilities and what additional actions, if any, are needed; (2) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports and what additional actions, if any, are needed; and (3) what limitations in oversight authority, if any, the Coast Guard faces in ensuring the security of offshore energy infrastructure. GAO reviewed Coast Guard documents, such as inspection records, and relevant laws and regulations and interviewed Coast Guard inspectors and officials, including those at Coast Guard headquarters and the two Coast Guard districts that oversee all OCS facilities and deepwater ports that are subject to security requirements.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard has taken actions to address the security of OCS facilities (that is, facilities regulated for security pursuant to 33 C.F.R. part 106), but could improve its process for managing security inspections. For example, the Coast Guard developed a security plan for the Gulf of Mexico, in which all 57 OCS facilities are located, and it reviews security plans developed by the owners and operators of OCS facilities. It has also issued guidance, which states that Coast Guard personnel should conduct security inspections of OCS facilities annually, but has conducted about one-third of these inspections from 2008 through 2010. Further, the Coast Guard does not have procedures in place to ensure that its field units conduct these inspections. Consequently, the Coast Guard may not be meeting one of its stated goals of reducing the risk and mitigating the potential results of an act that could threaten the security of personnel, the OCS facility, the environment, and the public. The Coast Guard also faces challenges in summarizing inspection results. Specifically, its database for storing inspection data has limitations that make it difficult to determine if security inspections were conducted. For example, there is no data field to identify OCS facilities, which makes it difficult to readily analyze whether required inspections were conducted. By addressing some of these challenges, Coast Guard managers could more easily use the data as a management tool to inform decision making. The Coast Guard has also taken actions to ensure the security of the four deepwater ports, but opportunities exist for improvement. The Coast Guard's actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports are similar to actions it has taken to ensure the security of OCS facilities. For example, Coast Guard security plans address security at deepwater ports, and the Coast Guard also reviews security plans developed by the owners and operators of the deepwater ports. However, Coast Guard guidance for deepwater ports does not call for annual security inspections, and it has conducted only one security inspection at a deepwater port from 2008 through 2010. Coast Guard officials said that the Coast Guard plans to begin annual security inspections of deepwater ports in recognition of the risk of a transportation security incident. However, limitations in the Coast Guard's inspection database and lack of guidance available to database users may complicate the Coast Guard's management and oversight of inspections at deepwater ports. For example, the data field for deepwater ports has been incorrectly applied to other types of infrastructure and some deepwater ports are recorded under multiple names. Unless the Coast Guard addresses these database limitations and issues updated guidance to database users, it will be difficult for the Coast Guard to verify that the deepwater ports are complying with applicable maritime security requirements. The Coast Guard has limited authority regarding the security of mobile offshore drilling units (MODU) registered to foreign countries, such as the Deepwater Horizon. The Coast Guard is taking action, though, to gain a fuller understanding of the security risks associated with MODUs by conducting a study to help determine whether additional actions could better ensure the security of offshore energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico, including MODUs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Coast Guard develop policies or guidance to ensure that (1) annual security inspections are conducted at OCS facilities and (2) information entered into its database for both OCS facilities and deepwater ports is more useful for management. DHS and the Coast Guard concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-628 | gao_GAO-16-628_0 | The Bureau estimates that if it succeeds with these innovations it can conduct the 2020 Census for $12.5 billion in constant 2020 dollars. The Bureau’s October 2015 Cost Estimate Does Not Reflect Key Best Practices
Since our January 2012 report in which we reviewed the Bureau’s initial estimate of the total cost of the decennial census, the Bureau has taken significant steps to improve its capacity for cost estimating. Despite this progress, the Bureau’s October 2015 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect characteristics of a high-quality estimate as described in our 2009 Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and cannot be considered reliable. To reflect these characteristics, an organization must meet or substantially meet each best practice. One reason why our overall assessment is low is because the estimate is not well-documented. We found the estimate partially met best practices for this characteristic. In addition, a risk and uncertainty analysis should be performed to determine the level of risk associated with the estimate. Additionally the Bureau carried out its risk and uncertainty analysis only for a portion of costs in fiscal years 2018 to 2020, telling us it scoped it narrowly by design to those 3 years when most of the census costs—and predominantly variable costs—occur. We found that the Bureau’s risk and uncertainty analysis (modeled costs) covered $4.6 billion, only about 37 percent of the $12.5 billion total estimated life-cycle cost, and less than one-half of the total estimated future cost of the census, which would include fiscal years 2017 to 2023 (see figure 4). The Bureau Identified a Broad Range of Risks, but Did Not Clearly Account for Them in the Cost Estimate
The Bureau Identified a Broad Range of Risks Potentially Affecting 2020 Census Cost
The Bureau identified 158 different project-level risks for the 2020 Census. The cost estimation team said that it was aware of the risk registers, but had not consulted them. It also reported not having examined specific risks directly for accounting in the cost model. Further, taking steps to ensure its cost estimate is reliable would help improve decision making, budget formulation, progress measurement, course correction when warranted, and accountability for results. Yet this institutional awareness of risk was not fully leveraged in the Bureau’s cost estimation process. As a result, the Bureau is unable to determine with confidence what risks the Bureau with its $12.5 billion cost estimate is prepared to mitigate or address. Improving control over how risk and uncertainty are accounted for and communicated with the Bureau’s decennial cost estimation process, such as by implementing and institutionalizing processes or methods with clear guidance, will improve Bureau and congressional confidence that the Bureau’s budgeted contingencies are at appropriate levels. To help ensure the Bureau produces a reliable cost estimate for the 2020 Census, take the following steps to meet the characteristics of a high-quality estimate:
Comprehensive—among other practices, ensure the estimate includes all life-cycle costs and documents all cost-influencing assumptions. It also provided additional context that we incorporated, as appropriate. The Department of Commerce also noted that while it fully recognizes the Census Bureau can further improve its process under the Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide as well as the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, it stands behind the quantitative integrity of the current life-cycle cost estimates for the 2020 Census. We reviewed (1) the extent to which the Bureau's life-cycle cost estimate met our best practices for cost estimation; (2) the extent to which the Bureau's key cost assumptions were supported by field tests, prior studies, and other evidence-based analysis; and (3) the extent to which the Bureau has identified and accounted for key risks facing the 2020 Census within its risk and uncertainty analyses of its life-cycle cost estimate. | Why GAO Did This Study
In October 2015, the Bureau estimated that with its new approach it can conduct the 2020 Census for $12.5 billion, $5 billion less than the $17.8 billion it estimated it would cost to repeat the design and methods of the 2010 Census. Reliable cost estimates can help an agency manage large complex activities like the 2020 Census, as well as help Congress make funding decisions and provide oversight.
GAO was asked to evaluate the reliability of the Bureau's life-cycle cost estimate. Among other objectives, this report assesses the extent to which (1) the Bureau's life-cycle cost estimate met GAO's best practices for cost estimation and (2) the Bureau identified and accounted for key risks facing the 2020 Census. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed documentary and testimonial evidence from Bureau officials responsible for developing the 2020 Census cost estimate. GAO used its cost assessment guide ( GAO-09-3SP ) and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government ( GAO-14-704G ) as criteria.
What GAO Found
Since 2012, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has taken significant steps to improve its capacity to carry out an effective cost estimate; however, its October 2015 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect characteristics of a high-quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable. To reflect these characteristics, an organization must meet or substantially meet four best practices. Overall, GAO found the cost estimate partially met the characteristics of two best practices (comprehensive and accurate) and minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). One reason why GAO's overall assessment is low is because the estimate is not well-documented. Improving cost estimation practices will increase the reliability of the Bureau's cost estimate, which will in turn help improve decision making, budget formulation, progress measurement, course correction when warranted, and accountability for results.
Best practices state a risk and uncertainty analysis should be performed to determine the level of risk associated with the cost estimate. The Bureau carried out such an analysis only for a portion of estimated costs for fiscal years 2018 to 2020. According to Bureau officials, they scoped the analysis narrowly to those 3 years when most of the census costs occur. GAO found that, as a result, the Bureau's risk and uncertainty analysis (modeled costs) covered $4.6 billion, only about 37 percent of the $12.5 billion total estimated life-cycle cost, and less than one-half of the total estimated cost of the census during future fiscal years.
Note: All figures are in constant 2020 dollars.
The Bureau has risk identification processes, which identify a broad range of risks that could affect the cost of the 2020 Census. Yet this awareness of risk is not leveraged in the Bureau's cost estimation. The cost estimation team did not consult risk registers or examine specific risks directly for inclusion in the cost model or risk and uncertainty analysis. It was not known what risks, if any, had been accounted for in other data in the cost model. As a result, neither the Bureau nor GAO are able to determine with confidence what risks the Bureau is prepared to mitigate or address within its $12.5 billion cost estimate. Improving control over how risk is accounted for will improve confidence that the Bureau's budgeted contingencies are at appropriate levels.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations including that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to take specific steps to ensure its cost estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate and improve control over how risk and uncertainty are accounted for in cost estimation. The Department of Commerce agreed with GAO's recommendations and provided additional context that was incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_T-RCED-96-210 | gao_T-RCED-96-210_0 | HUD’s Section 8 program provides rental subsidies for low-income families. Problems Affecting the Portfolio
The insured Section 8 portfolio suffers from three basic problems—high subsidy costs, high exposure to insurance loss, and in the case of some properties, poor physical condition. If existing rents exceeded market rents, the process would lower the mortgage debt, thereby allowing a property to operate and compete effectively at lower market rents. To obtain data to better assess the likely outcomes and costs of the mark-to-market proposal, HUD contracted with Ernst & Young LLP in 1995 for a study on HUD-insured properties with Section 8 assistance to (1) determine the market rents and physical condition of the properties and (2) develop a financial model to show how the proposal would affect the properties and to estimate the costs of subsidies and claims associated with the mark-to-market proposal. As such, it is important to note that the study’s results do not reflect the changes that HUD made to its proposal in early 1996. Unfortunately, however, these benefits may come at a high cost. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) proposal to restructure its section 8 multifamily rental housing portfolio.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the section 8 portfolio suffers from high subsidy costs, exposure to insurance losses, and deteriorating property conditions; (2) HUD has proposed to implement a mark-to-market process that would allow property owners to set rents at market levels and allow HUD to reduce mortgage debt, terminate mortgage insurance, and restructure section 8 subsidies; (3) HUD contracted for a study to obtain information on market rents and the physical condition of the properties in its portfolio; (4) the study showed that the majority of insured section 8 properties would require debt reduction or forgiveness to continue operating; (5) the study also showed that, for most properties, assisted rents are higher than estimated market rents; (6) the contractor's study methodology was reasonable; and (7) any benefits that the HUD proposal realizes may come at a high cost. |
gao_GAO-05-17 | gao_GAO-05-17_0 | Testing of the Requisition- Processing Systems Is Needed to Improve Internal Controls for Foreign Military Sales
Our reviews showed that the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force were not testing their automated systems to ensure that the systems were accurately reviewing and approving blanket order requisitions for compliance with restrictions and operating in accordance with foreign military sales policies. Our tests of the services’ automated systems used to manage foreign countries’ requisitions for spare parts made through blanket orders showed that classified and controlled spare parts that the services did not want released were being released to countries. GAO’s internal control standards require periodic testing of new and revised software to ensure that it is working correctly, while the Office of Management and Budget’s internal control standards require periodic reviews to determine how mission requirements might have changed and whether the information systems continue to fulfill ongoing and anticipated mission requirements. In commenting on our prior reports, DOD either concurred or partially concurred with our recommendations for testing the services’ requisition- processing systems. The department, however, does not have a plan specifying the remedial actions to be taken to implement these recommendations. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the military services are developing a new automated system, the Case Execution Management Information System, to process foreign military sales requisitions. Internal control standards requiring testing will be applicable to the new system. Army’s Practice Provides More Stringent Protection against the Improper Release of Parts to Foreign Countries
Our reviews showed that the Navy’s and the Air Force’s systems allowed country managers, who are responsible for managing the sale of items to foreign countries, to override system decisions not to release to foreign countries classified or controlled parts that are requisitioned under blanket orders. We identified instances where Navy and Air Force country managers overrode the systems’ decisions without documenting their reasons for doing so. For 19 of the requisitions, the managers overrode the system’s decisions and shipped classified and controlled spare parts without documenting their reasons for overriding the system. Compared with the Navy’s and the Air Force’s systems, the Army’s system provides more stringent protection against releasing classified or controlled parts that are not authorized for release under blanket orders to foreign countries. However, modifying systems, as the Army did, to reject requisitions that are made under blanket orders for classified or controlled parts and to preclude country managers from manually overriding system decisions would provide more stringent protection against releasing classified or controlled parts that are not authorized for release under blanket orders to a foreign country. Recommendations for Executive Action
To reduce the likelihood of releasing classified and controlled spare parts that DOD does not want to be released to foreign countries, we recommend that you take the following three actions: Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy, and direct the Secretary of the Air Force to develop an implementation plan, such as a Plan of Actions & Milestones, specifying the remedial actions to be taken to ensure that applicable testing and review of the existing requisition-processing systems are conducted on a periodic basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under Department of Defense (DOD) policy, the export of classified and controlled spare parts must be managed to prevent their release to foreign countries that may use them against U.S. interests. GAO has issued a series of reports on the foreign military sales program in which weaknesses in the military services' internal controls were identified. This report highlights (1) a systemic problem that GAO identified in the internal controls of the military services' requisition-processing systems and (2) a potential best practice that GAO identified in one service that provides an additional safeguard over foreign military sales of classified and controlled parts.
What GAO Found
At the time GAO conducted its reviews, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force were not testing their automated requisition-processing systems to ensure that the systems were accurately reviewing and approving blanket order requisitions for compliance with restrictions on the sale of classified and controlled spare parts and operating in accordance with foreign military sales policies. Blanket order requisitions are based on agreements between the U.S. government and a foreign country for a specific category of items for which foreign military sales customers will have a recurring need. GAO's tests of the services' requisition-processing systems showed that classified and controlled spare parts that the services did not want to be released to foreign countries under blanket orders were being released. GAO's internal control standards require periodic testing of new and revised software to ensure that it is working correctly, while the Office of Management and Budget's internal control standards require periodic reviews to determine how mission requirements might have changed and whether the information systems continue to fulfill ongoing and anticipated mission requirements. DOD either concurred or partially concurred with GAO's recommendations for testing the requisition-processing systems. The department, however, does not have a plan specifying the remedial actions to be taken to implement these recommendations. Internal control standards requiring testing also will be applicable to the Case Execution Management Information System, an automated requisition-processing system that DOD and the military services are developing to replace the existing individual military service systems. The Army's automated requisition-processing system incorporates a potential best practice that helps to prevent the release of classified or controlled parts that are not authorized under blanket orders to foreign countries. The automated systems used by the Navy and the Air Force allow country managers to override system decisions not to release to foreign countries classified or controlled parts that are requisitioned under blanket orders. GAO found instances where Navy and Air Force country managers overrode the systems' decisions without documenting their reasons for doing so. In contrast, the Army's system automatically cancels requisitions that are made under blanket orders for classified or controlled parts. Because the requisitions are automatically canceled, country managers do not have an opportunity to override the system's decisions. Compared with the Navy's and the Air Force's systems, the Army's system provides more stringent protection against releasing classified or controlled parts that are not authorized under blanket orders to foreign countries. |
gao_GAO-11-461T | gao_GAO-11-461T_0 | TSA Did Not Validate the Science Underlying the SPOT Program before Deploying SPOT
As discussed in our May 2010 report, TSA deployed SPOT nationwide before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. Specifically, DHS’s plan to assess SPOT is not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. According to TSA, SPOT was deployed before a scientific validation of the program was completed, but TSA stated that this deployment was made in response to the need to address potential threats to the aviation system, such as suicide bombers. However, a 2008 report issued by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences stated that the scientific evidence for behavioral monitoring is preliminary in nature. Thus, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the validation study on the SPOT program being conducted to determine whether the study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the SPOT program. According to DH S’s Science and Technology Directorate, this independent review is expected to be completed in early April 2011. As we noted in our report, research on other issues, such as determining the number of individuals needed to observe a given number of passengers moving at a given rate per day in an airport environment or the duration that such observation can be conducted by BDOs before observation fatigue affects effectiveness, could provide additional information on the extent to which SPOT can be effectively implemented in airports. As we reported in March 2011, Congress may wish to consider limiting program funding pending receipt of an independent assessment of TSA’s SPOT program. TSA Is Taking Steps to Address Operational Challenges in Implementing the SPOT Program
In May 2010, we reported that TSA is not fully utilizing the resources it has available to systematically collect the information obtained by BDOs on passengers whose behaviors and appearances resulted in either a referral to a BDO or to a LEO, and who thus may pose a risk to the aviation system. Official guidance on what data should be entered into the system on passengers could better position TSA personnel to be able to consistently collect information to facilitate synthesis and analysis in “connecting the dots” with regard to persons who may pose a threat to the aviation system. In March 2011, TSA stated that it has taken steps to implement our recommendation by revising SPOT standard operating procedures to provide guidance directing the input of BDO data into the Transportation Information Sharing System. TSA plans to implement these revised procedures in April 2011. In addition, all SPOT airports have access to the Transportation Information Sharing System as of March 2011 according to TSA. In addition, as we previously reported, studying airport video recordings of the behaviors exhibited by persons transiting airport checkpoints who were later charged with or pleaded guilty to terrorism-related offenses could provide important insights about behaviors that may be common among terrorists or could demonstrate that terrorists do not generally display any identifying behaviors. Using CBP and Department of Justice information, we examined the travel of key individuals allegedly involved in six terrorist plots that have been uncovered by law enforcement agencies. As a result, in our May 2010 report, we recommended that if the current validation effort determines that the SPOT program has a scientifically validated basis for using behavior detection for counterterrorism purposes in the airport environment, then TSA should study the feasibility of using airport checkpoint surveillance video recordings to enhance its understanding of terrorist behaviors. DHS agreed with our recommendation and noted that TSA agrees this could be a useful tool and is working with DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate to utilize video case studies of terrorists, if possible. In March 2011, TSA stated that it is exploring ways to better utilize video recordings to identify these behavioral indicators. | Why GAO Did This Study
The attempted passenger aircraft bombing of Northwest flight 253 on December 25, 2009, provided a vivid reminder that the civil aviation system remains an attractive terrorist target. To enhance aviation security, in October 2003 the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began testing of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security. The SPOT program utilizes behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers. This testimony provides information on (1) the extent to which TSA has validated the scientific basis for SPOT and (2) other operational challenges. This statement is based on a prior report GAO issued in May 2010 on SPOT, including selected updates made in March 2011. For the updates, GAO reviewed documentation on TSA's progress in implementing the report's recommendations.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in May 2010, TSA deployed its behavior detection program nationwide before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for the program. According to TSA, the program was deployed before a scientific validation of the program was completed in response to the need to address potential security threats. However, a scientific consensus does not exist on whether behavior detection principles can be reliably used for counterterrorism purposes, according to a 2008 report of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. DHS is conducting a study on the scientific basis of SPOT. Thus, in May 2010, GAO recommended that DHS convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of its study. DHS concurred and stated that it is convening an independent panel to review its current efforts to help validate the scientific basis for the program, which is expected to complete its work by early April 2011. Nonetheless, DHS's study to assess SPOT is not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. For example, factors such as the length of time behavior detection officers (BDO) can observe passengers without becoming fatigued are not part of the plan and could provide additional information on the extent to which SPOT can be effectively implemented. The results of a panel to review DHS's methodology could help ensure a rigorous, scientific validation of SPOT. As GAO previously reported, TSA experienced SPOT operational challenges, including not systematically collecting and analyzing information obtained by BDOs on passengers who may pose a threat to the aviation system. Better utilizing existing resources would enhance TSA's ability to quickly verify passenger identity and could help TSA to more reliably "connect the dots" with regard to persons who pose a threat. Thus, GAO recommended that TSA clarify BDO guidance for inputting information into the database used to track suspicious activities, and develop a schedule to expand access to this database across all SPOT airports. TSA agreed and in March 2011 stated that it has revised the SPOT standard operating procedures on how BDOs are to input data into the database used to report suspicious activities. TSA plans to implement these revised procedures in April 2011. TSA also reported that all SPOT airports have access to this database as of March 2011. In addition, GAO reported that individuals allegedly involved in six terrorist plots transited SPOT airports. GAO recommended in May 2010 that TSA study the feasibility of using airport video recordings of the behaviors exhibited by persons transiting airport checkpoints who were later charged with or pleaded guilty to terrorism-related offenses. GAO reported that such recordings could provide insights about behaviors that may be common among terrorists or could demonstrate that terrorists do not generally display any identifying behaviors. TSA agreed that studying airport videos could be a useful tool in understanding terrorist behaviors in the airport environment and in March 2011 reported that it is exploring ways to better utilize such recordings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen TSA's SPOT program. TSA generally concurred with the recommendations and has actions under way to address them. GAO provided the updated information to TSA. TSA had no comment. |
gao_T-RCED-98-227 | gao_T-RCED-98-227_0 | In the case of the Alaska Region, appropriations are further allocated to (1) the regional office, which provides overall direction and support for programs and activities in the region as well as funds for the State and Private Forestry operations located in Anchorage, Alaska; (2) the centralized field costs, which fund programs or activities that usually have regionwide benefits; (3) the four field offices to operate “on the ground” programs; and (4) reserve accounts from which distributions are made during the year to the field offices. As shown on table 1, the Alaska Region’s operating costs ranged from $108 million to $127 million annually during fiscal years 1993 through 1997 and were estimated to be about $106 million for fiscal year 1998. The Regional Office’s Use of Centralized Field Costs
Until fiscal year 1998, the Alaska Region used a category of operating costs, known as centralized field costs, as a means to improve efficiency by having one office—either the regional office or one of the field units—manage certain programs or activities for the benefit of multiple offices. Recent Legislation Results in Reclassification of Centralized Field Costs
In the conference report for the Forest Service’s fiscal year 1998 appropriations, the conferees expressed concern “about the appearance that expenditures for regional office operations and centralized field costs have risen significantly as a proportion of annual appropriated funds since 1993.” As a result, in the appropriations act the Congress limited the Alaska Regional Office’s expenditures for the regional office’s operations and centralized field costs to $17.5 million, without 60 days prior notice to the Congress. Separating the costs associated with the State and Private Forestry organizational unit from the regional office’s expenses. Regional Reserves Distributed to Local Field Offices
The Alaska Region establishes reserves because of the uncertainty about the timing or the amount of funds needed for certain projects. Once the specific amount or responsible unit is determined, the region distributes the necessary reserves to the unit responsible for making the payment. Any ending balance in the reserve category becomes the carryover amount for the next fiscal year. The Rationale for the Split Funding for the Work of Research Scientists on the Tongass Land Management Plan Was Not Documented
Beginning in fiscal year 1995, the Forest Service’s Pacific Research Station scientists performed work in connection with the Tongass Land Management Plan. Although we asked for documentation of the rationale for decisions about the funding split for the particular work performed by the research scientists, neither of these organizations could provide us with adequate explanations or documentation. Our analysis of these data showed that the Research Station scientists used 60 percent of the funds for the revision of the plan and 40 percent for post-plan studies. On March 4, 1998, the Research Station provided us with the estimated budget allocation for fiscal year 1998, and again we asked the Pacific Northwest Research Station’s Science Manager for justification for the charges to the Research appropriation for the work of the Research Station scientists, including the documentation required by the August 1997 revision to the Forest Service’s Service-Wide Appropriations Handbook. Furthermore, because of the lack of documentation or adequate explanations, we could not determine whether the National Forest System and the Research appropriations were used appropriately or inappropriately in fiscal years 1995 through 1998. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed: (1) the National Forest Service's Alaska Region's allocation of funds for its operating costs for fiscal year (FY) 1993 through FY 1998; (2) the nature, purpose, and allocation of centralized field costs and the steps the Alaska Region is taking to comply with the congressional limitation on the expenditures for the regional office and centralized field costs; (3) the rationale for and the distribution of regional reserve funds; and (4) whether the Forest Service's National Forest System and Research appropriations were used appropriately to pay for work performed by the Pacific Northwest Research Station in connection with the revision of the Tongass Land Management Plan and for post-plan studies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Alaska Region's operating costs ranged from $108 million to $127 million annually during FY 1993 through FY 1997; (2) the region allocated 71 to 76 percent of these funds to field offices carrying out local programs, 13 to 17 percent for managing regional office operations, 4 to 7 percent for centralized field costs, 2 to 5 percent for regional reserves, and 2 to 4 percent for state and private forestry operations; (3) for FY 1998, the region's estimated allocations totalled about $106 million to carry out these regional programs; (4) until FY 1998, the Alaska Region used centralized field costs to manage certain programs or activities for the benefit of multiple offices; (5) the Forest Service's FY 1998 appropriations act limited the Alaska Regional Office's expenditures for regional office operations and centralized field costs to $17.5 million; (6) to comply with this legislative requirement, the Alaska Region eliminated the use of the centralized field cost category, included unallocated funds in regional reserve accounts until the funds are distributed to the field units, and separated the costs for state and private forestry operations from the operations of the regional office; (7) the Alaska Region establishes reserves because of the uncertainty about the timing or the amount of funds needed for certain projects; (8) once the specific amount or responsible unit is determined, the region distributes the necessary reserves to the unit responsible for making the payment; (9) any ending balance in the reserve category becomes the carryover amount for the next fiscal year; (10) beginning in FY 1995, both the Alaska Region's portion of the National Forest System appropriation and the Pacific Northwest Research Station's portion of the Forest and Rangeland Research appropriation funded the work performed by the Research Station scientists on the revision of the Tongass Land Management Plan and post-plan studies; (11) documentation of the rationale for decisions about the funding split for particular work performed by the research scientists could not be provided; and (12) GAO could not determine whether the National Forest System and Research appropriations were used appropriately or inappropriately for FY 1995 through FY 1998. |
gao_GAO-10-782 | gao_GAO-10-782_0 | Within OCIE, the NRSRO examination team within the Office of Market Oversight conducts NRSRO examinations. NRSRO Application Review Process Limits SEC Staff’s Ability to Ensure That Applicants Meet the Act’s Requirements and NRSRO Examination Program Faces Staffing Challenges
SEC’s implementation of the Act involved developing an NRSRO application review process and an examination program. As currently implemented and staffed, both programs require further attention. Staff said that even if SEC had authority to examine an NRSRO applicant prior to acting on its application, the Act’s 90-day deadline for acting on an application would not provide enough time for a more thorough review. We identified other registration processes that have built in greater authority and flexibility for the staff to clarify issues before registering applicants. However, because the NRSRO registration program requires SEC to act within 90 days of receiving the application and SEC has limited ability to extend that deadline, staff have recommended granting registration to credit rating agencies as NRSROs with some concerns outstanding about their meeting the Act’s requirements. As a result, with the current level of staffing it is unlikely that OCIE would have been able to meet its planned routine examination schedule of examining the three largest NRSROs every 2 years and the remaining NRSROs every 3 years depending on staffing resources, and two examinations have taken over 18 months to complete. SEC requested additional resources which it anticipated using to fully staff this oversight function. The Dodd-Frank Act requires SEC to staff the office sufficiently to carry out these requirements. SEC Has Increased the Amount of Performance-related Data NRSROs Are Required to Disclose, but These Data Have Limited Usefulness
Since the implementation of the Act, SEC has made several revisions to the Form NRSRO that are intended to make more information publicly available for evaluating and comparing NRSRO performance. However, because SEC did not specify how NRSROs should calculate these statistics, the NRSROs used varied methodologies, limiting their comparability. Further, we found that the ratings history data sets do not contain enough information to construct comparable performance statistics and are not representative of the population of credit ratings at each NRSRO. Without better disclosures, the information being provided will not serve its intended purpose of increasing transparency. Although the number of NRSROs has increased, the credit rating industry remains highly concentrated. First, credit rating agencies may have relatively high fixed costs. Models Proposing Alternative Means of Compensating NRSROs Intend to Address Conflicts of Interests in the Issuer- Pays Model
As part of an April 2009 roundtable held to examine oversight of credit rating agencies, SEC requested perspectives from users of ratings and others on whether it should consider additional rules to better align the raters’ interest with those who rely on those ratings, and specifically, whether one business model represented a better way of managing conflicts of interest than another. SEC has recently removed or proposed to remove references to NRSRO ratings from several rules. To ensure that SEC has sufficient staff with the skills necessary to address the requirement in the Dodd-Frank Act that SEC establish an Office of Credit Ratings and examine each NRSRO every year, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission should: Develop and implement a plan for the establishment of this office that includes the identification of the number of staff and the skills required of these staff to meet the required examination timetable and provide quality oversight of the NRSROs, including plans for the recruitment of any new hires and appropriate training. To address the inconsistencies in the NRSROs’ methodologies for calculating required performance statistics and total outstanding ratings for initial and updated Form NRSRO filings, address limitations in the required 10 percent and 100 percent rating history disclosures, and increase the comparability and usefulness of these disclosures, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission should take the following eight actions: for the disclosures of required performance statistics, provide specific guidance for NRSROs for calculating and presenting these performance statistics, considering the impact of different methodologies on the information content of the performance statistics and the purpose for which SEC intends the statistics to be used; and evaluate the appropriateness of SEC’s currently designated asset classes for presenting performance statistics, and where SEC determines that the asset classes are not appropriate, modify the requirements accordingly; for the disclosures of required 10 percent and 100 percent ratings histories, ensure that the data elements required as part of the datasets allow users to construct complete ratings histories, identifying the beginning of ratings histories, and distinguish between different types of ratings; consider requiring NRSROs to publish a codebook to explain the variables included in the datasets; clarify that NRSROs should include defaults in the ratings histories review its guidance to NRSROs for generating the 10 percent samples and modify it as needed to ensure that the samples are 10 percent of the type of ratings typically analyzed in each asset class, that withdrawn ratings are not removed from these samples, and that the samples are periodically redrawn; and review its guidance to NRSROs for generating the 100 percent rating history disclosures and modify it as needed to ensure that these histories include those ratings that are typically analyzed in each asset class; and that withdrawn ratings are not removed from these disclosures; for the disclosures of total outstanding ratings required on Form NRSRO, provide specific guidance to NRSROs to calculate their total outstanding ratings. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To discuss the implementation of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (Act), focusing on Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rulemaking and SEC’s implementation of the registration and examination programs for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO), we reviewed the rules SEC has adopted to implement the Act, including the NRSRO registration program and its oversight of NRSROs. To understand additional changes to SEC’s oversight of the NRSROs, we reviewed the recently passed Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (Act), which intended to improve credit ratings by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition. The Act established Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight over Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO), which are credit rating agencies that are registered with SEC. The Act requires GAO to review the implementation of the Act. This report (1) discusses the Act's implementation; (2) evaluates NRSROs' performance-related disclosures; (3) evaluates removing NRSRO references from certain SEC rules; (4) evaluates the impact of the Act on competition; and (5) provides a framework for evaluating alternative models for compensating NRSROs. To address the mandate, GAO reviewed SEC rules, examination guidance, completed examinations, and staff memoranda; analyzed required NRSRO disclosures and market share data; and interviewed SEC and NRSRO officials and market participants.
What GAO Found
SEC's implementation of the Act involved developing an NRSRO registration program and an examination program. As currently implemented and staffed, both programs require further attention. (1) The process for reviewing NRSRO applications limits SEC staff's ability to fully ensure that applicants meet the Act's requirements. While SEC had registered 10 of 11 credit rating agency applicants as of July 2010, some staff memoranda to the Commission summarizing their review of applications described concerns that were not addressed prior to registration. According to staff, the 90-day time frame for SEC action on an application and the lack of an express authority to examine the applicants prior to registration prevented the concerns from being addressed prior to approval. Unlike other registration application programs that have built in greater authority and flexibility for their staff to clarify outstanding questions regarding applications before approval, the NRSRO registration program requires SEC to act within 90 days of receiving the application. As a result, staff recommended granting registration with ongoing concerns about NRSROs meeting the Act's requirements. (2) With its current level of staffing for NRSRO examinations, SEC's Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) would likely not have been able to meet its routine examination schedule of examining the three largest NRSROs every 2 years and others every 3 years. OCIE has requested additional resources to fully staff the NRSRO examination program. While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) requires SEC to establish an Office of Credit Ratings to conduct annual examinations of each NRSRO and staff the office sufficiently to carry out these examinations, SEC may face challenges in meeting the required examination timetable and providing quality supervision over NRSROs unless it develops a plan that clearly identifies staffing needs, such as requisite skills and training. While SEC has increased the amount of performance-related data NRSROs are required to disclose, the usefulness of the data is limited. First, SEC requires NRSROs to disclose certain performance statistics, increasing the amount of performance information available for some NRSROs. However, because SEC does not specify how NRSROs should calculate these statistics, NRSROs use varied methodologies, limiting their comparability. Second, SEC issued two rules requiring NRSROs to make certain ratings history data publicly available. However, the data sets do not contain enough information to construct comparable performance statistics and are not representative of the population of the credit ratings at each NRSRO. Without better disclosures, the information being provided will not serve its intended purpose of increasing transparency. In July 2008, SEC proposed amendments that would have removed references to NRSRO ratings from several rules. Since the implementation of the Act, the number of NRSROs has increased from 7 to 10; however, industry concentration as measured by NRSRO revenues, the number of entities rated, and the dollar volume of new asset-backed debt rated remains high. As part of an April 2009 roundtable held to examine oversight of credit rating agencies, SEC requested perspectives from users of ratings and others on whether it should consider additional rules to better align the raters' interest with those who rely on those ratings, and specifically, whether one business model represented a better way of managing conflicts of interest than another. SEC should identify the additional time frames and authorities it needs to review NRSRO applications, develop a plan to help ensure the NRSRO examination program is sufficiently staffed, improve NRSROs' performance-related disclosure requirements, and develop a plan to approach the removal of NRSRO references from its rules. SEC generally agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-329 | gao_GAO-05-329_0 | Within DTRA, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CT) directorate manages the program’s daily operations. DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls over the CTR Program
Since 2003, DOD has improved its management and internal controls over the CTR program. Following two project failures in Russia, DOD implemented a series of new measures in 2003 that provided a more structured approach to managing the CTR program. Most importantly, in July 2003, DOD filled vacancies within AT&L, the office responsible for ensuring that DTRA’s implementation of CTR projects was meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals. For example, DOD adopted several new methods to assess and mitigate the risks involved in cooperating with CTR- recipient governments. While DOD’s enhancements are an improvement over the previous management and internal controls for the program, CTR procedures do not include final reviews of CTR projects upon their completion. As such, DOD has no mechanism for assessing the success of completed projects and applying lessons learned to future projects. The DOD IG reported that the CTR program management’s failure to fully assess project risks contributed to DOD spending nearly $200 million on projects in Russia to construct a liquid rocket fuel disposition facility that was never utilized and to design a solid rocket motor elimination facility that was never constructed. The information was not included in the project’s 2003 review. Most significantly, the success of the CTR program requires the cooperation of recipient governments. Good internal controls help mitigate the risks from having to rely on recipient governments to sign agreements, provide access, and support project implementation. Legislative Mandates Covering the CTR Program
As required by section 3611 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, we reviewed the status of DOD’s implementation of legislative mandates covering the CTR program. We focused on those controls most relevant to the CTR program, including organizational structure, risk assessments, performance measures, program reviews, communications, and monitoring of projects. Current CTR Program Areas
Since 1992, Congress has authorized DOD to provide more than $5 billion for the CTR program to help the former states of the Soviet Union, including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia, secure and eliminate their weapons of mass destruction and prevent their proliferation. DOD’s Current Management and Internal Controls for the CTR Program Compared with Internal Control Standards
In managing the CTR program, standards for internal controls in the federal government provide an overall framework for DOD to establish and maintain management controls and identify and address major performance challenges and areas at risk for mismanagement. Etana Finkler also provided assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 3611 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 mandates that GAO assess the Department of Defense's (DOD) internal controls for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and their effect on the program's execution. In addressing the mandate, we assessed DOD's management and internal controls over implementing CTR projects since 2003 by using the control standards for the federal government as criteria. In response to the mandate, we focused on those management and internal control areas considered most relevant to CTR project implementation: (1) building a management structure, (2) risk assessments, (3) performance measures, (4) program reviews, (5) communications, and (6) project monitoring. The Congress also mandated that GAO describe the status of DOD's implementation of legislative mandates covering the CTR program.
What GAO Found
Through the CTR program, DOD provides assistance to help the former states of the Soviet Union secure and eliminate their weapons of mass destruction. Since 2003, DOD has improved its management and internal controls over the CTR program. Prior to 2003, DOD had problems managing the program and ensuring that the program was meeting its objectives. These inadequacies became apparent in 2003 following two project failures in Russia that cost the CTR program almost $200 million, including the never used liquid rocket fuel disposition facility. Following these incidents, DOD implemented a more structured approach to managing the CTR program. In July 2003, DOD filled vacancies in the office responsible for managing the program, providing a level of leadership and oversight that did not previously exist. Once in place the new leadership made important improvements to the program's internal controls in the areas of organizational structure, risk assessments, performance measures, program reviews, and communication. For example, DOD now assesses and balances risks with project requirements and measures project performance at each phase. DOD also conducts semi-annual meetings to review commitments and responsibilities of CTR-recipient governments and to minimize risk. Although enhancing its internal controls helps mitigate the risks that stem from having to rely on the cooperation of CTR-recipient governments, DOD can never fully eliminate the project risks associated with recipient governments' cooperation. Furthermore, while DOD's enhancements are an improvement over previous internal controls, current mechanisms do not include a separate review of CTR projects upon their completion. As such, DOD lacks a system for evaluating projects upon their completion and applying lessons learned to future projects. |
gao_GAO-06-449 | gao_GAO-06-449_0 | To develop the first TacSat, DOD effectively managed requirements, employed mature technologies, and built the satellite in the science and technology environment, all under the guidance of a leader who provided a clear vision and prompt funding for the project. Once TacSat 1’s requirements were set, OFT did not change them. According to a number of DOD officials, the ultimate success of the TacSat 1 procurement was largely the result of the former OFT director, who provided the original impetus and obtained support for the experiment from high levels within DOD and the Congress; negotiated a customized mission assurance agreement with Air Force leaders to launch TacSat 1 from Vandenberg Air Force Base at a cost that was affordable given the experiment’s budget; empowered TacSat 1’s project manager at the Naval Research Laboratory to make appropriate trade-off decisions to deliver the satellite on time and within cost; and helped OFT staff develop an efficient work relationship with the Naval Research Laboratory team and provided the laboratory with prompt decisions. These efforts are generally in the early stages. FALCON is expected to flight-test hypersonic technologies and be capable of launching small satellites such as TacSats. DOD Faces Several Challenges in Pursuing Responsive Tactical Capabilities for Warfighters
DOD has several challenges to overcome in pursuing a responsive tactical capability for the warfighter. DOD Has Yet to Provide a Low-Cost, Small Launch Vehicle
While DOD has delivered TacSat 1 on time and within budget, the satellite is not yet operational because it lacks a reliable low-cost—under $10 million—small launch vehicle to place it in orbit. However, in pursuing a low-cost, on-demand tactical capability, the science and technology and acquisition communities have moved forward on somewhat separate tracks, and it is unclear to what extent the work and knowledge gained by the labs will be leveraged when the TacSat experiments are transferred to the acquisition community. Specifically, DOD’s process for developing TacSat 1 reflects best practices that larger space system programs could employ to achieve better acquisition outcomes. In addition, some DOD officials believe that these efforts—focusing on delivering capabilities to the warfighter through TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles—could lead to long-term benefits, including providing opportunities for major space systems to test new technologies, enhancing the skills of DOD’s space workforce, and broadening the space industrial base. Second, developing small, low-cost launch vehicles could provide an avenue for testing new technologies in space. According to industry representatives and DOD officials, efforts to develop a small, low-cost launch vehicle could improve the acquisition process because testing technologies in an operational environment could lower the risk for program managers by providing mature technologies that could be integrated into their acquisition programs. Third, giving space professionals the opportunity to manage small-scale projects like TacSats from start to finish may better prepare them for managing larger, more complex space system acquisitions in the future. Finally, building low-cost, responsive satellites and launch vehicles could create opportunities for small, innovative companies to compete for DOD contracts and thereby increase competition and broaden the space industrial base. Conclusions
For more than two decades, DOD has invested heavily in space assets to provide the warfighter with critical information needed to successfully conduct military operations. To understand the challenges to DOD’s efforts and to determine whether DOD’s experiences with TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles could inform major space system acquisitions, we analyzed a wide body of GAO and DOD studies that discuss acquisition problems and associated challenges, including our work on best practices in weapon system development that we have conducted over the past decade. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than two decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested heavily in space assets to provide the warfighter with mission-critical information. Despite these investments, DOD commanders have reported shortfalls in space capabilities. To provide tactical capabilities to the warfighter sooner, DOD recently began developing TacSats--a series of small satellites intended to be built within a limited time frame and budget--and pursuing options for small, low-cost vehicles for launching small satellites. GAO was asked to (1) examine the outcomes to date of DOD's TacSat and small, low-cost launch vehicle efforts, (2) identify the challenges in pursuing these efforts, and (3) determine whether experiences with these efforts could inform DOD's major space system acquisitions.
What GAO Found
Through effective management of requirements and technologies and strong leadership, DOD was able to deliver the first TacSat satellite in 12 months and for less than $10 million. The Office of Force Transformation, TacSat 1's sponsor, set requirements early in the satellite's development process and kept them stable. DOD modified existing technologies for use in space, significantly reducing the likelihood of encountering unforeseen problems that could result in costly design changes. The satellite was also built within DOD's science and technology environment, which enabled service laboratory scientists to address problems quickly, inexpensively, and innovatively. The vision and support provided by leadership were also key to achieving the successful delivery of TacSat 1. DOD has also made progress in developing three additional TacSats and is working toward developing a low-cost launch vehicle available on demand. Despite this achievement, DOD faces several challenges in providing tactical capabilities to the warfighter sooner. First, DOD has yet to develop a low-cost, small launch vehicle available to quickly put tactical satellites, including TacSat 1, into orbit. Second, limited collaboration between the science and technology and the acquisition communities--as well as the acquisition community's tendency to expand requirements after program start--could impede efforts to quickly procure tactical capabilities. Securing funding for future TacSat experiments may also prove difficult because they are not part of an acquisition program. Finally, DOD lacks a departmentwide strategy for implementing these efforts, and because key advocates of the experiments have left DOD, it is unclear how well they will be supported in the future. Regardless of these challenges, DOD's experiences with the TacSat experiments thus far could inform its major space system acquisitions. DOD's approach to developing the TacSats--matching requirements to available resources, using proven technologies, and separating technology development from product development--reflects best commercial practices that lead to quicker delivery with less risk. According to some DOD officials, the TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles--once they are developed--could also provide an avenue for large space system acquisitions to prove out technologies in the space environment, something DOD has avoided because of the high cost of launching such experiments. These officials also believe that giving space professionals the opportunity to manage small-scale projects like TacSats may better prepare them for managing larger, more complex space system acquisitions. Finally, these officials noted that building small-scale satellite systems and launch vehicles could create opportunities for small, innovative companies to compete for DOD contracts and thereby broaden the space industrial base. |
gao_GGD-98-150 | gao_GGD-98-150_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate IRS’ tax year 1994 EIC compliance study methodology to determine if the reported results were reasonably accurate, (2) identify the primary sources of EIC noncompliance found in that study, and (3) determine whether recent IRS compliance efforts are designed to address the primary sources of noncompliance. Accordingly, we calculated confidence intervals at the 95 percent confidence level to indicate the precision of the estimates. To determine whether this $4.4 billion overclaim estimate is reasonably accurate, we evaluated IRS’ study methodology. For returns filed with an EIC claim, the tax year 1994 study was designed to evaluate taxpayers’ compliance with each EIC eligibility filing requirement, to produce an overall estimate of EIC amounts claimed in error, and to identify the sources of error. The study was not designed to detect or quantify EIC claims that taxpayers could have made, but did not. Although some issues with the study design affected the precision of the results, our analysis showed that these limitations did not affect the study’s major message or its usefulness in designing compliance approaches. IRS’ Study Methodology Supported the Reported Findings
IRS’ study is representative of taxpayers filing an EIC claim on a tax year 1994 return filed between January 15 and April 21, 1995. Largest Source of EIC Overclaims for Tax Year 1994 Was Nonqualifying Children
The largest source of noncompliance found in the tax year 1994 study relates to the EIC requirements most difficult for IRS to verify—those related to the eligibility of qualifying children. 1. 3. Recent Compliance Efforts Are Aimed at Major Sources of Noncompliance, but It Is Too Early to Measure Their Effect
With new enforcement tools provided by Congress and an increase in funding specifically designated for EIC-related activities, IRS began implementing in fiscal year 1998 a plan that calls for attacking EIC noncompliance through expanded customer service and public outreach, strengthened enforcement, and enhanced research. This choice generally should result in lower administrative costs and higher participation rates and emphasizes that the credit is for working taxpayers. EIC eligibility, particularly related to qualifying children, is difficult for IRS to verify through traditional enforcement procedures, such as matching return data to third-party information reports. Thoroughly verifying qualifying child eligibility basically requires IRS to do an audit of the type done in the EIC compliance studies—a costly, time-consuming, and intrusive proposition. Most of the efforts that make up the EIC compliance initiative had not progressed far enough at the time we completed our audit for us to make any judgment about their effectiveness. IRS plans to measure the overall impact of its compliance initiative on the EIC overclaim rate through annual studies of EIC compliance starting with a baseline study of tax year 1997 returns. IRS plans to measure the results of individual programs implemented in 1998, but some of these results will not be available for planning fiscal year 1999 activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) 1994 Earned Income Credit (EIC) compliance study, focusing on: (1) evaluating IRS' study methodology to determine if the reported results were reasonably accurate; (2) identifying the primary sources of EIC noncompliance found in the study; and (3) determining whether recent IRS compliance efforts are designed to address the primary sources of noncompliance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS' estimate of $4.4 billion in EIC overclaims has a 95-percent confidence interval of $4 billion to $4.9 billion; (2) GAO's evaluation of the study methodology showed that the estimate is reasonably accurate and representative of EIC claimants filing between January 15 and April 21, 1995; (3) some aspects of the study methodology affected the precision of the results; but, given the scale of the findings, these limitations do not affect the study's message or its usefulness in designing compliance approaches; (4) although it is a reasonable estimate of EIC overclaims, the entire $4.4 billion should not be viewed as a potential savings to the government had IRS somehow been able to prevent or correct all of these errors; (5) for returns filed with an EIC claim, the tax year 1994 study was designed to evaluate taxpayers' compliance with each EIC eligibility filing requirement, to produce an overall estimate of EIC amounts claimed in error, and to identify the sources of these errors; (6) the study was not designed to detect or quantify EIC claims that taxpayers could have made; (7) the largest source of taxpayer error identified by the tax year 1994 study relates to EIC requirements that are difficult for IRS to verify--those related to qualifying children; (8) unlike income transfer programs, the EIC was designed to be administered through the tax system; (9) this choice generally should result in lower administrative costs and higher participation rates and emphasizes that the credit is for working taxpayers; (10) EIC eligibility is difficult for IRS to verify through its traditional enforcement procedures; (11) thoroughly verifying qualifying child eligibility requires IRS to do an audit of the type done in the EIC compliance studies; (12) with new enforcement tools provided by Congress and an increase in funding designated for EIC-related activities, IRS began implementing in fiscal year 1998 a plan that, over a period of 5 years, calls for attacking EIC noncompliance; (13) most of the efforts that make up the EIC compliance initiative had not progressed far enough at the time GAO completed its audit for it to make any judgment about their effectiveness; (14) IRS plans to measure the overall impact of the compliance initiative on the overclaim rate through annual studies of EIC compliance starting with a baseline study of tax year 1997 returns; and (15) IRS plans to measure the results of the individual initiative components implemented in 1998. |
gao_GAO-08-510 | gao_GAO-08-510_0 | With a firm date established in law, all full-power television broadcasters will cease broadcasting their analog signal by February 17, 2009. The Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005 addresses the responsibilities of FCC related to the DTV transition. Broadcast Stations Have Made Substantial Progress in Transitioning to Digital Television, and the Vast Majority Are Already Transmitting a Digital Signal
Most broadcasters have made significant progress in preparing their stations for the transition to digital, with 91 percent of survey respondents reporting that they were already transmitting a digital signal. In addition, 68 percent of survey respondents are broadcasting their digital signal on the channel from which they will be broadcasting after the transition. Approximately 9 percent of survey respondents will have to move to a completely new channel once the transition is complete. Nine Percent of Stations Responding to the Survey Are Not Broadcasting Digitally, but Almost All Stations Plan to Have a Digital Signal by February 17, 2009
Our survey of broadcast stations found that 97 stations, or 9 percent, are not broadcasting a digital signal. According to FCC, stations that are not currently transmitting a digital signal either (1) were granted a license to operate a digital signal along with their analog signal but have yet to begin broadcasting digitally or (2) were not given a digital license and plan to turn off their analog signal at the same time that they turn on their digital signal—known as “flash cutting.” According to our survey, 5 percent (61 stations) of the stations indicated that they plan to flash cut to a digital-only broadcast. Furthermore, 64 percent of the flash cutters responding to our survey noted that they need to order equipment to complete their digital facilities. Other stations responding to our survey indicated that they have coordination issues to resolve prior to completing the transition, such as the U.S. government reaching agreements with the Canadian and Mexican governments and coordinating with cable providers and satellite companies. Technical issues that some stations need to address include (1) antenna and equipment replacement or relocation and (2) channel relocation. FCC states that 514 of these stations will relocate their current digital channel to their analog channel. Other Issues, Such as Construction Scheduling and Financial Constraints, Might Affect Some Stations during Their Transition
The construction of broadcast towers or financial constraints might affect some stations during their transition. At the time we completed our survey, however, some broadcasters were waiting for FCC decisions before they could finalize their transition plans. In its December 2007 third periodic review and order, FCC finalized a number of actions to facilitate broadcasters’ completion of the DTV transition. For example, the third periodic review and order addressed, among other things, (1) time frames for television stations to complete construction of their digital facilities; (2) information all full-power television stations must provide to FCC by February 19, 2008, detailing the station’s current transition status, any additional steps needed to commence its full, digital operations, and its timeline to meet the February 17, 2009, transition deadline; (3) when and for how long stations will be permitted to reduce or cease service on their analog or paired digital channel; and (4) guidelines for rapid approval of minor expansion of authorized service areas for stations that are moving their digital channel for posttransition operations to allow these stations additional flexibility to use their existing analog antenna. Some Broadcast Stations Required FCC Decisions Prior to Finalizing Their Digital Facilities
In our survey of broadcast stations, 128 respondents indicated they were “awaiting action from FCC” to complete building their final digital facilities. FCC noted that it believes broadcasters have everything they need from the commission to proceed with construction of their final digital facilities. FCC also provided technical comments that we incorporated in this report where appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to provide information on technical issues surrounding the digital television (DTV) transition, specifically, (1) the status of broadcast stations in transitioning to digital, (2) the extent to which broadcast stations are encountering issues during the DTV transition and how these issues impact the broadcast community, and (3) the actions the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has taken to guide broadcasters in the DTV transition and how those actions have affected the broadcast community. Of the 1,682 broadcast stations that were asked to complete the survey, we received 1,122 completed surveys, for an overall response rate of 66.7 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005, requires all full-power television stations in the United States to cease analog broadcasting by February 17, 2009, known as the digital television (DTV) transition. Prior to the transition date, the television broadcast industry must take a series of actions to ensure that over-the-air programming will continue to be available to television households once the transition is complete. For example, broadcast stations must obtain, install, and test the necessary equipment needed to finalize their digital facilities, and some stations will need to coordinate the movement of channels on the day the analog signal ceases transmission. This requested report examines (1) the status of broadcast stations in transitioning to digital, (2) the extent to which broadcast stations are encountering issues, and (3) the actions the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has taken to guide broadcasters in the digital transition. To address these issues, GAO conducted a Web-based survey of full-power television broadcast stations. GAO surveyed 1,682 stations and obtained completed questionnaires from 1,122 stations, for a response rate of 66.7 percent. GAO also reviewed legal, agency, and industry documents and interviewed public, private, and other stakeholders. We provided FCC with a draft of this report, and FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found
Television broadcast stations have made substantial progress in transitioning to digital television, with the vast majority already transmitting a digital signal. Approximately 91 percent of the 1,122 full-power stations responding to our survey are currently transmitting a digital signal, with approximately 68 percent of survey respondents transmitting their digital signal at full strength and 68 percent transmitting their digital signal on the channel from which they will broadcast after the transition date. However, some stations still need to complete construction of their final digital facilities, and others need to relocate their digital channel to complete the transition. For example, 23 percent of survey respondents indicated they will be moving their digital channel to their analog channel. In addition, other stations need to move to a completely new channel. While almost all full-power stations are already broadcasting a digital signal, 9 percent of stations responding to our survey indicated that they are not currently broadcasting digitally. Almost all of these stations, however, indicated that they plan to have their digital signal operational by February 17, 2009. Some stations, including those already broadcasting a digital signal, need to resolve various technical, coordination, or other issues before their transition to digital is complete. For example, over 13 percent of stations responding to our survey reported that they need to install or relocate their digital or analog antennas. Some of these stations still need to order equipment, such as antennas, to build their final digital facilities. Furthermore, stations may have coordination issues to address to complete their final digital facilities. In particular, some stations are awaiting agreements with the Canadian and Mexican governments regarding their signals crossing the borders of these respective countries before they can complete their digital facilities. Stations also need to coordinate with cable providers and satellite companies to ensure that cable and satellite facilities receive digital signals when the analog signals are turned off. Lastly, the construction of broadcast towers or financial constraints might affect some stations during their transition. FCC's actions have provided guidance to broadcasters throughout the digital transition, but at the time we completed our survey, some broadcasters were awaiting FCC decisions. Since 1987, FCC has directed broadcasters with a series of rulemakings and orders, including assigning digital broadcast channels and developing timelines for the construction of digital facilities. Furthermore, FCC has conducted periodic reviews of the transition and released a ruling on its third periodic review on December 31, 2007, in which FCC addressed a number of important DTV issues. However, some stations responded to our survey that they needed decisions from FCC, such as approval for a construction permit or for changes to their final digital channel. According to FCC, it will address remaining issues quickly and with the release of an order in March 2008, FCC stated that it believes broadcasters have everything they need from the commission to proceed with construction of their final digital facilities. |
gao_GGD-97-181 | gao_GGD-97-181_0 | The objectives of this report are to (1) identify U.S. supervisors’ expectations for adequate internal controls and audits in U.S. branches and agencies of FBOs (FBO branches), (2) determine the extent of serious weaknesses in FBO branches’ internal controls and audit reported by U.S. supervisors, and (3) describe U.S. supervisors’ efforts to address these weaknesses. U.S. U.S. Bank Supervisors Expect Internal Controls That Enable Timely Detection of Any Significant Errors or Irregularities
According to the examination manual, supervisory agencies in the United States expect each U.S. FBO branch to have internal controls consistent with the size and complexity of its operations as well as an independent internal audit function and/or adequate audit coverage by the head officeor external auditors. In assessing an FBO branch’s internal controls, supervisors are to consider (1) the adequacy of these controls and the level of adherence to them; (2) the frequency, scope, and adequacy of the branch’s internal and external audit function; (3) the number and severity of internal control and audit exceptions; (4) whether internal control and audit exceptions are effectively tracked and resolved in a timely manner; (5) the adequacy and accuracy of management information reports; and (6) whether the system of controls is regularly reviewed to keep pace with changes in the FBO branch’s business plan and laws and regulations. In general, good internal control exists when no one is in a position to make significant errors or perpetrate significant irregularities without timely detection, according to the examination manual. A Significant Number of FBO Branches Rated Fair or Lower Had Serious Internal Control and Audit Weaknesses
The results of our analysis of examination reports of the 254 FBO branches rated fair, marginal, and unsatisfactory (i.e., 3, 4, or 5) from January 1993 to June 1996 indicate that a significant number of these FBO branches were reported to have serious weaknesses in internal controls, and that a majority of the FBO branches had at least 1 serious audit weakness. Forty-one Percent of the FBO Branches Were Reported to Have Inadequate Frequency of Audits
We found that 41 percent (103) of the FBO branches rated fair or lower were found by supervisors to have audits of inadequate frequency. Supervisory staff we interviewed agreed that inadequate response to audit criticisms is among the most serious of audit weaknesses and could be indicative of poor management. U.S. The objectives of these efforts include helping to ensure (1) the detection of losses that have occurred as the result of a branch’s weaknesses in internal controls and audits, (2) the timely correction by branches of serious weaknesses in internal controls and audits, (3) an increased understanding among multinational banks of the importance of adequate internal controls and audits, and (4) the preparedness of supervisors to conduct effective assessments of internal controls. U.S. U.S. U.S. Supervisors’ Measures Do Not Capture Linkages Between Initiatives and Results
U.S. supervisors have not yet developed a strategy for evaluating the results of their initiatives to improve internal controls and audits at FBO branches. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) identified U.S. supervisors' expectations for adequate internal controls and audits in foreign banking organization (FBO) branches; (2) determined the extent of serious weaknesses in FBO branches' internal controls and audits reported by U.S. supervisors during examinations; and (3) described U.S. supervisors' efforts to address these weaknesses.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) U.S. supervisors expect each U.S. FBO branch to have: (a) a system of internal controls that is consistent with the size and complexity of its operation; and (b) an internal audit function of adequate scope and frequency or an adequate system of head office or external audits; (2) although few FBO branches' deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), U.S. supervisors have an interest in the activities of FBO branches because the supervisors wish to preserve standards that help ensure the efficiency of and confidence in U.S. markets; (3) a guiding principle for U.S. supervisors in assessing internal controls is that good internal control exists when employees are not in a position to make significant errors or perpetrate significant irregularities without timely detection; (4) in evaluating a FBO branch's overall system of internal control, U.S. supervisors are to consider the adequacy of controls and the level of adherence to them; (5) a significant number of the 254 FBO branches U.S. supervisors rated fair or lower had one or more of the weaknesses in internal control that U.S. supervisors identified as being among the most serious, and a majority of the FBO branches had one or more of the weaknesses in audit function identified as being among the most serious; (6) 67 percent of the 254 FBO branches whose examination reports GAO reviewed were reported to have had audits of inadequate scope; 41 percent were reported to have had audits of inadequate frequency; and 28 percent were reported to have had inadequate management response to audit criticisms; (7) according to U.S. supervisors, these audit weaknesses represent serious problems in management's oversight of internal controls and could slow or limit improvement of internal controls at some FBO branches; (8) GAO found that U.S. supervisors are undertaking numerous efforts intended to address internal control and audit weaknesses at FBO branches; (9) the objectives of these efforts include helping to ensure: (a) detection of losses that have occurred as the result of an FBO branch's internal control and audit weaknesses; (b) timely correction by FBO branches of serious weaknesses in control procedures and audit functions; (c) increased understanding among multinational banks of the importance of adequate internal controls and audits; and (d) preparedness of supervisors to conduct effective assessments of internal controls; and (10) prompt attention to the development of a strategy for evaluating the results of these initiatives is now needed to determine whether progress is being made in improving the condition of internal controls at FBO branches. |
gao_GGD-99-88 | gao_GGD-99-88_0 | IRS Strategy for Managing Customer Service Improvements Shows Promise But Could Be Improved
IRS established a promising strategy for managing the implementation of the agency’s customer service initiatives. A Program Office and Steering Committee Managed Implementation
IRS’ basic management strategy was to establish a central office, TSI, in January 1998 to manage the overall implementation of customer service improvements that were being carried out by many different IRS and Treasury offices. It can be used to identify program overlap, duplication, or fragmentation. According to TSI officials, however, this information was not routinely completed and updated by offices implementing the initiatives. TSI Had Early Management Problems
Early actions to develop the database notwithstanding, TSI had problems in carrying out its responsibilities during its first months of operation. However, IRS had not assessed the need for information on expected costs and benefits and how results of the initiatives were to be measured. As of January 1999, managers for a few of the 25 initiatives we reviewed had documented management information on costs and benefits, milestones and completion dates, and anticipated results. Such efforts have resulted in improved performance. It provides agencies with tools to determine whether they have used public resources economically, efficiently, and effectively to achieve the purposes for which they were appropriated. Conclusions
As of January 1999, IRS had established priorities, reduced the number of initiatives to a manageable level, aligned them with its strategic goals and objectives, and assigned accountability for individual initiatives. IRS also improved its ability to monitor and track individual initiatives by providing on-line access to its database and by asking managers responsible for work on individual initiatives to input information on milestones and completion dates. Recommendations
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue develop an approach and provide guidance to managers for determining the appropriate cost and benefit information for the customer service initiatives and for measuring the results of the initiatives in relation to IRS’ customer service objectives. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objective
At the request of the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, we agreed to assess IRS’ strategy for managing the implementation of its customer service initiatives—including whether IRS had developed information on expected costs and benefits, milestones and completion dates, and performance measures to gauge results. By January 1, 1999, expand telephone service to 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to improve customer service.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS' strategy for managing the implementation of its customer service initiatives shows promise but could be improved; (2) IRS' basic approach was to establish a central office, the Taxpayer Service and Treatment Improvement Program (TSI), and form a high-level steering committee, chaired by the Commissioner, to oversee the implementation of improvement initiatives that were being carried out by many different IRS and Department of the Treasury offices; (3) TSI and the steering committee were established in January 1998; (4) in its early months, TSI had problems carrying out its responsibilities; (5) officials attributed most of the problems to the large number of potential initiatives on the agenda; (6) by January 1999, TSI and the steering committee had taken steps to: (a) prioritize the initiatives, reducing the number to 157 primary initiatives; (b) align these initiatives to IRS' newly established strategic goals and objectives; and (c) assign accountability for their completion to specific executives; (7) TSI provided offices involved in day-to-day implementation of individual initiatives with on-line access to the central information database it had developed to categorize and monitor progress on the initiatives; (8) IRS could further improve its customer service management strategy; (9) by January 1999, TSI had identified a need for information on milestones and completion dates for each primary initiative and asked offices implementing individual initiatives to input this information into its database; (10) however, TSI had not assessed the need for information on: (a) expected costs and benefits; and (b) performance measures; (11) managers in a few of the offices implementing initiatives GAO reviewed had documented all these types of information on their own, but this information was not being used by IRS' leadership; (12) as past GAO reports have shown, not only do high-performing, results-oriented organizations set priorities, align activities with mission-related goals and objectives, and assign accountability, but they also develop and use information to monitor progress and evaluate results; (13) information on costs, benefits, milestones and completion dates, and performance measures is critical to successfully managing for results; (14) although it can be difficult to develop, this information provides agencies with tools they can use to monitor and evaluate how efficiently and effectively programs are achieving their purposes; and (15) it is important to help determine whether public resources have been used to achieve the purposes for which they were appropriated. |
gao_GAO-11-526 | gao_GAO-11-526_0 | Background
DOD’s Family of Readiness Reporting Systems
DOD established the Defense Readiness Reporting System in response to the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. Two Types of Mission Assessments
DOD units assess their readiness for their core and assigned missions using two different types of mission assessments. The systems are also designed to meet the services’ reporting requirements, as well as to collect other services-specific information from reporting units. Army and Marine Corps Requirements for Readiness Reporting Have Generally Increased the Quantity and Objectivity of Information Available to Decision Makers
Revised Army and Marine Corps Guidance Requires New Objective Measure of Readiness
The current Army and Marine Corps readiness reporting requirements generally have increased the quantity and objectivity of readiness information provided to decision makers. While the Army and Marine Corps updated their readiness reporting guidance in 2010 to include more objective assigned mission ratings, the services’ guidance retained many of the previous reporting requirements for core missions, such as the requirements to report personnel and equipment information, training assessments, commander comments that provide additional information about their unit’s reported resources, and installation readiness reports. Army and Marine Corps Units Have Implemented Revised Guidance for Readiness Reporting, but Some Reporting Is Inconsistent
While the Army and Marine Corps have taken steps to implement the revised readiness reporting guidance, we identified several areas where units were inconsistently reporting readiness. Reporting Time Frames Are Inconsistent
We found that Army and Marine Corps units are using different time frames when reporting their readiness data. Internal Controls Are Not Preventing Readiness Reporting Inconsistencies
According to federal standards for internal control, management must continually assess and evaluate its internal controls to assure that the control activities being used are effective and updated when necessary. OSD and the Services Continue to Develop Their Respective Systems in the Enterprise
The DRRS Concept of Operations calls for a family of systems to be developed and operated under a single framework to share information requirements and data elements seamlessly across the enterprise. Because the developers have focused on the needs of different system users, and have yet to reach agreement on key elements, progress in achieving interoperability among the three individual systems and across the enterprise has been incremental. In our report, we also recommended that DOD conduct an independent program risk assessment of DRRS, and use the findings in our report and the risk assessment to decide how to redirect the program structure, approach, funding, management, and oversight. However, as we were finishing this review the risk assessment was postponed and is currently scheduled to begin in the fall of 2011. Until this assessment is completed and presented to the DRRS Executive Committee for any actions, OSD will not have the information needed to reach consensus with the services and make any adjustments needed to achieve interoperability. However, some readiness data are currently being reported in an inconsistent manner that diminishes its value to decision makers. To increase the timeliness and consistency of readiness information and thus enhance the usefulness of this information to decision makers, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army and Commandant of the Marine Corps to: Provide additional internal controls, which could include clarifying policy guidance, increasing quality assurance reviews, or putting system technical checks in place to prevent submission of data that does not comply with service readiness reporting requirements. Specifically, DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop an alternative means of indicating which units are in RESET without using C-5 as a means to flag units in RESET. DOD stated that internal controls are adequate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which current readiness reporting requirements have affected the content of readiness information provided to various decision makers within and outside of the Department of Defense (DOD), we interviewed officials from the Department of Army–Readiness Division and Headquarters Marine Corps Readiness Branch. To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps units have consistently implemented their current readiness reporting guidance, we first reviewed the data within each service’s respective readiness reporting systems and compared the data with system criteria—Army Regulation 220-1 and Marine Corps Order 3000.13. | Why GAO Did This Study
To obtain visibility of the capabilities of its military forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed an enterprise of interconnected readiness reporting systems. In 2010, to better meet the information needs of their leaders, the Army and Marine Corps implemented new reporting requirements. House and Senate Reports, which accompanied proposed bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, directed GAO to review recent readiness reporting changes. GAO assessed the extent that 1) current readiness reporting policies have affected the content of readiness information provided to decision makers, 2) the services have consistently implemented their new policies, and 3) changes to the Army, Marine Corps, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) systems have affected the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) enterprise. GAO analyzed DOD, Army, and Marine Corps policies, readiness data, service readiness reporting systems, and spoke to headquarters officials and reporting units.
What GAO Found
Current Army and Marine Corps guidance has generally improved the quantity and objectivity of readiness information available to decision makers. As in the past, Army Regulation 220-1 and Marine Corps Order 3000.13 direct units to report on two types of missions--the core missions for which units were designed as well as any other missions they may be assigned, but recent changes to the guidance also added new requirements. Units must now provide objective, personnel and equipment data to supplement commanders' assessments of their units' assigned mission capabilities. The updated service guidance also provides additional criteria, which are intended to help unit commanders consistently assess their units' mission capabilities. The new data and additional mission assessment criteria improve the objectivity and consistency of readiness information provided to decision makers. However, to clearly identify units that recently returned from deployment, the Army regulation now requires units to uniformly report a specific service directed readiness level rather than assess and report the unit's actual readiness level. As a result, decision makers lack a complete picture of the readiness of some units that could be called upon to respond to contingencies. While the Army and Marine Corps have taken steps to implement the revised readiness reporting guidance, units are inconsistently reporting readiness in some areas. GAO site visits to 33 Army and 20 Marine Corps units revealed that units were using inconsistent reporting time frames, and GAO data analysis showed that 49 percent of Marine Corps reports submitted between May 2010 and January 2011 were late. Furthermore, units are reporting equipment and personnel numbers differently, and some units are not linking their two types of mission assessments, in accordance with current guidance. The federal standards for internal control state management must continually assess and evaluate its internal controls to assure that the control activities being used are effective and updated when necessary. However, Marine Corps and Army quality assurance reviews have not identified all the inconsistencies and system mechanisms are not preventing the submission of inconsistent data. Until internal controls improve, decision makers will continue to rely on readiness information that is based on inconsistent reporting. While the DRRS Concept of Operations calls for a family of systems to exchange information seamlessly under an enterprise framework, DOD and the services have focused their efforts on the needs of different users and have not reached agreement on key steps to achieve interoperability. Consequently progress has been incremental. In 2009, GAO issued a report highlighting the challenges facing DRRS and recommended that DOD use GAO's report and an independent program risk assessment to redirect the program's approach, structure, and oversight. As of April 2011, the risk assessment had not been done and it is now scheduled to begin in the fall of this year. Until this assessment is complete, OSD will continue to lack the information it needs to reach consensus with the services and make any adjustments needed to achieve interoperability.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Army develop an alternative means to show which units recently returned from deployment and that both services improve internal controls to enhance readiness reporting. DOD did not concur, citing the availability of other readiness data and actions taken on internal controls. GAO disagrees that the data DOD cites provides sufficient visibility; therefore, additional actions are needed. |
gao_NSIAD-99-6 | gao_NSIAD-99-6_0 | Specifically, we examined (1) the basis for program requirements and (2) the rates of inventory fill and maintenance condition of prepositioned stocks and the reliability of this readiness data. The Army’s brigade sets in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, and afloat reflect the current two-war strategy, but Army officials have expressed a need to reevaluate the requirements for three brigade sets in Europe. The readiness of the afloat, Korea, and Qatar sets is improving, and despite present shortages these sets could provide a significant combat capability, if needed. Readiness is declining in the European sets, and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages caused by the transfer of equipment to support troops in, or returning from, Bosnia. The Army has recognized these problems with its programs and has begun taking steps to correct them, but it may be several years before the problems are fully resolved and it can reliably assess the readiness of its prepositioning programs. Thus, the Army reports that this set is at a high level of readiness. Air Force Prepositioning Programs Have Poorly Defined Requirements and Incomplete Readiness Information
The Air Force does not have precise requirements established for its prepositioned bare base and vehicle programs. Because the Air Force has not assessed the infrastructure available in the region, current requirements are based on worst-case scenarios that assume the Air Force must provide virtually all of the living and operating facilities required by deploying forces and will not have any other sources of supply for housing, food, or laundry requirements. In addition, the Air Force is storing over 900 general purpose and specialty vehicles in Europe but has no current requirements for these vehicles to be stored there. The Air Force Has Not Determined Valid Requirements for the Vehicle Program
The Air Force has not precisely defined requirements for its prepositioned vehicle program. However, much of the Air Force’s vehicle fleet is aging and in poor condition. Over 40 percent of these vehicles were not mission capable as of July 1998. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to reevaluate the requirements for European prepositioning, including whether the current brigade set configurations best meet the envisioned missions; take steps to ensure that the operational projects requirements meet operational needs and are prioritized in accordance with DOD’s current wartime strategy; complete ongoing efforts to improve the processes used to determine sustainment requirements and work with other DOD stakeholders to determine what stocks will be available from the industrial base and host nations; develop reliable reports of inventory fill and maintenance conditions for the operational projects and sustainment programs so that their readiness can be reliably measured; and dispose of unneeded stocks. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To reliably assess DOD’s readiness status and evaluate its future budget requests, the Congress may wish to consider having the Secretary of Defense periodically report on (1) the progress by DOD, the Army, and the Air Force to address the recommendations made in this report and (2) the impact of any shortages that remain after requirements and reporting problems are addressed, including how DOD and the services would mitigate shortages in the event of a major conflict. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the readiness of the Department of Defense (DOD) prepositioning programs, focusing on the: (1) basis for the program requirements; and (2) rates of inventory fill and maintenance condition of prepositioned stocks and the reliability of this readiness data.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Army and Air Force have poorly defined, outdated, or otherwise questionable requirements in the major programs that GAO reviewed; (2) the Army and Air Force have reported significant shortages and poor maintenance conditions in their prepositioning programs; (3) reliable data to assess inventory fill and maintenance condition was unavailable; (4) while the services are taking steps to address the requirements and reporting problems, it may be several years before these problems are resolved and readiness can be reliably assessed; (5) the positioning of the Army's brigade sets in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, and afloat supports the current two-war strategy; (6) the three brigade sets in Europe are in a state of flux, and the Army recognizes the need to revisit and evaluate the requirements for those sets; (7) the Kuwait set is at a high level of readiness, and the sets afloat, in Korea, and in Qatar are improving as additional equipment is added to these sets; (8) the readiness of the European sets is declining and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages caused by the transfer of equipment to units in, or returning from, Bosnia; (9) the Army has not determined valid requirements for its operational projects and sustainment programs; (10) the Army is reviewing these programs to establish requirements; (11) until the Army establishes valid requirements and improves inventory reporting, their readiness cannot be reliably and comprehensively assessed; (12) the Air Force has not determined precise requirements for its bare base and vehicle programs; (13) in the Persian Gulf, the Air Force has not completed the detailed planning at each of its planned operating locations to determine what infrastructure and vehicles would be available to deploying forces; (14) current requirements are based on a worst-case scenario that assumes the Air Force must provide virtually all the facilities and vehicles it would need should a major war occur; (15) in Europe, the Air Force is storing over 900 vehicles but has no current requirements for the vehicles to be stored there; (16) in the vehicle program, the Air Force does not have reliable, comprehensive reports of inventories on hand or their maintenance condition; (17) at one location visited, GAO found that over 40 percent of Air Force's aging vehicles were in poor condition and would require repair before being used; and (18) until the Air Force determines requirements for these programs and improves reporting, the impact of shortfalls and poor maintenance conditions will be difficult to discern. |
gao_GAO-15-706 | gao_GAO-15-706_0 | Federal Roles and FAA’s Budget
In 2004, the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act gave DOT, among other things, the specific responsibility of overseeing the public safety aspects of space tourism, but the act prohibited DOT from regulating the safety of crew and spaceflight participants before 2012, except in response to high-risk events, serious injuries, or fatalities—a provision that in 2012 was extended to September 30, 2015. Launch Mishaps and Indemnification
Since October 2014, there have been three mishaps involving FAA licensed or permitted launches. The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Industry Has Expanded in Recent Years
During the last decade, U.S. companies conducted fewer orbital launches in total than companies in Russia or Europe, which are among their main foreign competitors. However, in recent years U.S. companies have conducted an increasing number of orbital launches. Moreover, in 2014, U.S. companies conducted more orbital launches than companies in Russia, which conducted four, or Europe, which conducted six. FAA Faces Multiple Challenges Regarding Developments in the Commercial Space Launch Industry
We asked FAA officials, representatives from nine commercial space launch companies, and three experts to identify the challenges that FAA faces—and is likely to face in the near future—to address significant developments in the commercial space launch industry over the last decade. The challenges for FAA that they identified included the following: (1) determining whether and when to regulate the safety of crew and spaceflight participants, (2) increased workload relating to licensing and permitting launches and launch sites, (3) creating a safety reporting system, and (4) responding to emerging business plans. Among the reasons provided were allowing the space tourism industry and industry standards more time to develop and because of changing technologies. An FAA official indicated that the agency’s position is that the moratorium should be allowed to expire. FAA officials said that hybrid vehicles are evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine which regulations apply. Several developments, such as NASA’s commercial cargo and crew programs, continuing efforts to begin space tourism operations, and the launching of small satellites, may increase FAA’s workload for licensing and permitting launches. Because FAA has not provided this type of detailed information in its budget submissions, Congress lacks information that would be helpful in making decisions about the resources needed for the agency’s commercial space launch activities. Recommendation
To provide Congress with more information about the resources requested to address developments in the commercial space launch industry, in justifying requested changes, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to provide more detailed information in its budget submissions for the Office of Commercial Space Transportation regarding its workload. Specifically, we examined (1) how the competitive landscape has changed for the U.S. commercial space launch industry over the last decade, (2) challenges that FAA faces in licensing and regulating commercial space launches, (3) the status of developing industry standards for human spaceflight, (4) how FAA has projected its commercial space launch licensing workload for future fiscal years when submitting budget requests to Congress and how changes in the number and types of launches might affect its budget needs in future years, and (5) how changes in the number and types of commercial space launches could affect the government’s overall exposure and indemnification for commercial launches. The experts that we interviewed were selected from academia and private industry based on their knowledge of FAA’s oversight of the commercial space launch industry. We also compared (1) FAA’s fiscal year 2016 budget submission for the Office of Commercial Space Transportation against the Office of Management and Budget’s guidance on budget formulation and (2) the number of launches that FAA projected during the last 10 fiscal years with the actual number of launches that occurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. commercial space launch industry has changed considerably since the enactment of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004. FAA is required to license or permit commercial space launches, but to allow the space tourism industry to develop, the act prohibited FAA from regulating crew and spaceflight participant safety before 2012—a moratorium that was later extended but will now expire on September 30, 2015. Since October 2014, there have been three mishaps involving FAA licensed or permitted launches.
GAO was asked to examine the changes in the commercial space launch industry and FAA's oversight of the industry. This report addresses, among other things, (1) changes in the industry over the last decade, (2) FAA challenges in addressing industry developments, and (3) FAA's launch licensing workload and budget. GAO reviewed FAA's guidance and documentation on its launch permit, licensing, and safety oversight activities; interviewed FAA officials, industry stakeholders, and experts who were selected on the basis of their knowledge of FAA's oversight of the commercial space launch industry; and visited the spaceports where the two 2014 launch mishaps occurred.
What GAO Found
During the last decade, U.S. companies conducted fewer orbital launches in total than companies in Russia or Europe, which are among their main foreign competitors. However, the U.S. commercial space launch industry has expanded recently. In 2014, U.S. companies conducted 11 orbital launches, compared with none in 2011. In addition, in 2014, U.S. companies conducted more orbital launches than companies in Russia, which conducted four, or Europe, which conducted six.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)—which is responsible for protecting the public with respect to commercial space launches, including licensing and permitting launches—faces multiple challenges in addressing industry developments. If Congress does not extend the regulatory moratorium beyond September 2015, FAA will need to determine whether and when to regulate the safety of crew and spaceflight participants. Most commercial space launch company representatives told GAO that they favor extending the regulatory moratorium beyond September 2015 to allow the industry more time to develop. Current bills propose extending it as well. In addition, according to FAA officials and industry stakeholders, FAA faces an increasing workload related to licensing and permitting launches such as NASA's commercial cargo and crew programs that involve transporting cargo and crew to the International Space Station; space tourism; and the launching of small satellites.
FAA's budget requests for its commercial space launch activities generally have been based on the number of projected launches. However, in recent years, the actual number of launches has been much lower than the projections. For fiscal year 2016, FAA requested a 16 percent increase in staff for its commercial space launch activities to keep pace with industry growth. Office of Management and Budget guidance indicates that if an agency is requesting significant changes in full-time positions, it should provide a detailed justification of the changes and discuss alternative implementation strategies. However, FAA's fiscal year 2016 budget submission does not provide a detailed justification of the staffing changes and does not consider alternatives to hiring additional staff. Because FAA has not done this, Congress lacks information that would be helpful in making decisions about the resources needed for the agency's commercial space launch activities. FAA officials said that the agency lacked additional workload metrics, which officials are now developing to include in future budget submissions for its commercial space launch oversight activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FAA, in its budget submissions, provide more detailed information about the Office of Commercial Space Transportation's workload. FAA agreed with the recommendation but thought the report did not convey the extent of industry growth. GAO added information on challenges related to industry growth. |
gao_GAO-06-601T | gao_GAO-06-601T_0 | Overview of CRA Purpose, Procedures, and Requirements
Congressional oversight of rulemaking using the CRA can be an important and useful tool for monitoring the regulatory process and balancing and accommodating the concerns of American citizens and businesses with the effects of federal agencies’ rules. CRA seeks to accomplish this by giving Congress an opportunity to review most rules before they take effect and to disapprove those found to be too burdensome, excessive, inappropriate, duplicative, or otherwise objectionable. Under CRA, two types of rules, major and nonmajor, must be submitted to both Houses of Congress and GAO before they can take effect. CRA specifies that the determination of what rules are major is to be made by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Major rules cannot be effective until 60 days after publication in the Federal Register or submission to Congress and GAO, whichever is later. CRA established a procedure by which members of Congress may disapprove agencies’ rules by introducing a resolution of disapproval that, if adopted by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President, can nullify an agency’s rule. Members of Congress seldom have attempted to use this disapproval process. GAO’s Role and Activities under CRA
GAO’s only stated role under CRA is to provide Congress with a report on each major rule concerning GAO’s assessment of the promulgating federal agency’s “compliance with the procedural steps” required by various acts and executive orders governing the regulatory process. We conduct an annual review to determine whether all final rules covered by the Act and published in the Federal Register have been filed with the Congress and us. Although we reported that agencies’ compliance with CRA requirements was inconsistent during the first years after CRA’s enactment, compliance improved over time. Trends in Presidential and Congressional Review of Rulemaking
Agencies and GAO have provided Congress a considerable amount of information about forthcoming rules in response to CRA. However, as we found in our review of the information generated on federal mandates under UMRA, the benefits of compiling and making information available on potential federal actions should not be underestimated. Further, as we also found regarding UMRA, the availability of procedures for congressional disapproval may have some deterrent effect. Still, as I noted in my testimony before this Subcommittee last November, efforts to enhance presidential oversight of agencies’ rulemaking appear to have been more significant and widely employed in recent years than similar efforts to enhance congressional oversight. Some recent legislative proposals have focused on expanding the information and analysis available to Congress on pending rules, while others focus on enhancing the mechanisms that Congress could employ for its own review—and potential disapproval—of agencies’ rules. | Why GAO Did This Study
This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Congressional Review Act (CRA). Congressional oversight of rulemaking using the CRA can be an important and useful tool for monitoring the regulatory process and balancing and accommodating the concerns of American citizens and businesses with the effects of federal agencies' rules. This statement provides an overview of the purpose and provisions of CRA; GAO's role and activities in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Act; and trends on CRA within the broader context of developments in presidential and congressional oversight of federal agencies' rulemaking.
What GAO Found
CRA gives Congress an opportunity to review most rules before they take effect and to disapprove those found to be too burdensome, excessive, inappropriate, duplicative, or otherwise objectionable. Under CRA, two types of rules, major and nonmajor, must be submitted to both Houses of Congress and GAO before they can take effect. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget specifies which rules are designated as major rules based on criteria set out in the CRA. Major rules cannot be effective until 60 days after publication in the Federal Register or submission to Congress and GAO, whichever is later. Congress may disapprove agencies' rules by introducing a resolution of disapproval that, if adopted by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President, can nullify an agency's rule. Members of Congress seldom have attempted to use this process. GAO's role under CRA is to provide Congress with a report on each major rule concerning GAO's assessment of the promulgating federal agency's compliance with the procedural steps required by various acts and executive orders governing the regulatory process. GAO compiles information on the rules it receives under CRA in a database containing basic information about major and nonmajor rules. GAO also conducts an annual review to determine whether all final rules covered by the Act and published in the Federal Register have been filed with the Congress and GAO. Although we reported that agencies' compliance with CRA requirements was inconsistent during the first years after CRA's enactment, compliance improved over time. There have been a limited number of CRA joint resolutions, but the benefits of compiling and making information available on potential federal actions should not be underestimated. The procedures for congressional disapproval also may have some deterrent effect. Efforts to enhance presidential oversight of agencies' rulemaking appear to have been more significant and widely employed in recent years than similar efforts to enhance congressional oversight. Some recent legislative proposals have focused on expanding the information and analysis available to Congress on pending rules, while others focus on enhancing the mechanisms that Congress could employ for its own review--and potential disapproval--of agencies' rules. |
gao_GAO-03-1038T | gao_GAO-03-1038T_0 | Acting soon reduces the likelihood that the Congress will have to choose between imposing severe benefit cuts and unfairly burdening future generations with the program’s rising costs. Acting soon would allow changes to be phased in so the individuals who are most likely to be affected, namely younger and future workers, will have time to adjust their retirement planning. 1.) 2.) Although the Trustees’ 2003 intermediate estimates project that the combined Social Security Trust Funds will be solvent until 2042, program spending will constitute a rapidly growing share of the budget and the economy well before that date. In 2008, the first baby boomers will become eligible for Social Security benefits, and the future costs of serving them are already becoming a factor in the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) 10-year projections. By 2018, Social Security’s tax income is projected to be insufficient to pay currently scheduled benefits. The shift from positive to negative cash flow, however, will place increased pressure on the federal budget to raise the resources necessary to meet the program’s ongoing costs. 5.) Social Security remains the foundation of the nation’s retirement system. The analytic framework GAO has developed to assess proposals comprises three basic criteria: the extent to which a proposal achieves sustainable solvency and how it would affect the economy and the federal budget; the relative balance struck between the goals of individual equity and income adequacy; and how readily a proposal could be implemented, administered, and explained to the public. As I have already discussed, reducing the relative future burdens of Social Security and health programs is essential to a sustainable budget policy for the longer term. Social Security’s Long-Term Financing Shortfall Requires Action Sooner Rather Than Later
As you requested, we applied our criteria to a scenario of Trust Fund Exhaustion. Under this scenario, currently scheduled benefits would be paid in full until the combined OASDI Trust Funds are exhausted. In effect, after trust fund exhaustion, all beneficiaries would experience a sharp drop in benefits. Additional reductions in the following years would result in benefits equal to about two-thirds of currently scheduled levels by the end of the 75-year simulation period. The use of our criteria in evaluating the Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario underscores the need to take action sooner rather than later to address Social Security’s financing shortfall. By definition this scenario would achieve sustainable solvency because after the combined trust funds had run out of assets, benefit payments would be adjusted each year to equal annual tax income. Under the Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario, the effect on benefits would differ sharply before and after exhaustion took place. Due to the timing of the reductions under the Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario, younger generations would bear greater benefit reductions. Consequently, lifetime benefits would be reduced more for younger generations. Under the Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario we used, benefits would be adjusted proportionately for all recipients, increasing the likelihood of hardship for lower income retirees and the disabled. In evaluating Social Security reform proposals, the choice among various benefit reductions and revenue increases will affect the balance between income adequacy and individual equity. As the baby boom generation retires and the numbers of those entitled to these retirement benefits grow, the difficulties of reform will be compounded. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Social Security is an important social insurance program affecting virtually every American family. It is the foundation of the nation's retirement income system and also provides millions of Americans with disability insurance and survivors' benefits. Over the long term, as the baby boom generation retires, Social Security's financing shortfall presents a major program solvency and sustainability challenge. The Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging asked GAO to discuss Social Security's long-term financing challenges and the results of GAO's analysis of an illustrative "Trust Fund Exhaustion" scenario. Under this scenario, benefits are reduced proportionately for all beneficiaries by the shortfall in revenues occurring upon exhaustion of the combined Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds. This scenario was developed for analytic purposes and is not a legal determination of how benefits would be paid in the event of trust fund exhaustion. GAO's analysis used the framework it has developed to analyze the implications of reform proposals. This framework consists of three criteria: (1) the extent to which the proposal achieves sustainable solvency and how it would affect the U.S. economy and the federal budget, (2) the balance struck between the twin goals of income adequacy and individual equity, and (3) how readily changes could be implemented, administered, and explained to the public.
What GAO Found
Although the Trustees' 2003 intermediate estimates show that the combined Social Security Trust Funds will be solvent until 2042, program spending will constitute a growing share of the budget and the economy much sooner. Within 5 years, the first baby boomers will become eligible for Social Security. By 2018, Social Security's tax income is projected to be insufficient to pay currently scheduled benefits. This shift from positive to negative cash flow will place increased pressure on the federal budget to raise the resources necessary to meet the program's ongoing costs. In the long term, Social Security, together with rapidly growing federal health programs, will dominate our nation's fiscal outlook. Absent reform, the nation will ultimately have to choose between persistent, escalating federal deficits, significant tax increases, and/or dramatic budget cuts of unprecedented magnitude. The Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario we analyzed dramatically illustrates the need for action sooner rather than later. (See Social Security Reform: Analysis of a Trust Fund Exhaustion Scenario. GAO-03-907 . Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2003.) Under this scenario, after the combined trust funds had been fully depleted, benefit payments would be adjusted each year to equal annual tax income. Under this scenario, after trust fund exhaustion those receiving benefits would experience large and sudden benefit reductions. Additional smaller reductions in the following years would result in benefits equal to about two-thirds of currently scheduled levels by the end of the 75-year simulation period. The Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario raises significant intergenerational equity issues. The timing of the benefit adjustments means the Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario places a much greater burden on younger generations. Lifetime benefits would be reduced much more for younger generations. In addition, under the Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario, benefits would be adjusted proportionately for all recipients, increasing the likelihood of hardship for lower income retirees and the disabled, especially those who rely on Social Security as their primary or sole source of retirement income. Fundamentally, the Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario illustrates trade-offs between achieving sustainable solvency and maintaining benefit adequacy. The longer we wait to take action, the sharper these trade-offs will become. Acting soon would allow changes to be phased in so the individuals who are most likely to be affected, namely younger and future workers, will have time to adjust their retirement planning while helping to avoid related "expectation gaps." Finally, acting soon reduces the likelihood that the Congress will have to choose between imposing severe benefit cuts and unfairly burdening future generations with the program's rising costs. |
gao_GAO-12-136 | gao_GAO-12-136_0 | NQF Made Progress on Projects under Each of the Contract Activities as of August 31, 2011
From January 14, 2010, through August 31, 2011, NQF has made progress on 60 of the 63 projects under the activities required under its contract with HHS. NQF has made progress on three projects related to retooling—that is, converting previously endorsed quality measures to an electronic format that is compatible with electronic health records (EHR). Other Health Care Quality Measurement Activity. NQF Did Not Meet Expected Time Frames and Exceeded Cost Estimates
Our review of NQF documents found that NQF had not met or did not expect to meet time frames on more than half of the projects under the contract activities that were completed or ongoing, as of August 2011. For example, NQF was expected to complete its initial retooling of 113 endorsed quality measures into electronic formats by September 2010, but this effort was not completed until December 2010. HHS officials stated that the first set of 44 retooled measures submitted had errors that required correction. For example, the delays in projects related to the EHR contract activity, including expanding the scope of the retooling project, contributed to NQF exceeding its cost estimate of about $3.8 million for the entire EHR contract activity by about $560,000 in the second contract year. While HHS monitored NQF’s progress and approved changes to the time frames and cost estimates for the projects under the contract activities, HHS did not use available tools for monitoring that are required under NQF’s contract. These tools could have helped to provide an opportunity for HHS to make any appropriate changes to NQF’s projects. HHS officials told us that, prior to August 2011, they had not enforced a contractual requirement for NQF to submit—nor had it received from NQF—a financial graph in its monthly progress reports that provides information comparing NQF’s monthly incurred costs for each of the contract activities with initial cost estimates. Specifically, NQF reported about $12.8 million in total costs and fixed fees for the contract activities it performed during the second contract year—January 14, 2010, through January 13, 2011. HHS Used or Planned to Use Some NQF Measures Received under the Contract but Has Not Comprehensively Planned for Other Measurement Needs to Implement PPACA
For its various programs or initiatives, HHS has used or planned to use about one-half of the quality measures that NQF has endorsed, maintained, or retooled under the contract, as of August 31, 2011, and HHS officials expect to evaluate if and how the remaining measures will be used. HHS officials told us that these 44 measures are being used but have not yet been tested to assess the feasibility of implementing them in the electronic format. For example, HHS officials told us that they will consider implementation of most of the retooled measures in future stages of the EHR Incentive Program. HHS Does Not Have a Comprehensive Plan for Determining How It Will Use NQF’s Work under the Contract to Implement PPACA Requirements Related to Quality Measurement
Although HHS has taken steps to determine how it can use the measures received under the contract with NQF, the agency does not have a comprehensive plan for determining how it will use the remainder of the work conducted under NQF’s contract to implement PPACA requirements, including plans for additional quality measures that need to be endorsed during the remaining contract years. Without such a plan, HHS may be limited in its efforts to prioritize which specific measures it needs to develop and have endorsed by NQF for its health care quality programs and initiatives established by PPACA. As a result, HHS may be unable to ensure that the agency receives the quality measures needed to meet PPACA requirements and specified time frames related to quality measurement. For more than half of the projects, including all five projects in the endorsement activity, NQF did not meet or did not expect to meet the initial time frames approved by HHS. Until the testing is completed, HHS runs the risk that some of the retooled measures may not work as intended when implemented in electronic format for performance measurement, which is a concern because use of these measures is an important component of HHS’s long-term goal for providers to use health information technology (IT) to exchange information and improve the quality of care. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that HHS receives the quality measures it needs to effectively implement its quality measurement programs and initiatives within required time frames, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS take the following three actions: use monitoring tools required under the NQF contract to obtain detailed and timely information on NQF’s performance and use that information to inform any appropriate changes to time frames, projects, and cost estimates for the remaining contract years; ensure that testing of the electronic versions of the measures retooled by NQF that are being used or are planned for use in the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive programs is completed in a timely manner to help identify potential errors and address issues of implementation; and develop a comprehensive plan that identifies the quality measurement needs of HHS programs and initiatives, including PPACA requirements, and provides a strategy for using the work NQF performs under the contract to help meet these needs. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations and provided general comments. NQF concurred with many of the findings in the report and provided clarification and additional context on the findings and recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to enter into a 4-year contract with an entity to perform various activities related to health care quality measurement. In January 2009, HHS awarded a contract to the National Quality Forum (NQF), a nonprofit organization that endorses health care quality measuresthat is, recognizes certain ones as national standards. In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) established additional duties for NQF. This is the second of two reports MIPPA required GAO to submit on NQFs contract with HHS. In this reportwhich covers NQFs performance under the contract from January 14, 2010, through August 31, 2011GAO examines (1) the status of projects under NQFs required contract activities and (2) the extent to which HHS used or planned to use the measures it has received from NQF under the contract to meet its quality measurement needs, as of August 2011. GAO interviewed NQF and HHS officials, reviewed relevant laws, and reviewed HHS and NQF documents.
What GAO Found
NQF has made progress on projects under its contract activities, as of August 2011. Specifically, NQF has completed or made progress on 60 of 63 projects. For example, NQF has completed projects to endorse measures related to various topics, including nursing homes. However, for more than half of the projects, NQF did not meet or did not expect to meet the initial time frames approved by HHS. For example, NQF completed one project to retool measuresthat is, convert previously endorsed quality measures to an electronic format. While the retooling project was expected to be completed by September 2010, its completion was delayed by 3 months. NQF and HHS officials identified various reasons that contributed to this delay, including an expansion of the projects scope and complexity. As a result of the delay, HHS did not have all the retooled measures it expected to include in its Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Program. The delay of this project was also a contributing factor to NQF exceeding its estimated cost for its entire contract activity related to EHR by about $560,000 in the second contract year January 14, 2010, through January 13, 2011. While HHS monitored NQFs progress through monthly progress reports and approved changes to time frames and costs, HHS did not use all of the tools for monitoring that are required under the contract. Specifically, HHS did not conduct an annual performance evaluation to assess timeliness and cost issues that could have helped to inform NQFs future scope of work. Until August 2011, HHS did not enforce the provision for NQF to submit a financial graph to compare monthly costs for each contract activity with cost estimates, which is information not included in monthly progress reports. These tools could have provided additional, more detailed information to help identify instances in which NQF might have been at risk of not meeting time frames or exceeding cost estimates, which could have provided HHS an opportunity to make any appropriate changes to NQFs activities.
HHS had used or planned to use about half of the measures164 of 344that it received from NQF under the contract, as of August 2011. For example, HHS used 44 measures that NQF retooled under the contract in its EHR Incentive Program. HHS officials stated that the 44 measures used in the program contained errors, which required corrections. HHS officials also have not yet tested the retooled measures to assess the feasibility of implementing them in the electronic format; therefore, HHS runs the risk that some of these measures may not work as intended when implemented. HHS officials told GAO they expect to evaluate if and how they could use all of the remaining measures HHS received under the contract. However, HHS has not determined how PPACA requirements for quality measurement may have changed its needs for endorsed quality measures. As a result, HHS has not established a comprehensive plan that identifies its measurement needs and time frames for obtaining endorsed measures and that accounts for relevant PPACA requirements. Without such a plan, HHS may be limited in its efforts to prioritize which specific measures it needs to develop and to have endorsed by NQF during the remainder of the NQF contract. As a result, HHS may be unable to ensure that the agency receives the quality measures needed to meet PPACA requirements, including time frames for implementing quality measurement programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends HHS: (1) use all monitoring tools required under the contract to help address NQFs performance, (2) complete testing of retooled measures, and (3) comprehensively plan for its quality measurement needs. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with these recommendations. NQF concurred with many of the findings in the report and provided additional context. |
gao_GAO-15-371T | gao_GAO-15-371T_0 | We have categorized our concerns about VA’s ability to ensure the timeliness, cost-effectiveness, quality, and safety of the health care the department provides into five broad areas: (1) ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes, (2) inadequate oversight and accountability, (3) information technology challenges, (4) inadequate training for VA staff, and (5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. The recently enacted Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act included a number of provisions intended to help VA address systemic weaknesses. It is also critical that Congress maintains its focus on oversight of VA health care. Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations
Although the executive branch has undertaken numerous initiatives to better manage the more than $80 billion that is annually invested in information technology (IT), federal IT investments too frequently fail or incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. We have previously testified that the federal government has spent billions of dollars on failed IT investments. These and other failed IT projects often suffered from a lack of disciplined and effective management, such as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and governance. As of January 2015, about 23 percent of the 737 recommendations had been fully implemented. Given current and emerging risks, we are expanding the Enforcement of Tax Laws area to include IRS’s efforts to address tax refund fraud due to identity theft (IDT), which occurs when an identity thief files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer’s identifying information and claims a refund. However, advances in technology which have dramatically enhanced the ability of both government and private sector entities to collect and process extensive amounts of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) pose challenges to ensuring the privacy of such information. The number of reported security incidents involving PII at federal agencies has increased dramatically in recent years. Capacity. Action plan. Demonstrated progress. Continued Progress
Since our last high-risk update in 2013, there has been solid and steady progress on the vast majority of the 30 high-risk areas from our 2013 list. Progress has been possible through the concerted actions and efforts of Congress and the leadership and staff in agencies and OMB. Of the 11 areas that have been on the High Risk List since the 1990s, 7 have at least met or partially met all of the criteria for removal and 1 area—DOD Contract Management—is 1 of the 2 areas that has made enough progress to remove subcategories of the high-risk area. Narrowing High Risk Areas
Since our 2013 update, sufficient progress has been made to narrow the scope of the following two areas. These actions have addressed this high-risk issue. Progress in Selected High-Risk Areas
In addition to the two areas that we narrowed—Protecting Public Health through Enhanced Oversight of Medical Products and DOD Contract Management—nine other areas met at least one of the criteria for removal from the High Risk List and were rated at least partially met for all four of the remaining criteria. Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information
We added this high-risk area in 1997 and expanded it this year to include protection of PII. CMS made positive strides, but more needs to be done to fully meet our criteria. CMS should require a surety bond for certain types of at-risk providers and suppliers; publish a proposed rule for increased disclosures of prior actions taken against providers and suppliers enrolling or revalidating enrollment in Medicare, such as whether the provider or supplier has been subject to a payment suspension from a federal health care program; establish core elements of compliance programs for providers and improve automated edits that identify services billed in medically unlikely amounts; develop performance measures for the Zone Program Integrity Contractors who explicitly link their work to the agency’s Medicare FFS program integrity performance measures and improper payment reduction goals; reduce differences between contractor postpayment review requirements, when possible; monitor the database used to track Recovery Auditors’ activities to ensure that all postpayment review contractors are submitting required data and that the data the database contains are accurate and complete; require Medicare administrative contractors to share information about the underlying policies and savings related to their most effective edits; and efficiently and cost-effectively identify, design, develop, and implement an information technology solution that addresses the removal of Social Security numbers from Medicare beneficiaries’ health insurance cards. In support of Congress and to further progress to address high-risk issues, we continue to review efforts and make recommendations to address high- risk areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is one of the world's largest and most complex entities; about $3.5 trillion in outlays in fiscal year 2014 funded a broad array of programs and operations. GAO maintains a program to focus attention on government operations that it identifies as high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.
Since 1990, more than one-third of the areas previously designated as high risk have been removed from the list because sufficient progress was made in addressing the problems identified. The five criteria for removal are: (1) leadership commitment, (2) agency capacity, (3) an action plan, (4) monitoring efforts, and (5) demonstrated progress.
This biennial update describes the status of high-risk areas listed in 2013 and identifies new high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. Solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, improve service to the public, and strengthen government performance and accountability.
What GAO Found
Solid, steady progress has been made in the vast majority of the high-risk areas. Eighteen of the 30 areas on the 2013 list at least partially met all of the criteria for removal from the high risk list. Of those, 11 met at least one of the criteria for removal and partially met all others. Sufficient progress was made to narrow the scope of two high-risk issues— Protecting Public Health through Enhanced Oversight of Medical Products and DOD Contract Management. Overall, progress has been possible through the concerted actions of Congress, leadership and staff in agencies, and the Office of Management and Budget.
This year GAO is adding 2 areas, bringing the total to 32.
Managing Risks and Improving Veterans Affairs (VA) Health Care. GAO has reported since 2000 about VA facilities' failure to provide timely health care. In some cases, these delays or VA's failure to provide care at all have reportedly harmed veterans. Although VA has taken actions to address some GAO recommendations, more than 100 of GAO's recommendations have not been fully addressed, including recommendations related to the following areas: (1) ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes, (2) inadequate oversight and accountability, (3) information technology challenges, (4) inadequate training for VA staff, and (5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. The recently enacted Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act included provisions to help VA address systemic weaknesses. VA must effectively implement the act.
Improving the Management of Information Technology (IT) Acquisitions and Operations. Congress has passed legislation and the administration has undertaken numerous initiatives to better manage IT investments. Nonetheless, federal IT investments too frequently fail to be completed or incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. GAO has found that the federal government spent billions of dollars on failed and poorly performing IT investments which often suffered from ineffective management, such as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and governance. Over the past 5 years, GAO made more than 730 recommendations; however, only about 23 percent had been fully implemented as of January 2015.
GAO is also expanding two areas due to evolving high-risk issues.
Enforcement of Tax Laws. This area is expanded to include IRS's efforts to address tax refund fraud due to identify theft. IRS estimates it paid out $5.8 billion (the exact number is uncertain) in fraudulent refunds in tax year 2013 due to identity theft. This occurs when a thief files a fraudulent return using a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information and claims a refund.
Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information (PII). This risk area is expanded because of the challenges to ensuring the privacy of personally identifiable information posed by advances in technology. These advances have allowed both government and private sector entities to collect and process extensive amounts of PII more effectively. The number of reported security incidents involving PII at federal agencies has increased dramatically in recent years.
What GAO Recommends
This report contains GAO's views on progress made and what remains to be done to bring about lasting solutions for each high-risk area. Perseverance by the executive branch in implementing GAO's recommended solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential to achieving greater progress. |
gao_GAO-15-164 | gao_GAO-15-164_0 | IRS and state charity regulators both play a key role providing oversight of charitable organizations. However, the health and education sectors had the largest amount of assets. The human services sector includes activities related to employment, housing and shelter, and youth development. In addition to being concentrated in a few sectors, a large proportion of total assets were controlled by a relatively small number of charitable organizations. Limited Resources Contribute to Fewer Examinations
With IRS budget cuts, the number of EO FTEs has declined over the past several years, leading to a steady decrease in the number of organizations examined. For charitable organizations, the examination rate was about 0.7 percent in 2013, while for individual and corporate tax returns it was 1 percent and 1.4 percent, respectively. From fiscal year 2011 to 2013, the exam rate decreased from .81 percent to .71 percent (by about 12 percent). Lack of Timely and Complete Data Limits IRS Ability to Provide Adequate Oversight of Charitable Organizations and to Provide for the Transparency of the Tax- Exempt Sector
The e-filing rate for tax-exempt organizations is significantly lower than for other taxpayers and organizations. Expanded e- filing may result in more accurate and complete data becoming available in a timelier manner, which in turn, would allow IRS to more easily identify areas of noncompliance. In our 2014 report on partnerships and S corporations, we recommended that Congress consider expanding the mandate for partnerships and corporations to electronically file their tax returns in order to cover a greater share of filed returns. However, state regulators and other subject matter specialists said statutory requirements for safeguarding taxpayer information and uncertainty about how these safeguards must be implemented limit state regulators’ ability to use relevant information shared by IRS. Conclusions
EO oversight of charitable organizations helps ensure that these entities abide by the purposes that justify their tax exemption and protects the sector from potential abuses and loss of confidence by the donor community. However, these actions have not addressed measuring the outcomes of EO activities (such as the effect of EO’s actions on the compliance rate for the charitable sector as a whole), for specific segments of the sector (such as universities and hospitals), or for particular aspects of noncompliance (such as personal inurement or political activity). Because EO does not measure the current level of compliance, it cannot set goals for increasing compliance or know to what extent its actions are affecting compliance. The Exempt Organizations Business Division is grappling with several other challenges that complicate oversight efforts. This lower rate means that there is less digitized data available for data mining and analytics and higher labor costs for IRS. A lack of clarity about how state charity regulators can use IRS data to build cases against suspect charitable organizations impedes regulators’ ability to leverage IRS’s examination work. Direct EO to develop quantitative, results-oriented compliance goals and additional performance measures and indicators that can be used to assess impact of exams and other enforcement activities on compliance. 2. GAO staff members who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report (1) describes what is known about the number, type, size, and other characteristics of 501(c)(3) charitable organizations; (2) describes IRS oversight activities for charitable organizations; (3) determines how IRS assesses its oversight efforts of charitable organizations to ensure they are meeting their charitable purposes; and (4) determines how IRS collaborates with state charity regulators and U.S. Attorneys to identify and prosecute organizations suspected of engaging in fraudulent or other criminal activity. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS oversight of charitable organizations helps to ensure they abide by the purposes that justify their tax exemption and protects the sector from potential abuses and loss of confidence by the donor community. In recent years, reductions in IRS's budget have raised concerns about the adequacy of IRS oversight.
GAO was asked to review IRS oversight of charitable organizations. In this report, GAO (1) describes the charitable organization sector, (2) describes IRS oversight activities, (3) determines how IRS assesses its oversight efforts, and (4) determines how IRS collaborates with state charity regulators and U.S. Attorneys to identify and prosecute organizations suspected of engaging in fraudulent (or other criminal) activity.
GAO reviewed and analyzed IRS data, strategic planning and performance documents, and documented improvement efforts. We also interviewed IRS and Department of Justice officials, state charity regulators, and subject matter specialists. GAO compared IRS's practices to federal guidance on performance management.
What GAO Found
Charitable organizations play a major role in our economy and provide critical services and resources to families and individuals in need. Although charitable organizations vary considerably in size and purpose, in 2011 the largest number of organizations was in the human services sector, providing services such as employment and housing assistance. The highest concentration of assets was in the health and education sectors, which include hospitals and universities. In addition to being concentrated in a few sectors, a large proportion of all assets were controlled by a relatively small number of charitable organizations—less than 3 percent hold more than 80 percent of the assets.
Over the past several years, as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) budget has declined, the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) within its Exempt Organizations (EO) division has fallen, leading to a steady decrease in the number of charitable organizations examined. In 2011, the examination rate was 0.81 percent; in 2013, it fell to 0.71 percent. This rate is lower than the exam rate for other types of taxpayers, such as individuals (1.0 percent) and corporations (1.4 percent).
EO is grappling with several challenges that complicate oversight efforts. While EO has some compliance information, such as how often exams result in change of tax exempt status, it does not have quantitative measures of compliance for the charitable sector as a whole, for specific segments of the sector (such as universities and hospitals) or for particular aspects of noncompliance (such as personal inurement or political activity). Because EO does not have these measures and does not know the current level of compliance, it cannot set quantitative, results-oriented goals for increasing compliance or assess to what extent its actions are affecting compliance.
Statutory requirements for safeguarding taxpayer data limit both IRS's ability to share data and state regulators' ability to use it. A lack of clarity about how state regulators are allowed to use IRS data to build cases against suspect charitable organizations further impedes regulators' ability to leverage IRS's examination work.
The e-filing rate for tax-exempt organizations is significantly lower than for other taxpayers. This lower rate means there is less digitized data available for data analytics and higher labor costs for IRS. Expanded e-filing may result in more accurate and complete data becoming available in a timelier manner, which in turn, would allow IRS to more easily identify areas of noncompliance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends IRS 1) develop compliance goals and additional performance measures that can be used to assess the impact of enforcement activities on compliance and 2) clearly communicate with state charity regulators how they are allowed to use IRS information related to examinations of charitable organizations. GAO also recommends that Congress consider expanding the mandate for 501(c)(3) organizations to electronically file their tax returns to cover a greater share of filed returns. In written comments, IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-265 | gao_GAO-08-265_0 | OSHA and OPPTS Used Different Processes during Multiyear Efforts to Complete Communication Products on Asbestos
OSHA and OPPTS followed different paths from 2000 through 2007 to prepare their SHIB and brochure, respectively, on asbestos in automobile brakes and clutches. Among the primary differences, the two agencies initiated work on their asbestos products in response to different triggers, OSHA took longer than OPPTS to produce a final product, and OPPTS’ process incorporated more steps to obtain input from external parties. In total, OSHA and OPPTS took years to complete all the steps of their processes from initiation through dissemination of their products on asbestos in automotive brakes—approximately 5-½ years for OSHA and approximately 3-½ years for OPPTS. 2 illustrates one of the potential hazards.) Review
The review phase requires internal agency reviews and approvals and might also include interagency reviews, external reviews, or both. The final products are posted on OSHA’s Web site, by product type. Sometimes there is a press release, but not always. Figure 5 illustrates the OPPTS process for preparing communication products. The agency’s processes set no specific time frames for how long development of a product should take. OPPTS typically develops a Communication Plan to ensure that its announcement and release of a particular product is tailored to reach the intended audience. More Transparency and Documentation Requirements Apply to Rulemaking Than to the Preparation of Communication Products
There are significant differences in the requirements that apply to rulemaking compared to the preparation of communication products, because rulemaking must comply with legal requirements that are not applicable to the preparation of communication products. These differences are to be expected, given the legal effect and consequences of rules. Among other things, the executive order, bulletin, and implementation memorandum require agencies to (1) develop clearance procedures for significant guidance documents; (2) provide OMB advance notice and an opportunity for consultation on significant guidance; (3) create and maintain a current list of all significant guidance on their Web sites and establish a means for the public to submit comments electronically on significant guidance, as well as requests for issuance, reconsideration, modification, or rescission of significant guidance documents; and (4) provide public notice and seek public comments on any economically significant guidance. These changes move the treatment of significant guidance closer to the requirements for rules. Communication products provide crucial information to regulated parties and the general public. To the extent feasible, this should include identifying the applicable policies and procedures governing OMB/interagency coordination and reviews of such products, as well as any other key processes that the agencies believe are important to understanding how they prepare their products. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to describe the processes that the Department of Labor’s (DOL)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances (OPPTS) used to initiate, develop, review, and disseminate updated communication products on exposure to asbestos in automotive brakes and clutches, identify how long the processes took, and assess the extent to which the agencies followed applicable policies and procedures; describe the general policies and procedures that OSHA and OPPTS have for the initiation, development, review, and dissemination of communication products; and compare the agencies’ policies and procedures for communication products with those applicable to the initiation, development, review, and dissemination of rules, and describe what might be the effects of 2007 administration initiatives regarding guidance documents. Appendix II: Preparation of OSHA and OPPTS Communication Products on Asbestos in Automotive Brakes
The descriptions of the events in this appendix on the preparation of the OSHA and OPPTS communication products on asbestos in automotive brakes were provided by officials at OSHA and OPPTS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies address their missions not only through regulations but also by issuing communication products--such as guidance, fact sheets, and brochures--that can provide crucial information to regulated parties and the public. Since 2000, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances (OPPTS) developed new versions of such products to address the potential hazards of exposure to asbestos in automotive brakes. GAO was asked to describe (1) how OSHA and OPPTS prepared their products on asbestos in automotive brakes, (2) the general processes that OSHA and OPPTS use to prepare their communication products, and (3) how these processes compare to those for rulemaking and how recent administration initiatives might affect them. GAO reviewed and analyzed available documents and interviewed officials at OSHA, OPPTS, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
What GAO Found
OSHA and OPPTS followed different paths from 2000 through 2007 to update communication products on asbestos in automotive brakes and clutches. OSHA took longer than OPPTS to produce a final product, and OPPTS' process incorporated more steps to obtain input from external parties. Twice before final posting, OSHA officials had decided to not release drafts that had been prepared, because they needed more data to understand how pervasive asbestos in brake products were and wanted to avoid raising unnecessary alarm. For a time, staff from OSHA and OPPTS considered releasing a joint product. Overall, OSHA and OPPTS took years to complete all the process steps to produce their products on asbestos in automotive brakes and clutches--approximately 5-? years for OSHA and approximately 3-? years for OPPTS. In preparing their respective communication products, both OSHA and OPPTS generally followed applicable agency policies and procedures. Both OSHA and OPPTS have standard processes that guide the initiation, development, review, and dissemination of their communication products. OSHA publicly posts all of its applicable instructions, while OPPTS publicly posts only some. Under both agencies' processes, communication products may be initiated by various sources, developed only after getting management approval, and undergo intraagency coordination and management-level clearance. But interagency (including OMB) or other external reviews are not always required. OSHA's policies for disseminating products focus on responsibilities for posting and maintaining final products on the agency's Web site. Beginning at the development phase, OPPTS policies call for the formulation of a communication plan intended to ensure that the dissemination of a particular product is tailored to reach the intended audience. The agencies' processes establish no specific time frames or benchmarks for how long the preparation of a product should take. GAO identified at least five areas where the agencies' processes for preparing communication products and those for rules have significant differences. In contrast to the agencies' processes for communication products, rulemaking imposes requirements on agencies regarding (1) justification of the rule, (2) interagency reviews of drafts, (3) transparency of the processes used, (4) opportunities for public comment, and (5) the public's ability to monitor development and review. These differences are to be expected, given the binding effect of rules, and are each rooted in legal requirements that apply to rulemaking, but not to the preparation of communication products. In January 2007, the administration imposed new requirements for agencies' significant guidance documents, for example requiring agencies to provide OMB advance notice and an opportunity to consult on significant guidance before issuance. These changes move the treatment of significant guidance closer to the requirements for rules but do not cover any other types of communication products. |
gao_GAO-05-97 | gao_GAO-05-97_0 | Background
SSA’s Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income programs are the nation’s largest providers of federal income assistance to disabled individuals, with the agency making payments of approximately $113 billion to more than 14 million beneficiaries and their families in 2004. Nonetheless, the agency has considerable work to accomplish before it will be effectively positioned to fully process all disability claims in an electronic environment. However, as indicated in table 1, not all of the 54 state DDSs are expected to be certified to process initial disability claims and to use the electronic folder as the official record until January 2007. The paper folders will continue to serve as the official records for these cases. The managers added that processing claims electronically had thus far taken longer and consumed more resources than before the electronic system was implemented. According to the officials, the contractor began work on this strategy in May 2005 and is expected to deliver an initial report in September 2005. These recommendations called for the agency to (1) resolve critical problems that it had identified in pilot testing of the electronic disability system and conduct end-to-end testing of the interrelated system components, (2) ensure that users approved the software being developed and that systems were certified for production, (3) finalize AeDib risk mitigation strategies, (4) validate AeDib cost and benefit estimates, and (5) improve communications with and effectively address the concerns of disability stakeholders and users involved in the initiative. Specifically, SSA officials provided evidence indicating that the agency has taken measures to ensure that users approve new software and that it certifies its systems for production. However, SSA did not demonstrate any actions on two of the recommendations. In the continued absence of risk mitigation strategies, the agency lacks a critical means of ensuring that it can prevent circumstances that could impede a successful project outcome. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further reduce the risks to SSA’s progress in successfully achieving its electronic disability claims processing capability, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security take the following two actions: develop and implement a strategy that articulates milestones, resources, and priorities for efficiently and effectively resolving problems with the electronic disability system’s operations, including (1) identifying and implementing a solution to improve the use of electronic forms, (2) identifying and implementing a solution to address concerns with existing computer monitors, and (3) ensuring that the DDSs have the necessary software capabilities to fully and efficiently process initial claims in the electronic processing environment; and ensure that the state DDSs develop and implement continuity of operations plans that complement SSA’s plans for continuing essential disability claims processing functions in any emergency or other situation that may disrupt normal operations. We recognize that SSA does not expect to complete all states’ certifications until early 2007. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the current status of SSA’s accelerated implementation of its electronic disability system—the initiative known as AeDib and (2) identify actions the agency has taken in response to our prior recommendations on this initiative. To assess the agency’s status in implementing its electronic disability system, we analyzed relevant project management documentation including schedules, project plans, and reports documenting the status of the system’s rollout to the 54 state disability determination service (DDS) offices and SSA’s 144 Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through an initiative known as AeDib, the Social Security Administration (SSA) is implementing a system in which medical images and other documents that have traditionally been kept in paper folders will be stored in electronic folders, enabling disability offices--including SSA's 144 Office of Hearings and Appeals sites and 54 state disability determination services--to process disability claims electronically. This initiative supports a program that, in 2004, made payments of approximately $113 billion to more than 14 million beneficiaries and their families. In March 2004, GAO recommended that SSA take steps to ensure the successful implementation of the electronic disability system. GAO was asked to assess SSA's status in implementing AeDib and the actions the agency has taken in response to GAO's prior recommendations on this initiative.
What GAO Found
Since January 2004, SSA has been implementing its electronic disability system at 53 state disability determination services and 85 Office of Hearings and Appeals sites. It plans to complete implementation in all state sites by October 2005 and all hearings and appeals sites by November 2005. Nonetheless, considerable work is needed before these entities will be ready to process all initial claims electronically. SSA's effort to certify all state offices to electronically process claims and maintain the electronic folder as an official claims record is not expected to be completed until January 2007. In addition, state disability officials expressed concerns about the system's operations and reliability and about limitations in their electronic processing capabilities. Accordingly, a number of the offices reported varying levels of system usage, and their officials said that processing claims electronically generally took longer and consumed more resources than the previous method. Further, SSA and the state disability determination services lacked continuity of operations plans for ensuring that states could continue to process disability claims during emergencies. As SSA has implemented its system, it has taken actions that supported three of GAO's five prior recommendations. It has initiated studies that could help validate AeDib planning assumptions, costs, and benefits. It has also approved new software and certified its systems for production. In addition, according to state disability officials, the agency had improved its communications with them. However, SSA did not demonstrate action on two recommendations calling for thorough testing of its interrelated system components before implementation and completion of risk mitigation strategies for the projects supporting the initiative. Thorough testing and risk mitigation strategies could have helped limit problems with the system's operation and other circumstances that could impede the project's success. |
gao_GAO-07-114 | gao_GAO-07-114_0 | SBA has also taken steps to expedite the process for disbursing approved disaster loans. However, SBA’s planning approach appears to be limited in that the agency has not established a time frame for completing key aspects of its comprehensive disaster management plan, such as cross-training other agency staff to provide backup support in a disaster and has not assessed whether it could leverage outside resources—such as the results of disaster simulations or catastrophe models—to enhance its disaster planning processes. SBA Did Not Engage in Comprehensive Disaster Planning Prior to Gulf Coast Hurricanes
As was the case with SBA’s limited planning efforts for the implementation of DCMS, the agency also did not engage in comprehensive disaster planning for other logistical areas prior to the Gulf Coast hurricanes. However, information obtained during the course of our review indicates that SBA’s limited disaster planning process, including the lack of a written plan for staffing requirements associated with surges in loan applications under varying disaster scenarios, further impeded the efficiency of the agency’s response. SBA Utilized a Variety of Outreach Approaches during the Gulf Coast Hurricanes, but Several Factors May Have Limited Their Effectiveness
SBA took a number of steps, under trying conditions, to reach out to Gulf Coast hurricane victims to provide information and assistance regarding disaster recovery loan assistance services. For example, the agency mobilized its staff members to reach out to victims by speaking at organized events and by advertising in a variety of media including the Internet. SBA’s Outreach to Gulf Coast Hurricane Victims May Have Been Reduced by the Complexity of Federal Disaster Assistance Programs and the Damage Associated with the Hurricanes
SBA officials told us that they took a variety of steps to explain the agency’s disaster assistance programs to the victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes. SBA Has Initiated an Internal Review of Outreach Provided to Victims of the Gulf Coast Hurricanes
According to SBA officials, the agency has initiated a follow-up internal review of its outreach to victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes. SBA officials said that they recognize the importance of better disaster planning and are in the process of developing a disaster plan that is designed to addresses key limitations in the agency’s previous planning approach (e.g, strengthening loan surge capacity through potential agreements with private sector lenders and reestablishing the disaster reserve corps). Consequently, SBA should take additional steps to help ensure that it would be better prepared to provide timely and effective assistance to the victims of a future disaster. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better position SBA to prepare for and respond to potential disasters, we recommend that the Administrator of SBA direct the Office of Disaster Assistance to take the following two actions: develop time frames for completing key elements of the disaster management plan and a long-term strategy for acquiring adequate office space; and direct staff involved in developing the disaster management plan to further assess whether the use of disaster simulations or catastrophe models would enhance the agency’s disaster planning process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) assess the Small Business Aministration’s (SBA) logistical planning efforts prior to the Gulf Coast hurricanes and current disaster planning efforts and (2) discuss SBA’s outreach efforts to Gulf Coast hurricane victims. From the survey, among other things, we obtained the loan applicants’ views on how and when they learned of the disaster loan program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration (SBA) is the federal government's primary provider of disaster loans to businesses, homeowners, and renters. In a previous report (GAO- 06-860), GAO found that SBA's limited information systems planning contributed to delays in processing disaster loans for the victims of the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma). To provide further insight into how SBA's disaster preparedness could be enhanced, this second report, initiated under the Comptroller General's authority, assesses other logistical issues (e.g., staffing and space acquisition) that may have affected the efficiency of the agency's response to the hurricanes. Specifically, this report (1) assesses SBA's logistical planning efforts prior to the Gulf Coast hurricanes and current planning efforts and (2) discusses SBA's outreach services to hurricane victims. GAO reviewed disaster planning reports, interviewed SBA officials, and visited the Gulf Coast region.
What GAO Found
SBA engaged in limited logistical disaster planning prior to the Gulf Coast hurricanes, which, in retrospect, likely contributed to the initial challenges that the agency faced in processing the related surge in disaster loan applications on a timely basis. GAO reports, reports by other investigative agencies, and disaster management experts have stated that comprehensive planning and the supplementary use of sophisticated techniques (e.g., simulations of varying disaster scenarios) can help organizations prepare for potential disasters and mitigate their effects. However, SBA did not engage in or complete comprehensive disaster plans prior to the Gulf Coast hurricanes, in part, due to the view by headquarters agency officials that such planning yielded limited benefits and that local agency officials were in the best position to estimate logistical requirements. With better planning, available evidence suggests the agency could have been better positioned to provide initial disaster assistance to hurricane victims in an organized and efficient manner. In particular, SBA faced challenges in training and supervising thousands of temporary employees hired to process loan applications, had not taken steps to help ensure additional trained staff would be available, and encountered difficulties in obtaining suitable office space for the expanded workforce. In the wake of the Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA officials said that they recognized the importance of disaster planning and have initiated a planning process designed to address key areas, which includes cross-training other agency staff to provide disaster assistance and recruiting and training a reserve of potential temporary employees. SBA has also taken steps to expedite the process for disbursing approved disaster loans. However, GAO continues to have concerns about several limitations in SBA's current planning process, including the lack of a timetable for competing key elements of its disaster management plan and the fact that the agency has not assessed whether its disaster plan would benefit from the supplemental use of disaster simulations or catastrophe models. SBA took a variety of steps under trying conditions to inform victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes about its assistance programs, but several factors may have limited the effectiveness of these outreach efforts. SBA staff members reached out to disaster victims by speaking at about 600 organized events and advertising. However, the effectiveness of SBA's outreach efforts may have been reduced by, among other things, both the extensive damage and victim relocations associated with the hurricanes. According to SBA officials, the agency has initiated an internal review of the outreach that it provided to victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes and is developing a plan to better provide such outreach in future disasters. |
gao_HEHS-97-20 | gao_HEHS-97-20_0 | Furthermore, SSA is concerned with the amount of time required to process claims—in many cases a claimant waits more than a year for a final disability decision. As a top-down process, reengineering requires strong, continuous, and committed senior executives from the beginning of the redesign. More specifically, in this report, we address SSA’s vision and progress for redesigning the disability claims process, issues related to the scope and complexity of the redesign, and the agency’s efforts to maintain stakeholder support. Although SSA has begun nearly all of the initiatives it planned to have under way during the first 2 years of its implementation plan, as of July 1996, SSA had (1) not completed any initiative and (2) not begun testing for 14 of the 19 initiatives that contain testing requirements. These designees, as well as DPRT staff who assist them, are drawn from SSA’s federal and state workforce. SSA’s Redesign Solution
In deciding to redesign the disability claims process, SSA tackled the entire process rather than using a building block approach, improving aspects of the process a little at a time. While SSA has been working to secure their support for the redesigned process, a number of stakeholders do not support SSA’s approach. We did not develop evidence that such turnover has had a negative impact on SSA’s redesign. But continued turnover could result in possible loss of momentum or change of scope or direction. Federal employees will receive about 30 weeks of training and state employees about 6. Further, many of the initiatives are complex and have expanded in scope, thus increasing the time frames to complete them. Moreover, this delay also means that no concrete and measurable results are available to maintain stakeholder support. Recommendation
To increase the likelihood that its reengineering project will succeed, given the major delays that SSA has experienced and the risk of further decline in stakeholder support, we recommend that the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration concentrate on accomplishing rapid results through initiatives of smaller, more manageable scope. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Social Security Administration's (SSA) efforts and progress in redesigning the disability determination claims process to reduce administrative costs and the time a claimant waits for a decision, focusing on: (1) SSA's vision and progress for redesigning the disability claims process; (2) issues related to the scope and complexity of the redesign; and (3) SSA's efforts to maintain stakeholder support.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) SSA is about one-third the way through the 6 years it estimated for redesigning the process, but has made relatively little progress in meeting its goals; (2) as of July 1996, SSA had not completed any initiative and testing had not begun for 14 of the 19 initiatives that contain testing requirements; (3) there have not been concrete and measurable accomplishments to keep the support of stakeholders; (4) a number of these initiatives have expanded in scope, thus increasing the time frames required to complete them; (5) increasing the time frames has several disadvantages, such as delaying implementation and heightening the risk of disruption from turnover in senior executives; (6) in addition to delays, SSA has also experienced turnover of senior executives since the beginning of the redesign; (7) although it is difficult to determine if this turnover has had a negative impact on the redesign thus far, continued turnover could result in possible loss of momentum or change of direction; (8) further complicating SSA's redesign efforts are difficulties in maintaining much needed stakeholder support; (9) some federal and state employees, as well as the unions that represent them, are concerned that redesign could mean the loss of jobs; (10) state employees are concerned about SSA's decision to pay federal employees at a higher rate than state employees for the same job; and (11) support from state management officials involved in the disability claims process has been declining steadily. |
gao_GAO-11-828T | gao_GAO-11-828T_0 | Ticket holders who assign their tickets and demonstrate “timely progress” toward self- supporting employment, such as by fulfilling minimum earnings or education requirements to be reviewed regularly, are exempted from medical CDRs. When the ticket holder has sufficient earnings, the EN becomes eligible for payments from SSA. Due to low participation rates by both ticket holders and ENs, SSA revised the Ticket program regulations in 2008. According to EN representatives, ticket holder participation remains low due, in part, to a lack of understanding and awareness of the program. Although the number of ticket holders assigning their tickets has increased since the 2008 changes, the extent to which more ticket holders are returning to work and exiting the benefit rolls is unknown. In our May report, we recommended that SSA prioritize and carry through with a study of participating ticket holders’ exits from the rolls and the agency noted it has plans to study the effects of the 2008 changes on the Ticket program. Although an increasing number of ENs are participating in the Ticket program since the 2008 changes in regulations, many ENs are not actively participating and SSA ticket payments have remained concentrated with only 20 ENs. Employment Networks Vary in Service Approaches, but Increasingly Focus on the Employed or Ready to Work
Those ENs receiving some of the largest payment amounts from SSA provide a range of services, including assistance with job search and retention. But since the 2008 changes in regulations, an increasing number of ENs used service approaches targeting ticket holders who are already working or do not need assistance in obtaining employment. In our May report we recommended that SSA adopt a strategy for compiling and using data on trends in EN service provision to determine whether service approaches, such as sharing SSA ticket payments with ticket holders, are consistent with program goals of helping ticket holders find and retain employment and reduce dependency on benefits. SSA Lacks Adequate Management Tools for Evaluating Employment Networks and Ticket Holders to Ensure Program Integrity and Effectiveness
SSA has not developed EN performance measures to assess their success in helping assigned ticket holders obtain and retain employment and reduce dependence on disability benefits. Without performance measures, SSA is unable to systematically evaluate EN performance, and ultimately determine whether ENs should be allowed to remain in the program. SSA’s EN handbook does state the ultimate goal of the program is to reduce dependence and, whenever possible, eliminate reliance on benefits. 1 for excerpts of calls our investigative staff made to ENs posing as the brother of a ticket holder to learn about the Ticket program and the services provided by the ENs). We recommended that SSA move forward to develop EN performance measures consistent with the requirements of the Ticket law. SSA also has not consistently monitored or enforced the timely progress of ticket holders who assign their tickets to ENs and VRs in order to assess whether they should continue to be exempt from medical CDRs—a key tool for assessing continuing eligibility for benefits. However, SSA has acknowledged in the preamble to its program regulations and in a 2005 internal memo the importance of reviewing timely progress to ensure ticket holders who have medically improved and no longer meet SSA’s disability requirements do not receive benefits and its disability programs do not incur unwarranted costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency Program (Ticket program). Created by law in 1999, the Ticket program was intended to assist disability beneficiaries in obtaining and retaining employment, and potentially bring about significant savings to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund by reducing or eliminating their benefits. Under the program, SSA provides each eligible beneficiary (ticket holder) with a ticket to obtain services from SSA-approved public or private providers, referred to as employment networks (EN), or from traditional state vocational rehabilitation agencies (VR). When the Ticket program was created, it was estimated that it had the potential to provide significant savings to the Social Security Trust Funds and Treasury. However, our prior work and the work of SSA's Office of the Inspector General and others has questioned the viability of the program due to low participation and costs that are not offset by beneficiaries returning to work and reducing dependency on benefits. In an effort to address these concerns, SSA revised its regulations in 2008 to attract more ticket holders and ENs. This testimony summarizes our report issued in May and focuses on (1) how participation of ticket holders and employment networks in the Ticket program has changed over time, (2) what is known about the range of service approaches used by employment networks, and (3) the policies and processes SSA has to evaluate employment networks and ticket holders to ensure program integrity and effectiveness.
What GAO Found
In summary, we found that more ticket holders and ENs are participating in the Ticket program since SSA revised its regulations in 2008, but the overall participation rate remains low. SSA has not yet studied whether the 2008 changes have enabled more ticket holders to obtain employment and exit the benefit rolls. The number of ENs approved to serve ticket holders has increased; however, many ENs are not actively participating, and ticket payments have remained concentrated with only 20 ENs. These ENs provide a range of services, including assistance with job search and retention. But since the 2008 changes in regulations, an increasing number have used service approaches targeting ticket holders who are already working or ready to work, including simply passing back a portion of the payment from SSA. Finally, we found SSA lacks adequate management tools for evaluating ENs and ticket holders to ensure program integrity and effectiveness. For instance, SSA has not developed performance measures for contracted ENs to assess their success in helping assigned ticket holders obtain and retain employment and reduce dependence on disability benefits. Without such measures, we found multiple ENs communicating to ticket holders how to work part time and keep full disability benefits indefinitely, despite the fact that the ultimate goal of the program is to reduce dependence on benefits. In addition, ticket holders who show timely progress toward self-supporting employment are generally exempt from medical continuing disability reviews (CDRs) conducted to determine continued eligibility for benefits. However, SSA has not consistently monitored or enforced the requirements for timely progress and, therefore, ticket holders in the program have been exempt from CDRs for years regardless of whether they show progress in the program. Lack of systematic monitoring of timely progress has both program integrity and cost implications, such as the potential for ineligible beneficiaries to continue receiving benefits. In our May report, we made four recommendations to address these issues and enhance program oversight. SSA has already implemented one of these recommendations, developing performance measures for ENs, and has reported it is moving forward to implement another to track EN service approaches and assess their consistency with program goals. We will continue to monitor the agency's implementation of the other recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-357 | gao_GAO-03-357_0 | In addition, given the challenges agencies face in recruiting and retaining child welfare workers, some supervisors provide direct assistance to caseworkers by taking on some of their cases. Public and Private Child Welfare Agencies Face Challenges in Recruiting and Retaining Workers and Supervisors
Child welfare agencies face a number of challenges recruiting and retaining workers and supervisors. Caseworkers we interviewed in each state also cited administrative burdens, such as increased paperwork requirements for each child in a case; a lack of supervisory support; and insufficient time to participate in training as issues impacting both their ability to work effectively and their decision to stay in the child welfare profession. Former child welfare workers also identified these issues in exit interview documents we reviewed. In addition to retirement and other personal reasons staff chose to leave their positions, low salaries and high caseloads were among the factors affecting child welfare workers’ decisions to sever their employment. Some Evidence Suggests How Recruitment and Retention Challenges Affect Children’s Safety and Permanency, but the Magnitude of the Effect Is Unknown
Caseworkers we interviewed in all four states and our analysis of HHS’s CFSRs indicate that recruitment and retention challenges affect children’s safety and permanency by producing staffing shortages that increase the workloads of remaining staff. Our analysis of the 27 available CFSRs corroborates caseworkers’ experiences showing that staff shortages, high caseloads, and worker turnover were factors impeding progress toward the achievement of federal safety and permanency outcomes. Agency Staff Shortages and High Caseloads Impair Caseworkers’ Abilities to Perform Critical Case Management Activities
According to the caseworkers we interviewed in each of the four states, staffing shortages and high caseloads disrupt case management by limiting their ability to establish and maintain relationships with children and families. Agencies Have Implemented Various Workforce Practices, but Few Have Been Fully Evaluated
Public and private agencies have implemented a variety of workforce practices to address recruitment and retention challenges, but few of these initiatives have been fully evaluated. Child Welfare (forthcoming). Annotated Bibliography - Child Welfare Workforce. State Child Welfare Agency Survey: Report. Accreditation Of Public Child Welfare Agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
A stable and highly skilled child welfare workforce is necessary to effectively provide child welfare services that meet federal goals. This report identifies (1) the challenges child welfare agencies face in recruiting and retaining child welfare workers and supervisors, (2) how recruitment and retention challenges have affected the safety and permanency outcomes of children in foster care, and (3) workforce practices that public and private child welfare agencies have implemented to successfully confront recruitment and retention challenges.
What GAO Found
Child welfare agencies face a number of challenges in recruiting and retaining workers and supervisors. Low salaries, in particular, hinder agencies' ability to attract potential child welfare workers and to retain those already in the profession. Additionally, caseworkers GAO interviewed in all four of the states GAO visited cited high caseloads and related administrative burdens, which they said took from 50 to 80 percent of their time; a lack of supervisory support; and insufficient time to take training as issues impacting both their ability to work effectively and their decision to stay in the child welfare profession. Most of these issues also surfaced in GAO's analysis of 585 exit interviews completed by child welfare staff across the country who voluntarily severed their employment. According to caseworkers GAO interviewed, high turnover rates and staffing shortages leave remaining staff with insufficient time to establish relationships with children and families and make the necessary decisions to ensure safe and stable permanent placements. GAO's analysis of HHS's state child welfare agency reviews in 27 states corroborated caseworker accounts, showing that large caseloads and worker turnover delay the timeliness of investigations and limit the frequency of worker visits with children, hampering agencies' attainment of some key federal safety and permanency outcomes. Child welfare agencies have implemented various workforce practices to improve recruitment and retention--including engaging in university-agency training partnerships and obtaining agency accreditation, a goal achieved in part by reducing caseloads and enhancing supervision--but few of these initiatives have been rigorously evaluated. |
gao_GAO-09-277 | gao_GAO-09-277_0 | In Utah, Good Neighbor projects focused on the repair of fire-damaged trails and watershed protection and restoration. Colorado Good Neighbor Projects Focused on Fuel Reduction
In Colorado, 38 projects were conducted under Good Neighbor authority from fiscal year 2002, after the authority was granted, through fiscal year 2008. These projects primarily focused on fuel reduction. Good Neighbor Projects Are Generally Governed by State Procedures, but Projects Involving Timber Sales Also Incorporate Certain Federal Requirements
State procedures are used for projects that involve service contracts, which include most Good Neighbor projects to date, while projects that include timber sales incorporate both state and federal requirements. Neither BLM in Colorado nor the U.S. Forest Service in Utah has developed written procedures for conducting Good Neighbor timber sales, primarily because neither agency has sold timber under the authority. However, such procedures could help ensure accountability for federal timber if these agencies conduct such sales in the future. We examined CSU’s and the Utah agencies’ contracting requirements concerning three fundamental principles of government contracting— transparency, competition, and oversight. Agencies in both states are generally required to award a contract to the lowest-priced bidder who meets the requirements set forth in the solicitation for bids for contracts, except in certain circumstances, such as when contracts are sizable enough to require a request for proposal—in which the state requires bidders to address additional criteria in their bids, such as technical requirements—or when strong justifications for not choosing the lowest bidder can be documented by the contracting officer. We did not compare Colorado’s timber sale requirements with those of BLM, or Utah’s with those of the U.S. Forest Service, because neither BLM in Colorado nor the U.S. Forest Service in Utah has conducted timber sales under Good Neighbor authority to date, and neither BLM in Colorado nor the U.S. Forest Service in Utah has developed written procedures for doing so. The use of Good Neighbor authority also increased the effectiveness of fuel reduction treatments in areas that include federal, state, and private ownership and helped to maximize the degree of wildland fire risk reduction per dollar spent on the project, according to agency officials. Challenges in Conducting Projects Include Lack of Understanding of the Authority and Concern about Adequacy of State Contract Procedures
Federal and state agencies have also encountered challenges in using Good Neighbor authority, including a lack of understanding of the authority that has complicated partnerships between federal and state officials. According to their Good Neighbor authorizing legislation, the U.S. Forest Service and BLM in Colorado may permit CSFS to perform watershed restoration activities on federal lands when the agency is carrying out similar and complementary activities on adjacent state or private lands. Specifically, the U.S. Forest Service should collaborate with Colorado and Utah, and BLM should collaborate with Colorado, to document information such as (1) the types of projects that have proven to be successful uses of the authority; (2) how differences in the authority’s scope within each state have affected project selection; (3) how project planning and implementation responsibilities have been divided among federal and state project partners; and (4) the costs and benefits associated with using Good Neighbor authority to conduct projects, including any project efficiencies and cost savings that have resulted from the authority’s use. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the activities conducted under Good Neighbor authority, including the number, type, and scope of projects undertaken; (2) the federal and state guidance, procedures, and controls being used to conduct Good Neighbor projects, including contracting requirements and timber sale procedures; and (3) the successes, challenges, or lessons learned, if any, that have resulted from the use of Good Neighbor authority. Our review of Good Neighbor authority included obtaining documentation and holding meetings and discussions with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the two agencies that have implemented Good Neighbor authority; the Colorado State Forest Service (CSFS) and the Utah Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands (UDFFSL), the two state agencies that have conducted Good Neighbor projects; and Colorado State University (CSU) and the Utah Division of Purchasing, the agencies in each of these states generally responsible for administering service contracts for each state’s forest service. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2000, Congress authorized the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service to allow the Colorado State Forest Service to conduct certain activities, such as reducing hazardous vegetation, on U.S. Forest Service land when performing similar activities on adjacent state or private land. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) received similar "Good Neighbor" authority in 2004, as did the U.S. Forest Service in Utah. Congress has also considered the authority's expansion to other states. GAO was asked to determine (1) the activities conducted under the authority; (2) the federal and state guidance, procedures, and controls used to conduct Good Neighbor projects; and (3) successes, challenges, and lessons learned resulting from the authority's use. To do so, GAO reviewed Good Neighbor project documentation and interviewed federal and state officials.
What GAO Found
Fifty-three projects were conducted under Good Neighbor authority through fiscal year 2008, including 38 in Colorado and 15 in Utah, with most of the projects (44 of 53) conducted on U.S. Forest Service land. These projects included hazardous fuel reduction on about 2,700 acres of national forest and about 100 acres of BLM land, mostly in Colorado, and the repair of firedamaged trails and watershed protection and restoration in Utah. Together, the two agencies spent about $1.4 million on these projects, split almost evenly between the two states. Although most projects involved contracting for services such as fuel reduction, some projects involved timber sales in which contractors purchased timber resulting from their fuel reduction activities. These timber sales occurred only in Colorado and totaled about $26,000. State procedures are used in conducting Good Neighbor projects that involve service contracts, while projects that include timber sales incorporate both state and federal requirements. Both Colorado and Utah have contracting requirements that generally address three fundamental principles of government contracting--transparency, competition, and oversight. For example, both states solicit competition among bidders and generally require service contracts to be awarded to the lowest-priced bidder meeting the contract criteria. State requirements were generally comparable to federal procurement requirements. When Good Neighbor projects involve timber sales, state procedures incorporate certain requirements that help the U.S. Forest Service account for state removal of federal timber. The U.S. Forest Service and Colorado are currently supplementing their joint Good Neighbor procedures to ensure that additional accountability provisions are included in future timber sale contracts. Neither BLM in Colorado nor the U.S. Forest Service in Utah has developed written procedures for conducting Good Neighbor timber sales, primarily because they have not sold timber under the authority. Such procedures could help ensure accountability for federal timber if future projects include such sales. Federal and state officials who have used Good Neighbor authority cited project efficiencies and enhanced federal-state cooperation as its key benefits. For example, the agencies cited their ability to improve the effectiveness of fuel reduction treatments in areas that include federal, state, and private ownership. Federal and state agencies have also encountered challenges such as a lack of understanding of the authority and complicated processes for approving Good Neighbor agreements. Agency officials and others also noted several factors to consider when conducting future Good Neighbor projects, whether in Colorado, Utah, or other states that may be granted the authority--including the type of projects to be conducted and the type of land to be treated. While the agencies are not required to document their experiences in using the authority, officials contemplating future use of the authority could benefit from such documentation--including information on successes, challenges, and lessons learned to date. |
gao_T-RCED-99-96 | gao_T-RCED-99-96_0 | This is true for both the 71 largest airports, as well as for the nation’s 3,233 smaller commercial and general aviation airports. Funding Sources Vary Depending on Airports’ Size
In 1996, tax-exempt bonds, the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), and passenger facility charges (PFC) together provided about $6.6 billion of the total $7 billion in funding for large and small airports. Table 1 lists these sources of funding and their amounts in 1996. As shown in figure 1, smaller airports relied on AIP grants for half of their funding, followed by tax-exempt airport and special facility bonds,and state grants. AIP grants accounted for only 10 percent of larger airports’ funding. Funding Levels Fall Short of Small Airports’ Plans for Development
Small airports’ planned capital development during 1997 through 2001 may cost nearly $3 billion per year, or $1.4 billion per year more than these airports raised in 1996. Figure 2 compares small airports’ total funding for capital development in 1996 with their annual planned spending for development. But even if the entire bond financing available to smaller airports were spent on AIP-eligible projects, these airports would have, at a minimum, about $945 million a year in AIP-eligible projects that are not funded. For large airports, the difference between 1996 funding and planned development is about $1.5 billion. However, because large airports obtained $5.5 billion in funding in 1996 versus $1.5 billion for small airports, large airports’ potential shortfall represents 21 percent of their planned development costs as compared to small airports’ potential shortfall of 48 percent. Effect on Smaller Airports of Proposals to Increase and Better Use Airport Funding Varies
Proposals to increase airport funding or make better use of existing funding vary in the extent to which they would help smaller airports and close the gap between their funding and the costs of planned development. For example, increasing AIP funding would help smaller airports more than larger airports because current funding formulas would channel an increasing proportion of AIP funds to them. Most of these airports already return the maximum amount that must be turned back for redistribution to smaller airports in exchange for the opportunity to levy PFCs. 2). FAA’s Efforts to Make Better Use of Existing AIP Grants Have Had Mixed Results
In recent years, the Congress has directed FAA to undertake steps to find ways to extend existing AIP funds, especially for small airports that rely more extensively on AIP funds than do large airports. Others efforts, such as pilot projects to test innovative financing and privatization, have received less interest from airports and are still being tested. Both FAA and the participating states believe that they are benefiting from the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed airport funding issues as they apply to smaller airports, focusing on: 1) how much funding has been made available to airports, particularly smaller airports, for their capital development and what are the sources of these funds; (2) comparing airports' plans for future development with current funding levels; and (3) what effect will various proposals to increase or make better use of existing funding have on smaller airports' ability to fulfill their capital development plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1998, GAO reported that the 3,304 airports that make up the federally supported national airport system obtained about $7 billion from federal and private sources for capital development; (2) the nation's 3,233 smaller airports accounted for 22 percent of this total, or about $1.5 billion; (3) as a group, smaller airports depend heavily on federal grants, receiving half of their funding from the federally-funded Airport Improvement Program (AIP) and the rest from airport bonds, state grants, and passenger facility charges; (4) by contrast, the 71 largest airports in the national airport system obtained $5.5 billion in funding, mostly from tax-exempt bonds and relied on AIP for only 10 percent of their funding; (5) small airports planned to spend nearly $3 billion per year for capital development during 1997 through 2001, or $1.4 billion per year more than they were able to fund in 1996; (6) smaller airports' planned development consists of projects eligible for AIP grants, like runways, and projects not eligible for grants, like terminal retail space; (7) at least $945 million and as much as $1.4 billion of smaller airports' planned development that are eligible for grants may not be funded on an annual basis; (8) the difference between funding and planned development is much greater for smaller commercial and general aviation airports than it is for large airports; (9) several initiatives to increase or make better use of existing funding have emerged in recent years, including increasing the amount of AIP funding and raising the maximum amount airports can levy in passenger facility charges; (10) under current formulas, increasing the amount of AIP funding would help smaller airports more than larger airports, while raising passenger facility charges would mainly help larger airports; and (11) other initiatives for making better use of federal grant monies, such as AIP block grants to states, have primarily been directed toward smaller airports, but none appears to offer a major breakthrough in reducing the shortfall between funding and the levels airports plan to spend on development. |
gao_GAO-14-46 | gao_GAO-14-46_0 | GAO has noted the value of using this information for guarding against improper payments. Recent legislative proposals have also sought to encourage federal agencies to use SSA’s death information. SSA Receives Death Reports from a Number of Sources, but Its Procedures for Handling Them Allow for Erroneous, Incomplete, and Delayed Death Information
SSA Receives Death Reports From Multiple Sources to Create Its Set of Death Records
SSA receives death reports from a variety of sources, including states, family members, funeral directors, post offices, financial institutions, and other federal agencies. SSA Verifies Only Certain Death Reports Before Including Them in Its Death Records, and Does Not Include Others
SSA does not independently verify all death reports it receives. In accordance with policy, the agency only verifies death reports for Social Security beneficiaries, and then verifies only those reports from sources it considers less accurate. Analysis we performed on records in the full death file that were erroneously included showed that most of these errors would not have occurred if SSA had verified the death reports when it received them. They did not think these types of errors would have resulted in improper benefit payments because they involved persons recorded as deceased. Access to Death Data Varies and SSA Lacks Transparency in Communicating How it Determines Agency Eligibility and Reimbursement Costs
SSA Lacks Written Guidance on Its Process for Determining Agency Access to Full Death Data
The Social Security Act requires SSA to share its full death file, to the extent feasible, with federal benefit-paying agencies for the purpose of preventing improper payments, if the agency reimburses SSA for its reasonable costs and the arrangement does not conflict with SSA’s duties with respect to state data. In addition, officials told us SSA would generally have the authority to share the full death file with the OIG at benefit-paying agencies for the purpose of ensuring proper payment of federally-funded benefits. Because SSA has some discretion in making such determinations and agencies’ circumstances may differ, this variation in determinations may not represent inconsistency with the Act. Agencies can purchase a DMF subscription through the Department of Commerce’s National Technical Information Service (NTIS), which reimburses SSA for the cost of providing the file.In accordance with the Act, SSA excludes state-reported death records from the DMF. Moreover, SSA officials said they expect the percentage of state-reported deaths as a proportion of all of SSA’s death records to increase over time, which could lead to a greater portion of death data being removed each year to create the DMF. Reimbursement Amounts Vary and SSA Does Not Share How They are Calculated
Under the Act, one condition of receiving SSA’s full death data is that the recipient agency reimburses SSA for the reasonable cost of sharing death data. However, factors including legal requirements and a quid pro quo arrangement have resulted in varying projected reimbursement amounts for different agencies (see table 1). For example, VA is not required to provide reimbursement by statute, while OPM provides federal retirement data to SSA that is critical to its mission, and the agencies have agreed that the expenses involved in the exchanges are reciprocal. For other agencies, some of these differences in projected reimbursement amounts cannot fully be explained by the frequency with which the agencies expect to receive the data. As a result, recipient agencies do not know the factors that lead to the reimbursement amounts they are charged, which could prevent them from making informed decisions based on the amount they are spending. To clarify how SSA applies the eligibility requirements of the Social Security Act and enhance agencies’ awareness of how to obtain access, develop and publicize guidance it will use to determine whether agencies are eligible to receive SSA’s full death file. In response to our first recommendation, SSA agreed to perform a risk assessment as part of its death information processing system redesign project, but raised concerns about performing risk assessments for other users of the death data. However, we believe that by assessing the risks of inaccuracies in its death data, SSA’s efforts could shed light on risks posed to other agencies’ programs in addition to its own. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) how the Social Security Administration (SSA) obtains death reports for inclusion in the death data it maintains and steps it takes to ensure these reports are accurate; and (2) the factors affecting federal agency access to SSA’s death data. To address these objectives, we reviewed applicable federal laws and SSA procedures, as well as relevant reports and evaluations, such as reports from multiple Offices of Inspectors General. To evaluate SSA’s processes for obtaining, processing, and sharing death information, we reviewed standard criteria, such as the Standards for Internal Controls in the We performed independent testing of SSA’s death Federal Government.data to identify specific types of errors such as dates of birth that followed dates of death. To assess the factors affecting agencies’ access to SSA’s death data, we interviewed officials at seven federal agencies that used the death data— either the full death file or the Death Master File (DMF). | Why GAO Did This Study
As the steward of taxpayer dollars, the federal government must guard against improper payments. Federal agencies may avoid paying deceased beneficiaries by matching their payment data with death data SSA maintains and shares. In addition, recent legislation has established additional requirements for federal agencies to use death data to prevent improper payments. However, the SSA Office of Inspector General has identified inaccuracies in SSA's death data, which could diminish its usefulness to federal agencies.
GAO was asked to examine SSA's death data. This report explores (1) how SSA obtains death reports and steps it takes to ensure death reports are accurate; and (2) factors affecting federal agency access to SSA's death data. In addressing these objectives, GAO interviewed SSA officials and representatives of entities reporting or using the death data. GAO reviewed applicable federal laws, SSA procedures, and reports. GAO also performed independent testing of SSA's death data for certain errors.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) receives death reports from multiple sources, including state vital records agencies (states), family members, and other federal agencies to create its set of death records. In accordance with the Social Security Act (Act), SSA shares its full set of death data with certain agencies that pay federally-funded benefits, for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy of those payments. For other users of SSA's death data, SSA extracts a subset of records into a file called the Death Master File (DMF), which, to comply with the Act, excludes state-reported death data. SSA makes the DMF available via the Department of Commerce's National Technical Information Service, from which any member of the public can purchase DMF data. Certain procedures that SSA uses for collecting, verifying, and maintaining death reports could result in erroneous or untimely death information. For example, SSA does not independently verify all reports before including them in its death records. In accordance with its policy, the agency only verifies death reports for Social Security beneficiaries in order to stop benefit payments, and then, verifies only those reports from sources it considers less accurate, such as other federal agencies. GAO identified instances where this approach led to inaccurate data. For example, GAO's analysis of a sample of death records SSA erroneously included in its death data found that these errors may not have occurred if SSA had verified them. In other cases, when data provided do not match SSA's records, SSA typically does not record these deaths. According to federal internal control standards, agencies should conduct risk assessments of factors impeding their ability to achieve program objectives, such as data errors that could result in improper benefit payments. Agency officials told us SSA has not performed such risk assessments, but has initiated work on a full redesign of its death processing system.
SSA lacks written guidelines other than the language in the Act for determining whether agencies are eligible under the Act to access the full death file, and it does not share with agencies how it determines the reasonable cost of sharing the data, which recipients of the full file are required to reimburse SSA. Because SSA has not developed or shared guidance on how it determines agency eligibility, this could create confusion among potential recipients regarding eligibility. Ensuring appropriate access is important because the DMF contains about 10 percent fewer records than the full death file, and officials expect that difference to increase over time. Additionally, there is a lack of transparency of cost information about the amounts recipients expect to pay. As a result of not knowing the factors that lead to the reimbursement amounts, agencies may not have sufficient information to make informed decisions. We found that SSA provided differing estimates for agencies' reimbursement amounts. Some variation is due to legal requirements and a quid pro quo arrangement. For example, one agency does not reimburse SSA for the cost of providing the death data because it provides SSA with its own data, and the agencies have agreed that the expenses involved in the exchanges are reciprocal. However, for some agencies this variation could not fully be explained by the frequency with which they expected to receive the data. For example, two agencies expected to pay similar reimbursement amounts in 2013 despite expecting to receive the file at different frequencies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SSA assess risks associated with inaccuracies; develop and publicize guidance it will use to determine agency access under the Act; and share detailed reimbursement estimates. SSA partially agreed with the recommendations to assess risks and share detailed reimbursement estimates, but did not agree to develop and publicize guidance, stating that each request is unique. GAO believes that the recommendation remains valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_NSIAD-95-197 | gao_NSIAD-95-197_0 | Antipersonnel mines pose a particularly difficult clearance problem because they are hard to detect, inexpensive, and prone to proliferation. These methods are slow, costly, and labor-intensive. The worldwide challenge is even more daunting. Many individual countries have been working on countermine operations and UXO clearance and are developing clearance technologies and methods. Research and Development Efforts Are Not Well-Coordinated
No formal mechanism or strategic plan exists to ensure that a fully coordinated U.S. research and development effort is leveraged at the problem. The key questions that the forum attempted to address were (1) whether a legitimate UXO requirement—different from the countermine requirement—exists that warrants the pursuit of technological solutions; (2) whether the research and development efforts currently planned or underway constitute a sound approach toward such a solution; (3) what factors (technical, managerial, or otherwise), if any, impede the advancement of detection and clearance technology for landmines and other UXO; (4) what change in approach to technology development (technical, managerial, or otherwise), if any, should be made in the near term and long term; and (5) who or what organizations should take the lead in instituting change and ensuring that the efforts in developing landmine and UXO detection and clearance technology are well orchestrated. Comments From the Department of Defense
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated August 29, 1995. As noted in the report, because of the number of organizations involved and the various projects underway, it is difficult to estimate the current level of U.S. investment in technologies related to detection and clearance of landmines and other UXO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the extent to which existing or foreseeable technologies offer solutions to worldwide landmine and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) problems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) U.S. research and development requirements for UXO detection and clearance technology are broader today than they were during the Cold War; (2) the Department of Defense's (DOD) technological efforts have supported countermine operations, for which the main priority is making paths through minefields during combat; (3) U.S. research and development efforts cover a group of near-term and advanced technologies that could increase detection and clearance functions; (4) the most effective clearance techniques are time-consuming, expensive, and labor intensive; (5) the current technologies do not perform well against newer, more advanced munitions; (6) no governmentwide strategy exists to ensure that the most is gained from the various clearance efforts; (7) the technologies available today are inadequate and unable to keep pace with the number of landmines being emplaced annually; and (8) the barriers to technical solutions include the relative ease with which inexpensive improvements in mine designs have outstripped detection and clearance methods, the unique clearance challenges that developing countries pose, and the difficulty in controlling the proliferation of antipersonnel landmines. |
gao_GAO-16-841 | gao_GAO-16-841_0 | DOD and the Services are Taking Steps to Manage the Impact of Continued Deployments on Readiness
Persistently Low Reported Readiness Levels Attributed to Various Factors
After more than a decade of conflict, recent budget uncertainty, and decreases in force structure, U.S. forces are facing significant challenges in rebuilding readiness. The Navy currently has 272 ships, a decrease from 333 ships in 1998—an 18 percent decrease. For example, in 1991 the Air Force had 154 fighter and bomber squadrons, and as of December 2015 the Air Force had 64 fighter and bomber squadrons—a 58 percent decrease from 1991 levels. Global Demands Are Expected to Continue and to Challenge Some Portions of the Force
Though DOD officials indicated that overall demand has been decreasing since 2013—primarily because of the drawdown of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan—DOD has reported that the ability of the military force to rebuild capacity and capability is hindered by continued, and in some cases increased, demand for some types of forces. Some portions of the force have experienced reduced demand and improved readiness. However, at the time of our report, the department was still working to complete implementation of Global Force Management reform initiatives and thus it is too soon to tell what impact implementation of these initiatives will have on DOD’s readiness recovery efforts. The intent is to better balance the distribution of forces for high-priority missions with the need to rebuild the readiness of the force. Revising combatant command plans: DOD officials noted that in 2015 the department began efforts to revise several major plans in an attempt to better reflect what the current and planned force is expected to achieve. DOD’s Implementation and Oversight of Department-Wide Readiness Rebuilding Efforts Do Not Fully Incorporate Key Elements of Sound Planning
DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority, but implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts has not fully included key elements of sound planning, which could place readiness recovery efforts at risk given the continued high pace of operations and many competing priorities. Each service has also established readiness recovery strategies, but these strategies have been incomplete or not comprehensive and, in many cases, have not fully identified the resources required to achieve the goals the strategies support. Service Readiness Recovery Plans Do Not Capture the Entire Force and Have Changing Time Frames
In 2015, the services reported their readiness rebuilding plans to DOD, which included some readiness goals, strategies for achieving the identified goals, and time frames for when the rebuilding efforts would be complete. In response, the services selected force elements that were either experiencing a high pace of deployments, facing challenges in achieving readiness recovery, or were key to their respective readiness recovery efforts. Extended deployments to meet global demands have resulted in greater and more costly maintenance requirements. Metrics and Evaluating Progress: DOD and the Services Track Readiness Trends, but Most of the Services Have Not Established Metrics and DOD Has Not Developed a Method to Evaluate Progress Toward Achieving Readiness Recovery
An element of sound planning is developing a set of metrics that will be applied to gauge progress toward attainment of the plan’s long-term goals. In addition, DOD has not validated the service-established readiness rebuilding goals, nor does it have metrics on which it can evaluate readiness recovery efforts to determine the extent to which they reflect the department’s priorities and are achieving intended goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the department can implement readiness rebuilding efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to take the following three actions:
Establish comprehensive readiness rebuilding goals to guide readiness rebuilding efforts and a strategy for implementing identified goals, to include resources needed to implement the strategy. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report is a public version of our June 2016 classified report. DOD deemed some of the information in that report as SECRET, which must be protected from public disclosure. To describe the factors that affect reported readiness levels and to identify the steps the department is taking to manage the impact of continued deployments on readiness, we reviewed and analyzed readiness data and information from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and each of the military services. We also conducted interviews with Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and combatant command officials to discuss global demand trends, and obtained documentation, such as departmental guidance and related briefings, and reviewed these documents to understand DOD’s efforts to reform the departmental process used to source global demands. | Why GAO Did This Study
For over a decade, DOD deployed forces to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is now supporting increased presence in the Pacific and emerging crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. These deployments have significantly stressed the force.
The House Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision that GAO review DOD's efforts to rebuild military readiness. This report (1) describes the factors that affect reported readiness levels and DOD's efforts to manage the impact of deployments on readiness, and (2) assesses DOD's implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts. This report is a public version of a previously issued classified product and omits information DOD identified as SECRET, which must be protected from public disclosure.
GAO analyzed and reviewed data on reported readiness rates and departmental readiness rebuilding efforts. GAO interviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and combatant command officials regarding current demand and readiness rates and challenges with rebuilding military readiness. GAO also conducted separate reviews of the readiness of the military services.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes that more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and force structure reductions have degraded military readiness, and the department has efforts under way to manage the impact of deployments on readiness. The military services have reported persistently low readiness levels, which they have attributed to emerging and continued demands on their forces, reduced force structure, and increased frequency and length of deployments. For example, the Air Force experienced a 58 percent decrease in the number of fighter and bomber squadrons from 1991 to 2015 while maintaining a persistent level of demand from the combatant commands for the use of its forces. In addition, the Navy has experienced an 18 percent decrease in its fleet of ships since 1998 and an increase in demand, resulting in the deployment lengths for many ships increasing from 7 months to a less sustainable 9 months. DOD officials have indicated that overall demand has been decreasing since 2013, but the department has reported that the ability to rebuild capability and capacity is hindered by continued demand for some forces. To mitigate the impact of continued deployments on readiness, the Joint Staff has focused on balancing the distribution of forces for high-priority missions with the need to rebuild the readiness of the force. Efforts include revising major plans to better reflect what the current and planned force is expected to achieve and improving the management of DOD's process for sourcing global demands by, among other things, balancing the supply of forces with the minimum required to meet global demands. However, it is too soon to tell what impact implementation of these initiatives will have on DOD's readiness recovery efforts because the department is still working to complete implementation.
DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority, but implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts have not fully included key elements of sound planning, putting the rebuilding efforts at risk. Key elements of sound planning for results-oriented outcomes include a mission statement supported by long-term goals, strategies for achieving the goals, metrics, and an evaluation plan to determine the appropriateness of the goals and effectiveness of implemented strategies. In 2014, DOD tasked the military services to develop plans for rebuilding readiness. Each service developed a plan based on the force elements that were experiencing a high pace of deployments or facing challenges in achieving readiness recovery. In 2015, the services reported their readiness rebuilding plans to DOD, which identified readiness goals and timeframes for achieving them, but these goals were incomplete and some of the timeframes have been extended. GAO found that the services have also not defined comprehensive strategies, with the resources required for achieving the identified goals, nor have they fully assessed the effect of external factors such as maintenance and training on readiness rebuilding goals. Moreover, the services have not fully established metrics that the department can use to oversee readiness rebuilding efforts and evaluate progress towards achieving the identified goals. Without DOD incorporating key elements of sound planning into recovery efforts, and amid competing priorities that the department must balance, successful implementation of readiness recovery plans may be at risk.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations, including that DOD and the services establish comprehensive readiness goals and strategies for implementing them, as well as associated metrics that can be used to evaluate whether readiness recovery efforts are achieving intended outcomes. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-307 | gao_GAO-07-307_0 | Physicians Who Treated a Disproportionate Share of Overly Expensive Patients Were Found in Each of 12 Areas Studied
In each of the 12 metropolitan areas studied, we found physicians who treated a disproportionate share of overly expensive patients. 1.) Outlier Physicians Were Present in Every Metropolitan Area
Based on 2003 Medicare claims data, our analysis found outlier generalist physicians in all 12 metropolitan areas we studied. Outlier generalists and other generalists saw similar average numbers of Medicare patients (219 compared with 235) and their patients averaged the same number of office visits (3.7 compared with 3.5). However, after taking into account beneficiary health status and geographic location, we found that beneficiaries who saw an outlier generalist, compared with those who saw other generalists, were 15 percent more likely to have been hospitalized, 57 percent more likely to have been hospitalized multiple times, and 51 percent more likely to have used home health services. By contrast, they were 10 percent less likely to have been admitted to a skilled nursing facility. The 10 health care purchasers in our study profiled physicians—that is, compared physicians’ performance to an efficiency standard to identify those who practiced inefficiently. To measure efficiency, the purchasers we spoke with generally compared actual spending for physicians’ patients to the expected spending for those same patients, given their clinical and demographic characteristics. Most of the 10 we spoke with also evaluated physicians on quality. The purchasers linked their efficiency profiling results and other measures to a range of physician-focused strategies to encourage the efficient provision of care. Two purchasers used a population-based model, which aggregated patient claims data to classify a patient’s health status score for patients in the population to estimate expected expenditures for the patients a physician treats. Health Care Purchasers Linked Physician Profiling Results to Range of Incentives Encouraging Efficiency
The health care purchasers we examined directly tied the results of their profiling methods to incentives that encourage physicians to practice efficiently. We found that the incentives varied widely in design, application, and severity of consequences—from steering patients toward the most efficient providers to excluding a physician from the purchaser’s provider network because of inefficient practice patterns. CMS Has Tools Available to Profile Physicians for Efficiency, but May Need Some Additional Authorities to Use Results in Ways Similar to Other Purchasers
Medicare’s data-rich environment is conducive to conducting profiling analyses designed to identify physicians whose medical practices are inefficient compared with their peers. CMS has a comprehensive repository of Medicare claims data and experience using key methodological tools. However, CMS may not have legislative authority to implement some of the incentives used by other health care purchasers to encourage efficiency. These figures suggest that CMS has enough clinical and expenditure data to compute reliable efficiency measures for most physicians billing Medicare. The profiling system should include the following elements: total Medicare expenditures as the basis for measuring efficiency, adjustments for differences in patients’ health status, empirically based standards that set the parameters of efficiency, a physician education program that explains to physicians how the profiling system works and how their efficiency measures compare with those of their peers, financial or other incentives for individual physicians to improve the efficiency of the care they provide, and methods for measuring the impact of physician profiling on program spending and physician behavior. CMS also found our focus on the need for risk adjustment in measuring physician resource use to be particularly helpful. We believe that the optimal profiling effort would include financial or other incentives to curb individual physicians’ inefficient practices and would measure the effort’s impact on Medicare spending. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) directed GAO to study the compensation of physicians in traditional fee-for service (FFS) Medicare. GAO explored linking physician compensation to efficiency--defined as providing and ordering a level of services that is sufficient to meet a patient's health care needs but not excessive, given the patient's health status. In this report, GAO (1) estimates the prevalence in Medicare of physicians who are likely to practice inefficiently, (2) examines physician-focused strategies used by health care purchasers to encourage efficiency, and (3) examines the potential for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to profile physicians for efficiency and use the results. To do this, GAO developed a methodology using 2003 Medicare claims data to compare generalist physicians' Medicare practices with those of their peers in 12 metropolitan areas. GAO also examined 10 health care purchasers that profile physicians for efficiency.
What GAO Found
Based on 2003 Medicare claims data, GAO's analysis found outlier generalist physicians--physicians who treat a disproportionate share of overly expensive patients--in all 12 metropolitan areas studied. Outlier generalists and other generalists saw similar numbers of Medicare patients and their respective patients averaged the same number of office visits. However, after taking health status and location into account, GAO found that Medicare patients who saw an outlier generalist--compared with those who saw other generalists--were more likely to have been hospitalized, more likely to have been hospitalized multiple times, and more likely to have used home health services. By contrast, they were less likely to have been admitted to a skilled nursing facility. Certain public and private health care purchasers routinely evaluate physicians in their networks using measures of efficiency and other factors. The 10 health care purchasers in our study profiled physicians--that is, compared physicians' performance to an efficiency standard to identify those who practiced inefficiently. To measure efficiency, the purchasers we spoke with generally compared actual spending for physicians' patients to the expected spending for those same patients, given their clinical and demographic characteristics. Most of the 10 purchasers also evaluated physicians on quality. To encourage efficiency, all 10 purchasers linked their physician evaluation results to a range of incentives--from steering patients toward the most efficient providers to excluding physicians from the purchaser's provider network because of inefficient practice patterns. CMS has tools available to evaluate physicians' practices for efficiency but would likely need additional authorities to use results in ways similar to other purchasers. CMS has a comprehensive repository of Medicare claims data to compute reliable efficiency measures for most physicians serving Medicare patients and has substantial experience using methods that adjust for differences in patients' health status. However, CMS may not currently have the flexibility that other purchasers have to link physician profiling results to a range of incentives encouraging efficiency. Implementation of other strategies to encourage efficiency would likely require legislation. CMS said that our recommendation was timely and that our focus on the need for risk adjustment in measuring physician resource use was particularly helpful. However, CMS only discussed using profiling results for educating physicians. GAO believes that the optimal profiling effort would include financial or other incentives to encourage efficiency and would measure the effort's impact on Medicare. GAO concurs with CMS that this effort would require adequate funding. |
gao_GAO-10-841 | gao_GAO-10-841_0 | Carriers: Transport goods from a foreign port to a U.S. port. Four of these 10 data elements are identical to elements submitted later for customs entry purposes. ATS Targeting
The collection of these additional 10+2 data elements is intended to improve high-risk targeting efforts. CBP’s Regulatory Assessment Generally Adheres to OMB Guidance, but Could Have Been Improved by Additional Information
CBP’s regulatory assessment generally adheres to OMB guidance by including required elements—such as a statement of the need for the proposed action, an examination of alternative approaches, and evaluation of the benefits and costs. Additionally, a more complete analysis of the uncertainty involved in estimating key variables used to evaluate costs and benefits, and additional information regarding some costs to foreign entities, could also have improved CBP’s regulatory assessment. Greater transparency regarding the selection of alternatives could have improved the assessment by justifying the limited scope of the alternatives analyzed in the regulatory assessment and providing insight into CBP’s decision making. OMB guidance states that regulatory analyses should be transparent, and in particular that such analyses should clearly explain the assumptions used in the analysis. However, the regulatory assessment does not describe or analyze how or why CBP made this judgment. CBP officials acknowledged that, to the extent data are available on these costs, this information could be added to the regulatory assessment. CBP Has Collected, Assessed, and Shared Information with the Trade Industry to Monitor and Help Improve Compliance with and Implementation of the 10+2 Rule
CBP has collected and assessed a variety of information, such as daily compliance reports, and has shared information with the trade industry, through importer progress reports and outreach events, to help improve compliance with and implementation of the 10+2 rule. CBP is also using information it has collected to monitor and help improve implementation of the rule, for example, by posting a “Frequently Asked Questions” document on its Web site that addresses some common problems. CBP Is Using Information It Has Collected to Monitor and Help Improve Implementation of the 10+2 Rule
CBP officials said that CBP is generally satisfied with the status of ISF implementation, based on CBP data that indicate that approximately 80 percent of shipments in July 2010 were compliant with the ISF requirement. CBP Has Not Yet Finalized Its Targeting Criteria to Identify Risk Factors in 10+2 Data, and CBP’s Use of the Data Has Not Impacted Trade Flow
Data generated by the 10+2 rule are available for use in targeting efforts, such as identification of unmanifested containers, but CBP has not yet finalized the ATS national security weighted rule set—CBP’s primary targeting criteria within ATS for identifying high-risk cargo containers—to identify risk factors present in the ISF data set. Additionally, CBP officials stated that access to vessel stow plans—one of the two data elements provided by carriers—has enhanced CBP’s ability to identify potentially dangerous unmanifested containers—containers and their associated contents not listed on a ship’s manifest that pose a security risk in that no information is known about their origin or contents. According to best practices in project management, the establishment of project milestones and time frames can help ensure timely project completion. However, establishing milestones and time frames for having the finalized weighted rule set in place could help guide CBP in such testing and provide CBP with goals for completing interim steps and finishing this project, thus better positioning it for targeting high-risk cargo, thereby fulfilling the statutory purpose of the requirement to collect the additional data elements. If CBP publishes an update to its regulatory assessment, as CBP officials said that CBP may do, further transparency could help clarify CBP’s decision making in formulating the 10+2 rule. In addition, a more complete analysis—with further analysis of uncertainty for both costs and benefits, as well as certain costs to foreign entities—could help to provide better information about the circumstances under which benefits justify costs. To accomplish the statutory purpose of collecting the 10+2 data, which is to enhance CBP’s ability to target high-risk cargo containers, CBP plans to update the ATS national security weighted rule set to identify risk factors in 10+2 data. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Commissioner of CBP take the following two actions: If CBP updates its Regulatory Assessment and Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, provide greater transparency in the updated assessment regarding the information which contributed to decisions made in developing the 10+2 rule by including information, such as: 1. a discussion of how the alternatives were selected for analysis, including alternatives that were considered but not included in the analysis, and what information CBP considered in addition to the regulatory assessment to conclude that the alternative requiring the Importer Security Filing, with an exemption for bulk cargo, and the Additional Carrier Requirements was preferable over the other alternatives analyzed; 2. an uncertainty analysis for the costs to importers for a day of delay and for the value of statistical life; and 3. to the extent data are available, estimates for lost profits borne by foreign entities. Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cargo containers present significant security concerns given the potential for using them to smuggle contraband, including weapons of mass destruction. In January 2009, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), implemented the Importer Security Filing (ISF) and Additional Carrier Requirements, collectively known as the 10+2 rule. Collection of cargo information (10 data elements for importers, such as country of origin, and 2 data elements for vessel carriers), in addition to that already collected under other CBP rules, is intended to enhance CBP's ability to identify high-risk shipments. As requested, GAO assessed, among other things, (1) the extent to which CBP conducted the 10+2 regulatory assessment in accordance with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, (2) how CBP used information it collected and assessed to inform its efforts to implement the 10+2 rule since January 2009, and (3) the extent to which CBP has used the additional 10+2 data to identify high-risk cargo. GAO analyzed relevant laws, OMB guidance, and CBP's 10+2 regulatory assessment, and interviewed CBP officials.
What GAO Found
CBP's 10+2 regulatory assessment generally adheres to OMB guidance, although greater transparency regarding the selection of alternatives analyzed and a more complete analysis could have improved CBP's assessment. CBP's regulatory assessment addresses some elements of a good regulatory assessment, as required by OMB, such as the need for the proposed action and evaluation of the benefits and costs. However, the assessment lacks transparency in that it does not explain how the four alternatives considered for the rule--variations in what and how many data elements are to be collected--were selected or how the preferred alternative was chosen. OMB guidance states that regulatory analyses should clearly explain the assumptions used in the analysis. If, as CBP officials stated, an update might be published in the future, greater transparency could help justify the scope of alternatives analyzed in the regulatory assessment and provide insight into CBP's decision making. Further, a more complete analysis of the uncertainty involved in estimating key variables used to evaluate costs and benefits could have improved CBP's regulatory assessment by providing better information about the circumstances under which benefits justify costs. CBP officials said that to the extent that data are available, this information could be added to an updated regulatory assessment to improve its completeness. CBP is using information it has collected, assessed, and shared with the trade industry to monitor and help improve compliance with and implementation of the 10+2 rule. For example, CBP collects daily information on the ISF compliance of importers' shipments at each U.S. port to monitor the status of ISF implementation, as well as data on vessels arriving in U.S. ports for which carriers did not supply information such as the position of each cargo container (stow plans). CBP data indicate that in July 2010, approximately 80 percent of shipments were ISF compliant, and CBP officials said that most carriers had submitted stow plans. CBP publishes answers to frequently asked questions on its Web site and has conducted outreach sessions with the trade industry to discuss errors in ISF submissions and help improve compliance. The 10+2 rule data elements are available for identifying high-risk cargo, but CBP has not yet finalized its national security targeting criteria to include these additional data elements to support high-risk targeting. CBP has assessed the submitted 10+2 data elements for risk factors, and according to CBP officials, access to information on stow plans has enabled CBP to identify more than 1,000 unmanifested containers--containers that are inherently high risk because their contents are not listed on a ship's manifest. CBP has conducted a preliminary analysis that indicates that the collection of the additional 10+2 data elements could help determine risk earlier in the supply chain, but CBP has not yet finalized its national security targeting criteria for identifying high-risk cargo containers or established project time frames and milestones--best practices in project management--for doing so. Such efforts could help provide CBP with goals for finishing this project, thus better positioning it to improve its targeting of high-risk cargo.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP should, if it updates its regulatory assessment, include information to improve transparency and completeness, and set time frames and milestones for updating its national security targeting criteria. DHS concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-97-112 | gao_AIMD-97-112_0 | System Inventories Are Integral to Correcting the Year 2000 Problem and Managing Information Technology Resources
As discussed in our Year 2000 Assessment Guide, agencies need to ensure that they have complete and accurate enterprisewide inventories of their information systems during the assessment phase of the Year 2000 correction effort. The inventory also plays a very critical role in the later stages of the Year 2000 process, which include renovation, validation, and implementation. As discussed in our Year 2000 Assessment Guide, system inventories serve as a useful Year 2000 decision-making tool, by offering added assurance that all systems are identified and linked to a specific business area or process, and that all enterprisewide cross boundary systems are considered. Importance of DIST for DOD’s Year 2000 Efforts
Defense has designated the Defense Integration Support Tools database to be the departmentwide automated information systems inventory for use in making information technology decisions and managing the Year 2000 effort. For example, in November 1996, the Under Secretary for Defense (Comptroller) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence issued a joint memorandum to senior Defense managers stating that they considered DIST to be “the backbone tool for managing the Department’s Information Technology investment strategies, identifying functional information systems interfaces and data exchange requirements, and managing the efforts to fix the Year 2000 problem.”
In its Year 2000 Management Plan, Defense reaffirmed that DIST will be the official repository for the DOD components and added that the reason components are required to report every quarter on their systems and are encouraged to report significant progress on their systems is “to give DOD the visibility necessary to ensure a thorough and successful transition to Year 2000 compliance for all DOD systems.” It also stated that this reporting “will also keep other functional , that your systems interface with or exchange data with, informed as to the status of your Year 2000 compliance progress.” Finally, Defense noted that the DIST needed to be up-to-date so that it could keep the Congress informed on the Department’s efforts to achieve Year 2000 compliance. DOD Recognizes DIST Data Integrity Problems
Defense has recognized that DIST is currently not a reliable and accurate management tool that can have a beneficial impact on the Year 2000 effort or on other initiatives to improve and manage information systems. As a result, the ASD/C3I and DISA have undertaken initiatives to improve the reliability of DIST data and to increase their user friendliness. DIST also does not contain key scheduling and tracking information, such as when critical systems within the services’ and components’ Year 2000 programs will be in the various phases and whether a system is behind schedule. Second, the Department as a whole will be constrained in its ability to ensure that all systems owned by the military services and components are being made Year 2000 compliant. Third, without an enterprisewide inventory, Defense cannot adequately ensure that all interfaces are properly identified and corrected. However, in order to ensure complete validation of DIST, we believe that the Office of the ASD/C3I and DISA need to supplement these actions with efforts that involve fully comparing service inventories (and command inventories in the case of the Navy) to DIST and reconciling differences identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to improve the Defense Integration Support Tools (DIST) database, which serves as the DOD inventory of automated information systems and is intended to be used as a tool to help DOD components in addressing year 2000 date problems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a critical step in solving the year 2000 problem is to conduct an enterprisewide inventory of information systems for each business area to establish the necessary foundation for year 2000 program planning; (2) a thorough inventory also ensures that all systems are identified and linked to a specific business area or process, and that all enterprisewide cross-boundary systems are considered; (3) in addition, the inventory can play a critical role in the later stages of year 2000 correction; (4) for DOD, this inventory is particularly important given the tens of thousands of systems and the many interfaces between systems owned by the services and DOD agencies and considering that these systems vary widely in their importance in carrying out DOD missions; (5) in such a complex system environment, the inventory helps facilitate information technology resource and trade-off decisions; (6) the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) have recognized that, at present, DIST, the Department's enterprisewide inventory, is not a reliable and accurate tool for managing DOD's year 2000 effort; (7) as a result, the Office of the ASD/C3I and DISA have initiated efforts to: (a) improve the integrity of DIST inventory information; (b) facilitate access to information within the database; and (c) ensure that services and components input information needed to complete the inventory; (8) however, given the pace at which these efforts have been proceeding, GAO does not believe that DIST will be usable and reliable in time to have a beneficial impact on year 2000 correction efforts; (9) without a complete inventory, the Department as a whole cannot adequately assess departmentwide progress toward correcting the year 2000 problem and address crosscutting issues--such as whether system interfaces are being properly handled and whether there is a need for additional testing facilities; and (10) thus, the Office of the ASD/C3I and DISA need to expedite efforts to complete the DIST inventory before substantial renovation efforts begin in the services and components, and ensure that the information in DIST is accurate, complete, reliable, and usable. |
gao_GAO-06-513T | gao_GAO-06-513T_0 | Most tribal lands are located in rural or remote locations, though some are near metropolitan areas. Tribal Telephone Subscribership Rate is Substantially Below the National Level and Internet Subscribership Is Unknown
As of 2000, the telephone subscribership rate for Native American households on tribal lands had improved since 1990, but was still substantially below the national rate, while the rate for Internet subscribership on tribal lands was unknown due to a lack of data. According to data from the 2000 decennial census, about 69 percent of Native American households on tribal lands in the lower 48 states had telephone service, which was about 29 percentage points less than the national rate of about 98 percent. However, because it will take time to accumulate a large enough sample to produce data for small communities, annual reports will not be available for all small communities, including tribal lands, until 2010. The rate of Internet subscribership for Native American households on tribal lands is unknown because neither the Census Bureau nor FCC collects this data at the tribal level. Without current subscribership data, it is difficult to assess progress or the impact of federal programs to improve telecommunications on tribal lands. Native Americans Can Benefit from Several General and Tribal- Specific Federal Programs to Improve Telecommunications Services
The Department of Agriculture’s Rural Utilities Service and FCC are responsible for several general programs designed to improve the nation’s telecommunications infrastructure and make services affordable for all consumers, which can benefit tribes and tribal lands. An additional universal service program, known as E-rate, provides discounts on telecommunications services for schools and libraries nationwide. In at least two cases, tribes have not applied for E-rate funds because their tribal libraries are not eligible for state LSTA funds. The rural location and rugged terrain of most tribal lands and tribes’ limited financial resources were the barriers to improved telecommunications most often cited by the officials of tribes and Alaska Native Villages we interviewed. These two barriers, the rural location of tribal lands (which increases the cost of installing telecommunications infrastructure) and tribes’ limited financial resources (which can make is difficult for residents and tribal governments to pay for services) can combine to deter service providers from making investments in telecommunications on tribal lands, resulting in a lack of service, poor service quality, and little or no competition. A fourth barrier cited by tribal officials and other stakeholders is the complex and costly process of obtaining rights-of-way for deploying telecommunications infrastructure on tribal lands, which can impede service providers’ deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. Tribes Are Addressing Barriers to Improved Telecommunications in Different Ways. Some of those we spoke to told us that they were doing this because their provider was unwilling to invest in improved telecommunications services, in part due to the barriers of the tribe’s rural location, rugged terrain, and limited financial resources. The tribes we visited are using federal grants, loans, or other assistance, long-range planning, and private-sector partnerships to help improve service on their lands. In addition, some tribes have addressed these barriers by focusing on wireless technologies, which can be less costly to deploy across large distances and rugged terrain. Some tribes are addressing the shortage of technically-trained tribal members to plan and implement improvements on tribal lands through mentoring and partnerships with educational institutions. | Why GAO Did This Study
An important goal of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, is to ensure access to telecommunications services for all Americans. This testimony is based on GAO's January 2006 report GAO-06-189 , which reviewed 1) the status of telecommunications subscribership for Native Americans living on tribal lands; 2) federal programs available for improving telecommunications on these lands; 3) barriers to improvements; and 4) how some tribes are addressing these barriers.
What GAO Found
Based on the 2000 decennial census, the telephone subscribership rate for Native American households on tribal lands was substantially below the national level of about 98 percent. Specifically, about 69 percent of Native American households on tribal lands in the lower 48 states and about 87 percent in Alaska Native villages had telephone service. This data indicates some progress since 1990, though changes since 2000 are not known. The U.S. Census Bureau is implementing a new survey that will provide annual telephone subscribership rates, but the results for all tribal lands will not be available until 2010. The status of Internet subscribership on tribal lands is unknown because no one collects this data at the tribal level. Without current subscribership data, it is difficult to assess progress or the impact of federal programs to improve telecommunications on tribal lands. The Rural Utilities Service and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have several general programs to improve telecommunications in rural areas and make service affordable for low-income groups, which would include tribal lands. In addition, FCC created some programs targeted to tribes, including programs to provide discounts on the cost of telephone service to residents of tribal lands. However, one of FCC's universal service fund programs, which supports telecommunications services at libraries, has legislatively based eligibility rules that preclude tribal libraries in at least two states from being eligible for this funding. FCC officials told GAO that it is unable to modify these eligibility rules because they are contained in statute and thus modifications would require legislative action by Congress. The barriers to improving telecommunications on tribal lands most often cited by tribal officials, service providers, and others GAO spoke with were the rural, rugged terrain of tribal lands and tribes' limited financial resources. These barriers increase the costs of deploying infrastructure and limit the ability of service providers to recover their costs, which can reduce providers' interest in investing in providing or improving telecommunications services. Other barriers include the shortage of technically trained tribal members and providers' difficulty in obtaining rights of way to deploy their infrastructure on tribal lands. GAO found that to address the barriers of rural, rugged terrain and limited financial resources that can reduce providers' interest in investing on tribal lands, several tribes are moving toward owning or developing their own telecommunications systems, using federal grants, loans, or other assistance, and partnerships with the private sector. Some are also focusing on wireless technologies, which can be less expensive to deploy over rural, rugged terrain. Two tribes are bringing in wireless carriers to compete with wireline carriers on price and service. In addition, some tribes have developed ways to address the need for technical training, and one has worked to expedite the tribal decision-making process regarding rights-of-way approvals. |
gao_GAO-08-250T | gao_GAO-08-250T_0 | The remaining operating revenues come from the Smithsonian’s private trust funds. Despite Some Improvements, Deteriorating Facilities Threaten Collections, and Security and Real Property Portfolio Management Efforts Have Strengths and Limitations
With regard to real property management, the Smithsonian has made a number of facilities improvements since our 2005 report, but the continued deterioration of many facilities has caused access restrictions and threatened the collections, and the Smithsonian’s cost estimate for facilities projects has increased. The Smithsonian follows many key security practices to protect its assets but faces communication and funding challenges. 2). 3). In our September 2007 report, we recommended that the Smithsonian increase awareness of security issues. The Smithsonian concurred with this recommendation. The Smithsonian has omitted privately funded projects from its capital plan and its estimate of $2.5 billion for facilities projects through 2013, making it challenging for the Smithsonian and other stakeholders to comprehensively assess the funding and scope of facilities projects. As a result, our September 2007 report recommends that the Smithsonian include privately funded projects in its capital plan. The Smithsonian Has Taken Some Steps to Address Our Recommendation Regarding Funding Strategies, but Its Evaluation of Funding Options Has Been Limited
Funding constraints are clearly a common denominator with regard to the Smithsonian’s security and real property management, but while the Board of Regents has taken some steps to address our 2005 recommendation to develop a funding plan to address its facilities revitalization, construction, and maintenance needs, its evaluation of funding options has been limited. In September 2005, an ad-hoc Committee on Facilities Revitalization established by the Board of Regents reviewed nine funding options that had been prepared by Smithsonian management for addressing this estimated funding need. Our analysis of the Smithsonian’s evaluations of the eight other funding options, including the potential benefits and drawbacks of each, showed that the evaluations were limited in that they did not always include a complete analysis, fully explain specific assumptions, or benchmark with other organizations—items crucial to determining each option’s potential viability. We recommended that the Smithsonian Board of Regents perform a more comprehensive analysis of alternative funding strategies beyond principally using federal funds to support facilities and submit a report to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) describing a funding strategy for current and future facilities needs. The Smithsonian concurred with this recommendation. Preliminary Results Suggest that the Board of Regents Has Made Some Changes to Strengthen Governance, but Governance Challenges Remain
According to preliminary results of ongoing work, as of November 2007, the Board of Regents had largely implemented 12 of the Governance Committee’s 25 recommendations. The board is also conducting studies on whether changes to the size and composition of the board would improve governance, how to effectively engage the Smithsonian’s advisory boards, and executive compensation. Governance experts and others we interviewed stated that in general, the board appears to have taken some positive steps toward governance reform. However, according to the literature we reviewed and governance experts we interviewed, success will depend in part on how Regents embrace their new responsibilities and on their level of engagement, as good governance results from a board that consists of active and deeply engaged members. Our testimony regarding the Smithsonian’s real property management is based on our past report on the Smithsonian’s facilities, including their condition, security, management, and funding, and information provided by Smithsonian officials on steps taken to develop a funding plan for facilities projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) is the world's largest museum complex. Its funding comes from its own private trust fund assets and federal appropriations, with the majority of funds for facilities coming from federal appropriations. In 2005, GAO reported that the Smithsonian's current funding would not be sufficient to cover its estimated $2.3 billion in facilities projects through 2013 and recommended that the Smithsonian Board of Regents, its governing body, develop and implement a funding plan. Recently, problems related to a lack of adequate oversight of executive compensation and other issues have raised concerns about governance at the Smithsonian. This testimony discusses GAO's recently issued work on the Smithsonian's real property management efforts and its efforts to develop and implement strategies to fund its facilities projects. In addition, it describes preliminary results of GAO's ongoing work on the Smithsonian's governance challenges. The work for this testimony is based on GAO's September 2007 report, Smithsonian Institution: Funding Challenges Affect Facilities' Conditions and Security, Endangering Collections, which included recommendations. For ongoing governance work, GAO reviewed Smithsonian documents and interviewed Smithsonian officials, academics, and representatives of nonprofit associations.
What GAO Found
While the Smithsonian has made some improvements to its real property management, the continued deterioration of many Smithsonian facilities has caused problems, and the Smithsonian's real property management efforts face challenges. The deterioration of facilities has caused access restrictions and threatened collections. In addition, the Smithsonian's estimate for facilities projects increased to $2.5 billion. While the Smithsonian follows key security practices, communication of security information and funding constraints pose challenges. The Smithsonian has made significant strides in improving its real property portfolio management. However, the Smithsonian omitted privately funded projects from its capital plan, making it challenging to assess the total funding and scope of projects. GAO's September 2007 report recommended that the Smithsonian increase awareness of security issues and include privately funded projects in its capital plan. The Smithsonian concurred. To address GAO's 2005 recommendation that the Smithsonian develop a funding plan for facilities projects, the Board of Regents created an ad-hoc committee that reviewed nine options and chose to request increased federal funding. Some of the Smithsonian's evaluations of the nine funding options were limited in that they did not always provide complete analysis, fully explain assumptions, benchmark with other organizations, or consider combining options to increase revenue. GAO's September 2007 report recommended that the Smithsonian more comprehensively analyze funding options and report to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget on a funding strategy. The Smithsonian concurred. The Board of Regents recently established a prioritized list of funding options. Preliminary results of GAO's ongoing work on broader governance issues indicate that the Board of Regents has made some changes to strengthen governance, such as more clearly defining the Regents' oversight responsibilities and improving access between the board and key members of senior management. The board is also studying whether changes to its size and composition would strengthen governance. GAO's preliminary work suggests that the Board appears to have taken some positive steps toward governance reform, but that success will depend in part on how Regents embrace their new responsibilities and on their level of engagement. |
gao_HEHS-96-155 | gao_HEHS-96-155_0 | Instead, VA staff continue to focus on providing training services because, among other reasons, they lack adequate training and expertise in job placement. In addition, our analysis of national program data revealed that the percentage of veterans in the program with serious employment handicaps has been steadily declining over the last 5 years. VA Continues to Place Few Veterans
In our 1992 report, we noted that approximately 202,000 veterans were found eligible for vocational rehabilitation program services between October 1983 and February 1991. VA rehabilitated 5 percent of the eligible veterans, while the remaining veterans (24 percent) continued to receive program services. VA Does Not Emphasize Employment Services
VA’s vocational rehabilitation program is primarily focused on sending veterans to training rather than on finding them suitable employment, according to VA officials. Moreover, our analysis of national program data on current program participants showed that the vast majority of veterans in training were enrolled in higher education programs. VA Does Not Have Readily Available Data on the Cost of Providing Rehabilitation Services
VA headquarters and regional agency officials did not know the costs associated with providing rehabilitation services to individual veterans. Our analysis also showed that, generally, over half of the total cost of rehabilitation services consisted of subsistence allowances. VA spent over $6,000 on a 20-percent-disabled veteran who dropped out of the program after about a year. State Vocational Rehabilitation Program Provides a Mix of Services
The state vocational rehabilitation program provides a wide range of services designed to help people with disabilities prepare for and engage in gainful employment to the extent of their capabilities. Cost Varies Slightly Among Rehabilitated and Dropouts
Our analysis of national program data showed that in fiscal year 1993, the state vocational rehabilitation agencies spent, on average, about $3,000 on each client who was rehabilitated. The national data also showed that the state program spent, on average, about $2,000 on each client who did not complete the program after receiving a plan. The client was deaf and classified as severely disabled. VA Has Begun to Take Steps to Improve Program Effectiveness
In response to prior GAO and VA reports that recommended that VA emphasize finding jobs for veterans, VA has begun to reengineer its vocational rehabilitation program. The overall objective of VA’s reengineering effort is to increase the number of veterans who obtain suitable employment through improvements in program management. VA’s design team has identified several key initiatives aimed at improving program effectiveness. At each VA regional office and state agency visited, we randomly selected and reviewed 9 to 12 case files of program participants who had been rehabilitated or had dropped out of the program between January 1 and June 30, 1995. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) vocational rehabilitation program, focusing on: (1) the percentage of rehabilitated veterans; (2) the services provided; (3) the characteristics of clients served; (4) the cost of rehabilitation; and (5) VA efforts to improve program effectiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) despite the 1980 legislation requiring VA to focus its rehabilitation program on finding disabled veterans suitable employment and subsequent GAO reports recommending that VA implement this legislation, VA continues to place few veterans in jobs; (2) VA officials told GAO that the percentage of veterans classified as rehabilitated is low because the program does not focus on providing employment services; (3) instead, VA continues primarily to send veterans to training, particularly to higher education programs; (4) GAO's analysis of national program data showed that the characteristics of program participants are changing and that VA does not have readily available cost data associated with providing rehabilitation services to individual veterans; (5) GAO's review of over 100 case files, however, showed that VA spent, on average, about $20,000 on each veteran who gained employment and about $10,000 on each veteran who dropped out of the program; (6) generally, over half of the total costs of rehabilitation services consisted of payments to assist veterans in covering their basic living expenses; (7) with regard to Education's state vocational rehabilitation program, GAO's analysis of national program data showed that over the last 5 years (1991-1995) state agencies rehabilitated 37 percent of the approximately 2.6 million individuals eligible for vocational rehabilitation program services, while about 31 percent continued to receive program services; (8) the state agencies provide a wide range of rehabilitative services, from physical restoration and transportation to college education and on-the-job training; (9) in addition, a majority of the program participants had severe disabilities; (10) moreover, national program data showed that state vocational rehabilitation agencies spent, on average, about $3,000 on each client who achieved employment and about $2,000 on each client who dropped out of the program; (11) the state program does not provide funds to cover client living expenses; (12) in response to prior GAO and VA findings and recommendations, VA recently established a design team to identify ways of improving program effectiveness; (13) the team's overall objective is to increase the number of veterans who obtain suitable employment through improvements in program management; (14) the team is also looking at ways to improve staff skills in job finding and placement activities; and (15) VA hopes to begin implementing program changes in fiscal year 1997. |
gao_GAO-14-778 | gao_GAO-14-778_0 | 1). Reliability and Maintainability (R+M). Technical Data Rights. DOD Is Currently Developing an F-35 Sustainment Strategy, but It May Not Be Affordable
DOD has a number of sustainment planning documents that will make up the F-35 program’s overall sustainment strategy, including the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan, which, according to DOD policy, will provide the basis for sustainment activities. However, the current sustainment strategy that DOD is developing may not be affordable. However, the department has not taken steps to fully address these risks, which could affect the development of the sustainment strategy. The F-35 is the most software-intensive fighter aircraft DOD has procured to date. Improved Assumptions and Additional Analyses Could Increase Reliability of F-35 O&S Costs
DOD’s most recent O&S cost estimates are comprehensive in that they include all DOD-required program elements and are organized according to a standard O&S cost-estimating structure; but weaknesses exist with respect to a few of the assumptions, and the estimates did not include all analyses necessary to make them fully reliable. After 2015, the Marine Corps is planning on using the aircraft’s increased capability, which will likely result in more fuel being used. In addition, the JPO estimate does not include reasonable assumptions about part-replacement rates and depot maintenance. To help DOD address key risks to F-35 affordability and operational readiness, and to improve the reliability of its O&S cost estimates for the life cycle of the program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the F-35 Program Executive Officer to take the following five actions:
To enable DOD to better identify, address, and mitigate performance issues with the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) that could have an effect on affordability, as well as readiness, establish a performance-measurement process for ALIS that includes, but is not limited to, performance metrics and targets that (1) are based on intended behavior of the system in actual operations and (2) tie system performance to user requirements. To improve the reliability of the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) F-35 O&S cost estimate, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of CAPE to take the following two actions for future F-35 O&S cost estimates: clearly document assumptions related to intermediate-level maintenance and revise fuel burn assumptions to better reflect the current and future state of the F-35 program and conduct uncertainty analyses to understand the potential range of costs associated with its estimates to reflect the most likely costs associated with the program. We acknowledge that the department established affordability targets for sustainment in March 2012, but these actions do not fully address the intent of our recommendation because, as we note in our report, these affordability targets may not be representative of what the services can actually afford because the methodology for determining the targets was not informed by resource constraints within military service budgets. DOD concurred with the recommendation that the Program Executive Officer conduct uncertainty analysis on future F-35 O&S cost estimates. To assess the extent to which DOD has developed a sustainment strategy for the F-35 program and addressed potential risks related to affordability and operational readiness, we reviewed documentation of program plans and analyses with relevant sustainment elements, including the F-35 Life Cycle Sustainment Plan, the Weapon System Planning Document, the F-35 Future Support Construct, the F-35 Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment Concept of Operations, and the F-35 Operational Requirements Document. To determine the extent to which DOD has developed a reliable operating and support (O&S) cost estimate for the F-35 program, we evaluated both DOD’s Joint Program Office (JPO) and its Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office 2013 O&S cost estimates using GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Lightning II is intended to replace a variety of existing aircraft in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, while providing the most supportable, technologically advanced, lethal, and survivable aircraft to date. The F-35 is DOD's most expensive weapon system, with estimated sustainment costs of about $1 trillion. With the military services planning for the ability to deploy and maintain the F-35 within 4 years, DOD is working to develop a sustainment strategy that will be both affordable and executable for the program's life cycle.
GAO was mandated to review DOD's F-35 sustainment planning efforts. This report addresses the extent to which DOD has (1) developed an F-35 sustainment strategy and addressed potential risks related to affordability and operational readiness and (2) developed a reliable O&S cost estimate for the program's life cycle. GAO analyzed documented plans and cost estimates and interviewed DOD and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) currently has or is developing several plans and analyses that will make up its overall F-35 sustainment strategy, which is expected to be complete in fiscal year 2019. The annual F-35 operating and support (O&S) costs are estimated to be considerably higher than the combined annual costs of several legacy aircraft (see fig.). DOD has begun some cost-savings efforts and established sustainment affordability targets for the F-35 program, but DOD did not use the military services' budgets to set these targets. Therefore, these targets may not be representative of what the services can afford and do not provide a clear benchmark for DOD's cost-savings efforts. In addition, DOD has not fully addressed several issues that have an effect on affordability and operational readiness, including aircraft reliability and technical-data rights, which could affect the development of the sustainment strategy.
It is unclear whether DOD's O&S cost estimates for the F-35 program reflect the most likely costs that the F-35 program will incur. DOD has two primary F-35 O&S estimates that each total around $1 trillion over a 56-year life cycle. These cost estimates are comprehensive in that they include all DOD-required program elements and are organized according to a standard O&S cost-estimating structure; however, weaknesses exist with respect to a few of the assumptions, and the estimates did not include all analyses necessary to make them fully reliable. For example, the estimates did not use reasonable fuel burn rate assumptions that reflect the likely future F-35 fuel usage. Further, one of the estimates did not use reasonable assumptions about part replacement rates and depot maintenance. Finally, while DOD took some steps to mitigate the uncertainties inherent in cost estimates, DOD officials did not conduct key analyses to determine the level of risk associated with the estimates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop better informed affordability constraints; address three risks that could affect sustainment, affordability, and operational readiness; and take steps to improve the reliability of its cost estimates. DOD concurred with all but one recommendation and partially concurred with the recommendation to conduct uncertainty analysis on one of its cost estimates, stating it already conducts a form of uncertainty analysis. GAO continues to believe that the recommended analysis would provide a more comprehensive sense of the uncertainty in the estimates. |
gao_RCED-97-104 | gao_RCED-97-104_0 | Number of Employees and Committee Members With FSA Farm Loans
Our analysis of FSA’s loan portfolio database showed that 414 employees and 1,209 county committee members had FSA farm loans as of September 30, 1996. FSA’s federal employees and county committee members had slightly more loans per borrower than other FSA borrowers, while FSA’s nonfederal employees had slightly fewer loans per borrower than other borrowers. Differences in the Size and Repayment History of Loans to FSA Employees, County Committee Members, and Other Borrowers
While the outstanding principal of the direct and guaranteed loans of FSA employees and county committee members was about $265 million of the $16.9 billion in FSA’s outstanding loan principal as of September 30, 1996, we found some differences in the average amount of loans, loan delinquencies, and debt relief received by FSA employees and county committee members in comparison with other FSA borrowers. With respect to delinquencies, FSA’s federal employees were delinquent on their direct farm loans slightly less often than other borrowers. However, the average amounts of the delinquencies for FSA’s federal employees and county committee members were somewhat larger than the delinquencies of other borrowers, as shown in table 3. Number of Cases Requiring Action to Avoid Conflicts of Interest
Starting in 1995, FSA’s state offices began to survey FSA employees and committee members to identify those with loans and relationships with borrowers so that the offices could take action to avoid conflicts of interest in FSA’s farm loan program. As of March 1997, according to the data we obtained from the 50 FSA state offices, 1,767 employees and county committee members (about 7 percent) had loans or loan-related relationships that required action to avoid conflicts of interest. FSA identified these cases through its state offices’ (1) surveys of employees and committee members and (2) reviews of individual cases to identify those whose loans and relationships with borrowers required action to avoid conflicts of interest. However, FSA headquarters has not reviewed the actions of its state offices on county employee groups. However, FSA has not provided state offices with clear and consistent guidance on identifying situations that constitute conflicts of interest and carrying out their responsibilities, nor has it periodically reviewed how well the state offices are fulfilling their roles. As a result, FSA has little assurance that state offices have consistently identified and acted upon all conflict-of-interest cases. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of FSA to (1) clarify FSA’s policy and guidance that define situations constituting potential conflicts of interest and the actions that are needed for addressing such cases, (2) require all state offices to address conflict-of-interest cases using the revised policy and guidance, and (3) monitor and review state and county offices’ actions to ensure that the efforts to address conflicts of interest are adequate and thorough. South Dakota FSA officials did not obtain information on the total number of county committee members. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed conflicts of interest in the Farm Service Agency's (FSA) farm loan program, focusing on the: (1) number of FSA's federal and nonfederal employees and county committee members who have FSA farm loans; (2) comparative size and repayment history of farm loans to FSA's federal employees, FSA's nonfederal employees, county committee members, and other FSA borrowers; (3) number of cases FSA has identified requiring action to avoid conflicts of interest; and (4) actions FSA has taken to address these cases.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of September 30, 1996, FSA's loan portfolio indicated that 414 of about 16,300 FSA federal and nonfederal employees and 1,209 of about 8,150 members of county committees had 4,089 FSA farm loans; (2) while the outstanding principal of the loans of FSA's federal and nonfederal employees and county committee members was about $265 million of FSA's outstanding loan principal of $16.9 billion, these employees' loans differed in size when compared with the loans of other FSA borrowers; (3) as of September 30, 1996, the loans of FSA's federal employees averaged about $197,700 per borrower, the loans of nonfederal employees averaged about $127,000, the loans of FSA's county committee members averaged about $183,500, and the loans of all other borrowers averaged about $145,200 per borrower; (4) with respect to repayment history, FSA's federal and nonfederal employees and county committee members were delinquent and needed debt relief on their farm loans less often than other borrowers; (5) however, when these employees received debt relief, it was greater than the relief granted other borrowers, 53 percent, on average, for FSA's federal employees, and 7 percent and 2 percent, respectively, for nonfederal employees and county committee members; (6) as of March 1997, FSA had identified 1,767 cases in which its federal and nonfederal employees or county committee members had loans or relationships with other borrowers that required action to avoid conflicts of interest; (7) these cases were identified through FSA's review of 3,622 cases in which FSA's federal and nonfederal employees and county committee members reported that they or their relatives or business associates had FSA farm loans; (8) the total number of cases is likely to increase as FSA proceeds with its efforts to identify cases requiring action to avoid conflicts of interest; (9) although FSA has made progress in dealing with conflicts of interest, it has not provided its state offices with clear and consistent guidance on how to identify and address conflict-of-interest cases; (10) furthermore, FSA headquarters has not reviewed the state offices' efforts to address conflicts of interest; and (11) as a result, FSA's state offices vary in the extent to which they have identified and taken action on cases to avoid conflicts of interest. |
gao_GAO-16-619 | gao_GAO-16-619_0 | Figure 1 describes the steps in this process, which starts each fiscal year with VA’s assessment of its needs, based on gaps in areas such as providing care to veteran populations and existing facility conditions, and concludes with the identification of capital projects to propose to Congress in VA’s annual budget submission and a long-range capital plan that identifies VA’s capital needs over a 10-year horizon. Alternatively, as part of its leasing process, VA decides whether to obtain a delegation of authority from the General Services Administration (GSA) in order to award and execute certain leases. Leases executed under GSA’s leasing authority that exceed the prospectus threshold of $2.85 million require GSA to obtain approval from GSA’s authorizing committees. According to the Cost Guide’s four characteristics, a reliable cost estimate is: comprehensive when it accounts for all possible costs associated with a project, is structured in sufficient detail to ensure that costs are neither omitted nor double-counted, and the estimating teams’ composition is commensurate with the assignment; well-documented when supporting documentation is accompanied by a narrative explaining the process, sources, and methods used to create the estimate, and contains the underlying data used to develop the estimate; accurate when it is not overly conservative or too optimistic and is based on an assessment of the costs most likely to be incurred; and credible when it has been cross-checked with independent cost estimates, the level of confidence associated with the point estimate— the best guess at the cost estimate given the underlying data—has been identified, and a sensitivity analysis has been conducted—that is, the project has examined the effect of changing one assumption related to each project activity while holding all other variables constant in order to identify which variable most affects the cost estimate. As such, according to VA officials, leasing is often VA’s preferred alternative for major medical facilities because it can have shorter project implementation times than if VA were to construct a government-owned facility and can provide flexibility to relocate in the future to meet changes in VA’s needs. This can allow VA to relocate to facilities more aligned with changes in VA’s needs. Further, construction of a federally-owned facility requires a full upfront funding commitment that can be difficult to attain in the current budgetary environment. In particular, we found that while VA regularly cited future “flexibility,” such as ability to move when needs change, as a justification for the leases included in its annual capital plans, the benefits that VA has experienced from this flexibility with major medical facility leases are not presented to VA stakeholders responsible for selecting projects to present to Congress or to congressional decision makers. We and OMB have previously identified the importance of assessing the results of capital decisions and incorporating lessons learned from those assessments into capital decisions. Without transparency on the actual benefits VA has experienced from leasing its major medical facilities, VA and congressional decision makers may lack information to make informed decisions about the need for VA’s major medical facility leases. VA’s Cost-Estimating Process for Major Medical Facility Leases Aligns with Most of Our Best Practice Steps, and Recent Changes May Improve VA’s Estimates for These Leases
VA’s cost-estimating procedures for major medical facility leases generally align with 9 of our 12 cost-estimating best practice steps and recent changes may improve the quality of VA’s cost-estimating process for these leases. Both of these steps are in the early stages, and their success will depend on how quickly and successfully VA implements them. VA Has Made Progress Meeting GSA’s Requirements for Delegated- Leasing Authority
In July 2014, VA started requesting delegations of leasing authority on a lease-by-lease basis from GSA to pursue its major medical facility and other leases, and initially experienced challenges meeting GSA’s conditions in order to receive these delegations of authority. VA has taken steps to address these challenges, including developing a management review process for all applications to GSA for delegations of leasing authority, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of these steps in helping VA to pursue all types of major medical facility leases. According to GSA officials, VA’s applications have not had any significant problems meeting GSA’s submission requirements since VA implemented the steps above, and regularly include required documentation, such as justifications for paying above market lease rates. While VA has made progress meeting GSA’s requirements to receive delegations of leasing authority, only 6 of VA’s 572 applications for delegation of leasing authority between July 2014 and January 2016 were above GSA’s current prospectus threshold of $2.85 million in average annual rent. According to VA officials, GSA’s prospectus-level projects can be more difficult to plan as operating leases given their cost and complexity. In January 2016, VA also issued new guidance for leased medical facilities emphasizing that these facilities should only meet minimum VA and federal requirements given that the government cannot own the leased space at the end of the lease term. In particular, VA’s new design guidance for major medical facility leases could mitigate design, and thus cost, changes from those included in proposals to Congress. Further, VA’s decision to conduct a “lessons learned” study of actual lease costs compared to estimated costs shows promise for VA to understand the factors that impact cost variance from proposal estimates. VA concurred with our recommendation and provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA operates the largest health care network in the United States, with over 2,700 health care sites, including hospitals and outpatient facilities. However, many facilities are outdated, and VA estimates that its capital needs will require up to $63 billion over the next 10 years. In recent years, VA has increasingly leased its facilities, including major medical facilities. These facilities can exceed 200,000 square feet; provide services to veterans such as mental health and other clinical care; are generally built by private developers to meet VA and federal design requirements; and have average annual rent rates in excess of $1 million. VA must submit proposals to Congress and receive authorizations for major medical facility leases.
GAO was asked to review VA's leasing program. This report examines: (1) the factors that account for VA's decisions to lease major medical facilities; (2) the extent to which VA's cost-estimating process for leasing these facilities reflects best practices; and (3) steps VA has taken to align its lease process to GSA requirements for delegated leasing authority. GAO analyzed agency documents, VA data on major medical facility leases and lease delegation requests to GSA, compared VA's cost-estimating procedures to best practices in GAO's Cost Guide , and interviewed VA and GSA officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) leases major medical facilities to benefit from shorter time frames to open a facility and to attain flexibility to relocate. These factors may help VA to meet its needs, such as improving facility compliance with standards and increasing veterans' access to care and services. Unlike owned facilities that can be difficult to dispose of, VA must vacate leased facilities at the end of the lease term, which can allow VA to relocate to space better aligned with its needs. Leases executed under a delegation of authority from the General Services Administration (GSA) can be obligated on an annual basis, whereas owned facilities require full upfront funding that can be difficult to obtain. VA cited flexibility to move as a justification in all 51 of its proposals for these leases since 2015. VA does not, however, assess and provide information to decision makers on how it has benefited from this flexibility. Without transparency on these benefits, VA and congressional decision makers may lack information to understand the need for these leases. GAO and the Office of Management and Budget have reported on the importance of assessing the results of capital decisions in making future decisions.
VA's cost-estimating procedures for major medical facility leases generally align with GAO's 12 cost-estimating best practice steps and recent changes in VA's approach may improve the quality of VA's estimates. GAO's review of cost data for these leases since 2006 found that actual costs often varied more than 15 percent above or below the estimates included in their proposals, often due to project design changes. In 2016, VA introduced a design guide for leased medical facilities that delineates VA and federal requirements, such as security and sustainability standards, that may reduce the risk of project, and thus cost, changes from those included in proposals. VA also initiated a lessons-learned effort to evaluate the factors that contribute to differences between actual lease costs and those included in proposals. The success of these steps will depend on how quickly and effectively VA implements them.
VA has made progress meeting GSA's requirements to obtain needed delegations of authority to pursue VA leases by expanding training, implementing a management review process, and working more closely with GSA. According to GSA, VA's requests for delegation of authority now regularly include required documentation, such as justifications for paying above market lease rates. As a result, VA has received delegations of authority in about 21 days, down from 58 days when VA first started to apply for delegations in July 2014. However, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of these steps with VA's prospectus-level leases, executed under GSA's delegated authority, that exceed $2.85 million in average annual rent. These leases require authorization from GSA's authorizing committees and can be more difficult to align with GSA's requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA assess the benefits of major medical facility leasing and use the information in VA's annual capital plans. VA concurred with GAO's recommendation, and GAO incorporated VA's technical comments as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-02-39 | gao_GAO-02-39_0 | While two of these areas are very close to appropriate maturity levels, the Joint Strike Fighter’s critical technologies are not projected to be matured to levels that we believe would indicate a low risk program at the planned start of the engineering and manufacturing development phase. The Joint Strike Fighter Program has made good progress in some technology areas. | What GAO Found
The Joint Strike Fighter Program (JSFP), the military's most expensive aircraft program, is intended to produce affordable, next-generation aircraft to replace aging aircraft in military inventories. Although JSFP has made good progress in some technology areas, the program may not meet its affordability objective because critical technologies are not projected to be matured to levels GAO believes would indicate a low risk program at the planned start of engineering and manufacturing development in October 2001. |
gao_GAO-05-618 | gao_GAO-05-618_0 | The NAEP can be used to track trends in student achievement over time or to compare student performance in a particular state with the national average. Most Students with Disabilities Were Included in Regular Reading Assessments, and Relatively Few Were Included through Alternate Assessments
In 49 states and the District of Columbia, most students with disabilities who were tested in the 2003-04 school year were included through regular reading assessments. For information about the percentage of students included in this type of assessment, see figure 2. Education officials discussed several reasons students with disabilities were excluded from the assessment including: (1) the student had such a severe disability that the student could not meaningfully participate; (2) the principal and the IEP team decided that the student should not participate; and (3) the student’s IEP required that the student be tested with accommodations that NAEP does not allow. Team decision criteria could vary across states, leading to differences in exclusion rates. Officials from the four states we studied in depth, assessment companies, and national education organizations told us that designing and implementing alternate assessments that measured student achievement on state standards was difficult. Consequently, designing alternate assessments that measured academic achievement was relatively new for many states. National assessment and education experts told us that measuring these students’ achievement often required an individualized approach. Officials in two of the four states also reported that they were not using alternate assessments based on grade-level standards because they were unaware of models that appropriately measured achievement. Education Provided Many Types of Assistance, but Officials Said Examples of Alternate Assessment Approaches Would Be Helpful
Education provided a broad range of assistance to help states implement assessment requirements for students with disabilities, such as disseminating guidance that included technical information on alternate assessments, reviewing state assessment plans, awarding grants to help states improve their assessment systems, and conducting on-site visits. Our review of Education’s Web site, however, disclosed that certain information on the development and use of alternate assessment for students with disabilities was difficult to locate. Education has provided much guidance to states on how to include students with disabilities in statewide assessment systems. We have also included some additional information the department provided to us on outreach and technical assistance efforts on the assessment of students with disabilities and how students with disabilities participated in the NAEP. Appendix I: Percent of Students with Disabilities Participating in State Reading/Language Arts Assessments in the 2003-04 School Year, by State
Did not provide usable data Sum of the number of students with disabilities participating in the three different types of reading assessments was greater than figure the state provided for the total number of students participating in reading assessments. GAO-05-5. No Child Left Behind Act: More Information Would Help States Determine Which Teachers Are Highly Qualified. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 has focused attention on improving the academic achievement of all students, including more than 6 million students with disabilities and requires that all students be assessed. Students with disabilities may be included through accommodations, such as extended time, or alternate assessments, such as teacher observation of student performance. To provide information about the participation of students with disabilities in statewide assessments, GAO determined (1) the extent to which students with disabilities were included in statewide assessments; (2) what issues selected states faced in implementing alternate assessments; and (3) how the U.S. Department of Education (Education) supported states in their efforts to assess students with disabilities.
What GAO Found
In the 2003-04 school year, at least 95 percent of students with disabilities participated in statewide reading assessments in 41 of the 49 states that provided data. Students with disabilities were most often included in the regular reading assessment, and relatively few took alternate assessments. Nationwide, the percentage of students with disabilities who were excluded from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) was 5 percent, but varied across states, ranging from about 2 percent to 10 percent in 2002. Among the reasons for exclusion were differences in accommodations between states and the NAEP and variation in decisions among states about who should take the NAEP. National experts and officials in the four states we studied told us that designing and implementing alternate assessments was difficult because these assessments were relatively new and the abilities of students assessed varied widely. Officials in two states said they were not using an alternate assessment measured on grade-level standards because they were unfamiliar with such assessment models or because of concerns that the assessment would not appropriately measure achievement. In addition, learning the skills to administer alternate assessments was time-consuming for teachers, as was administering the assessment. Education provided support to states on including students with disabilities in statewide assessments in a number of ways, including disseminating guidance through its Web site. However, a number of state officials told us that the regulations and guidance did not provide illustrative examples of alternate assessments and how they could be used to appropriately assess students with disabilities. In addition, our review of Education's Web site revealed that information on certain topics was difficult to locate. |
gao_NSIAD-96-147 | gao_NSIAD-96-147_0 | Observers generally stated that the irregularities did not appear to be the result of organized fraud and did not have a significant impact on the election’s outcome. U.S. Support for Haitian Elections
The U.S. government spent about $18.8 million in financial support for Haiti’s parliamentary, local, and presidential elections. Technical assistance was provided by a team of U.N. election experts in Haiti. The remaining USAID funds were grants to four U.S. nongovernmental organizations for election observation, assistance, and support. In addition to financial support, the United States made diplomatic efforts to assure that the elections were held and a successor to Aristide inaugurated by February 1996. The Inspector General staff generally found adequate controls over funds expended by AIFLD, IFES, IRI, and NDI. The number of politically motivated killings and abuses has decreased dramatically since the intervention of international forces and the return of President Aristide, but allegations of political murder and abuse continue to plague Haiti. U.S. Assistance for Haitian Elections
As of April 1996, the United States had spent about $18.8 million to support Haiti’s electoral process from the June 1995 parliamentary and local elections through the December 1995 presidential election. These funds were disbursed mostly through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which provided grants to the United Nations and various nongovernmental organizations for direct elections support and elections-related support activities. The Organization of American States (OAS) spent about $3.7 million from a State Department grant for election monitoring. International Civilian Mission in Haiti for human rights monitoring. GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to foster democratic elections and increased respect for human rights in Haiti, focusing on: (1) how the elections in Haiti were conducted; (2) the nature and extent of U.S. support for Haitian elections; (3) whether election assistance funds were properly controlled and spent; and (4) the progress made in investigating allegations of politically motivated killings.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) during Haiti's parliamentary and local elections in June 1995, international observers noted various irregularities, but subsequent elections were less troubled; (2) most observers agreed that the presidential elections were generally peaceful, citizens were free to vote, organized fraud was not evident, and technical irregularities did not affect the election's outcome; (3) the U.S. government spent about $18.8 million in support of Haiti's parliamentary, local, and presidential elections, including $9.1 million through a United Nations trust fund, $6 million by U.S. nongovernmental organizations, and $3.7 million to support the efforts of the Organization of American States to observe the elections; (4) without U.S. financial and diplomatic support, it is unlikely that the elections would have been held in time to inaugurate the president's successor in February 1996; (5) the Agency for International Development (AID) Inspector General found that adequate controls existed over the use of election support funds granted to the four U.S. nongovernmental organizations; and (6) the human rights situation in Haiti remains fragile and continues to concern the United States and international organizations, despite dramatic improvements. |
gao_GAO-06-1005T | gao_GAO-06-1005T_0 | Participating brokers use an MLS to “list” the homes they have for sale, providing other brokers with detailed information on the properties (“listings”), including how much of the commission will be shared with the buyer’s agent. While comprehensive price data are lacking, evidence from academic literature and industry participants with whom we spoke highlight several factors that could limit the degree of price competition, including broker cooperation, largely through MLSs, which can discourage brokers from competing with one another on price; resistance from traditional full- service brokers to brokers who offer discounted prices or limited services; and state antirebate and minimum service laws and regulations, which some argue may limit pricing and service options for consumers. In addition, the industry has no significant barriers to entry, since obtaining a license to engage in real estate brokerage is relatively easy and the capital requirements are relatively small. While real estate brokerage has competitive attributes, with a large number of players competing for a limited number of home listings, much of the academic literature and some industry participants we interviewed described this competition as being based more on nonprice variables, such as quality, reputation, or level of service, than on price. Comprehensive data on brokerage fees are lacking. However, past analyses and anecdotal information from industry analysts and participants indicate that, historically, commission rates were relatively uniform across markets and over time. But some economists have noted that in a competitive marketplace, real estate commission rates could reasonably be expected to vary across markets or over time—that is, to be more sensitive to housing market conditions than has been traditionally observed. Thus, with the increase in housing prices, the brokerage fee (in dollars) for selling a median-priced home increased even as the commission rate fell. A discount broker may advertise a lower commission rate to attract listings, but the broker’s success in selling those homes, and in attracting additional listings in the future, depends in part on other brokers’ willingness to cooperate (by showing the homes to prospective buyers) in the sale of those listings. However, some brokers and industry analysts noted that the growth of firms offering lower commissions or flat fees has made an increasing number of consumers aware that there are alternatives to traditional pricing structures and that commission rates are negotiable. Some State Laws and Regulations Can Affect Price Competition
Although state laws and regulations related to real estate licensing can protect consumers, DOJ and FTC have expressed concerns that laws and regulations that restrict rebates to consumers or require minimum levels of service by brokers may also unnecessarily hinder competition among brokers and limit consumer choice. As of July 2006, at least 12 states appeared to prohibit, by law or regulation, real estate brokers from giving consumers rebates on commissions or appeared to place restrictions on this practice. Sellers of properties can also benefit from the Internet because it can give their listings more exposure to buyers. Although Internet-oriented brokerages and related firms represented only a small portion of the real estate brokerage market in 2005, the Internet has made different service and pricing options more widely available to consumers. Wider Use of the Internet in Real Estate Brokerage Will Depend on the Availability of Listing Information and Other Factors
Several factors could limit the extent to which the Internet is used in real estate transactions. Finally, other factors, such as the lack of a uniform technology to facilitate related processes—such as inspection, appraisal, financing, title search, and settlement—may inhibit the use of the Internet for accomplishing the full range of activities needed for real estate transactions. Bibliography
This bibliography includes articles from our review of literature on the structure and competitiveness of the residential real estate brokerage industry. Federal Trade Commission. The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry, vol. | Why GAO Did This Study
Consumers paid an estimated $65.7 billion in residential real estate brokerage fees in 2005. Observing that commission rates have remained relatively uniform--regardless of market conditions, home prices, or the effort required to sell a home--some economists have questioned the extent of price competition in the residential real estate brokerage industry. Furthermore, while the Internet offers time and cost savings to the process of searching for homes, Internet-oriented brokerage firms account for only a small share of the brokerage market. This has raised concerns about potential barriers to greater use of the Internet in real estate brokerage. In this testimony, which is based on a report issued in August 2005, GAO discusses (1) factors affecting price competition in the residential real estate brokerage industry and (2) the status of the use of the Internet in residential real estate brokerage and potential barriers to its increased use.
What GAO Found
The residential real estate brokerage industry has competitive attributes, but its competition appears to be based more on nonprice factors, such as reputation or level of service, than on brokerage fees, according to a review of the academic literature and interviews with industry analysts and participants. Although comprehensive data on brokerage fees are lacking, past analyses and anecdotal information suggest that commission rates have persisted in the same range over long periods, regardless of local market conditions, housing prices, or the cost or the effort required to sell a home. One potential cause of limited price variation in the industry is the use of multiple listing services (MLS), which facilitates cooperation among brokers in a way that can benefit consumers but may also discourage participating brokers from deviating from conventional commission rates. For instance, an MLS listing gives brokers information on the commission that will be paid to the broker who brings the buyer to that property. This practice potentially creates a disincentive for home sellers or their brokers to offer less than the prevailing rate, since buyers' brokers may show high-commission properties first. In addition, some state laws and regulations may also affect price competition, such as those prohibiting brokers from giving clients rebates on commissions and those requiring brokers to provide consumers with a minimum level of service. Although such provisions can protect consumers, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have argued that they may prevent price competition or reduce consumers' choice of brokerage services. The Internet has changed the way consumers look for real estate and has facilitated the growth of alternatives to traditional brokers. A variety of Web sites allows consumers to access property information that once was available only by contacting brokers directly. The Internet also has fostered the growth of nontraditional residential real estate brokerage models, including discount brokers and broker referral services. However, industry participants and analysts cited several potential obstacles to more widespread use of the Internet in real estate transactions, including restrictions on listing information on Web sites, some traditional brokers' resistance to cooperating with nontraditional firms, and certain state laws and regulations that prohibit or restrict commission rebates to consumers. |
gao_GAO-08-42 | gao_GAO-08-42_0 | Governmentwide priorities. Measure produces the same result under similar conditions. ATO Established Annual Performance Measures to Be Consistent with Federal Guidance and Selects Major Programs for Measuring and Reporting
ATO developed its performance targets to be consistent with targets set in the Department of Transportation’s strategic plan, OMB guidance, and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, which call for other federal agencies to establish cost and schedule goals for acquisitions and to achieve at least 90 percent of those goals. To measure schedule performance, at the start of each fiscal year ATO managers select a minimum of two schedule milestones from each major acquisition selected for performance reporting that year. ATO reports the result as the percentage of major programs that are on schedule. ATO’s Acquisition Performance Measures’ Lack of Certain Successful Attributes and 1-Year Focus Impairs Validity of Performance Reporting
ATO’s acquisition performance measures meet four of eight key attributes for successful performance measures that we have identified, but the lack of objective criteria for selecting programs for performance measurement reduces objectivity, reliability, and assurance that core programs are included; the clarity of the performance measures could also be improved. Objective performance measures should not allow subjective considerations or judgments to dominate the outcome of the measurement. The lack of objective criteria for designating major programs also impairs the key attribute of reliability and the assurance that the measures include core program activities. ATO’s On-Budget Performance Measure Does Not Clearly Indicate the Use of Revised Budget Estimates
ATO’s on-budget acquisition performance measure lacks clarity in reporting because ATO does not indicate that the acquisition performance of baselined programs is measured using the most recently approved budget estimates, as reflected in the January CIP. However, because ATO measures budget performance for an 8-month timeframe against the most recently approved budget estimate, STARS was considered on budget for fiscal years 2003 through 2006. Because ATO’s performance measures lack several attributes of successful performance measures, and are focused on 1-year snapshots of performance, they may not provide a valid assessment of acquisition performance over time. ATO’s Performance Measurement Could Mask Budget Increases and Delays in the Transition to NextGen
When measured against original baselines, ATO shows improvement in its managing of acquisitions, but its performance is lower than indicated in FAA’s annual Performance and Accountability Report. The absence of original budget and schedule estimates in ATO’s performance reporting could give the impression to Congress and the American people that ATO’s acquisitions and the transition to NextGen are progressing more smoothly than is actually the case. These issues are critical as ATO begins acquiring new systems with a goal of completing the transition to NextGen by 2025. Recognizing impending budget increases and schedule delays and taking corrective action will be necessary to keep the overall NextGen effort on track. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) how the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) establishes goals and performance measures for acquiring air traffic control (ATC) systems and how they are reported; (2) how ATO’s acquisition performance measures compare with key attributes of successful performance measures; and (3) the implications of using ATO’s existing performance measures to assess progress in the transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). Although ATO has other performance measures that it applies to its acquisitions, in this report we focused only on the two that FAA uses to report its performance—the percentages of acquisitions on budget and acquisitions on schedule. | Why GAO Did This Study
Acquiring new systems on budget and on schedule is critically important in transitioning to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). However, air traffic control modernization has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1995, in part due to acquisitions exceeding budget and schedule targets. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Air Traffic Organization (ATO) has responsibility for managing air traffic control acquisitions. GAO was asked to examine (1) ATO's goals, performance measures, and reporting for systems acquisitions; (2) the validity of ATO's performance measures; and (3) the implications of using ATO's performance measures to assess progress in transitioning to NextGen. To address these issues, GAO compared ATO's measures with attributes of successful performance measures, interviewed agency officials, and sought perspectives of aviation experts.
What GAO Found
To be consistent with federal guidance and with targets set in the Department of Transportation's strategic plan, ATO established annual acquisition goals and performance measures that call for a high percentage of its major acquisitions to be within 10 percent of budget and on schedule. ATO identifies major acquisitions and reports performance against its goals using its most recently approved budget and schedule estimates. To measure on-budget performance, ATO calculates budget increases over an 8-month period--between January and August of each year. To measure on-schedule performance, ATO selects a minimum of two annual milestones from its major acquisitions and calculates the percentage of milestones that are on schedule. Because ATO's acquisition performance measures lack objectivity, reliability, coverage of core activities, and clarity, and focus only on the preceding year, they may not provide a valid assessment of performance over time. On the positive side, the measures are aligned with FAA's strategic objectives, are measurable, have no overlap, and address governmentwide priorities. However, the performance measures lack objectivity because ATO has no objective criteria for designating which programs are "major" and should be selected for performance reporting. This makes it possible for subjective considerations to dominate the outcome and leaves the performance measures vulnerable to bias in the selection of programs for reporting. The lack of objective criteria for designating major programs also impairs the reliability of the measures (the ability of the measures to produce the same results each time they are applied under similar conditions) and undermines assurance that ATO managers include all core program activities in performance reporting each year. The performance measures also lack clarity in that they do not indicate that ATO measures the performance of many acquisitions against the most recently approved budget and schedule estimates rather than the original estimates. ATO's acquisition performance measurement and reporting could mask budget increases and schedule delays that could have a negative effect on the transition to NextGen. Although ATO reported performance that exceeded its goals for fiscal years 2004 through 2006 and showed nearly steady improvement, when measured against original baselines, acquisition performance improved but was lower than reported. Going forward, the absence of original budget and schedule information on ATO's acquisitions could give the impression that the transition to NextGen is progressing more smoothly than might actually be the case. It will be important for ATO and Congress to recognize budget increases and schedule delays so that the capacity, efficiency, and safety benefits of NextGen can be realized in a cost-efficient and timely fashion. |
gao_GAO-01-318 | gao_GAO-01-318_0 | It is up to them to select a reputable carrier, ensure that they understand the terms and conditions of the contract, and understand the remedies that are available to them when problems arise so that they can resolve disputes directly with the carrier. Conclusions
Available information indicates that consumer complaints in the household goods industry are increasing. In addition, there was widespread agreement among the government, industry, and consumer organizations we contacted that the Department’s lack of action has contributed to the growth of problems. The Department defends its limited actions by stating that safety activities are the primary focus of its motor carrier efforts. However, the Department has not taken steps to understand the nature and extent of problems in the industry—and therefore to determine whether its limited approach to oversight and enforcement is appropriate. Nor has it made more than minimal efforts to provide information to consumers that would assist them in making more informed choices. Consumer education as a preventative tool takes on increased importance if the motor carrier administration is to pursue its course of limited oversight and enforcement. The motor carrier administration has recently recognized the need to be more active in this area and has outlined plans to increase its involvement. | What GAO Found
For moving services, the primary responsibility for consumer protection lies with consumers to select a reputable household goods carrier, ensure that they understand the terms and conditions of the contracts, and understand and pursue the remedies that are available to them when problems arise. Available information indicates that consumer complaints in the household goods industry are increasing. In addition, there was widespread agreement among the government, industry, and consumer organizations GAO contacted that the Department of Transportation's lack of action has contributed to the growth of problems. The Department contends that safety activities are the primary focus of its motor carrier efforts. However, the Department has not taken steps to understand the nature and extent of problems in the industry--and therefore to determine whether its limited approach to oversight and enforcement is appropriate. Nor has it made more than minimal efforts to provide information to consumers that would assist them in making more informed choices. Consumer education as a preventive tool takes on increased importance if the motor carrier administration is to pursue its course of limited oversight and enforcement. The motor carrier administration has recently recognized the need to be more active in this area and has outlined plans to increase its involvement. |
gao_GAO-06-1068 | gao_GAO-06-1068_0 | DOD Data Show Demographic and Deployment Characteristics of Hundreds of Thousands of Reservists Deployed in Support of GWOT
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that more than 531,000 reservists have been mobilized in support of GWOT and more than 378,000 reservists, or about 71 percent of the number mobilized, have been deployed in support of GWOT through June 30, 2006 (see fig. The data also indicate that the vast majority of reservists who deployed in support of GWOT were U.S. citizens, White, and male. Since fiscal year 2003, the total number of mobilizations has declined, while the number of deployments remained stable through fiscal year 2005. Our analysis of DOD data indicates that across the services, the majority of reservists have been deployed once, and of those deployed in support of GWOT, most—about 307,000 reservists, or 81 percent—have spent a year or less deployed. Alternatively, more than 65,000 reservists, or 17 percent, have spent more than 1 year but less than 2 years deployed, and about 6,000 reservists, or fewer than 2 percent, have spent more than 2 years deployed. Further, about 90 percent of those who responded identified themselves as non-Hispanic and 8 percent as Hispanic (see table 3). Data for the Volunteer Status, Location Deployed, and Unit Deployed Variables Were Either Not Available or Not Reliable
We were unable to analyze the volunteer status variable because the data do not exist for all of the reserve components. DMDC and the services, as required by DOD policy, have taken steps to improve the reliability of the mobilization data; however, more action is needed to improve the reliability of CTS data and DMDC’s analyses of those data. For example, (1) the rebaselining effort resulted in substantial changes being made to the mobilization data, and the Army—which has mobilized and deployed the largest number of reservists for GWOT—has not completed this rebaselining effort, which the Joint Staff tasked DMDC and the services to do in November 2005; (2) we identified data issues that DOD has not addressed that could further improve the reliability of the data, such as standardizing the use of key terms like deployment; and (3) DMDC does not have effective controls for ensuring the accuracy of its data analyses used to produce reports as required by federal government internal control standards. DMDC and the Services Are Updating the Mobilization Data in CTS, but Concerns Remain
We have found the deployment and mobilization data we used to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes (that is, providing descriptive data), and DMDC and the services have recently taken steps to improve the reliability of mobilization data. However, additional steps are needed to make mobilization data more reliable. Navy officials said that the Navy has validated its personnel records and established a common baseline of data with DMDC. DOD data analyses are important because decision makers at DOD and in Congress need the data to make sound decisions about reserve force availability, medical surveillance, and planning and budgeting. Further, DOD has not documented key procedures and processes for verifying the data analyses it provides to its customers, thus compromising its ability to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and consistency of these analyses. Until decision makers in DOD and Congress have accurate, complete, and consistent data and analyses, they will not be in the best position to make informed decisions about the myriad of reserve deployment matters. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) what Department of Defense (DOD) data indicate are the number of reservists mobilized and deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the selected demographic and deployment characteristics of those deployed and (2) whether DOD’s reserve deployment and mobilization data and analyses are reliable. We then worked with the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to identify the data fields within DMDC’s Contingency Tracking System (CTS) that best provided information about the selected demographic and deployment variables we wanted to analyze. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has previously reported on the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to track reservists deployed to the theater of operations and made recommendations. Reliable mobilization and deployment data are critical for making decisions about reserve force availability and medical surveillance. Because of broad congressional interest, GAO initiated a review under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative to determine (1) what DOD data indicate are the number of reservists mobilized and deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the selected demographic and deployment characteristics of those deployed and (2) whether DOD's reserve deployment and mobilization data and analyses are reliable. GAO analyzed data and data analyses from DOD's Contingency Tracking System (CTS) and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of DOD data indicates that more than 531,000 reservists have been mobilized in support of GWOT as of June 30, 2006, and more than 378,000 reservists, or 71 percent of the number mobilized, have been deployed. The number of reservists deployed increased through fiscal year 2003 and remained stable through fiscal year 2005. The majority of reservists have been deployed once. GAO's analysis further indicates that of the more than 378,000 reservists who have deployed in support of GWOT, 81 percent have spent a year or less deployed and 17 percent of reservists have spent more than 1 year but less than 2 years deployed. Of those who deployed, almost 98 percent were U.S. citizens. Since GWOT began, about 78 percent of reservists who were deployed were White, about 14 percent were Black or African American, and almost 90 percent identified themselves as non-Hispanic and 8 percent as Hispanic. Of those who were deployed, 89 percent were male and 11 percent were female. There were three variables--volunteer status, location deployed, and unit deployed--required by DOD policy for which the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) could not provide data because the data either did not exist or were not reliable enough for the purposes of GAO's report. GAO found the deployment and mobilization data used to be reliable for providing descriptive information. However, the mobilization data, some deployment data fields, and DMDC's processes for data analyses need improvement. DMDC and the services have recently taken steps to improve the reliability of mobilization data; however, additional steps are needed to make mobilization data more reliable. DMDC and the services have undertaken a large-scale, challenging effort to replace all previous service-provided mobilization data in DMDC's CTS database with new data from the services, referred to as "rebaselining." To date, the Air Force has certified that it has rebaselined its data and Navy officials say they have validated their personnel files and established a common baseline of data with DMDC. The Army, which has mobilized the largest number of reservists, has not completed its rebaselining effort and has not set a deadline for completion. Also, DOD has not fully addressed other data issues that could affect the accuracy and completeness of the data, such as standardizing the use of key terms and ensuring that the services address data issues identified by DMDC as well as provide data for all required data fields, such as location, to DMDC. Also, because the data analyses DMDC provided had numerous errors, GAO questions the effectiveness of its verification procedures and other supporting procedures, all of which DMDC has not documented. Until DOD addresses data issues and DMDC documents the internal control procedures it uses to analyze data and verify its analyses of the data, the information provided to decision makers within Congress and DOD may be unreliable and decision makers will not be in the best position to make informed decisions about reserve force availability and reservists' exposure to health hazards. |
gao_GAO-12-311 | gao_GAO-12-311_0 | In addition, confusion over the definition and scope of the mission perpetuates confusion about the capabilities and expenditures associated with the mission. In September 2011, NORAD stopped using the term “air sovereignty alert” (ASA) and created a new term, “aerospace control alert” (ACA) without clearly defining ACA or the capabilities that are now included within it. DOD Has Not Fully Implemented a Risk- Based Management Approach That Balances Risk and Costs for ASA Operations
DOD has taken a series of actions for ASA operations that are consistent with a risk-based management approach; however, several key actions have yet to be taken to fully implement a risk-based management approach that would enable the department to better balance risk and costs. DOD Has Established and Linked Its Homeland Defense Strategic Goal to Its ASA Objectives, but Has Not Established Performance Measures
DOD’s overarching homeland defense goal is to secure the United States from direct attack, but DOD is unable to measure the extent to which ASA operations help to achieve that goal. NORAD Has Not Conducted Routine Risk Assessments, and Its ASA Model Has Limitations
Although we have previously recommended that NORAD should conduct routine risk assessments of ASA operations—the second phase of a risk-based management approach—we found that it has not implemented this recommendation. While we are encouraged that DOD has examined some alternatives to its current ASA operations, adopting a more-rigorous risk-based management approach—including balancing risk and costs—would help decision makers within DOD and elsewhere more-effectively allocate finite DOD resources. Weak Internal Controls Limit the Ability of the Air Force and National Guard Bureau to Accurately Identify ASA Expenditures
Internal control weaknesses limit the Air Force’s ability to accurately identify expenditures with regard to Air Force management of ASA operations. Air Force and National Guard Bureau Officials Have Not Accurately Identified ASA Expenditures
We analyzed the fiscal year 2010 expenditure information the Air Force and National Guard Bureau submitted to Congress and found that it did not accurately identify all ASA expenditures.Force’s submission to Congress, more than $246 million was expended on ASA operations in fiscal year 2010. First, we found that the Air Force overstated its ASA flying-hour expenditures by at least $22 million. Third, the budget justification document the Air Force provided to Congress did not include some expenditures that are related to ASA. Additionally, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government cite the importance of developing detailed internal-controls policies, procedures, and practices to ensure basic accountability, maintain funds control, and prevent fraud and abuse. Conclusions
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has taken extensive efforts to protect the airspace over the United States, aviation threat profiles have changed, and fiscal resources have become more constrained. Matter for Congressional Consideration
In order to ensure that the Air Force is taking action that addresses the long-term sustainability of ASA operations, Congress may wish to consider requiring the Secretary of the Air Force to fully implement the remaining actions identified in our 2009 report within a time period that Congress believes most prudent. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Air Force has implemented the recommendations from our 2009 report, we interviewed officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, the Air Force’s homeland-defense office, the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, the National Guard Bureau, and three air sovereignty alert (ASA) units. Appendix II: Air Force’s Implementation of Our 2009 Recommendations as of November 2011
Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services with units that consistently conduct Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) operations to formally assign ASA duties to these units and then ensure that the readiness of these units is fully assessed, to include personnel, training, equipment, and ability to respond to an alert. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to implement ASA as a steady-state mission according to NORAD, Department of Defense (DOD), and Air Force guidance by (1) incorporating ASA operations within the Air Force submissions for the 6-year Future Years Defense Program; (2) updating the Air Force homeland defense policy, homeland operations doctrine, and concept of operations to incorporate and define the roles and responsibilities for ASA operations; and (3) updating and implementing the ASA program action directive. However, the approach that DOD uses to backfill personnel and units for ASA operations is still managed on an ad hoc basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 11 years since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has put forth extensive efforts to protect the nations aviation sector and airspace. These efforts include air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations, for which the Air Force provides personnel and fully fueled, fully armed aircraft sitting on constant alert at 18 sites across the United States. In 2009, GAO found shortcomings in the Department of Defenses (DOD) management of ASA operations, leading to a number of GAO recommendations. For this report, GAO examined the extent to which (1) the Air Force has implemented GAOs 2009 recommendations, (2) DOD has implemented a risk-based management approach for ASA operations, and (3) the Air Force has accurately identified expenditures for ASA operations. To do so, GAO analyzed relevant strategies, planning documents, guidance, and expenditure data; and interviewed North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Air Force, National Guard Bureau, and other DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Air Force has not fully implemented the recommendations from GAOs 2009 report. With regard to GAOs recommendation that the military services should formally assign ASA duties to the units that consistently conduct them and ensure that the readiness of those units is fully assessed, the Air Force did so. However, the National Guard Bureau is considering reversing that action because it believes that the recommendation can be better addressed through the Air Forces standard deployment process. The Air Force has also not established a timetable to implement ASA as a steady-state mission; has not developed and implemented a plan to recapitalize the aging fighter aircraft that conduct ASA operations before the end of their service lives; and, when ASA units are deployed to support other ongoing operations, the Air Force continues to identify replacement units to perform the ASA mission on an ad hoc basis. All of the above were related to recommendations GAO made to the Air Force in its 2009 report. Separately, GAO found considerable confusion about the capabilities associated with ASA operations in part because, in September 2011, NORAD stopped using the term air sovereignty alert and created a new term, aerospace control alert (ACA), without clearly defining ACA or the missions that are now included within it.
DOD has taken a series of actions for ASA operations that are consistent with a risk-based management approach. However, several key actions have yet to be taken that would enable the department to better balance risk and costs. Risk-based management includes conducting routine risk assessments that evaluate threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets, as recommended in GAOs 2009 report, and selecting between alternative courses of action to mitigate risk and make decisions about allocating resources. Although threats to the nations air sovereignty continue to emerge and evolve, GAO found that DOD is unable to measure the extent to which ASA helps to achieve the departments homeland-defense goal of securing the United States from direct attack because DOD has not established performance measures. NORAD has not conducted routine risk assessments of ASA operations. DOD has also yet to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for two of the three alternatives to current ASA operations that GAO evaluated. Adopting a more-rigorous risk-based management approachincluding balancing risk and costswould help policymakers within DOD and elsewhere more effectively allocate finite DOD resources.
Weak internal controls limit the ability of the Air Force and National Guard Bureau to accurately identify ASA expenditures. GAO analyzed the fiscal year 2010 expenditure information that the Air Force and National Guard Bureau submitted to Congress along with DODs fiscal year 2012 budget justification and found the reported expenditures of more than $246 million to be inaccurate. For example, GAO found that the Air Force overstated ASA flying-hour expenditures by at least $22 million and included expenditures related to national special-security events, which are not part of ASA operations. GAO found that the Air Forces ability to identify ASA expenditures is limited by unclear roles and responsibilities for programming and budgeting and a lack of guidance on defining and tracking ASA expenditures. These types of internal controls are important to ensuring basic accountability, maintaining funds control, and preventing fraud and abuse.
What GAO Recommends
Congress may wish to consider requiring the Air Force to fully implement GAOs 2009 recommendations. In addition, GAO recommends that DOD improve its risk management of ASA operations and improve the Air Forces ability to accurately identify ASA expenditures. DOD fully or partially agreed with all of GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-328 | gao_GAO-06-328_0 | In its role as the nation’s tax collector, IRS has a demanding responsibility in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing the nation’s tax laws. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the status of IRS’s actions to correct or mitigate previously reported weaknesses at two sites and (2) whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems located at the sites are effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer data. IRS Has Made Progress in Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses
IRS has made progress toward implementing more effective information security controls over key financial and tax processing systems that are located at two critical data processing sites, and has corrected or mitigated 41 of the 81 specific technical weaknesses that we reported as unresolved at the time of our last reviews at the selected sites. Electronic access controls include those related to network management, user accounts and passwords, user rights and file permissions, and logging and monitoring of security-relevant events. IRS’s electronic access controls were inadequate. These controls include policies, procedures, and control techniques to physically secure computer resources, prevent exploitation of vulnerabilities, and prevent unauthorized changes to system software. Information Security Program Is Not Yet Fully Implemented
A key reason for the information security weaknesses in IRS’s financial and tax processing systems was that although the agency has developed and documented policies and procedures, it has not yet fully implemented its information security program to help ensure that effective controls were established and maintained. FISMA requires agencies to develop, document, and implement an information security program that includes periodic assessments of the risk and the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost- effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training to inform personnel—including contractors and other users of information systems—of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures; at least annual testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices relating to management, operational, and technical controls of every major information system that is identified in the agencies’ inventories; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in their information security policies, procedures, or practices; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Conclusions
IRS has made progress in correcting or mitigating previously reported weaknesses and in implementing controls over key financial and tax processing systems. However, information security weaknesses—both old and new—continue to impair its ability to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and other sensitive data. Until IRS fully implements a comprehensive agencywide information security program that includes enhanced policies, procedures, plans, training, and continuity of operations, its facilities and computing resources and the information that is processed, stored, and transmitted on its systems will remain vulnerable. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing the nation's tax laws. It relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. Effective information security controls are essential for ensuring that information is adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, disruption, or destruction. As part of its audit of IRS's fiscal year 2005 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) the status of IRS's actions to correct or mitigate previously reported information security weaknesses at two sites and (2) whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems located at the facilities are effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer data.
What GAO Found
IRS has made progress in correcting or mitigating previously reported information security weaknesses and in implementing controls over key financial and tax processing systems that are located at two of its critical data processing sites. It has corrected or mitigated 41 of the 81 specific technical weaknesses that we reported as unresolved at the time of our last review at those selected sites. Although IRS has made progress, controls over its key financial and tax processing systems located at two sites were ineffective. In addition to the 40 previously reported weaknesses for which IRS has not completed actions, GAO identified new information security control weaknesses that threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of IRS's financial information systems and the information they process. For example, IRS has not implemented effective electronic access controls related to network management, user accounts and passwords, user rights and file permissions, and logging and monitoring of security-related events. In addition, it has not effectively implemented other information security controls to physically secure computer resources, and to prevent exploitation of vulnerabilities and unauthorized changes to system software. Collectively, these weaknesses increase the risk that sensitive financial and taxpayer data will be inadequately protected against disclosure, modification, or loss, possibly without detection, and place IRS operations at risk of disruption. A key reason for IRS's weaknesses in information security controls is that it has not yet fully implemented an information security program to ensure that effective controls are established and maintained. Until IRS fully implements a comprehensive agencywide information security program, its facilities and computing resources and the information that is processed, stored, and transmitted on its systems will remain vulnerable. |
gao_GAO-06-399 | gao_GAO-06-399_0 | The legislative history of ANSCA is focused on economic development for the benefit of Alaska Natives. About 13 percent of total 8(a) dollars were obligated to ANC firms in fiscal year 2004. Sole-Source Contracts Represent Majority of 8(a) ANC Obligations for Selected Agencies
For the six agencies included in our 8(a) trend analysis, sole-source obligations to ANC firms increased from about $180 million in fiscal year 2000 to almost $876 million in fiscal year 2004. Over the five-year period, sole-source obligations represented about 77 percent of these agencies’ total obligations to 8(a) ANC firms. Chugach Management Services, Inc.
Chugach Management Services, Inc.
ASRC Airfield & Range Services, Inc.
Ahtna Technical Services, Inc.
Ahtna Technical Services, Inc.
Field Support Services, Inc.
KUK/KBRS Global, a joint venture between Kuk Construction LLC and Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.
Washington D.C.
Bowhead Information Technology Services, Inc.
Washington D.C.
Bowhead Support Services, a division of Bowhead Transportation Company, Inc.
Agency Officials View Contracting with ANC Firms as Quick and Easy, but Rules Not Always Followed
In general, acquisition officials at the agencies we reviewed told us that the option of using ANC firms under the 8(a) program allows them to quickly, easily, and legally award contracts for any value. They also pointed out that awarding 8(a) contracts to ANC firms helps agencies meet their small business goals. Our review of 16 large sole-source contracts found that contracting officials had not always complied with requirements to notify SBA when modifying contracts, such as increasing the scope of work or the dollar value, and to monitor the percentage of the work performed by 8(a) firms versus their subcontractors. ANCs Use the 8(a) Program to Increase Revenue and Provide Benefits
ANCs use the 8(a) program as one of many tools to generate revenue with the goal of providing benefits to their shareholders. Key Practice Is Creation of Multiple 8(a) Subsidiaries
To generate revenue, many ANCs own multiple businesses in the 8(a) program, taking advantage of their special ability to do so. SBA’s records, however, showed the company as 100-percent owned by the parent ANC. Improvements Needed in Oversight of ANCs in the 8(a) Program
SBA has not tailored its policies and practices to account for ANCs’ unique status in the 8(a) program and growth in federal contracting, even though officials recognize that ANCs enter into more complex business relationships than other 8(a) participants. They told us that they are planning to revise their regulations and policies to address ANCs’ unique status in the 8(a) program. SBA Oversight of ANCs in the 8(a) Program Is Not Adequate
SBA’s oversight has fallen short in that it does not track the business industries in which ANC subsidiaries have 8(a) contracts to ensure that more than one subsidiary of the same ANC is not generating the majority of its revenue under the same primary NAICS code; consistently determine whether other small businesses are losing contracting opportunities when large, sole-source contracts are awarded to 8(a) ANC firms; adhere to a legislative and regulatory requirement to ascertain whether 8(a) ANC firms, when entering the 8(a) program or for each contract award, have, or are likely to have, a substantial unfair competitive advantage within an industry; ensure that partnerships between 8(a) ANC firms and large firms are functioning in the way they were intended under the 8(a) program; and maintain information on ANC 8(a) activity. Clearly, 6 of the 7 procuring agencies in our review--which account for most of the government’s 8(a) dollars to ANC firms--agree that there is a need for them to work with SBA to develop guidance for contracting officers in light of the unique procurement advantages Congress has provided 8(a) ANC firms. Energy’s written response is included as appendix VII. We traveled to Alaska and met with representatives of 30 Alaska Native corporations (ANC). Benefits for elder shareholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Alaska Native corporations (ANC) were created to settle land claims with Alaska Natives and foster economic development. In 1986, legislation passed that allowed ANCs to participate in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) program. Since then, Congress has extended special procurement advantages to 8(a) ANC firms, such as the ability to win sole-source contracts for any dollar amount. This report identifies (1) trends in the government's 8(a) contracting with ANC firms, (2) the reasons agencies have awarded 8(a) sole-source contracts to ANC firms and the facts and circumstances behind some of these contracts, and (3) how ANCs are using the 8(a) program. GAO also evaluated SBA's oversight of 8(a) ANC firms.
What GAO Found
While representing a small amount of total federal procurement spending,8(a) obligations to firms owned by ANCs increased from $265 million in fiscal year 2000 to $1.1 billion in 2004. In fiscal year 2004, obligations to ANC firms represented 13 percent of total 8(a) dollars. Sole-source awards represented about 77 percent of 8(a) ANC obligations for the six procuring agencies that accounted for the vast majority of total ANC obligations over the 5-year period. These sole-source contracts can represent a broad range of services, as illustrated in GAO's contract file sample, which included contracts for construction in Brazil, training of security guards in Iraq, and information technology services in Washington, D.C. In general, acquisition officials at the agencies reviewed told GAO that the option of using ANC firms under the 8(a) program allows them to quickly, easily, and legally award contracts for any value. They also noted that these contracts help them meet small business goals. In reviewing selected large, sole-source 8(a) contracts awarded to ANC firms, GAO found that contracting officials had not always complied with certain requirements, such as notifying SBA of contract modifications and monitoring the percent of work that is subcontracted. ANCs use the 8(a) program to generate revenue with the goal of providing benefits to their shareholders. These benefits take many forms, including dividend payments, scholarships, internships, and support for elder shareholders. A detailed discussion of the benefits provided by the ANCs is included as appendix X of the report. Some ANCs are heavily reliant on the 8(a) program for revenues, while others approach the program as one of many revenue-generating opportunities. GAO found that some ANCs have increasingly made use of the congressionally authorized advantages afforded to them. One of the key practices is the creation of multiple 8(a) subsidiaries, sometimes in highly diversified lines of business. From fiscal year 1988 to 2005, ANC 8(a) subsidiaries increased from one subsidiary owned by one ANC to 154 subsidiaries owned by 49 ANCs. SBA, which is responsible for implementing the 8(a) program, has not tailored its policies and practices to account for ANCs' unique status and growth in the 8(a) program, even though SBA officials recognize that ANCs enter into more complex business relationships than other 8(a) participants. Areas where SBA's oversight has fallen short include: determining whether more than one subsidiary of the same ANC is generating a majority of its revenue in the same primary industry, consistently determining whether awards to 8(a) ANC firms have resulted in other small businesses losing contract opportunities, and ensuring that the partnerships between 8(a) ANC firms and large firms are functioning in the way they were intended. During our review, SBA officials agreed that improvements are needed and said they are planning to revise their regulations and policies. |
gao_GAO-15-730 | gao_GAO-15-730_0 | Background
This section describes nuclear fuel production and uranium enrichment, DOE’s and USEC’s involvement in uranium enrichment, and cleanup of uranium enrichment plants. Since 1998, DOE and USEC Have Been Involved in 23 Transactions
Since USEC was privatized in 1998 through June 1, 2015, DOE and USEC have engaged in 23 transactions (see app. Based on our analysis of documents and interviews with DOE officials, we grouped these transactions into the following six broad categories:
Establishment of USEC. DOE and USEC engaged in 3 transactions to help establish the company as a private company. For example, DOE transferred enriched uranium to USEC, as required by the USEC Privatization Act, from 1998 to 2003. These transfers established value for USEC in the marketplace. DOE and USEC engaged in 6 transactions for national security purposes. Specifically, DOE engaged in one transaction in 2012 to secure unobligated LEU from USEC to meet national security needs for the production of tritium for up to 18 months, and DOE engaged in a second transaction later in 2012 to secure unobligated LEU from USEC to meet national security needs for the production of tritium for up to 15 years. Facilities management. DOE and USEC engaged in 5 transactions regarding the operation and management of various facilities, including the Portsmouth and Paducah GDPs, as well as other facilities associated with the development of the American Centrifuge technology. In another transaction, after USEC ceased enrichment activities at the Portsmouth GDP, DOE contracted with USEC from 2001 through 2011 for several activities associated with maintaining the facility in a dormant condition and preparing the facility for decontamination and decommissioning. Nuclear materials management and security. DOE and USEC engaged in 3 transactions to support the management and security of nuclear materials. In one transaction beginning in 1999, DOE agreed to pay USEC to provide safeguards and security services for HEU that DOE stored at the Portsmouth GDP. Issues from prior transactions. DOE and USEC engaged in 3 transactions to address issues with previous transfers of uranium when DOE had inadvertently provided USEC with uranium that did not conform to industry standards or more uranium than originally agreed on by the parties. In a second transaction, in 2003, DOE transferred HEU to USEC to replace other material that DOE transferred to USEC prior to privatization that did not conform to industry standards. In the other two transactions, USEC and its subsidiaries paid a fee for access to DOE restricted data related to the centrifuge technology. DOE Identified Various Costs and Benefits of Some of the Transactions
DOE identified various monetary and nonmonetary costs and benefits of the 23 transactions. However, for transactions occurring prior to 2005, DOE officials were not always able to provide definitive information about the costs and benefits of the transactions independent of that which was stated in the transactional documents. For transactions occurring after 2005—which mostly fell into the national security category—the costs DOE identified were incurred through the transfer of appropriated funds to USEC, transfer of various types of uranium, and acceptance of responsibility for the future disposition of depleted uranium tails. DOE provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) identify transactions involving the Department of Energy (DOE) and USEC Inc. (USEC, now known as Centrus Energy Corp.) since USEC was privatized in 1998 and (2) describe the costs and benefits, if any, of these transactions to DOE, as identified by DOE. For the purpose of our review, we define a transaction as a contract or agreement providing for an exchange of funds, uranium of any type, or services between or involving DOE and USEC. We included in our scope any transactions that occurred between USEC’s privatization on July 28, 1998, and present (July 1, 2015), as well as transactions that commenced before July 28, 1998, but that continued to be executed after USEC was privatized. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE has had a long and complex relationship with USEC Inc. and its successor, Centrus Energy Corp. Until 2013, USEC, a government corporation that was privatized in 1998, was the only company enriching uranium that, according to DOE, could meet DOE's LEU needs for tritium production. However, USEC ceased enrichment operations in May 2013, and the future of its planned next-generation American Centrifuge enrichment facility is uncertain. GAO has previously reported on financial and other transactions involving DOE and USEC, including transactions that involved the transfer of uranium.
GAO was asked to report on the history of the financial relationship between DOE and USEC. This report (1) identifies transactions involving DOE and USEC since USEC was privatized and (2) describes the costs and benefits, if any, of these transactions to DOE, as identified by DOE. GAO defines a transaction as a contract or agreement providing for an exchange of monetary payments, uranium of any type, or services between or involving DOE and USEC occurring from USEC's privatization on July 28, 1998, through July 1, 2015. GAO analyzed key DOE and USEC documents and interviewed DOE and Centrus Energy Corp. officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) has engaged with USEC Inc. (USEC) in 23 transactions since USEC was privatized in 1998 through July 1, 2015. The 23 transactions fall into the following six categories:
Establishment of USEC . DOE engaged with USEC in 3 transactions to help establish the company as a private company. For example, from 1998 to 2003, DOE transferred enriched uranium, as required by the USEC Privatization Act, to USEC to establish commercial value for USEC.
National security . DOE engaged with USEC in 6 transactions for national security purposes. For example, DOE engaged in several transactions to secure domestic low-enriched uranium (LEU), used in nuclear reactors, for the production of tritium—a radioactive isotope of hydrogen used to enhance the power of nuclear weapons—and support the development of USEC's next-generation American Centrifuge uranium enrichment technology.
Facilities management . DOE engaged with USEC in 5 transactions regarding the operation and management of various facilities. For example, after USEC ceased enrichment operations at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (GDP)—which it leased from DOE—DOE contracted with USEC from 2001 to 2011 to maintain the facility in a dormant condition and prepare it for future decontamination and decommissioning.
Nuclear materials management and security . DOE engaged with USEC in 3 transactions to support nuclear materials management. For instance, in a transaction beginning in 1999, DOE agreed to pay USEC to provide safeguards and security services for highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is used in nuclear weapons, that DOE stored at the Portsmouth GDP.
Issues from prior transactions . DOE engaged with USEC in 3 transactions to address issues with previous transfers of uranium. For example, in 2003, DOE transferred HEU to USEC to replace previously transferred material that turned out to be contaminated and that did not conform to industry standards.
Other . In 2 other transactions, USEC and its subsidiaries paid a fee for access to DOE restricted data related to the centrifuge technology. A third transaction involved a pilot project to determine the usability of certain uranium as nuclear fuel.
DOE identified various monetary and nonmonetary costs and benefits of the 23 transactions. DOE was able to identify the costs and benefits for most transactions that have occurred since 2005. For these transactions, DOE incurred costs through the transfer of appropriated funds and various types of uranium, as well as acceptance of responsibility for the future disposition of certain uranium. The benefits DOE received include monetary payments, LEU, and nonmonetary national security benefits. For transactions that occurred or began occurring prior to 2005, DOE was not always able to provide definitive information on its costs and benefits, in part because the agency's accounting system changed in 2004, and agency officials were not able to access information on certain transactions occurring prior to that time.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOE reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-10-592 | gao_GAO-10-592_0 | Finally, it assigns individual personnel to its ships. In February 2002, the Navy increased the Navy Standard Workweek from 67 to 70 hours. For example, it replaced some classes that were formerly led by instructors with computer-based training. The Navy Lacks a Firm Analytical Basis for Some of Its Reductions to Cruiser and Destroyer Crew Sizes
Since 2001, the Navy has reduced the requirements and actual numbers of enlisted personnel aboard its guided-missile cruisers and guided-missile destroyers. The Navy made these adjustments based on its optimal manning initiative as well as a decision to change certain standards it uses to translate estimated workload into workforce requirements. Additionally, we were told by shipboard personnel that in-port workload is increasing, which raises questions about the Navy’s assumption that workload while a ship is underway exceeds in-port workload. For example, when decreasing the Productivity Allowance, the Navy did not conduct the type of analysis called for in its instruction, such as job task analysis or engineering studies, to verify this change. The Navy Has Evaluated Some Aspects of Its Training Changes but Lacks Performance Measures and Data to Fully Evaluate the Impact of These Changes
The Navy has made significant changes to its training programs and has evaluated some aspects of these changes, specifically, those related to cost and training time, but lacks the performance measures and data necessary to fully evaluate the impact changes to training have had on trainees’ job performance and the time required for personnel to achieve various qualifications. For example, Navy training officials we spoke with stated that the changes to training have resulted in improvements such as decreases in class length and overall training cost. Officials also estimated that since implementing these new methods of training for surface warfare officers, the Navy has saved about $50 million annually. While important, these metrics do not enable the Navy to determine how its training programs are affecting key aspects, such as the trainees’ job performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities once they report to their ships. Many of these leaders said that those sailors and officers who did not receive classroom instruction but instead were taught using new methods, such as computer-based training, required more on-the-job training when they arrived on board than those who had received classroom instruction. The time required for personnel to achieve watchstation and warfare qualifications is a potential metric the Navy could use to measure the effects of changes of its training programs. Without undertaking certain types of analysis—such as job task analysis and engineering studies—or testing the validity of its long- standing assumptions, such as whether at-sea workload exceeds in-port workload, the Navy will not have all the information it needs to measure the workload of its ships and translate that workload into workforce requirements. Without performing additional analysis to determine that the standards and assumptions it uses to determine personnel requirements are valid, the Navy cannot be assured that its ship crews are appropriately sized to accomplish necessary tasks and maintain the material readiness of ships both at sea and in port on a daily basis. Overall, without an analysis of assumptions and standards used to reduce ship crew sizes— and without outcome-based performance metrics to evaluate the impact of training program changes—the Navy cannot be assured that the sizes of its ship crews are sufficient to operate and maintain its ships and cannot fully determine the effectiveness of the training changes it has implemented and whether further adjustments are necessary. Appendix II: Distribution of Enlisted and Officer Pay Grades, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, directed GAO to compare shipboard rank/rate distributions over time and analyze underlying reasons for any changes and their impact on ship capabilities for selected ship types. Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Navy used valid assumptions and standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers and destroyers, we analyzed various Navy documents and instructions related to determining crew sizes, including Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1000.16K, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures in order to identify the steps required in the Navy’s process to determine crew sizes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2000, the Navy has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs. For example, it has reduced crew sizes on some of its surface ships and has moved from instructor-led to more computer-based training. In House Report 111-166, which accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the House Armed Services Committee directed GAO to review the training, size, composition, and capabilities of the Navy's ship crews. This report assesses the extent to which the Navy (1) used valid assumptions and standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers and destroyers, and (2) has measured the impact of changes to its training programs, including on the time it takes personnel to achieve various qualifications. To do so, GAO analyzed Navy procedures for determining crew size compared to guidance, analyzed current Navy metrics to measure training impact, and interviewed relevant officials and conducted visits to 11 ships.
What GAO Found
Since 2001, in an effort to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs, the Navy has reduced the requirements and size of crews for some types of ships. For example, from fiscal years 2001 to 2009, enlisted requirements declined by about 20 percent and crew sizes declined by about 16 percent on cruisers and destroyers. The Navy made these reductions based on an initiative it referred to as optimal manning as well as a decision to change certain standards it uses to translate estimated workload into workforce requirements. During pilot tests and the implementation of its optimal manning initiative, the Navy considered several elements, such as job task analysis and work studies, called for in its guidance. However, it analyzed only at-sea workload data because of a long-standing Navy assumption that at-sea workload exceeds in-port workload. While best practices require that valid and reliable data are used to assess workforce requirements, the Navy has not tested the validity of its assumption for excluding in-port data. Additionally, GAO was told by shipboard personnel that in-port workload has been increasing. Furthermore, when changing standards, such as increasing the standard workweek from 67 to 70 hours, the Navy did not conduct the types of analysis called for in its guidance to verify that these changes were warranted. Without performing additional analysis to determine that the assumption and standards it uses to determine personnel requirements are valid, the Navy cannot be assured that it has appropriately sized crews to maintain material readiness and accomplish necessary tasks aboard its ships. The Navy has made significant changes to its training programs and evaluated some aspects of these changes, specifically those related to cost and training time. However, it lacks outcome-based performance measures and complete data necessary to fully evaluate the impact changes to training have had on trainees' job performance and the time required for personnel to achieve various qualifications. For example, in 2003, the Navy replaced its 6-month division officer course with computer-based training and officials told GAO that this change has resulted in decreases in class length and saved the Navy about $50 million annually. While important, these input and output-based metrics do not enable the Navy to determine how its training programs are affecting the level of the trainees' job performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities once they report to their ships. The time it takes for personnel to achieve qualification standards is a potential metric the Navy could use to evaluate its training programs, however data on actual qualification times, while improving, are incomplete. GAO met with leaders from 11 different ships who told GAO that the sailors and officers taught using new methods such as computer-based training, required more on-the-job training when they arrived onboard than those who had previously received classroom instruction. They also noted that because of reductions in crew sizes, there are fewer personnel available to provide this on-the-job training. Without additional outcome-based performance measures to supplement its current metrics, the Navy cannot fully determine the effectiveness of the training changes it has implemented and whether further adjustments are necessary. |
gao_HEHS-99-91 | gao_HEHS-99-91_0 | The BBA created the Medicare+Choice program, effective January 1, 1999, to broaden beneficiaries’ health plan options. Withdrawals Reduce Access to Plans for Some Beneficiaries, but New Plan Entries May Increase Access for Others
In the fall of 1998, an unusually large number of plans decided to not renew their Medicare contracts for 1999 or to reduce the number of counties in which they offered services. As a result of these decisions, about 7 percent of all Medicare managed care enrollees had to switch to another plan or return to FFS. While some plans were deciding to leave, however, a number of plans were applying to enter the program or expand their existing service areas. A plan was more likely to withdraw from a county where payment rates were low relative to other counties in the plan’s service area, the plan had been operating since 1992, the plan had low enrollment, or the plan was in a weak competitive position compared with other plans in the county. At that time, many plans left Medicare because they were unable to attract members and were unprofitable. Although a smaller percentage of low-payment counties were affected by withdrawals compared with high-payment counties, enrollees living in the low-payment counties were more likely to be affected by the withdrawals. For plans that dropped selected counties from their service areas, payment rates appear to be one factor that influenced their decisions. The Medicare managed care program expanded rapidly in recent years; many new plans entered the program, and existing plans expanded the areas they served. Some plans may have withdrawn from counties where they found it difficult to build or maintain provider networks. Small Reductions Seen in Availability of Some Benefits
Medicare managed care plans have typically offered more generous benefits—such as coverage for prescription drugs, dental care, and hearing exams—than those available in the FFS program. Benefit Changes Had Larger Impact on Beneficiaries in Low-Payment Counties
In comparing 1997 and 1999 plan benefit packages for beneficiaries living in counties with at least one managed care plan, we found that access to plans offering different additional benefits decreased slightly after the BBA payment changes (see fig. Access to a plan offering prescription drug coverage, the only benefit for which overall beneficiary access increased between 1997 and 1999, decreased slightly for beneficiaries living in the lowest-payment-rate counties. When plans announced they would be withdrawing from Medicare or reducing the areas in which they offered services, however, some observers expressed concern about the future of Medicare managed care and debated whether certain provisions established by the BBA should be revised. At the same time, HCFA has approved a small number of new plans and is reviewing 30 new plan applications, indicating continued plan interest in participating in Medicare. Some of these new plans, if approved, would offer services in counties that previously had few or no managed care plans. While the new payment rates and regulations were undoubtedly considered by plans in making their participation decisions, other factors associated with plan withdrawals—recent entry in the county, low enrollment, and higher levels of competition—suggest that a number of Medicare plans withdrew from markets in which they had difficulty competing. For example, a plan that served an average beneficiary in Arthur County, Nebraska, would have received about $221 per month. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on managed care plans' decisions to leave the Medicare program or to reduce the geographic areas that they serve, focusing on: (1) plans that receive capitated payments; (2) the patterns of plan and beneficiary participation in managed care; (3) factors associated with plans' decisions to enter or leave the Medicare Choice program; and (4) changes in plans' benefit packages and premiums.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although an unusually large number of managed care plans left the Medicare program, a number of new plans have demonstrated their interest in serving beneficiaries by applying to enter the program or expanding the areas in which they offer services; (2) last fall, shortly before Medicare Choice was implemented, 45 plans announced they would not renew their Medicare contracts and 54 others announced they would reduce the geographic areas in which they provided services; (3) about 407,000 enrollees had to choose a new managed care plan or switch to fee-for-service; (4) at the same time, however, several new plans applied to enter the program; (5) thus far, the Health Care Financing Administration has approved 10 new plans for 1999 and is reviewing 30 additional plan applications; (6) some of the pending plan applications are for counties that previously had few or no managed care plans; (7) plan withdrawals cannot be traced to a single cause; a variety of factors appear to be associated with plans' participation decisions; (8) payment level is one factor that influences where plans offer services, but withdrawals were not limited to counties with low payments; (9) when a plan reduced its service area, however, GAO found that counties with low payment rates relative to payments in the rest of a plan's service area were more likely to experience a withdrawal than counties with higher payment rates; (10) a review of other factors suggests that a portion of the withdrawals may have been the result of plans deciding that they were unable to compete effectively in certain areas; (11) for example, plans were more likely to withdraw from counties where they had begun operating since 1992, where they had attracted fewer enrollees, or where they faced larger competitors; (12) some plans have indicated that they withdrew from areas where they were unsuccessful in establishing sufficient provider networks; (13) a broad comparison of plan benefit packages from 1997 and 1999 indicates modest reductions in the inclusion of certain benefits; (14) in 1999, a slightly greater percentage of beneficiaries can join a plan that offers prescription drug coverage, while a slightly smaller percentage of beneficiaries have access to a plan offering dental care, hearing exams, and foot care; (15) beneficiaries living in the lowest-payment-rate areas experienced greater decreases in access than the average beneficiary; and (16) those living in the lowest payment areas experienced a decrease in access to plans offering prescription drug benefits, while beneficiaries in higher payment areas saw an increase in access to plans offering drug benefits. |
gao_GAO-15-617 | gao_GAO-15-617_0 | Agencies Reported Achieving Billions of Dollars in Savings from Implementation of OMB’s IT Reform Efforts
As previously stated, beginning in 2010, OMB launched a series of IT reform initiatives in the areas of data center consolidation, cloud computing, and shared services migration, among other things, intended to help agencies achieve greater efficiency in their IT investments, as well as identify and execute opportunities for savings. In total, 24 of the 26 agencies reported achieving approximately $3.6 billion in cost savings and avoidances from the implementation of OMB’s IT reform efforts between fiscal years 2011 and 2014. Data center consolidation and optimization cost savings and avoidances comprise slightly more than half of the $3.6 billion total, while PortfolioStat and other initiatives (such as cloud computing and shared services migration) comprise the remainder of the cost savings and avoidances. Agencies Have Incomplete Plans for Reinvesting Savings
Most agencies did not fully implement OMB’s guidance for submitting reinvestment plan information. Of the 27 agencies required to submit reinvestment plan information to OMB, 5 had fully implemented OMB’s guidance, while the remaining 22 agencies had partially implemented the guidance. Only One-Third of Agencies’ Fiscal Year 2014 Reduction and Reinvestment Plans Were Complete
Most agencies did not follow OMB’s guidance for proposing one-time fiscal year 2014 IT reductions of 10 percent and reinvestments of between 50 and 100 percent of the savings in their budget submissions for that fiscal year. The two agencies that did not submit one-time fiscal year 2014 reduction and reinvestment plan information—Defense and HHS—provided varying reasons for not doing so. Specifically, agencies should have submitted a total of $7.6 billion in reductions and proposed reinvestments between $3.8 and $7.6 billion. In addition, none of the four selected agencies had tracked the performance results of their planned reinvestments. Until OMB requires agencies to report actual reinvestment performance and defines performance targets to guide agency reinvestment efforts, it will be limited in its ability to ensure that agencies are reinvesting funds as planned and may not be able to hold agencies accountable. Finally, without improved tracking of reinvestments through the use of existing governance mechanisms and the implementation of FITARA, Interior and Labor may lack assurance that their component agencies are reinvesting in areas consistent with agency-wide goals. While the four agencies that we selected documented key governance processes and fully embraced OMB’s “cut and reinvest” guidance by proposing to reinvest the full amount of their proposed reductions in their fiscal year 2014 budget submissions, none of the four agencies was able to provide support that they had tracked the actual performance of their proposed reinvestments. Specifically, OMB and 12 agencies agreed with our recommendations, while 1 (State) did not state whether it agreed or disagreed, 3 had no comments, and 1 (Defense) partially agreed. Until such requirements are in place, agencies may be challenged to ensure that their considerable savings are being used in the most efficient and effective manner possible and OMB will be limited in its ability to ensure that agencies’ reinvestments are occurring as planned. Agriculture also noted that it supports our recommendations to OMB to define targets for agency reinvestment and require that agencies complete their reinvestment plans and track actual performance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess agencies’ progress in achieving savings from their information technology (IT) reform efforts; (2) evaluate the extent to which agencies have established plans to reinvest their savings; and (3) evaluate how selected agencies have reinvested their savings, including the extent to which IT governance processes are in place to oversee such reinvestments. We rated this requirement as “fully implemented” if the agency’s submission met or exceeded OMB’s reduction and reinvestments targets and included all required supplemental information; “partially implemented” if the agency’s submission either did not meet OMB’s reduction and reinvestment targets or did not include the required supplemental information for each of the proposed reductions and reinvestments; and “not implemented” if the agency did not meet OMB’s reduction and reinvestment targets and did not provide supplemental information for all required fields, or the agency did not submit the required documentation to OMB. For evaluating how selected agencies have reinvested their savings, including the extent to which IT governance processes are in place to oversee such reinvestments, we selected four federal agencies (the Departments of Education, Interior, and Labor, and the Social Security Administration) based on their fiscal year 2014 proposed IT reductions and reinvestments, as documented in their budget submission documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Beginning in 2010, OMB initiated a series of IT reform efforts to consolidate the growing number of data centers and eliminate duplicative spending. In May 2012, the agency began a “cut and reinvest” effort that required agencies to propose fiscal year 2014 IT reductions and reinvestments.
GAO was asked to review agencies' savings from OMB's IT reform efforts and determine how those savings are being reinvested. The objectives were to (1) assess agencies' progress in achieving savings from their IT reform efforts, (2) evaluate agencies' plans to reinvest their savings, and (3) evaluate how selected agencies have reinvested their savings and governance processes to oversee the reinvestments. GAO assessed 26 agencies' cost savings and avoidance documentation, evaluated 27 agencies' (including the Smithsonian Institution) reinvestment plans against OMB's guidance, and compared 4 of the agencies' governance processes against best practices. The 4 agencies were selected, in part, because they had the highest dollar amounts of proposed IT reinvestments.
What GAO Found
Twenty-four of the 26 federal agencies participating in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) information technology (IT) reform initiatives reported achieving an estimated total of $3.6 billion dollars in cost savings and avoidances between fiscal years 2011 and 2014. Slightly more than half (or about $2.0 billion) of the savings and avoidances were from data center consolidation and optimization efforts. Notably, of the $3.6 billion total, the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, and the Social Security Administration accounted for about $2.5 billion (or 69 percent).
Most agencies did not fully meet OMB's requirements to submit reinvestment plan information. Of the 27 agencies required to submit reinvestment plans (including one-time and ongoing plans), 5 agencies had fully implemented OMB's guidance, while the remaining 22 had only partially implemented it. For example, most agencies had not fully implemented OMB's guidance for submitting one-time fiscal year 2014 IT reduction and reinvestment plans as part of OMB's “cut and reinvest” effort. As a result, agencies' plans were substantially short of OMB's overall fiscal year 2014 targets: $3.0 billion in proposed reductions and $2.1 billion in proposed reinvestments, compared to OMB's targets of $7.6 billion in reductions and as much as $7.6 billion in reinvestments. Agencies provided varied reasons for not meeting OMB's requirements, such as that their components had not fully tracked and reported how their savings were to be reinvested. Until agencies complete their ongoing reinvestment plans, they will be challenged to ensure that their considerable savings are being used in the most efficient and effective manner possible.
Four selected agencies—the Departments of Education, Interior, Labor, and the Social Security Administration—had documented key governance processes to guide the development of their fiscal year 2014 budget submission, which included proposed IT reinvestments of $350 million. However, none of the four agencies had tracked the reinvestment performance results. They provided varied reasons for not doing so, and two agencies noted the lack of visibility into their components' reinvestments. The lack of performance tracking is also due to OMB not requiring agencies to document actual results. In addition, OMB has not defined targets for reinvestments beyond fiscal year 2014. Until OMB requires agencies to track actual reinvestment performance and defines targets, it will be limited in its ability to ensure that agencies are actually reinvesting funds as planned and may not be able to hold them accountable. Finally, without improved tracking, selected agencies may lack assurance that their components are reinvesting in areas consistent with agency-wide goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that agencies complete their IT savings reinvestment plans and improve tracking, and that OMB define targets for agency reinvestment and require that agencies complete their plans and track actual reinvestment performance. OMB and 12 agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations, 1 did not state whether it agreed or disagreed, 3 had no comments, and 1 partially agreed. |
gao_GAO-17-456T | gao_GAO-17-456T_0 | Census tracts and nonmetropolitan counties that lose their designation begin a 3- year “redesignation” period during which firms in those areas can continue to apply to and participate in the program and receive contracting preferences. After the 3 years, firms in these areas lose their certified status and the associated federal contracting award preferences. SBA recertifies firms (that is, determines that firms continue to meet HUBZone eligibility requirements to participate in the program) every 3 years. SBA Has Made Some Improvements in Response to Identified Weaknesses
Since 2008, GAO has reported on weaknesses in the HUBZone program and SBA’s efforts to address those vulnerabilities. GAO made 11 recommendations intended to address identified problems associated with the program’s certification and recertification processes, communication with firms, and the program’s susceptibility to fraud and abuse (see app. Certification Process
We reported in June 2008 that, for its certification process, SBA relied on data that firms entered in the online application system and performed limited verification of the self-reported information. Consequently we recommended that SBA develop and implement guidance to more routinely and consistently obtain supporting documentation upon application. In response to that recommendation, SBA revised its certification process, and since 2009 has required firms to provide documentation, which SBA officials review to determine the firms’ eligibility for the HUBZone program. For example, in July 2008 we testified that 10 HUBZone firms in the Washington, D.C., area had made fraudulent or inaccurate representations to get into or remain in the HUBZone program, and in a March 2009 report we found that another 19 firms in four other metropolitan areas had made fraudulent representations. In March 2016, we found that SBA had not yet implemented additional controls (such as guidance for when to request supporting documents) for the recertification process because SBA officials believed that any potential risk of fraud would be mitigated by site visits to firms. Based on data that SBA provided, the agency visited about 10 percent of certified firms each year during fiscal years 2013–2015. According to SBA officials, as of February 2017 this change has not yet eliminated the backlog. Notification to Firms
We subsequently reported in February 2015 that while HUBZone designations can change with some frequency, SBA’s communications to firms about programmatic changes (including redesignation) generally had not been targeted or specific to firms that would be affected by the changes. However, we found in March 2016 that SBA had not yet implemented changes to better ensure that all currently certified firms would be notified of changes that could affect their program eligibility. As of February 2017, SBA had begun to improve its notifications to all firms. We will continue to monitor SBA’s implementation of this activity. We plan to continue to evaluate elements of the HUBZone program. We classify each recommendation as partially implemented (the agency took steps to implement the recommendation but more work remains); open (the agency has not taken steps to implement the closed, not implemented (the agency decided not to take action to implement the recommendation). GAO recommendations Small Business Contracting: Opportunities Exist to Further Improve HUBZone Oversight: GAO-15-234, February 12, 2015 Establish a mechanism to better ensure that firms are notified of changes to HUBZone designations that may affect their participation in the program, such as ensuring that all certified firms and newly certified firms are signed up for the broadcast e-mail system or including more specific information in certification letters about how location in a redesignated area can affect their participation in the program Conduct an assessment of the recertification process and implement additional controls, such as developing criteria and guidance on using a risk-based approach to requesting and verifying firm information, allowing firms to initiate the recertification process, and ensuring that sufficient staff will be dedicated to the effort so that a significant backlog in recertifications does not recur. | Why GAO Did This Study
The purpose of the HUBZone program is to stimulate economic development in economically distressed areas designated as HUBZones. SBA certifies small business firms located in HUBZones to participate in the HUBZone program—that is, determines they are eligible for federal contracting preferences under the program, such as awards of sole-source and set-aside contracts. HUBZone areas lose their designations when they no longer meet applicable criteria on economic conditions and enter a 3-year transitional period (“redesignation”) during which HUBZone firms can continue to apply to and participate in the program. HUBZone firms had almost $6.6 billion in obligations on active federal contracts for calendar year 2015.
This testimony discusses, among other things, areas of weaknesses that GAO previously identified in reviews and fraud investigations of the program, related recommendations, and SBA's actions to address them. This statement is based on GAO's body of work issued between June 2008 and September 2016. GAO also met with SBA officials in February 2017 to discuss the status of open recommendations.
Since 2008, GAO has made 11 recommendations to improve the HUBZone program. SBA has implemented seven of these recommendations, not implemented two and is in the process of implementing the other two.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Administration (SBA) designates economically distressed areas as Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZones), based on data such as unemployment and poverty rates. Since 2008, GAO has issued several products that identified weaknesses in the HUBZone program and made recommendations to SBA to address them. While weaknesses remain, SBA has taken some steps to enhance program processes to varying extents. For example,
Certification process. In 2008, GAO found that SBA performed limited verification of the information firms reported on applications. In response to GAO's recommendation to develop and implement guidance for the certification process, SBA has taken steps to improve its processes to verify the eligibility of firms applying to the program. Since fiscal year 2009, SBA has required firms to provide supporting documentation for applications that the agency then reviews.
Susceptibility to fraud and abuse. In 2008 and 2009, GAO's investigations found 29 HUBZone firms in five metropolitan areas made fraudulent or inaccurate representations, which allowed them to get into or remain in the program. In response to GAO's recommendations to address potential fraud, SBA increased its documentation requirements. But in 2010, GAO still was able to obtain HUBZone certification using bogus addresses. Subsequently, according to SBA officials, in fiscal year 2010 SBA began conducting site visits to 10 percent of certified firms.
Recertification process. Firms wishing to remain in the program must recertify their continued eligibility to SBA every 3 years. However, in 2015, GAO found that SBA had not required firms seeking recertification to submit any information to verify continued eligibility and instead simply relied on their attestations of continued eligibility. GAO recommended that SBA reassess its recertification process and add additional controls. As of February 2017, SBA had not yet implemented this recommendation.
Communications with firms about designations. GAO found in 2015 that SBA's communications to firms about programmatic changes (including redesignation) generally were not specific to affected firms and thus some firms might not have been informed they would lose eligibility. GAO recommended that SBA establish a better notification mechanism. In response, SBA revised its letters to newly certified firms to inform them of the consequences of redesignation, and as of February 2017, SBA was implementing additional steps to ensure that all currently certified firms would be notified of changes that could affect their program eligibility. |
gao_GAO-12-680 | gao_GAO-12-680_0 | Background
DOD Schools and Students with Disabilities
DOD operates a worldwide school system to meet the educational needs of military dependent students and others, such as the children of DOD’s civilian employees overseas. 1). 2). DOD Provides Special Education Services through a Complex System That Varies by Location
Like public schools in the United States, DOD is required to provide special education and related services necessary to meet the unique needs of eligible students. Domestic DOD schools provide special education for all types and levels of disabilities, mainly within DOD schools. Schools in Ramstein, Germany, are equipped to serve children with severe disabilities of any type. Military Branches Screen Families and Consult with DODEA to Assign Families to Overseas Locations, but Ineffective Processes May Strain School Resources
Military Branches’ Processes to Coordinate Overseas Assignment of Servicemembers with Families with Special Needs Are Not Always Effective
Because DOD schools in overseas communities are designated to serve children with certain types and levels of disabilities, the military branches and DODEA are required to coordinate the overseas assignment of servicemembers with families with special needs, including all children with IEPs. For example, during our review of DODEA’s screening and assignment concern database, we found one case in which a school overseas that did not have pre-existing programs in place for students with severe cognitive disabilities received such a student. Families Generally Satisfied with Special Education Services, but Face Challenges Obtaining Them
Limited Educational and Medical Specialists in Some Locations Pose Challenges for Families, and Schools Struggle to Hire and Retain Staff
Families in 21 out of the 22 focus groups we held told us they were generally satisfied with the special education services their children received in DOD schools once they received them. In addition, participants in three focus groups were not aware that the EFM program provided support in learning about or accessing services. However, the extent to which these efforts are helping families obtain information and access services for their children remains unclear. Office of Special Needs’ Oversight of Screening Processes and Family Support Programs Is Limited
Although OSN was established to enhance and monitor the military branches’ support for military families with special needs, it lacks a strong oversight role and enforcement authority. At least one military branch has Because DOD currently lacks performance goals and benchmarks, it cannot assess the effectiveness of the branches’ EFM programs and ensure that improvements are made when needed. Without overall performance information to proactively identify emerging problem areas, some of the branches have only been able to react to specific problems after they have arisen. OSN has recently taken some steps to enhance the military branches’ EFM programs. However, it is unclear when some of these efforts will be completed or if they will be effectively implemented. While OSN was established in part to monitor the military branches’ support for families with special needs, it has limited enforcement authority over the branches’ EFM programs. Specifically, it is limited in the extent to which it can compel the branches to comply with DOD or service-level program requirements, and it has no direct means by which to hold them accountable if they fail to do so. To ensure that military families are assigned to overseas installations that can readily meet their children’s special educational and medical needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the secretaries of each branch to ensure that all military dependent children of school age are medically and educationally screened in accordance with each branch’s policies and that all required educational screening forms are forwarded to DODEA for educational assignment recommendations prior to families’ relocations. To improve oversight of the military branches’ programs for families with special needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct OSN to establish uniform benchmarks and performance goals for the identification/enrollment and assignment coordination components of the military branches’ EFM programs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) how the Department of Defense (DOD) provides special education services, and any associated challenges for families and schools; (2) how DOD entities coordinate to assign families to overseas locations, and how schools might be affected; (3) what challenges, if any, families face in obtaining DOD services for their children with special educational needs and accessing related information; and (4) what steps, if any, DOD is taking to enhance screening and overseas assignment for families with children with special educational needs. During our school visits we conducted 22 focus groups with parents of children with special education needs enrolled in these schools. In addition, we reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD operates a worldwide school system to meet the educational needs of military dependents. Questions have arisen about whether DOD is meeting the special needs of some of these children, such as those with learning disabilities. In response to a mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, GAO reviewed (1) how DOD provides special education services; (2) how DOD entities coordinate to assign families overseas and how schools might be affected; (3) what challenges, if any, families face in accessing DOD services for their children with special educational needs and obtaining related information; and (4) what steps, if any, DOD is taking to enhance screening and overseas assignment for families with children with special educational needs. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, analyzed DOD documents and data, and conducted interviews with officials from multiple DOD entities, including schools. GAO also held 22 focus groups with parents of children with special needs during site visits and phone interviews at eight military installations worldwide.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) provides special education services through a complex system that varies by location. Domestically, DOD provides special education mainly within DOD schools. In contrast, DOD schools overseas vary in the types and levels of disabilities they are readily equipped to serve. For example, DOD schools in Ramstein, Germany, are equipped to serve children with severe disabilities of any type, whereas schools in some other overseas installations have no pre-established special education programs of any kind.
Overseas assignment of servicemembers with children with special educational needs requires coordination between the military branches through their Exceptional Family Member (EFM) programs and the DOD Education Activity--the office that oversees education of military dependent children in DOD schools. Each branch implements its own processes for screening military families and assigning servicemembers to locations where there are school services that can meet their families' needs. However, impediments to effective placements may strain school resources. More specifically, ineffective screenings may result in families being placed in locations where schools are not readily equipped to serve certain needs. For example, we found one case in which a school that only had programs in place for students with mild disabilities received a student with severe needs who had not been educationally screened.
Families in many of GAO's focus groups were generally satisfied with the services DOD provided their children with special needs once they received them, but they felt that the limited availability of special education and medical specialists overseas presented challenges. Some parents were concerned their children were not receiving all the services they needed, partly due to difficulties DOD schools encounter hiring and retaining special education staff, especially overseas. While the military branches provide family support services, parents in our focus groups also indicated they lacked information about obtaining special education and related medical services. DOD is taking some steps to provide better information to families, but the extent to which these efforts are helping them is unclear.
DOD's recently established Office of Special Needs (OSN) is responsible for enhancing and monitoring support for military families with special needs. OSN and the military branches have initiated efforts to improve screening and overseas assignment of military families with special needs. However, it is unclear when some of these efforts will be completed. Moreover, while OSN was established in part to enhance and monitor the military branches' support for families with special needs, it has limited enforcement authority and oversight over the branches' EFM programs. Specifically, it is limited in the extent to which it can compel the branches to comply with DOD or service-level program requirements, and it has no direct means by which to hold them accountable if they fail to do so. In addition, DOD currently lacks agencywide benchmarks and performance goals for all components of the EFM program. As a result, it cannot assess the effectiveness of the branches' EFM programs and ensure that improvements are made when needed. Without overall performance information to proactively identify emerging problem areas, some of the branches have had to conduct investigations to address problems after they have arisen.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) ensure the military branches medically and educationally screen all school-age children before relocation overseas; (2) direct OSN to establish benchmarks and performance goals for the EFM program; and (3) direct OSN to develop and implement a process for ensuring the branches' compliance with EFM program requirements. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-318 | gao_GAO-14-318_0 | Since 2003, DHS Components Have Contributed about $3.6 Billion in Revenues to the TFF and Obligated about $2.6 Billion from the Fund
From fiscal years 2003 through 2013, Treasury reported that DHS components contributed about $3.6 billion to the TFF and obligated about $2.6 billion for costs associated with forfeiture activities. For example,
CBP received $29.6 million in fiscal year 2010, of which $15 million was obligated to support the construction of Border Patrol facilities in southwest border locations and the purchase of equipment for these facilities; $6.8 million was used for the purchase and installation of Non-Intrusive Inspection equipment; and, the remainder was spread out for smaller purchases such as field and intelligence equipment.ICE received $21.3 million in fiscal year 2011 for a range of activities, including $6 million to defray the costs of Title III court-ordered intercepts, which support investigations related to the southwest border, among other things; $2 million to cover costs of investigative activities with ICE’s HSI, such as translation, transcription, and duplication services; $2 million to support Border Enforcement Security Taskforces; and $2.5 million to purchase a system to conduct multiple undercover operations online, simultaneously. The guidance requires that sharing in joint investigations reflect the degree of direct participation of the agency in the law enforcement effort resulting in the forfeiture, in accordance with federal Specifically, it directs responsible officials to base equitable sharing law.determinations on the work hours that all participating agencies expended on the investigation and then, if applicable, consider qualitative factors regarding additional contributions that agencies may have made, such as providing unique and indispensable assistance, to adjust percentages. Accordingly, 31 of the 40 low-value equitable sharing packages that we reviewed were missing key information to support the basis for final sharing percentages. Application of qualitative factors: All 31 low-value packages we reviewed that did not include full support for sharing determinations did not contain clear documentation of how qualitative factors were used to adjust sharing determinations. For example, in 1 HSI equitable sharing package we reviewed, two police departments contributed the same number of work hours, but one received a 10 percent larger share than the other, resulting in a difference of about $48,000 in forfeiture proceeds. Establishing a mechanism to ensure that the basis for low-value equitable sharing determinations is fully documented by all DHS components responsible for making determinations could enhance the transparency of decision making and help DHS components and TEOAF better ensure that equitable sharing decisions are made in compliance with Treasury’s guidance. The guidance does not provide specific information on how to apply these examples to adjust sharing percentages. Nonetheless, headquarters officials from all three DHS components that conduct equitable sharing stated that additional guidance could help ensure a more consistent understanding of these factors among headquarters and field offices. Treasury’s guidance does not include incurring extraordinary expenses as an example of a qualitative factor, despite this factor being included in the equitable sharing application. In addition, the application includes two other factors to consider when assessing agency contributions that are not included in Treasury’s guidance. Providing guidance on qualitative factors that are listed on the application form, including what they entail and how to apply them, could help officials from state and local agencies, as well as DHS components, have a better and more consistent understanding of these factors. While we recognize the subjective nature of evaluating agency contributions based on the facts and circumstances of each case, additional guidance on qualitative factors could help better ensure consistency with which these factors are applied across cases. To help improve management controls over the equitable sharing program, we recommend that the Director of TEOAF take the following two actions:
Establish a mechanism to ensure that the basis for DHS’s low-value equitable sharing determinations—including component work hours, how qualitative factors are applied to adjust percentages, and the rationale for component headquarters’ changes to percentages—is documented in equitable sharing packages. Treasury concurred with both recommendations in this report in an e-mail provided on March 20, 2014. What have been Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components’ revenues contributed to and obligations from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF) from fiscal years 2003 through 2013? To what extent have DHS components designed controls to help ensure compliance with the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) guidance when implementing the equitable sharing program? Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)—and for the fund as a whole. Assessing DHS Controls
To determine the extent to which DHS components that conduct equitable sharing—ICE, USSS, and CBP—have designed controls to help ensure compliance with Treasury’s guidance when implementing the equitable sharing program, we analyzed federal statutes and Treasury guidance on making equitable sharing determinations and DHS controls designed to help ensure compliance with guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every year, DHS components seize millions of dollars in assets during investigations and other activities and contribute forfeited proceeds to the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. Treasury manages the fund, which held about $1.7 billion in assets in fiscal year 2013. DHS components use proceeds primarily to cover forfeiture activity costs, which include sharing proceeds with state and local agencies that participate in DHS investigations through Treasury's equitable sharing program. GAO was asked to review the management of the fund.
This report addresses (1) DHS revenues contributed to and obligations from the fund and (2) the extent to which DHS components have designed controls to help ensure compliance with Treasury's guidance when implementing the equitable sharing program. GAO analyzed financial data from fiscal years 2003 through 2013 on the forfeiture fund; Treasury's equitable sharing guidance; and a sample of 40 DHS equitable sharing packages, selected based on payment amounts and other factors; Sample results are not generalizable but provided information on DHS's compliance with guidance. GAO also interviewed DHS and Treasury officials.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2003 through 2013, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components that participate in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)—contributed approximately $3.6 billion in revenues to the fund and obligated about $2.6 billion from the fund for forfeiture-related activities. These obligations included, among other things, approximately $1.2 billion that DHS components shared with state, local, federal, and foreign law enforcement agencies that participated in forfeiture efforts. Also, during this period, DHS components used about $348 million from the fund to support various law enforcement activities and projects, such as the construction of Border Patrol facilities along the southwest border.
DHS components have designed controls to help ensure compliance with the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) equitable sharing guidance, but controls could be enhanced though additional documentation and guidance.
Documentation: Treasury's guidance directs components to base equitable sharing determinations on the work hours that all participating agencies contributed to an investigation and then consider qualitative factors regarding agency contributions, such as originating the information that led to the seizure, to adjust percentages. However, 31 of the 40 DHS component equitable sharing packages—which contain sharing determinations and other documents—that GAO reviewed did not include key information, such as component work hours expended on a case and documentation of how qualitative factors were applied to make determinations, to support the basis for final sharing percentages, consistent with federal internal control standards. For example, in 1 package GAO reviewed, two police departments contributed the same number of work hours, but one received a 10 percent larger share than the other, resulting in a difference of about $48,000 in forfeiture proceeds. However, the package did not clearly document how qualitative factors were applied to adjust the percentages. Fully documenting the basis for DHS equitable sharing determinations could help enhance the transparency of decision making and better position DHS components and Treasury to ensure that equitable sharing decisions are made in compliance with Treasury's guidance.
Guidance: Treasury's guidance on qualitative factors includes three examples, but does not include three other factors listed on the equitable sharing application or provide specific information on how to apply factors to adjust sharing percentages. For example, incurring extraordinary expenses is listed as a factor on the application, but is not included as an example in the guidance. Providing guidance on qualitative factors that are listed on the application, including what they entail and how to apply them, could help participating agencies have a better and more consistent understanding of these factors. In addition, headquarters officials from the three DHS components that conduct equitable sharing stated that additional guidance could help ensure a more consistent understanding of these factors among headquarters and field offices. Developing additional guidance on qualitative factors could help better ensure consistency with which these factors are applied across cases.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Treasury ensure that the basis for DHS equitable sharing determinations is fully documented and develop additional guidance on qualitative factors used to make determinations. Treasury concurred with both recommendations and outlined steps it plans to take to address them. |
gao_GAO-13-195 | gao_GAO-13-195_0 | Regulators Have Made Progress in Implementing Dodd- Frank Act Reforms, but Many Efforts Are Ongoing
Federal financial regulators are continuing to implement reforms pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. A key goal of the act was to promote the stability of the financial system, and the act puts forward a number of reforms to achieve this goal, such as provisions related to identifying and addressing systemic risk and enhancing supervision of large, complex financial institutions. To better monitor and contain the potential for such events to create systemic risk and increase overall system stability, the act mandated various reforms including creating FSOC and the Office of Financial Research (OFR); establishing heightened prudential requirements for certain nonbank financial companies and new capital standards for banks and bank holding companies; establishing the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) to address failures of certain financial institutions; expanding the regulation of the swaps market; and banning banking entities from engaging in certain types of trading and investments. Some key actions to implement these reforms have not been completed. The provisions in U.S. regulators’ implementation of these capital requirements are intended to conform to these international standards and are proposed to phase in over the next 10 years. The Federal Reserve and FDIC finalized and made effective rules relating to resolution plans, and the large financial institutions that were the first firms required to prepare such plans submitted these to regulators as expected in July 2012. The role that proprietary trading—trading activities conducted by banking entities for their own accounts as opposed to those of their clients— played in the recent crisis is a matter of debate. Regulators have taken some steps to implement this reform. Although regulators have finalized some rules in this area, they have not yet completed all of the rules that would implement the reforms described above. However, as of December 2012, SEC had yet to issue key rules related to credit rating agencies, several of which had statutory deadlines. This would result in any such advisers that had not previously registered to begin providing reports to SEC on their activities and being subject to examinations by regulatory staff. Regulators Have Faced Various Challenges Implementing Reforms
A variety of challenges have affected regulators’ progress in executing rulemaking requirements intended to implement the act’s reforms. Number and Complexity of Rulemakings Has Delayed the Implementation of Certain Reforms
The regulators identified the number and complexity of the required rulemakings as a primary impediment to their implementation of financial regulatory reforms. Because of the broad effects that removal of the references to credit ratings would have, regulators stated that they had to approach this task with great care to avoid unintended consequences, which is why some of these rules have yet to be finalized. Although Coordination among Regulators Improves Rules, It Has Delayed Implementation of Some Reforms
Regulators’ progress in implementing the act’s reforms also has been delayed because of the need to coordinate with other domestic and foreign regulators. Although the federal financial regulators have developed and fostered several mechanisms to facilitate coordination and believe these efforts have improved the quality of the rulemakings, several regulators said that interagency coordination has increased the amount of time needed to develop and finalize several rulemakings. For example, regulatory staff told us that they had received more than 19,000 comment letters on the proposed proprietary trading ban rules, further complicating the rulemaking process. Other Challenges to Reform Implementation Included Establishing New Entities
The need to establish new regulatory bodies or offices mandated by the act affected the pace of implementation of some reforms, as illustrated by the following examples:
The staff responsible for establishing the new federal consumer financial protection agency—CFPB—faced the challenge of simultaneously forming its agency structure, initiating supervision and oversight responsibilities, and creating rules mandated by the act. Looking forward, CFTC and SEC staff expressed concerns about their ability to carry out rule enforcement. Various Areas Continue to Pose Risks, and Regulatory Actions to Mitigate These Risks Have Not Been Finalized or Implemented
Although the act addressed a number of weaknesses of the regulatory system that were exposed by the recent or past financial crises, some risks remain and others have emerged. In 2009, we reported on many of the limitations in the U.S. financial regulatory system that the 2007-2009 crisis once again revealed. In our report, we offered a framework for evaluating regulatory reform proposals that described characteristics that should be reflected in any new regulatory system (see table 2). This framework can serve as a useful lens for examining how weaknesses were addressed through the act and where additional work remains. The creation of FSOC could help to address the framework’s call for a systemwide focus on risks. For example, if the new resolution authority—OLA—is effective, it could reduce the potential for additional taxpayer exposure arising from the failure of large financial institutions. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The group that represents mutual funds—the Investment Company Institute— issued a letter noting that SEC’s 2010 reforms improved the credit quality, maturity, liquidity, and transparency of money market funds and arguing that the additional changes contemplated by the SEC Chairman would effectively put an end to money market funds as an investment vehicle, which would harm investors and eliminate a funding source for many businesses. However, market observers have raised concerns that key areas—the tri-party repurchase (repo) market and swaps clearinghouses—in which financial risks have been concentrated lack adequate protections. However, currently only two institutions provide credit to facilitate transactions in this market. Although many of the Dodd-Frank Act’s reforms and these other regulatory efforts seek to address risks arising from large institutions and other concentrations of risk, some market observers noted that risks that could have systemic implications could also arise from other sources. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to examine what is known about the (1) the overall status of U.S. financial regulatory reforms arising from the act, (2) challenges affecting the implementation of these reforms, and (3) areas that pose continued risk. To address our first two objectives, we synthesized GAO’s body of work on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) reforms and other financial regulatory reform efforts and challenges. We took several steps to determine the number of provisions requiring regulators to issue rulemakings or take other key actions as well as the status of regulators’ efforts to implement the provisions. During the course of our work, staff from several regulatory agencies noted that the private law firm’s data we used as the initial source to identify provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that required rulemakings and other key actions by regulators overstates the number of required actions. Financial Markets Regulation: Financial Crisis Highlights Need to Improve Oversight of Leverage at Financial Institutions and across System. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2007-2009 financial crisis resulted in unprecedented government actions to respond to the unfolding turmoil in the markets, including providing capital to many financial institutions and government conservatorship for others. Although many factors likely contributed to the crisis, gaps and weaknesses in the supervision and regulation of the U.S. financial system generally played an important role. In recognition of the need to improve the regulation of financial markets and institutions to minimize the potential for future crises, in 2009 GAO designated reform of the U.S. financial regulatory system as one of the high-risk issues facing the federal government. In July 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act directed regulators to implement reforms across a range of areas. To assess these efforts, GAO examined the (1) overall status of U.S. financial regulatory reforms arising from the act, (2) challenges affecting the implementation of the act, and (3) areas that pose continued risk.
GAO analyzed data from private and regulatory sources on the status of required rulemakings, synthesized GAO's body of work on Dodd-Frank Act reforms, and interviewed financial regulators and industry and consumer groups on the status of and challenges to implementing reforms.
What GAO Found
Implementation of financial regulatory reform is ongoing. Although regulators have made progress in implementing some key reforms required by the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), others remain incomplete. Moreover, the effectiveness of some implemented reforms, as illustrated below, remains to be seen.
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was established to, among other things, identify systemic threats, and it has taken steps to carry out its responsibilities. However, GAO recently made a number of recommendations to enhance the accountability and transparency of FSOC's decisions and activities and improve collaboration among its members.
Regulators have taken actions to implement some key reforms intended to reduce systemic risk. For example, FSOC developed--and is currently implementing--a process and criteria to determine whether certain nonbank financial institutions should be designated for supervision. But, to date, no such designations have been made. Although not directly required by the act, regulators have also proposed rules implementing international standards to enhance capital requirements for banks. These also are not yet final and their protections are proposed to phase in over the next 10 years.
Key aspects of new liquidation authorities and other reforms for resolving troubled financial firms have been implemented, with certain institutions having submitted required resolution plans--"living wills"-- that would guide their rapid and orderly resolution in a bankruptcy, if needed. However, market observers noted the effectiveness of these provisions would not be known until the first large failure.
Overall, GAO identified 236 provisions of the act that require regulators to issue rulemakings across nine key areas. As of December 2012, regulators had issued final rules for about 48 percent of these provisions; however, in some cases the dates by which affected entities had to comply with the rules had yet to be reached. Of the remaining provisions, regulators had proposed rules for about 29 percent, and rulemakings had not occurred for about 23 percent.
A variety of challenges affected regulators' progress in implementing the act's reforms. Regulators noted that completing rules has taken time because of the number and complexity of the issues, and because many rules are interconnected. For example, to implement the act's ban on proprietary trading-- trading activities conducted by financial institutions for their own accounts as opposed to those of their clients--the regulators issued draft rules that contained over 750 questions for the public's input and spurred over 19,000 comment letters. Further, regulators said that implementing the act's reforms requires a great deal of coordination at the domestic and international levels. Although regulators have established mechanisms to facilitate coordination and believe coordination efforts have improved the quality of the rulemakings, several regulators indicated that coordination increased the amount of time needed to finalize rulemakings. Finally, regulators noted that they have prioritized developing responsive, appropriate rules over meeting tight statutory deadlines. As a result, some important rules may take the longest to develop.
Although the act addressed a number of weaknesses of the regulatory system that were exposed by the recent financial crisis, some risks remain and others have emerged. In 2009, GAO established a framework for evaluating financial regulatory reform proposals; it outlines nine characteristics that should be reflected in any new regulatory system. This framework provides a useful lens through which to consider how weaknesses were addressed through the act and where additional work remains. For example, the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau could help to ensure broader and more consistent oversight of firms and issues affecting consumers. Additionally, the creation of FSOC could help to provide a systemwide view and identify potential threats before they create a disruption. In contrast:
The efficiency of the regulatory system was not materially changed as a large, fragmented regulatory structure with numerous regulators remains. This requires regulators to coordinate actions and try to reconcile or balance differing approaches to ensure that regulated entities are subject to appropriate scrutiny.
GAO and others have raised concerns about the failed housing government-sponsored enterprisesFannie Mae and Freddie Macthat have operated under federal conservatorships since 2008, and as of December 2012 have received $187 billion in federal assistance. Until their status is resolved, these entities continue to represent financial exposures for the federal government, a risk to taxpayers, and an impediment to the transition to a housing market that functions effectively without the current level of substantial federal support.
Although the act took steps to increase the regulatory systems focus on systemic threats, regulators have expressed concerns that the current structure of money market mutual funds may represent an unresolved risk. These funds provide short-term funding to many financial institutions but lack capital buffers and other protections that could reduce the likelihood of destabilizing runs on their holdings. However, some have questioned the need for additional recent reforms affecting these funds.
Certain credit risk concentrations also pose potential systemic implications, such as the failure of one of the two institutions that provide credit to facilitate transactions in the tri-party repurchase (repo) market that provides short-term funding to many institutions. While these concentrations of credit risks create potential threats to stability, some observers caution that threats also can emerge from other sources, such as from risky products or large numbers of failures among smaller institutions.
Although various proposals for action to address these risks have been put forward, definitive actions have yet to be taken to implement them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report, but has previously made over 25 recommendations to the federal financial regulators related to Dodd- Frank reforms implementation. |
gao_GAO-08-523T | gao_GAO-08-523T_0 | Several Issues Underscore Importance of Energy to DOD
Several issues, such as rising fuel costs, worldwide energy demand, and the high fuel burden during operations, underscore the importance of energy to DOD. Fuel costs for DOD are substantial and the volatility of world oil prices will likely continue to affect the department. Rising fuel costs may require DOD to make difficult trade-offs, such as redirecting funds from ongoing programs to pay for needed fuel. Other energy issues that are likely to affect DOD in the future are the increased U.S. dependence on foreign oil, projected increases in the worldwide demand for oil, and uncertainties about world oil supplies. In addition, DOD’s high fuel requirements on the battlefield can place a significant logistics burden on military forces, limit the range and pace of operations, and add to mission risks. DOD and the Military Services Have Made Efforts to Reduce Mobility Energy Demand
DOD and the military services have made efforts to reduce mobility energy demand for their forces and in their weapons systems. In 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense included energy in DOD’s list of the top 25 transformational priorities for the department as part of its initiative to pursue targeted acquisition reforms. In addition, each of the military services has its own initiatives under way to reduce mobility energy demand. The Army is addressing fuel consumption at forward-deployed locations by developing foam-insulated tents and temporary dome structures that are more efficient to heat and cool and therefore could reduce the demand for fuel-powered generators at these locations. The Navy has established an energy conservation program aimed at encouraging ships to reduce energy consumption. Air Force. These initiatives include determining fuel-efficient flight routes, reducing the weight on aircraft, optimizing air refueling, and improving the efficiency of ground operations. The Marine Corps has initiated efforts to develop alternative power sources and improve fuel management. DOD Has Not Established an Overarching Organizational Framework to Guide and Oversee Mobility Energy Reduction Efforts
While DOD and the military services have several efforts under way to reduce mobility energy demand, DOD has not established an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee these efforts. We found that DOD’s current approach to mobility energy lacks these elements. As indicated in its charter, the task force is required to develop a comprehensive DOD energy strategy and an implementation plan. DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Incorporating Fuel Efficiency into Key Business Processes and in Implementing Recommendations from Department-Sponsored Studies
In the absence of an overarching organizational framework, DOD has made limited progress in incorporating fuel efficiency as a consideration in key business processes—which include developing requirements for and acquiring new weapons systems—and in implementing recommendations made in department-sponsored studies on fuel reduction. To establish such a framework, DOD should designate an executive-level OSD official who is accountable for mobility energy matters; develop a comprehensive, departmentwide strategic plan; and improve DOD’s business processes to incorporate energy efficiency considerations. In addition, we recommended that the military services designate executive-level focal points to establish effective communication and coordination among OSD and the military services on departmentwide mobility energy reduction efforts as well as to provide leadership and accountability over their own efforts. With a mobility energy overarching organizational framework in place, DOD would be better positioned to reduce its significant reliance on petroleum-based fuel and to address the energy challenges of the 21st century. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the single largest U.S. energy consumer. About three-fourths of its total consumption consists of mobility energy--the energy required for moving and sustaining its forces and weapons platforms for military operations. GAO was asked to discuss DOD's efforts to manage and reduce its mobility energy demand. This testimony addresses (1) energy issues that are likely to affect DOD in the future, (2) key departmental and military service efforts to reduce demand for mobility energy, and (3) DOD's management approach to guide and oversee these efforts. This testimony is based primarily on work conducted for a report that GAO issued today (GAO-08-426) on DOD's management of mobility energy.
What GAO Found
Several issues, such as rising fuel costs, worldwide energy demand, and the high fuel burden during operations, underscore the importance of energy to DOD. Fuel costs for DOD are substantial and the volatility of world oil prices will likely continue to affect the department--which may require DOD to make difficult trade-offs such as redirecting funds from ongoing programs to pay for needed fuel. Other energy issues that are likely to affect DOD in the future are the increased U.S. dependence on foreign oil, projected increases in the worldwide demand for oil, and uncertainties about world oil supplies. Furthermore, DOD's high fuel requirements on the battlefield can place a significant logistics burden on military forces, limit the range and pace of operations, and add to mission risks, including exposing supply convoys to attack. Given these issues, DOD must be well positioned to effectively manage energy demands for military operations. DOD has initiatives under way to reduce mobility energy demand. At the department level, OSD created a task force to address energy security concerns. In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense included energy in DOD's list of the top 25 transformational priorities for the department as part of its initiative to pursue targeted acquisition reforms. Each of the military services also has its own initiatives under way. The Army is addressing fuel consumption at forward-deployed locations by developing foam-insulated tents and temporary dome structures that are more efficient to heat and cool, reducing the demand for fuel-powered generators. The Navy has established an energy conservation program to encourage ships to reduce energy consumption. The Air Force has developed an energy strategy and undertaken initiatives to determine fuel-efficient flight routes, reduce the weight on aircraft, optimize air refueling, and improve the efficiency of ground operations. The Marine Corps has initiated research and development efforts to develop alternative power sources, such as hybrid power, and improve fuel management. While these and other mobility energy reduction efforts are under way, DOD lacks elements of an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee these efforts. Specifically, GAO found that DOD's current approach to mobility energy lacks (1) a single executive-level OSD official who is accountable for mobility energy matters, (2) a comprehensive strategic plan for mobility energy, and (3) an effective mechanism to provide for communication and coordination of mobility energy efforts among OSD and the military services as well as leadership and accountability over each military service's efforts. GAO also found that DOD has made limited progress in incorporating fuel efficiency as a consideration in key business processes--which include developing requirements for and acquiring new weapons systems. With a mobility energy overarching organizational framework in place, DOD would be better positioned to reduce its significant reliance on petroleum-based fuel and to address the energy challenges of the 21st century. |
gao_GAO-07-16 | gao_GAO-07-16_0 | 3). DOD provides guidance and safety oversight for government and commercial launches at federal launch sites. Other federal agencies support commercial launches in various ways. FAA’s oversight of launches includes the use of a system safety process in its licensing and monitoring process and incorporation of management controls, which we have reported to be effective means of providing safety oversight and program management. FAA Has Developed Regulations and Training to Respond to Emerging Issues
In response to changes in the commercial space launch industry, including the emerging issues of anticipated growth in space tourism, FAA issued regulations in 2000 for the licensing of launch and reentry of reusable launch vehicles. FAA stated that it addresses these concerns by (1) making license determinations on a case-by-case basis using common performance standards and (2) providing waivers in special circumstances. In addition, industry officials and one expert with whom we spoke raised concerns about the costs that expendable launch vehicle companies would incur to comply with the proposed regulations, because they believe that FAA’s safety requirements at federal launch sites will be in addition to the Air Force’s requirements. FAA Faces Human Resources and Workload Challenges in Addressing Its Responsibilities for Licensing Reusable Vehicles
If the space tourism industry develops as rapidly as some industry representatives suggest, FAA’s responsibility for licensing reusable launch vehicles will greatly expand. However, FAA said that it has since filled these positions. However, the agency has not conducted trend analyses of that information. FAA Faces the Challenge of Determining the Circumstances under Which It Would Regulate Crew and Flight Participant Safety on Space Tourism Flights before 2012
The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 requires that a phased approach be used in regulating commercial human space flight, and that regulatory standards evolve as the industry matures. To Help Address Key Competitive Issues Facing the Industry, the U.S. Government Has Played an Important Role
The U.S. commercial space launch industry faces key competitive issues concerning high launch costs and export controls. FAA is prohibited from regulating crew and passenger safety before 2012, except in response to incidents that either pose a high risk or result in serious or fatal injury. FAA has interpreted this limited authority to allow it to regulate crew safety in certain circumstances and has been proactive in proposing regulations concerning emergency training for crews and passengers. Recognizing the potential conflict in the oversight of commercial space launches, Congress required DOT to report by December 2008 on whether the federal government should separate the promotion of human space flight from the regulation of such activity. To determine how well FAA has overseen the safety of commercial space launches to date and to what extent it is responding to key emerging issues in the commercial space launch industry, we reviewed FAA’s safety oversight processes, identified key emerging issues in the commercial space launch industry, and reviewed FAA’s response to those issues. FAA’s safety review includes an analysis of the reliability and functions of the vehicle, an assessment of the risk and hazards it poses to public property and individuals, and a review of the launch company’s policies and practices to demonstrate that the operations “pose no unacceptable threat to the public.” FAA conducts environmental reviews to fulfill its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act, and FAA ensures that proposed commercial space transportation activities present “no unacceptable danger to the natural environment.” In addition, FAA reviews a proposed payload to determine whether its launch or reentry would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the successful launches of SpaceShipOne raised the possibility of an emerging U.S. commercial space tourism industry that would make human space travel available to the public. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which has responsibility for safety and industry promotion, licenses operations of commercial space launches and launch sites. To allow the industry to grow, Congress prohibited FAA from regulating crew and passenger safety before 2012, except in response to high-risk events. GAO evaluated FAA's (1) safety oversight of commercial space launches, (2) response to emerging issues, and (3) challenges in regulating and promoting space tourism and responding to competitive issues affecting the industry. GAO reviewed FAA's applicable safety oversight processes and interviewed federal and industry officials.
What GAO Found
Several measures indicate that FAA has provided a reasonable level of safety oversight for commercial launches. For example, none of the 179 commercial launches that FAA licensed over the past 17 years resulted in fatalities, serious injuries, or significant property damage. However, FAA shared safety oversight with the Department of Defense (DOD) for most of these launches because they took place at federal launch sites operated by DOD. In addition, FAA's licensing activities incorporate a system safety process, which GAO recognizes as effective in identifying and mitigating risks. GAO's analysis of FAA records indicates that the agency is appropriately applying management controls in its licensing activities, thereby helping to ensure that the licensees meet FAA's safety requirements. In response to emerging issues in the commercial space launch industry, such as the potential development of space tourism, FAA has developed safety regulations and training for agency employees. The industry has raised concerns about the costs of complying with regulations and about the flexibility of the regulations to accommodate launch differences. However, FAA believes it has minimized compliance costs by basing its regulations on common safety standards and has allowed for flexibility by taking a case-by-case approach to licensing and by providing waivers in certain circumstances. FAA faces several challenges and competitive issues in regulating and promoting space tourism. For example, FAA expects to need more experienced staff for safety oversight as new technologies for space tourism evolve, but has not estimated its future resource needs. Other challenges for FAA include determining the specific circumstances under which it would regulate space flight crew and passenger safety before 2012 and balancing its responsibilities for safety and promotion to avoid conflicts. Recognizing the potential conflict in the oversight of commercial space launches, Congress required the Department of Transportation (DOT) to commission a report by December 2008 on several issues, including whether the promotion of human space flight should be separate from the regulation of such activity. In addition, U.S. commercial space launch industry representatives said that they face competitive issues concerning high launch costs and export controls that can affect their ability to sell services overseas. The federal government has provided support to the industry to help lower launch costs. |
gao_GAO-09-1009T | gao_GAO-09-1009T_0 | Widespread Management Environment and Audit Quality Problems
We found audit quality problems at DCAA offices nationwide. Because the conclusions and opinions in the rescinded reports were used to assess risk in planning subsequent audits, they impact the reliability of hundreds of other audits and contracting decisions covering billions of dollars in DOD expenditures. A management environment and agency culture that focused on facilitating the award of contracts and an ineffective audit quality assurance structure are at the root of the agencywide audit failures we identified. DCAA’s focus on a production-oriented mission led DCAA management to establish policies, procedures, and training that emphasized performing a large quantity of audits to support contracting decisions and gave inadequate attention to performing quality audits. An ineffective quality assurance structure, whereby DCAA gave passing scores to deficient audits compounded this problem. Thirty-three of 37 internal control audits did not include sufficient testing of internal controls to support auditor conclusions and opinions. Instead, these audits focus on a review of the adequacy of contractor policies and procedures. Production environment and audit quality issues. Although the DOD IG report contained evidence of significant, systemic noncompliance with professional standards throughout DCAA audits that OIG staff reviewed and the IG report included numerous findings and recommendations related to those issues, the DOD IG gave DCAA a “clean” peer review opinion, concluding that for audits and attestation engagements performed during fiscal year 2006, “…the internal quality control system was operating effectively to provide reasonable assurance that DCAA personnel were following established policies, procedures, and applicable auditing standards….”
The overall report conclusion in the DOD IG report is inconsistent with the detailed observations in the report, which indicate numerous significant deficiencies in DCAA’s system of quality control. DCAA corrective actions. DCAA initiated a number of actions to address findings in our July 2008 report, the DOD Comptroller/CFO August 2008 “tiger team” review, and the Defense Business Board study, which was officially released in January 2009. Examples of key DCAA actions to date include the following. Eliminating production metrics and implementing new metrics intended to focus on achieving quality audits. Establishing an anonymous Web site to address management and hotline issues. DCAA’s Assistant Director for Operations has been proactive in handling internal DCAA Web site hotline complaints. Revising policy guidance to address auditor independence, assure management involvement in key decisions, and address audit quality issues. DCAA also took action to halt auditor participation in nonaudit services that posed independence concerns. 1. 2. 3. 2. 3. Legislative and Other Actions Could Further Improve DCAA
In addition to correcting the fundamental weaknesses in DCAA’s mission and overall management environment, we believe certain legislative measures as well as other actions could enhance DCAA’s effectiveness and independence. For example, granting DCAA certain authorities and protections—similar to those offered to presidentially appointed inspectors general (IG) under the IG Act—could enhance DCAA’s independence. In the longer term, Congress could consider changes in organizational placement after DCAA has had sufficient opportunity to effectively implement current reform efforts. Our report also discusses matters for congressional consideration that could enhance DCAA’s effectiveness and independence. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our recent audit of the Defense Contract Audit Agency's (DCAA) overall management environment and quality assurance structure. DCAA is charged with a critical role in Department of Defense (DOD) contractor oversight by providing auditing, accounting, and financial advisory services in connection with the negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts and subcontracts. DCAA's mission encompasses both audit and nonaudit services in support of DOD contracting and contract payment functions. DCAA audits of contractor internal controls in accounting, billing, estimating, and other key systems support decisions on pricing and contract awards. Internal control audits also impact the planning and reliability of other DCAA audits because DCAA uses the results of these audits to assess risk and plan the nature, extent, and timing of tests for other contractor audits and assignments. Last year, we reported the results of our investigation of allegations about certain DCAA audits at three locations in California, which substantiated claims that (1) audit documentation did not support the reported opinions; (2) DCAA supervisors dropped findings and changed audit opinions without adequate audit evidence for their changes; and (3) sufficient work was not performed to support the audit opinions and conclusions. At that time we were conducting a broader audit of DCAA's overall organizational environment and quality control system. Given the evidence presented at the Committee's September 2008 hearing, you requested that we expand our ongoing assessment. Our current report, which the Committee is releasing today, presents the results of our DCAA-wide audit, including (1) an assessment of DCAA's management environment and quality assurance structure; (2) an analysis of DCAA's corrective actions in response to our July 2008 report and two DOD reviews, and (3) potential legislative and other actions that could improve DCAA's effectiveness and independence.
What GAO Found
A management environment and agency culture that focused on facilitating the award of contracts and an ineffective audit quality assurance structure are at the root of the agencywide audit failures we identified. DCAA's focus on a production-oriented mission led DCAA management to establish policies, procedures, and training that emphasized performing a large quantity of audits to support contracting decisions and gave inadequate attention to performing quality audits. An ineffective quality assurance structure, whereby DCAA gave passing scores to deficient audits compounded this problem. DCAA initiated a number of actions to address findings in our July 2008 report, the DOD Comptroller/CFO August 2008 "tiger team" review, and the Defense Business Board study, which was officially released in January 2009. Examples of key DCAA actions to date include the following. (1) Eliminating production metrics and implementing new metrics intended to focus on achieving quality audits. (2) Establishing an anonymous Web site to address management and hotline issues. DCAA's Assistant Director for Operations has been proactive in handling internal DCAA Web site hotline complaints. (3) Revising policy guidance to address auditor independence, assure management involvement in key decisions, and address audit quality issues. DCAA also took action to halt auditor participation in nonaudit services that posed independence concerns. In addition to correcting the fundamental weaknesses in DCAA's mission and overall management environment, we believe certain legislative measures as well as other actions could enhance DCAA's effectiveness and independence. For example, granting DCAA certain authorities and protections--similar to those offered to presidentially appointed inspectors general (IG) under the IG Act--could enhance DCAA's independence. In the longer term, Congress could consider changes in organizational placement after DCAA has had sufficient opportunity to effectively implement current reform efforts. |
gao_GAO-11-854T | gao_GAO-11-854T_0 | FECA benefits are paid to federal employees who are unable to work because of injuries sustained while performing their federal duties. Proposals to Change Benefits for Older Beneficiaries
Concerns that beneficiaries remain in the FECA program past retirement age have led to several proposals to change the program. Because returning to work could mean giving up a FECA benefit for a reduced pension amount, concerns have been raised by some that the program may provide incentives for beneficiaries to continue on the program beyond retirement age. In 1996, we reported on two alternative proposals to change FECA benefits once beneficiaries reach the age at which retirement typically occurs: (1) converting FECA benefits to retirement benefits, and (2) changing FECA wage-loss benefits to a newly established FECA annuity. Labor’s proposal would still keep the changed benefit within the FECA program. Questions and Issues to Consider if Crafting FECA Changes
We also discussed in our 1996 report a number of issues that merit consideration in crafting legislation to change benefits for older beneficiaries. Going forward, Congress may wish to consider the following questions as it assesses and considers current reform proposals: (1) How would benefits be computed? (2) Which beneficiaries would be affected? (3) What criteria, such as age or retirement eligibility, would initiate changed benefits? (4) How would other benefits, such as FECA medical and survivor benefits, be treated and administered? (5) How would benefits, particularly retirement benefits, be funded? The retirement conversion alternative raises complex issues, arising in part from the fact that conversion could result in varying retirement benefits, depending on conversion provisions, retirement systems, and individual circumstances. A key issue is whether or not benefits would be adjusted. The unadjusted option would allow for retirement benefits as provided by current law. The adjusted option would typically ensure that time on the FECA rolls was treated as if the beneficiary had continued to work. This adjustment could (1) credit time on FECA for years of service or (2) increase the salary base (for example, increasing salary from the time of injury by either an index of wage increases or inflation, assigning the current pay of the position, or providing for merit increases and possible promotions missed due to the injury). Currently most federal employees are covered by FERS, but conversion proposals might have to consider differences between FERS and CSRS participants, and participants in any specialized retirement systems. Other groups that might be uniquely affected include injured workers who are not eligible for federal retirement benefits, individuals eligible for retirement conversion benefits, but not vested; and individuals who are partially disabled FECA recipients but active federal employees. With regard to vesting, those who have insufficient years of service to be vested might be given credit for time on the FECA rolls until vested. There is also the question of whether changes will focus on current or future beneficiaries. Exempting current beneficiaries delays receipt of full savings from FECA cost reductions to the future. One option might be a transition period for current beneficiaries. For example, current beneficiaries could be given notice that their benefits would be changed after a certain number of years. Past proposals have used either age or retirement eligibility as the primary criterion for changing benefits. If retirement eligibility is used, consideration must be given to establishing eligibility for those who might otherwise not become retirement eligible. This would be true for either the retirement conversion or the annuity option. At least for purposes of initiating the changed benefit, time on the FECA rolls might be treated as if it counted for service time toward retirement eligibility. Deciding on the criteria that would initiate change in benefits might require developing benchmarks. In addition to changing FECA compensation benefits, consideration should be given to whether to change other FECA benefits, such as medical benefits or survivor benefits. For example, the 1981 Reagan administration proposal would have ended survivor benefits under FECA for those beneficiaries whose benefits were converted to the retirement system. For the retirement conversion alternative, another issue is the funding of any retirement benefit shortfall. Currently, agencies and individuals do not make retirement contributions if an individual receives FECA benefits; thus, if retirement benefits exceed those for which contributions have been made, retirement funding shortfalls would occur. Retirement fund shortfalls can be funded through payments made by agencies at the time of conversion or prior to conversion. Proposals for the FECA annuity alternative typically keep funding under the current FECA chargeback system. Although FECA’s basic structure has not been significantly amended for many years, there continues to be interest in reforming the program. Proposals to change benefits for older beneficiaries raise a number of important issues, with implications for both beneficiaries and federal agencies. Related GAO Products
Federal Workers’ Compensation: Issues Associated with Changing Benefits for Older Beneficiaries. Federal Employees’ Compensation Act: Issues Associated With Changing Benefits for Older Beneficiaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses issues related to possible changes to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) program, a topic that we have reported on in the past. At the end of chargeback year 2010, the FECA program, administered by the Department of Labor (Labor) had paid more than $1.88 billion in wage-loss compensation, impairment, and death benefits, and another $898.1 million for medical and rehabilitation services and supplies. Currently, FECA benefits are paid to federal employees who are unable to work because of injuries sustained while performing their federal duties, including those who are at or older than retirement age. Concerns have been raised that federal employees on FECA receive benefits that could be more generous than under the traditional federal retirement system and that the program may have unintended incentives for beneficiaries to remain on the FECA program beyond the traditional retirement age. Over the past 30 years, there have been various proposals to change the FECA program to address this concern. Recent policy proposals to change the way FECA is administered for older beneficiaries share characteristics with past proposals we have discussed in prior work. In August 1996, we reported on the issues associated with changing FECA benefits for older beneficiaries. Because FECA's benefit structure has not been significantly amended in more than 35 years, the policy questions raised in our 1996 report are still relevant and important today. This testimony will focus on (1) previous proposals for changing FECA benefits for older beneficiaries and (2) questions and associated issues that merit consideration in crafting legislation to change benefits for older beneficiaries. This statement is drawn primarily from our 1996 report in which we solicited views from selected federal agencies and employee groups to identify questions and associated issues with crafting benefit changes. For that report, we also reviewed relevant laws and analyzed previous studies and legislative proposals that would have changed benefits for older FECA beneficiaries. The perception that many retirement-age beneficiaries were receiving more generous benefits on FECA had generated two alternative proposals to change benefits once beneficiaries reach the age at which retirement typically occurs: (1) converting FECA benefits to retirement benefits and, (2) changing FECA wage-loss benefits by establishing a new FECA annuity. We also discussed a number of issues to be considered in crafting legislation to change benefits for older beneficiaries. Going forward, Congress may wish to consider the following questions in assessing current proposals for change: (1) How would benefits be computed? (2) Which beneficiaries would be affected? (3) What criteria, such as age or retirement eligibility, would initiate changed benefits? (4) How would other benefits, such as FECA medical and survivor benefits, be treated and administered? (5) How would benefits, particularly retirement benefits, be funded?
What GAO Found
The retirement conversion alternative raises complex issues, arising in part from the fact that conversion could result in varying retirement benefits, depending on conversion provisions, retirement systems, and individual circumstances. A key issue is whether or not benefits would be adjusted. The unadjusted option would allow for retirement benefits as provided by current law. The adjusted option would typically ensure that time on the FECA rolls was treated as if the beneficiary had continued to work. This adjustment could (1) credit time on FECA for years of service or (2) increase the salary base (for example, increasing salary from the time of injury by either an index of wage increases or inflation, assigning the current pay of the position, or providing for merit increases and possible promotions missed due to the injury). Currently most federal employees are covered by FERS, but conversion proposals might have to consider differences between FERS and CSRS participants, and participants in any specialized retirement systems. Other groups that might be uniquely affected include injured workers who are not eligible for federal retirement benefits, individuals eligible for retirement conversion benefits, but not vested; and individuals who are partially disabled FECA recipients but active federal employees. With regard to vesting, those who have insufficient years of service to be vested might be given credit for time on the FECA rolls until vested. There is also the question of whether changes will focus on current or future beneficiaries. Exempting current beneficiaries delays receipt of full savings from FECA cost reductions to the future. One option might be a transition period for current beneficiaries. For example, current beneficiaries could be given notice that their benefits would be changed after a certain number of years. Past proposals have used either age or retirement eligibility as the primary criterion for changing benefits. If retirement eligibility is used, consideration must be given to establishing eligibility for those who might otherwise not become retirement eligible. This would be true for either the retirement conversion or the annuity option. At least for purposes of initiating the changed benefit, time on the FECA rolls might be treated as if it counted for service time toward retirement eligibility. Deciding on the criteria that would initiate change in benefits might require developing benchmarks. In addition to changing FECA compensation benefits, consideration should be given to whether to change other FECA benefits, such as medical benefits or survivor benefits. For example, the 1981 Reagan administration proposal would have ended survivor benefits under FECA for those beneficiaries whose benefits were converted to the retirement system. For the retirement conversion alternative, another issue is the funding of any retirement benefit shortfall. Currently, agencies and individuals do not make retirement contributions if an individual receives FECA benefits; thus, if retirement benefits exceed those for which contributions have been made, retirement funding shortfalls would occur. Retirement fund shortfalls can be funded through payments made by agencies at the time of conversion or prior to conversion. |
gao_GAO-06-804 | gao_GAO-06-804_0 | Social Security Currently Indexes Both Benefits and Revenues
While Social Security did not use automatic indexing initially, it is now a key feature of the program’s design, as well as a central element of many reform proposals. Under the current program, benefits for new beneficiaries are computed using wage indexing, benefits for existing beneficiaries are adjusted using price indexing, and on the revenue side, the cap on the amount of earnings subject to the payroll tax is also adjusted using wage indexing. In particular, the indexing approach in the 1972 amendments resulted in (1) a “double- indexing” of benefits to inflation for new beneficiaries though not for existing ones; (2) a form of “bracket creep” based on the structure of the benefit formula that slowed benefit growth as earnings increased over time, which offset the double indexing to some degree; and (3) instability of program costs that was driven by the interaction of price and wage growth in benefit calculations. Various Reform Proposals Include Indexing Provisions
Various reform proposals have suggested changes to most of the indexing features of the current Social Security system. Indexing the replacement factors would reduce benefits at the same proportional rate across income levels, while changing the indexing of lifetime earnings or the bendpoints could alter the distribution of benefits across income levels. Some proposals would index revenues in new ways. Retirement Indexing Approaches in Other Countries Generally Focus on Benefit Reductions instead of Increased Contributions
A number of reforms have focused on methods that primarily adjust benefits rather than taxes to address the fiscal solvency of national pension systems. Indexing Approaches Affect Both Current and Future Beneficiaries
In some of the countries we studied, changes in indexing methods affect both current and future retirees. Indexing Can Be Used to Achieve Desired Distributional Effect
In the U.S. Social Security program, indexing can have different effects on the distribution of benefits and on the relationship between contributions and benefits, depending on how it is applied to benefits or taxes. Indexing payroll tax rates would also have distributional effects. We analyzed three indexing scenarios; the dependency ratio index, which links the growth of initial benefits to changes in the dependency ratio, the ratio of the number of retirees to workers; the CPI index, which links the growth of initial benefits to changes in the CPI; and the mortality index, which links the growth of initial benefits to changes in life expectancy to maintain a constant life expectancy at the normal retirement age. Thus, benefits at all levels will be affected by the same percentage reduction, for example, 5 percent, regardless of earnings. Reducing the COLA would also have equity implications. Key Considerations in Choosing an Index
Indexing raises other important considerations about the program’s role, the stability of the variables underlying the index, and the treatment of Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries. Thus, if the current indexing of initial benefits was changed to price growth, there is an implication that the appropriate level of benefits is one that maintains purchasing power over time rather than the current approach that maintains a relative standard of living across age groups (i.e., replacement rates). As with other ways to change benefits, an index that is designed to improve solvency by adjusting retirement benefits may result in large reductions to disabled workers, who often have fewer options to obtain additional income from other sources. Some indexes are premised on the past behavior of economic or demographic relationships. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to SSA and the Department of the Treasury. SSA provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. For this report we used GEMINI to simulate Social Security benefits and taxes primarily for 100,000 individuals born in 1985. If disabled and survivor benefits were not reduced at all, reductions in other benefits would be greater than shown in this analysis. 2. 3. 4. Bracket creep resulted from the progressive benefit formula, which provided lower replacement rates for higher earners than for lower earners. Social Security Reform: Analysis of a Trust Fund Exhaustion Scenario. | Why GAO Did This Study
The financing shortfall currently facing the Social Security program is significant. Without remedial action, program trust funds will be exhausted in 2040. Many recent reform proposals have included modifications of the indexing currently used in the Social Security program. Indexing is a way to link the growth of benefits and/or revenues to changes in an economic or demographic variable. Given the recent attention focused on indexing, this report examines (1) the current use of indexing in the Social Security program and how reform proposals might modify that use, (2) the experiences of other developed nations that have modified indexing, (3) the effects of modifying the indexing on the distribution of benefits, and (4) the key considerations associated with modifying the indexing. To illustrate the effects of different forms of indexing on the distribution of benefits, we calculated benefit levels for a sample of workers born in 1985, using a microsimulation model. We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative as part of a continued effort to assist Congress in addressing the challenges facing Social Security. We provided a draft of this report to SSA and the Department of the Treasury. SSA provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Indexing currently plays a key role in determining Social Security's benefits and revenues, and is a central element of many proposals to reform the program. The current indexing provisions that affect most workers and beneficiaries relate to (1) benefit calculations for new beneficiaries, (2) the annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for existing beneficiaries, and (3) the cap on taxable earnings. Some reform proposals would slow benefit growth by indexing the initial benefit formula to changes in prices or life expectancy rather than wages. Some would revise the COLA under the premise that it currently overstates inflation, and some would increase the cap on taxable earnings. National pension reforms in other countries have used indexing in various ways. In countries with high contribution rates that need to address solvency issues, recent changes have generally focused on reducing benefits. Although most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries compute retirement benefits using wage indexing, some have moved to price indexing, or a mix of both. Some countries reflect improvements in life expectancy in computing initial benefits. Reforms in other countries that include indexing changes sometimes affect both current and future retirees. Indexing can have various distributional effects on benefits and revenues. Changing the indexing of initial benefits through the benefit formula typically results in the same percentage change in benefits across income levels regardless of the index used. However, indexing can also be designed to maintain benefits for lower earners while reducing or slowing the growth of benefits for higher earners. Indexing payroll tax rates would maintain scheduled benefit levels but reduce the ratio of benefits to contributions for younger cohorts. Finally, the effect of modifying the COLA would be greater the longer people collect benefits. Indexing raises considerations about the program's role, the treatment of disabled workers, and other issues. For example, indexing initial benefits to prices instead of wages implies that benefit levels should maintain purchasing power rather than maintain relative standards of living across age groups (i.e., replacement rates). Also, as with other ways to change benefits, changing the indexing of the benefit formula to improve solvency could also result in benefit reductions for disabled workers as well as retirees. |
gao_GAO-16-828 | gao_GAO-16-828_0 | Background
EB-5 Program
Under the EB-5 Program Regional Center model, first enacted as a pilot program in 1992 and reauthorized numerous times since, a certain number of the EB-5 visas are set aside annually for immigrant investors investing within economic units called regional centers, which are established to promote economic growth. Supporting documentation is assessed to ensure that the prospective immigrant investors have met (1) the terms of participation for the program, (2) criteria for lawful admission for permanent residence on a conditional basis, and (3) requirements of the program to have the conditional basis of his or her lawful permanent resident status removed. This includes conducting and planning risk assessments to gather additional information on potential fraud risks to the program. USCIS is also taking steps to collect more applicant and petitioner information through a random site visit pilot and expanding its use of background checks, among other things, to help improve its ability to identify specific incidence of fraud. Further, USCIS has taken preliminary steps to digitize and analyze the paper files submitted by petitioners and applicants to the program. DHS concurred with our August 2015 recommendation that USCIS plan and conduct regular fraud risk assessments of the EB-5 Program in the future. For example, we reported that in one instance, a couple created a regional center and solicited immigrant investors with promises of investing in a local energy company. Reliance on Paper Files Continues to Hinder USCIS’s Ability to Mitigate Fraud in EB-5, and Planned Digitization Efforts Have Not Yet Been Implemented
We found in August 2015 that USCIS is unable to comprehensively identify and address fraud trends across the program because of its reliance on paper-based documentation and because it faces certain limitations with using available data and with collecting additional data on EB-5 immigrant investors or investments. These challenges exist in part because many of the files were several thousand pages long and would take significant time to review. According to an FDNS official, this supporting information can be an important source of potential fraud indicators as it contains details such as business plans associated with the investment. USCIS Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Fraud Risk Management Leading Practices, but Has Not Yet Created a Fraud Risk Profile to Guide Its Efforts
USCIS continues to take steps to improve overall fraud risk management but has not incorporated certain leading practices that could benefit its efforts. In particular, USCIS has taken actions that closely align with the first and second components, which call for federal managers to (1) commit to combating fraud by creating an organizational culture and structure conducive to fraud risk management; and (2) plan regular fraud risk assessments and assess risks to determine a fraud risk profile. While USCIS has taken steps to implement selected leading fraud- management practices, we found that USCIS has not developed a fraud risk profile—an overarching document that guides an organization’s fraud-management efforts—as called for by the Fraud Risk Framework. Instead, USCIS’s completed and planned risk assessments span multiple years and were developed as separate documents and reports, and USCIS lacks a unifying document that consolidates these findings and informs the specific control activities managers design and implement. Absent a fraud risk profile, USCIS may not be well positioned to identify and prioritize fraud risks in the EB-5 Program and ensure the appropriate controls are in place to mitigate these risks. The continuation of planned efforts to digitize the files, including the supporting evidence submitted by applicants and petitioners, could help USCIS better identify fraud indicators in the program. Recommendation for Executive Action
To strengthen USCIS’s EB-5 Program fraud risk management, we recommend the Director of USCIS develop a fraud risk profile that aligns with leading practices identified in GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework. Leading practices for each of these components include the following: (1) commit: create an organizational culture to combat fraud at all levels of the agency, and designate an entity within the program office to lead fraud risk management activities; (2) assess: assess the likelihood and impact of fraud risks, and determine risk tolerance, examine the suitability of existing controls, and prioritize residual risks; (3) design and implement: develop, document, and communicate an antifraud strategy, focusing on preventive control activities; and (4) evaluate and adapt: collect and analyze data from reporting mechanisms and instances of detected fraud for real-time monitoring of fraud trends, and use the results of monitoring, evaluations, and investigations to improve fraud prevention, detection, and response. Identified Fraud Risks. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created the EB-5 visa category to promote job creation and capital investment by immigrant investors in exchange for lawful permanent residency and a path to citizenship. Participants must invest either $500,000 or $1 million in a business that is to create at least 10 jobs. Upon meeting program requirements, immigrant investors are eligible for conditional status to live and work in the United States and can apply to remove the conditional basis of lawful permanent residency after 2 years. In August 2015, GAO reported on weaknesses in certain USCIS fraud mitigation activities, and made two related recommendations.
GAO was asked to review actions taken by USCIS to address fraud risks in the EB-5 program since its August 2015 report. This report examines the extent to which USCIS (1) has taken steps to enhance its fraud detection and mitigation efforts; and (2) has incorporated selected leading fraud risk management practices into its efforts. GAO reviewed relevant program documentation and information; selected and reviewed a random, nongeneralizable sample of immigrant investor petitions and regional-center applications submitted between fiscal years 2010 and 2014; and compared USCIS's actions against GAO's Fraud Risk Framework.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has recently taken steps intended to enhance fraud detection and mitigation activities for the Employment-Based Fifth Preference Immigrant Investor Program (EB-5 Program) and address previous GAO recommendations.
This includes actions such as conducting and planning additional risk assessments to gather additional information on potential fraud risks to the program. For example, USCIS is leveraging overseas staff to investigate potential fraud associated with unlawful sources of immigrant investor funds and is conducting a site visit pilot to help assess the potential risks of fraud among EB-5 program investments. USCIS is also taking steps to collect more information about EB-5 program investments and immigrant investors through new, revised forms and expanding its use of background checks, among other things, to help improve its ability to identify specific incidence of fraud. However, fraud mitigation in the EB-5 Program is hindered by a reliance on voluminous paper files, which limit the agency's ability to collect and analyze program information. In its review of a nongeneralizable selection of files associated with EB-5 program regional centers and immigrant investors, GAO found that identifying fraud indicators is extremely challenging. For example, many of these files were several thousand pages long and would take significant time to review. According to USCIS documentation, the program anticipates receiving approximately 14 million pages of supporting documentation from its regional-center applicants and immigrant investor petitioners annually. Recognizing these limitations, USCIS has taken preliminary steps to study digitizing and analyzing the paper files submitted by petitioners and applicants to the program, which could help USCIS better identify fraud indicators in the program; however, these efforts are in the early stages.
USCIS has incorporated selected leading fraud risk management practices into its efforts but could take additional actions to help guide and document its efforts. GAO's Fraud Risk Framework is a set of leading practices that can serve as a guide for program managers to use when developing efforts to combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based manner. USCIS's actions align with two key components of the Fraud Risk Framework: (1) commit to combating fraud by creating an organizational culture and structure conducive to fraud risk management such as by providing specialized fraud awareness training; and (2) assess risks by planning and completing regular fraud risk assessments. However, USCIS has not developed a fraud risk profile, an overarching document that guides its fraud management efforts, as called for in the Fraud Risk Framework. Instead, USCIS's risk assessments, spanning multiple years, were developed as separate documents and reports, and there is not a unifying document that consolidates and systematically prioritizes these findings. Without a fraud risk profile, USCIS may not be well positioned to identify and prioritize fraud risks in the EB-5 Program, ensure the appropriate controls are in place to mitigate fraud risks, and implement other Fraud Risk Framework components.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USCIS develop a fraud risk profile that aligns with leading practices identified in GAO's Fraud Risk Framework. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-07-1097T | gao_GAO-07-1097T_0 | FCIA doubled the federal funds available for independent living programs to $140 million each year. FCIA Increased Independent Living Allocations for Most States and Allocations per Youth Vary by State
While overall federal funding for state independent living programs doubled with the passage of FCIA, there were significant variations in the changes to state allocations, and the maximum amount of funds available at the time of our 2004 report for each eligible foster care youth ranged between $476 and $2,300. In addition, the funding formula is based on the total number of all children in foster care. States Expanded and Improved Services for Youth after FCIA, but Reported That Gaps in Critical Services Remain
In our 2004 survey, 40 states reported expanding services to youth younger than they had previously served, and 36 states reported serving older youth, but states reported service gaps in critical areas, such as mental health and housing. About one-third of reporting states were serving less than half of their eligible foster care youth population, while an equal percentage of states were serving three-fourths or more. States also reported that these challenges were more prominent in rural areas. Of the 4 states we visited in 2004, 3 cited difficulties due to more stringent eligibility requirements in the adult system, different levels of services, and long waiting lists for services. Youth reported difficulties renting housing because of a lack of an employment history, a credit history, or a cosigner. This service gap was identified by states again in our 2006 survey, as 31 state child welfare directors reported dissatisfaction with the level of housing for foster youth transitioning to independence. States Reported Increased Coordination with Federal and State Programs to Provide Independent Living Services to Youth, but Barriers Hinder Linkages across Programs
After FCIA, 49 states reported increased coordination with a number of federal, state, and local programs that can provide or supplement independent living services, but officials from the 4 states we visited reported several barriers in developing the linkages necessary to access services under these programs across local areas. Despite states’ efforts, we continued to find in our 2006 survey that states were least likely to address challenges in providing services such as mental health that are typically provided outside of the child welfare system by other agencies. Officials in the 4 states we visited in 2004 reported several barriers that hinder their ability to establish linkages with other agencies and programs, including the lack of information on the array of programs available in each state or local area and differences in program priorities. To some extent, this has been due to the fact that state and local child welfare officials differ in their awareness of resources available from other agencies. States’ and HHS’s Actions in Response to FCIA Requirements Have Not Yet Established Accountability for Independent Living Programs
All states developed multiyear plans as required under FCIA and submitted annual progress reports to ACF for their independent living programs, but the absence of standard comprehensive information within and across state plans and reports precludes using them at the state and federal levels to monitor how well the programs are working to serve foster care youth. State plans and annual reports: All states developed state plans as required by FCIA that described independent living services they planned to provide to foster care youth and submitted annual reports to ACF, but for several reasons, these plans and reports cannot be used to assess states’ independent living programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress passed the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 (FCIA), which doubled annual federal funds for independent living programs to $140 million. This testimony discusses (1) states' FCIA funding allocations, (2) services provided and remaining challenges, (3) state coordination of programs to deliver services, and (4) the states and the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families' (ACF) progress toward meeting program accountability requirements. This testimony is primarily based on our 2004 report on FCIA (05-25), with updated information from our 2007 testimony on state child welfare challenges (07-850T). To conduct the 2004 work, we surveyed state independent living coordinators, conducted 4 state site visits, and reviewed states' plans and annual reports. Updated information from our 2007 testimony was taken primarily from a 2006 survey of state child welfare directors.
What GAO Found
States' funding allocations for independent living programs effectively ranged from a maximum of approximately $500 to $2,300 for each foster care youth who was eligible for independent living services, according to data available at the time of our 2004 report. Funding varied because of differences in states' eligibility requirements and the funding formula used to allocate funds. Although our 2004 survey of state independent living coordinators showed that 40 states reported expanding existing independent living services to younger youth and 36 states reported serving youth older than they had previously served, states varied in their ability to engage youth and to provide key services. About one-third of reporting states were serving less than half of their eligible foster care youth population, while an equal percentage of states were serving three-fourths or more. Our 2006 survey of state child welfare directors showed that critical gaps remain in providing services such as mental health and housing for youth transitioning to independence. Mental health barriers included differences in eligibility requirements and level of services between the youth and adult systems, and long waiting lists. Housing barriers included limited affordable housing in costly urban areas, scarce rental housing in rural areas, and problems obtaining a rental lease due to the lack of youth employment and credit history or a co-signer to guarantee payment. Almost all states that we surveyed in 2004 reported an increase in coordination with some federal, state, and local programs, but linkages with other federal and state youth-serving programs were not always in place to increase services available across local areas. Many programs exist at the federal, state, or local level that can be used to provide or supplement independent living services, and each state reported in our survey using some of these programs to provide services. Despite these coordination efforts, some states may not make full use of the available resources. Inconsistent availability of information on the array of programs that were operating in each state and local area was cited as a challenge in promoting coordination in both our prior and more current work. States and HHS have taken action to fulfill the accountability provisions of FCIA, but 8 years later, little information is available to assess program outcomes. All states developed multiyear plans for their programs and submitted annual reports, but using these documents to assess state performance was hindered by inconsistencies between the plans and reports, an absence of goals and baseline information to measure progress, and incomplete information on outcomes for the youth serviced. ACF started developing an information system in 2000 to monitor state performance, but final regulations directing states to begin collecting data and tracking outcomes are still pending. ACF is also conducting evaluations of selected independent living programs, but results are not yet available. |
gao_NSIAD-98-149 | gao_NSIAD-98-149_0 | Data provided by the Army on the first 6 months of contractor operations indicated that Cendant had received and processed 793 relocation authorizations and arranged (booked) 581 moves. Cendant also assisted members in initiating 181 Do-It-Yourself moves. The Army’s Plans to Evaluate the Pilot Project Need to Be Further Refined
The Army has developed an evaluation plan to facilitate data collection on quality of life, total cost, and impact on small business; define agency responsibilities; and explain which data will be used for comparative purposes. Transportation and storage costs under the pilot will be compared with what the Army would have paid under the MTMC program. Prior to commenting on a draft of this report, the Army had not explained what constituted success for the pilot, how much weight each factor (quality of life, total cost, and impact on small business) should have in determining overall success, and whether there were thresholds that specific factors should attain to be considered successful. Such advance determinations are typically part of a sound study methodology to enhance the credibility of the results and to avoid any perception of bias. The information provides thresholds for determining the success of the overall Hunter pilot and the relative importance of each evaluation factor. The Army Audit Agency, however, has not yet completed its validation of those responses. Other Pilot Projects or Tests Underway or Planned
Other pilots or tests are also underway or are being planned in DOD. The Army Hunter pilot, on the other hand, is limited to one location, Hunter, and one service, the Army, although it provides for move management services, including entitlement counseling and destination relocation assistance, for all Hunter Army families, relocating to anywhere in the world. USTRANSCOM will also maintain oversight of the personal property program pilots and tests and assure consistent evaluation criteria and assessment of the pilot program results. Notwithstanding this and other pilots and tests planned or underway, DOD and Army officials briefed us at the end of this review about plans to expand the Hunter pilot by testing it at selected DOD sites. The information, with some minor exceptions, represents important steps toward formulating a sound evaluation plan. However, the evaluation method has not been finalized or made a formal part of the evaluation plan, and questions remain about the definition of terms and small business group measurements. We recognize that further issues could be identified as the evaluation method is finalized. In agreeing with our draft recommendation, DOD provided additional information regarding the Army’s method for determining what results it plans to use to judge the pilot a success. We reviewed the data and observed how it was being collected. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the Army's Hunter pilot program, an alternative approach for providing relocation services for its personnel stationed at Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Georgia, focusing on: (1) data collected to date; (2) GAO's observations on how the Army plans to evaluate the data; and (3) other pilot tests that are under way or planned in the Department of Defense (DOD).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) through the first 6 months of operation, the Hunter pilot contractor had received and processed nearly 800 requests for transportation and relocation services, arranged for transportation of nearly 600 personal property shipments, and assisted Army members initiate another 200 do-it-yourself moves; (2) because many of the shipments had not been completed at the time of GAO's review, the Army had paid for only about 200 of these shipments, at a cost of about $500,000, but it was actively collecting data on all the factors--quality of life, cost, and impact on small businesses--it was planning to use in its evaluation of the pilot; (3) however, at the time GAO completed its work, the Army had not determined what it would consider successful within each factor or how much weight each factor would have in determining overall success; (4) specifically, the Army had not determined criteria to judge the success or failure of the pilot to help it assess whether the pilot was performing better or worse than the existing program; (5) making such determinations before pilot program data are analyzed would be important to enhancing the credibility of the Army's assessment and for use in making comparisons with other pilot programs that are under way or planned in DOD; (6) these include pilots under way by the Navy or planned by the Military Traffic Management Command; (7) also, DOD and the Army are considering expanding the pilot now being tested at Hunter Army Airfield to other DOD sites; (8) subsequently, in response to GAO's draft report, the Army provided it with new information on how it will determine the results of the pilot; (9) the information, with some minor exceptions, represents important steps toward formulating a sound evaluation plan; (10) however, the evaluation method has not yet been finalized or made a formal part of the evaluation plan, and questions remain about the definition of terms and small business group measurements; and (11) GAO recognized that further issues could be identified as the evaluation method is refined and finalized. |
gao_GAO-05-748 | gao_GAO-05-748_0 | Contingency-fee consultants in the two states we reviewed—Georgia and Massachusetts—have developed reimbursement-maximizing projects in each of the five categories of claims that we reviewed, generating more than $2 billion during state fiscal years 2000 through 2004 in additional federal Medicaid reimbursements, mainly in Georgia. CMS Surveys Found Increasing Use of Contingency-Fee Consultants for Reimbursement- Maximizing Projects
CMS surveyed its regional offices in fiscal years 2002 and 2004 and found that an increasing number of states were using consultants on a contingency-fee basis for projects to maximize federal reimbursements. This survey identified 34 states involved in contingency-fee contracts to help them maximize federal Medicaid reimbursements in a variety of categories. CMS does not identify the extent to which states’ Medicaid claims stem from projects using contingency-fee consultants to maximize federal reimbursements. After UPL projects generated for Georgia more than $1.2 billion in additional federal Medicaid reimbursements for state fiscal years 2001 through 2003, and a dispute developed between the state and the consultant about the extent to which the additional reimbursements were attributable to the consultant’s project, the state and the consultant agreed upon an additional $28 million in fees to be paid over 2 years. Claims from Contingency-Fee Projects Are Not Always Consistent with Law or Current Policy and Can Undermine Medicaid’s Fiscal Integrity
We and others have identified claims from contingency-fee consultant projects that appeared to be inconsistent with current CMS policy and claims that were inconsistent with federal law. One factor involved federal requirements that were inconsistently applied, evolving, or not specific; the second involved Medicaid payments to government units, which can facilitate the inappropriate shifting of state costs to the federal government. Contingency-Fee Projects in Selected States Resulted in Problematic Federal Reimbursements in Five Categories of Claims
In the five categories of Medicaid services we reviewed, we identified claims that were problematic in Georgia, Massachusetts, or both. Specifically, the consultant recommended that the two state agencies claim Medicaid reimbursement on the basis of the facilities’ estimated costs for rehabilitation services, rather than on the state agencies’ actual per diem payment. Limited State and CMS Oversight of Claims from Contingency-Fee Projects Raises Concerns about Medicaid Financial Management
Georgia, Massachusetts, and CMS provided limited oversight of claims associated with projects developed with the aid of contingency-fee consultants to ensure that they were consistent with Medicaid requirements. For example, CMS had listed these two categories on a financial tracking sheet of high-risk areas as of 2000. Conclusions
Because of its size, complexity, and federal-state structure, the Medicaid program has been subject to waste, abuse, and exploitation. Although CMS has taken steps in recent years to minimize the federal financial risk involved in inappropriate financing schemes, the agency must also ensure that its policies are clear and consistently applied across states. States are required to make DSH payments to hospitals that care for a disproportionate number of low-income patients. 3. 5. 10. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid--the federal-state health care financing program covering nearly 54 million low-income people at a cost of $276 billion in fiscal year 2003--is by its size and structure at risk of waste and exploitation. Because of challenges inherent in overseeing the program, administered federally by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), GAO in 2003 added Medicaid to its list of high-risk federal programs. To help administer the program, states may employ consultants in a number of roles, sometimes under contracts whereby payment is contingent upon the consultant's performance. GAO was asked to report on states' use of contingency-fee consultants. GAO examined the extent to which (1) states are using contingency-fee consultants for projects to maximize federal Medicaid reimbursements, (2) claims from contingency-fee projects in selected states are consistent with federal law and policy, and (3) states and CMS are overseeing claims from such projects.
What GAO Found
As of 2004, 34 states--up from 10 states in 2002--used contingency-fee consultants to implement projects to maximize federal Medicaid reimbursements. Projects varied widely, and because of certain risk factors--including a nationwide growth in dollars--GAO focused on claims in five categories. Contingency-fee consultants in the 2 states GAO reviewed, Georgia and Massachusetts, have developed projects in all five categories. From these and other projects, for state fiscal years 2000 through 2004, Georgia obtained an estimated $1.5 billion in additional federal reimbursements and Massachusetts obtained an estimated $570 million. These states paid contingency fees of more than $90 million. In Georgia, Massachusetts, or both states, GAO identified claims from contingency-fee projects in the five categories reviewed that were problematic because they appeared to be inconsistent with current policy or were inconsistent with federal law; others undermined Medicaid's fiscal integrity. For example, for services provided to children in state custody residing in private facilities, a Georgia project claimed increased federal Medicaid reimbursements on the basis of the facilities' estimated costs, which were often higher than the state's actual payments to the facilities. Problematic projects often involved categories of claims where federal law and policy were inconsistently applied, evolving, or not specific. Problematic projects also involved Medicaid payments to government entities, which can facilitate the inappropriate shifting of state costs to the federal government. The states and CMS have provided limited oversight of claims associated with contingency-fee projects. CMS has not routinely collected information enabling it to identify claims or projects developed by contingency-fee consultants to maximize federal reimbursements, despite long-standing recognition that such claims are at risk of being inconsistent with federal requirements. Problems GAO identified illustrate the urgent need to address broader issues in oversight and financial management. CMS has taken steps to strengthen its financial oversight of Medicaid, but the agency can do more to reduce the risk of current and emerging financing schemes, including responding to prior GAO recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-643 | gao_GAO-08-643_0 | SBA Relies on Federal Law to Identify HUBZone Areas, but Its Map Is Inaccurate and the Economic Characteristics of Designated Areas Vary Widely
SBA relies on federal law to identify qualified HUBZone areas, but its HUBZone map is inaccurate and the economic characteristics of HUBZone areas vary widely. The map that SBA uses to publicize HUBZone areas contains ineligible areas and has not been updated to include eligible areas. Such an expansion could diffuse the benefits to be derived from steering businesses to economically distressed areas. Internal control standards for federal agencies state that agencies should document and verify information that they collect on their programs. We found that of the more than 3,600 firms that were proposed for decertification in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, more than 1,400 were not processed within 60 days. As a result, there is an increased risk that ineligible firms may participate in the program and have opportunities to receive federal contracts based on HUBZone certification. We found that SBA verifies the information it receives from firms in limited instances. Factors such as conflicting guidance on how to consider the various small business programs when awarding contracts and a lack of HUBZone firms with the necessary expertise may have affected the ability of federal agencies to meet their HUBZone goals. SBA Has Limited Performance Measures and Has Not Implemented Plans to Evaluate the Effectiveness of the Program
While SBA has some measures in place to assess the performance of the HUBZone program, the agency has not implemented its plans to conduct an evaluation of the program’s benefits. We reviewed SBA’s performance measures for the HUBZone program and found that although the measures related to the core activity of the program (providing federal contracting assistance), they were not directly linked to the program’s mission of stimulating economic development and creating jobs in economically distressed communities. Most Federal Agencies Did Not Meet Their Contracting Goals for the HUBZone Program
Although contracting dollars awarded to HUBZone firms have increased since fiscal year 2003—when the statutory goal of awarding 3 percent of federally funded contract dollars to HUBZone firms went into effect— federal agencies collectively still have not met that goal. As a result, ineligible small businesses have been able to participate in the program, while eligible businesses have not been able to participate. Specifically, revisions to the statutory definition of HUBZone areas since 1999 have nearly doubled the number of areas and created areas that can be characterized as less economically distressed than areas designated under the original statutory criteria. The mechanisms that SBA uses to certify and monitor firms provide limited assurance that only eligible firms participate in the program. Also, SBA does not follow its policy of recertifying all firms every 3 years. Further, SBA lacks a formal policy on how quickly it needs to make a final determination on decertifying firms that may no longer be eligible for the program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To review the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) administration and oversight of the HUBZone program, we examined (1) the criteria and process that SBA uses to identify and map HUBZone areas and the economic characteristics of such areas; (2) the mechanisms that SBA uses to ensure that only eligible small businesses participate in the HUBZone program; and (3) the actions SBA has taken to assess the results of the program and the extent to which federal agencies have met their HUBZone contracting goals. Specifically, we analyzed the data to determine (1) the number of applications submitted in fiscal years 2000 through 2007 and their resolution; (2) the number of recertifications that SBA performed in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 and their results; (3) the number of recertifications conducted of HUBZone firms based on the number of years firms had been in the program; (4) the number of program examinations that SBA performed in fiscal years 2004 through 2007 and their results; (5) the number of program examinations conducted of HUBZone firms based on the number of years firms had been in the program; and (6) the number of firms proposed for decertification in fiscal years 2004 through 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program provides federal contracting assistance to small firms located in economically distressed areas, with the intent of stimulating economic development. Questions have been raised about whether the program is targeting the locations and businesses that Congress intended to assist. GAO was asked to examine (1) the criteria and process that SBA uses to identify and map HUBZone areas and the economic characteristics of such areas, (2) the mechanisms SBA uses to ensure that only eligible small businesses participate in the program, and (3) the actions SBA has taken to assess the results of the program and the extent to which federal agencies have met their HUBZone contracting goals. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed statutory provisions, as well as SBA, census, and contracting data, and interviewed SBA and other federal and local officials.
What GAO Found
SBA relies on federal law to identify qualified HUBZone areas based on provisions such as median income in census tracts, but the map it uses to publicize HUBZone areas is inaccurate, and the economic characteristics of designated areas vary widely. To help firms determine if they are located in a HUBZone area, SBA publishes a map on its Web site. However, the map contains areas that are not eligible for the program and excludes some eligible areas. As a result, ineligible small businesses have been able to participate in the program, and eligible businesses have not been able to participate. Revisions to the statutory definition of HUBZone areas (such as allowing continued inclusion of areas that ceased to be qualified) have nearly doubled the number of areas and created areas that are less economically distressed than areas designated under the original criteria. Such an expansion could diffuse the benefits to be derived from steering businesses to economically distressed areas. The mechanisms that SBA uses to certify and monitor firms provide limited assurance that only eligible firms participate in the program. Although internal control standards state that agencies should verify information they collect, SBA verifies the information reported by firms on their application or during recertification--its process for monitoring firms--in limited instances and does not follow its own policy of recertifying all firms every 3 years. GAO found that more than 4,600 firms that had been in the program for at least 3 years went unmonitored. Further, SBA lacks a formal policy on how quickly it needs to make a final determination on decertifying firms that may no longer be eligible for the program. Of the more than 3,600 firms proposed for decertification in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, more than 1,400 were not processed within 60 days--SBA's unwritten target. As a result of these weaknesses, there is an increased risk that ineligible firms have participated in the program and had opportunities to receive federal contracts based on their HUBZone certification. SBA has taken limited steps to assess the effectiveness of the HUBZone program, and from 2003 to 2006 federal agencies did not meet the government-wide contracting goal for the HUBZone program. While SBA has some measures to assess the results of the HUBZone program, they are not directly linked to the program's mission, and the agency has not implemented its plans to conduct an evaluation of the program based on variables tied to the program's goals. Consequently, SBA lacks key information to manage the program and assess performance. Contracting dollars awarded to HUBZone firms increased from fiscal year 2003 to 2006, but consistently fell short of the government-wide goal of awarding 3 percent of annual contracting dollars to HUBZone firms. According to contracting officials GAO interviewed, factors such as conflicting guidance on how to consider the various small business programs when awarding contracts and a lack of HUBZone firms in certain industries may have affected the ability of federal agencies to meet their HUBZone goals. |
gao_GAO-04-123T | gao_GAO-04-123T_0 | In our January 2003 report, we estimated that more than half of the government’s 6,100 career SES members on board as of October 2000 will have left the service by October 2007. Estimates for SES attrition at 24 large agencies showed substantial variations in both the proportion that would be leaving and the effect of those losses on the gender, racial, and ethnic profile. In developing our estimates of future diversity of the SES corps, we analyzed appointment trends for the federal government and at 24 large agencies to determine the gender, racial, and ethnic representation of the SES corps in 2007 if appointment trends that took place from fiscal years 1995 through 2000 continued. We found that, governmentwide, the only significant change in diversity by 2007 would be an increase in the number of white women, from 19.1 to 23.1 percent, and a corresponding decrease in white men, from 67.1 to 62.1 percent. Our projection of what the SES would look like if recent appointment trends continued through October 1, 2007, showed variation, with 12 agencies having increased minority representation and 10 having less. To ascertain what the gender, racial, and ethnic profile of the candidate pool for SES replacements would look like, we performed the same simulations and projections for GS-15s and GS-14s as we did for the SES. The results show a somewhat lower proportion of this workforce will leave. Our simulation shows that significant numbers of current minority GS-15s and GS-14s will be employed through fiscal year 2007, and coupled with our projection of promotions, shows there will be substantial numbers of minorities at both the GS-15 (8,957) and GS-14 (15,672) levels, meaning that a sufficient number of minority candidates for appointment to the SES should be available. Replacing Over Half of the SES Corps Presents a Challenge and an Opportunity for Federal Government
During fiscal years 2001 through 2007, the wave of near-term retirements and normal attrition for other reasons presents the federal government with the challenge and opportunity to replace over half of its career SES corps. Succession planning is also tied to the federal government’s opportunity to change the diversity of the SES corps through new appointments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government faces large losses in its Senior Executive Service (SES), primarily through retirement but also because of other normal attrition. This presents the government with substantial challenges to ensuring an able management cadre and also provides opportunities to affect the composition of the SES. In a January 2003 report, GAO-03-34 , GAO estimated the number of SES members who would actually leave service through fiscal year 2007 and reviewed the implications for diversity, as defined by gender, race, and ethnicity of the estimated losses. Specifically, GAO estimated by gender, race, and ethnicity the number of members of the career SES who will leave government service from October 1, 2000, through September 30, 2007, and what the profile of the SES will be if appointment trends do not change. GAO made the same estimates for the pool of GS-15s and GS-14s, from whose ranks the vast majority of replacements for departing SES members come, to ascertain the likely composition of that pool.
What GAO Found
More than half of the 6,100 career SES members employed on October 1, 2000, will have left service by October 1, 2007. Using recent SES appointment trends, the only significant changes in diversity would be an increase in the number of white women and an essentially equal decrease in white men. The percentage of GS-15s and GS-14s projected to leave would be lower (47 percent and 34 percent, respectively), and we project that the number of minorities still in the GS-15 and GS-14 workforce would provide agencies sufficient opportunity to select minority members for the SES. Estimates showed substantial variation in the proportion of SES minorities leaving between 24 large agencies and in the effect on those agencies' gender, racial, and ethnic profiles. Minority representation at 10 agencies would decrease and at 12 would increase. Agencies have an opportunity to affect SES replacement trends by developing succession strategies that help achieve a diverse workforce. Along with constructive agency leadership, these strategies could generate a pool of well-prepared women and minorities to boost the diversity of the SES ranks. |
gao_GAO-02-309 | gao_GAO-02-309_0 | One of BJA’s major grant programs is the Byrne Program. VAWO programs seek to improve criminal justice system responses to domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking by providing support for law enforcement, prosecution, courts, and victim advocacy programs across the country. Number, Type, Status of Completion, and Award Amount of Byrne and VAWO Discretionary Grant Program Evaluations
During fiscal years 1995 through 2001, NIJ awarded about $6 million to carry out five Byrne and five VAWO discretionary grant program evaluations. According to NIJ, the five VAWO program evaluations included both impact and process evaluations. As of December 2001, only one of these evaluations, the impact evaluation of the Byrne CAR Program, had been completed. In contrast, in the Byrne Children at Risk impact evaluation, all five sites participated. Appendix I provides summaries of the four evaluations. The Assistant Attorney General also stated that the report contrasts the Byrne evaluation with the three VAWO evaluations and obscures important programmatic differences that affect an evaluator’s ability to achieve “GAO’s conditions for methodological rigor.” She pointed out that the Byrne CAR Program was intended to test a research hypothesis and that the evaluation was designed accordingly, i.e., the availability of baseline data were ensured; randomization of effects were stipulated as a precondition of participation; and outcome measures were determined in advance on the basis of the theories to be tested. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) could not separate the cost of the impact evaluation from the cost of the process evaluation. 10. | What GAO Found
Discretionary grants awarded under the Bureau of Justice Assistance's (BJA) Byrne Program help state and local governments make communities safe and improve criminal justice. Discretionary grants awarded under BJA's Violence Against Women Office (VAWO) programs are aimed at improving criminal justice system responses to domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) awarded $6 million for five Byrne Program and five VAWO discretionary grant program evaluations between 1995 and 2001. Of the 10 programs evaluated, all five VAWO evaluations were designed to be both process and impact evaluations of the VAWO programs. Only one of the five Byrne evaluations was designed as an impact evaluation and the other four evaluations were process evaluations. GAO's in-depth review of the four impact evaluations since fiscal year 1995 showed that only one of these--the evaluation of the Byrne Children at Risk Program--was methodologically sound. The other three evaluations, all of which examined VAWO programs, had methodological problems. |
gao_GAO-04-576 | gao_GAO-04-576_0 | DOD’s failure to detect or prevent these improper payments was the result of weaknesses in the design of key internal controls, as well as breakdowns in key existing controls. Our data mining of airline ticket data from Bank of America centrally billed account files and about half of DOD’s fiscal year 2001 and 2002 travel vouchers identified about 27,000 travel claims totaling over $8 million for which DOD made potentially improper reimbursements to travelers for airline tickets that DOD purchased with the centrally billed accounts. Requesting reimbursement for items that the traveler did not pay for may violate the False Claims Act and be punishable by imprisonment or a monetary fine, or both. The traveler told us that he did not notice that he was paid for expenses he did not incur, even though in one instance, DFAS overpaid the traveler more than $3,500 for one round-trip ticket from Washington, D.C., to Singapore. These actions included renting luxury vehicles, such as a Lincoln Navigator and Mercedes Benz, while on official travel—without specific authorization to rent a luxury vehicle—and using his individually billed account to obtain government-rate tickets for his family members, as the examples illustrate. The 123 improper payments included 109 payments totaling almost $85,000 that were made to 77 travelers who were paid for airline tickets they did not purchase, and 14 payments totaling about $13,000 to 14 travelers in which DOD paid the traveler and the airline for two airline tickets purchased for the same travel. Only four travelers notified DFAS—and made restitution—on the improper payments prior to our audit even though typically more than a year had passed since the improper payment. The Air Force Audit Agency projected that, “This condition, if not corrected, will result in the Air Force inappropriately reimbursing individuals at least $6.5 million” over the next 6 years. The additional work demonstrated that someone with knowledge of the DOD travel system could fraudulently obtain an airline ticket, and have DOD pay for that ticket, with a centrally billed account. Lack of Controls Enabled GAO to Obtain an Airline Tickets Using a Fictitious Travel Order
DOD’s failure to verify the validity of travel orders before it issued airline tickets, and that it created obligations to pay for these tickets, increased our concerns that DOD would issue, and pay for, airline tickets on the basis of invalid travel orders. Fraudulent Airline Ticket Transactions Resulting from Compromised Accounts
DOD’s centrally billed accounts require safeguarding because stolen account numbers can be repeatedly used to fraudulently purchase goods and services. Between August 2001 and March 2002, a Navy seaman used the centrally billed account numbers assigned to two Navy GTOs to purchase over 70 unauthorized tickets totaling more than $60,000. A major contributing factor to these instances was that many DOD units did not adequately protect centrally billed account numbers. At two offices, GTO officials told us that they did not know how to dispute unauthorized charges. To obtain reasonable assurance that DOD military and civilian personnel do not improperly request reimbursement for airline tickets purchased with centrally billed accounts and reinforce the seriousness of filing false claims against the government, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the heads of all DOD agencies, to implement the following four recommendations: Periodically issue guidance to military and civilian personnel reminding them that the cost of airfare expenses purchased with a centrally billed account should not be claimed as a reimbursable expense on travel vouchers, and of the potential penalties for doing so. Our assessment covered the following: whether DOD improperly reimbursed travelers for the cost of airline tickets paid using centrally billed accounts, whether internal controls were effective to prevent the CTO from issuing unauthorized airline tickets on the basis of invalid travel orders, and whether other control weaknesses led to the centrally billed accounts being compromised and fraudulently used. Determine Whether DOD Improperly Reimbursed Travelers for Tickets DOD Purchased Using the Centrally Billed Accounts
To determine whether DOD improperly reimbursed travelers for airline tickets that DOD—not the travelers—paid for using the centrally billed accounts, we reviewed prior audit reports from DOD’s Office of Inspector General and DOD’s various audit agencies and interviewed DFAS officials. Then to confirm whether the payments were improper we tested a nonrepresentative selection of 124 travelers from the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy who submitted 204 travel vouchers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ineffective management and oversight of the Department of Defense's (DOD) premium class travel and unused airline tickets led to concerns about DOD's overall management of the centrally billed accounts. GAO was asked to determine whether (1) DOD improperly reimbursed travelers for airline tickets DOD paid for using centrally billed accounts, (2) internal controls were effective in preventing issuance of unauthorized airline tickets, and (3) other control weaknesses led to compromised and fraudulently used centrally billed accounts.
What GAO Found
A weak control environment and breakdowns in key controls over centrally billed accounts resulted in DOD paying travelers for airline tickets they did not purchase, issuing and paying for unauthorized airline tickets, and paying for goods and services obtained with compromised centrally billed accounts. Based on mining of limited fiscal year 2001 and 2002 data provided by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, GAO identified about 27,000 transactions totaling more than $8 million in which DOD potentially reimbursed travelers for airline tickets paid for by DOD--not the travelers. Requesting reimbursement for items that the traveler knowingly did not pay for may be a crime that could result in imprisonment or a monetary fine, or both. GAO's subsequent tests of a nonrepresentative selection of 124 individuals who submitted 204 of these 27,000 transactions confirmed that DOD improperly paid 91 individuals almost $98,000 for 123 airline tickets DOD purchased with centrally billed accounts. Only 4 travelers voluntarily reimbursed DOD prior to GAO initiating the audit, even though typically, more than a year had passed since the improper payments. Several travelers submitted multiple claims for airline tickets they did not purchase, which could indicate intent to defraud the government. In 2003, the Air Force Audit Agency reported that this same problem existed at the Air Force and estimated that, if not corrected, this problem will cost the Air Force more than $6 million over 6 years. Examples of Potentially Fraudulent Travel Claims Grade/rank Cost Number Nature of cases GS-15 $9,700 13 Traveler claimed he did not notice the additional $9,700 in his bank account. GS-13 3,600 6 Traveler continued to submit false claims after DOD told the traveler to stop requesting reimbursement for airline tickets purchased with centrally billed accounts. The traveler also rented luxury vehicles--such as a Mercedes Benz--while on government travel and approved his own travel vouchers. E-9 1,400 2 Traveler told us he knew of the improper payment, but he was waiting for DOD to request repayment. Source: GAO review of DOD travel data. GAO also determined that key internal controls did not provide DOD reasonable assurance that (1) airline tickets purchased and paid for with the centrally billed accounts were based on valid travel orders and (2) centrally billed account numbers were adequately protected against unauthorized use. To demonstrate weaknesses in DOD's system of internal controls, GAO submitted a fictitious travel order to a commercial travel office to obtain an airline ticket from Washington, D.C., to Atlanta, Ga. DOD issued GAO the airline ticket, established an obligation, and paid for the ticket without detecting the fictitious nature of the request. GAO also found instances where a lack of physical safeguards resulted in the centrally billed account numbers being stolen and used for personal gain. One DOD traveler stole a centrally billed account number to purchase over 70 airline tickets totaling more than $60,000, which he sold at a discounted rate to coworkers and their family members for personal travel. Because DOD disputed those fraudulent charges, DOD did not pay for those tickets. However, not all DOD units dispute unauthorized charges. As a result, DOD is vulnerable to paying for fraudulent charges on compromised centrally billed accounts. |
gao_GAO-15-150 | gao_GAO-15-150_0 | In addition, TSA worked to develop procedures to ensure screening resources are focused on passengers determined to be high risk and passengers about whom TSA has less information while expediting the screening of passengers TSA has assessed as being lower risk based on information it has on such passengers. Since October 2011, TSA further expanded the known traveler populations eligible for expedited screening. These include (1) inclusion on a TSA PreTM list of known travelers, (2) identification of passengers as low risk by TSA’s Risk Assessment algorithm, or (3) a real-time threat assessment at the airport using the Managed Inclusion process. Passenger Eligibility Based on Real Time Threat Assessments Using Managed Inclusion Process
Managed Inclusion is designed to provide expedited screening to passengers not deemed low risk prior to arriving at the airport. These layers include (1) the Secure Flight vetting TSA performs to identify high-risk passengers required to undergo enhanced screening at the checkpoint and to ensure these passengers are not directed to TSA PreTM expedited screening lanes, (2) a randomization process that TSA uses to include passengers into TSA Pre™screening lanes who otherwise were not eligible for expedited screening, (3) BDOs who observe passengers and look for certain high-risk behaviors, (4) canine teams and ETD devices that help ensure that passengers have not handled explosive materials prior to travel, and (5) an unpredictable screening process involving walk-through metal detectors in expedited screening lanes that randomly select a percentage of passengers for additional screening. The Department of Homeland Security did not concur with this recommendation; however, in August 2014, TSA noted that it is taking actions to optimize the effectiveness of its behavior detection program and plans to begin testing this effort in October 2014. As a result of this work, we recommended in January 2013, among other things, that TSA take actions to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of canine teams. TSA Should Ensure that Its Effectiveness Testing of the Managed Inclusion Process is Conducted in Accordance with Established Methodological Practices
TSA officials stated that they tested the security effectiveness of the individual components of the Managed Inclusion process before implementing Managed Inclusion, and determined that each layer alone provides an effective level of security. However, we have previously conducted work on several of the layers used in the Managed Inclusion process, including BDOs, ETD, and canine teams and raised concerns regarding their effectiveness and recommended actions to address those concerns. However, TSA could not provide us with specifics or a plan or documentation showing how the testing is to be conducted, the locations where it is to occur, how those locations are to be selected, or the timeframes for conducting testing at each location. We have previously reported on challenges TSA has faced in designing studies and protocols to test the effectiveness of security systems and programs in accordance with established methodological practices. Ensuring its planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design practices will help TSA provide reasonable assurance that the effectiveness testing will yield reliable results. As noted earlier in this report, because expedited screening is voluntary, not all passengers who are eligible necessarily use expedited screening. For example, a passenger may be traveling with a group in which not all passengers in the group are eligible for expedited screening, so the passenger may choose to forgo expedited screening. TSA also noted that it began achieving the 25 percent of passengers receiving expedited screening goal in November 2013 and attributed reaching this goal to an increase in the number of participating air carriers from seven in July 2013 to nine in November 2013, an increase in the number of airports where TSA PreTM dedicated screening lanes are available to over 100 airports in October 2013, the implementation of TSA PreTM Risk Assessments on a flight-by-flight basis in October 2013, and the increased use of Managed Inclusion in October 2013. Conclusions
TSA’s new methods to assess passenger risk, such as TSA PreTM Risk Assessments and Managed Inclusion, have significantly increased the use of expedited screening. To ensure that TSA’s planned testing yields reliable results, we recommend that the TSA Administrator take steps to ensure that TSA’s planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA screens or oversees the screening of more than 650 million passengers annually at more than 450 U.S. airports. In 2011, TSA began providing expedited screening to selected passengers as part of its overall emphasis on risk-based security. Specifically, by determining passenger risk prior to travel, TSA intended to focus screening resources on higher-risk passengers while expediting screening for lower-risk passengers.
GAO was asked to determine how TSA implemented and expanded expedited screening via TSA Pre✓ TM . This report examines, among other things, (1) how TSA has developed, implemented, and used expedited screening, (2) how TSA assesses passenger risk, and (3) the extent to which TSA has determined the Managed Inclusion system's effectiveness. GAO analyzed TSA procedures and data from October 2011 through January 2014 on expedited screening and interviewed officials at TSA, airport authorities, air carriers, and industry associations about expedited screening.
What GAO Found
Since the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implemented its expedited screening program—known as TSA Pre✓ TM in 2011, the number of passengers receiving expedited screening grew slowly, and then increased about 300 percent in October 2013 when TSA expanded its use of methods to increase passenger participation, such as conducting automated risk assessments of all passengers. In conducting these assessments, TSA assigns passenger scores based upon information available to TSA to identify low risk passengers eligible for expedited screening for a specific flight prior to the passengers’ arrival at the airport.
To assess whether a passenger is eligible for expedited screening, TSA considers (1) inclusion on an approved TSA Pre✓ TM list of known travelers; (2) results from the automated risk assessments of all passengers; and (3) threat assessments of passengers conducted at airport checkpoints known as Managed Inclusion. Managed Inclusion uses several layers of security, including procedures that randomly select passengers for expedited screening, behavior detection officers who observe passengers to identify high-risk behaviors, and either passenger screening canine teams or explosives trace detection devices to help ensure that passengers selected for expedited screening have not handled explosive material. Prior to Managed Inclusion’s implementation, TSA relied primarily on approved lists of known travelers to determine passenger eligibility for expedited screening.
TSA has tested the effectiveness of individual Managed Inclusion security layers and determined that each layer provides effective security. GAO has previously conducted work on several of the layers used in the Managed Inclusion process, raising concerns regarding its effectiveness and recommending actions to TSA to strengthen them. For example, in January 2013, GAO recommended that TSA take actions to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of canine teams. TSA subsequently addressed this recommendation by conducting the assessment. In October 2014, TSA planned to begin testing Managed Inclusion as an overall system, but could not provide specifics or a plan or documentation showing how the testing is to be conducted, the locations where it is to occur, how these locations are to be selected, or the timeframes for conducting testing at each location. Moreover, GAO has previously reported on challenges TSA has faced in designing studies to test the security effectiveness of its other programs in accordance with established methodological practices such as ensuring an adequate sample size or randomly selecting items in a study to ensure the results can be generalizable—key features of established evaluation design practices. Ensuring its planned testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design practices will help TSA provide reasonable assurance that the testing will yield reliable results.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2014. Information that the Department of Homeland Security deemed sensitive has been removed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TSA take steps to ensure and document that its planned testing of the Managed Inclusion system adheres to established evaluation design practices, among other things. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-461 | gao_GAO-10-461_0 | Army’s Management Processes Not Effective in Enabling Second Deployment Sites to Achieve LMP Benefits
The Army’s management processes that were established prior to the second deployment of LMP were not effective in enabling the second deployment sites to realize the full benefits of LMP. Although the depots were able to continue to repair items and support the warfighter, LMP users had to rely on manual work-around processes, which are not part of how LMP is intended to function and hinder the Army’s ability to realize the benefits expected from LMP. The depots experienced data quality issues, despite improvements the Army made to address data quality issues experienced during the first deployment of LMP at Tobyhanna Army Depot, because the Army’s testing strategy did not provide reasonable assurance that the data being used by LMP were accurate and reliable. Additionally, the Army’s training strategy did not effectively provide users the skills necessary to perform all of their tasks in LMP. Users at the depots stated that the training they received before LMP became operational was not conducted in a realistic environment that showed them how to perform their expected duties. Instead, the metrics used by the LMP program management office focused on whether the software was working but did not measure whether the deployment sites were performing their day-to-day operations using LMP as envisioned. Data Quality Issues Prevented Depots from Realizing the Full Benefits of LMP
The Army was unable to realize the full benefits of LMP at the second deployment sites because of data quality issues. Officials at Letterkenny Army Depot noted, however, that they had pre-positioned materials prior to the transition to LMP to ensure that the depot could perform its repair mission if difficulties arose, which enabled the depot to perform its day-to- day operations despite the data shortcomings. However, the Army’s testing efforts focused on determining whether the software worked as designed. Army’s Training Strategy Did Not Fully Meet Needs of LMP Users
Although the Army’s training strategy was designed to provide LMP users the skills and knowledge to successfully perform their new roles, LMP users we interviewed at Corpus Christi and Letterkenny Army Depots stated that the training they received prior to LMP becoming operational did not fully meet their needs. Army Lacked Comprehensive Metrics to Assess LMP Implementation
The Army was unable to determine whether the second deployment sites had achieved the envisioned functionality of LMP because the Army lacked a comprehensive set of metrics to measure the success of LMP implementation. Our previous work has shown that successful performance measures should be aligned throughout the organization and cover the activities that an entity is expected to perform to support the intent of the program. LMP Has Provided the Army Some Benefits
Although data quality and training issues prevented the second deployment sites from using the full capabilities of LMP as envisioned, the use of LMP at the second deployment sites has provided the Army some benefits that were not available in legacy systems, such as increased visibility. Additionally, LMP program management officials stated that they had developed changes to their testing strategy and that tests are scheduled to begin in May 2010. Accordingly, because these events have yet to occur, we were unable to determine whether they adequately addressed the issues we identified during the second deployment related to data testing and training. Unless the Army addresses these challenges, the third deployment locations are likely to face the same, or even greater, problems, since the third deployment of LMP will occur at more locations and affect more users than the previous deployments. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the Army concurred with our recommendations and highlighted the corrective actions it is taking to (1) improve testing activities to obtain reasonable assurance that the data used by LMP can support the LMP processes, (2) improve training for LMP users, and (3) establish performance metrics that will enable the Army to assess whether the deployment sites are able to use LMP as intended. The Army commented that the expected date of completion for development of these measures is July 1, 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) is an Army business system that is intended to replace the aging Army systems that manage inventory and depot repair operations. Through 2009, the Army obligated more than $1 billion for LMP. LMP was originally scheduled to be completed by 2005, but after the first deployment in July 2003, the Army delayed fielding because of significant problems. The Army has since decided to field the system in two additional deployments: the second deployment occurred in May 2009, and the third deployment is scheduled to occur in October 2010. GAO was asked to evaluate the effectiveness of the Army's management processes in enabling the second deployment sites to realize the full benefits of LMP.
What GAO Found
The Army's management processes that were established prior to the second deployment of LMP were not effective in enabling the second deployment sites to realize the full benefits of LMP. When LMP becomes fully operational at the second deployment locations, the Army expects that it will significantly enhance depot operations. However, the Army was unable to ensure that the data used by LMP were of sufficient quality to enable the depots to perform their day-to-day missions after LMP became operational. As a result of these data quality issues, depot personnel had to develop and use manual work-around processes until they could correct the data in LMP, which prevented the Army from achieving the expected benefits from LMP. Data quality issues occurred despite improvements made by the Army to address data issues experienced during the first deployment of LMP because the Army's testing strategy did not provide reasonable assurance that the data being used by LMP were accurate and reliable. Instead, the Army's testing efforts focused on whether the software was functioning, but did not assess whether the data used by the depots to perform their repair missions were of sufficient quality to work in LMP. According to depot officials, the data problems are being corrected as they are identified. Additionally, the Army's training strategy did not effectively provide LMP users the skills necessary to perform their new tasks. Users at the depots stated that the training they received did not provide a realistic environment that showed them how to perform their expected duties, and did not always match their new responsibilities. However, users at the depots also stated that they had received additional training that resolved the issue. The Army also lacked a comprehensive set of metrics with which to measure the success of LMP implementation. GAO's previous work has shown that successful performance measures should be aligned throughout the organization and cover the activities that an entity is expected to perform. However, the Army did not have common metrics with which to measure success during the second deployment, and the Army's scorecard for measuring LMP implementation focused on the software, but did not assess whether the depots were able to perform their work using LMP as envisioned. Despite these challenges, LMP has provided the Army some benefits, and officials at the second deployment sites provided examples of how LMP had improved their day-to-day operations, for example, through the increased visibility of assets. The third deployment of LMP is scheduled to occur in October 2010, and will involve more commands, occur at locations across the globe, and affect more users than the previous deployments. LMP program management officials stated that they are taking steps to address the issues discussed in this report for the third deployment and are adjusting plans related to data testing and training. However, because these plans are being developed, GAO was unable to verify that the problems have been resolved. Without correcting these issues prior to the third deployment, the Army is likely to face similar, or potentially greater, problems that prevent it from realizing the full benefits of LMP. |
gao_GAO-03-598 | gao_GAO-03-598_0 | Beginning in the mid-1990s, DOD began to conceive of a different type of unmanned air vehicle—the unmanned combat air vehicle or UCAV—which would be capable of performing dangerous, lethal combat missions, including suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Importance of Matching Resources with Requirements before Product Development
The product development decision that DOD is approaching for its UCAV program represents a commitment by the product developer to deliver a product at established cost, schedule, and performance targets and identifies the amount of resources that will be necessary to do so. A key to achieving this match is to ensure that the developer has the resources—technology, design and production knowledge, money, and time—needed to design, test, manufacture, and deliver the product. The need to address one problem can slow down other work on the weapon system. Figure 3 illustrates the timing of the match between a customer’s requirements and a product developer’s resources for successful and problematic programs we have reviewed. This step put the program at considerable risk because it increased the gap between requirements and resources. The program added two new requirements—one for electronic attack capability and one for increased flying range—while reducing a critical resource, time, to mature key UCAV technologies. UCAV Requirements Increased During 2002
The UCAV program’s original requirements were difficult to meet because they posed significant but manageable technical challenges to building an air vehicle that is, at once, affordable throughout its life cycle, highly survivable, and lethal. However, keeping requirements and resources in balance and funding intact until product development starts will be a challenge. This competition would increase DOD’s ability to pursue the best technical solution. In addition, more time will be added under the joint program to conduct demonstrations by delaying the start of product development by several years. Drawing on the experience of the UCAV to date as well as other programs, DOD will face challenges in keeping the requirements for the new joint design balanced with available resources. Conclusion
UCAVs offer a potential for DOD to carry out dangerous missions without putting lives at stake and to find cost-effective ways of replacing DOD’s aging tactical aircraft fleet. The decision to create a joint program could make for a better program if the gap between resources and requirements can be closed. The program also faces the challenge of sustaining funding support from both services at a time when it is competing against other large aircraft investments. Regardless of which direction the new program takes, the role played by the Office of the Secretary of Defense will continue to be instrumental in helping to negotiate requirements, to assure the right resources are provided, and to make further difficult tradeoff decisions throughout the program. We also recommend that the Secretary formalize the management role performed by his office and the attendant authority to perform that role; ensure that the services are fully involved in the process; and work to develop an efficient approach to transitioning the UCAV from DOD’s technology development environment to the services’ acquisition environment so the needs of the war fighter can be met more quickly. DOD did state that the department’s UAV Planning Task Force would continue to provide oversight over all DOD UCAV program activities. To determine options that may be available to UCAV program managers in making changes to requirements or resources, we examined the program’s risk assessments of its 15 technologies, processes, and system attributes to identify risk associated with beginning product development at different points in time. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing a new unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) that can suppress enemy air defenses and conduct other air-to-ground attacks, particularly against heavily defended targets. Because it may perform these missions at a relatively low cost, the UCAV could be used to replace some of DOD's aging tactical aircraft fleet. A key to UCAV's success will lie in DOD's ability to match users' needs, or requirements, with the developer's resources (technology and design knowledge, money, and time) when product development begins. Our work shows that doing so can prevent rework and save both time and money. Therefore, we assessed DOD's ability to make this match. GAO conducted its work on the basis of the Comptroller General's authority and addresses the report to the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services because of its interest and jurisdiction in the program.
What GAO Found
The UCAV program's original performance objectives posed manageable challenges to build an affordable, highly survivable, and lethal weapon system. The Air Force, however, added requirements for electronic attack and increased flying range after DOD accelerated the program's product development schedule by 3 years. These changes widened the gap between the customer's requirements and the developer's resources, specifically time, reducing the probability that the program would deliver production aircraft on cost, on schedule, and with anticipated performance capabilities. DOD has recently decided to adopt a new joint service approach to UCAV development that provides more time to close the requirements--resource gap before product development starts. It appears DOD may add new content because it is proposing to build a new prototype that would be a larger air vehicle, capable of flying and carrying out combat missions for longer periods of time. To reduce technical risk, DOD anticipates delaying the start of product development for several years in order to address new requirements. As a gap between resources and requirements widened in 2002, risks projected for the start of product development with UCAV's 15 technologies, processes and system attributes increased significantly. The new joint plan brings the risks back down. This action also allows competition back into the UCAV development effort. DOD will still face challenges in controlling joint, multimission requirements and ensuring that both services continue to provide funds for the program while also funding other large aircraft investments. If these challenges are not met, the gap between requirements and resources could resurface. DOD's role will continue to be instrumental in helping to negotiate requirements, assure resources are in place, and make difficult program trade-offs. |
gao_GAO-03-729T | gao_GAO-03-729T_0 | We identified three general types of Bus Rapid Transit systems—those that (1) use buses on exclusive busways, (2) share high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes with other vehicles, and (3) provide improved bus service on city arterial streets. Bus Rapid Transit systems using arterial streets may have lanes reserved for buses and street enhancements that speed buses and improve service. Federal Grants and a Demonstration Program Are Available to Help Support Bus Rapid Transit Projects
A variety of federal grant programs could be used to help fund Bus Rapid Transit projects, but few projects are in line to receive awards. However, few Bus Rapid Transit projects are ready to compete for these funds, competition for funding is intense, and constraints on the use and size of the grants limit their usefulness for Bus Rapid Transit projects. It provides grants of up to 80 percent of the capital costs of bus and rail projects that operate on exclusive rights-of-way. Currently, the program requires that, to be eligible for funding, a project must operate on separate rights-of-way for the exclusive use of mass transit and high-occupancy vehicles. Under the proposal, new non-fixed-guideway improvements done on a corridor basis would be eligible for New Starts funds. Bus Rapid Transit and other transit projects can qualify for certain types of federal highway funds administered by the Federal Highway Administration. The program provided $50,000 to 10 transit agencies to share information and data on new Bus Rapid Transit projects. FTA wanted the Bus Rapid Transit program to show how using technological advancements and improving the image of buses would allow buses to increase ridership and operate with the speed, reliability, and efficiency of Light Rail. FTA plans to evaluate the demonstration projects after they are implemented. Several Factors Affect the Selection of Bus Rapid Transit As a Mass Transit Option
Decisions to pursue a Bus Rapid Transit project require significant planning and analysis of factors associated with transit options. Capital and Operating Costs
The cost of constructing a mass transit system is a major consideration for communities as they evaluate their transportation options. Our September 2001 report examined 20 existing Bus Rapid Transit lines and found that Bus Rapid Transit capital costs, when adjusted to 2000 dollars, averaged $13.5 million per mile for busways, $9.0 million per mile for buses on HOV lanes, and $680,000 per mile for buses on city streets. Our 2001 report analyzed operating costs for six cities that had some form of Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail systems. System Performance
An important objective of any mass transit system is to move as many people as quickly as possible. In the systems we examined, these factors varied considerably for Bus Rapid Transit. We also found that, in most instances, Bus Rapid Transit was faster than Light Rail in the six cities in our study. Other Advantages and Disadvantages of Bus Rapid Transit
The other advantages and disadvantages of Bus Rapid Transit could also affect a community’s decision to pursue it as a mass transit option. In addition, the public might view an alternative to Bus Rapid Transit, such as Light Rail, as the mark of a “world-class” city and a means to improve the community’s image and stimulate economic development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Buses form the backbone of the nation's mass transit systems. About 58 percent of all mass transit users take the bus, and even in many cities with extensive rail systems, more people ride the bus than take the train. In recent years, innovative Bus Rapid Transit systems have gained attention as an option for transit agencies to meet their mass transit needs. These systems are designed to provide major improvements in the speed, reliability, and quality of bus service through barrier-separated bus-ways, high-occupancy vehicle lanes, or reserved lanes or other enhancements on arterial streets. The characteristics of Bus Rapid Transit systems vary considerably, but may include (1) improved physical facilities or specialized structures such as dedicated rights-of-way; (2) operating differences such as fewer stops and higher speeds; (3) new equipment such as more advanced, quieter, and cleaner buses; and (4) new technologies such as more efficient traffic signalization and real-time information systems. This testimony, which updates a report GAO issued in September 2001, provides (1) information on federal support for Bus Rapid Transit systems and (2) an overview of factors affecting the selection of Bus Rapid Transit as a mass transit option.
What GAO Found
Federal grants are available for Bus Rapid Transit projects, primarily through the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) New Starts program. However, only one project currently has a funding commitment since few Bus Rapid Transit projects are ready to compete for funding, competition for New Starts funding is intense, and certain types of Bus Rapid Transit projects are not eligible for New Starts funding because the program provides grants only for projects that operate on a separate right-of-way for the exclusive use of mass transit and high-occupancy vehicles. FTA is proposing to change this requirement so that more Bus Rapid Transit projects can be eligible for New Starts funding. In addition, constraints on the use or size of the other federal grants may limit their usefulness for Bus Rapid Transit projects. Under a demonstration program that began in 1999, FTA awarded $50,000 to each of 10 grantees for projects designed to help determine the extent to which Bus Rapid Transit can increase ridership, improve efficiency, and provide high-quality service. FTA plans to evaluate the demonstration projects to determine their most effective elements. When selecting a mass transit system, communities consider its capital and operating costs, performance, and other advantages and disadvantages. In the cities that GAO reviewed, the per-mile capital costs of Bus Rapid Transit varied with the type of system--averaging $13.5 million for bus-ways, $9.0 million for buses on high-occupancy vehicle lanes, and $680,000 for buses on city streets--and compared favorably with the per-mile capital costs of Light Rail. In the cities that GAO reviewed with both Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail service, neither type of service had a consistent advantage in terms of operating costs, and Bus Rapid Transit was comparable to Light Rail in terms of ridership and operating speed. A major advantage of Bus Rapid Transit is its flexibility: buses can be rerouted to accommodate changing traffic patterns and can operate on bus-ways, high-occupancy vehicle lanes, and city arterial streets. However, the public may view Bus Rapid Transit as less likely than Light Rail to improve a community's image and spur economic development. |
gao_GAO-07-644T | gao_GAO-07-644T_0 | They help the Congress and the executive branch carry out their responsibilities while improving the government’s performance and enhancing its accountability. GAO has played an important role in describing the current state of government contracting, identifying the challenges agencies face, and recommending specific steps agencies should take to improve their acquisition and contracting outcomes. Helping the Congress through Insight
GAO’s work helps to identify programs, policies, and practices that are working well, and opportunities to improve their linkages across agencies, across all levels of government, and with nongovernmental partners in order to achieve positive national outcomes. The following are a few examples of our recent efforts to assist the Congress with such insight: Providing a comprehensive framework for congressional oversight of hurricanes Katrina and Rita: We developed a number of crosscutting and comprehensive reviews of aspects of the preparedness for, response to, and recovery from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Building on this work, we continue to support your Committee and others through a range of audit and evaluation engagements to examine federal programs that provide rebuilding assistance to the Gulf Coast, including the federal government’s contribution to the rebuilding effort and the role it might play over the long term. We are examining lessons learned from past national emergencies and catastrophic disasters—both at home and abroad—that may prove useful in identifying ways to approach rebuilding. Helping the Congress through Foresight
Our products and assistance to the Congress also focus on a wide range of emerging needs and identify and address governance issues that must be addressed to respond to a broad range of 21st Century challenges and opportunities. As the Chief Accountability Officer of the United States Government, I continue to call attention to our long-term fiscal challenge and the risks it poses to our nation’s future. Congressional Support to Enhance GAO’s Effectiveness
Continuously improving on the critical role we play in supporting the Congress will require modest enhancements to GAO’s resources and authorities that I proposed in our fiscal year 2008 budget request and discussed in my Senate appropriations hearing. Our fiscal year 2008 budget request seeks the resources necessary to allow us to rebuild and enhance our workforce, knowledge capacity, employee programs, and critical infrastructure. GAO is an invaluable tool for helping the Congress review, reprioritize, and revise existing mandatory and discretionary spending programs and tax policies. In addition to providing the resources we need to support the Congress, we will also be seeking enactment of a set of statutory provisions that would enhance our ability to provide the Congress the information and analysis it needs to discharge its constitutional responsibilities. Among other things, we will seek to modernize authority for the Comptroller General and his/her authorized representatives to administer oaths in performance of the work of the office. We are working with the cognizant entities and the appropriate authorization and oversight committees to discuss the potential impact of legislative relief for these issues. Appendix I: GAO’s Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress
1. Reduce the Tax Gap 2. Appendix II: GAO’s 2007 High-Risk List
Addressing Challenges In Broad-Based Transformations Strategic Human Capital Management Managing Federal Real Property Protecting the Federal Government’s Information Systems and the Nation’s Critical Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security Establishing Appropriate And Effective Information-Sharing Mechanisms to Improve DOD Approach to Business Transformation DOD Personnel Security Clearance Program FAA Air Traffic Control Modernization Financing the Nation’s Transportation System(New)
Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical to U.S. National Security Interests(New)
Transforming Federal Oversight of Food Safety(New)
Appendix IV: Budget Authority in Fiscal Year 2006 Dollars and Full-Time Equivalent Usage, Fiscal Years 1992 - 2007
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Committee sought GAO's views on the role GAO has played in assisting congressional oversight and the authorities and resources GAO needs to further improve its assistance to the Congress. Today's testimony discusses some of the ways that GAO has helped "set the table" for this Committee, the Congress, the executive branch, and the nation to engage in a constructive and informed dialogue about the challenges and opportunities our nation is facing in the 21st century. It also discusses the authority and resources GAO will need to address the critical oversight and other needs of the Congress.
What GAO Found
GAO is a key tool for the Congress as it works to improve economy, efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and ethics within the federal government. To better meet the needs of the Congress, GAO has transformed itself to provide a range of key oversight, insight, and foresight services while "leading by example" in transforming how government should do business. GAO's oversight work has traditionally focused on ensuring government entities are spending funds as intended by the Congress and complying with applicable laws and regulations, while guarding against fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. For example, since the early 1990s, GAO has updated its list of government programs and operations across government that it identifies as "high risk." It has contributed to the Congress enacting a series of governmentwide reforms and achieving tens of billions of dollars in financial benefits. Last November, GAO issued recommendations for oversight in the 110th Congress ranging from Iraq, to food safety, to the tax gap. GAO work also provides important insight into what programs, policies, and operations are working well; best practices to be shared and benchmarked; how agencies can improve the linkages across the silos of government; and how different levels of government and their nongovernmental partners can be better aligned to achieve important outcomes for the nation. For example, GAO developed a number of crosscutting and comprehensive reviews of the preparedness for, response to, and recovery from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. GAO has issued over 40 related reports and testimonies, and in work for this Committee and others GAO is examining lessons learned from past national emergencies and catastrophic disasters--both at home and abroad--that may prove useful in identifying ways to approach rebuilding. Finally, GAO's work can provide the Congress with foresight by highlighting the long-term implications of today's decisions and identifying key trends and emerging challenges facing our nation before they reach crisis proportions. As the Chief Accountability Officer of the United States Government, the Comptroller General continues to call attention to the nation's long-term fiscal challenge and the risks it poses to our nation's future. Continuously improving on the critical role GAO plays in supporting the Congress will require enhancements to GAO's resources and authorities. GAO's fiscal year 2008 budget request seeks resources to allow it to rebuild and enhance its workforce, knowledge capacity, employee programs, and infrastructure. GAO will be proposing changes to its authority, such as the ability to administer oaths in conducting its work, relief from certain mandated reviews, additional human capital flexibilities, and the creation of a Board of Contract Appeals at GAO. Finally, the Comptroller General has noted that GAO should be increased in size over the next 6 years to address the current and anticipated needs of the Congress. |
gao_GAO-12-926T | gao_GAO-12-926T_0 | The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is the federally designated U.S. Electric Reliability Organization, and is overseen by FERC. In addition, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007established federal policy to support the modernization of the electricity grid and required actions by a number of federal agencies, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), FERC, and the Department of Energy. The Electricity Grid Is Potentially Vulnerable to an Evolving Array of Cyber-Based Threats
Threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure—which includes the electricity industry and its transmission and distribution systems—are evolving and growing. In February 2011, the Director of National Intelligence testified that, in the past year, there had been a dramatic increase in malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. computers and networks, including a more than tripling of the volume of malicious software since 2009. Different types of cyber threats from numerous sources may adversely affect computers, software, networks, organizations, entire industries, or the Internet. Intentional threats include both targeted and untargeted attacks from a variety of sources, including criminal groups, hackers, disgruntled employees, foreign nations engaged in espionage and information warfare, and terrorists. The potential impact of these threats is amplified by the connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures, creating opportunities for attackers to disrupt critical services, including electrical power. In addition, the increased reliance on IT systems and networks also exposes the electric grid to potential and known cybersecurity vulnerabilities. We and others have also reported that smart grid and related systems have known cyber vulnerabilities. For example, the Department of Homeland Security’s Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team recently noted that the number of reported cyber incidents affecting control systems of companies in the electricity sector increased from 3 in 2009 to 25 in 2011. Actions Have Been Taken to Secure the Electricity Grid, but Challenges Remain
Multiple entities have taken steps to help secure the electricity grid, including NERC, NIST, FERC, and the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy. For example, it reviewed and approved NERC’s eight critical infrastructure protection standards in 2008. Challenges to Securing Electricity Systems and Networks
In our January 2011 report, we identified a number of key challenges that industry and government stakeholders faced in ensuring the cybersecurity of the systems and networks that support our nation’s electricity grid.These included the following:
There was a lack of a coordinated approach to monitor whether industry follows voluntary standards. Aspects of the current regulatory environment made it difficult to ensure the cybersecurity of smart grid systems. Utilities were focusing on regulatory compliance instead of comprehensive security. There was a lack of security features built into smart grid systems. The electricity industry did not have an effective mechanism for sharing information on cybersecurity and other issues. The electricity industry did not have metrics for evaluating cybersecurity. To improve coordination among regulators and help Congress better assess the effectiveness of the voluntary smart grid standards process, we recommended that the Chairman of FERC develop an approach to coordinate with state regulators and with groups that represent utilities subject to less FERC and state regulation to (1) periodically evaluate the extent to which utilities and manufacturers are following voluntary interoperability and cybersecurity standards and (2) develop strategies for addressing any gaps in compliance with standards that are identified as a result of this evaluation. Although FERC agreed with these recommendations, they have not yet been implemented. We will continue to monitor the status of its efforts to address these recommendations. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Cybersecurity Guidance Is Available, but More Can Be Done to Promote Its Use. Electricity Grid Modernization: Progress Being Made on Cybersecurity Guidelines, but Key Challenges Remain to Be Addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The electric power industry is increasingly incorporating information technology (IT) systems and networks into its existing infrastructure (e.g., electricity networks, including power lines and customer meters). This use of IT can provide many benefits, such as greater efficiency and lower costs to consumers. However, this increased reliance on IT systems and networks also exposes the grid to cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by attackers. Moreover, GAO has identified protecting systems supporting our nations critical infrastructure (which includes the electricity grid) as a governmentwide high-risk area.
GAO was asked to testify on the status of actions to protect the electricity grid from cyber attacks. Accordingly, this statement discusses (1) cyber threats facing cyber-reliant critical infrastructures, which include the electricity grid, and (2) actions taken and challenges remaining to secure the grid against cyber attacks. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work in this area and reviewed reports from other federal agencies, media reports, and other publicly available sources.
What GAO Found
The threats to systems supporting critical infrastructures are evolving and growing. In testimony, the Director of National Intelligence noted a dramatic increase in cyber activity targeting U.S. computers and systems, including a more than tripling of the volume of malicious software. Varying types of threats from numerous sources can adversely affect computers, software, networks, organizations, entire industries, and the Internet itself. These include both unintentional and intentional threats, and may come in the form of targeted or untargeted attacks from criminal groups, hackers, disgruntled employees, nations, or terrorists. The interconnectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures can amplify the impact of these threats, potentially affecting the operations of critical infrastructures, the security of sensitive information, and the flow of commerce. Moreover, the electricity grids reliance on IT systems and networks exposes it to potential and known cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by attackers. The potential impact of such attacks has been illustrated by a number of recently reported incidents and can include fraudulent activities, damage to electricity control systems, power outages, and failures in safety equipment.
To address such concerns, multiple entities have taken steps to help secure the electricity grid, including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy. These include, in particular, establishing mandatory and voluntary cybersecurity standards and guidance for use by entities in the electricity industry. For example, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which have responsibility for regulation and oversight of part of the industry, have developed and approved mandatory cybersecurity standards and additional guidance. In addition, NIST has identified cybersecurity standards that support smart grid interoperability and has issued a cybersecurity guideline. The Departments of Homeland Security and Energy have also played roles in disseminating guidance on security practices and providing other assistance.
As GAO previously reported, there were a number of ongoing challenges to securing electricity systems and networks. These include:
A lack of a coordinated approach to monitor industry compliance with voluntary standards.
Aspects of the current regulatory environment made it difficult to ensure the cybersecurity of smart grid systems.
A focus by utilities on regulatory compliance instead of comprehensive security.
A lack of security features consistently built into smart grid systems.
The electricity industry did not have an effective mechanism for sharing information on cybersecurity and other issues.
The electricity industry did not have metrics for evaluating cybersecurity.
What GAO Recommends
In a prior report, GAO has made recommendations related to electricity grid modernization efforts, including developing an approach to monitor compliance with voluntary standards. These recommendations have not yet been implemented. |
gao_GAO-14-149T | gao_GAO-14-149T_0 | The IL Track Mainly Serves Older Veterans and Provides a Wide Variety of Benefits
From fiscal years 2008 through 2011, the typical participant in the IL track was a male Vietnam-era veteran. Of the 9,215 veterans who entered the IL track in these years, most (67 percent) were male and 50 years old or older. Regardless of disability rating level, the most prevalent disabilities among this group were post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), tinnitus (“ringing in the ears”), and hearing loss. Furthermore, our review of the case files of 182 randomly selected IL track veterans in fiscal year 2008 shows that they were provided a wide range of goods and services, from individual counseling and the installation of ramps to a boat, camping gear, and computers. For all veterans who entered the IL track in fiscal year 2008, we estimated that VR&E purchased a total of almost $14 million in goods and services. The average spent per IL track case that year was nearly $6,000. Most Veterans Were “Rehabilitated” but within Varying Time Frames
We found that most (about 89 percent) of IL track veterans who began only one plan during fiscal year 2008 were classified by VR&E as “rehabilitated”—i.e., successfully reaching and maintaining the goals identified in their IL plan—by the end of fiscal year 2011. At the same time, about 11 percent of cases were either “discontinued”—i.e., closed by VR&E because the rehabilitation goals in the veteran’s IL plan were not completed—or were still active cases. In addition, VR&E’s IL rehabilitation rate was higher in regional offices with larger IL caseloads. Furthermore, in fiscal year 2008 IL veterans nationwide completed their IL plans in an average of 384 days (about 13 months); however, we found that the length of time to rehabilitate these veterans varied by regional office from a low of 150 days at the St. Paul Regional Office to a high of At most regional offices (49 895 days at the Roanoke Regional Office. VR&E Exercises Limited Oversight of the IL Track
We identified four key areas where VR&E’s oversight of the IL track was limited: (1) ensuring compliance with case management requirements, (2) monitoring regional variation in IL track caseload and benefits provided, (3) adequacy of policies and procedures for approving expenditures on goods and services for IL track veterans, and (4) availability of critical program management information. VR&E has relied on the information provided through its general quality assurance (QA) activities and a series of periodic ad hoc studies to oversee the administration of the IL track. VR&E’s Policy for Approving IL Track Expenditures May Not Be Adequate
VR&E’s current policy for approving IL track expenditures may not be adequate, considering the broad discretion VR&E provides to regions in determining and purchasing goods and services. Thus, regional offices have the ability to purchase a broad range of items without any Central Office approval, resulting in some offices purchasing goods and services that may be questionable or costly. In one case we reviewed, VR&E Central Office approval was not required for the purchase of a boat, motor, trailer, and the boat’s shipping cost, among other items, totaling about $17,500. Federal financial accounting standards also recommend that costs of programs be measured and reported. Types of IL benefits provided: The system does not collect information on the types of IL benefits provided to veterans in a standardized manner that can be easily aggregated and analyzed for oversight purposes. Number of IL veterans served: The system does not provide VR&E with the information it needs to monitor its statutory entrant cap and program operations. The law allows VR&E to initiate “programs” of independent living services and assistance for no more than a specified number of veterans each year, which, as of 2012, was set at 2,700. In analyzing VR&E’s administrative data, we found that VR&E counts the number of IL plans developed annually rather than the number of individual veterans admitted to the track. At the time of our review, no specific time frames were provided for the CWINRS redesign, but officials noted it could take up to 3 years to obtain funding for this effort. Officials told us that they plan to modify CWINRS, and In conclusion, strengthening oversight of VR&E’s IL track is imperative given the wide range of goods and services that can be provided under the law to help veterans with service-connected disabilities improve their ability to live independently when employment is not feasible. | Why GAO Did This Study
Of the 9,215 veterans who entered the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Independent Living (IL) track within the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program from fiscal years 2008 to 2011, most were male Vietnam era veterans in their 50s or 60s. The most prevalent disabilities among these veterans were post-traumatic stress disorder and tinnitus ("ringing in the ears"). GAO's review of 182 IL cases from fiscal year 2008 shows that VR&E provided a range of IL benefits to veterans; the most common benefits being counseling services and computers. Less common benefits included gym memberships, camping equipment, and a boat. GAO estimates that VR&E spent nearly $14 million on benefits for veterans entering the IL track in fiscal year 2008--an average of almost $6,000 per IL veteran.
About 89 percent of fiscal year 2008 IL veterans were considered by VR&E to be "rehabilitated" by the end of fiscal year 2011; that is, generally, to have completed their IL plans. These plans identify each veteran's independent living goals and the benefits VR&E will provide. The remaining 11 percent of cases were either closed for various reasons, such as the veteran declined benefits, or were still active. Rehabilitation rates across regions varied from 49 to 100 percent, and regions with larger IL caseloads generally rehabilitated a greater percentage of IL veterans. On average, IL plans nationwide were completed in 384 days; however, completion times varied by region, from 150 to 895 days.
GAO identified four key areas where VR&E's oversight was limited. First, some regions may not be complying with certain case management requirements. For instance, while VR&E is required to coordinate with the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) on IL benefits, VR&E counselors have difficulty obtaining timely responses from VHA. This has resulted in delayed benefits or VR&E providing the benefits instead of VHA. Second, VR&E does not systematically monitor regional variation in IL caseloads and benefits provided. Instead, it has relied on its quality assurance reviews and ad hoc studies, but these are limited in scope. Third, VR&E's policies for approving IL expenditures may not be appropriate as regions were permitted to purchase a range of items without Central Office approval, some of which were costly or questionable. In one case GAO reviewed, Central Office review was not required for expenditures of $17,500 for a boat, motor, trailer, and the boat's shipping, among other items. Finally, VR&E's case management system does not collect information on IL costs and the types of benefits purchased. VR&E also lacks accurate data on the number of IL veterans served. While the law currently allows up to 2,700 veterans to enter the IL track annually, data used to monitor the cap are based on the number of IL plans developed, not on the number of individual veterans admitted. Since veterans can have more than one IL plan in a fiscal year, one veteran could be counted multiple times towards the cap. VA plans to make modifications to its case management system to address this, but officials noted that it could take up to 3 years to obtain funding for this project.
What GAO Found
The IL track--one of five tracks within VA's VR&E program--provides a range of non-employment related benefits to help veterans with service-connected disabilities live more independently when employment is not considered feasible at the time they enter the VR&E program. These benefits can include counseling, assistive devices, and other services or equipment. This testimony is based on GAO's report issued in June 2013, and describes (1) the characteristics of veterans in the IL track, and the types and costs of benefits provided; (2) the extent to which their IL plans were completed, and the time it took to complete them; and (3) the extent to which the IL track has been administered appropriately and consistently across regional offices.
GAO analyzed VA administrative data from fiscal years 2008 to 2011, and reviewed a random, generalizable sample of 182 veterans who entered the IL track in fiscal year 2008. In addition, GAO visited five VA regional offices; interviewed agency officials and staff; and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency policies, procedures, studies, and other documentation.
What GAO Recommends
In its June 2013 report, GAO recommended that VR&E explore options to enhance coordination with VHA, strengthen its oversight of the IL track, and reassess its policy for approving benefits. VA agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-199T | gao_GAO-16-199T_0 | Background
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) established TSA as the primary federal agency with responsibility for securing the nation’s civil aviation system. AIT systems equipped with ATR (AIT-ATR) automatically interpret the image and display anomalies on a generic outline of a passenger instead of displaying images of actual passenger bodies. TSA Has Not Consistently Evaluated the Overall Effectiveness of New Technologies, Programs, and Processes Using Robust Methods of Testing and Evaluation
In our 2014 reviews of TSA’s AIT-ATR systems and Managed Inclusion process, we found that TSA had conducted some testing before adopting the new technology and process, but it had not fully demonstrated their effectiveness. With regard to the AIT-ATR system, in March 2014, we reported that, according to TSA officials, checkpoint security is a function of technology, people, and the processes that govern them; however, we found that TSA did not include each of those factors in determining overall AIT-ATR system performance. AIT-ATR system effectiveness relies on both the technology’s capability to identify threat items and its operators to resolve those threat items. Given that TSA was seeking to procure the second generation of AIT systems, known as AIT-2, we reported that DHS and TSA would be hampered in their ability to ensure that future AIT systems meet mission needs and perform as intended at airports unless TSA evaluated system effectiveness based on both the performance of the AIT-2 technology and screening officers who operate the technology. TSA concurred and has addressed this recommendation. Specifically, in June 2015, TSA provided documentation showing that, while conducting operational testing of the AIT-2 system, the agency considered screening officer performance and measured AIT-2 system effectiveness based on both the performance of the AIT-2 technology and the screening officers who operate it. This should help TSA assess whether this screening system will meet mission needs and perform as intended. TSA Has Not Consistently Established Performance Measures That Fully Reflect Program Goals
In 2014, we reported on two instances in which TSA’s performance measures made it difficult to assess TSA’s performance in meeting its goals. In September 2014, we found that Secure Flight had established program goals that reflect new program functions since implementation began in 2009 to identify additional types of high-risk and also low-risk passengers; however, the program performance measures in place at that time did not allow TSA to fully assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. For example, one program goal was to accurately identify passengers on various watch lists. To assess performance toward this goal, Secure Flight collected various types of data, including the number of passengers TSA identifies as matches to high- and low-risk lists, but did not have measures to assess the extent of system matching errors—for example, the extent to which Secure Flight is missing passengers who are actual matches to these lists. DHS concurred with our recommendation, and, according to TSA officials, as of April 2015, TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis was evaluating its current Secure Flight performance goals and measures and determining what new performance measures should be established to fully measure progress against program goals. TSA Has Not Consistently Used Program Data to Identify Opportunities for Improvement
We have also reported on findings related to program data—such as canine program assessment data and Secure Flight screening error data—that TSA collected but had not analyzed, missing opportunities to refine and further improve TSA programs. In January 2013, we reported that TSA collected and used key canine program data in support of its NEDCTP program, but could better analyze these data to identify program trends. For example, we found that in reviewing short notice assessments (covert tests), TSA did not analyze the results beyond the pass and fail rates. We recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. DHS concurred with our recommendation and has taken actions to address them. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed in each product. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 exposed vulnerabilities in the nation's aviation system, billions of dollars have been spent on a wide range of programs designed to enhance aviation security. Continuing fiscal pressure highlights the need for DHS's TSA, the primary federal agency responsible for aviation security, to allocate its finite resources for the greatest impact.
This testimony addresses the extent to which TSA has (1) evaluated the overall effectiveness of new technologies, programs, and processes using robust methods of testing and evaluation, (2) established performance measures that fully reflect program goals, and (3) used program data to identify opportunities for improvement. This statement is based on findings from GAO reports and testimonies issued from January 2013 through June 2015, with selected updates conducted from April 2015 through October 2015 to, among other things, determine progress made in implementing previous GAO recommendations. For prior work, GAO analyzed TSA policy documents and interviewed TSA officials, among other things. For the updates, GAO reviewed documents and followed up with TSA officials about actions to address GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
Evaluation of new technologies, programs, and processes . GAO has found that TSA has not consistently evaluated the overall effectiveness of new technologies before adopting them. For example, in March 2014, GAO found that TSA testing of certain Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) systems—also referred to as full-body scanners—used to screen passengers at airports did not account for all factors affecting the systems. GAO reported that the effectiveness of AIT systems equipped with automated target recognition software (AIT-ATR)—which display anomalies on a generic passenger outline—relied on both the technology's capability to identify potential threat items and its operators' ability to resolve them. However, GAO found that TSA did not include operators' ability in determining overall AIT-ATR system performance. GAO recommended that TSA, in considering procurement of the next generation of AIT systems (AIT-2), measure system effectiveness based on the performance of both the technology and the screening personnel. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurred and, in June 2015, TSA provided documentation showing that, while conducting operational testing of the AIT-2 system, the agency considered screening officer performance and measured AIT-2 system effectiveness based on both the performance of the AIT-2 technology and the screening officers who operate it. This should help TSA assess whether this screening system will meet mission needs and perform as intended.
Establishment of performance measures. GAO has found that TSA has not consistently established performance measures that fully reflect program goals. For example, in September 2014, GAO found that TSA's performance measures for Secure Flight—a passenger prescreening program—did not allow TSA to fully assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. For example, one program goal was to accurately identify passengers on various watch lists, but TSA did not have measures to assess the extent of system matching errors, such as the extent to which Secure Flight is missing passengers who are actual matches to these lists. GAO recommended that TSA develop such measures. DHS concurred, and, as of April 2015, TSA was evaluating its current Secure Flight performance goals and measures and determining what new performance measures should be established to fully measure progress against program goals.
Use of program data. GAO has also reported on findings related to program data that TSA collected but had not analyzed, missing opportunities to refine and further improve TSA programs. For example, in January 2013, GAO reported that TSA collected and used key program data in support of its National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program, but could better analyze these data to identify program trends. For example, GAO found that in reviewing the results of certain covert tests, TSA did not analyze the results beyond the pass and fail rates, missing an opportunity to identify corrective actions. GAO recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA concurred with GAO's recommendation and has taken actions to address this, including requiring analysis of the reasons for certain failed assessments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to strengthen TSA's aviation security programs. DHS generally agreed and has either addressed or has actions underway to address most of them. Consequently, GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-11-77 | gao_GAO-11-77_0 | Currently, there are no requirements for the long-range statewide transportation plan to include specific project information, a financial plan demonstrating how the plan is to be funded and implemented, performance measures for achieving goals, or a regularly updated schedule, and the state is not required to obtain federal approval for the plan. Draft legislation authorizing surface transportation programs would require USDOT to set transportation planning performance measures for MPOs and require MPOs to develop performance targets to meet those measures. State DOTs Conduct a Variety of Long- and Short-Range Planning Activities, and Surveyed RPOs Are Generally Satisfied Their Needs Are Considered
State DOTs Conduct Several Research Activities to Develop Long-Range Plans, but Many Plans Do Not Include Performance Elements and Project- Specific Information
Through our survey and interviews, we found that state DOTs commonly conduct several research activities in developing their long-range statewide transportation plans, including developing inventories and reviewing existing transportation assets, conducting corridor studies, and using transportation demand models. STIP Development Activities
Research to assess needs. Allocating funding. STIP Project Selection Factors
State DOTs reported that they select projects for inclusion in their STIP based on a range of factors, but funding availability and political and public support were of greater importance than the results of economic analysis of a transportation project’s benefits. Funding, Public Involvement, and Administrative Requirements Are the Primary Challenges in Statewide Planning
State DOTs Report Facing Funding Challenges in Developing Long-Range Plans and STIPs
In our survey, we asked each of the 52 state DOTs, including Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico, to identify the top three challenges that they encountered in developing both their long-range statewide transportation plans and their STIPs. Involving the public. Data limitations. Complying with federal requirements. USDOT Has Limited Oversight Authority of Long-Range Statewide Transportation Plans, and STIP Oversight Focuses on Process
USDOT Has Limited Oversight Authority of Long-Range Statewide Transportation Plans, and Some States’ Plans Are Updated Infrequently
USDOT has limited oversight authority over long-range statewide transportation plans. Pursuant to federal law, USDOT’s oversight of the STIP is focused on a state DOT’s compliance with planning process requirements. Most States Reported Making Some Use of Performance Measurement for Planning, but a Performance-Based Framework Offers Opportunities to Improve Statewide Planning
Most States Reported Using Some Performance Measures and Targets, but Several Challenges Limit Greater Use of Performance Measurement in Planning
In our survey and interviews, state DOTs reported using performance measurement—specifically performance measures and targets—in the statewide transportation planning process. Not surprisingly, state DOTs also reported that safety and asset condition measures were considered to be most useful to the statewide planning process. Forty-one state DOTs reported that identifying indicators for qualitative measures such as livability was a great or very great challenge. Those elements include (1) national transportation goals, (2) collaboratively developed performance measures, (3) appropriate performance targets, and (4) revised federal oversight of statewide planning. USDOT officials reported that a performance-based planning framework would require legislative changes to transition USDOT’s statewide planning oversight role to focus on transportation outcomes, such as whether states are making progress in improving highway safety or maintaining the nation’s transportation assets in a state of good repair. Conclusions
Statewide transportation planning is an important process for deciding how to spend substantial amounts of federal surface transportation funds—almost $46 billion in fiscal year 2009. Actions to accomplish this transition could include identifying specific transportation outcomes for states to address in statewide transportation planning and charging USDOT with assessing states’ progress in achieving these outcomes through its STIP review and approval process, requiring states to update their long-range statewide transportation plans on a prescribed schedule to ensure the effective use of federal planning funds and to address statewide planning outcomes, and requiring USDOT and states to collaboratively develop appropriate performance measures to track progress in achieving planned transportation outcomes. USDOT officials provided technical comments which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through the statewide transportation planning process, states decide how to spend federal transportation funds--almost $46 billion in fiscal year 2009. Draft legislation to reauthorize federal surface transportation legislation would, among other things, revise planning requirements to recognize states' use of rural planning organizations (RPO) and require performance measurement. As requested, GAO examined (1) states' planning activities and RPOs' satisfaction that rural needs are considered, (2) states' planning challenges, (3) the U.S. Department of Transportation's (USDOT) approach to overseeing statewide planning, and (4) states' use of performance measurement and opportunities to make statewide planning more performance based. GAO analyzed planning documents; surveyed departments of transportation in 50 states, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C., and 569 RPOs; interviewed officials in 6 states; and held an expert panel on performance-based planning.
What GAO Found
States conduct a variety of long- and short-range planning activities, and the majority of RPOs surveyed reported being generally satisfied that rural needs are considered. To develop required long-range statewide transportation plans (long-range plans), states conduct research activities, such as inventorying assets and modeling traffic. While the resulting plans generally include some performance elements, such as goals, many plans do not include performance targets. Such targets are not required, but prior GAO work shows that targets are useful tools to indicate progress toward achieving goals. To develop required short-range plans--state transportation improvement programs (STIP)--states assess needs and determine funding allocations. However, in selecting projects, states assigned greater importance to factors such as political and public support than to economic analysis of project benefits and costs. While the majority of surveyed RPOs reported being satisfied that their rural needs were considered, some RPOs reported less satisfaction with their role in allocating funds for rural areas. States commonly cited insufficient or uncertain funding to implement transportation projects among the primary challenges to long- and short-range planning. States also reported that involving the public and addressing transportation data limitations were significant long-range planning challenges. Short-range planning challenges included meeting federal requirements to demonstrate the availability of sufficient project funding and to update the STIP to reflect changes. USDOT has a limited role in the oversight of long-range plans, and pursuant to federal law, its STIP oversight focuses on states' compliance with procedures. Furthermore, USDOT is not required to review long-range plans, states are not required to update them on a schedule, and some states reported infrequent updates. For example, 10 states reported not updating plans since the most recent surface transportation authorization in 2005. Limited USDOT oversight and infrequent updates present risks, including the ineffective use of federal planning funds. For the STIP, USDOT's oversight focuses, as required, on states' compliance with federal planning procedures. Information on whether states achieve outcomes such as reducing congestion is limited. While states are not required to set performance outcomes in planning, most states reported using performance measurement in the areas of safety and asset condition. Several challenges limit broader use of performance measures, including identifying indicators for qualitative measures such as livability and collecting data across transportation modes. Through our expert panel and interviews, we identified several elements that could improve states' use of performance measures, including national goals, federal and state collaboration on developing performance measures, appropriate targets, and revised federal oversight focusing on monitoring states' progress in meeting outcomes. To make statewide planning more performance based, Congress should consider requiring states to update their long-range plans on a prescribed schedule, identifying outcomes for statewide planning and directing USDOT to assess states' progress in achieving them, and requiring USDOT and states to collaboratively develop performance measures. USDOT provided technical comments which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-745 | gao_GAO-08-745_0 | At the start of the Deepwater Program, the Coast Guard chose to use a system-of-systems acquisition strategy that would replace its assets with a single, integrated package of aircraft, vessels, and communications systems through ICGS, a lead system integrator that was responsible for designing, constructing, deploying, supporting and integrating the assets to meet Coast Guard requirements. Coast Guard Has Established a More Accountable Acquisition Organization but Faces Challenges in Building Acquisition Workforce
Acknowledging that the initial approach to Deepwater gave too much control to the contractor, the Coast Guard has reoriented its acquisition organization to position itself to execute systems integration and program management responsibilities formerly carried out by industry. In the midst of these positive changes, the Coast Guard, like other federal agencies, faces challenges in building a capable government workforce to manage this large acquisition. While it attempts to reduce vacancy rates, it is relying on support contractors in key positions. Deepwater Management Improved with Better Use of Project Managers and Government Control over Integrated Product Teams
In conjunction with the restructuring of its acquisition directorate, Coast Guard officials have begun to increase the responsibilities and accountability of the project managers who oversee the acquisition of Deepwater assets. For example, a previous Deepwater management plan emphasized “partnership” between the Coast Guard and ICGS in managing Deepwater and “joint and ICGS responsibility for overall management and execution of the program, including authorization of necessary resources and resolving performance, cost, schedule, and risk tradeoff issues.” Under this scenario, according to Coast Guard officials, project managers could not provide as much direction as they wanted because of the terms of the contract, where ICGS bore ultimate responsibility for outcomes. If the recommendations had been heeded, changes to the ship’s design could have been made earlier and some additional costs may have been avoided. Officials stated that for some specialties, such as cost estimation, the Coast Guard can leverage existing relationships, such as with the Navy. Transition to Asset- by-Asset Approach Results in Greater Visibility and Control, but the Coast Guard Has Not Determined How to Manage System-Level Aspects
The Coast Guard’s move away from the ICGS contract and the system-of- systems model to a more traditional, asset-level acquisition strategy has resulted in greater government visibility and control. Coast Guard Is Not Fully Positioned to Manage Crucial System-Level Aspects of Deepwater
Although the shift to individual acquisitions is intended to provide the Coast Guard with more visibility and control, key aspects still require a system-level approach. The Coast Guard recognizes the need to develop an architecture with common components for use on all assets. The analysis, in general, did not make recommendations about the number of each asset to be procured. Disciplined Project Management Approach Is Beneficial Going Forward, but Key Decision Point Is Missing and Consequences of Prior Decisions May Be Costly
As the Coast Guard moves the Deepwater Program from a system-of- systems acquisition to a more traditional asset-based approach, it is introducing the use of a more disciplined and formalized process under its Major Systems Acquisition Manual (MSAM). This process requires documentation and approval of program activities at key points in a program’s life-cycle. Each milestone requires documentation that captures key information needed for decision making. This requirement would apply to Deepwater, as it has been designated a DHS major investment program. Conclusions
In response to significant problems in achieving its intended outcomes under Deepwater, Coast Guard leadership has made a major change in course in its management and oversight of this program. And because the Coast Guard’s knowledge of the reasonableness of contractors’ proposed cost and schedule targets for Deepwater assets relies in part on visibility into and confidence in the contractors’ earned value management data, the Coast Guard may lack a solid basis to evaluate future proposals by Northrop Grumman until known problems with its data are resolved. The comments from the Department of Homeland Security are included in their entirety in appendix III. 11, 2008). 5, 2008). Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard's Deepwater Program, under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has experienced serious performance and management problems. Deepwater is intended to replace or modernize Coast Guard vessels, aircraft, and the communications and electronic systems that link them together. As of fiscal year 2008, over $4 billion has been appropriated for Deepwater. The Coast Guard awarded a contract in June 2002 to a lead system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), to execute the program using a system-of-systems approach. In response to a Senate report accompanying a Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill, 2008, this GAO report assesses whether the changes the Coast Guard is making to its management and acquisition approach to Deepwater will put it in a position to realize better outcomes. GAO reviewed key program documents and interviewed Coast Guard and contractor personnel.
What GAO Found
Coast Guard leadership is making positive changes to its management and acquisition approach to the Deepwater Program that should put it in a position to realize better outcomes, although challenges to its efforts remain. The Coast Guard has increased accountability by bringing Deepwater under a restructured acquisition function and investing its government project managers with management and oversight responsibilities formerly held by ICGS. Coast Guard project managers and technical experts--as opposed to contractor representatives--now hold the greater balance of management responsibility and accountability for program outcomes. However, like other federal agencies, the Coast Guard has faced obstacles in building an adequate government workforce. It has various initiatives under way to develop and retain a workforce capable of managing this complex acquisition program, but faced with an almost 20 percent vacancy rate, it is relying on support contractors, such as cost estimators, in key positions. The Coast Guard's decision to manage Deepwater under an asset-based approach, rather than as an overall system-of-systems, has resulted in increased government control and visibility over acquisitions. Agency officials have begun to hold competitions for Deepwater assets outside of the ICGS contract. While the asset-based approach is beneficial, certain cross-cutting aspects of Deepwater, such as the program's communications and intelligence components and the numbers of each asset needed, still require a systems-level approach. The Coast Guard recognizes this but is not yet fully positioned to manage these aspects. The Coast Guard has begun to follow the disciplined, project management framework of its Major Systems Acquisition Manual (MSAM), which requires documentation and high-level executive approval of decisions at key points in a program's life cycle. But the consequences of not following this approach in the past are now evident, as Deepwater assets have been delivered without a determination of whether their planned capabilities would meet mission needs. The MSAM process currently allows limited initial production to proceed before the majority of design activities have been completed. In addition, a disconnect between MSAM requirements and current practice exists because DHS had earlier delegated to the Coast Guard all Deepwater acquisition decisions, resulting in little departmental oversight. Coast Guard project managers and decision makers are now receiving information intended to help manage project outcomes, but some key information is unreliable. The earned value management data reported by ICGS lacks sufficient transparency to be useful to Coast Guard program managers, and subcontractor Northrop Grumman's system for producing the data may need to be re-certified to ensure its reliability. Officials state that they are addressing these issues through joint efforts with the Navy and the Defense Contract Management Agency. |
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