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gao_NSIAD-96-63 | gao_NSIAD-96-63_0 | The remaining 212,000 personnel are in headquarters units and units that support combat. The Guard’s eight combat divisions and three separate combat units are not required to accomplish the two-conflict strategy, according to Army war planners and war planning documents that we reviewed. The Guard’s 15 enhanced brigades are the principal reserve component ground combat forces. Guard Combat and Support Structure Exceeds State Mission Needs
The Guard has a wide range of state missions. Study of Guard Combat Structure
The Army is studying the redesign of the Guard’s combat structure to meet critical shortages in support capabilities. review the Army’s future unresourced support requirements, review the structure and missions of the Guard combat elements and develop options for changing the structure to meet future Army requirements, conduct a resource feasibility assessment of the options to determine whether the Army possesses or is able to program the resources needed to equip and maintain the redesigned structure, and refine and prioritize the options for presentation to the Army leadership by March 1996. The Commission determined that the Army’s combat structure exceeds the requirements for a two major regional conflict scenario and concluded that reserve component forces with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill shortfalls in higher priority areas. Because the Guard’s combat forces exceed projected war requirements and the Army’s analysis indicates a shortage of support forces, we believe it is appropriate for the Army to study the conversion of some Guard combat forces to support roles. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) roles and missions of the Army National Guard's combat units; and (2) efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army to redesign the Guard's combat divisions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) despite reductions, the Army National Guard's combat units may still be too large for projected war requirements; (2) the Guard's eight remaining combat divisions and three separate combat units are not needed to meet the two-conflict strategy or any probable conflict scenarios; (3) DOD considers the excess Guard forces to be a strategic reserve that could be used as occupational and rotational forces, a deterrent against aggressive regimes, and support for civilian authorities, but it did not present any analytical support for the continued force levels; (4) DOD has not finalized plans for 15 enhanced Guard combat brigades, and fewer than 15 may be needed; (5) state missions often require more support skills and equipment than Guard combat forces, which usually supplement other state resources in emergencies; (6) over the last decade, states have needed only a fraction of the Guard's personnel to meet their emergency requirements; (7) the Army is studying ways that the Guard could meet critical shortages in its support capabilities; and (8) DOD believes that since Guard forces exceed combat needs, reserve components with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to meet higher priorities. |
gao_GAO-16-430 | gao_GAO-16-430_0 | States are also responsible for customer service in their UI programs. In addition to state UI benefits, the Federal- State Extended Benefit Program provides additional weeks of benefits during high and rising unemployment. Claimants Faced Challenges Filing Claims by Phone and Accessing Services in Other Languages, and Most States Collect Some Information on Claimant Challenges
Claimants in Our Focus Groups Reported Experiencing Long Call Wait Times and Difficulty Using Automated Phone Systems
Claimant Quote “It’s pretty much been the same, the same problems as in 2009 when I first applied, specifically, the wait times, trying to get a hold of someone taking so long. For example, 38 states (88 percent)—including the three we visited—reported collecting data on the total number of calls answered by program representatives and average call wait times. Many States Reported Facing Challenges, and Most Have Taken Some Steps to Improve Customer Service, Such as Increasing Self-Service
States responding to our survey reported facing various customer service challenges—such as staffing, outdated IT systems, funding constraints — which may help explain some of the challenges reported by claimants in our focus groups. Many States Reported Providing or Planning to Provide Self-Service and Other Practices to Ease Customers Claims Filing Experiences
Many states reported that they took or are planning to take some actions to improve customer service, such as providing self-service options on state UI program websites and implementing automated telephone systems (see fig. DOL Provides States with Monitoring and Assistance on Some Aspects of Customer Service, and Has Taken Steps to Share Successful State Practices
DOL’s Monitoring and Assistance Efforts Address Some Aspects of Customer Service
DOL’s ETA monitors states on a range of UI performance measures, some of which directly address certain aspects of customer service. Specifically, ETA measures the timeliness of first payments to eligible claimants and of appeals decisions and assesses the accuracy of two types of non-monetary eligibility determinations. ETA has also provided states with technical assistance or guidance on IT modernization, staffing issues, and program access, which were reported as customer service challenges by states and advocacy groups. Regarding program access, in October 2015, ETA issued guidance directing states to ensure that all individuals—including individuals with limited English proficiency, individuals with disabilities, and older individuals—can effectively access the UI program. Several States Reported They Could Benefit From More Information on Other States’ Successful Practices, and ETA Plans to Share Such Practices on an Ongoing Basis
Officials in all three states we visited told us that they have consulted with other states to learn from their experiences administering the UI program. Furthermore, ETA is currently in the process of conducting a national study of UI call center operations which officials expect will identify best practices on a range of issues, including staffing. When these efforts are completed, ETA plans to share the best practices it identifies with all states it its online community of practice. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) the customer service challenges, if any, recent Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants have faced, and the extent to which states collect information on claimants’ challenges, (2) any challenges states have faced in providing customer service to UI claimants, and any improvements they have made, and (3) the extent to which Department of Labor (DOL) monitors states’ customer service efforts and provides assistance to help them make improvements. To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; conducted a survey of state unemployment insurance (UI) programs; interviewed DOL and state UI programs officials; conducted site visits to 3 states; and held 6 focus groups with recent UI claimants in all 3 site visit states. The survey included questions about available methods for filing UI claims in each state, the status of information technology (IT) systems modernization in each state, the data states collect related to customer service, the challenges that states have experienced with respect to UI claims during the recent recession and during the previous 12 months, the practices that states have implemented to improve customer service, and the views of state UI officials about the assistance that DOL has provided related to customer service. The results from our interviews with state UI programs and ETA regional offices are not generalizable. We conducted these focus groups in September 2015. All of the participants selected for the focus groups were fluent English speakers. | Why GAO Did This Study
UI benefits are a critical source of income for millions of unemployed Americans. Overseen federally by DOL and administered by states, the UI program requested $32.5 billion in benefits in fiscal year 2015 for approximately 7 million UI claims. During the 2007-2009 recession, states faced challenges processing record numbers of claims, and questions were raised about the quality of customer service. GAO was asked to review customer service issues in state UI programs.
GAO examined (1) customer service challenges, if any, recent UI claimants have faced and the extent to which states collect information on claimants' challenges, (2) any challenges states have faced providing customer service to claimants, and any improvements they have made, and (3) the extent to which DOL monitors states' customer service efforts and provides assistance to help them make improvements.
GAO surveyed state UI programs in 50 states and the District of Columbia (with 48 responding); interviewed officials from state UI programs and advocacy groups in California, New York, and Texas (selected for geographical diversity and large numbers of UI claims); and conducted six focus groups with recent UI claimants in these three states. Focus group results are not generalizable, but provide important insights into the experiences of some UI claimants. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws and DOL guidance.
What GAO Found
In GAO focus groups of recent claimants filing for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, those who filed by phone reported experiencing various challenges, such as long call wait times; however, those filing for benefits online reported that it was generally easy to do. In all six of the focus groups GAO conducted in the three states it visited, individuals who had claimed benefits by phone between July 2014 and July 2015 reported experiencing challenges with the state UI program's customer service. GAO defined customer service as including ease of program access, courtesy, timeliness, and accuracy, as well as responsiveness to customer needs and expectations. Some participants in all six focus groups reported experiencing long call wait times and difficulties using automated phone systems. In addition, in two of the states visited, representatives of advocacy groups reported that special populations, including individuals with limited English proficiency, had difficulty accessing the UI program. In GAO's survey of state UI programs, most states—including those GAO visited— reported collecting some data on customer service challenges for claimants. For example, 38 states reported collecting data on average call wait times.
Many states reported challenges in providing customer service, including staffing issues, and most have taken some steps to improve customer service, such as increasing self-service options. Specifically, more than half the states GAO surveyed reported insufficient staffing, outdated Information Technology (IT) systems, and funding constraints, all of which could play a role in claimant challenges. Many states also reported that they have taken or are planning to take some actions to improve customer service. For example, 45 states reported taking action to provide self-service options, and 42 states reported taking action to provide customer service training to program representatives.
The Department of Labor's (DOL) Employment and Training Administration (ETA) provides states with monitoring and assistance on some aspects of customer service. ETA monitors and measures state performance on the timeliness of benefit payments and appeals decisions. ETA also monitors and measures the accuracy of states' non-monetary eligibility determinations, such as whether states accurately assess reasons for claimants' separation from employment. In addition, ETA provides states with various technical assistance. ETA has provided states with assistance on IT modernization, staffing issues, and program access for special populations. UI program officials in the three states GAO visited said they could benefit from more information on other states' successful customer service practices, including practices for addressing continuing staffing and IT challenges. ETA plans to share these practices on an ongoing basis, officials said. For example, officials said ETA plans to share successful practices—including those related to staffing—obtained from its national study of call center operations through its online community of practice. ETA also plans to continue to collect lessons learned from state IT system modernization efforts and disseminate them to states.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-15-772 | gao_GAO-15-772_0 | Suppression. Federal Wildland Fire Policy History
Federal wildland fire management policy has evolved over the past century in response to changing landscape conditions and greater recognition of fire’s role in maintaining resilient and healthy ecosystems. Agencies Have Made Several Key Changes in Their Approach to Wildland Fire Management Since 2009
Since 2009, the five federal agencies have made several changes in their approach to wildland fire management. In collaboration with nonfederal partners such as tribal and state governments, they have also developed a strategy aimed at coordinating federal and nonfederal wildland fire management activities around common goals, such as managing landscapes for resilience to fire-related disturbances. The extent to which the agencies’ actions have resulted in on-the-ground changes varied across agencies and regions, however, and officials identified factors, such as proximity to populated areas, that may limit their implementation of some of these actions. Agencies Assess Effectiveness of Their Programs in Several Ways, but Have Not Consistently Conducted Reviews That Could Improve Responses to Wildland Fires
The agencies assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs in several ways, including through performance measures, efforts to assess specific activities, and reviews of specific wildland fire incidents. Both the Forest Service and Interior are developing new performance measures and evaluations, in part to help better assess the results of their current emphasis on risk-based management, according to agency officials. Forest Service and Interior Agencies Have Not Consistently Conducted Reviews of Wildland Fire Incidents to Assess their Effectiveness
The Forest Service and the Interior agencies have conducted reviews to assess their effectiveness in responding to wildland fires but have not consistently followed agency policy in doing so and did not always use specific criteria for selecting the fires they have reviewed. Moreover, officials did not provide a time frame for completing their update. Within Interior, BLM officials told us BLM completed its last fire review based on significant cost (i.e., federal expenditures of $10 million or more) in 2013. This is consistent with our previous body of work on performance management, which has shown that it is important for agencies to collect performance information to inform key management decisions, such as how to identify problems and take corrective actions and how to identify and share effective approaches. For suppression, the Forest Service and Interior manage funding as needed for units to respond to individual wildland fires. Interior is working to develop a system that likewise reflects current conditions. Each year, the agencies estimate the expected level of funding for suppression activities using the average of the previous 10 years of suppression obligations. Draft guidance provided by the Forest Service did not contain specific criteria for such reviews, however, and Interior officials did not provide information about how they planned to develop criteria or the factors they would consider. By developing specific criteria for selecting fires to review and conducting the reviews, and making commensurate changes to agency policies to help ensure the criteria are consistently applied, the agencies may enhance their ability to ensure that their fire reviews provide useful information and meaningful results. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that the agencies have sufficient information to understand the effectiveness of their approach to wildland fires, and to better position them to develop appropriate and effective strategies for wildland fire management, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior direct the Chief of the Forest Service and the Director of the Office of Wildland Fire to take the following two actions:
Develop specific criteria for selecting wildland fires for review and for conducting the reviews as part of their efforts to improve their approach to reviewing fires, and
Once such criteria are established, revise agency policies to align with the specific criteria developed by the agencies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) key changes the federal wildland fire agencies have made in their approach to wildland fire management since 2009, (2) how the agencies assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs, and (3) how the agencies determine the distribution of their wildland fire management resources. During these semistructured interviews we asked about (1) significant changes to the agencies’ approach to wildland fire management, including regional efforts to implement the policy areas identified in the 2009 interagency Guidance for Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, (2) agency efforts to assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management activities, and (3) agency processes for determining the distribution of fire management resources. Appendix II: Forest Service and Interior Agency Obligations for Preparedness, Fuel Reduction, and Suppression, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2014
This appendix provides information on preparedness, fuel reduction, and suppression obligations by the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior’s four wildland fire agencies—the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service—for fiscal years 2004 through 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
Wildland fire plays an important ecological role in maintaining healthy ecosystems. Over the past century, however, various land management practices, including fire suppression, have disrupted the normal frequency of fires and have contributed to larger and more severe wildland fires. Wildland fires cost billions to fight each year, result in loss of life, and cause damage to homes and infrastructure. In fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the five federal wildland fire agencies obligated a total of $8.3 billion to suppress wildland fires.
GAO was asked to review multiple aspects of federal wildland fire management across the five federal wildland fire management agencies. This report examines (1) key changes the federal wildland fire agencies have made in their approach to wildland fire management since 2009, (2) how the agencies assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs, and (3) how the agencies determine the distribution of their wildland fire management resources. GAO reviewed laws, policies, and guidance related to wildland fire management; reviewed agency performance measures; analyzed obligation data for fiscal years 2004 through 2014; and interviewed officials from the five agencies, as well as Interior's Office of Wildland Fire.
What GAO Found
Since 2009, the five federal agencies responsible for wildland fire management—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service in the Department of the Interior—have made several key changes in their approach to wildland fire management. One key change was the issuance of agency guidance in 2009 that provided managers with more flexibility in responding to wildland fires. This change allowed managers to consider different options for response given land management objectives and the risk posed by the fire. The agencies also worked with nonfederal partners to develop a strategy aimed at coordinating wildland fire management activities around common goals. The extent to which the agencies' steps have resulted in on-the-ground changes varied across agencies and regions, however, and officials identified factors, such as proximity to populated areas, that may limit their implementation of some changes.
The agencies assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs in several ways, including through performance measures and reviews of specific wildland fires. The agencies are developing new performance measures, in part to help better assess the results of their current emphasis on risk-based management, according to agency officials. However, the agencies have not consistently followed agency policy regarding fire reviews, which calls for reviews of all fires resulting in federal suppression expenditures of $10 million or more, nor have they used specific criteria for the reviews they have conducted. GAO has previously found that it is important for agencies to collect performance information to inform key management decisions and to identify problems and take corrective actions. Forest Service and Interior officials said focusing only on suppression costs does not allow them to identify the most useful fires for review, and they told GAO they are working to improve their criteria for selecting fires to review and conducting these reviews. Forest Service officials did not indicate a time frame for their efforts, and while they provided a draft update of their policy manual, it did not contain specific criteria. Interior officials told GAO they expect to develop criteria by the end of 2015, but did not provide information about how they planned to develop such criteria or the factors they would consider. By developing specific criteria for selecting fires to review and conducting reviews, and making commensurate changes to agency policies, the agencies may enhance their ability to help ensure that their fire reviews provide useful information about the effectiveness of their wildland fire activities.
The Forest Service and Interior determine the distribution of fire management resources for three primary wildland fire activities of suppression, preparedness, and fuel reduction in part on the basis of historical funding amounts. For suppression, the Forest Service and Interior manage suppression funding as needed for responding to wildland fires, estimating required resources using the average of the previous 10 years of suppression obligations. For preparedness and fuel reduction, the Forest Service and Interior distribute resources based primarily on historical amounts. Both are working to distribute resources in ways that better reflect current conditions, including developing new systems that they stated they plan to begin using in fiscal year 2016.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the agencies develop specific criteria for selecting wildland fires for review and conducting the reviews, and revise agency policies accordingly. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-103 | gao_T-AIMD-96-103_0 | VBA has, however, been proceeding without an overall business strategy clearly setting forth how it will improve its performance and tackle entrenched service-delivery problems. VBA is in the process of restructuring its regional offices in an effort to cope with declining resources. A comprehensive business strategy is needed—one that includes developing strategic and information resources management plans, setting performance goals and measures, and incorporating the results of major agency initiatives, such as business process reengineering. VBA is moving in this direction; currently, however, it has no clearly articulated business strategy. Assistance in this area could come from the National Academy of Public Administration, which has recently been commissioned by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Customer-focused goals, aimed at improving the quality of service, are needed. In response to concerns raised by us and others over the past 3 years, VBA is preparing to reengineer its compensation and pension claims-processing operations, and has taken several positive steps. For example, the Information Technology Management and Reform Act and the Paperwork Reduction Act require agency heads to analyze the agency’s mission and, on the basis of this analysis, revise business processes as appropriate; design and implement a process for maximizing the value and assessing and managing the risks of information technology acquisitions; integrate budgetary, financial, and program management decisions in this process; and use this process to select, control, and evaluate the results of information technology initiatives. VBA needs to make major improvements in the way it manages its information technology investments to meet these legislative requirements. Another risk is that this project was not following sound systems-development practices. The need for more rigorous management and technical methods is critical if VBA is to successfully develop modern, efficient, and cost-effective business processes and computer systems that will allow them to deliver truly improved services to veterans. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Veterans Benefits Administration's (VBA) efforts to modernize and streamline its business processes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VBA is experiencing information technology acquisition problems and serious management and technical weaknesses; (2) VBA needs to adopt a clearly articulated business strategy to solve its service-delivery problems, coordinate its reengineering efforts, and cope with constrained resources; (3) VBA is developing strategic and information resources management plans that it will use in preparing its fiscal year 1998 budget request; (4) the National Academy of Public Administration will assess ways to make VBA claims processing more efficient; (5) VBA needs to develop performance goals and measures aimed at improving the quality of service; (6) VBA is reengineering its compensation and pension business processes, but it must improve its management of its information technology investments by developing critical cost, benefit, and risk information; (7) VBA has acquired some computer equipment before completing its reengineering analysis and may have to discard the equipment; and (8) VBA is not following sound software and systems development practices. |
gao_GAO-06-473 | gao_GAO-06-473_0 | DOD has developed procedures and guidance, created an organization to integrate contingency plans, and planned and conducted some training and exercises. DOD’s operational planning is incomplete because it is developing BMDS in a unique way and exempted BMDS from the department’s traditional requirements guidance. DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System
DOD has taken positive steps in planning to operate the BMDS. DOD officials agreed that planning for new weapon systems articulated in requirements guidance generally includes critical planning elements such as establishing operational criteria, identifying personnel requirements, developing training programs, completing successful testing, and establishing readiness reporting. This was done, in part, to identify budget requirements. We and DOD have repeatedly recognized the need to link resources to capabilities to facilitate DOD’s decision making and congressional oversight. Without the ability to clearly identify and assess the total ballistic missile defense operational costs, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress has complete information to use when making funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities; provide assurance that DOD’s plans to field ballistic missile defense capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of operating the New Triad. Complete and Transparent Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs Are Not Visible in DOD’s FYDP
Complete costs to operate ballistic missile defense elements that will be fielded between fiscal years 2006-2011 are not visible to DOD or Congress in the FYDP because the current FYDP structure does not provide a way to identify and aggregate all ballistic missile defense system operational costs. Several Factors Impair the Completeness and Transparency of Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs
The completeness and transparency of operational costs for ballistic missile defense system elements are impaired by four primary factors: (1) operational costs are included in many program elements and there is no mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2) the Missile Defense Agency is authorized to use research and development funds to pay for operational costs, (3) DOD has not included all known operational costs in its budget estimates, and (4) DOD has not yet identified all costs associated with the New Triad, of which the ballistic missile defense system is an important part. Without operational criteria, it may be difficult for the Secretary of Defense to objectively assess combatant commands’ and services’ preparations to conduct BMDS operations and the Secretary may not have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers requests to fund operations. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and identifying responsibility for ensuring necessary actions, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions and assure itself or Congress that all of the necessary pieces will be in place before declaring either limited defense operations or subsequent blocks of capability operational. In addition, it will be difficult for DOD to determine whether the return on its significant development investment in BMDS can be realized. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress in planning to operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), and to determine whether the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on total ballistic missile defense operational costs, we conducted various analyses, reviewed key documentation, and interviewed relevant DOD officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the mid-1980s to develop a capability to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. In 2002, recognizing the new security environment after the September 11 attacks, President Bush directed that an initial set of defensive ballistic missile capabilities be put in place in 2004. Although DOD is developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to meet an urgent need, preparing to operate and support a system under continuous development poses significant challenges. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in planning to operate the BMDS, and (2) the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on BMDS operational costs.
What GAO Found
DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not established criteria that would have to be met before declaring BMDS operational, nor has DOD resolved security issues or completed training and personnel plans. DOD officials agree that operational criteria are typically established and met prior to declaring a system operational, and that planning for new systems includes identifying personnel requirements, developing training programs, and identifying logistics and maintenance requirements. DOD has developed BMDS procedures and guidance, created an organization to integrate planning and operational support, and conducted some training and exercises. However, DOD has not established formal criteria for declaring that limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability are operational or completed planning for security, training, and personnel. DOD has not done this because it is developing BMDS in a unique way and BMDS is exempted from traditional requirements guidance. Without specific operational criteria, the Secretary of Defense will not be in a sound position to objectively assess combatant commands' and services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations nor have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers requests to fund operations. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and identification of responsibility for ensuring necessary actions have been completed, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions, assure itself or Congress that the necessary pieces are in place before declaring the system operational, and determine whether the return on its significant development investment in BMDS can be realized. The FYDP, a major source of budget information, does not provide complete and transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs. DOD and GAO have repeatedly recognized the need to link resources to capabilities to facilitate decision making and oversight. However, complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs are not visible in the FYDP because the FYDP's structure does not provide a way to identify and aggregate these costs. Four primary factors impair the visibility of ballistic missile defense operational costs in the current FYDP structure: (1) operational costs are included in many program elements and there is no mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2) the Missile Defense Agency is authorized to use research and development funds to pay for operational costs, (3) DOD has not included all known operational costs in its budget estimates, and (4) DOD has not identified all costs associated with the New Triad, of which BMDS is an important part. Without the ability to identify and assess total ballistic missile defense operational costs, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress has complete information to make funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities; provide assurance that ballistic missile defense capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of employing the New Triad. |
gao_GAO-06-738T | gao_GAO-06-738T_0 | Key to this collaboration will be the work of JPDO’s seven partner agencies: the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. ATO Has Taken Steps to Improve ATC Modernization, but Challenges Remain
To improve its management of ATC modernization, ATO has taken steps toward having a more results-oriented culture; a flatter, more accountable management structure; and more businesslike management and acquisition processes. For the past 2 fiscal years, FAA has met its acquisition performance goals. ATO has begun to revise its business processes to increase accountability. The technical difficulties encountered with LAAS, among other things, led FAA to suspend this acquisition. ATO Faces Human Capital Challenges in Creating a More Results-Oriented Culture and Hiring and Training Thousands of Air Traffic Controllers
ATO faces a challenge in sustaining and institutionalizing management focus on its transformation to an effective PBO and a results-oriented culture. In the past, air traffic controllers were permanently assigned to FAA’s major system acquisition program offices and provided input into air traffic control modernization projects. I will now discuss the status of JPDO’s planning efforts. JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS, but Faces Challenges and Opportunities in Several Areas
JPDO has engaged in practices that facilitate collaboration among its partner agencies, but faces challenges in continuing to leverage resources from these agencies and in defining the roles and responsibilities of the various entities involved. JPDO has been structured to involve both federal and nonfederal stakeholders, but maintaining the support of nonfederal stakeholders over the long term and soliciting the participation of some stakeholders may prove difficult. ATO has primary responsibility for the ATC system’s current and near-term modernization, while JPDO has responsibility for planning and coordinating a transformation to NGATS over the next 20 years. However, as mentioned, no current air traffic controllers are involved in NGATS. Two fundamental pieces of this technical planning are modeling and developing an enterprise architecture (a tool, or blueprint, for understanding and planning complex systems). Development of the NGATS enterprise architecture is critical to JPDO’s planning efforts, and many of JPDO’s future activities will depend on the robustness and timeliness of its architecture development. ATO Has Begun to Take a Number of Steps to Address Rising Operating Costs
To address rising operating costs and improve performance, ATO has developed a formal cost control program that includes completing the development of a cost accounting system and using information from the system to conduct activity value analysis—that is, to assess the value of its products and services to its customers. The cost control program also includes conducting annual business case reviews, primarily for its capital programs, and assisting Congress in identifying funding priorities. To control costs, ATO is decommissioning and consolidating ATC facilities, improving its contract management, pursuing cost reduction opportunities through outsourcing, and avoiding or reducing personnel costs through workforce attrition and efficiency gains. However, ATO has thousands of navigational aids in use, many of which could be decommissioned during the transition to NGATS. Also, much of the NGATS planning and implementation depends on the development of the NGATS enterprise architecture. Going forward, efforts to control costs and leverage resources will become even more critical. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over a decade ago, GAO listed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) effort to modernize the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system as a high-risk program because of systemic management and acquisition problems. Two relatively new offices housed within FAA--the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)--are now primarily responsible for planning and implementing these modernization efforts. Congress created ATO to be a performance-based organization that would improve both the agency's culture, structure, and processes, and the ATC modernization program's performance and accountability. Congress created JPDO, made up of seven partner agencies, to coordinate the federal and nonfederal stakeholders necessary to plan a transition from the current air transportation system to the "next generation air transportation system" (NGATS). This statement is based on GAO's recently completed and ongoing studies of the ATC modernization program. GAO provides information on (1) the status of ATO's efforts to improve the ATC modernization program, (2) the status of JPDO's planning efforts for NGATS, and (3) actions to control costs and leverage resources for ATC modernization and the transformation to NGATS.
What GAO Found
ATO has taken a number of steps as a performance-based organization to improve the ATC modernization program, but continued management attention will be required to institutionalize these initiatives. ATO has adopted core values, streamlined its management, and begun to revise its acquisition processes to become more businesslike and accountable. For the past 2 years, ATO has met its major acquisition performance goals. ATO still faces challenges, including sustaining its transformation to a results-oriented culture, hiring and training thousands of air traffic controllers, and ensuring stakeholder involvement in major system acquisitions. JPDO has made progress in planning for NGATS by facilitating collaboration among federal agencies, ensuring the participation of federal and nonfederal stakeholders, addressing technical planning, and factoring global harmonization into its planning, but JPDO faces challenges in continuing to leverage the partner agencies' resources and in defining the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies involved. JPDO could find it difficult to sustain the support of stakeholders over the longer term and to generate participation from some key stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers. JPDO has taken steps to develop an enterprise architecture (the blueprint for NGATS) and will have an early version later this year. The robustness and timeliness of this enterprise architecture are critical to many of JPDO's future NGATS planning activities. ATO has taken a number of actions to control costs and maximize capital funds, which will become increasingly important during the transition to NGATS. ATO has established cost control as one of its key performance metrics, developed a cost accounting system, and is using its performance management system to hold its managers accountable for controlling costs. ATO has developed a formal cost control program that includes, among other things, (1) conducting annual business case reviews for its capital programs, (2) decommissioning and consolidating ATC facilities, and (3) pursuing cost reduction opportunities through outsourcing. These cost control initiatives represent an important first step to improved performance but will require review and monitoring. |
gao_GAO-06-468 | gao_GAO-06-468_0 | The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (the fees legislation) directed the Park Service to establish air tour fees by October 1, 1993. Congress directed FAA and the Park Service to work together to regulate air tours over park units in the National Parks Overflights Act of 1987 (Grand Canyon Act) and the National Parks Air Tour Management Act of 2000 (Air Tour Management Act). Largely through Voluntary Compliance, the Park Service Has Collected Some, but Not All, Air Tour Fees at Three Park Units
The Park Service, relying largely on voluntary compliance, has collected some, but not all, air tour fees from air tour operators at Grand Canyon, Haleakala, and Hawaii Volcanoes. However, voluntary compliance with the air tour fee requirement has been inconsistent across the three park units, and several operators are not paying the required fees. For example, we found that 13 of the 21 air tour operators that conducted air tours over Grand Canyon from May 2000 through December 2003, underpaid their air tour fees by more than $1.5 million. The Park Service Cannot Verify Air Tour Activity Over the Three Park Units
The Park Service is unable to verify the number of air tours that operators conduct over Grand Canyon, Haleakala, and Hawaii Volcanoes, thus limiting the agency’s ability to ensure that operators are making all the required payments. Except for Grand Canyon, current laws and regulations do not require air tour operators to record and report their air tour activity over national park units to either the Park Service or FAA. Consequently, the Park Service relies on air tour operators to voluntarily report all their air tours and pay the required fees. The Park Service Cannot Effectively Enforce Compliance Due to the Lack of Air Tour Data
The Park Service—the agency charged with collecting air tour fees—has limited ability to enforce compliance because it does not have jurisdiction over airspace and lacks sufficient air tour data. Conversely, FAA—the agency with authority over airspace and air tour operators—is not required to assist with collecting, or enforcing the collection of, air tour fees. As a result, both Park Service and FAA officials told us the agencies currently have little or no ability to take enforcement action against noncompliant operators. Different Geographic Applicability of Two Laws Complicates Efforts to Collect Air Tour Fees
The fees legislation and the Air Tour Management Act and/or their respective implementing guidelines and regulations have different geographic applicability, which complicates the Park Service’s efforts to collect air tour fees. As a result, only one additional park unit, Hawaii Volcanoes, has qualified to charge fees in the past 12 years. Expanding air tour fees to other park units could generate additional funding for the Park Service, but such an expansion would require a legislative change and should be balanced against any potential impacts on air tour operators. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve compliance with air tour fee payments and to help understand the impacts of such fees on air tour operators’ businesses, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of FAA to take the following two actions: Establish a procedure for air tour operators at Grand Canyon National Park to report their air tour information simultaneously to the Park Service and FAA, or ensure that the air tour information is forwarded to the Park Service once it is reported to FAA by air tour operators. We then adjusted these figures to express them in inflation-adjusted 2005 dollars. To identify what factors hinder the collection of air tour fees, and to provide information on the possible expansion of air tour fees to additional park units, we considered the results of our January 2006 report, particularly the sections on the lack of data on air tour activity over park units and the Park Service’s not funding its share of the cost of developing air tour management plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (the fees legislation) required the National Park Service to begin collecting fees from operators that conduct air tours over national park units that meet certain criteria. Currently, only Grand Canyon, Haleakala, and Hawaii Volcanoes National Parks meet the criteria to charge air tour fees. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in cooperation with the Park Service, also regulates air tours over park units pursuant to the National Parks Overflights Act of 1987 and the National Parks Air Tour Management Act of 2000. GAO was asked to (1) assess the Park Service's collection of air tour fees and (2) identify what factors, if any, hinder the collection of air tour fees. GAO is also providing information on the possible expansion of air tour fees to additional park units.
What GAO Found
Relying largely on voluntary compliance, the Park Service has collected some, but not all, fees from air tour operators at Grand Canyon, Haleakala, and Hawaii Volcanoes National Parks. After passage of the fees legislation, these three park units instituted air tour fees in 1994 by requesting operators to voluntarily report their air tours and pay appropriate fees monthly. Since then, the Park Service has collected about $19 million at the three park units (in inflation-adjusted 2005 dollars). However, voluntary compliance with the air tour fee requirement has been inconsistent, and several operators are not paying the required fees. For example, GAO found that 13 of the 21 operators conducting air tours over Grand Canyon underpaid their air tour fees for calendar years 2000 through 2003 by more than $1.5 million. The Park Service's ability to collect air tour fees is hindered by several factors. The Park Service cannot verify air tour activity over the three park units. Air tour operators are not required to record and report to either the Park Service or FAA their number of air tours over park units, except for Grand Canyon. Operators at Grand Canyon are required to report their air tours only to FAA. Consequently, the Park Service relies on operators to voluntarily report their air tours and pay the required fees. A GAO January 2006 report recommended that FAA take steps to require operators to report to both agencies their air tours over park units under the 2000 air tour act, including Haleakala and Hawaii Volcanoes. The Park Service cannot effectively enforce compliance due to the lack of air tour data. The Park Service has limited ability to enforce compliance because it does not have jurisdiction over airspace and lacks sufficient air tour data. Conversely, FAA is not required to assist with collecting, or enforcing the collection of, air tour fees. As a result, both Park Service and FAA officials told GAO, the agencies have little or no ability to take enforcement action against noncompliant operators. Different geographic applicability of two laws complicates efforts to collect air tour fees. The fees legislation and the 2000 air tour act have different geographic applicability, which has complicated the Park Service's collection efforts. Air tour fees are currently charged at only 3 of the 86 park units with air tours, based on the criteria established in the fees legislation. Expanding air tour fees to other park units could generate additional funding for the Park Service, but such an expansion would require a legislative change and should be balanced against potential impacts on air tour operators. Legislation could explicitly provide that the additional funding may be used to develop the air tour management plans required by the 2000 air tour act. Regarding the potential impacts on air tour operators, the 2000 air tour act directed FAA to prepare a report to Congress on this subject by October 2000. FAA has drafted the report but has not submitted it to Congress. |
gao_GAO-03-843 | gao_GAO-03-843_0 | With the passage of the Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, TSA, along with over 20 other agencies, was transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Size and Diversity of Transportation Modes Create Security Challenges
The size of the transportation system makes it difficult to adequately secure. The transportation system’s extensive infrastructure crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The extensiveness of the infrastructure as well as the sheer volume of freight and passengers moved through the system creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists. The Number of Stakeholders Creates Challenges
Securing the transportation system is made more difficult because of the number of stakeholders involved. The sluggish economy has further weakened the transportation industry’s financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional amounts made available. The roles of the federal agencies in securing the nation’s transportation system, however, are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. TSA is also planning to establish security standards for all modes of transportation and is launching a number of new security efforts for the maritime and land transportation modes. First, the transportation system is intermodal, interdependent, and international. TSA’s and DOT’s Roles and Responsibilities Have Not Been Clearly Defined
The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with their security efforts. While TSA was primarily focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations launched various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and land transportation modes. Through these structured interviews we collected information on the challenges that exist in securing the transportation system, vulnerabilities of different modes, actions that transportation stakeholders—including the federal, state, and local governments and the operators—have taken to enhance security since September 11, TSA’s and DOT’s ongoing and planned security efforts, roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system, and future security actions that industry associations and security experts believe are needed. The report credits TSA for meeting a number of aviation security deadlines during its first year of existence and highlights the efforts of DOT modal administrations and other federal agencies to improve the security of all modes since September 11. | Why GAO Did This Study
The economic well being of the U.S. is dependent on the expeditious flow of people and goods through the transportation system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. TSA was recently transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO was asked to examine the challenges in securing the transportation system and the federal role and actions in transportation security.
What GAO Found
Securing the nation's transportation system is fraught with challenges. The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer volume of passengers and freight moved makes it both an attractive target and difficult to secure. Addressing the security concerns of the transportation system is further complicated by the number of transportation stakeholders that are involved in security decisions, including government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, and thousands of private sector companies. Further exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has weakened the transportation industry's financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional amounts made available. It will take a collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing and future transportation challenges. Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance security. At the federal level, TSA primarily focused on meeting aviation security deadlines during its first year of existence and DOT launched a variety of security initiatives to enhance the other modes of transportation. For example, the Federal Transit Administration provided grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the largest transit agencies, among other things. TSA has recently focused more on the security of the maritime and land transportation modes and is planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation starting this summer. DOT is also continuing their security efforts. However, the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system have not been clearly defined, which creates the potential for overlap, duplication, and confusion as both entities move forward with their security efforts. |
gao_GAO-15-82 | gao_GAO-15-82_0 | According to its 2014 Chief FOIA Officer Report, DHS and its component agencies reported that they processed 204,332 FOIA requests in fiscal year 2013, the most of any federal government agency. It experienced an 81 percent increase in backlogged requests from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2013. At the end of fiscal year 2013, approximately half of all reported backlogged federal FOIA requests (about 50,000 of 95,000) belonged to DHS. DHS agreed with our recommendations and took steps to address them. For example, the department implemented electronic FOIA processing systems in certain components. In this regard, the Privacy Office—as the department’s central FOIA office—has agency-wide responsibility for FOIA compliance and performance, to include developing policies to implement FOIA initiatives, providing training, and preparing required annual reports. Further, while the selected components report their FOIA processing costs to the Privacy Office, which then aggregates this data, these reported costs are incomplete, thus hindering accountability for the total costs incurred by the department and the components in managing and processing FOIA requests. Toward this end, the office currently performs a number of oversight and coordination functions:
Requests weekly and monthly reports by all components on their FOIA processing, including monthly statistics on the number of requests processed and backlogged. Full FOIA Costs of DHS’s Privacy Office and Selected Components are Unknown
Both Justice and federal cost accounting standards require federal agencies to report on specific categories of FOIA-related costs. Specifically, while the Privacy Office and the selected components all reported the salaries of FOIA office staff as input to the department’s FOIA annual report for fiscal year 2013, most did not report or did not fully report costs for other categories, including employee benefits, non-personnel direct costs, indirect costs, and salaries of staff outside the components’ FOIA offices who retrieve requested documents. Further, the duplicate processing of a single FOIA request by USCIS and ICE staff contributes to an increase in the time needed to respond to a FOIA request for immigration files. The June 2011 DHS Open Government Plan 2.0 further directed the department and its components to reduce the FOIA backlog by 15 percent per year. Specifically, in conjunction with the Department of Commerce and the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Government Information Services identified 13 electronic system capabilities that can enhance FOIA processing: using a single, component-wide system for tracking requests; accepting the request online, either through e-mail or an online assigning the request tracking number and tracking the status of the multi-tracking a request electronically; allowing supervisors to review the case file to approve redactions and routing a request to the responsible office electronically; storing and routing responsive records to the appropriate office electronically; redacting responsive records with appropriate exemptions applied electronically; calculating and recording processing fees electronically; fee calculations for processing electronically; generating system correspondence, such as an e-mail or letter, with a allowing a requester the ability to track the status of the request electronically; tracking an appeal electronically; and generating periodic reporting statistics electronically, such as monthly backlog and annual report data used to develop reports. Full implementation could help improve the efficiency with which it processes FOIA requests. Further, absent capabilities consistent with Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act (as amended), the two components are not implementing the federal requirement to make their electronic information accessible to people with disabilities. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Director of DHS’s Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: (1) the responsibilities of, and total costs incurred by, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and selected components in managing and processing FOIA requests, and whether any duplication exists; (2) actions DHS and the selected components have taken to reduce FOIA backlogs and the results of their actions; and (3) the status of DHS’s and the selected components’ efforts to acquire and implement automated systems for processing FOIA requests. We interviewed DHS and component officials about their responsibilities and management practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
FOIA requires federal agencies to provide the public with access to government information. In fiscal year 2013, DHS and its component agencies reported processing more than 200,000 FOIA requests, the most of any federal agency. At the end of fiscal year 2013, about half of all reported backlogged federal FOIA requests (about 50,000 of 95,000) belonged to DHS.
GAO was asked to review DHS's processing of FOIA requests. GAO's objectives were to determine (1) the responsibilities of and total costs incurred by DHS and selected components in managing and processing FOIA requests, and whether duplication exists; (2) actions DHS and selected components have taken to reduce FOIA backlogs and the results; and (3) the status of DHS's and selected components' efforts to acquire and implement automated systems for processing requests. GAO evaluated DHS's and five selected components' FOIA-related procedures, fiscal year 2013 cost data, and other documentation. The five components together received more than 90 percent of DHS's FOIA requests during fiscal year 2013. GAO also interviewed department and component agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) processing responsibilities are split between the department's Privacy Office, which acts as its central FOIA office, and FOIA offices in its component agencies. The Privacy Office has a number of oversight and coordination functions, including developing policies to implement FOIA initiatives, providing training, and preparing annual reports. Meanwhile, components' FOIA offices are responsible for processing the vast majority of the requests received by the department, subject to regulations and policies issued by the Privacy Office. While components report FOIA processing costs to the Privacy Office, which then aggregates and reports them to the Department of Justice, reported costs are incomplete (for example, the costs do not reflect employee benefits or the salaries of staff outside the components' FOIA offices who retrieve requested documents), thus hindering accountability for total costs. Regarding duplication, GAO determined that certain immigration-related requests are processed twice by two different DHS components. The duplicate processing of such requests by the two components contributes to an increase in the time needed to respond to the requests.
In 2011, DHS established a goal of reducing backlogged FOIA requests by 15 percent each year, and its component agencies have taken actions toward this goal, including increasing staff, reporting and monitoring backlog information, providing training, and offering incentives to staff for increased productivity. Although there was initial progress by the end of fiscal year 2012, backlog numbers do not account for an estimated 11,000 improperly closed requests, and the number of backlogged requests increased in fiscal year 2013 to a level higher than 2011 (see figure).
DHS and its components have implemented or are planning to implement various technology capabilities to support FOIA processing based on best practices and federal requirements. However, not all of these systems possess all capabilities recommended by federal guidance, such as online tracking and electronic redaction, or the required capabilities to accommodate individuals with disabilities. Adopting such system capabilities departmentwide could help DHS increase the efficiency of its FOIA processing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending, among other things, that DHS improve the reporting of FOIA costs, eliminate duplicative processing, and direct components to implement recommended and required FOIA system capabilities. In written comments on a draft of the report, DHS agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-1042 | gao_GAO-05-1042_0 | FDA’s Medical Device Application Review Processes
Each of the 2005 and 2006 MDUFMA performance goals are linked to actions FDA takes under one of three processes for reviewing medical device applications: the PMA review process, the 510(k) review process, and the BLA review process. FDA may (1) issue an order approving the application, which allows the manufacturer to begin marketing the device; (2) send the manufacturer an “approvable” letter pending a GMP inspection, which indicates that FDA should be able to approve the device after the agency determines that the manufacturer’s device establishment is in compliance with GMP requirements; (3) send the manufacturer an approvable letter indicating that the agency should be able to approve the device if the manufacturer can make minor corrections or clarifications to the application; (4) issue a “not approvable” letter informing the manufacturer that FDA does not believe that the application can be approved because the data provided by the manufacturer do not demonstrate that the device is reasonably safe and effective; or (5) issue an order denying approval of the application, which informs the manufacturer that the agency has completed its scientific review, identified major safety or effectiveness problems, and decided not to approve the application. When FDA did not have sufficiently complete data to evaluate performance against a MDUFMA performance goal, we reviewed preliminary data and found that FDA took actions tied to most of these other fiscal year 2005 goals within specified time frames. Our analysis shows that FDA met most of the MDUFMA 2005 performance goals for which there were sufficiently complete data to measure performance (see fig. These data were from applications that FDA received in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and were used to measure the agency’s performance against about half of the performance goals established for fiscal year 2005. As of March 31, 2005, FDA had sufficiently complete data from applications received in fiscal year 2003 to measure performance against 11 of the 20 goals established for fiscal year 2005. FDA met 9 of those 11 goals and did not meet 2 of them. As of March 31, 2005, FDA had preliminary data from applications received in fiscal year 2003 on 7 of the 9 performance goals for fiscal year 2005 for which data were not sufficiently complete to evaluate performance. FDA took actions tied to these 11 goals within the specified time frames. Based on the limited data that were available as of March 31, 2005, it is unclear whether or to what extent FDA will meet the fiscal year 2005 MDUFMA performance goals because the agency’s performance could change as the agency completes its review of applications. Limited Available Data Suggest That FDA is Likely to Meet Some Performance Goals Established for Fiscal Year 2006
The limited data available on FDA’s performance suggest that FDA is likely to meet some of its fiscal year 2006 performance goals. Our analysis of FDA’s performance for applications received in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 shows that FDA has been meeting most of the MDUFMA 2006 performance goals for which it had sufficiently complete data. We also reviewed FDA’s preliminary data from applications received in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and the first 6 months of fiscal year 2005, and found that FDA took actions tied to most of the remaining fiscal year 2006 goals within specified time frames. Preliminary performance results could change as the agency completes actions for applications received in fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005 and FDA’s performance could change as it receives applications in fiscal year 2006. As of March 31, 2005, FDA had sufficiently complete data from applications received in fiscal year 2003 to measure performance against 14 of 26 goals established for fiscal year 2006. FDA met 12 of those 14 goals. FDA also had sufficiently complete data from applications received in fiscal year 2004 to measure performance against 12 performance goals and met 9 of those 12 goals. In general, when sufficient data indicated that FDA’s performance results for applications received in a fiscal year met the performance goal established for fiscal year 2005, then the agency also met the performance goal established for fiscal year 2006, even when the 2006 goal required FDA to take action within specified time frames on a greater percentage of applications. To help meet its MDUFMA performance goals, FDA has taken several steps consistent with those outlined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in his November 2002 letter establishing those goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reviews applications from manufacturers that wish to market medical devices in the United States. To facilitate prompt approval of new devices and clearance of devices that are substantially equivalent to those legally on the market, the Congress passed the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 (MDUFMA). The act authorizes FDA to collect user fees from manufacturers and, in return, requires FDA to meet performance goals tied to the agency's review process. These goals are linked to certain actions FDA may take during the application review process. The goals specify lengths of time for taking these actions and the percentage of actions the agency is to take within specified time frames. MDUFMA requires GAO to report on whether FDA is meeting performance goals established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for fiscal year 2005 and whether FDA is likely to meet the goals established for fiscal year 2006. GAO analyzed data provided by FDA that are based on actions taken on applications FDA received from October 1, 2002, through March 31, 2005. GAO used FDA's performance on applications received in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 as an indicator of the agency's likely performance.
What GAO Found
Limited available data indicate that FDA has been meeting some MDUFMA performance goals established for fiscal year 2005. It is uncertain, however, whether FDA will meet all of the goals. FDA met most of the MDUFMA 2005 performance goals for which data were sufficiently complete to measure the agency's performance. As of March 31, 2005, FDA had sufficiently complete data from applications received in fiscal year 2003 to measure performance against 11 of the 20 goals established for fiscal year 2005. FDA met 9 of those 11 goals. For applications received in fiscal year 2004, FDA had sufficiently complete data to measure performance against 10 goals and met 9 of them. When FDA did not have sufficiently complete data to evaluate performance, GAO reviewed preliminary data from applications received in fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005. These data suggest that FDA has taken actions tied to many of the fiscal year 2005 goals within specified time frames. These data are preliminary because some applications from each year were pending within the review process and FDA could receive and act on additional applications or amendments to applications. For example, as of March 31, 2005, about half of the applications FDA had received in fiscal year 2005 were pending action by FDA or responses from manufacturers. Because FDA's performance against the MDUFMA performance goals is based on the percentages of actions the agency takes on applications within required time frames, FDA's performance results could change as the agency completes actions on all applications and amendments for which the performance goals apply. The limited data available on FDA's performance suggest that FDA is likely to meet some fiscal year 2006 performance goals. GAO's analysis of FDA's past performance shows that FDA met most of the MDUFMA 2006 performance goals for which it had sufficiently complete data to evaluate its performance. As of March 31, 2005, FDA has sufficiently complete data from applications received in fiscal year 2003 to measure performance against 14 of 26 goals established for fiscal year 2006. FDA met 12 of those 14 goals. FDA also had sufficiently complete data from applications received in fiscal year 2004 to measure performance against 12 performance goals and met 9 of those 12 goals. GAO also reviewed preliminary data from applications FDA received in fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005 and found that FDA took actions tied to many of the fiscal year 2006 goals within specified time frames. Most of these results are preliminary, however, and FDA's performance could change as the agency completes actions for applications received in fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005 and receives applications in fiscal year 2006. FDA concurred with GAO's findings. |
gao_GAO-07-933T | gao_GAO-07-933T_0 | From the 1970s through 1987, Hadnot Point, Tarawa Terrace, and Holcomb Boulevard water systems provided drinking water to most of Camp Lejeune’s housing areas. Department of the Navy Environmental Functions
Certain Navy entities provide support functions for Marine Corps bases such as Camp Lejeune. Based on environmental contamination at various areas on the base, Camp Lejeune was designated as a National Priorities List site in 1989. However, ATSDR officials said they are reanalyzing the findings of this study because of an error in the original assessment of exposure to VOCs in drinking water. The study examines whether individuals born during 1968 through 1985 to mothers who were exposed to the contaminated drinking water at any time while they were pregnant and living at Camp Lejeune were more likely than those who were not exposed to have neural tube defects, oral cleft defects, or childhood hematopoietic cancers. Efforts to Identify and Address Past Drinking Water Contamination at Camp Lejeune Began in the 1980s and Continue with Long-term Cleanup and Monitoring
Efforts to identify and address past drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune began in the 1980s, when the Navy initiated water testing at Camp Lejeune. In 1982 and 1983, water monitoring for TTHMs by a laboratory contracted by Camp Lejeune led to the identification of TCE and PCE as the contaminants in two water systems at Camp Lejeune. In 1984 and 1985, the NACIP program identified VOCs, including TCE and PCE, in 12 of the wells serving the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace water systems. Upon investigating the contamination, DOD and North Carolina officials concluded that both on- and off-base sources were likely to have caused the contamination in the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace water systems. As a result, those 5 wells were removed from service. Although ATSDR Did Not Always Receive Requested Funding and Experienced Delays in Receiving Information from DOD, Officials Said Their Work Has Not Been Significantly Delayed
Since ATSDR began its Camp Lejeune-related work in 1991, the agency did not always receive requested funding and experienced delays in receiving information from DOD entities. Since fiscal year 2003, funding for ATSDR’s Camp Lejeune-related work has been provided by the Marine Corps. Provision of Information to ATSDR by DOD
ATSDR has experienced some difficulties obtaining information from Camp Lejeune and DOD officials. Officials said that while funding and access to records were probably slowed down and made more expensive by DOD officials’ actions, their actions did not significantly impede ATSDR’s health study efforts. The ATSDR officials also stated that while issues such as limitations in access to DOD data had to be addressed, such situations are normal during the course of a study. Experts Convened by NAS Generally Agreed That Many Parameters of ATSDR’s Current Study Were Appropriate
The seven members of an expert panel convened by NAS at our request generally agreed that specific parameters of ATSDR’s current study were appropriate, including the study population, the exposure time frame, and the selected health effects. The expert panel members had mixed opinions on ATSDR’s projected completion date. The current study follows recommendations from the agency’s 1997 public health assessment of Camp Lejeune, which noted that studies of cancer among those who were exposed in utero should be conducted to further the understanding of the health effects in this susceptible population. Two panel experts said that ATSDR had limited its study to health effects that are rare and that generally occur at higher levels of exposure to VOCs such as TCE and PCE than are expected to have occurred at Camp Lejeune. Of the five panel experts who commented on the proposed completion date, three said that the date appeared reasonable, and two others said that based on the complexity of the water modeling the projected completion date might be optimistic. oth natural processes and human activities. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has determined that enzene is a known carcinogen. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the early 1980s, volatile organic compounds (VOC) were discovered in some of the water systems serving housing areas on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune. Exposure to certain VOCs may cause adverse health effects, including cancer. Since 1991, the Department of Health and Human Services' Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has been examining whether individuals who were exposed to the contaminated drinking water are likely to have adverse health effects. ATSDR's current study is examining whether individuals who were exposed in utero are more likely to have developed certain childhood cancers or birth defects. GAO was asked to testify on its May 11, 2007 report: Defense Health Care: Activities Related to Past Drinking Water Contamination at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune (GAO-07-276). This testimony summarizes findings from the report about (1) efforts to identify and address the past drinking water contamination, (2) the provision of funding and information from the Department of Defense (DOD) to ATSDR, and (3) an assessment of the design of the current ATSDR study. GAO reviewed documents, interviewed officials and former residents, and contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to convene an expert panel to assess the current ATSDR study.
What GAO Found
Efforts to identify and address the past drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune began in the 1980s, when Navy water testing at Camp Lejeune detected VOCs in some base water systems. In 1982 and 1983, continued testing identified two VOCs--trichloroethylene (TCE), a metal degreaser, and tetrachloroethylene (PCE), a dry cleaning solvent--in two water systems that served base housing areas, Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace. In 1984 and 1985 a Navy environmental program identified VOCs, such as TCE and PCE, in some of the individual wells serving the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace water systems. Ten wells were subsequently removed from service. DOD and North Carolina officials concluded that on- and off-base sources were likely to have caused the contamination. It has not been determined when contamination at Hadnot Point began. ATSDR has estimated that well contamination at Tarawa Terrace from an off-base dry cleaner began as early as 1957. Since ATSDR began its Camp Lejeune-related work in 1991, the agency has not always received requested funding and has experienced delays in receiving information from DOD. However, ATSDR officials said that while funding and access to records were probably slowed down and made more expensive by DOD officials' actions, their actions did not significantly impede ATSDR's Camp Lejeune-related health study efforts. The ATSDR officials also stated that while issues such as limitations in access to DOD data had to be addressed, such situations are normal during the course of a study. Members of the expert panel that the National Academy of Sciences convened for GAO generally agreed that many parameters of ATSDR's current study are appropriate, including the study population, the exposure time frame, and the selected health effects. Regarding the study's proposed completion date of December 2007, the panel experts had mixed opinions: three of the five panel experts who commented said that the projected date appeared reasonable, while two said that the date might be optimistic. DOD, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of the May 11, 2007 report, which GAO incorporated where appropriate. Three members of an ATSDR community assistance panel for Camp Lejeune provided oral comments on issues such as other VOCs that have been detected at Camp Lejeune, and compensation, health benefits, and additional notification for former residents. GAO focused its review on TCE and PCE because they were identified by ATSDR as the chemicals of primary concern. GAO's report notes that other VOCs were detected. GAO incorporated the panel members' comments where appropriate, but some issues were beyond the scope of the report. |
gao_GAO-17-302 | gao_GAO-17-302_0 | Revenues Generated and Services Provided
As of April 2016, the Park Service had 488 concessions contracts in over 100 park units, and in 2015, such operations collectively generated about $1.4 billion in gross revenues and paid about $104 million in franchise fees to the Park Service. Challenges Highlighted in 2000 GAO Report
Our 2000 report on the concessions program, which we issued prior to the implementation of the 1998 Concessions Act, highlighted three management challenges: Inadequate staff qualifications and training: We generally found that Park Service staff at the headquarters, regional, and park unit levels did not have the necessary skills or training to implement the program. We found that concessions staff were often transferred from other career fields at the Park Service, such as interpretive or law enforcement rangers and the agency’s view was that “anyone could do concessions.”
Inability to manage contract workload and expired contracts: We found that the Park Service was unable to manage its concessions contract workload, and this had resulted in approximately 45 percent of concessions contracts and permits (283 of 630) being expired as of December 31, 1999, meaning that these contracts had exceeded their original term and were under an extension. Specifically, the Park Service has hired concessions staff with relevant skills or educational backgrounds, is using consultants, and has increased training opportunities. In addition, the Park Service has reduced the number of concessions contracts under extension because it is issuing contracts on a regular basis. Since then, headquarters has increased its involvement in the concessions program. While the Park Service has taken steps to obtain more centralized information on the concessions program, we found that some concessioners’ financial reports were missing or data contained in the reports we reviewed were sometimes reported incorrectly. Without timely or accurate financial data from concessioners, the agency could be limited in its ability to oversee certain aspects of the concessions program such as determining whether concessioners have paid their franchise fees. Concessions Program Continues to Face Challenges, Which the Park Service’s Strategic Plan May Address, but the Plan Is Missing Key Elements to Track Progress
In interviewing Park Service officials and concessioners, we identified some challenges in the three steps of the concessions process: prospectus development can be a lengthy and expensive process, and it can be hard to generate competition for some contracts; the agency’s evaluation panels can sometimes have difficulty assessing proposals, and the award process can be lengthy; and contract management can be affected by limited staffing and confusion about how to fund capital improvements and maintenance. Confusion exists, in part, because the Park Service has not finalized certain guidance or made it publicly available. For example, the plan has a goal to improve the prospectus and contract award process which aims to reduce costs and improve efficiency to the government and bidders. Similarly, the plan aims to attract more bids for concessions contracts, increase the accuracy of financial reporting, and increase the percentage of concessions staff who receive training. As we previously found, a critical element in an organization’s efforts to manage for results is its ability to set meaningful goals for performance and to measure progress towards these goals. Without clearly defined performance goals that would provide a basis against which results can be compared, it will be difficult for the Park Service to track its progress in these areas and determine where additional effort may be needed to address identified challenges to the concessions program. However, in some instances required reports from concessioners were not provided on time or those submitted contained incorrect financial data that was not identified in the review process. In addition, Park Service officials and concessioners identified ongoing challenges with the concessions program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve oversight of the concessions program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of the National Park Service to take the following three actions: review the financial reporting process and make any necessary adjustments to help ensure timely and accurate reporting of data on annual financial reports; finalize guidance on maintenance and capital improvements and make it publicly available to concessioners; and develop performance goals with targets and timeframes in its commercial services strategic plan. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) how the concessions program has changed since our 2000 report and (2) any ongoing challenges in the concessions program. To address these objectives, we examined relevant laws, regulations, and Park Service documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 1998 Concessions Management Improvement Act governs concessions services at national parks. In 2016, the Park Service managed 488 concessions contracts, and such contracts generated about $1.4 billion in gross revenues in the prior year. Under these contracts, companies and individuals operate businesses in parks, including lodges, restaurants, and recreational services. GAO was asked to review the concessions program.
This report examines (1) how the concessions program has changed since GAO's 2000 report and (2) any ongoing challenges in the concessions program. To conduct this work, GAO examined Park Service policy, guidance, and relevant laws and regulations; analyzed Park Service data on concessions contracts; interviewed Park Service staff at headquarters, all seven regions, and 20 park units, selected for size of concessions program and park type, among other things; and interviewed concessioners and stakeholders, such as consultants familiar with the concessions program.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's National Park Service (Park Service) has made several changes to its concessions program since GAO issued a report on the program in 2000. In that report, GAO highlighted three management challenges: (1) inadequate qualifications and training of concessions staff; (2) backlog of expired contracts that were extended; and (3) lack of accountability in the concessions program. In this review, GAO found that the Park Service has taken steps to address these challenges:
Staff qualifications: Park Service has hired many concessions staff with relevant skills or educational backgrounds, such as in hospitality services or business. In addition, the Park Service developed several training classes for concessions staff to help improve their skills.
Contracts under extension: Park Service has reduced the percentage of extended contracts, from about 45 percent in 2000 to 28 percent in 2016.
Accountability: Park Service headquarters has increased its involvement in the concessions program and has centralized more information on the program. However, in some instances, GAO found that some financial reports that were to be submitted by concessioners to the Park Service were not submitted in a timely manner or data in the submitted reports were inaccurate. Park Service staff did not identify these discrepancies when reviewing the reports. Without timely and accurate financial data from concessioners, the agency could be limited in its ability to oversee certain aspects of the program such as determining whether concessioners paid required fees.
GAO identified some ongoing challenges in each of the three steps of the concessions process. First, developing a prospectus, which provides information on a concessions operation to potential bidders, can be a lengthy and expensive process, and it can be hard to generate competition. Second, the agency's evaluation panels can sometimes have difficulty assessing some proposals, and the award process can be lengthy. Third, contract management can be affected by limited staffing and confusion among concessioners about how to fund maintenance and capital improvements on buildings or land assigned to them by the Park Service. This situation is, in part, because the Park Service has not yet finalized related guidance and made it publicly available to concessioners. The Park Service's commercial services strategic plan recognizes many of the challenges GAO identified and lists goals to potentially address them. For example, the plan has a goal to improve the prospectus and contract award processes by reducing costs and improving efficiency to the government and bidders. In addition, the plan aims to attract more bids for concessions contracts, increase the accuracy of financial reporting, and increase the percentage of concessions staff that receive training. However, these goals do not have targets or timeframes for their completion. Leading practices indicate it is critical for an agency to set meaningful performance goals and to measure progress towards these goals. Without clearly defined performance goals that contain targets or timeframes, it will be difficult for the Park Service to track its progress in these areas and determine where additional effort may be needed to address identified challenges in the concessions program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Park Service review and adjust its process to help ensure timely and accurate reporting of financial data from concessioners, finalize its guidance and make it public, and develop performance goals with targets and timeframes in its commercial services strategic plan. The Department of the Interior agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-96-90 | gao_AIMD-96-90_0 | Software development is a critical component of this major modernization initiative. We requested that VA identify for our evaluation those projects using the best software development processes implemented within VBA and AAC. Organizations that have a repeatable software development process have been able to significantly improve their productivity and return on investment. As shown in table 2, these processes include (1) requirements management, (2) software project planning, (3) software project tracking and oversight, (4) software subcontract management, (5) software quality assurance, and (6) software configuration management. Initiatives cited by the VBA include: development and distribution of interim configuration management procedures; identification of a library structure to hold all of the work products from the development process; and initiation of several meetings with SEI to discuss the Software CMM. Austin Automation Center Software Practices
Similar to VBA, we compared the CMM criteria in appendix II to the software development practices at AAC. Unless both VBA and AAC initiate improvement activities within the various KPAs and accelerate those already underway, they are unlikely to produce and maintain high-quality software on time and within budget. Conclusions and Recommendations
Because VBA and AAC do not satisfy any of the KPAs required for a level 2 (i.e., repeatable) capability, there is no assurance that (1) investments made in new software development will achieve their operational improvement objectives or (2) software will be delivered consistent with cost and schedule estimates. Comments From the Veterans Benefits Administration
Comments From the Department of Veterans Affairs
The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Veterans Affairs’ May 24, 1996, letter. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed software development processes and practices at the Department of Veterans Affairs' Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) and Austin Automation Center (AAC).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) neither VBA nor AAC satisfy any of the criteria for a repeatable software development capability; (2) VBA and AAC do not adequately define systems requirements, train personnel, plan software development projects, estimate costs or schedules, track software project schedules or changes, manage software subcontractors, or maintain quality assurance and software configuration procedures; (3) VBA initiatives to improve its software development processes include developing and distributing interim configuration management procedures, identifying a library structure for all work products, and meeting with the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) to discuss software development; (4) VBA and AAC cannot reliably develop and maintain high-quality software on any major project within existing cost and schedule constraints; and (5) VBA and AAC can use their strengths in software quality assurance and their improvement activities in software configuration management as a foundation for improving their software development processes. |
gao_NSIAD-96-33 | gao_NSIAD-96-33_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Because of significant congressional interest in privatization of depot maintenance workloads, and engine workloads in particular, we addressed the following: (1) the rationale supporting the continued need for DOD to maintain capability to repair engines at its own depots, (2) whether there are opportunities to privatize additional engine workloads, and (3) the impact excess capacity within DOD’s depot system has on the cost-effectiveness of decisions to privatize additional workloads. Public and private depot repair capabilities, capacity, and competition are key factors that impact readiness and cost, and, therefore, influence source-of-repair decisions. It found that DOD’s depots have over 3 million direct labor hours in excess engine repair capacity. Table 2.2 shows our assessment of excess engine capacity in the DOD depot system. 2469 requirement. Prior to the decision to privatize-in-place the San Antonio Air Logistics Center, the closure of one of the largest organic engine overhaul facilities would have allowed DOD to reduce excess capacity, improve the cost-effectiveness of remaining public sector engine repair facilities, and create opportunities to privatize repair of some commercial counterpart engines. In most cases, they had sufficient capacity to absorb the additional work. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO examined the Department of Defense's (DOD) depot maintenance program, focusing on whether the: (1) DOD depots should retain their engine repair capabilities; (2) opportunities exist to privatize additional engine repair workloads; and (3) excess capacity within the DOD depot system adversely affects privatization decisions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD maintains its engine repair capability in the public depot system to comply with statutory requirements and to reduce the costs and readiness risks associated with private-sector repairs; (2) most companies have the capacity to absorb additional military workloads, but doing so would increase per-unit repair costs; (3) the decision to realign Kelly Air Force Base and to close the San Antonio Air Logistics Center allows DOD to reduce excess engine capacity, improve the cost-effectiveness of its remaining engine repair facilities, and privatize additional commercial counterpart engine work; and (4) the decision to keep the depot open by privatizing its workload will limit or preclude any reduction in excess depot capacity and associated overhead costs. |
gao_GAO-15-579 | gao_GAO-15-579_0 | GPRAMA Requirement for Quarterly Priority Progress Reviews GPRAMA requires that, not less than quarterly, at all agencies required to develop agency priority goals, the head of the agency and Chief Operating Officer, with the support of the agency Performance Improvement Officer, shall: For each agency priority goal, review with the appropriate goal leader the progress achieved during the most recent quarter, overall trends, and the likelihood of meeting the planned level of performance;
Coordinate with relevant personnel within and outside the agency that contribute to the accomplishment of each agency priority goal;
Assess whether relevant organizations, program activities, regulations, policies, and other activities are contributing as planned to the agency priority goals;
Categorize agency priority goals by risk of not achieving the planned level of performance; and For agency priority goals at greatest risk of not meeting the planned level of performance, identify prospects and strategies for performance improvement, including any needed changes to agency program activities, regulations, policies, or other activities. Nine Leading Practices Identified by GAO That Can Be Used to Promote Successful Data-Driven Performance Reviews
Reviews are conducted frequently and regularly. Most Agencies Reported Conducting Data-Driven Reviews Consistent with Requirements, Guidance, and Leading Practices
Nearly All Agencies Reported Holding Regular Data-Driven Review Meetings at Least Quarterly
GPRAMA Requirement: Quarterly Reviews GPRAMA requires that agency leaders conduct reviews on progress toward agency priority goals (APGs) not less than quarterly. Of the 23 CFO Act agencies surveyed, 20 agencies reported that they hold data-driven review meetings at least quarterly, with some agencies holding them more frequently. A Few Agencies Reported Conducting Less Frequent in- Person Reviews
OMB guidance is clear that reviews should be held in person to bring together senior leaders and officials involved in all levels of program delivery. Homeland Security. Health and Human Services. Therefore, progress on each APG is only reviewed by officials from State in an in-person review meeting once a year. As GPRAMA requirements and OMB guidance are clear that in-person review meetings should be held at least once a quarter, and that progress on each APG should be reviewed each quarter in these meetings, the approaches of these four agencies – DHS, HHS, State, and USDA – are not consistent with requirements for the frequency and expected characteristics of reviews. A Few Agencies Reported Their COOs Do Not Lead Reviews
USDA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and State reported in our survey that the agency head or COO does not lead meetings that are used to review progress on APGs, as specified by GPRAMA and OMB guidance. Twenty-one out of 22 agencies reported that their goal leaders always or often participate in review meetings. All 22 agencies reported that they always or often collect data on APG performance measures and milestones in advance of their review meetings. After data have been collected and analyzed, they must be effectively communicated to participants. Furthermore, all 22 agencies also reported that they always or often distribute these materials to participants for review before the meetings. Through our survey, we found that most agencies reported they always or often use their review meetings to assess progress and contributions, and identify goals at risk. SBA reported through our survey that participants would rarely identify and agree on specific follow-up actions to be taken after meetings. Most Agencies Reported Review Meetings Have Positively Affected Performance, Collaboration, Accountability, and Efficiency
The results of our survey on agency data-driven review practices indicate that review meetings have had positive effects on progress toward agency goals, collaboration between agency officials, the ability to hold agency officials accountable for progress toward goals, and the ability to identify opportunities to improve agency operations. Sustaining Positive Effects of Reviews Requires Ongoing Leadership Commitment, Institutionalizing Review Processes, and Demonstrating Value to Participants
As reported through our survey and discussions with agency officials, data-driven review meetings can improve agency performance and results by increasing leadership oversight and management capacity to use performance information, focusing attention on goals and priorities, identifying areas where targeted improvements are needed, and improving communication and collaboration across an agency. These practices are consistent with requirements, guidance, and leading practices. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that agency review processes provide frequent, regular opportunities to assess progress on agency priority goals (APG), and are conducted in a manner consistent with GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requirements, OMB guidance, and leading practices, we recommend the following actions:
That the Secretary of Agriculture work with the COO and PIO to modify the Department’s review processes to ensure that review meetings: (1) are held at least quarterly; (2) are led by the agency head or COO; (3) involve APG leaders; (4) and involve, as appropriate, agency officials with functional management responsibilities. DHS, HHS, and USDA concurred with our recommendations. DOD and State concurred with all but one recommendation—to ensure the COO leads the reviews—with which they partially concurred. For these reasons, we believe that these recommendations to follow requirements and guidance remain valid. Specifically, this report examines (1) the extent to which agencies are conducting data-driven performance reviews in a manner consistent with GPRAMA requirements, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and leading practices; and (2) how agency data-driven performance reviews have affected performance, collaboration, accountability, and efficiency within agencies, and how positive effects can be sustained. | Why GAO Did This Study
How federal leaders manage the operations and performance of their agencies significantly affects their ability to achieve important outcomes critical to public health and safety. GAO's previous work has identified weaknesses in agencies' use of performance information that can hinder achievement of critical results.
This report is part of GAO's response to a statutory requirement to review GPRAMA implementation. It examines (1) the extent to which agencies are conducting data-driven performance reviews consistent with GPRAMA requirements, OMB guidance, and leading practices; and (2) how reviews have affected performance, collaboration, accountability, and efficiency in agencies, and how positive effects can be sustained.
GAO surveyed PIOs at 23 agencies, followed up to clarify responses, and interviewed officials involved in reviews at 5 agencies. These agencies were selected based on size and the extent to which leaders use reviews, as reported on a 2013 survey. GAO also reviewed OMB guidance and relevant documentation from agencies.
What GAO Found
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires that federal agencies review progress on agency priority goals (APG) at least once a quarter. GPRAMA requires that reviews be conducted by top agency leaders, involve APG goal leaders and other contributors, and be used to identify at-risk goals and strategies to improve performance. While GPRAMA requires that agencies conduct reviews, it also required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to prepare guidance on its implementation. Since 2011, OMB has provided guidance on how reviews should be conducted, specifying they should be held in person. Further, GAO previously identified nine leading practices for reviews.
Agencies Reported Review Practices Consistent with Requirements and Guidance. Of the 23 agencies GAO surveyed, most reported conducting data-driven reviews consistent with requirements, guidance, and leading practices. Specifically, most agencies reported:
conducting data-driven review meetings at least once a quarter, with several agencies holding them more frequently (20 agencies);
conducting Chief Operating Officer (COO)-led reviews, or reviews led jointly by the COO and Performance Improvement Officer (PIO) (19);
always or often involving PIOs (22) and APG goal leaders (21) in reviews;
always or often collecting and analyzing relevant data in advance of reviews, and incorporating these data into meeting materials (22);
always or often using review meetings to assess APG progress (20); and
always or often identifying follow-up actions to be taken after review meetings (18), an action that is positively correlated with the reported impact of reviews on agency performance improvement.
Agency Review Practices Inconsistent with Requirements and Guidance. Some agency practices were inconsistent with requirements or guidance. For instance, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported that it does not hold in-person reviews, and the Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Health and Human Services (HHS) reported that they do not hold regular, in-person reviews each quarter. The Department of State (State) reported that progress on each APG is only reviewed in an in-person review once a year, rather than each quarter, as required. The Department of Defense (DOD), USDA, and State also reported that their reviews are not led by their agency heads or COO. DOD also reported it rarely identifies follow-up actions to be taken after meetings.
Agencies Reported Positive Effects of Reviews . Most agencies reported their reviews have had positive effects on progress towards agency goals, collaboration between agency officials, the ability to hold officials accountable for progress, and efforts to improve the efficiency of operations. According to agency officials, reviews can bring together people, analytical insights, and resources to rigorously assess progress on goals or milestones, develop collaborative solutions to problems, enhance individual and collective accountability for performance, and review efforts to improve efficiency. Agencies reported that sustaining these effects requires ongoing leadership commitment, institutionalizing review processes, and demonstrating value to participants.
What GAO Recommends
To ensure that agency reviews are consistent with requirements, guidance, and leading practices, GAO is making recommendations to five agencies. DHS, HHS, and USDA concurred with the recommendations. DOD and State concurred with all but one recommendation—to ensure the COO leads the reviews—with which they partially concurred. GAO believes these recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-17-533T | gao_GAO-17-533T_0 | The information systems and networks that support federal operations are highly complex and dynamic, technologically diverse, and often geographically dispersed. Agencies Face Key Challenges in Ensuring an Effective Cybersecurity Workforce
We and others have identified a number of key challenges federal agencies are facing to ensure that they have a sufficient cybersecurity workforce with the skills necessary to protect their information and networks from cyber threats. These challenges pertain to identifying and closing skill gaps as part of a comprehensive workforce planning process, recruiting and retaining qualified staff, and navigating the federal hiring process. For example: In November 2011, we reported that eight federal agencies had identified challenges in their workforce planning efforts. These recommendations have not yet been implemented. In an April 2015 report, the Partnership for Public Service noted a continuing need for the government to develop an understanding of the size and skills of the current cybersecurity workforce; project the government’s future cybersecurity human capital needs; assess qualitative and quantitative gaps between the current workforce and the workforce needed to address future challenges; and develop strategies, as well as program and policy goals, designed to close those gaps. However, we and others have found that agencies have faced persistent challenges in recruiting and retaining well-qualified cybersecurity talent: In November 2011, we reported that the quality of cybersecurity training and development programs varied significantly across the eight agencies in our review. In August 2016, we reported the results of our review of the current authorities of agency chief information security officers (CISO). In August 2016, we issued a report on the extent to which federal hiring authorities were meeting agency needs. As noted previously, we have identified both information security and strategic human capital management as government-wide high-risk areas. To address these high-risk areas, agencies need to take focused, concerted action, including implementing our outstanding recommendations, which can help mitigate the challenges associated with developing an effective cybersecurity workforce. Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Strategy: As called for by the CSIP, OMB and OPM issued the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Strategy in July 2016, detailing government-wide actions to identify, expand, recruit, develop, retain, and sustain a capable and competent workforce in key functional areas to address complex and ever- evolving cyber threats. Recent Laws Address Cybersecurity Workforce Issues
In addition to the aforementioned executive-level initiatives, several recently enacted federal laws include provisions aimed at improving the federal cybersecurity workforce. The Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015 assigns specific workforce planning-related actions to federal agencies. Other Ongoing Activities Could Assist Agencies in Recruiting and Retaining Cybersecurity Professionals
Beyond the government-wide initiatives and recently enacted legislation discussed previously, federal agencies have instituted other ongoing activities that may assist the federal government in enhancing its cybersecurity workforce. These include the following, among others:
Promoting cyber and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education: A recent presidential commission on cybersecurity highlighted the need for federal programs that support education at all levels to incorporate cybersecurity awareness for students as they are introduced to and provided with Internet- based devices. The curricula developed by NICERC is free to any K-12 educator within the United States and comprises a library of cyber-based curricula that provides opportunities for students to become aware of cyber issues, engage in cyber education, and enter cyber career fields. One such program—the Scholarship for Service program operated by DHS and NSF— provides scholarships and stipends to undergraduate and graduate students who are pursuing information security-related degrees, in exchange for 2 years of federal service after graduation. National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies: DHS, in partnership with several other agencies, launched the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS) in February 2013 as an online resource to connect government employees, students, educators, and industry with cybersecurity training providers across the nation. The federal government continues to be challenged in key areas—such as identifying skills gaps, recruiting and retaining qualified staff, and navigating the federal hiring process—that are essential to ensuring the adequacy of its cybersecurity workforce. If effectively implemented, these initiatives, laws, and activities could help establish the cybersecurity workforce needed to secure and protect federal IT systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government faces an ever-evolving array of cyber-based threats to its systems and information. Further, federal systems and networks are inherently at risk because of their complexity, technological diversity, and geographic dispersion, among other reasons. GAO has designated the protection of federal information systems as a government-wide high-risk area since 1997. In 2001, GAO introduced strategic government-wide human capital management as another area of high risk. A key component of the government's ability to mitigate and respond to cyber threats is having a qualified, well-trained cybersecurity workforce. However, shortages in qualified cybersecurity professionals have been identified, which can hinder the government's ability to ensure an effective workforce.
This statement discusses challenges agencies face in ensuring an effective cybersecurity workforce, recent initiatives aimed at improving the federal cyber workforce, and ongoing activities that could assist in recruiting and retaining cybersecurity professionals. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on published work related to federal cybersecurity workforce efforts, and information reported by other federal and non-federal entities focusing on cybersecurity workforce challenges.
What GAO Found
GAO and others have identified a number of key challenges facing federal agencies in ensuring that they have an effective cybersecurity workforce:
Identifying skills gaps: As GAO reported in 2011, 2015, and 2016, federal agencies have faced challenges in effectively implementing workforce planning processes for information technology (IT) and defining cybersecurity staffing needs. GAO also reported that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) could improve its efforts to close government-wide skills gaps.
Recruiting and retaining qualified staff: Federal agencies continue to be challenged in recruiting and retaining qualified cybersecurity staff. For example, in August 2016, GAO reported that federal chief information security officers faced significant challenges in recruiting and retaining personnel with high-demand skills.
Federal hiring activities: The federal hiring process may cause agencies to lose out on qualified candidates. In August 2016 GAO reported that OPM and agencies needed to assess available federal hiring authorities to more effectively meet their workforce needs.
To address these and other challenges, several executive branch initiatives have been launched and federal laws enacted. For example, in July 2016, OPM and the Office of Management and Budget issued a strategy with goals, actions, and timelines for improving the cybersecurity workforce. In addition, laws such as the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015 require agencies to identify IT and cyber-related positions of greatest need.
Further, other ongoing activities have the potential to assist agencies in developing, recruiting, and retaining an effective cybersecurity workforce. For example:
Promoting cyber and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education: A center funded by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed a kindergarten to 12th grade-level cyber-based curriculum that provides opportunities for students to become aware of cyber issues, engage in cyber education, and enter cyber career fields.
Cybersecurity scholarships: Programs such as Scholarship for Service provide tuition assistance to undergraduate and graduate students studying cybersecurity in exchange for a commitment to federal service.
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies: DHS, in partnership with several other agencies, launched the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies in 2013 as an online resource to connect government employees, students, educators, and industry with cybersecurity training providers across the nation.
If effectively implemented, these initiatives, laws, and activities could further agencies' efforts to establish the cybersecurity workforce needed to secure and protect federal IT systems.
What GAO Recommends
Over the past several years, GAO has made several recommendations to federal agencies to enhance their IT workforce efforts. Agencies are in various stages of implementing these recommendations. |
gao_OCE-95-119 | gao_OCE-95-119_0 | Since our 1992 report, the Congress and the President have taken action on the deficit. By drastically reducing national saving, rising deficits would shrink private investment and eventually result in a declining capital stock. Deficit Reduction Would Promote Economic Growth in the Long Term
The economic benefits of deficit reduction are illustrated by the three fiscal paths we simulate in our model. The deficit reduction necessary to achieve beneficial long-term economic outcomes and reduced interest costs would entail difficult budgetary reductions and require a greater share of national income to be devoted to saving, thus foregoing some consumption in the short term. A cut in this spending area reduces the proportion of the budget growing quickly, thereby reducing the total budget growth. Fiscal Pressures Will Continue
Even if a balanced budget is achieved early in the next century, deficits could reemerge as the coming demographic changes continue to exert fiscal pressures. Budget Policy: Long-Term Implications of the Deficit (GAO/T-OCG-93-6, Mar. Budget Policy: Prompt Action Necessary to Avert Long-Term Damage to the Economy (GAO/OCG-92-2, June 5, 1992). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the long-term economic impacts of the budget deficit.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) some progress has been made in reducing the deficit since 1992, but the long-term deficit outlook remains a national problem; (2) inaction in reducing the deficit would inevitably result in a declining economy; (3) although taking action to reduce the deficit would promote long-term economic growth and reduce interest costs, such action would require significant budget adjustments; (4) early reductions in fast growing areas, such as health programs, would contribute more to the elimination of long-term deficits than other types of spending reductions; (5) even after a balanced budget is achieved, deficits could continue to emerge as demographic changes exert fiscal pressures; and (6) Congress faces difficult tradeoffs between the short- and long-term economic benefits of deficit reduction. |
gao_GAO-08-563T | gao_GAO-08-563T_0 | The Housing GSEs Share Similar Missions
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s mission is to enhance the availability of mortgage credit across the nation during both good and bad economic times by purchasing mortgages from lenders (banks, thrifts, and mortgage lenders), which then use the proceeds to make additional mortgages available to home buyers. MBS issued by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are either sold to investors (off-balance sheet obligations) or held in their retained portfolios (on-balance sheet obligations). The 12 FHLBanks that constitute the FHLBank System traditionally made loans—also known as advances—to their members (typically banks or thrifts) to facilitate housing finance and community and economic development. More recently, the FHLBanks initiated programs to purchase mortgages directly from their members and hold them in their retained portfolios. Housing GSE Activities Involve Significant Risks
While the housing GSEs have generated public benefits, their large size and activities pose potentially significant risks to taxpayers. The GSEs also pose potential risks to the stability of the U.S. financial system. Housing GSE Regulatory Structure Is Divided among OFHEO, HUD, and FHFB
The current regulatory structure for the housing GSEs is divided among OFHEO, HUD, and FHFB, as described below: OFHEO is an independent office within HUD and is responsible for regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s safety and soundness. FHFB is responsible for regulating the FHLBank System’s safety and soundness as well as its mission activities. Establishing a single housing GSE regulator that is equipped with adequate authorities and governed by a board would better ensure that the GSEs operate in a safe and sound manner and fulfill their housing missions. In addition to concerns about OFHEO’s and FHFB’s authorities to fulfill their safety and soundness responsibilities, the fragmentation of authorities and responsibilities between OFHEO and HUD amplify our significant concerns with HUD’s capacity as the mission regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As stated in our previous testimony, HUD officials we contacted said the department lacked sufficient staff and resources necessary to carry out its GSE mission oversight responsibilities. A Single Housing GSE Regulator Equipped with Sufficient Authorities and Governed by a Board or Hybrid Board Structure Is Critical
To address the deficiencies in the current GSE regulatory structure that I have just described, we have consistently supported and continue to believe in the need for the creation of a single regulator to oversee both safety and soundness and mission of the housing GSEs. This single regulator should be better able to assess the competitive effects of these activities on all three housing GSEs and better able to ensure consistency of regulation for GSEs that operate in similar markets. Adequate Regulatory Authorities Are Essential
It is essential that the new GSE regulator have adequate powers and authorities to address unsafe and unsound practices, respond to financial emergencies, and ensure that the GSEs comply with their public missions. Additional studies may be needed to more precisely estimate the extent to which the GSEs’ activities benefit home buyers. However, in our previous work, we have stated that a “stand-alone” agency with a board of directors would better ensure the independence and prominence of the regulator and allow it to act independently of the influence of the housing GSEs, which are large and politically influential. Financial Regulation: Review of Selected Operations of the Federal Housing Finance Board. Capital Structure of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Development of the Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Regulator. | Why GAO Did This Study
The housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)--Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBank System), play a critical role in the nation's housing finance system. However, concerns exist that the fragmented federal oversight structure for the GSEs is not well positioned to help ensure that they operate in a safe and sound manner and fulfill their housing missions. This testimony provides information on the GSEs' missions and risks, the current regulatory structure, and proposed regulatory reforms. To prepare this testimony, GAO relied on a substantial body of previous work and updated its analysis in light of recent events.
What GAO Found
While the GSEs provide certain public benefits, they also pose potential risks. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's primary activity involves purchasing mortgages from lenders and issuing mortgage-backed securities that are either sold to investors or held in the GSEs' retained portfolio. The 12 FHLBanks traditionally made loans to their members and more recently instituted programs to purchase mortgages from their members and hold such mortgages in their portfolios. While not obligated to do so, the federal government could provide financial assistance to the GSEs, if one or more experienced financial difficulties, that could result in significant costs to taxpayers. Due to the GSEs' large size, the potential also exists that financial problems at one or more of the GSEs could have destabilizing effects on financial markets. The current housing GSE regulatory structure is fragmented and not well equipped to oversee their financial soundness or housing mission achievement. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) is responsible for safety and soundness oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac while the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) is responsible for safety and soundness and mission oversight of the FHLBank System. Both regulators lack key statutory authorities to fulfill their safety and soundness responsibilities as compared to the authorities available to federal bank regulators. For example, OFHEO and FHFB are not authorized to limit the asset growth of housing GSEs if capital falls below predetermined levels. Moreover, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which has housing mission oversight responsibility for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, faces a number of challenges in carrying out its responsibilities. In particular, HUD may not have sufficient resources and technical expertise to review sophisticated financial products and issues. Creating a single housing GSE regulator could better ensure consistency of regulation among the GSEs. With safety and soundness and mission oversight combined, a single regulator would be better positioned to consider potential trade-offs between these sometimes competing objectives. To be effective, the single regulator must have all the regulatory oversight and enforcement powers necessary to address unsafe and unsound practices, respond to financial emergencies, assess the extent to which the GSEs' activities benefit home buyers and mortgage markets, and otherwise ensure that the GSEs comply with their public missions. To ensure the independence and prominence of the regulator and allow it to act independently of the influence of the housing GSEs, this new GSE regulator should be governed by a board or hybrid board structure. |
gao_GAO-15-564T | gao_GAO-15-564T_0 | Cost Increases and Schedule Delays at the Denver Facility and Other Projects
Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
We reported in April 2013 that costs increased and schedules were delayed considerably for all four of VA’s largest medical-facility construction projects, when comparing November 2012 construction project data with the cost and schedule estimates first submitted to Congress. VA provided an update in April for the total estimated cost and estimated completion date for some of its projects. However, as of March 2015, the final phase of the Las Vegas project to expand the emergency department is projected to be completed in the summer of 2015. By this time, the project’s costs had increased by approximately $470 million, and the project’s completion was delayed by 14 months. VA Took Steps to Implement New Construction Management Design Practices, But Did Not Implement Changes Early Enough to Positively Impact the Denver Project
In our April 2013 report, we found that VA had taken steps to improve its management of major medical-facility construction projects, including creating a construction-management review council. In our 2013 report we also found that VA had taken steps to implement a new project delivery method—called the Integrated Design and Construction (IDC) method. In response to the construction industry’s concerns that VA and other federal agencies did not involve the construction contractor early in the design process, VA and the Army Corps of Engineers began working to establish a project delivery model that would allow for earlier contractor involvement in a construction project, as is often done in the private sector. We found in 2013 that VA did not implement IDC early enough in Denver to garner the full benefits. VA Has Taken Actions to Implement GAO Recommendations
In our April 2013 report we identified systemic reasons that contributed to overall schedule delays and cost increases, and recommended that VA take actions to improve its construction management of major medical facilities: including (1) developing guidance on the use of medical equipment planners; (2) sharing information on the roles and responsibilities of VA construction project management staff; and (3) streamlining the change order process.aimed at addressing issues we identified at one or more of the four sites we visited during our review. VA has implemented our recommendations; however, the impact of these actions may take time to reflect improvements, especially for ongoing construction projects, depending on several issues, including the relationship between VA and the contractor. Since completing our April 2013 report, we have not reviewed the extent Our recommendations were to which these actions have affected the four projects, or the extent to which these actions may have helped to avoid the cost overruns and delays that occurred on each specific project. Thus, we recommended that the Secretary of VA develop and implement agency guidance to assign medical equipment planners to major medical construction projects. Sharing Information on the Roles and Responsibilities of VA’s Construction- Management Staff
In September 2013, in response to our recommendation, VA put procedures in place to communicate to contractors the roles and responsibilities of VA officials who manage major medical facility construction projects, including the change order process. This lack of clarity can cause confusion for contractors and architectural and engineering firms, ultimately affecting the relationship between VA and the general contractor. Therefore, in our 2013 report, we recommended that VA develop and disseminate procedures for communicating—to contractors—clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the VA officials who manage major medical-facility projects, particularly those in the change-order process. Streamlining the Change- Order Process
On August 29, 2013, VA issued a handbook for construction contract modification (change-order) processing which includes milestones for completing processing of modifications based on their dollar value. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA operates one of the nation's largest health care delivery systems. In April 2013, GAO reported that VA was managing the construction of 50 major medical-facility projects costing between $10 million and hundreds of millions of dollars, including the ongoing project in Denver. This statement discusses VA construction management issues, specifically, (1) the extent to which the cost, schedule, and scope at Denver and other major medical-facility projects has changed and the reasons for these changes, (2) actions VA has taken since 2012 to improve its construction management practices, and (3) VA's response to GAO's recommendations for further improvements in its management of these construction projects.
This statement is based on GAO's April 2013 report ( GAO-13-302 ), May 2013 ( GAO-13-556T ), April 2014 ( GAO-14-548T ), and January 2015 ( GAO-15-332T ) testimonies, and selected updates on VA projects—located in Denver, Colorado; Las Vegas, Nevada; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Orlando, Florida. To conduct these updates, GAO obtained documentation from VA in April 2015.
What GAO Found
In April 2013, GAO found that costs substantially increased and schedules were delayed for Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) largest medical-facility construction projects, located in Denver, Colorado; Las Vegas, Nevada; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Orlando, Florida. In comparison with initial estimates, the cost increases for these projects now range from 66 percent to 427 percent and delays range from 14 to 86 months. Since the 2013 report, some of the projects have experienced further cost increases and delays because of design issues. For example, as of April 2015, the cost for the Denver project increased by nearly $930 million, and the completion date for this project is unknown.
In its April 2013 report, GAO found that VA had taken some actions since 2012 to address problems managing major construction projects. Specifically, VA established a Construction Review Council in April 2012 to oversee the department's development and execution of its real property programs. VA also took steps to implement a new project delivery method, called Integrated Design and Construction, which involves the construction contractor early in the design process to identify any potential problems early and speed the construction process. However, in Denver, VA did not implement this method early enough to garner the full benefits of having a contractor early in the design phase.
VA has taken actions to implement the recommendations in GAO's April 2013 report. In that report, GAO identified systemic reasons that contributed to overall schedule delays and cost increases at one or more of four reviewed projects and recommended ways VA could improve its management of the construction of major medical facilities. In response, VA has
issued guidance on assigning medical equipment planners to major medical facility projects who will be responsible for matching the equipment needed for the facility in order to avoid late design changes leading to cost increases and delays;
developed and disseminated procedures for communicating to contractors clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the VA officials who manage major medical-facility projects to avoid confusion that can affect the relationship between VA and the contractor; and
issued a handbook for construction contract modification (change-order) processing that includes milestones for completing processing of modifications based on their dollar value and took other actions to streamline the change order process to avoid project delays.
While VA has implemented GAO's recommendations, the impact of these actions may take time to show improvements, especially for ongoing construction projects, depending on several issues, including the relationship between VA and the contractor.
What GAO Recommends
In its April 2013 report, GAO recommended that VA (1) develop and implement agency guidance for assignment of medical equipment planners; (2) develop and disseminate procedures for communicating to contractors clearly defined roles and responsibilities of VA officials; (3) issue and take steps to implement guidance on streamlining the change-order process. VA implemented GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-583 | gao_GAO-11-583_0 | The National Export Initiative brought new emphasis to the federal government’s role in promoting exports. MAS Combines Industry and Trade Expertise in Providing Analytical and Policy Support to the U.S. Government
MAS Offices Focus on Industry Sectors and Economic Analysis, Primarily in Manufacturing
MAS’s primary goal is to support the competitiveness of U.S. industry in domestic and international markets, which it does largely through providing policy advice, research, and analytical support to other parts of Commerce and the U.S. government. MAS’s major activities include: collection and dissemination of data on U.S. industry and trade; production of analyses on domestic and international trade and investment policies that can affect competitiveness; identification and resolution of overseas market and trade barriers; and management of the Industry Trade Advisory Committees (see tables 2 and 3 for more detailed descriptions of MAS’s activities; see app. MAS’s Clients Report that MAS Provides Analysis Not Readily Available Elsewhere in Government
While MAS conducts activities that have similarities to activities of other agencies, officials from MAS’s client agencies stated that MAS can provide analysis that combines industry and trade expertise that is not readily available elsewhere in government. MAS Faces Challenges in Prioritizing Activities, Monitoring its Workload, and Communicating its Role and Contributions
MAS Has Undertaken an Internal Review, but Has Not Had a Clear System to Prioritize Activities or a Clear Mission Statement
MAS has undertaken an internal review to update its mission and priorities regarding activities and clients and has proposed changes which are currently under departmental review. MAS’s System to Monitor Its Workload is Used Unevenly
MAS does not have a mechanism to systematically monitor analysts’ workload or the amount of time spent on requests for different clients. Consequently, the public and Congress may have limited information about MAS’s contributions to policy making. For the general public, ITA’s Web sites provide limited information about MAS’s priorities and activities. MAS Faces Challenges in Measuring Its Contributions to the Trade Policy Process
External Factors Affect MAS’s Achievement of Its Broad, Outcome-Based Performance Targets
Due to its policy-support role, MAS’s ability to meet its performance targets, such as breaking down trade barriers faced by U.S. firms, depends on actions from other agencies, Congress, businesses, and foreign governments. Some of this work is used by senior government officials in Commerce and other parts of the Executive Branch. MAS has established a detailed process to measure its performance, but the office does not systematically obtain feedback from all its clients or track its contributions to major policy decisions that fall outside its performance measures. This makes it difficult for MAS to accurately determine the extent to which it adds value or to identify opportunities for improvement. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better assure MAS is meeting the needs of its clients, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce, in concert with MAS management, take the following four actions: 1. In order to ascertain whether MAS is meeting the needs of its government clients involved in the trade policy process, explore ways to more systematically obtain information on the value it is adding. In its comment letter, Commerce stated that it fully concurred with our findings and recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the Office of Manufacturing and Services’s (MAS) goals and activities, and how the types of analysis and expertise it provides compare with those provided by other government entities; (2) how MAS prioritizes its activities and targets its resources; and (3) the extent to which MAS tracks and reports its contributions to increasing U.S. competitiveness and trade. We also interviewed officials from other U.S. government agencies, including International Trade Commission, Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Departments of State, Energy, Transportation, Treasury, Environmental Protection Agency, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB). To assess the reliability of the World Bank and Commerce data, we interviewed knowledgeable agency officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Declining U.S. manufacturing has been an issue of continuing concern for policymakers; this was reflected in the Obama Administration's (Administration) 2010 announcement of the National Export Initiative. The Administration has also shown interest in improving the efficiency of the federal support of trade operations. In 2004, the Office of Manufacturing and Services (MAS) was established within the Department of Commerce's (Commerce) International Trade Administration (ITA) to enhance the global competitiveness of U.S. industry. GAO was asked to examine (1) MAS's goals and activities and how they compare with those of other government entities; (2) how MAS prioritizes its activities and targets its resources; and (3) the extent to which MAS tracks and reports its efforts. GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials from MAS, other parts of ITA and Commerce, and other agencies..
What GAO Found
MAS's primary goal is to support the competitiveness of U.S. industry, which it does largely through combining its industry and trade expertise to support other parts of Commerce, including other parts of the ITA and external U.S. government clients, such as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). The major activities of MAS's offices include: collection and dissemination of data on U.S. industry and trade, production of analyses on policies that can affect competitiveness, and identification and resolution of overseas trade barriers. While some activities may seem similar to those of other agencies, such as USTR, officials from MAS's client agencies stated that MAS's combination of industry and trade expertise is not readily available to them elsewhere in the government. MAS has undertaken an internal review to update its mission and priorities regarding activities and clients and has proposed changes currently under departmental review. MAS does not have a mechanism to systematically monitor analysts' workload or the amount of time spent on requests for different clients. The absence of workload data may hinder its ability to effectively allocate its resources to address the needs of the trade policy process. Further, MAS's role has not been clearly communicated, and ITA's Web site provides limited information about MAS. Consequently, the public and Congress have limited information about MAS's activities and contributions to policy making. MAS's ability to meet its performance targets largely depends on actions from other government agencies and other parties, making isolating its contributions difficult. MAS developed a series of steps, or milestones, to help isolate its contributions to trade policy outcomes, although officials acknowledged continuing challenges. Further, MAS does not systematically obtain feedback on its performance from the agencies to which it provides analysis, nor does it track its contributions to major policy decisions that fall outside its externally reported performance targets. This makes it difficult to assess the extent to which MAS's work adds value to the trade policy process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Commerce take actions, in concert with MAS, to finalize MAS's focusing of mission and priorities, systematically monitor workload, and more systematically obtain and communicate information on the value MAS adds to the trade policy process. In its comments, Commerce concurred with the findings and recommendations and expects to make progress by October 2011. |
gao_GGD-99-180 | gao_GGD-99-180_0 | Guidance Has Not Been Developed for Implementing the BHC Act and CRA in the BHC Merger Application Process
In acting on a BHC merger application, FRB must consider the convenience and needs of the community to be served under the BHC Act and take into account the records of the relevant depository institutions under CRA. Neither the BHC Act nor CRA, or their legislative histories, provide guidance on how FRB is to take into account the convenience and needs of the community when considering a BHC merger application. The federal regulators, including FRB, have developed guidance on how to assess a depository institution’s CRA performance. However, FRB has not developed guidance on how it will evaluate the CRA record, comprising the regulators’ ratings of institutions’ CRA performance and comments from the public, for large BHC merger applications. FRB’s CRA Performance Review Process for the Six Large BHC Merger Applications Lacked Transparency
In reviewing the six BHC merger applications, it appeared to us that FRB attempted to balance the CRA performance ratings with information that raised concerns with the institutions’ CRA performance obtained through the public comment process. FRB conducted analyses with HMDA and CRA small business data to address concerns of insufficient home mortgage and small business lending, respectively. FRB’s consideration of branch closures was generally limited to a determination of whether the applicant had an adequate branch closure policy and its past branch closure record. FRB’s lack of written guidance on how it addresses public comments contributed to the concerns voiced by the community groups and BHC applicants we contacted regarding the lack of transparency in the merger application process. Home Mortgage Lending, Small Business Lending, Branch Closures, and CRA Agreements Were the Four Principal CRA Public Concerns in the Six Mergers
The four principal CRA concerns raised in the six mergers were (1) an insufficient amount of home mortgage lending in LMI areas, (2) an insufficient amount of small business lending in LMI areas, (3) expected bank branch closures in LMI areas, and (4) the lack of specificity in CRA agreements. FRB approved four of the mergers with conditions for the reporting of branch closures. Bank Merger Activity Was Not Associated With Adverse Change in Mortgage Lending in Minority and LMI Areas for Three BHC Mergers
By analyzing three large BHC mergers using appropriate statistical measures and benchmarks for lending performance, we found that after none of the three mergers was there a disproportionate decline in single- family home mortgage lending to minority and LMI census tracts. FRB’s Legal Responsibilities
Our legal analysis included a review of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act) and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). NBD’s Acquisition of First Chicago
NBD Corporation acquired First Chicago Corporation in 1995. Chemical’s Acquisition of Chase Manhattan
Commenters raised CRA concerns for both Chemical and Chase Manhattan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed large bank holding company mergers and the impact of such mergers on low- and moderate-income (LMI) areas, focusing on: (1) the Federal Reserve Board's (FRB) legal responsibilities in assessing Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC) mergers for Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) performance; (2) FRB's process for assessing the CRA performance of six large BHC merger applicants, including how FRB addressed the principal public concerns related to the CRA performance; and (3) the premerger and postmerger mortgage lending in LMI and minority communities for three large BHC mergers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in acting on a BHC merger application, FRB must consider the convenience and needs of the community to be served under the BHC Act and take into account the record of the relevant depository institutions under CRA; (2) neither the BHC Act nor CRA, or their legislative histories, provide guidance on how FRB is to take these factors into account when considering a BHC merger application; (3) the depository institutions' primary federal regulators have developed guidance for their assessments of a depository institution's CRA performance; (4) however, FRB has not developed guidance on how it evaluates the CRA records of the merging BHCs; (5) for the six BHC merger applications that GAO reviewed, FRB attempted to balance the regulators' ratings of the depository institutions' CRA performance and information presented through public comments that raised concerns with the institutions' CRA records; (6) all of the bank subsidiaries included in the six mergers had satisfactory or outstanding performance ratings in their most recent CRA examinations; (7) the principal CRA concerns raised by commenters included insufficient home mortgage lending, insufficient small business lending, and branch closures in LMI areas; (8) FRB analyzed Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) and small business data to address concerns of insufficient home mortgage and small business lending, respectively; (9) FRB's consideration of branch closures was generally limited to a determination of whether the applicant had an adequate branch closure policy and its past branch closure record; (10) FRB approved all six mergers, but four of the mergers were approved with conditions for the reporting of subsequent branch closures; (11) FRB's lack of written guidance on how it addresses public comments raising CRA concerns contributed to the concerns voiced by community groups and the BHC applicants regarding the lack of transparency in the merger application process; (12) on the basis of GAO's analysis of home mortgage lending, BHC merger activity had not been associated with adverse changes in single-family home mortgage lending in minority and LMI areas in the major metropolitan areas served by the acquired BHCs for the three BHC mergers GAO analyzed; and (13) NBD Corporation's acquisition of First Chicago and Chemical Banking Corporation's acquisition of Chase Manhattan Bank have been associated with stable to increased lending in the relevant areas. |
gao_GAO-15-760T | gao_GAO-15-760T_0 | USAID Had Developed Processes for Awarding EFSP Funds but Lacked Guidance on Modifying Awards and Responding to Changing Market Conditions
In our March 2015 report, we found that USAID had developed processes for awarding cash-based food assistance grants; however, it lacked formal internal guidance for its process to approve award modifications and provided no guidance for partners on responding to changing market conditions that might warrant an award modification. Under the terms of the APS, USAID awards new cash-based food assistance grants through either a competitive proposal review or an expedited noncompetitive process. For our March 2015 report, we reviewed 22 proposals for new cash-based food assistance projects that were awarded and active as of June 1, 2014; we found that USAID made 13 of these awards through its competitive process, 7 through an abbreviated noncompetitive review, and 2 under authorities allowing an expedited emergency response. USAID lacked guidance for staff on modifying awards. According to USAID officials, USAID follows a similar process in reviewing requests to modify ongoing awards, which implementing partners may propose for a variety of reasons, such as an increase in the number of beneficiaries within areas covered by an award or a delay in completing cash distributions. Twenty of these cost modifications resulted in an increase in total funding for the 13 grants from about $91 million to about $626 million, a 591 percent increase. 2). The Syria regional award modifications amounted to about 82 percent of the total increase in funding for the cost modifications we reviewed. We concluded that without formal guidance, USAID cannot hold its staff and its partners accountable for taking all necessary steps to justify and document the modification of awards. We have yet to verify this information to determine whether it addresses the issues we identified. Additionally, in our March 2015 report we found that, although USAID required partners implementing cash-based food assistance to monitor market conditions, USAID did not provide clear guidance about how to respond when market conditions change—for example, when and how partners might adjust levels of assistance that beneficiaries receive. We did not find similar food price changes in Jordan and Kenya. USAID’s Partners Had Generally Implemented Financial Controls in Projects We Reviewed; We Found Weaknesses in Risk Planning, Implementation, and Guidance
In our March 2015 report, we found that USAID relied on its implementing partners to implement financial oversight of EFSP projects, but it did not require them to conduct comprehensive risk assessments to plan financial oversight activities—two key components of an internal control framework. In addition, we found that USAID provided little or no guidance to partners and its own staff on carrying out these components. Our March 2015 report found that for case study projects we reviewed in four countries, neither USAID nor its implementing partners conducted comprehensive risk assessments that address financial vulnerabilities that may affect cash-based food assistance projects, such as counterfeiting, diversion, and losses. Control activities had weaknesses. We reviewed selected distribution documents for three implementing partners with projects that began around 2012 in our four case study countries (Jordan, Kenya, Niger, and Somalia). However, the directive lacked guidance on how to estimate and report losses. In addition, we found that USAID’s guidance to partners on financial control activities is limited. For example, USAID lacked guidance to aid implementing partners in estimating and reporting losses. We concluded that when implementing partners for EFSP projects have gaps in financial guidance and limitations with regard to oversight of cash- based food assistance projects, the partners may not put in place appropriate controls for areas that are most vulnerable to fraud, diversion and misuse of EFSP funding. Limitations in USAID’s field financial oversight. However, USAID’s guidance to its FFP officers and its implementing partners on financial oversight and reporting is limited. USAID concurred with this recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
For over 60 years, the United States has provided assistance to food-insecure countries primarily in the form of food commodities procured in the United States and transported overseas. In recent years, the United States has joined other major donors in increasingly providing food assistance in the form of cash or vouchers. In fiscal year 2014, U.S.-funded cash and voucher projects in 28 countries totaled about $410 million, the majority of which was for the Syria crisis, making the United States the largest single donor of cash-based food assistance.
This testimony summarizes GAO's March 2015 report (GAO-15-328) that (1) reviewed USAID's processes for awarding and modifying cash-based food assistance projects and (2) assessed the extent to which USAID and its implementing partners have implemented financial controls to help ensure appropriate oversight of such projects. GAO analyzed program data and documents for selected projects in Jordan, Kenya, Niger, and Somalia; interviewed relevant officials; and conducted fieldwork in Jordan, Kenya, and Niger.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) awards new cash-based food assistance grants under its Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) through a competitive proposal review or an expedited noncompetitive process; however, USAID lacks formal internal guidance for modifying awards. In its March 2015 review of 22 grant awards, GAO found that USAID made 13 through its competitive process, 7 through an abbreviated noncompetitive review, and 2 under authorities allowing an expedited emergency response. According to USAID, the agency follows a similar process for modification requests. Partners may propose cost or no-cost modifications for a variety of reasons, such as an increase in the number of beneficiaries or changing market conditions affecting food prices. In its review of 13 grant awards that had been modified, GAO found that cost modifications for 8 awards resulted in an increase in funding for the 13 awards from about $91 million to $626 million. According to USAID, procedures for modifying awards have been updated but GAO has yet to verify this information. GAO also found that though USAID requires partners to monitor market conditions—a key factor that may trigger an award modification—it did not provide guidance on when and how to respond to changing market conditions. GAO concluded that, until USAID institutes formal guidance, it cannot hold its staff and implementing partners accountable for taking all necessary steps to justify and document the medication of awards.
USAID relies on implementing partners for financial oversight of EFSP projects but did not require them to conduct comprehensive risk assessments to plan financial oversight activities, and it provided little related procedural guidance to partners and its own staff. For projects in four case study countries reviewed in its March 2015 report, GAO found that neither USAID nor its implementing partners conducted comprehensive risk assessments to identify and mitigate financial vulnerabilities. Additionally, although USAID's partners had generally implemented financial controls over cash and voucher distributions that GAO reviewed, some partners' guidance for financial oversight had weaknesses, such as a lack of information on how to estimate and report losses. In addition, GAO found that USAID had limited guidance on financial control activities and provided no information to aid partners in estimating and reporting losses. As a result, partners may neglect to implement appropriate financial controls in areas that are most vulnerable to fraud, diversion, and misuse of EFSP funding.
What GAO Recommends
GAO's March 2015 report included recommendations to strengthen USAID's guidance for staff on approving award modifications and guidance for partners on responding to changing market conditions. GAO also made recommendations to strengthen financial oversight of cash-based food assistance projects by addressing gaps in USAID's guidance on risk assessments and mitigation plans and on financial control activities. USAID concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-203 | gao_GAO-02-203_0 | Background
Under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, the State Department controls the export and temporary import of defense articles and services. Figure 1 shows the key phases of the license application review process. However, the State Department has not established formal guidelines for licensing officers to use to determine which agencies and State Department offices need to see certain license applications. As a result, the licensing office may be referring more applications than necessary. The State Department lacks procedures to control the flow of license applications through the review process, and as a result, in fiscal year 2000, hundreds of applications were lost and thousands more were delayed. State Department license reviewers told us that they frequently receive calls from applicants asking why their application is taking a long time. State Department Has Added Personnel and Plans to Automate the Process, but Needs to Focus on Correcting Process Weaknesses
The licensing office has taken steps to improve license processing time by hiring additional licensing officers and is planning to upgrade the office’s electronic business processing system. Recommendations for Executive Actions
To improve the efficiency and timeliness of the munitions licensing process, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Office of Defense Trade Controls in conjunction with reviewing agencies and offices to develop criteria for determining which license applications to refer to other agencies and offices, and formal guidelines and training for organizations that receive referrals so that reviewers clearly understand their duties when reviewing license applications, and establish timeliness goals for each phase of the licensing process. 2. | What GAO Found
The U.S. defense industry and some foreign government purchasers have expressed concern that the U.S. export control process is unnecessarily burdensome. Defense industry officials contend that extended reviews of export license applications by the State Department have resulted in lost sales and are harming the nation's defense industry. The State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls is responsible for licensing the export and temporary import of defense articles and services. Many license applications take a long time to review because of their complexity and the need to consider different points of view. However, several conditions make the application review process less efficient and cause delays. The State Department has not established formal guidelines for determining the agencies and offices that need to review license applications. As a result, the licensing office refers more license applications to other agencies and offices than may be necessary. Furthermore, many license application reviewers in State Department reviewing offices consider license reviews a low priority. The State Department lacks procedures to monitor the flow of license applications through the review process. The State Department has hired new licensing officers which license office officials say has decreased processing time, and plans to upgrade the office's electronic business system. However, the planned upgrade needs to (1) ensure a controlled and timely flow of applications and (2) track the progress of applications. |
gao_GAO-13-373 | gao_GAO-13-373_0 | However, because funds from LIHEAP, which assists low-income families in reducing their energy bills by making long-term energy efficiency improvements to their homes, precluded from being used for new construction, they cannot be used to replace existing homes with newer, more efficient models. Three States Have Replaced Older Manufactured Homes with More Energy Efficient Models
We identified three states––Maine, Montana, and Washington—that have used a combination of state and federal funds to conduct pilot programs that replaced older manufactured homes with more energy efficient models. The three programs were relatively small, accounting for about $4.5 million in spending and responsible for replacing 81 homes, over about 2 years. The programs differed in program requirements, the types of financing used, and the types of replacement homes used. To be eligible, beneficiaries’ manufactured homes were required to have been built before 1976 and deemed unsuitable for weatherization. The pilot was funded by a $2 million grant funded by HUD’s HOME Program. Table 1 provides a comparison of the three replacement programs. States Reported Facing Challenges, Including Difficulty Finding Potential Beneficiaries Who Were Eligible and Willing to Participate
Officials from all three state replacement pilot programs and representatives of organizations and agencies that aided these programs told us that they faced three key types of challenges: (1) many potential beneficiaries were not eligible to participate; (2) some potential beneficiaries were not willing to participate; and (3) other logistical challenges, such as finding suitable replacement homes within a reasonable distance to transport them to beneficiaries, which resulted in higher costs. Did not own or have a long-term lease for the land. Poor credit histories. Some potential beneficiaries were doubtful that such a program would be legitimate. Unwilling to take on any debt. Unwilling to move from their current location. Some potential beneficiaries may be unwilling, or unable, to pay the increased property taxes that would result from the increased value of their homes. After replacement, the sales value of the new home would be added to the land value, and the beneficiary’s property taxes would have tripled. Officials from all three pilots also identified other challenges that were primarily logistical in nature. Energy Savings Alone Did Not Fully Offset the Costs of Replacing Older Manufactured Homes, but Replacements May Have Had Other Benefits
In the three replacement pilot programs we examined, the energy savings alone were not sufficient to fully offset the costs of replacing older manufactured homes, but program officials told us that these programs were not specifically focused on doing so and that they had health and welfare benefits for beneficiaries. Specifically, the two programs that maintained information on energy use and estimated savings spent an average of about $56,119 per unit to replace each older manufactured home and estimated about $489 in annual energy savings per home. The average cost of replacement homes varied across the three programs we examined. The least costly program we examined was Montana’s, which replaced some older manufactured homes with used, but newer and more energy efficient models, with an average cost of about $42,339 per home. Officials reported that the replacement homes in these programs were significantly more energy efficient, resulting in improved quality of life for the beneficiaries and significantly lower projected energy costs on a square foot basis; however, officials in all three states said these energy savings alone were generally not sufficient to pay for the cost of the replacement over a typical loan period. Nonetheless, state officials told us that these replacement programs were not specifically designed for energy savings to offset replacement costs, and some officials told us that energy efficiency gains were secondary to the health and welfare benefits of getting occupants into safer, more weather-tight manufactured homes. HHS provided technical and clarifying comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Approximately 2 million of the nations 130 million housing units are manufactured homes (i.e., mobile homes) that were built before 1976. These older manufactured homes are generally considered to have some of the poorest energy efficiency of all housing units. Many of the occupants of these homes qualify for federal assistance to help pay their energy bills through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program. A portion of this programs funds can be used to improve the energy efficiency of these homes; however, program funding may not be used for new construction, or replacing existing homes. Some states have conducted pilot programs to replace older manufactured homes with newer, more energy efficient models.
GAO was asked to identify and review state programs and the extent to which they may be cost-effective based on reduced energy costs. For this report, GAOs objectives were to (1) identify states that have funded replacement programs and describe these programs; (2) identify challenges, if any, these states reported facing in implementing these programs; and (3) determine the extent to which these programs resulted in energy savings sufficient to offset replacement costs. To address these objectives, GAO surveyed all 50 states and the District of Columbia, examined data from pilot programs spanning about 2 years, and interviewed officials from three state-based programs.
HHS provided technical and clarifying comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO identified three statesMaine, Montana, and Washingtonthat have developed pilot programs focused on replacing older manufactured homes using a combination of state and federal funds. The three programs were relatively small, accounting for about $4.5 million in spending and responsible for replacing 81 homes, over about 2 years. The programs differed in requirements, including whether the land that the replacement home would occupy had to be owned or could be leased; the types of financing used, with some replacements requiring recipients to take on a partial mortgage; and the types of replacement homes.
Program officials and representatives of organizations that aided them from the three state replacement pilot programs identified three key types of challenges in implementing these programs. First, they told GAO that many potential beneficiaries were not eligible to participate because (1) they had liens on their existing properties, (2) they did not own or have a long-term lease for the land the homes would be placed on, or (3) their credit histories made them ineligible for any type of loan. Second, these officials told GAO that some potential beneficiaries were unwilling to participate because they were: (1) mistrustful that such a program would be legitimate; (2) unwilling to take on any debt, regardless of the poor condition of their home; (3) unwilling to move from their current location; or (4) unwilling to take on increases in property taxes resulting from increased home value. Third, they identified challenges that were primarily logistical in nature, such as the need to construct wheelchair ramps or update utilities, which could raise the cost of replacement.
In the three pilot replacement programs GAO examined, the energy savings did not fully offset the costs of replacing older manufactured homes over a typical loan period. The two programs that maintained information on energy use and estimated savings spent an average of about $56,119 per unit to replace each older manufactured home and estimated about $489 in annual energy savings per home. The average cost of replacement homes varied across the three programs GAO examined. The least costly program GAO examined was Montanas, which replaced some older manufactured homes with used, but newer and more energy efficient models, with an average cost of about $42,339 per home. However, state officials told GAO that these replacement programs were not specifically focused on energy savings and that energy efficiency gains were secondary to the health and welfare benefits of getting occupants into safer, more weather-tight manufactured homes. |
gao_AIMD-98-185 | gao_AIMD-98-185_0 | In its 1980 report, the Subcommittee recognized that higher fourth quarter obligations may not indicate a problem with wasteful spending. The source of this information was Treasury’s Financial Management Service (FMS) Standard Form (SF) 225 - Report on Obligations. Potential for Improper Year-End Spending Has Been Constrained
Changes in the budget environment and procurement reforms have reduced the potential magnitude of problems with year-end spending. Changes in the Budget Environment Affect Year-End Spending
Fewer funds, which have been made available for more than 1 year, reduce the opportunity and need to spend funds quickly at year-end for many agencies. Increasingly, federal government spending is made up of direct payments to individuals or grants to states not subject to year-end spending pressures. At the same time, appropriators have made funds available for more than 1 year. Procurement Changes Address the Subcommittee’s Concerns
OMB officials stated that in their view, improper or unnecessary contracts associated with the rush to spend funds at year-end are far less of a problem than they once were due to open competition requirements, improved agency procurement planning, and fewer available resources. Additionally, there were significant differences in the three sets of data that agencies reported for fiscal year 1997. OMB told us that the OMB and FMS project to merge these separate year-end reporting requirements will resolve or greatly alleviate the differences in year-end reporting data. Agencies’ failure to report and reconcile budget execution information is another example of the broader financial management concerns we raised in our financial audit of the fiscal year 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements of the United States Government. Although agencies have the primary responsibility for ensuring that their budgets are executed and accounted for properly, our study revealed that the ability of Congress and OMB to oversee the rate and timing of federal spending across agencies is limited in the absence of complete and accurate reporting. In addition, it points to inadequate central oversight of the financial status of the federal government because of agencies’ widespread reporting noncompliance. Even at year-end, budget execution data reported to OMB and year-end accounting data provided to Treasury do not agree for many agencies. Recommendation
To improve oversight of agencies’ execution of the budget, we recommend that the Office of Management and Budget reemphasize compliance with the OMB Circular A-34 requirement that agencies provide quarterly data no later than 20 days after the close of a calendar quarter, and examine quarterly reporting by agencies that varies significantly from planned or historical rates. We periodically report on agencies’ progress in correcting deficiencies and on where additional actions need to be taken. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) actions taken to correct problems with federal yearend spending practices and the award of government contracts; and (2) quarterly obligation data for selected departments and agencies to determine if fourth quarter obligations were higher than obligations in earlier quarters of the fiscal year (FY).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) changes in the budget environment and procurement reforms have affected the opportunity and need to obligate funds quickly at yearend; (2) agencies spend far less today than they did in 1980 on providing goods and services directly, as payments to individual beneficiaries and grants to state and local governments have increased; (3) this trend, combined with limits on discretionary spending, has significantly changed the budget environment for most agencies; (4) at the same time, Congress has made funds available for longer periods for many agencies, which reduces the pressure to spend funds at the end of each year; (5) in addition, systemic procurement reforms addressed most of the issues raised in the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs' report although problems persist in certain agencies and with some procurements; (6) GAO's work and that of others indicates that today, there are more safeguards against unplanned yearend spending and, in most discretionary programs, fewer resources available for low-priority purchases than in 1980; (7) despite these changes, it is difficult to assess the patterns of spending during the year because reported quarterly budget execution data are not reliable; (8) without complete and timely information for oversight, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other decisionmakers do not have an accurate assessment of the financial status of federal programs during the year; (9) even at yearend, there are significant differences in three comparable sets of data that agencies report to OMB and the Department of the Treasury; (10) although OMB officials stated that a new system they have built jointly with Treasury to collect yearend data starting in FY 1999 should resolve or greatly alleviate the differences in yearend budget data, more work is needed to assure compliance with the requirement for quarterly data; and (11) agencies' failure to report and reconcile budget execution information mirrors broader financial management problems found in GAO's financial audit of the FY 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements of the United States government. |
gao_GAO-09-88 | gao_GAO-09-88_0 | We limited our review of the NASA OIG’s accomplishments to the results of audits and investigations reported to the Congress for this period and did not audit or otherwise verify the dollar amounts of the monetary accomplishments or potential savings to the government reported by the NASA OIG. We calculated a ratio for each OIG’s budget information as a percentage of its respective agency’s budget for comparative purposes. During the 5-year period of fiscal years 2003 through 2007, 99 percent of NASA OIG’s dollar accomplishments came from investigations with 88 percent coming from two joint investigations with other OIGs. 1.) As shown in table 4, almost all of the NASA OIG’s monetary accomplishments have come from investigations during fiscal years 2003 through 2007. In contrast, over the same 5- year period the OIG’s potential audit savings contributed about $9 million or about 1 percent of the OIG’s total reported 5-year monetary accomplishments, with one audit in fiscal year 2007 responsible for $7 million of this amount and another audit in fiscal year 2004 responsible for about $1.5 million. When this same calculation is made based on the monetary accomplishments reported by all 30 OIGs with IGs appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the overall average return on their total budgetary resources in fiscal year 2007 was $9.49 for every dollar spent by the government for their offices, or almost 26 times that of the NASA OIG for fiscal year 2007. OIG Planning Lacks Economy and Efficiency Objectives
Of the 71 reports completed by the NASA OIG’s Office of Audits over fiscal years 2006 and 2007, 70 did not include recommendations that address the economy and efficiency of NASA’s programs and operations with potential cost savings. 2.) These losses affect the ability of the OIG to maintain experienced audit personnel. We did not review the reasons for the OIG’s employee turnover but believe that the OIG would benefit from a review by an objective third-party expert to address the reasons for the relatively high attrition rate as compared to the overall rate for NASA. External Reviews of NASA OIG and the Integrity Committee’s Investigation
Over the 5-year period of fiscal years 2003 through 2007, NASA OIG had three routine external peer reviews—two reviews of its auditing practice and one review of its investigative practice. Conclusions
The fundamental mission of the NASA OIG includes providing independent and objective oversight of NASA to identify areas for improved economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. The OIG’s budgets and staffing levels have not been adversely affected when compared to both the NASA budgets and staffing and to the budgets of other OIGs. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to strengthen audit oversight and management of the NASA OIG, we recommend that the NASA IG include in strategic and annual planning, performance audits that address NASA’s economy and efficiency with potential monetary savings and that the OIG work closely with an objective outside party to obtain external review and consultation in the strategic and annual planning processes, and identify the causes of high employee turnover with the assistance of an objective expert, and determine actions needed as appropriate. The IG Act requires that IGs address issues of economy and efficiency and provide independent audits and investigations. The NASA IG points out that in our comparison of monetary accomplishments and the return on investment by 30 IG offices where the IGs are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, our presentation of monetary accomplishments for the Department of Agriculture OIG and the Department of Homeland Security OIG includes the accomplishments of DCAA. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to review the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) and provide information on (1) the audit and investigative coverage of NASA; (2) the NASA OIG's audit and investigative accomplishments; (3) the NASA OIG's budget and staffing levels, including staff attrition rates; and (4) the results of external reviews of the NASA OIG. GAO obtained information from NASA OIG reports, interviews, and documentation.
What GAO Found
The fundamental mission of the statutory federal IG offices, including the NASA OIG, includes identifying areas for improved economy, efficiency, and effectiveness through independent and objective oversight and preventing and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse. Of the 71 reports issued by the OIG's Office of Audits in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, only 1 report had recommendations to address the economy and efficiency of NASA's programs and operations with measurable monetary accomplishments. Over the 5-year period of fiscal years 2003 through 2007, audit reports contributed to only 1 percent of the OIG's total monetary accomplishments. The remaining 99 percent came from the OIG's investigative cases. Of about $9 million in total reported monetary accomplishments from audits over the 5-year period, almost $7 million was from one audit completed in fiscal year 2007. When the monetary accomplishments of both audits and investigations in fiscal year 2007 are combined and compared to the OIG's budget of $34 million, the return for each budget dollar is $0.36. This calculation for all 30 OIGs with IGs appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate averages $9.49, or 26 times that of the NASA OIG. The OIG's relative lack of monetary accomplishments from audits is due, at least in part, to the OIG's strategic and annual audit plans, which do not provide assurance that NASA's economy and efficiency will be addressed or that measurable monetary accomplishments will be achieved. We believe that during the planning process, the OIG should consult with an objective third party with experience in providing economy and efficiency audits with potential monetary savings. The OIG's budgets and staffing kept pace or did slightly better than all of NASA for these same resources during fiscal years 2003 through 2007. When comparing the fiscal year 2007 budgets of all 30 IGs appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate with their respective agencies' budgets, the NASA OIG ranked 11th. Nevertheless, GAO noted that the OIG's ability to retain experienced audit personnel was adversely affected by a staff attrition rate that has increased from 12 percent to almost 20 percent over fiscal years 2003 through 2007. Due to the relatively high attrition rates, GAO believes that the OIG should use the assistance of an objective expert to identify the causes of staff turnover. The NASA OIG's most recent peer reviews for both audits and investigations have resulted in unqualified opinions. A recent investigation by the Integrity Committee of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency and the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency reported that the NASA IG had an appearance of a lack of independence. The investigation was closed, but corrective actions did not address this finding and the Integrity Committee considers the issue unresolved. This issue has been raised by members of the Congress as a limitation in obtaining independent oversight of NASA. |
gao_GAO-12-21 | gao_GAO-12-21_0 | The subsidies services offer providers for off-installation child care are intended to provide benefits comparable to those that families would receive for on-installation care. Military Families’ Child Care Costs Are Largely Driven by Policies, Including Subsidy Caps, Which Vary by Service
For On-Installation Care, Services’ Policies Resulted in Variations in Per-Child Costs
As a result of services’ policies, the per-child monthly cost of on- installation care at a CDC for families within the same income category varied by as much as $230 in school year 2010, depending on their service and installation (see fig. For example, the per-child monthly cost for on-installation care for a family with an annual income of $50,000 could have ranged from $335 to $518 in school year 2010; however, for families in this income category at most military installations with CDCs, the per-child monthly cost was within the OSD standard fee range of $335 and $413. For Off-Installation Care, Families in Services with Fixed Subsidy Caps Had Higher Average Costs in School Year 2010 than Families in Other Services
In school year 2010, families using off-installation care in the Air Force and Navy, which capped the monthly amount of subsidy a family could receive at $200 per child, had higher average monthly child care costs than did families in the Army and Marine Corps, which did not have fixed subsidy caps. As a result, some families in these services paid more for off-installation care than they would have paid on installation. In general, the effects of these subsidy policy changes will vary by family. Limited Awareness of DOD-Subsidized Child Care Programs and Availability of Care Pose Barriers for Military Families
Even with Outreach Initiatives, DOD Faces Challenges Educating Military Families about Child Care Programs
Although DOD provides information about subsidized child care programs through a number of sources, DOD officials and military parents cited limited awareness of these programs as a key barrier to their use. DOD and the services have taken a number of steps to address these challenges. Officials from DOD and groups representing military families told us that information on DOD- subsidized child care is more likely to be absorbed if it is provided when military families need it. Other examples include the Navy and Air Force’s new programs to market DOD- subsidized child care programs to military families, such as to reservists who have children and have recently deployed. In addition to learning about DOD-subsidized child care, obtaining information about applying for this care has also been a challenge families face, because servicemembers must apply for on-installation child care at different places than for off-installation child care. DOD intends to market the system DOD-wide to servicemembers once it is fully implemented. DOD plans to pilot the system in the spring of 2012, and to begin full implementation of the system in the late summer or fall of 2012. Availability of On- Installation Care Is Limited but Increasing, and Eligible Off-Installation Providers Are Scarce
In response to limited availability of on-installation child care and eligible off-installation providers, DOD and the services are increasing capacity at on-installation facilities and in the community as part of their commitment to family readiness. DOD anticipates that construction projects approved in fiscal years 2008 through 2010 will add over 21,000 additional child care spaces. Military families that cannot obtain on-installation care due to wait lists and those that are geographically isolated from an installation may be eligible for DOD-subsidized off-installation care, but community-based providers who meet DOD’s quality standards are in short supply. For instance, differences among the services in families’ costs for off-installation care could be minimized if all services offered subsidies that made up the full difference between a family’s private provider rate and what they would have paid for on-installation care, with no subsidy caps. As DOD increases the number of eligible child care providers for off-installation programs and moves toward centralizing access to DOD-subsidized child care programs through its planned agencywide system for requesting both on- and off-installation care, outreach will need to keep pace, with particular attention to families who live off installation. DOD stated that in addition to the recent and planned changes to DOD and the Army’s fee policies that will likely reduce the differences among the services, the Air Force also implemented fee policy changes reducing out-of-pocket expenses for families. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
Our review focused on the following questions: (1) What are the out-of- pocket child care costs paid by military families who use Department of Defense (DOD) subsidized child care? (2) What are the barriers, if any, to obtaining DOD-subsidized care, and what has DOD done in response? Sample of Family Files
To determine the out-of-pocket costs for families using DOD-subsidized off-installation care, we analyzed these costs for a random probability sample of 338 families from all four services in school year 2010. Specifically, we collected and analyzed data from family files maintained by the contractor that administers DOD’s off-installation child care subsidies, the National Association of Child Care Resource and Referral Agencies (NACCRRA). We found the data we assessed to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the range of on-installation fees per child by service in school years 2010 and 2011, and out-of-pocket costs for families using DOD-subsidized off- installation child care in school year 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
About a million military servicemembers serve the United States while raising a family, and many need reliable, affordable child care. Paying for high-quality child care can be challenging for these families, so the Department of Defense (DOD) offsets costs by subsidizing on-installation child care centers and offering subsidies for approved off-installation care providers. Deployments related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan increased the demand for child care. The extent of military families out-of-pocket child care costs for those using subsidized care are not known, and families may face barriers to obtaining DOD-subsidized care. GAO was mandated to examine: (1) the out-of-pocket child care costs paid by military families who use DOD-subsidized care; and (2) the barriers, if any, to obtaining DOD-subsidized care, and what has DOD done in response.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed DOD policies and guidance; interviewed officials from DOD, its contractor that administers DODs off-installation child care subsidies, and organizations that support military families; reviewed DOD fee data for school year 2009-2010 (school year 2010) and school year 2010-2011 (school year 2011); and analyzed child care costs for a random probability sample of 338 families using off-installation care in school year 2010. GAO conducted nongeneralizable discussion groups with military parents at two large military installations.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.DOD generally agreed with the reports findings and also provided additional information on several specific points in the report.
What GAO Found
Out-of-pocket costs for military families who use DOD-subsidized child care are largely driven by policies that vary by service. DOD establishes income-based fee ranges for on-installation child care, but each service sets its own fees and discounts within these parameters. As a result, in school year 2010 the per-child costs that families from the same income categories paid for on-installation care varied by service and installation. For example, the monthly per-child cost for a family with an income of $50,000 could have ranged from $335 to $518. Families costs for off-installation child care through private providers are also affected by policy differences among the services. All services offer subsidies for off-installation care that are intended to make families costs comparable to those for on-installation care. In an effort to offer benefits to more families, some services use a fixed cap to limit the subsidy amount. In school year 2010, the Air Force and Navy capped their subsidies at $200 per child per month, and families in these services had higher average monthly costs for off-installation care than Army and Marine Corps families, and also had higher costs than what they would have paid for on-installation care. For example, on average, Navy families using off-installation care paid $87 more per month than they would have paid for on-installation care, while Army families paid $63 less. Other factors, such as the number of children in care, also contributed to families costs for off-installation care. DOD and the services recent policy changes reduced differences among and within services in families costs for on-installation care, and DOD plans to further reduce these differences in the next 3 to 5 years. While the effects of these policy changes on individual families costs for off-installation care vary by family, families in services with fixed subsidy caps will likely continue to have higher average costs than families in services that do not.
Military families face two main barriers to obtaining DOD-subsidized child care: lack of awareness and insufficient availability. According to DOD officials and based on GAOs group discussions, some families remain unaware of subsidized child care, particularly off-installation care, despite DODs efforts to provide information at pre-deployment briefings, and through other outreach efforts. Families who are geographically isolated from an installation, such as reservists and recruiters, may be less likely to be aware of subsidized care. The individual services have taken steps to increase awareness of DOD-subsidized child care, such as establishing positions for professionals who educate families about child care options. However, even families who are informed about DOD-subsidized child care may face barriers obtaining it due to a lack of available space at on-installation centers and a scarcity of eligible child care providers off installation. The shortage of on-installation child care spaces resulted, in part, from heavy deployment demands, and DOD has responded by approving construction projects that it anticipates will provide over 21,000 new child care spaces using fiscal year 2008 through 2010 funding. DOD and the services have initiatives under way to increase the availability of eligible off-installation providers. In addition, DOD is developing an agencywide system that will provide servicemembers a central place to request both on-installation and off-installation child care. DOD plans to pilot the system in the spring of 2012 and intends to market it DOD-wide to servicemembers once it is fully implemented. The agency is in the process of contracting for the development of a marketing plan. |
gao_GAO-04-900 | gao_GAO-04-900_0 | Plan Changes the Navy and Marine Corps’ Operational Concepts and Reduces Force Structure to Achieve Procurement Savings
The Plan proposes that the Navy and Marine Corps (1) merge operational concepts; (2) reduce the number of squadrons, aircraft per squadron, and backup aircraft; and (3) reduce the total number of aircraft to be procured in the future. The Department of the Navy anticipates that these changes will save approximately $28 billion in procurement costs over the next 18 years through fiscal year 2021. Navy and Marine Corps Merge Concepts of Operation
Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps would increase the extent to which their tactical aviation units are used as a combined force for both services. Navy’s Analysis Generally Appears Reasonable, but Some Limitations Could Understate Risks
The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet its operational requirements with a smaller force primarily on the results of a contractor study. The contractor’s analysis generally appeared reasonable because it assessed the relative capability of different tactical aviation force structures and included important assumptions about force structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies. However, the department has not conducted such an assessment. These factors are (1) uncertainty about requirements for readiness funding to support the tactical aviation force and (2) projected delays in fielding the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft that might cause the Department of the Navy not to implement the Plan as early as expected and might increase operations and maintenance costs. Additionally, these delays will oblige the Department of the Navy to operate legacy aircraft longer than expected, which could result in increased operations and maintenance costs. Conclusions
The contractor’s study results provided the Department of the Navy with a reasonable basis for concluding that it could afford to buy a smaller but more capable force that would meet its future operating requirements by using fewer Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation squadrons of more capable aircraft as a combined force and achieving efficiencies that allow it to reduce the number of backup aircraft needed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the potential that the future Navy and Marine Corps integrated tactical aviation force will meet the mission needs of both services and ensure more transparency when making future decommissioning decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: direct the Secretary of the Navy to thoroughly assess all of the factors that provide the basis for the number of backup aircraft needed to support a smaller tactical aviation force under the plan to integrate Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation forces, develop guidance that (1) identifies the criteria and methodology for analyzing future decisions about which units to decommission and (2) establishes requirements for documenting the process used and analysis conducted, and direct the Secretary of the Navy to analyze future readiness funding requirements to support the tactical aviation integration plan and include required funding in future budget requests. To determine the process the Navy and Marine Corps used to assess which reserve squadrons should be decommissioned in fiscal year 2004, we obtained information from the Marine Corps Reserve Headquarters and the 4th Marine Air Wing showing a comparative analysis of Marine Corps Reserve squadrons. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act and the Senate Report for the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO examine the Navy and Marine Corps' Tactical Aviation Integration Plan. In response to these mandates, this report addresses (1) how Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, force structure, and procurement costs change; (2) the methodology and assumptions the services used to analyze the potential for integrating the forces; (3) the analytical process the services used to decide which reserve squadrons to decommission; and (4) other factors that might affect implementation of the Plan.
What GAO Found
Concerns about the affordability of their prior tactical aviation procurement plan prompted the Navy and Marine Corps to agree to a new Tactical Aviation Integration Plan. Under this Plan, the two services will perform their missions using fewer units of more capable aircraft and reducing total program aircraft procurement costs by $28 billion over the next 18 years. Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps will increase the extent to which their tactical aviation units are used as a combined force to accomplish both services' missions. The Plan also reduces the services' tactical aviation force structure by decommissioning five squadrons, thus decreasing the number of Navy and Marine Corps squadrons to 59, and reduces the total number of aircraft they plan to buy from 1,637 to 1,140. The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet the Navy and Marine Corps' operational requirements with a smaller force primarily on the findings of a contractor study that evaluated the relative capability of different tactical aviation force structures. GAO's review of the contractor's methodology and assumptions about force structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies suggests that much of the analysis appears reasonable. However, GAO noted some limitations--including the lack of analytical support for reducing the number of backup aircraft--increase the risk that the smaller force will be less effective than expected. The Navy and Marine Corps each followed a different process in selecting a reserve squadron to decommission. The Marine Corps made a clear and well-documented analysis of the operational, fiscal, logistical, and personnel impacts of different options that appears to provide decision makers with a reasonable basis for selecting the Reserve unit to decommission. By contrast, the Navy selected its reserve squadron without clear criteria or a documented, comprehensive analysis, and thus with less transparency in its process. Two other factors that might affect successful implementation of the Plan are the potential unavailability of readiness funding and delays in fielding the new force. Although the contractor recommended that the Navy identify future readiness-funding requirements, to date, the Navy has not conducted this analysis. In addition, the Department of the Navy is experiencing engineering and weight problems in developing the Joint Strike Fighter that will cause it to be delayed until 2013, at least 1 year later than had been projected, and other high risks to the program remain. Because these delays will cause the Navy to operate legacy aircraft longer than expected, they might also increase operations and maintenance costs, making an analysis of future readiness funding requirements even more important. |
gao_GAO-14-122 | gao_GAO-14-122_0 | The Navy Has Reduced Deficiencies at Delivery but Still Accepts Some Ships with Numerous Construction Deficiencies
Recognizing that it has experienced significant quality problems with several ship classes, the Navy has focused on reducing the number of serious deficiencies, particularly “starred” deficiencies, which require a waiver from the Chief of Naval Operations to defer correction until after delivery. Even so, the Navy still accepts some ships with large numbers of open deficiencies. Navy policy states that ships are to be delivered based on acceptance trials and satisfactory correction or resolution of deficiencies. Commercial Firms Resolve Quality Deficiencies before Delivery, with Some Practices Potentially Informative for Navy in Spite of Different Environment
The environment in which leading commercial ship buyers and builders operate differs in substantial ways from the Navy’s. Nevertheless, some commercial practices supporting delivery of ships with a minimum number of deficiencies may be useful for the Navy. Leading Commercial Ship Buyers Focus on Taking Delivery of Ships Meeting Quality Expectations
Throughout the construction process, the ship buyer’s oversight team, the shipbuilders’ quality personnel, and classification society personnel routinely identify deficiencies such as design errors, supplier and vendor quality issues, and problems with workmanship. In the commercial world, ship buyers use payment terms as leverage to ensure that the shipbuilder delivers a ship to the expected level of quality. Commercial and Navy Shipbuilding Utilize Differing Approaches to Foster Accountability and Ensure Quality
Commercial Ship Buyer Oversight Structure Creates Clear Lines of Accountability While Navy Oversight Is More Diffused
Another mechanism commercial ship buyers use to ensure quality assurance is having dedicated, trained inspection teams on site to monitor and oversee all aspects of construction. Increasing the emphasis on quality may help contribute to the goal of delivering ships that are defect- free, or nearly defect-free, as called for in Navy policy and demonstrated in commercial shipbuilding. Inspectors regularly patrol the shipyard, where they observe the shipyard’s in- process work. Most SUPSHIP locations reported spending about 30 percent of their inspection efforts on in-process evaluations. The shipbuilders agree that quality problems are generally the result of a breakdown with the execution of their quality management plans rather than problems with the plans themselves.contractor shipyards we visited reported having made progress on this front, and shipbuilder quality representatives told us they have been able to improve the detection of quality problems earlier in the production process and hold front-line supervisors accountable for the quality of the work they oversee. Further, there are signs that builders are starting to hold their workforce accountable for quality issues. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the construction quality of ships delivered to the Navy, we recommend that the Secretary of the Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following five actions: 1. 2. In its response, DOD concurred with two of our recommendations and partially concurred with three. DOD said that it will continue to strive to reduce the number of open deficiencies to zero at the time the ship is delivered to the Navy. Further, although trends have improved over time, recently delivered ships still had a significant number of deficiencies. DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation, to provide guidance on quality requirements in contracts. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. Lastly, we reviewed the Navy’s efforts to improve ship quality by reviewing key memos and documents outlining the Back to Basics program and meeting with the officials responsible for implementing these efforts—most of whom were in the Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair commands. When meeting with commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders, we also discussed the ship classification process and the role of classification societies in shipbuilding. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy expects to spend about $15 billion per year to provide its fleet with the most advanced ships to support national defense and military strategies. Problems with recently delivered ships have focused attention on quality issues.
House Report No. 112-110, accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2012, mandated that GAO review the Navy's quality assurance processes for new ship construction. This report discusses, among other issues, (1) quality problems in constructing recently delivered ships and Navy actions to improve quality and (2) key practices employed by leading commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders to ensure quality and how these compared with Navy practices.
GAO analyzed Navy data on ship quality from 2006 to May 2013 and spoke with Navy officials and shipbuilders. GAO also reviewed deficiency data for commercial ships and spoke with buyers and builders.
What GAO Found
The Navy has experienced significant quality problems with several ship classes over the past several years. It has focused on reducing the number of serious deficiencies at the time of delivery, and GAO's analysis shows that the number of deficiencies--particularly "starred" deficiencies designated as the most serious for operational or safety reasons--has generally dropped. Nonetheless, the Navy continues to accept ships with large numbers of open deficiencies. Accepting ships with large numbers of uncorrected deficiencies is a standard practice and GAO found that there are varying interpretations of Navy policy with regard to when the defects should be resolved. In 2009, the Navy organization that oversees ship construction launched the Back to Basics initiative to improve Navy oversight of ship construction. However, a key output of the initiative promoting consistent and adequate quality requirements in Navy contracts has yet to be implemented.
Although the environment in which leading commercial ship buyers and builders operate differs in many ways from the Navy's, some commercial practices aimed at helping to ensure that ships are delivered with a minimum number of deficiencies may be informative for the Navy. Throughout the course of commercial shipbuilding projects, significant numbers of quality defects and instances of non-conforming work are identified. However, leading commercial ship buyers and shipbuilders make great efforts to ensure that these issues are resolved prior to delivery. Further, commercial ship buyers establish clear lines of accountability and hold their personnel responsible for ensuring the shipbuilder delivers a quality vessel. While commercial ship buyers focus on regularly witnessing in-process work through roaming patrols and impromptu inspections, Navy processes at the shipyards place less emphasis on in-process work. Moreover, leading commercial shipbuilders have strong quality management processes that track quality problems to the worker or supervisor level. Navy shipbuilding contractors have historically experienced difficulties in holding production workers and supervisors accountable for their work, but some of the shipyards reported they are making progress on increasing worker accountability.
What GAO Recommends
To improve the construction quality of ships delivered to the Navy, GAO is recommending, among other things, that the Navy clarify policy on when deficiencies should be addressed, provide guidance on contract quality requirements, and assess applicability of certain commercial practices to Navy shipbuilding. DOD agreed with two recommendations and partially agreed with three, stating for example that current policy is adequate but that the Navy would monitor deficiency trends. GAO believes that the recommendations remain valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_T-GGD-98-141 | gao_T-GGD-98-141_0 | General Services Administration: Many Building Security Upgrades Made but Problems Have Hindered Program Implementation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the General Services Administration’s (GSA) progress in upgrading the security of federal buildings under its operation. timetables in the DOJ report because of GSA’s sense of urgency to upgrade security in its buildings, reduced staffing due to downsizing, data reliability problems, and uncertain funding sources have hindered GSA’s upgrade program implementation. Because of data reliability problems, neither GSA nor we can specify the exact status or cost of the building security upgrade program, and because GSA has not established program outcome measures, neither GSA nor we know the extent to which completed upgrades have resulted in greater security or reduced vulnerability for federal office buildings. Thus, GSA is not in a good position to manage its program to mitigate security threats. Nevertheless, based on the existing accounting system data, we estimate that from October 1, 1995, through March 31, 1998, GSA obligated roughly $353 million for the building security upgrade program nationally. Specifically, we were to determine (1) what criteria GSA used to assess security risks and prioritize security upgrades for its buildings, (2) the implementation and operational status of GSA’s security upgrade program and the costs GSA has incurred by both funding source and type of security upgrade, and (3) whether any problems have hindered GSA’s implementation of the security upgrade program. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the General Services Administration's (GSA) progress in upgrading the security of federal buildings under its operation, focusing on: (1) what criteria GSA used to assess security risks and prioritize security upgrades for its buildings; (2) the implementation and operational status of GSA's security upgrade program and the costs GSA has incurred by both funding source and type of security upgrade; and (3) whether any problems have hindered GSA's implementation of the security upgrade program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GSA used the Department of Justice (DOJ) report's criteria to assess risks and prioritize security upgrades in its buildings; (2) despite the formidable challenges posed by this program, GSA has made progress implementing upgrades in federal buildings throughout the country, particularly in its higher risk buildings; (3) GSA's data systems indicate that about 7,000 upgrades were completed and it estimates that roughly $353 million were obligated from the Federal Buildings Fund for the upgrade program nationally between October 1, 1995, and March 31, 1998; (4) however, mistakes made by rushing to meet the timetables in the DOJ report because of GSA's sense of urgency to upgrade security in its buildings, reduced staffing due to downsizing, data reliability problems, and uncertain funding sources have hindered GSA's upgrade program implementation; (5) because of data reliability problems, neither GSA nor GAO can specify the exact status or cost of the building security upgrade program, and because GSA has not established program outcome measures, neither GSA nor GAO knows the extent to which completed upgrades have resulted in greater security or reduced vulnerability for federal office buildings; and (6) GSA is not in a good position to manage its program to mitigate security threats. |
gao_GAO-06-698T | gao_GAO-06-698T_0 | Insufficient Invoice Review and Approval Process Increased FBI’s Vulnerability to Payment of Unallowable Contractor Costs
FBI’s review and approval process for Trilogy contractor invoices, which was carried out by a review team consisting of officials from FBI, GSA, and Mitretek, did not provide an adequate basis for verifying that goods and services billed were actually received by FBI or that payments were for allowable costs. We identified about $10.1 million in questionable contractor costs paid by FBI. These costs included payments for first-class travel and other excessive airfare costs, incorrect billings for overtime hours worked, potentially overcharged labor rates, and other questionable costs. Given FBI’s poor control environment over invoice payments and the fact that we reviewed only selected FBI payments to Trilogy contractors, other questionable costs may have been paid that have not been identified. Major Lapses in Accountability Resulted in Millions of Dollars of Missing Trilogy Equipment
Our audit also disclosed that FBI did not adequately maintain accountability for equipment purchased for the Trilogy project. Consequently, we found that FBI could not locate over 1,200 assets purchased with Trilogy funds, which we valued at approximately $7.6 million. These weaknesses resulted in the payment of millions of dollars of questionable contractor costs, which may have unnecessarily increased the overall cost of the project. Unless FBI strengthens its controls over contractor payments, its ability to properly control the costs of future projects involving contractors, including its new Sentinel project, will be seriously compromised. Further, weaknesses in FBI’s controls over the equipment acquired for Trilogy resulted in millions of dollars in missing equipment and call into question FBI’s ability to adequately safeguard its equipment, as well as confidential and sensitive information that could be accessed through that equipment from unauthorized use. It also includes 12 recommendations to help improve FBI’s accountability for assets. FBI also provided additional information related to Trilogy assets we identified as missing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Trilogy project--initiated in 2001--is the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) largest information technology (IT) upgrade to date. While ultimately successful in providing updated IT infrastructure and systems, Trilogy was not a success with regard to upgrading FBI's investigative applications. Further, the project was plagued with missed milestones and escalating costs, which eventually totaled nearly $537 million. This testimony focuses on (1) the internal controls over payments to contractors, (2) payments of questionable contractor costs, and (3) FBI's accountability for assets purchased with Trilogy project funds.
What GAO Found
FBI's review and approval process for Trilogy contractor invoices, which included a review role for GSA as contracting agency, did not provide an adequate basis for verifying that goods and services billed were actually received and that the amounts billed were appropriate, leaving FBI highly vulnerable to payments of unallowable costs. This vulnerability is demonstrated by FBI's payment of about $10.1 million in questionable contractor costs we identified using data mining, document analysis, and other forensic auditing techniques. These costs included first-class travel and other excessive airfare costs, incorrect charges for overtime hours, potentially overcharged labor rates, and charges for which the contractors could not provide adequate supporting documentation to substantiate the costs purportedly incurred. FBI also failed to establish controls to maintain accountability over equipment purchased for the Trilogy project. These control lapses resulted in more than 1,200 missing pieces of equipment valued at approximately $7.6 million that GAO identified as part of its review. Given the poor control environment and the fact that GAO reviewed only selected FBI payments to Trilogy contractors, other questionable contractor costs may have been paid that have not been identified. If these control weaknesses go uncorrected, future contracts, including those related to Sentinel--FBI's new electronic information management system initiative--will be greatly exposed to improper payments. In addition, the lack of accountability for Trilogy equipment calls into question FBI's ability to adequately safeguard its existing assets as well as those it may acquire in the future. |
gao_GAO-17-576T | gao_GAO-17-576T_0 | Indirect Costs on NSF Awards Ranged From 16 Percent to 24 Percent of Total Annual Award Funding from 2000 through 2016 and Differed by Type of Organization
Our preliminary analysis of NSF data indicates that for fiscal years 2000 through 2016, indirect costs on NSF awards ranged from 16 percent to 24 percent of the total annual amounts the agency awarded, though the percentage generally has increased since 2010. NSF officials told us that variation in indirect costs from year to year can be due to a variety of factors such as (1) differences in the types of organizations awarded, (2) the types of activities supported by the individual awards—research vs. individuals or students vs. infrastructure, (3) the type of research activity, and (4) the disciplinary field of awards. According to NSF officials, prospective awardees are required to provide direct and indirect costs in their proposed budgets using the organization’s negotiated indirect cost rate. After an award is made, NSF does not require awardees to report information about indirect costs when requesting reimbursements for work done on their awards for projects. According to NSF officials, doing so would unnecessarily increase the reporting burden on awardees. NSF Guidance for Setting Indirect Cost Rates Has Not Been Consistently Implemented and Does Not Include Certain Details
Our preliminary review of NSF’s guidance for setting indirect cost rates and a nongeneralizable sample of nine indirect cost rate files indicates that NSF has issued internal guidance that includes procedures for staff to conduct timely and uniform reviews of indirect cost rate proposals, collect data, set rates, and issue letters to formalize indirect cost rate agreements. However, in our preliminary analysis of NSF guidance, we found that (1) NSF staff did not consistently follow guidance for updating the tracking system, (2) the guidance did not include specific procedures for how supervisors are to document their review of staff workpapers, and (3) NSF had not updated the guidance to include procedures for implementing new provisions issued under the Uniform Guidance. However, our preliminary analysis of reports from the tracking database indicates that NSF staff have not consistently followed the guidance for updating the tracking database with current data about the awardees for which NSF has cognizance and the status of indirect cost rate proposals. Moreover, our preliminary observations on NSF’s guidance indicates that it does not include procedures for implementing certain aspects of OMB’s Uniform Guidance, which became effective for grants awarded on or after December 26, 2014. In closing, I would note that we are continuing our ongoing work to examine NSF’s data on indirect costs for its awards over time and its implementation of its guidance for setting indirect cost rates for organizations over which it has cognizance. NSF awards billions of dollars to organizations each year and, given the constrained budget environment, it is essential that NSF ensures efficient and effective use of federal science funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
NSF awards billions of dollars to institutions of higher education (universities), K-12 school systems, industry, science associations, and other research organizations to promote scientific progress by supporting research and education.
NSF reimburses awardees for direct and indirect costs incurred for most awards. Direct costs, such as salaries and equipment, can be attributed to a specific project that receives an NSF award. Indirect costs are not directly attributable to a specific project but are necessary for the general operation of an awardee organization, such as the costs of operating and maintaining facilities. For certain organizations, NSF also negotiates indirect cost rate agreements, which are then used for calculating reimbursements for indirect costs. Indirect cost rate negotiations and reimbursements are to be made in accordance with federal guidance and regulation and NSF policy.
This testimony reflects GAO's preliminary observations from its ongoing review that examines (1) what is known about NSF's indirect costs for its awards over time, and (2) the extent to which NSF has implemented guidance for setting indirect cost rates for organizations. GAO reviewed relevant regulation, guidance, and agency documents; analyzed budget data, a nongeneralizable sample of nine indirect cost rate files from fiscal year 2016 selected based on award funding; and interviewed NSF officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's preliminary analysis of National Science Foundation (NSF) data indicates that for fiscal years 2000 through 2016, indirect costs on NSF awards ranged from 16 percent to 24 percent of the total annual amounts awarded, though the percentage generally has increased since 2010 (see fig.). NSF officials stated that variation in indirect costs from year to year can be due to a variety of reasons, such as the types of organizations awarded and the disciplinary field of awards. GAO's observations are based on data from planned budgets on individual NSF awards, rather than actual indirect cost expenditures, because NSF does not require awardees to report indirect costs separately from direct costs in their reimbursement requests. According to NSF officials, collecting such information would unnecessarily increase the reporting burden on awardees.
NSF has issued guidance for negotiating indirect cost rate agreements that includes procedures for staff to conduct timely and uniform reviews of indirect cost rate proposals. GAO's preliminary review of NSF's guidance and a sample of nine indirect cost rate files found that (1) NSF staff did not consistently follow guidance for updating the agency's tracking database with current data about some awardees, (2) the guidance did not include specific procedures for how supervisors are to document their review of staff workpapers, and (3) NSF had not updated the guidance to include procedures for implementing certain aspects of Office of Management and Budget guidance that became effective for grants awarded on or after December 26, 2014, such as the circumstances in which NSF can provide an awardee with an extension of indirect cost rates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony but will consider making recommendations, as appropriate, as it finalizes its work. |
gao_NSIAD-97-60 | gao_NSIAD-97-60_0 | Number of Nonflying Positions
In fiscal year 1996, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force designated 11,336 positions as nonflying positions to be filled by aviators. These nonflying positions represent about 25 percent of all authorized aviator positions. As shown in table 1, the total number of nonflying positions has decreased since fiscal year 1994 and is expected to continue to decrease slightly up through fiscal year 2001. ACIP and ACP Paid to Aviators in Flying and Nonflying Positions
All aviators receive ACIP, regardless of whether they are in flying or nonflying positions, if they meet the following criteria. ACP criteria are more flexible than ACIP in deciding who receives it, the amount paid, and the length of the contract period. For fiscal years 1994 through April 30, 1996, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force made ACIP and ACP payments to their aviators totaling $909.1 million. However, the way the services implement this incentive varies widely in terms of who receives ACP, the length of time over which it is paid, and how much is paid. Effect of Nonflying Positions on Aviator Training Requirements
The services include nonflying positions in their aviator requirements for determining future aviator training needs. Therefore, aviator training requirements reflect the number of aviators needed to fill both flying and nonflying positions. Because nonflying positions are included in the total aviator requirements, the Navy and the Marine Corps project aviator shortages for fiscal years 1997-2001 and the Air Force projects aviator shortages for fiscal years 1998-2001. As shown in table 5, there are more than enough pilots and navigators available to meet all flying position requirements. Therefore, to the extent that the number of the nonflying positions filled by aviators could be reduced, the number of aviators that need to be trained, as shown in table 4, could also be reduced. This, in turn, would enable the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force to reduce their aviator training costs by as much as $5 million for each pilot and $2 million for each navigator that the services would not have to train. The savings to the Army would be less because its aviator training costs are about $366,000 for each pilot. The point, however, is that the services have not determined that all the nonflying positions require aviator expertise. The data were submitted to the appropriate Defense Financial Accounting System offices for the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps to identify the amounts of aviation career incentive pay (ACIP) and aviation continuation pay (ACP) paid to each aviator. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed certain Department of Defense (DOD) nonflying positions, focusing on: (1) the number of aviators (pilots and navigators) that are assigned to nonflying positions in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; (2) the amount of aviation career incentive pay (ACIP) and aviation continuation pay (ACP) paid to aviators in nonflying positions; (3) whether the services implement ACIP and ACP uniformly; and (4) whether the nonflying positions affect the number of aviators the services plan to train to meet future requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) for fiscal year (FY) 1996, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force designated 11,336 positions, or about 25 percent of all aviator positions, as nonflying positions to be filled by aviators; (2) since FY 1994, the number of nonflying positions has decreased and this decrease is expected to continue through 2001 when the number of such positions is estimated to be 10,553; (3) for fiscal years 1994 through April 30, 1996, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force paid $739.7 million in ACIP, of which $179.1 million was paid to aviators in nonflying positions; (4) additionally, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force paid $169.4 million in ACP, of which $31.9 million was paid to aviators in nonflying positions; (5) the Army does not pay ACP; (6) ACIP is payable to all aviators who meet certain flying requirements and all the services implement it in a consistent fashion; (7) with ACP, however, the services have a great deal of latitude in deciding who receives it, the length of time it is paid and the amount that is paid; (8) in determining their aviator training requirements, the services consider both flying and nonflying positions; (9) including nonflying positions increases the total aviator requirements and results in the services projecting aviator shortages in the upcoming fiscal years; (10) however, GAO's analysis showed that there are more than enough aviators available to satisfy all flying position requirements; (11) to the extent that the number of nonflying positions filled by aviators can be reduced, the number of aviators that need to be trained also could be reduced, saving training costs of about $5 million for each Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force pilot candidate and about $2 million for each navigator candidate; and (12) the savings to the Army would be about $366,000 for each pilot training requirement eliminated. |
gao_GAO-04-1040 | gao_GAO-04-1040_0 | In like manner, income reported to IRS on a K-1 by S-Corps and trusts can be matched with income reported on tax returns by shareholders and beneficiaries, respectively. Data Transcription Errors and Erroneous TINs Reduce the Accuracy of K-1 Data
Data transcription errors made by IRS on paper-filed K-1 data and invalid TINs submitted by flow-through entities on both paper-filed and e-filed K-1s lower the accuracy of K-1 data. Consequently, data from an estimated 18 million tax year 2002 paper K-1s that were entered into databases used by IRS for research and enforcement purposes have transcription error rates from 5 to 9.5 percent. IRS Does Not Notify Flow- Through Entities of Invalid TINs That It Was Unable to Correct
After IRS checks the validity of TINs provided on K-1s, it does not notify either paper-filing or e-filing flow-through entities of the invalid TINs it finds so the entities can take steps to correct the TINs, due to concerns about the potential burden on the entities and resource constraints. However, as table 1 shows, in tax year 2002 the overall percentage of invalid K-1 TINs IRS found with its TIN validation program was comparable for e-filed (about 7 percent) and paper (6 percent). K-1 Data Accuracy and Availability Pose Problems in Research and Examination Efforts
In addition to using K-1 data in its document-matching program, IRS is using K-1 data in its research programs to better understand flow-through relationships. Data limitations have also affected IRS’s efforts to identify potentially noncompliant taxpayers for examination. Based on our sample of closed examination cases, in at least 40 percent of the examinations, IRS corrected line items that are currently not transcribed. IRS examination and research staff we interviewed indicated that if IRS captured this information and made it available to them, it would help them identify those returns with errors or omissions that IRS should examine. The benefits for IRS are faster and more comprehensive information as well as cost reductions. The main challenge for taxpayers is the cost of converting from paper to e-filing. Conclusions
Although there are some costs to taxpayers to e-file and to IRS in processing e-filed flow-through entity returns and related K-1s, in general e- filed K-1s offer substantial advantages for both IRS and taxpayers. We are not making a recommendation for further action to expand e-filing of flow through-entities’ returns, including K-1s, because IRS agreed to take steps to do so pursuant to a TIGTA recommendation and is currently studying the costs of increasing e-filing to IRS and taxpayers. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the accuracy of K-1 data used by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), specifically transcription errors and invalid taxpayer identification numbers (TIN); (2) determine whether any limitations in the availability or accuracy of K-1 data have affected IRS’s ability to identify noncompliance; and (3) describe the benefits and challenges of increasing electronic filing of K-1s. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over a trillion dollars in income was distributed in tax year 2002 by flow-through entities, such as partnerships, subchapter S corporations, and trusts, to their partners, shareholders, or beneficiaries, respectively. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that from 6 to 15 percent of such income is unreported on individual tax returns. This income is reported to both IRS and to the recipients on a Schedule K-1 (K-1). IRS uses K-1 data in its document-matching program to identify noncompliance and for other purposes. GAO was asked to (1) assess the accuracy of K-1 data, specifically transcription errors and taxpayer identification numbers (TIN); (2) determine whether any limitations in the availability or accuracy of K-1 data have affected IRS's ability to identify noncompliance; and (3) identify the benefits and challenges of increasing e-filing of K-1s.
What GAO Found
The accuracy of paper-filed K-1 data is reduced by transcription errors; paper and e-filed K-1s have inaccurate TINs. IRS estimates that transcription errors for tax year 2002 ranged from 5 and 9.5 percent and is taking steps to address such errors. Although e-filed K-1s do not require transcription, for tax year 2002, the percentage of invalid TINs for e-filed K-1s and paper-filed K-1s were comparable (7 and 6 percent, respectively). Due to potential burden on flow-through entities and resource constraints, IRS does not notify the entities of invalid TINs on K-1s for correction. If IRS did so, this would likely give e-filing entities enough time to correct invalid TINs before IRS runs its document-matching program. Inaccurate or limited K-1 data have created problems for IRS researchers and examiners. IRS research staff indicated that inaccurate TINs adversely affected their analysis of flow-through entity networks. Further, because IRS captures limited data from flow-through entity returns, including the K-1, IRS staff lack data they consider helpful, such as "Other Income" to help identify tax shelters. In at least 40 percent of closed examination cases we sampled, IRS examiners found errors with return line items not entered into IRS's databases when returns are received. If these lines were available up front, researchers say they would be able to better identify returns with potential noncompliance. Increased e-filing of K-1s would provide benefits and challenges to both IRS and taxpayers. Benefits for IRS include faster, more complete information and millions in annual cost reductions. Benefits for taxpayers include fewer IRS contacts with them because IRS would have more accurate information in its systems. The primary challenge for IRS is its current inability to electronically process all flow-through entity returns and related forms, including the K-1. For taxpayers, the primary challenge is the cost of converting from paper to e-filing. |
gao_T-AIMD-97-147 | gao_T-AIMD-97-147_0 | In fact, the Department’s Office of Inspector General was unable to express an opinion on the fiscal year 1994 FFELP principal financial statements, taken as a whole, because of the unreliability of student loan data on which the Department based its expected costs to be incurred on outstanding guaranteed loans. Yet operating in such an environment presents complications due to the lack of uniformity in how the systems handle and store information. This has still not been accomplished. Department officials have acknowledged that integration is important and has not been fully achieved. One example of how this disparity can affect program operations can be seen in the differences in how student enrollment status is stored in NSLDS, compared with the system that supports the Pell Grant Program. Acquisition of Stand-Alone Systems Continues, Increasing Problems and Cost
The Department has a compelling need for a systems architecture that would enable the eventual integration of all title IV systems. They are also expensive. As I mentioned earlier, this is a costly approach to systems acquisition. Student Financial Aid Systems Contract Costs Over 5 Years
Pell Grant Recipient Financial Management System (PGRFMS)
National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS)
FFELP System (FFELPS)
Central Processing System (CPS) (includes multiple data entry contracts)
Related GAO Products
Student Financial Aid Information: Systems Architecture Needed To Improve Programs’ Efficiency (GAO/AIMD-97-122, July 29, 1997). Department of Education: Status of Actions To Improve the Management of Student Financial Aid (GAO/HEHS-96-143, July 12, 1996). Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its review of the Department of Education's progress in integrating its National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS) with other student financial aid systems, as required by law.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Department of Education has made only limited progress in integrating NSLDS with the other student financial aid systems that support title IV programs; (2) this is largely because the Department has not developed an overall systems architecture, a framework needed to allow these disparate systems to operate in concert with each other; (3) as a result, while information can be shared among systems, the process is cumbersome, expensive, and unreliable; (4) further, the lack of a systems architecture allows the proliferation of individual stand-alone systems; (5) this is expensive, not only with respect to system procurement, operation, and maintenance, but also in terms of efficiency; (6) such an approach has served immediate program needs on a limited basis, but undermines sharing of student financial aid information across programs; and (7) this, in turn, can result in different databases containing different and perhaps conflicting information on the status of student loan or grant. |
gao_GAO-11-429T | gao_GAO-11-429T_0 | To help reduce or eliminate the long-term risk of flood damage to buildings and other structures insured by NFIP, FEMA has used a variety of mitigation efforts, such as elevation, relocation, and demolition. In response to the magnitude and severity of the losses from the 2005 hurricanes, Congress increased NFIP’s borrowing authority from the Treasury to $20.8 billion. Efforts to Reform NFIP’s Financial Structure Will Require Balancing Public Policy Goals
We have previously identified four public policy goals for evaluating the federal role in providing natural catastrophe insurance: charging premium rates that fully reflect actual risks, limiting costs to taxpayers before and after a disaster, encouraging broad participation in natural catastrophe insurance encouraging private markets to provide natural catastrophe insurance. I will discuss the key areas that need to be addressed, actions that can be taken to help achieve these goals, and the trade-offs that would be required. First, the act requires FEMA to charge many policyholders less than full-risk rates to encourage program participation. Specifically, increasing rates could: result in premium rates that more fully reflected the actual risk of loss; decrease costs for taxpayers by reducing costs associated with postdisaster borrowing to pay claims; and encourage private market participation, because the rates would more closely approximate those that would be charged by private insurers. Limiting Taxpayer Costs Could Be Achieved by Increasing Premium Rates, but Further Mitigation Efforts Could Incur Up- Front Costs
In order to reduce expenses to taxpayers that can result when NFIP borrows from Treasury, NFIP needs to be able to generate enough in premiums to pay its claims, even in years with catastrophic losses—a goal that is closely tied to that of eliminating subsidies and other reduced rates. For example, FEMA has three separate flood mitigation programs. Outreach efforts would need to include areas with low and moderate flood risks to help ensure that the risk pool remained diversified. FEMA’s Operational and Management Issues May Limit Progress in Achieving NFIP Goals
As Congress weighs NFIP’s various financial challenges in its efforts to reform the program, it must also consider a number of operational and management issues that may limit efforts to meet program goals and impair NFIP’s stability. For example, preliminary results of our ongoing work show that FEMA: does not have a strategic plan specific to NFIP with goals, objectives, and performance measures for guiding and measuring the program; lacks a strategic human capital plan that addresses the critical competencies required for its workforce; does not have effective collaborative practices that would improve the functioning of program and support offices; lacks a centralized electronic document management system that would allow its various offices to easily access and store documents; has only recently implemented or is still developing efforts to improve some acquisition management functions, making it difficult to assess the effects of these actions; and does not have an effective system to manage flood insurance policy and claims data, despite having invested roughly 7 years and $40 million on a new system whose development has been halted. While FEMA has begun to acknowledge and address some of these management challenges, additional work remains to be done to address these issues. Our final report will include recommendations to address them. Closing Comments
Congressional action is needed to increase the financial stability of NFIP and limit taxpayer exposure. GAO previously identified four public policy goals that can provide a framework for crafting or evaluating proposals to reform NFIP. Third, Congress could encourage FEMA to continue to increase participation in the program by expanding targeted outreach efforts and limiting postdisaster assistance to those individuals who choose not to mitigate in moderate- and high-risk areas. For its part, FEMA needs to take action to address a number of fundamental operational and managerial issues that also threaten the stability of NFIP and have contributed to its remaining on GAO’s high-risk list. Financial Management: Improvements Needed in National Flood Insurance Program’s Financial Controls and Oversight. GAO’S High-Risk Program. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has been on GAO's high-risk list since 2006, when the program had to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to cover losses from the 2005 hurricanes. The outstanding debt is $17.8 billion as of March 2011. This sizeable debt, plus operational and management challenges that GAO has identified at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administers NFIP, have combined to keep the program on the high-risk list. NFIP's need to borrow to cover claims in years of catastrophic flooding has raised concerns about the program's long-term financial solvency. This testimony 1) discusses ways to place NFIP on a sounder financial footing in light of public policy goals for federal involvement in natural catastrophe insurance and 2) highlights operational and management challenges at FEMA that affect the program. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its past work on NFIP and on its ongoing review of FEMA's management of NFIP, which focuses on its planning, policies, processes, and systems. The management review includes areas such as strategic and human capital planning, acquisition management, and intra-agency collaboration.
What GAO Found
Congressional action is needed to increase the financial stability of NFIP and limit taxpayer exposure. GAO previously identified four public policy goals that can provide a framework for crafting or evaluating proposals to reform NFIP. These goals are: (1) charging premium rates that fully reflect risks, (2) limiting costs to taxpayers before and after a disaster, (3) encouraging broad participation in the program, and (4)encouraging private markets to provide flood insurance. Successfully reforming NFIP would require trade-offs among these often competing goals. For example, currently nearly one in four policyholders does not pay full-risk rates, and many pay a lower subsidized or "grandfathered" rate. Reducing or eliminating less than full-risk rates would decrease costs to taxpayers but substantially increase costs for many policyholders, some of whom might leave the program, potentially increasing postdisaster federal assistance. However, these trade-offs could be mitigated by providing assistance only to those who needed it, limiting postdisaster assistance for flooding, and phasing in premium rates that fully reflected risks. Increasing mitigation efforts to reduce the probability and severity of flood damage would also reduce flood claims in the long term but would have significant up-front costs that might require federal assistance. One way to address this trade-off would be to better ensure that current mitigation programs were effective and efficient. Encouraging broad participation in the program could be achieved by expanding mandatory purchase requirements or increasing targeted outreach to help diversify the risk pool. Such efforts could help keep rates relatively low and reduce NFIP's exposure but would have to be effectively managed to help ensure that outreach efforts were broadly based. Encouraging private markets is the most difficult challenge because virtually no private market for flood insurance exists for most residential and commercial properties. FEMA's ongoing efforts to explore alternative structures may provide ideas that could be evaluated and considered. Several operational and management issues also limit FEMA's progress in addressing NFIP's challenges, and continued action by FEMA will be needed to help ensure the stability of the program. For example, in previous reports GAO has identified weaknesses in areas that include financial controls and oversight of private insurers and contractors, and has made many recommendations to address them. While FEMA has made progress in addressing some areas, preliminary findings from GAO's ongoing work indicate that these issues persist and need to be addressed as Congress works to more broadly reform NFIP.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous recommendations aimed at improving financial controls and oversight of private insurers and contractors, among others. |
gao_GAO-11-139 | gao_GAO-11-139_0 | However, because of problems experienced during the deployment, the Army decided to delay implementation until the problems were resolved. Prior to transitioning to LMP, the Army is directed to certify that each Army depot is prepared to transition. The Army Has Improved Its Implementation of LMP but May Not Fully Achieve the Intended LMP Functionality at Its Third Deployment Locations
The Army has improved its LMP implementation strategy from the previous two deployments, but continues to face several problems that may prevent LMP from fully providing its intended functionality at each of the third deployment locations. Although the Army has mitigation plans in place if the software capabilities are not delivered on time or as intended, these mitigation plans will increase costs. Long-Standing Data Inaccuracies Remain in the LMP System
The Army does not have reasonable assurance that the data used by LMP are of sufficient quality to enable the commands, depots, and arsenals to perform their day-to-day missions using LMP as intended. The Army initiated a testing strategy to determine data accuracy, but it has not provided reasonable assurance that the data used by LMP can support the LMP processes. Although the Army implemented new testing activities to support the third deployment of LMP, these activities were designed to assess whether the sites could use the software but did not evaluate whether the data loaded into LMP are of sufficient quality to support the LMP processes. Army Testing Activities Do Not Assess Data Quality
Based on our observations during the second deployment of LMP, we previously recommended that the Army direct the Army Materiel Command to improve its testing activities to obtain reasonable assurance that the data are of a quality that can be used by LMP to support the LMP processes. Data Problems Persist at Second Deployment Locations
Persistent data issues have prevented Corpus Christi Army Depot and Letterkenny Army Depot—the two depots that deployed LMP in May 2009—from achieving the intended benefits from LMP. The Army Has Yet to Fully Develop Software to Achieve Intended LMP Benefits but Has Mitigations Plans That May Be Costly
The Army’s software development schedule and subsequent testing of capabilities needed by several locations was not expected to be delivered until after September 2010. Unlike operations under the previous deployments of LMP, the operations at some of the third deployment locations are unique and therefore require additional capabilities. For example, the Army Sustainment Command and the Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command require LMP to interface with existing systems in order to perform their day-to-day missions. Functionality for the Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command Still Being Developed
The Army is continuing to develop the software functionality that the Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command needs to perform its mission using LMP, but Army officials said that full functionality will not be available until after LMP has been deployed. For example, in the event that this functionality is not delivered or does not operate as expected, the Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command expects to hire 172 additional personnel to perform manual data entry until the software can provide the required and agreed-upon functionality. According to Tank-automotive and Armaments Command officials, the arsenals will lose this capability once LMP is deployed until a replacement system is fielded. Recommendation for Executive Action
Given the long-standing challenges associated with the Army’s implementation of LMP and the need for mitigation strategies that may result in increased costs until LMP is fully functional, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of the Army as the Army’s Chief Management Officer to report to Congress within 90 days of the beginning of the LMP third deployment on the progress of LMP implementation at the Army depots, arsenals, and life cycle commands, and provide periodic updates to Congress until such time as the mitigation strategies are no longer necessary. This report should identify the extent to which the third deployment sites are able to use LMP as intended, the benefits that LMP is providing, an assessment of the Army’s progress in ensuring that data used in LMP can support the LMP processes, timelines for the delivery of software and additional capabilities necessary to achieve the full benefits of LMP, and the costs and time frames of the mitigation strategies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) is an Army business system that is intended to replace the aging Army systems that manage inventory and depot repair operations. From 1999 through 2009, the Army expended more than $1 billion for LMP. LMP was originally scheduled to be completed by 2005, but after the first deployment in July 2003, the Army delayed fielding because of significant problems. The Army later decided to field the system in two additional deployments: the second in May 2009 and the third in October 2010. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which the Army will achieve the intended functionality (e.g., supply chain management and materiel maintenance) from LMP for the commands, depots, and arsenals participating in the third deployment. To do this, GAO reviewed Army plans and policies related to LMP and met with Army officials at three Army commands and several third deployment sites.
What GAO Found
The Army has made improvements to its LMP implementation strategy, but it may not fully achieve the intended LMP functionality in its third deployment, which began in October 2010, because it has not corrected long-standing data inaccuracies and has not fully developed the software and systems needed to support critical functionality. Specifically: (1) GAO previously recommended that the Army improve testing activities to obtain reasonable assurance that the data used by LMP can support the LMP processes. The Army implemented data audits and new testing activities to improve data accuracy, but data issues persist, which could impede LMP functionality. According to Army officials, these new testing activities were designed to assess how well the LMP software functions but not how well the data work in LMP. Third deployment locations were also able to perform individual tests on the data, but these activities were not coordinated or managed by the Army. As a result, the audits and new testing activities did not provide the Army reasonable assurance that the data in LMP are of sufficient quality to achieve the intended LMP functionality once the system has been deployed. Without this assurance, the Army may experience the same data-related problems during the third deployment that were experienced during the second deployment, which prevented Corpus Christi and Letterkenny Army Depots from using LMP functionality as intended. (2) The Army's software development schedule and subsequent testing of capabilities needed by several locations are not expected to be delivered until after September 2010, but costly mitigations may be required if delivery is delayed. Unlike the previous deployments of LMP, the operations at some of the third deployment locations require additional capabilities. For example, the Army Sustainment Command and the Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command perform missions that require LMP to interface with existing systems in order to perform day-to-day missions. If the software capabilities are not operating as intended, several sites will not have the necessary LMP functionality to perform their missions. The Army has mitigation plans to address this functionality gap. For example, the Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command plans to hire 172 additional personnel, and the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command expects to hire 95 additional personnel to perform manual data entry until the capability is delivered. The Army expects that these mitigation plans will increase costs. Prior to transitioning to LMP, the Army is directed to certify that it is prepared to make the transition, but it is not required to regularly report to Congress specifically on LMP implementation. Congress therefore lacks complete and ongoing information to aid in its oversight of this program characterized by implementation delays and long-standing problems that have precluded LMP functionality at the sites included in the first two LMP deployments. GAO previously recommended that the Army address issues related to its implementation of LMP.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends further that the Army periodically report to Congress on the progress of LMP, including its progress in ensuring that the data used in LMP can support the system, timelines for the delivery of software necessary to achieve full benefits, and the costs and time frames of its mitigation strategies. DOD agreed with GAO's findings and recommendation. |
gao_RCED-95-209 | gao_RCED-95-209_0 | Both BLM and the Forest Service prepare comprehensive land and resource management plans for their public lands. Within the appropriated dollar allocations, OHV activities were given lower funding and staffing priorities than other competing programs at the eight locations we reviewed, and—according to agency officials—this ranking is typical for other BLM and the Forest Service locations with OHV activities. In the aggregate, two-thirds of this funding came from the states. Local communities and private organizations contributed funds at some locations and services and materials at all locations; the total value of these contributions, however, was not readily available. Pinos Ranger District in California, 7 staff spent part of their time and 4 staff worked full-time on the OHV program. Monitoring Has Not Been Systematic, and Confusion Has Hampered Enforcement
As required under the executive orders and implementing regulations, BLM and the Forest Service have prepared resource management and activity plans that require systematic, documented monitoring to (1) identify any adverse effects of OHV use on natural and cultural resources and any needed corrective actions and (2) determine users’ compliance with OHV regulations. These orders were issued in the 1970s to establish policies and provide for procedures to regulate the use of off-highway vehicles (OHV) on federal lands. More specifically, our objectives were to obtain information on (1) the funding and staffing for OHV programs and (2) the extent to which the two agencies were complying with the executive orders’ requirements that they designate federal lands for OHV use, monitor OHV use to identify adverse effects and any needed corrective actions and to determine compliance with regulations, and address or correct any adverse effects of OHV use. OHV program staff provided us, for fiscal year 1993, with estimates of the amount of federal funding and the number of staff that were being devoted to OHV activities at each of the eight locations and with the actual amount of state funding provided through cooperative partnerships at all of the locations except the one where state funding was not provided. VI.3.) Designation of Land for OHV Use
The Mt. VII.3). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) and the Forest Service's implementation of executive orders regulating the use of off-highway vehicles (OHV) on federal lands, focusing on the agencies': (1) designation of federal lands for OHV use; (2) monitoring of OHV use to identify adverse effects and any needed corrective actions; and (3) compliance with OHV regulations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) at the 8 locations reviewed, BLM and the Forest Service restricted OHV use in their management plans, but they generally gave lower funding and staffing priority to OHV activities than to other programs; (2) in fiscal year 1993, approximately two-thirds of the estimated total funding for OHV monitoring activities came from the states; (3) only 36 percent of the agency staff assigned to OHV activities worked full-time on such activities; (4) local communities and organizations provided additional funds and volunteer services and material to support OHV activities; (5) BLM and Forest Service compliance with the executive orders at the 8 locations was mixed because of limited staff and funding and higher priority activities; (6) although all 8 locations had lands prescribed for OHV use, 5 locations did not have maps and signs ready to show the public where and under what conditions OHV could be used; (7) at all locations, OHV monitoring was casual, adverse effects were seldom documented, and needed corrective actions had not been prioritized; and (8) although citations were written for violations at all the locations, enforcement was hampered by confusion over where and when OHV restrictions applied. |
gao_GAO-16-493 | gao_GAO-16-493_0 | Delphi-Prism produces SEC’s financial statements. Under FISMA, the SEC Chairman has responsibility for, among other things, (1) providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the agency’s information systems and information; (2) ensuring that senior agency officials provide information security for the information and information systems that support the operations and assets under their control; and (3) delegating to the agency chief information officer (CIO) the authority to ensure compliance with the requirements imposed on the agency. However, weaknesses limited the effectiveness of other controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SEC’s information systems. Although SEC had issued policies and implemented controls based on those policies, it did not consistently protect its network from possible intrusions, identify and authenticate users, authorize access to resources, audit and monitor actions taken on its systems and network, and restrict physical access to sensitive assets. As a result, SEC is at an increased risk that accounts could be compromised and used by unauthorized individuals to access sensitive financial data. However, SEC did not always ensure that only authorized individuals were granted access to its systems. SEC did not maintain and monitor official configuration baselines for some of the platforms used to host financially significant systems and general support system that we reviewed. However, SEC did not appropriately separate incompatible access to three computing environments for 20 individuals. Although SEC had developed contingency and disaster recovery plans and implemented controls for this planning, its plans were not complete or up to date. SEC Did Not Fully Implement Its Information Security Program
The information security weaknesses existed in the SEC computing environment, in part, because SEC had not fully implemented key elements of its agency-wide information security program. Specifically, it did not always (1) review and update its policies in a timely manner, (2) completely document plans of actions and milestones items, (3) document its physical inventory, and (4) fully implement and effectively manage its continuous monitoring program. SEC Made Limited Progress Remediating Previously Reported Information Security Control Weaknesses
SEC resolved 5 of the 20 previously reported information security control deficiencies in the areas of access controls, audit and monitoring, and separation of duties that remained unresolved as of September 30, 2014. In particular, SEC resolved 2 weaknesses important to improving its information security by separating the user production network from the internal management network and storing all critical system logs in a centralized location for a key financial system. While SEC had made progress in addressing the remaining 15 of 20 previously reported weaknesses, these weaknesses still existed as of September 30, 2015. Conclusions
While SEC had improved its information security by addressing previously identified weaknesses, the information security control weaknesses that continued to exist in its computing environment may jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information residing in and processed by the system. In a separate report with limited distribution, we are also making 30 recommendations to address newly identified control weaknesses related to access controls, configuration management, segregation of duties, physical security, and contingency and disaster recovery plans. II), SEC concurred with the six recommendations addressing its information security program. SEC also stated that the commission had taken action to address one recommendation and described actions to address the other five. This report contains recommendations to you. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine the effectiveness of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) information security controls for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its key financial systems and information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The SEC is responsible for enforcing securities laws, issuing rules and regulations that provide protection for investors, and helping to ensure that the securities markets are fair and honest. In carrying out its mission, the SEC relies on computerized information systems to collect, process, and store sensitive information, including financial data. Having effective information security controls in place is essential to protecting these systems and the information they contain.
This report details weaknesses GAO identified in the information security program at SEC during its audit of the commission's fiscal years 2015 and 2014 financial statements. GAO's objective was to determine the effectiveness of information security controls for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SEC's key financial systems and information. To do this, GAO examined information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested controls over key financial applications; interviewed agency officials; and assessed corrective actions taken to address previously reported weaknesses.
What GAO Found
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) improved its information security by addressing weaknesses previously identified by GAO, including separating the user production network from the internal management network. However, weaknesses continue to limit the effectiveness of other security controls. In particular:
While SEC had issued policies and implemented controls based on those policies, it did not consistently protect access to its systems. Organizations should design and implement controls to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computer resources. The commission did not consistently protect its network from possible intrusions, identify and authenticate users, authorize access to resources, audit and monitor actions taken on its systems and network, and restrict physical access to sensitive assets.
The commission did not consistently manage the configuration of its systems. Configuration management includes ensuring that hardware and software are configured with appropriate security features and that changes are systematically controlled. However, SEC did not maintain and monitor official configuration baselines for its financial systems and general support system.
The commission did not always appropriately separate incompatible duties. Separation of duties involves dividing responsibilities so that a single individual does not control all critical stages of a process. However, SEC did not adequately separate duties among its three computing environments.
While SEC had developed contingency and disaster recovery plans for its information systems, those plans were not fully reviewed, completed, or up-to-date. Contingency and disaster recovery planning are essential to resuming operations in the event of a disruption or disaster.
These weaknesses existed in part because SEC had not fully implemented an organization-wide information security program, as called for by federal law and guidance. In particular, the commission had not (1) consistently reviewed and updated its information security policies in a timely manner, (2) completely documented plans of action to address weaknesses, (3) documented a physical inventory of its systems and applications, and (4) fully implemented a program to continuously monitor the security of its systems and networks.
Finally, of 20 weaknesses previously identified by GAO that remained unresolved as of September 30, 2014, SEC had resolved 5 and made progress in addressing the other 15 as of September 30, 2015. Two resolved weaknesses were important to improving SEC security.
Collectively, these weaknesses increase the risk that SEC's systems could be compromised, jeopardizing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive financial information. While not constituting material weaknesses or significant deficiencies, they warrant SEC management's attention.
What GAO Recommends
In addition to the 15 prior recommendations that have not been fully implemented, GAO is recommending that SEC take 6 additional actions to more fully implement its information security program. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO recommended SEC take 30 actions to address newly identified control weaknesses. SEC concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-597T | gao_GAO-06-597T_0 | TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the Management and Performance of an Aviation Security Workforce, but Continues to Face Challenges
In recent years, TSA has taken numerous actions related to the deployment, training, and performance of their aviation security workforce. However, while the guidance clearly defined FSD roles and responsibilities, TSA’s primary document outlining FSDs’ authority was outdated and lacked clarity regarding FSD authority relative to that of other airport stakeholders with whom FSDs must coordinate closely to help ensure the effectiveness of aviation security efforts. The use of TSOs in these support functions could adversely affect the ability of FSDs to adequately staff their screening checkpoints. TSA Has Strengthened TSO Training, but Faces Challenges in Delivering the Training
Since we reported on TSO training in September 2003, TSA has taken a number of actions designed to strengthen training available to the TSO workforce as part of its efforts to enhance the performance of TSOs. As previously discussed, TSA is taking steps to address the TSO staffing challenges. OI officials stated that they will continue testing. Officials did not specify when such a program might begin. Since then, TSA has finalized targets for the indexes, including targets for passenger and checked baggage covert testing. TSA Has Made Progress in Providing Regulatory Oversight of Airport and Air Carrier Security Activities, but it Could Better Target Workforce Resources
TSA has taken steps to strengthen oversight for key areas of aviation security, including domestic air cargo security operations conducted by air carriers, and airport perimeter security operations and access controls carried out by airport operators. As of October 2005, however, TSA had not developed performance measures to determine to what extent air carriers and indirect air carriers are complying with air cargo security requirements, limiting TSA’s ability to effectively target its workforce for future inspections and fulfill its oversight responsibilities. Additional Action Needed to Strengthen TSA Inspections and Oversight of Domestic Air Cargo Security
We reported in October 2005 that TSA had significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted of air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with security requirements. TSA officials stated that the agency planned to conduct additional tests. These recommendations included (1) developing a methodology and schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets; (2) reexamining the rationale for existing air cargo inspection exemptions; (3) developing measures to gauge air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements; (4) developing a plan for systematically analyzing and using the results of air cargo compliance inspections to target future inspections and identify system wide corrective actions; (5) assessing the effectiveness of enforcement actions in ensuring air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements; (6) and ensuring that the data to be used in the Freight Assessment System are complete, accurate, and current. At the time of our review, we found TSA had begun evaluating commercial airport security but needed a better approach for assessing results. However, given the challenges TSA faces in determining appropriate staffing levels at airports, it is critical that TSA carefully consider how it strategically hires, deploys and manages its TSO workforce to help strengthen its passenger and checked baggage screening programs. Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining. | Why GAO Did This Study
It has been over 3 years since the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed responsibility for passenger and baggage screening at commercial airports. This testimony focuses on the progress TSA is making in strengthening aspects of aviation security and the challenges that remain. Particularly, this testimony highlights (1) progress TSA has made, and challenges it faces, in managing a federalized security workforce--including federal security directors (FSD) and transportation security officers (TSO)--with operational responsibility for ensuring security of passengers and their baggage; and (2) actions TSA has taken, and the challenges it faces, to ensure appropriate regulatory oversight of other airport security activities.
What GAO Found
TSA has made progress in managing, deploying, and training a federalized aviation security workforce, including FSDs (the lead authority at U.S. airports) and TSOs (formerly known as screeners). FSDs have, for example, formed partnerships with key federal and private-sector stakeholders at airports engaged in security and operations. We reported, however, that the guidance on FSD authority is outdated and lacks clarity, particularly regarding security incidents when FSDs must coordinate with other stakeholders. Regarding TSOs, TSA has taken and has planned actions to strengthen the management and deployment of the TSO workforce. TSA has, for instance, developed a screening allocation model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports. However, FSDs have reported concerns that despite such a model, attracting, hiring, and retaining an adequate part-time TSO workforce remains a challenge. We have reported that, while TSA has expanded training opportunities for TSOs, insufficient TSO staffing and other problems hinder the ability of TSOs to take training. To evaluate TSO performance, TSA has collected performance data by conducting covert (undercover, unannounced) tests at passenger screening checkpoints. TSA has taken steps to strengthen key areas of aviation security for which it has regulatory and oversight responsibility, including domestic air cargo security, but faces challenges related to oversight and performance measurement. We reported in October 2005, for example, that while TSA had significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted, performance measures to determine to what extent air carriers and others are complying with air cargo security requirements had not been developed. Without such performance measures, and a systematic analysis of these results of air cargo security inspections, TSA's ability to target its workforce for future inspections, and fulfill oversight responsibilities, will be limited. Further, while TSA has incorporated elements of risk-based decision making into securing air cargo, its efforts are not yet complete. To address these and other issues, TSA officials stated that they plan to compile additional information on air cargo inspections to enhance their ability to conduct compliance inspections of air carriers using covert testing, and to require random inspection of air cargo. |
gao_GAO-02-256 | gao_GAO-02-256_0 | The exchanges operate retail stores similar to department stores selling apparel, footwear, household appliances, jewelry, cosmetics, food, and other merchandise. The exchanges generally did not maintain the names and locations of the relevant overseas factories. Exchanges Are Less Proactive in Identifying Factories’ Working Conditions
The military exchanges’ methods for identifying working conditions in overseas factories that manufacture their private label merchandise are not as proactive as the methods employed by companies in the private sector. Leading retailers have been addressing these challenges for as long as 10 years and have taken three key steps to promote adequate working conditions and compliance with labor laws and regulations in overseas factories—developing codes of conduct, implementing the codes of conduct by the clear dissemination of expectations, and monitoring to ensure that suppliers’ factories comply with their codes of conduct. Recommendations for Executive Action
As the Secretary of Defense moves to implement the congressionally directed program to assure that private label exchange merchandise is not produced by child or forced labor, we recommend the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), require the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Naval Exchange Service Command, and Marine Corp Community Services to develop their program around the framework outlined in this report, including creating a code of conduct that reflects the values and expectations that the exchanges have of their suppliers; developing an implementation plan for the code of conduct that includes steps to communicate the elements of the code to internal staff, business partners, and factory workers and to train them on these elements; developing a monitoring effort to ensure that the codes of conduct are using government agencies, such as the Departments of State and Labor, retailers, and the International Labor Organization as resources for information and insights that would facilitate structuring their program; establishing ongoing communications with these organizations to help the exchanges stay abreast of information that would facilitate their implementation and monitoring efforts to assure that exchange merchandise is not produced by child or forced labor; and pursuing these efforts jointly where there are opportunities to minimize costs. We also interviewed officials from industry associations and labor and human rights groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
The military exchanges operate retail stores similar to department stores in more than 1,500 locations worldwide. The exchanges stock merchandise from many sources, including name-brand companies, brokers and importers, and overseas firms. Reports of worker rights abuses, such as child labor and forced overtime, and antilabor practices have led human rights groups and the press to scrutinize working conditions in overseas factories.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the military exchanges are not as proactive as private sector companies in determining working conditions at the overseas factories that manufacture their private label merchandise. Moreover, the exchanges have not sought to verify that overseas factories comply with labor laws and regulations. A single industrywide standard for working conditions at overseas factories was not considered practical by the 10 retailers GAO contacted. However, these retailers have taken the following three steps to ensure that goods are not produced by child or forced labor: (1) developing workplace codes of conduct that reflect their expectations of suppliers; (2) disseminating information on fair and safe labor conditions and educating their employees, suppliers, and factory workers on them; and (3) using their own employees or contractors to regularly inspect factories to ensure that their codes of conduct are upheld. |
gao_GAO-14-132 | gao_GAO-14-132_0 | Agencies Lack Complete and Reliable Data on the Cost of External Executive Training and Are Likely Underreporting Costs
Agencies Reported Spending Millions of Dollars and Most Used Multiple External Providers from Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012
The 26 CHCO Council agencies responding to our questionnaire reported that, from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, they spent almost $57 million (in constant 2012 dollars) for about 30,000 participants to attend executive training courses offered by external providers. OPM requires agencies to maintain records of training plans, expenditures, and activities, and to submit the recorded data to OPM. For example, one agency reported that it did not include costs for course materials. OPM officials agreed that agencies have challenges collecting and reporting costs for executive training through the EHRI database, and as a result, executive training cost data in EHRI is probably lower than actual agency expenditures. However, OPM has not established interim milestones for the completion of these planned meetings with agencies to address training data deficiencies, nor has OPM set timeframes for agencies to have a plan in place for improving the completeness and reliability of agency data on executive training costs. One leading transformation practice is to establish milestones and timeframes to demonstrate progress towards achieving goals. Agencies are required by statute and OPM implementing regulations to evaluate how well training programs contribute to mission accomplishment and meet organizational performance goals. OPM acknowledged that some agencies struggle with evaluating training programs. However, OPM is not sharing lessons learned from agencies that reported having assessed the impact of executive training on agency missions. However, eight agencies that responded to our questionnaire (and that are also members of the CHCO Council) reported that they have conducted these evaluations and may have lessons learned from which other agencies could benefit. Further, 20 of 26 agency CHCOs said they found opportunities for achieving efficiencies government-wide. For instance, some CHCOs said agencies can increase interagency cooperation on executive training by sharing space in training seminars with other agencies, and allowing admission of SES candidates from other federal agencies into training programs such as SESCDPs. CHCOs also said that OPM could assist agencies in locating executive training programs open to other agencies and departments, and provide a central source for listing executive development opportunities throughout the federal government. Participation facilitates brainstorming solutions to previously identified issues faced by career SES and SES candidates. Moreover, by not establishing a timeframe for improving the reliability of executive training cost data, OPM may be missing an opportunity to better position itself to hold agencies accountable for improving the data. OPM has not used interagency councils to share lessons learned from agencies that have experience with assessing executive training’s impact on agency missions. Although OPM has developed and published guidance on evaluating training’s impact on agency mission and goals, over half of the CHCO agencies are not conducting these evaluations of executive training provided by external providers. Agency CHCOs reported that more assistance from OPM is needed. By not assessing lessons learned and other potential efficiencies identified by agencies, OPM may be missing an opportunity to better position agencies to achieve these efficiencies in executive training. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that agencies track and report comparable and reliable cost data and perform evaluations that assess the impact of executive training on agency performance or missions, we recommend that the Director of OPM, in coordination with the CHCO Council, take the following actions:
Establish interim milestones for meeting with agencies in order to address training data deficiencies and to establish well-defined timeframes for improving the reliability of the data in its EHRI database. However, we believe that more steps can be taken. Specifically, this report (1) describes what is known about how much Chief Human Capital Officers Council (CHCO Council) agencies have spent on executive training offered by external providers and assesses the reliability of available cost data; (2) assesses how CHCO Council agencies evaluate the effectiveness of the training; (3) compares opportunities identified by agency CHCOs to achieve efficiencies in executive training to leading training practices, and (4) provides views of career Senior Executive Service (SES) and SES candidates from selected agencies on the value of the training they received. We selected three agencies – the Department of Energy (Energy), Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) – to obtain illustrative examples of how they approached executive training in their respective agencies and collected data related to costs; how they implemented and evaluated the results of their executive training programs identified in the questionnaire; and how they identified potential efficiencies and steps planned or already taken to achieve them. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government annually spends millions of dollars on executive training programs administered by external training providers. GAO was asked to review the costs and value of this training. This review (1) describes what is known about how much CHCO Council agencies have spent on executive training offered by external providers and assesses the reliability of available cost data; (2) assesses how CHCO Council agencies evaluate the effectiveness of the training; (3) compares executive training efficiency opportunities identified by agency CHCOs to leading practices; and (4) provides views of career SES and SES candidates from selected agencies on the value of the training they received. GAO obtained information from CHCO Council agencies through a questionnaire, and selected three of 26 CHCO Council agencies--the Departments of Energy, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs--to provide illustrative examples. GAO based its selection, in part, on workforce size, number of career SES, and total training costs.
What GAO Found
Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) from 26 agencies reported that, from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, they spent almost $57 million (in constant 2012 dollars) on executive training provided by external providers. CHCOs reported using the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Federal Executive Institute and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government most often. Agencies are required to maintain records of training plans, expenditures, activities, and (since 2006) to report training data to OPM. However, half of the CHCOs reported data to GAO that they deemed incomplete, or with limitations. For example, two agencies did not include travel related costs; one did not include costs for course materials; another did not include costs from all components. OPM officials agree that training cost data reported by agencies continues to be unreliable, and is probably lower than actual agency expenditures. OPM officials said they are meeting with agencies to address data deficiencies. However, OPM has not set interim milestones for meeting with agencies or established a timeframe to improve reporting. One leading practice is to establish such interim milestones and timeframes, in order to demonstrate progress towards achieving goals. By not establishing interim milestones and timeframes for improving the reliability of executive training cost data, OPM may be missing an opportunity to better position itself to hold agencies accountable for improving their data.
Most CHCOs reported evaluating participant reaction and changing their training programs based on participant input, but fewer reported assessing training impact on agency mission. Agencies are required by statute and OPM implementing regulations to evaluate how well training programs contribute to mission accomplishment and performance goals. OPM is not sharing lessons learned from agencies that have experience assessing executive training impact on agency mission. However, OPM acknowledged that some agencies struggle with these evaluations; in response, OPM has issued guidance on the subject. CHCOs cited time, costs, and difficulty as reasons for not conducting the required evaluations and reported the need for additional OPM assistance. Eight agencies reported conducting these evaluations and may have lessons learned from which other agencies could benefit. For example, VA has a process for assessing the impact of executive training on its mission that it has used to make better training investment decisions.
CHCOs identified opportunities for agencies and OPM to achieve efficiencies in executive training. CHCOs said agencies could (1) increase interagency cooperation by sharing training facilities and expanding eligibility to Senior Executive Service (SES) candidates from other agencies, and (2) implement or expand computer-based training. CHCOs also said OPM could, among other things, (1) help centralize training offerings by creating a centrally funded SES candidate development program, and (2) assist agencies in identifying programs open to other agencies and departments. By not assessing lessons learned and other efficiencies identified by agencies, OPM may be missing an opportunity to better position agencies to achieve these efficiencies in executive training.
Career SES and SES candidates generally said external executive training is useful and valuable, but suggested that it would be more cost-effective for the government to negotiate prices as a large-scale buyer, versus individual agencies purchasing training.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OPM (1) establish interim milestones for meeting with agencies to address training data deficiencies and establish time frames for improving the reliability of agency data, (2) share information and examples of how agencies have evaluated the impact of executive training on agency mission and goals, and (3) assess potential efficiencies identified by agencies for possible government-wide implementation. OPM concurred with the recommendations and has taken useful steps. GAO still believes that more effective activities can be taken. |
gao_GGD-00-5 | gao_GGD-00-5_0 | We also reviewed the applicable provisions of the Restructuring Act, IRS interpretations of the act’s requirements, IRS procedures for selling seized assets, and seizure case files. This sample yielded sufficiently complete information on 115 taxpayers with a corresponding 139 seizures to evaluate IRS’ management and control over assets seized. We have summarized those comments in this letter and reprinted the written comments, in entirety, in appendix I.
IRS Has Not Finalized Plans on How to Remove Revenue Officers From Asset Sales
As of October 1999, IRS had not finalized its plans for removing revenue officers from any participation in selling seized assets. As part of its discussions, the group recognized that any decisions reached would require consideration of a number of issues, including the following. The group considered the circumstances under which IRS should use private sector contractors or other government agencies to manage and sell assets. Little Progress in Addressing Control Weaknesses Identified in 1992
In our current review of IRS’ seized asset management and sales processes, we found little improvement from 1992 conditions in the 1997 seizures we reviewed. Our overall report on weaknesses in IRS’ seizure processes contains additional details. Sales Practices Provide Little Assurance of Maximum Proceeds
Similar to our 1992 review, we found that IRS’ sales practices provided little assurance that the maximum possible sales proceeds were achieved. However, the new system still did not provide IRS management with information useful for establishing accountability over seized assets or monitoring the management and sales of the assets as envisioned by federal financial management guidelines. More specifically, the automated inventory system did not require the entry of the full description of assets as recorded by revenue officers in their case files; did not provide data entry fields for capturing information on asset did not provide a data entry field for theft, loss, and damage expenses; did not consistently capture information on the value of the assets—in some instances valuing the assets at the amount of the taxpayer’s delinquency and in others, at the value of the taxpayer’s ownership interest in the assets; did not always coincide with the revenue officers’ files or the actual property on hand (in comparing system records, revenue officers’ files, and our physical inspection of assets involving 16 seizures in 4 IRS district offices, we found discrepancies in 15 seizures); and was not required to be updated in a timely manner. Conclusion
Regardless of whether seized asset sales are done “in-house” by an IRS specialist or contracted out to a private concern, IRS must have controls that provide for accountability over seized assets, security for assets, sales practices that protect the government’s and taxpayers’ interests, and information to allow for management oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) progress in eliminating asset management control weaknesses, focusing on: (1) the implementation of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act's mandate to remove revenue officers from the asset sale function; and (2) other internal control weaknesses identified in GAO's 1992 testimony.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of October 1999, IRS had not finalized its plans for removing revenue officers from its process for selling seized assets; (2) after the passage of the Restructuring Act, IRS organized a study group to consider establishing a specialist position for both managing and disposing of assets after they were seized by revenue officers; (3) the group has been meeting and is considering the scope of the new position; (4) however, the scope of the position, including the extent to which private sector contractors may be used to manage and sell seized property, a position description, or procedures for governing the specialists' actions, has not been finalized; (5) GAO's review of a representative sample of 1997 nationwide seizure cases, selected as part of GAO's overall review of weaknesses in IRS' seizure processes, showed that the fundamental internal control weaknesses GAO identified in 1992 remained; (6) more specifically, GAO's review of case files showed the following: (a) similar to 1992, sufficiently complete information to establish accountability over assets was not always recorded by revenue officers when assets were seized; (b) as in 1992, IRS' security arrangements for seized assets were, in some instances, minimal or nonexistent; (c) similar to 1992, IRS' sale practices provided little assurance that the maximum possible sales proceeds were achieved; and (d) although installed after 1992, IRS' automated seizure information system still did not provide IRS management with information useful for establishing accountability over seized assets or monitoring the management and sales of the assets; and (7) regardless of the results of IRS' decisions on contracting out all or part of the asset management and sales function, IRS will remain responsible for assuring that assets are appropriately managed and sold. |
gao_GAO-16-320 | gao_GAO-16-320_0 | The LD-2s contain information that includes: a list of individuals who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the client the name of the lobbyist reporting on quarterly lobbying activities; the name of the client for whom the lobbyist lobbied; during the reporting period; whether any lobbyists served in covered positions in the executive or legislative branch such as high ranking agency officials or congressional staff positions, in the previous 20 years; codes describing general issue areas, such as agriculture and education; a description of the specific lobbying issues; houses of Congress and federal agencies lobbied during the reporting period; and reported income (or expenses for organizations with in-house lobbyists) related to lobbying activities during the quarter (rounded to the nearest $10,000). The LDA also requires lobbyists to report certain political contributions semiannually in the LD-203 report. Figure 2 shows lobbyists filed disclosure reports as required for most new lobbying registrations from 2010 through 2015. For Most LD-2 Reports, Lobbyists Provided Documentation for Key Elements but for Some LD-2 Reports, Lobbyists Rounded Their Income or Expenses Incorrectly
For selected elements of lobbyists’ LD-2 reports that can be generalized to the population of lobbying reports our findings have been consistent from year to year. In 2015, we identified 31 percent of reports that did not round reported income or expenses according to the guidance. This year, we estimate that 21 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed one or more previously held covered positions as required. As in our other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. Most lobbying firms we surveyed rated the definitions of terms used in LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand with regard to meeting their reporting requirements. This is consistent with prior reviews. It also shows the status of the referrals received and the number of enforcement actions taken by USAO in its effort to bring lobbyists into compliance. In August 2015, USAO finalized a settlement in the amount of $125,000 for the Carmen Group to address failure to file for several years. This is the largest civil penalty assessed under the LDA to date. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided updated data which we incorporated into the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which lobbyists are able to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA) by providing documentation to support information contained on registrations and reports filed under the LDA; to identify challenges and potential improvements to compliance, if any; and to describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO), its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts it has made to improve LDA enforcement. We used the House database for sampling LD- 2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of 2014 and the first and second quarters of 2015, as well as for sampling year-end 2014 and midyear 2015 political contributions (LD-203) reports. To assess the extent to which lobbyists could provide evidence of their compliance with reporting requirements, we examined a stratified random sample of 80 LD-2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of 2014 and the first and second quarters of 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
The LDA, as amended, requires lobbyists to file quarterly lobbying disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. The law also requires that GAO annually audit lobbyists' compliance with the LDA. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to USAO in its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts USAO has made to improve enforcement. This is GAO's ninth report under the mandate.
GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 80 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of 2014 and the first and second quarters of 2015. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2014 and midyear 2015. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 45,565 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity, and 29,189 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO met with officials from USAO to obtain status updates on its efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply.
GAO provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided updated data which GAO incorporated into the report.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
For the 2015 reporting period, most lobbyists provided documentation for key elements of their disclosure reports to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA). For lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports filed during the third and fourth quarter of 2014 and the first and second quarter of 2015, GAO estimates that
88 percent of lobbyists filed initial LD-2 reports as required for new lobbying registrations (lobbyists are required to file LD-2 reports for the quarter in which they first register); the figure below describes the filing process and enforcement;
93 percent could provide documentation for income and expenses, but on 31 percent of these LD-2 reports lobbyists did not correctly follow the guidance to round to the nearest $10,000; and
85 percent filed year-end LD-203 2014 reports as required.
These findings are generally consistent with prior reports GAO issued for the 2010 through 2014 reporting periods. As in our other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. GAO estimates that 21 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed one or more previously held covered positions. However, over the past several years of reporting on lobbying disclosure, GAO has found that most lobbyists in the sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand with regard to meeting their reporting requirements.
The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) stated it has sufficient resources and authority to enforce compliance with the LDA. USAO continued its efforts to bring lobbyists into compliance by prompting them to file reports or applying civil penalties. In August 2015, USAO finalized a $125,000 settlement with the Carmen Group, the largest civil penalty settlement for noncompliance. |
gao_GAO-06-337 | gao_GAO-06-337_0 | Environmental factors are critical to the incidence and severity of ASR. Figure 2 shows the pattern of ASR’s spread throughout the world. 2005 ASR Efforts Showed Benefits of a National Coordination Strategy and Highlight the Importance of Consistent Data and Strong Leadership
USDA’s development and implementation of a coordinated framework was instrumental in providing an effective response to ASR on soybeans in 2005. However, inconsistencies in how researchers monitor, test, and report on the disease could lead to incomplete or inaccurate data and detract from the value of future prediction models. Sentinel plots—typically about 2,500 square feet of soybeans, other host plants, or a combination of the two—are planted a few weeks before the beginning of the growing season and serve as an advance warning of approaching ASR. In total, states monitored more than 1,000 sentinel plots in 2005. Outreach for Training, Education, and Information Dissemination Was Effective in 2005 and Is Planned to Continue in 2006
In preparation for the 2005 growing season, USDA and the 31 soybean-producing states we surveyed sponsored about 1,500 presentations, programs, and workshops on ASR. Several states also displayed ASR information on their state Web sites. Lack of an Action Plan Describing How Leadership Responsibilities Will Be Assumed and Managed in 2006 Raises Concerns About a Sustained National Effort for ASR
The national effort for ASR during the 2005 growing season was directed by senior APHIS headquarters officials, who coordinated the federal, state, and industry effort to develop the framework. Changes to the successful management approach employed by USDA in 2005 raise questions about how the program will perform in 2006. EPA, USDA, and Others Have Made More Fungicides Available While Continuing to Develop Longer-Term Solutions
As of December 31, 2005, EPA had approved a total of 20 fungicide products for treating ASR on soybeans, including 12 for which emergency exemptions were granted. For the longer term, USDA, universities, and private companies are conducting research to develop ASR-resistant or -tolerant soybeans but expect that these will not be available commercially for 5 to 9 years. In terms of the availability of application equipment and fungicides in 2005, the officials we surveyed in the nine states where ASR was confirmed reported no problems with access to equipment. Commercialization may take an additional 2 to 4 years. Going forward, however, differences in how researchers monitor, test, and report on the disease could detract from the value of future prediction models. In written comments, USDA said that the report fairly describes USDA’s preparations related to ASR. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) strategy for minimizing the effects of Asian Soybean Rust (ASR) now that the disease has arrived in the continental United States and the lessons learned that could be used to improve future efforts, we interviewed officials from USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES), the Agricultural Research Service, the Farm Service Agency (FSA), and the Risk Management Agency (RMA) to identify efforts that have been implemented since November 2004. To determine the progress that USDA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and others have made in developing, testing, and licensing fungicides to treat ASR and in identifying and breeding ASR-resistant or -tolerant soybeans, we interviewed officials from EPA and state departments of agriculture to obtain information about their efforts to license fungicides to treat ASR. 23. Related GAO Products
Agriculture Production: USDA’s Preparation for Asian Soybean Rust. GAO-05-668R. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, U.S. agriculture faced potentially devastating losses from Asian Soybean Rust (ASR), a fungal disease that spreads airborne spores. Fungicides approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can protect against ASR. In 2005, growers in 31 states planted about 72.2 million soybean acres worth about $17 billion. While favorable weather conditions limited losses due to ASR, it still threatens the soybean industry. In May 2005, GAO described the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) efforts to prepare for ASR's entry, (Agriculture Production: USDA's Preparation for Asian Soybean Rust, GAO-05-668R). This report examines (1) USDA's strategy to minimize ASR's effects in 2005 and the lessons learned to improve future efforts and (2) USDA, EPA, and others' efforts to develop, test, and license fungicides for ASR and to identify and breed soybeans that tolerate it.
What GAO Found
USDA developed and implemented a framework--with federal and state agencies, land grant universities, and industry--that effectively focused national attention on ASR in 2005 and helped growers make informed fungicide decisions. The framework was effective in several ways. For example, sentinel plots--about 2,500 square feet of soybeans or other host plants planted early in the growing season in the 31 soybean-producing states--provided early warning of ASR. Officials in 23 of 25 states GAO surveyed reported that this effort was effective. Researchers could also promptly identify and report on the incidence and severity of the disease on a USDA Web site, alerting officials and growers to ASR's spread. Going forward, however, differences in how researchers monitor, test, and report on the disease could lead to incomplete or inaccurate data and detract from the value of future prediction models. For example, models to forecast ASR's spread partly rely on states' observations of sentinel plots. USDA asked states to report results weekly, but updates ranged from 4 reports, in total, during the growing season in one state to 162 reports in another state. Inconsistencies also occurred in the designation and placement of plots and in the testing of samples for ASR. Further, changes to the successful management approach employed by USDA in 2005 raise questions about how the program will perform in 2006. For 2006, most operational responsibility for ASR will shift from USDA headquarters to a land grant university. GAO is concerned that USDA's lack of a detailed action plan describing how program responsibilities will be assumed and managed in 2006 could limit the effectiveness of ASR management for this year. EPA, USDA, and others increased the number of fungicides growers can use to combat ASR while efforts continue to develop ASR-tolerant soybeans. As of December 2005, EPA had approved 20 fungicides for treating ASR on soybeans, including 12 that had emergency exemptions. According to officials in the nine states where ASR was confirmed in 2005, growers had access to fungicides. USDA, universities, and private companies are also developing ASR-tolerant soybeans and have identified 800 possible lines of resistant soybeans, out of a total of 16,000 lines. USDA estimates it may take 5 to 9 years to develop commercially available ASR-tolerant soybeans. |
gao_GAO-16-328 | gao_GAO-16-328_0 | Not All Newly Enrolled Veterans in Our Review Were Able to Access Primary Care; Others Experienced Wide Variation in the Amount of Time They Waited for Care
Newly Enrolled Veterans Did Not Always Receive Primary Care Appointments Due to Weaknesses in VHA’s Appointment Scheduling Process and Other Factors
Our review of medical records for a sample of veterans at six VA medical centers found several problems in medical centers processing veterans’ requests that VA contact them to schedule appointments, and thus not all newly enrolled veterans were able to access primary care. Veterans Experienced Wide Variation in the Amount of Time They Waited for Primary Care Due to Limited Appointment Availability and Weaknesses in Scheduling Practices
Based on our review of medical records for a sample of veterans across the six VA medical centers in our review, we found the average number of days between newly enrolled veterans’ initial requests that VA contact them to schedule appointments and the dates the veterans were seen by primary care providers at each medical center ranged from 22 days to 71 days. VHA’s Oversight of Veterans’ Access to Primary Care Is Hindered in Part by Data Weaknesses
VHA Monitors Only a Portion of the Time It Takes Newly Enrolled Veterans to Access Primary Care
A key component of VHA’s oversight of veterans’ access to primary care, particularly for newly enrolled veterans, relies on monitoring appointment wait times. Our review of medical records for 120 newly enrolled veterans found that, on average, the total amount of time it took to be seen by primary care providers was much longer when measured from the dates veterans initially requested VA contact them to schedule appointments than it was when using appointment wait times calculated using veterans’ preferred dates as the starting point. Scheduling Errors Continue to Affect the Reliability of Wait-Time Data, Including for Primary Care
Ongoing problems continue to affect the reliability of wait-time data, including for primary care, used by VHA, VISN, and VA medical center officials for monitoring and oversight. We found that schedulers incorrectly revised patients’ preferred dates to later dates, inconsistent with VHA policy, under two scheduling scenarios: 1. They indicated that high turnover among schedulers and the lack of an updated standardized scheduling policy make it more difficult to train schedulers and to direct these staff to current policy, which increases the likelihood of errors. Consequently, data used for monitoring and oversight do not capture the time newly enrolled veterans wait prior to being contacted by a scheduler, making it difficult for officials to effectively identify and remedy scheduling problems that arise prior to making contact with veterans. (2) Monitor the full amount of time newly enrolled veterans wait to be seen by primary care providers, starting with the date veterans request they be contacted to schedule appointments. In its written comments, VA concurred with all three of the report’s recommendations, and identified actions it is taking to implement them. Appendix I: Prior GAO Recommendations Related to Oversight of Veterans’ Access to Primary and Specialty Care
Our prior work has found weaknesses in the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA) ability to effectively oversee timely access to health care for veterans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Primary care services are often the entry point for veterans needing care, and VHA has faced a growing demand for outpatient primary care services over the past decade. On average, 380,000 veterans were newly enrolled in VHA's health care system each year in the last decade.
GAO was asked to examine VHA's efforts to provide timely access to primary care services. This report examines, among other things, (1) newly enrolled veterans' access to primary care and (2) VHA's related oversight. GAO interviewed officials from six VA medical centers selected to provide variation in factors such as geographic location, clinical services offered, and average primary care wait times; reviewed a randomly selected, non-generalizable sample of medical records for 180 newly enrolled veterans; and interviewed VHA and medical center officials on oversight of access to primary care. GAO evaluated VHA's oversight against relevant federal standards for internal control.
What GAO Found
GAO found that not all newly enrolled veterans were able to access primary care from the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA), and others experienced wide variation in the amount of time they waited for care. Sixty of the 180 newly enrolled veterans in GAO's review had not been seen by providers at the time of the review; nearly half were unable to access primary care because VA medical center staff did not schedule appointments for these veterans in accordance with VHA policy. The 120 newly enrolled veterans in GAO's review who were seen by providers waited from 22 days to 71 days from their requests that VA contact them to schedule appointments to when they were seen, according to GAO's analysis. These time frames were impacted by limited appointment availability and weaknesses in medical center scheduling practices, which contributed to unnecessary delays.
VHA's oversight of veterans' access to primary care is hindered, in part, by data weaknesses and the lack of a comprehensive scheduling policy. This is inconsistent with federal internal control standards, which call for agencies to have reliable data and effective policies to achieve their objectives. For newly enrolled veterans, VHA calculates primary care appointment wait times starting from the veterans' preferred dates (the dates veterans want to be seen), rather than the dates veterans initially requested VA contact them to schedule appointments. Therefore, these data do not capture the time these veterans wait prior to being contacted by schedulers, making it difficult for officials to identify and remedy scheduling problems that arise prior to making contact with veterans. Further, ongoing scheduling errors, such as incorrectly revising preferred dates when rescheduling appointments, understated the amount of time veterans waited to see providers. Officials attributed these errors to confusion by schedulers, resulting from the lack of an updated standardized scheduling policy. These errors continue to affect the reliability of wait-time data used for oversight, which makes it more difficult to effectively oversee newly enrolled veterans' access to primary care.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VHA (1) ensure veterans requesting appointments are contacted in a timely manner to schedule one; (2) monitor the full amount of time newly enrolled veterans wait to receive primary care; and (3) issue an updated scheduling policy. VA concurred with all of GAO's recommendations and identified actions it is taking to implement them. |
gao_GAO-05-709T | gao_GAO-05-709T_0 | GAO’s long-term budget simulations illustrate the magnitude of this fiscal challenge. Performance budgeting can help enhance the government’s capacity to assess competing claims in the budget by arming budgetary decision makers with better information on the results of both individual programs as well as entire portfolios of tools and programs addressing common outcomes. PART is central to the Administration’s budget and performance integration initiative. However, it is not clear that PART has had any significant impact on congressional authorization, appropriations, and oversight activities to date. Achieving Success in Performance Budgeting Requires Credible Information, Congressional “Buy- in,” and a Comprehensive and Crosscutting Perspective
Let me now turn to three factors we believe are critical to sustaining successful performance budgeting over time: 1. building a supply of credible performance information, 2. encouraging demand for that information and its use in congressional processes by garnering stakeholder buy-in, and 3. taking a comprehensive and crosscutting approach to assessing related programs and policies. As part of the executive branch budget formulation process, PART must clearly serve the President’s interests. Reexamination Requires a Crosscutting Perspective
While existing performance budgeting initiatives provide a foundation for a baseline review of federal policies, programs, functions, and activities, several changes are in order to support the type of reexamination needed. Such an approach would require assessing the performance of all programs related to a particular goal—including tax expenditures and regulatory programs—using a common framework. Concluding Observations
The federal government is in a period of profound transition and faces an array of challenges and opportunities to enhance performance, ensure accountability, and position the nation for the future. In addition to the serious long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation, a number of overarching trends, such as defense and homeland security policies, increasing global interdependence, and advances in science and technology, drive the need to reconsider the proper role for the federal government in the 21st century, including what it does, how it does it, who does it, and how it gets financed. This will mean bringing a variety of tools and approaches to bear. Through PMA and its related initiatives, including PART, the Administration has taken important steps in the right direction by calling attention to successes and needed improvements in federal management and performance. It will only be through the continued attention of the executive branch and Congress that progress can be sustained and, more importantly, accelerated. This effort can both strengthen the budget process itself and provide a valuable tool to facilitate a fundamental reexamination of the base of government. We recognize that this process will not be easy. Given the wide range of programs and issues covered, the process of rethinking the full range of federal government programs, policies, and activities could take a generation or more to complete. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its work to improve the management and performance of the federal government, GAO monitors progress and continuing challenges in performance budgeting and the Administration's related initiatives, such as the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). In light of the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance and other emerging 21st century challenges, we have also reported that performance budgeting can help facilitate a needed reexamination of what the federal government does, how it does it, who does it, and how it is financed in the future. GAO remains committed to working with Congress and the Administration to help address these important and complex issues.
What GAO Found
The federal government is in a period of profound transition and faces an array of challenges and opportunities to enhance performance, ensure accountability, and position the nation for the future. A number of overarching trends--including the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance--drive the need to reexamine what the federal government does, how it does it, who does it, and how it gets financed. This will mean bringing a variety of tools and approaches to bear on the situation. Performance budgeting holds promise as a means for facilitating a reexamination effort. It can help enhance the government's capacity to assess competing claims for federal dollars by arming decision makers with better information both on the results of individual programs as well as on entire portfolios of tools and programs addressing common goals. However, it is important to remember that in a political process, performance information should be one, but will not be the only, factor in decision making. Existing performance budgeting efforts, such as PART, provide a means for facilitating a baseline review of certain federal policies, programs, functions, and activities. Successful application of these initiatives in this reexamination process rests on building a supply of credible and reliable performance information, encouraging demand for that information by garnering congressional buy-in on what is measured and how it is presented, and developing a comprehensive and crosscutting approach to assessing the performance of all major federal programs and policies encompassing spending, tax expenditures, and regulatory actions. Through the President's Management Agenda and its related initiatives, including PART, the Administration has taken important steps in the right direction by calling attention to successes and needed improvements in federal management and performance. However, it is not clear that PART has had any significant impact on authorization, appropriations, and oversight activities to date. It will only be through the continued attention of the executive branch and Congress that progress can be accelerated and sustained. Such an effort can strengthen the budget process itself and provide a valuable tool to facilitate a fundamental reexamination of the base of government. We recognize that this process will not be easy. Furthermore, given the wide range of programs and issues covered, the process of rethinking government programs and activities could take a generation or more to complete. |
gao_HEHS-95-59 | gao_HEHS-95-59_0 | SSA also performs a number of administrative functions to pay Social Security benefits. In 1953, the FSA was abolished and its functions were transferred to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). Specifically, we found that HHS and SSA have progressed well in (1) identifying and transferring personnel and other resources; (2) effecting organizational changes prompted by the transition; and (3) addressing changes to SSA’s budget process, as called for in the act. Of these, 478 will provide personnel administration services for SSA, 289 will provide legal support, and 263 will perform audit and investigative activities. HHS and SSA have also agreed on nonpersonnel resources to be transferred, such as funds, computer equipment, and furniture. SSA plans to establish a Washington, D.C., office to facilitate a closer working relationship with the Congress and the executive branch. An Independent SSA Faces Significant Challenges
While SSA has progressed well toward completing the transition, the agency will continue to face significant challenges as an independent agency. SSA has undertaken initiatives to improve its disability application process to more efficiently handle caseloads and reduce backlogs. 4, 1993). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO: (1) evaluated the Social Security Administration's (SSA) and Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) transition plans; and (2) identified some of the policy changes SSA will face as an independent agency.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) SSA and HHS have progressed towards the goal of SSA functioning as an independent agency; (2) HHS has successfully identified and transferred personnel and other resources to SSA; (3) there has been effective organizational changes prompted by the transition; (4) SSA and HHS have made changes to the SSA budget process, and SSA has initiated an effort to improve its claims processing function; (5) SSA and HHS have agreed that nonpersonnel transfers, such as funds, computer equipment, and furniture will be dependent on personnel transfers to SSA; (6) SSA will maintain its own legal and auditing departments; and (7) SSA will establish a Washington, DC office in order to bring about a closer working relationship with Congress and the executive branch. |
gao_GAO-09-351 | gao_GAO-09-351_0 | State and DOD Have Developed Procedures to Conduct Background Screenings of U.S. Citizens; Only State Has Developed Departmentwide Procedures to Screen Foreign and Local National Personnel
State Has Developed a Background Screening Process for Private Security Contractor Personnel, Including Foreign and Local National Personnel
State has developed a process for conducting background screenings of its private security contractor personnel, U.S. citizens, and foreign and local nationals alike, which, according to State officials, meets the requirements of HSPD-12. The lack of a focal point to resolve disagreements among the offices responsible for developing and implementing DOD’s background screening policies and procedures has hindered timely execution of the HSPD-12 requirements. For example, officials from USD-I have interpreted HSPD-12 as requiring a government screening and adjudication process for foreign nationals that would be equivalent to the National Agency Check with Written Inquiries investigation used for U.S. citizens. Officials within AT&L maintain that this approach is unrealistic and would severely limit the numbers of foreign national contractor personnel the department could use to support U.S. forces in contingency operations. According to AT&L officials a National Agency Check with Written Inquiries equivalent screening for foreign nationals would not be feasible, given the difficulty of screening foreign nationals and the inconsistent quality of criminal and employment records from one country to another. While DOD has acknowledged the inherent force protection risk it assumes when using contractor personnel, without the development and implementation of departmentwide background screening procedures that apply to all private security contractor personnel, including foreign nationals, DOD does not have full assurance that all of its private security contractor personnel have been properly screened. More specifically the focal point should direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to develop departmentwide procedures for conducting and adjudicating background screenings of foreign national contractor personnel and establish a time frame for implementation; develop an effective means to communicate to MNF-I the new procedures so that MNF-I officials can adjust their existing background screening policies and procedures, if necessary, to comport with the procedures; and develop a training program to ensure that military commanders and contracting officials, including contracting officers and contracting officers’ representatives, understand the department’s policies and procedures for background screening as well as their roles and responsibilities. To ensure that DOD fully meets the requirements of Section 862 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to: establish minimum processes and requirements for the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract during a combat operation; direct the geographic combatant commanders, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop and publish the regulations, orders, directives, instructions, and procedures for private security contractors operating during a contingency operation within their area of responsibility; provide a report to Congress with the timelines for completing the minimum processes discussed in the recommendation above; and revise the Federal Acquisition Regulation to require the insertion into each covered contract a clause addressing the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under such, contract. In addition, DOD stated that it does not conduct its own background investigations on foreign nationals and lacks the infrastructure to do so. However, as we noted, the process used in Iraq has several shortcomings. Our assessment of the extent to which DOD’s draft policy meets the requirements of Section 862 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 is based on our review of the draft regulation as it was written on May 2009. To determine the extent to which DOD and State have implemented processes to ensure that private security contractor personnel in Iraq are trained, we reviewed DOD and State contracts for security services in Iraq and interviewed DOD and State officials responsible for ensuring that these requirements have been met. To examine the measures the two departments have taken to account for weapons used by private security contractors in Iraq, we obtained and reviewed DOD and State arming guidance and policies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Currently in Iraq, there are thousands of private security contractor (PSC) personnel supporting DOD and State, many of whom are foreign nationals. Congressional concerns about the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions in Iraq are reflected in a provision in the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that directs DOD to develop guidance on PSCs. This report examines the extent (1) that DOD and State have developed and implemented policies and procedures to ensure that the backgrounds of PSC employees have been screened and (2) that DOD has developed guidance to implement the provisions of the NDAA and (3) that DOD and State have addressed measures on other issues related to PSC employees in Iraq. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed DOD and State guidance, policies, and contract oversight documentation and interviewed agency and private security industry officials.
What GAO Found
State and DOD have developed policies and procedures to conduct background screenings of PSC personnel working in Iraq who are U.S. citizens, but only State has done so for foreign nationals. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) directs U.S. government agencies to establish minimum background screening requirements in order to issue access credentials. But DOD has not developed departmentwide procedures for conducting background screenings of its foreign national PSC personnel. Disagreements among the various DOD offices responsible for developing and implementing these policies and procedures hindered timely execution of the HSPD-12 requirements, and the completion of this development and implementation has been hampered by the lack of a focal point to resolve these disagreements. For example, officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence interpret HSPD-12 as requiring a government screening process for foreign national contractor personnel that is equivalent to the National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI) currently used for U.S. citizen contractor personnel. But officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics maintain that a NACI-equivalent screening for foreign nationals would not be feasible, given the inherent difficulty of screening foreign nationals and the inconsistent quality of criminal and employment records from one country to another, and further, such an approach would will severely limit the numbers of foreign national contractor personnel DOD could use. The offices also differ as to who should approve background screenings, known as adjudication. The Commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq has established a screening process for PSCs, but GAO has identified several shortcomings that limit the effectiveness of this process. For example, the process directs contractors to obtain background screening for entities that will not provide data to contractors. While DOD has acknowledged the inherent force protection risk it assumes when using contractor employees, without the timely development of standardized policies and procedures, DOD lacks full assurance that all its PSCs are properly screened. While DOD is developing guidance to meet the requirements of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the draft guidance does not meet all of the requirements of that act. For example, the draft guidance does not address the requirement for establishing minimum standards for background screening of PSCs. Instead it directs the combatant commanders to establish standards for their respective areas of responsibility, though it does not establish time frames within which they should do so. Without addressing these concerns, DOD's draft guidance only partially meets the requirements of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. DOD and State have taken actions on other issues related to PSCs in Iraq. For example, they have implemented similar processes to ensure that PSC personnel are trained, and to account for PSC weapons. Both agencies have also developed policies related to alcohol use by PSCs |
gao_GAO-10-165T | gao_GAO-10-165T_0 | EPA administers its environmental enforcement responsibilities through its headquarters Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA). EPA has established principles for its enforcement and compliance program. However, when we reviewed EPA’s enforcement efforts we found that variations among EPA’s regional offices had led to inconsistencies in the actions they take to enforce environmental requirements. For example, we found that inspection coverage by EPA and state enforcement staff varied for facilities discharging pollutants within each region, the number and type of enforcement actions taken by EPA’s regions also varied, the size of the penalties assessed and the criteria used in determining penalties assessed varied by region, and the regions’ overall strategies in overseeing the states within their jurisdiction varied, which may have resulted in more in-depth reviews in some regional programs than in others. We identified a number of factors that contributed to variations in EPA’s enforcement that included the following: differences in the philosophical approaches among enforcement staff about how to best achieve compliance with environmental requirements, differences in state laws and enforcement authorities, and in the manner in which regions respond to these differences, variations in resources available to both state and regional enforcement the flexibility afforded by EPA policies and guidance that allow states a degree of latitude in their enforcement programs, and incomplete and inadequate enforcement data which, among other things, hamper EPA’s ability to accurately characterize the extent of variations. At that time, we reported that EPA had improved its oversight of state enforcement programs by implementing the State Review Framework (SRF). While we recognized the value in EPA’s identification and documentation of these findings, we also reported that EPA had not developed a plan for how it would uniformly address them in a timely manner, nor had the agency identified the root causes of the weaknesses, although some EPA and state officials attributed the weaknesses to causes such as increased workloads concomitant with budgetary reductions. EPA generally agreed with most of the recommendations we made in 2007, but did not specifically comment on the recommendations we made in 2000. Enforcement Resources Have Not Kept Pace with Increased Responsibilities and Better Resource Planning Would Enhance Enforcement Activities
In 2005, we reported that the scope of EPA’s responsibilities under the Clean Water Act had increased significantly since 1972, along with the workload associated with implementing and enforcing the act’s requirements. At the same time, EPA had authorized states to take on more responsibilities, shifting the agency’s workload from direct implementation to oversight. In 2007, we reported that while overall funding for carrying out enforcement activities to regions and authorized states had increased from fiscal years 1997 through 2006, these increases had not kept pace with inflation and the growth in enforcement responsibilities. Over the 10-year period we reviewed, EPA’s enforcement funding to the regions increased from $288 million in fiscal year 1997 to $322 million in fiscal year 2006, but declined in real terms by 8 percent. Both EPA and state officials told us they found it difficult to respond to new requirements while carrying out their previous responsibilities. Although we recognized that resources had not kept pace with EPA’s responsibilities under the Clean Water Act, we also found that EPA’s process for budgeting and allocating resources did not fully consider the agency’s current workload, either for specific statutory requirements, such as those included in the Clean Water Act, or for the broader goals and objectives in the agency’s strategic plan. To develop the estimates of the gap, EPA and the states created a detailed model of activities associated with implementing the Clean Water Act, the average time it took to complete such activities, and the costs of performing them. Our 2007 report acknowledged that EPA had made substantial progress in improving priority setting and enforcement planning with states through its system for setting national enforcement priorities and the National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS), which was designed to give states demonstrating strong environmental performance greater flexibility and autonomy in planning and operating their environmental programs. Measures Used to Report on the Effectiveness of Enforcement Efforts Can Be Improved
In 2008, we reported that EPA relies on a variety of measures to assess and report on the effectiveness of its civil and criminal enforcement programs. Moreover, we identified three shortcomings in how EPA calculates and reports penalty information to the Congress and the public that may result in an inaccurate assessment of the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act to help reduce water pollution and improve the health of the nation's waterways. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers its enforcement responsibilities under the act through its Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), as well as its 10 regional offices and the states. Over the last 9 years, GAO has undertaken a number of reviews of EPA's environmental enforcement activities, including for the Clean Water Act. For this testimony statement, GAO was asked to summarize the results of five prior reports on the effectiveness of EPA's enforcement program. Specifically, this statement includes information on the (1) factors that cause variations in enforcement activities and lead to inconsistencies across regions, (2) impact that inadequate resources and work force planning has had on enforcement, (3) efforts EPA has taken to improve priority planning, and (4) accuracy and transparency of measures of program effectiveness. GAO's prior recommendations have included the need for EPA to collect more complete and reliable data, develop improved guidance, and better performance measures. Although EPA has generally agreed with these recommendations, its implementation has been uneven. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement.
What GAO Found
In 2000, GAO found variations among EPA's regional offices in the actions they take to enforce environmental requirements. For example, the regions varied in the inspection coverage of facilities discharging pollutants, the number and type of enforcement actions taken, and the size of the penalties assessed and the criteria used in determining penalties. GAO also found that variations in the regions' strategies for overseeing state programs may have resulted in more in-depth reviews in some regional programs than in others. Several factors contributed to these variations including differences in the philosophical approaches among enforcement staff about how best to achieve compliance with environmental requirements, differences in state laws and enforcement authorities and how the regions respond to these differences, variations in resources available to state and regional offices, the flexibility afforded by EPA policies and guidance that allow latitude in state enforcement programs, and incomplete and inadequate enforcement data that hampered EPA's ability to accurately characterize the extent of variations. In 2007, GAO reported improvements in EPA's oversight of state enforcement activities with the implementation of a state review framework. However, while this framework helped identify several weaknesses in state programs, the agency had not developed a plan for how it would uniformly address these weaknesses or identify the root causes of these weaknesses. In 2005, GAO reported that the scope of EPA's responsibilities under the Clean Water Act along with workload associated with implementing and enforcing the act's requirements had increased significantly. At the same time, EPA had authorized states to take on more responsibilities, shifting the agency's workload from direct implementation to oversight. In 2007, GAO reported that while overall funding for enforcement activities had increased from $288 million in fiscal year 1997 to $322 million in fiscal year 2006, resources had not kept pace with inflation or the increased responsibilities. Both EPA and state officials told GAO that they found it difficult to respond to new requirements while carrying out previous responsibilities and regional offices had reduced enforcement staff by about 5 percent. In 2005, GAO also reported that EPA's process for budgeting and allocating resources did not fully consider the agency's workload, either for specific statutory requirements such as those included in the Clean Water Act or the broader goals and objectives in the agency's strategic plan. Any efforts made by the agency to develop a more systematic process would be hampered by the lack of comprehensive and accurate workload data. In 2007, GAO reported that EPA had made substantial progress in improving priority setting and enforcement planning with states through its system for setting national enforcement priorities and this had fostered a more cooperative relationship with the states. Finally, in 2008, GAO reported that EPA could improve the accuracy and transparency of some of the measures that it uses to assess and report on the effectiveness of its civil and criminal enforcement programs. GAO identified shortcomings in how EPA calculates and reports these data that may prevent the agency from providing Congress and the public with a fair assessment of the programs. |
gao_GAO-13-155 | gao_GAO-13-155_0 | FCC initiated the ESN project in order to continue its response to the incident, mitigate the risk to its information resources from the malicious software, reduce the risk of a successful future attack, and address weaknesses in its security controls and network architecture. FCC Did Not Effectively Implement Appropriate Information Security Controls in the Initial Components of Enhanced Secured Network Project
FCC did not effectively implement appropriate information security controls in the initial components of the ESN project. As a result, FCC limited the effectiveness of its security enhancements and its sensitive information remained at unnecessary risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper disclosure, or destruction. As a result of these and other deficiencies, FCC faces an unnecessary risk that individuals could gain unauthorized access to its sensitive systems and information. FCC Did Not Fully Implement Key Risk Management Activities in Developing and Deploying the Initial Components of the Enhanced Secured Network Project
The information security weaknesses in the initial portions of the project occurred, in part, because FCC had not fully performed key information security activities during the development and deployment of these initial components. While we agree that the security threat makes implementation urgent, using an iterative methodology would not negate the need to perform security risk management activities called for by federal guidelines and the commission’s policies. FCC Has Not Consistently Implemented Key Procedures for Managing the Enhanced Secured Network Project
Given the significance of the ESN project to FCC’s information security, it is important that the project be managed effectively to ensure that the project succeeds in its goal of addressing weaknesses in FCC’s security controls and network architecture. Cost estimation. FCC did not establish a reliable schedule for the ESN project. Specifically:
Sequencing all activities. Maintaining a baseline schedule. Additionally, the prime contractor did not document plans for how project risks would be addressed. Although the commission reported that the project is within cost and on schedule, the lack of a reliable life cycle cost estimate and project schedule, inconsistent management of project risks, and inconsistent oversight may leave FCC management and Congress without sufficient awareness of the total life-cycle costs for developing and deploying the ESN, sufficient assurance that the commission will be able to successfully complete the project by its scheduled completion date, and adequate understanding of potential obstacles to the success of the project. Unless FCC more effectively implements its IT security policies, improves its project management practices, and conducts regular oversight in accordance with commission policies, unnecessary risk exists that the ESN project may not succeed in its purpose of effectively protecting the commission’s systems and information. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen IT and project management controls over the ESN project, we recommend that the Chairman of the FCC take the following seven actions:
Perform key security risk management activities for the ESN project including selecting and documenting the security controls, assessing the implementation of the controls, and authorizing the system to operate. In a separate report with limited distribution, we are also making 26 recommendations associated with 21 findings to resolve technical information security weaknesses related to access controls and configuration management of the ESN. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess the extent to which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has (1) effectively implemented appropriate information security controls for the initial components of its Enhanced Secured Network (ESN) project; and (2) implemented appropriate procedures to manage and oversee its ESN project. We also compared documentation of ESN project activities and plans to these requirements and practices, and interviewed commission officials about FCC’s policies and ESN’s information security practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
In September 2011, FCC discovered that it had experienced a security breach on its computer network, which potentially allowed sensitive information to be compromised. The commission initiated the ESN project to implement enhanced security controls and an improved network architecture to defend against cyber attacks and reduce the risk of a successful future attack. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which FCC has (1) effectively implemented appropriate information security controls for the initial components of the ESN project, and (2) implemented appropriate procedures to manage and oversee its ESN project. To do so, GAO determined the effectiveness of ESN security controls by evaluating control configurations and identifying management controls; and determined how FCC applied them to the ESN project by analyzing documentation and interviewing commission officials.
What GAO Found
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) did not effectively implement appropriate information security controls in the initial components of the Enhanced Secured Network (ESN) project. Although FCC took steps to enhance its ability to control and monitor its network for security threats, weaknesses identified in the commission's deployment of components of the ESN project as of August 2012 resulted in unnecessary risk that sensitive information could be disclosed, modified, or obtained without authorization. This occurred, in part, because FCC did not fully implement key information security activities during the development and deployment of the initial components of the project. While FCC policy is to integrate security risk management into system life-cycle management activities, the commission instead deployed the initial components of the ESN project without, among other things, first selecting and documenting the security controls, assessing the controls, or authorizing the system to operate. As a result of these deficiencies, FCC's information remained at unnecessary risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper disclosure, or destruction. Further, addressing these deficiencies could require costly and timeconsuming rework.
FCC's efforts to effectively manage the ESN project were hindered by its inconsistent implementation of procedures for estimating costs, developing and maintaining an integrated schedule, managing project risks, and conducting oversight. If not addressed, these weaknesses could pose challenges for the commission to achieve the project's goal of improved security. Specifically, FCC
had not developed a reliable life cycle cost estimate for ESN that includes all implementation costs;
did not, in its project schedule, adequately identify the sequence in which activities must occur, ensure that detailed activities were traceable to higherlevel activities, or establish a baseline schedule;
documented and managed some risks to project success, but its prime contractor did not identify any project risks until after the deployment of the initial components of the ESN project had begun; and
had not included the ESN project in its processes for conducting regular oversight of information technology projects.
According to FCC officials, a key reason that they had not fully applied their policies or widely accepted best practices for security risk management and project management is because the ESN project was an emergency project and, therefore, needed to be initiated quickly. However, while GAO agrees that the security threat makes implementation urgent, it does not negate the need to perform key security risk management activities. Unless FCC more effectively implements its IT security policies and improves its project management practices and effectively applies them to the ESN project, unnecessary risk exists that the project may not succeed in its purpose of effectively protecting the commission's systems and information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making seven recommendations to the FCC to implement management controls to help ensure that ESN meets its objective of securing FCC's systems and information. In commenting on a draft of this report, FCC concurred with the recommendations. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is also making 26 recommendations to resolve technical information security weaknesses related to access controls and configuration management of the ESN. |
gao_HEHS-98-108 | gao_HEHS-98-108_0 | Coordinating medical centers are responsible for establishing contracts, usually with their university-affiliated medical schools, for the examination of Persian Gulf spouses and children using standard medical protocols and guidelines developed by VA.
Persian Gulf Dependents’ Examination Program Has Had Implementation Problems
The Persian Gulf Spouse and Children Examination Program has faced implementation problems that, to this point, have limited the program’s effectiveness. Also, examination sites are not easily accessible for some participants because only 36 of VA’s 172 medical centers participate in the program, and the law does not allow for VA to reimburse participants for costs such as travel and lodging. In addition, as of January 1998, no examinations had been conducted in 3 of the 16 coordinating medical centers we contacted because those centers had not negotiated contracts with affiliated medical schools or other providers. Outreach efforts at the medical centers we contacted ranged from direct mailings to veterans on the Persian Gulf Registry to relying only on national outreach efforts. Without information on how participants learned of the program or knowledge of the potential universe of Persian Gulf spouses and children who believe their illnesses or disorders may be related to a family member’s service in the Gulf, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of national or local outreach efforts. However, VA estimated that, on the basis of the $2 million authorized for the program, it could provide about 4,500 examinations, based on an average cost of $400 per examination, and have a reserve of $200,000 to cover the cost of additional diagnostic tests. As of January 1998, coordinating medical centers reported they had received 2,802 requests for examinations. Forty-one percent of family members who requested examinations did not report for appointments, refused examinations, or had not yet responded to requests to schedule examinations, as shown in table 1. Our analysis showed that the process from requesting an examination to completion of the examination takes an average of over 15 weeks. VA implemented the program through 36 of its 172 medical centers. Because of turnover in key medical center positions, including program coordinators, VA officials indicated that they were unaware of the status of some requests for examinations. Also, VA did not require monthly activity reports from coordinating medical centers until October 1997—1-1/2 years after the start of the program. We found that payment delays are caused, in part, because code sheets, which capture medical information for entry into the registry database, are rejected by VA’s Austin, Texas, processing center when they are not properly completed. Staff from VA medical centers and affiliated medical schools complained that code sheets were difficult and time consuming to complete and lacked clear instructions. However, these officials did not ask for additional referrals because they believed resources were constrained and the approval process would take additional time and require participants to make another trip to the medical school. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) implementation of the Persian Gulf Spouse and Children Examination Program, focusing on: (1) outreach efforts; (2) obstacles to family members' participation; and (3) contracting issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Persian Gulf Spouse and Children Examination Program has faced numerous implementation problems that have limited its effectiveness in providing medical examinations; (2) to inform Persian Gulf veterans and their family members about the program, VA approached outreach in two ways--with a national campaign supplemented by local efforts at coordinating VA medical centers; (3) GAO found that some medical centers made efforts to contact Persian Gulf veterans and their families, while others relied on headquarters' outreach efforts; (4) however, GAO could not assess the effectiveness of these efforts because of a lack of information on the potential number of Persian Gulf family members who believe their illnesses are related to a family member's service in the Gulf War; (5) although as of January 1998 coordinating medical centers had received 2,802 requests for examinations, VA has completed only 872; (6) forty-one percent of applicants either failed to report for appointments, refused examinations, or had not yet answered requests to schedule examinations; (7) program participants face a lengthy and cumbersome scheduling process carried out through VA offices other than the local VA medical centers; (8) GAO's analysis showed that it takes an average of over 15 weeks for a participant to get an examination; (9) in addition, because VA chose to administer the program through only 36 of its 172 medical centers, examination sites are not always easily accessible to participants; (10) three of the 16 coordinating medical centers GAO contacted have not conducted any examinations because they have not contracted with their affiliated medical schools or other providers; (11) VA headquarters officials were unaware that examinations had not been conducted in two of the centers because of turnover in key center positions, and because VA did not start requiring monthly activity reports, which give the cumulative status of examination requests, from coordinating medical centers until October 1997; (12) GAO found that payment delays are caused in part by contractors incorrectly completing required paperwork, which staff from VA medical centers and affiliated medical schools told GAO is time consuming to complete and lacks clear instructions; and (13) although VA reserved $200,000 of authorized funds to cover the costs of tests, medical center officials told GAO they would have requested more referrals but believed resources were limited and the approval process would require additional time and travel for participants. |
gao_NSIAD-95-5 | gao_NSIAD-95-5_0 | Combat forces are exclusively military, whether active-duty or reserve. In response to this request we examined (1) DOD and service efforts to replace military personnel in peacetime support positions with DOD civilian employees and (2) the adequacy of planning for the future use of DOD civilian employees and contractor personnel to support military forces in theaters of contingency operations. To determine the number of DOD civilian employees and contractor personnel who deployed to the Gulf War, the functions they performed, and problems associated with their deployment, we reviewed DOD’s April 1992 final report to the Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, with a particular focus on the “Civilian Support” appendix. Some of our reports and other DOD-sponsored studies show that civilian employees generally cost the government less than military personnel. In addition, a preference for using military personnel has often existed because the military personnel system provides a high degree of management control. Inadequate Integration Between Requirements and Budgeting Processes Hampers Military-to-Civilian Replacements
Many DOD and service personnel managers identified the inadequate integration between the process for determining civilian requirements and the budget process that funds these requirements as a barrier against replacing military personnel with civilians. Even when funds are allocated to replace military personnel in support positions with civilians, the services may not be required to use the funds for that purpose. Conclusions
Although DOD and the military services have general policies requiring them to use civilian personnel where possible, the services currently vary in the extent to which they use thousands of military personnel in support positions that, according to DOD and service officials, could be civilian. Eliminating military positions and replacing them with civilians can save significant personnel costs, since some cost analyses estimate that, during peacetime, each civilian costs about $15,000 per year less than a military person of comparable pay grade. Some Corrective Measures Are Being Taken
Each service has modified some of its regulations to respond to the problems identified during the Persian Gulf War. However, these changes have not yet been fully implemented. They have not fully identified civilian employees or contractor personnel who perform combat essential functions and who might be called to deploy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) guidance and decisionmaking processes for determining when and whether to use civilian or military personnel in support positions, focusing on: (1) DOD and the military services' efforts to replace military personnel in support positions; (2) whether the services have adequately planned for the future use of civilian employees and contractor personnel to support military operations in combat areas; and (3) the actions taken to correct problems concerning civilian deployments to the Persian Gulf War.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although DOD and the services have attempted to convert military positions to civilian positions, the extent of these changes appears limited, since the ratio of military personnel to civilian personnel has not changed significantly; (2) replacing military personnel with civilian employees could reduce military personnel costs and release military members for use in combat-specific duties; (3) some DOD-sponsored studies have determined that civilian employees in peacetime support functions cost the government about $15,000 less per year than military employees in comparable pay grades; (4) service officials are reluctant to replace military personnel with civilian employees because the military is downsizing, they believe they can exert greater control over military personnel, they often do not receive sufficient funds or information to support civilian replacements, and budget allocation and civilian personnel requirement decisions are often made separately; and (5) the services have made efforts to correct some of the problems identified during the Persian Gulf deployment, but they have not identified their future potential wartime requirements for DOD civilian employees or contractor personnel or taken adequate steps to ensure that these personnel remain in the services for future crises. |
gao_GAO-01-776 | gao_GAO-01-776_0 | A business opportunity requires payment of at least $500 for the opportunity to distribute goods and services of the seller with assistance in the form of locations or accounts. The Franchise Rule requires disclosures only to prospective purchasers. In addition to the Franchise Rule, FTC enforces section 5 of the FTC Act, which declares unlawful unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. Much of the debate has centered on the relative bargaining power franchisees have when dealing with their franchisors over various issues, such as the location of new franchise outlets or the termination of franchise relationships without good cause and advance, written notice. FTC’s Complaints and Enforcement Activities Focused Mostly on Business Opportunities
FTC has focused most of its franchise and business opportunity enforcement activities on business opportunity ventures because, according to FTC staff, problems such as fraud and other types of misrepresentation are much more prevalent with business opportunities than with franchises. Statistically Reliable Data on Franchise Relationship Problems Do Not Exist
The extent and nature of franchise relationship problems are unknown because neither FTC, franchise trade associations, nor state regulatory agencies have readily available, statistically reliable data—that is, the data available are not systematically gathered or generalizable—that would indicate the full scope of these problems. Nonetheless, such data might provide valuable insights as to whether a federal statute is needed to generally regulate franchise relationships. Over the past several years, Congress and others have debated the need for a federal statute to regulate franchises and address problems that can arise after the sale of a franchise. Matter for Congressional Consideration
If Congress believes that it needs empirical data before considering franchise relationship legislation, it could commission and fund a study that would (1) design and implement an approach for collecting empirical data on the extent and nature of franchise relationship problems and (2) examine franchisor and franchisee experiences with existing remedies for resolving disputes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Franchises are business arrangements that require payment for the opportunity to sell trademarked goods and services. Business opportunity ventures do not involve a trademark, but require payment for the opportunity to distribute goods or services with assistance in the form of locations or accounts. The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Trade Regulation Rule on Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures (Franchise Rule) requires franchise and business opportunity sellers to disclose financial and other information to prospective purchasers before they pay any money or sign an agreement. In addition, FTC enforces section 5 of the FTC Act, which addresses unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Over the past several years, Congress has debated the need for a federal statute to generally regulate franchises, including issues that arise between franchisors and franchisees after the franchise agreement is signed. Much of the debate centers on the relative bargaining power franchisees have when dealing with their franchisors over various issues, such as the location of new franchised outlets or the termination of franchise relationships without good cause and advance, written notice. This report reviews FTC's enforcement of its Franchise Rule and discusses various franchise relationship issues.
What GAO Found
GAO found that FTC has focused most of its Franchise Rule enforcement resources on business opportunity ventures because, according to FTC staff, problems in this area have been more pervasive than problems with franchises. The extent and nature of franchise relationship problems are unknown because of a lack of readily available, statistically reliable data--that is, the data available are not systematically gathered or generalizable. Absent such data, opinions varied as to the need for a federal statute to regulate franchise relationships. If Congress believes it needs empirical data before considering franchise relationship legislation, it could commission a study that would (1) design and implement an approach for collecting empirical data on the extent and nature of franchise relationship problems and (2) examine franchisor and franchisee experiences with existing remedies for resolving disputes. |
gao_GAO-07-995T | gao_GAO-07-995T_0 | Background
The TAA program was designed to assist workers who have lost their jobs as a result of international trade. The program provides two primary benefits to these workers—training and extended income support. Health coverage benefit. Labor Could Improve Its TAA Program Administration
Labor could improve the way it administers the program in two key areas—the process it uses to allocate training funds and its tracking of program outcomes. Labor’s process for allocating training funds presents two significant challenges to states. First, the amount states receive at the beginning of the fiscal year does not adequately reflect states’ spending the year before or the current demand for training services in the state. Second, Labor distributes a significant amount of funds to most states on the last day of the fiscal year, even to states that have spent virtually none of their current year’s allocation. 1). 2). In our recent report, we recommended that the Secretary of Labor develop procedures to better allocate training funds and ensure that any reserve funds are given to only those states that have spent or obligated a substantial portion of the current fiscal year allocation. In its comments, Labor agreed with our findings and recommendations and noted that it would examine the process for allocating training funds to states. TAA Data Do Not Provide a Complete and Credible Picture of the Program’s Performance
TAA performance data are incomplete and may be inaccurate. States Face Challenges in Providing Services to Workers
States report being challenged by the lack of flexibility to use training funds to provide trade-affected workers with case management services, such as counseling to help them decide whether they need training and what type of training would be most appropriate. In addition, efforts to enroll workers in training are sometimes hampered by the confusing TAA training enrollment deadline that requires workers be enrolled in training within 8 weeks of certification or 16 weeks of layoff to qualify for extended income support. States do not receive TAA program funds for case management and, by law, cannot use training funds for this service. States also reported limitations to using administrative funds to provide case management. As of April 2007, Labor had not yet begun gathering information on the impact of the deadline. Several Factors Limit Participation in the Wage Insurance and Health Coverage Benefits
Several factors, including a short deadline for getting a job and the cost of buying health coverage, may limit participation in two new benefits resulting from the TAA Reform Act of 2002. In our site visits, states reported that the requirement that workers must find a job within 26 weeks to receive the wage insurance benefit was the major factor preventing more workers from taking advantage of the benefit. Furthermore, in our most recent report, we suggested that in order to enable more workers to take advantage of the wage insurance benefit, Congress may wish to consider increasing the length of time workers have to become reemployed and eliminating the requirement that to be certified as eligible for wage insurance, the petitioning workers must have been laid off from a firm where the affected workers lacked easily transferable skills and a significant portion of those workers were aged 50 or over. While cost is one of the most significant factors limiting participation in the health coverage benefit, some states also reported that the health coverage tax credit program can be complicated and difficult to understand for both workers and local case managers. An industry certification approach based on three petitions certified within 180 days would likely increase the number of workers eligible for TAA, but the extent of the increase depends upon the specific criteria that are used. As we identify in our forthcoming report, either approach presents some design and implementation challenges. Concluding Observations
Through our work on the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program since passage of the Reform Act in 2002 we have identified a number of areas where Labor and the Congress should take action. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, administered by the Department of Labor (Labor), is the nation's primary program providing income support, job training, and other benefits to manufacturing workers who lose their jobs as a result of international trade. In fiscal year 2006, Congress appropriated about $900 million for TAA, including about $220 million for training. GAO has conducted a number of studies on the TAA program since the program was last reauthorized in 2002. This testimony draws upon the results of two of those reports, issued in 2006 and 2007, as well as ongoing work, and addresses issues raised and recommendations made regarding (1) Labor's administration of the TAA program, (2) the challenges states face in providing services to trade affected workers, (3) the factors that affect workers' use of the wage insurance and health coverage benefits, and (4) the impact of using industrywide certification approaches on the number of workers potentially eligible for TAA.
What GAO Found
Labor could improve the way it administers the program in two key areas--the process it uses to allocate training funds and its tracking of program outcomes. Labor's process for allocating training funds presents two significant challenges to states. First, the amount states receive at the beginning of the fiscal year does not adequately reflect the current demand for training services in the state. Second, Labor distributes a significant amount of funds to most states on the last day of the fiscal year, even to states that have spent less than 1 percent of the current fiscal year training allocation. Regarding program outcomes, TAA nationwide performance data are incomplete and may be inaccurate. We recommended that Labor develop procedures to better allocate the training funds and improve data. Labor recently noted that it would examine its processes. States face challenges in providing services to workers, including the lack of flexibility to use training funds to provide trade-affected workers with case management services, such as counseling to help them decide whether they need training and which training would be most appropriate. States receive no TAA program funds for case management and must either use their limited administrative funds or seek resources from other programs, such as those funded by the Workforce Investment Act. States also reported that their efforts to enroll workers in training are sometimes hampered by the training enrollment deadline and that workers find the deadline confusing. We have suggested that Congress consider providing states the flexibility to use training funds for case management and simplifying the training enrollment deadline. Few TAA participants take advantage of the wage insurance and health coverage benefits, and several factors limit participation. For example, several states reported that the requirement that workers must find a job within 26 weeks to receive the wage insurance benefit was the major factor preventing more workers from taking advantage of the benefit. Regarding the health coverage benefit, several states told us that high out-of-pocket costs may discourage workers from using the benefit. Furthermore, states also reported that the health coverage benefit can be complicated and difficult to understand. We have suggested that the Congress may wish to consider increasing the length of time workers have to become eligible for wage insurance. In addition, we also recommended that a centralized resource be developed to assist workers with their questions about health coverage. In response, the agency has developed new simplified materials. Finally, an industry certification approach based on three petitions certified within any 180-day period would likely increase the number of workers eligible for TAA, potentially doubling those eligible. The approach also presents some design and implementation challenges. |
gao_NSIAD-97-24 | gao_NSIAD-97-24_0 | U.S. fighter aircraft have the ability to outlast and outperform other foreign-built aircraft, which translates into a significant combat advantage over possible adversaries. To protect national security interests, Defense officials review applications referred by State to determine whether the export would undermine the U.S. lead in hot section technology and, consequently, U.S. air superiority.Defense and State have not approved the export of the most advanced hot section technology for either military or commercial use, although certain exports have been allowed under government-to-government agreements with U.S. allies that restrict transfer beyond the government. This argument reflects the view that all dual-use items should be subject to export control under Commerce’s licensing system because most applications of these items are commercial. Industry Supports the Change in Jurisdiction
Manufacturers of jet engines and communications satellites we talked with support the transfer of the items to the Commerce Control List. Commerce’s and State’s Licensing Systems Differ
State and Commerce implement different laws to control exports of military and dual-use items. State has broad authority to deny a license, and it can deny simply with the explanation that it is against U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. Items Transfer to Commerce Licensing Jurisdiction
In October and November 1996, Commerce and State published changes to their respective regulations transferring licensing jurisdiction for commercial jet engine hot section technology and commercial communications satellites to Commerce. National security controls have been focused on preventing exports to certain destinations. A new “significant item” control will be created for these two items. Although most foreign policy controls define specific and limited policy objectives, the policy objective for this control—consistency with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests—is broadly stated. Implications of Change Are Uncertain
These regulatory and procedural changes are intended to allow Commerce to control and deny, when appropriate, exports of the two items to all destinations. State approved exports of commercial communications satellites with conditions on the safeguard of the satellite and associated technology. According to Commerce and other executive branch officials, the change in jurisdiction is not intended to change U.S. licensing policy—what destinations and end users the United States will approve licenses for—but only the procedures under which licensing decisions will be made. These differences in the underlying basis for decisions create uncertainty as to whether the changed procedures for making licensing decisions will result in changes in licensing policy. It was only after Commerce appealed the Secretary of State’s decision to the President, and the President decided to transfer jurisdiction for both commercial communications satellites and commercial jet engine hot section technology to the Department of Commerce that unanimous support for the transfer of jurisdiction came about. To determine the executive branch’s rationale for the change in licensing jurisdiction, we interviewed officials at Commerce and State. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the implications of changing export licensing jurisdiction for two sensitive dual use items from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce, focusing on: (1) the military sensitivity of the two items; (2) the executive branch's rationale for the change in jurisdiction; (3) the licensing systems that the two departments use to control exports; and (4) proposed changes in Commerce controls for these two items.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the items transferred to Commerce control, commercial jet engine hot section technology and commercial communications satellites, are militarily sensitive items; (2) hot section technology gives U.S. fighter aircraft the ability to outlast and outperform other aircraft, a key element in achieving air superiority; (3) because of the military significance of this technology, State does not allow the export of the most advanced hot section technology for either military or commercial use; (4) commercial communications satellites being transferred to Commerce jurisdiction contain militarily sensitive characteristics; (5) State has approved the export of commercial communications satellites for foreign launch with conditions for safeguarding sensitive technologies for certain destinations such as China; (6) the executive branch's decision to transfer licensing jurisdiction reflects Commerce's position that all hot section technology and communications satellites for commercial use should be under Commerce jurisdiction; (7) transferring jurisdiction also makes U.S. national controls for these items consistent with international trade commitments to control them as dual use items; (8) State has broad authority to deny a license, and it can deny simply with the explanation that it is against U.S. national security or foreign policy interests; (9) jet engine and satellite manufacturers support the change in jurisdiction, viewing the Commerce system as more responsive to the needs of business; (10) the state and Commerce export control systems differ; (11) Commerce controls items to achieve specific national security and foreign policy objectives; (12) national security controls are aimed at preventing items from reaching certain destinations such as China and Russia; (13) foreign policy controls are aimed at achieving specific objectives, including antiterrorism, regional stability, and nonproliferation; (14) in recognition of the military sensitivity of these items, Commerce is implementing new and expanded control procedures; (15) these new control procedures are intended to allow Commerce to control and deny, where appropriate, exports of the two items to all destinations; (16) according to Commerce and other executive branch officials, the change in jurisdiction is not intended to change U.S. licensing policy, but it is intended only to change the procedures under which licensing decisions will be made; and (17) these differences in the underlying basis for decisions create uncertainty as to whether the changed procedures for making licensing decisions will result in changes in licensing policy. |
gao_GAO-03-446 | gao_GAO-03-446_0 | The model emphasizes that successful strategic human capital management requires the integration of human capital approaches with strategies for accomplishing organizational missions and program goals. Such integration allows the agency to ensure that its core processes efficiently and effectively support mission-related outcomes. Selected Agencies Took Actions to Integrate Human Capital Approaches with Organizational Missions
The executive branch agencies we reviewed took a range of actions as part of efforts to integrate human capital approaches with strategies for achieving organizational missions. In addition, the agency leaders and human capital leaders jointly have employed human capital professionals and agency line managers to share the accountability for successfully integrating human capital approaches into the planning and decision making of the agencies. As an advocate for human capital initiatives, council members are to ensure that activities in the agency reflect the human capital strategic plan. Human Capital Leaders Have Taken Actions to Transform Human Capital Organizations
High-performing organizations treat strategic human capital management as fundamental to effective overall management. The strategic consultant component serves as a strategic partner, change agent, and consultant to agency managers. The occupation is in transition from valuing narrowly focused specialists to requiring generalists, who have all the skills necessary to play an active role in helping to determine the overall strategic direction of the organization. Agency leaders included human capital leaders in key agency strategic planning and decision making. Working together, agency leaders and human capital leaders have employed human capital professionals and agency line managers to share accountability for successfully integrating strategic human capital considerations into agency planning and decision making. We asked these experts to identify federal agencies that they believed had taken actions to improve the integration of their strategic human capital management functions. We selected six agencies—the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the General Services Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Geological Survey—to identify examples of human capital integration actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Successful strategic human capital management requires the integration of human capital approaches with strategies for accomplishing organizational missions and program goals. Such integration allows the agency to ensure that its core processes efficiently and effectively support mission-related outcomes. Based on the recommendations of various human capital experts, GAO identified six executive branch agencies that had taken key actions to integrate their human capital approaches with their strategic planning and decision making. The agencies were the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the General Services Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Geological Survey. These key actions may prove helpful to other agencies as they seek to ensure that their human capital approaches are aligned with their program goals.
What GAO Found
The executive branch agencies GAO reviewed have taken key actions to integrate their human capital approaches with their strategies for accomplishing organizational missions and to shift the focus of their human capital office from primarily compliance activities to consulting activities. Agency leaders included human capital leaders in key agency strategic planning and decision making and, as a result, the agencies engaged the human capital organization as a strategic partner in achieving desired outcomes relating to the agency's mission. Human capital leaders took actions to transform the agencies' human capital organizations by establishing clear human capital strategic visions, restructuring their organizations, and improving the use of technology to free organizational resources. Human capital leaders also promoted a transition to a larger strategic role for human capital professionals with their focus being more on consulting rather than compliance activities. The human capital profession is in transition from valuing narrowly focused specialists to requiring generalists, who have all the skills necessary to play an active role in helping to determine the overall strategic direction of the organization. Jointly, agency leaders and human capital leaders are having human capital professionals and agency line managers share the accountability for successfully integrating strategic human capital considerations into agency strategic planning and decision making. |
gao_GAO-16-314T | gao_GAO-16-314T_0 | Table 1 provides examples of COIs and KPPs for the NSC. Two of those key test events are: Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E): This event is meant to gather the data necessary to resolve COIs, determine an asset’s operational effectiveness and suitability, and, according to Coast Guard acquisition guidance, occur prior to a full-rate production decision. While Initial Operational Testing Revealed Some Major Deficiencies, the NSC Met Most of Its Key Performance Parameters
As we reported in January 2016, IOT&E took place about 2 years later than planned and after 7 of the 8 planned NSCs were under contract, with 3 operational. Five of the 10 major deficiencies pertained to the NSC’s weapon systems and cutter boats. In January 2016 we recommended, and the Coast Guard concurred, that the NSC’s KPPs for the operation of the cutter boats should be clarified. Following IOT&E, DHS held an acquisition review board (ARB) to discuss the outcome of IOT&E, which resulted in DHS approving the NSC program for full rate production in October 2014. The resulting acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) from October 2014 directed the Coast Guard to conduct FOT&E and complete three action items: (1) complete testing of the cybersecurity COI; (2) verify the correction of all major deficiencies, including the unmet KPPs; and (3) assess the NSC’s cyber-security capabilities. Table 4 shows the Coast Guard’s plans, as we reported in January 2016, for resolving the major deficiencies. As we also found in January 2016, while the Coast Guard has plans to conduct FOT&E for the NSC, it will have accepted the delivery of at least the 6th NSC before the testing is complete, meaning that the Coast Guard will be operating 6 NSCs before it has resolved issues from IOT&E and knows the cutter’s full capabilities. Further, DHS’s directive on test and evaluation does not include any direction or guidance on FOT&E. Without updated guidance that establishes timeframes and responsibilities for completing all testing, the Coast Guard risks encountering the same scenario with the OPC—and other future DHS assets—that it has experienced with the NSC. That is, the Coast Guard could continue to buy assets without having demonstrated their full capabilities in testing. Problems Discovered Outside of IOT&E Are Preventing the Coast Guard from Operating Fully Capable NSCs
As we reported in January 2016, by the time of the spring 2014 IOT&E event, the Coast Guard had nearly four years of experience operating the NSCs. The Coast Guard has encountered several issues that require major retrofits and design changes on the NSC to correct problems encountered during operations and discovered during test events outside of IOT&E. In order to minimize cost increases for some of these changes, the Coast Guard plans to maintain the original equipment design for the production of the remaining NSCs and plans to conduct retrofits after accepting delivery of the cutters. In some instances, replacement equipment is still in the prototype phase. Thus, we recommended, and DHS agreed, to provide oversight and specify any further actions the NSC program should take at the conclusion of the studies related to the propulsion systems. Observations on the FRC and OPC Acquisitions
As the Coast Guard has progressed in its acquisition of cutters, it has matured its acquisition processes, which has been demonstrated in its approach with the FRC and OPC programs. The process to date reflects some lessons learned from the NSC acquisition, for example in the areas of competition and the schedule for IOT&E. Furthermore, as the $12 billion OPC program moves forward, it may have opportunities to further incorporate some best practices that we have highlighted in our past work on shipbuilding. In May 2009, we reported on best practices that commercial shipbuilders use to ensure that ships are delivered on time and within budget. We found that before a contract is signed, a full understanding of the effort needed to design and construct the ship is reached, enabling commercial buyers and shipbuilders to sign a contract that fixes the price, delivery date, and ship performance parameters. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard's flagship, 418-foot NSC was first commissioned in 2008. It completed initial testing, an event designed to test all critical systems that are necessary for successful operations, in the spring of 2014, after 7 of the 8 planned cutters were already under contract and 3 ships were operational. GAO has been reviewing the NSC as part of its broader Coast Guard acquisition reviews since 2001.
This statement is primarily based on GAO's January 2016 report on the NSC's initial testing event ( GAO-16-148 ), and addresses issues related to (1) the results of the NSC's initial test event, (2) the Coast Guard's plans for follow-on testing, and (3) the performance of the NSC during operations. The statement also includes GAO's observations on the Coast Guard's acquisition approach for its Fast Response Cutter and Offshore Patrol Cutter programs. GAO reviewed these two programs in June 2014 ( GAO-14-450 ) and April 2015 ( GAO-15-171SP ) and also conducted selected updates on their acquisition status in January 2016. The statement also draws on GAO's prior work on commercial shipbuilding best practices.
What GAO Found
In January 2016, GAO reported that the Navy's Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force conducted the initial testing on the National Security Cutter (NSC) in spring 2014, when three of the cutters were already operational. The Navy deemed the NSC operationally effective and suitable. At the same time however, the testing revealed some major deficiencies. Two metrics used to assess an asset in testing are key performance parameters (KPP) and critical operational issues (COI). The NSC met 18 of 19 COIs and 12 of its 19 KPPs. Navy testers found 10 major deficiencies that varied in terms of their effect on the NSC program, including 4 deficiencies related to the NSC's weapon systems and 1 for its cutter boats. The Coast Guard plans to correct most of the NSC's major deficiencies.
Also, as GAO reported, following initial testing, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acquisition review board approved the NSC program for full rate production in October 2014. The Coast Guard plans to begin follow-on testing in fall 2016. DHS acquisition guidance does not specify the timing of follow-on testing for its programs or any actions program offices should take in response to the findings of follow-on testing. As a result, future DHS acquisitions risk fielding assets without knowing the full capabilities, as was the case with the NSC.
GAO also found that problems discovered outside of testing are preventing the Coast Guard from operating fully capable NSCs. By the time of initial testing, the Coast Guard had nearly 4 years' experience operating NSCs and has encountered issues that require retrofits. In order to minimize cost increases for some changes, the Coast Guard plans to maintain the original equipment for the production of the remaining NSCs and conduct retrofits after accepting delivery. In some instances, replacement equipment is still in the prototype phase. The identified problems will continue to affect the NSC until retrofits are implemented.
GAO has observed, based on prior work reviewing the Coast Guard's ongoing Fast Response Cutter program and plans for its upcoming Offshore Patrol Cutter program, that the Coast Guard has matured its acquisition process. The process to date reflects some lessons learned from the NSC acquisition, for example in the areas of competition and the schedule for initial testing. Furthermore, as the $12 billion Offshore Patrol Cutter program moves forward, it may have opportunities to further incorporate some best practices that GAO has highlighted in May 2009 ( GAO-09-322 ) and March 2013 ( GAO-13-325 ) on other shipbuilding work. For example, before a contract is signed, best practices call for a full understanding of the effort needed to design and construct the ship to be reached, enabling commercial buyers and shipbuilders to sign a contract that fixes the price, delivery date, and ship performance parameters.
What GAO Recommends
In January 2016 ( GAO-16-148 ), GAO recommended that DHS take several actions to strengthen oversight of test and evaluation of major assets. GAO also recommended that the Coast Guard direct the NSC program to clarify the key performance parameters for cutter boat operations. DHS and the Coast Guard concurred with all of these recommendations. |
gao_GGD-95-9 | gao_GGD-95-9_0 | Because these preferences are applied only to developing countries, however, GSP is inconsistent with article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
At the request of Senators Harris Wofford and Byron Dorgan and Representatives Steve Gunderson, William Hughes, Collin Peterson, and David Obey, we analyzed (1) benefits provided to beneficiary developing countries, (2) limitations on GSP imports, (3) administration of the program for adding or removing products from GSP coverage, and (4) administration of program provisions requiring that countries follow certain intellectual property and worker rights practices. U.S. import duties forgone on GSP imports were almost $900 million in 1992. These imports received GSP duty-free entry on $3.7 billion in shipments. Alternative Duty Preference Options That Complement GSP Benefits
Other duty preference options exist for GSP beneficiaries that replace some duty-free benefits that could have been realized under the GSP Program: many items that are eligible under the GSP Program instead receive tariff preferences through alternative means. Only a few countries have been graduated for specific products. This type of exclusion is referred to as a competitive need limit. Administrative Process for Product Cases
The GSP Program has a generally well-structured administrative process for consideration of petitions to add or remove products from GSP coverage. 5). GSP’s graduation policy considers: (1)the BDC’s developmental level; (2)the BDC’s competitive position in the product concerned; (3)the BDC’s practices relating to trade, investment, and worker rights; and (4)the overall economic interests of the United States, including the effect continued GSP treatment would have on the relevant U.S. producers, workers, and consumers. Most GSP benefits go to the relatively small number of more advanced or larger developing countries that can better meet U.S. market demands. Adding new provisions would further reduce the leverage to achieve the objectives of existing provisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effectiveness of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences Program (GSP), focusing on: (1) the benefits provided to beneficiary developing countries (BDC); (2) the limitations on GSP imports; (3) how products are removed from or added to GSP coverage; and (4) whether program provisions requiring that countries follow certain intellectual property and worker rights practices are enforced.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) only a few of the more advanced or larger developing countries receive GSP benefits; (2) although imports from BDC have increased annually, overall imports from several GSP countries have decreased because of their economic graduation; (3) new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade tariff reductions have reduced the value of GSP duty-free benefits and U.S. leverage to demand compliance with GSP requirements; (4) BDC believe that the GSP program has helped their economic development; (5) in 1992, GSP benefits totalled $16.7 billion and the United States lost nearly $900 million in foregone duties; (6) over the last few years, Mexico has received the most GSP benefits; (7) several GSP program provisions limit duty-free entry in specific cases; (8) administrative exclusions under GSP should diminish, since Mexico has graduated from the GSP program and competitive need limit exclusions have been increasing for other beneficiary countries; (9) although the administrative process for considering petitions to add or remove products from GSP coverage is generally effective and well-structured, opportunities exist to improve program administration through better information dissemination and strengthened product petition acceptance requirements; and (10) adding new provisions to strengthen intellectual property and worker rights during program renewal may place too many conditions on beneficiary countries for their continued program participation. |
gao_GAO-09-772T | gao_GAO-09-772T_0 | The converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring. The restructuring also led agency executives to mitigate potential data gaps by deciding to use a planned demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite, as an operational satellite providing climate and weather data. However, problems with two critical sensors continue to drive the program’s cost and schedule. As a result, those other activities now face cost increases and schedule delays. Program officials reported that they plan to revise the program’s cost estimate over the next few weeks and to submit it for executive-level approval by the end of June 2009. Although the program’s approved cost and schedule baseline is not achievable and the polar satellite constellation is at risk, the Executive Committee has not yet made a decision on how to proceed with the program. Executive Committee Has Not Effectively Fulfilled Its Responsibilities
While the NPOESS Executive Committee has made improvements over the last several years in response to prior recommendations, it has not effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the membership and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently oversee and direct the NPOESS program. Until these shortfalls are addressed, the Committee is unable to effectively oversee the NPOESS program—and important issues involving cost growth, schedule delays, and satellite continuity will likely remain unresolved. To address DOD’s requirement, the NPOESS Program Executive Officer sponsored two successive alternative management studies; however, neither of the studies identified a viable alternative to the existing satellite integrator. The Program Executive Officer plans to conduct a final assessment of alternatives prior to the June 2010 decision on whether to exercise the option to have the current system integrator produce the next two NPOESS satellites. In addition, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to take the following five actions: (1) establish a realistic time frame for revising the program’s cost and schedule baselines; (2) develop plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in satellite continuity; (3) track the Committee’s action items from inception to closure; (4) improve the Committee’s ability to achieve successful outcomes by identifying the desired outcome associated with each of the Committee actions, as well as time frames and responsible parties, when new action items are established; and (5) improve the Committee’s efficiency by establishing time frames for escalating risks to the Committee for action so that they do not linger unresolved at the program executive level. Costs are now expected to grow by as much as $1 billion over the prior life cycle cost estimate of $13.95 billion, and problems in delivering key sensors have led to delays in launching NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites— by a year or more for NPP and the first NPOESS satellite. Specifically, if any planned satellites fail on launch or in orbit, there would be a gap in satellite data until the next NPOESS satellite is launched and operational—a gap that could last for 3 to 5 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)--a tri-agency acquisition managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and global climate monitoring. Since its inception, NPOESS has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. As the often-delayed launch of its demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project--NPP) draws closer, these problems continue. GAO was asked to summarize its report being released today that (1) identifies the status and risks of key program components, (2) assesses the NPOESS Executive Committee's ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluates efforts to identify an alternative system integrator for later NPOESS satellites.
What GAO Found
The NPOESS program's approved cost and schedule baseline is not achievable and problems with two critical sensors continue to drive the program's cost and schedule. Costs are expected to grow by about $1 billion from the current $13.95 billion cost estimate, and the schedules for NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites are expected to be delayed by 7, 14, and 5 months, respectively. These delays endanger the continuity of weather and climate satellite data because there will not be a satellite available as a backup should a satellite fail on launch or in orbit--loss of a Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellite, an NPOESS satellite, or NPP could result in a 3 to 5 year gap in data continuity. Program officials reported that they are assessing alternatives for mitigating risks, and that they plan to propose a new cost and schedule baseline by the end of June 2009. However, the Executive Committee does not have an estimate for when it will make critical decisions on cost, schedule, and risk mitigation. While the NPOESS Executive Committee has made improvements over the last several years in response to prior recommendations, it has not effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the membership and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently oversee and direct the NPOESS program. Until its shortfalls are addressed, the Committee will be unable to effectively oversee the NPOESS program--and important issues involving cost growth, schedule delays, and satellite continuity will likely remain unresolved. The NPOESS program has conducted two successive studies of alternatives to using the existing system integrator for the last two NPOESS satellites, but neither identified a viable alternative to the current contractor. Program officials plan to conduct a final study prior to the June 2010 decision on whether to proceed with the existing prime contractor. |
gao_GAO-05-12 | gao_GAO-05-12_0 | OMB and Agencies Have Made Progress Implementing Major Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002
Overall, OMB and federal agencies have made progress implementing Titles I and II of the E-Gov Act. OMB and designated federal agencies are taking actions to implement the provisions of the act in most cases; however, the act’s requirements have not always been fully addressed. Progress in Implementing Provisions with Statutory Deadlines
In most cases, OMB and designated federal agencies have taken responsive action to address the act’s requirements with statutory deadlines, although these have not always been completed within stipulated time frames. For example, OMB established the Interagency Committee on Government Information in June 2003, within the deadline prescribed by the act. The committee is to develop recommendations on the categorization of government information and public access to electronic information. In one case, OMB has not taken fully responsive action to address the requirements of the act. Progress in Implementing Provisions without Statutory Deadlines
As with the provisions specifying deadlines, in most cases where deadlines are not specified, OMB and federal agencies have either fully implemented the provisions or demonstrated positive action toward implementation. For example, in May 2003, the E-Gov Administrator issued a memorandum detailing procedures for requesting funds from the E-Government Fund, although the act did not specify a deadline for this action. In other cases, OMB has either taken actions that are related to the act’s provisions but do not fully address them, or it has not yet made key decisions that would allow actions to take place. Specifically, OMB has not ensured that a study on using IT to enhance crisis preparedness and response has been conducted that addresses the content specified by the act, established a required program to encourage contractor innovation and excellence in facilitating the development and enhancement of electronic government services and processes, or ensured the development and maintenance of a required repository and Web site of information about research and development funded by the federal government. Until these issues are addressed, the government is at risk of not fully achieving the objective of the E-Government Act to promote better use of the Internet and other information technologies to improve government services to its citizens, internal government operations, and opportunities for citizen participation in government. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure the successful implementation of the E-Government Act and its goal of promoting better use of the Internet and other information technologies to improve government services to citizens, internal government operations, and opportunities for citizen participation in government, we recommend that the Director, OMB, direct the Administrator of the Office of E-Government to carry out the following three actions: ensure that the report to Congress regarding the study on enhancement of crisis response required under section 214 addresses the content specified by the act; establish and promote a governmentwide program, as prescribed by 44 U.S.C. For several sections, the act requires specific actions, such as the initiation of pilot projects, establishment of interagency workgroups or committees, development and issuance of guidance/policies, conduct of a study, or issuance of reports. We analyzed relevant documentation, including OMB’s fiscal year 2003 report to Congress on implementation status of the E-Gov Act. The PRA established the OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for governmentwide oversight and stated that the Administrator of OIRA should “serve as principal adviser to the Director on Federal information resources management policy.” Under the PRA IRM umbrella, OIRA is responsible for overseeing information collection and the control of paperwork, including review of agency information collection proposals; statistical policy and coordination; records management, including oversight of compliance with the privacy, including oversight of compliance with the Privacy Act; information security, including oversight of compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act; information disclosure, including oversight of compliance with the Freedom of Information Act; and information technology, including oversight of the Clinger-Cohen Act and promoting the use of information technology “to improve the productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of Federal programs, including through dissemination of public information and the reduction of information collection burdens on the public.”
The E-Government Act of 2002 added to OMB’s statutory PRA duties with requirements to promote “electronic government,” defined as government use of Web-based Internet applications and other information technologies to enhance access to and delivery of government information and services and to improve government operations. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other federal agencies likewise have a variety of activities under way that address these provisions. Disparities in Access to the Internet: Title II, Section 215
Section 215 of the E-Government Act requires the GSA Administrator to contract with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study on disparities in Internet access for online government services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The E-Government Act (E-Gov Act) of 2002 was enacted with the general purpose of promoting better use of the Internet and other information technologies to improve government services for citizens, internal government operations, and opportunities for citizen participation in government. Among other things, the act specifically requires the establishment of the Office of Electronic Government within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to oversee implementation of the act's provisions and mandates a number of specific actions, such as the establishment of interagency committees, completion of several studies, submission of reports with recommendations, issuance of a variety of guidance documents, establishment of new policies, and initiation of pilot projects. Further, the act requires federal agencies to take a number of actions, such as conducting privacy impact assessments, providing public access to agency information, and allowing for electronic access to rulemaking proceedings. OMB has linked several of the act's provisions to ongoing e-government initiatives that it has sponsored. While some deadlines specified in the act have passed, many required actions do not have statutory deadlines or have deadlines that have not yet passed. This report responds to a Congressional request that we review the implementation status of major provisions from Titles I and II of the E-Gov Act.
What GAO Found
In most cases, OMB and federal agencies have taken positive steps toward implementing the provisions of Titles I and II of the E-Gov Act. For example, OMB established the Office of E-Government, designated its Assistant Director for Information Technology (IT) and E-Government as the office's Administrator in April 2003, and published guidance to federal agencies on implementing the act in August 2003. In most cases, OMB and federal agencies have taken action to address the act's requirements within stipulated time frames. For example, OMB established the Interagency Committee on Government Information in June 2003, within the deadline prescribed by the act. The committee is to develop recommendations on the categorization of government information and public access to electronic information. Even when deadlines have not yet passed, in all but one case OMB and agencies have taken action to implement the act. For example, federal courts have established informational Web sites in advance of the April 2005 deadline specified by the act, and court officials are taking steps to ensure that the Web sites fully meet the criteria stipulated by the act. Similarly, in most cases where deadlines are not specified, OMB and federal agencies have either fully implemented the provisions or demonstrated positive action toward implementation. For example, in May 2003, the E-Government Administrator issued a memorandum detailing procedures for requesting funds from the E-Government Fund, although the act did not specify a deadline for this action. Although the government has made progress in implementing the act, the act's requirements have not always been fully addressed. Specifically, OMB has not ensured that a study on using IT to enhance crisis preparedness and response has been conducted that addresses the content specified by the act, established a required program to encourage contractor innovation and excellence in facilitating the development and enhancement of electronic government services and processes, or ensured the development and maintenance of a required repository and Web site of information about research and development funded by the federal government. Further, GSA has not contracted with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a required study on disparities in Internet access for online government services. In the first three cases, OMB has either taken actions that are related to the act's provisions but do not fully address them (in the first and second cases) or has not yet made key decisions that would allow actions to take place (in the third case). In the last case, GSA is seeking funding for the required study in fiscal year 2006. Until these issues are addressed, the government may be at risk of not fully achieving the objective of the E-Government Act to promote better use of the Internet and other information technologies to improve government services and enhance opportunities for citizen participation in government. |
gao_GAO-06-515 | gao_GAO-06-515_0 | Additionally, FHA insures 99 percent of the unpaid principal balance plus accrued interest. HUD’s Decentralized Management Provides Field Offices Flexibility, but Varying Awareness of Underwriting and Monitoring Practices and Concerns Over Insufficient Staff Expertise Increase Program’s Potential Risks
While the decentralization of the program allows field offices some flexibility in their specific practices, the results of our visits to five field offices revealed differences in the extent to which field office staff were aware of current program requirements. Further, while individual offices had developed useful practices for implementing the program’s loan underwriting and monitoring requirements, they lack a mechanism for systematically sharing practices with other offices. We also found that field office officials were concerned about adequate current or future levels of staff expertise—a critical factor in avoiding unwarranted risk in the Section 232 program, in that health care facility loans are generally more complicated and require specialized expertise compared with loans insured under HUD’s other multifamily programs. FHA’s Coordination with States’ Oversight of Quality of Care for Section 232 Residential Care Facilities Is Limited
FHA requires field office officials, when processing applications for Section 232 mortgage insurance from existing state-licensed facilities to review the most recent annual state-administered inspection report for the facilities, but does not require the continued monitoring of annual inspection reports for state-licensed facilities once it has insured them. Four of the five HUD field offices we visited do not routinely collect annual inspection reports for the insured facilities they oversee. However, program and industry trends show sources of potential risks that could affect the future performance of the Section 232 portfolio and the GI/SRI Fund. The Section 232 program is concentrated in several large markets and in loans made by relatively few lenders. 5). Further, the model does not fully capture the effects on existing loans to changes in market interest rates, and it uses proxy data that are not comparable to the loans in the Section 232 program. HUD Uses a Model to Estimate Credit Subsidy Costs
Federal law requires HUD to estimate a credit subsidy for its loan guarantees. HUD estimates a credit subsidy for each loan cohort. HUD’s cash flow model does not explicitly consider differences in loan performance between types of facilities, such as nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and board and care facilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that field offices are aware of and implement current requirements and policies for the Section 232 Mortgage Insurance for Residential Care Facilities program, and reduce risk to the GI/SRI Fund, we recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development direct the FHA Commissioner to take the following actions: Revise the “Multifamily Asset Management and Project Servicing Handbook” in a timely manner to include monitoring requirements specific to Section 232 properties; Establish a process for systematically sharing loan underwriting and monitoring practices among field offices involved with the Section 232 program; Assure, as part of the department’s strategic human capital management efforts, sufficient levels of staff with appropriate training and expertise for Section 232 loans; Incorporate a review of annual inspection reports for insured Section 232 facilities that are subject to federal or state inspections, even in the absence of a revised regulatory agreement; and Complete and implement the revised regulatory agreements in a timely manner. Factors potentially affecting prepayments. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) overall management of the program, including loan underwriting and monitoring; (2) the extent to which HUD’s oversight of insured health care facilities is coordinated with the states’ oversight of the quality of care provided by facilities; and (3) the financial implications of the program to the General Insurance/Special Risk Insurance (GI/SRI) Fund, including risk posed by program and market trends; and (4) how HUD estimates the annual credit subsidy for the program, including the factors and assumptions used. However, the proposed revisions have been awaiting approval since August 2, 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through its Section 232 program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures approximately $12.5 billion in mortgages for residential care facilities. In response to a requirement in the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Conference Report and a congressional request, GAO examined (1) HUD's management of the program, including loan underwriting and monitoring; (2) the extent to which HUD's oversight of insured facilities is coordinated with the states' oversight of quality of care; (3) the financial risks the program poses to HUD's General Insurance/Special Risk Insurance (GI/SRI) Fund; and (4) how HUD estimates the annual credit subsidy cost for the program.
What GAO Found
While HUD's decentralized program management allows its 51 field offices flexibility in their specific practices, GAO found differences in the extent to which staff in the five field offices it visited were aware of current program requirements. For example, four offices were unaware of required addendums to the programs' standard regulatory agreement. Further, while individual offices had developed useful practices for loan underwriting and monitoring, they lacked a mechanism for systematically sharing such practices with other offices. Also, field office officials were concerned about adequate current or future levels of staff expertise--a critical factor in managing program risk in that health care facility loans are complicated and require specialized knowledge and expertise. FHA requires a review of the most recent annual state-administered inspection report for state-licensed facilities applying for program insurance, and recommends, but does not require, continued monitoring of such reports for facilities once it has insured them. Four of the five HUD field offices GAO visited do not routinely collect annual inspection reports for their insured facilities. While the reports are but one of several monitoring tools, they provide potential indicators of future financial risk. HUD has proposed revising its standard regulatory agreements to require insured facility owners or operators to submit annual inspection reports and to report notices of violations. However, the proposed revisions have been awaiting approval since August 2004, and the implementation date is uncertain. The Section 232 program accounts for only about 16 percent of the GI/SRI Fund's total unpaid principal balance, but program and industry trends pose potential risks to the Section 232 program and to the GI/SRI Fund. For example, in recent years the program has insured increasing numbers of assisted living facility loans and refinancing loans, for which there are limited data available to assess long-term performance. Other potential risk factors include increasing prepayments (full repayment before loan maturity) and loan concentration in several large markets and among relatively few lenders. Projected shifts in demand for residential care facilities could affect currently insured facilities and the overall market for the types of facilities that HUD insures under the program. To estimate the program subsidy cost, HUD uses a model to project cash flows for each loan cohort (the loans originated in a given fiscal year) over its entire life. HUD's model does not explicitly or fully consider certain factors, such as loan prepayment penalties, interest rate changes, or differences in loans to different types of facilities, and uses some proxy data that is not comparable to Section 232 loans. The model's exclusion of potentially relevant factors and it use of this proxy data could affect the reliability of HUD's credit subsidy estimates. |
gao_GAO-01-852T | gao_GAO-01-852T_0 | Statutory Rulemaking Requirements
Some of the statutory rulemaking requirements that Congress has enacted over the years apply to all agencies, but some of the requirements are applicable only to certain agencies. Some of these requirements have been in place for more than 50 years, but most have been implemented within the past 20 years or so. Under the RFA, independent and non-independent regulatory agencies must prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis at the time proposed rules are issued unless the head of the issuing agency determines that the proposed rule would not have a “significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities.” The regulatory flexibility analysis must include a description of, among other things, (1) the reasons why the regulatory action is being considered; (2) the small entities to which the proposed rule will apply and, where feasible, an estimate of their number; (3) the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements of the proposed rule, and (4) any significant alternatives to the proposed rule that accomplish the statutory objectives and minimize any significant economic impact on small entities. The statute defined a “federal mandate” as not including conditions imposed as part of a voluntary federal program or as a condition of federal assistance. For example, we concluded that the Occupational Safety and Health Act gave OSHA no discretion in whether to hold companies (rather than individual employees) responsible for health and safety violations. Under the CRA, before a final rule can become effective it must be filed with Congress and GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the procedural and analytical rulemaking requirements applicable to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and other federal regulatory agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the rulemaking requirements that have been placed on OSHA and other agencies are voluminous and require a wide range of procedural, consultative, and analytical actions on the part of the agencies. Federal agencies sometimes take years to develop final rules, and the requirements are not as effective as expected or as they could be. This lack of effectiveness can be traced to how the requirements have been implemented and the requirements themselves. |
gao_GAO-02-42 | gao_GAO-02-42_0 | Foreign Markets for U.S. Products and Services
State reported it achieved performance targets for all seven indicators outlined in the performance plan for 2000. Conclusions
Weaknesses in State’s fiscal year 2000 performance report made it difficult to determine the department’s progress toward achieving the key outcomes. These weaknesses are rooted in performance goals and indicators established in its performance plan for 2000, which was prepared in 1998 and which we have criticized in a prior report. State has taken a major step toward implementing GPRA requirements by producing a fiscal year 2002 plan that is superior to earlier efforts. In its future performance report, State will need to focus its efforts on reporting on all indicators in the plan and, if targets are not achieved, providing clear explanations of the reasons why and what actions State plans to achieve the targets in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of State's fiscal year 2000 performance report and its fiscal year 2002 performance plan.
What GAO Found
Weaknesses in State's fiscal year 2000 performance report made it difficult to determine the department's progress toward achieving such key outcomes as eliminating the threat from weapons of mass destruction and expanding foreign markets for U.S. products and services. These weaknesses are rooted in performance goals and indicators established in State's performance plan for 2000, which GAO criticized in an earlier report. State has taken a major step toward implementing Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requirements by producing a fiscal year 2002 plan that is superior to earlier efforts. State will need to focus on reporting on all indicators in the plan and, if targets are not achieved, clearly explain why and what actions it plans to achieve the targets in the future. |
gao_GAO-15-85 | gao_GAO-15-85_0 | Bulk drug substances—usually raw powders—are generally not approved by FDA for marketing in the United States. Medicare, Medicaid, and Private Health Insurers Have Varying Payment Practices for Compounded Drugs, and Medicare Part B Payment Policy Is Unclear
For Compounded Drugs Dispensed in Pharmacy Settings, Medicare, Medicaid, and Private Health Insurers Have Varying Payment Practices
Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurer payment practices for compounded drugs dispensed in pharmacy settings allow for the payment of FDA-approved products but vary in whether they allow payment for bulk drug substances in these compounds. Officials from four of the five state Medicaid programs and two insurers that offer Medicaid managed care plans we spoke with told us that they generally do not pay for bulk drug substances used to make compounded drugs under the prescription drug benefit. As a result, most of these public programs and private health insurers pay for compounded drugs, including both the FDA- approved products and bulk drug substances that comprise these drugs, because they may be unable to identify whether compounded drugs were administered and what individual ingredients were used to make the compounded drugs. Public programs and private health insurers may conduct further reviews of outpatient claims to determine whether the drug billed under a nonspecific HCPCS code is a compounded drug and to identify its ingredients in order to make payment decisions. In addition, while CMS has a national policy for payment of compounded drugs under Medicare Part B, the agency does not have any policies regarding federal Medicaid payments for compounded drugs administered in outpatient settings and likely provides some federal matching dollars to states to pay for compounded drugs, including those that contain bulk drug substances.develop their own payment policies for these drugs. CMS, the five state Medicaid programs, and four of the five insurers provided us with information on whether they review outpatient claims, including requesting and reviewing additional documentation, with drugs billed under the nonspecific code. The policy also indicates that payment is available for compounded drugs; however, it does not stipulate whether payment is available for ingredients in compounded drugs that are FDA-approved products only or whether it is also available for those ingredients that are bulk drug substances that have not been As noted above, most of the Part B contractors do approved by FDA.not require providers to submit NDCs for compounded drug ingredients to determine whether these ingredients are FDA-approved products or bulk drug substances and, therefore, may be paying for ingredients that are not FDA-approved. Payment Practices, among Other Factors, May Affect the Use of Compounded Drugs
Officials from the public programs and private health insurers we spoke with generally agreed that payment practices for compounded drugs may affect the use of these drugs. Officials from CMS, one state Medicaid program, three of the five insurers, the two Part D-only sponsors, and the three PBMs with whom we spoke stated that payment practices for compounded drugs did affect their use, specifically when public programs and private health insurers excluded payments for bulk drug substances in retail pharmacy settings. The experiences of the Part D sponsor and the two insurers suggest that Part D payment practices may affect the use of compounded drugs. Further, officials from one of the three insurers that pay for ingredients that are FDA-approved products only and do not pay for bulk drug substances in their private health plans in the commercial market told us that these practices have resulted in a decrease in compounded drug claims and payments. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that Medicare Part B is able to appropriately apply its payment policy for compounded drugs, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to clarify the Medicare Part B payment policy for compounded drugs and, as necessary, align payment practices with the policy. For example, CMS should consider updating the Medicare Part B payment policy to either explicitly allow or restrict payment for compounded drugs containing bulk drug substances and, as appropriate, develop a mechanism to indicate on Medicare Part B claims both whether a beneficiary received a compounded drug and the drug’s individual ingredients in order to properly apply this policy and determine payment. We also note that neither bulk drug substances nor compounded drugs, regardless of their ingredients, are generally approved by FDA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drug compounding is a process whereby a pharmacist mixes or alters ingredients to create a drug tailored to the medical needs of an individual patient. Compounded drugs make up 1 to 3 percent of the $300 billion domestic prescription drug market. Compounded drugs and some of their ingredients are not approved by FDA. Members of Congress have questioned whether federal health care programs' payment practices create incentives for providers to prescribe these drugs.
GAO was asked to examine public programs' and private health insurers' payment practices for compounded drugs. GAO examined (1) Medicare's, Medicaid's, and private health insurers' payment practices for compounded drugs and (2) the extent to which these payment practices for compounded drugs affect their use. GAO reviewed the payment policies of CMS, the five largest state Medicaid programs, five of the largest insurers that offer both Medicare and Medicaid managed care plans as well as private plans, and the two largest Medicare Part D-only sponsors. GAO also interviewed officials from these entities and from provider associations.
What GAO Found
Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurers have varying payment practices for compounded drugs, depending upon whether compounded drugs and their ingredients can be identified on health insurance claims, and Medicare's Part B payment policy for these drugs is unclear.
For drugs dispensed in pharmacy settings, claims contain sufficient information for public programs and private insurers to identify compounded drugs and their ingredients. These programs and plans use claims information to determine whether compounded drug ingredients are products approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or are bulk drug substances—usually raw powders—that are generally not approved by FDA. Two of the five insurers and one of the two Medicare Part D-only sponsors we spoke with generally do not pay for these substances in their Medicare Part D plans. Four of the five state Medicaid programs and three of the five insurers offering private health plans we spoke with generally do not pay for ingredients that are bulk drug substances in their respective plans.
For drugs administered in outpatient physician office settings, claims lack information to identify compounded drugs because there are no specific billing codes for most of these drugs. Therefore, Medicare, most state Medicaid programs, and most private health insurers pay for these compounded drugs. Some public programs and private health insurers conduct further claims reviews for compounded drugs billed under nonspecific codes, including obtaining information that can be used to determine FDA-approval status of compounded drug ingredients, and make payment decisions based on this information.
Additionally, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsible for administering the Medicare program—has a national payment policy for compounded drugs under Medicare Part B, but this policy is unclear. The policy generally states that drugs must be FDA-approved to be paid for under Medicare. Payment may be available for compounded drugs, but the policy does not stipulate whether payment is available for ingredients that are bulk drug substances, which are generally not FDA-approved. CMS contractors who process Part B claims do not collect information on the FDA-approval status of drug ingredients and, therefore, may be paying for ingredients that are not FDA-approved products. Thus, it is uncertain whether Medicare payments are inconsistent with Part B policy.
Payment practices of public programs and private health insurers may affect the use of compounded drugs when specific payment exclusions exist, such as those for bulk drug substances; however, other factors also affect the use of compounded drugs. For example, insurers that restrict payment for compounded drugs dispensed in pharmacy settings in their private health plans to only ingredients that are FDA-approved products saw significant decreases in both the number of claims and the amount of payments for these drugs after they implemented these restrictions. Individual patient need, such as the need for custom dosages, and drug shortages also affect the use of compounded drugs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS clarify its Medicare Part B payment policy to either allow or restrict payment for compounded drugs containing bulk drug substances and align payment practices with this policy. HHS disagreed with this recommendation, stating that the Part B payment policy does not depend on drug ingredients. GAO maintains that the policy needs clarification. |
gao_GAO-03-234 | gao_GAO-03-234_0 | Background
The Congress, among others, has been concerned about the academic achievement gap between economically disadvantaged students and their more advantaged peers. The disparity between poor students’ performance on standardized tests and the performance of their nonpoor peers is well documented, and there is broad consensus that poverty itself adversely affects academic achievement. Furthermore, research has indicated the importance of socioeconomic status as a predictor of student achievement. Differences in school spending can affect characteristics that may be related to student achievement. Inner city schools in Boston, Chicago, and St. Louis generally spent more per pupil than neighboring suburban schools, whereas selected suburban schools in Fort Worth and New York almost always spent more per pupil than the inner city schools. Three factors generally explained spending differences between inner city and suburban schools: (1) average teacher salaries; (2) student- teacher ratios; and (3) ratios of students to student support staff, such as guidance counselors, librarians, and nurses. To compensate for additional challenges faced by schools in these areas, federal education dollars are generally targeted to low-income areas. Differences in Per-Pupil Spending between Selected Inner City Schools and Suburban Schools Varied by Metropolitan Area
Differences between inner city and suburban school per-pupil spending were related to the particular metropolitan area studied and generally seemed to be most influenced by teacher salaries. In Denver and Oakland, an examination of spending differences among the selected suburban and inner city schools revealed mixed results. Finally, the type of in-school parental involvement in the inner city and suburban schools differed. Inner City Students’ Achievement Scores Were Generally Lower than Suburban Students’ Achievement Scores
In general, at the schools we visited in the metropolitan areas of Fort Worth, New York, Oakland, and St. Louis, inner city students’ average achievement scores on state reading assessment tests were lower than scores at the neighboring suburban schools. 6 for the percentage of first-year teachers by school and metropolitan area.) This study covered selected inner city and suburban schools in seven metropolitan areas. Methodology to Analyze Differences in Spending and Factors Accounting for Spending Differences
For each metropolitan area, per-pupil spending for each of the three inner city schools and three suburban schools were ordered and paired, that is, the lowest spending inner city school was paired with the lowest spending suburban school, the middle spending inner city school was paired with the middle spending suburban school, and the highest spending inner city school was paired with the highest spending suburban school. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 has focused national attention on the importance of ensuring each child's access to equal educational opportunity. The law seeks to improve the performance of schools and the academic achievement of students, including those who are economically disadvantaged. The Congress, among others, has been concerned about the education of economically disadvantaged students. This study focused on per-pupil spending, factors influencing spending, and other similarities and differences between selected high-poverty inner city schools and selected suburban schools in seven metropolitan areas: Boston, Chicago, Denver, Fort Worth, New York, Oakland, and St. Louis.
What GAO Found
Among the schools GAO reviewed, differences in per-pupil spending between inner city and suburban schools varied across metropolitan areas, with inner city schools spending more in some metropolitan areas and suburban schools spending more in other areas. The inner city schools that GAO examined generally spent more per pupil than suburban schools in Boston, Chicago, and St. Louis, while in Fort Worth and New York the suburban schools in GAO's study almost always spent more per pupil than the inner city schools. In Denver and Oakland, spending differences between the selected inner city and suburban schools were mixed. In general, higher per-pupil expenditures at any given school were explained primarily by higher staff salaries regardless of whether the school was an inner city or suburban school. Two other explanatory factors were student-teacher ratios and ratios of students to student support staff, such as guidance counselors, nurses, and librarians. Federal funds are generally targeted to low-income areas to compensate for additional challenges faced by schools in those areas. In some cases, the infusion of federal funds balanced differences in per-pupil expenditures between the selected inner city and suburban schools. There is a broad consensus that poverty itself adversely affects academic achievement, and inner city students in the schools reviewed performed less well academically than students in the suburban schools. The disparity in achievement may also be related to several other differences identified in the characteristics of inner city and suburban schools. At the schools GAO visited, inner city schools generally had higher percentages of first-year teachers, higher enrollments, fewer library resources, and less in-school parental involvement--characteristics that some research has shown are related to school achievement. |
gao_GGD-97-1 | gao_GGD-97-1_0 | Over this same period, the percentage of all employers that offered only DC pension plans increased from 68 to 88 percent. The percentage of employers that offered only DB plans decreased from 24 to 9 percent, and the percentage that offered both DC and DB plans decreased from 8 to 3 percent. The increase in the percentage of employers offering only DC plans occurred across all industries. For the 6,974 of these employers that filed a Form 5500 report in 1992, the study found that 1,449 (or about 21 percent) of the employers had terminated their DB plans and adopted or retained DC plans. From 1984 to 1993, an increasing proportion of the employers with 2,500 or more employees offered both DC and DB plans. These results suggest that most private employers did not require employees to contribute to their DB plans. Furthermore, employers contributed proportionately more to DC plans that were designed to provide primary pension benefits than they did to DC plans that supplemented the benefits of a DB plan. Trends in Administrative Expenses for Private Pensions
In 1993, the average reported administrative expense per plan participant was $103 for employers that sponsored only DC plans and $157 for employers that sponsored only DB plans. From 1988 to 1993, the average reported administrative expense per participant remained fairly constant for both DC and DB plans.Consequently, growth in administrative expenses did not appear to explain why employers that already had a DB plan would shift to a DC plan. Possible Explanations of the Growth in DC Plans Provided by the Literature
The literature suggested various factors that may explain why employers might prefer to offer only DC plans to their employees. The objectives of our review were to determine how many private employers offered a retirement program consisting of (1) only defined contribution (DC) plans, (2) only defined benefit (DB) plans, or (3) a combination of the two types of plans; the average employer and employee contributions to the plans;the average administrative expenses charged to the plans; and the factors that may influence private sector employers when they decide to offer DC plans versus DB plans as a part of their employees’ retirement package. IRS Form 5500 Analysis Results
Table II.1: Number of Private Sector Employers, by Type of Pension Plan Offered (1984-1993)
Table II.2: Number of Participants Covered by Private Pension Plans, by Type of Plan Offered (1984-1993)
Table II.3: Number of Private Sector Employers, by Employer Size and Type of Pension Plan Offered (1984-1993)
Type of pension plan(s) offered (continued)
Type of pension plan(s) offered (continued)
Type of pension plan(s) offered (continued)
Table II.4: Number of Private Sector Employers, by Industry and Type of Pension Plan Offered (1984-1993)
Type of pension plan(s) offered (continued)
Type of pension plan(s) offered (continued)
Type of pension plan(s) offered (continued)
Type of plan(s) offered Note 1: This table includes only those employers that sponsored single-employer pension plans. Chang, A. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the: (1) numbers and types of pension plans sponsored nationwide by private employers from 1984 to 1993; (2) proportions of total contributions made to these plans by employers and employees; (3) average administrative expense for these plans; and (4) reasons employers sponsor certain types of pension plans.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) using a computerized database of reports employers have filed with the Internal Revenue Service, GAO found that in 1993, 88 percent of private employers with single-employer pension plans sponsored only defined contribution (DC) plans; (2) this represented a sizable increase over 1984 when 68 percent of private employers reported they had only DC plans; (3) from 1984 to 1993, the percentage of employers that offered only defined benefit (DB) plans decreased from 24 to 9 percent, and those employers offering both DC and DB plans decreased from 8 to 3 percent; (4) the growth in DC plans occurred across all employer sizes and industries; however, the percentage of employers with 2,500 or more employees that sponsored both DC and DB plans increased over the same period and nearly half of these employers continued to sponsor a DB plan in 1993; (5) the data showed that private employers generally did not require employees to contribute to DB plans and that employers provided a greater proportion of total contributions to DC plans that were the only plan offered to employees compared with DC plans that supplemented a DB plan; and (6) from 1988 to 1993, administrative expenses remained fairly constant for DC and DB plans, and the average reported administrative expense per participant was lowest for employers that offered only DC plans. GAO also found that: (1) its review of retirement literature revealed a variety of possible explanations for why employers might prefer DC over DB plans if they decide to sponsor only one type of plan; (2) these factors included increasingly complex regulations for DB plans, a surge in the number of employers terminating DB plans to acquire capital assets, and employees' growing preference for pension benefits that they can retain when they change jobs; (3) the literature also noted that an employment shift has occurred away from industries in which employers traditionally favored DB plans toward industries in which employers favored DC plans; and (4) because the literature primarily addressed factors that influence private-sector decisionmaking on pension plan design, these factors may or may not be relevant to the federal government and other public employers. |
gao_GAO-12-905T | gao_GAO-12-905T_0 | However, our reviews of the 1990, 2000, and the 2010 Censuses have shown that early planning, the use of leading management practices, and strong congressional oversight can help reduce the costs and risks of the national headcount. Lesson Learned 1: Reexamine the Nation’s Approach to Taking the Census
In our April 2011 testimony, we noted that based on the results of prior enumerations, simply refining current methods—some of which have been in place for decades—will not bring about the reforms needed to control costs while maintaining accuracy given ongoing and newly emerging societal trends such as concerns over personal privacy and an increasingly diverse population.reconsider the nation’s approach to the census including rethinking such activities as how it plans, tests, implements, monitors, and evaluates enumeration activities. The Bureau is also researching how it can use administrative records to reduce the cost of certain decennial activities. During the 2010 Census, the Bureau made only limited use of administrative records. Lesson Learned 2: Assess and Refine Existing Operations Focusing on Tailoring Them to Specific Locations and Population Groups
We previously found that leveraging such data as local response rates, census socio-demographic information, as well as other data sources and empirical evidence, might help control costs and improve accuracy by providing information on ways the Bureau could more efficiently allocate its resources. The 2010 Census had several census-taking activities tailored to specific population groups. Other efforts included mailing a bilingual English/Spanish questionnaire in some areas, and sending a second “replacement” census questionnaire to about 53 million households in areas with historically lower response rates. Preliminary Bureau evaluations suggest that some of these targeted efforts contributed to an increased awareness of the census and were associated with higher questionnaire mail-back response rates. This operation is important for building an accurate address list. Designing future studies to better isolate the return on investment would help the Bureau further tailor its operations to specific population groups and locations and potentially generate substantial cost savings. Lesson Learned 3: Institutionalize Efforts to Address High-Risk Areas
A key priority for the Bureau will be to continue to address those shortcomings that led us to designate the 2010 Census a high-risk area in 2008, including strengthening its ability to develop reliable life-cycle cost estimates and following key practices important for managing information technology (IT) so that they do not recur in 2020. The Bureau has made progress in these areas. In our January 2012 report, we found that the Bureau had not yet established policies, procedures, or guidance for developing the 2020 Census life cycle cost estimate and is at risk of not following related best practices. As the Bureau prepares for 2020, it will be important for it to continue to improve its ability to manage its IT investments. Lesson Learned 4: Ensure that the Bureau’s Management, Culture, and Business Practices Align with a Cost-Effective Enumeration
As we noted in our May 2012 report, the Bureau’s early planning and preparation efforts for the 2020 Census are consistent with most leading practices in each of three management areas we reviewed— organizational transformation, long-term planning, and strategic workforce planning. These are important steps forward that, if continued, could help the Bureau’s planning stay on track for 2020. However, the Bureau’s schedule does not include milestones or deadlines for key decisions needed to support transition between the planning phases which could result in later downstream planning activity not being based on evidence from such sources as early research and testing. While the Bureau’s efforts are largely consistent with leading practices in each of these areas, in our May 2012 report, we noted that additional steps could be taken going forward to build on these early planning efforts. Specifically, we recommended that the Director take a number of actions to make 2020 Census planning more consistent with key practices in the three management areas, such as examining planned transformation activity to ensure its alignment with resources, developing a more-detailed long-term schedule to smooth transition to later planning phases, and setting workforce planning goals and monitor them to ensure their attainment. The Department of Commerce concurred with our findings and recommendations and has taken steps to address our recommendations. Concluding Observations
The Bureau is moving forward along a number of fronts to secure a more cost-effective 2020 enumeration. The Bureau’s initial preparations for 2020 are making progress. Decennial Census: Additional Actions Could Improve the Census Bureau’s Ability to Control Costs for the 2020 Census. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Obtaining an accurate census in the face of societal trends such as increased privacy concerns and a more diverse population has greatly increased the cost of the census. At $13 billion, 2010 was the costliest census in U.S. history. Without changes, future enumerations could be fiscally unsustainable. GAOs past work noted that early planning, leading management practices, and strong congressional oversight, can help reduce the costs and risks of the enumeration. GAO also identified four key lessons learned from 2010 that could help secure a more cost-effective 2020 Census. The Bureau agreed and is taking steps to address them. As requested, this testimony focuses on the Bureaus progress on these lessons learned and what remains to be done going forward. It is based on GAOs completed work, including an analysis of Bureau documents, interviews with Bureau officials, and field observations of census operations in urban and rural locations across the country.
What GAO Found
Overall, the U.S. Census Bureaus (Bureau) planning efforts for 2020 are off to a good start, as the Bureau made noteworthy progress within each of the four lessons learned from the 2010 Census. Still, additional steps will be needed within each of the lessons learned in order to sustain those reforms.
1. Reexamine the nations approach to taking the Census. The Bureau has used a similar approach to count most of the population for decades. However, the approach has not kept pace with changes to society. Moving forward, the Bureau has begun to rethink its approach to planning, testing, implementing, and monitoring the census. For example, the Bureau is researching how it can use administrative records, such as data from other government agencies, to locate and count people including nonrespondents. Use of administrative records could help reduce the cost of field operations, but data quality and access issues must first be resolved.
2. Assess and refine existing operations focusing on tailoring them to specific locations and population groups. The 2010 Census had several operations tailored to specific population groups or locales. For example, the Bureau mailed bilingual English/Spanish forms to some areas and sent a second questionnaire to areas with historically lower response rates. Preliminary evaluations show these targeted efforts contributed to an increased awareness of the census and higher mail-back response rates. For 2020, the Bureau is considering expanding these efforts. Designing future studies to better isolate the return on investment of key census operations would help the Bureau further target its operations to specific population groups and locations and potentially gain significant cost savings.
3. Institutionalize efforts to address high-risk areas. Focus areas for the Bureau include improving its ability to manage information technology (IT) investments and develop a reliable cost estimates. In January 2012, GAO reported that the Bureau did not have policies and procedures for developing the 2020 Census cost estimate. In moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to improve its IT acquisition management policies and develop better guidance to produce more reliable cost estimates.
4. Ensure that the Bureaus management, culture, and business practices align with a cost-effective enumeration. In May 2012, GAO reported that the Bureaus early planning efforts for the 2020 Census were consistent with most leading practices for organizational transformation, long term planning, and strategic workforce planning. Nevertheless, GAO found that additional steps could be taken to build on these early efforts. For example, the Bureaus schedule does not include milestones for key decisions to support the transition between planning phases. These milestones are important and could help with later downstream planning.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony, but past reports recommended that the Bureau strengthen its testing of key IT systems, develop policies and procedures for its cost estimates, and take actions to make 2020 Census planning more consistent with leading management practices. The Bureau generally agreed with GAOs findings and recommendations and is taking steps to implement them. |
gao_GAO-06-479 | gao_GAO-06-479_0 | In addition, the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) has identified rightsizing as one of the administration’s priorities. A Number of State Bureaus Provide Embassy Support Remotely, with More Efforts Planned
State has a number of overseas regional bureaus that provide management support remotely in a variety of ways. State’s functional bureaus also provide remote support. In addition, the Bureau of African Affairs employs staff in Paris to provide financial support to posts in Africa. In particular, limits on what management functions non-American staff perform might limit the extent to which services can be provided remotely. Also, current funding arrangements for the various regional bureaus and posts might limit opportunities for remote support to be offered from one region to another. Finally, a reluctance to change further constrains opportunities to expand remote support. Providing Support Remotely Offers Potential Advantages, but Cost Analyses and Performance Measures Are Needed
According to State officials, there are several potential advantages to providing administrative support to posts from remote locations rather than at individual posts, including potential cost savings, enhanced security for American personnel, and improved quality of administrative support. However, at the time of our review, State had not conducted analyses of the cost advantages associated with providing administrative support remotely rather than at posts and had no systematic performance measures and feedback mechanisms in place to assess the quality of support provided. For example, in 2002, the U.S. Embassy in Nassau, Bahamas, requested a full-time American financial management officer at post to handle its financial management workload, according to the post management officer. Providing Support from an Overseas Regional Center
According to officials in Washington and overseas, potential advantages also could arise from providing support remotely from a regional service center overseas. For example, the Deputy Director of the Florida Regional Center told us that there had been no analysis on how much money has been saved by serving posts from the Florida center rather than having management officials at the posts, and he said that such a study would be useful, not only for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, but also for other regional bureaus when they consider using regional centers to provide remote support. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following three actions: Identify and analyze the various costs associated with providing support at individual posts versus at regional service centers in the United States or overseas; Develop systematic performance measures and feedback mechanisms to measure the quality and customer satisfaction of support services provided remotely; and Use the cost analyses and feedback on quality and customer satisfaction inform post management of which services could be offered remotely, the various costs involved, and the quality of services offered; consider ways to improve the quality of remote support, when determine whether additional posts, including posts that are requesting new U.S. officer positions in management functions, might be logical candidates for receiving remote support. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The President has emphasized the importance of safety, efficiency, and accountability in U.S. government staffing overseas by designating the achievement of a rightsized overseas presence as a part of the President's Management Agenda. One of the elements of rightsizing involves relocating certain administrative support functions from overseas posts to the United States or regional centers overseas, which can provide cheaper, safer, or more effective support. This report (1) reviews State's efforts in providing administrative support from remote locations, (2) identifies the challenges it faces in doing so, and (3) outlines the potential advantages and concerns associated with providing support remotely.
What GAO Found
State has a number of regional and domestic offices that provide some management support remotely to overseas posts in areas such as financial management and human resources. For example, State's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs provides support to posts in its region through staff based in Florida. State announced in October 2005 it would identify and remove additional functions that do not need to be performed at post and could instead be performed domestically or at regional centers overseas. State faces several challenges in trying to expand its use of remote support. For example, restrictions on what management functions non-American staff can perform might limit the extent to which services can be provided remotely. In addition, current funding arrangements for various regional bureaus and posts might limit opportunities for remote support to be offered from one region to another, while posts' reluctance to change is a further constraint. State is assessing whether certain regulations could be waived or changed and how institutional challenges might be overcome. There are several potential advantages to providing administrative support to posts from remote locations, and several concerns. For example, one U.S.-based officer provides financial management support to multiple overseas posts, eliminating the need for an American financial management officer at each post served, which, according to State, could result in cost savings. Officials at posts we visited reported they were generally satisfied with the level of support and customer service at a regional or domestic service center, though some noted concerns. However, at the time of our review, State had neither analyzed the potential cost savings associated with providing remote support nor systematically assessed the quality of support provided. In addition, many officials in Washington and overseas were unaware of the full breadth of support offered by regional service centers. |
gao_GAO-14-435 | gao_GAO-14-435_0 | The chairmanship of the Council rotates among the eight Arctic States. The Arctic Council Is a Voluntary Intergovernmental Forum for Arctic States, with the Involvement of Others, to Address Environmental and Economic Development Issues
The Council is a voluntary intergovernmental forum for the eight Arctic States, with the involvement of indigenous organizations and other stakeholders, to address environmental and economic development issues through various projects and reports. According to federal officials, when the Council was established in 1996, it had about 30 ongoing projects. Six Key Agencies Hold Leadership Roles in the Council, and Other Agencies Participate Through Working Groups and Task Forces
Six key agencies hold leadership roles as head of the U.S. delegations to the Council’s working groups, and other agencies lead the U.S. efforts on Council task forces (see fig. Agencies Collaborate on Arctic Council Work and Face Challenges by Not Having a Clear Direction or Specific Resources for the Work
Within the United States, federal agency officials who participate in the Council collaborate primarily through the Arctic Policy Group, an informal interagency group led by State but is not part of the Council itself. Specifically, some agency officials and these stakeholders said that the six agencies have not developed a strategy that guides agency collaboration for Council participation and aligns the agencies’ work. Agencies Have Acted on Some Arctic Council Voluntary Recommendations but State Does Not Track Actions and Faces Challenges Implementing Them
Federal agencies have taken various actions on some voluntary recommendations that the United States and other Arctic States have adopted through the Council, but State does not have a process to review and track progress made on these actions and faces challenges implementing them. Without such a process to review and track progress toward implementing Council recommendations, State officials said that State and other key agencies do not know the status of the recommendations and could face challenges planning for and prioritizing actions to address Arctic issues. Broad and Numerous Recommendations Create Implementation Challenges
Some federal officials and stakeholders directly involved in Council work said that the United States—with State as the lead agency—and other Arctic States at times face challenges implementing the broad recommendations made in the declarations and the numerous recommendations made in the working group and task force reports. However, challenges implementing the broad and numerous recommendations remain and State officials said that a need exists for the Council to more clearly specify actions with measurable outcomes and prioritize the Council recommendations to better ensure their implementation. With these changes and an increase in global attention on the region, the Council’s work will likely continue to expand. Without a joint strategy, key collaborating agencies may continue to face challenges prioritizing the work, delivering unified messages, and consistently participating in the Council. Specifically, State officials said the Council does not have guidelines for adopting clear and prioritized recommendations. As a result, State officials said that the Council has produced valuable work, but the recommendations have not historically produced actions leading to measurable results in addressing Arctic issues. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help clarify the direction of future U.S. participation and position the United States for a successful Arctic Council chairmanship, assess the status of recommendations adopted through the Council, and strengthen the Council’s ability to address Arctic issues within its purview, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following three actions:
As a part of its responsibilities in assuming the Council chair in 2015 and in collaboration with other relevant agencies, develop a joint strategy for U.S. participation in the Council that outlines a clear direction for the agencies and identifies resources needed to sustain collaborative efforts and consistent participation in the Council. Work with other Arctic States to develop guidelines for producing clear recommendations with measurable actions and prioritizing the recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to review matters related to U.S. participation in the Arctic Council (Council). This report examines (1) how the Council is organized and how it addresses environmental and economic development issues; (2) how U.S. federal agencies with a key leadership role participate in the Council and the associated challenges, if any; and (3) the actions the Department of State (State) and other federal agencies have taken to implement and manage voluntary recommendations the United States has adopted through the Council and associated challenges, if any. Global Change Research Program, the Department of the Interior’s U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent changes in the Arctic from a warming climate, such as decreased sea ice coverage making marine areas more accessible, have increased global attention to the region's economic opportunities. In 1996, the eight Arctic States—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States—formed the Arctic Council to promote cooperation on various Arctic issues with input from indigenous groups. U.S. Arctic policy highlights the importance of the Council to pursue U.S. Arctic interests.
GAO was asked to examine matters related to U.S. Council participation. This report examines (1) the Council's organization and how it addresses environmental and economic development issues; (2) how key U.S. agencies participate in the Council and any challenges; and (3) agencies' actions to implement and manage voluntary Council recommendations and any challenges. GAO analyzed key documents; interviewed federal and other Arctic stakeholders; attended a Council meeting; and visited four Alaskan Arctic communities selected for their sizes and needs.
What GAO Found
The Arctic Council (Council) is a voluntary intergovernmental forum for Arctic States, with involvement of indigenous organizations and other stakeholders, to address various environmental and economic issues through projects and reports targeting a variety of subjects. The eight Arctic States guide the work of the Council through consensus decisions and rotate the chairmanship of the Council every 2 years. The United States will assume the chairmanship in 2015. The participants meet in six working groups, four task forces, and various expert groups to produce such documents as scientific assessments and guidance. For example, the Council has produced assessments of Arctic climate change impacts and shipping. As Arctic issues have emerged, the Council has expanded and broadened its work to address them. For example, since the Council's was established in 1996, the number of ongoing projects has increased from about 30 to 80.
Six key federal agencies hold leadership roles in the Arctic Council and other agencies participate through the Council's working groups and task forces. The U.S. Department of State (State) leads this participation and collaborates with the five other key agencies that lead the delegations to Council working groups—the Environmental Protection Agency, National Nuclear Security Agency, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and U.S. Global Change Research Program—as well as other federal agencies with Arctic interests. In collaborating on Council work, the agencies face challenges by not having a clear direction or specific resources for their work. For example, key agency officials said that the agencies do not have a strategy that guides and aligns their Council work. Without a clear direction or specific resources for the collaborative effort, the agencies face challenges prioritizing the work, delivering unified messages to other Arctic States, and consistently participating in the Council. GAO previously reported that agencies can enhance and sustain collaborative efforts by engaging in various practices, such as establishing joint strategies and identifying necessary resources.
Federal agencies have acted on some voluntary recommendations that the United States and other Arctic States have adopted through the Council. However, State does not review or track progress made on these actions and faces challenges implementing the voluntary recommendations. Specifically, State informally discusses the recommendations with other agencies during monthly meetings but does not have a process to review and track progress the agencies have made toward implementing them. State officials said that the agency may need to more formally assess such progress because, without such a process, State does not know the status of recommendation implementation and faces challenges planning for and prioritizing future actions to address Arctic issues. In addition, the United States—with State as the lead agency—and other Arctic States face challenges implementing the Council's broad and numerous recommendations. To address these challenges, State officials said that the Council needs to more clearly specify and prioritize recommendations, but the Council does not have guidelines for doing so. Without such guidelines, officials said the recommendations have not historically produced actions with measurable outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State work with relevant agencies to develop a strategy identifying direction for agency Council participation and resource needs; develop a process to review and track progress on recommendations; and work with other Arctic States to develop guidelines for clear and prioritized recommendations. State agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-677T | gao_GAO-09-677T_0 | Hedge Funds Generally Are Subject to Limited Direct Oversight and the Federal Government Does Not Specifically Limit or Monitor Private Sector Plans’ Investments in Hedge Funds
SEC’s ability to directly oversee hedge fund advisers is limited to those that are required to register or voluntarily register with SEC as investment advisers. On the basis of the results, FRBNY noted that the banks generally had strengthened practices for managing risk exposures to hedge funds, but the banks could further enhance firmwide risk management systems and practices, including expanded stress testing. Plan fiduciaries are expected to meet general standards of prudent investing and no specific restrictions on investments in hedge funds or private equity have been established. Updates to the surveys indicated that institutional investors plan to continue to invest in hedge funds. Several pension plan officials told us that they sought to obtain returns greater than the returns of the overall stock market through at least some of their hedge fund investments. In addition to investment challenges, hedge funds pose additional challenges, including: (1) limited information on a hedge fund’s underlying assets and valuation (limited transparency); (2) contract provisions which limit an investor’s ability to redeem an investment in a hedge fund for a defined period of time (limited liquidity); and (3) the possibility that a hedge fund’s active or risky trading activity will result in losses due to operational failure such as trading errors or outright fraud (operational risk). Pension plans that invest in hedge funds take various steps to mitigate the risks and challenges posed by hedge fund investing, including developing a specific investment purpose and strategy, negotiating important investment terms, conducting due diligence, and investing through funds of funds. According to market participants doing business with larger hedge funds, hedge fund advisers have improved disclosure and become more transparent about their operations, including risk management practices, partly as a result of recent increases in investments by institutional investors with fiduciary responsibilities, such as pension plans, and guidance provided by regulators and industry groups. The creditors and counterparties we interviewed said that they have exercised market discipline by tightening their credit standards for hedge funds and demanding greater disclosure. However, regulators and market participants also identified issues that limit the effectiveness of market discipline or illustrate failures to properly exercise it. In addition, the actions of creditors and counterparties may not fully prevent hedge funds from taking excessive risk if these creditors’ and counterparties’ risk controls are inadequate. These factors can contribute to conditions that create the potential for systemic risk if breakdowns in market discipline and the risk controls of creditors and counterparties are sufficiently severe that losses by hedge funds in turn cause significant losses at key intermediaries or instability in financial markets. Regulators View Hedge Fund Activities as Potential Sources of Systemic Risk and Are Taking Measures to Enhance Market Discipline and Prepare for Financial Disruptions
Although financial regulators and market participants recognize that the enhanced efforts by investors, creditors, and counterparties since LTCM impose greater market discipline on hedge funds, some remain concerned that hedge funds’ activities are a potential source of systemic risk. Some regulators regard counterparty credit risk as the primary channel for potentially creating systemic risk. At the time of our work in 2007, financial regulators said that the market discipline imposed by investors, creditors, and counterparties is the most effective mechanism for limiting the systemic risk from the activities of hedge funds (and other private pools of capital). For instance, they have examined particular hedge fund activities across regulated entities, mainly through international multilateral efforts. Finally, in September 2007, the PWG formed two private sector committees comprising hedge fund advisers and investors to address investor protection and systemic risk concerns, including counterparty credit risk management issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008, GAO issued two reports on hedge funds--pooled investment vehicles that are privately managed and often engage in active trading of various types of securities and commodity futures and options contracts--highlighting the need for continued regulatory attention and for guidance to better inform pension plans on the risks and challenges of hedge fund investments. Hedge funds generally qualified for exemption from certain securities laws and regulations, including the requirement to register as an investment company. Hedge funds have been deeply affected by the recent financial turmoil. But an industry survey of institutional investors suggests that these investors are still committed to investing in hedge funds in the long term. For the first time hedge funds are allowed to borrow from the Federal Reserve under the Term-Asset Backed Loan Facility. As such, the regulatory oversight issues and investment challenges raised by the 2008 reports still remain relevant. This testimony discusses: (1) federal regulators' oversight of hedge fund-related activities; (2) potential benefits, risks, and challenges pension plans face in investing in hedge funds; (3) the measures investors, creditors, and counterparties have taken to impose market discipline on hedge funds; and (4) the potential for systemic risk from hedge fund-related activities. To do this work we relied upon our issued reports and updated data where possible
What GAO Found
Under the existing regulatory structure, the Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission can provide direct oversight of registered hedge fund advisers, and along with federal bank regulators, they monitor hedge fund-related activities conducted at their regulated entities. Although some examinations found that banks generally have strengthened practices for managing risk exposures to hedge funds, regulators recommended that they enhance firmwide risk management systems and practices, including expanded stress testing. The federal government does not specifically limit or monitor private sector plan investment in hedge funds. Under federal law, fiduciaries must comply with a standard of prudence, but no explicit restrictions on hedge funds exist. Pension plans invest in hedge funds to obtain a number of potential benefits, such as returns greater than the stock market and stable returns on investment. However, hedge funds also pose challenges and risks beyond those posed by traditional investments. For example, some investors may have little information on funds' underlying assets and their values, which limits the opportunity for oversight. Plan representatives said they take steps to mitigate these and other challenges, but doing so requires resources beyond the means of some plans. According to market participants, hedge fund advisers have improved disclosures and transparency about their operations as a result of industry guidance issued and pressure from investors and creditors and counterparties. Regulators and market participants said that creditors and counterparties have generally conducted more due diligence and tightened their credit standards for hedge funds. However, several factors may limit the effectiveness of market discipline or illustrate failures to properly exercise it. Further, if the risk controls of creditors and counterparties are inadequate, their actions may not prevent hedge funds from taking excessive risk and can contribute to conditions that create systemic risk if breakdowns in market discipline and risk controls are sufficiently severe that losses by hedge funds in turn cause significant losses at key intermediaries or in financial markets. Financial regulators and industry observers remain concerned about the adequacy of counterparty credit risk management at major financial institutions because it is a key factor in controlling the potential for hedge funds to become a source of systemic risk. Although hedge funds generally add liquidity to many markets, including distressed asset markets, in some circumstances hedge funds' activities can strain liquidity and contribute to financial distress. In response to their concerns regarding the adequacy of counterparty credit risk, a group of regulators had collaborated to examine particular hedge fund-related activities across entities they regulate, and the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG). The PWG also established two private sector committees that recently released guidelines to address systemic risk and investor protection. |
gao_GAO-17-558 | gao_GAO-17-558_0 | Programs also differ in their source of funding: some programs are entirely federally-funded, while in other programs, the states and the federal government each contribute some funding for benefits, program administration, or both. Selected Federal Low-Income Programs Vary with Regard to Target Populations, Rules for Counting Income and Assets, and Benefits Selected Programs Target a Range of Low-Income Populations, Including People Who Are Elderly or Disabled or Those with Dependent Children, and Some Require Work
In addition to having different program purposes, the six programs we reviewed target a range of low-income populations, including people with some earnings, people who are elderly or disabled, or families with dependent children, according to our analysis of agency documents, as confirmed by the agencies (see table 3). These variations affect whose income is counted, what income is and is not counted, whether expenses are deducted from income, and how much income applicants may have and still be eligible. For some programs, such as SSI, the applicant unit is the individual, while for others, such as SNAP, the unit is the household (see table 5). For purposes of counting income, for example, both TANF and the Housing Choice Voucher program count the income of individuals in a “family.” However, in the case of the Housing Choice Voucher program, for example, a single person living alone or a group of persons living together is considered a “family,” while for TANF cash assistance, states determine what constitutes a “family” and the family must generally include a dependent child. In contrast, the cash benefit received from the refunded portion of EITC is not counted as income when determining eligibility for any of the other selected programs. For the four programs that provide monthly benefits—Housing Choice Vouchers, SNAP, SSI, and TANF—average benefit levels ranged from $258 monthly for SNAP to $626 monthly for Housing Choice Vouchers in fiscal year 2015. Legal, Administrative, and Financial Constraints Challenge Efforts to Streamline Rules for Low-Income Programs Several Challenges Hinder Efforts to Streamline Program Rules
Legal, administrative, and financial constraints pose challenges to streamlining or better aligning varying eligibility rules for low-income programs, according to our previous work. A key challenge to streamlining eligibility rules for these low-income programs is that the programs are authorized by different federal statutes, which establish many of the program rules. These different statutes were enacted—and amended—at different times in response to differing circumstances. Other laws, such appropriations acts, can also have an impact on federal programs and their rules. Modifying eligibility rules to bring them more in line with each other would require changing many laws and coordination among a broad set of lawmakers, including multiple congressional committees. To start with, a different federal agency or office administers each program we reviewed. Specifically, for programs that allow state flexibility, state governments also establish some program rules, making it more difficult to streamline or align program rules within or across these programs at the federal level. On the one hand, if such rule changes have the effect of raising a program’s income eligibility limits, more people will be eligible for assistance and that program’s costs may increase, particularly for entitlement programs. Agencies and States Have Made Efforts to Streamline Rules within Program Constraints
Despite these challenges, Congress, federal agencies, and states have taken some steps to streamline eligibility rules, according to our prior work. These include establishing automatic or categorical eligibility among programs, making greater use of technology and data-sharing among low-income programs, and aligning application and eligibility determination processes for multiple programs. For example, in addition to SNAP BBCE policies already discussed (which make households that receive noncash services funded by TANF categorically eligible for SNAP in some states), SSI recipients in most states are automatically eligible for Medicaid health insurance, and if they live alone or in households in which all members receive SSI benefits, they are automatically eligible for SNAP. For example, some states reported that they integrated aspects of the SNAP eligibility process with those of other programs, such as through combined applications, common eligibility workers, or integrated or linked eligibility systems, according to our 2017 report. According to a December 2015 Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of the latest data available for subsidized housing, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the estimated proportion of those eligible who received benefits in 2012 varied substantially, and not all of those eligible actually received benefits. Appendix II: Selected Deductions for Calculating Income for Determining Program Eligibility
Appendix III: Maximum Monthly Income an Applicant May Have and Still Be Eligible for Six Selected Low-Income Programs
There is no single maximum income amount an applicant may have to be eligible for the six federal low-income programs we reviewed, and the amount of allowable income varies significantly among the programs, according to data confirmed by the administering agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Various federal programs provide cash assistance, food, housing, and health care to millions of individuals, families, and households whose income falls below defined levels and who meet other eligibility requirements. As GAO previously reported, the numerous financial and nonfinancial rules for determining eligibility for such low-income programs can confuse applicants and increase program administration challenges. GAO was asked to examine eligibility rules for low-income programs.
This report examines (1) the ways in which eligibility rules and benefits for selected federal low-income programs vary across the programs; and (2) what is known about challenges associated with efforts to streamline these rules. GAO reviewed relevant agency guidance and other information provided by agencies and analyzed financial eligibility rules and benefits across six low-income programs. GAO confirmed all information on program rules with the respective administering agencies. GAO selected these programs because they are among the largest of the federally funded programs addressing low-income people's basic needs and they illustrate variations in eligibility rules among low-income programs. GAO also reviewed previous GAO reports and selected reports from the Congressional Research Service and other knowledgeable research and policy organizations.
What GAO Found
Six key federally funded programs for low-income people vary significantly with regard to who is eligible, how income is counted and the maximum income applicants may have to be eligible, and the benefits provided. In fiscal year 2015, the most current data available, the federal government spent nearly $540 billion on benefits for these six programs—the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Medicaid, the Housing Choice Voucher program, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The target population for each of these programs differs, for example, people who are elderly or disabled or who have dependent children. Further, some programs have conditions for continued eligibility, such as participation in work activities under TANF. The six programs also vary in what income is and is not counted when determining an applicant's eligibility. For example, certain programs, such as SNAP, disregard a portion of earned income, while others do not. The maximum amount of income an applicant may have and still be eligible for benefits, which is determined for some programs at the federal level and for others at the state or local level, also differs significantly. As of December 2016, this amount ranged from $5,359 per month for one state's Medicaid program to $0 per month in one state for TANF cash assistance, for a single parent with two children. Benefit levels also differed across the six selected programs, with average monthly benefits for these programs ranging in fiscal year 2015 from $258 for SNAP to $626 for Housing Choice Vouchers, and four of the six programs adjust benefits annually.
Legal, administrative, and financial constraints pose challenges to efforts to streamline varying eligibility rules for federal low-income programs, according to GAO's current and previous work. A key challenge is that the programs are authorized by different federal statutes enacted at different times in response to differing circumstances. Other laws, such as appropriations laws, can also have an impact on federal programs and their rules. As a result, streamlining eligibility rules would require changing many laws and coordination among a broad set of lawmakers and congressional committees. A further challenge is that a different federal agency or office administers each program GAO reviewed. For some of these programs, such as TANF, state governments also establish some program rules, making it more difficult to streamline rules at the federal level within or across these programs. Finally, financial constraints may also affect efforts to streamline program rules. For example, if rule changes raise the income eligibility limit in a program, more people may become eligible and that program's costs may increase. Despite these challenges, Congress, federal agencies, and states have taken some steps to streamline program administration and rules, such as by making greater use of data-sharing where permitted by federal law and aligning programs' applications and eligibility determination processes. For example, SSI recipients in most states are automatically eligible for Medicaid, and GAO previously reported that some states have integrated the SNAP eligibility process with other low-income programs, such as through combined applications and common eligibility workers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-03-642T | gao_GAO-03-642T_0 | The Corporation receives appropriations to fund program operations and the National Service Trust. The number of AmeriCorps participants increased by nearly 20,000 from 1998 to 2001. Three Factors Contributed to the Need to Suspend AmeriCorps Enrollments
Three factors contributed to the Corporation’s need to suspend enrollments in AmeriCorps. Inappropriate Obligation Practices
The Corporation did not appropriately record or track its obligations for education awards to program participants. Lack of Communication
Corporation executives we interviewed said that there was little if any coordination between the AmeriCorps program office and officials responsible for the management of the Trust about the number of positions that the Trust could support. New Policies Established, but Additional Changes May be Needed
In response to concerns that the AmeriCorps program may have enrolled participants without adequately providing for their education awards, the Corporation has developed several new policies. Other policy changes are directed to improving communication among key executives, limiting grantees’ flexibilities and requiring more timely information on participants. While the Corporation may unilaterally reduce the number of authorized positions awarded to a grantee prior to participant enrollment, from the time of grant award until the Corporation acts to reduce the approved number of positions, the grantee and its subgrantee, not the Corporation, will control the number of participants who may enroll, up to the maximum number of participants the Corporation has approved in the grant agreement. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2002, the Corporation for National and Community Service suspended enrollments in the AmeriCorps program due to concern that the National Service Trust may not contain enough funds to meet the education award obligations resulting from AmeriCorps enrollments. This testimony reflects GAO's preliminary review of the factors that contributed to the need to suspend enrollments and GAO's preliminary assessment of the Corporation's proposed changes.
What GAO Found
The number of participants enrolled in AmeriCorps increased by about 20,000 from program year 1998 to program year 2001. However, the number of AmeriCorps participants was not reconciled with the number of education awards that the National Service Trust could support. GAO identified several factors that led the Corporation to suspend enrollments. The factors included inappropriate obligation practices, little or no communication among key Corporation executives, too much flexibility given to grantees regarding enrollments, and unreliable data on the number of AmeriCorps participants. The Corporation has established new policies that may improve the overall management of the National Service Trust if the policies are fully implemented. However, the Corporation has not made policy changes to correct a key factor--how it obligates funds for education awards. |
gao_GAO-06-1085 | gao_GAO-06-1085_0 | DOD Has Established Force Health Protection and Surveillance Policies for Deployed Federal Civilians, but Should Do More to Ensure That Components Comply with Its Requirements
DOD has established force health protection and surveillance policies aimed at assessing and reducing or preventing health risks for its deployed federal civilian personnel; however, the department lacks procedures to ensure the components’ full implementation of its policies. In August 2006, DOD issued a revised policy (to be effective in December 2006) that outlines procedures to address its lack of centralized deployment and health-related data. Our review of deployment records and other documentation at the selected component locations found that these components lacked documentation to show that some federal civilian personnel who deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq had received the required pre-deployment health assessments. Lack of Centralized Deployment Information Hinders the Overall Effectiveness of Force Health Protection and Surveillance for Deployed Federal Civilian Personnel
Beyond the aforementioned weaknesses found in the selected components’ implementation of force health protection and surveillance requirements for deploying federal civilians, as a larger issue, DOD lacks comprehensive, centralized data that would enable it to readily identify its deployed civilians, track their movements in theater, or monitor their health status, further hindering efforts to assess the overall effectiveness of its force health protection and surveillance capabilities. Nonetheless, DOD’s new policy is not comprehensive enough to ensure that the department will be sufficiently informed of the extent to which its components are complying with existing health protection requirements for its deployed federal civilians. Until the department provides a similar oversight and quality assurance mechanism for its deployed federal civilians, it will not be effectively positioned to ensure compliance with its policies, or ensure the health care and protection of these individuals as they continue to support contingency operations. These policies state that DOD federal civilians who require treatment for injuries or diseases sustained during overseas hostilities may be provided care under the DOD military health system. Specifically, in reviewing a sample of seven workers’ compensation claims (out of a universe of 83) filed under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act by DOD federal civilians who deployed to Iraq, we found that in three cases where care was initiated in theater the affected federal civilians had received treatment in accordance with DOD’s policies. Further, in all seven claims that we reviewed, DOD federal civilians who requested medical care after returning to the United States, had, in accordance with DOD’s policy, received initial medical examinations and/or treatment for their deployment-related injuries or illnesses and diseases through either military or civilian treatment facilities. Special Pays and Benefits Provided to Deployed DOD Federal Civilian and Military Personnel Generally Vary in Type and Amount
DOD provides a number of special pays and benefits to its federal civilian personnel who deploy in support of contingency operations, which are generally different in type and in amount from those provided to deployed military personnel. Further, survivors of deceased DOD federal civilian and military personnel generally receive comparable types of cash survivor benefits—lump sum, recurring, or both—but benefit amounts differ for the two groups. However, some special pays are unique to each group. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which DOD has established force health protection and surveillance policies for DOD federal civilians who deploy outside of the United States in support of contingency operations, and how the components (military services and the Defense Contract Management Agency) have implemented those policies, we reviewed pertinent force health protection and surveillance policies and discussed these policies with the following offices or commands: U.S. Central Command; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manpower and Personnel; Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (including the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Deployment Health Support Directorate; Civilian Personnel Policy; and Civilian Personnel Management Services); the Surgeons General for the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). Appendix II: Temporary and Permanent Partial Disability Benefits Provided to DOD Federal Civilian and Military Personnel
Both DOD federal civilian and military personnel are eligible to receive disability benefits when they sustain a line-of-duty injury. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded its involvement in overseas military operations, it has grown increasingly reliant on its federal civilian workforce to support contingency operations. The Senate Armed Services Committee required GAO to examine DOD's policies concerning the health care for DOD civilians who deploy in support of contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. GAO analyzed over 3,400 deployment-related records for deployed federal civilians and interviewed department officials to determine the extent to which DOD has established and the military services and defense agencies (hereafter referred to as DOD components) have implemented (1) force health protection and surveillance policies and (2) medical treatment policies and procedures for its deployed federal civilians. GAO also examined the differences in special pays and benefits provided to DOD's deployed federal civilians and military personnel.
What GAO Found
DOD has established force health protection and surveillance policies to assess and reduce or prevent health risks for its deployed federal civilian personnel, but it lacks procedures to ensure implementation. Our review of over 3,400 deployment records at eight component locations found that components lacked documentation that some federal civilian personnel who deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq had received, among other things, required pre- and post-deployment health assessments and immunizations. These deficiencies were most prevalent at Air Force and Navy locations, and one Army location. As a larger issue, DOD lacked complete and centralized data to readily identify its deployed federal civilians and their movement in theater, further hindering its efforts to assess the overall effectiveness of its force health protection and surveillance capabilities. In August 2006, DOD issued a revised policy which outlined procedures that are intended to address these shortcomings. However, these procedures are not comprehensive enough to ensure that DOD will know the extent to which its components are complying with existing health protection requirements. In particular, the procedures do not establish an oversight and quality assurance mechanism for assessing the implementation of its force health protection and surveillance requirements. Until DOD establishes a mechanism to strengthen its force health protection and surveillance oversight, it will not be effectively positioned to ensure compliance with its policies, or the health care and protection of deployed federal civilians. DOD has also established medical treatment policies for its deployed federal civilians which provide those who require treatment for injuries or diseases sustained during overseas hostilities with care that is equivalent in scope to that provided to active duty military personnel under the DOD military health system. GAO reviewed a sample of seven workers' compensation claims (out of a universe of 83) filed under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act by DOD federal civilians who deployed to Iraq. GAO found in three cases where care was initiated in theater, that the affected civilians had received treatment in accordance with DOD's policies. In all seven cases, DOD federal civilians who requested care after returning to the United States had, in accordance with DOD's policies, received medical examinations and/or treatment for their deployment-related injuries or diseases through either military or civilian treatment facilities. DOD provides certain special pays and benefits to its deployed federal civilians, which generally differ in type and/or amount from those provided to deployed military personnel. For example, both civilian and military personnel are eligible to receive disability benefits for deployment-related injuries; however, the type and amount of these benefits vary, and some are unique to each group. Further, while the survivors of deceased federal civilian and military personnel generally receive similar types of cash survivor benefits, the comparative amounts of these benefits differ. |
gao_GAO-07-856T | gao_GAO-07-856T_0 | After a drug is on the market, OND staff receive information about safety issues in several ways. FDA Lacked a Clear and Effective Decision-making Process for Postmarket Drug Safety
In our March 2006 report, we found that FDA’s postmarket drug safety decision-making process was limited by a lack of clarity, insufficient oversight by management, and data constraints. Decision-making Process on Drug Safety Lacked Clarity about Criteria for Action and the Role of ODS
While acknowledging the complexity of the postmarket drug safety decision-making process, we found through our interviews with OND and ODS staff and in our case studies that the process lacked clarity about how drug safety decisions were made and about the role of ODS. In those reviews FDA indicated that an absence of established criteria for determining what safety actions to take, and when to take them, posed a challenge for making postmarket drug safety decisions. A Lack of Communication and Limited Oversight Hindered the Decision- making Process
A lack of communication between ODS and OND’s review divisions and limited oversight of postmarket drug safety issues by ODS management also hindered the decision-making process. Another problem was the lack of systematic information on drug safety issues. According to the ODS Director, ODS maintained a database of consults that provided some information about the consults that ODS staff conducted, but it did not include information about whether ODS staff made recommendations for safety actions and how the safety issues were handled and resolved, such as whether recommended safety actions were implemented by OND. Data Constraints Have Contributed to Difficulty in Making Postmarket Safety Decisions
Data constraints—such as weaknesses in data sources and FDA’s limited ability to require certain studies and obtain additional data—have contributed to FDA’s difficulty in making postmarket drug safety decisions. The availability of these data sources has been constrained, however, because of FDA’s limited authority to require drug sponsors to conduct postmarket studies and its resources. FDA’s Initiatives to Improve Postmarket Drug Safety Decision Making
Prior to the completion of our March 2006 report, FDA began several initiatives to improve its postmarket drug safety decision-making process. Most prominently, FDA commissioned the IOM to convene a committee of experts to assess the current system for evaluating postmarket drug safety, including FDA’s oversight of postmarket safety and its processes. IOM issued its report in September 2006. FDA also had underway several organizational changes that we discussed in our 2006 report. FDA has also begun several initiatives since our March 2006 report that we believe could address three of our four recommendations. To make the postmarket safety decision-making process clearer and more effective, we recommended that FDA revise and implement its draft policy on major postmarket drug safety decisions. To make the postmarket safety decision-making process clearer, we recommended that FDA clarify ODS’s role in FDA’s scientific advisory committee meetings involving postmarket drug safety issues. We also suggested in our report that Congress consider expanding FDA’s authority to require drug sponsors to conduct postmarket studies in order to ensure that the agency has the necessary information, such as clinical trial and observational data, to make postmarket decisions. Prescription Drugs: Improvements Needed in FDA’s Oversight of Direct- to-Consumer Advertising. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, several high-profile drug safety cases raised concerns about the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) ability to manage postmarket drug safety issues. In some cases there were disagreements within FDA about how to address these issues. GAO was asked to testify on FDA's oversight of drug safety. This testimony is based on Drug Safety: Improvement Needed in FDA's Postmarket Decision-making and Oversight Process, GAO-06-402 (Mar. 31, 2006). The report focused on the complex interaction between two offices within FDA that are involved in postmarket drug safety activities: the Office of New Drugs (OND), and the Office of Drug Safety (ODS). OND's primary responsibility is to review new drug applications, but it is also involved in monitoring the safety of marketed drugs. ODS is focused primarily on postmarket drug safety issues. ODS is now called the Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology. For its report, GAO reviewed FDA policies, interviewed FDA staff, and conducted case studies of four drugs with safety issues: Arava, Baycol, Bextra, and Propulsid. To gather information on FDA's initiatives since March 2006 to improve its decision-making process for this testimony, GAO interviewed FDA officials in February and March 2007, and received updated information from FDA in May 2007.
What GAO Found
In its March 2006 report, GAO found that FDA lacked clear and effective processes for making decisions about, and providing management oversight of, postmarket drug safety issues. There was a lack of clarity about how decisions were made and about organizational roles, insufficient oversight by management, and data constraints. GAO observed that there was a lack of criteria for determining what safety actions to take and when to take them. Insufficient communication between ODS and OND hindered the decision-making process. ODS management did not systematically track information about ongoing postmarket safety issues, including the recommendations that ODS staff made for safety actions. GAO also found that FDA faced data constraints that contributed to the difficulty in making postmarket safety decisions. GAO found that FDA's access to data was constrained by both its limited authority to require drug sponsors to conduct postmarket studies and its limited resources for acquiring data from other external sources. During the course of GAO's work for its March 2006 report, FDA began a variety of initiatives to improve its postmarket drug safety decision-making process, including the establishment of the Drug Safety Oversight Board. FDA also commissioned the Institute of Medicine to examine the drug safety system, including FDA's oversight of postmarket drug safety. GAO recommended in its March 2006 report that FDA take four steps to improve its decision-making process for postmarket safety. GAO recommended that FDA revise and implement its draft policy on the decision-making process for major postmarket safety actions, improve its process to resolve disagreements over safety decisions, clarify ODS's role in scientific advisory committees, and systematically track postmarket drug safety issues. FDA has initiatives underway and under consideration and that, if implemented, could address three of GAO's four recommendations. In the 2006 report GAO also suggested that Congress consider expanding FDA's authority to require drug sponsors to conduct postmarket studies, as needed, to collect additional data on drug safety concerns. |
gao_GAO-03-900 | gao_GAO-03-900_0 | 3). There Are Some Variations in the Use of Distance Education at Minority Serving Institutions Compared to Other Schools
It is difficult to generalize across the Minority Serving Institutions, but available data indicate that while Minority Serving Institutions tend to offer at least one distance education course at about the same rate as other schools, they differ in how many courses are offered and which students take the distance education courses. Minority Serving Institutions tend to be similar to non-Minority Serving Institutions in the percentage of schools that offer distance education, and to a considerable degree, they also mirror other schools in that distance education is more prominent at larger schools and at public schools. We found that Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Tribal Colleges offered fewer distance education courses than other schools, which may be a reflection of their generally smaller size. Similarly, in July 2003, Education reported that a higher percentage of larger schools eligible for federal student aid programs offered distance education compared with smaller schools. Teaching Preference and Resources Available for Distance Education Affect the Extent to Which Minority Serving Institutions Offer Distance Education
According to officials of Minority Serving Institutions, there are two factors that explain why some Minority Serving Institutions do not offer distance education. Here are examples from two schools that prefer teaching their students in the classroom rather than by the use of distance education. For Many Institutions, Expanding Technology on Campus is More Important Than Applying It to Distance Education
Minority Serving Institutions generally indicated that offering more distance education was a lower priority than using technology to educate their classroom students. Title V, part A, under which funds are provided to Hispanic Serving Institutions, explicitly allows program funds to be used for “creating or improving facilities for Internet or other distance learning academic instruction capabilities, including purchase or rental of telecommunications technology equipment or services.” The program for Historically Black Colleges and Universities (Title III, part B) and Tribal Colleges (Title III, part A) does not specifically address the use of funds in this manner, however, using grant funds for expanding distance education offerings or technology usage are authorized activities, according to Education staff. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Education (1) direct managers of the Title III and Title V programs to further improve their annual performance report for Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Tribal Colleges by including areas such as student access to computers and the number of distance education courses that were offered and (2) study the feasibility of adding questions on distance education and information technology to an existing study at Education, such as IPEDS, to develop baseline data on technology capacity at Minority Serving Institutions and to judge the extent to which progress is being made. In 1998, the Congress moved the provisions authorizing grants to Hispanic Serving Institutions to Title V of the Higher Education Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Distance education--offering courses by Internet, video, or other forms outside the classroom--is a fast growing part of postsecondary education. GAO was asked to review the state of distance education at Minority Serving Institutions, which are schools that serve high percentages of minority students, including Blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians. Under Titles III and V of the Higher Education Act, these schools are eligible for grants that can be used for expanding their technology, including distance education. GAO's review focused on (1) the use of distance education at Minority Serving Institutions, (2) key factors influencing these schools' decisions about whether or not to offer distance education, and (3) steps the Department of Education could take, if any, to improve monitoring efforts of technological progress under Titles III and V programs.
What GAO Found
There are some variations in the use of distance education at Minority Serving Institutions compared to other schools. For example, while Minority Serving Institutions tend to offer at least one distance education course at the same rate as other schools, they differ in how many courses are offered and which students take the courses. Also, like other schools, larger Minority Serving Institutions tend to offer more distance education than smaller schools, and public schools tend to offer more distance education than private schools. However, Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Tribal Colleges generally offer fewer courses than other schools, and a smaller percentage of minority students take such courses. Minority Serving Institutions consider two main factors in deciding whether to offer distance education. The first is distance education's compatibility with the school's preferred teaching method. Many schools that offered no distance education had a strong preference for a classroom-based approach. The second is resources--schools offering little or no distance education had limited technology and support personnel. Also, Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Hispanic Serving Institutions viewed distance education as a lower priority compared to expanding technology usage in the classroom. By contrast, Tribal Colleges gave distance education higher priority, reflecting the greater geographic dispersion of their students. Education could strengthen its monitoring efforts of the Title III and V programs by expanding its existing system. Currently, the monitoring efforts for tracking the progress of technological improvements are more complete for Hispanic Serving Institutions than for the other Minority Serving Institutions. Education also lacks good baseline information on technology capacity at Minority Serving Institutions. Expanding current efforts to include such data would provide a basis for measuring the progress being made by Minority Serving Institutions. |
gao_RCED-95-24 | gao_RCED-95-24_0 | This trend is expected to continue. Services across the Atlantic and to the Pacific Rim are particularly important to U.S. airlines. That carrier therefore has a competitive advantage. Limited Access to Slots Reduces Commercial Value of U.S. Airlines’ Traffic Rights
U.S. airlines have only limited access to several congested airports in Europe and the Pacific Rim because they cannot obtain slots—reservations for aircraft landings and take-offs—that allow efficient connections with domestic flights. Airlines operating at airports overseas generally have little control over terminal facilities. Cargo Restrictions and Processing Delays Raise U.S. Airlines’ Operating Costs
At three Pacific Rim airports we visited, U.S. airlines face restrictions on distributing cargo in the importing countries and problems clearing customs. In contrast, foreign airlines generally do not experience such problems to the same extent when operating in the United States and thus avoid the resulting drain on efficiency, quality, and competitiveness. DOT and the State Department Have Had Mixed Success in Resolving U.S. Airlines’ Problems in Doing Business Overseas
DOT and the State Department recognize that U.S. airlines face a variety of doing-business problems overseas. However, because it does not periodically collect and analyze information on these problems, DOT cannot determine whether certain problems are pervasive in different countries, document whether they are increasing in number, make the most effective use of its limited resources to address these problems, or enter bilateral negotiations as well prepared as it could be. These include (1) negotiating with foreign governments that are often protecting their own flag carriers from increasing U.S. competition, (2) weighing the elimination of these problems with attempts to obtain valuable traffic rights for U.S. carriers, (3) balancing the competing commercial interests of various U.S. airlines, and (4) addressing these problems with significantly fewer resources in DOT’s Office of International Aviation. Most successes have involved eliminating problems that violate bilateral accords. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of State's and Department of Transportation's (DOT) efforts to resolve the problems U.S. airlines face when operating in Europe and the Pacific Rim.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) U.S. airlines serving key Pacific Rim airports often face obstacles that foreign airlines operating in the United States do not, including limited access to landing and take-off slots, inadequate terminal facilities, restrictions on the performance of ground services, and delays in processing cargo; (2) although obstacles at overseas airports affect all airlines, they most adversely affect U.S. airlines because they are unable to use their superior operational efficiency as a competitive advantage; (3) these obstacles raise U.S. airlines' operating costs and provide the home-country carrier with a competitive advantage; (4) although the State Department and DOT have had some success in eliminating problems that violate bilateral accords, they have been less successful in improving U.S. airline competition in Pacific Rim countries; (5) the State Department and DOT negotiate with foreign governments for the right to perform certain services and attempt to balance U.S. airlines' competing commercial interests with the overall goal of gaining traffic rights for U.S. carriers; and (6) DOT does not collect sufficient information on U.S. airlines' obstacles at overseas airports to determine whether the problems of doing business in the Pacific Rim are pervasive or whether it is effectively using its limited resources to solve these problems. |
gao_GGD-00-66 | gao_GGD-00-66_0 | Clinger-Cohen further requires civilian agencies to separately identify the funding levels requested for acquisition workforce education and training in their congressional budget justification documents submitted in support of the President’s budget and provides that agencies may not obligate funds appropriated for acquisition workforce education and training under the act for any other purpose. Neither GSA Nor VA Has Organizationwide Training Data, But Some Training Is Being Provided
Neither GSA nor VA has comprehensive organizationwide data showing the extent to which its acquisition workforce has received required training. GSA and VA each have both automated information systems and manual records that have some information on their acquisition workforces. GSA and VA have established core training for acquisition personnel who need a warrant. According to a GSA Greater Southwest Regional Office official, the one contracting officer who had not completed the training did not need the warrant, and the warrant was suspended for this individual. We reviewed the training records for the 46 GSA and 8 VA contracting officers at the two field locations we visited, who were required by OFPP policy to meet continuing education requirements by December 1999, and found that 22 out of 46 (48 percent) of GSA’s and 4 out of 8 (50 percent) of VA’s contracting officers had not met the OFPP requirements. Although in September 1997 OFPP tasked the Federal Acquisition Institute with developing a management information system to assist departments and agencies in collecting and maintaining standardized data, the system has not yet been developed. OFPP’s Policy Letter 97-01 tasked the Federal Acquisition Institute to work with agencies and OPM to develop a governmentwide management information system that would allow departments and agencies to collect and maintain standardized acquisition workforce information, including training data. Recommendations
To ensure that the skills of their acquisition workforces are current, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs fully adhere to OFPP’s policy associated with Clinger-Cohen’s training provisions by (1) establishing core training requirements for all contracting officer representatives and contracting officer technical representatives; (2) ensuring that all acquisition personnel receive the required core training and continuing education, consistent with OFPP’s policy; (3) directing appropriate agency personnel to collect and maintain accurate and up-to-date data showing the extent to which acquisition personnel meet training requirements; and (4) seeing that all funding that agencies plan to use for educating and training their acquisition workforces is identified in appropriate budget documents and that all related expenditures for such education and training are tracked. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether (1) the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) had assurance that their acquisition workforces met training requirements as defined by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and whether contracting officers at one GSA and one VA field location met each agency’s training requirements; (2) OFPP had ensured that federal civilian departments and agencies collected and maintained standardized acquisition workforce information, as required by the 1996 Clinger-Cohen Act; and (3) GSA and VA were taking actions to comply with the Clinger- Cohen Act’s funding requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the training of the acquisition workforce in certain federal civilian departments and agencies, focusing on whether: (1) the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) had assurance that their acquisition workforces met training requirements as defined by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and whether contracting officers at one GSA and one VA field location met each agency's training requirements; (2) OFPP had taken action to ensure that civilian departments and agencies collected and maintained standardized acquisition workforce information, as required by the 1996 Clinger-Cohen Act; and (3) GSA and VA were taking actions to comply with Clinger-Cohen Act funding requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) both GSA and VA have efforts under way to train their acquisition workforces; (2) however, neither had assurance that all members of their acquisition workforces had received core training and continuing education, as required by OFPP's policy; (3) neither agency had complete readily accessible information on the overall extent to which their acquisition workforces had received required training; (4) contrary to OFPP's policy, neither GSA nor VA had established core training requirements for some segments of their acquisition workforces--contracting officer representatives and contracting officer technical representatives who do not have authority to award contracts; (5) by reviewing agency training records and obtaining documentation directly from GSA's Greater Southwest Regional Office and VA's medical center in Dallas, GAO determined that 99 percent of GSA and 72 percent of VA contracting officers at these two locations met core training requirements that GSA and VA had established for such personnel; (6) however, only about half of GSA's and VA's contracting officers in these locations who were to have continuing education requirements completed by December 1999 had met those requirements by the due date; (7) to help explain why some officers had not completed the required training, agency officials cited conflicts in scheduling the training and a lack of awareness of training requirements; (8) OFPP has not yet ensured that civilian departments and agencies were collecting and maintaining standardized information, including training data, on their acquisition workforces, as required by Clinger-Cohen; (9) in September 1997, OFPP tasked the Federal Acquisition Institute to work with departments and agencies and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to develop a governmentwide management information system, including specifications for the data elements to be captured, to assist departments and agencies in collecting and maintaining standardized data; (10) system development was significantly delayed because the Institute and OPM had not reached agreement on final system requirements and specifications; (11) neither GSA nor VA identified all the funds it planned to use for acquisition workforce training in its congressional budget justification documents as required by Clinger-Cohen; (12) Clinger-Cohen provides that agencies may not obligate funds specifically appropriated for acquisition workforce education and training under the act for any other purpose; and (13) appropriations acts GAO reviewed for GSA and VA did not specify a funding level for acquisition workforce education and training. |
gao_RCED-98-156 | gao_RCED-98-156_0 | On May 25, 1995, in response to a formal request from AIC, FAA determined that AIC also had provided qualifying turnaround service during November 1990. . . .” FAA cited further language from the legislative history, emphasizing that the 1991 amendment was designed to “ensure that Hawaii does not become a dumping ground for Stage 2 aircraft. . . .” On the basis of these statements, FAA concluded that the Congress had intended to preclude an airline from flying an aircraft from the mainland to Hawaii, and then flying that same aircraft between two points in Hawaii in order to qualify the latter segment as turnaround service. Although AIC argued to FAA that one takeoff and one landing constituted a flight, under the 1991 amendment a flight qualifying as turnaround service consists of operation among “two or more points, all of which are within the state of Hawaii.” Thus, the 1991 provision clearly contemplates that such a flight may consist of more than one takeoff and one landing. AIC has maintained that two sections of the Airport Noise and Capacity Act direct the Secretary of Transportation to consider various competitive impacts of the requirements to phase out Stage 2 aircraft.However, these sections are not relevant for operations in Hawaii because the noise legislation’s mandatory phaseout of Stage 2 aircraft applies only in the contiguous 48 states on the U.S. mainland. Because AIC did not provide turnaround service at the time the Airport Noise and Capacity Act was passed, under an October 1996 amendment it must either cease serving Hawaii’s interisland cargo markets after September 30, 1998, or provide service with Stage 3 aircraft, as a company official has indicated it may do. Alternatively, the Congress could pass legislation temporarily extending AIC’s right to operate Stage 2 aircraft, which would allow the airline to continue interisland service without modifying the single aircraft that provides it. AIC’s Entry Into Interisland Markets Has Enhanced Competition
AIC’s November 1995 entry has enhanced competition in Hawaii’s interisland air cargo markets, most markedly by offering new service options for some customers. AIC Has Become the Second-Largest Airline Serving Hawaii’s Air Cargo Markets
Since November 1995, when AIC began providing scheduled interisland cargo service, it has acquired nearly one-fifth of the total market. If AIC takes such a step, there could be a discernible effect on a variety of interisland customers. The extent to which rates might increase in AIC’s absence remains unclear because there were only a few instances in which we were able to determine the effect AIC’s market presence has had on rates. Scope and Methodology
To determine the basis on which FAA revised its interpretation of turnaround service, we obtained detailed legal positions prepared by AIC, Aloha Airlines, and Hawaiian Airlines. Also in Washington, we met with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) attorney responsible for drafting the agency’s initial and revised interpretations of turnaround service. In Hilo, we met with a variety of agricultural producers who cultivate tropical plants and flowers destined primarily for mainland markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the basis for the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) revision of its interpretation of turnaround service in Hawaii, focusing on determining how American International Cargo's (AIC) November 1995 entry into the Hawaiian inter-island air cargo market with relatively noisy Stage 2 aircraft has affected--and how its potential future exit could affect--competition in Hawaii's air cargo markets.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in May 1995, FAA determined that one segment of a flight AIC had been operating in November 1990 with a single Stage 2 aircraft included a takeoff and a landing in Hawaii and that it therefore qualified as inter-island turnaround service; (2) consequently, FAA concluded that, under the Airport Noise and Capacity Act, AIC could legally initiate scheduled inter-island service using its single Stage 2 aircraft; (3) however, after a formal inquiry from Aloha Airlines and a broader assessment of the legislation's intent, FAA revised its interpretation of turnaround service; (4) this revised decision held that the flight AIC was operating in November 1990 did not constitute turnaround service because it included points outside Hawaii; (5) GAO's review of relevant legislation and the legislative history found FAA's revised interpretation to be legally sound; (6) in particular, the flight that AIC conducted at the time the federal noise legislation was passed does not qualify as turnaround service--defined in a 1991 amendment as consisting of the operation of a flight between two or more points, all of which are within the state of Hawaii--and therefore does not render the airline exempt from statutory noise requirements; (7) AIC's November 1995 entry into Hawaii's inter-island markets has enhanced competition markedly by providing new services to a variety of customers; (8) for instance, since that date, AIC has offered scheduled daytime flights using large cargo containers--a service that its competitors do not offer; (9) this service has facilitated the delivery of time-sensitive express cargo and has helped to create new mainland markets for some of Hawaii's agricultural producers, who previously had to rely on ocean transportation; (10) in addition, although the airlines and their customers could not provide GAO with sufficient data to determine AIC's overall impact on rates, anecdotal information indicates that the company has introduced some price competition into inter-island markets; (11) consequently, while there could be a discernable effect on the breadth of services provided if AIC exits Hawaii's inter-island markets after September 30, 1998, the extent to which rates might increase remains unclear; (12) AIC told GAO that it wishes to continue serving Hawaii's inter-island markets after this date; and (13) however, absent federal legislation extending AIC's right to use Stage 2 aircraft, the airline will need to use Stage 3 aircraft to remain in these markets. |
gao_GAO-12-47 | gao_GAO-12-47_0 | Risk management is a continuous process that includes the assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to determine what actions should be taken to reduce one or more of these elements of risk. One way in which DHS has applied risk management principles to the PSGP is through the use of a risk model to assess the relative risk posed to ports throughout the nation and to help determine PSGP eligibility and funding levels. Each port area’s allocation is driven by the results of the PSGP risk analysis model. DHS Allocated PSGP Funds Based Largely on Risk, but the Risk Model Can Be Further Strengthened
PSGP Allocations Were Largely Based on Port Risk and DHS Implementation Decisions
For fiscal years 2010 and 2011, DHS allocations of PSGP funds were based on DHS’s risk model and implementation decisions, and were made largely in accordance with risk. See table 3 below. Instead, the new vulnerability index recognizes that different ports can have different vulnerability levels. FEMA officials reported that grantees may not draw down their grant funds right away for two main reasons. One-Quarter of Awarded PSGP Grant Funding Is Unavailable to Grantees Due to Various Challenges
Of the nearly $1.7 billion in port security grants that FEMA awarded to port areas in fiscal years 2006 through 2010, more than $400 million—or about 24 percent—remained unavailable to grantees as of September 2011, as shown in table 6 below. Grantees cannot use unavailable funds to begin work on security projects. Of this, about $116 million—or 48 percent—was unavailable because the funds have not been used for specific projects.on-hold funds—exist in all four funding groups, and result when FEMA has approved the use of grant funding for a specific grant project, but compliance with postaward requirements—such as environmental and The second type of unavailable funds— budgetary reviews—has not been completed.requirements are met, these grant funds remain “on-hold.” Each type of unavailable funding—unused and on-hold—results from a different set of challenges, as discussed below. Without a more efficient review process, certain grant applicants that cannot fund the cost-match requirement may not receive grant funds to implement their projects, or may not even apply for funds. For example, although FEMA has systems to track the financial information related to its grants programs, these systems did not allow FEMA to track the status of grant reviews, such as EHP reviews. DHS and FEMA Have Taken Steps to Address Unavailable Balances
DHS and FEMA have taken a number of steps to address unavailable balances. FEMA Is Developing Measures to Assess PSGP Administration but Does Not Have Measures to Assess Effectiveness
In July 2011, during the course of our review, FEMA finalized eight performance measures designed to track how well FEMA GPD administers and manages the PSGP. FEMA has not evaluated the effectiveness of this program in strengthening critical maritime infrastructure against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks because it has not implemented measures to track progress toward achieving program goals. Best practices for project management also call for milestone dates, among other factors, in carrying out a project successfully. As a result, FEMA’s progress toward implementing measures to assess whether the program is achieving its stated purpose remains unclear. The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)—administered by FEMA and supported with subject matter expertise from the Coast Guard—is one tool DHS uses to protect critical maritime infrastructure from these risks. While the allocation process has been risk- based, FEMA has faced significant challenges administering the grant program. FEMA has taken steps to improve the availability of funds and has developed internal performance measures to begin evaluating its administration of the grant program. Initial steps have been taken to develop performance measures for the PSGP, but the time frame for implementing them is unclear. To strengthen DHS’s methodology for measuring vulnerability in ports, and to improve the precision of grant allocations to high-risk port areas, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to:
Develop a vulnerability index that accounts for how security improvements affect port vulnerability, and incorporate these changes into future iterations of the PSGP risk model. To ensure that waiver requests—including those submitted under previous cost-share years in which money remains unassigned and those that may be submitted in future grant rounds if a cost-share requirement is applied—are evaluated promptly, we recommend that the FEMA Administrator—in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security—evaluate the waiver review process to identify sources of delay and take measures to expedite the process. To strengthen the administration, oversight, and internal controls of the PSGP, and to streamline processes, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to develop—in collaboration with the Coast Guard—time frames and related milestones for implementing performance measures to monitor the effectiveness of the PSGP. However, as discussed in the report, further improvements are needed to ensure that the vulnerability score for a specific port is responsive to changes in security that may occur in that port—such as the implementation of new security measures—and that the vulnerability index is populated using the most precise data available. However, as discussed in the report, it is too early to know how effective these measures will be in helping FEMA to assess its performance and improve its grant management. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has awarded nearly $1.7 billion dollars to port areas through its Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) to protect critical maritime infrastructure and the public from terrorist attacks. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--a DHS component agency--is the agency responsible for distributing grant funds. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which DHS has (1) allocated PSGP funds in accordance with risk; (2) encountered challenges in administering the grant program and what actions, if any, DHS has taken to overcome these challenges; and (3) evaluated the effectiveness of the PSGP. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the PSGP risk model, funding allocation methodology, grant distribution data, and program documents, such as PSGP guidance. Additionally, GAO interviewed DHS and port officials about grant processes, funding distribution, and program challenges, among other things.
What GAO Found
In 2010 and 2011, PSGP allocations were based largely on port risk and determined through a combination of a risk analysis model and DHS implementation decisions. DHS uses a risk analysis model to allocate PSGP funding to port areas that includes all three elements of risk--threat, vulnerability, and consequence--and DHS made modifications to enhance the model's vulnerability element for fiscal year 2011. For example, DHS modified the vulnerability equation to recognize that different ports can have different vulnerability levels. However, the vulnerability equation is not responsive to changes in port security--such as the implementation of PSGP-funded security projects. Additionally, the vulnerability equation does not utilize the most precise data available in all cases. DHS addressed prior GAO recommendations for strengthening the vulnerability element of grant risk models, but the PSGP model's vulnerability measure could be further strengthened by incorporating the results of past security investments and by refining other data inputs. FEMA has faced several challenges in distributing PSGP grant funds, and FEMA has implemented specific steps to overcome these challenges. Only about one-quarter of awarded grant funding has been drawn down by grantees, and an additional one-quarter remains unavailable (see table below). Funding is unavailable--meaning that grantees cannot begin using the funds to work on projects--for two main reasons: federal requirements have not been met (such as environmental reviews), or the port area has not yet identified projects to fund with the grant monies. Several challenges contributed to funds being unavailable. For example, DHS was slow to review cost-share waiver requests--requests from grantees to forego the cost-share requirement. Without a more expedited waiver review process, grant applicants that cannot afford the cost-share may not apply for important security projects. Other challenges included managing multiple open grant rounds, complying with program requirements, and using an antiquated grants management system. FEMA has taken steps to address these challenges. For example FEMA and DHS have, among other things, increased staffing levels, introduced project submission time frames, implemented new procedures for environmental reviews, and implemented phase one of a new grants management system. However, it is too soon to determine how successful these efforts will be in improving the distribution of grant funds. FEMA is developing performance measures to assess its administration of the PSGP but it has not implemented measures to assess PSGP grant effectiveness. Although FEMA has taken initial steps to develop measures to assess the effectiveness of its grant programs, it does not have a plan and related milestones for implementing measures specifically for the PSGP. Without such a plan, it may be difficult for FEMA to effectively manage the process of implementing measures to assess whether the PSGP is achieving its stated purpose of strengthening critical maritime infrastructure against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS strengthen its methodology for measuring vulnerability in ports by accounting for how past security investments reduce vulnerability and by using the most precise data available. GAO also recommends that DHS evaluate the cost-share waiver review process and take steps to expedite the process where appropriate and develop a plan with milestones for implementing performance measures for the PSGP. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-114 | gao_GAO-15-114_0 | Figure 1 shows detention fees DOD accrued from fiscal years 2003 through 2012. To do so, they incorporated recommendations by DOD audit agencies and other organizations aimed at improving container management. However, it is uncertain whether all of the recommendations have been incorporated into DOD policy as appropriate because the department does not have a comprehensive list of the recommendations that have been made over the years. DOD’s Container- Management Policy and Guidance Incorporate Some Recommendations to Improve Container Management
Since the early years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, DOD officials have made efforts to improve container management in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Leadership’s responsibility for container management in the CENTCOM area of responsibility is addressed in the Container Detention memorandum signed by both the commander of U.S. Transportation Command and CENTCOM in August 2012.Transportation Command officials, this memorandum was published as a direct result of a recommendation made in a Joint Logistics Board report, also published in 2012, that included additional recommendations aimed at enhancing senior leaders’ understanding of container-management challenges and detention-fee payments and enforcing compliance with previously published container-management policy as outlined in CENTCOM’s Container Management Letter of Instruction. According to U.S. DOD Cannot Ensure That All Recommendations Addressing Container Management in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility Have Been Incorporated in Policy and Guidance as Appropriate
Notwithstanding DOD’s efforts to improve container management in the CENTCOM area of responsibility by either updating existing or developing new policy and guidance in response to recommendations made by DOD and other organizations, DOD cannot ensure recommendations have been addressed in policy and guidance as appropriate. However, DOD did not provide answers for the remaining 40 recommendations. DOD Has Taken Steps to Manage and Reduce Shipping- Container Detention Fees in Afghanistan, but Its Ability to Manage and Reduce These Fees Is Limited
Since mid-2012, DOD has taken a number of steps to manage and reduce shipping-container detention fees incurred for the untimely return of commercial shipping containers used in Afghanistan. The joint memorandum also established a requirement within the CENTCOM area of responsibility that within 15 days of a shipping container’s arrival, receiving organizations are to acknowledge receipt of the container, unload the container, and notify the responsible carrier that its container is available for pickup. DOD’s Incomplete and Inaccurate Container- Management Data Limits Its Ability to Manage and Reduce Detention Fees in Afghanistan
Although DOD has estimated that there will be a decrease in the amount of detention fees it will pay, its ability to manage and reduce detention fees for containers subject to them in Afghanistan is limited by incomplete and inaccurate data on the number and location of containers in country. Moreover, DOD has not assessed contributing factors to determine the root causes for its incomplete and inaccurate data. However, our analysis of DOD’s container-management system data and carrier delivery data for the end of each month in 2013 showed that DOD had not recorded in the container-management system about 16 percent of the carrier-owned containers delivered and received in Afghanistan. However, DOD has not identified the root cause or causes for the inaccurate inventory data that this recommendation and the selected technology are intended to address, which is critical if the department is to correct the procedural weaknesses that contribute to inaccurate and incomplete data. To help ensure DOD’s container-management system has more complete and accurate data, and DOD is better positioned to assess progress in managing containers to reduce detention fees, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander CENTCOM to identify the root cause or causes for the procedural weaknesses in the handling of containers and the extent to which they contribute to the incomplete and inaccurate recording of container-management data in theater, and develop and implement a corrective action plan with effective solutions for the root causes identified that provide for completion of corrective measures. DOD concurred with the first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive list of recommendations made by DOD agencies and other organizations, and make the information available for policymakers to incorporate, as appropriate, into new or existing container-management policy and guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD uses DOD or commercial carrier shipping containers to transport supplies worldwide. Container management has been a long-standing challenge. DOD has paid detention fees of about $823 million from 2003 through 2012 for retaining containers longer than allowed, primarily due to operations within CENTCOM, including Afghanistan, where fees continue to accrue. GAO was asked to review DOD's efforts to address container-management challenges and the accumulation of detention fees.
This report assesses the extent to which (1) DOD policy and guidance incorporate recommendations addressing container-management challenges in CENTCOM's area of responsibility, and (2) DOD has managed and reduced detention fees for containers in Afghanistan since 2012. GAO reviewed prior audit reports to identify container-management recommendations; analyzed data such as container type and ownership from 2010 through 2013; and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Since the early years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to improve container management in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility have included either updating existing or developing new container-management policy and guidance. However, the department cannot provide reasonable assurance that all recommendations addressing container management in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have been incorporated in DOD's policy or guidance, as appropriate. DOD officials incorporated some recommendations made by DOD audit agencies and other organizations aimed at improving container management into policy and guidance. For example, in August 2012 the commanders of CENTCOM and U.S. Transportation Command issued a joint memorandum outlining leadership's responsibility for container management in the CENTCOM area of responsibility that was a direct result of a 2012 Joint Logistics Board report that recommended corrective actions to enhance senior leaders' understanding of container management. However, DOD does not have a comprehensive list of the corrective actions that have been recommended over time. Without such a list, DOD cannot reasonably ensure that all of the recommendations have been incorporated into policy and guidance as appropriate. For example, of the 95 corrective actions that GAO identified from reports by DOD audit agencies and other organizations issued from 2003 through 2013, DOD officials could not provide information on steps taken to address 40 of the corrective actions.
Since 2012, DOD has taken steps to manage and reduce shipping container detention fees incurred due to the untimely return of commercial carrier-owned shipping containers in Afghanistan, but its ability to manage and reduce these fees is limited by inaccurate and incomplete data. In August 2012, DOD established the requirement that within 15 days of a shipping container's arrival: (1) receipt of the container was to be recorded by the unit in-theater, (2) the container was to be unloaded, and (3) the responsible carrier was to be notified that its container was available for pickup. DOD also developed a set of tracking metrics to monitor progress in meeting this requirement. However, incomplete and inaccurate data about the location and number of containers accruing detention fees hindered DOD's ability to manage and reduce detention fees for containers in Afghanistan. For example, GAO analysis of DOD's container-management system data and carrier delivery data for each month in 2013 showed that DOD had not recorded in the container-management system about 16 percent of the carrier-owned containers delivered and received in Afghanistan. DOD has identified factors, or procedural weaknesses, that may contribute to incomplete and inaccurate data; however, it has not assessed the extent to which these weaknesses have contributed to data inaccuracies, determined the root causes of these weaknesses, or developed a corrective-action plan for correcting them. Without an assessment of the root causes and a corrective-action plan, it will be difficult for DOD to have complete and accurate data, which could limit its ability to manage and reduce detention fees for containers in Afghanistan and in future contingency operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop a list of recommendations and incorporate them into policy and guidance and (2) identify root causes for procedural weaknesses that contribute to inaccurate, incomplete container data and develop and implement a corrective plan. DOD concurred with the first recommendation and partially concurred with the second because it partially disagreed to whom GAO directed the recommendation. GAO concurred and modified the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-799 | gao_GAO-08-799_0 | EEOC Responds to Individual Charges of Discrimination and Provides Broad Outreach, but Does Not Track Performance Related to Gender Pay Issues
Consistent with its legal mandate, EEOC addresses gender pay discrimination primarily by responding to individual charges, although it also conducts some agency-initiated investigations. EEOC collects detailed information on its enforcement efforts, but its does not specifically monitor its performance related to gender pay enforcement. As a result, EEOC does not use the information that it collects to identify trends related to gender pay, which could in turn help EEOC understand how its gender pay enforcement efforts contribute to overall performance goals and agency priorities. EEOC also conducts fee-based and free outreach on a broad range of topics, including gender pay. It monitors free outreach to ensure that it reaches both employers and workers and holds senior regional officials accountable for achieving high quality ratings on some fee-based outreach. Specifically:
EEOC assigns charges that appear to have merit based on the available evidence for further investigation to determine whether the employer violated anti-discrimination laws. At the same time, gender pay cases accounted for 19 percent of all agency-initiated investigations. A similar rise is not seen for agency-initiated gender pay cases. Labor Targets Systemic Gender Pay Discrimination and Conducts Outreach, but Limitations Exist in Enforcement Efforts and Monitoring Performance
Labor’s OFCCP conducts compliance evaluations of federal contractors, including those who may be engaging in systemic gender pay discrimination, but the mathematical model used to target contractors for systemic discrimination has not yet been evaluated. In addition, OFCCP regulations require that contractors conduct self-evaluations of their compensation systems, but relevant guidance is located in different sources and not cross-referenced. While OFCCP collects detailed enforcement data by type of discrimination, it does not use this data to monitor enforcement trends and performance outcomes regarding gender pay or other specific areas of discrimination. Even if it chose to monitor specific areas of discrimination, questionable reliability of enforcement data undermines OFCCP’s ability to monitor performance. As a result, OFCCP does not know the extent to which its gender pay enforcement efforts contribute to agencywide performance goals. OFCCP also conducts outreach to federal contractors on topics that may include gender pay, but does not systematically measure the performance of these efforts. In contrast, Labor’s Women’s Bureau, which also provides outreach on topics focused on working women, sets specific performance targets and measures its impact. To help allocate resources efficiently, OFCCP prioritizes some of its evaluations of federal contractors based on whether they may be engaging in any type of systemic discrimination. However, without this type of monitoring, OFCCP may have difficulty determining how best to prioritize its resources among the different types of discrimination it addresses. To strengthen OFCCP’s enforcement and outreach efforts and gauge the performance of those efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Director of OFCCP to: Evaluate the Westat mathematical model and incorporate lessons learned from the prior model to ensure contractors are appropriately being selected for compliance evaluations and to maximize limited enforcement resources; Improve oversight of compliance evaluations for contractors by establishing linkages between relevant and current guidance on conducting compensation self-evaluations and devising a unique violation code to document any non-compliance with the compensation self- evaluation requirement; Ensure the planned new data system incorporates standardized data entry instructions and adequate internal controls to screen for erroneous, inconsistent, or missing data, and ensures violation codes are correctly entered; Develop a cost-effective means for monitoring performance of gender pay enforcement efforts relative to other areas, using information generally already captured in existing databases, once determined reliable; and Devise a method for systematically collecting feedback from recipients of outreach and technical assistance and using this information to measure and monitor outreach performance. However, as we noted in our report, more than half of gender pay charges are filed only under Title VII. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To obtain information on how the Department of Labor (Labor) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforce laws and provide outreach addressing gender pay disparities, we reviewed documents and data and conducted interviews. In addition, we interviewed EEOC and Labor officials in their respective central offices and two field offices for each agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, GAO found that women, on average, earned 80 percent of what men earned in 2000 and workplace discrimination may be one contributing factor. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Labor (Labor) enforce several laws intended to prevent gender pay discrimination. GAO examined (1) how EEOC enforces laws addressing gender pay disparities among private sector employers and provides outreach and what is known about its performance, and (2) how Labor enforces laws addressing gender pay disparities among federal contractors and provides outreach and what is known about its performance. GAO analyzed relevant laws, regulations, monitoring reports, and agency enforcement data and conducted interviews at the agencies' central offices and two field offices experienced in gender pay cases.
What GAO Found
EEOC addresses gender pay discrimination primarily by responding to individual charges, initiating investigations, and conducting outreach, but the agency does not fully monitor gender pay enforcement efforts. EEOC prioritizes incoming charges of discrimination against employers that appear to merit further investigation, and GAO's analysis of EEOC data showed that charges of gender pay discrimination were prioritized for investigation more frequently than non-gender pay charges. EEOC collects detailed information on all its enforcement efforts and uses these data to monitor enforcement performance overall as well as by statute, including one statute dedicated to gender pay. However, EEOC does not monitor gender pay enforcement efforts under another statute that covers multiple discrimination topics and under which more than half of gender pay charges are filed. As a result, EEOC does not make complete use of available information to help identify trends related to gender pay cases, set agency priorities, or understand how its gender pay enforcement efforts are contributing to overall performance goals relative to other efforts. EEOC also conducts both fee-based and free outreach on a broad range of topics, which can include gender pay. EEOC monitors the number and type of free outreach activities and holds itself accountable for providing outreach to both employers and employees and obtaining high audience ratings on some fee-based outreach. Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) conducts compliance evaluations targeted to federal contractors based on whether they may be engaging in systemic discrimination, but efforts to monitor the performance of enforcement and outreach activities are limited. OFCCP uses a mathematical model to select contractors for review based on the likelihood of noncompliance, but it has not yet evaluated the model for how well it predicts systemic discrimination due to resource constraints. In addition, regulations require contractors to conduct a self-evaluation of their compensation systems to identify and address gender pay disparities. However, OFCCP's guidance on this is found in different source documents that are not cross-referenced, and its data system lacks a unique code to help the agency easily determine the extent to which contractors are complying with the self-evaluation requirement. While OFCCP collects enforcement data by type of discrimination and monitors enforcement performance overall, it does not monitor enforcement trends and performance outcomes regarding gender pay or other specific areas of discrimination. Even if it were to do so, questionable reliability of certain enforcement data undermines performance monitoring. As a result, OFCCP may have difficulty determining how best to prioritize its resources among the different types of discrimination it addresses. To increase awareness of anti-discrimination laws, OFCCP also conducts outreach to federal contractors on topics that include gender pay. OFCCP holds itself accountable for achieving a targeted number of events, but does not systematically gather recipient feedback and use it to measure the quality of its outreach efforts. In contrast, Labor's Women's Bureau, which also provides outreach to working women, sets performance targets and systematically measures its impact. |
gao_HEHS-98-211 | gao_HEHS-98-211_0 | There were similar difficulties in locating patients who had received a jaw implant device manufactured by Vitek. These responsibilities include providing agency field staff with guidance on inspecting manufacturers for compliance with the regulation during GMP inspections and monitoring corrections and removals of device products from the market. FDA Inspections Do Not Ensure Manufacturers Can Track Devices to End Users
FDA’s approach to ensuring that device manufacturers are operating tracking systems capable of tracing devices from distribution to end users has several limitations, such as a failure to include audits of the tracking systems in its inspections and infrequent inspections. Moreover, FDA has not taken steps to ensure that tracking continues when manufacturers responsible for tracking go out of business, merge, or are acquired by others. However, a senior FDA official told us that this requirement has never been used and is not included in FDA’s guidance manual. In addition, FDA’s inspections of manufacturers’ tracking systems have not been conducted at least once every 2 years, as required by GMP standards. In addition, the Office of Compliance also plans to develop an audit plan that will require FDA inspectors to independently verify the adequacy of manufacturers’ standard operating procedures for tracking and determine whether the procedures are being followed. FDA also did not terminate recalls of tracked devices in a timely manner. Of the 49 recalls that were reported completed by manufacturers, less than one-half were terminated by FDA within its 90-workday standard. Recommendations to the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration
To improve FDA’s ability to monitor manufacturer compliance with the medical device tracking regulation and conduct recalls of tracked devices in a timely manner, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA develop and implement a plan to verify the completeness and accuracy of data in the tracking systems of device manufacturers to ensure that the systems can trace devices through the chain of distribution to end users, take steps to recover the medical device tracking records of manufacturers that have failed and have not provided such information to FDA and report to the Congress on the results of its assessment of options for covering the costs of operating a device tracking system for failed establishments, revise the medical device tracking regulation to require an establishment that acquires the right to manufacture another establishment’s tracked device either through merger or acquisition to immediately notify FDA that it has assumed the tracking obligations of the former establishment, and examine the reasons for delays in completing recalls of tracked devices and develop and implement strategies for improving the timeliness of recalls. To determine the amount of time manufacturers and FDA took to complete recalls of tracked devices, we analyzed data in recall records and FDA’s recall database maintained by CDRH and the Office of Regulatory Affairs on the dispositions of 54 recalls of tracked devices that were initiated by manufacturers during fiscal years 1994 through 1996. FDA guidelines instruct manufacturers to complete recalls within 6 months from the date of initiation of the recall. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on whether the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is providing adequate oversight of the tracking systems of high-risk device manufacturers and whether recalls of devices are executed promptly, focusing on whether: (1) FDA ensures that manufacturers operate tracking systems that are capable of tracking devices through the distribution chain to end users; and (2) device manufacturers and FDA are executing recalls of tracked devices in a timely manner.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) there are several weaknesses in FDA's approach for determining whether device manufacturers are operating tracking systems capable of quickly locating and removing defective devices from the market and notifying patients who use them; (2) FDA's inspections of the tracking systems do not include independent audits that could verify the completeness and accuracy of data in the systems; (3) instead, the inspections focus on reviews of the manufacturers' written standard operating procedures for tracking; (4) further, although the good manufactured product standard require FDA to inspect manufacturers of tracked devices at least once every 2 years, only about one-half of the 238 manufacturers subject to tracking were inspected during fiscal year (FY) 1996 and FY 1997; (5) FDA attributed its limited inspection activity to a reduction in field resources; (6) FDA has also not acted to ensure that device tracking continues when establishments go out of business, merge, or are acquired by other entities; (7) FDA officials told GAO they are planning to revise their inspection program to include an audit plan to better assess manufacturers' compliance with the tracking requirements and redirect FDA's compliance priorities toward high-risk devices, such as implant devices; (8) the details for most of these plans, however, have not yet been determined; (9) in GAO's analysis of FDA's recall data, manufacturers and FDA have not acted in a timely manner to correct and remove defective devices from the market; (10) less than one-third of the 54 recalls initiated from FY 1994 through FY 1996 were completed by manufacturers within 6 months, as specified in FDA guidelines; (11) FDA has also had problems terminating device recalls in a timely manner; (12) less than one-half of the 49 recalls reported completed by manufacturers were reviewed and terminated by FDA within the 90-workday standard established by the agency; and (13) FDA officials have identified several factors that may contribute to delays in completing recalls, but an in-depth review of the recall procedures used by manufacturers and FDA has not been conducted. |
gao_AIMD-98-184 | gao_AIMD-98-184_0 | This report includes actual investment outlays for fiscal years 1981 through 1997 and estimates contained in the President’s 1999 budget for fiscal years 1998 through 2003. The estimates for 1998 through 2002 using the 1999 budget estimates are higher than those for the corresponding period contained in the 1998 budget both in dollars and as a percent of total outlays. Accordingly, to offer assurance that the investment trend line was not a function of the level of overall federal outlays, we analyzed the outlays’ share of GDP. As figure 2 shows, these estimates for the 1998 through 2002 period are higher in all years than the corresponding estimates from the 1998 budget. The spending pattern is different when analyzed in terms of constant dollars. As shown in figure 5, the 1999 budget estimates for investment from 1998 through 2002 range from slightly more than $2 billion to almost $11 billion higher than the 1998 budget estimates. Investment by Category
Investment by category is a way of describing the three major types of investment financed by the federal government—outlays for physical assets, research and development, and education and training. Estimates in the 1999 budget for 1998 through 2003 are in the $33 billion to $34 billion range and are higher than those contained in the 1998 budget. Based on the average annual outlays from 1981 through 2003, investment outlays in seven budget functions comprise about 95 percent of all investment outlays, with the top four comprising 79 percent of total investment. In descending order of constant dollar investment outlays, the functions are (1) Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services, (2) Transportation, (3) Health (principally R&D at the National Institutes of Health), (4) General Science, Space, and Technology, (5) Natural Resources and Environment, (6) National Defense, and (7) Energy. However, as illustrated in figure 10, 1999 budget estimates for 1998 through 2003 remain in the $27 billion to $28 billion range as compared to 1998 budget estimates which had projected a steady decrease after 1997 to $23 billion in 2002. Estimates in the 1999 budget increase from $12 billion in 1998 to $15 billion in 2003, in contrast to last year’s estimates which showed a gradual decline to $11 billion in 2002. Outlays then continued a fairly steady increase to $11 billion in 1995. Downward Trends
Investment outlays in the Natural Resources and Environment function (300), which includes items such as Environmental Protection Agency activities, show a continuous downward trend from 1981 through 2003. Estimates in the 1999 budget for 1998 through 2003 show a continuing decline to less than $5 billion. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO updated its 1997 report on federal investment trends.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the annual levels of investment spending for the period 1998 through 2002 in the President's 1999 budget is estimated to range from slightly more than $2 billion to almost $11 billion higher each year than the levels estimated in the President's 1998 budget for the same period; (2) only one budget function--energy--has lower estimates for 1998 through 2002 than in the 1998 budget; (3) the share of total federal budget outlays and of gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to investment declined slightly from the early 1980s through 1997; (4) according to the administration's policy estimates contained in the President's 1999 budget, investment's share of both outlays and GDP will increase slightly from 1998 through 2000 and then fall slightly through 2003; (5) these new estimates represent a change from the 1998 budget estimates which showed a continuing gradual decline from 1998 through 2002; (6) when investment outlays are converted to constant 1992 dollars, roughly the same picture emerges over this time period; (7) investment spending in estimated constant dollar outlays generally increased from the mid-1980s through 1995 before dropping in 1996 and 1997; (8) in the 1999 budget, investment spending is projected to increase from 1998 through 2000 and then gradually decrease through 2003; (9) after dropping from 1981 to 1983, physical capital remained relatively stable through 1995, with slight declines in 1996 and 1997; (10) the 1999 budget estimates for fiscal years 1998 through 2003 show a relatively stable level--around $33 billion to $34 billion each year; (11) this is a higher level than the 1998 budget estimates, which showed a steady decline from 1998 through 2002; (12) the research and development category had relatively steady increases from the mid-1980s through 1997 and estimates for 1998 through 2003 continue to increase; (13) this is a change from the estimates for 1998 through 2002 made in the 1998 budget which had shown modest decreases after 1998; (14) the pattern of investment from 1981 through 2003 in constant dollars varies across budget functions; (15) seven functions contain about 95 percent of investment outlays; (16) four of those functions, Education and Training, Transportation, Health, and General Science, Space, and Technology show general increases over this period; (17) the National Defense function shows several fluctuations but remains relatively flat overall; and (18) the Natural Resources and Environment and Energy functions shows a continued downward trend from the 1980s through 2003. |
gao_GAO-04-203 | gao_GAO-04-203_0 | Background
The space shuttle is the world’s first reusable space transportation system. Since it is the nation’s only launch system capable of transporting people, the shuttle’s viability is critical to the space station. However, efforts to do so have been stymied by the agency’s inability to develop a long-term strategic investment plan and a systematic approach for defining shuttle requirements, because the spacecraft’s life expectancy and mission have continued to change. Specifically, NASA has not made explicit decisions on shuttle requirements-–such as its future mission, lift capability, and life expectancy. NASA’s Process for Selecting and Prioritizing Upgrades Could Be Further Improved
NASA is making an effort to improve how it identifies, selects, and prioritizes shuttle upgrades. The SLEP Process Currently in Place
In December 2002, NASA initiated a SLEP as the primary framework for ensuring safe and effective operations, along with a management plan a few months later, documenting roles and responsibilities and an annual process for selecting and prioritizing upgraded projects and studies. Shuttle Upgrades Could Potentially Cost Billions More Than Currently Estimated
Until NASA finalizes the basic requirements for the shuttle and further improves its process for identifying and selecting upgrades, it will be difficult to accurately and reliably estimate the total cost of upgrades through 2020. The total cost of shuttle upgrades, however, could potentially be significantly greater as the estimate did not include potential projects such as a crew escape system. In addition, a number of potential changes could significantly increase the estimated cost, such as changes in program requirements, schedule slippages caused by delays in software and hardware integration, and implementation of recommendations of the CAIB. However, in June 2003, the agency estimated the shuttle upgrade cost through that year by using a rough order of magnitude estimate of $300 million-$500 million a year, or a total of $5 billion- $8 billion. NASA had planned to upgrade the shuttle in the future. Now, after the Columbia tragedy, NASA has an increased emphasis to fly the shuttle safely through 2020. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the agency’s efforts to modernize the space shuttle, we recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following four actions: Fully define the requirements for all elements of the ISTP so that those responsible for identifying, selecting, and prioritizing shuttle upgrades will have the guidance and a sound basis to ensure their decisions on upgrade projects are completely integrated with all other elements of the transportation plan. Assessment due by February 2004 for Service Life Extension Program Summit. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Columbia tragedy has accentuated the need to modernize the 20-year-old space shuttle, the only U.S. launch system that carries people to and from space. The shuttle will now be needed for another two decades. As it ages, the spacecraft's components will also age, and it may become increasingly unreliable. GAO examined the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) plans to upgrade the shuttle through 2020, how it will identify and select what upgrades are needed, how much the upgrades may cost, and what factors will influence that cost over the system's lifetime.
What GAO Found
NASA cannot fully define shuttle upgrade requirements until it resolves questions over the shuttle's operational life and determines requirements for elements of its Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) such as the International Space Station (ISS). Prior efforts to upgrade the shuttle have been stymied because NASA could not develop a strategic investment plan or systematically define the spacecraft's requirements because of changes in its life expectancy and mission. NASA is trying to improve how it identifies, selects, and prioritizes shuttle upgrades. In March 2003, it institutionalized a Space Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to ensure safe and effective operations, along with a management plan documenting roles and responsibilities and an annual process for selecting upgraded projects and studies. In addition, NASA will try to improve shuttle safety by implementing the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). NASA's estimate of the total cost to upgrade the shuttle--$300 million-$500 million a year, or a total of $5 billion-$8 billion through 2020--is reasonably based but could be significantly higher, as it does not include potential projects such as a crew escape system. It will be difficult for NASA to make an accurate estimate until it firmly establishes the basic requirements (such as life expectancy) for the shuttle and the process for selecting shuttle upgrades. A number of potential changes could significantly increase the cost of shuttle upgrades, including responses to the recommendations of the CAIB. |
gao_GAO-02-491T | gao_GAO-02-491T_0 | In other words, EPA indicated that SBREFA—the statute that Congress enacted to strengthen the RFA— caused the agency to use the discretion permitted in the RFA and conduct fewer regulatory flexibility analyses. Previous Reports on the RFA and SBREFA
We have issued several other reports in recent years on the implementation of the RFA and SBREFA that, in combination, illustrate both the promise and the problems associated with the statutes. For example, in 1991, we examined the implementation of the RFA with regard to small governments and concluded that each of the four federal agencies that we reviewed had a different interpretation of key RFA provisions. SBA repeatedly characterized some agencies as satisfying the act’s requirements, but other agencies were consistently viewed as recalcitrant. We also recommended that OMB take certain actions to improve the administration of these review requirements, some of which have been implemented. For example, some agencies did not consider their rules to have a significant impact because they believed the underlying statutes, not the agency-developed regulations, caused the effect on small entities. | What GAO Found
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) requires agencies to prepare an initial and a final regulatory flexibility analysis. The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA) seeks to strengthen RFA protections for small entities, and some of the act's requirements are built on "significant impact." GAO has reviewed the implementation of RFA and SBREFA several times in recent years, with topics ranging from specific provisions in each statute to the overall implementation of RFA. Although both of these reforms have clearly affected how federal agencies regulate, GAO believes that their full promise has not been realized, and key questions about RFA remain unanswered. These questions lie at the heart of RFA and SBREFA, and their answers can have a substantive effect on the amount of regulatory relief provided through those statutes. Because Congress did not answer these questions when the statutes were enacted, agencies have had to develop their own answers, and those answers differ. |
gao_GGD-98-28 | gao_GGD-98-28_0 | The S&T Committee, whose charter has not been revised since before CTAC was created, does not reflect the committee’s current composition, responsibilities, and relationship to CTAC. Also, CTAC did not systematically consider and fund the counterdrug technology needs of state and local agencies as part of its process for selecting and funding projects, and, until recently, state and local agencies were not represented on the S&T Committee. In addition, although several agencies told us of cases in which CTAC efforts had helped them to avoid unnecessary duplicative research, CTAC was unaware of these cases because it had no system in place to determine the extent to which unnecessary duplication was identified and avoided due to CTAC’s efforts. CTAC Has Not Used the S&T Committee Regularly and Consistently
CTAC has not regularly and consistently involved the full S&T Committee in key decisions relating to its coordination process. However, our task of determining CTAC’s contributions to federal drug control efforts was complicated because CTAC has no meaningful performance measures to enable it to (1) assess the extent to which it is achieving its mission and contributing to the development and deployment of counterdrug technology and (2) identify and implement any needed improvements to better achieve its mission. In summary, these agency officials considered 10 of the 36 projects to be contributions because they had different criteria than CTAC for considering a project a contribution. Meaningful Performance Measures Were Lacking
Determining CTAC’s progress in achieving its mission and its contributions to the development and deployment of counterdrug technology was complicated by CTAC’s lack of meaningful performance indicators or measures. Conclusions
CTAC has in place a coordination process for identifying counterdrug technology needs and selecting and funding R&D projects to meet those needs. Recommendations
For CTAC to more effectively coordinate with federal, state, and local counterdrug R&D agencies in identifying and prioritizing technology needs and selecting projects for CTAC funding, we recommend that the Director, ONDCP, direct the Chief Scientist to work with the S&T Committee to help ensure that:
The S&T Committee meets regularly to exchange information on federal, state, and local drug supply and demand reduction technology needs; obtain, assess, and prioritize R&D needs; and recommend to the Chief Scientist selection and funding of the otherwise unfunded highest priority projects. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to the request of the Chairman of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control that we review the operations and contributions of the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC), our objectives were to determine (1) how CTAC coordinates its counterdrug research and development (R&D) efforts with other federal agencies to address counterdrug R&D needs that are not being met by other agencies and to avoid unnecessary duplication and (2) what contributions CTAC has made to counterdrug R&D efforts since its creation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the operations and contributions of the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC), focusing on: (1) how CTAC coordinates its counterdrug research and development (R&D) efforts with other federal agencies to address counterdrug R&D needs that are not being met by other agencies and to avoid unnecessary duplication; and (2) what contributions CTAC has made to counterdrug R&D efforts since its creation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) CTAC has a coordination process in place for identifying counterdrug technology needs and selecting and funding R&D projects to meet those needs; (2) however, GAO identified the following shortcomings in CTAC's design and execution of the process: (a) the Science and Technology (S&T) Committee's charter, which was created before CTAC existed, does not reflect the Committee's current composition, responsibilities, and relationship to CTAC; (b) CTAC did not regularly and consistently involve the S&T Committee in its coordination process; (c) CTAC did not regularly evaluate and prioritize the agencies' counterdrug R&D technology needs to ensure that it funded otherwise unfunded projects with the highest priority; (d) CTAC did not systematically identify and consider the counterdrug technology needs of state and local agencies, in conjunction with federal agencies' needs, as part of its regular process for selecting and funding projects, and state and local agencies were only recently represented on the S&T Committee; (e) agencies generally did not submit transitional or acquisition plans to CTAC; and (f) although a few agencies cited instances where duplication was avoided as a result of CTAC's efforts, CTAC had not developed any means for determining the extent to which unnecessary duplication had been identified and avoided due to its efforts; (3) as a result of these shortcomings, neither GAO nor CTAC could determine the extent to which its coordination process was meeting its mission; (4) GAO's task of determining CTAC's contribution to federal drug control efforts was complicated by CTAC's lack of meaningful performance measures to enable it to: (a) assess its progress in achieving its mission and contributing to the development and deployment of counterdrug technology; and (b) identify and implement any needed improvements to better achieve its mission; (5) CTAC's Chief Scientist told GAO that he considered not just technologies that are completed and in use as contributions, but also uncompleted projects that have reached various stages of development; and (6) the contact officials of the lead R&D agencies identified by CTAC told GAO that they considered 10 of the 36 projects cited as contributions by CTAC to be actual contributions. |
gao_GAO-13-698 | gao_GAO-13-698_0 | Both services’ aviation communities have used simulators for more than half a century. Specifically, until the 1980s, training in the ground communities was primarily live training. In addition, in response to an increase in vehicle rollovers, both services began using egress trainers to train servicemembers to safely evacuate their vehicles. In developing a similar training system— the Marine Corps Instrumentation Training System —the service determined that it could reuse 87 percent of the components in the Army’s system. As a result, officials told us, the Marine Corps achieved approximately $11 million in cost avoidance and fielded the system in 2 years instead of the projected 9 years. According to Marine Corps officials, they are monitoring the Army’s LVC-IA initiative to leverage applicable technology and lessons learned. The Army and Marine Corps Consider Various Factors in Determining the Mix of Live and Simulation-Based Training, But Lack Key Information to Assess the Impact and Cost of Simulation- Based Training
The Army and Marine Corps consider various factors —such as safety, and training objective or mission—in determining whether to use live or simulation-based training to meet training requirements. In addition, the services have not developed a methodology to identify the costs associated with using simulation-based training. To leverage the advantages associated with both types of training and determine whether to use live or simulation-based training, officials from the services consider a number of factors, such as: training objective or mission; safety of servicemembers conducting the training and the safety of the general public; required training frequency for the task; available training time; the need to replicate environmental conditions, e.g., weather conditions; availability of training ranges, simulators, and simulations; and realism of existing simulators and simulations, including their concurrency.guidance, when deciding whether to use simulation-based training, the primary consideration is improving the quality of training and the state of readiness; potential cost savings or avoided costs are an important, but secondary, consideration. The Army and Marine Corps Cite Benefits of Simulation-Based Training, but Lack Information to Evaluate Impacts on Performance and Cost
Army and Marine Corps training documents and officials from both services have noted benefits from the use of simulation-based training — both in terms of training effectiveness and in terms of cost savings or cost avoidance. Currently, in the absence of performance data, the services obtain information on the contribution of simulation-based training from subject matter experts, who are responsible for developing training programs of instruction and overarching strategies, as well as information based on feedback and after action reports from deployments and training exercises. However, taking additional steps to expand these efforts by establishing performance-oriented metrics and a methodology to identify the costs associated with simulation-based training would provide them greater insights into how the use of simulation-based training contributes to improved performance or proficiency of servicemembers, and a point of comparison for assessing the cost implications of using simulation-based or live training. Moreover, until the Army and Marine Corps take actions to increase their visibility over the impact of simulation-based training on performance and costs, they will continue to lack key information that could assist them in determining how to optimize the mix of live and simulation-based training in the future and target simulation-based training investments on the devices that have the greatest potential to improve mission performance. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve decision makers’ abilities to make fully informed decisions concerning whether training requirements can be met with live and simulation-based training and determine optimal mixes of live and simulation-based training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the following two actions:
Develop outcome-oriented performance metrics that can be used to assess the impact of simulation-based training on improving the performance or proficiency of servicemembers and units. In its comments, DOD noted that the Army and Marine Corps capture all relevant costs needed for decision-making during the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process in procuring simulators/simulation devices. In our report, we specifically recognize that the Army and Marine Corps assess costs associated with simulation based devices, such as life cycle costs, as they make acquisition decisions and during their budget development process when they determine funding needs to operate acquired devices. To determine how the Army’s and Marine Corps’ use of simulation-based training devices has changed since the services first began using simulators, we reviewed and analyzed service briefings and documentation that provided information on the historical use of simulation-based training devices, and the timelines within which simulators for various occupations became available. To ascertain the factors the Army and Marine Corps consider in determining whether to use live or simulation-based training, including the extent to which they consider performance and cost information, we assessed Army and Marine Corps documentation, such as the 2013 Army Posture Statement; U.S Army Training Concept 2012-2020; Army Regulation 350-38, Policies and Management for Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations; the 2012 Army Training Strategy; the Posture of the United States Marine Corps, 2013 Report to Congress; and Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2013. We also reviewed our previous reports on Air Force and Navy virtual training. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army and Marine Corps use live and simulation-based training to meet training goals and objectives. Service officials have noted benefits from the use of simulation-based training--both in terms of training effectiveness and in cost savings or cost avoidance. A House report accompanying the bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012 mandated GAO to review the status of the military services' training programs. This report follows GAO's reports on the Navy and Air Force, and assesses (1) changes in the Army's and Marine Corps' use of simulation-based training, including efforts to integrate live and simulation-based training capabilities; and (2) the factors the Army and Marine Corps consider in determining whether to use live or simulation-based training, including the extent to which they consider performance and cost information. GAO focused on a broad cross-section of occupations (e.g., aviation, armor, artillery), and analyzed service training strategies and other documents; and conducted six site visits and interviewed service officials involved with training and training development for the selected occupations.
What GAO Found
Over the past several decades, the Army and Marine Corps have increased their use of simulation-based training--simulators and computer-based simulations. Historically, the aviation communities in both services have used simulators to train servicemembers in tasks such as takeoffs, and emergency procedures that could not be taught safely live. In contrast, the services' ground communities used limited simulations prior to 2000. However, advances in technology, and emerging conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to increased use of simulation-based training in the ground forces. For example, in response to increases in vehicle rollovers, both services began using simulators to train servicemembers to safely evacuate vehicles. The services are also collaborating in the development of some simulation-based training devices. For instance, according to Marine Corps officials, the service reused 87 percent of the Army's Homestation Instrumentation Training System's components in its own training system, achieving about $11 million in cost avoidance and saving an estimated 7 years in fielding time. The services are also taking steps to better integrate live and simulation-based training, developing technical capabilities to connect previously incompatible simulation-based training devices. The Army's capability is now being fielded, and the Marine Corps' is in the initial development phase.
The Army and Marine Corps consider various factors in determining whether to use live or simulation-based training, but lack key performance and cost information that would enhance their ability to determine the optimal mix of training and prioritize related investments. As the services identify which requirements can be met with either live or simulation-based training or both, they consider factors such as safety and training mission. Also, they have cited numerous benefits of simulation-based training, such as improving servicemember performance in live training events, and reducing operating costs. Both services rely on subject matter experts, who develop their training programs, and after action reports from deployments and training exercises for information on how servicemembers may have benefited from simulation-based training. However, neither service has established outcome metrics to assist them in more precisely measuring the impact of using simulation-based devices to improve performance or proficiency. Leading management practices recognize that performance metrics can help agencies determine the contributions that training makes to improve results. Army and Marine Corps officials also generally consider simulation-based training to be less costly than live training and analyze some data, such as life cycle costs, when considering options to acquire a particular simulation-based training device. However, once simulation-based training devices are fielded, the services neither reevaluate cost information as they determine the mix of training nor have a methodology for determining the costs associated with simulation-based training. Federal internal control standards state that decision makers need visibility over a program's financial data to determine whether the program is meeting the agencies' goals and effectively using resources. Without better performance and cost data, the services lack the information they need to make more fully informed decisions in the future regarding the optimal mix of training and how best to target investments for simulation-based training capabilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the services develop metrics, and a methodology to compare live and simulation-based training costs. DOD partially concurred, but noted that it captures all relevant costs needed for decision making. GAO continues to believe the services may not be considering some important simulation-based training costs and a specific methodology is needed to more fully identify the universe of costs needed for comparison purposes. |
gao_GGD-99-120 | gao_GGD-99-120_0 | We requested comments on a draft of this report from OMB, the Departments of Agriculture and Energy, and NASA. The Relationship Between NPR Recommendations and Agency Savings Claims Was Not Clear
OMB generally did not distinguish between NPR’s and other contributions for the agency-specific recommendations we reviewed. OMB Used Standard Budget Estimating Techniques to Estimate Savings
According to OMB, the procedures and techniques it used to estimate NPR savings were those that it commonly follows in developing the President’s budget. OMB last updated its estimates in 1997, so any changes that have occurred since then are not reflected in NPR’s claimed savings. Our prior reviews of budget estimates have shown that it is difficult to reconstruct the specific assumptions used or to track savings for estimates produced several years ago. As we reported in 1996, once an estimate is prepared and time passes, it becomes difficult to retrace the original steps and reconstruct events in order to replicate the original estimate.Moreover, it is often difficult to isolate the impacts of particular proposals on actual savings achieved due to the multiple factors involved. Estimated savings from both recommendations were included when OMB aggregated total NPR-estimated savings. Offsetting Costs May Not Have Been Fully Included
OMB and CBO both estimated savings for the recommendation to streamline USDA, and these estimates differed. While OMB estimated the savings to be $770 million, CBO’s estimate was $446 million—a difference of $324 million. . . with respect to the costs associated with severance benefits and relocation. While the administration assumes that agency baseline budgets are large enough to absorb these costs, CBO assumes that the costs would reduce the potential savings. OMB Lacked Documentation and Reported Estimates Incorrectly
According to OMB, consistent with its normal budget practices, OMB examiners generally did not retain documentation for NPR savings estimates. Instead, the OMB examiners attempted to reconstruct how they thought the savings had been estimated through approximating rather than replicating savings estimates. OMB did, however, provide documentation on the estimated savings for two of the six recommendations we reviewed. Conclusions
NPR claimed savings from agency-specific recommendations that could not be fully attributed to its efforts. We also found that some savings were overstated because OMB counted savings twice, and two of the estimates were reported incorrectly, resulting in claims that were understated. From that amount, OMB subtracted offsetting costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the savings claims from the National Performance Review (NPR), which has been renamed the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, focusing on how the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated savings from selected NPR recommendations targeted toward individual agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NPR claimed savings from agency-specific recommendations that could not be fully attributed to its efforts; (2) OMB generally did not distinguish NPR's contributions from other initiatives or factors that influenced budget reductions at the agencies GAO reviewed; (3) therefore, the relationship between the recommended action and the savings claimed from the recommendations GAO reviewed was not clear; (4) to estimate the savings from the agency-specific recommendations, OMB said it used the same types of procedures and analytic techniques that have long been used in developing the President's budget; (5) as GAO's previous reviews of budget estimates have shown, it is difficult to reconstruct the specific assumptions used and track savings for estimates produced several years ago; (6) moreover, GAO has reported that it is often impossible to isolate the impacts of particular proposals or recommendations on actual savings achieved due to the multiple factors involved; (7) OMB relied on these point-in-time estimates rather than attempting to measure actual savings; (8) OMB last updated its estimates in 1997, so any changes that have occurred since then are not reflected in NPR's claimed savings; (9) GAO identified two instances where OMB counted at least part of the estimated savings twice; (10) therefore, the total estimated savings from the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration recommendations were overstated; (11) for one recommendation where OMB and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) both estimated savings, GAO found that offsetting program costs may not have been fully included in OMB's estimates; (12) in estimating savings that resulted from personnel reductions at USDA, OMB and CBO considered different offsetting costs and arrived at different estimates, with CBO's estimate being $324 million less than OMB's $770 million estimate; (13) according to CBO, it assumed that severance benefits and relocation costs would reduce the potential savings, while OMB assumed that the agency could absorb those costs; (14) consistent with OMB's normal budget practices, OMB examiners generally did not retain documentation when estimating NPR savings; (15) instead, the OMB examiners attempted to reconstruct how they thought the savings had been estimated through approximating rather than replicating savings estimates; (16) OMB had documentation for two of the recommendations GAO reviewed; and (17) however, GAO found that the savings were reported incorrectly. |
gao_GAO-12-800 | gao_GAO-12-800_0 | The Executive Branch Has Not Issued Clearly Defined Policy Guidance for Determining When a Federal Civilian Position Needs a Security Clearance
The DNI, in the capacity as Security Executive Agent responsible for developing uniform and consistent policies related to the security clearance process, has expressed intent to issue guidance relating to national security positions. OPM Has Developed a Tool to Help Agencies Determine the Proper Sensitivity Level for Most Federal Positions, but the Tool Lacks Input from the DNI
To assist with position designation, the Director of OPM—the Executive Agent for Suitability—has developed a process that includes a position designation system and corresponding automated tool to guide agencies in determining the proper sensitivity level for the majority of federal This tool—namely, the Position Designation of National positions.Security and Public Trust Positions—enables a user to evaluate a position’s national security and suitability requirements so as to determine a position’s sensitivity and risk levels, which in turn dictate the type of background investigation that will be required for the individual who will occupy that position. More recently, after the implementation of the tool, in an April 2012 audit of a DOD agency, OPM assessed the sensitivity levels of 39 positions, and OPM’s designations differed from the agency’s designations in 26 of those positions. The Executive Branch Does Not Have a Consistent Process for Reviewing and Validating Existing Security Clearance Requirements for Civilian Positions
According to Executive Order 12968, the number of employees that each agency determines is eligible for access to classified information shall be kept to the minimum required, and, subject to certain exceptions, eligibility shall be requested or granted only on the basis of a demonstrated, foreseeable need for access. Additionally, Executive Order 12968 states that access to classified information shall be terminated when an employee no longer has a need for access, and that requesting or approving eligibility for access in excess of the actual requirements is prohibited. Also, Executive Order 13467 authorizes the DNI to issue guidelines or instructions to the heads of agencies regarding, among other things, uniformity in determining eligibility for access to classified information. During our review of several DHS and DOD components, we found that officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum but were not always subject to a requirement to review and validate the security clearance needs of existing positions on a periodic basis. The fiscal year 2012 base price for a top secret clearance investigation conducted by OPM is $4,005 and the periodic reinvestigation is $2,711, while the base price of an investigation for a secret clearance is $260. Agencies employ varying practices because the DNI has not established a requirement that executive branch agencies consistently review and revise or validate existing position designations on a recurring basis. Without a requirement to consistently review, revise, or validate existing security clearance position designations, executive branch agencies—such as DHS and DOD—may be hiring and budgeting for both initial and periodic security clearance investigations using position descriptions and security clearance requirements that no longer reflect national security needs. Finally, since reviews are not being done consistently, DHS and DOD and other executive branch agencies cannot have reasonable assurances that they are keeping to a minimum the number of positions that require security clearances on the basis of a demonstrated and foreseeable need for access. Without collaborative input from both OPM and DNI in future revisions to the tool, executive branch agencies will continue to risk making security clearance determinations that are inconsistent or at improper levels. Finally, while Executive Order 12968 says that clearances should, subject to certain exceptions, be granted only on the basis of a demonstrated need for access and kept to a minimum, the DNI has not issued guidance that requires agencies to review and revise or validate their existing federal civilian position designations. While ODNI concurred with our first recommendation—that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining whether federal civilian positions require a security clearance—OPM stated that it is not clear to OPM that it has a significant role in prescribing the policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if a federal civilian position requires a security clearance. We are also sending copies to the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of Management and Budget. To determine the extent to which the executive branch has established policies and procedures for agencies to review and revise or validate existing federal civilian position security clearance requirements, we interviewed knowledgeable officials from the federal agencies and selected components in table 1. DOD commonly employs this practice and, in some cases, the individual ultimately never requires access to classified information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Security clearances allow personnel access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can, in some cases, cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In 2011, the DNI reported that over 4.8 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible for a clearance. To safeguard classified data and manage costs, agencies need an effective process to determine whether civilian positions require a clearance. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which the executive branch has established policies and procedures for agencies to use when (1) first determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance and (2) reviewing and revising or validating existing federal civilian position security clearance requirements. GAO reviewed executive orders and the Code of Federal Regulations and met with officials from ODNI and OPM because of their Directors assigned roles as Security and Suitability executive agents, as well as DHS and DOD based on the volume of clearances they process.
What GAO Found
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), as Security Executive Agent, has not provided agencies clearly defined policy and procedures to consistently determine if a position requires a security clearance. Executive Order 13467 assigns DNI responsibility for, among other things, developing uniform and consistent policies to determine eligibility for access to classified information, and gives the DNI authority to issue guidance to agency heads to ensure uniformity in processes relating to those determinations. In the absence of this guidance, agencies are using an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) tool that OPM designed to determine the sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the type of investigation needed. OPM audits, however, found inconsistency in these position designations, and some agencies described problems in implementing OPMs tool. In an April 2012 audit, OPM reviewed the sensitivity levels of 39 positions in an agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) and reached different conclusions than the agency for 26 of them. Problems exist, in part, because OPM and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) did not collaborate on the development of the position designation tool, and because their roles for suitabilityconsideration of character and conduct for federal employmentand security clearance reform are still evolving. Without guidance from the DNI, and without collaboration between the DNI and OPM in future revisions to the tool, executive branch agencies will continue to risk making security clearance determinations that are inconsistent or at improper levels.
The DNI also has not established guidance to require agencies to review and revise or validate existing federal civilian position designations. Executive Order 12968 says each agency shall request or grant clearance determinations, subject to certain exceptions, based on a demonstrated need for access, and keep to a minimum the number of employees that it determines are eligible for access to classified information. The order also states that access to classified information shall be terminated when an employee no longer has a need for access, and prohibits agencies from requesting or approving eligibility in excess of actual requirements for access. During this review of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD components, GAO found that agency officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum, but were not always required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security clearance needs of existing positions. Overdesignating positions results in significant cost implications, given that the fiscal year 2012 base price for a top secret clearance investigation conducted by OPM is $4,005, while the base price of a secret clearance is $260. Conversely, underdesignating positions could lead to security risks. GAO found that the agencies follow varying practices because the DNI has not established guidance that requires executive branch agencies to review and revise or validate position designations on a recurring basis. Without such a requirement, executive branch agencies may be hiring and budgeting for initial and periodic security clearance investigations using position descriptions and security clearance requirements that no longer reflect national security needs. Further, since reviews are not done consistently, DHS and DOD and other executive branch agencies cannot have assurances that they are keeping the number of positions that require security clearances to a minimum.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the DNI issue clearly defined policy for agencies to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance, and that the DNI and Director of OPM collaborate to revise the existing position designation tool. GAO further recommends that the DNI issue guidance to require agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of their existing federal civilian positions. ODNI and OPM concurred, although OPM raised concerns with which GAO disagrees and addresses in the report. |
gao_GAO-15-463 | gao_GAO-15-463_0 | To establish statutory objectives for DOD to achieve financial statements that are validated as ready for audit by a certain date, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 mandated that DOD develop and maintain a FIAR Plan that includes, among other things, the specific actions to be taken and costs associated with (1) correcting the financial management deficiencies that impair the department’s ability to prepare timely, reliable, and complete financial management information and (2) ensuring that DOD’s financial statements are validated as ready for audit by not later than September 30, 2017. FIAR strategy and methodology (6 recommendations). In its May 2015 FIAR Plan Status Report, DOD stated that 9 recommendations were met and the remaining 20 were partially met. While DOD is making progress, it is important to note that implementation of the panel’s recommendations may not include all of the actions that the department must take to achieve auditable financial statements. For example, as the DOD IG and the IPA firms perform examinations and audits, they may identify deficiencies in internal controls that were not previously known and therefore were not addressed by the panel’s recommendations. Two of these relate to the area on challenges to achieving financial management reform and auditability. DOD has also met the requirements of four financial management workforce- related recommendations. DOD’s Actions Have Partially Met 20 of the Panel’s Remaining Recommendations
We agree with DOD that the department’s actions partially met the remaining 20 panel recommendations, described below by the four areas of the panel’s review, and continued actions are needed. ERP System Implementation Efforts
The panel made nine recommendations in this area, and we agree with DOD that all of these recommendations have been partially met and none have been fully met. Conclusions
The panel’s report and its recommendations touch on some of the most critical challenges the department faces in achieving lasting financial management improvements and financial statement audit readiness. DOD is monitoring its progress implementing the FIAR Plan against interim milestones. However, as the target date for validating DOD’s audit readiness approaches, as we have previously stated, DOD has emphasized asserting audit readiness by set dates over assuring that processes, systems, and controls are effective, reliable, and sustainable. While time frames are important for measuring progress, DOD should not lose sight of the ultimate goal of implementing lasting financial management reform to ensure that it can routinely generate reliable, auditable financial information and other information critical to decision making and effective operations. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help meet its financial management improvement and audit readiness goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to reconsider the status of the three panel recommendations that DOD classified as met that we determined were partially met and take the necessary actions to reasonably assure that these recommendations have been met. Appendix I: Status of DOD’s Actions to Implement the Panel on Defense Financial Management and Auditability Reform Recommendations
This appendix contains our assessment of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) progress in addressing the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Defense Financial Management and Auditability Reform’s (the panel) recommendations, organized by the four areas the panel reviewed. The status of each recommendation is based on our assessment of information received prior to or as of May 2015 and DOD’s reported status as of the May 2015 Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan Status Report. For example, DOD’s components must first determine the existence of these assets. DOD Actions: The department, in its May 2015 FIAR Plan Status Report, stated that it has a three-pronged approach for addressing risk management in which DOD has (1) identified audit readiness deal- breakers by reviewing past audits, (2) defined the critical path to achieving financial statement auditability and included related tasks and milestones in the April 2015 FIAR Guidance, and (3) reinforced the importance of internal controls over areas of significant risk by including a new chapter on internal controls in the FIAR Guidance and implementing a centralized tracking database to monitor corrective actions developed in response to notices of findings and recommendations generated from examinations and audits. Moreover, because the panel recommendation is addressed to the department, the FIAR Governance Board members need to attest for their individual components and the DOD Comptroller needs to attest for the department whether they are on track to achieve audit readiness in 2017 in each FIAR Plan Status Report to fully meet this recommendation. GAO Status: We consider this recommendation partially met because the department has not yet assessed the competencies of all civilian, military, and contracted personnel performing financial management- related functions, as recommended by the panel. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
A congressional panel examined the capacity of DOD's financial management system for providing timely, reliable, and useful information for decision making and reporting. The panel, in its January 2012 report, included 29 recommendations addressed to DOD in four areas: (1) FIAR strategy and methodology, (2) challenges to achieving financial management reform and auditability, (3) financial management workforce, and (4) enterprise resource planning systems implementation.
GAO was asked to review the status of DOD's actions to implement these recommendations. This report examines the extent to which the recommendations have been implemented. GAO reviewed pertinent legislation, including the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2010 through 2015 as well as the department's FIAR Guidance and FIAR Plan Status Reports. GAO analyzed relevant information and interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, and two service providers. Using the three status categories developed for GAO's high-risk work—met, partially met, and not met—GAO determined the extent to which DOD implemented the panel's recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress toward implementing each of the 29 recommendations made by the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Financial Management and Auditability Reform (the panel). GAO determined that DOD's actions met 6 of the panel's recommendations and partially met the other 23. In its May 2015 Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan Status Report, DOD reported that 9 recommendations were met and 20 were partially met. The 3 recommendations for which GAO disagreed with DOD's reported status of met related to (1) attestations on audit readiness in each of the FIAR Plan Status Reports; (2) inclusion of FIAR-related goals in Senior Executive Service performance plans, and rewarding and evaluating performances over time based on those goals; and (3) the review of audit readiness assertions by component senior executive committees. For example, while each FIAR Plan Status Report is coordinated among FIAR Governance Board (Board) members, including the Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer among others, in these reports Board members do not explicitly attest to whether DOD is on track to achieve audit readiness in 2017 as called for by the panel's recommendation and not all Board members provide signed statements about component audit readiness in the reports.
GAO and DOD agree that the remaining 20 recommendations were partially met and continued actions are needed, but GAO found that additional actions are needed to address some recommendations. These 20 partially met recommendations cover such diverse topics as a strategy for the consolidation of component financial information, valuation of historical asset costs, and assessing the competencies of the civilian financial management workforce. For example, DOD has made progress in assessing the competencies of its civilian financial management workforce in the financial management community, but has not yet assessed the competencies of all civilian, military, and contracted personnel performing financial-related functions, as recommended by the panel. Other recommendations are related to the implementation of enterprise resource planning systems—automated systems that perform a variety of business-related financial management tasks. DOD officials have stated that these systems are critical to DOD's ability to achieve audit readiness, but none of these recommendations have been fully met.
The panel's report and its recommendations touch on some of the most critical challenges DOD faces in achieving lasting financial management improvements and financial statement audit readiness. However, it is important to note that implementation of the panel's recommendations may not include all of the actions needed for DOD to achieve auditable financial statements. As auditors perform examinations and audits, they may identify deficiencies that were not previously known and therefore were not addressed by the panel's recommendations. DOD is monitoring its progress for implementing the FIAR Plan against interim milestones included in its April 2015 FIAR Guidance. However, as the audit readiness date approaches, DOD has emphasized asserting audit readiness by set dates over assuring that processes, systems, and controls are effective, reliable, and sustainable. While time frames are important for measuring progress, DOD should not lose sight of the ultimate goal of implementing lasting financial management reform, among other things, to ensure that it can routinely generate reliable, auditable financial information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DOD reconsider the status of three panel recommendations that it determined to be met but that GAO determined to be only partially met. DOD concurred with the recommendation and described planned actions to address it. |
gao_GAO-01-566 | gao_GAO-01-566_0 | Background
The ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars is the cornerstone of U.S. defense strategy. The fleet of civilian and military passenger and cargo aircraft and the En Route System (ERS) airfields provide the critical air component. Shortfall in Capacity Predicted, Precise Amounts Unclear
According to DOD’s January 2001 estimate, in the event of overlapping major theater wars in Korea and Southwest Asia, the 13 ERS airfields would not currently have enough capacity to move the required amounts of personnel and equipment to the war zones in the time required (the specific requirements and capacities are classified). DOD expects the shortfall to be largely eliminated by 2005. As a result, the remaining bases have become much more important as the only airfield options available for en- route mobilization support. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the ERS airfields have the capacity needed to meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy, we obtained briefings, reviewed documents, and interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Transportation Command, the European Command, the Central Command, the Pacific Command, the Air Force Mobility Command, the RAND Corporation, and the Naval Postgraduate School. To determine whether the ERS has the information and organizational structure needed to ensure that its operations are carried out efficiently and effectively, we analyzed data and reports on a variety of basic management issues and discussed information gaps with DOD officials. | What GAO Found
The National Military Strategy calls for the Department of Defense (DOD) to maintain the transportation capability to quickly move the large amounts of personnel and equipment needed to win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars anywhere in the world. To provide this mobility, DOD relies on a transportation system--the En Route System (ERS)--that includes an airlift fleet of cargo aircraft and a critical network of overseas airfields that provide logistical support to aircraft on their way to the war zones. Although the two-war requirement and other aspects of the National Military Strategy are now under review by the new administration, the ERS remains critically important as the primary means of quickly moving U.S. soldiers and equipment to areas of conflict around the world. This report addresses (1) whether en-route airfields have the capacity to meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy, (2) the causes of any shortfalls and DOD's plans to correct them, and (3) whether DOD has the information and management structure needed to ensure that the operations of the ERS can be carried out efficiently and effectively. |
gao_GAO-05-819 | gao_GAO-05-819_0 | Strategic airlift moves cargo and passengers between the continental United States and overseas theaters or between overseas theaters. The Extent to Which AMC Used Capacity as Efficiently as Possible on Strategic Military Aircraft Cannot Be Readily Ascertained
Because AMC does not systematically collect and analyze operational factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of data about operational factors that impact payloads on individual missions, we calculated the average payloads for each type of strategic aircraft and compared these to the payload planning factors. However, because AMC lacks data to determine how operational factors impact payloads, we are not able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient use of an aircraft’s capacity. Historical Mission Planning Files Have Limitations That Prevent Their Use to Determine Whether AMC Used Aircraft Capacity as Efficiently as Possible
Historical mission planning files identify mission data and operational factors that may impact aircraft payloads, but we found limitations with using these files to determine whether AMC used an aircraft’s capacity as efficiently as possible. Missions that did not meet minimum requirements for strategic airlift carried an average of about 5 short tons of cargo and 26 passengers. We found that aircraft payloads for OEF and OIF were, on average, less than historical average payloads. In general, in the absence of information about operational factors that could explain why heavier payloads were not transported, command officials do not know whether and where opportunities existed to use an aircraft’s capacity more efficiently or if there is the opportunity to reduce operational tempo, costs, and wear and tear on aircraft. Conclusions
Because DOD emphasizes delivering the “right items to the right place at the right time” over the efficient use of an aircraft’s capacity, AMC has a reason for underutilizing aircraft capacity on some missions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help officials determine whether they used an aircraft’s capacity as efficiently as possible and improve the reliability and completeness of data on operational factors that can impact payloads, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to direct the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to take the following two actions: Revise and clarify relevant data fields in GATES, and work with DOD entities that support other transportation information systems, such as the Global Transportation Network and service deployment systems, to capture comprehensive, well-defined data on operational factors that impact payloads for individual missions, and require supervisors to review these data fields for accuracy. As a result, AMC officials try not to use C-5 aircraft at this and similar locations unless C-17 aircraft are not available. | Why GAO Did This Study
Airlift is a flexible, but expensive, transportation method. From September 2001 to April 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $9.5 billion using airlift to transport equipment, supplies, and troops for Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As of December 2004, airlift accounted for about 13 percent of all cargo and passengers transported for these operations. DOD has stated that high demand for available airlift assets requires the department to use airlift assets as efficiently as possible. However, DOD's primary objective emphasizes delivering "the right items to the right place at the right time" over using aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. Under the Comptroller General's authority, GAO sought to determine whether DOD used capacity on strategic military aircraft transporting cargo and passengers between the United States and overseas theaters for OEF and OIF as efficiently as possible.
What GAO Found
Because the Air Mobility Command (AMC), which is the Air Force agency responsible for managing airlift, does not systematically collect and analyze operational factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. AMC collects data about short tons transported and information about operational factors, such as weather and runway length, when planning and executing airlift missions. AMC does not capture data about these variables in a manner that allows officials to determine historically whether aircraft capacity was used efficiently. Historical mission planning files and the Global Air Transportation Execution System that is used to track mission data could provide some information about operational factors that affect mission payloads, but limitations associated with these data sources do not allow officials to determine whether DOD used aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of data about operational factors that impact payloads on specific missions, GAO calculated the average payloads for each type of strategic aircraft and compared these to historical average payloads, known as payload planning factors. GAO found that over 97 percent of C-5 missions and more than 81 percent of C-17 missions carried payloads below DOD's payload planning factors. However, because data on operational factors that impact payloads were not available, GAO was not able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient use of aircraft capacity. Without adequate information about operational variables and how these impact mission payloads, AMC officials do not know the extent to which opportunities exist to use aircraft more efficiently and whether operational tempo, cost, and wear and tear on aircraft could be reduced. In addition, DOD officials do not have the benefit of such analysis to determine future airlift requirements for planning purposes. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-209 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-209_0 | China will have to make significant changes to its economy to be able to meet WTO commitments (for a brief discussion of China’s economy, see app. Existing WTO members and countries that agree to join the WTO must abide by a set of rules and obligations that promote trade and increase transparency and fairness in the world trading system. China is currently in the negotiation phase of the accession process. Legal Framework Affecting China’s WTO Accession
At this point, my statement will discuss (1) USTR’s requirement to consult with Congress before a U.S. vote on China’s WTO membership, (2) presidential determinations on China’s state trading enterprises, (3) provisions in U.S. law affecting China’s MFN status, (4) the potential use of WTO’s non-application provision if China joins the WTO, and (5) implications for the United States if non-application is invoked. The administration believes that temporary, that is, conditional MFN under Jackson-Vanik conflicts with the WTO obligation to provide unconditional MFN to WTO members. Non-application Clause
If China becomes a WTO member and Congress has not passed legislation removing China from title IV’s coverage, the administration plans to invoke the “non-application clause” of article XIII of the WTO agreement. The “non-application clause” permits either a WTO member or an incoming member to refuse to apply WTO commitments to each other. An important consequence of the United States invoking WTO non-application is that if China becomes a member, it does not have to grant the United States all the trade commitments it makes to other WTO members, both in the negotiated accession package or in the underlying WTO agreements. The agreement established reciprocal Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status between the two countries and committed both parties to protect intellectual property. The most recent data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggest that China is the second-largest economy worldwide. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the relationship between China's most-favored nation (MFN) status and World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, focusing on the: (1) WTO accession process; and (2) legal framework affecting China's MFN status, its implications for WTO membership, and the role Congress plays in the process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) China has the largest economy worldwide that is not covered by the WTO; (2) the WTO seeks to promote open and fair international trade through increased transparency, rules, and commitments to reduce barriers on foreign goods and services, and provide a binding system for resolving disputes; (3) China would like to join the WTO and is currently in the negotiation phase, which is the second of the four-stage process for becoming a member; (4) joining the WTO will require China to make substantial changes to its economy; (5) although Congress does not vote on China's WTO membership, the United States Trade Representative is required to consult with Congress before a WTO vote is taken; (6) the Administration plans to ask Congress to enact legislation to resolve a potential conflict between the conditional MFN afforded China under U.S. legislation and the unconditional MFN provided by the WTO agreements; (7) if China becomes a member and Congress has not enacted this legislation, the Administration intends to invoke a WTO provision that would permit the United States not to apply the WTO Agreements to China; (8) an important consequence of taking this exception is that China and the United States would not be obligated to provide each other all the WTO trade commitments that they would give to other WTO member states; and (9) in such a situation, U.S. business may not be able to benefit fully from the commitments China will make to open its markets to other WTO members. |
gao_GAO-10-117T | gao_GAO-10-117T_0 | Although the high-level leadership and governance structure of the current reform effort distinguish it from previous efforts, it is difficult to gauge progress of reform, or determine if corrective action is needed, because the council, through the Joint Reform Team, has not established a method for evaluating the progress of the reform efforts. Without a strategic framework that fully addresses the long-standing security clearance problems and incorporates key practices for transformation—including the ability to demonstrate progress leading to desired results—the Joint Reform Team is not in a position to demonstrate to decision makers the extent of progress that it is making toward achieving its desired outcomes, and the effort is at risk of losing momentum and not being fully implemented. Therefore, we recommended that the OMB Deputy Director of Management, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, ensure that the appropriate entities—such as the Performance Accountability Council, its subcommittees, or the Joint Reform Team— establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort to include (1) a mission statement and strategic goals; (2) outcome-focused performance measures to continually evaluate the progress of the reform effort toward meeting its goals and addressing long-standing problems with the security clearance process; (3) a formal, comprehensive communication strategy that includes consistency of message and encourages two-way communication between the Performance Accountability Council and key stakeholders; (4) a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the information technology strategy among all agencies responsible for developing and implementing components of the information technology strategy; and (5) long-term funding requirements for security clearance reform, including estimates of potential cost savings from the reformed process that are subsequently provided to decision makers in Congress and the executive branch. In addition to limited visibility over timeliness of clearances, the executive branch’s annual reports to Congress on the personnel security clearance process have provided decision makers with limited data on quality, and the executive branch has missed opportunities to make the clearance process transparent to Congress. For example, we independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports prepared by OPM that DOD adjudicators (employees who decide whether to grant a clearance to an applicant based on the investigation and other information) used to make clearance decisions, for initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, were missing required documentation. Because neither OPM nor DOD measures the completeness of their investigative reports or adjudicative files, both agencies are limited in their ability to explain the extent to which or the reasons why some documents are incomplete. Incomplete documentation may lead to increases in the time needed to complete the clearance process and in the overall costs of the process and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. We have stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process and emphasized that attention to quality could increase reciprocity—accepting another federal entity’s clearances—and the executive branch, though not required to include information on quality in its annual reports, has latitude to report appropriate information. We are encouraged that, while the 2009 report did not provide any data on quality, unlike previous reports it did identify quality metrics that the executive branch proposes to collect. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the key recommendations from the two reports we recently released, which include (1) the need for a fully developed strategic framework for the reform process that includes outcome-focused performance measures to show progress and (2) more transparency in annually reporting to Congress on the timeliness and quality of the clearance process. This testimony is based on our review of the Joint Reform Team's plans, as well as our work on DOD's security clearance process, which includes reviews of clearance-related files and interviews of senior officials at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOD, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and OPM. In addition, this statement is based on key practices and implementation steps for mergers and organizational transformations. We conducted our work on both reports between March 2008 and May 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
What GAO Found
Although the high-level leadership and governance structure of the current reform effort distinguish it from previous efforts, it is difficult to gauge progress of reform, or determine if corrective action is needed, because the council, through the Joint Reform Team, has not established a method for evaluating the progress of the reform efforts. Without a strategic framework that fully addresses the long-standing security clearance problems and incorporates key practices for transformation--including the ability to demonstrate progress leading to desired results--the Joint Reform Team is not in a position to demonstrate to decision makers the extent of progress that it is making toward achieving its desired outcomes, and the effort is at risk of losing momentum and not being fully implemented. In addition to limited visibility over timeliness of clearances, the executive branch's annual reports to Congress on the personnel security clearance process have provided decision makers with limited data on quality, and the executive branch has missed opportunities to make the clearance process transparent to Congress. For example, we independently estimated that 87 percent16 of about 3,500 investigative reports prepared by OPM that DOD adjudicators (employees who decide whether to grantclearance to an applicant based on the investigation and other information) used to make clearance decisions, for initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, were missing required documentation. Because neither OPM nor DOD measures the completeness of their investigative reports or adjudicative files, both agencies are limited in their ability to explain the extent to which or the reasons why some documents are incomplete. Incomplete documentation may lead to increases in the time needed to complete the clearance process and in the overall costs of the process and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. We have stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process and emphasized that attention to quality could increase reciprocity--accepting another federal entity's clearances--and the executive branch, though not required to include information on quality in its annual reports, has latitude to report appropriate information. We are encouraged that, while the 2009 report did not provide any data on quality, unlike previous reports it did identify quality metrics that the executive branch proposes to collect. |
gao_GAO-10-627 | gao_GAO-10-627_0 | DOE Has Broadly Indicated the Program’s Direction but Is Not Well Positioned to Evaluate Progress
DOE has broadly indicated the direction of the LGP but has not developed all the tools necessary to evaluate progress. DOE officials have identified a number of broad policy goals that the LGP is intended to support, including helping to ensure energy security, mitigate climate change, jumpstart the alternative energy sector, and create jobs. Additionally, through DOE’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and a mission statement for the LGP, the department has explained that the program is intended to support the “early commercial production and use of new or significantly improved technologies in energy projects” that “avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, and have a reasonable prospect of repaying the principal and interest on their debt obligations.”
To help operationalize such policy goals efficiently and effectively, principles of good governance identified in our prior work on GPRA indicate that agencies should develop associated performance goals and measures that are objective and quantifiable. DOE has linked the LGP to two departmentwide performance goals: “Double renewable energy generating capacity (excluding conventional hydropower) by 2012.” “Commit (conditionally) to loan guarantees for two nuclear power facilities to add new low-carbon emission capacity of at least 3,800 megawatts in 2010.”
DOE has also established nine performance measures for the LGP (see app. However, the departmentwide performance goals are too few to reflect the full range of policy goals for the LGP. For example, there is no measurable performance goal for job creation. The performance goals also do not reflect the full scope of the program’s authorized activities. For example, as of April 2010, DOE had issued two conditional commitments for energy efficiency projects—as authorized in legislation—but the energy efficiency projects do not address either of the performance goals because the projects are expected to generate little or no renewable energy and are not associated with nuclear power facilities. Thus, DOE lacks the foundation to assess the program’s progress, and more specifically, to determine whether the projects it supports with loan guarantees contribute to achieving the desired results. DOE Has Taken Steps to Implement the LGP but Has Treated Applicants Inconsistently and Lacks Mechanisms to Identify and Address Applicants’ Concerns
As the LGP’s scope and authority have increased, the department has taken a number of steps to implement the program for applicants. Among other things, the manual contains detailed internal policies and procedures that lay out requirements, criteria, and staff responsibilities for determining which proposed projects should receive loan guarantees. Specifically, we found the following: DOE has treated applicants inconsistently. First, we found that, in at least five of the ten cases in which DOE made conditional commitments, it did so before obtaining all of the final reports from external reviewers, allowing these applicants to receive conditional commitments before incurring expenses that other applicants were required to pay. However, it is unclear how DOE could have had sufficient information to negotiate the terms of a conditional commitment without completing the types of reviews generally performed during due diligence, and proceeding without this information is contrary to the department’s procedures for the LGP. DOE lacks systematic mechanisms for applicants to appeal its decisions or provide feedback to DOE. Conclusions
DOE has made substantial progress in building a functional program for issuing loan guarantees under Title XVII of EPAct; however, it may not fully realize the benefits envisioned for the LGP until it further improves its ability to evaluate and implement the program. Such confidence could also be undermined by implementation processes that do not treat applicants consistently—unless DOE has clear and compelling grounds for disparate treatment—particularly if DOE skips steps in its review process prior to issuing conditional commitments or rereviews rejected applications for some applicants without having an administrative appeal process. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOE’s ability to evaluate and implement the LGP, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following four actions: Direct the program management to develop relevant performance goals that reflect the full range of policy goals and activities for the program, and to the extent necessary, revise the performance measures to align with these goals. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Department of Energy (DOE) has identified what it intends to achieve through the Loan Guarantee Program (LGP) and is positioned to evaluate progress, we reviewed and analyzed relevant provisions of Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act); DOE’s budget request documents; and Recovery Act planning information, as well as other documentation provided by DOE. To evaluate DOE’s implementation of the LGP for applicants, we reviewed relevant legislation, such as EPAct and the Recovery Act; DOE’s final regulations and concept of operations for the LGP; solicitations issued by DOE inviting applications for loan guarantees; DOE’s internal project tracking reports; technical and financial review criteria for the application review process; minutes from CRB meetings held between February 2008 and November 2009; applications for loan guarantees; application rejection letters issued by DOE; and other various DOE guidance and procurement documents related to the process for issuing loan guarantees. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the Department of Energy's (DOE) loan guarantee program (LGP) for innovative energy projects was established in Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, its scope has expanded both in the types of projects it can support and in the amount of loan guarantee authority available. DOE currently has loan guarantee authority estimated at about $77 billion and is seeking additional authority. As of April 2010, it had issued one loan guarantee for $535 million and made nine conditional commitments. In response to Congress' mandate to review DOE's execution of the LGP, GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOE has identified what it intends to achieve through the LGP and is positioned to evaluate progress and (2) how DOE has implemented the program for applicants. GAO analyzed relevant legislation, prior GAO work, and DOE guidance and regulations. GAO also interviewed DOE officials, LGP applicants, and trade association representatives.
What GAO Found
DOE has broadly indicated the program's direction but has not developed all the tools necessary to assess progress. DOE officials have identified a number of broad policy goals that the LGP is intended to support, including helping to mitigate climate change and create jobs. DOE has also explained, through agency documents, that the program is intended to support early commercial production and use of new or significantly improved technologies in energy projects that abate emissions of air pollutants or of greenhouse gases and have a reasonable prospect of repaying the loans. GAO has found that to help operationalize such policy goals efficiently and effectively, agencies should develop associated performance goals that are objective and quantifiable and cover all program activities. DOE has linked the LGP to two departmentwide performance goals, namely to (1) double renewable energy generating capacity by 2012 and (2) commit conditionally to loan guarantees for two nuclear power facilities to add a specified minimum amount of capacity in 2010. However, the two performance goals are too few to reflect the full range of policy goals for the LGP. For example, there is no performance goal for the number of jobs that should be created. The performance goals also do not reflect the full scope of program activities; in particular, although the program has made conditional commitments to issue loan guarantees for energy efficiency projects, there is no performance goal that relates to such projects. Without comprehensive performance goals, DOE lacks the foundation to assess the program's progress and, more specifically, to determine whether the projects selected for loan guarantees help achieve the desired results. DOE has taken steps to implement the LGP for applicants but has treated applicants inconsistently and lacks mechanisms to identify and address their concerns. Among other things, DOE increased the LGP's staff, expedited procurement of external reviews, and developed procedures for deciding which projects should receive loan guarantees. However, GAO found: (1) DOE's implementation of the LGP has treated applicants inconsistently, favoring some and disadvantaging others. For example, DOE conditionally committed to issuing loan guarantees for some projects prior to completion of external reviews required under DOE procedures. Because applicants must pay for such reviews, this procedural deviation has allowed some applicants to receive conditional commitments before incurring expenses that other applicants had to pay. It is unclear how DOE could have sufficient information to negotiate conditional commitments without such reviews. (2) DOE lacks systematic mechanisms for LGP applicants to administratively appeal its decisions or to provide feedback to DOE on its process for issuing loan guarantees. Instead, DOE rereviews rejected applications on an ad hoc basis and gathers feedback through public forums and other outreach efforts that do not ensure the views obtained are representative. Until DOE develops implementation processes it can adhere to consistently, along with systematic approaches for rereviewing applications and obtaining and addressing applicant feedback, it may not fully realize the benefits envisioned for the LGP.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE develop performance goals reflecting the LGP's policy goals and activities; revise the loan guarantee process to treat applicants consistently unless there are clear, compelling grounds not to do so; and develop mechanisms for administrative appeals and for systematically obtaining and addressing applicant feedback. DOE said it is taking steps to address GAO's concerns but did not explicitly agree or disagree with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-814 | gao_GAO-15-814_0 | Background
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) created the Recovery Board composed of Inspectors General to promote accountability by overseeing recovery-related funds. Subsequent legislation expanded the Recovery Board’s mandate to include oversight of other federal spending, including those funds appropriated for purposes related to the effects of Hurricane Sandy. The ROC Has Provided Valuable Analytic Capabilities to the Oversight Community
As we reported in our July 2015 testimony describing the progress made in the initial implementation of the DATA Act, the ROC has provided significant analytical services to its clients, including many OIGs, in support of their antifraud and other activities. Specifically, on the basis of the ROC’s client-service performance data that we reviewed, as part of the ROC’s analysis supporting investigations and audits, the ROC researched roughly 1.7 million entities associated with $36.4 billion in federal funds during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 at the request of various OIGs and other entities. 3). The ROC developed specialized data-analytic capabilities to better ensure federal spending accountability. In another example, the Environmental Protection Agency OIG used the ROC’s data visualizations of a link analysis that identifies relationships among entities involved in activities such as collaborating to commit fraud. Treasury Decided Not to Transfer the ROC’s Assets but Has an Opportunity to Transfer Additional Information That Could Benefit the Do Not Pay Center Business Center
Treasury Decided Not to Transfer the ROC’s Assets, Citing Cost, Lack of Investigative Authority, and Other Reasons
In May 2015, Treasury officials told us that the department did not plan to exercise its discretionary authority to establish a data-analysis center or expand an existing service under the DATA Act. Such processes can be time-consuming and lengthy. Treasury officials said they considered DNP as a possible host of the ROC’s assets but ultimately concluded that the transfer of ROC assets to Treasury would not be cost-effective or add value to Treasury’s efforts. The development of data-sharing agreements is difficult and time-consuming. However, because Treasury currently does not plan to transfer the assets of the ROC, the center’s users will need to consider alternatives when the Recovery Board closes. Some large OIGs that previously used the ROC told us that they intend to develop their own analytic capabilities. While OIGs with the financial resources to do so may pursue replication of the ROC’s tools, the ROC’s termination may have more effect on the audit and investigative capabilities of some small- and medium-sized OIGs that do not have the resources to develop independent data analytics or pay fees for a similar service, according to some OIG officials. Through the DATA Act, Congress provided Treasury the option to transfer the ROC’s assets. A legislative proposal that explicitly articulates the relative costs and benefits of developing an analytics center with a mission and capabilities similar to the ROC could help Congress decide whether to authorize and fund such an entity. CIGIE officials stated that they have not developed such a proposal absent specific direction from Congress, but these officials expressed concerns about the effect of the September 30, 2015, sunset of the Recovery Board on the OIG community and, as noted above, have sought options within their current budget to increase analytic resources available to OIGs. Conclusions
Agencies seeking to address improper payments and fraud, waste, and abuse face challenging prospects, especially in an environment in which estimated improper payments rose by $19 billion to $124.7 billion in fiscal year 2014. Although cost and other challenges may limit the viability of transferring certain of the ROC’s assets to Treasury, other assets—especially information and documentation that could serve as templates for data sharing or developing the technical specifications for procuring additional software— may assist DNP as it expands its services and capabilities to address improper payments. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To help preserve a proven resource supporting the oversight community’s analytic capabilities, Congress may wish to consider directing CIGIE to develop a legislative proposal to reconstitute the essential capabilities of the ROC to help ensure federal spending accountability. We are sending copies of this report to relevant congressional committees, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), and the Chair of the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (Recovery Board). We also reviewed documentation from the Recovery Board on the ROC’s resources, including hardware, software contracts, data sets, and human capital, as well as information on its staffing levels over time, to develop a complete picture of the capabilities that Treasury could obtain through a transition. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improper payments government-wide increased approximately $19 billion in fiscal year 2014, resulting in an estimated total of $124.7 billion. The DATA Act authorized Treasury to establish a data-analysis center or expand an existing service.
Congress included a provision in the DATA Act for GAO to review the implementation of the statute. This report addresses (1) the value of the ROC's capabilities provided to the oversight community; (2) Treasury's plans for transferring assets from the ROC, and (3) the potential effect, if any, of Treasury's plans on the ROC's users.
GAO reviewed documentation on the ROC's assets, a transition plan developed by the ROC, and its performance data from fiscal year 2012 through March 2015. On the basis of factors such as frequency of requests for assistance and agency size, GAO interviewed various ROC users about their views. GAO also interviewed Treasury and CIGIE officials to obtain their perspectives on the ROC's capabilities and its future status.
What GAO Found
The Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board's (Recovery Board) Recovery Operations Center (ROC) provided significant analytical services primarily to Offices of the Inspector General (OIG) to support antifraud and other activities. Congress initially established the Recovery Board to oversee funds appropriated by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Subsequently, it expanded the Recovery Board's mandate to include oversight of other federal spending, and most recently through the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) authorized the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to transfer ROC assets to Treasury by September 30, 2015, when the Recovery Board closes. On the basis of the ROC's client-service performance data that GAO reviewed, the center researched roughly 1.7 million entities associated with $36.4 billion in federal funds in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. The ROC developed specialized data-analytic capabilities that, among other things,
helped OIGs identify high-risk entities and target audit and investigative resources to those entities;
identified organizations with previous fraudulent activities that nevertheless received contracts during Hurricane Sandy; and
identified entities involved in activities such as collaborating to commit fraud, and visually depicted relationships among these entities for juries.
Treasury does not plan to transfer the ROC's assets, such as hardware and software, citing cost, lack of investigative authority, and other reasons. However, Treasury could transfer additional information to its Do Not Pay Center Business Center (DNP), which assists agencies in preventing improper payments. For instance, transferring documentation of data-sharing agreements, which can be difficult and time-consuming to establish, could serve as a template for DNP efforts to expand the number of data sets it uses to identify improper payments. Although cost and other challenges may limit the viability of transferring certain of the ROC's assets to Treasury, other assets—especially those that could serve as templates for negotiating access to and procuring additional data—may assist DNP as it expands its services and capabilities.
Because Treasury does not plan to transfer the ROC's assets, the ROC's users will need to consider alternatives when the Recovery Board closes. Specifically, officials from some large OIGs that have used the ROC told GAO they intend to develop their own analytical capabilities. However, officials from some small- and medium-sized OIGs said they do not have the resources to develop independent data analytics or pay for a similar service, thus foregoing the ROC's capabilities. The Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) could reconstitute some of the ROC's analytic capabilities and has explored options to do so. However, CIGIE officials stated that CIGIE does not currently have the resources to accomplish this reconstitution. A legislative proposal that articulates for Congress the relative costs and benefits of developing an entity with a mission and capabilities similar to the ROC could be an appropriate first step in preserving the essence of the center's proven value to its users. CIGIE officials stated that they have not developed such a proposal absent congressional direction, but noted that they support Congress's expressed interest in preserving and expanding analytic resources for the oversight community.
What GAO Recommends
If Congress wants to maintain the ROC's analytic capabilities, it should consider directing CIGIE to develop a proposal to that effect to help ensure federal spending accountability. GAO also recommends that Treasury consider transferring additional information to enhance Treasury's DNP. Treasury concurred with GAO's recommendation, and CIGIE is supportive of assuming additional analytical functions for the OIG community with additional funding. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-46 | gao_T-AIMD-96-46_0 | To ensure this occurs, program units in agencies must carefully analyze the processes or procedures that are being modernized. When processes are reengineered in concert with the power of information technology, significant results can be achieved. When the system becomes operational in 1999, HCFA expects it to process over 1 billion claims annually and be responsible for paying $288 billion in benefits per year. Consistently Applying Management Practices Is Important to Success
It is important that federal executives learn from leading organizations that have been successful in applying and managing technology to thorny business problems as well as opportunities for change. Table 2 illustrates the set of management practices we found in the leading organizations we studied. And when used, they can help produce repeatable success. First, government leaders must facilitate success. The second key factor affecting long-term improvement to IT management in government is reinforcing accountability for results. This Subcommittee can play an important role in promoting new, effective management practices throughout the government by: providing oversight and guidance to federal agencies in implementing the IT-management related provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act and the Information Technology Management Reform Act—similar to the very effective role you have played in overseeing the implementation of the Chief Financial Officers Act; focusing oversight attention on high risk IT projects and initiatives, such as your upcoming hearing planned on IRS’s financial management reforms and Tax System Modernization project; identifying and focusing agency attention on new systems development efforts that are demonstrating signs of managerial or technical problems early in their life cycle before huge sums of money have been spent, such as your recent hearing on HCFA’s Medicare Transaction System; and highlighting the importance of emerging information technologies and management techniques that can be effectively applied to the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed how leading organizations' best practices can be effectively used to improve information technology (IT) management in the federal government.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal IT-related expenditures total over $25 billion per year, but the benefits from IT are unknown; (2) IT can be used to improve organizational performance, but risks of failure must be carefully managed to ensure successful decisions and project completions; (3) organizations that have successfully implemented IT projects have found that with rapidly changing technological power and choices, sustainable and effective management practices are needed to achieve consistent success; and (4) federal agencies must facilitate success by implementing improved IT management processes and reinforce accountability to produce noticeable results with IT investments. |
gao_GAO-17-551 | gao_GAO-17-551_0 | Background
Each year, CMS evaluates approximately 3,000 acute care hospitals participating in HVBP on their performance in prior years on a series of quality and efficiency measures. Beginning in fiscal year 2013, the HVBP program provided new bonuses and penalties that were based on each hospital’s performance on a subset of these measures. CMS determines each hospital’s payment adjustment based on the hospital’s total performance score relative to all participating hospitals. 1.) Quality Scores Were Generally Lower for Safety Net Hospitals Compared to All Hospitals, while Small Rural and Urban Hospitals Generally Had Higher Quality and Efficiency Scores
Safety net hospitals generally had lower median quality domain scores in comparison to all hospitals, while small rural and small urban hospitals generally scored higher on quality and efficiency domains during fiscal years 2013 through 2017. 2). 3). HVBP Payment Adjustments Have Varied over Time, but Safety Net Hospitals Generally Had Lower Payment Adjustments Compared to the Other Hospital Types
Median payment adjustments generally have varied for all hospitals, and small rural and small urban hospitals, since the program began; however, in most years, the median payment adjustment for safety net hospitals has been a penalty—that is, a negative payment adjustment. The majority of all hospitals received a bonus or a penalty of less than 0.5 percent each year of the program (see fig. An increasing percentage of hospitals have also received penalties of greater than 0.5 percent over time, and safety net hospitals consistently had the highest percentage of penalties of 0.5 percent or more when compared to all hospitals, small rural hospitals, and small urban hospitals. Since Fiscal Year 2015, High Efficiency Scores Have Resulted in Bonuses for Some Lower Quality Hospitals
About 20 Percent of All Hospitals Receiving Bonuses Had Composite Quality Scores below the Median and Received Bonuses Because of High Efficiency Scores
Since the efficiency score was added to the HVBP program in fiscal year 2015, about 20 percent of the hospitals that received bonuses each year had weighted composite quality scores below the median for all hospitals in fiscal years 2015 through 2017 (see table 4). We also found that hospitals with missing domain scores were more likely to receive a bonus than hospitals with all domain scores. As a result, hospitals with missing domain scores are more likely to get a bonus, and, in some cases, those bonuses are greater than median bonuses overall. Conclusions
The aim of the HVBP program is to improve hospital quality and efficiency by providing incentives for hospitals to improve their quality of care and to become more cost efficient. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the HVBP program accomplishes its goal to balance quality and efficiency and to ensure that it minimizes the payment of bonuses to hospitals with lower quality scores, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following two actions:
Revise the formula for the calculation of hospitals’ total performance score or take other actions so that the efficiency score does not have a disproportionate effect on the total performance score. Appendix I: Quality and Efficiency Measures in the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program, Fiscal Years 2013 through 2017
Table 7 lists the Inpatient Quality Reporting program measures that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) used to analyze hospitals’ performance in the Hospital Value-based Purchasing program during fiscal years 2013 through 2017. | Why GAO Did This Study
The HVBP program, enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), evaluates hospital performance on quality and efficiency (Medicare spending per beneficiary) measures. Based on those results, CMS adjusts Medicare payments, leading to bonuses or penalties for hospitals. The first HVBP payment adjustments started in fiscal year 2013.
PPACA included a provision for GAO to assess the HVBP program's impact on Medicare quality and efficiency, including the effects on safety net, small rural, and small urban hospitals. This report addresses (1) hospitals' performance in quality and efficiency categories; (2) how hospitals' payment adjustments have changed over time; and (3) the effect, if any, of efficiency scores on payment adjustments.
GAO analyzed CMS documentation and data on performance scores and payment adjustments in each year for all hospitals participating in fiscal years 2013 through 2017. GAO also analyzed results for safety net, small rural, and small urban hospitals and interviewed CMS officials.
What GAO Found
The Hospital Value-based Purchasing (HVBP) program aims to improve quality of care and efficiency by creating financial incentives for about 3,000 participating hospitals. From fiscal years 2013 through 2017, performance on quality and efficiency measures varied by hospital type. Safety net hospitals—those that serve a high proportion of low-income patients—generally scored lower in quality compared to all participating hospitals. In contrast, small rural and small urban hospitals—those with 100 or fewer acute care beds—scored higher on efficiency compared to all hospitals.
Payment adjustments—bonuses or penalties, announced prior to each fiscal year—have varied over time for all hospitals. In four out of the five years of GAO's analysis, small rural and small urban hospitals were more likely to receive a bonus compared to all participating hospitals, while safety net hospitals were more likely to receive a penalty. While a majority of all hospitals received a bonus or a penalty of less than 0.5 percent each year, the percentage of hospitals receiving a bonus greater than 0.5 percent increased from 4 percent to 29 percent from fiscal year 2013 to 2017. In dollar terms, most hospitals had a bonus or penalty of less than $100,000 in fiscal year 2017.
Some hospitals with high efficiency scores received bonuses, despite having relatively low quality scores, which contradicts the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Service's (CMS) stated intention to reward hospitals providing high-quality care at a lower cost. Further, among hospitals that were missing one or more quality scores, the efficiency score had a greater effect on the total performance score because of the methodology used by CMS. This methodology compensated for the missing scores by increasing the weights of all of the non-missing scores. Consequently, hospitals with missing scores were more likely to receive bonuses than hospitals with complete scores.
Bonus or Penalty Status of Hospitals Participating in the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program, Fiscal Years 2015 through 2017
What GAO Recommends
So that lower quality hospitals do not receive bonuses, GAO recommends that CMS revise (1) the methodology used to calculate total performance scores and (2) its method of accounting for missing quality scores. In its written comments, HHS indicated that it would consider revising these two methodologies. |
gao_NSIAD-96-131 | gao_NSIAD-96-131_0 | The report stated that infrastructure activities accounted for $160 billion in fiscal year 1994, or about 60 percent of DOD’s total obligational authority. In our 1995 report, we concluded that, based on our analysis of the 1996 FYDP using the program elements that we considered to be associated with infrastructure activities, the proportion of infrastructure funding in the total defense budget would remain relatively constant through 2001. Using the FYDP, DOD has clearly identified program elements that fund infrastructure activities and refer to these as “direct infrastructure.” However, there are parts of the total infrastructure funding that cannot be clearly identified in the FYDP. Activities that provide support services to the mission programs and primarily operate from fixed locations are classified as infrastructure programs. In fiscal year 1996, intelligence, space, and command, control, and communications programs accounted for $25.2 billion, or 20 percent of mission programs. No Significant Net Infrastructure Savings Are Projected Through 2001
Our review of DOD’s fiscal year 1996 FYDP found no significant net infrastructure savings between fiscal years 1996 and 2001 because the proportion of infrastructure in the DOD budgets under current plans will remain relatively constant through 2001. Most Infrastructure Activities Are Funded by the Operation and Maintenance and Military Personnel Appropriations
As shown in figure 3, most direct infrastructure activities are funded by operation and maintenance and military personnel appropriations. Specific Options for Reducing DOD’s Infrastructure
We present 13 options in appendix I where estimates of budgetary savings were developed by CBO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) infrastructure activities and their associated costs in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to determine whether DOD plans to spend less for infrastructure activities by fiscal year (FY) 2001; and (2) summarized its work that identified opportunities for DOD to reduce or streamline infrastructure activities, and asked the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate potential budgetary savings.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) there are no significant net infrastructure savings to DOD between FY 1996 and FY 2001, based on GAO analysis of infrastructure-related program elements in FYDP; (2) the proportion of planned infrastructure funding in DOD budgets will remain relatively constant at about 60 percent through 2001; (3) the combination of operation and maintenance and military personnel appropriations fund about 80 percent of infrastructure activities that can be identified in FYDP; (4) DOD excludes most intelligence, space, and command, control, and communications programs the provide support services to mission programs from its definition of infrastructure; (5) these programs account for about $25.2 billion in FY 1996; (6) parts of total infrastructure funding cannot be clearly identified in FYDP, including funds that pay for Defense Business Operations Fund activities; and (7) there were 13 options for consolidating, streamlining, or reengineering infrastructure activities that CBO estimates could result in savings of $11.8 billion from FY 1997 through FY 2001. |
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