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gao_GAO-12-320 | gao_GAO-12-320_0 | BOP houses inmates across six geographic regions in 117 federal institutions, 15 privately managed prisons, 185 RRCs (also known as halfway houses), and home detention. The authorities can be classified into two main categories: (1) authorities that reduce the length of the inmate’s sentence, and (2) authorities that allow BOP to transfer an inmate out of prison to serve the remainder of his or her sentence in an RRC or home detention. BOP’s Use of Authorities That Can Reduce a Federal Prisoner’s Period of Incarceration Varies
Eligible Prisoners Can Participate in RDAP in Time to Complete the Program; Few Receive the Maximum Sentence Reduction
BOP is required, subject to the availability of appropriations, to provide residential substance abuse treatment and make arrangements for appropriate aftercare for all eligible prisoners. The amount of sentence reduction awarded upon completion is based on the length of an inmate’s sentence.complete RDAP, and receive a sentence reduction if eligible. BOP Has Used Other Authorities Less Frequently to Reduce Federal Prisoners’ Periods of Incarceration
Modification of an imposed sentence: BOP has authority to motion the court to reduce an inmate’s sentence in certain statutorily authorized circumstances, but that authority is implemented infrequently, if at all. BOP provided inmates who successfully completed the program and were serving sentences of 12 to 30 months with a sentence reduction of up to 6 months. Generally, the 2-year pilot program enabled BOP to transfer to home detention inmates who were at least 65 years old, had served at least 10 years and 75 percent of their non-life sentences, had no history of violence, sexual offenses, or escape or attempted escape from a BOP institution, and who BOP determined would be of no substantial risk of engaging in criminal conduct or endangering any person or the public if released and with respect to whom BOP had determined that release to home detention will result in a substantial net reduction of costs to the During the program, 71 inmates were transferred to federal government. For example, of the 538 cases BOP reviewed in fiscal year 2011, 99 requests to serve sentences concurrently were granted, for a total of about 118,700 days of sentence credit, 386 were not granted, and 53 were still under review as of the end of fiscal year 2011.
Credit for criminal custody: BOP has the authority to grant credit for time served in criminal custody (such as time spent awaiting trial), and according to BOP policy, it considers detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for the purposes of deportation to be administrative custody until criminal charges are brought against a detainee. Inmate Eligibility and Lack of Capacity Impact BOP’s Use of Certain Flexibilities
Certain Inmates’ Ineligibility for Community Corrections Impacts BOP’s Use of RRCs and RDAP
BOP officials cited inmate ineligibility for placement in community corrections as the number one reason that all inmates do not get released through RRCs and one of the chief reasons that some inmates are precluded from participating in RDAP. This ineligibility for RRC placement also disqualifies an inmate from placement in home detention. Based on the most recently available data, in fiscal year 2010, about 29,000 inmates spent time in an RRC prior to release from BOP custody. According to BOP officials, systemwide program capacity similarly constrains BOP’s utilization of RDAP sentence reductions—specifically, BOP’s ability to admit RDAP participants early enough to earn their maximum allowable sentence reductions. This has enabled inmates to enter the program sooner and resulted in an increase in the percentage of eligible inmates who complete RDAP and receive the maximum sentence reductions from 14 percent in fiscal year 2009 to 25 percent in fiscal year 2011. Conclusions
Federal inmate populations have been increasing and BOP is operating at more than a third over capacity. Inmates, who earn their good conduct time, as most do, end up serving about 87 percent of their sentences. BOP’s housing of inmates in community-based facilities or home detention is a key flexibility it uses to affect a prisoner’s period of incarceration. However, BOP does not require its RRC contractors to separate the price of home detention services from the price of RRC beds. While BOP is working to develop a process to require contractors to submit separate prices for the price of RRC beds and home detention services, without establishing a plan, including a time frame for development, BOP does not have a road map for how it will achieve this goal. Recommendation for Executive Action
To determine the cost of home detention and potentially achieve cost savings, we recommend that the Director of BOP establish a plan, including time frames and milestones for completion, for requiring contractors to submit separate prices of RRC beds and home detention services. Prior to receiving BOP’s comment letter, on January 20, 2012, BOP’s audit liaison requested that the wording of our recommendation be changed from “requiring contractors to identify RRC costs and home detention costs separately” to “requiring contractors to submit separate prices of RRC beds and home detention services.” He stated that BOP was requesting this change because contractors are not required to disclose financial information, such as the actual costs to them of providing services to inmates, to BOP. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Justices Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is responsible for the custody and care of federal offenders. BOPs population has increased from about 145,000 in 2000 to about 217,000 in 2011 and BOP is operating at 38 percent over capacity. There is no longer parole for federal offenders and BOP has limited authority to affect the length of an inmate's prison sentence. BOP has some statutory authorities and programs to reduce the amount of time an inmate remains in prison, which when balanced with BOPs mission to protect public safety and prepare inmates for reentry, can help reduce crowding and the costs of incarceration. GAO was asked to address: (1) the extent to which BOP utilizes its authorities to reduce a federal prisoners period of incarceration; and (2) what factors, if any, impact BOP's use of these authorities. GAO analyzed relevant laws and BOP policies; obtained nationwide data on inmate participation in relevant programs and sentence reductions from fiscal years 2009 through 2011; conducted site visits to nine BOP institutions selected to cover a range of prison characteristics and at each, interviewed officials responsible for relevant programs; and visited four community-based facilities serving the institutions visited. Though not generalizable, the information obtained from these visits provided insights.
What GAO Found
BOPs use of authorities to reduce a federal prisoners period of incarceration varies. BOP primarily utilizes three authoritiesthe Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP), community corrections, and good conduct time.
(1) Eligible inmates can participate in RDAP before release from prison, but those eligible for a sentence reduction are generally unable to complete RDAP in time to earn the maximum reduction (generally 12 months). During fiscal years 2009 through 2011, of the 15,302 inmates who completed RDAP and were eligible for a sentence reduction, 2,846 (19 percent) received the maximum reduction and the average reduction was 8.0 months. BOP officials said that participants generally do not receive the maximum reduction because they have less than 12 months to serve when they complete RDAP.
(2) To facilitate inmates reintegration into society, BOP may transfer eligible inmates to community corrections locations for up to the final 12 months of their sentences. Inmates may spend this time in contract residential re-entry centers (RRCs)also known as halfway housesand in detention in their homes for up to 6 months. Based on the most recently available data, almost 29,000 inmates completed their sentences through community corrections in fiscal year 2010, after an average placement of about 4 months; 17,672 in RRCs, 11,094 in RRCs then home detention, and 145 in home detention only. RRCs monitor inmates in home detention and charge BOP 50 percent of the daily RRC cost to do so. However, BOP does not require RRC contractors to separate the price of home detention services from the price of RRC beds and thus, does not know the actual costs of home detention. BOP officials stated that they are developing a process to review and amend existing RRC contracts and require new contractors to submit proposals separating out RRC and home detention prices, but did not document the specifics of the review process or establish time frames or milestones for the review. Thus, BOP does not have a roadmap for how it will achieve this goal.
(3) Most eligible inmates receive all of their potential good conduct time credit for exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations54 days taken off their sentence, per year served, if an inmate has earned or is earning a high school diploma; 42 days if not. As of the end of fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011, about 87 percent of inmates had earned all of their available credit.
BOP also has other authorities, such as releasing prisoners early for very specialized reasons, but has used these less frequently for various reasons.
Inmate eligibility and lack of capacity impact BOPs use of certain flexibilities and programs that can reduce an inmates time in prison. BOP officials cited inmate ineligibility for RRC placement (e.g., inmates who are likely to escape or be arrested or with sentences of 6 months or less, among other things) as the primary reason that some inmates are not released through community corrections and one of the main reasons that some inmates are not able to participate in RDAP. BOPs lack of additional RRC space has prevented it from increasing the length of its RRC placements. According to BOP, lack of program capacity also prevents eligible inmates from entering and completing RDAP early enough to earn their maximum allowable sentence reductions, which prevents BOP from maximizing the cost savings provided by the authority.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BOP establish a plan, including time frames and milestones, for requiring contractors to submit prices of RRC beds and home detention services. BOP concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-367 | gao_GAO-16-367_0 | ORR Selected Six New Child Advocate Program Locations, but Advocates Are Not Available in Other Locations Where Services May Be Needed
ORR Selected New Locations in Cities with Large Numbers of Unaccompanied Children
ORR expanded the child advocate program to three locations in fiscal year 2015, and selected an additional three locations for expansion in fiscal year 2016 that each held more than 50 children in ORR custody, as required by VAWA 2013. 6). ORR Provides Guidance on Referrals but Lacks a Process to Monitor Referrals to Ensure Vulnerable Children Are Served
ORR Reports Plans to Review Referral Guidance in Light of the Changing Population of Children
To help vulnerable children receive advocate services, ORR provided guidance in September 2011 to care providers and other relevant stakeholders on referring vulnerable children to the child advocate program. After the local Young Center office decides an advocate is available to work with a child, it sends a recommendation to ORR headquarters for ORR to officially appoint an advocate for the child. Further, cases served that met multiple criteria increased from 44 percent in fiscal year 2014 to 66 percent in fiscal year 2015. Inconsistent referral practices. These recommendations give children— especially those who are unable to make an independent decision due to young age or trauma—a voice during the immigration process, according to our interviews with various stakeholders. We analyzed Young Center program data and found that from fiscal years 2012 through 2015 the child advocate program submitted 493 recommendations to ORR, immigration courts, children’s attorneys, and others (see table 4). Over 70 percent of these recommendations were adopted by the entity receiving them. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act states that “ child advocate shall be provided access to materials necessary to effectively advocate for the best interest of the child.” In addition, federal standards for internal control state that relevant, reliable, and timely information should be communicated to those who need it in a form and time frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. ORR officials told us that significant incident reports may include information about other children or ORR care provider staff and as a result, ORR does not provide copies to the Young Center to protect the confidentiality of the other individuals. ORR’s information sharing policies allow its care providers to verbally describe information contained in significant incident reports when requested by the Young Center. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure vulnerable unaccompanied children receive child advocate services, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services direct ORR to develop a monitoring process that includes: (1) regularly reviewing referrals to the program contractor, including identifying which care providers in locations with a child advocate program do not make referrals; and (2) reviewing information on the children the program contractor determines it is unable to serve. To help the program’s contractor improve its recommendations on behalf of vulnerable unaccompanied children, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct ORR to work with the program’s contractor to ensure access to key information is provided in a timely manner. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines: (1) the extent to which the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) implemented requirements to increase the number of child advocate program locations and the impact of the expansion on program costs and number of children served, (2) the extent to which ORR ensured vulnerable unaccompanied children were receiving services, and (3) the benefits of the child advocate program, and what challenges, if any, it faces. These sites were selected based on variation in the number of children served, amount of time the advocate program has been operational, and types of ORR care facilities in operation. In addition, we interviewed three legal services providers—located in Chicago, Ill., Corpus Christi, Tex., and Washington, D.C.—that had experience representing children with an advocate. We also reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, including the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 and the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. The recommendations information we analyzed included all written recommendations from fiscal years 2012 through 2015 and some verbal recommendations tracked by the Young Center and provided to stakeholders in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. The recommendation information included the number of recommendations made; types of decision makers that received recommendations (such as immigration judges, attorneys, ORR, etc. Unaccompanied Children: HHS Can Take Further Actions to Monitor their Care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Thousands of unaccompanied children arrive in the United States each year. For a small number of especially vulnerable children—about 1 percent in fiscal year 2015—ORR provides an independent child advocate to develop safety and well-being recommendations to stakeholders, such as immigration judges. The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 directed HHS to expand the program and included a provision for GAO to review the child advocate program.
This report examines (1) the extent to which ORR increased the number of program locations, (2) the extent to which ORR ensured vulnerable children received advocate services, and (3) the program's benefits and challenges. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; analyzed data from fiscal years 2012-2015 on the number and characteristics of child advocate cases served and recommendations made to stakeholders; and interviewed officials at ORR and the Department of Justice's immigration judges, and child advocate service providers in Chicago, Ill.; Brownsville, Tex.; and Washington, D.C.—selected to obtain variation in the number of children served and amount of time the program was operational, among other factors.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) expanded the child advocate program from two locations to five and added three more locations in fiscal year 2016. The child advocate program—operated by a contractor—was developed in 2004 to promote the best interests of especially vulnerable unaccompanied children in ORR custody. Advocates meet with children regularly and develop recommendations regarding their care and custody. Approximately 336 children were assigned an advocate in fiscal year 2015—97 of them in the three new locations. ORR expects the contractor to provide advocates to an increasing number of children in locations with larger numbers of children in ORR custody, and plans to monitor progress through monthly reports from the contractor.
Children are referred to the program primarily by shelter staff (care providers), who are expected to use a set of criteria established by ORR to determine eligibility. Once the program contractor receives the referral, it decides if an advocate is available to work with a child and then sends a recommendation to ORR to officially appoint an advocate. However, ORR does not receive a copy of referrals that the contractor is unable to serve. Further, GAO's data analysis shows and the program's contractor reported inconsistent referral practices. Contrary to federal internal control standards, ORR does not monitor referrals by care providers or contractor decisions about which children it serves. As a result, ORR cannot know whether eligible vulnerable children are overlooked.
Stakeholders GAO interviewed said the advocate program gives children a voice during the immigration process and aids decision making regarding their care and custody. However, the contractor said their efforts are hampered by ORR's information sharing policy. GAO found that from fiscal years 2012-2015, more than 70 percent of the 493 recommendations made by advocates were adopted by ORR, immigration courts, and others. However, the contractor said ORR does not provide them with some key information on children. For example, they do not receive significant incident reports that describe behavioral incidents while in ORR care, past abuse or neglect, or other concerns. The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 states that child advocates “shall be provided access to materials necessary to effectively advocate.” The contractor said creating recommendations without complete information limits their effectiveness. ORR officials told GAO that they are considering providing the contractor with copies of all significant incident reports and other key information; but as of April 6, 2016 the policy had not changed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ORR improve its efforts to monitor care provider referrals and contractor decisions, and ensure that the contractor has timely access to key information on the children. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-850 | gao_GAO-02-850_0 | Background
The Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) is a cabinet-level interagency committee chaired by the Secretary of Commerce. Limits of TPCC Authority
The Export Enhancement Act of 1992 requires that the TPCC develop and implement an annual national export strategy that, among other things, establishes a set of federal priorities supporting U.S. exports and develops a plan to align federal programs with established priorities; proposes an annual unified federal trade promotion budget. The TPCC’s National Export Strategies Do Not Identify Agencies’ Specific Goals or Use of Resources
The TPCC’s annual national export strategies have identified broad priorities, but they have not discussed agencies’ specific export promotion goals, such as increasing exports in a TPCC targeted market, or assessed progress made toward achieving the committee’s broad priorities. It identified the most competitive sectors for U.S. companies as well as regional barriers to U.S. exports. Later strategies also discussed broad trade objectives. For example, the 1997 strategy noted that the United States was losing market share in Eastern Europe to the EU, but the 1998 strategy did not report on any changes in this condition. The 2002 strategy did not specifically discuss China. The overall effect is that it is not clear whether federal export promotion resources are being used most productively. In its 2002 strategy, the recently energized TPCC identified several key areas for improved agency coordination, some of which address problems initially recognized in the TPCC’s 1993 strategy, including the need for (1) cross training agency personnel so they are knowledgeable about other agency programs, (2) improving exporters’ access to timely and accurate trade information, and (3) expanding outreach and trade education for new-to- export firms. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist federal agencies in making the best use of federal export promotion resources and to assist U.S. exporters, we recommend that the Chairman of the TPCC ensure that its national export strategies consistently (1) identify agencies’ specific goals within the strategies’ broad priorities, (2) identify how agencies’ resources are allocated in support of their specific goals, and (3) analyze progress made in addressing the recommendations in the committee’s prior annual strategies. Many of the export agencies were represented in this region, including USAID. Specifically, we assessed (1) whether the committee’s strategy has established export priorities, assessed progress made toward achieving the strategy’s priorities, and proposed an alignment of federal resources in support of these priorities; and (2) whether the committee has made progress in coordinating the various agencies’ export promotion programs. | What GAO Found
Ten years ago, to coordinate the activities of the various federal agencies involved in export promotion and to ensure better delivery of services to potential exporters, Congress established the interagency Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) under the Export Enhancement Act of 1992. Among other things, the act required the committee to develop a governmentwide strategic plan that (1) establishes priorities for federal activities in support of U.S. export activities and (2) proposes the annual, united federal trade promotion budget that supports the plan. TPCC's annual national export strategies identify broad priorities for promoting U.S. trade, but they do not discuss agencies' specific goals or assess progress made. In its initial strategies, the committee identified 10 regionally dispersed priority markets for future trade promotion efforts, but it did not discuss agencies' specific goals or report later on progress made in increasing exports to these markets. Shifting to a regional approach 3 years later in its 1997 strategy, the committee identified Central and Eastern Europe as a region where U.S. government assistance to U.S. exporters would be important in increasing market share. Again the strategy did not discuss agencies' specific goals nor did later strategies report on progress made or even cover consistent topics from year to year. Without regular assessments of progress, it is not clear whether export promotion resources are being used most productively in support of the strategy. Furthermore, the committee has limited ability to align agency resources with its strategy. The committee has made modest but inconsistent progress in coordinating federal agencies' export promotion efforts. In its first national export strategy in 1993, the committee identified coordination weaknesses and recommended improvements, most of which required interagency consensus to implement. Although many of its initial recommendations were implemented during the committee's first few years, some have not been implemented--for example, the need for improved agency staff training and improved trade information services to bring clarity to the export process, as well as the need for expanded outreach and trade education for new-to-export firms. |
gao_GAO-09-798 | gao_GAO-09-798_0 | The Formula Does Not Capture Certain Taxable Resources
While proper measures of need and cost are important for both beneficiary and taxpayer equity, the VR funding formula lacks equity for state taxpayers, in particular, because its measure of a state’s ability to contribute to the VR program is limited to per capita income and does not include all potentially taxable resources. This provision of the formula served a purpose when the formula was last revised, in 1978, to ensure that no state experienced a funding decrease. We present three options, or prototypes, to illustrate the range of options. Challenge of basing incentive awards on an agency’s performance, without accounting for factors outside its control: A variety of factors outside an agency’s control may influence performance outcomes, such as the state’s economy and the characteristics and needs of the individuals who seek rehabilitation services. Although Education uses multiple measures to evaluate state VR agencies’ performance, an issue to consider is whether or not the current measures would be appropriate to use for distributing incentive awards. Adjusting performance standards to account for differences in local economies and program clients: The level of performance required of each state VR agency to receive an incentive award could be adjusted to account for the challenges they face. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, & Methodology
Our objectives were to: (1) assess the extent to which the funding formula meets generally accepted equity standards, (2) develop options for revising the formula to better meet these standards, and (3) identify issues to consider with incorporating performance incentives into the formula. As a result, they were included in our measure. We assessed the reliability and validity of ACS data by interviewing Census Bureau officials and disability experts, reviewing documentation and literature, and conducting comparisons with other disability data. Measuring State Financing Capacity
A taxpayer equity standard stipulates that funds are distributed so that states can provide individuals comparable services using both state and federal funds, while each state contributes about the same proportion of their resources to a given federal program. These proportions are presented in appendix III. Allotments per working-aged person with a disability (cost-adjusted): To determine for each state the allotment per working-aged person with a disability, as adjusted for the costs of providing services, we used Education data on the VR grant allotments that states received in fiscal year 2008, ACS data on state disability populations in 2007 (using the five disability questions, as described earlier), and the cost index, as described earlier. Analysis of Formula Options
For our second objective, we developed three formula options based upon equity standards commonly used to design and evaluate funding formulas. Education obtains the data from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis. Appendix VII: Description of Formula Options
This appendix provides detailed information on three formula options or prototypes for revising the VR funding formula: (1) a partial beneficiary equity formula that distributes funds based only on the size of a state’s population potentially needing services, (2) a full beneficiary equity formula with the addition of a cost of services factor, and (3) a taxpayer equity formula with the addition of a measure of state resources. It would only partially achieve beneficiary equity because it does not account for differences among states in the cost of providing services. | Why GAO Did This Study
State vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies play a crucial role in helping individuals with disabilities obtain employment. In fiscal year 2008, the Department of Education (Education) distributed over $2.8 billion in grants to state agencies, using a funding formula that was last revised in 1978. Questions have been raised about whether this formula is outdated, allocates funds equitably, and adequately accounts for state agencies' performance. GAO was asked to: (1) examine the extent to which the current formula meets generally accepted equity standards, (2) present options for revising the formula, and (3) identify issues to consider with incorporating performance incentives into the formula. To address these objectives, GAO relied upon two equity standards commonly used to design and evaluate funding formulas: beneficiary equity, which stipulates that funds should be distributed so that each state can provide the same level of services to each person in need; and taxpayer equity, which stipulates that states should contribute about the same proportion of their resources to a given program. GAO analyzed data from Education, Department of the Treasury, Census Bureau, and other agencies; surveyed state VR agencies; interviewed agency officials and disability experts; and reviewed literature on performance incentives.
What GAO Found
The VR funding formula falls short of meeting equity standards because it uses imprecise measures of state needs and resources. The formula does not account for differences among states in the proportion of people with a disability or the costs of providing services. As a result, the amount of services that states can purchase per person with a disability varies, from $83 to $277 (see figure). In addition, the formula uses only per capita income to measure a state's ability to contribute to the program, excluding other taxable resources. GAO presents three options for revising the formula to illustrate a range of possibilities: the first distributes funds based on states' disability populations, the second also accounts for costs of providing services, and the third further accounts for state resources beyond per capita income. Because any formula change would redistribute funds among states, potentially disrupting services to individuals, GAO also presents options for establishing a transition period. Including performance incentives in the funding formula has potential for improving performance but can also pose challenges. These include: effectively balancing the VR program's multiple goals, rewarding agencies for meeting individuals' specific needs, and basing awards on an agency's performance rather than influences outside its control. GAO identified ways to mitigate these risks, such as using multiple performance measures to address different goals, and adjusting the performance level required for an agency to receive an incentive award. However, these approaches would still require careful consideration of several issues, such as how to account for clients' varying disability levels and needs and provide appropriate incentives for achieving desired outcomes. |
gao_GAO-07-296 | gao_GAO-07-296_0 | However, in December 2006, Congress passed and the President signed the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, which extends the NMTC for an additional year (through the end of 2008) with an additional $3.5 billion of NMTC allocation authority. In a tiered leveraged investment structure, a portion of the money being invested in the investment fund comes from equity investors and a portion of the money originates from a debt investment (loan). Financial Institutions and Individuals Are the Primary NMTC Investors, and CDEs Most Often Use NMTC Investments to Make Loans to Qualified Businesses
Banks and individuals constitute the majority of NMTC claimants when qualified equity investments are originally made. Banks and other corporations that invested in the credit had relatively large net assets. Businesses Primarily Receive Loans from CDEs That They Use Chiefly for Investment in Commercial Real Estate
CDEs that received NMTC allocations have used their allocations to make investments totaling $3.1 billion through fiscal year 2005, primarily in the form of loans to businesses in low-income communities. NMTC Investors Report That the NMTC Increases Investment in Low- Income Communities and Statistical Analysis Indicates That These Investments May Be Financed by Shifting Assets from Other Uses and Some New Investment
The results of our investor survey and statistical analysis indicate that the NMTC may be increasing investment in eligible low-income communities by participating investors, which is consistent with the program’s purpose. As of January 2007, the CDFI Fund had identified nine CDEs that were not compliant with their allocation agreements and one CDE that was not in compliance with the NMTC program’s “substantially all” requirement. The CDFI Fund developed policies and procedures for conducting site visits to CDEs where CDFI Fund officials check the validity of data reported by CDEs’ to the CDFI Fund and obtain additional information about CDEs’ efforts to remain compliant. According to IRS officials, a more streamlined format for sharing data between IRS and the CDFI Fund would allow IRS to better target noncompliance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Based on consultations with staff at cognizant congressional committees, the objectives of this report are to (1) describe the status of the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program; (2) profile the characteristics of NMTC investors, the Community Development Entities (CDE) that receive NMTC allocations, and the businesses and communities that receive NMTC investments; (3) assess how effective the NMTC has been in bringing new investment to low-income communities by the investors that have participated in the program; and (4) assess the steps that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund are taking to ensure CDEs and investors are complying with the NMTC and evaluate how effective these steps have been. We collected documents on the program status and efforts to monitor NMTC compliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 authorized up to $15 billion of allocation authority under the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) to stimulate investment in low-income communities. The act mandated that GAO report on the program to Congress by January 31, 2004, 2007, and 2010. Two subsequent laws authorized an additional $1 billion in NMTC authority for certain qualified investments and extended the program for 1 year with an additional $3.5 billion of authority. This report (1) describes the status of the NMTC program, (2) profiles NMTC program participants, (3) assesses the credit's effectiveness in attracting investment by participating investors, and (4) assesses IRS and the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund compliance monitoring efforts. To conduct the analysis, GAO surveyed NMTC investors, conducted statistical analysis, and interviewed IRS and CDFI Fund officials.
What GAO Found
As of January 2007, the CDFI Fund had awarded $12.1 billion of NMTC authority to 179 Community Development Entities (CDE). CDEs that received allocations began making NMTC investments in 2003, and the program has continued to grow since then. Investors use two main investment structures to make NMTC investments: direct investments to CDEs and tiered investments, which include equity investments and leveraged investments, where a portion of the investment amount originates from debt and a portion from equity. Banks and individuals constitute the largest proportion of NMTC investors, though banks and other corporations have made the largest share of NMTC investment. CDEs that received allocations applied for allocations in a competitive selection process and, through fiscal year 2005, most investment from CDEs to low-income communities had been used for either commercial real estate rehabilitation or new commercial real estate construction. The results of GAO's survey and statistical analysis indicate that the NMTC may be increasing investment in low-income communities by participating investors. Investors indicated that they have increased their investment budgets in low-income communities as a result of the credit, and GAO's analysis indicates that businesses may be shifting investment funds from other types of assets to invest in the NMTC, while individual investors may be using at least some new funds to invest in the NMTC. The CDFI Fund and IRS developed processes to monitor CDEs' compliance with their allocation agreements and the tax code. However, IRS's study of CDE compliance does not cover the full range of NMTC transactions, focusing instead on transactions that were readily available, and may not support the best decisions about enforcement in the future. Moreover, IRS and the CDFI Fund are not collecting data that would allow IRS to identify credit claimants and amounts to be claimed. |
gao_GAO-06-657T | gao_GAO-06-657T_0 | Continuing Pay Problems for Army Soldiers
Continuing pay problems resulted in overpayments and debt for sick and injured GWOT Army soldiers. Our investigation into allegations of pay problems related to 37 soldiers assigned to the MRPU at Fort Bragg identified actual overpayments of approximately $218,000 to 232 sick and injured Army National Guard and Reserve soldiers in outpatient status during the period April 2003 through June 2005. As a policy, DFAS does not pursue collection action on the debts of fallen soldiers. In addition, DFAS may pursue collection of debts of other deceased soldiers. We found that hundreds of separated battle-injured soldiers were pursued for repayment of military debts that occurred through no fault of their own, including 74 soldiers whose debts had been reported to credit bureaus, private collection agencies, and TOP at the time we initiated our audit in June 2005. Although the Debt Collection Act gives DOD authority to use these debt collection tools, in response to our audit, the Army temporarily suspended collection action on debts of battle-injured soldiers until a determination could be made about whether these soldiers’ debts were eligible for relief. Overpayments and Debt Collection Action Have Placed Significant Hardship on Sick and Injured Soldiers and Their Families
Debt collection actions have caused a variety of problems for injured and sick Army GWOT soldiers. Depression – sent to MRPU at Fort Bragg and redeployed to Iraq. By this time, the soldier’s overpayments had resulted in debt of $1,300. Separated Battle-Injured Soldier Case Studies
Case studies related to our audit of separated battle-injured soldier debt showed that several of these soldiers also had gone without a paycheck for several months while they were in Army medical facilities undergoing treatment for their war injuries because debt caused by overpayments of combat pay and other errors was offset against their military pay. Table 2 illustrates examples of the effects of debt collection actions on 10 of our separated Army battle-injured case study soldiers and their families. The Army debt was the only blot on the soldier’s credit report. Pay calculation errors. For example, the act could be clarified to make debt relief available to soldiers regardless of when they separated from active duty. Currently, soldiers who separated from the Army more than 1 year ago are not eligible to obtain debt relief, and soldiers who paid debts are not eligible for refunds. These pay problems have resulted in significant frustration for injured soldiers and their families. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of GAO's past four reports and testimonies on Army military pay and travel pay for soldiers who have served in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), GAO was asked to determine if weaknesses in Army processes for initiating and terminating active duty pay might result in erroneous payments and debt, including (1) overpayments to soldiers in the Fort Brag Medical Retention Processing Unit (MRPU)--1 of 23 MRPUs--and (2) overpayments and other errors that resulted in debt collection action against battle-injured soldiers who were released from active duty. GAO also was asked to develop case studies to illustrate the effects of these problems on soldiers and their families and to determine ways that Congress could make the debt collection process more soldier friendly.
What GAO Found
Continuing pay problems resulted in overpayments and debt for sick and injured Army soldiers serving in GWOT. As with GAO's prior work, these pay problems resulted in significant frustration and financial problems for the soldiers and their families. Our audit of separated Army GWOT soldier debt identified nearly 1,300 separated battle-injured soldiers and soldiers who were killed in combat during the first 4 years of GWOT deployment who had incurred a total of $1.5 million in debt as of September 30, 2005. DOD has authority to write off debts of deceased soldiers and generally does not pursue collection action on the debts of soldiers who were killed in action. However, we found that hundreds of battle-injured soldiers were pursued for repayment of military debts through no fault of their own, including at least 74 soldiers whose debts had been reported to credit bureaus and private collection agencies at the time we initiated our audit in June 2005. Although the Debt Collection Act gives DOD authority to use these debt collection tools, in response to our audit, the Army temporarily suspended collection action on debts of battle-injured soldiers until a determination could be made about whether these soldiers' debts were eligible for relief. In addition our investigation of pay problems related to Army National Guard and Reserve soldiers assigned to the Fort Bragg MRPU identified overpayments of approximately $218,000 related to 232 sick and injured soldiers. Many sick and injured Fort Bragg soldiers faced garnishment of wages and other debt collection action resulting from their pay errors. Congress recently gave the Department of Defense (DOD) authority to cancel some GWOT soldier debts. Because of restrictions in the law, debts of injured soldiers who separated at different times can be treated differently, and soldiers who paid their debts are not eligible for refunds. Also, because this authority expires in December 2007, soldiers and their families could face bad credit reports and visits from collection agencies in the future. |
gao_GAO-05-533T | gao_GAO-05-533T_0 | Identification of Mandates Under UMRA Is Complex
The procedures under UMRA for the identification and analysis of intergovernmental and private sector mandates are very complex. Even if proposed legislation or regulations are reviewed under UMRA, those provisions are subject to various definitions, exclusions, and exceptions before being identified as containing mandates at or above UMRA’s cost thresholds. As mentioned previously, in 2001 and 2002, the period of our review, only 5 of the 377 statutes enacted and 9 of the 122 major rules issued contained federal mandates at or above UMRA’s thresholds. Specifically, we identified at least 43 statutes and 65 rules issued in 2001 and 2002 that resulted in new costs or other negative financial impacts on nonfederal parties that the affected parties might perceive as unfunded or under funded mandates even though they did not meet UMRA’s definition of a mandate or did not meet or exceed UMRA’s thresholds. To begin to address this question, you asked us to obtain the views of a diverse group of parties knowledgeable about UMRA and federal mandates. Views of Parties Regarding UMRA and Unfunded Mandates
Parties from the various sectors provided a variety of comments but they generally fell into several broad themes. UMRA’s coverage was the most frequently cited theme, with comments provided by all the sectors (academic/think tank, business, federal agencies, public interest advocacy groups, and state and local governments). UMRA Coverage Generally Viewed as a Weakness but a Few Parties Disagree
Given the findings from our May 2004 report, it’s not surprising that UMRA’s coverage, including its numerous definitions, exclusions, and exceptions, was the most frequently cited issue by parties from all five sectors. Others provided more specific comments, including points regarding issues with the exclusion of indirect costs and UMRA’s cost thresholds for legislative and regulatory mandates, which result in excluding many federal actions that may significantly impact nonfederal entities. According to CBO’s 2005 report on unfunded mandates, “Over half of the intergovernmental mandates for which CBO provided estimates were preemptions of state and local authority.”
Despite the widespread view in several sectors that UMRA’s narrow coverage leaves out federal actions with potentially significant impacts on nonfederal entities, there was less agreement by parties about how to address this issue. Parties across and within sectors had differing views on both the enforcement mechanisms provided in the law itself and the level of effort exercised by those responsible for implementing UMRA’s provisions. The few parties commenting about judicial review suggested expanding it to provide more opportunities for judicial challenges and more effective remedies when noncompliance of the Act’s requirements occur. A few parties primarily from the academic/think tank and public interest advocacy groups sectors said that efforts to limit or stop implementation of mandates through legal action might be unwarranted, because UMRA was not intended to preclude the enactment of federal mandates. Sectors Also Raise Concerns About Federal Mandates in General
Parties from all sectors also raised a number of broader issues about federal mandates—namely, the design and funding and evaluation of federal mandates—and suggested a variety of options. About half the parties, representing most sectors commented on the evaluation of federal mandates and offered suggestions to improve mandates, whether covered by the Act or not. Finally, as we move forward in an environment of constrained fiscal resources, the issue of unfunded mandates raises broader questions about the assignment of fiscal responsibilities within our federal system. Part of this public policy debate includes a reexamination of the federal government’s role in our system and a need to sort out how responsibilities for these kinds of programs should be financed in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) was enacted to address concerns about federal statutes and regulations that require nonfederal parties to expend resources to achieve legislative goals without being provided funding to cover the costs. UMRA generates information about the nature and size of potential federal mandates but does not preclude the implementation of such mandates. At various times in UMRA's 10-year history, Congress has considered legislation to amend aspects of the act to address ongoing questions about its effectiveness. This testimony is based on GAO's reports, Unfunded Mandates: Analysis of Reform Act Coverage ( GAO-04-637 , May 12, 2004) and Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act's Strengths, Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement ( GAO-05-454 , March 31, 2005). Specifically, this testimony addresses (1) UMRA's procedures for the identification of federal mandates and GAO's analysis of the implementation of those procedures for statutes enacted and major rules issued in 2001 and 2002, and (2) the views of a diverse group of parties familiar with UMRA on the significant strengths and weaknesses of the act as the framework for addressing mandate issues and potential options for reinforcing the strengths or addressing the weaknesses.
What GAO Found
The identification and analysis of intergovernmental and private sector mandates is a complex process under UMRA. Proposed legislation and regulations are subject to various definitions, exceptions, and exclusions before being identified as containing mandates at or above UMRA's cost thresholds. Also, some legislation and rules may be enacted or issued via procedures that do not trigger UMRA reviews. In 2001 and 2002, 5 of 377 statutes enacted and 9 of 122 major or economically significant final rules issued were identified as containing federal mandates at or above UMRA's thresholds. Despite the determinations under UMRA, at least 43 other statutes and 65 rules resulted in new costs or negative financial consequences that affected nonfederal parties might perceive as unfunded or underfunded federal mandates. GAO obtained information from 52 knowledgeable parties, who provided a significant number of comments about UMRA, specifically, and federal mandates, generally. Their views often varied across and within the five sectors we identified (academic/think tank, public interest advocacy groups, business, federal agencies, and state and local governments). Overall, the numerous strengths, weaknesses, and options for improvement identified during the review fell into several broad themes, including, among others, UMRA-specific issues such as the act's coverage and enforcement, and more general issues about the design, funding, and evaluation of federal mandates. UMRA's coverage was, by far, the most frequently cited issue by parties from the various sectors. Parties across most sectors said that UMRA's numerous definitions, exclusions, and exceptions leave out many federal actions that might significantly impact nonfederal entities and suggested that they should be revisited. However, a few parties, primarily from the public interest advocacy sector, viewed UMRA's narrow coverage as a strength that should be maintained. Another issue on which the parties had particularly strong views was the perceived need for better evaluation and research of federal mandates and more complete estimates of both the direct and indirect costs of mandates on nonfederal entities. The most frequently suggested option to address these evaluation issues was more post-implementation evaluation of existing mandates or "look backs" at their effectiveness. Going forward, the issue of unfunded mandates raises broader questions about assigning fiscal responsibilities within our federal system. The long-term fiscal challenges facing the federal and state and local governments and the continued relevance of existing programs and priorities warrant a national debate to review what the government does, how it does business, and how it finances its priorities. Such a reexamination includes considering how responsibilities for financing public services are allocated and shared across the many nonfederal entities in the U.S. system. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-18 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-18_0 | I will note funding levels and trends for activities in each category and then discuss the particular set of issues and questions that could be raised with respect to relevance, priority, and efficiency. 3). From fiscal year 1992 to 1995, U.S. government agencies spent over $6.6 billion to support U.N. peace operations in Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia; this figure includes $3.4 billion in incremental costs incurred by the Department of Defense and funded outside of the 150 account. 5). As I said earlier, a large percentage of sustainable development funding is directed by the Congress or the President for specific purposes, such as child survival and population programs. Foreign Affairs Management
In recent years, about 14 percent of the international affairs budget has been spent to fund activities related to the management of foreign affairs. The fiscal year 1997 funding level of $1.1 billion was 25 percent lower than it was in fiscal year 1992. Related—and large—expenditures for trade and investment activities and programs outside the 150 account include the activities of the Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the various agricultural trade promotion and credit guaranty programs, and the programs of the Small Business Administration. These tables are intended to illustrate the broad range of activities that support U.S. international policy objectives and are funded outside the 150 account. Examines programs, budget requests, and management activities; proposes changes; and participates in counterterrorism efforts. Provides information on national security and international affairs and gives training to foreign audit organizations. 2, 1995). 18, 1995). Multilateral Assistance
Multilateral Organizations: U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the programs and activities funded by the international affairs budget, the function 150 account of the federal budget, focusing on the issues that should be raised in assessing the current programs and activities on the books that support U.S. foreign policy and economic objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) funding in the 150 account, which totalled $18.1 billion in fiscal year 1997, constitutes only 1 percent of the federal budget and just 3 to 4 percent of discretionary funding; (2) these expenditures fund activities that are designed to influence world political and economic agendas; (3) to support its interest in such agendas, the U.S. government maintains a worldwide infrastructure of embassies, missions, consulates, and trade offices, with an overseas staff of more than 35,000; (4) the 150 account funds a wide range of programs and activities; (5) a large percentage of the funds in the account is directed by Congress or the President for specific countries and purposes; (6) to facilitate the examination of 150 account funding, GAO grouped the various programs and activities into six categories: (a) security and peacekeeping operations; (b) bilateral assistance; (c) foreign affairs management; (d) public diplomacy; (e) multilateral assistance; and (f) trade and investment; and (7) GAO presented information on the funding levels and trends for activities in each of the six categories and also discussed the particular set of issues and questions that could be raised with respect to relevance, priority, and efficiency. |
gao_GAO-09-731 | gao_GAO-09-731_0 | CPSC obtains most of its information on injuries from its National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), which gathers information from a nationally representative sample of about 100 hospital emergency rooms. CPSC Has Not Analyzed Racial and Ethnic Differences in Product- Related Injury and Death because of Data Limitations
CPSC estimates product-related injury and death rates by age group, but because neither emergency room nor death certificate data provide complete information about both race and ethnicity and related products, CPSC has not analyzed product-related injury and death rates by race and ethnicity or other characteristics that could identify particularly vulnerable populations. As shown in figure 2, our analysis of CPSC’s NEISS data found that race and ethnicity data were not coded in about 31 percent of cases in 2007. In addition, NEISS hospitals that have recorded race and ethnicity information do so inconsistently, in part because of limited CPSC guidance. The majority of hospitals reviewed in this study had inconsistent methods for collecting data on patient race, ethnicity, and primary language. While death certificates may contain more complete and accurate race and ethnicity data than the NEISS system, according to CPSC and CDC officials, related product information is not consistently documented on the certificates. CPSC Has Developed or Modified Some Consumer Information Efforts to Reach Specific Minority Populations, but Has Not Assessed the Results of These Efforts
CPSC has incorporated some elements of key consumer education practices to provide consumer product safety information to minority populations, such as periodically using consumer and other stakeholder input to inform its outreach efforts, but it has not specifically defined goals or developed measures to assess whether these efforts are effectively reaching minority populations (see app. CPSC has also identified and established relationships with other organizations to help disseminate consumer safety information to additional minority communities through electronic, broadcast, and print media. Organizations we contacted for this report, including NSN members, consumer groups, and organizations that conduct injury prevention research or implement injury prevention programs in diverse communities generally reported using safety information provided by CPSC, and some offered suggestions for improving efforts to reach minority communities. CPSC Has Used Some Consumer Input to Develop Safety Information, but Has Not Assessed Outreach Efforts to Specific Audiences
CPSC has periodically conducted audience research to strengthen its consumer information efforts. CPSC has also established goals for its overall consumer information efforts, but not for its messages targeted to specific populations. CPSC relies on the Neighborhood Safety Network to share product safety information with audiences that can be hard to reach, but the agency has not formally assessed whether these populations are receiving and using the information. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) what is known about the relative incidence of preventable injuries and deaths related to drowning, poisoning, and suffocation associated with products intended for children’s use among minority children compared with nonminority children, and (2) what actions the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has taken through its public information and education initiatives to minimize child injuries and deaths, including those in minority populations, related to products intended for children’s use. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) estimated that 29,400 deaths in the United States were related to consumer products. As required under Section 107 of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, this study reviews what is known about the relative incidence of preventable injuries and deaths among minority children associated with products intended for children's use and also examines what actions CPSC has taken through its public information and education initiatives to minimize these injuries and deaths. To address these issues, we assessed injury and death data sources used by CPSC, compared CPSC's consumer education efforts with key practices, and interviewed federal officials and groups representing the health and consumer interests of minority populations.
What GAO Found
Few studies have assessed racial and ethnic differences in child death rates from injuries related to consumer products, and CPSC has not analyzed whether specific racial or ethnic groups are disproportionately affected by product hazards because of data limitations. These limitations include incomplete and inconsistent race and ethnicity data on emergency room reports and the inconsistent presence of product-related information on death certificates. In 2007, race and ethnicity data were not coded in about 31 percent of cases in CPSC's National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), which collects data from a nationally representative sample of hospital emergency rooms. In addition, the hospitals that do record race and ethnicity information in CPSC's NEISS system do so inconsistently, in part because of limited CPSC guidance. While death certificates may include more complete race and ethnicity information compared with nonfatal injury data from hospitals, related product information is not consistently documented on the certificates. Despite this lack of data, CPSC has developed or modified some consumer information efforts to reach specific minority populations, but it has not assessed the results of these efforts. CPSC provides information in Spanish for many of its outreach efforts, including its telephone hotline, Web site, television, radio, and print publications. CPSC has also identified and established relationships with other organizations to help disseminate consumer safety information to minority communities. And while CPSC has used some consumer input to develop safety information, it has not assessed outreach efforts for specific audiences. CPSC has also established goals for its overall consumer information efforts, but not for its messages targeted to specific populations. In addition, CPSC relies on its Neighborhood Safety Network, a group of organizations that have expressed interest in receiving product safety information, to share information with audiences that can be hard to reach, but the agency has not assessed whether these populations are receiving and using the information. Organizations we contacted for this report, including Neighborhood Safety Network members and children's safety groups, generally reported using safety information provided by CPSC, but some offered suggestions for improvement of efforts to reach minority communities, such as providing safety information in other languages and additional exposure through broadcast media. |
gao_T-RCED-98-61 | gao_T-RCED-98-61_0 | The Park Service’s Estimate and the Composition of the Maintenance Backlog
In 1997, in support of its fiscal year 1998 budget request, the Park Service estimated that its maintenance backlog was about $6.1 billion.Maintenance is generally considered to be work done to keep assets—property, plant, and equipment—in acceptable condition. Of the estimated $6.1 billion maintenance backlog, most of it—about $5.6 billion, or about 92 percent—are construction projects. The Park Service’s list of projects in the construction portion of the maintenance backlog reveals that over 21 percent, or $1.2 billion, of the $5.6 billion is for new facilities. We visited four parks to review the projects listed in the Park Service’s maintenance backlog estimates for those parks and found that the estimates included new construction projects as part of the backlog estimate. As a result, including these types of projects in the maintenance backlog contributes to confusion about the actual maintenance needs of the national park system. Is It Reliable? The Park Service compiles its maintenance backlog estimates on an ad hoc basis in response to requests from the Congress or others; it does not have a routine, systematic process for determining its maintenance backlog. The January estimate of the maintenance backlog—its most recent estimate—was based largely on information that was compiled over 4 years ago. This fact, as well as the absence of a common definition of what should be included in the maintenance backlog, contributed to an inaccurate and out-of-date estimate. Managing the Backlog
In order to begin addressing its maintenance backlog, the Park Service needs (1) accurate estimates of its total maintenance backlog and (2) a means for tracking progress so that it can determine the extent to which its needs are being met. Park Service officials told us that they have not developed a precise estimate of the total maintenance backlog because the needs far exceed the funding resources available to address them. The recent actions by the Congress to provide the Park Service with substantial additional funding, which could be used to address its maintenance backlog, further underscores the need to ensure that available funds are being used to address those needs and to show progress in improving the conditions of the national park system. This condition information is essential to providing the Park Service with better data on its overall maintenance needs. If properly implemented, this requirement should make the Park Service as a whole, as well as individual park managers, more accountable for how it spends maintenance funds to improve the condition of park facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed: (1) the Park Service's estimate of the maintenance backlog and its composition; (2) how the agency determined the maintenance backlog estimate and whether it is reliable; and (3) how the agency manages the backlog.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Park Service's estimate of its maintenance backlog does not accurately reflect the scope of the maintenance needs of the park system; (2) the Park Service estimated, as of January 1997, that its maintenance backlog was about $6.1 billion; (3) most of this amount--about $5.6 billion, or about 92 percent--was construction projects; (4) of this amount, over 21 percent or $1.2 billion was for the construction of new facilities; (5) while GAO does not question the need for these facilities, including these kinds of new construction projects or projects that expand or upgrade park facilities in an estimate of the maintenance backlog is not appropriate because it goes beyond what could reasonably be viewed as maintenance; (6) as a result, including these projects in the maintenance backlog contributes to confusion about the actual maintenance needs of the national park system; (7) the Park Service's estimate of its maintenance backlog is not reliable; (8) its maintenance backlog estimates are compiled on an ad hoc basis in response to requests from Congress or others; (9) the agency does not have a routine, systematic process for determining its maintenance backlog; (10) the most recent estimate, as of January 1997, was based largely on information that was compiled by the Park Service over 4 years ago and has not been updated to reflect changing conditions in individual park units; (11) this fact, as well as the absence of a common definition of what should be included in the maintenance backlog, contributes to an inaccurate and out-of-date estimate; (12) the Park Service does not use the estimated backlog in managing park maintenance operations; (13) as such, it has not specifically identified its total maintenance backlog; (14) since the backlog far exceeds the funding resources being made available to address it, the Park Service has focused its efforts on identifying the highest-priority maintenance needs; (15) however, given that substantial additional funding resources can be used to address maintenance--over $100 million starting in fiscal year (FY) 1998--the Park Service should more accurately determine its total maintenance needs and track progress in meeting them so that it can determine the extent to which they are being met; (16) the Park Service is beginning to implement the legislatively mandated management changes in FY 1998; and (17) these changes could, if properly implemented, help the Park Service develop more accurate data on its maintenance backlog and track progress in addressing it. |
gao_GAO-03-467T | gao_GAO-03-467T_0 | The Coast Guard has overall federal responsibility for many aspects of port security and is involved in a wide variety of activities. The Coast Guard’s homeland security role is still evolving; however, its resource commitments to this area are substantial and will likely grow. Our past work on government restructuring and reorganization has identified a number of factors that are critical to success in these efforts. Our testimony today focuses on six of these factors—strategic planning, communication and partnership-building, performance management, human capital strategy, information management and technology, and acquisition management—and, based on past work, some of the key challenges the Coast Guard faces in addressing and resolving them. Strategic planning is important within the Coast Guard, which now faces a challenge in merging past planning efforts with the new realities of homeland security. Most notably, as part of the current military build-up in the Middle East, the Coast Guard has sent nine cutters to assist the DOD in the event of war with Iraq. Where homeland security once played a relatively small part in the Coast Guard’s missions, a new plan must now delineate the goals, objectives, strategies, resource requirements, and implementation timetables for achieving this vastly expanded role while still balancing resources among its various other missions. The agency is now developing a strategic deployment plan for its homeland security mission and plans to finish it sometime this year. Second, they include the relationships among the components of a parent department, such as DHS. However, the Coast Guard has work under way to define its homeland security mission and the desired outcomes stemming from that mission. For example, to deal with its expanded homeland security role and meet all of its other responsibilities, the Coast Guard expects to add thousands of new positions over the next 3 years. We will continue to assess the department’s actions in these areas. In conclusion, these challenges are daunting but not insurmountable. The Coast Guard continues to do an admirable job of adapting to its new homeland security role through the hard work and dedication of its people, and it has the management capability to address the implementation issues discussed here as well. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security. Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard is one of 22 agencies being placed in the new Department of Homeland Security. With its key roles in the nation's ports, waterways, and coastlines, the Coast Guard is an important part of enhanced homeland security efforts. But it also has non-security missions, such as search and rescue, fisheries and environmental protection, and boating safety. GAO has conducted a number of reviews of the Coast Guard's missions and was asked to testify about the Coast Guard's implementation challenges in moving to this newly created Department.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard faces major challenges in effectively implementing its operations within the Department of Homeland Security. GAO has identified critical success factors for reorganizing and restructuring agencies, and its recent work in reviewing the Coast Guard has focused on challenges dealing with six of these factors--strategic planning, communications and partnership-building, performance management, human capital strategy, information management and technology, and acquisition management. The Coast Guard faces challenges in all of these areas. The difficulty of meeting these challenges is compounded because the Coast Guard is not just moving to a new parent agency: it is also substantially reinventing itself because of its new security role. Basically, the agency faces a fundamental tension in balancing its many missions. It must still do the work it has been doing for years in such areas as fisheries management and search and rescue, but now its resources are deployed as well in homeland security and even in the military buildup in the Middle East. The Coast Guard's expanded role in homeland security, along with its relocation in a new agency, have changed many of its working parameters, and its adjustment to this role remains a work in process. Much work remains. Some of the work is strategic in nature, such as the need to define new missions and redistribute resources to meet the wide range of missions. Others include accommodating a sudden surge of new positions or trying to ensure that its most ambitious acquisition project--the Deepwater Project--remains viable. |
gao_GAO-15-185 | gao_GAO-15-185_0 | The loan must not have risky features such as negative amortization, interest-only payments, or balloon payments (except in certain circumstances). Thus, securities collateralized solely by QM loans (and therefore QRM loans) are not subject to risk-retention requirements. In addition, OMB encourages agencies to preplan efforts to retrospectively review their regulations and give careful consideration about how best to promote empirical testing of the effects of rules both in advance and retrospectively. Initial Effects of Mortgage Regulations Likely Limited for Most Borrowers
Overall, agencies, market participants, and observers estimated that the QM and QRM regulations would not have a significant effect initially because many loans made in recent years already met QM and QRM criteria before these regulations were promulgated. Securitization of Mortgages
Market participants with whom we spoke stated that the QM standards were unlikely to have a significant effect on the securitization of residential mortgages, largely because the majority of loans originated were expected to be QM loans. Qualified Residential Mortgage Regulations Likely to Have Limited Effects in Current Secondary Market
Availability of Mortgages
According to agency officials and observers, the QRM regulations, which were finalized in December 2014, were unlikely to have a significant effect on the availability of residential mortgages under current market conditions. For example, the risk-retention rule states that “the agencies recognize that aligning the QRM and QM definitions has the potential to intensify any existing bifurcation in the mortgage market that may occur between QM and non-QM loans, as securitizations collateralized by non-QMs could have higher funding costs due to risk- retention requirements in addition to potential risk of legal liability under the ability-to-repay rule.” The agencies acknowledged this risk but decided that not aligning QRM and QM definitions likely would result in even greater segmentation in the securitization market and higher costs for consumers. Planning for Reviews of Regulations Lacked Key Elements
CFPB and HUD have begun planning for their reviews of the QM regulations. The agencies responsible for the QRM regulations identified outcomes and potential data sources and analytical methods, but had not yet identified specific metrics and baselines for examining the QRM regulations. CFPB Had Not Completed Plan That Specified Outcomes and Methodologies
In response to the Dodd-Frank requirement to review significant rulemakings, CFPB has made efforts to identify data, but as of May 2015 had not finalized a plan that specified what outcomes and methodologies—such as metrics, baselines, and analytical methods—it will use to examine the effects of the QM regulations. As of May 2015, the agency also had not identified how it would measure the effects of these regulations, including metrics, baselines, and analytical methods. Agency officials said their efforts have included identifying potential data sources for the review of the QRM regulations. However, agency officials acknowledged that the data available from these sources are missing key information, such as points and fees and borrower’s debt-to-income ratios, needed to determine if a loan is QM or non-QM, and consequently QRM eligible. However, it is not clear if the expanded data will be available for the initial reviews. Finalizing plans to retrospectively review the mortgage regulations and incorporating these key elements will better position the agencies to measure the effects of the regulations and identify any unintended consequences. The agencies also could better understand data limitations and methodological challenges and have sufficient time to develop methods to deal with these limitations and challenges. To enhance the effectiveness of their preparations for conducting a retrospective review of the QRM regulations, the agencies responsible for the QRM regulations—FDIC, FHFA, Federal Reserve, HUD, OCC, and SEC—should develop a plan that identifies the metrics, baselines, and analytical methods to be used and specify the roles and responsibilities of each agency in the review process. The other four agencies (the Federal Reserve, FHFA, OCC, and SEC) did not explicitly agree with our recommendations but outlined activities or efforts related to planning for the retrospective review of the QRM definition. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes selected trends in the origination and securitization of residential mortgages in 2000–2014; (2) discusses the expected effects of the qualified mortgage (QM) and qualified residential mortgage (QRM) regulations on the residential mortgage market; and (3) examines the extent to which federal agencies have plans in place to monitor and assess the effects of the QM and QRM regulations on the residential mortgage market. Agencies’ Plans to Monitor and Assess the Effects of the QM and QRM Provisions
To examine the extent to which agencies have plans in place to monitor and assess the effects of the QM and QRM provisions on the residential mortgage market, we identified and reviewed requirements and guidance relating to agencies’ efforts to monitor and assess regulations (criteria). Report to the Congress on Risk Retention. Bureau of Consumer Finance Protection. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Standard and Poor’s. | Why GAO Did This Study
Amid concerns that risky mortgage products and poor underwriting standards contributed to the recent housing crisis, Congress included mortgage reform provisions (QM and QRM) in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. CFPB's regulations establishing standards for QM loans became effective in January 2014. More recently, six agencies jointly issued the final QRM rule that will become effective in December 2015. GAO was asked to review possible effects of these regulations. This report (1) discusses views on the expected effects of the QM and QRM regulations, and (2) examines the extent of agency planning for reviewing the regulations' effects, among its objectives. GAO's methodologies included identifying and reviewing academic, industry, and federal agency analyses on the expected effects of the regulations. GAO also reviewed federal guidance on retrospective reviews and interviewed agency officials to assess agency efforts to examine the effects of the QM and QRM regulations.
What GAO Found
Federal agency officials, market participants, and observers estimated that the qualified mortgage (QM) and qualified residential mortgage (QRM) regulations would have limited initial effects because most loans originated in recent years largely conformed with QM criteria.
The QM regulations, which address lenders' responsibilities to determine a borrower's ability to repay a loan, set forth standards that include prohibitions on risky loan features (such as interest-only or balloon payments) and limits on points and fees. Lenders that originate QM loans receive certain liability protections.
Securities collateralized exclusively by residential mortgages that are “qualified residential mortgages” are exempt from risk-retention requirements. The QRM regulations align the QRM definition with QM; thus, securities collateralized solely by QM loans are not subject to risk-retention requirements.
The analyses GAO reviewed estimated limited effects on the availability of mortgages for most borrowers and that any cost increases (for borrowers, lenders, and investors) would mostly stem from litigation and compliance issues. According to agency officials and observers, the QRM regulations were unlikely to have a significant initial effect on the availability or securitization of mortgages in the current market, largely because the majority of loans originated were expected to be QM loans. However, questions remain about the size and viability of the secondary market for non-QRM-backed securities.
Agencies have begun planning their reviews of the QM and QRM regulations (due January and commencing December 2019, respectively); however, these efforts have not included elements important for conducting effective retrospective reviews. Federal guidance encourages agencies to preplan their retrospective reviews and carefully consider how best to promote empirical testing of the effects of rules. To varying degrees, the relevant agencies have identified outcomes to examine, potential data sources, and analytical methods. But existing data lack important information relevant to the regulations (such as loan performance or borrower debt to income) and planned data enhancements may not be available before agencies start the reviews. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) has proposed expanding Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data reporting requirements, but the earliest that the enhanced data will be available is 2017. Similarly, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) identified how it intends to examine its QM regulations and some potential data sources but has yet to determine how it would measure the effects of these regulations, including metrics, baselines, and analytical methods. Agencies also have not specified how they will conduct their reviews, including determining which data and analytical methods to use. Finalizing plans to retrospectively review the mortgage regulations will position the agencies to better measure the effects of the QM and QRM regulations and identify any unintended consequences. Additionally, the agencies could better understand data limitations and methodological challenges and have sufficient time to develop methods to deal with these limitations and challenges.
What GAO Recommends
CFPB, HUD, and the six agencies responsible for the QRM regulations should complete plans to review the QM and QRM regulations, including identifying specific metrics, baselines, and analytical methods. CFPB, HUD, and one QRM agency—the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—concurred or agreed with the recommendations. The other QRM agencies did not explicitly agree with the recommendations, but outlined ongoing efforts to plan their reviews. |
gao_GAO-14-422 | gao_GAO-14-422_0 | Officials Attribute the Decline in Horn of Africa Piracy to a Combination of Efforts to Prevent, Disrupt, and Prosecute
The Action Plan establishes the U.S. role in countering piracy as a collaborative one, seeking to involve all countries and shipping-industry partners with an interest in maritime security. As incidents of piracy have declined off the Horn of Africa, the number of steaming days has also declined, as shown in figure 6. As a result, in September 2010 we recommended that the NSCS, in collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense, State, Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury, as well as the Attorney General: (1) reassess and revise the Action Plan to better address evolving conditions off the Horn of Africa and their effect on priorities and plans; (2) identify measures of effectiveness to use in evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts; (3) direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to identify the costs of U.S. counterpiracy efforts including operational, support, and personnel costs; and assess the benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and (4) clarify agency roles and responsibilities and develop joint guidance, information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to operate across agency boundaries for implementing key efforts such as strategic communication, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating Since we issued our report in 2010, conditions have prosecution. Piracy declined sharply in 2012 and 2013. During the course of this review, State officials told us the key measures are the number of hostages and ships hijacked, but they have not established formal measures and their decisions are generally guided by discussions rather than formal assessments. In September 2010, we reported that the United States is not collecting information to determine the most cost-effective mix of counterpiracy activities. The United States Has Not Assessed Piracy and Maritime Crime in the Gulf of Guinea
According to DOD and State officials, U.S. efforts to combat piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea are guided by the same over-arching U.S. policies and security goals as the efforts to combat piracy off of the Horn of Africa. DOD and State officials told us that as the United States and international partners look to expand efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, coordinating activities to achieve the most effective mix and efficient use of resources is increasingly important. However, according to officials from the U.S. government agencies working in the region, the NSCS has not directed them to conduct a collective assessment of efforts to combat piracy and maritime crime that weighs the U.S. security interests, goals, and resources in the region against the various types of agency and international activities underway. An assessment of the various U.S. and international efforts, as well as of the geopolitical environment and other regional factors could help determine what additional actions are needed to align all of the efforts underway. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that efforts to counter piracy and maritime crime are coordinated and prioritized to effectively address the evolving threat, we recommend that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense and State, work through the Counter-Piracy Steering Group or otherwise collaborate with the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury, and the Attorney General to conduct an assessment of U.S. efforts to address piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea to inform these efforts and determine whether additional actions to address counterpiracy and maritime security, such as developing an action plan that includes elements of a strategic approach, are needed to guide and coordinate activities. In an email from the NSCS dated June 12, 2014, the NSCS did not concur or non-concur with our recommendations, but provided information related to its current counterpiracy efforts. Key contributors to this report are found in Appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report assesses how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since 2010 and describes U.S. efforts to assess its counterpiracy actions, given any changing conditions; and identifies trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea and U.S. efforts to address them and evaluates the extent to which the United States has assessed its counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. To assess how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since 2010, we analyzed data from the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the U.S. Office of Naval intelligence (ONI) on reported piracy incidents, hostages taken, and ransoms paid off the Horn of Africa from 2008 through 2013. To identify trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea we analyzed IMB data on actual and attempted piracy incidents from 2007 through 2013, and ONI data from 2010 through 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
Piracy and maritime crime continues to threaten ships off the Horn of Africa's east coast and in the Gulf of Guinea off Africa's west coast, putting seafarers in harm's way and costing governments and industry billions of dollars in ransom, insurance, and protective measures. The types and causes of piracy and maritime crime, as well as the African states' ability to address the problem in the two regions, differ. To help U.S. agencies coordinate efforts, the NSCS developed an interagency plan in 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy off the Horn of Africa in collaboration with industry and international partners. GAO was asked to evaluate U.S. counterpiracy activities.
This report: (1) assesses how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since our 2010 review, and describes U.S. efforts to assess its counterpiracy actions, given any changing conditions; and (2) identifies trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea and U.S. efforts to address them, and evaluates the extent to which the United States has assessed its counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. GAO reviewed plans, activities, and data from 2007 through 2013 and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, international partners, and industry, selected as a nongeneralizable sample for their involvement in counterpiracy activities.
What GAO Found
Piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa's east coast near Somalia have declined sharply since 2010, but U.S. agencies have not assessed their counterpiracy efforts as GAO recommended in 2010. Since 2010, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports piracy incidents declined from 219 to 15 in 2013. Similarly, from 2010 to 2013 hostages taken by pirates declined from 1,016 to 34. Also, a World Bank report stated that total ransoms declined by 2012. Officials participating in counterpiracy activities from the Departments of Defense and State, among others, as well as shipping industry officials and international partners, attribute the decline to a combination of prevention, disruption, and prosecution activities. However, officials cautioned that this progress is tenuous, and discontinuing these efforts could allow piracy to resurge. Despite changing conditions, U.S. agencies have not systematically assessed the costs and benefits of their counterpiracy efforts. Agency officials stated that their decisions and actions are guided by discussions rather than formal assessments. GAO has previously noted that assessments of risk and effectiveness in an interagency environment can strengthen strategies and resource usage. As such, GAO's prior recommendations remain valid and could help U.S. agencies identify the most cost effective mix of efforts and prioritize activities as they respond to changing conditions and fiscal pressures while avoiding a resurgence in piracy.
Off the west coast of Africa, piracy and maritime crime has been a persistent problem in the Gulf of Guinea, as shown in the figure below. Although the United States has interagency and international efforts underway with African states to strengthen maritime security, it has not assessed its efforts or the need for a collective plan to address the evolving problem in the region. The U.S. role in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has focused on prevention, disruption, and prosecution, through training and assistance to African coastal states. However, according to U.S. agencies working in the region, the National Security Council Staff (NSCS) has not directed them to collectively assess their efforts to address piracy and maritime crime. An assessment of agencies' Gulf of Guinea efforts could strengthen their approach by informing the appropriate mix of activities to achieve the most effective use of limited resources, as well as help determine if additional actions are needed.
Reported Incidents of Piracy and Maritime Crime, 2008 through 2013
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the NSCS, with the Secretaries of Defense and State, collaborate with the involved agencies to assess their efforts and to determine whether additional actions are needed to guide efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. The NSCS did not concur or non-concur with GAO's recommendations but provided an update on its planning activities. |
gao_GAO-16-51 | gao_GAO-16-51_0 | Veterans in Our Review Said the Post-9/11 OJT and Apprenticeship Programs Helped Them Transition to Civilian Life, but Relatively Few Veterans Have Participated
Veterans in Our Review Said the Program’s Supplemental Income Helped Them Cover Living Expenses while They Trained
The majority of veteran participants who replied to our survey (125 of 156) cited more than one benefit to the program. Many veterans we interviewed (21 of 28) said that this supplemental income helped them offset the loss of income they experienced after leaving the military. In addition to providing supplemental income, about half of the OJT and apprenticeship participants who responded to our survey (80 of 156) reported that the programs allowed them to use their GI Bill benefits, to which they are entitled, when college was not a good fit for them. Since 2011, About 27,000 Veterans Have Participated in the Post- 9/11 GI Bill OJT and Apprenticeship Programs to Train in a Variety of Occupations
Of the approximately 1.2 million veterans who used their Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits since October 2011, about 27,000—or about 2 percent— participated in the OJT or apprenticeship programs, according to VA program data. Agency Websites
Focus on Higher Education Benefits Another source of information about Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits are agency websites, and while VA’s and DOL’s websites provide some information on these benefits, VA’s website is more focused on higher education benefits. State Officials We Surveyed Reported Providing Outreach to Veterans and Employers, Which Varied By State
Most state officials we surveyed reported that they reach out to veterans using direct methods, such as attending job fairs and providing briefings and presentations to veterans’ groups (see table 6). Lack of Program Awareness and Administrative Burdens Have Challenged Veterans and Employers, According to State Officials and Program Participants
Veterans and Employers Often Lack Awareness of OJT and Apprenticeships as Options under the Post- 9/11 GI Bill, According to State Officials and Program Participants
Veterans and employers generally lack awareness of OJT and apprenticeship options, and they most often heard of these programs from word-of-mouth sources, according to state officials and program participants we surveyed. Such efforts to ease the administrative challenges could include allowing employers and apprenticeship sponsors to submit monthly certification forms by email, or providing confirmation that monthly forms have been received. Little Is Known about the Performance of VA’s OJT and Apprenticeship Programs
VA Does Not Measure Outcomes for Participants in the Post-9/11 GI Bill OJT and Apprenticeship Programs
VA has not established outcome measures to report on the performance of Post-9/11 GI Bill OJT and apprenticeship participants. Specifically, VA does not measure such outcomes as whether participants retained employment or experienced earnings gains after completing the program. However, standards for internal control call for establishing and reviewing performance measures to allow an agency to evaluate relevant data and take appropriate actions. Data on DOL Programs Indicate Potential for Positive Employment Outcomes for OJT and Apprenticeship Models
DOL collects performance data for its OJT services and Registered Apprenticeship program, and these data suggest that OJT and apprenticeship training models can be associated with positive outcomes for measures such as employment retention and earnings gains. Conclusions
While many veterans benefit from higher education after their military service ends, for some veterans it may not be the ideal career path to successfully attain civilian jobs. However, many suggested that VA’s current, paper-based system for paying monthly benefits is inefficient, leading to administrative burdens for employers and delayed benefit payments for veterans—adding economic stress for veterans who are counting on this assistance. However, this system may not be implemented until at least 2017, and increasing numbers of veterans will become eligible for Post-9/11 OJT and apprenticeship benefits as the military continues to draw down its forces. However, VA is limited in its ability to assess the impact of its Post-9/11 GI Bill OJT and apprenticeship programs on veterans because VA does not measure performance outcomes for participants. VA agreed with each of our three recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In conducting our review of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Post- 9/11 GI Bill on-the-job training (OJT) and apprenticeship programs, our objectives were to examine (1) how selected veterans and employers used the programs and how widely they have been used, (2) to what extent VA and states have taken steps to inform veterans and employers about these programs, (3) what challenges, if any, veterans and employers have faced in using them, and (4) to what extent VA has assessed the performance and effectiveness of its programs. GAO closed the survey on July 24, 2015. State Approving Agency (SAA) Survey
To learn about what states are doing to help veterans and employers use the Post-9/11 OJT and apprenticeship programs, as well as gain insight on veterans’ and employers’ use of these programs and challenges states faced, we emailed a MS Word questionnaire to SAA officials in the 44 states in which these officials oversee implementation of these programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the military draws down its forces, many veterans will enter the civilian workforce and may seek educational and training opportunities to further their transition into civilian jobs. Because pursuing a higher education degree may not be the best path for some veterans, the Post-9/11 GI Bill OJT and apprenticeship programs provide alternative opportunities. GAO was asked to review these programs.
This report examines (1) how selected veterans and employers used the programs and how widely they have been used; (2) to what extent VA and states have taken steps to inform veterans and employers about these programs; (3) what challenges, if any, veterans and employers have faced in using them; and (4) to what extent VA has assessed the performance of its programs. GAO analyzed VA program data as of March 2015 and DOL program data from 2013 and 2014, and assessed outreach materials. GAO also surveyed officials in all 44 states overseeing VA's programs; conducted nongeneralizable surveys of randomly selected veterans and employers; and interviewed veterans and employers in two states selected for variation in veteran population and type of state agency.
What GAO Found
Veterans surveyed and interviewed by GAO said the on-the-job training (OJT) and apprenticeship programs offered under the Post-9/11 GI Bill—the largest education benefit program overseen by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—have helped them transition to civilian life, though program data show relatively few veterans have participated. Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits were initially available only for higher education, but in 2011 provisions were enacted that expanded benefits to cover OJT and apprenticeship. Many veterans GAO interviewed (21 of 28) said that the supplemental income the programs provided helped them offset income losses they experienced when leaving the military. About half of the veterans responding to GAO's survey (80 of 156) reported that the program allowed them to use their GI Bill benefits even though college was not a good fit for them. Since OJT and apprenticeship benefits became available in 2011, about 27,000 of the 1.2 million veterans who have received Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits have participated in these programs.
VA primarily provides information about the OJT and apprenticeship programs through mandatory briefings for transitioning servicemembers and on its website. While VA's outreach efforts include some information on these programs, VA's mandatory briefings and web resources generally emphasize higher education and lack sufficient detail for veterans to reasonably understand how to use their GI Bill benefits for OJT and apprenticeships. State officials GAO surveyed reported conducting outreach in a variety of ways, such as attending job fairs and speaking to veterans groups. Without more outreach, veterans who could benefit from these programs may not learn about them.
Key challenges faced by veterans and employers using these programs include lack of awareness and administrative burdens, according to state officials, veterans, and employers GAO surveyed. Most state officials surveyed (39 of 44) reported that lack of awareness about the programs is a primary challenge they face in facilitating veteran and employer participation. Further, over half of state officials surveyed (24 of 42) cited challenges related to VA's current paper-based payment processing system, which requires employers to fax or mail monthly forms to VA in order for a veteran to receive benefits. In addition, 11 of the 15 employers and apprenticeship sponsors GAO interviewed said the process is burdensome or inefficient, and 6 of the 28 veterans GAO interviewed said their benefits have sometimes been delayed. VA is developing a new data system, but it may not be implemented until 2017 at the earliest, according to VA officials, and administrative challenges in the interim could hinder program participation.
Little is known about the performance of VA's Post-9/11 GI Bill OJT and apprenticeship programs because VA does not measure program outcomes, such as whether participants retain employment after completing the program. Absent such information, GAO examined Department of Labor (DOL) outcome data for its related OJT and apprenticeship programs, which indicate the potential for positive outcomes for these training models. Standards for internal control call for establishing and reviewing performance measures to allow an agency to evaluate relevant data and take appropriate actions. Without such measures, VA is limited in its ability to assess its programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA improve outreach, ease administrative challenges, and establish outcome measures for its OJT and apprenticeship programs. VA agreed with GAO's conclusions and concurred with all three recommendations. |
gao_GGD-95-214 | gao_GGD-95-214_0 | Our objectives were to assess the extent to which banks provide securities brokerage services and how these services are regulated; the Federal Reserve’s supervision of bank holding company subsidiaries that the agency authorizes to underwrite and deal in securities, including the completeness and results of its inspections; and
FDIC’s regulation of bona fide subsidiaries that underwrite and deal in securities. 2). In the past, bank regulators did not always review the bank-direct brokerage operations as part of bank examinations, but they issued new guidance and examination procedures in 1994 that have increased emphasis on such reviews. Most Bank Brokerage Services Were Provided Through Subsidiaries and Third-Party Arrangements
As table 2.1 shows, 12 percent of the banks that offered securities brokerage services (287 banks, or about 3 percent of banks nationwide) provided only bank-direct brokerage services. However, as of September 1994, FDIC had no formal examiner training program that focused on oversight of securities activities of state nonmember banks and their subsidiaries. Under the current regulatory structure the same type of securities activities can be overseen by different regulators depending on how banks organize their securities activities. Nevertheless, securities activities can pose risks to banking organizations, just as they can to securities firms. Federal Reserve examiners or bank holding company internal auditors usually reviewed and tested for compliance with all applicable firewalls. However, the agency has not fully prepared its examiners to examine these activities and does not have other procedures for monitoring the subsidiaries’ activities. 3(a). 4. 5(a). Bona fide subsidiaries are required to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission as broker-dealers and be members in good standing of the National Association of Securities Dealers. GAO Comment
1. 6. 2. 4. Address Correction Requested | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal bank regulators' oversight of banks' securities activities, focusing on the: (1) extent to which banks provide securities brokerage services; (2) how those services are regulated; (3) results of Federal Reserve inspections of bank holding company subsidiaries authorized to underwrite and deal in securities; and (4) Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) regulation of bank subsidiaries that can underwrite and deal in securities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) about 22 percent of U.S. banks offered securities brokerage services to their customers in 1994; (2) the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) regulated the securities activities of 88 percent of these 2,400 banks by providing these services through broker dealers, while 287 banks provided bank-direct brokerage services; (3) federal bank regulators did not always review bank-direct brokerage operations routinely, but the regulators jointly issued new guidance and examination procedures in 1994 that emphasized these reviews; (4) securities activities can be overseen by different regulators depending on how the banks organize their securities activities, creating the potential for inconsistent oversight; (5) although Federal Reserve examiners usually met their inspection schedules, addressed inspection procedures, and tested securities subsidiaries for compliance with applicable firewalls, there were a few cases of insufficient documentation; and (6) FDIC had no centralized program to oversee the activities of the bona fide securities subsidiaries and had not fully prepared its examiners to examine securities activities, posing risks to affiliated banks. |
gao_GAO-07-791 | gao_GAO-07-791_0 | The reviews addressed multiple purposes, such as examining the efficiency and effectiveness of regulations and identifying opportunities to reduce regulatory burden. The mix of reviews conducted—in terms of the impetus to start a review and the purpose of the review—varied not only across but also within the agencies that we examined. Agencies’ officials reported they conducted discretionary reviews more often than mandated studies. While most of the mandatory review requirements identified by the selected agencies establish standard review factors that agencies should consider when conducting their reviews— which agencies reported following—about half of the agencies within our review have formal policies and procedures that establish a standards- based approach for conducting discretionary reviews. The Level of Documentation in Agencies’ Reviews Varied Depending on the Impetus and Phase of the Review, but Overall Could Be Improved
Agency documentation for selecting regulations to review varied from detailed documentation of selection criteria considered to no documentation of the selection process. Reviews Resulted in a Variety of Outcomes that Were Considered Useful, but Mandatory Reviews Most Often Resulted in No Change
Agency reviews of existing regulations resulted in various outcomes— from amending regulations to no change at all—that agencies and knowledgeable nonfederal parties reported were useful. Conversely, agency officials reported that their discretionary reviews more often generated additional action. For example, Congress required FCC to conduct reviews of its regulations that apply to the operation or activity of telecommunication service providers to “determine whether any such regulation is no longer necessary in the public interest as the result of meaningful economic competition between providers of such service.”
Agencies’ officials reported that reviews often had useful outcomes other than changes to regulations, such as changes or additions to guidance and other related documents, decisions to conduct additional studies, and validation that existing rules were working as planned. Both agencies and nonfederal parties identified the lack of public participation in the review process as a barrier to the usefulness of reviews. Agency officials and nonfederal parties also suggested a number of practices that could facilitate conducting and improving the usefulness of regulatory reviews, including: (1) development of a prioritization process to facilitate agencies’ ability to address time and resource barriers and allow them to target their efforts at reviews of regulations that are more likely to need modifications, (2) pre- planning for regulatory reviews to aid agencies in identifying the data and analysis methodology that they will need to conduct effective reviews, and (3) utilizing independent parties to conduct the reviews to enhance the review’s credibility and effectiveness, among other things. Nonfederal parties also cited this data limitation as a challenge to agency reviews. Limited Public Participation
Agencies and nonfederal parties identified the lack of public participation in the review process as a barrier to the usefulness of reviews. In particular, overlapping or duplicative reviews may strain limited agency resources. Minimum standards for documenting and reporting all completed review results. Accordingly, for selected agencies, we are reporting on: 1. the magnitude of retrospective review activity and type of retrospective reviews agencies completed from calendar year 2001 through 2006, including the frequency, impetus (mandatory or discretionary), and purposes of the reviews; 2. the processes and standards that guide agencies’ planning, conduct, and reporting on reviews, and the strengths and limitations of the various review processes and requirements; 3. the outcomes of reviews, including the perceived usefulness of the reviews and how they affected subsequent regulatory activities; and 4. the factors that appear to help or impede agencies in conducting or using retrospective reviews, including which methods, if any, that agencies and we identified as most cost-effective for conducting reviews. GAO’s Federal Rules Database, which is used to compile information on all final rules, showed that the nine agencies accounted for almost 60 percent of all final regulations published from 2001 through 2006. transparency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress and presidents require agencies to review existing regulations to determine whether they should be retained, amended, or rescinded, among other things. GAO was asked to report the following for agency reviews: (1) numbers and types completed from 2001 through 2006; (2) processes and standards that guided planning, conducting, and reporting; (3) outcomes; and (4) factors that helped or impeded in conducting and using them. GAO evaluated the activities of nine agencies covering health, safety, environmental, financial, and economic regulations and accounting for almost 60 percent of all final regulations issued within the review period. GAO also reviewed available documentation, assessed a sample of completed reviews, and solicited perspectives on the conduct and usefulness of reviews from agency officials and knowledgeable nonfederal parties.
What GAO Found
From 2001 through 2006, the selected agencies completed over 1,300 reviews of existing regulations. The mix of reviews conducted, in terms of impetus (mandatory or discretionary) and purpose, varied among agencies. Mandatory requirements were sometimes the impetus for reviews, but agencies more often exercised their own discretionary authorities to review regulations. The main purpose of most reviews was to examine the effectiveness of the implementation of regulations, but agencies also conducted reviews to identify ways to reduce regulatory burdens and to validate the original estimates of benefits and costs. The processes and standards guiding reviews varied across agencies and the impetus and phase of the review process. They varied by the extent to which agencies applied a standards-based approach, incorporated public participation, and provided complete and transparent documentation. For example, while almost all agencies had standards for conducting mandatory reviews, only about half of the agencies had such standards for conducting discretionary views. The extent of public involvement varied across review phases, with relatively more in the selection process for discretionary reviews. Agencies more often documented all phases of mandatory reviews compared to discretionary reviews. The outcomes of reviews included amendments to regulations, changes to guidance and related documents, decisions to conduct additional studies, and confirmation that existing rules achieved the intended results. Mandated reviews, in particular, most often resulted in no changes. Agencies noted that discretionary reviews generated additional action more often than mandatory reviews. Agencies and nonfederal parties generally considered all of the various review outcomes useful. Multiple factors helped or impeded the conduct and usefulness of retrospective reviews. Agencies identified time and resources as the most critical barriers, but also cited factors such as data limitations and overlapping or duplicative review requirements. Nonfederal parties said that the lack of transparency was a barrier; they were rarely aware of the agencies' reviews. Both agencies and nonfederal parties identified limited public participation as a barrier. To help improve the conduct and usefulness of reviews, agencies and nonfederal parties suggested practices such as pre-planning to identify data needed to conduct effective reviews, a prioritization process to address time and resource barriers, high-level management support, grouping related regulations together when conducting reviews, and making greater use of diverse communication technologies and venues to promote public participation. |
gao_GAO-07-711 | gao_GAO-07-711_0 | Background
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop the Iraqi security forces, first under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and later through the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). DOD and MNF-I Have Not Specified Which DOD Equipment Accountability Procedures Apply to the Train-and-Equip Program for Iraq
As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD equipment accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq under IRRF and ISFF but outside traditional security assistance programs, which, according to DOD officials, allowed DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program. DOD officials stated that, since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs—including the registration of small arms transferred to foreign governments—did not apply. 2). First, until December 2005, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi security forces. Second, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting documents that confirm the dates the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the equipment. At that time, they also attempted to recover past records. We identified discrepancies between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and MNSTC-I property book records (see fig. Our analysis of the MNSTC-I property book records found that DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for at least 190,000 weapons reported as issued to Iraqi forces as of September 22, 2005. According to MNSTC-I officials who rotated in country in June 2006, the command began to place greater emphasis on collecting documentation of Iraqi receipt of equipment. Furthermore, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets—the January 2007 property book records for the Ministry of Defense contained 227 columns and 5,342 rows. MNSTC-I officials also have acknowledged that the spreadsheet system is an inefficient management tool given the large size of the program, large amount of data, and limited number of personnel available to maintain the system. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) may have applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment issued to Iraqi security forces. We reviewed MNF-I’s accountability procedures for the U.S.-funded equipment it has issued to the Iraqi security forces, and we reviewed documentation from and interviewed current and former officials with the U.S. Central Command, MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MNC-I in Baghdad, Iraq; Tampa, Florida; Washington, D.C.; and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to train and equip Iraqi forces. This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment issued to the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and interviewed current and former officials from DOD and MNF-I.
What GAO Found
As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces. DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the lack of a fully operational distribution network, among other reasons. Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting records confirming the dates the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the items. Since June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting the supporting documents. However, GAO's review of the January 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are an inefficient management tool given the large amount of data and limited personnel to maintain the system. |
gao_GAO-11-790 | gao_GAO-11-790_0 | Background
Low-power television stations, as indicated by their name, operate at lower power levels and transmit over a smaller area than full-power television stations. Class A stations: Unlike translator stations and LPTV stations, Class A stations are classified as a primary service. Stations that applied for and received Class A status must meet requirements that are not applied to other low-power television stations, such as broadcasting an average of at least 3 hours per week of locally produced programming. Several Thousand Low-Power Television Stations Are Located across the United States and Its Territories, and the Majority of Stations Have Taken Steps to Transition to Digital
Thousands of Low-Power Television Stations Provide Programming to Communities across the United States
As previously noted, we are using the term “low-power television stations” to refer to translators, LPTV stations, and Class A stations. Translators tend to be concentrated in both rural and mountainous areas. FCC Issued an Order Establishing a Deadline and Processes for Low- Power Television Stations to Transition to Digital, but These Stations Face Challenges in Transitioning Largely because of Regulatory Uncertainty
FCC Has Established a Deadline and Processes for Low-Power Television Stations to Transition to Digital
FCC previously allowed low-power stations to apply for digital facilities, and recently established a deadline of September 1, 2015, for low-power television stations to cease analog operations and convert to digital broadcasting. This is a concern for stations located in urban markets where spectrum is already scarce and for translator stations in rural areas that use several channels. FCC’s actions related to Class A stations: In its July 15 Report and Order, FCC established a process for Class A stations to transfer their protected status to their digital companion channel, which had previously posed challenges for some stations in their transition to digital. However, the stations may be unaware of this opportunity, as it is not explicitly stated in the July 15 Report and Order. FCC Does Not Have Data to Evaluate whether Low- Power Service Is Meeting Goals, and May Not Understand How Its Decisions on Low-Power Television Stations Affect Communities
Although FCC’s low-power television goals—meeting the needs of underserved communities, and contributing to localism and diversity—are well documented, FCC has not collected data to evaluate the extent to which the stations fulfill unmet needs or contribute to meeting FCC’s policy goals. However, FCC’s ability to weigh the effects of its decisions on low-power television stations, the communities they serve, and FCC’s goals of localism and diversity against the increasing need for wireless broadband spectrum could be limited by a lack of data. FCC sought comments on its statutory authority to create additional Class A stations and how to define eligibility, but has not issued an order deciding whether to create additional Class A stations and may need legislative guidance from Congress on whether additional stations can apply for Class A status after the original window of eligibility established by CBPA. As part of the 2009 digital television transition of full-power stations, FCC did use some of the technical data it collects from low-power licensees to create an internal document for a commissioner that identified areas in which the only source of over-the-air broadcasting is a low-power television station. Lacking such information, FCC does not know the public benefit of low-power television stations’ receiving spectrum for television broadcast. Regarding our recommendation that FCC work with Congress, as necessary, to determine what the long-term role of Class A stations should be, whether additional low-power television stations should be permitted to apply for Class A status, and what criteria stations must meet to qualify for such status, FCC stated that it plans to analyze the data from Class A stations’ children’s programming reports to determine the stations’ measures to provide educational and informational children’s programming. To identify the steps FCC has taken to transition low-power television stations to digital, and any challenges low-power television stations are facing transitioning to digital, we interviewed FCC officials and reviewed FCC’s orders and notices of proposed rulemaking relating to the digital transition of low-power television stations and the proposed reallocation of broadcast spectrum for wireless broadband, as well as comments submitted in response to FCC’s requests for comments on these issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Television stations that broadcast at lower power levels were not required to meet the 2009 digital transition deadline for full-power stations. These low-power television stations transmit over a smaller area, and most are less regulated than full-power stations. Low-power television stations use valuable radio frequency spectrum, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) noted the stations' digital transition could aid its efforts to clear spectrum for wireless broadband. GAO examined (1) low-power television stations' location and status in transitioning to digital, (2) FCC's steps to transition low-power television stations to digital and whether these stations are facing challenges transitioning to digital, and (3) why low-power television stations were established and the extent to which FCC collects information to determine if low-power television service is meeting FCC's statutory and policy goals. GAO analyzed FCC data and documents, reviewed stakeholder comments, and interviewed agency officials, stakeholders, and low-power television licensees.
What GAO Found
Thousands of over-the-air low-power television stations serve communities across the United States in both urban and rural areas, and about 60 percent of all such stations have either completed the digital transition or have taken steps to transition. Over half of all low-power television stations are known as translators, which retransmit major network and other stations' programming in areas that cannot receive the signals from a primary station, generally in rural and mountainous areas. The remaining stations include low-power television stations known as LPTV stations and Class A stations. Class A stations have a special status that gives them greater interference protection than translator and LPTV stations and requires them to broadcast a minimum amount of locally produced programming. Some LPTV and Class A stations serve niche or local audiences with ethnic, religious, or other programming. In July 2011, FCC issued an order that established a deadline of September 1, 2015, for low-power television stations to cease analog broadcasts, but stations may still face challenges in making the transition to digital because of regulatory uncertainty. Specifically, an FCC proposal to reallocate spectrum from broadcasting to wireless broadband created regulatory uncertainty and difficulty for stations attempting to justify investing in transitioning to digital. Such a reallocation would leave fewer channels for television broadcasts and could make it difficult for low-power stations to find an available channel that does not interfere with other stations. FCC's order noted these concerns when adopting the 2015 deadline, rather than a previously proposed deadline of 2012, but it is currently unknown whether the uncertainty posed by the spectrum reallocation will be resolved prior to 2015. FCC's order adopted other measures, such as establishing a process for Class A stations to transfer their status to their new digital channels. Previously, without such a process, some stations delayed completing their transition to digital and others lost their Class A status after they transitioned to digital and ceased analog operation. According to FCC officials, such stations can apply to regain Class A status; however, stations may be unaware of this option as it is not explicit in the order. Low-power television stations were established to reach underserved communities; FCC has noted that the stations can positively affect FCC's goals of localism and diversity. However, FCC has not collected data to evaluate the extent to which these stations fulfill unmet community needs or contribute to meeting FCC's policy goals. Specifically, FCC does not collect programming data, is limited in its ability to identify stations that are not broadcasting, and has not evaluated low-power stations' impact in assessments of the information needs of communities. Lacking such information, FCC does not know the public benefit of stations and is limited in its ability to weigh the effects of its decisions on low-power television stations against the increasing need for spectrum for broadband services. Furthermore, although FCC proposed allowing additional stations to apply for Class A status as a means to preserve community programming, it has not issued an order and may need legislative guidance to determine the future of Class A status. FCC should (1) explore options for assessing the impact of low-power stations on the communities served and on FCC's goals, and (2) work with Congress as necessary to determine what the long-term role of Class A stations should be, whether additional stations should be permitted to apply for Class A status, and what criteria stations must meet to qualify for such status. FCC stated it is taking actions to address GAO's recommendations, and provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-04-583 | gao_GAO-04-583_0 | At the same time, DOD is increasingly moving to privatize its housing, relying on the private sector to renovate and operate privatized housing as well as build and maintain many new housing units. Services Do Not Clearly and Consistently Explain the Impact of Privatization in Their Budget Justifications to Congress
Budget justification materials submitted to Congress for family housing O&M funding do not clearly and consistently explain how the housing privatization program impacts the services’ budget requests. The services use similar assumptions and methods to develop budget requests for family housing O&M, but they often rely on assumptions established up to a year and a half before the budgets are executed. While the services have the ability to revise and update their budget requests, they typically choose not to because of the difficulty of doing so when faced, in part, with other competing defense priorities, and the relatively small size of the family housing O&M budget. Furthermore, changes in the pace of expected privatization can affect funding required for individual accounts and subaccounts, although not uniformly, but the impact of privatization is not well explained in the services’ budget justifications. Rather, service officials said that they are more likely to make the needed funding adjustments for family housing O&M during budget execution through reprogrammings. Congress Has Limited Visibility Over the Reprogramming of Family Housing O&M Funds
Congress has limited visibility of the services’ reprogramming of family housing O&M funds. However, appropriations such as the regular O&M do provide such information. In addition, their data reflecting reprogramming actions throughout the year do not always match comparable official obligation data produced by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. However, Congress is not notified when reprogrammings are below 10 percent or result in a funding decrease. In other appropriations, DOD provides congressional decision makers with more information on reprogrammings than in family housing O&M. Conclusions
The services’ budget justification submissions to Congress have not always been clear in explaining funding requirements and the impacts of the privatization initiative on the budget requests for each of the nine family housing O&M accounts and subaccounts. In addition, the Navy and the Marine Corps provide even less visibility of reprogrammings of family housing O&M funds because they do not report obligations for the four operations subaccounts and, prior to fiscal year 2004, did not notify Congress of reprogrammings for these subaccounts. Until the Navy and the Marine Corps report obligation data using the same structure that congressional conferees use to designate funds for the four operations subaccounts and resolve data inconsistencies between them and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, DOD and congressional decision makers will continue to lack sufficient budget visibility, hindering their ability to evaluate Navy and Marine Corps budget requests with the same degree of confidence and detail as those of the other services. To improve visibility over the Navy and the Marine Corps’ reprogrammings of family housing O&M funds, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to work with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to take the following two actions: Report obligation data using the same budget structure that congressional conferees use to designate how funds are to be used for the four operations subaccounts, similar to reporting done by the other military services. Justification materials summarize the assumptions and methods used to develop the budget request: Services have additional information that could help clarify the request. This is a summary account for accumulating costs for the following: (1) lease cost—foreign account; costs for charges and other payments specified in the lease agreement for housing in foreign countries; (2) lease cost—foreign account government rental guarantee program; costs for charges and other payments specified in the lease agreement for housing in Europe under the Army’s foreign account government rental guarantee program; (3) lease cost—domestic account; costs for charges and other payments specified in the lease agreement for housing in the United States including U.S. possessions and territories; (4) lease cost—section 801 account; costs for charges and other payments specified in the lease agreement for section 801-type housing; (5) other operation and maintenance cost—foreign account; costs for maintenance, utilities, and contracted services not provided by the lessor for housing in foreign countries (also includes initial make-ready costs, costs of government-owned furnishings, any pro rata share of the costs of installation services, and administrative costs such as assignment, travel, and inspection by installation personnel, and reimbursements to the Department of State for foreign affairs administrative support costs); (6) other operation and maintenance cost—foreign account government rental guarantee program; costs for maintenance, utilities, and contracted services not provided by the lessor for housing in foreign countries (also includes initial make-ready costs, costs of government-owned furnishings, any pro rata share of the costs of installation services, and administrative costs such as assignment, travel, and inspection by installation personnel, and reimbursements to the Department of State for foreign affairs administrative support costs); (7) other operation and maintenance cost—domestic account; costs for maintenance, utilities, and contracted services not provided by the lessor for housing in the United States (also includes initial make ready costs, costs of government-owned furnishings, any pro rata share of the costs of installation services, and administrative costs such as assignment, travel, and inspection by installation personnel); and (8) other operation and maintenance cost—Section 801 account; costs for maintenance, utilities, and contracted services not provided by the lessor for Section 801-type housing (also includes initial make ready costs, costs of government-owned furnishings, any pro rata share of the costs of installation services, and administrative costs such as assignment, travel, and inspection by installation personnel). | Why GAO Did This Study
The military services have owned and operated much housing on their installations but increasingly are privatizing housing, relying on the private sector to manage the renovation, construction, and maintenance of existing and new homes for military families. Funding to operate and maintain existing government-owned housing is provided through the family housing operation and maintenance (O&M) appropriations. The amount of funding required varies based on a number of factors, including how quickly privatization occurs to reduce requirements for government-owned housing. As requested, this report discusses the (1) services' assumptions and methods used to develop budget requests and how well their budget justifications explain the impact of privatization on family housing O&M funds and (2) the extent to which Congress has visibility over the services' reprogramming of family housing O&M funds.
What GAO Found
Budget justification materials submitted to Congress for family housing O&M funding do not clearly and consistently explain funding requirements and how the housing privatization program impacts the services' budget requests, frustrating congressional oversight. Various factors have contributed to this situation. The services use similar assumptions and methods to develop budget requests for family housing O&M, but they often rely on assumptions established up to a year and a half before the budgets are executed. While the services have the ability to revise and update their budget requests, they typically choose not to because of the difficulty of doing so related in part to other competing defense priorities and the relatively small size of the family housing O&M budget. Given these considerations, defense officials said that they are more likely to make the needed funding adjustments through reprogrammings. In addition, changes in the pace of expected privatization can affect funding required for the nine family housing O&M accounts and subaccounts--although not uniformly--but the effects of these changes are not well explained in budget justifications submissions to Congress. Although, in many cases, the services may have data that could result in better informed decision making, they do not always include such information in budget justifications. Congress has limited visibility of the services' reprogramming of family housing O&M funds. For example, Congress is not notified when reprogrammings are below 10 percent of the initial funding amount or result in a decrease. On the other hand, DOD provides congressional decision makers with more information on reprogrammings for other appropriations, such as regular O&M. In addition, compared with the other services, the Navy and the Marine Corps' reporting of reprogrammings provides even less visibility. For example, they did not report to Congress reprogrammings for the four subaccounts--management, services, furnishings, and miscellaneous--within the operations account. In addition, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service's obligation reports for the Navy and Marine Corps do not separate the four operations subaccounts, as they do for the other services. Navy and Marine Corps officials were not aware of the usefulness to separate the four operations subaccounts. Also, the Navy and the Marine Corps obligation data reflecting reprogramming actions do not always match comparable official obligation data produced by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Even though the two services have been working with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, officials told GAO that this has been a long-standing issue and difficult to resolve. Collectively, this lack of visibility over the reprogramming of funds and data inconsistencies hinder the ability of congressional and DOD decision makers to evaluate family housing O&M budget requests and obligations. |
gao_GAO-08-1022T | gao_GAO-08-1022T_0 | USPS Has Taken Steps to Improve Realignment Planning and Accountability, but Measurement of Most Realignment Efforts Is Limited to the Budget Process
USPS has taken steps to respond to most of our prior recommendations to strengthen planning and accountability for its network realignment efforts. It has clarified how it makes realignment decisions and generally addressed how it integrates its realignment initiatives, but it has not established measurable performance targets for these initiatives. USPS believes that its budgeting process accounts for the cost reductions achieved through these initiatives. PAEA calls for USPS to, among other matters, establish performance goals and identify anticipated costs, cost savings, and other benefits associated with the infrastructure realignment alternatives in its Network Plan. Evaluation of results: USPS has measured the results of its AMP consolidations through a post-implementation review. When we met with USPS officials in June 2008, we asked why they did not have measurable performance goals and targets for the individual realignment initiatives. The Deputy Postmaster General explained that the realignment targets are captured in USPS’s goal of saving $1 billion per year. USPS will have additional opportunities to provide information about its estimated costs and cost savings related to its realignment efforts in its annual report to Congress, which is required by the end of December. Developing and implementing more transparent performance targets and results can help inform Congress about the effectiveness of USPS’s realignment efforts. They expect to lower costs and achieve savings by reducing excess processing capacity and fuel consumption, as well as by working with the mailing industry to implement new technologies such as delivery point sequencing, flats sequencing, and Intelligent Mail.® Going forward, USPS has opportunities, in its annual report to Congress and in other reports and strategic plans, to further articulate how it plans to integrate these three initiatives and to what extent they are helping USPS meet its goals. USPS Has Established Delivery Service Standards
USPS has partially responded to our prior recommendations related to improving delivery performance information by establishing delivery performance standards and committing to develop performance targets against these standards and provide them to the PRC in August. However, full implementation of performance measures and reporting is not yet completed. Delivery service performance is a critical area that may be affected by the implementation of the realignment initiatives. Our July 2006 report found that USPS’s delivery performance standards, measurement, and reporting needed improvement. Furthermore, we recommended that USPS improve the transparency of its delivery standards, measurement, and reporting. Moreover, USPS provided a specific proposal for measuring and reporting its delivery performance to the PRC, which has requested public comment on USPS’s proposal. USPS Has Improved Its AMP Communication Plan
USPS has taken steps to respond to our recommendations that it improve its communication of realignment plans and proposals with stakeholders. Improve public engagement. Increase transparency. USPS has incorporated into its 2008 AMP Communication Plan several modifications aimed at improving public notification and engagement. USPS has increased transparency, largely by clarifying its processes for addressing public comments and plans to make additional information available to the public on its Web site. Congress has also addressed USPS’s communication process. PAEA required USPS to describe its communication procedures related to AMP consolidations in its Network Plan. Now, it will be crucial for USPS, in going forward, to establish and maintain an ongoing and open dialogue with its various stakeholders, including congressional oversight committees and Members of Congress who have questions or are concerned about proposed realignment changes. USPS’s Network Plan stated that USPS had terminated operations at 46 AMCs during fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and another 8 AMCs in fiscal year 2008. U.S. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. Postal Service: The Service’s Strategy for Realigning Its Mail Processing Infrastructure Lacks Clarity, Criteria, and Accountability. GAO. GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has issued reports on the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) strategy for realigning its mail processing network and improving delivery performance information. These reports recommended that the Postmaster General (1) strengthen planning and the overall integration of its realignment efforts, and enhance accountability by establishing measurable targets and evaluating results, (2) improve delivery service standards and performance measures, and (3) improve communication with stakeholders by revising its Area Mail Processing (AMP) Communication Plan to improve public notice, engagement, and transparency. The 2006 postal reform act required USPS to develop a network plan by June 2008 that described its vision and strategy for realigning its network; the anticipated costs, cost savings, and other benefits of its realignment initiatives; performance measures for its delivery service standards, and its communication procedures for consolidating AMP operations. This testimony discusses USPS's actions toward addressing GAO recommendations to (1) strengthen network realignment planning and accountability, (2) improve delivery performance information, and (3) improve communication with stakeholders. This testimony is based on prior GAO work, a review of USPS's 2008 Network Plan and revised AMP Communication Plan, and updated information from USPS officials. USPS did not have comments on this testimony.
What GAO Found
USPS has taken steps to respond to most of GAO's prior recommendations to strengthen planning and accountability for its network realignment efforts. In its June 2008 Network Plan, USPS clarified how it makes realignment decisions, and generally addressed how it integrates its realignment initiatives. However, USPS has not established measurable performance targets for its realignment initiatives. USPS believes that its budgeting process accounts for the cost reductions achieved through these initiatives. The Deputy Postmaster General explained that such performance targets are captured in USPS's overall annual goal of achieving $1 billion in savings. While these measures are not as explicit or transparent as GAO had recommended, USPS is required to report annually by the end of December to Congress on, among other matters, its realignment costs and savings. Also, USPS's annual compliance reports to the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) will provide opportunities for further transparency of performance targets and results. USPS's Network Plan notes that to respond to declining mail volumes, USPS must increase efficiency and decrease costs across all its operations. Given USPS's challenging financial situation, effective implementation of network realignment is needed; and USPS's annual reports could help inform Congress about the effectiveness of its realignment efforts. USPS has partially responded to GAO's recommendations to improve its delivery performance standards, measurement, and reporting, but full implementation of performance measures and reporting is not yet completed. USPS established delivery performance standards in December 2007. USPS's Network Plan stated that USPS would develop targets and measures to assess performance against these standards by fiscal year 2009. In addition, USPS has recently submitted a proposal for measuring and reporting on delivery service performance to the PRC. The PRC has requested public comment on USPS's proposal, which depends upon USPS and mailers implementing new technology. Delivery service performance is a critical area that may be affected by the implementation of the realignment initiatives. USPS has also taken steps to address GAO's recommendations to improve communication with its stakeholders as it consolidates its AMP operations by modifying its Communication Plan to improve public notification and engagement, increasing transparency by clarifying its processes for addressing public comments, and making additional information available on its Web site. Going forward, it will be crucial that USPS establishes and maintains an ongoing and open dialogue with stakeholders, including congressional oversight committees and Members of Congress who have questions or are concerned about proposed realignment changes |
gao_GAO-06-306 | gao_GAO-06-306_0 | FBI’s Information Technology Upgrade Project, which FBI subsequently renamed Trilogy, was FBI’s largest automated information systems initiative to date. Insufficient Invoice Review and Approval Process Increased FBI’s Vulnerability to Payment of Unallowable Contractor Costs
FBI’s review and approval process for Trilogy contractor invoices, which was carried out by a review team consisting of officials from FBI, GSA, and Mitretek, did not provide an adequate basis to verify that goods and services billed were actually received by FBI or that payments were for allowable costs. We identified about $10.1 million of questionable contractor costs paid by FBI. These included payments for first-class travel and other excessive airfare costs, incorrect billings for overtime hours, potentially excessive labor rates, and other questionable subcontractor costs. Major Lapses in Accountability Resulted in Millions of Dollars of Missing Trilogy Equipment
FBI did not adequately maintain accountability for computer equipment purchased for the Trilogy project. Consequently, we found that FBI could not locate over 1,200 assets purchased with Trilogy funds, which we valued at approximately $7.6 million. In addition, during its physical inventory counts for fiscal years 2003 through 2005, FBI identified over 30 pieces of Trilogy equipment valued at about $167,000 that it reported as having been lost or stolen. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) internal controls provided reasonable assurance that improper payments to contractors would not be made or would be detected in the normal course of business, we used the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, Guide for Evaluating and Testing Controls Over Sensitive Payments, and The Executive Guide on Strategies to Manage Improper Payments: Learning from Public and Private Sector Organizations as a basis for assessing FBI’s internal control structure over its Trilogy program. Validity of Payments
To determine whether FBI’s payments to contractors were properly supported as a valid use of government funds, we performed data mining, document analysis, and other forensic auditing techniques to select transactions to test. Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Comments from the General Services Administration
GAO Comments
1. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Trilogy project--initiated in 2001--is the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) largest information technology (IT) upgrade to date. While ultimately successful in providing updated IT infrastructure and systems, Trilogy was not a success with regard to upgrading FBI's investigative applications. Further, the project was plagued with missed milestones and escalating costs, which eventually totaled nearly $537 million. In light of these events, Congress asked GAO to determine whether (1) internal controls provided reasonable assurance that improper payment of unallowable contractor costs would not be made or would be detected in the normal course of business, (2) payments to contractors were properly supported as a valid use of government funds, and (3) FBI maintained proper accountability for assets purchased with Trilogy project funds.
What GAO Found
FBI's review and approval process for Trilogy contractor invoices, which included a review role for the General Services Administration (GSA) as contracting agency, did not provide an adequate basis to verify that goods and services billed were actually received and that the amounts billed were appropriate, leaving FBI highly vulnerable to payments of unallowable costs. This vulnerability is demonstrated by FBI's payment of about $10.1 million in questionable contractor costs we identified using data mining, document analysis, and other forensic auditing techniques. These costs included first-class travel and other excessive airfare costs, incorrect charges for overtime hours, potentially overcharged labor rates, and charges for which the contractors could not provide adequate supporting documentation to substantiate the costs purportedly incurred. FBI also failed to establish controls to maintain accountability over equipment purchased for the Trilogy project. These control lapses resulted in more than 1,200 missing pieces of equipment valued at approximately $7.6 million that GAO identified as part of its review. In addition, in its own inventory counts, FBI identified 37 pieces of Trilogy equipment valued at approximately $167,000 that had been lost or stolen. |
gao_GAO-08-610 | gao_GAO-08-610_0 | Overview of WTC Health Programs
Following the attack on the WTC, the Congress appropriated approximately $8.8 billion to FEMA, over several years, for response and recovery activities. Federal funds appropriated or awarded for the WTC health programs from October 2001 through December 2007 have totaled about $369.2 million. Lesson 1: Registering all responders during a response to a disaster could improve implementation of screening and monitoring services. Lesson 2: Designing and implementing screening and monitoring programs that foster the ability to conduct epidemiologic research could improve the understanding of health effects experienced by responders and help determine the need for ongoing monitoring. Lesson 3: Providing timely mental health screening and monitoring that is integrated with physical health screening and monitoring could improve the ability to accurately diagnose physical and mental health conditions and prevent more serious mental health conditions from developing. Lesson 4: Including a treatment referral process in screening and monitoring programs could improve the ability of responders to gain access to needed treatment. Lesson 5: Making comparable services available to all responders, regardless of their employer or geographic location, could ensure more equitable access to services for responders and help ensure that data collected about responders’ health are consistent and comprehensive. ASPR is also taking steps to establish a system to register HHS employees and certain other volunteers, but it has not completed its effort. HHS Has Taken Some Steps to Ensure That Responders Are Registered Following a Disaster, but These Efforts Are Incomplete
Using experience gained from the WTC disaster, HHS’s ATSDR has developed and tested a Rapid Response Registry (RRR) survey instrument that state and local entities can voluntarily adopt to register responders and other individuals exposed to a disaster. HHS Has Not Developed a Plan That Incorporates the Lessons from the WTC Health Programs
HHS has not developed a department-level plan for designing and implementing responder health programs that incorporates the five lessons from the WTC health programs. As a result, HHS has not indicated whether its policies and actions following a disaster or emergency would apply these lessons, such as by building epidemiologic research into the design of screening and monitoring services. Another consequence of not having a plan is that HHS has not described the roles and responsibilities of its components in designing and implementing responder health programs. According to the NRF, agencies should clearly define roles and responsibilities in their disaster preparedness plans, but HHS has not identified which components would be involved in responder health programs, which component would take the lead, how the expertise of various components would be used, and how efforts would be coordinated. In the absence of a department-level plan describing the roles of all relevant HHS agencies with regard to responder health programs, NIOSH developed a proposal in February 2008 for working with some of the relevant HHS components to develop strategies to ensure responder safety and health. Although NIOSH’s proposal for a project to develop strategies for addressing responder health issues is a step in the right direction, HHS has not developed a department-level plan that incorporates the five lessons from the WTC program and defines the roles and responsibilities of all HHS components with regard to planning and implementing responder health programs. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that effective programs are developed to deal with the health effects that responders may experience in the event of a future disaster, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS take the following action: develop a department-level responder screening and monitoring plan that defines the roles and responsibilities of HHS components and incorporates the five lessons identified from the experience of the WTC health programs. Specifically, this plan should facilitate the registration of all responders and ensure that screening and monitoring services are designed to foster epidemiologic research; provide timely mental health screening and monitoring that is integrated with physical health screening and monitoring; include a treatment referral process; and make comparable services available to all responders, regardless of their employer or geographic location. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the World Trade Center (WTC) attack, the Congress appropriated more than $8 billion to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency for response and recovery activities. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) received some of this funding to establish health screening and monitoring programs for responders to the disaster and later received additional appropriations to fund treatment. In total, about $369.2 million has been appropriated or awarded for the WTC health programs. GAO previously reported on problems that these programs have had in ensuring the availability of services for all responders. GAO was asked to examine lessons from the WTC health programs that could guide future programs. GAO examined (1) lessons from the programs' experience and (2) HHS actions or plans that incorporate the lessons. GAO interviewed WTC health program officials and other experts and reviewed DHS and HHS documents.
What GAO Found
GAO identified five important lessons from the experience of the WTC health programs that could help with the development of responder health programs in the event of a future disaster. First, registering all responders during a response to a disaster could improve implementation of screening and monitoring services. Second, designing and implementing screening and monitoring programs that foster the ability to conduct epidemiologic research could improve the understanding of health effects experienced by responders and help determine the need for ongoing monitoring. Third, providing timely mental health screening and monitoring that is integrated with physical health screening and monitoring could improve the ability to accurately diagnose physical and mental health conditions and prevent more serious mental health conditions from developing. Fourth, including a treatment referral process in screening and monitoring programs could improve the ability of responders to gain access to needed treatment. Fifth, making comparable services available to all responders, regardless of their employer or geographic location, could ensure more equitable access to services for responders and help ensure that data collected about responders' health are consistent and comprehensive. HHS has taken steps to facilitate responder registration, but has not developed a department-level plan for responder health programs. HHS's Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry has developed a survey instrument that state and local entities can adopt to register responders and other individuals exposed to a disaster. In a separate effort, HHS's Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response is taking steps to establish a system to register HHS employees and other federal public health and medical personnel who are deployed to a disaster, but it has not completed this effort. HHS has not developed a department-level plan for designing and implementing responder health programs that incorporates the five lessons from the WTC health programs. As a result, HHS has not indicated whether its policies and actions following a disaster or emergency would apply these lessons. Another consequence of not having a plan is that HHS has not described its components' roles and responsibilities for designing and implementing responder health programs. It has not identified which HHS components would be involved in responder health programs, which component would take the lead, how the expertise of various components would be used, or how efforts would be coordinated. In the absence of a department-level plan, HHS's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health developed a proposal in February 2008 for a project to develop strategies to ensure responder safety and health. While GAO concluded that this proposal is a step in the right direction for addressing responder health issues, it noted that the proposal does not fully address the lessons that have been identified from the WTC health programs. |
gao_GAO-08-160 | gao_GAO-08-160_0 | Background
Section 1423 of the Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003 directed the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy to establish an acquisition advisory panel to (1) review all federal acquisition laws and regulations and, to the extent practicable, governmentwide acquisition policies, with a view toward ensuring effective and appropriate use of commercial practices, performance-based contracting, the performance of acquisition functions across agency lines of responsibility, and the use of governmentwide contracts and (2) make any recommendations for the modification of laws, regulations, or policies that are considered necessary to protect the best interests of the federal government; ensure the continuing financial and ethical integrity of acquisitions by the federal government; and enhance effective, efficient, and fair award and administration of contracts for the acquisition of goods and services. Our work is generally consistent with the panel recommendations, and we have issued numerous products that address the importance of a robust requirements definition process and the need for competition. The panel made recommendations to change the guidance to contracting officers in awarding contracts to small businesses. All but one of the recommendations requires legislation for implementation. Our work is generally consistent with the panel findings and recommendations on the acquisition workforce. Contractors Supporting the Federal Government
The panel reported that, in some cases, contractors are solely or predominantly responsible for the performance of mission-critical functions that were traditionally performed by government employees, such as acquisition program management and procurement, policy analysis, and quality assurance. Further, the panel noted that this development has created issues with respect to the proper roles of, and relationships between, federal employees and contractor employees in the “blended” workforce. OFPP Plans to Address Most SARA Panel Recommendations
OFPP representatives told us the office agrees with almost all of the 89 panel recommendations and has already acted on some SARA recommendations, while potential actions are pending on others. Table 1 shows how OFPP expected the 89 recommendations to be implemented. Panel recommendations directed to Congress include such potential legislative changes as authorizing the General Services Administration to establish a new information technology schedule for professional services and enacting legislation to strengthen the preference for awarding contracts to small businesses. OFPP has identified 51 recommendations that it plans to address. Conclusions
The SARA Panel, like GAO, has made numerous recommendations to improve federal government acquisition—from encouraging competition and adopting commercial practices to improving the accuracy and usefulness of procurement data. To do this, OFPP will need to work with the chief acquisition officers and senior procurement officials across all the federal agencies to lay out a strategy or plan that includes milestones and reporting requirements that OFPP could use to establish accountability, exercise oversight, and gauge the progress and results of implementing the recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how the Service Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) Acquisition Advisory Panel recommendations compare to GAO’s past work and recommendations, we reviewed and analyzed the panel report and related GAO products. To determine how the panel recommendations will likely be addressed, we obtained the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s (OFPP) comments on each recommendation and how OFPP plans or expects them to be implemented. As a result, we present the recommendations in the following categories: (1) legislative action, (2) changes to the FAR, (3) OFPP actions, and (4) agency actions. Reliability of Federal Procurement Data. | Why GAO Did This Study
A growing portion of federal spending is related to buying services such as administrative, management, and information technology support. Services accounted for about 60 percent of total fiscal year 2006 procurement dollars. The Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) of 2003 established a Services Acquisition Advisory Panel to make recommendations for improving acquisition practices. In January 2007, the panel proposed 89 recommendations to improve federal acquisition practices. GAO was asked to determine how the panel recommendations compare to GAO's past work and identify how the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) expects the recommendations to be addressed. To do this, GAO analyzed the panel report and compared its findings and recommendations to GAO's past work and recommendations, obtained OFPP's views on how it expected the recommendations to be implemented, and reviewed proposed legislation in Congress to determine if legislative provisions had the potential to address some recommendations.
What GAO Found
The SARA Panel, like GAO, has made numerous recommendations to improve federal government acquisition--from encouraging competition and adopting commercial practices to improving the accuracy and usefulness of procurement data. The recommendations in the SARA Panel report are largely consistent with GAO's past work and recommendations. The panel and GAO have both pointed out: the importance of a robust requirements definition process and the need for competition; the need to establish clear performance requirements, measurable performance standards, and a quality assurance plan to improve the use of performance-based contracting; the risks inherent in the use of interagency contracts due to their rapid growth and their improper management; stresses on the federal acquisition workforce and the need for a strategy to assess these workforce needs; concerns about the role of contractors engaged in acquisition program management and procurement traditionally performed by government employees and the proper roles of federal employees and contractor employees in a "blended" workforce; and the adverse effects of inaccurate and incomplete federal procurement data, such as not providing a sound basis for conducting procurement analyses. The panel also made recommendations that would change the guidance for awarding contracts to small businesses. While GAO's work has addressed some small business policy issues, GAO has not made recommendations that would change the guidance to be used for awarding contracts to small businesses. OFPP representatives told GAO that OFPP agrees with almost all of the panel recommendations and expected that most of the 89 panel recommendations would be implemented through one of the following means: congressional actions; changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulation; OFPP actions, such as issuing new or revised policy; and federal agency actions. OFPP has already acted on some SARA recommendations, while other actions are pending or under consideration. Milestones and reporting requirements are in place to help OFPP gauge the implementation status of some recommendations but not for others. Moreover, OFPP does not have a strategy or plan to allow it to exercise oversight and establish accountability for implementing all of the panel recommendations and to gauge their effect on federal acquisitions. |
gao_HEHS-95-201 | gao_HEHS-95-201_0 | Several business coalitions and health care organizations used the first HEDIS measures in 1991. Using HEDIS as a base, some employers have begun to distribute to their employees educational materials that include outcome measures. 1.) 2.) Consumers We Interviewed Use Information Comparing Quality in Health Care Decision-Making
Many of the employers and individual consumers of health care we talked with are increasingly using information that compares the quality of care furnished by health care providers or health plans to make purchasing decisions and to encourage providers and plans to improve the quality of their care. They want standardized information that allows them to compare providers and plans. While employers themselves have initiated efforts to cooperate with one another, few we interviewed are making complete health care data available to assist individual consumers in making purchasing decisions. Scope and Methodology
To obtain information on how consumers use data comparing the quality of health care providers or health plans and what information they want when making health care purchasing decisions, we interviewed both employers and individual consumers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on health care quality issues, focusing on: (1) how consumers use health care performance reports that contain comparative data on the quality of health care providers; and (2) what information consumers consider most important.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) employers and individuals use information that measures and compares the quality of health care furnished by providers and health plans when making purchasing decisions; (2) consumers want performance reporting efforts to continue and are requesting that more data be made publicly available; (3) consumers want standardized and comparable health care information to assess health care providers' or health plans' performance; (4) many employers get health care performance data through business coalitions, consultants, and their own data collection efforts; and (5) although employers have begun cooperating with one another to enhance their purchasing decisions, few employers make health care data available to their employees. |
gao_GAO-03-456 | gao_GAO-03-456_0 | Background
DOD’s readiness assessment and reporting system was designed to assess and report on military readiness at three levels—(1) the unit level; (2) the joint force level; and (3) the aggregate, or strategic, level. We have issued several reports containing recommendations for improving readiness reporting. Although some information was added, we found that some of the same quality issues remain—namely, that the reports do not specifically describe readiness problems, their effects on readiness, or remedial actions. The law does not mandate specific explanations of these “readiness indicators,” but we believe it is essential for Congress to understand the significance of the information in these reports for use in its oversight role. Because DOD is not reporting on all the requirements added over the past several years, the Congress is not receiving all the information mandated by law. For example, DOD took the following actions in response to legislative requirements: DOD is now reporting on the readiness of prepositioned equipment and is listing individual units that have reported low readiness as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. DOD Is Not Reporting on All Items Required
DOD is reporting on some, though not all, of the items Congress required be added to the quarterly readiness reports. The 1994 report included a list of 26 readiness indicators that DOD commanders said were important for a more comprehensive assessment of readiness. DOD had not developed implementing regulations as of January 2003. Lack of Implementation Plan Could Hinder Development of New Readiness Reporting System
DOD issued a directive in June 2002 to establish a new readiness reporting system. Officials in the OUSD P&R readiness office responsible for developing the new system said that they plan to use the new system to comply with the requirements in the National Defense Authorization Acts and to address many of the recommendations contained in a congressionally directed independent study. Since the directive for creating a new readiness reporting system established broad policy with no specifics and since DOD has not developed an implementation plan, the extent to which the new system will address the current system’s shortcomings will remain unknown until the new system is fully capable in 2007. As a result, the information available to Congress is not as effective as it could be as an oversight tool. To be able to assess progress in developing the new readiness system, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the OUSD P&R to develop an implementation plan that identifies performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable; the cost and personnel resources needed to achieve the goals, including an identification of the new system’s development and implementation costs in the President’s Budget beginning in fiscal year 2005 and Future Years Defense Plan; performance indicators to measure outcomes; an evaluation plan to compare program results with established goals; and milestones to guide development to the planned 2007 full capability date. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the progress the Department of Defense (DOD) has made in resolving issues raised in our prior report concerning both the unit level readiness reporting system and the lack of specificity in DOD’s Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress, we met with DOD officials and reviewed regulations and quarterly reports. To determine the extent to which DOD has complied with legislative reporting requirements enacted since our prior report, we compared a complete listing of these requirements to DOD’s readiness reporting. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) readiness assessment system was designed to assess the ability of units and joint forces to fight and meet the demands of the national security strategy. In 1998, GAO concluded that the readiness reports provided to Congress were vague and ineffective as oversight tools. Since that time, Congress added reporting requirements to enhance its oversight of military readiness. Therefore, the Chairman asked GAO to examine (1) the progress DOD made in resolving issues raised in the 1998 GAO report on both the unit-level readiness reporting system and the lack of specificity in DOD's Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress, (2) the extent to which DOD has complied with legislative reporting requirements enacted since 1997, and (3) DOD's plans to improve readiness reporting.
What GAO Found
Since 1998, DOD has made some progress in improving readiness reporting--particularly at the unit level--but some issues remain. For example, DOD uses readiness measures that vary 10 percentage points or more to determine readiness ratings and often does not report the precise measurements outside DOD. DOD included more information in its Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress. But quality issues remain--in that the reports do not specifically describe readiness problems, their effects on readiness, or remedial actions to correct problems. Nor do the reports contain information about funding programmed to address specific remedial actions. Although current law does not specifically require this information, Congress could use it for its oversight role. DOD complied with most, though not all, of the legislative readiness reporting requirements enacted by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1998-2002. For example, DOD (1) is now listing the individual units that have reported low readiness and reporting on the readiness of prepositioned equipment, as required by the fiscal year 1998 Act; (2) is reporting on 11 of 19 readiness indicators that commanders identified as important and that Congress required to be added to the quarterly reports in the fiscal year 1998 Act, but is not reporting on the other 8 readiness indicators; and (3) has not yet implemented a new comprehensive readiness reporting system as required in the fiscal year 1999 Act. As a result, Congress is not receiving all the information mandated by law. DOD issued a directive in June 2002 to establish a new comprehensive readiness reporting system that DOD officials said they plan to use to comply with the reporting requirements specified by Congress. The new system is intended to implement many of the recommendations included in a congressionally directed independent study for establishing such a system. However, the extent to which the new system will actually address the current system's shortcomings is unknown, because the new system is currently only a concept, and full capability is not scheduled until 2007. As of January 2003, DOD had not developed an implementation plan containing measurable performance goals, identification of resources, performance indicators, and an evaluation plan to assess progress in developing the new reporting system. Without such a plan, neither DOD nor the Congress will be able to fully assess whether the new system's development is on schedule and achieving desired results. |
gao_GAO-08-918 | gao_GAO-08-918_0 | This revised policy is an important step in establishing a framework for control of IT equipment. Successful implementation of these efforts will be key to improving controls over VA’s IT equipment. OIT monitored the 2007 physical inventory effort for IT equipment and reported that as of May 15, 2008, VA was unable to locate approximately 62,800 recorded IT equipment items, of which over 9,800 could have stored sensitive information. VA Has Made Significant Progress in Addressing GAO Recommendations
To address recommendations in our July 2007 report, VA completed action on 10 of our 12 recommendations, partially implemented actions on one other recommendation, and has actions under way to address the remaining recommendation. Effective implementation of this new policy will be essential to ensuring adequate control and accountability of VA’s IT equipment and any sensitive information residing on that equipment. Tests of IT Inventory Controls at Case Study Locations Identified Continuing Weaknesses
Our tests of IT equipment inventory controls at four case study locations, including three VA HCS and VA headquarters, identified continuing control weaknesses related to missing items, lack of accountability, and errors in IT equipment inventory records. As previously noted, in July 2008 VA mandated early implementation of revised policy related to control of IT equipment. Although the early implementation of July 2008 policy changes may address IT equipment control weaknesses, this policy was not in effect at the time of our tests. In addition, we found physical security weaknesses at IT storage facilities at all four locations. GAO Tests Identified Significant Numbers of Missing IT Equipment Items
Our tests of physical inventory controls from February through May of 2008 identified 50 missing IT equipment items, including 9 medical equipment items. Because VA does not know what, if any, sensitive information resided on the equipment, notifications to potentially affected individuals could not be made. The continuing occurrences of missing items indicate that underlying control weaknesses have not yet been corrected. Weaknesses in Controls over Hard Drives in the Disposal Process
Although VA requires that hard drives of IT equipment and medical equipment be sanitized prior to disposal to prevent unauthorized release of sensitive personal and medical information, we found weaknesses in the disposal process at each of our test locations that pose a risk that sensitive personal and medical information could be compromised. Further, VA’s lack of user-level accountability and its failure to maintain accurate and complete IT inventory records have hindered efforts to locate missing items. Major contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Given the continuing nature of information technology (IT) equipment inventory control problems and their significance, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations asked us to perform additional follow-up work to determine (1) whether the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made progress in implementing our prior recommendations for improving internal control over IT equipment and (2) the effectiveness of VA’s current internal controls to prevent theft, loss, or misappropriation of IT equipment. In concert with the Subcommittee request that VA perform a departmentwide physical inventory of IT assets, we reviewed the results of VA’s 2007 physical inventory of IT equipment items and VA’s process for completing Reports of Survey on lost and stolen items. We also assessed controls over hard drives in the excess property disposal process, and our investigators made physical security inspections of IT storage locations at our four case study locations. | Why GAO Did This Study
In July 2004, GAO reported that the six Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers it audited lacked a reliable property control database and effective inventory policies and procedures. In July 2007, GAO reported that continuing internal control weaknesses over IT equipment at four case study locations at VA resulted in an increased risk of theft, loss, and misappropriation of IT equipment assets. GAO's two reports included 18 recommendations to improve internal control over IT equipment. GAO was asked to perform a follow-up audit to determine (1) whether VA has made progress in implementing GAO's prior recommendations for improving internal control over IT equipment and (2) the effectiveness of VA's current internal controls to prevent theft, loss, or misappropriation of IT equipment. GAO reviewed policies and other pertinent documentation, statistically tested IT equipment inventory controls at four geographically disparate locations, and interviewed VA officials.
What GAO Found
VA has made significant progress in addressing prior GAO recommendations to improve controls over IT equipment. Of the 18 recommendations GAO made in its two earlier reports, VA completed action on 14 recommendations, partially implemented action on 2 recommendations, and is working to address the 2 remaining open recommendations. These recommendations focused on strengthening policies and procedures to establish a framework for accountability and control of IT equipment. If effectively implemented, VA's July 2008 policy changes would address many of the control weaknesses GAO identified. Mandated early implementation of this new policy addresses user-level accountability and requirements for strengthening physical security. In addition, to determine the extent of inventory control weaknesses over its IT equipment, VA performed a departmentwide physical inventory in 2007. However, as of May 15, 2008, VA reported that it could not locate about 62,800 IT equipment items, of which 9,800 could have stored sensitive information. Because VA does not know what, if any, sensitive information resided on the equipment, potentially affected individuals could not be notified. GAO's statistical tests of IT equipment inventory controls from February through May 2008 at four locations identified continuing control weaknesses, including missing items, lack of accountability, and errors in IT equipment inventory records. Although these control weaknesses may be addressed through early implementation of the July 2008 policies, the fact that GAO identified missing items only a few months after these locations had completed their physical inventories is an indication that underlying weaknesses in accountability over IT equipment have not yet been corrected. GAO's tests identified 50 missing items, of which 34 could have stored sensitive data, but again, notifications to individuals could not be made. Further, the lack of user-level accountability and inaccurate records on status, location, and item description of IT equipment items at the four case study locations make it difficult to determine the extent to which actual theft, loss, or misappropriation of IT equipment may have occurred. In addition, the four locations had weaknesses in controls over hard drives in the property disposal process as well as physical security weaknesses at IT storage facilities. These control weaknesses present a risk that VA could lose control over new, used, and excess IT equipment and that any sensitive personal and medical information residing on hard drives in this equipment could be compromised. |
gao_HEHS-98-152 | gao_HEHS-98-152_0 | Also, in exchange for the prospect of higher returns, the Social Security trust fund would have to take on greater risk. The possible extension of the trust fund’s solvency resulting from any stock investment scenario would be significantly shorter if the future stock returns are lower than the historical average of 7 percent after inflation.Moreover, if the return on stocks over the next 20 or 30 years averages less than the expected return on Treasury securities, the trust fund would be exhausted sooner than in 2029, exacerbating Social Security’s long-term financial imbalance. With government stock ownership, the risk and potential returns would be shared collectively by workers and beneficiaries. Effects of Government Stock Investments on the Federal Budget and National Saving
In the short term, under current budget scoring rules, government stock investing would increase reported budget deficits or decrease budget surpluses because stock purchases would be treated as outlays.9, 10 Each dollar invested in stocks is a dollar no longer available to the Treasury to finance other government spending or reduce debt held by the public. Implementation Issues Associated With Government Stock Investing
Government stock ownership, and to a lesser extent government management of individual accounts, would raise certain implementation issues, the most significant of which are stock selection and shareholder voting rights. Conceptually, these issues do not pose major obstacles. An indexing approach could reduce (1) the costs of selecting and managing a stock portfolio, (2) the exposure to some investment risks, and (3) the likelihood of the government controlling the corporate affairs of individual companies. I would like to conclude with four key observations about stock investing through the government and through individual accounts. Second, simply shifting assets from the trust fund into the stock market, either through the government or individual accounts, does not by itself increase national saving. Stock investing could indirectly prompt actions to raise saving by revealing the size of federal deficits excluding Social Security’s temporary surpluses. Fourth, critics of government stock investing have cited its potential to increase government influence over the private sector. Related GAO Products
Social Security Financing: Implications of Government Stock Investing for the Trust Fund, the Federal Budget, and the Economy (GAO/AIMD/HEHS-98-74, April 22, 1998). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its work on the government stock investing option, focusing on: (1) the implications of government stock investing for the Social Security Trust Fund; (2) the impact of stock investing on the federal budget and national saving; and (3) implementation issues related to selecting and managing a stock portfolio that could affect the degree of government involvement in corporate affairs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) government stock investing is a complex proposal that has potential consequences for Social Security, the federal budget, and national saving; (2) it also differs in key ways from proposals to establish individual accounts; (3) for the Social Security Trust Fund, government stock offers the prospect of higher returns but, by itself, is unlikely to solve the program's long-term financial imbalance, and it would be accompanied by greater risk; (4) the key distinction between stock investing through the government and through individual accounts is that, under government stock investing, the risks and returns would be shared collectively through the government rather than borne individually; (5) more generally, individual accounts proposals would alter Social Security's current structure and scale back the income redistribution aspect of the current program; (6) from a budget perspective, shifting a portion of trust fund assets into the stock market would raise deficits or diminish surpluses in the short term but would not significantly affect national saving; (7) while government stock investing by itself has no direct effect on saving, it indirectly could prompt actions to raise savings by revealing the size of federal deficits excluding Social Security's temporary surpluses; (8) implementing a government stock investing proposal would raise issues about stock selection, administrative costs, and shareholder voting rights that, conceptually, do not pose major obstacles; and (9) however, some of these issues could raise concerns about increased government influence over the private sector. |
gao_GAO-12-58 | gao_GAO-12-58_0 | USCP Has Enhanced Retirement Benefits, a Higher Minimum Starting Salary, and a Wider Variety of Duties Compared to Most Federal Police Forces
USCP has enhanced retirement benefits and a higher minimum entry- level salary than most other federal police forces GAO reviewed. However, USCP reported that its officers routinely engage in similar activities, such as intelligence operations, and have similar employment requirements for entry-level officers, such as being in good physical condition, as most other federal police forces. Retirement Benefits and Salary
USCP and three other police forces—Park Police, Secret Service Uniformed Division, and Supreme Court Police—have enhanced retirement benefits, similar to those received by federal LEOs, where officers can retire after fewer years of service and their retirement annuities accrue faster than the other six federal police forces GAO reviewed. USCP and the three police forces with enhanced retirement benefits offered among the highest minimum entry-level salaries, ranging from $52,020 to $55,653, as shown in table 2. These duties ranged from routinely protecting members of Congress to buildings. While USCP and seven of the other nine police forces said that human capital flexibilities were important tools for recruiting and retaining police officers, their use generally depends on need or budget, among other factors. Attrition
From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, USCP’s average attrition rate was 6.5 percent compared to the other nine federal police forces, which ranged from 3.5 percent to just under 14 percent. Primary Reasons Why Federal Police Officers Leave or Stay
Federal police forces said that their police officers generally leave their forces either because of personal reasons or for better career advancement opportunities, and officers generally stay because of appreciation for the agency’s mission.other police forces indicated that most of their police officers leave for personal reasons, such as the desire to work closer to home. USCP had among the lowest attrition, and Secret Service Uniformed Division had among the highest. Even though human capital flexibilities are intended to be a tool to recruit and retain employees, and most of the police forces considered them at least somewhat important, the police forces that offered a wider variety of human capital flexibilities did not always have lower attrition rates. While retirement benefits, pay, and use of human capital flexibilities could affect attrition, the extent to which they do so can vary for a given agency, and other factors—such as family issues and promotion opportunities, as previously discussed—could influence an employee’s decision to leave or remain with his or her employer. Benefits under Existing FERS Provisions Generally Meet Recommended Targets, if Fully Utilized, with TSP Balances Being a Significant Factor
The benefits of USCP officers retiring at the age of 57 under existing FERS provisions, if fully utilized by USCP officers, would meet retirement income targets generally recommended by some retirement experts. However, the level of benefits depends significantly on the level of employee TSP contributions. In 2010, the USCP Labor Committee presented six proposals that would enhance the current USCP benefit structure. Five of the six would increase existing costs; our review found that the other proposal, which urges the USCP Board to exercise its current authority by allowing officers to voluntarily remain on the job until age 60 rather than retire at 57, as mandated, would have a minimal impact on costs to the federal government and could improve officers’ retirement benefits. In 2010, the USCP Labor Committee provided selected members of Congress with six proposed changes to further enhance the current USCP benefit structure. OPM also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
To understand how the United States Capitol Police (USCP) compares to other federal police forces with regard to retirement benefits, compensation, duties, employment requirements, attrition, human capital flexibilities, and costs associated with the proposed benefit enhancements, we addressed the following questions: (1) How does the USCP compare to other federal police forces in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area with respect to retirement benefits, minimum entry-level salary, duties, and employment requirements? (2) How does attrition at USCP compare to other federal police forces, and how if at all, have USCP and other federal police forces used human capital tools to recruit and retain qualified officers? For the first and second objectives, we identified other federal police forces that were potentially comparable to USCP based on (1) prior work on federal uniformed police forces, (2) inclusion in the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) occupational series for police officers (0083), and (3) the number of officers located in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area or who receive Washington, D.C. locality pay.information, we selected nine federal police forces whose officers are part of, or functionally equivalent to, the 0083 occupational series and who have at least 50 officers who are located in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area or receive Washington, D.C. locality pay, as listed in Based on this table 5.to OPM’s 0083 occupational series—or police series—for which an individual’s primary duties involve the performance or supervision of law enforcement work in the preservation of the peace; the prevention, detection, and investigation of crimes; the arrest or apprehension of violators; and the provision of assistance to citizens in emergency situations, including the protection of civil rights. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Washington, D.C. metropolitan (DC metro) area is home to many federal police forces, including the United States Capitol Police (USCP), which maintain the safety of federal property, employees, and the public. Officials are concerned that disparities in pay and retirement benefits have caused federal police forces to experience difficulties in recruiting and retaining officers. In 2010, the USCP Labor Committee proposed six changes to enhance the USCP benefit structure. GAO was asked to review USCPs pay and retirement benefits and compare them to other federal police forces in the DC metro area. GAO (1) compared USCP to other forces with respect to retirement benefits, minimum entry-level salary, duties, and employment requirements; (2) compared attrition at USCP to other forces, and determined how, if at all, USCP and other forces used human capital flexibilities (e.g., retention bonus); and (3) determined what level of retirement income USCP benefits provide and the costs associated with the proposed benefit enhancements. GAO chose nine other federal police forces to review based on prior work, inclusion in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) police occupational series, and officer presence in the DC metro area. GAO analyzed laws, regulations, OPM data from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, and human capital data from the 10 police forces. GAO also surveyed the 10 forces.
USCP and the Office of Personnel Management generally agreed with our findings and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
USCP generally has enhanced retirement benefits, a higher minimum starting salary, and a wider variety of protective duties than other federal police forces in the DC metro area that GAO reviewed, but has similar employment requirements. Even though USCP, Park Police, Supreme Court Police, and Secret Service Uniformed Division are federal police forces, they provide enhanced retirement benefits similar to those offered by federal law enforcement agencies that have additional investigative duties. These enhanced benefits allow their officers to retire early and accrue retirement pensions faster than other federal police forces. USCP and these three forces also offered among the highest minimum entry-level salariesranging from $52,020 to $55,653than the other six forces GAO reviewed, which had minimum entry-level salaries ranging from $38,609 to $52,018. USCP reported routinely having a wider variety of duties than most other forces. These duties ranged from routinely protecting members of Congress to protecting buildings. USCP and most of the forces generally have similar employment requirements, such as being in good physical condition.
USCPs attrition rate is generally lower than the majority of the federal police forces in our review; and USCP and seven of the other nine police forces considered human capital flexibilities to be at least of some importance to recruiting and retaining qualified officers, but use of these flexibilities generally depends on recruiting needs, among other factors. From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, USCP had the fourth lowest attrition rate (6.5 percent) among the 10 police forces GAO reviewed; the attrition rates for the nine other forces ranged from 3.5 percent to just under 14 percent. Officials from USCP and four other forces GAO reviewed stated that, currently, attrition is not a problem because of the challenging economy. For example, officials from USCP and Bureau of Engraving and Printing Police stated that their officers want to retain their jobs in the challenging economy. In addition, USCP and other forces said that when their officers do leave the force, they generally do so either because of personal reasons or for better career advancement opportunities, and officers generally stay for reasons such as good working environment or appreciation for the agencys mission. The extent to which retirement benefits, pay, and use of human capital flexibilities affect attrition can vary among forces given other factorssuch as family issuesthat could influence an employees decision to leave or remain with his or her employer.
If fully utilized, benefits for USCP officers who retire at the age of 57 under existing provisions generally would be within the range of retirement income targets suggested by some retirement experts. However, the level of benefits depends significantly on the level of employee retirement contributions. In 2010, the USCP Labor Committee presented six proposals that would enhance the current USCP benefit structure. GAOs analysis shows that five of the six would increase existing costs, GAOs review found the other proposal, which urges the USCP Board to exercise its current authority to allow officers to voluntarily remain employed until age 60 rather than retire at age 57, as mandated, would have only a minimal impact on USCP costs and could increase officers retirement income. |
gao_GAO-15-544 | gao_GAO-15-544_0 | DOD and Selected Components Have Taken Steps to Implement Insider- Threat Programs, but DOD Has Not Issued Supplemental Guidance
DOD and Selected Components Have Begun Implementing Insider- Threat Programs That Incorporate Minimum Standards
DOD and the six selected components we reviewed have begun incorporating the minimum standards called for in E.O. Selected Components Have Not Incorporated Key Elements of Insider- Threat Programs That Are Cited in DOD Guidance
In addition to the minimum standards issued by the President, DOD guidance and reports identify elements that could enhance DOD’s efforts to protect classified information and systems. Develop a baseline of normal activity. DOD Has Assessed Its Insider-Threat Program but Has Not Analyzed Gaps or Incorporated Risk Assessments into the Program
DOD and Other Entities Have Assessed the Department’s Insider- Threat Program
DOD has conducted self-assessments of its insider-threat program; additionally, independent entities have assessed DOD components’ compliance with relevant policies and standards. This information is limited because the current assessments do not reflect the extent to which the components have accomplished tasks associated with the 63 key performance indicators. DOD and the Six Components Have Not Incorporated Risk Assessments into Insider- Threat Programs
National-level security guidance states that agencies should assess their For example, the risk posture as a part of their insider-threat programs.National Insider Threat Task Force’s guide states that agencies should identify their critical assets and then assess the risk to those assets. Until DOD provides supplemental guidance directing components to incorporate risk assessments into their insider-threat programs, components may not assess risk and DOD will not be able to determine whether current security measures are adequate or whether proposed security measures would address a component’s level of risk. DOD Identified Technical and Policy Changes to Protect against Insider Threats in the Future but Does Not Consistently Collect Information for Oversight and Recommendations
Selected DOD Components Identified Technical and Policy Changes for Future Action
To help protect classified information and systems from future insider threats, in the technical area, officials from three of the six DOD components we reviewed told us that they are hoping to obtain or improve analytic tools that allow the component to identify anomalous These analytic tools behavior that could indicate insider-threat activities.would obtain data through monitoring of user activity. DOD plans to provide this information in 2015. According to OUSD (Intelligence) officials, they do not have a process to collect information from the components to support management and oversight duties and inform resource recommendations and investment goals because DOD has not dedicated a program office that is focused on oversight of the insider-threat program. Without identifying a program office to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence’s responsibilities in managing and overseeing DOD and components’ insider-threat programs, DOD may not be able to collect all information about DOD components’ technical and policy needs and could face challenges in establishing goals, and recommending resources and improvements to address insider threats. However, DOD components have not taken action to incorporate other key elements into their insider-threat programs because DOD has not issued guidance that identifies actions beyond the minimum standards that components should take to enhance their insider-threat programs. Such guidance would assist components in developing and strengthening insider-threat programs and better position the department to safeguard classified information and systems. While DOD has assessed aspects of its insider-threat program, it has not evaluated or documented the extent to which these assessments provide a continuing analysis of gaps as required by statute and has not incorporated risk assessments into insider-threat programs; nor have the results of the existing assessments been provided to DOD’s senior insider-threat official. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented an insider-threat program that incorporates minimum standards and key elements to protect classified information and systems, we evaluated initiatives that DOD had established and policy and guidance that identify responsibilities within the department to address the threat that insiders pose to classified information and systems. 13587), the national insider-threat policy and minimum standards, DOD guidance and reports, Committee on National Security Systems guidance, a set of leading practices that the National Insider Threat Task Force recommends, practices that other federal agencies and private industry use, and a list of essential elements that a group of private-sector and U.S. government analysts created.consulted by key element, see appendix III. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2010, the United States has suffered grave damage to national security and an increased risk to the lives of U.S. personnel due to unauthorized disclosures of classified information by individuals with authorized access to defense information systems. Congress and the President have issued requirements for structural reforms and a new program to address insider threats.
A 2014 House Committee on Armed Services report included a provision that GAO assess DOD's efforts to protect its information and systems. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD has implemented an insider-threat program that incorporates minimum standards and key elements, (2) DOD and others have assessed DOD's insider-threat program, and (3) DOD has identified any technical and policy changes needed to protect against future insider threats. GAO reviewed studies, guidance, and other documents; and interviewed officials regarding actions that DOD and a nonprobability sample of six DOD components have taken to address insider threats.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) components GAO selected for review have begun implementing insider-threat programs that incorporate the six minimum standards called for in Executive Order 13587 to protect classified information and systems. For example, the components have begun to provide insider-threat awareness training to all personnel with security clearances. In addition, the components have incorporated some of the actions associated with a framework of key elements that GAO developed from a White House report, an executive order, DOD guidance and reports, national security systems guidance, and leading practices recommended by the National Insider Threat Task Force. However, the components have not consistently incorporated all recommended key elements. For example, three of the six components have developed a baseline of normal activity—a key element that could mitigate insider threats. DOD components have not consistently incorporated these key elements because DOD has not issued guidance that identifies recommended actions beyond the minimum standards that components should take to enhance their insider-threat programs. Such guidance would assist DOD and its components in developing and strengthening insider-threat programs and better position the department to safeguard classified information and systems.
DOD and others, such as the National Insider Threat Task Force, have assessed the department's insider-threat program, but DOD has not analyzed gaps or incorporated risk assessments into the program. DOD officials believe that current assessments meet the intent of the statute that requires DOD to implement a continuing gap analysis. However, DOD has not evaluated and documented the extent to which the current assessments describe existing insider-threat program capabilities, as is required by the law. Without such a documented evaluation, the department will not know whether its capabilities to address insider threats are adequate and address statutory requirements. Further, national-level security guidance states that agencies, including DOD, should assess risk posture as part of insider-threat programs. GAO found that DOD components had not incorporated risk assessments because DOD had not provided guidance on how to incorporate risk assessments into components' programs. Until DOD issues guidance on incorporating risk assessments, DOD components may not conduct such assessments and thus not be able to determine whether security measures are adequate.
DOD components have identified technical and policy changes to help protect classified information and systems from insider threats in the future, but DOD is not consistently collecting this information to support management and oversight responsibilities. According to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence officials, they do not consistently collect this information because DOD has not identified a program office that is focused on overseeing the insider-threat program. Without an identified program office dedicated to oversight of insider-threat programs, DOD may not be able to ensure the collection of all needed information and could face challenges in establishing goals and in recommending resources and improvements to address insider threats.
This is an unclassified version of a classified report GAO issued in April 2015.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD issue guidance to incorporate key elements into insider-threat programs, evaluate the extent to which programs address capability gaps, issue risk-assessment guidance, and identify a program office to manage and oversee insider-threat programs. DOD agreed or partially agreed with all of the recommendations, and described actions it plans to take. However, DOD's actions may not fully address the issues as discussed in the report. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-321 | gao_T-AIMD-00-321_0 | Last month we recommended that the Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs implement these actions to improve VA’s IT investment decision-making process.VA concurred with these recommendations, and stated that the in-process review plans will include completion dates, post implementation review findings, such as lessons learned, will be provided to investment panel members, and the VAInformationTechnologyCapitalInvestmentGuide,which was printed and distributed to VA’s agencies earlier this month, provides guidance on processes for selecting, controlling, and evaluating IT investments and procurements below the Capital Investment Board threshold. It decided to separate the CIO function from the chief financial officer and established the position of assistant secretary for information and technology to serve as VA’s CIO. This past May,we testified before this Subcommittee that VA no longer planned to develop such a strategy. In contrast to VBA, VHA has a decentralized process for tracking IT expenditures. However, VHA does not have a uniform mechanism for tracking IT expenditures across the administration. Challenges Continue for Two IT Projects
I would now like to discuss the status of VA’s efforts to develop and implement VHA’s Decision Support System and VBA’s compensation and pension replacement project. The May 2000 responses to two questions asked by VHA’s chief network officer also indicate that DSS is not being fully utilized. Specifically, data in the existing VBA system will need to be converted to the new system. In addition, VBA must develop data exchanges to allow the compensation and pension replacement system to share data with other systems. For example, it is critical that changes to veteran information, such as name and address, captured in the compensation and pension replacement system be changed in other VBA systems. Earlier this month, we reported that serious computer security problems persisted throughout the department and VHA because VA had not yet fully implemented an integrated security management program and VHA had not effectively managed computer security at its medical facilities.Consequently, financial transaction data and personal information on veterans’ medical records continued to face increased risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, improper disclosure, or destruction. While it has improved its IT investment decision-making process and plans to fill its department CIO position, VA may encounter problems achieving its “One VA” vision until it develops an overall business process reengineering strategy and a departmentwide, integrated IT architecture. In addition, VA’s lack of departmentwide tracking of IT expenditures makes it difficult for the department to manage the risks of its IT investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) information technology (IT) program, focusing on VA's efforts to: (1) improve its process for selecting, controlling, and evaluating IT investments; (2) fill the chief information officer (CIO) position; (3) develop an overall strategy for reengineering its business processes; (4) complete a departmentwide integrated systems architecture; (5) track its IT expenditures; (6) implement the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) Decision Support System and the Veterans Benefits Administration's (VBA) compensation and pension replacement project; and (7) improve the department's computer security.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) overall, VA's IT investment decision-making process has improved, and it has started to implement recommendations GAO enumerated in May and August of this year; (2) further, VA is obtaining a full-time CIO now that the Administration has identified a candidate for the position; (3) however, the department no longer plans to develop an overall strategy for reengineering its business process to effectively function as "One VA," nor has it defined the integrated IT architecture needed to efficiently acquire and utilize information systems across VA; (4) in addition, VA lacks a uniform mechanism that readily tracks IT expenditures; (5) instead, VA's different offices use various mechanisms for tracking IT expenditures; (6) VHA's Decision Support System (DSS) and VBA's compensation and pension replacement project continue to face challenges; (7) as demonstrated in a survey to all Veterans Integrated Service Networks and medical centers directors, DSS is not being fully utilized; (8) in addition, while VBA plans to pilot test portions of its compensation and pension replacement system in January 2001, other key issues need to be addressed before the system can be fully implemented; (9) for example, VBA does not have a plan or schedule for converting data from the old system to the new system and exchanging data between the new system and other systems; (10) regarding computer security, VA has begun to address weaknesses identified by GAO and its Office of Inspector General; and (11) until it develops and implements a comprehensive, coordinated security management program, VA will have limited assurance that financial information and sensitive medical records are adequately protected from misuse, unauthorized disclosure, and destruction. |
gao_HEHS-98-204 | gao_HEHS-98-204_0 | Thus, under the law, the “best interests of a child” is defined on a narrow, case-specific basis, whereas child welfare agencies have historically assumed that same-race placements are in the best interests of all children. In addition, the two counties provided training on the act to caseworkers responsible for making placement decisions. Some states believed that HHS’ guidance regarding the use of race in placement decisions was more restrictive than provided for in the act. California Implementation Efforts
Implementation of the 1994 act required changes to law and regulations at the state level and to policies at the county level. However, that county has not formally revised its foster care or adoption policies in over 20 years, according to one county official. Both counties also incorporated training on the 1994 act into their curriculums for new caseworkers. HHS and California Were Slow to Respond to the 1996 Amendment
Following amendment of the act, HHS was slower to revise its policy guidance and provided less technical assistance to states than it did after the passage of the 1994 act. Although HHS did not repeat its technical assistance effort to assist states in understanding the amended law, the state and counties we reviewed provided some training on the amended act to staff. To date, the state has targeted the training to licensing and recruitment staff—who work with potential foster and adoptive parents—and not to caseworkers or supervisors who place children in foster and adoptive homes. HHS and the State Face Continuing Implementation Challenges
Officials at all levels of government face a diverse set of challenges as they continue to implement the amended act. Major issues that remain include changing caseworkers’ and practitioners’ beliefs about the importance of race-based placement decisions, developing a shared understanding at all levels of government about allowable placement practices, and developing an effective federal compliance monitoring system. The Act’s Removal of Race From Placement Decisions Not Consistent With Long-Standing Social Work Practice and Some Caseworkers’ Beliefs
The belief that race or cultural heritage is central to a child’s best interests when making a placement is so inherent in social work theory and practice that a policy statement of the National Association of Social Workers still reflects this tenet, despite changes in the federal law. State and Local Officials Need Information on How to Change Social Work Practice
State program officials in California are struggling to understand the amended act in the context of casework practice issues. Analysis of any administrative data will be hampered by difficulties in interpreting the results. While case files are another source of information about placement decisions, and such files are used in one type of review periodically performed by HHS, reviewing those files may provide little documentation to assist in determining whether placement decisions are consistent with the amended act’s restrictions on the use of race-based factors. Conclusions
The Multiethnic Placement Act, as amended, has been difficult for agencies to implement. The Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994
Interethnic Adoption Provisions Amending the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994
HHS Guidance on the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994
HHS Guidance on the Interethnic Adoption Provisions
HHS Clarification of Placement Practice Issues
Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to those named above, Patricia Elston led the federal fieldwork and coauthored the draft, and Anndrea Ewertsen led the California fieldwork and coauthored the draft. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the implementation of the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, as amended, at the federal level and in states with large and ethnically diverse foster care caseloads, focusing on: (1) efforts by federal, state, and local agencies to implement the 1994 act in the areas of assistance; (2) efforts by federal, state, and local agencies in these same areas to implement the 1996 amendment to the act; and (3) the challenges all levels of government face to change placement practices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and California initiated collaborative, multipronged efforts to inform agencies and caseworkers about the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994; (2) HHS program officials recognized that the act requires child welfare agencies to undergo a historic change in how foster care and adoption placement decisions are made by limiting the use of race as a factor; (3) within 6 weeks of the act's passage, HHS took the first step in a comprehensive approach to implementation that involved issuing policy guidance and providing technical assistance; (4) some states believed that HHS' policy was more restrictive regarding the use of race in placement decisions than provided for in the act; (5) after enactment of the 1996 amendment, HHS did not update its policy guidance for 9 months, and it has done little to address casework practice issues; (6) California has yet to conform its state laws and regulations to the amended act; (7) the state provided training to some county staff, but the training was not targeted toward staff who have primary responsibility for placing children in foster or adoptive homes; (8) both counties have provided some training to caseworkers on the 1996 amendment, either through formal training sessions or one-on-one training by supervisors, however, only one county has begun to revise its policies; (9) changing long-standing social work practices, translating legal principles into practical advice for caseworkers, and developing compliance monitoring systems are among the challenges remaining for officials at all levels of government in changing placement decisionmaking; (10) the implementation of this amended act predominantly relies on the understanding and willingness of caseworkers to eliminate race from the placement decisions they make; (11) while agency officials and caseworkers understand that this legislation prohibits them from delaying or denying placements on the basis of race, not all believe that eliminating race will result in placements that are in the best interests of children; (12) state and local officials and caseworkers demonstrated lingering confusion about allowable actions under the law; (13) the state training session GAO attended on the amended act showed that neither the state nor HHS has provided clear guidance to caseworkers to apply the law to casework practice; and (14) federal efforts to determine whether placement decisions are consistent with the amended act's restrictions on the use of race-based factors will be hampered by difficulties in identifying data that are complete and sufficient. |
gao_GGD-97-81 | gao_GGD-97-81_0 | The implementation of the act by states and jurisdictions could vary depending on the extent that the states provide assistance. Assistance Jurisdictions and States Reported Providing in 1996
Most jurisdictions that reported providing bilingual voting assistance in the 1996 general election said that they provided both written and oral assistance. In addition, some states had passed their own legislation requiring some form of bilingual voting assistance (see page 15). Moreover, two states, California and Hawaii, reported providing assistance to groups that the act did not require them to assist. Of the 11 states that reported providing written assistance, 7 reported providing bilingual voting instructions. Some Covered Jurisdictions Reported Providing No Bilingual Assistance
Although the jurisdictions that we surveyed were designated to provide bilingual voting assistance, 20 jurisdictions reported that they did not do so for the 1996 general election. They reported not providing assistance because they said that they (1) were unable to locate or identify individuals in their areas needing assistance (5 jurisdictions), (2) were not contacted by individuals in need of assistance or did not know of individuals needing assistance (13 jurisdictions), or (3) believed they had been exempted from providing assistance (2 jurisdictions). Some Jurisdictions and States Reported Providing Assistance to Groups That Were Not Required to Be Covered
Five jurisdictions and two states reported that in addition to providing assistance to minority language groups, as required under the act, they also furnished assistance to other groups. Costs Jurisdictions and States Reported Incurring to Provide Bilingual Voting Assistance in 1996
In response to our survey questions on the cost of providing bilingual voting assistance, 34 jurisdictions said they reported all costs and 30 jurisdictions said they reported partial costs for 1996 elections. Few Jurisdictions and States Said They Identified Costs for Providing Bilingual Voting Assistance
Covered jurisdictions and states are not required to maintain data on their costs of providing bilingual voting assistance. Jurisdictions’ Reported Costs for Elections in 1996
Of the 272 responding jurisdictions that reported providing bilingual voting assistance, 34 jurisdictions reported the total cost of providing such assistance, of which 6 jurisdictions said they provided oral assistance only but at no additional cost. States’ Reported Costs for Elections in 1996
Of the 12 state respondents that reported providing bilingual voting assistance, Florida and Hawaii reported total bilingual voting assistance costs for the 1996 elections. Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, and Rhode Island provided partial cost data. States’ and Jurisdictions’ Reported Costs for Prior Elections
For prior election years 1992 to 1995, 29 jurisdictions and 6 states provided cost data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed aspects of the implementation of bilingual language provisons of the Voting Rights Act, focusing on: (1) the types of assistance jurisdictions provided for the 1996 general election; and (2) actual cost that covered jurisdictions incurred to provide bilingual voting assistance in 1996 and prior years, if available.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) of the 292 jurisdictions that responded to GAO's survey, 272 reported providing bilingual voting assistance for the 1996 general election; (2) of the 292 respondents, 213 said that they provided both written and oral bilingual voting assistance to their minority language voters, 45 said that they provided written assistance only, 14 said that they provided oral assistance only, and 20 said they did not provide any assistance; (3) with respect to the jurisdictions not providing any assistance, 5 said they tried, but were unable to identify individuals needing assistance, 13 said that no one needed assistance or that no one had ever sought assistance, and 2 believed that they had been exempted from providing assistance; (4) in addition, five jurisdictions and two states reported furnishing bilingual voting assistance to groups that the act did not require them to assist; (5) in addition to assistance provided by jurisdictions, states may also provide assistance, such as translation of state election propositions or translated sample ballots; (6) 12 of the 26 states that responded said that they furnished some bilingual voting assistance; (7) the 14 remaining states reported that they provided no bilingual voting assistance; (8) in addition, some states, such as California (CA) and New Jersey, have adopted their own laws requiring bilingual voting assistance; (9) as the act does not require covered jurisdictions and states to maintain data on the costs of providing bilingual, information provided by the surveyed jurisdictions and states on their costs was scant; (10) of the 272 jurisdictions that reported providing assistance in 1996, 208 were unable to provide information on their costs; (11) of the 64 jurisdictions that reported cost information, only 34 provided information on total costs and the remainder provided partial costs; (12) the 34 jurisdictions' reported costs varied greatly; (13) of the 12 states that provided assistance, only Hawaii and Florida reported their total costs for providing bilingual voting assistance in 1996; (14) Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, and Rhode Island (RI) reported partial cost data; (15) only 29 jurisdictions and 6 states provided some data on election year costs for 1992 to 1995; (15) moreover, the amounts jurisdictions reported spending on bilingual voting assistance in prior years varied widely; and (16) the amounts states reported also varied by year. |
gao_GAO-16-127 | gao_GAO-16-127_0 | Airports and Airlines That We Reviewed Have Plans, but a Comprehensive National Aviation- Preparedness Plan Does Not Exist
Airports and Airlines That We Reviewed Generally Have Communicable- Disease Preparedness Plans
Airports and Airlines We Reviewed Have Preparedness Plans
All of the 14 airports and three airlines we reviewed have plans—often contained in multiple documents—in place for responding to communicable disease threats from abroad. The plans in place for each airport and airline generally address the high-level components that we identified as common among applicable federal and international guidance. Establishment of an incident command center. 3. 2. In 2010, ICAO, by resolution, further urged member states to ensure that the public health sector and the aviation sector collaborate to develop a national preparedness plan for aviation to help prevent the spread of communicable diseases through air travel, and that member states establish requirements for the involvement of stakeholders, such as airport operators and airlines, in the development of the plan. While the United States has not developed a national aviation- preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks, DOT and CDC officials contend that some elements of such a plan already exist. However, FAA reported to ICAO in 2010—by way of answering an ICAO questionnaire on member states’ fulfillment of this standard—that individual airport plans are intended to handle one or two flights with inbound passengers and not respond to a full epidemic, which may require a response involving multiple airports on a national level. An adaptable and scalable framework would subsequently improve harmonization of individual plans across airports and airlines— helping ensure that the individual plans work in accordance with one another for a national level response effort—and serve as the basis for training airport and airline staff and crew. To address these challenges, aviation stakeholders reported taking actions such as developing communication tools and strategies; reviewing, exercising, and improving response plans; and providing training, equipment, and cleaning supplies. A national aviation- preparedness plan could serve as the basis for testing communication mechanisms among responders to ensure those mechanisms are effective prior to addressing a communicable disease outbreak. It could also serve as the basis to ensure that airport and airline staff have received appropriate training and access to properly maintained equipment to reduce the risk of exposure to communicable diseases during an outbreak. Airport and airline representatives we spoke with identified actions they took to provide information about the Ebola threat to better inform the public. Furthermore, Annex 9 to the Chicago Convention obligates member states to establish a national aviation- preparedness plan—a plan intended to provide a mechanism for the public health sector to coordinate with the aviation sector in the event of a communicable disease threat. Such a plan could help maximize an effective response to a public health threat, while minimizing potential inefficiencies in the national response effort and unnecessary disruptions to the national aviation system. Recommendation
To help improve the U.S. aviation sector’s preparedness for future communicable disease threats from abroad, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation work with relevant stakeholders, such as the Department of Health and Human Services, to develop a national aviation-preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
GAO was asked to review the preparedness of the U.S. aviation system in responding to communicable disease threats from abroad. This report examines: 1. The extent to which selected U.S. airports and airlines have preparedness plans to respond to communicable disease threats from abroad and the extent to which a national aviation-preparedness plan guides preparedness. Selected airports and airlines: We selected for review 14 airports—which accounted for about 53 percent of total international arriving passengers in 2014—that met one or more of the following criteria (see table 1): have enhanced passenger entry-screening procedures in place for international passengers arriving from the three current or past Ebola- affected countries in West Africa; received the first and second largest number of international passengers from each of five world regions in 2014; large hub airports with a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) quarantine station on site at the time of our review; large hub airports without a CDC quarantine on site, but still receiving a larger number of international passengers relative to other large hubs without a CDC quarantine station on site; experienced a confirmed Ebola case; have a station manager from one of the three U.S. airlines in our review; and are located within proximity to a GAO office. We identified and reviewed applicable federal requirements and international obligations, including the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices, and guidance for U.S. airports and airlines with international air traffic. We reviewed available documents from the five selected federal departments and their relevant components and interviewed officials from these departments. To examine challenges that U.S. airports and airlines, including contractors, have faced when responding to communicable disease threats, including Ebola, and the actions they have taken to help address those challenges, we first identified challenges through interviews with selected airports and airlines as discussed above, as well as interviews with representatives from the labor union representing airport- and airline- service employees, and airport- and airline-contract employers of service employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Past communicable diseases, such as the recent Ebola epidemic, have resulted in many deaths and highlight the potential economic cost of disruptions to air travel and the U.S. and global economies.
GAO was asked to review the preparedness of the U.S. aviation system to respond to communicable diseases. This report examines (1) the extent to which selected U.S. airports and airlines have plans for responding to communicable disease threats from abroad and to which a national aviation-preparedness plan guides preparedness, and (2) the challenges that U.S. airports and airlines have faced when responding to threats and any actions taken to address them.
GAO reviewed available documents and interviewed representatives from 14 U.S. international airports—selected to reflect a range of activities and facilities—and the 3 major U.S. airlines. GAO also reviewed applicable federal requirements and international obligations and guidance for U.S. airports and airlines, and interviewed officials and reviewed documents from federal agencies and aviation stakeholder groups.
What GAO Found
All of the 14 airports and 3 airlines GAO reviewed have plans for responding to communicable disease threats from abroad, although the United States lacks a comprehensive national aviation-preparedness plan aimed at preventing and containing the spread of diseases through air travel. U.S. airports and airlines are not required to have individual preparedness plans, and no federal agency tracks which airports and airlines have them. Consequently, it is not clear the extent to which all U.S. airports and airlines have such plans. The plans GAO reviewed generally addressed the high-level components that GAO identified as common among applicable federal and international guidance, such as establishment of an incident command center and activation triggers for a response. GAO identified these components to provide a basis for assessing the breadth of the plans. The plans GAO reviewed for each airport were developed by, or in collaboration with, relevant airport stakeholders, such as Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) airport staff. As provided in Annex 9, the Chicago Convention, an international aviation treaty to which the United States is a signatory, obligates member states to develop a national aviation-preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks. The Department of Transportation (DOT) and CDC officials contend that some elements of such a plan already exist, including plans at individual airports. However, FAA has reported that individual airport plans are often intended to handle one or two flights with arriving passengers, rather than an epidemic, which may require involvement from multiple airports on a national level. Most importantly, a national aviation-preparedness plan would provide airports and airlines with an adaptable and scalable framework with which to align their individual plans—to help ensure that individual airport and airline plans work in accordance with one another. DOT and CDC officials agree that a national plan could add value. Such a plan would provide a mechanism for the public-health and aviation sectors to coordinate to more effectively prevent and control a communicable disease threat while minimizing unnecessary disruptions to the national aviation system.
Aviation stakeholders GAO spoke with identified multiple challenges in responding to communicable disease threats and actions they took or would take in response. For example, airline and airport representatives told GAO they sometimes experienced difficulties sharing timely and accurate information about threats, and some reported that they improved communication by developing tools, such as standardized forms, to collect and share relevant information. Employees at aviation services firms that GAO spoke with—including contract workers who clean aircraft—raised concerns about the availability of training and access to equipment to control exposure to communicable diseases. Some airports GAO reviewed developed additional mechanisms to ensure adequate training and preparation during the Ebola threat. A national aviation-preparedness plan could serve as the basis for testing communication mechanisms among responders to ensure those mechanisms are effective prior to a communicable disease outbreak as well as to provide the basis for ensuring that airport and airline staff receive appropriate training and equipment to reduce their risk of exposure to communicable diseases during an outbreak.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOT work with relevant stakeholders, such as the Department of Health and Human Services, to develop a national aviation-preparedness plan for communicable diseases. DOT agrees a plan is needed, but suggests public health agencies lead the effort. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is correctly directed to DOT, as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-09-627T | gao_GAO-09-627T_0 | 1.) The hospital pays the operator for services supplied. 2.) Industry Has Expanded and Safety Concerns Have Grown in Recent Years
Available Data Suggest Industry Growth and Increased Competition
According to industry experts and observers, the air ambulance industry has grown, but data limitations make it difficult to determine by how much. 3). According to the officials we interviewed and others who have studied the industry, the increase in the stand-alone provider business model is linked to the development, mandated in 1997, of a Medicare fee schedule for ambulance transports, which has increased the potential for profit making. Industry Experienced Highest Number of Fatal Accidents in 2008, but Data Limitations Preclude Complete Understanding of Safety Record
From 1998 through 2008, the air ambulance industry averaged 13 accidents per year, according to NTSB data. Since 2003, the number of accidents has slightly declined, fluctuating between 11 and 15 accidents per year. 4). Industry and FAA Have Acted to Address Air Ambulance Accident Trends and Causes
Increase in Number of Accidents Has Led to Greater Industry Focus on Safety
In 2007, we reported that the air ambulance industry’s response to the higher number of accidents has taken a variety of forms, including research into accident causes and training. FAA has changed its oversight to reflect the varying sizes of operators. Provided technical resources. Launched accident mitigation program. Revised minimum standards for weather and safe cruise altitudes: To enhance safety, FAA revised its minimal requirements for weather and safe cruise altitudes for helicopter air ambulances in November 2008. Potential Strategies for Improving Air Ambulance Safety
Despite the actions taken by the industry and the federal government, 2008 was the deadliest year on record for the air ambulance industry. As a board member noted at the recent NTSB hearing on air ambulance safety, the recent accident record of the industry is unacceptable. Based on our body of work on aviation safety, including air ambulance safety; a review of the published literature; and interviews with government and industry officials, we have identified several potential strategies for improving air ambulance safety. Obtain complete and accurate data on air ambulance operations: As we reported in 2007, FAA lacks basic industry information, such as the number of flights and flight hours. Increase use of safety technologies: We have previously reported that using appropriate technology and infrastructure can help improve aviation safety. Sustain recent efforts to improve air ambulance safety: Our past aviation safety work and anecdotal information on air ambulance accident trends suggest that the industry and federal government must sustain recent efforts to improve air ambulance safety. The study contained 19 safety recommendations to FAA and others. Fully Address NTSB recommendations: In 2006, NTSB published a special report focusing on the air ambulance industry, which included four recommendations to FAA to improve air ambulance safety. Clarify the role of states in overseeing air ambulance services: Air ambulance industry stakeholders disagree on the role that states should play in overseeing broader aspects of air medical operations. Agency Comments
We provided a draft copy of this testimony to FAA for review and comment. FAA provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Air ambulance transport is widely regarded as improving the chances of survival for trauma victims and other critical patients. However, recent increases in the number of air ambulance accidents have led to greater industry scrutiny by government agencies, the public, the media, and the industry itself. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and others have called on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which provides safety oversight, to issue more stringent safety requirements for the industry. This testimony discusses (1) recent trends in the air ambulance industry with regard to its size, composition, and safety record; (2) recent industry and government efforts to improve air ambulance safety; and (3) potential strategies for improving air ambulance safety. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's February 2007 study on air ambulance safety (GAO-07-353). To update and supplement this 2007 report, GAO analyzed the latest safety information from NTSB and FAA, reviewed published literature on the state of the air ambulance industry, and interviewed FAA officials and industry representatives. GAO provided a copy of the draft testimony statement to FAA. FAA provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The air ambulance industry has increased in size, and concerns about its safety have grown in recent years. Available data suggest that the industry grew, most notably in the number of stand alone (independent or community-based) as opposed to hospital-based operators, and competition increased among operators, from 2003 through 2008. During this period, the number of air ambulance accidents remained at historical levels, fluctuating between 11 and 15 accidents per year, and in 2008, the number of fatal accidents peaked at 9. This accident record is cause for concern. However, a lack of reliable data on flight hours precludes calculation of the industry accident rate--a critical piece of information in determining whether the increased number of accidents reflects industry growth or a declining safety record. The air ambulance industry and FAA have acted to address accident trends and causes. For example, FAA enhanced its oversight to reflect the varying sizes of operators, provided technical resources to the industry, launched an accident mitigation program, and revised the minimum standards for weather and safe cruising altitudes that apply to air ambulance operations. Despite the actions to improve air ambulance safety, 2008 was the deadliest year on record for the industry. Through its work on aviation safety, including air ambulance safety; review of the published literature; and interviews with government and industry officials, GAO has identified several potential strategies for improving air ambulance safety, including the following: (1) Obtain complete and accurate data on air ambulance operations. (2) Increase the use of safety technologies. (3) Sustain recent efforts to improve air ambulance safety. (4) Fully address NTSB's recommendations. (5) Adopt safety management systems within the air ambulance industry. (6) Clarify the role of states in overseeing air medical services. (7) Determine the appropriate use of air ambulance services. |
gao_GAO-02-328 | gao_GAO-02-328_0 | At the Okinawa Summit on July 23, 2000, the president announced the Global Food for Education Initiative and the pilot program. According to the White House press release, which was issued the day the program was announced, the purpose of the pilot program is to improve student enrollment, attendance, and performance in poor countries. Lessons Learned from School Feeding Programs Define Conditions for Likely Success
Research and expert views on school feeding programs indicate that these programs are more likely to have positive results when they are carefully targeted and integrated with other educational, health, and nutritional interventions. According to a USDA official, the funds are being used to facilitate monitoring and evaluation of the pilot program’s impact. While WFP officials are confident of eventual support, most donor countries seem unlikely to provide substantial support unless the United States adopts a permanent program that is not dependent on surplus commodities and/or unless the pilot program demonstrates strong, positive results. Long-Term Program Will Need Substantial Support from Other Donors
The U.S.-proposed GFEI challenged other donor countries and organizations to join the United States in helping achieve the goal of education for all children in developing countries by 2015. Since the initiative was first proposed, U.S. officials have indicated they would like to see other donors contribute, in aggregate, anywhere from two-thirds to three-quarters of the total cost of a global food for education program. The Clinton administration estimated that at least 300 million children in developing countries need school meals. USDA did not require WFP to provide either the initial or supplemental submission. Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
GAO Comments
1. | What GAO Found
At the Group of Eight industrialized countries' summit in July 2000, President Clinton proposed a Global Food for Education Initiative (GFEI) whereby developed countries would provide school breakfasts or lunches to needy children in poor countries. The aim of the initiative is to use school meals to attract children to school, keep them attending once they enroll, and improve learning. The president also announced a one-year, $300 million pilot program to be run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to jump-start the proposed global effort. Research and expert views on the effectiveness of school feeding programs indicate that the programs are more likely to be successful when they are carefully targeted and integrated with other educational, health, and nutritional interventions. In establishing the pilot program, USDA did not build on some important lessons from previous school feeding programs. Although USDA expects more than eight million children to benefit from the pilot program, the structure, planning, and management fall short in ensuing that the program's objectives will be attained. Representatives of most other donor countries GAO interviewed said their governments were either noncommittal about, or unwilling to provide, substantial support for a comprehensive, long-term food for education program. This lack of support is a problem because the United States envisioned a multilateral program with other donors funding about three-quarters of the program's total cost. GFEI seems unlikely to attract much support from other donors unless the United States adopts a permanent program that does not depend on surplus agricultural commodities or the pilot program produces strong, positive results. |
gao_AIMD-98-134 | gao_AIMD-98-134_0 | In 1993, OCSE published a certification guide, which addresses the functional requirements for child support enforcement systems. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) whether HHS’ certification guidance addresses the system provisions in the Family Support Act of 1988 and implementing regulations, (2) whether HHS has consistently administered the certification process, and (3) the certification status of the state systems. To document the certification process, we obtained and analyzed OCSE’s guidance for certifying child support enforcement systems. Specifically, it used the same types of teams, the same guidance that was discussed earlier, and the same method for certification reviews. While OCSE published many standardized certification reports on the results of its certification reviews, we noted three types of exceptions with the reporting process. Current Status: Many Systems Not Certified, More Reviews Scheduled
As of March 31, 1998, OCSE had either certified or conditionally certified 25 of 54 child support enforcement systems, representing approximately 38 percent of the reported average national caseload for fiscal year 1995. Some states have had several levels of review. Conclusions
OCSE’s certification guidance addresses the system requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988 and HHS’ implementing regulations, and OCSE has administered the certification process consistently across states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) certification process for state child support enforcement systems, its administration of the process and the certification status of the state systems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) certification guidance issued by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) addresses the system requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988 and HHS' implementing regulations; (2) analysis of the certification process shows that OCSE has administered this process consistently across states since it began certifying child support enforcement systems in 1993; (3) it has used the same guidance for certification reviews and conducted reviews that were similar in scope and length for each level of certification; (4) while OCSE published many certification reports on the results of its certification reviews, its reporting was not always consistent; (5) as of March 31, 1998, OCSE had either certified or conditionally certified 25 of the 54 child support enforcement systems; and (6) OCSE had also conducted 13 additional reviews and was preparing certification reports for those systems. |
gao_GAO-08-142T | gao_GAO-08-142T_0 | DHS Contracting Decisions For A Broad Range Of Activities Were Largely Driven By A Lack Of Staff And Expertise And Immediacy Of Need
A broad range of program-related and administrative activities was performed under the professional and management support services contracts we reviewed. DHS decisions to contract for these services were largely driven by the need for staff and expertise to get programs and operations up and running. While DHS has identified core mission-critical occupations and plans to reduce skill gaps in core and key competencies, it has not directly addressed the department’s use of contractors for services that closely support the performance of inherently governmental functions. Figure 1 shows the type and range of services provided in the nine cases and the location of contractor performance. DHS’s human capital plan is unclear as to how this could be achieved and whether it will inform the Department’s use of contractors for services that closely support the performance of inherently governmental functions. DHS Did Not Consider Risk Or Provide Enhanced Oversight When Contracting For Selected Services
While program officials generally acknowledged that their professional and management support services contracts closely supported the performance of inherently governmental functions, they did not assess the risk that government decisions may be influenced by, rather than independent from, contractor judgments—as required by federal procurement policy. In addition, none of the program officials and contracting officers we spoke with was aware of these requirements, and few believed that their professional and management support service contracts required enhanced oversight. Federal guidance also states that agency officials must retain control over and remain accountable for policy and program decisions. For the nine cases we reviewed, the level of oversight DHS provided did not always help ensure accountability for decisions or the ability to judge whether contractors were performing as required; however, DHS’s Chief Procurement Officer is implementing an acquisition oversight program with potential to address this issue. This program was designed to allow flexibility to address specific procurement issues and is based on a series of reviews at the component level that could address selected services. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) obligated $1.2 billion to procure four types of professional and management support services. While contracting for such services can help DHS meet its needs, using contractors to provide services that closely support inherently governmental functions increases the risk of government decisions being influenced by, rather than independent from, contractor judgments. This testimony summarizes our September 2007 report to this Committee and others and focuses on (1) the types of professional and management support services DHS has contracted for and the circumstances that drove its contracting decisions, and (2) DHS's consideration and management of risk when contracting for such services. GAO analyzed 117 statements of work and 9 case studies in detail for selected contracts awarded in fiscal year 2005 by the Coast Guard, the Office of Procurement Operations, and the Transportation Security Administration.
What GAO Found
A broad range of program-related and administrative activities was performed under the four types of professional and management support services contracts we reviewed--program management and support, engineering and technical, other professional, and other management support. DHS decisions to contract for these types of services were largely driven by the need for staff and expertise to get programs and operations up and running. While DHS has identified core mission critical occupations and plans to reduce skill gaps in core and key competencies, it is unclear whether this will inform the department's use of contractors for services that closely support the performance of inherently governmental functions. Program officials generally acknowledged that their professional and management support services contracts closely supported the performance of inherently governmental functions, but they did not assess the risk that government decisions may be influenced by, rather than independent from, contractor judgments--as required by federal procurement guidance. In addition, none of the program officials and contracting officers we spoke with was aware of these requirements, and few believed that their professional and management support service contracts required enhanced oversight. Federal guidance also states that agency officials must retain control over and remain accountable for policy and program decisions. For the nine cases we reviewed, the level of oversight DHS provided did not always help ensure accountability for decisions or the ability to judge whether contractors were performing as required. DHS's Chief Procurement Officer is implementing an acquisition oversight program--designed to allow flexibility to address specific procurement issues--with potential to address this issue. |
gao_GAO-08-1121 | gao_GAO-08-1121_0 | Medicaid, a joint federal and state program which provides health care coverage for low-income individuals and families; pregnant women; and aged, blind, and disabled people, provided health coverage for an estimated 20.1 million children aged 2 through 18 in federal fiscal year 2005. Dental Disease and Inadequate Receipt of Dental Care Remain Significant Problems for Children in Medicaid
Children in Medicaid aged 2 through 18 often experience dental disease and often do not receive needed dental care, and although receipt of dental care has improved somewhat in recent years, the extent of dental disease for most age groups has not. Information from NHANES surveys from 1999 through 2004 showed that about one in three children ages 2 through 18 in Medicaid had untreated tooth decay, and one in nine had untreated decay in three or more teeth. Compared to children with private health insurance, children in Medicaid were substantially more likely to have untreated tooth decay and to be in urgent need of dental care. MEPS surveys conducted in 2004 and 2005 found that almost two in three children in Medicaid aged 2 through 18 had not received dental care in the previous year and that one in eight never sees a dentist. Children in Medicaid also fared poorly when compared to national benchmarks, as the percentage of children in Medicaid ages 2 through 18 who received any dental care— 37 percent—was far below the Healthy People 2010 target of having 66 percent of low-income children under age 19 receive a preventive dental service. MEPS data on Medicaid children who had received dental care—from 1996 through 1997 compared to 2004 through 2005—showed some improvement for children ages 2 through 18 in Medicaid. Projecting these proportions to 2005 enrollment levels, we estimate that 6.5 million children in Medicaid had untreated tooth decay, with 2.2 million children having untreated tooth decay involving three or more teeth. Survey data also showed that about one in eight children (13 percent) in Medicaid reportedly never see a dentist. In contrast, about 40 percent of children with private insurance had a sealant. Comparison of Past and Recent Survey Data Suggests That the Rate of Dental Disease in Children in Medicaid Is Not Decreasing, although the Receipt of Dental Care Has Improved Somewhat in More Recent Years
While comparisons of past and more recent survey data suggest that a larger proportion of children in Medicaid had received dental care in recent surveys, the extent that children in Medicaid experience dental disease has not decreased. This increase appears to be driven by younger children, as the 2 through 5 age group had substantially higher rates of dental disease in the more recent time period, 1999 through 2004. Data for adolescents, by contrast, suggest declining rates of tooth decay. This change was statistically significant. Concluding Observations
The information provided by nationally representative surveys regarding the oral health of our nation’s low-income children in Medicaid raises serious concerns. In commenting on the draft, CMS acknowledged the challenge of providing dental services to children in Medicaid, as well as all children nationwide, and cited a number of activities undertaken by CMS in coordination with states, such as completing 17 focused dental reviews and forming an Oral Health Technical Advisory Group. Appendix I: NHANES Analysis
The National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), conducted multiple times since the early 1960s by the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) National Center for Health Statistics of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), is designed to provide nationally representative estimates of the health and nutrition status of the noninstitutionalized civilian population of the United States. We also used standard errors to calculate if changes from the 1988 through 1994 time period to the 1999 through 2004 time period were statistically significant at the 95 percent level. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, concerns have been raised about the adequacy of dental care for low-income children. Attention to this subject became more acute due to the widely publicized case of Deamonte Driver, a 12-year-old boy who died as a result of an untreated infected tooth that led to a fatal brain infection. Deamonte had health coverage through Medicaid, a joint federal and state program that provides health care coverage, including dental care, for millions of low-income children. Deamonte had extensive dental disease and his family was unable to find a dentist to treat him. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which children in Medicaid experience dental disease, the extent to which they receive dental care, and how these conditions have changed over time. To examine these indicators of oral health, GAO analyzed data for children ages 2 through 18, by insurance status, from two nationally representative surveys conducted by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). GAO also interviewed officials from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and dental associations and researchers. In commenting on a draft of the report, HHS acknowledged the challenge of providing dental services to children in Medicaid, and cited a number of studies and actions taken to address the issue.
What GAO Found
Dental disease remains a significant problem for children aged 2 through 18 in Medicaid. Nationally representative data from the 1999 through 2004 NHANES surveys--which collected information about oral health through direct examinations--indicate that about one in three children in Medicaid had untreated tooth decay, and one in nine had untreated decay in three or more teeth. Projected to 2005 enrollment levels, GAO estimates that 6.5 million children aged 2 through 18 in Medicaid had untreated tooth decay. Children in Medicaid remain at higher risk of dental disease compared to children with private health insurance; children in Medicaid were almost twice as likely to have untreated tooth decay. Receipt of dental care also remains a concern for children aged 2 through 18 in Medicaid. Nationally representative data from the 2004 through 2005 MEPS survey--which asks participants about the receipt of dental care for household members--indicate that only one in three children in Medicaid ages 2 through 18 had received dental care in the year prior to the survey. Similarly, about one in eight children reportedly never sees a dentist. More than half of children with private health insurance, by contrast, had received dental care in the prior year. Children in Medicaid also fared poorly when compared to national benchmarks, as the percentage of children in Medicaid who received any dental care--37 percent--was far below the Healthy People 2010 target of having 66 percent of low-income children under age 19 receive a preventive dental service. Survey data on Medicaid children's receipt of dental care showed some improvement; for example, use of sealants went up significantly between the 1988 through 1994 and 1999 through 2004 time periods. Rates of dental disease, however, did not decrease, although the data suggest the trends vary somewhat among different age groups. Younger children in Medicaid--those aged 2 through 5--had statistically significant higher rates of dental disease in the more recent time period as compared to earlier surveys. By contrast, data for Medicaid adolescents aged 16 through 18 show declining rates of tooth decay, although the change was not statistically significant. |
gao_GAO-17-564 | gao_GAO-17-564_0 | Expanded Access Program
Through FDA’s expanded access program, licensed physicians, on behalf of their patients with serious or immediately life-threatening ailments, who have no other comparable medical options, and who are unable to participate in a clinical trial, can request and possibly access investigational drugs for treatment of the patients, if the patients meet certain eligibility requirements. For expanded access protocol requests sponsored by manufacturers, the roles and responsibilities of the various entities involved in the process typically are as follows:
The manufacturer: In addition to submitting the request for the expanded access protocol to FDA, the manufacturer, as the sponsor of the request, is responsible for the collection and submission of data to FDA on any adverse events that occurred from administering the drug to patients who received it under the expanded access protocol. Expanded Access IND Requests
An expanded access IND request aims to provide access to an investigational drug outside of a clinical trial and under a new IND. Where the drug is at in the drug development process can affect the type of expanded access request that may be submitted to FDA. Selected Drug Manufacturers Reported Different Experiences with Expanded Access Requests, and FDA Allowed Nearly All Requests to Proceed from Fiscal Year 2012 through 2015
Selected Drug Manufacturers Reported Different Experiences with the Number and Types of Expanded Access Requests They Received
Each of the nine selected manufacturers from whom we obtained information reported having experiences with the expanded access program, but the extent of the experiences, and with what type of request, varied. Nearly all of the expanded access requests FDA received and reviewed (approximately 96 percent) were for single patients (including both emergency and non-emergency requests). If FDA has not otherwise responded to an expanded access treatment protocol request within 30 days, the request is automatically allowed to proceed. 2. 3. FDA and Others Have Taken Steps to Improve the Expanded Access Program and Patient Access to Investigational Drugs, but Stakeholders Continue to Cite Concerns
FDA Continues to Undertake Efforts to Improve the Expanded Access Program
According to FDA officials and stakeholders, FDA has undertaken efforts to improve the expanded access program. Simplified Application Form, Guidance, and Website
In response to concerns raised by patients and physicians that the process for physicians trying to request expanded access to drugs for single patients was complex and cumbersome, FDA issued a new simplified, alternative application form for these requests (Form FDA 3926) in June 2016, finalized its related guidance, and made changes to its website. The stakeholders we spoke with, including representatives of drug manufacturers and patient and physician advocacy groups, reported concerns about these legislative changes:
Some contended that the laws would not help patients gain access to investigational drugs because they do not compel manufacturers to give access. FDA Reported Limited Use of Expanded Access Safety Data in its Drug Approval Process, and Some Manufacturers Have Asked for More Clarity on This Use by FDA
FDA reported using expanded access safety data, specifically adverse events data, in a few cases in approving new drugs for marketing in the United States and not more widely because expanded use situations generally lack controls used in most clinical trials. Some of the manufacturers reported that they have concerns about the possibility that FDA’s use of adverse events data from expanded access requests would result in a clinical hold on their drug, which would halt all testing on human subjects and, as a result, delay the drug’s development process. Specifically, our review of FDA’s regulations and nine related documents FDA uses to communicate with manufacturers regarding expanded access use found little information communicating how FDA uses adverse events data from expanded access in new drug application reviews. Only one of the documents—its expanded access treatment use guidance that was issued in June of 2016—refers to how expanded access data might be used by FDA in the drug approval process. Some manufacturers also noted that the lack of clear information about how FDA uses these data can influence their decision not to give patients access to their drugs. This could impact FDA’s goal of facilitating expanded access to drugs for treatment use by patients with serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions, when appropriate. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help FDA meet its goal of facilitating expanded access to investigational drugs by patients with serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions, when appropriate, the Commissioner of FDA should clearly communicate how the agency will use adverse event data from expanded access use when reviewing drugs and biologics for approval for marketing and sale in the United States. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Individual Patient Expanded Access Application, Form FDA 3926, is to be completed and submitted to FDA by a patient’s physician requesting single-patient expanded access of an investigational drug. | Why GAO Did This Study
FDA's goal for the expanded access program is to allow patients with immediately life-threatening and serious ailments access to investigational drugs when appropriate. Stakeholders have raised concerns that FDA's process is confusing or burdensome, particularly for the entities that have roles in the process—such as physicians, manufacturers, and institutional review boards.
GAO was asked to examine the expanded access program. Among other objectives, GAO examined 1) what is known about the number, type, and time frames of expanded access requests received by FDA; 2) what actions FDA and other stakeholders have taken to improve expanded access; and 3) how FDA uses data from expanded access in the drug approval process.
GAO reviewed regulations and FDA documents and analyzed FDA data on the numbers and types of expanded access requests it received from FY2012 through 2015, the most recent at the time of the review. GAO also interviewed FDA officials and other stakeholders including nine manufacturers—selected to represent large and small companies—and patient and physician representatives.
What GAO Found
Under the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) expanded access program, patients with serious or life threatening ailments and no other comparable medical options can obtain access to investigational drugs outside of a clinical trial. Expanded access requests must be submitted to FDA but manufacturers must also grant permission for patients to access their investigational drugs. Of the nearly 5,800 expanded access requests that were submitted to FDA from fiscal year 2012 through 2015, FDA allowed 99 percent to proceed. Almost 96 percent of these requests were for single patients (either emergency or non-emergency). FDA's review process for expanded access requests is designed such that all requests are either allowed or not allowed to proceed within 30 days of receiving each request. FDA typically responded to emergency single-patient requests within hours and other types of requests within the allotted 30 days.
FDA and other stakeholders, including a non-profit organization and a drug manufacturer, have taken steps to improve the expanded access process and patient access to drugs. For example, in response to concerns that the process to request expanded access to drugs was complex and cumbersome, FDA simplified its website, guidance, and the forms required for the most common types of requests. Efforts by other stakeholders include a project to educate and streamline the process by which institutional review boards approve treatment plans for expanded access drug use and a pilot advisory group to help a drug manufacturer manage expanded access requests. Some states have also enacted “Right-to-Try” laws to facilitate patient access to investigational drugs. These laws provide liability and licensing protections for manufacturers and providers under state law if an adverse event—such as an adverse reaction to the drug—occurs with patients who were allowed access to investigational drugs. However, some stakeholders GAO interviewed cited concerns that these laws may not help patients access drugs, in part because they do not compel a manufacturer to provide access.
Manufacturers sponsoring clinical trials must submit safety reports to FDA that include adverse events data resulting from clinical trials and any expanded access use, to be used in assessing the safety of a drug within the drug approval process. FDA reported using these data from expanded access use in a few cases during the drug approval process but not more widely, because its use does not have the same controls as clinical trials. FDA officials reported that they communicate with manufacturers on how they will use expanded access adverse events data. However, GAO's review of documents FDA uses to communicate with drug manufacturers about the expanded access program found that only one included a reference to its use of these data, and it did not include specific examples of how the data might be used. Further, some of the manufacturers told GAO the guidance was unclear. These manufacturers noted that the lack of clear information can influence their decision whether to give patients access to their drugs because of their concerns that an adverse event will result in FDA placing a clinical hold on their drug, which could delay its development. This could impact FDA's goal of facilitating expanded access to drugs for treatment use by patients with serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions, when appropriate.
What GAO Recommends
FDA should clearly communicate how it uses adverse events data from expanded access use in the drug approval process. FDA agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-49 | gao_GAO-12-49_0 | Ginnie Mae guarantees the timely payment of principal and interest on MBS. Ginnie Mae’s Market Share and MBS Volume Increased Substantially from 2007 to 2010
In 2010, Ginnie Mae- Guaranteed MBS Represented 25 Percent of the Market
According to Inside Mortgage Finance data, from calendar year 2007 to 2010 Ginnie Mae’s share of the MBS market increased from nearly 5 percent to 25 percent as the total size of the secondary mortgage market declined and the role of private-label MBS issuers declined substantially. 2). As the demand for FHA and other federally insured or guaranteed mortgages grew during this time, financial institutions increased their issuance of Ginnie Mae-guaranteed MBS to finance these federally insured or guaranteed loans. 3). According to Ginnie Mae data, as Ginnie Mae’s share of the secondary mortgage market increased, the volume of Ginnie Mae-guaranteed MBS outstanding increased from $412 billion in 2005 to more than $1 trillion in 2010 (see fig. Ginnie Mae Has Been Taking Steps to Better Manage Risks
Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems or from external events. We and others, including HUD’s OIG, have identified limited staff, substantial reliance on contractors, and the need for modernized information systems as operational risks that Ginnie Mae may face. Ginnie Mae also faces counterparty risk when an issuer fails or defaults, which would require the agency to service the underlying loans and ensure that investors receive monthly principal and interest payments. Moreover, its actual staff levels trailed its authorized staff levels. Between 2005 and 2010, as Ginnie Mae’s volume and issuer activity increased and staff levels remained largely the same, the agency increasingly relied on contractors. Although Ginnie Mae has conducted risk assessments on its contracts, it has not yet implemented the recommendations from these assessments. Ginnie Mae Has Taken Steps to Revise Some of its Counterparty Risk Management Processes
To manage its counterparty risk, Ginnie Mae has processes in place to oversee issuers that include approval, monitoring, and enforcement. In response to changing market conditions and increased market share, Ginnie Mae revised its approval and monitoring procedures. In addition, Ginnie Mae has several planned initiatives to enhance its management of counterparty risk; however, many have not yet been fully implemented. Although Ginnie Mae Continues to Fulfill Its Mission, Its Model for Estimating Costs and Revenues Could Be Improved
Ginnie Mae defines its mission as expanding affordable housing by linking capital markets to the nation’s housing markets. As of September 30, 2010, excess revenues allowed Ginnie Mae to accumulate a capital reserve of about $14.6 billion. Ginnie Mae’s Model Does Not Implement Certain Practices Identified in Federal Guidance for Cost Estimation of Credit Programs
Although Ginnie Mae has made some changes to the model it uses to forecast cash flows for the program, it has not implemented certain practices identified in Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) guidance. Because Ginnie Mae’s revised model does not fully implement certain practices identified in FASAB guidance, the model may lack critical data needed to produce a reliable credit subsidy rate and reserve for loss amount, which could affect Ginnie Mae’s ability to provide more informed budgetary cost estimates and financial statements. Ultimately, because of these limitations on its model, Ginnie Mae could be limited in its ability to accurately portray the extent to which Ginnie Mae’s programs represent a financial exposure to the government. We identified several areas in which the agency could better implement certain practices identified in federal guidance for estimating program costs, including using the best available data, conducting sensitivity analyses, and assessing and documenting reasons for using management assumptions (judgment) rather than data. 2. Conduct and document sensitivity analyses to determine which cash flow assumptions have the greatest impact on the model. 3. USDA did not have any comments. In addition, Ginnie Mae agreed with our observation about the importance of completing ongoing and planned initiatives for enhancing its risk-management processes, as soon as practicable, to improve operations. To describe the reasons for changes in Ginnie Mae’s market share and volume, we interviewed officials from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—more specifically, from Ginnie Mae, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Office of the Inspector General, Public and Indian Housing; the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Housing Service; the Department of Veterans Affairs; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (government-sponsored enterprises); the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Mortgage Bankers Association. To assess the types of risks Ginnie Mae faces and how it manages these risks, we conducted a literature review of risks that may be prevalent in the MBS market for Ginnie Mae and government-sponsored enterprises. To determine how recent changes in Ginnie Mae’s market share and volume might affect financial exposure to the federal government and the agency’s ability to meet its mission, we interviewed officials from Ginnie Mae and its contractor that conducts modeling, the Office of Management and Budget, and FHA. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) has increased its role in the secondary mortgage market significantly. Ginnie Mae is a wholly owned government corporation in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). It guarantees the timely payment of principal and interest of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by pools of federally insured or guaranteed mortgage loans, such as Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans. GAO was asked to (1) describe how Ginnie Mae's volume of MBS and market share have changed, (2) assess the risks Ginnie Mae faces and how it manages these risks, and (3) determine what effect recent changes in Ginnie Mae's market share and volume may have on financial exposure to the federal government, including mission. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed data on volume and market share and assessed their reliability. GAO also reviewed guidance and Ginnie Mae's credit subsidy calculations and estimation model, and interviewed agency officials and others.
What GAO Found
From 2007 to 2010, the volume of Ginnie Mae-guaranteed MBS and its share of the secondary mortgage market increased substantially. Ginnie Mae-guaranteed MBS outstanding grew from $412 billion to more than $1 trillion, and market share grew from 5 percent to more than 25 percent. As the demand for FHA and other federally insured or guaranteed mortgages grew during this time, financial institutions increased their issuance of Ginnie Mae-guaranteed MBS to finance these federally insured or guaranteed loans. Ginnie Mae has taken steps to better manage operational and counterparty risks, and has several initiatives planned or underway. The agency may face operational risk--the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, or from external events--and counterparty risk--the risk that issuers fail to provide investors with monthly principal and interest payments. GAO and others, including HUD's Inspector General, have identified limited staff, substantial reliance on contractors, and the need for modernized information systems as operational risks that Ginnie Mae may face. For example, although Ginnie Mae's market share and volume of MBS have increased in recent years, its staffing levels were relatively constant and actual staff levels trailed authorized levels. In addition, between 2005 and 2010, the agency increasingly relied on contractors. Ginnie Mae has identified gaps in resources and conducted risk assessments on its contracts but has not yet fully implemented changes based on these analyses. To manage its counterparty risk, Ginnie Mae has processes in place to oversee MBS issuers that include approval, monitoring, and enforcement. In response to changing market conditions and increased market share, Ginnie Mae revised its approval and monitoring procedures. Ginnie Mae also has several planned initiatives to enhance its risk-management processes for issuers, including its tracking and reporting systems, but these plans have not been fully implemented. It will be important for Ginnie Mae to complete these initiatives as soon as practicable to enhance its operations. The growth in outstanding Ginnie Mae-guaranteed MBS resulted in an increased financial exposure for the federal government as Ginnie Mae fulfills its mission of expanding affordable housing by linking capital markets to the nation's housing markets. Nonetheless, Ginnie Mae's revenues have exceeded its costs and it has accumulated a capital reserve of about $14.6 billion. However, GAO found that in developing inputs and procedures for the model used to forecast costs and revenues, the agency did not consider certain practices identified in Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) guidance for preparing cost estimates of federal credit programs. Ginnie Mae has not developed estimates based on the best available data, performed sensitivity analyses to determine which assumptions have the greatest impact on the model, or documented why it used management assumptions rather than available data. By not fully implementing certain practices identified in FASAB guidance that GAO believes represent sound internal controls for models, Ginnie Mae's model may not use critical data which could affect the agency's ability to provide well-informed budgetary cost estimates and financial statements. This may limit Ginnie Mae's ability to accurately report to the Congress the extent to which its programs represent a financial exposure to the government. Ginnie Mae should enhance the model it uses to forecast cash flows for the program by (1) assessing potential data sources, (2) conducting sensitivity analyses, and (3) assessing and documenting its modeling approaches and reasons for using management assumptions, among others. In written comments, Ginnie Mae agreed with GAO's recommendation to conduct sensitivity analyses, but neither agreed nor disagreed with the other recommendations. |
gao_GGD-99-62 | gao_GGD-99-62_0 | To gather information on how U.S. regulators were addressing international Year 2000 risks, we reviewed guidance and other issuances and discussed international Year 2000 risks with representatives of the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We also interviewed officials from and reviewed documents of key international organizations that were established to address Year 2000 problems in global financial markets, including the Global 2000 Coordinating Group and the Joint Year 2000 Council. Large, Internationally Active U.S. Financial Institutions Were Assessing International Risks
Large, internationally active U.S. financial institutions, which account for most of the financial exposures and relationships with foreign financial institutions and markets, may be at risk if the foreign organizations are not ready for the Year 2000 date change. Further, they said that they are preparing plans to mitigate the risks their international activities pose to their operations, but that they generally did not anticipate Year 2000 problems in other countries to have a significant long-term impact on their business operations. The Year 2000 readiness of foreign organizations’ computer systems is important to these large U.S. financial institutions because they have substantial international financial exposures. At the large U.S. banks and securities firms we contacted, representatives of these institutions described (1) the progress they had made in readying their own systems to process Year 2000 dates and (2) the actions they had taken to assess their international exposures. One of the large U.S. securities firms we contacted issued a research report on Year 2000 readiness in January 1999. U.S. Banking and Securities Regulators Are Assessing International Year 2000 Risks
U.S. bank and securities regulators are assessing the international risks faced by the entities they oversee. Although these reports were technically just required to be filed by the securities firms’ broker-dealer affiliates subject to SEC regulation, SEC officials told us that the firms submitting these reports have generally provided information that addresses the global operations of their firms outside of the regulated U.S. entity, when relevant. Foreign Financial Institutions and Regulators We Visited Were Also Addressing the Year 2000 Problem
Like their counterparts in the United States, officials of the foreign financial institutions we visited said they were also working to ready their systems for the date change in 2000, although their progress generally lagged those of U.S. institutions. In the United States, bank regulators issued at least 11 statements to provide guidance for banks on a variety of topics to help them prepare for the Year 2000. The Joint Year 2000 Council is the other organization actively addressing international Year 2000 issues. Other areas that financial regulators and financial institutions said they are addressing that will require continued efforts include (1) developing mechanisms for coordinating between regulators and other organizations during the date change period, (2) promoting additional Year 2000 readiness disclosure by foreign organizations, and (3) developing strategies for communicating the readiness status of the financial sector to public. This lack of information contributed to uncertainty about the readiness status of these providers. Internationally, individual infrastructure sectors also have taken steps to address Year 2000 issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the international risks that the year 2000 computer problem poses to U.S. financial institutions, focusing on the extent to which: (1) large, internationally active U.S. financial institutions were addressing international year 2000 risks; (2) U.S. banking and securities regulators were overseeing these risks for the institutions they regulate; (3) large foreign financial institutions and their regulators are addressing the year 2000 risks; and (4) other issues may require attention before 2000 arrives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) large U.S. financial institutions have financial exposures and relationships with international financial institutions and markets that may be at risk if these international organizations are not ready for the date change occurring on January 1, 2000; (2) however, the 7 large U.S. banks and securities firms GAO visited were taking actions to address these risks; (3) they had identified the organizations with which they had critical foreign business relationships, had assessed the year 2000 readiness status of these organizations, and were developing plans to mitigate the risks that would be posed by the lack of year 2000 readiness of one or more of these organizations; (4) they told GAO that they did not expect potential year 2000 disruptions to have much long-term effect on their global operations; (5) U.S. banking and securities regulators were also addressing the international year 2000 risks of the institutions they oversee; (6) banking regulators had issued guidance for banks on addressing international year 2000 risks and were assessing bank preparations for these risks during bank examinations; (7) securities regulators, although not directly responsible for securities firms' foreign activities, were assessing these firms' efforts to address international and other external year 2000 risks using information obtained through the regulated U.S. broker-dealer affiliate; (8) foreign financial institutions reportedly have lagged behind their U.S. counterparts in preparing for the year 2000 date change; (9) one of the major reasons cited for the lag was that these firms also had to make systems modifications to prepare for the introduction of a new European currency in January 1999; (10) officials from 4 of the 7 large foreign financial institutions GAO visited said they had scheduled completion of their preparations for year 2000 about 3 to 6 months after their U.S. counterparts, but they planned to complete their efforts by mid-1999 at the latest; (11) two international organizations created to assist international year 2000 efforts, the Global 2000 Coordinating Group and the Joint Year 2000 Council, were also playing a major role in assessing readiness and helping global financial market institutions and regulators address year 2000 issues; (12) promoting additional year 2000 readiness disclosure by foreign organizations was an issue for which regulators have taken steps to address; and (13) regulators acknowledged the need to continue developing strategies for communicating the readiness status of the financial sector to alleviate concerns among members of the public. |
gao_RCED-99-10 | gao_RCED-99-10_0 | RBS operates the following loan programs: the business and industry (B&I) program, the intermediary relending program (IRP), and the rural economic development (RED) program. Increasing Total Volume and Value of Loans in Recent Years
RBS approved more than 2,900 rural business loans during fiscal year 1993 through the first half of fiscal 1998. The total amount of these loans was more than $3.2 billion, or approximately $1.1 million, on average, per loan. Specifically, RBS approved the following loans during this 5.5-year period:
2,299 guaranteed B&I loans totaling almost $2.9 billion and averaging $1.2 million, and 58 direct B&I loans totaling about $17 million and averaging about $300,000 and
315 IRP loans totaling about $280 million and averaging about $900,000, and 256 RED loans totaling about $70 million and averaging about $275,000. Subsidies Account for a Large Part of RBS’ Costs of Operating the Loan Programs
RBS’ estimated cost for the business loan programs totaled about $290 million during fiscal year 1993 through fiscal 1997. The cost of operating a federal credit program consists of two components: subsidy costs, which involve the estimates of default costs, interest rate subsidies, fees, and other costs and revenues; and administrative costs, which cover salaries and other expenses. Borrowers that were delinquent (at least 30 days past due on loan repayment) held about $116 million, or 5.4 percent, of the total outstanding principal. Specifically, the agency lost $263.8 million on guaranteed B&I loans during fiscal year 1993 through March 31, 1998. Over $100 Million of Guaranteed B&I Loans Are at Risk
According to RBS’ automated files, over $112 million, or 6.1 percent of the more than $1.8 billion in outstanding principal on guaranteed B&I loans as of March 31, 1998, was held by 76 borrowers that were delinquent. There were no delinquencies on these loans. This appendix provides information on RBS’ three loan programs: the business and industry (B&I) program, the intermediary relending program (IRP), and the rural economic development (RED) program. 2. 3. 4. 6. 7. Concerned about the financial status of RBS’ business loan programs, the former Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture asked that we report on (1) the number and dollar value of loans approved by the agency, (2) the federal government’s costs associated with the agency’s loans, and (3) the financial condition of the agency’s loan portfolio, including the losses incurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the: (1) number and dollar value of business assistance loans approved by the Department of Agriculture's Rural Business-Cooperative Service (RBS); (2) federal government's costs associated with the agency's loans; and (3) financial condition of the agency's loan portfolio, including the losses incurred.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) RBS approved more than 2,900 rural business loans during fiscal year (FY) 1993 through the first 6 months of FY 1998; (2) these loans totalled about $3.2 billion; (3) more than three quarters of these loans and almost 90 percent of the total loan amount were guaranteed business and industry loans; (4) only 2 percent of the loans were direct government-funded business and industry loans; (5) the remaining loans were direct loans under the intermediary relending program and the rural economic development program; (6) the estimated total cost of these loan programs was about $290 million during FY 1993 through FY 1997; (7) of this amount, the subsidy costs of the loans, which primarily involve the estimates of default costs and interest rate subsidies, were almost $195 million; (8) administrative costs, which cover estimates of salaries and other expenses associated with operating the programs, totalled about $95 million; (9) as of March 31, 1998, the unpaid principal on the RBS's outstanding guaranteed and direct loans totalled about $2.2 billion; (10) delinquent borrowers held about $116 million--$112 million on guaranteed business and industry loans and about $4 million on direct business and industry loans and intermediary relending loans--or 5.4 percent of the total outstanding principal; (11) furthermore, from the start of FY 1993 through March 31, 1998, the agency incurred loan losses totalling about $266 million: about $264 million on guaranteed business and industry loans and about $2 million on intermediary relending loans; and (12) the agency did not experience any losses on debt associated with direct business and industry loans or with rural economic development loans. |
gao_GAO-06-211 | gao_GAO-06-211_0 | DOD views the GIG as the cornerstone of information superiority, a key enabler of net-centric warfare, and a pillar of defense transformation. DOD’s Management Approach for the GIG Is Not Optimized to Make Departmentwide Investment Decisions
The effort to make the GIG a reality represents a different, inherently joint type of development challenge that requires a high degree of coordination and cooperation, but DOD is using a management approach that is not optimized for this type of challenge. Responsibility for developing and implementing the GIG resides with numerous entities, with no one entity clearly in charge or accountable for investment decisions. Without a management approach optimized to enforce investment decisions across the department, DOD is at risk of continuing to develop and acquire systems in a stovepiped and uncoordinated manner and of not knowing whether the GIG is being developed within cost and schedule, whether risks are being adequately mitigated, and whether the GIG will provide a worthwhile return on DOD’s investment. However, the Office of the Chief Information Officer generally has less influence on investment and program decisions than the services and defense agencies, which determine investment priorities and manage program development efforts. Consequently, the services and defense agencies have relative freedom to invest or not invest in the types of joint, net-centric systems that are consistent with GIG objectives. DOD’s Key Decision- Making Processes Are Not Designed to Support Investments in Crosscutting Efforts Such as the GIG
DOD’s major decision-making processes are not structured to support crosscutting, departmentwide efforts such as the GIG. In some significant respects, the processes remain configured for investing in weapon and information systems on an individual service and defense agency basis. In addition, the department’s new process for determining requirements is still evolving, and it is not yet identifying shortfalls and gaps in joint military capabilities on a departmentwide basis. The resource allocation process remains structured in terms of individual service programs and outdated mission areas instead of crosscutting capabilities such as net- centricity, and it is inflexible in terms of accommodating emerging near- term requirements and rapidly advancing technologies. Finally, the lack of integration among the three processes makes it difficult to ensure that development efforts are affordable and technically feasible. The PPBE process is still not flexible enough to quickly accommodate emerging technologies or requirements resulting from lessons learned. However, in practice the department has long struggled to achieve service buy-in, which is essential to joint acquisition success. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Department of Defense’s (DOD) management approach for the Global Information Grid (GIG) and the extent to which the department’s primary decision-making processes support the GIG, we collected and reviewed (1) related legislation, directives, instructions, and guidance; (2) DOD policies and guidance related to the GIG and network- centric (or “net-centric”) governance; and (3) programmatic and technical documents pertaining to core GIG systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Defense (DOD) officials currently estimate that the department will spend approximately $34 billion through 2011 to develop the core network of the Global Information Grid (GIG), a large and complex undertaking intended to provide on-demand and real-time data and information to the warfighter. DOD views the GIG as the cornerstone of information superiority, a key enabler of network-centric warfare, and a pillar of defense transformation. A high degree of coordination and cooperation is needed to make the GIG a reality. In prior work GAO found that enforcing investment decisions across the military services and assuring management attention and oversight of the GIG effort were key management challenges facing DOD. This report assesses (1) the management approach that DOD is using to develop the GIG and (2) whether DOD's three major decision-making processes support the development of a crosscutting, departmentwide investment, such as the GIG.
What GAO Found
DOD's management approach for the GIG--in which no one entity is clearly in charge or accountable for results--is not optimized to enforce investment decisions across the department. The DOD Chief Information Officer has lead responsibility for the GIG development effort, but this office has less influence on investment and program decisions than the military services and defense agencies, which determine investment priorities and manage program development efforts. Consequently, the services and defense agencies have relative freedom to invest or not invest in the types of joint, net-centric systems that are consistent with GIG objectives. Without a management approach optimized to enforce departmentwide investment decisions, DOD is at risk of not knowing whether the GIG is being developed within cost and schedule, whether risks are being adequately mitigated, or whether the GIG will provide a worthwhile return on DOD's investment. The department's three major decision-making processes are not structured to support crosscutting, departmentwide development efforts such as the GIG. In some significant respects, the department's processes for setting requirements, allocating resources, and managing acquisitions encourage investing in systems on an individual service and defense agency basis. While the department has developed a new process for determining requirements, the framework to assess capability needs is still evolving; the new process is not yet identifying shortfalls and gaps in joint military capabilities on a departmentwide basis; and requirements-setting continues to be driven by service perspectives. In addition, the resource allocation process is structured in terms of individual service programs and outdated mission areas instead of crosscutting capabilities such as net-centricity, and it is not flexible enough to quickly accommodate requirements resulting from lessons learned or from rapidly emerging technologies. Also, the process for managing acquisitions is unsuited to developing a system of interdependent systems such as the GIG, and DOD has struggled to achieve service buy-in on joint-service development programs to address interoperability problems. Finally, the lack of integration among these three processes makes it difficult to ensure that development efforts are affordable and technically feasible. |
gao_GGD-98-104 | gao_GGD-98-104_0 | Differences in Customs Treatment for GPL and Private Express Carrier Parcels Shipped to Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom
Legal differences in foreign customs treatment of postal and private express parcels existed in all three countries. Differences in foreign customs treatment of GPL and private express parcels were greatest in Japan, where private express carriers were subject to requirements regarding the preparation of shipping documentation and payment of duties and taxes for their parcels that did not apply to GPL parcels. In the United Kingdom, USPS was providing certain shipping data to the customs service on GPL parcels that were similar to the information that the carriers were required to provide. In Canada, GPL and private express parcels were subject to the same requirements because GPL parcels were being delivered for USPS by a private express carrier there. Regarding two major areas of concern to the carriers, we found no evidence that GPL parcels received preferential treatment over private express parcels in terms of (1) the speed of customs clearance in all three countries and (2) the assessment and collection of applicable duties and taxes in Canada and the United Kingdom. On behalf of individual importers, USPS was paying duties and taxes on GPL parcels shipped to Canada and the United Kingdom. We were unable to determine whether duties and taxes were assessed on dutiable GPL parcels shipped to Japan because (1) USPS did not have records on payment of duties and taxes on GPL parcels shipped to Japan, because the recipients of postal parcels in Japan are responsible for paying applicable duties and taxes; and (2) Japan Customs did not provide statistics on the amount of duties and taxes that recipients paid on GPL parcels. The delivery and customs clearance processes for GPL and private express parcels in Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom were based primarily on the domestic import requirements applicable to mail and goods imported by private carriers in those countries. We found that the private express carriers followed similar delivery processes for shipments from the United States to the three countries in our review. However, USPS’ delivery and customs clearance processes for GPL parcels differed among the three countries. U.S. law subjected private express parcels to customs inspection prior to export, but outbound postal parcels were not subject to this requirement. Issues Related to Addressing Differences in Requirements for Postal and Private Express Parcels
The private express industry has commented that differences in customs clearance requirements for postal and privately shipped parcels result in more work and higher costs for the carriers, placing them at a disadvantage in competing with USPS to provide international parcel delivery service. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the United States Postal Service's (USPS) Global Package Link (GPL) service, focusing on whether differences existed in customs treatment for GPL and private express carrier parcels by foreign customs services in Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the delivery and customs clearance processes for GPL and private express parcels in Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom were based primarily on the domestic import requirements applicable to mail and parcels imported by private carriers in those countries; (2) all three countries had separate customs clearance processes and requirements for mail and parcels imported by private express carriers; (3) under U.S. law, the private express carriers were required to submit their parcels to U.S. Customs for inspection prior to export, but USPS was not subject to this requirement for its outbound parcels; (4) differences in foreign customs treatment of GPL and private express parcels were greatest in Japan, where private express carriers were subject to requirements regarding the preparation of shipping documentation and payment of duties and taxes on their parcels that did not apply to GPL parcels; (5) in the United Kingdom, USPS was providing certain shipping data to the Customs Service on GPL parcels that was similar to the information that carriers were required to provide; (6) in Canada, GPL and private express parcels were subject to the same requirements because GPL parcels were being delivered for USPS by a private express carrier there; (7) regarding two major areas of concern to the carriers, GAO found no evidence that GPL parcels received preferential treatment over private express parcels in terms of: (a) the speed of customs clearance in any of the three countries; or (b) the assessment of duties and taxes in Canada and the United Kingdom; (8) on behalf of individual importers, USPS was paying duties and taxes on GPL parcels shipped to Canada and the United Kingdom; (9) GAO was unable to determine whether duties and taxes were assessed on dutiable GPL parcels shipped to Japan because: (a) USPS did not have records on payment of duties and taxes on GPL parcels shipped to Japan, because the recipients of postal parcels in Japan are responsible for paying applicable duties and taxes; and (b) Japan Customs did not provide statistics on the amount of duties and taxes that recipients paid on GPL parcels; (10) GAO found that the private express carriers followed similar delivery and customs clearance processes for parcels shipped from the United States to the three countries in its review; and (11) the private express industry has commented that differences in customs clearance requirements for postal and privately shipped parcels result in more work and higher costs for the carriers, placing them at a disadvantage in competing with USPS to provide international parcel delivery service. |
gao_GAO-11-262 | gao_GAO-11-262_0 | According to OMB, these data are intended to provide a near real-time perspective on the performance of these investments, as well as a historical perspective. OMB Has Multiple Efforts Under Way to Further Refine the Dashboard and Uses the Dashboard to Improve IT Management
Since our last report, OMB has initiated multiple efforts to increase the Dashboard’s value as a management and oversight tool, and has used data in the Dashboard to improve the management of federal IT investments. Specifically, OMB is focusing its efforts in four main areas: streamlining key OMB investment reporting tools, eliminating manual monthly submissions, coordinating with agencies to improve data, and improving the user interface. OMB anticipates these efforts will increase the Dashboard’s data reliability by ensuring that the agencies are aware of and are working to address issues. Specifically, OMB analysts are using the Dashboard’s investment trend data to track changes and identify issues with investments’ performance in a timely manner. Additionally, according to OMB officials, the Dashboard is one of the key sources of information that OMB analysts use to identify IT investments that are experiencing performance problems and to select them for a TechStat session—a review of selected IT investments between OMB and agency leadership that is led by the Federal CIO. Furthermore, according to OMB, these sessions and other OMB management reviews have resulted in a $3 billion reduction in life-cycle costs, as of December 2010. Dashboard Ratings Did Not Always Reflect True Investment Cost and Schedule Performance
While the efforts previously described are important steps to improving the quality of the information on the Dashboard, cost and schedule performance data inaccuracies remain. Until the agencies submit complete, reliable, and timely data to the Dashboard and OMB revises its Dashboard calculations, performance ratings will continue to be inaccurate and may not reflect current program performance. For example, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast’s schedule performance was rated “green” on the Dashboard in July 2010, but our analysis showed its current performance was “yellow” that month. In particular, there were four primary weaknesses in agency practices that resulted in inaccurate cost and schedule ratings on the Dashboard: the investment baseline on the Dashboard was not reflective of the investment’s actual baseline, agencies did not report data to the Dashboard, agencies reported erroneous data, and unreliable earned value data were reported to the Dashboard. Table 1 shows the causes of inaccurate ratings for the selected investments. Until agencies provide more reliable data and OMB improves the calculations of the ratings on the Dashboard, the accuracy of the ratings will continue to be in question and the ratings may not reflect current program performance. Specifically, we are recommending that: The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the CIO to ensure that investment data submissions include complete and accurate investment information for all required fields; comply with OMB’s guidance on updating the CIO rating as soon as new information becomes available that affects the assessment of a given investment, including when an investment is in the process of a rebaseline; and work with C4ISR officials to comply with OMB’s guidance on updating investment cost and schedule data on the Dashboard at least monthly. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine what efforts the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has under way to improve the Dashboard and the ways in which it is using data from the Dashboard to improve information technology (IT) management and (2) examine the accuracy of the cost and schedule performance ratings on OMB’s Dashboard. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year the federal government spends billions of dollars on information technology (IT) investments. Given the importance of oversight, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established a public Web site, referred to as the IT Dashboard, that provides detailed information on about 800 federal IT investments, including assessments of actual performance against cost and schedule targets (referred to as ratings). In the second of a series of Dashboard reviews, GAO was asked to (1) determine OMB's efforts to improve the Dashboard and how it is using data from the Dashboard, and (2) examine the accuracy of the Dashboard's cost and schedule performance ratings. To do so, GAO analyzed documentation on OMB oversight efforts and Dashboard improvement plans, compared the performance of 10 major investments from five agencies with large IT budgets against the ratings on the Dashboard, and interviewed OMB and agency officials.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's first review, in July 2010, OMB has initiated several efforts to increase the Dashboard's value as an oversight tool, and has used the Dashboard's data to improve federal IT management. These efforts include streamlining key OMB investment reporting tools, eliminating manual monthly submissions, coordinating with agencies to improve data, and improving the Dashboard's user interface. Recent changes provide new views of historical data and rating changes. OMB anticipates that these efforts will increase the reliability of the data on the Dashboard. To improve IT management, OMB analysts use Dashboard data to track investment changes and identify issues with performance. OMB officials stated that they use these data to identify poorly performing IT investments for review sessions by OMB and agency leadership. OMB reported that these sessions and other management reviews have resulted in a $3 billion reduction in life-cycle costs, as of December 2010. While the efforts above as well as initial actions taken to address issues GAO identified in its prior review--such as OMB's updated ratings calculations to factor in ongoing milestones to better reflect current status--have contributed to data quality improvements, performance data inaccuracies remain. The ratings of selected IT investments on the Dashboard did not always accurately reflect current performance, which is counter to the Web site's purpose of reporting near real-time performance. Specifically, GAO found that cost ratings were inaccurate for six of the investments that GAO reviewed and schedule ratings were inaccurate for nine. For example, the Dashboard rating for a Department of Homeland Security investment reported significant cost variances for 3 months in 2010; however, GAO's analysis showed lesser variances from cost targets for the same months. Conversely, a Department of Transportation investment was reported as on schedule on the Dashboard, which does not reflect the significant delays GAO has identified in recent work. These inaccuracies can be attributed to weaknesses in how agencies report data to the Dashboard, such as providing erroneous data submissions, as well as limitations in how OMB calculates the ratings. Until the selected agencies and OMB resolve these issues, ratings will continue to often be inaccurate and may not reflect current program performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that selected agencies take steps to improve the accuracy and reliability of Dashboard information and OMB improve how it rates investments relative to current performance and schedule variance. Agencies generally concurred with the recommendations; OMB did not concur with the first recommendation but concurred with the second. GAO maintains that until OMB implements both, performance may continue to be inaccurately represented on the Dashboard. |
gao_GAO-11-543T | gao_GAO-11-543T_0 | Some Indian reservations have a mixture of Indian and non-Indian residents. Some Unique Issues that May Affect Economic Activity in Indian Country
Our prior work has highlighted five broad categories of unique issues that have the potential to create uncertainty for tribes or, in some cases, private companies wishing to pursue economic activities on Indian reservations. Land in Trust Issues May Create Uncertainty
Having a land base is essential for many tribal economic development activities such as agriculture, grazing, timber, energy development, and gaming. Tribal Environmental Standards May Create Uncertainty
The Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and Clean Air Act authorize the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to treat Indian tribes in the same manner as it does states, referred to as TAS (treated as states), for the purposes of implementing these laws on tribal lands. On the other hand, in some cases, states are concerned that tribes with program authority may impose standards that are more stringent than the state’s, resulting in a patchwork of standards within the state and potentially hindering the state’s economic development plans. We have reported on tax provisions regarding (1) the uncertainties that tribes faced regarding the types of activities that they could finance with tax-exempt bonds and (2) the impact of accelerated depreciation provisions. However, in June 2008, we reported that there were insufficient data to identify users of the provision and assess whether the provision had increased economic development on Indian reservations. Obtaining Rights-of-Way Across Indian Land Can Involve Uncertainty
Securing rights-of-way across Indian lands is an important component of providing Indian lands with the critical infrastructure needed to support economic activity. In January 2006, we reported that according to several telecommunications service providers and tribal officials, obtaining a right-of-way through Indian lands is a time-consuming and expensive process that can impede service providers’ deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. Certain Issues Related to the Legal Status of Tribes May Complicate the Resolution of Disputes
The unique legal status of tribes has resulted in a complex set of rules that may affect economic development efforts. However, sovereign immunity may influence a private company’s decision to contract with an Indian tribe and the limitations imposed by federal law on Indian tribes’ civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian reservations may create uncertainties regarding where lawsuits arising out of those contracts can be brought. Special Provisions for Gaming and Small Business Contracting
In contrast to the unique issues that can cause uncertainty or pose challenges to economic activity in Indian country, tribes can take advantage of special provisions for gaming and small business contracting. In addition, in 1986, a law was enacted that allowed Alaska Native corporation (ANC)-owned businesses to participate in the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) program—one of the federal government’s primary means for developing small businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. In April 2006, we reported on the use of special procurement advantages by ANCs, and found that 8(a) obligations to firms owned by ANCs increased from $265 million in fiscal year 2000 to $1.1 billion in 2004. We have ongoing work looking at the use of these special procurement advantages by ANCs, tribes, and NHOs. Economic Development: Federal Assistance Programs for American Indians and Alaska Natives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Indian tribes are among the most economically distressed groups in the United States. In 2008, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that the poverty rate among American Indian and Alaska Natives was almost twice as high as the population as a whole--27 percent compared with 15 percent. Residents of tribal lands often lack basic infrastructure, such as water and sewer systems, and sufficient technology infrastructure. Without such infrastructure, tribal communities often find it difficult to compete successfully in the economic mainstream. This testimony statement summarizes GAO's observations on (1) five broad categories of unique issues that may create uncertainty and therefore affect economic activity in Indian country and (2) tribes' use of special gaming and small business contracting provisions. It is based on prior GAO reports.
What GAO Found
GAO's previous work has identified five broad categories of unique issues that may create uncertainty for tribes or, in some cases, private companies wishing to pursue economic activities on Indian reservations. Accruing land in trust. Having a land base is essential for tribal economic development activities such as agriculture, energy development, and gaming. However, a February 2009 Supreme Court decision has raised uncertainty about the process for taking land in trust for tribes and their members. Tribal environmental standards. The Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and Clean Air Act authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to treat Indian tribes in the same manner as states. In some cases, however, states are concerned that tribes with this authority may impose standards that are more stringent than the state standards, which could result in a patchwork of standards within the state and potentially hinder economic activity. Indian tax provisions. Tribes face uncertainties regarding the types of activities that they can finance with tax-exempt bonds. Also, in 2008, GAO reported that there were insufficient data to (1) identify the users of a tax provision that allows for accelerated depreciation of certain property used by businesses on Indian reservations and (2) assess whether the provision had increased economic development on Indian reservations. Obtaining rights-of-way. Securing rights-of-way across Indian land is important in providing Indian lands with the infrastructure needed to support economic activity. In 2006, GAO reported that obtaining rights-of-way through Indian lands was a time-consuming and expensive process. Legal status of tribes. The unique legal status of tribes has resulted in a complex set of rules that may affect economic activities. For example, Indian tribes have sovereign immunity, which can influence a business's decision to contract with a tribe. Also, the limitations imposed by federal law on Indian tribes' civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian reservations can create uncertainties over where lawsuits arising out of contracts with tribes can be brought. In contrast to these unique issues that may pose challenges to economic activity in Indian country, some Indian tribes have taken advantage of special provisions for gaming and small business contracting. The National Indian Gaming Commission reports that tribal gaming operations generated $26.5 billion in revenue for 2009. However, not all tribes have gaming operations and the majority of the revenue is generated by a fraction of the operations. Similarly, Alaska Native Corporations (ANC) have been granted special procurement advantages. In 2006, GAO reported that obligations to firms owned by ANCs that participated in the Small Business Administration's 8(a) program increased from $265 million in fiscal year 2000 to $1.1 billion in 2004. We have ongoing work looking at the use of these special procurement advantages. This testimony statement contains no new recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-647 | gao_GAO-17-647_0 | Figure 1 shows the phases of DOD’s acquisition process. The program was subsequently designated the MQ-25. That system, referred to as the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system was to have the potential to operate in highly contested environments. Under the MQ-25 program, the Navy is now focused on developing and fielding an unmanned tanker capable of operating from the carrier, in a permissive environment, to refuel other naval aircraft and provide only limited ISR capability. The MQ-25 system will consist of three segments: an aircraft segment; a control system and connectivity segment (CS&C); and an aircraft carrier segment (see figure 2). The aircraft carrier segment is to make modifications to upgrade the existing carrier infrastructure to support unmanned aircraft systems. These three segments will be managed and integrated by the Navy’s Unmanned Carrier Aviation program office, acting as a Lead Systems Integrator. Between fiscal years 2017 and 2022, the Navy has budgeted almost $2.5 billion to continue development of the MQ-25 carrier and control segments and to begin development of the aircraft segment. MQ-25 Requirements Have Been Validated
In July 2017, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated system requirements for the MQ-25. The Navy has two primary requirements, known as key performance parameters. Those requirements are: (1) carrier suitability and (2) air refueling. The Navy refined the carrier suitability requirement to focus more clearly on the MQ-25’s basic ability to operate on and from the aircraft carrier. While the Navy is still developing, refining, and finalizing most of the acquisition documentation that will make up its program business case, our review of its acquisition strategy and other available documentation showed that they reflect key aspects of a knowledge-based approach and generally align with what we have found to be product-development best practices:
Using open systems standards and an evolutionary approach: The Navy is planning to use open systems standards and an evolutionary development approach to develop, fly, and deploy the MQ-25 over time. Using knowledge-based criteria to assess progress and inform key decisions: The Navy has established knowledge-based criteria for seven key points during MQ-25 aircraft development. Constraining development schedule: According to the Navy’s acquisition strategy, the MQ-25 aircraft is expected to take 6 to 8 years from the start of product development (i.e., Milestone B) to the fielding of an initial operational capability. The Navy plans to issue a request for proposals to the four competing contractors in October 2017 and award the contract to one of those four contractors the following year. With the Milestone B review scheduled in the summer of 2018, the ultimate success of the MQ- 25 program largely depends on the Navy’s ability to present an executable business case and then effectively implement its planned approach. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided DOD with a copy of this report and they returned technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy expects to invest almost $2.5 billion through fiscal year 2022 in the development of an unmanned aerial refueling system referred to as the MQ-25 . The MQ-25 is the result of a restructure of the former Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike system. The program is expected to deliver an unmanned aircraft system that operates from aircraft carriers and provides aerial refueling to other Navy aircraft and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The Navy plans to release a request for proposals for air system development by October 2017 and award a development contract one year later.
A House Armed Services Committee report on a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 contained a provision for GAO to review the status of the MQ-25 program. This report assesses the extent to which the MQ-25's acquisition strategy is (1) rooted in validated requirements and (2) structured to follow a knowledge-based acquisition process.
To do this work, GAO reviewed the Navy's requirements documentation, acquisition strategy, and other relevant documents and compared them with acquisition statutes, Department of Defense acquisition policy, and previous GAO reports and best practices. GAO also discussed the MQ-25 requirements and acquisition strategy with the Navy program office and other cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The MQ-25 requirements have been validated by DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The Navy has identified two primary requirements: carrier suitability, which means the ability to operate on and from the Navy's aircraft carriers; and air refueling, which is the ability to provide fuel to other carrier-based assets while in flight. While the MQ-25 system is also expected to possess intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; those capabilities are not considered primary requirements. According to the program's acquisition strategy, the MQ-25 system will consist of three segments: the Air segment; a control and connectivity segment, which will interface with existing command and control systems; and an aircraft carrier segment, which will make modifications to upgrade existing carrier infrastructure. These three segments will be managed and integrated by the Navy's Unmanned Carrier Aviation program office, acting as a Lead Systems Integrator (see figure below).
The Navy has established a knowledge-based approach for acquiring the MQ-25 aircraft. For example, the Navy plans to take an incremental approach to develop and evolve the MQ-25 over time. Further, the Navy expects to use knowledge-based criteria to assess progress at key decision points during development, and to use only technologies with high levels of maturity. With the Milestone B review scheduled in the summer of 2018—signaling the beginning of development—the ultimate success of the MQ-25 program depends heavily on the Navy's ability to present an executable business case and then effectively implement its planned approach.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations. DOD's technical comments are incorporated in this report. |
gao_RCED-98-146 | gao_RCED-98-146_0 | Prices Paid by Non-WIC Purchasers Rose Faster Than Usual When Rebate Requirement Went Into Effect
Wholesale infant formula prices rose steadily from 1982 to 1996. Since little data are available on the factors that could have affected the price of infant formula, we could not analyze the extent to which, if at all, the accelerated price rise in infant formula was due to the rebate requirement. For WIC agencies, which had previously paid the same price as non-WIC purchasers, the net prices paid for infant formula decreased significantly after rebates went into effect. WIC agencies, for example, paid 85 percent less, on average, than the wholesale price for infant formula after accounting for rebates in 1996. Net Prices for Infant Formula Sold to WIC Agencies Fell Significantly With Introduction of Rebate Requirement
The prices WIC agencies paid for infant formula decreased significantly after the rebate requirement went into effect in 1989. Key Characteristics of Infant Formula Market May Have Contributed to High Rebates
Key characteristics of the infant formula market are the likely reason that manufacturers are able to offer WIC agencies significant rebates. 3.) Subsidy of WIC Infant Formula by Non-WIC Purchasers Is Unlikely
Although we did not have access to price and cost data that could help us determine definitively whether non-WIC consumers subsidized WIC through the prices they paid for infant formula, we relied on economic analysis and other available information to address the issue. Our analysis indicates that it is unlikely non-WIC purchasers subsidized WIC purchases of infant formula as a result of the rebate program. In economic terms, a subsidy of WIC by the non-WIC purchasers of infant formula would occur if a producer sold formula to the WIC market at less than the producer’s cost of production and used the profits generated by the non-WIC purchasers paying a higher price to compensate for the loss. Our economic analysis of the infant formula market, as well as other available evidence, suggests that while prices may have differed significantly between the WIC and non-WIC markets, it is unlikely that an economic subsidy of the WIC market by the non-WIC market occurred. However, such rebates will not generate the level of savings obtained through the rebates on infant formula, in part because these other food products do not account for as large a share of WIC food costs and in part because market characteristics for other products make it likely that manufacturers will offer smaller rebates for each item. Finally, some other options to reduce costs may be more effective in generating savings for WIC than sole-source rebates for foods other than infant formula. Finally, manufacturers may have less incentive to offer substantial rebates for other WIC food products because they do not sell as much of their product to the WIC market. We did this by assuming that after the introduction of sole-source rebates, wholesale prices increased at the same rate as prices in the pharmaceutical industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on several issues related to Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) rebates for infant formula, focusing on: (1) how prices in the infant formula market changed for non-WIC purchasers and WIC agencies after the introduction of sole-source rebates; (2) how key characteristics of the infant formula market may contribute to the size of rebates offered by the manufacturers; (3) whether there is any evidence indicating that non-WIC purchasers of infant formula subsidized WIC purchases through the prices they paid; and (4) whether the significant cost savings WIC agencies have achieved by using sole-source rebates for infant formula have implications for other WIC products.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) at about the time the WIC rebate requirement went into effect in 1989, the wholesale prices paid by non-WIC purchasers rose faster than usual while the net prices paid by WIC agencies decreased; (2) since few data are available on the factors that could have affected the price of infant formula, GAO could not analyze the extent to which the accelerated price rise in infant formula was due to the rebate requirement; (3) WIC agencies, which paid the same price as non-WIC purchasers between 1982 and 1989, paid significantly less for infant formula after the rebate requirement was implemented in 1989; (4) key characteristics of the infant formula market are the likely reason that manufacturers are able to offer WIC agencies significant rebates; (5) in particular, the method of marketing infant formula--through physicians' recommendations--contributes to strong brand loyalty among parents; (6) although GAO did not have access to the price and cost data that could determine definitively whether non-WIC consumers subsidized WIC through prices they paid for infant formula, GAO's analysis indicates that it is doubtful that such a subsidy has occurred; (7) a subsidy would occur if a manufacturer sold formula to WIC agencies for less than its cost of production and the price paid by non-WIC purchasers compensated for this loss; (8) although prices have differed substantially between the WIC and non-WIC markets, available evidence indicates that manufacturers are still covering their production costs in the WIC market; (9) furthermore, it is unlikely that manufacturers would have an incentive to sell formula at a loss to over 50 percent of the market--the share accounted for by WIC; (10) rebates for other food products purchased by WIC can help reduce the program's costs but probably will not generate the level of savings generated by infant formula rebates; (11) savings for other products would be lower than for infant formula in part because no other single product accounts for as large a portion of WIC costs as infant formula and because the market characteristics of other products make it likely that manufacturers would offer smaller rebates per item; and (12) ultimately, the states may find that other cost-reducing options are more effective than rebates in generating savings for some WIC foods other than infant formula. |
gao_GAO-15-408 | gao_GAO-15-408_0 | 1). 2). USPS’s Recently Established Standard Procedures for Parcel Select NSAs Have Gaps
USPS Established Standard Procedures in June 2014
USPS’s Sales Department (Sales) has lead responsibility for managing Parcel Select NSAs and recently established standard procedures for managing NSA contracts. The Standard Procedures address, in part, some leading contract management practices. 3). However, PRC officials noted that they do not review and are not statutorily required to review the extent to which mailers or USPS have complied with other contractual requirements, such as minimum volume requirements and any payments to USPS for failure to meet these requirements as part of its Annual Compliance Determination Report. Specifically, the procedures lack documentation requirements and clearly defined management responsibilities for some contract monitoring and evaluation activities. For example, USPS did not document management decisions about an underperforming contract. Documenting such information would help ensure that future decisions are based upon past results and enhance accountability for the effective and efficient use of USPS resources. Reviewing and updating the Standard Procedures to include documentation requirements would provide additional assurance that USPS’s Parcel Select NSAs are effectively managed. USPS Could Improve Its Method to Estimate Attributable Costs for Parcel Select NSAs
Each competitive product, including each Parcel Select NSA, must earn sufficient revenues to cover its attributable costs; however, USPS’s costing method to estimate attributable costs for individual Parcel Select contracts does not account for all key cost factors. This limits USPS’s analysis of attributable costs for Parcel Select NSAs. See GAO, U.S. For example, UPS and FedEx— both of which pay USPS to deliver packages the last mile under certain circumstances and compete with USPS for end-to-end package delivery business—recently began basing the ground delivery rates they charge on both the size and weight of packages, a concept called “dimensional Representatives from another mailer told us that in serving weighting.”their own customers, they continually assess the characteristics of each package—including weight and size—to determine the costs of handling each package and to make cost-effective decisions regarding the delivery method they choose. If mailers choose to route larger or heavier packages via Parcel Select, collecting and studying information on the weight and size of packages could position USPS to better understand how this affects its delivery costs and the extent to which revenues for individual Parcel Select NSAs cover their attributable costs. In addition to not collecting detailed cost information that accounts for key package characteristics, USPS’s method to estimate attributable costs uses national averages for Parcel Select packages instead of contract- specific cost estimates for each NSA. This estimating further limits USPS’s analysis of the extent to which each contract covers its attributable costs. USPS officials questioned whether the time and expense required to develop contract-specific attributable cost estimates that account for package weight and dimension would significantly improve decision- making. In the past, USPS has used other less intensive methods to improve its cost estimates for other products. Conclusions
USPS continues to face significant financial challenges. Parcel Select helps to address these challenges by providing USPS with a revenue source that has increased from $466 million in fiscal year 2009 to over $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2014. In addition, collecting and studying information on the size and weight of Parcel Select NSA packages could improve USPS’s analysis of attributable cost coverage for each contract and position USPS to better understand how mailers’ business decisions affect these costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide additional assurance that the procedures USPS uses to develop, monitor, and evaluate the performance of its Parcel Select NSAs are effective, the Postmaster General should direct executive leaders in Sales to: review the Standard Procedures to identify gaps in contract management responsibilities, including documentation requirements and assigning clearly defined management responsibilities for contract monitoring and evaluation activities, and update the procedures to address the identified gaps. To better understand attributable costs for individual Parcel Select NSAs, the Postmaster General should direct the appropriate staff to: identify and implement cost-effective methods, such as using a sample, to collect and study information on the costs of delivering Parcel Select packages of varying characteristics in order to develop contract-specific attributable cost estimates. However, as the report notes, while USPS does collect data on the weight of all Parcel Select packages, it does not collect information on the size of NSA packages and has not studied the impact of either of these factors on USPS’s delivery costs for specific contracts. As the report notes, collecting and studying information on the size and weight of Parcel Select packages is important, because larger and heavier packages can increase USPS’s delivery costs. Postal Service (USPS) has established to develop, monitor, and evaluate the performance of its Parcel Select negotiated service agreements (NSA), including implementation, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations such as the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA). We also examined Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) documents, such as orders and notices. In addition, we conducted interviews with USPS officials from the Sales, Finance, and Legal departments, who are responsible for developing, monitoring, and evaluating the performance of Parcel Select NSAs; PRC officials responsible for reviewing the contracts; and representatives from eight mailers that signed 12 of the 13 Parcel Select NSAs to determine how USPS implements its procedures. We compared USPS’s procedures for managing the contracts against selected leading contract management practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS faces significant financial challenges. Parcel Select is a key USPS package shipping product to help address these challenges, with revenues growing from $466 million to over $2.5 billion from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2014. As of April 3, 2015, USPS has executed 13 Parcel Select NSAs—customized contracts that lower mailers' shipping prices in exchange for meeting volume targets and other requirements. GAO was asked to review how USPS manages these contracts.
GAO examined (1) USPS's procedures to manage Parcel Select NSAs and (2) its method to determine attributable cost coverage for each contract. To perform this work, GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations; analyzed documents for all 13 contracts; compared USPS's procedures against selected leading contract management practices most applicable to USPS's role; and interviewed USPS and PRC officials and representatives from 8 mailers that signed 12 of the 13 contracts.
What GAO Found
In June 2014, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) established standard procedures that departments should follow to manage all negotiated service agreement (NSA) contracts, including Parcel Select NSAs. Although the procedures, in part, address some leading contract management practices, such as defining performance management activities, they lack documentation requirements and clearly defined management responsibilities for some activities. For example, the procedures do not require USPS to document some key management decisions, such as USPS's decision to forego additional revenue when a mailer did not ship a minimum volume of packages, as contractually required. Documenting such information could improve future decision making and enhance accountability for the effective and efficient use of USPS resources. USPS acknowledged that the procedures contained gaps when they were initially established. Reviewing and updating the standard procedures to include documentation requirements and clearly defined management responsibilities would provide additional assurance that USPS's Parcel Select NSAs are effectively managed.
USPS's costing method for Parcel Select NSAs does not account for package size or weight or use contract-specific cost estimates. Each Parcel Select NSA is required to earn sufficient revenues to cover USPS's costs—referred to as “attributable costs” in the postal context. The Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), which annually reviews compliance, determined that each contract met this requirement. However, USPS's analysis of attributable costs for Parcel Select NSAs is limited, because USPS has not studied the impact of package size or weight on specific contracts or developed contract-specific cost estimates.
Package size and weight information : USPS does not collect information on the size of NSA packages and has not studied the impact of package size and weight on USPS's delivery costs for specific contracts. However, larger and heavier packages can increase USPS's costs. For example, carriers must walk packages that are too large for a centralized mailbox to the customer's door, which increases costs. Moreover, mailers use size and weight to inform their own business decisions. For example, one mailer continually assesses package size and weight to make cost-effective decisions about the delivery method it chooses. If mailers route larger or heavier packages via Parcel Select, collecting and studying such information could improve USPS's analysis of attributable costs for Parcel Select NSAs.
Contract-specific cost estimates : USPS's method to determine attributable costs uses average cost estimates for the Parcel Select product instead of contract-specific cost estimates. USPS's use of averages further limits its analysis of the extent to which each Parcel Select NSA covers its attributable costs, because USPS had not studied the extent to which the size and weight of packages shipped under individual contracts deviated from the characteristics of packages USPS used to estimate the average.
USPS officials questioned whether the benefits of developing contract-specific cost estimates would exceed the costs; however, USPS has used less intensive methods, such as sampling, to improve estimates for other products in the past.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USPS update its standard procedures to address gaps in documentation requirements and contract management responsibilities. Also, USPS should identify cost-effective methods to collect and study information on delivery costs for Parcel Select packages of varying characteristics to develop contract-specific attributable cost estimates. USPS agreed with these recommendations, but stated that the cost impact of package size and weight is likely small given where these packages enter the mail stream. |
gao_GAO-04-801 | gao_GAO-04-801_0 | Pipelines have an inherent safety advantage over other modes of freight transportation because they are primarily located underground, away from public contact. These accidents resulted in an average of 2 fatalities and 8 injuries per year. OPS, within RSPA, administers the national regulatory program to ensure the safe operation of the nation’s natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. Key Management Elements Are Needed to Determine the Effectiveness of OPS’s Enforcement Strategy
Although in recent years OPS has made a number of changes in its enforcement strategy that have the potential to improve pipeline safety, the effectiveness of this strategy cannot currently be determined because the agency has not incorporated three key elements of effective program management—clear program goals, a well-defined strategy for achieving those goals, and performance measures linked to the program goals. According to these officials, in the last several years, they have placed a priority on developing and implementing this risk-based regulatory approach and on developing a sound approach for overseeing pipeline operators’ fulfillment of the agency’s new requirements. 4.) 5.) OPS Needs Adequate Measures of the Effectiveness of Its Enforcement Strategy
According to OPS officials, the agency uses three types of performance measures to determine the effectiveness of both its enforcement activities and other oversight efforts: (1) the achievement of agency performance goals, (2) agency inspection and enforcement activity, and (3) the integrity management performance of pipeline operators, such as pipeline repairs made in response to the agency’s new requirements. Most of the penalties that OPS assessed have been paid; however, OPS and FAA lack important management controls to ensure that penalties are collected. Inflation was low during this period. If the effects of inflation are considered, the average assessed penalty for 1995 through 1999 would be $21,000, and the average assessed penalty for 2000 through 2003 would be $30,000, in 2003 dollars.) For the 216 penalties that were assessed from 1994 through 2003, OPS assessed the penalty that it proposed 69 percent of the time (150 civil penalties). Stakeholders Expressed Differing Views on Whether OPS’s Civil Penalties Deter Noncompliance
Although OPS has increased both the number and the size of the civil penalties it has imposed, the effect of this change, if any, on deterring noncompliance with safety regulations is not clear. For example, some of the interstate agents said that civil penalties—no matter what the amount—are a deterrent because the penalty puts the pipeline operator in the public eye. In light of the progress OPS has made in these other areas and the issues we raised with OPS in preparing this report, OPS has indicated that it will devote more attention to managing its enforcement program than it has previously. OPS should fully define its strategy for achieving these goals. OPS should establish a systematic approach for designing performance measures that incorporates identified key practices. The two reporting methods are not comparable. However, the agency did not increase its use of enforcement actions until 2000 when it began its “tough but fair” phase. 12.) 14.) 18.) Over the same period, the number of OPS’s enforcement and administrative actions fluctuated widely. | Why GAO Did This Study
While pipelines are inherently safer to the public than other modes of freight transportation, pipeline accidents involving natural gas and hazardous liquids (such as gasoline) can have serious consequences. For example, a natural gas pipeline ruptured near Carlsbad, New Mexico, in 2000, killed 12 people, and resulted in $1 million in damages or losses. The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) administers the national regulatory program to ensure safe pipeline transportation. OPS uses its enforcement program, when safety problems are found, as one means to do so. This study reports on (1) the effectiveness of OPS's enforcement strategy and (2) OPS's actions for assessing monetary sanctions (civil penalties), among other things.
What GAO Found
The effectiveness of OPS's enforcement strategy cannot be determined because the agency has not set goals for its enforcement program, fully defined its strategy, or established performance measures linked to goals that would allow an assessment of results. These are key elements of effective management. Without these elements, the agency cannot determine whether recent changes in its strategy are having the desired effects on pipeline safety. Over the past several years, OPS has placed priority on other areas--developing a new risk-based regulatory approach--and it believes these efforts will change the safety culture of the industry. OPS now intends to devote more attention to strengthening the management of the agency's enforcement program. In particular, OPS is developing an enforcement policy that will help define its enforcement strategy and has made some initial steps toward identifying new performance measures. However, OPS does not anticipate finalizing such a policy until sometime during 2005 and lacks a systematic approach for incorporating some of the key practices identified for achieving successful performance measurement systems. OPS has increased both the number and the size of the penalties it has assessed against pipeline operators over the last 4 years (2000 through 2003) following its decision to be "tough but fair" in assessing penalties. During this period, OPS assessed an average of 22 penalties per year, compared with an average of 14 per year for the previous 5 years (1995 through 1999), a period of more lenient enforcement. In addition, the average penalty amount increased from $18,000 to $29,000 over the two periods. While civil penalty use and size has increased, it is not clear whether this action will help deter noncompliance with the agency's safety regulations. Stakeholders expressed differing views: some thought that any penalty had a deterrent effect if it kept the pipeline operator in the public eye, while others told us that the penalties were too small to be effective sanctions. About 94 percent of the 216 penalties levied from 1994 through 2003 have been paid. However, OPS lacks effective management controls to assure that penalties are collected. For example, OPS does not routinely inform its collection agent of penalties it has assessed. |
gao_HEHS-98-4 | gao_HEHS-98-4_0 | To evaluate VA’s ability to achieve its revenue targets, we reviewed (1) VA’s fiscal year 1998 budget submission, the MCCR program’s 1996 business plan, and other documents detailing VA’s health care restructuring plans, such as VA’s Prescription for Change, new budget allocation system, and its use of performance measures; (2) interviewed MCCR and health care staff from VA facilities and VA’s headquarters; and (3) interviewed staff and reviewed documents from VA’s General Counsel and Regional Counsels. In addition to requiring that care be medically necessary and provided in an appropriate setting, policies may require the policyholder to pay a specified amount (such as $500), referred to as a deductible or out-of-pocket payment, for covered health care services before the insurance begins paying; require policyholders to pay a certain percentage of covered charges, known as a copayment or coinsurance; specify what services are covered and any limits on the days of coverage or frequency of services; require, as a condition for payment, that providers or policyholders obtain prior approval from the insurer before admission to a hospital; preclude or reduce payment (other than for emergency care) to providers that are not members of HMOs, preferred provider organizations (PPO), or point-of-service (POS) plans; and “wrap around” other insurance coverage and pay only that portion of approved charges not paid by the primary insurance, such as Medicare. Recoveries declined to $495.2 million in fiscal year 1996 and to $213.4 million during the first two quarters of fiscal year 1997. 1.) On the other hand, veterans in the discretionary care category have some financial incentive to help VA obtain information about their insurance coverage because a portion of insurers’ payments is used to reduce their copayments. Many Factors Could Lead to Decrease in Future Recoveries
Many factors help explain the decline in VA recoveries from private health insurance since fiscal year 1995 and make it likely that, without significant changes in the recovery program and/or an increase in the number of VA users with fee-for-service insurance coverage, declines will continue over the next 5 years. These factors include the declining and aging of the veteran population, increased enrollment in HMOs and other managed care plans, changes in how insurers process VA claims, shifts in care from inpatient to outpatient settings, and difficulty identifying care provided to veterans with service-connected disabilities for treatment of nonservice-connected conditions. This means that VA would have to increase the percentage of veterans using VA services just to maintain current workload. Continued Increase in Managed Care Plan Enrollment Could Reduce Future Recoveries
Continued increases in enrollment in HMOs, PPOs, and POS plans are likely to reduce future VA recoveries from private health insurance. Changes in How Insurers Process VA Claims Could Lead to Refunds and Reduced Recoveries
Changes in how insurers process VA claims could result in refunds of over $600 million in overpayments and reduce VA’s future recoveries by over 20 percent. VA Initiatives Seek to Reverse Decline and Increase Recoveries
VA officials identified a number of legislative and management initiatives intended to address the previously mentioned factors and help it achieve its recovery goals. The second problem VA sought to address through legislation was the lapsing of its authority to recover its costs for providing health care services to veterans with service-connected disabilities for conditions unrelated to their service-connected disabilities. VA has not estimated the potential increased recoveries from the initiative, but notes that the initiative is important to prevent further decreases in recoveries from Medicare supplemental policies. Conclusions
Although VA currently recovers less than a third of the amounts it bills to private health insurers, opportunities to recover more of its billed charges appear to be limited. VA’s ability to achieve its goals is uncertain considering the many factors likely to decrease future recoveries. Matters for Consideration by the Congress
The statutes governing VA recoveries from private health insurance and veteran copayments do not clearly specify the relationship between the two provisions. Develop procedures to ensure that authority to retain health insurance recoveries would not detract from services to veterans who lack private health insurance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to recover from private health insurers the costs it incurs to provide health care services to veterans with no service-connected disabilities, focusing on: (1) those factors that limit VA's ability to recover more of its billed charges; (2) VA's ability to achieve its revenue targets by identifying factors that could decrease future recoveries and assessing the potential for VA initiatives to increase medical care cost recoveries; and (3) the way VA applies insurance payments to veterans' copayment liability for veterans in the discretionary care category.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) attaining VA's goal to increase recoveries from private health insurance from $495 million in fiscal year (FY) 1996 to $826 million in FY 2002 will be difficult; (2) for GAO's sample, most of the charges VA was unable to recover for bills submitted to private health insurers were appropriately denied or reduced by the insurers; (3) recoveries from private health insurance dropped for the first time in FY 1996 and have continued to drop during FY 1997; (4) several factors help explain the decreases and suggest that further decreases are likely, including: (a) the declining and aging of the veteran population, meaning that VA must serve a greater proportion of veterans to maintain its current workload and that more VA users will have secondary, rather than primary, health insurance coverage in the future; (b) veterans' increased enrollment in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other managed care plans, and decreased enrollment in fee-for-service plans, which reduces the number of veterans covered by insurance from which VA can reasonably expect to recover; (c) changes in how insurers process VA claims that could result in refunds to insurers of overpayments that VA estimates exceeded $600 million and could reduce future recoveries by over 20 percent; and (d) shifts in care from inpatient to outpatient settings that, while both needed and appropriate, could reduce private insurance recoveries and increase recovery costs; (5) VA has a number of initiatives to address some of these problems and to help it attain its recovery goals; (6) these include legislation to: (a) allow VA to retain recoveries from private health insurance and veteran copayments as an incentive to improve the identification and pursuit of recoveries; and (b) extend lapsing authority to recover the costs of services provided to veterans for conditions unrelated to their service-connected disabilities; (7) VA's initiatives would address some, but not all, of the factors affecting future recoveries; (8) however, considerable uncertainty remains about VA's ability to achieve its revenue goal; (9) VA was unable to provide an analytical basis for its recovery projections; (10) projected increases in VA's future recoveries were not supported by or attributed to improvements related to its planned initiatives; and (11) VA's General Counsel interprets the relationship between recoveries from private health insurance and veterans' copayments as requiring that a portion of insurance recoveries to be used to reduce veterans' copayment obligations. |
gao_GAO-14-713 | gao_GAO-14-713_0 | Of the total reported data centers, 242 were reported by agencies as “core” data centers—meaning that they are primary consolidation points for agency enterprise IT services and not planned for closure, while the remaining 9,416 were reported as “non-core.”memorandum states that the goal is for agencies to close 40 percent of the total non-core data centers, or 3,766 data centers based on the May 2014 inventory data, by the end of fiscal year 2015. Pursuant to this goal, agencies have reported achieving more than a billion dollars in savings and avoidances through fiscal year 2013 and are planning a total of about $3.3 billion in savings and avoidances by the end of fiscal year 2015—an amount that is approximately $300 million higher than OMB’s goal. Between fiscal years 2011 and 2017, agencies reported planning approximately $5.3 billion in total savings and avoidances. However, planned cost savings may be higher because six agencies with as many as 67 data center closures each have been limited in their abilities to fully report their savings. In addition, slightly more than half of agencies with planned cost savings are underreporting their fiscal years 2012 through 2015 figures to OMB by approximately $2.2 billion. While several agencies noted internal agency communication issues as the reasons for not reporting savings to OMB, other agencies were unable to provide a reason. Specifically, between fiscal years 2011 and 2013, 19 agencies collectively reported achieving an estimated $1.1 billion in cost savings and avoidances. Notably, Defense, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) account for approximately $850 million (or 74 percent) of the reported estimated savings through fiscal year 2013. As prescribed by OMB’s initial guidance on data center consolidation, the 19 agencies that reported achieving cost savings and avoidances did so using a variety of approaches. Further, through fiscal year 2017, these agencies collectively reported planning an additional $2.1 billion in cost savings and avoidances, for a total of approximately $5.3 billion. Although agencies are already collectively reporting approximately $5.3 billion in planned cost savings and avoidances from their consolidation efforts, these savings may be higher because 6 of the 24 agencies, claiming between 11 and 67 data center closures each, have been limited in their abilities to report savings. Specifically, of the 21 agencies with actual and estimated fiscal years 2012 through 2015 cost savings and avoidances, 10 agencies fully reported their savings and avoidances to OMB through the integrated data collection process, 8 agencies partially reported this information, and 3 agencies did not report it. Agencies Reported Successes and Challenges in Achieving Cost Savings
Agencies Reported That Efforts to Achieve Consolidation Cost Savings Face Challenges Similar to Those Previously Reported
In 2011 and 2012, we reported on the broad challenges that agencies were facing during data center consolidations. In light of how closely the successes and challenges reported by agencies relate to achieving cost savings—a key OMB goal for FDCCI—it will be important for OMB to continue to provide leadership and guidance to the initiative. directed the Task Force to develop data In May 2014, OMB released a set of 11 data center consolidation optimization metrics established by the Task Force. In addition, related targets to be achieved by the end of fiscal year 2015 have been established for all the metrics except for the cost-per- operating-system metric, which provides for measuring progress on optimizing data center costs. As previously mentioned, in 2009, OMB reported that server utilization rates were as low as 5 percent across the federal government’s servers. According to an official from the GSA FDCCI Program Management Office that led initial efforts to establish the metrics, server utilization was not included as a metric for a variety of reasons, including that agencies have not traditionally collected the necessary data to be able to calculate server utilization, agencies do not have the server monitoring capabilities required to collect such data, and improvements in other areas of the metrics (such as virtualization) would likely result in higher server utilization. In addition, without a specific metric for server utilization, OMB may not be fully aware of agencies’ progress on a key metric that was a driving force in launching FDCCI. Specifically, OMB and 12 agencies agreed with our recommendations, 1 agency did not state whether it agreed or disagreed, 1 agency had no comments, and 1 agency—NASA—agreed with one of our recommendations but partially agreed with the other. Accordingly, we continue to believe our recommendation remains valid. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the extent to which agencies have achieved cost savings to date and identified future savings through their consolidation efforts, (2) identify agencies’ notable consolidation successes and challenges in achieving cost savings, and (3) evaluate the extent to which data center optimization metrics have been established. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, as focal point for information technology management across the government, OMB's Federal Chief Information Officer launched the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative to consolidate the growing number of centers. As of May 2014, agencies reported a total of 9,658 data centers—approximately 6,500 more than reported by OMB in 2011.
GAO was asked to review federal agencies' continuing efforts to consolidate their data centers and achieve cost savings. The objectives were to (1) evaluate the extent to which agencies have achieved cost savings to date and identified future savings through their consolidation efforts, (2) identify agencies' notable consolidation successes and challenges in achieving cost savings, and (3) evaluate the extent to which data center optimization metrics have been established. GAO assessed agency-reported cost savings and avoidance documentation, interviewed agency officials, and assessed data center optimization metrics against prior OMB requirements and goals.
What GAO Found
Of the 24 agencies participating in the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative, 19 agencies collectively reported achieving an estimated $1.1 billion in cost savings and avoidances between fiscal years 2011 and 2013. Notably, the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Treasury accounted for approximately $850 million (or 74 percent) of the total. In addition, 21 agencies collectively reported planning an additional $2.1 billion in cost savings and avoidances by the end of fiscal year 2015, for a total of approximately $3.3 billion—an amount that is about $300 million higher than the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) original $3 billion goal. Between fiscal years 2011 and 2017, agencies reported planning a total of about $5.3 billion in cost savings and avoidances.
However, planned savings may be higher because six agencies that reported having closed as many as 67 data centers reported limited or no savings, in part because they encountered difficulties, such as calculating baseline data center costs. In addition, 11 of the 21 agencies with planned cost savings are underreporting their fiscal years 2012 through 2015 figures to OMB by approximately $2.2 billion. While several agencies noted communication issues as the reason for this, others did not provide a reason. Until OMB assists agencies in reporting savings and agencies fully report their savings, the $5.3 billion in total savings will be understated.
Most agencies reported successes in achieving cost savings—notably, the benefits of key technologies, reduced power consumption and facility costs, and improvements in asset inventories. However, agencies also reported challenges, many of which were the same as GAO found in 2012. One of the most-reported challenges was related to obtaining power usage information as a means to determine cost savings. In light of how closely these successes and challenges relate to achieving cost savings, it is important for OMB to continue to provide leadership and guidance, including—as GAO previously recommended—using the Data Center Consolidation Task Force to monitor agencies' efforts.
Pursuant to OMB guidance, in May 2014 the Data Center Consolidation Task Force completed a set of 11 metrics to measure agency progress toward optimizing their data centers, such as power usage and facility utilization. In addition, related targets to be achieved by fiscal year 2015 have been developed for nearly all the metrics. However, the metrics do not address server utilization, even though OMB reported this to be as low as 5 percent in 2009, which is significantly below OMB's target of 60 to 70 percent. Without such a metric, OMB may not be getting important insight into agencies' progress on a key issue that was a driving factor in launching the consolidation initiative.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that OMB assist agencies in reporting cost savings and develop a metric for server utilization as part of any reevaluation of the metrics. GAO is also recommending, among other things, that agencies fully report their consolidation cost savings. OMB and 12 agencies agreed, 1 did not state whether it agreed or disagreed, 1 had no comments, and 1 partially agreed noting challenges. GAO continues to believe the recommendation remains valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_HEHS-97-102 | gao_HEHS-97-102_0 | About 2.5 million people apply to the Social Security Administration (SSA) each year for disability benefits. About 22 percent of all applicants appeal their cases to ALJs; about two-thirds of all claimants whose claims are denied at the DDS reconsideration level appeal to an ALJ. Differences in Decision Results Are Long-standing
The differences between DDS and ALJ results are a long-standing problem contributing to the growth in OHA backlogs and increased case-processing time, according to our 1996 report on SSA’s efforts to reduce backlogs in appealed decisions. To respond to the first objective, we divided the possible contributing factors into three types: (1) factors related to differences in RFC assessments made by DDSs and ALJs, (2) procedural factors that contribute to differences in decisions, and (3) use of quality reviews to manage the process. These data indicate that ALJs are significantly more likely than DDS medical consultants to find that applicants have very limited work capacity. This study found that DDS and ALJ adjudicators reached different results even when presented with the same evidence. Such an opinion might include, for example, a statement that a claimant “cannot stand or walk for more than two hours total in a day.” In the disability determination, adjudicators must give controlling weight to these treating source opinions provided they are (1) well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and (2) consistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. As a result, ALJs often cannot rely on the evaluations as developed by the DDSs. Although claimants have the right to representation, SSA relies on the ALJ to fully document the case, considering the claimant’s as well as the government’s best interests. SSA’s Planned Improvements in Procedures
SSA plans to take several actions so that DDS and ALJ procedures better ensure decision-making consistency, including requiring more detailed DDS rationales, returning selected appealed cases to the DDS for consideration of new evidence introduced at ALJ hearings, and using a “predecision interview” by a disability examiner. Quality Reviews Do Not Focus on Inconsistency Between DDS and ALJ Decisions
SSA could use its ongoing quality reviews to better focus on differences in DDSs’ and ALJs’ assessments of functional capacity and of procedures to improve its management of the decision-making process and reduce inconsistent decisions between DDSs and ALJs. Such a focus would be necessary for both identifying and reconciling differences in decisions. As envisioned, disability examiners and physician consultants as well as reviewing judges will review ALJ awards. The agency has not explicitly established this as a goal, however. SSA has developed process unification initiatives that, if implemented, could significantly improve the consistency of decisions. Competing workloads at all levels of adjudication, however, could jeopardize progress in this important area. SSA has not established explicit outcome-oriented goals or measures, however, to assess its progress in achieving consistent decisions. In addition, we recommend that, given the magnitude and seriousness of the problem, the Commissioner should, under the Results Act, articulate the process unification results that the agency hopes to achieve and establish a performance goal by which it could measure and report its progress in shifting the proportion of cases awarded from the ALJ to the DDS level. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) decisionmaking process for disability determinations and efforts to improve the process, focusing on: (1) factors that contribute to differences between disability determination services' (DDS) and administrative law judges' (ALJ) decisions; and (2) SSA's actions to make decisions in initial and appealed cases more consistent.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) ALJs made nearly 30 percent of all awards in 1996; (2) because two-thirds of all cases appealed to ALJs have resulted in awards, questions have arisen about the fairness, integrity, and cost of SSA disability programs; (3) differences in assessing applicants' functional capacity and procedural factors, as well as weaknesses in quality assurance, contribute to inconsistent decisions; (4) ALJs are far more likely than DDSs to find claimants unable to work on the basis of their functional capacity; (5) this outcome has occurred even when ALJ and DDS adjudicators review the same evidence for the same case; (6) most notably, DDS adjudicators tend to rely on medical evidence such as the results of laboratory test; ALJs tend to rely more on symptoms such as pain and fatigue; (7) DDS and ALJ decisionmaking practices and procedures also contribute to inconsistent results because they limit the usefulness of DDS evaluations as bases for ALJ decisions; (8) in addition, SSA procedures often lead to substantial differences between the evidentiary records examined by DDS and ALJs; (9) specifically, ALJs may examine new evidence submitted by a claimant and hear a claimant testify; (10) as a result, even with a well-explained DDS decision, ALJs could reach a different decision because the evidence in the case differs from that reviewed by the DDS; (11) SSA has not used its quality review systems to identify and reconcile differences in approach and procedures used by DDSs and ALJs; (12) the quality review systems for the initial level and appeals levels of the decisionmaking process merely reflect the differences between the levels; they do not help produce more consistent decisions; (13) although SSA has not managed the decisionmaking process well in the past, its current process unification initiatives, when fully implemented, could significantly help to produce more consistent decisions; (14) competing workload pressures at all adjudication levels could, however, jeopardize SSA's efforts; (15) as a result, SSA, in consultation with the Congress, will need to sort through its many priorities and be more accountable for meeting its deadlines and establishing explicit measures to assess its progress in reducing inconsistency; and (16) this may include, for example, setting a goal, under the Government Performance and Results Act, to foster consistency in results, set quantitative measures, and report on its progress in shifting the proportion of cases awarded from the ALJ to the DDS level. |
gao_AIMD-96-130 | gao_AIMD-96-130_0 | 4. Normal Investment and Redemption Procedures Used for Most Trust Funds
Our analysis showed that, during the 1995-1996 debt ceiling crisis, Treasury used its normal investment and redemption procedures to handle the receipts and maturing investments and to redeem Treasury securities for 12 of the 15 trust funds we examined. Actions Related to the Civil Service Fund
During the 1995-1996 debt ceiling crisis, the Secretary of the Treasury redeemed Treasury securities held by the Civil Service fund and suspended the investment of some Civil Service fund receipts. During November 1995 and February 1996 the Secretary of the Treasury redeemed about $46 billion of the Civil Service fund’s Treasury securities before they were needed to pay for trust fund benefits and expenses. Other Actions to Stay Within the Debt Ceiling
In addition to the actions involving the Civil Service fund, during the 1995-1996 debt ceiling crisis, the Secretary of the Treasury (1) suspended the investment of G-Fund receipts and (2) did not reinvest some of the Exchange Stabilization Fund’s maturing securities. Also, the Congress authorized Treasury to issue selected securities that were temporarily exempted from being counted against the debt ceiling. Exchange Stabilization Fund’s Maturing Investments Not Reinvested
On several occasions between February 21 and March 12, 1996, Treasury did not reinvest some of the maturing securities held by the Exchange Stabilization Fund. In the case of the Social Security funds, such a loss could not be restored without special legislation. Conclusions
During the 1995-1996 debt ceiling crisis, Treasury acted in accordance with statutory authorities when it (1) suspended some investments of the G-Fund, (2) exercised its discretion in not reinvesting some of the Exchange Stabilization Fund’s maturing Treasury securities, and (3) issued certain Treasury securities to government trust funds without counting them toward the debt ceiling. However, Treasury’s actions during the crisis resulted in the government incurring about $138.9 billion in additional debt that would normally have been considered as subject to the debt ceiling. Several of Treasury’s actions during the debt ceiling crisis also resulted in interest losses to certain government trust funds. Regarding restoration of the Civil Service fund, Treasury restored the securities that would have been issued had a debt issuance suspension period not occurred and the interest losses. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of the Treasury's actions during the 1995-1996 debt ceiling crisis, focusing on: (1) investments and redemptions in federal trust funds; and (2) the Treasury's restoration of fund losses.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) during the 1995-1996 debt ceiling crisis, Treasury followed normal investment and redemption procedures for 12 of the 15 major government trust funds; (2) Treasury suspended normal investments and redemptions for the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Trust, Government Securities Investment (G-fund), and Exchange Stabilization Funds and took other actions to stay within the debt ceiling; (3) these actions were proper and consistent with the Secretary of the Treasury's legal authority; (4) as required, the Secretary of the Treasury determined in November 1995 that a debt issuance suspension period existed prior to exercising his authority; (5) Treasury redeemed $46 billion in Civil Service fund securities in November 1995 and February 1996 and suspended investment of $14 billion in fund receipts in December 1995; (6) Treasury exchanged about $8.6 billion in Civil Service fund securities for Federal Financing Bank (FFB) securities, which FFB then used to repay borrowings from the Treasury; (7) Treasury suspended some investments and reinvestments of G-fund receipts and maturing securities during the crisis; (8) on several occasions, Treasury did not reinvest some of the maturing securities held by the Exchange Stabilization Fund; (9) in March 1996, Treasury issued some securities that were temporarily exempt from the debt ceiling, which allowed it to pay $29 billion in social security benefits and invest $58.2 billion in fund receipts and maturing securities; (10) although the Treasury did not technically exceed the debt ceiling during the crisis, the government incurred about $138.9 billion in additional debt that normally would have been subject to the ceiling; (11) several Treasury actions resulted in interest losses to certain government trust funds; and (12) Congress raised the debt ceiling to $5.5 billion at the end of March 1996, and Treasury fully restored the Civil Service fund's and the G-fund's interest losses by June 1996, but it could not restore the Stabilization fund's interest loss without special legislation. |
gao_GAO-12-706 | gao_GAO-12-706_0 | Employers Cited Challenges with the Largely Paper-Based Process, Implementation of New Rules and Procedures, and Complexity
Most Applications are Approved, but Some Employers Experience Processing Delays
In fiscal year 2011, most employers’ applications for H-2A workers were approved, but some employers experienced delays in having their applications for H-2A workers processed. Labor approved 94 percent of the H-2A applications for foreign agricultural workers and processed 63 percent of approved applications by the statutory deadline of at least 30 days prior to the date workers were to begin work.not process 37 percent of applications by the deadline, including 7 percent of applications approved less than 15 days before workers were needed, leaving little time for employers to petition DHS and for workers to obtain visas from State. 2). Agencies Took Steps to Improve the Process, but Delays in Modernization and Unclear Guidance Continue to Pose Challenges
Labor and DHS Efforts to Modernize the Application Process Have Been Delayed
To process applications more efficiently and provide better customer service, Labor and DHS have taken steps to create new electronic applications that will allow employers to file for H-2A workers online, but development and implementation of both applications has been delayed (see table 2). Federal Agencies Updated Processes and Reached Out to Employers, but Labor’s Guidance to States Needs Improvement
Recently and over the course of our review, in addition to taking steps to modernize the H-2A application process, federal agencies have taken a number of other steps to improve employers’ experience with the application process. Specifically, Labor made changes to its review process to informally resolve issues with employers and reduce unnecessary delays and appeals. In March 2012, Labor began using e-mail to communicate with employers in all states about their applications. One employer representative expressed frustration that neighboring states used different methods to determine acceptable practices for the same crop and that the results differed. Officials from Labor and DHS, and State’s contractor attended the most recent of these meetings, held in Texas in January 2012. Conclusions
The H-2A program is a means through which agricultural employers can legally hire temporary foreign workers when there is a shortage of U.S. workers. Meanwhile, employers who require workers at different points of the season must bear the additional costs of submitting paperwork to multiple agencies for each set of workers. In addition, employers continue to express confusion about how state workforce agencies and Labor are applying Labor’s new regulations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the timeliness of application processing, as part of creating new online applications, we recommend that the Secretaries of Labor and Homeland Security: develop a method of automatically collecting data on the reasons for deficiency notices, requests for additional evidence, and denials, and use this information to develop strategies to improve the timeliness of H-2A application processing. To promote consistency and transparency of decisions made about the acceptability of employer applications and clarify program rules, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor: review and revise, as appropriate, guidance provided to state workforce agencies on methods to determine the acceptability of employment practices. Labor and DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with our recommendation that the agency develop a method to automatically collect additional data through its forthcoming electronic application system to improve the timeliness of application processing. Labor did not agree with our recommendation that it allow employers to file a single application per season for workers arriving on different start dates, stating that the department’s regulations define the date of need as the first date the employer requires the services of all H-2A workers that are the subject of the application, not an indication of the first date of need for only some of the workers. We are not recommending that employers conduct a single labor market test corresponding with their earliest date of need. | Why GAO Did This Study
The H-2A visa program allows U.S. employers anticipating a shortage of domestic agricultural workers to hire foreign workers on a temporary basis. State workforce agencies and three federal agenciesthe Departments of Labor, Homeland Security, and State review applications for such workers. GAO was asked to examine (1) any aspects of the application process that present challenges to agricultural employers, and (2) how federal agencies have addressed any employer challenges with the application process. GAO analyzed Labor and DHS data; interviewed agency officials and employer representatives; and conducted site visits in New York, North Carolina, and Washington.
What GAO Found
Over 90 percent of employer applications for H-2A workers were approved in fiscal year (FY) 2011, but some employers experienced processing delays. For example, the Department of Labor (Labor) processed 63 percent of applications in a timely manner in FY 2011, but 37 percent were processed after the deadline, including 7 percent that were approved less than 15 days before workers were needed. This left some employers little time for the second phase of the application process, which is managed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and for workers to obtain visas from the Department of State (State). Although workers can apply for visas online, most of the H-2A process involves paper handling, which contributes to processing delays. In addition, employers who need workers at different times of the season must repeat the entire process for each group of workers. Although the agencies lack data on the reasons for processing delays, employers reported delays due to increased scrutiny by Labor and DHS when these agencies implemented new rules and procedures intended to improve program integrity and protect workers. For example, in FY 2011, Labor notified 63 percent of employers that their applications required changes or additional documentation to comply with its new rules, up sharply from previous years.
Federal agencies are taking steps to improve the H-2A application process. Labor and DHS are developing new electronic application systems, but both agencies systems have been delayed. Labor also recently began using e-mail to resolve issues with employers, and all three agencies provided more information to employers to clarify program requirements. Even with these efforts, some employers view Labors decisions as inconsistent. For example, some employers received different decisions about issues such as whether they can require workers to have experience in farm work and questioned the methods states used to decide whether the job qualifications in their applications were acceptable. We found states used different methods to determine acceptable qualifications, which is allowed under Labors guidance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) Labor and DHS use their new electronic application systems to collect data on reasons applications are delayed and use this information to improve the timeliness of application processing; (2) Labor allow employers to submit one application for groups of similar workers needed in a single season; and (3) Labor review and revise, as appropriate, its guidance to states regarding methods for determining the acceptability of employment practices in employers applications. DHS and Labor agreed with the recommendation to collect additional data and Labor agreed with the recommendation to update its guidance. Labor disagreed with the recommendation it allow employers to apply once per season. GAO believes the recommendation is still valid and that a single application does not preclude timely testing of the labor market as workers are needed. |
gao_GAO-10-719 | gao_GAO-10-719_0 | How the Federal Government Acquired Its Equity Interest Varies by Institution, but Resulted from Assistance Aimed at Stabilizing Financial Markets, Housing Markets, or Individual Market Segments
The federal government’s equity interest was acquired in a variety of ways and resulted from assistance aimed at stabilizing markets or market segments. As of June 1, 2010, the government held an equity ownership interest in the form of preferred or common shares in the five major corporations—AIG, Chrysler, Citigroup, GM, GMAC—and the Enterprises. Of the 92 directors currently serving on these boards, 73 were elected since November 2008 (table 2). Many of these new directors were nominated to their respective boards because it was determined that a change in leadership was required as a result of the financial crisis, while others were designated by the government and other significant shareholders as a result of their common share ownership. Companies must adhere to the executive compensation and corporate governance rules as a condition for receiving TARP assistance. Nevertheless, SIGTARP and GAO found that the level of government involvement in the companies varied among the recipients, depending on whether Treasury and other federal entities are investors, creditors, or conservators. For example, Treasury’s involvement in Bank of America, Citigroup, and GMAC has been limited because, in exchange for its investments, Treasury—as an investor—initially received preferred shares that did not have voting rights except in certain limited circumstances, such as amendments to the company charter, in the case of certain mergers, and the election of directors to the companies’ boards in the event that dividends are not paid for several quarters. However, FHFA, as the Enterprises’ conservator and regulator, has instituted a number of requirements, policies, and practices that involve them in the Enterprises. Being both a creditor and a shareholder in private companies creates another conflict for the government. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to (1) describe how and why the government obtained an ownership interest in the companies, (2) evaluate the extent of government involvement in companies receiving exceptional assistance, (3) describe the government’s monitoring of the companies’ financial viability and exit strategies, and (4) discuss the implications of the government’s ongoing involvement in the companies. The report focused on companies receiving exceptional assistance from the federal government, including American Insurance Group (AIG), Bank of America Corporation (Bank of America), Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler), Citigroup, Inc. (Citigroup), General Motors Company (GM), and GMAC, Inc. (GMAC), as well as its involvement in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Enterprises). Troubled Asset Relief Program: Continued Stewardship Needed as Treasury Develops Strategies for Monitoring and Divesting Financial Interests in Chrysler and GM. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Status of Government Assistance Provided to AIG. | Why GAO Did This Study
The recent financial crisis resulted in a wide-ranging federal response that included providing extraordinary assistance to several major corporations. As a result of actions under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and others, the government was a shareholder in the American International Group Inc. (AIG); Bank of America; Citigroup, Inc. (Citigroup); Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler); General Motors Company (GM); Ally Financial/GMAC, Inc. (GMAC); and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Enterprises). The government ownership interest in these companies resulted from financial assistance that was aimed at stabilizing the financial markets, housing finance, or specific market segments. This report (1) describes the government's ownership interest and evaluates the extent of government involvement in these companies, (2) discusses the government's management and monitoring of its investments and exit strategies, and (3) identifies lessons learned from the federal actions. This work was done in part with the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) and involved reviewing relevant documentation related to these companies and the federal assistance provided. GAO interviewed officials at Treasury, Federal Reserve, Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and the banking regulators, as well as the senior executives and relevant officials at the companies that received exceptional assistance.
What GAO Found
The extent of government equity interest in companies receiving exceptional assistance varied and ranged from owning preferred shares with no voting rights except in limited circumstances (Bank of America until it repurchased its shares in 2009) to owning common shares with voting rights (Chrysler, Citigroup, GM, and GMAC) to acting as a conservator (the Enterprises). In each case, the government required changes to the companies' corporate governance structures and executive compensation. For example, of the 92 directors currently serving on boards of these companies, 73 were elected since November 2008. Many of these new directors were nominated by their respective boards, while others were designated by the government and other significant shareholders as a result of their common share ownership. The level of involvement in the companies varied depending on whether the government served as an investor, creditor, or conservator. For example, as an investor in Bank of America, Citigroup, and GMAC, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) had minimal or no involvement in their activities. As both an investor in and a creditor of AIG, Chrysler, and GM--as a condition of receiving assistance--the government has required some combination of the restructuring of their companies, the submission of periodic financial reports, and greater interaction with company personnel. FHFA--using its broad authority as a conservator--has instituted a number of requirements and practices that involve them in the Enterprises. |
gao_GAO-06-226T | gao_GAO-06-226T_0 | UN Budgeting Processes Limit OIOS’s Effectiveness
The ability of OIOS to carry out independent, effective oversight is impeded by the UN’s budgeting processes for the regular budget and funds from the assessed peacekeeping budget and voluntary contributions from funds and programs subject to OIOS’s oversight, which are known as extrabudgetary resources. The Secretariat’s budget office—over which OIOS has oversight authority—exercises control over OIOS’s regular budget, which may result in potential conflicts of interest. In addition, OIOS lacks control over extrabudgetary resources from UN funds and programs. OIOS negotiates its terms of work and payment for services with the manager of the program it intends to examine. However, if the entity does not agree to an OIOS examination or does not provide requested funding for OIOS to perform its work, OIOS cannot adequately perform its oversight responsibilities. OIOS’s Oversight Capacity Is Hindered by the UN’s Budgeting Processes for the Regular Budget
OIOS’s ability to carry out independent, effective oversight is hindered by the UN’s budgeting processes for its regular budget. A General Assembly resolution in the creation of OIOS stated that the new internal oversight body shall exercise operational independence and that the Secretary- General, when preparing the budget proposal for OIOS, should take into account the independence of the office. UN budgeting processes make it difficult for OIOS to reallocate its regular budget resources among OIOS locations worldwide or among its three divisions—internal audit; investigations; and monitoring, evaluation, and consulting services—to meet changing priorities. OIOS officials have stated that the office is under resourced, but they do not have a mechanism in place to determine appropriate staffing levels or to justify budget requests, except for peacekeeping oversight services. Officials provided us with several examples of work funded through the regular budget that they were unable to undertake due to resource constraints. The United Nations Has Made Progress but Has Yet to Fully Address Previously Identified Procurement Concerns
The United Nations has improved the clarity of its procurement manual, which now provides procurement staff with clearer guidance on UN procurement regulations and policies. However, the United Nations has yet to fully address several problems affecting the openness and professionalism of its procurement system. Specifically, concerns remain relating to an independent bid protest system, staff training and professional certification, and ethics regulations. The UN Procurement Service Has Improved the Clarity of its Procurement Manual
The UN Procurement Service has improved the clarity of its procurement manual. The manual now has detailed step-by-step instructions of the procurement process for both field and headquarters staff, including illustrative flow charts. The United Nations Has Not Established an Independent Bid Protest Process
The United Nations has not heeded a 1994 recommendation by a group of independent experts to establish an independent vendor bid protest process as soon as possible. As a result, UN vendors cannot protest the Procurement Service’s handling of their bids to an independent official or office. We reported in 1999 that such a process is an important aspect of an open procurement system. The United Nations Has Not Fully Addressed Concerns Regarding Certification and Training of Its Staff
The United Nations has not fully addressed longstanding concerns regarding the qualifications of its procurement staff. In addition, it has yet to determine the extent to which its training budget may need to increase to pay for these new programs. A June 2005 report by a UN contractor indicated that most UN headquarters Procurement Service officers and assistants have not been certified as to the level of their procurement experience and education. The contractor informed us that the UN’s level of certification was low compared with the level at other organizations. It has developed basic and advanced training curricula and provided training to staff at headquarters and in the field during 2004 and 2005. The Procurement Service has also begun developing a mandatory certification program. The United Nations Has Yet to Finalize Procurement Ethics Regulations
The United Nations has not yet acted on several proposals forwarded by the UN Procurement Service to clarify ethics regulations for procurement staff. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses internal oversight and procurement in the United Nations (UN). The findings of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the UN's Oil for Food Program have rekindled long-standing concerns about internal oversight and procurement at the United Nations. In addition, the UN's 2005 World Summit called for a host of reforms, from human rights, terrorism, and peace-building to economic development and management reform. Specifically, this testimony conveys our preliminary observations on the UN's budgeting processes as it relates to the ability of the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to perform independent and effective oversight. We will also discuss some of the UN's efforts to address problems affecting the openness and professionalism of its procurement system. We would like to emphasize that our comments reflect the preliminary results of two ongoing GAO engagements examining the UN's internal oversight and procurement services. We will issue reports covering a wide range of issues in both areas early next year.
What GAO Found
OIOS's ability to carry out independent, effective oversight over UN organizations is hindered by the UN's budgeting processes for its regular and extrabudgetary resources. In establishing OIOS in 1994, the General Assembly passed a resolution stating that OIOS should exercise operational independence in carrying out its oversight responsibilities and that the Secretary-General should take into account the independence of the office in preparing its budget. The Secretariat's budget office--over which OIOS has oversight authority--exercises control over OIOS's regular budget, which may result in conflicts of interest and infringe on OIOS's independence. In addition, UN budgeting processes make it difficult for OIOS to reallocate its regular budget resources among OIOS locations worldwide or among its three oversight divisions--internal audit; investigations; and monitoring, evaluation, and consulting services--to meet changing priorities. OIOS officials provided us with several examples of work funded through the regular budget that they were unable to undertake due to resource constraints. In addition, OIOS does not have a mechanism in place to identify or justify OIOS-wide staffing needs, except for peacekeeping oversight services. OIOS also lacks control over its extrabudgetary resources, which comprise 62 percent of its overall budget in fiscal biennium 2004-2005. The UN funds and programs that OIOS oversees maintain control over some of these resources since OIOS negotiates its terms of work and payment for services with the managers of the programs it intends to examine. If the entity does not agree to an OIOS examination or does not provide sufficient funding for OIOS to carry out its work, OIOS cannot adequately perform its oversight responsibilities. The United Nations has made progress in improving the clarity of its procurement manual but has yet to fully address previously identified concerns affecting the lack of openness and professionalism of its procurement system. Specifically, concerns remain relating to an independent bid protest system, staff training and professional certification, and ethics regulations. In 2002, the United Nations revised its procurement manual, which now provides staff with clearer guidance on UN procurement regulations and policies, including more detailed step-by-step instructions of the procurement process than it had when we reported in 1999. However, the Secretariat has yet to enhance the openness of the procurement system by heeding a 1994 recommendation by outside experts that it establish an independent bid protest process. At present, vendors cannot file complaints with an independent official or office if they believe that the UN Procurement Service has not handled their bids appropriately. As a result, senior UN officials may not be made aware of problems in the procurement process. In addition, the United Nations has not fully addressed longstanding concerns affecting the professional qualifications of its procurement workforce. The Procurement Service is developing a new training curriculum and a professional certification program. It has trained some procurement staff as instructors but has yet to complete training curricula. In addition, the United Nations still needs to develop the individual training profiles necessary to determine the extent of its training requirements. A June 2005 report by an independent contractor indicated that most headquarters procurement officers and procurement assistants do not possess professional procurement certifications. According to the contractor, the level of certification was low in comparison to other organizations. Further, the United Nations has yet to adopt several internal proposals to clarify UN ethics regulations for procurement staff and vendors, such as a code of conduct. |
gao_GAO-03-9 | gao_GAO-03-9_0 | Scope and Methodology
To address the objectives in this report, we selected two regional offices (Region VI, Dallas, and Region IX, San Francisco) and three diverse programs (Head Start, Child Support Enforcement, and the Community Services Block Grant) that represent ACF’s self-described best examples of how managers used performance information to inform the resource allocation process. We also obtained staff and management views on the challenges to further budget and performance integration. Budget Formulation and Performance Planning Are Closely Related but Are Not Completely Integrated
ACF’s GPRA planning process follows the budget process and must be completed according to the budget timeline, but formulation does not begin with a formal look-back at program performance to help shape the upcoming year’s budget request and performance plan; thus, the processes are not yet completely integrated. At the program level, ACF officials told us that training and technical assistance (T/TA) and salaries and expense funds are often allocated based on program performance and needs. Linking Resources to Results Is an Evolving Process
While ACF has progressed in better aligning its resources with program goals and desired results, almost all managers and staff we spoke with recognized that strengthening the link between resources and results is a work in progress, and that many challenges still need to be addressed before ACF can more fully integrate budget and planning. ACF has begun to identify and implement mitigation strategies to address these issues. Third-Party Issues Limit ACF’s Ability to Work towards National Performance Goals and to Collect, Verify, and Report Performance Information
ACF conducts much of its work through “third parties”—states, localities, and other non-federal service providers—which often limits the extent to which ACF directly influences program outcomes. Difficulty Isolating a Particular Program’s Effect on Outcomes Affects ACF’s Ability to Determine Program Effectiveness
Since ACF is part of a network of federal, state, local, and nongovernmental efforts aimed at improving long-term social health and social outcomes, attributing a particular outcome to any particular effort can be a great challenge. Organizational Culture Change Seen as Needed to Strengthen Performance and Budget Integration Is a Slow Process
ACF and HHS officials repeatedly told us that the culture change necessary to support and strengthen the linkages between resources and results takes time but is beginning to take root. Managers and staff also report a clearer understanding of the difference between outputs and outcomes, and the use of outcome measures is becoming more common. Also, linking employees’ day-to-day activities to goals and priorities through such instruments as outcome-based employee performance contracts has brought encouraging results to the region. In turn, staff can help grantees take advantage of these linkages in their own programs. The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of the Assistant Secretary for Budget, Technology and Finance, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Encouraging a clearer and closer link between budgeting, planning, and performance is essential to improving federal management and instilling a greater focus on results. Through work at various levels within the organization, this report on the Administration for Children and Families (ACF)--and its two companion studies on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (GAO-03-258) and the Veterans Health Administration (GAO-03-10)--records (1) what managers considered successful efforts at creating linkages between planning and performance information to influence resource choices and (2) the challenges managers face in creating these linkages.
What GAO Found
The Administration for Children and Families' (ACF) budget and performance planning processes are clearly related but are not fully integrated. Budget and planning align more closely after ACF sends the budget request and performance plan to the Department of Health and Human Services for review. Finally, unlike budget formulation, budget execution largely occurs in the regional offices, where resource allocation is often driven by program performance. Officials in ACF's Head Start, Child Support Enforcement, and Community Services Block Grant programs described three general ways in which decisions at the programmatic level are influenced by performance: (1) training and technical assistance money is often allocated based on needs and grantee performance, (2) partnerships and collaboration help ACF work with grantees towards common goals and further the administration's agenda, and (3) organizing and allocating regional staff around agency goals allow employees to link their day-to-day activities to longer-term results and outcomes. While ACF must overcome some difficult barriers to further budget and performance integration, it has begun to identify and implement mitigation strategies for some of these issues. For example, ACF conducts much of its work through nonfederal service providers, which often limits the extent to which ACF can influence national performance goals and can seriously complicate data collection. To address this, ACF has successfully collaborated with providers to develop national performance goals and build data collection capacity. This has also raised awareness of the importance of collecting and reporting performance data uniformly. Since ACF programs are often only part of a network of long-term federal, state, and local efforts to address serious health and social concerns, attributing a particular outcome to a particular program can be difficult. ACF has addressed this issue by using program evaluations to help isolate the effects of a particular program, strengthening the link between outputs and outcomes, and identifying intermediate outputs and outcomes to help measure program performance. The organizational culture change necessary to support the linkages between resources and results takes time, but change is beginning to take root. Some managers and staff reported a noticeable difference in the use and understanding of outcomes versus outputs, and outcome-based performance agreements for managers and staff are becoming more common. |
gao_GAO-14-501 | gao_GAO-14-501_0 | VA may use these authorities to enter into agreements that include outleases, licenses, permits, sharing agreements, and EUL agreements with public or private entities to use land and buildings for revenue or in-kind consideration. According to VA, it uses this system to evaluate property management by its administrations, regional networks, and medical centers. VA Does Not Maintain Reliable Data on the Number of Land-use Agreements and Their Associated Revenues
Based on our review of land-use agreement data for fiscal year 2012, VA does not maintain reliable data on the total number of land-use agreements and VA did not accurately estimate the revenues those agreements generate.provided to us from VA’s CAI system, VA reported that it had over 400 land-use agreements with over $24.8 million in estimated revenues for fiscal year 2012. VHA also noted in its revisions that there were 13 agreements that had been terminated prior to fiscal year 2012 that should have been removed from the system. However, on the basis of our independent review of revenue receipts, we found that 5 agreements generated more than $240,000 in revenue in fiscal year 2012. By implementing a mechanism that will allow it to assess whether medical centers have timely entered the appropriate land-use agreement data into CAI, and working with the medical centers to correct the data, as needed, VA would be better positioned to reliably account for land-use agreements and the associated revenues that they generate. Additional Monitoring at Three VA Medical Centers Could Improve the Billing and Revenue- Collection Process for Land-use Agreements
Weaknesses Noted in Various Aspects of the Revenue Collection Process at the Selected Medical Centers
At the three medical centers we visited, we found weaknesses with the billing and collection processes that impair VA’s ability to effectively and timely collect land-use agreement revenues from its sharing partners. As a result and according to a VA New York fiscal official, VA did not bill the sharing partner for several years’ rent that totaled over $1 million. After it discovered this error, VA began to take collection action on the unpaid rent in 2012, but over $200,000 in delinquent rent remained outstanding as of April 2014. At the North Chicago medical center, VA officials did not bill one of its sharing partners for about $3,000 for the month of August 2012. VA Did Not Effectively Monitor Many of Its Land-use Agreements at Two of the Three Selected Medical Centers
VA did not effectively monitor the status of the land-use agreements at the medical center level for two selected sites that we visited. Original Payment Terms with Nonprofit Organization Not Enforced. Because of the lack of monitoring, one sharing partner— a local School of Medicine—with seven expired agreements remained on the property and occupied the premises without written authorization during fiscal year 2012. The City of Los Angeles has utilized a 12-acre field—Barrington Park—on VA property for recreational use (e.g., dog park and baseball fields) without a written agreement. VA officials acknowledged that they had not performed systematic reviews of these agreements and had not established mechanisms to enable them to do so. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve the quality of the data collected on specific land-use agreements (i.e., sharing, outleases, licenses, and permits), enhance the monitoring of its revenue process and monitoring of agreements, and improve the accountability of the VA in this area, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs take the following six actions: develop a mechanism to independently verify the accuracy, validity, and completeness of VHA data for land-use agreements in CAI; develop mechanisms to: monitor the billing and collection of revenues for land-use agreements to help ensure that transactions are promptly and accurately recorded at the three medical centers; foster collaboration between key offices to improve billing and collections practices at the New York and North Chicago medical centers; and access and monitor the status of land-use agreements to help ensure that agreement terms are enforced, agreements are renewed as appropriate, and all agreements are documented in writing as required at the New York and West Los Angeles selected medical centers; develop a plan for the West Lost Angeles medical center that identifies the steps to be taken, timelines, and responsibilities in implementing segregation of duties over the billing and collections process; and develop guidance on managing expiring agreements at the three medical centers. Agency Comments
We provided the Departments of Veterans Affairs with a draft of this report for its review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA manages one of the nation's largest federal property portfolios. To manage these properties, VA uses land-use authorities that allow VA to enter into various types of agreements for the use of its property in exchange for revenues or in-kind considerations. GAO was asked to examine VA's use of land-use agreements.
This report addresses the extent to which VA (1) maintains reliable data on land-use agreements and the revenue they generate, (2) monitors the billing and collection processes at selected VA medical centers, and (3) monitors land-use agreements at selected VA medical centers. GAO analyzed data from VA's database on its land-use agreements for fiscal year 2012, reviewed agency documentation, and interviewed VA officials. GAO also visited three medical centers to review the monitoring of land-use agreements and the collection and billing of the associated revenues. GAO selected medical centers with the largest number of agreements or highest amount of estimated revenue. The site visit results cannot be generalized to all VA facilities.
What GAO Found
According to the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Capital Asset Inventory system—the system VA utilizes to record land-use agreements and revenues—VA had hundreds of land-use agreements with tens of millions of dollars in estimated revenues for fiscal year 2012, but GAO's review raised questions about the reliability of those data. For example, one land-use agreement was recorded 37 times, once for each building listed in the agreement, 13 agreements terminated before fiscal year 2012 had not been removed from the system, and more than $240,000 in revenue from one medical center had not been recorded. VA relies on local medical center staff to enter data timely and accurately, but lacks a mechanism for independently verifying the data. Implementing such a mechanism and working with medical centers to make corrections as needed would better position VA to reliably account for its land-use agreements and the associated revenues they generate.
GAO found weaknesses in the billing and collection processes for land-use agreements at three selected VA medical centers due primarily to ineffective monitoring. For example, VA incorrectly billed its sharing partners for 14 of 34 agreements at the three centers, which resulted in VA not billing $300,000 of the nearly $5.3 million owed. In addition, at the New York center, VA had not billed a sharing partner for several years' rent that totaled over $1 million. VA began collections after discovering the error; over $200,000 was outstanding as of April 2014. VA stated that it did not perform systematic reviews of the billing and collection practices at the three centers and had not established mechanisms to do so. VA officials at the New York and North Chicago centers stated that information is also not timely shared on the status of agreements with offices that perform billing due to lack of collaboration. Until VA addresses these issues, VA lacks assurance that it is collecting the revenues owed by its sharing partners.
VA did not effectively monitor many of its land-use agreements at two of the centers. GAO found problems with unenforced agreement terms, expired agreements, and instances where land-use agreements did not exist. Examples include the following:
In West Los Angeles, VA waived the revenues in an agreement with a nonprofit organization—$250,000 in fiscal year 2012 alone—due to financial hardship. However, VA policy does not allow revenues to be waived.
In New York, one sharing partner—a local School of Medicine—with seven expired agreements remained on the property and occupied the premises without written authorization during fiscal year 2012.
The City of Los Angeles has used 12 acres of VA land for recreational use since the 1980s without a signed agreement or payments to VA. An official said that VA cannot negotiate agreements due to an ongoing lawsuit brought on behalf of homeless veterans about its land-use agreement authority.
VA does not perform systematic reviews and has not established mechanisms to do so, thus hindering its ability to effectively monitor its agreements and use of its properties.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations to VA including recommendations to improve the quality of its data, foster collaboration between key offices, and enhance monitoring. VA concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-868 | gao_GAO-04-868_0 | Radio frequencies, or channels, carry the information. The Coast Guard Has Taken Advantage of Opportunities for Quick AIS Installation, but Much Work Remains
The total cost and time frame for the development of a nationwide AIS remain uncertain. The Coast Guard expects planning for the technical requirements to be completed between December 2004 and February 2005. According to the Coast Guard, the cost estimate is preliminary, because geographic and other factors are expected to significantly affect the cost of installation at different locations, and the impacts are yet to be determined. Bringing AIS into service in the 10 VTS areas should improve vessel- monitoring capability at these locations. On the basis of its experience installing AIS in the VTS areas, the Coast Guard estimates that installing AIS equipment nationwide could cost between $62 million and $165 million—a preliminary estimate that one Coast Guard official responsible for reviewing such programs characterizes as “ballpark.”
Long-Range Planning for Nationwide AIS Installation Now Under Way
At the same time the Coast Guard is completing installation of AIS equipment in the 10 VTS areas, it is also planning for nationwide AIS installation, in waters where most of the needed infrastructure is not now available. Challenge and Opportunity Could Affect Nationwide AIS Development
As of June 2004, the continuing dispute between MariTEL and the Coast Guard over various frequency issues was in the hands of FCC, which expected to respond in summer 2004. At issue are competing views over the use of the internationally designated AIS frequencies. Depending on how FCC responds, and any subsequent actions by the interested parties, one factor that offers an opportunity to lower the federal government’s costs is the demonstrated or expressed willingness of certain local port entities to shoulder the expense and responsibility for AIS installation if they, along with the Coast Guard, can use AIS data for their own purposes. Then in February 2004, citing a desire to protect its licensed rights and to reach a quick “resolution to the AIS frequency controversy,” MariTEL submitted a proposal to FCC, “to share its licensed rights to channels 87B and 88B for use by ship stations and by the USCG at no cost.” In this proposal, MariTEL generally agreed with NTIA’s proposal to use channels 87B and 88B only for AIS, but unlike NTIA, it sought to limit access to the signals to ships, MariTEL, the Coast Guard, and the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. The inability of vessels to broadcast and monitor the U.S frequencies and the internationally designated AIS frequencies simultaneously heightens the risk of collisions. Depending on FCC’s Response, Local Needs for AIS Data Create a Possible Cost-Sharing Opportunity
An opportunity that may help the Coast Guard speed AIS installation at lower cost to the federal government is potential partnerships between the Coast Guard and local port entities. Conclusions
The development of AIS nationwide is an important step in the overall effort to increase port safety and security. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Communications Commission. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of international efforts to ensure maritime safety and security--and to carry out its mandates under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002--the U.S. Coast Guard is developing an automatic identification system (AIS) that should enable it to monitor ships traveling to and through U.S. waters. For AIS to operate nationwide, ships need equipment to transmit and receive AIS signals, and the Coast Guard needs shore stations and designated radio frequencies to keep track of the ships' identities and movements. Yet unresolved frequency issues between the Coast Guard and a private company, MariTEL, have come before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). GAO reviewed federal agencies' progress in developing AIS nationwide and identified certain challenges and opportunities in completing the work.
What GAO Found
Because the Coast Guard is in the early stages of progress toward nationwide AIS development, the total cost and completion time are uncertain. The Coast Guard has taken advantage of opportunities to bring AIS into service quickly in 10 areas where vessel-monitoring technology already exists, and it is simultaneously defining and planning for full nationwide coverage. The Coast Guard has only preliminary cost estimates for a nationwide system, because geographic and other factors will affect installation at different locations. The Coast Guard estimates that planning and testing will be completed, and a request for proposals from potential contractors issued, between December 2004 and February 2005. The Coast Guard faces both challenges and potential opportunities in its development of a nationwide AIS. Nationwide development depends in part on how FCC resolves a continuing dispute between federal agencies and MariTEL over issues including who should have access to the internationally designated AIS frequencies and for what uses. To help protect its licensed rights to certain frequencies, MariTEL generally seeks either sole control over the international standard AIS frequencies or shared control with ships and the federal government. The federal government seeks a resolution that will reserve the internationally designated frequencies for AIS use by government and nongovernment entities. FCC expects to respond in summer 2004. This response--and whether it leads to any additional actions on the part of the interested parties--could affect the overall cost and pace of nationwide AIS development. Depending on FCC's response, one factor that offers an opportunity to reduce federal costs is that some local port entities are willing to assume the expense and responsibility for AIS construction if they can use AIS data, along with the Coast Guard, for their own purposes. |
gao_GAO-07-376 | gao_GAO-07-376_0 | A program should not go forward into product development unless a sound business case can be made. DOD’s acquisition policy has adopted the knowledge- based approach to acquisitions. Finally, we analyzed the costs and funding estimates made to execute the FCS business case. The elements of a sound business case were not reasonably present, and we noted that the Army would continue building basic knowledge in areas such as requirements and technologies for several more years. This progress has necessitated making significant trade-offs to reconcile requirements with technical feasibility. Those challenges include completing the definition of all system-level requirements for all FCS systems and the information network (including addressing the “to-be-determined” items and issues to be resolved); completing the preliminary designs for all FCS systems and clearly demonstrating that FCS key performance parameters are obtaining a declaration from the Army user community that the likely outcomes of the FCS program will meet its projected needs; clearly demonstrating that the FCS program will provide capabilities that are clearly as good as or better than those available with current Army forces, a key tenet set out by the Army as it started the FCS development program in 2003; mitigating FCS technical risks to significantly lower levels; and making demonstrable progress towards meeting key FCS goals including weight reduction, reliability improvement, and average unit production cost reduction. Army Reports Significant Progress, but Major Technological Challenges Remain
The Army has made progress in the areas of critical technologies, complementary programs, and software development. Although the program has been successful in developing some technologies and demonstrating early capabilities, the status of its critical technologies is uncertain. FCS software integration performance and development. The first phase has a corresponding spin-out of mature FCS capabilities to current forces. This will have an impact on program cost, but full details are not yet available. Conclusions
The Army has been granted a lot of latitude to carry out a large program like FCS this far into development with relatively little demonstrated knowledge. Tangible progress has been made during the year in several areas, including requirements and technology. Such progress warrants recognition, but not confidence. Confidence comes from high levels of demonstrated knowledge, which are yet to come. Following the preliminary design review in 2009, there should be enough knowledge demonstrated to assess FCS’s prospects for success. ); a definition of acceptable levels of technology, design, and production maturity to be demonstrated at the critical design review and the production decision; an assessment of how well the FCS acquisition strategy and test plan will be able to demonstrate those levels of maturity; a determination of likely costs to develop, produce, and support the FCS that is informed by an independent cost estimate and supported by an acceptable confidence level; and a determination that the budget levels the Army is likely to receive will be sufficient to develop, produce, and support the FCS at expected levels of cost. Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features, Risks, and Alternatives, GAO-04-635T. Defense Acquisitions: Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges, GAO-01-311. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Future Combat System (FCS) is central to Army transformation efforts, comprising 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network. In previous work, GAO found that the elements of a sound business case--firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding--were not present. As a result, FCS is considered high risk and in need of special oversight and review. Congress has mandated that the Department of Defense (DOD) decide in early 2009 whether FCS should continue. GAO is required to review the program annually. In this report, GAO analyzes FCS development, including its requirements definition; status of critical technologies, software development, and complementary programs; soundness of its acquisition strategy related to design, production and spin-out of capabilities to current forces; and reasonableness of costs and sufficiency of funding.
What GAO Found
The Army has been granted a lot of latitude to carry out a large program like FCS this far into development with relatively little demonstrated knowledge. Tangible progress has been made during the year in several areas, including requirements and technology. Such progress warrants recognition, but confidence that the program can deliver as promised depends on high levels of demonstrated knowledge, which are yet to come. Following the preliminary design review in 2009, there should be enough knowledge to demonstrate the soundness of the FCS business case. If significant doubts remain about the program's executability at that time, DOD will have to consider alternatives to proceeding with the program. Currently, GAO sees the FCS business case as follows. Requirements--Progress has been made in defining requirements and making some difficult trade-offs, but key assumptions about the performance of immature technologies and other technical risks remain to be proven. Technology--The Army has made progress in maturing technologies, but it will take several more years to reach full maturity. All key technologies should have been mature in 2003 when the program began. FCS software has doubled in size compared to original estimates and faces significant risks. The Army is attempting a disciplined approach to managing software development. Acquisition Strategy--The FCS acquisition strategy is compressed. Key testing to demonstrate FCS performance will not be completed, and maturity of design and production will not be demonstrated until after the production decision. Program Costs--New estimates place FCS costs significantly above the current estimate of $163.7 billion. The Army has recently proposed a plan to buy fewer systems and slow production rates. This recent program adjustment will affect program costs, but details are not yet available. |
gao_GAO-09-539T | gao_GAO-09-539T_0 | Treasury’s Strategy for Deploying TARP Funds Continues to Evolve, Though CPP Remains Key Effort to Stabilize Financial Market
As of March 27, 2009, Treasury had disbursed $303.4 billion of the $700 billion in TARP funds (see table). Most of the funds (about $199 billion) went to purchase preferred shares of 532 financial institutions under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP)—Treasury’s primary vehicle under TARP for stabilizing financial markets. For example, it recently expanded monthly surveys of the largest institutions’ lending activity to cover all CPP participants, as GAO recommended. At this point, Treasury has not taken steps to verify this information or require the institutions to provide any additional documentation. As recommended in our December 2008 report, we continue to believe that Treasury should develop a formal system to help ensure compliance with the agreements and leverage the oversight activities of the bank regulators by having them include compliance with the agreements as part of their ongoing examinations. OFS had received approximately $2.9 billion in dividends through March 20, 2009, from its investments in CPP and certain other programs. Treasury has also continued to take steps to articulate a more clearly defined vision for TARP; and, in February 2009, it provided its strategy for using its remaining funds. Specifically, Treasury announced the Financial Stability Plan, which outlines a set of measures to address the financial crisis and restore confidence in the U.S. financial and housing markets. In particular, it has announced its plans to participate in the purchase of troubled assets through public-private partnerships and launched a homeownership protection program, both activities consistent with the original plans for TARP. Therefore we recommended in our March 2009 report that Treasury develop a communication strategy that includes building understanding and support for the various components of the program and suggested specific actions, such as hiring a communications officer, integrating communications into TARP operations, and scheduling regular and ongoing contact with congressional committees and members, among other actions. While Treasury has announced $70 billion dollars in assistance to AIG—more assistance than has been provided to any other single institution to date—it has yet to disperse the up to $30 billion of additional assistance or finalize the terms under which the assistance will be provided. Following the announcement of Treasury’s Homeownership Affordability and Stability Plan, in March 2009, Treasury released information on its Making Home Affordable Program. As part of our oversight responsibilities for TARP, we are monitoring Treasury’s implementation of AIFP, including the development of the required restructuring plans. Treasury Continues to Make Progress in Establishing OFS
Treasury has also made progress in establishing its management infrastructure, which includes five of our nine recommendations from our January 2009 report related to hiring, contracting, and establishing its internal controls. OFS has begun to build a financial reporting structure, including addressing the key accounting and financial reporting issues necessary to enable it to prepare financial statements and receive an audit opinion on those statements at this fiscal year end. Indicators Suggest Mixed Developments in the Credit Markets, but Isolating the Impact of TARP Continues to Present Challenges
Finally, we again note that while isolating the effect of TARP’s activities continues to be difficult, conditions appear to have generally improved in various credit markets since the announcement of the first TARP program. However, some indicators demonstrate that, since our January 2009 report, the cost of credit continues to increase in interbank and corporate bond markets and decrease in mortgage markets, while perceptions of risk (as measured by premiums over Treasury securities) have declined in interbank and mortgage markets and risen in corporate debt markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our work on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), under which the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has the authority to purchase and insure up to $700 billion in troubled assets held by financial institutions through its Office of Financial Stability (OFS). As Congress may know, Treasury was granted this authority in response to the financial crisis that has threatened the stability of the U.S. banking system and the solvency of numerous financial institutions. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (the act) that authorized TARP on October 3, 2008, requires GAO to report at least every 60 days on the findings resulting from our oversight of the actions taken under the program. We are also responsible for auditing TARP's annual financial statements and for producing special reports on any issues that emerge from our oversight. To carry out these oversight responsibilities, we have assembled interdisciplinary teams with a wide range of technical skills, including financial market and public policy analysts, accountants, lawyers, and economists who represent combined resources from across GAO. This testimon is based primarily on our March 31, 2009 report that we are issuing today--the third under the act's mandate, which covers the actions taken as part of TARP through March 27, 2009, and follows up on the recommendations we made in our previous reports.
What GAO Found
As of March 27, 2009, Treasury had disbursed $303.4 billion of the $700 billion in TARP funds. Most of the funds (about $199 billion) went to purchase preferred shares of 532 financial institutions under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP)--Treasury's primary vehicle under TARP for stabilizing financial markets. Treasury has continued to take significant steps to address all of the recommendations from our December 2008 and January 2009 reports. In particular, Treasury has recently expanded the scope of the monthly CPP surveys of the largest institutions to include all institutions participating in the program, which is intended to provide Treasury with information necessary to begin to track the effectiveness of the program. Treasury also continued to make progress in several other areas, including requiring firms participating in certain new programs to show how assistance will expand lending. These requirements will better enable Treasury to determine what institutions plan to do with any capital infusions and to track the resulting lending activity of participating institutions on a regular basis. In addition, we specifically found that though Treasury is now receiving dividends from the investments it has made in CPP and certain other programs, it has not publicly reported these receipts, which totaled almost $2.9 billion through March 20, 2009. In February 2009, Treasury announced its broad strategy for using the remaining TARP funds and provided the details for its major components in the following weeks. Specifically, Treasury announced the Financial Stability Plan, which outlined a comprehensive set of measures to help address the financial crisis and restore confidence in our financial markets, and a Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan to mitigate foreclosures and preserve homeownership. While articulating its plan was an important first step, Treasury continues to struggle with developing an effective overall communication strategy that is integrated into TARP operations. Without such a strategy, Treasury may face challenges, should it need additional funding for the program. Also, while Treasury has announced up to $70 billion dollars in assistance to AIG--more assistance than has been announced for any other single institution to date--it has yet to disperse the up to $30 billion of additional assistance or finalize the agreement. We continue to note the difficulty of measuring the effect of TARP's activities. Developments in the credit markets have generally been mixed since our January 2009 report. Some indicators revealed that the cost of credit has increased in interbank and corporate bond markets and decreased in mortgage markets, while perceptions of risk (as measured by premiums over Treasury securities) have declined in interbank and mortgage markets and risen in corporate debt markets. |
gao_GAO-06-374T | gao_GAO-06-374T_0 | Currently, U.S. air carriers conduct passenger prescreening by comparing passenger names against government-supplied terrorist watch lists and applying the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System rules, known as CAPPS rules. TSA Has Not Followed a Disciplined Life Cycle Process or Fully Defined System Requirements but Plans to Address These Issues
Based on evaluations of major federal information technology programs like Secure Flight, and research by others, following a disciplined life cycle management process in which key activities and phases of the project are conducted in a logical and orderly process and are fully documented, helps ensure that programs achieve intended goals within acceptable levels of cost and risk. Rather, program officials stated that they have used a rapid development method that was intended to enable them to develop the program more quickly. Rather the process has been ad hoc, with project activities conducted out of sequence. Without clarification on these decision points, the program is at risk of failure. Defining and documenting system requirements is integral to life cycle development. 2). 1 for an overview of this process). Comprehensive System Security Management Program Has Not Yet Been Established in Accordance with Federal Guidance
TSA has taken steps to implement an information system security management program for protecting Secure Flight information and assets. Until an updated program management plan and related schedules and cost estimates and expenditure plans, are prepared for Secure Flight—which should be developed despite program uncertainties, and updated as more information is gained—TSA and Congress will not be able to provide complete oversight over the program’s progress in meeting established commitments. However, TSA has not yet provided information and technical requirements that all stakeholders need to finalize their plans to support the program’s operations, and to adequately plan for the resources needed to do so. TSA has also begun to address air carriers’ questions about forthcoming Secure Flight requirements. Rather, TSA has decided that it will continue developing the Secure Flight application, which includes TSA’s name- matching technologies. Key Factors That Will Influence the Effectiveness of Secure Flight Have Not Been Finalized or Resolved
Several activities are under way, or are to be decided, that will affect Secure Flight’s effectiveness, including how operational testing is conducted, and how data requirements and data accuracy are determined. For example, TSA used historic air carrier passenger data from June 2004 and historic and simulated watch list data to test the functionality and effectiveness of Secure Flight’s name-matching technologies that match air carrier passenger records with potential terrorists in the TSDB. Key Policy Decisions That Will Impact System Effectiveness Have Not Been Made
Key policy decisions that will influence the effectiveness of Secure Flight in identifying passengers who should undergo additional security scrutiny have not yet been made. Further, according to TSA officials, the agency is in the process of developing but has not issued the system of records notice, which is required by the Privacy Act, or the privacy impact assessment, which is required by the E-Government Act, that would describe how TSA considered privacy in the development of the system and how it will protect passenger data once the system becomes operational. TSA Has Not Determined Secure Flight’s Redress Process
Congress mandates that Secure Flight include a process whereby aviation passengers determined to pose a threat to aviation security may appeal that determination and correct erroneous information contained within the prescreening system. When we reported on Secure Flight in March 2005, TSA had committed to take action on our recommendations to manage the risks associated with developing and implementing Secure Flight, including finalizing the concept of operations, system requirements and test plans; completing formal agreements with CBP and air carriers to obtain passenger data; developing life cycle cost estimates and a comprehensive set of critical performance measures; issuing new privacy notices; and putting a redress process in place. Over the past 11 months, TSA has made some progress on all of these areas, including conducting further testing of factors that could influence system effectiveness and corroborating with key stakeholders. To its credit, TSA has recently taken actions that recognize the need to instill more rigor and discipline into the development and management of Secure Flight, including hiring a program manager with information systems program management credentials. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the events of September 11, 2001, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and directed it to assume the function of passenger prescreening--or the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists to identify persons who should undergo additional security scrutiny--for domestic flights, which is currently performed by the air carriers. To do so, TSA is developing Secure Flight. This testimony covers TSA's progress and challenges in (1) developing, managing, and overseeing Secure Flight; (2) coordinating with key stakeholders critical to program operations; (3) addressing key factors that will impact system effectiveness; and (4) minimizing impacts on passenger privacy and protecting passenger rights. This testimony includes information on areas of congressional interest that GAO has previously reported on.
What GAO Found
TSA has made some progress in developing and testing the Secure Flight program. However, TSA has not followed a disciplined life cycle approach to manage systems development, or fully defined system requirements. Rather, TSA has followed a rapid development method intended to develop the program quickly. This process has been ad hoc, resulting in project activities being conducted out of sequence, requirements not being fully defined, and documentation containing contradictory information or omissions. Further, while TSA has taken steps to implement an information security management program for protecting information and assets, its efforts are incomplete. Finally, TSA is proceeding to develop Secure Flight without a program management plan containing program schedule and cost estimates. Oversight reviews of the program have also raised questions about program management. Without following a more rigorous and disciplined life cycle process, including defining system requirements, the Secure Flight program is at serious risk of not meeting program goals. Over the past year, TSA has made some progress in managing risks associated with developing Secure Flight, and has recently taken actions that recognize the need to install more rigor and discipline into the development process. TSA has also taken steps to collaborate with Secure Flight stakeholders whose participation is essential to ensuring that passenger and terrorist watch list data are collected and transmitted to support Secure Flight. However, key program stakeholders--including the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Terrorist Screening Center, and air carriers--stated that they need more definitive information about system requirements from TSA to plan for their support of the program. In addition, several activities that will affect Secure Flight's effectiveness are under way, or have not yet been decided. For example, TSA conducted name-matching tests, which compared passenger and terrorist screening database data, to evaluate the ability of the system to function. However, TSA has not yet made key policy decisions which could significantly impact program operations, including what passenger data it will require air carriers to provide and the name-matching technologies it will use. Further, Secure Flight's system development documentation does not fully explain how passenger privacy protections are to be met, and TSA has not issued the privacy notices that describe how it will protect passenger data once Secure Flight becomes operational. As a result, it is not possible to assess how TSA is addressing privacy concerns. TSA is also determining how it will provide for redress, as mandated by Congress, to provide aviation passengers with a process to appeal determinations made by the program and correct erroneous information contained within the prescreening process. However, TSA has not finalized its redress polices. |
gao_NSIAD-95-55 | gao_NSIAD-95-55_0 | Appendix II describes the Army’s nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel. Although the method for destroying binary chemical weapons has not been determined, the Army estimates that, subject to the availability of funds, it can destroy the binary weapons within 10 years for $190 million. With appropriate funding, the Army estimates that the destruction of recovered chemical items can be completed within 10 years, at a cost of $110 million. The Army estimates that it will take 10 years and $420 million to dispose of former chemical weapon production facilities. 1.) Lessons From the Stockpile Disposal Program Should Be Applied to the Nonstockpile Planning Process and Cost and Schedule Estimates
Because both chemical disposal programs involve similar environmental requirements and potentially similar disposal methods, many of the lessons learned from the stockpile disposal program may apply to the nonstockpile program. In the 1990s, we reported that the Army did not adequately anticipate and plan for (1) the time needed to obtain the necessary environmental approvals and permits for the stockpile disposal program and (2) the strong public opposition to the chemical weapons incineration process. However, lessons learned were not discussed in the Army’s 1993 survey and analysis report on the nonstockpile program. In its 1993 report, the Army reported that changes to environmental regulations could significantly affect its estimated disposal cost and schedule for the nonstockpile disposal program. As a result of these problems, the Army has not achieved its expected disposal rates for the stockpile program. To identify lessons learned from the Army’s stockpile disposal program, we reviewed our previous reports and testimonies and their supporting documentation. The activity’s office of Program Manager for Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel is responsible for collecting and analyzing data on nonstockpile chemical materiel; identifying and assessing sites with possible buried chemical warfare materiel; coordinating the transportation of recovered chemical weapons to locations for interim storage; destroying recovered chemical warfare materiel on-site as needed to protect the general public and environment; researching, developing, evaluating, and selecting disposal methods for all destroying binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical weapons, and former production facilities in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in compliance with public safety and environmental requirements and regulations, and in coordination with the potentially affected public; and reclaiming and destroying buried chemical warfare materiel in the interest of safeguarding the general public and environment. State governments and communities affected by the nonstockpile disposal program provide information for and have input into the Army’s decision-making process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's nonstockpile disposal program, focusing on: (1) the Army's planning process for the nonstockpile disposal program; (2) the Army's estimated disposal cost and schedule; and (3) applicable lessons learned from the Army's stockpile disposal program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Army has not finalized plans for its nonstockpile disposal program because it has not fully identified the amount of materiel to be destroyed or appropriate disposal methods; (2) the Army believes it can dispose of binary chemical weapons within 10 years for $190 million, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel within 5 years for $210 million, and recovered chemical weapons within 10 years for $110 million; (3) the Army has limited information on buried chemical warfare materiel, which it estimates will take 40 years to find and destroy at a cost of $16.6 billion; (4) the Army's nonstockpile disposal program will likely be affected by the same issues as the stockpile program, including compliance with federal, state, and local laws and regulations, obtaining environmental approvals and permits, and strong public opposition to chemical weapons incineration and transportation; (5) although the Army said it applied lessons learned from the stockpile disposal program to the nonstockpile disposal program, its 1993 survey and analysis report on the nonstockpile program did not discuss those lessons; and (6) the Army's estimated cost and schedule for the nonstockpile disposal program are likely to increase, since the Army has limited experience in destroying nonstockpile materiel and will likely encounter difficulties similar to those experienced in the stockpile disposal program. |
gao_GAO-04-660 | gao_GAO-04-660_0 | CMS is also responsible for monitoring the adequacy of state survey activities. The standards differentiate between “existing” and “new” facilities. Despite Effectiveness, Cost Has Been a Barrier to Requiring Sprinklers for All Older Nursing Homes
Although there has never been a multiple-death fire in a fully sprinklered nursing home, cost has been an impediment to requiring all homes to install automatic sprinklers. The decline in multiple-death fires with the introduction and enforcement of fire safety standards was also a rationale for not requiring sprinklers for older structures. As the fire safety code evolved over time, a properly functioning, automatic sprinkler system came to be regarded as the single most effective fire protection feature. Federal Fire Safety Requirements for Unsprinklered Nursing Homes Are Weak
The nursing home fires in Hartford and Nashville during 2003 as well as our review of waivers and FSES results revealed weaknesses in federal fire safety standards and their application to unsprinklered nursing homes. While the surveys of the Hartford and Nashville facilities conducted shortly before the fires either found compliance with federal standards or required corrective action, many other unsprinklered homes, including some constructed of combustible materials, are not required to meet all federal standards if they obtain a waiver from CMS or demonstrate an equivalent level of fire protection using FSES. According to fire department investigators and state officials, the lack of smoke detectors in resident rooms may have contributed to a delay in both staff response and fire department notification; earlier detection of these fires may have helped to limit the number of fatalities. State and Federal Oversight of Nursing Home Fire Safety Is Inadequate
State and federal oversight of nursing home fire safety is inadequate. Postfire investigations by Connecticut and Tennessee revealed deficiencies that existed, but were not cited, during prior surveys. Nationally, the wide variability among states in reported fire safety deficiencies suggests that other states may also be missing or failing to cite deficiencies, and the results of federal comparative fire safety surveys demonstrate that state surveyors either miss or fail to cite all fire safety deficiencies. CMS provides limited oversight of state survey activities to address the fire safety survey inconsistencies we identified. CMS regional offices (1) do not fully comply with the statutory requirement to conduct a minimum number of federal monitoring surveys to assess state surveyors’ performance on the fire safety component of state surveys, (2) lack basic data to assess the appropriateness of uncorrected deficiencies, (3) infrequently review state trends in citing fire safety deficiencies, and (4) provide insufficient oversight of deficiencies that are waived or that homes need not correct because of claimed compensating fire safety features. Second, staff interviews conducted after the fire to determine where each nursing home staff person was when the fire began and how each responded revealed that (1) the staff did not implement the home’s fire plan on the night of the fire, and (2) the home failed to conduct required quarterly fire drills during the night shift, relying instead on a review of written procedures. The prior survey was based on inaccurate documentation provided by the nursing home and was conducted during the daytime when night shift staff were not available for interviews. Some of the same deficiencies not cited by Connecticut and Tennessee surveyors prior to the fires likely contributed to the spread of smoke during the two nursing home fires in 2003. We believe that this is particularly important in homes that lack sprinkler protection but claim to have compensating construction features. Given industry concerns about the cost and the need for a transition period for homes to come into compliance, older homes will likely continue to operate without sprinklers for several years. Linen chute did not have a fire-resistance rating of at least 1 hour. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, 31 residents died in nursing home fires in Hartford, Connecticut, and Nashville, Tennessee. Federal fire safety standards enforced by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) did not require either home to have automatic sprinklers even though they have proven very effective in reducing the number of multiple deaths from fires. GAO was asked to report on (1) the rationale for not requiring all homes to be sprinklered, (2) the adequacy of federal fire safety standards for nursing homes that lack automatic sprinklers, and (3) the effectiveness of state and federal oversight of nursing home fire safety.
What GAO Found
Cost has been a barrier to CMS requiring sprinklers for all older nursing homes even though sprinklers are considered to be the single most effective fire protection feature. There has never been a multiple-death fire in a fully sprinklered nursing home and sprinklers are now required in all new facilities. The decision to allow older, existing facilities to operate without sprinklers is now being reevaluated in light of the 2003 nursing home fires. Although the amount is uncertain, sprinkler retrofit costs remain a concern, and the nursing home industry endorses a transition period for homes to come into compliance with any new requirement. If retrofitting is eventually required, it is likely to be several years before implementation begins. The nursing home fires in Hartford and Nashville revealed weaknesses in federal nursing home fire safety standards for unsprinklered facilities. For example, federal standards did not require either home to have smoke detectors in resident rooms where the fires originated, and the fire department investigations suggested that their absence may have delayed the notification of staff and activation of the buildings' fire alarms. In light of inadequate staff response to the Hartford fire, the degree to which the standards rely on staff to protect and evacuate residents may be unrealistic. Moreover, many unsprinklered homes are not required to meet all federal fire safety standards if they obtain a waiver or are able to demonstrate that compensating features offer an equivalent level of fire safety. However, some of these exemptions raise a concern about whether resident safety was adequately considered. For example, a large number of unsprinklered homes in at least two states have waivers of standards designed to prevent the spread of smoke during a fire. State and federal oversight of nursing home fire safety is inadequate. Postfire investigations by Connecticut and Tennessee revealed deficiencies that existed, but were not cited, during prior surveys. For example, a survey conducted of the Hartford home 1 month prior to the fire did not uncover the lack of fire drills on the night shift and, on the night the fire occurred, the staff failed to implement the home's fire plan. The survey was conducted during the daytime and relied on inaccurate documentation that all shifts were conducting fire drills. On the other hand, Tennessee's postfire investigation failed to explore staff response, a deficiency cited on the home's four prior surveys. The limited number of federal fire safety assessments, though inconsistent with the statutory requirement for federal oversight surveys, nonetheless demonstrate that state surveyors either miss or fail to cite all fire safety deficiencies. CMS provides limited oversight of state survey activities to address these fire safety survey concerns. In general, CMS (1) lacks basic data to assess the appropriateness of uncorrected deficiencies, (2) infrequently reviews state trends in citing fire safety deficiencies, and (3) provides insufficient oversight of deficiencies that are waived or that homes do not correct because of asserted compensating fire safety features. |
gao_NSIAD-95-70 | gao_NSIAD-95-70_0 | Introduction
The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of realigning and closing military installations. Specifically, they asked us to review issues related to the (1) cleanup cost, transferability, and reuse of property by nonfederal users and (2) progress, difficulties, and plans to address the problems. However, problems still remain with determining accurate cleanup costs, timing appropriations with cleanup needs, prioritizing available cleanup funds, and protecting the government’s interests when leasing or transferring property. Furthermore, a 1994 law allows for long-term leases to nonfederal users before cleanup is complete. Although leasing property allows its reuse before cleanup has been completed, DOD is still liable for environmental cleanup costs. Thus, the full extent of cleanup actions required may not be known for years. Also, installations may not be cleaned up by the time they close, and major groundwater, landfill, and unexploded ordnance sites will remain contaminated unless new technology is developed. Fast Track Cleanup Program Is Being Implemented but Needs Additional Development
DOD established the Fast Track Cleanup program in July 1993 to accelerate the environmental cleanup at closing installations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the environmental cleanup of Department of Defense (DOD) facilities slated for closing, focusing on: (1) the cleanup cost, transferability, and reuse of property by nonfederal users; and (2) DOD progress, difficulties, and plans to address the problems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) despite DOD actions to resolve environmental cleanup issues at bases slated for closure or realignment, problems remain with determining accurate cleanup costs, timing appropriations with cleanup needs, prioritizing available cleanup funds, and protecting the government's interests when leasing or transferring property; (2) cleanup costs will probably exceed the current DOD estimate of $5.4 billion because of additional cleanup needs and longer cleanup periods; (3) DOD could postpone clean up of some bases until after closure, since they will remain federal property or be under long-term lease to nonfederal users; (4) cleanup progress has been limited, since DOD is still studying the most contaminated sites; (5) the full extent of DOD cleanup actions may not be known for years; (6) some bases may not be cleaned up by the time they close, partly due to the need to develop new technology to cleanup groundwater, landfills, and unexploded ordnance sites; and (7) DOD has developed a fast track cleanup program to accelerate base cleanups, but it needs to improve program implementation. |
gao_GAO-14-78 | gao_GAO-14-78_0 | DOE Has Performed About $2 Billion of Work under the WFO Program Annually, but the Amount and Sponsors of Work Varied Among Laboratories
The total amount of work performed under the WFO program, as measured by costs incurred for WFO projects, has remained relatively constant over the last 5 fiscal years overall, but the amount of WFO work performed and the sponsors of the work varied widely among the laboratories. 2). As a result, the proportion of WFO performed as a percentage of total work performed declined from 17 percent in fiscal year 2008 to about 13 percent in fiscal year 2012. In fiscal year 2012, more than 6,500 WFO projects were carried out at DOE’s laboratories. 3). Private industry. Foreign entities. DOE Has Not Ensured That WFO Program Requirements Are Consistently Met
DOE has not ensured that WFO program requirements are consistently met. A DOE contracting officer or other authorized DOE designee is required to determine whether a proposed WFO project has met all of these requirements before approving or certifying the work. However, DOE officials from site offices at 8 of the 17 laboratories told us that the laboratories provide written justification in the WFO package to support, or determine, that some or all of the requirements are met and that the DOE officials have often accepted the laboratories’ determinations without taking steps to independently verify them. DOE has not ensured, however, that all laboratories have formal, written procedures for developing WFO project budgets or charging costs to ongoing projects, two important steps for recovering the full costs of materials and services provided.procedures for developing WFO project budgets and charging costs to projects that include, among other things, detailed instructions on the types of costs to include in a WFO project budget and specific instructions for calculating the costs and for ensuring that the costs of the work are charged to the sponsor. For example, a 2013 review at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory found that costs of administering WFO projects were allocated in part to other DOE projects, resulting in estimated $400,000 in project costs that the sponsor did not reimburse to the laboratory. DOE Did Not Consistently Conduct Required Annual WFO Program Reviews
DOE’s WFO order requires each DOE program office to annually review the WFO program at each of its laboratories to ensure compliance with WFO policies and procedures. The order does not specify what the reviews should include. As a result, the program offices varied in what they consider to be their annual review. DOE Has Not Measured WFO Program Performance against Established Objectives
DOE has not measured the extent to which WFO program objectives are being met, even though DOE site offices are required under the WFO order to measure their laboratories’ WFO program performance. Some DOE site offices and laboratories have taken steps to evaluate WFO program processes, but these steps are not consistent across the laboratories, generally do not address the program objectives in the WFO order, and do not incorporate key attributes of successful performance measures. performance measures provide organizations with Recent external and internal reviews of the DOE laboratories have recommended that clear performance measures are needed to measure laboratory WFO program performance against the WFO program objectives. DOE officials told us that, because WFO agreements are unique to each laboratory, they do not believe it is appropriate to develop one set of measures for all laboratories and that they have no plans to do so. DOE’s WFO program has allowed the department to share these capabilities with both other federal agencies and nonfederal entities. Choosing to report data on a case-by-case basis, rather than in an annual report, may make it difficult for those providing oversight and some users of the data, and because the data are not readily available, DOE will need to generate them, which is time-consuming, and the data may not be comparable across laboratories or over time. Specify in the WFO order what the annual WFO program reviews should include. For example, in response to the first three recommendations (i.e., ensure compliance with the requirements in the WFO order for project approval; require laboratories to establish and follow written procedures for developing WFO project budgets and for charging costs to WFO projects; and ensure compliance with the requirements for conducting biennial pricing reviews), DOE stated that it will issue a policy flash, or notice, on the requirements of the WFO program. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the amount and type of work conducted at the laboratories under the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Work for Others (WFO) program, we requested and obtained DOE data on WFO costs from DOE’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, including WFO program costs by sponsor and by laboratory, as measured in costs incurred. No material weaknesses were reported. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE's 17 national laboratories house cutting-edge scientific facilities and equipment, ranging from high-performance computers to ultra-bright X-ray sources for investigating fundamental properties of materials. DOE allows the capabilities of the laboratories to be made available to perform work for other federal agencies and nonfederal entities through its WFO program, provided that the work does not hinder DOE's mission or compete with the private sector, among other things. GAO was asked to review the WFO program. GAO examined (1) the amount and type of work conducted under the program, (2) the extent to which DOE has ensured that WFO program requirements are met, and (3) the extent to which program performance is measured against WFO program objectives. GAO reviewed DOE and laboratory data and documents, internal and external review reports, and interviewed officials from DOE and the laboratories.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2008 through 2012, the Department of Energy (DOE) performed about $2 billion annually of Work for Others (WFO) projects, as measured by the costs incurred. Although the amount of WFO performed has remained relatively constant over the last 5 years overall, WFO as a percentage of the total work performed at the laboratories--measured in total laboratory costs incurred--has declined from 17 percent in fiscal year 2008 to about 13 percent in fiscal year 2012. In fiscal year 2012, the WFO program included more than 6,500 projects. About 88 percent of this work was for other federal agencies, with the majority of it performed for the Department of Defense. For example, one project for the Army applies a laboratory's expertise in laser decontamination of surfaces to develop a system that will remove chemical agent residues from equipment. The remaining WFO work was sponsored by nonfederal entities, including state and local governments, universities, private industry, and foreign entities.
DOE officials have not ensured that WFO program requirements are consistently met. For example, a DOE official is required to determine whether a proposed WFO project has met DOE requirements for accepting work before approving, or certifying, the work and this responsibility may not be delegated to the laboratories. However, DOE officials from site offices at 8 of the 17 laboratories reported that these determinations were made by the laboratories and that the DOE officials did not take steps to independently verify the determinations prior to approving the work. DOE also cannot ensure that the full costs of materials and services for WFO projects are charged to sponsors because 12 of 17 laboratories have limited or no written procedures for developing WFO project budgets or charging costs to ongoing projects, two important steps for recovering the full costs of materials and services. A 2013 DOE Office of Inspector General report found that the costs of administering WFO projects at one laboratory were allocated to DOE projects, resulting in an estimated $400,000 in WFO project costs that were not reimbursed to the laboratory. DOE requires that its program offices annually review the WFO program at each of its laboratories. However, DOE requirements do not specify what the reviews should include, and DOE program offices varied in what they consider to be an annual review. DOE also requires the department's Chief Financial Officer to report annually on the activities conducted under the WFO program, but DOE officials told GAO that they no longer produce the report because the requirement is outdated, choosing instead to fulfill data requests on a case-by-case basis. As a result, DOE does not have data that are comparable across laboratories or over time.
DOE has not measured the extent to which WFO program performance is measured against program objectives and has not established performance measures to do so. Some DOE site offices and laboratories have taken steps to evaluate the performance of the WFO program, but these steps are not consistent across the laboratories, do not incorporate key attributes of successful performance measures, and do not address the WFO program objectives. Recent internal and external reviews of the laboratories have recommended that DOE establish clear measures to evaluate laboratory WFO program performance against the WFO program objectives. DOE officials told GAO that they do not believe it is appropriate to develop one set of measures for all laboratories and that they do not plan to do so.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that DOE take steps to ensure compliance with project approval requirements; require laboratories to establish written procedures for charging costs to projects; specify what the annual program reviews should include; produce annual reports on WFO activities; and establish performance measures for the WFO program. DOE generally agreed with the report and its recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-798 | gao_GAO-05-798_0 | DOD’s Compensation System Lacks Transparency to Identify Total Costs and How Compensation Is Allocated
Decision makers in Congress and at DOD do not have adequate transparency over total costs for providing military compensation to active duty servicemembers in terms of how compensation is allocated in the near term, if compensation investments are cost effective in meeting recruiting and retention goals, how much changes to compensation will cost in the long term, and whether compensation costs are affordable and sustainable in the future. Lack of transparency over costs is in part due to the sheer number of pays and benefits that make up the military compensation system and to the lack of a single source to show total cost of compensation. The lack of transparency over total costs to compensate servicemembers impacts decision makers’ ability to manage the system, including (1) assessing the long-term cost implications, (2) determining how best to allocate resources to ensure an optimum return on investment, and (3) assessing the efficiency of the current compensation system on DOD’s ability to meet recruiting and retention goals. Heavy Reliance on Benefits May Not Be Appropriate for Meeting Key Human Capital Goals or Not Sustainable in the Long Term
The federal government’s total costs to compensate its active duty servicemembers have increased significantly in the past 5 years, and given that costs are heavily weighted toward noncash and deferred benefits, the structure of the current compensation system raises questions about the reasonableness, appropriateness, and long-term affordability and sustainability of DOD’s approach to compensating its military workforce. Compensation Costs Have Significantly Increased
The total cost to the government to provide compensation for active duty members has grown about 29 percent, adjusted for inflation, between fiscal years 2000 and 2004, as shown in figure 1. In addition, special and incentive pays grew about 30 percent—from $3.3 billion to $4.3 billion—from fiscal years 2000 through 2004. It emphasizes the need to maintain programs and services viewed as benefits by servicemembers. Compared to civilians in government and in the private sector, the military’s compensation costs are much more heavily weighted toward benefits and deferred compensation like retirement and health care for retirees. Military Compensation System Is Weighted Toward Noncash and Deferred Benefits
In fiscal year 2004, noncash and deferred benefits made up about 51 percent of total compensation costs, on average. DOD’s Lack of an Effective Communication and Education Effort on Compensation Has Allowed Servicemembers’ Misperceptions and Concerns about Their Compensation to Perpetuate
According to DOD surveys and analysis of our focus group findings and survey data, many servicemembers are dissatisfied, and in some cases, harbor significant misperceptions about their pay and benefits in part because DOD does not effectively educate them about the competitiveness of their total compensation packages. Servicemembers, especially junior officers who said they do not intend to stay in the military for a full 20-year career, told us that they would prefer DOD to give them cash that they could invest toward their retirement. These findings suggest that a culture of dissatisfaction and misunderstanding about compensation exists among servicemembers. The most recent Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation—a DOD commission that reviews military compensation— found that cash compensation fares favorably overall to civilian wages. This lack of transparency is becoming a more urgent matter today as DOD and all federal agencies face tough choices ahead managing the serious and growing long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation. DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation to develop a comprehensive communication and education plan to inform servicemembers of the value of their pay and benefits and the competitiveness of their total compensation package when compared to their civilian counterparts. Scope and Methodology
Calculation of the Costs of Providing Active Duty Compensation
To calculate the cost of compensating active duty servicemembers to the federal government, we interviewed officials from the Department of Defense (DOD) including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness’ office of compensation, the office of the Comptroller within the Office of Secretary of Defense and the services, the Office of the Actuary, and Health Affairs. A. catch up to what it would have been without the Redux 62. penalty. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the years, the Department of Defense's (DOD) military compensation system has become an increasingly complex and piecemeal accretion of pays, allowances, benefits, and special tax preferences. DOD leaders have expressed concern that rising compensation costs may not be sustainable in the future and could crowd out other important investments needed to recapitalize equipment and infrastructure. Given the looming fiscal challenges facing the nation in the 21st century, GAO believes it is time for a baseline review of all federal programs to ensure that they are efficiently meeting their objectives. Under the Comptroller General's authority, GAO (1) assessed whether DOD's approach to compensation provides adequate transparency over costs; (2) identified recent trends in active duty compensation, and how costs have been allocated to cash and benefits; and (3) reviewed how active duty servicemembers perceive their compensation and whether DOD has effectively explained the value of the military compensation package to its members.
What GAO Found
DOD's historical piecemeal approach to military compensation has resulted in a lack of transparency that creates an inability to (1) identify the total cost of military compensation to the U.S. government and (2) assess the allocation of total compensation investments to cash and benefits. No single source exists to show the total cost of military compensation, and tallying the full cost requires synthesizing about a dozen information sources from four federal departments and the Office of Management and Budget. Without adequate transparency, decision makers do not have a true picture of what it costs to compensate servicemembers. They also lack sufficient information to identify long-term trends, determine how best to allocate available resources to ensure the optimum return on compensation investments, and better assess the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's current compensation system in meeting recruiting and retention goals. To address this and other major business transformation challenges in a more strategic and integrated fashion, GAO recently recommended the creation of a chief management official at DOD. Transparency over military compensation is critical because costs to provide compensation are substantial and rising, with over half of the costs allocated to noncash and deferred benefits. In fiscal year 2004, it cost the federal government about $112,000, on average, to provide annual compensation to active duty enlisted and officer personnel. Adjusted for inflation, the total cost of providing active duty compensation increased about 29 percent from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2004, from about $123 to $158 billion. During this time, health care was one of the major cost drivers, increasing 69 percent to about $23 billion in fiscal year 2004. In addition, military compensation is weighted more toward benefits compared with other government and private sector civilian compensation systems. Furthermore, less than one in five service members will serve 20 years of active duty service to become eligible for retirement benefits. Increasing compensation costs make the need to address the appropriateness and reasonableness of the compensation mix and the long-term affordability and sustainability of the system more urgent. DOD survey results and analysis of GAO focus groups and survey data have shown that servicemembers are dissatisfied and harbor misperceptions about their pay and benefits in part because DOD does not effectively educate them about the competitiveness of their total compensation packages. About 80 percent of the 400 servicemembers that GAO surveyed believed they would earn more as civilians; in contrast, a 2002 study showed that servicemembers generally earn more cash compensation alone than 70 percent of like-educated civilians. Servicemembers also expressed confusion over aspects of their compensation, like retirement, and many complained that benefits were eroding despite recent efforts by Congress and DOD to enhance pay and benefits. By not systematically educating servicemembers about the value of their total compensation, DOD is essentially allowing a culture of dissatisfaction and misunderstanding to perpetuate. |
gao_GAO-17-276 | gao_GAO-17-276_0 | However, we found little evidence of improper or potentially fraudulent purchases. The Department of the Interior (DOI) was not included in our government-wide analysis because the agency did not require one transaction review requirement in our test of the approval process, which may increase the risk that fraudulent, improper, and other abusive activity could occur without detection. According to OMB guidance, documentation that a purchase cardholder should maintain to minimize erroneous and improper purchases includes documentation of the purchase request and preapproval for self-generated purchases. The Department of Defense Level of Incomplete Documentation and the Government-Wide Rate Are Similar, while the Department of Veterans of Affairs Had More Complete Documentation
On the basis of our samples, we estimated that 23 percent of DOD transactions and 13 percent of VA transactions had incomplete documentation associated with the approval process for purchase card transactions. Together, DOD and VA accounted for over three-fourths of all purchase card spending and about two-thirds of all micropurchase spending in fiscal year 2014. Additionally, our targeted data mining of selected categories for potentially improper purchases found little evidence of improper purchases, including potentially fraudulent purchases, among micropurchase transactions made using government purchase cards. While federal government purchases are vast and varied, of the agencies we reviewed only DOI granted blanket purchase authority for cardholders for most transactions under the micropurchase limit in fiscal year 2014. This blanket authority increases the risk that fraudulent, improper, and other abusive activity could occur for DOI’s micropurchase spending, which was about $395 million in fiscal year 2014. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen the documentation of the purchase card transaction approval process, which can help to prevent improper and fraudulent micropurchases, we recommend that 1. the Administrator of GSA direct the head of the Center for Charge Card Management to provide guidance to agency purchase card managers reemphasizing the need to obtain and retain complete documentation in support of purchase card transactions, per OMB specifications and 2. the Secretary of the Interior direct the head of Office of Acquisition and Property Management to reexamine the agency’s Integrated Card Program policy to require that cardholders maintain documentation of purchase requests and preapproval for self-generated purchases for purchase card transactions. GSA noted that it is developing a comprehensive plan to address this recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) what actions the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have taken since 2008 to enhance program controls over micropurchases made using government purchase cards, and (2) whether weaknesses exist in the approval process for micropurchase transactions and, if so, whether there are indicators of improper or potentially fraudulent purchases. To determine what actions GSA and OMB may have taken to enhance program controls over micropurchases in the federal purchase card program, we reviewed purchase card policies and guidance issued by OMB and GSA since 2008. In addition, we obtained and analyzed purchase card training data from 2011 to 2015 from GSA, which were the most recently available data at the time of our review. From these data, we extracted and tested a random, stratified statistical sample of 300 transactions from a population of over 17 million micropurchases that were posted during fiscal year 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
For fiscal year 2014, the most recently available data at the time of GAO's review, the federal government spent $8.7 billion in micropurchases using purchase cards. In its last government-wide review of the program in 2008, GAO found that internal control weaknesses in agency purchase card programs left the government vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. GAO was asked to review purchase card micropurchases to determine whether weaknesses still exist.
GAO examined (1) what actions GSA and OMB have taken since 2008 to enhance program controls over micropurchases and (2) whether weaknesses exist in the approval process for them and, if so, whether there are indicators of improper or potentially fraudulent purchases. GAO analyzed purchase card policies and guidance issued by OMB and GSA; obtained purchase card data on fiscal year 2014 transactions; tested three elements of the approval process through a generalizable random, stratified sample of 300 transactions from a population of over 17 million across the government; and conducted targeted data mining for improper or potentially fraudulent purchases.
What GAO Found
Since 2008, the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have taken several steps, in part to address prior GAO recommendations, to enhance purchase card program controls over micropurchases, which are currently capped at $3,500 for most purchases. These steps include developing training, monitoring tools, and guidance. For example, according to OMB guidance, a cardholder should maintain documentation to minimize risk of erroneous and improper purchases, including documentation of the purchase request and preapproval for self-generated purchases.
GAO's government-wide review found some weaknesses in the approval process for micropurchases due to inadequate documentation. Specifically, in its sample, GAO found that 22 percent of transactions government-wide did not have complete documentation to substantiate the transactions' approval process. Additionally, GAO estimated that 23 percent of Department of Defense (DOD) transactions and 13 percent of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) transactions had incomplete documentation. Together, DOD and VA accounted for about two-thirds of all micropurchase spending in fiscal year 2014.
GAO's government-wide review and targeted data mining of selected categories for potentially improper purchases found little evidence of improper or potentially fraudulent purchases among micropurchase transactions. However, incomplete documentation increases the risk that fraud, charge card misuse, and other abusive activity could occur without detection. One agency, the Department of the Interior (DOI), granted blanket purchase authority for cardholders for most transactions under the micropurchase limit, and therefore did not require any documentation of the purchase request or preapproval. This blanket authority may increase the risk that fraudulent, improper, and other abusive activity could occur. Following OMB guidance for documentation can help reduce such risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA reemphasize OMB guidance to obtain and retain complete documentation of micropurchases, and that DOI require cardholders to document purchase request and preapproval for self-generated purchases. GSA concurred with GAO's recommendation. DOI partially agreed, noting potential challenges with requiring preapproval. GAO still believes this recommendation is valid. |
gao_GAO-03-88 | gao_GAO-03-88_0 | On January 10, 2002, Congress appropriated an additional $2 billion for CDBG funding, earmarking at least $500 million to compensate small businesses, nonprofit organizations, and individuals for their economic losses. HUD is one of many federal agencies that offer disaster assistance, and HUD requires that its funds not be used to duplicate benefits provided by other federal agencies, such as SBA. These types of assistance are not discussed in this report. Businesses with fewer than 10 employees accounted for about 75 percent of the businesses assisted (see fig. 3). SBA, New York City and State, Banks, and Nonprofit Organizations Have Also Assisted Small Businesses
Empire State and LMDC are not alone in their efforts to provide assistance to small businesses in lower Manhattan. Congress made special appropriations of $175 million to SBA for disaster assistance to respond to the terrorist attacks. The state established the World Trade Center Retail Recovery Grant Program to provide cash grants to retail businesses. In addition to the grant programs, within days of the September 11 attacks, both the city and state established emergency walk-in centers that assisted small businesses. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To obtain information on the assistance provided to small businesses from Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) supplemental funding, we interviewed officials from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), New York State’s Empire State Development Corporation (Empire State), and the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC). To obtain information on other sources of funds available to rebuild and sustain business in lower Manhattan, we interviewed officials from the following: the Small Business Administration (SBA), the New York City Economic Development Corporation, the New York Small Business Development Center (SBDC), FleetBoston and the Bank of New York, and nonprofit organizations that provided financial assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The attacks on the World Trade Center had a substantially negative impact on the New York City economy, severely affecting businesses. In the aftermath of the attacks, Congress, among other things, appropriated emergency supplemental funds to several federal agencies to aid and rebuild the affected areas. The Chairman of the House Committee on Small Business asked GAO to describe the assistance provided to small businesses that is funded from emergency supplemental appropriations of federal Community Development Block Grant funds and other sources.
What GAO Found
To assist in New York City's recovery from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress appropriated $3.5 billion in Community Development Block Grant funding of which Congress earmarked at least $500 million to be used to compensate small businesses, nonprofit organizations, and individuals for their economic losses. One year after the attacks, these funds, administered in part by New York State's Empire State Development Corporation (Empire State), have provided $266 million to about 9,000 small businesses, many with fewer than 10 employees. Such assistance has included grants to compensate businesses for part of their economic losses--for both physical and economic injuries--and payments to attract and retain small businesses in efforts to revitalize the affected areas. Hundreds of millions of dollars remain available through these and other programs to assist an estimated 18,000 affected businesses. Empire State has employed mailings, visits, walk-in centers, and mass media to inform businesses of assistance programs. Other efforts by the Small Business Administration, New York City and State, banks, and nonprofit organizations have provided critical assistance to address the immediate and additional unmet needs of small businesses. |
gao_GAO-10-260T | gao_GAO-10-260T_0 | Following issuance of the Morford Memo, DOJ entered into 35 DPAs and NPAs, 6 of which required the company to hire an individual to oversee the company’s compliance with the terms of the DPA. According to DOJ, the delays in selecting these three monitors have been due to challenges in identifyi ng candidates with proper experience and resources who also do not have potential conflicts of interest with the company. More Than Half of the Monitors Had Prior DOJ Experience; Some Companies Said Such Experience Was Valuable While Others Noted That It Might Impede Monitors’ Independence or Impartiality
For the 48 DPAs and NPAs where DOJ required independent monitors, companies have hired a total of 42 different monitors, more than half of whom were former DOJ employees. Specifically, of these 42 monitors, 23 previously worked at DOJ, while 13 did not. The length of time between the monitor’s separation from DOJ and selection as monitor ranged from 1 year to more than 30 years, with an average of 13 years. Of the remaining 13 monitors with no previous DOJ experience, 6 had previous experience at a state or local government agency, for example, as a prosecutor in a district attorney’s office; 3 had worked in federal agencies other than DOJ, including the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office of Management and Budget; 2 were former judges; 2 were attorneys in the military; 3 had worked solely in private practice in a law firm; and 1 had worked as a full-time professor. Companies Have Raised Concerns about the Scope and Cost of Monitors’ Duties, and DOJ Has Not Communicated Its Role in Resolving Such Concerns
Officials from 8 of the 13 companies with whom we spoke raised concerns about their monitors, which were either related to how monitors were carrying out their responsibilities or issues regarding the overall cost of the monitorship. However, these companies said that it was unclear to what extent DOJ could help to address these concerns. However, DOJ had a different perspective than the company officials on its involvement in resolving disputes between companies and monitors. According to the Senior Counsel to the ODAG, while DOJ has not established a mechanism through which companies can raise concerns with their monitors to DOJ and clearly communicated to companies how they should do so, companies are aware that they can raise monitor- related concerns to DOJ if needed. Specifically, one company raised concerns about the monitor to the U.S. Attorney handling the case, stating that, among other things, the company believed the monitor’s fee arrangement was unreasonably high and the monitor’s proposed billing arrangements were not transparent. Internal control standards state that agency management should ensure that there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. While the Criminal Division Fraud Section and one USAO have made efforts to articulate in the DPA or NPA the extent to which DOJ would be willing to be involved in resolving specific kinds of monitor issues for that particular case, other DOJ litigating divisions and USAOs that entered into DPAs and NPAs have not. However, once the monitors are selected and any issues—such as fee disputes or concerns with the amount of work the monitor is completing—arise between the monitor and the company, it is not always clear what role, if any, DOJ will play in helping to resolve these issues. Clearly communicating to companies and monitors the role DOJ will play in addressing companies’ disputes with monitors would help better position DOJ to be made aware of issues companies have identified related to monitor performance, which is of interest to DOJ since it relies on monitors to assess companies’ compliance with DPAs and NPAs. Recommendations
To provide clarity regarding DOJ’s role in resolving disputes between companies and monitors, the Attorney General should direct all litigating components and U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent cases of corporate fraud and mismanagement heighten the Department of Justice's (DOJ) need to appropriately punish and deter corporate crime. Recently, DOJ has made more use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs), in which prosecutors may require company reform, among other things, in exchange for deferring prosecution, and may also require companies to hire an independent monitor to oversee compliance. This testimony addresses (1) the extent to which prosecutors adhered to DOJ's monitor selection guidelines, (2) the prior work experience of monitors and companies' opinions of this experience, and (3) the extent to which companies raised concerns about their monitors, and whether DOJ had defined its role in resolving these concerns. Among other steps, GAO reviewed DOJ guidance and examined the 152 agreements negotiated from 1993 (when the first 2 were signed) through September 2009. GAO also interviewed DOJ officials, obtained information on the prior work experience of monitors who had been selected, and interviewed representatives from 13 companies with agreements that required monitors. These results, while not generalizable, provide insights into monitor selection and oversight.
What GAO Found
Prosecutors adhered to DOJ guidance issued in March 2008 in selecting monitors required under agreements entered into since that time. Monitor selections in two cases have not yet been made due to challenges in identifying candidates with proper experience and resources and without potential conflicts of interests with the companies. DOJ issued guidance in March 2008 to help ensure that the monitor selection process is collaborative and based on merit; this guidance also requires prosecutors to obtain Deputy Attorney General approval for the monitor selection. For DPAs and NPAs requiring independent monitors, companies hired a total of 42 different individuals to oversee the agreements; 23 of the 42 monitors had previous experience working for DOJ--which some companies valued in a monitor choice--and those without prior DOJ experience had worked in other federal, state, or local government agencies, the private sector, or academia. The length of time between the monitor's leaving DOJ and selection as a monitor ranged from 1 year to over 30 years, with an average of 13 years. While most of the companies we interviewed did not express concerns about monitors having prior DOJ experience, some companies raised general concerns about potential impediments to independence or impartiality if the monitor had previously worked for DOJ or had associations with DOJ officials. Representatives for more than half of the 13 companies with whom GAO spoke raised concerns about the monitor's cost, scope, and amount of work completed--including the completion of compliance reports required in the DPA or NPA--and were unclear as to the extent DOJ could be involved in resolving such disputes, but DOJ has not clearly communicated to companies its role in resolving such concerns. Companies and DOJ have different perceptions about the extent to which DOJ can help to resolve monitor disputes. DOJ officials GAO interviewed said that companies should take responsibility for negotiating the monitor's contract and ensuring the monitor is performing its duties, but that DOJ is willing to become involved in monitor disputes. However, some company officials were unaware that they could raise monitor concerns to DOJ or were reluctant to do so. Internal control standards state that agency management should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. While one of the DOJ litigating divisions and one U.S. Attorney's Office have made efforts to articulate in the DPAs and NPAs what role they could play in resolving monitor issues, other DOJ litigation divisions and U.S. Attorney's Offices have not done so. Clearly communicating to companies the role DOJ will play in addressing companies' disputes with monitors would help increase awareness among companies and better position DOJ to be notified of potential issues related to monitor performance. |
gao_GAO-11-574 | gao_GAO-11-574_0 | Background
Section 2667 of Title 10 provides authority to secretaries of the military departments to lease nonexcess real property under the control of the respective departments, subject to several provisions. In addition, each lease may not be for more than 5 years, unless the secretary concerned determines that a lease for a longer period will promote the national defense or be in the public interest; shall permit the secretary to revoke the lease at any time, unless the secretary determines that the omission of such a provision will promote the national defense or be in the public interest; shall provide for the payment (in cash or in kind) by the lessee of consideration in an amount that is not less than the FMV of the lease interest, as determined by the secretary; and shall provide that if and to the extent that the leased property is later made taxable by state or local governments under an act of Congress, the lease shall be renegotiated. The services have also used the authority contained in section 2667 to enter into more complex leases that the services refer to as EULs. Also, while no two EULs are identical, we found that the other five Army and Air Force case study EULs included some terms and conditions similar to those that were found to be problematic by the legal opinion, which raises questions about the extent to which such EULs comply with the statutory requirements. In addition, beyond those issues addressed in the legal opinion, we found that the three Army case study EULs and one Air Force case study EUL did not fully comply with another provision in section 2667 that requires that each lease executed pursuant to section 2667 provide for lease renegotiation if taxes are imposed on leased property. Legal Opinion Addressed Certain Compliance Issues
On March 30, 2011, we issued a legal opinion in which we concluded that certain terms and conditions of the legal documents comprising the Army’s Picatinny Arsenal EUL failed to comply with subsection 2667(e) of Title 10 and the miscellaneous receipts statute by failing to require that cash consideration be deposited into the appropriate account of the U.S.
Treasury. Provisions Similar to Those Addressed in the Legal Opinion Existed in Other EULs
While no two EULs are identical, we found that the five other Army and Air Force EULs in our case study review required that some or all cash consideration received pursuant to the EUL be deposited into an escrow account and not the U.S. Treasury before being disbursed from the escrow account to pay for in-kind construction and maintenance projects, which raises questions about the extent to which such EULs comply with section 2667 and the miscellaneous receipts statute. Army and Air Force Expectations for Some EULs Were Not Realized
The services’ expectations for EUL development time frames and financial benefits were not realized in two Army EULs and one Air Force EUL included in our case studies, and some received markedly less consideration to date than initially estimated. According to the services, the recent economic downturn caused development plans for several EULs to significantly slow down or to be placed on hold. Moreover, rather than resulting from the Army’s share of rental revenues from private sector tenants, Army officials stated that nearly all of the estimated future consideration is now expected to be the result of the Army getting back a portion of the rent that the Army pays to the developer for using EUL office space. The Services’ Management of the EUL Program Includes Weaknesses in Internal Controls and Guidance
Our review of the services’ management of the EUL program identified several weaknesses related to internal controls and program guidance. First, because the services generally lacked methodologies, analyses, or other documentation showing how certain provisions contained in the authorizing statute, section 2667 of Title 10, were addressed, it is not clear to what extent the services systematically considered and assessed each provision before entering into the leases. Third, some EULs included property that was being used by the military or might be needed for military purposes over the lease term, which could result in increased costs to relocate military activities or increased potential government costs in the event a service had to terminate a lease to regain use of the property. Fourth, the services have not regularly monitored EUL program administration costs to help ensure that the costs are in line with program benefits. The three 2001 site leases comprising the Fort Sam Houston EUL initially included three primary old, deteriorated buildings and associated land that was used mostly for parking. According to the Army, about 36 acres of land was included in these original leases. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making six recommendations to address EUL statutory compliance issues and EUL program management concerns. While we reviewed information on all 17 EULs in place at the end of fiscal year 2010, to specifically assess EUL compliance with statutory requirements, we selected 9 of the 17 EULs for detailed case study review. 10 U.S.C. 10 U.S.C. §1. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help address challenges associated with deteriorating facilities and underused property, the Department of Defense (DOD) has pursued a strategy that includes leasing underused real property to gain additional resources for improving installation facilities. Section 2667 of Title 10, U.S. Code, provides authority to the military departments to lease nonexcess real property, subject to several provisions, in exchange for cash or in-kind consideration. According to the military services, some leases, referred to as enhanced use leases (EUL), are more complex with long terms and could provide hundreds of millions of dollars for in-kind services to improve installation facilities. A committee report accompanying the 2011 defense authorization directed GAO to review the EUL program. This report (1) assesses the extent to which selected EULs complied with section 2667 of Title 10, U.S. Code; (2) determines to what extent the services' expectations for their EULs have been realized; and (3) evaluates the services' management of the EUL program. GAO reviewed information on the services' 17 EULs in place at the end of fiscal year 2010 and selected 9 for detailed case study.
What GAO Found
One of the Army EULs included in the GAO case studies did not comply with the EUL authorizing statute, section 2667 of Title 10, U.S. Code. In March 2011, GAO issued a legal opinion finding that certain terms and conditions of the legal documents comprising the Army's Picatinny Arsenal EUL violated section 2667(e) and the miscellaneous receipts statute by failing to require that cash consideration be deposited into the appropriate account of the U.S. Treasury. Instead, the cash was deposited into an escrow account at a local credit union. Also, while no two EULs are identical, GAO found that the two other Army and the three Air Force case study EULs included some terms and conditions similar to those that were found to be problematic by the legal opinion, which raised questions about the extent to which such EULs also comply with the statutory requirements. Moreover, beyond those issues addressed in the legal opinion, GAO found that three Army and one Air Force case study EULs did not comply with another provision in section 2667, which requires that each lease executed pursuant to section 2667 provide that if and to the extent that the leased property is later made taxable by state or local governments under an act of Congress, the lease shall be renegotiated. The services' expectations for EUL development timeframes and financial benefits were not realized in two Army and one Air Force EULs included in the GAO case studies largely because, according to the services, the recent economic downturn caused EUL development plans to significantly slow down or to be placed on hold. To illustrate, in the Fort Sam Houston EUL that was signed in 2001, only two of the three large deteriorated buildings included in the lease have been renovated, and the Army now estimates that EUL consideration will be about 22 percent less than was originally estimated. Moreover, in this case, the Army, rather than private sector tenants as was originally planned, has rented most of the EUL space that has been renovated. Thus, Army officials stated that nearly all of the estimated future consideration is now expected to be the result of the Army getting back a portion of the rent that the Army pays to the EUL developer. The services' management of the EUL program included weaknesses related to internal controls and program guidance. First, because the services generally lacked documentation showing how certain provisions contained in the authorizing statute were addressed, it was not clear to what extent the services addressed each provision before entering into the leases. Second, in some EUL cases, it was not clear how and to what extent the services ensured the receipt of the fair market value of the lease interest, as required by the authorizing statute. Third, some EULs included property that was being used or might be needed by the military over the lease term, which could result in increased costs to relocate military activities or increased potential costs, if a lease had to be terminated early to permit the military to regain control of the property. Fourth, the services were not regularly monitoring EUL program administration costs, as called for by internal control standards, to help ensure that costs were in line with program benefits.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD take several actions to address EUL statutory compliance issues and EUL management weaknesses. DOD agreed with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-661T | gao_GAO-07-661T_0 | Background
Enacted in 1988, the Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act authorized the President to investigate the effects of foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies on national security and to suspend or prohibit acquisitions that might threaten national security. The law and regulations establish a four-step process for reviewing foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies: (1) voluntary notice by the companies; (2) a 30-day review to identify whether there are any national security concerns; (3) a 45-day investigation period to determine whether those concerns require a recommendation to the President for possible action; and (4) a presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit the acquisition (see fig. Over the past decade, GAO has conducted several reviews of the Committee’s process and actions and has found areas where improvements were needed. Views Differed over What Constitutes a National Security Threat and When an Investigation Is Warranted
In 2005, we reported that a lack of agreement among Committee members on what defines a threat to national security and what criteria should be used to initiate an investigation may have limited the Committee’s analyses of proposed and completed foreign acquisitions. Some Committee member agencies argued for a more traditional and narrow definition of what constitutes a threat to national security—that is, (1) the U.S. company possesses export-controlled technologies or items; (2) the company has classified contracts and critical technologies; or (3) there is specific derogatory intelligence on the foreign company. Other members, including the Departments of Defense and Justice, argued that acquisitions should be analyzed in broader terms. Committee members also disagreed on the criteria that should be applied to determine whether a proposed or completed acquisition should be investigated. At the time of our work, Treasury, as Committee Chair, applied essentially the same criteria established in the law for the President to suspend or prohibit a transaction, or order divestiture: (1) there is credible evidence that the foreign controlling interest may take action to threaten national security and (2) no laws other than Exon-Florio and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act are adequate and appropriate to protect national security. However, the Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security Departments argued that applying these criteria at this point in the process is inappropriate because the purpose of an investigation is to determine whether or not credible evidence of a threat exists. While most reviews are completed in the required 30 days, some Committee members have found that completing a review within such short time frames can be difficult—particularly in complex cases. While Exon-Florio provides the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States the latitude to define what constitutes a threat to national security, the more traditional interpretation fails to fully consider factors currently embodied in the law. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950, enacted in 1988, authorized the President to suspend or prohibit foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies that pose a threat to national security. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States--chaired by the Department of Treasury with 11 other members, including the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security--implements Exon-Florio through a four-step review process: (1) voluntary notice by the companies of pending or completed acquisitions; (2) a 30-day review to determine whether the acquisition could pose a threat to national security; (3) a 45-day investigation period to determine whether concerns require possible action by the President; and (4) a presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit the acquisition. Over the past decade, GAO has conducted several reviews of the Committee's process and has found areas where improvements were needed. GAO's most recent work, conducted in 2005, indicated concerns remained.
What GAO Found
Exon-Florio reviews are meant to serve as a safety net when other laws may be inadequate to protect national security. GAO found that several aspects of the review process may have weakened the law's effectiveness. First, member disagreement about what defines a threat to national security may have limited the Committee's analyses. Some argued that reviews should be limited to concerns about export-controlled technologies or items, classified contracts, or specific derogatory intelligence concerning the company. Others argued for a broader scope, one that considers potential threats to U.S. critical infrastructure, defense supply, and technology superiority. Committee members also differed on the criteria that should be used to determine when an investigation is warranted. Some applied essentially the criteria in the law for a presidential decision--that is, there is credible evidence that the foreign controlling interest may take action that threatens national security and that no other laws other than the International Emergency Economic Powers Act are adequate to protect national security. Others argued that these criteria are inappropriate because the purpose of an investigation is to determine if credible evidence of a threat exists. While most cases can be completed within the 30-day review period, complex acquisitions may require more time. Concerned that an investigation could discourage foreign investment, the Committee allowed companies to withdraw notifications rather than proceed to investigation. While this practice can provide additional review time without chilling foreign investment, it may also heighten the risk to national security in transactions where there are concerns and the acquisition has been completed or is likely to be completed during the withdrawal period. Finally, because few cases are investigated, few require a presidential decision, giving Congress little insight into the Committee's process. |
gao_GAO-12-841T | gao_GAO-12-841T_0 | Even after this restructuring, however, the program continued to encounter technical issues, management challenges, schedule delays, and further cost increases. Overview of the GOES Program
In addition to polar-orbiting satellites, NOAA operates GOES as a two- satellite geostationary satellite system that is primarily focused on the United States. Within the program office, two project offices manage key components of the GOES-R system. Key components include acquiring and launching JPSS-1 and JPSS-2, developing and integrating five sensors on the two satellites, finding alternate host satellites for selected instruments that would not be accommodated on the JPSS satellites, and providing ground system support. To improve NOAA’s ability to execute GOES-R’s remaining planned development with appropriate reserves, improve the reliability of its schedules, and address identified program risks, we are recommending in our report being released today that NOAA
Assess and report to the NOAA Program Management Council the reserves needed for completing remaining development for each satellite in the series. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses two satellite acquisition programs within the Department of Commerces National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) programs are meant to replace current operational satellites, and both are considered critical to the United States ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting.
What GAO Found
As requested, this statement summarizes our two reports being released today on (1) the status, plans, and risks for JPSS and (2) the status, schedule management process, and risk management process within the GOES-R program. We found that the JPSS cost and GOES-R contractor cost data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Further, while we found that the GOES-R schedule and management reserve data were not sufficiently reliable, we reported on the datas shortcomings in our report. |
gao_GAO-05-681 | gao_GAO-05-681_0 | DSS is responsible for providing oversight, advice, and assistance to more than 11,000 U.S. contractor facilities that are cleared for access to classified information. DSS headquarters works with contractors to determine what, if any, protective measures are needed to reduce the risk of foreign interests gaining unauthorized access to U.S. classified information. DSS field staff are then responsible for monitoring contractor compliance with these measures. Protective measures vary in the degree to which foreign entities are insulated from classified information and are not intended to deny foreign owners the opportunity to pursue business relationships with their U.S.-based contractor facilities working on classified contracts. DSS’s Approach to Overseeing FOCI Contractors Is Insufficient
DSS does not systematically ask for, collect, or analyze foreign business transactions in a manner that helps it properly oversee contractors entrusted with U.S. classified information, nor does DSS aggregate and analyze information to determine the overall effectiveness of its oversight of FOCI contractors. Furthermore, DSS field staff said they lack research tools and sufficient training regarding the subject of foreign transactions and have indicated challenges with regard to staff turnover. During our review, we found a few instances in which contractors were not reporting foreign business transactions when they occurred. However, the contractor continued operating with unmitigated FOCI for at least 6 months. For example, DSS does not require its representatives to have financial or legal training. Within this environment, unless DSS improves the collection and analysis of key information and provides its field staff with the training and tools they need to perform FOCI responsibilities, DSS will continue to operate without knowing how effective its oversight is at reducing the risk of foreign interests gaining unauthorized access to U.S. classified information. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve knowledge of the timing of foreign business transactions and reduce the risk of unauthorized foreign access to classified information, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the director of DSS to take the following three actions: clarify when contractors need to report foreign business transactions determine how contractors should report and communicate dates of specific foreign business transactions to DSS, and collect and analyze when foreign business transactions occurred at contractor facilities and when protective measures were implemented to mitigate FOCI. In fact, we found two cases in which contractors appeared to have operated with unmitigated FOCI before protective measures were put into place. Regarding our next three recommendations, which aim to enable DSS to assess the overall effectiveness of its oversight of contractors under FOCI, DOD argues that it does not need to collect and analyze information on the universe of contractors under FOCI and trends in foreign business transactions, or aggregate compliance and counterintelligence information. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Defense Security Service’s (DSS) process for determining and overseeing contractors under foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI), we reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) regulations and guidance on FOCI protective measures included in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, and the Industrial Security Operating Manual, as well as DSS policies, procedures, and guidance for verifying contractors under FOCI and for overseeing them. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for ensuring that U.S. contractors safeguard classified information in their possession. DOD delegates this responsibility to its Defense Security Service (DSS), which oversees more than 11,000 contractor facilities that are cleared to access classified information. Some U.S. contractors have foreign connections that may require measures to be put into place to reduce the risk of foreign interests gaining unauthorized access to classified information. In response to a Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, GAO assessed the extent to which DSS has assurance that its approach provides sufficient oversight of contractors under foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI).
What GAO Found
DSS's oversight of contractors under FOCI depends on contractors self-- reporting foreign business transactions such as foreign acquisitions. As part of its oversight responsibilities, DSS verifies the extent of the foreign relationship, works with the contractor to establish protective measures to insulate foreign interests, and monitors contractor compliance with these measures. In summary, GAO found that DSS cannot ensure that its approach to overseeing contractors under FOCI is sufficient to reduce the risk of foreign interests gaining unauthorized access to U.S. classified information. First, DSS does not systematically ask for, collect, or analyze information on foreign business transactions in a manner that helps it properly oversee contractors entrusted with U.S. classified information. In addition, DSS does not collect and track the extent to which classified information is left in the hands of a contractor under FOCI before measures are taken to reduce the risk of unauthorized foreign access. During our review, we found instances in which contractors did not report foreign business transactions to DSS for several months. We also found a contractor under foreign ownership that appeared to operate for at least 6 months with access to U.S. classified information before a protective measure was implemented to mitigate foreign ownership. Second, DSS does not centrally collect and analyze information to assess its effectiveness and determine what corrective actions are needed to improve oversight of contractors under FOCI. For example, DSS does not know the universe of all contractors operating under protective measures, the degree to which contractors are complying overall with measures, or how its oversight could be strengthened by using information such as counterintelligence data to bolster its measures. Third, DSS field staff face a number of challenges that significantly limit their ability to sufficiently oversee contractors under FOCI. Field staff told us they lack research tools and training to fully understand the significance of corporate structures, legal ownership, and complex financial relationships when foreign entities are involved. Staff turnover and inconsistencies over how guidance is to be implemented also detract from field staff's ability to effectively carry out FOCI responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-15-755T | gao_GAO-15-755T_0 | Contract Costs Have Risen and Schedule Has Been Extended following State’s Incomplete Risk Assessment; Further Cost Increases Are Likely
As part of recent construction of Kabul facilities, in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, State awarded two contracts originally worth $625.4 million to meet growing facility requirements at the U.S. embassy in Kabul. The cost for the 2009 and 2010 contracts has increased by about 27 percent, from $625.4 million to $792.9 million (see table 2). With regard to schedule, projected completion has been delayed over 3 years to fall 2017, although the 2010 contract had not yet been revised to reflect that date as of May 2015. We found that State did not follow its cost containment and risk assessment policies, resulting in lost opportunities to mitigate risks. The consultant responsible for the risk assessment recommended risk mitigation actions, which State did not act on, that aligned with the cost containment recommendations. Thus, in our May 2015 report, we recommended that State ensure existing cost containment and risk assessment policies are followed in future Kabul construction projects. State concurred. State to Continue Use of Temporary Facilities but Lacks Specific Security Standards for Them, Contributing to Increased Costs and Extended Schedules
Since 2002, State has spent over $100 million to construct temporary facilities on the embassy compound to accommodate evolving staffing needs and provide temporary office and housing space as permanent facilities are built. On completing the project in 2017, all temporary facilities on-compound will be nearly 5 years old or more, and a smaller subset will be more than 10 years old. The lack of security standards for temporary facilities contributed to insufficient and differing levels of protection, increased costs, and extended schedule. In the absence of minimal security standards (or guidance) to guide planning for temporary facility construction, State inconsistently applied alternative security measures, resulting in insufficient and different levels of security between the temporary offices and housing. Thus, to address this issue, in our May 2015 report, we recommended that State consider establishing minimum security standards or other guidance for the construction of temporary structures, especially those used in conflict environments. State partially concurred. Lack of Strategic Facilities Planning and Policy Has Led to Coordination Challenges in Addressing Future Needs in Kabul
As discussed in our May 2015 report, since the U.S. embassy in Kabul reopened in 2002, the unpredictable operating environment of Afghanistan has produced changing facility needs that have continually outpaced the post’s existing capabilities. To meet these needs, State has made or plans to make approximately $2.17 billion in infrastructure investments in Kabul. However, State does not have a strategic facilities plan for Kabul that documents current and future embassy needs, comprehensively outlines existing facilities, analyzes gaps, provides projected costs, and documents decisions made. According to State officials in Kabul and Washington, coordination to address the embassy’s future needs is particularly difficult due to the large number of stakeholders in Kabul and in Washington. Examples of those challenges include issues related to: (1) proposed projects conflicting with on-compound construction, (2) implementation of on-compound physical security upgrades, and (3) ineffective coordination of off-compound construction projects. Thus, in our May 2015 report, we recommended that State develop a Kabul strategic facilities plan. OBO was unable to provide any current policy governing either post strategic facilities planning or site master planning. Without policies that clearly define strategic facilities planning and master planning, as well as outline the content and methods to conduct such planning, it will be difficult for OBO to fulfill these responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since re-opening in 2002, the U.S. embassy in Kabul has experienced a dramatic increase in staffing, followed by a gradual drawdown. State has invested or plans to invest a total of $2.17 billion in its facilities in Kabul to address current and projected space needs in a difficult environment with constantly evolving security threats. State awarded two contracts in 2009 and 2010 to construct additional on-compound housing and office facilities.
This statement summarizes GAO’s May 2015 report on the status of construction at the U.S. embassy in Kabul (GAO-15-410). Like its May 2015 report, this testimony discusses (1) the extent to which construction cost and schedule have changed and why, (2) State’s use of temporary facilities on-compound, and (3) State’s planning for projected embassy facility needs. For its May 2015 report, GAO examined agency planning, funding, and reporting documents and interviewed officials from State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and other offices. The review included fieldwork and associated follow-up in Kabul, Afghanistan throughout 2014.
What GAO Found
Cost and schedule have increased for the Kabul embassy construction project, in part due to incomplete cost and risk assessment. Cost for the 2009 and 2010 contracts has increased by about 27 percent, from $625.4 million to $792.9 million, and is likely to increase further. Projected completion has been delayed over 3 years to fall 2017. The Department of State (State) did not follow its cost containment and risk assessment policies, resulting in lost opportunities to mitigate risks. These risks, such as delays in the sequencing of the two contracts, eventually materialized, increasing cost and extending schedule. Unless State follows its policy, it may be unable to avoid or mitigate risks to cost and schedule on future projects.
Since 2002, State has built over $100 million in temporary buildings (intended for no more than 5 years' use) to meet space needs on-compound but has no security standards tailored to those facilities. On completing the project in 2017, all temporary facilities will be nearly 5 to 10 years old, and their continued use is likely. Without security standards or other guidance to guide temporary facility construction in conflict environments, State inconsistently applied alternative security measures that resulted in insufficient and different levels of security for temporary offices and housing, as well as increased cost and extended schedules. Without temporary facility security standards or guidance, future construction in conflict environments could encounter similar problems.
State's lack of a strategic facilities plan and policies governing such planning has led to coordination challenges in addressing the embassy's future facility needs. Industry standards cite the value of plans that comprehensively assess existing facilities, identify needs, and document decisions on meeting those needs. Additionally, State formally assigns responsibility for strategic facilities planning but lacks policy that governs implementation of such planning. State intends to make additional facility investments to address future facility needs. Without a strategic facilities plan and policy to guide its development, coordination to address these needs will continue to be difficult.
What GAO Recommends
In its May 2015 report, GAO recommended that State (1) adhere to its cost containment and risk assessment policies, (2) consider establishing security standards or guidance for temporary buildings in conflict zones, (3) develop a strategic facilities plan for Kabul, and (4) clarify its strategic facilities and master planning policy. State concurred with the first, third, and fourth recommendations and partially concurred with the second but discussed actions that could address the intent of GAO’s recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-151 | gao_GAO-10-151_0 | Scope and Methodology
To identify steps Chrysler and GM have taken since December 2008 to reorganize, we reviewed information on the companies’ finances and operations, including financial statements, select documents from their bankruptcy proceedings, and company-provided data, and interviewed representatives of the companies. Chrysler and GM Have Addressed Some Challenges Important to Achieving Viability, but the Effect of These Actions Remains to Be Seen
Since the condition of the domestic auto industry first came to the forefront of national attention in December 2008, Chrysler and GM have made changes to address key challenges to achieving viability, but the effect that these actions will have on the companies remains to be seen. Through the bankruptcy process, Chrysler and GM eliminated a substantial amount of their long-term financial liabilities, including debt owed to bank lenders and bondholders. Reducing the number of brands and models. Rationalizing dealership networks to align with sales volumes. Reducing production costs and capacity. Moreover, whether enough time has passed for the impact of the structural changes to be seen is unlikely, especially given that the automakers have not completed restructuring, the economy is still recovering, and new vehicle purchases remain at low levels. Treasury Does Not Plan to Be Involved in Chrysler’s or GM’s Day-to-Day Operations or Management, but It Plans to Closely Monitor the Companies’ Performance
Treasury, which has a sizable financial stake in Chrysler and GM, does not plan to be involved in the day-to-day management of the companies, but it has established certain requirements that will be in effect as long as it holds debt or equity in the companies. Treasury developed several principles to guide its role as an equity owner, including the commitment that, although Treasury reserves the right to set up-front conditions to protect taxpayers and promote financial stability, Treasury plans to oversee its financial interests in a commercial manner, in which it will focus primarily on maximizing its return and take a hands-off approach to day-to-day management. According to the agreements, Chrysler and GM must do the following: Produce a portion of their vehicles in the United States. Report to Treasury on the use of government funds. Have internal controls to ensure compliance with the requirements. Treasury’s Approach for Monitoring and Selling Its Ownership Interest in Chrysler and GM Does Not Fully Address All Important Considerations Experts Identified
Treasury’s general goals of exiting as soon as practicable, maximizing return on investment, and improving the strength and viability of Chrysler and GM are reasonable but possibly competing, according to the group of financial and industry experts we spoke with. In assessing Chrysler’s and GM’s financial condition and future prospects and putting together financing packages for the companies, Treasury hired or consulted with a number of individuals with experience in investment banking, equity analysis, and the auto industry, but it has not established a program office to oversee its investment in the auto companies. Because of the particular needs of the auto companies and the unprecedented nature of providing such assistance, Treasury hired or contracted with a number of individuals with expertise in the auto industry, equity investment, and relevant areas of law throughout the first half of calendar year 2009 as Treasury assessed Chrysler’s and GM’s financial condition, assembled financing packages for the companies, and helped with restructuring efforts. Some experts also noted that Treasury should assign an individual with expertise in investment banking or private equity to be in charge of monitoring these metrics, which Treasury officials told us they had done. To the extent possible, determine the optimal time and method to divest. Although Treasury officials said they plan to consider all options for selling the government’s ownership stakes in Chrysler and GM, they noted that they believe the most likely scenario for GM is to dispose of Treasury’s equity in the company through a series of public offerings. Treasury officials told us they believe their planned approach for managing Treasury’s equity in Chrysler and GM is sufficient for now. However, most of the original staff on Treasury’s auto team either have left Treasury or may do so in the future. Given the substantial decline in the number of staff and lack of dedicated staff for this oversight moving forward, however, we are concerned whether Treasury will continue to have the needed expertise to provide oversight of the use of government funds, assess the financial condition of the auto companies, and develop strategies to divest the government’s interests. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) provided $81.1 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) aid to the U.S. auto industry, including $62 billion in restructuring loans to Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler) and General Motors Company (GM). In return, Treasury received 9.85 percent equity in Chrysler, 60.8 percent equity and $2.1 billion in preferred stock in GM, and $13.8 billion in debt obligations between the two companies. As part of Government Accountability Office's (GAO) statutory responsibilities for providing oversight of TARP, this report addresses (1) steps Chrysler and GM have taken since December 2008 to reorganize, (2) Treasury's oversight of its financial interest in the companies, and (3) considerations for Treasury in monitoring and selling its equity in the companies. GAO reviewed documents on the auto companies' restructuring and spoke with officials at Treasury, Chrysler, and GM, and individuals with expertise in finance and the auto industry.
What GAO Found
Chrysler and GM have made changes since December 2008 to address key challenges to achieving viability, but the ultimate effect of these changes remains to be seen. The companies have eliminated a substantial amount of their long-term debt, reduced the number of brands and models of vehicles they sell, rationalized their dealership networks, and lowered production costs and capacities by reducing the number of factories and employees. It is difficult to fully assess the impact of these changes because of the short amount of time that has passed since reorganization and the low level of new vehicle sales. Moreover, Chrysler and GM are revaluing their assets and liabilities based on their reorganizations in 2009 and expect to prepare financial statements based on this effort in the coming months. Treasury does not plan to be involved in the day-to-day management of Chrysler and GM, but it plans to monitor the companies' performance. Treasury developed several principles to guide its role as a shareholder, including the commitment that although Treasury reserves the right to set up-front conditions to protect taxpayers and promote financial stability, Treasury will oversee its financial interests in a hands-off, commercial manner. The conditions that Treasury set for the companies include requiring that a portion of their vehicles be manufactured in the United States and that they report to Treasury on the use of the TARP funding provided. Treasury officials told us that they are also requiring that Chrysler and GM submit financial information on a regular basis and that they plan to meet with the companies' top management on a regular basis to discuss the companies' financial condition. Treasury should make certain that its current approach for monitoring and selling its equity in Chrysler and GM fully addresses all important considerations financial and industry experts identified. For example, Treasury initially hired or consulted with a number of individuals with experience in investment banking or equity analysis to help assess Chrysler's and GM's financial condition and develop financing packages for the companies. Many of these individuals have recently left as the restructuring phase of Treasury's work has been completed. Treasury will need to ensure these staff and any staff that depart in the future are replaced as needed with similarly qualified personnel. Also, Treasury does not currently contract with or employ outside firms with specialty expertise for its work with the auto industry but may need to do so in the future, to make sure sufficient expertise is available to oversee the government's significant financial interests in Chrysler and GM. In addition, although Treasury officials told us they are considering all options for divesting the government's ownership interests, including an initial public offering or private sale, they have focused primarily on a series of public offerings for GM and have not identified criteria for determining the optimal time and method to sell. Regardless of the option pursued, however, Treasury is unlikely to recover the entirety of its investment in Chrysler or GM, given that the companies' values would have to grow substantially above what they have been in the past. |
gao_GAO-03-334 | gao_GAO-03-334_0 | To determine the extent of unauthorized use of travel cards during fiscal year 2001, we tested a statistical sample of travel card transactions from each of the five component agencies. HHS Travel Card Monitoring Process Has Effectively Minimized Delinquencies and Write-offs, but Some Unauthorized Use Still Occurs
Two key indicators of how well agencies monitor their travel card programs are delinquency rates and write-off rates. At the end of fiscal year 2001, HHS’s delinquency rate was lower than the governmentwide rate. Because the vast majority of HHS cardholders pay their bills on time, write-offs as a percentage of total travel card charges were lower than the governmentwide write-offs. Program coordinators told us they routinely review the U.S. Bank reports to identify delinquent cardholders, and during this review, they may also identify unauthorized charges. We estimate that 22 percent of IHS travel card transactions for fiscal year 2001 were for unauthorized purposes. As table 6 shows, the main reason for problems at FDA was poor record retention. While these amounts are minimal, they relate to only a small percentage of travel voucher reimbursements for fiscal year 2001, and if extrapolated to all travel reimbursements, the amount could be significant. Further, in cases where the component agencies did not maintain adequate documentation to support the amounts reimbursed on travel vouchers, neither they nor we can determine if the travel voucher reimbursements are proper. Unchecked, unauthorized use could lead to increased delinquencies and write-offs, thus reducing the rebates HHS earns on its travel card program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To reduce unauthorized and personal use of travel cards and help ensure that travelers are not receiving reimbursements in excess of proper travel expenses, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services require component agencies to include procedures in their monitoring efforts for periodically testing a sample of travel card transactions to identify unauthorized travel card charges and any adverse trends that would warrant further testing or additional controls, issue an alert to voucher processing staff/reviewers reminding them to check vouchers for proper per diem amounts and amounts credited on hotel bills, and issue an alert to voucher processing staff/reviewers reminding them to obtain and retain the necessary receipts needed to determine the correct amount of travel reimbursement. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine whether (1) the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has an effective process for monitoring its travel card program to minimize delinquency rates, write- offs, and unauthorized use of the card and (2) HHS’s controls over travel voucher processing are effective in helping ensure that travelers are not receiving reimbursements in excess of proper travel expenses. | Why GAO Did This Study
By their nature, determining and paying allowable travel costs pose substantial risk, making effective internal control crucial. Because of this and weaknesses in internal control identified in the GAO review of travel card usage at the Department of Defense, GAO was requested to review the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) travel program. GAO assessed whether HHS's process for monitoring travel charge cards helps minimize delinquencies, write-offs, and unauthorized use. GAO also assessed whether controls over travel voucher processing help ensure proper reimbursements. GAO tested a statistical sample of travel card transactions at each of five HHS component agencies to determine if they were for authorized purposes. GAO also reviewed related travel vouchers to determine if reimbursement amounts were proper.
What GAO Found
HHS's process for monitoring its travel card program, which includes reviewing bank reports to identify delinquent cardholders, effectively minimized delinquencies and write-offs. However, some unauthorized use of the travel card still occurred. HHS delinquency rates were lower than governmentwide rates for most of 2001 and declined further in 2002. Also, HHS's .29 percent write-off rate--the amount of unpaid travel card charges written off as a percentage of total travel charges--was slightly lower than the governmentwide rate of .44 percent. HHS has not always identified or prevented unauthorized travel card use because its monitoring of travel card use focuses mainly on delinquencies. GAO estimated that unauthorized travel card transactions for fiscal year 2001 ranged from about 7 percent at one HHS component agency to about 22 percent at another. Examples of unauthorized charges included personal charges for meals and automated teller machine withdrawals. While unauthorized use had minimal negative monetary effect because the majority of cardholders who made these charges paid their travel card bills timely, left unchecked, such use could lead to increased delinquencies and write-offs. GAO also found weaknesses in voucher processing, inadequate review of vouchers, and poor record retention, resulting in some employees being reimbursed for more than allowable expenses and for amounts not properly supported. The excess reimbursement ranged from about $2 on one voucher to about $250 on another. While these amounts alone are insignificant and relate to only a small percentage of travel reimbursements for fiscal year 2001, excess reimbursements reduce the amount of available travel funds. Further, vouchers that are not supported by related receipts make it difficult to determine if the reimbursement amounts are proper. |
gao_NSIAD-97-213 | gao_NSIAD-97-213_0 | In our July 1996 report and subsequent testimony, we noted that the cost and schedule performance of the space station’s prime contractor had deteriorated and that the station’s near-term funding included only limited financial reserves. In our July 1996 report, we concluded that, if program costs continued to increase, threats to financial reserves worsened, and the Russian government failed to meet its commitment in a timely manner, NASA would either have to exceed its funding limitation or defer or rephase activities, which could delay the space station’s schedule and would likely increase its overall cost. Over the past several months, NASA has acknowledged that the potential for cost growth in the program has increased. Subsequently, NASA designed a three-step recovery plan. Step 1 focuses on adjusting the station schedule for an 8-month delay in the availability of the Service Module and developing temporary essential capabilities for the station in case the Service Module is further delayed by up to 1 year. NASA will decide later this fall on whether to begin step 2. Prime Contractor’s Cost and Schedule Performance Continues to Deteriorate
The prime contractor’s cost and schedule performance on the space station, which showed signs of deterioration last year, has continued to decline virtually unabated. Since April 1996, the cost overrun has quadrupled, and the schedule slippage has increased by more than 50 percent. So far, the prime contractor has not been able to stop or significantly reverse the continuing decline. Financial reserves have been used to fund additional requirements, overruns, and other authorized changes. To enable it to do so, NASA has implemented or initiated a variety of actions, including those summarized below:
The space station program is negotiating with ESA, Canada, and Brazil to provide station hardware. NASA transferred $200 million in fiscal year 1997 funding to the station program from other NASA programs to cover costs incurred due to Russian manufacturing delays. When NASA redesigned the station in 1993, it estimated that Russia’s inclusion as a partner would reduce program costs by $1.6 billion because the station’s assembly would be completed by June 2002—15 months earlier than previously scheduled.NASA has recently acknowledged that the completion of the station’s assembly will slip into 2003, but it has not yet scheduled the revised assembly completion milestone. NASA estimated the additional hardware costs associated with step 1 of the Russian recovery plan at $250 million. The total of $300 million in additional funding for the space station program in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 includes financial reserves. Conclusions and Recommendation
Some of NASA’s actions to reinforce its financial reserves and keep the program within its funding limitations have involved redefining the portion of the program subject to the limitations. Such actions make the value of the current limitations as a funding control mechanism questionable. After this information is available, the Congress may wish to consider reviewing the program. Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The following are GAO’s comments on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) letter dated September 8, 1997. GAO Comments
1. 2. In the past, NASA claimed the benefits of Russian participation on the program’s cost and schedule, but now that Russian participation is having negative cost and schedule effects, NASA argues that the additional funding needed should be accounted for outside the portion of the program subject to the funding limitation. 3. 4. 5. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the International Space Station (ISS), which is being developed by the United States and others, focusing on: (1) Russia's performance problems and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) reaction to them, including the additional cost and cost risk assumed by NASA; (2) cost and schedule experience under the prime contract; and (3) the status of and outlook for the program's financial reserves. GAO also identified actions taken by NASA to keep the space station program's funding within certain limits through the completion of the station's assembly.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in May 1997, NASA revised the space station assembly sequence and schedule to accommodate delays in the production and delivery of the Service Module; (2) this revision occurred after more than a year of speculation regarding Russia's ability to fund its space station manufacturing commitments; (3) to help mitigate the adverse effects of the Russians' performance problems and address the possibility that such problems would continue, NASA developed and began implementing step 1 of a three-step contingency plan; (4) NASA has budgeted an additional $300 million from other NASA activities for the space station program to cover the hardware cost under step 1; (5) NASA will also incur other costs under step 1 that have not yet been estimated; (6) significant additional cost growth could occur in the station program if NASA has to implement steps 2 and 3 of its contingency plan; (7) the cost and schedule performance of the station's prime contractor has continued to steadily worsen; (8) from April 1996 to July 1997, the contract's cost overrun quadrupled to $355 million, and the estimated cost to get the contract back on schedule increased by more than 50 percent to $135 million; (9) so far, NASA and prime contractor efforts have not stopped or significantly reversed the continuing deterioration; (10) the station program's financial reserves have also significantly deteriorated, principally because of program uncertainties and cost overruns; (11) the near-term reserve posture is in particular jeopardy, and the program may require additional funding over and above the remaining reserves before the completion of station assembly; (12) to date, NASA has taken a series of actions to keep the program from exceeding its funding limitations and financial reserves; (13) NASA is accounting for these actions in ways that enable it to report its continuing compliance with the funding limitations; (14) however, to show continuing compliance in some cases, NASA has had to redefine the portion of the program subject to the funding limitations; (15) thus, the value of the current limitations as a funding control mechanism is questionable; (16) since GAO's June 1997 testimony, further cost and schedule problems have materialized and NASA has acknowledged that the potential for cost growth in the program has increased; and (17) GAO believes the program has reached the point where the Congress may wish to review the entire program. |
gao_GAO-15-36 | gao_GAO-15-36_0 | Control activities include both preventive and detective controls. DOE officials cite the Cooperative Audit Strategy as a key internal control. federal agencies are required to review all programs and IPERA requires that agencies, in performing their risk assessments, take into account those risk factors that are likely to contribute to significant improper payments, such as 1. whether the program or activity reviewed is new to the agency; 2. the complexity of the program or activity reviewed, particularly with respect to determining correct payment amounts; 3. the volume of payments made annually; 4. whether payments or payment eligibility decisions are made outside of the agency, for example, by a state or local government, or a regional federal office; 5. recent major changes in program funding, authorities, practices, or 6. the level, experience, and quality of training for personnel responsible for making program eligibility determinations or certifying that payments are accurate; and 7. significant deficiencies in the audit reports of the agency including but not limited to the agency Inspector General or the Government Accountability Office report audit findings or other relevant management findings that might hinder accurate payment certification. DOE concurred with this recommendation. DOE Developed a Process for Assessing Improper Payment Risks, but Those Assessments Do Not Fully Evaluate Risk
DOE developed a process to assess its programs for risks of improper payments in fiscal year 2011 that included both a qualitative risk assessment and quantitative information on improper payments. However, based on our evaluation of the department’s fiscal year 2011 risk assessment process, we found that DOE did not prepare risk assessments for all of its programs, and the quantitative information reported was not reliable; DOE’s risk assessments did not always include a clear basis for the risk determination; and DOE’s risk assessments did not fully evaluate other relevant risk factors. Another revision directs DOE’s Loan Guarantee Program Office to prepare a risk assessment for DOE’s loan programs. For those that did, the support for their conclusions varied widely, and some assessments did not contain enough information for us to determine how the payment sites arrived at their risk determination. Based on our analysis, we determined that at least 6 of the 29 sites that prepared risk assessments did not take into account the eight risk factors, making the basis of their risk assessment determinations unclear. However, its guidance does not provide further direction on what should be provided in the assessment to address each risk factor. However, the 2014 guidance does not specify how payment sites should address each factor and what documentation they are to include in support of their risk determinations, which is inconsistent with federal standards for internal control. In particular, DOE’s guidance does not require programs to consider, as part of their risk assessments, weaknesses in key controls for preventing and detecting improper payments. However, DOE’s 2011 guidance did not require that programs consider risk factors related to internal control weaknesses—such as untimely contract audits or inadequate subcontractor oversight. Without providing in its guidance specific examples of other risk factors that present inherent risks likely to contribute to improper payments and directing payment sites to consider those other factors when performing their improper payment risk assessments, DOE will not have reasonable assurance that its payment sites consistently consider other relevant risk factors to fully evaluate risks. DOE reported that it did not have any programs susceptible to significant improper payments in 2011. As previously discussed, we found that DOE did not fully consider program risks in its fiscal year 2011 risk assessments and included unreliable data, which raises questions about whether the 2011 assessments were reliable. Nonetheless, because of its 2011 determination that it did not have programs susceptible to significant improper payments, the department was not required under IPERA to prepare risk assessments in 2012 and 2013. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve its ability to assess the risk of improper payments and make more effective use of DOE and contractor resources, we recommend the Secretary of Energy direct the department’s Chief Financial Officer to take the following four actions to revise the department’s IPERA guidance: direct field office sites with responsibility for non-M&O contractor risk assessments to address risk factors as they relate to those sites and take steps to ensure sites implement it; clarify how payment sites are to address risk factors and document the basis for their risk rating determinations and take steps to ensure sites implement it; clarify who is responsible at DOE for reviewing and approving risk assessments for consistency across sites and take steps to ensure those entities implement it; and provide specific examples of other risk factors that present inherent risks likely to contribute to significant improper payments, in addition to the eight risk factors, direct payment sites to consider those when performing their improper payment risk assessments, and take steps to ensure sites implement it. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the extent to which the Department of Energy (DOE) assesses its programs’ risks for improper payments. To determine this, we reviewed the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). For fiscal years 2011 through 2013, we analyzed DOE’s IPERA reporting, including qualitative risk assessments and quantitative information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improper payments are a significant problem in the federal government. To address this problem, IPERA requires that federal agencies review their programs and identify those that are susceptible to significant improper payments—a process known as a risk assessment. DOE's history of inadequate management and oversight of its contractors led GAO to designate DOE's contract management as a high-risk area vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. However, DOE reported that it does not have any programs susceptible to significant improper payments.
GAO was asked to review DOE's internal control environment, as it relates to IPERA, to determine whether the department was at low risk for significant improper payments. This report examines the extent to which DOE assessed its programs' risks for improper payments in fiscal years 2011 through 2013.
GAO reviewed IPERA, analyzed all risk assessments and related information for this period, and interviewed DOE officials and six contractors selected to represent the types of contractor payments made.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) developed a process to assess its programs for risks of improper payments, but its assessments do not fully evaluate risk. To comply with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA), in fiscal year 2011, DOE directed its programs to develop risk assessments using eight qualitative risk factors, such as recent major changes in program funding, and report quantitative information on improper payments. GAO found that 26 of 55 programs did not prepare risk assessments in 2011 and that the quantitative information reported, including the estimated amount of improper payments, was not reliable because, for example, it did not include information for all programs. In reviewing DOE's 2011 risk assessments, GAO also found the following:
DOE did not always include a clear basis for risk determinations . At least 6 of the 29 programs that prepared risk assessments did not take into account the eight qualitative risk factors, making the basis of their risk determinations unclear. At most, the assessments for 23 programs took into account the risk factors. However, support for their determinations varied widely, and some did not contain enough information to identify how the program arrived at its risk determination, which is inconsistent with federal standards for internal control. DOE's guidance directs personnel to prepare a risk assessment that considers these eight factors but does not provide further direction on what to include. Absent such direction, DOE personnel may not have a consistent understanding of how to complete their risk assessments.
DOE did not fully evaluate other relevant risk factors . DOE's risk assessments did not fully evaluate other relevant risk factors, such as weaknesses in key controls for preventing and detecting improper payments—including inadequate subcontractor oversight. GAO found that some risk assessments included information from internal control evaluations, but many did not. DOE guidance does not instruct personnel to consider weaknesses in key controls for preventing and detecting improper payments. Without providing specific examples of other relevant risk factors in guidance and directing personnel to consider them when performing risk assessments, DOE will not have reasonable assurance that each of its programs fully evaluates risks.
Based on its 2011 assessments, DOE was not required under IPERA to prepare risk assessments or report on the amount of improper payments in 2012 and 2013. However, not fully considering program risks in its 2011 assessments and including unreliable data raises questions about whether the 2011 assessments were reliable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE take steps to improve its risk assessments including revising guidance on how programs are to address risk factors and providing examples of other risk factors likely to contribute to improper payments and directing programs to consider those factors. DOE concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-490 | gao_GAO-16-490_0 | Patent Infringement Litigation Has Increased in Recent Years, and the Majority of Lawsuits Involved Patents Related to Computers and Computer Software
The number of federal district court filings of new patent infringement lawsuits has generally increased between 2007 and 2015, from more than 2,000 suits in 2007 to more than 5,000 suits in 2015 (see fig. Looking at the data in this way, we found that the number of defendants in new patent infringement suits filed in federal district courts increased from about 5,000 defendants in 2007 to more than 8,000 defendants in 2015, as shown in figure 2. Patent infringement suits are increasingly being filed in the predominantly rural Eastern District of Texas (see fig. In 2007, about 20 percent of all patent infringement defendants were named in cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas, and this percentage increased to almost 50 percent in 2015. As with computer and communications technologies, some stakeholders told us that software-related patents are easier to infringe because they also often have overly broad claims, an indicator of low quality patents. Additional Opportunities Exist to Improve Patent Quality at USPTO
USPTO has taken actions to address patent quality—most notably through its Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative—but there are additional opportunities for USPTO to improve patent quality. USPTO Has Not Consistently Defined Patent Quality or Established Specific Performance Measures
USPTO does not currently have a consistent definition for patent quality, which may limit its ability to assess the effects of its examination policies and review processes—as well as its Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative— on patent quality. While USPTO has found it difficult to clearly define patent quality, most of the stakeholders we spoke with told us that they would define patent quality as patent validity—that is, a quality patent would meet all the statutory requirements for patentability and would be upheld if challenged in a lawsuit or PTAB proceeding. Four supervisory patent examiners we interviewed told us that without a consistent definition of patent quality, USPTO is unable to standardize practices to improve patent quality. Time allotments and incentives can lead to pressure for examiners to complete their work quickly. Specifically, on the basis of our survey, we estimate that, given a typical workload, about 70 percent of examiners have less time than needed to complete a thorough examination. USPTO officials acknowledged that this difference was likely due to the additional time and supervisory review that junior examiners receive. The precise effects of the time allotted for examinations and incentives on quality are unclear because USPTO has not fully analyzed the effects of current time allotments or incentives on an examiner’s ability to perform a thorough examination. According to federal standards for internal control, agencies should provide staff with the right structure, incentives, and responsibilities to make operational success possible. Without analyzing the time and incentives needed for examiners to complete thorough examinations, USPTO cannot be assured that its current time allotments and incentives support the agency’s goal to optimize patent quality. Additionally, USPTO policies and procedures generally require clarity in issued patents. For example, on the basis of our survey, we estimate that nearly 90 percent of examiners always or often encountered broadly worded claims in applications they reviewed, and for nearly two-thirds of examiners, applications with broadly worded claims make completing a thorough examination more difficult. Without making use of tools to improve the clarity of patent applications, such as by having applicants include a glossary to define the terms used in the application, provide a claim chart, or indicate the use of functional claims through a checkbox, the agency is at risk of issuing unclear patents that may not comply with statutory requirements. USPTO does not have a consistent definition of patent quality that is clearly articulated in agency guidance or fully developed measurable goals and performance indicators to guide and evaluate work towards the agency’s quality goals. Evaluate the effects of compact prosecution and other agency application and examination policies on patent quality. In its written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III, USPTO generally agreed with our findings, concurred with our recommendations, and provided information on steps officials plan to take to implement the recommendations. We also conducted 11 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from technology companies, venture capital investors, and others knowledgeable about recent patent infringement litigation. To examine what additional opportunities exist, if any, to improve patent quality, we reviewed relevant laws and USPTO documents and interviewed USPTO officials and representatives of the examiners’ union—the Patent Office Professional Association. 1)
Appendix II: Patent Examination Process at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) (Corresponds to Fig. | Why GAO Did This Study
Resolving disputes over patent infringement and validity in court often costs millions of dollars. Legal scholars and economists have raised concerns about an increase in the numbers of low quality patents—such as those that are unclear and overly broad—which may lead to an increase in patent infringement suits and can hinder innovation by blocking new ideas from entering the marketplace.
GAO was asked to review issues related to patent quality. GAO examined (1) recent trends in patent infringement litigation and (2) what additional opportunities exist, if any, to improve patent quality. GAO reviewed relevant laws and agency documents; analyzed patent infringement litigation data from 2007 through 2015; conducted a survey of a generalizable sample of USPTO examiners; and interviewed officials from USPTO and knowledgeable stakeholders, including legal scholars, technology companies, and patent attorneys, among others.
What GAO Found
GAO found that district court filings of new patent infringement lawsuits increased from about 2,000 in 2007 to more than 5,000 in 2015, while the number of defendants named in these lawsuits increased from 5,000 to 8,000 over the same period. In 2007, about 20 percent of all defendants named in new patent infringement lawsuits were sued in the Eastern District of Texas, and by 2015 this had risen to almost 50 percent. According to stakeholders, patent infringement suits are increasingly being tried in the predominantly rural Eastern District of Texas, likely due to recent practices in that district that are favorable to the patent owners who bring these infringement suits. GAO also found that most patent suits involve software-related patents and computer and communications technologies. Several stakeholders told GAO that it is easy to unintentionally infringe on patents associated with these technologies because the patents can be unclear and overly broad, which several stakeholders believe is a characteristic of low patent quality.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has taken actions to address patent quality, most notably through its Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative, but there are additional opportunities for the agency to improve patent quality. For example, USPTO does not currently have a consistent definition for patent quality articulated in agency documents and guidance, which would be in line with federal internal-control standards and best practices for organizational performance. Most stakeholders GAO interviewed said they would define a quality patent as one that would meet the statutory requirements for novelty and clarity, among others, and would be upheld if challenged in a lawsuit or other proceeding. Without a consistent definition, USPTO is unable to fully measure progress toward meeting its patent quality goals. Additionally, USPTO has not fully assessed the effects of the time allotted for application examinations or monetary incentives for examiners on patent quality. Specifically, most stakeholders GAO interviewed said that time pressures on examiners are a central challenge for patent quality. Based on GAO's survey of patent examiners, GAO estimates that 70 percent of the population of examiners say they do not have enough time to complete a thorough examination given a typical workload. According to federal standards for internal control, agencies should provide staff with the right structure, incentives, and responsibilities to make operational success possible. Without assessing the effects of current incentives for examiners or the time allotted for examination, USPTO cannot be assured that its time allotments and incentives support the agency's patent quality goals. Finally, USPTO does not currently require applicants to define key terms or make use of additional tools to ensure patent clarity. Federal statutes require that patent applications use clear, concise, and exact terms. Based on a survey of patent examiners, GAO estimates that nearly 90 percent of examiners always or often encountered broadly worded patent applications, and nearly two-thirds of examiners said that this made it difficult to complete a thorough examination. Without making use of additional tools, such as a glossary of key terms, to improve the clarity of patent applications, USPTO is at risk of issuing patents that do not meet statutory requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes seven recommendations, including that USPTO more consistently define patent quality and articulate that definition in agency documents and guidance, reassess the time allotted for examination, analyze the effects of incentives on patent quality, and consider requiring applicants to use additional clarity tools. USPTO generally agreed with GAO's findings, concurred with the recommendations, and provided information on steps officials plan to take to implement the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-1089T | gao_GAO-04-1089T_0 | To help address this challenge, many agencies are in the process of replacing their core financial systems as part of their financial management system improvement efforts. Although the implementation of any major system is not a risk-free proposition, organizations that follow and effectively implement disciplined processes can reduce these risks to acceptable levels. The key to having a disciplined system development effort is to have disciplined processes in multiple areas, including project planning and management, requirements management, configuration management, risk management, quality assurance, and testing. HHS Had Not Effectively Implemented Disciplined Processes, Information Technology Management Practices, and Human Capital Planning
We found that HHS had adopted some best practices in its development of UFMS. However, at the time of our review, HHS had not effectively implemented several disciplined processes essential to reducing risks to acceptable levels and therefore key to a project’s success, and had adopted other practices that put the project at unnecessary risk. However, we found that HHS had focused on meeting its schedule to implement the first phase of the new system at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in October 2004, to the detriment of disciplined processes and thus had introduced unnecessary risks that may compromise the system’s cost, schedule, and performance. These matters are discussed in detail in our report. Project management and oversight using quantitative measures. We found that HHS did not have quantitative metrics that allowed it to fully understand (1) its capability to manage the entire UFMS effort; (2) how problems in its management processes would affect the UFMS cost, schedule, and performance objectives; and (3) the corrective actions needed to reduce the risks associated with the problems identified with its processes. Compounding these UFMS-specific problems are departmentwide weaknesses we have previously reported in information technology (IT) investment management, enterprise architecture, and information security. Specifically, HHS had not established the IT management processes needed to provide UFMS with a solid foundation for development and operation. Strategic workforce planning is essential for achieving the mission and goals of the UFMS project. In its comments, HHS characterized the risk in its approach as the result, not of a lack of disciplined processes, but of an aggressive project schedule. With a project of this magnitude and importance, we stand by our position that it is crucial for the project to adhere to disciplined processes that represent best practices. Therefore, in order to mitigate its risk to an acceptable level, we continue to believe it is essential for HHS to adopt and effectively implement our 34 recommendations. Delaying implementation of significant functionality at CDC is a positive step forward given the risks associated with the project. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has previously reported on systemic problems the federal government faces in achieving the goals of financial management reform and the importance of using disciplined processes for implementing financial management systems. As a result, the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, House Committee on Government Reform, asked GAO to review and evaluate the agencies' plans and ongoing efforts for implementing financial management systems. The results of GAO's review of the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) ongoing effort to develop and implement the Unified Financial Management System (UFMS) are discussed in detail in the report Financial Management Systems: Lack of Disciplined Processes Puts Implementation of HHS' Financial System at Risk (GAO-04-1008). In this report, GAO makes 34 recommendations focused on mitigating risks associated with the project. In light of this report, the Subcommittee asked GAO to testify on the challenges HHS faces in implementing UFMS.
What GAO Found
HHS had not effectively implemented several disciplined processes, which are accepted best practices in systems development and implementation, and had adopted other practices, that put the project at unnecessary risk. Although the implementation of any major system is not a risk-free proposition, organizations that follow and effectively implement disciplined processes can reduce these risks to acceptable levels. While GAO recognized that HHS had adopted some best practices related to senior level support, oversight, and phased implementation, GAO noted that HHS had focused on meeting its schedule to the detriment of disciplined processes. GAO found that HHS had not effectively implemented several disciplined processes to reduce risks to acceptable levels, including requirements management, testing, project management and oversight using quantitative measures, and risk management. Compounding these problems are departmentwide weaknesses in information technology management processes needed to provide UFMS with a solid foundation for development and operation, including investment management, enterprise architecture, and information security. GAO also identified human capital issues that significantly increase the risk that UFMS will not fully meet one or more of its cost, schedule, and performance objectives, including staffing and strategic workforce planning. HHS stated that it had an aggressive implementation schedule, but disagreed that a lack of disciplined processes is placing the UFMS program at risk. GAO firmly believes if HHS continues to follow an approach that is schedule-driven and shortcuts key disciplined processes, it is unnecessarily increasing its risk. GAO stands by its position that adherence to disciplined processes is crucial, particularly with a project of this magnitude and importance. HHS indicated that it plans to delay deployment of significant functionality associated with its UFMS project for at least 6 months. This decision gives HHS a good opportunity to effectively implement disciplined processes to enhance the project's opportunity for success. |
gao_GAO-09-406T | gao_GAO-09-406T_0 | GAO’s Recent Work Shows That NNSA’s and EM’s Projects Continue to Be at High Risk for Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Mismanagement
Over the past 3 years, we have reported on significant problems with NNSA’s and EM’s ability to manage major projects within cost and schedule targets. Two of these reports examined the performance of DOE’s largest construction projects—nearly all of these projects are managed by NNSA or EM—and EM’s largest nuclear waste cleanup projects. In summary, these reports documented that the cost increases and schedule delays that have occurred for most of these projects have been the result of inconsistent application of project management tools and techniques on the part of both DOE and its contractors. Regarding DOE’s largest construction projects, we reported in March 2007 that 8 of the 10 major NNSA or EM construction projects we reviewed had exceeded the initial cost estimates for completing these projects—in total, DOE added nearly $14 billion to these initial estimates. We also reported that 9 of the 10 projects were behind schedule—in total, DOE added more than 45 years to the initial schedule estimates. In regard to EM’s largest cleanup projects, in September 2008, we reported that 9 of the 10 major EM cleanup projects had experienced cost increases and schedule delays—in total DOE estimated that it needed an additional $25 billion to $42 billion to complete these cleanup projects over the initial cost estimates and an additional 68 to 111 more years than initially estimated. In addition to the findings in these two reports, we have issued other reports over the past 3 years that also found similar project management problems with NNSA and EM. Preliminary Results From Ongoing GAO Work on NNSA’s Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Indicate Continuing Project Management Concerns
We are currently reviewing the cost and schedule performance and the status of licensing the MFFF construction project at the Savannah River Site, a nearly $5 billion facility that is designed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for use in commercial nuclear reactors. In accordance with DOE’s project management requirements, NNSA is using an earned value management system to measure and report the progress of the MFFF construction project. For example, a schedule should specify when the project’s set of work activities will occur, how long they will take, and how they relate to one another. Although the MFFF project’s schedule was developed using many of these practices, the schedule, in addition to other problems, does not employ a key practice that is fundamental to having a sufficiently reliable schedule—specifically, MFFF project staff have not conducted a risk analysis on their current schedule using statistical techniques. Consequently, NNSA cannot adequately state its level of confidence in meeting the MFFF project’s completion date of October 2016, and NNSA’s schedule for the project therefore may not be reliable. II for the preliminary results of our analysis of the MFFF project’s schedule). Specifically, project officials told us that they plan to conduct a schedule risk analysis during the summer of 2009. Our work on this project is continuing, and we intend to work with NNSA to resolve these issues to the extent possible. These recommendations collectively call for DOE to ensure that project management requirements are consistently followed, to improve oversight of contractors, and to strengthen accountability for performance. Although DOE’s responses to these recommendations have been largely positive, and some corrective actions have been taken, most of the recommendations are still open, awaiting action by the department. DOE has also taken steps to better understand weaknesses underlying its contract and project management. Hanford Waste Treatment Plant: Department of Energy Needs to Strengthen Controls over Contractor Payments and Project Assets. National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation’s Nuclear Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) manages over 100 construction projects with estimated costs over $90 billion and 97 nuclear waste cleanup projects with estimated costs over $230 billion. DOE has about 14,000 employees to oversee the work of more than 93,000 contractor employees. Due to DOE's history of inadequate oversight and management of contractors, GAO continues to include DOE contract and project management on its list of government programs at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. This testimony discusses (1) recent GAO work on contract and project management within two of DOE's largest program offices--the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Office of Environmental Management (EM), (2) preliminary results of ongoing GAO work on project management at NNSA's Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) project at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and (3) actions needed by NNSA and EM to improve contract and project management. GAO's reports over the past 3 years have contained nearly 60 recommendations collectively calling for DOE to ensure that project management requirements are consistently followed, to improve oversight of contractors, and to strengthen accountability. While DOE has generally agreed with these recommendations and some actions have been taken, the majority are still open and awaiting action by DOE.
What GAO Found
Since 2006, GAO has issued 12 reports examining DOE's contract and project management. Two of these reports examined the performance of DOE's largest construction projects--nearly all of which are managed by NNSA or EM--and EM's largest nuclear waste cleanup projects. These reports documented that the cost increases and schedule delays that have occurred for most of these projects have been the result of inconsistent application of project management tools and techniques on the part of both DOE and its contractors. Specifically, GAO reported in March 2007 that 8 of the 10 major NNSA and EM construction projects that GAO reviewed had exceeded the initial cost estimates for completing these projects--in total, DOE added nearly $14 billion to these initial estimates. GAO also reported that 9 of the 10 major construction projects were behind schedule--in total, DOE added more than 45 years to the initial schedule estimates. In particular, the Waste Treatment Plant project at the Hanford Site had exceeded its original cost estimate by almost $8 billion and experienced schedule delays of over 8 years. GAO also reported in September 2008 that 9 of the 10 major EM cleanup projects GAO reviewed had experienced cost increases and schedule delays--in total, DOE estimated that it needed an additional $25 billion to $42 billion to complete these cleanup projects over the initial cost estimates and an additional 68 to 111 more years than initially estimated. In addition, GAO has issued a number of other reports over the past 3 years on specific projects which found similar management problems with NNSA and EM. Preliminary results from GAO's ongoing review of NNSA's MFFF project indicate project management concerns continue. The facility, which is designed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for use in commercial nuclear reactors, is estimated to cost about $4.8 billion and begin operations in 2016. One of the key management systems NNSA uses to measure and report on the project's progress--the project's earned value management system--depends on a reliable schedule that specifies, for example, when the project's work activities will occur, how long they will take, and how they relate to one another. GAO has previously identified nine key practices necessary for developing a reliable schedule. However, the project's schedule, in addition to other problems, does not adhere to a key practice that is fundamental to having a sufficiently reliable schedule--specifically, MFFF project staff have not conducted a risk analysis on their current schedule using statistical techniques. DOE officials responded that they plan on conducting a risk analysis of the schedule for the MFFF project during the summer of 2009. Consequently, NNSA cannot adequately state its level of confidence in meeting the MFFF project's completion date, and NNSA's schedule for the project therefore may not be reliable. GAO's work on this project is continuing, and GAO intends to work with NNSA to resolve these issues. |
gao_GAO-10-850 | gao_GAO-10-850_0 | Program Goals and Organizational Culture Guide Safety Reporting System Design and Implementation in Three Key Areas
According to lessons from our review of the literature, the design and implementation of an effective safety reporting system (SRS) includes consideration of program goals and organizational culture for decisions in three key areas: reporting and analysis, reporter protection and incentives, and feedback mechanisms. Case Studies Demonstrate the Need for Assessment and Resources in Design and Implementation and Suggest Certain Features in the Three Key Areas
Lessons from case studies of safety reporting systems (SRS) in three industries—aviation, commercial nuclear power, and health care— indicate the importance of cultural assessment and resource dedication in SRS design and implementation, and suggest certain features in the three key areas. 3. Reporting has increased. Lesson 2: Broad Reporting Thresholds, Experience- Driven Classification Schemes, and Processing at the Local Level Are Useful Features in Industries New to Safety Reporting
After the three industries instituted a voluntary SRS, workers experienced a sharp learning curve in recognizing a reportable event and developing trust in reporting. The CDC and APHIS Have Taken Steps to Improve the Usefulness of the TLR Reporting System; Lessons from the Literature and Case Studies Suggest Additional Steps
The CDC and APHIS Select Agent Program (SAP) has taken steps to improve reporting and enhance the usefulness of the theft, loss, and release (TLR) reporting system as a safety tool. Expanding the TLR reporting threshold to include hazards could provide additional data that might be useful for safety improvement efforts. The CDC and NIH—as recognized authorities on working safely with infectious diseases—disseminate safety information to the entire lab community. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Select Agent Program (SAP) manage a mandatory reporting system for theft, loss, and release (TLR) of select agents. Both of these reporting options will also require strong confidentiality protections, data deidentification, and other reporting incentives to foster trust in reporting. Matters for Congressional Consideration
In developing legislation for a national reporting system for the biological laboratory community, Congress should consider provisions for the agency it designates as responsible for the system to take into account the following in design and implementation: include stakeholders in setting system goals; assess labs’ organizational culture to guide design and implementation make reporting voluntary, with open-reporting formats that allow workers to report events in their own words and that can be submitted by all workers in a variety of modes (Web or postal), with the option to report to either an internal or external entity; incorporate strong reporter protections, data deidentification measures, and other incentives for reporting; develop feedback mechanisms and an industry-level entity for disseminating safety data and safety recommendations across the lab community; and ensure ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the safety reporting system and safety culture. Lastly, the HHS partially agreed with the third recommendation. While the agency agreed with the recommendation to develop processes for identifying reporting gaps and system evaluation to support targeted outreach and system modification, they disagreed with the recommendation to share TLR data for international lab safety improvement efforts. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methods
This appendix details the methods we used to identify lessons for designing and implementing an effective safety reporting system (SRS) from (1) the literature and (2) case studies of SRSs in the airline, commercial nuclear power, and health care industries; and apply those lessons to (3) assess the theft, loss, and release (TLR) reporting system for the Select Agent Program and (4) suggest design and implementation considerations for a national SRS for all biological labs. (1) Assessment, dedicated resources, and management focus are needed to understand and improve safety culture. (3) Strong legal protections and incentives encourage reporting and help prevent confidentiality breaches. (1) Consider limited immunity provisions to increase the reporting incentive. (4) A central, industry-level unit facilitates lesson sharing and evaluation. That is why our recommendations for improvements to the TLR program are directed to the CDC and APHIS, while recommendations for a national SRS for all labs are directed to Congress through matters for consideration. 3. 2, no. GAO. 1-2. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the number of biological labs increases, so too do the safety risks for lab workers. Data on these risks--collected through a safety reporting system (SRS) from reports of hazards, incidents, and accidents--can support safety efforts. However, no such system exists for all biological labs, and a limited system--managed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)--applies to only a subset of these labs. While a national SRS has been proposed, design and implementation are complex. In this context, GAO was asked to identify lessons from (1) the literature and (2) case studies; and to apply those lessons to (3) assess CDC and APHIS's theft, loss, or release (TLR) system for select agents, such as anthrax, and (4) suggest design and implementation considerations for a labwide SRS. To do its work, GAO analyzed SRS literature; conducted case studies of SRSs in aviation, commercial nuclear, and health care industries; and interviewed agency officials and biosafety specialists.
What GAO Found
According to the literature, effective design and implementation of a safety reporting system (SRS) includes consideration of program goals and organizational culture to guide decisions in three key areas: (1) reporting and analysis, (2) reporter protection and incentives, and (3) feedback mechanisms. Program goals are best identified through stakeholder involvement and organizational culture, through assessment. Case studies of SRSs in three industries--aviation, commercial nuclear, and health care--indicate that (1) assessment, dedicated resources, and management focus are needed to understand and improve safety culture; (2) broad reporting thresholds, experience-driven classification schemes, and local-level processing are useful SRS features in industries new to safety reporting; (3) strong legal protections and incentives encourage reporting and prevent potential confidentiality breaches; and (4) a central, industry-level unit facilitates lesson sharing and evaluation. While the CDC and APHIS Select Agent Program (SAP) has taken steps in the three key areas to improve the usefulness of the TLR system for select agents, steps for improvement remain. Specifically, the agencies have taken steps to better define reportable events, ensure the confidentiality of reports, and dedicate resources to use TLR data for safety improvement. However, lessons from the literature and case studies suggest additional steps in the three key areas to enhance the usefulness of the system. For example, lowering reporting thresholds could provide precursor data and limited immunity could increase the incentive to report. Finally, the CDC and APHIS are in a unique position--as recognized authorities in the lab community and with access to TLR reports from across the industry--to guide SRS evaluation and ensure safety lessons are broadly disseminated. For a national safety reporting system for all biological labs, existing information--about labs' organizational culture and the lab community's limited experience with SRSs--suggests the following features in the three key areas: (1) Reporting and analysis. Reporting should be voluntary; available to all workers; cover hazards, incidents, and less serious accidents; accessible in various modes (Web and postal); and with formats that allow workers to report events in their own words to either an internal or external SRS system. (2) Reporter protections and incentives. Strong confidentiality protections, data deidentification processes, and other reporting incentives are needed to foster trust in reporting. (3) Feedback mechanisms. SRS data should be used at both the local and industry levels for safety improvement. An industry-level entity is needed to disseminate SRS data and to support evaluation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, in developing legislation for a national SRS for biological labs, Congress consider provisions for certain system features. GAO also recommends three improvements to the CDC and APHIS TLR system. HHS disagreed with the first two recommendations and partially agreed with the third. USDA agreed with the three recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-205 | gao_GAO-07-205_0 | 3). Local businesses, or businesses of all sizes located in the states primarily affected by Hurricane Katrina—Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi— received 18 percent, or $1.9 billion, of the $11 billion in contracting dollars that the four agencies directly awarded between August 1, 2005, and June 30, 2006. Small businesses in these states received 66 percent of the $1.9 billion in Katrina-related contracting dollars awarded to local businesses by the four agencies we reviewed. Also, key information about small business subcontracting plans was not consistently available in official procurement data systems even though federal contracting rules state that the information should be documented there. Together, these 10 contractors accounted for 60 percent of these agencies’ prime contracting dollars. First, the official procurement data system, primarily for DHS and GSA, had no information at all on whether or not they required subcontracting plans for 70 percent or more of their contracting funds. DBEs Received About 10 Percent of the FAA Dollars Awarded for Katrina- Related Contracts
DBEs were awarded about $2.4 million of the nearly $24 million in Katrina- related contracts that airports in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi awarded with FAA funds for Katrina-related contracts during the period of our analysis (table 7). Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure compliance with federal contracting regulations and to more transparently disclose the extent to which subcontracting opportunities are available to small businesses, we recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense and the Administrator of General Services take the following two actions: Issue guidance to the appropriate procurement offices and personnel reinforcing (1) the reasons for subcontracting plan requirements and the importance of complying with them; (2) the necessity for documenting in publicly available sources the agencies’ decisions, particularly in instances when they determine not to require subcontracting plans; and (3) where subcontracting plans are in place, the need to adhere to the requirement for all prime contractors to report on their small business subcontracting accomplishments. This analysis showed that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOD, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) had received the largest supplemental appropriations and that these three agencies plus the General Services Administration (GSA) had awarded 86 percent of all funds for Katrina-related contracts as of May 2006. These 4 contractors were all large, and received a total of eight contracts. To obtain information on the extent to which Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBEs) received federal funds for transportation projects that relate to reconstruction or recovery from Hurricane Katrina, we analyzed data on contracts awarded between August 1, 2005, and June 30, 2006, with Department of Transportation funds in the states of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Defense (DOD), the General Services Administration (GSA), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) were responsible for 94 percent of the federal funds awarded for relief efforts via contracting as of May 2006. This report, which GAO conducted under the Comptroller General's Authority, describes (1) the amounts that small businesses received from prime contracts with these agencies, (2) the extent of subcontracting, (3) and the extent to which Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBEs) received Department of Transportation funds for Katrina-related projects. In conducting this study, GAO analyzed agency contract data, reviewed federal acquisition regulations, and interviewed agency procurement officials.
What GAO Found
Small businesses received a total of 28 percent of the $11 billion in contracting dollars that DHS, GSA, DOD, and the Corps directly awarded in response to Hurricane Katrina. Local businesses of all sizes in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi received 18 percent, or $1.9 billion of these funds. Small businesses received 66 percent of the $1.9 billion awarded in these states. Required information on small business subcontracting is not consistently available in official procurement data systems for the four agencies. The systems had no information on whether DHS or GSA required subcontracting plans for 70 percent or more of their contracting funds. In addition, when data showed agencies determined that the plans were not required, the four agencies often did not document a reason for their determinations, even though federal rules require such documentation when prime contracts meet criteria for having these plans. Incomplete information about subcontracting limits determining the extent to which agencies complied with contracting rules and gave small businesses maximum opportunities to win subcontracts. DBEs were awarded about 4 percent, or about $53 million, of the almost $1.3 billion the Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration funded for Katrina-related contracts in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi between August 1, 2005, and June 30, 2006. These contracts were awarded by the three state departments of transportation. DBEs also received about 10 percent of $24 million that airports in the three states awarded using Federal Aviation Administration funds for Katrina-related contracts. |
gao_GAO-15-573T | gao_GAO-15-573T_0 | Consequently, the security of these systems and networks is essential to protecting national and economic security, public health and safety, and the flow of commerce. The Federal Government and Its Contractors Face an Evolving Array of Cyber-Based Threats
Risks to cyber-based assets can originate from unintentional and intentional threats. Unintentional threats can be caused by, among other things, defective computer or network equipment, and careless or poorly trained employees. These threat sources make use of various techniques— or exploits—that may adversely affect federal information, computers, software, networks, and operations. These inherent advantages, combined with the increasing sophistication of cyber tools and techniques, allow threat actors to target government agencies and their contractors, potentially resulting in the disclosure, alteration, or loss of sensitive information, including PII; theft of intellectual property; destruction or disruption of critical systems; and damage to economic and national security. The deputy secretary was quoted as saying “it is a significant concern that over the past decade, terabytes of data have been extracted by foreign intruders from corporate networks of defense companies” and that some of the data concerned “our most sensitive systems.”
The Federal Government Faces Ongoing Challenges in Its Approach to Cybersecurity
Given the risk posed by cyber threats and the increasing number of incidents, it is crucial that the federal government take appropriate steps to secure its systems and information. In particular, challenges remain in the following key areas:
Designing and implementing risk-based cybersecurity programs at federal agencies. Specifically, for fiscal year 2014, 19 of the 24 federal agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act reported that information security control deficiencies were either a material weakness or a significant deficiency in internal controls over their financial reporting. Moreover, inspectors general at 23 of the 24 agencies cited information security as a major management challenge for their agency. Over the last several years, GAO and agency inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies aimed at improving their implementation of information security controls. For example:
Addressing cybersecurity for building and access control systems. In December 2014 we reported that DHS lacked a strategy for addressing cyber risk to building and access control systems and that its Interagency Security Committee had not included cyber threats to such systems in its threat report to federal agencies.Further, the General Services Administration (GSA) had not fully assessed the risk of cyber attacks aimed at building control systems. In August 2014 we reported that five of six agencies reviewed were inconsistent in overseeing assessments of contractors’ implementation of security controls. In addition, six agencies we reviewed had not fully developed comprehensive policies, plans, and procedures to guide their incident-response activities. The agencies generally agreed with these recommendations. In December 2013 we reported that eight federal agencies had inconsistently implemented policies and procedures for responding to data breaches involving PII. Implementing security programs at small agencies. In June 2014 we reported that six small agencies (i.e., agencies with 6,000 or fewer employees) had not fully implemented their information security programs. Until federal agencies take actions to address these challenges— including implementing the hundreds of recommendations made by us and inspectors general—federal systems and information, as well as sensitive personal information about members of the public, will be at an increased risk of compromise from cyber-based attacks and other threats. Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Cyber Incident Response Practices. Information Security: Agency Responses to Breaches of Personally Identifiable Information Need to Be More Consistent. Cybersecurity: Challenges in Securing the Electricity Grid. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies, as well as their contractors, depend on interconnected computer systems and electronic data to carry out essential mission-related functions. Thus, the security of these systems and networks is vital to protecting national and economic security, public health and safety, and the flow of commerce. If information security controls are ineffective, resources may be lost, information—including sensitive personal information—may be compromised, and the operations of government and critical infrastructure could be disrupted, with potentially catastrophic effects. Federal law sets forth various requirements, roles, and responsibilities for securing federal agencies' systems and information. In addition, GAO has designated federal information security as a high-risk area since 1997.
GAO was asked to provide a statement summarizing cyber threats facing federal agency and contractor systems, and challenges in securing these systems. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in this area.
What GAO Found
Federal and contractor systems face an evolving array of cyber-based threats. These threats can be unintentional—for example, from equipment failure, careless or poorly trained employees; or intentional—targeted or untargeted attacks from criminals, hackers, adversarial nations, or terrorists, among others. Threat actors use a variety of attack techniques that can adversely affect federal information, computers, software, networks, or operations, potentially resulting in the disclosure, alteration, or loss of sensitive information; destruction or disruption of critical systems; or damage to economic and national security. These concerns are further highlighted by the sharp increase in cyber incidents reported by federal agencies over the last several years, as well as the reported impact of such incidents on government and contractor systems.
Because of the risk posed by these threats, it is crucial that the federal government take appropriate steps to secure its information and information systems. However, GAO has identified a number of challenges facing the government's approach to cybersecurity, including the following:
Implementing risk-based cybersecurity programs at federal agencies: For fiscal year 2014, 19 of 24 major federal agencies reported that deficiencies in information security controls constituted either a material weakness or significant deficiency in internal controls over their financial reporting. In addition, inspectors general at 23 of these agencies cited information security as a major management challenge for their agency.
Securing building and access control systems: GAO previously reported that the Department of Homeland Security lacked a strategy for addressing cyber risks to agencies' building and access control systems—computers that monitor and control building operations—and that the General Services Administration had not fully assessed the risk of cyber attacks to such systems.
Overseeing contractors: The agencies GAO reviewed were inconsistent in overseeing contractors' implementation of security controls for systems they operate on behalf of agencies.
Improving incident response: The agencies GAO reviewed did not always effectively respond to cybersecurity incidents or develop comprehensive policies, plans, and procedures to guide incident-response activities.
Responding to breaches of personally identifiable information: The agencies GAO reviewed have inconsistently implemented policies and procedures for responding to data breaches involving sensitive personal information.
Implementing security programs at small agencies: Smaller federal agencies (generally those with 6,000 or fewer employees) have not always fully implemented comprehensive agency-wide information security programs.
Until agencies take actions to address these challenges—including the hundreds of recommendations made by GAO and inspectors general—their systems and information will be at increased risk of compromise from cyber-based attacks and other threats.
What GAO Recommends
In its previous work, GAO has made numerous recommendations to agencies to assist in addressing the identified cybersecurity challenges. |
gao_GAO-01-818 | gao_GAO-01-818_0 | In addition to losses due to fraud, the Department of Health and Human Services’ OIG has reported that billing errors, or mistakes, made by health care providers were significant contributors to improperly paid health care insurance claims. Some Advice Provided by Consultants Could Result in Violations of Law
The two workshops we attended provided certain advice that is inconsistent with the OIG guidance and that, if followed, could result in violations of criminal and civil statutes. The consultant claimed that reporting or refunding the overpayment would raise a red flag that could result in an audit or investigation. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report investigates health care consultants who conduct seminars or workshops that offer advice to health care providers on ways to enhance revenue and avoid audits or investigations. GAO attended several seminars and workshops offered by these consultants. GAO sought to determine whether the consultants were providing advice that could result in improper or excessive claims to Medicare, Medicaid, other federally funded health plans, and private health insurance carriers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that some advice was inconsistent with guidance provided by the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Inspector General (OIG). Such advice could result in violations of both civil and criminal statutes. |
gao_GAO-15-223 | gao_GAO-15-223_0 | Background
Mission-critical skills gaps within specific federal agencies as well as across the federal workforce pose a high risk to the nation because they impede the government from cost effectively serving the public and achieving results. We also noted that further progress in closing skills gaps will depend on, among other things, the extent to which OPM develops a predictive capacity to identify newly emerging skills gaps beyond those areas already identified. Lessons Learned From Initial Efforts to Close Mission-Critical Skills Gaps Could Strengthen Future Approaches
Working Group’s Effort Yields Three Key Lessons for Identifying Skills Gaps
Based on its deliberations from September 2011 through March 2012, the CHCO Council Working Group (Working Group) identified skills gaps in six government-wide, mission-critical occupations (MCO): cybersecurity, auditor, human resources specialist, contract specialist, economist, and the STEM family. Although this effort was an important step forward, because of various methodological shortcomings, the Working Group did not address a more comprehensive list of mission-critical skills gaps. Specifically, the Working Group’s experience underscores the importance of (1) using a robust, data-driven approach to identify potential MCOs early in the process; (2) prioritizing occupations using criteria that consider programmatic impact; and (3) consulting with subject matter experts and other stakeholders prior to identifying MCOs. Since 2011, our work has identified skills gaps in nearly two dozen occupations across the government. In some cases, such as cybersecurity, the gaps we identified were affecting multiple agencies and were consistent with the Working Group’s findings. In December 2013, we found that a decline in telecommunication expertise across multiple agencies compounded the General Services Administration’s (GSA) challenges in transitioning those agencies to a new network of telecommunications services, contributing to delays and cost overruns of 44 percent. OPM’s Efforts to Predict Emerging Mission-Critical Skills Gaps Are in the Early Planning Stages
OPM Plans to Strengthen the Methodology Used to Identify Emerging Skills Gaps
The interagency working group that identified the list of skills gaps in six government-wide mission-critical occupations (MCO) was re-named the Federal Agency Skills Team (FAST). In the first year, OPM officials stated that FAST intends to meet regularly until it identifies a new set of government-wide skills gaps, which OPM officials expect will occur by June 2015. This could allow for more discretion to address occupations with the potential for significant programmatic impacts even though an absolute majority of agencies may not have skills gaps in those areas. According to an OPM official, federal agencies’ ability to assess workforce competencies varies, which makes collection of government-wide data on competency gaps difficult. Therefore, as OPM develops its process for using EHRI to collect agencies’ skills gaps data, it will be important for OPM to also work with agency CHCOs to bolster the ability of agencies to assess workforce competencies by sharing competency surveys, lessons learned, and other tools and resources— and to ensure that such information can be stored in the EHRI database for government-wide workforce analysis. OPM and Selected Agencies Could Improve Efforts to Address Skills Gaps by Strengthening Data-Driven Reviews
OPM Developed HRstat Data-Driven Reviews to Help Agencies Regularly Track Their Progress in Achieving Their Human Resources Goals
Data-driven reviews—commonly referred to as “stat” meetings—are regularly scheduled, structured meetings used by organizations to review performance metrics with department or program personnel to drive progress on agency priorities and goals. Realizing this, OPM has established an interagency working group known as FAST, which is responsible for identifying and addressing current and emerging skills gaps. To ensure that OPM builds the predictive capacity to identify emerging skills gaps across the government—including the ability to collect and use reliable information on the competencies of the federal workforce for government-wide workforce analysis—we recommend that the Director of OPM take the following two actions:
Establish a schedule specifying when OPM will modify its EHRI database to capture staffing data that it currently collects from agencies through its annual workforce data reporting process. To help agencies and OPM better monitor progress toward closing skills gaps within agencies and government-wide, we recommend that the Director of OPM:
Work with the CHCO Council to develop a core set of metrics that all agencies should use as part of their HRstat data-driven reviews. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report assesses (1) lessons learned from initial efforts to close critical skills gaps and how they can inform future initiatives, (2) what progress the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has made in building a predictive capacity to identify future mission-critical skills gaps, and (3) how OPM and agencies are using HRstat to identify and close skills gaps. To assess how OPM and agencies are using HRstat to identify and close skills gaps, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of three agencies— the Departments of Commerce and Energy, and the U.S. Agency for International Development—from among the 24 agencies that had at least begun implementing HRstat at the time of our review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Mission-critical skills gaps both within federal agencies and across the federal workforce pose a high risk to the nation because they impede the government from cost-effectively serving the public and achieving results.
GAO was asked to review progress OPM has made in closing government-wide skills gaps, achieving its cross-agency priority goal, and additional steps needed to better identify and address skills gaps. This report assesses (1) lessons learned from initial efforts to close critical skills gaps and how they can inform future initiatives, (2) what progress OPM has made in building a predictive capacity to identify future mission-critical skills gaps, and (3) how OPM and agencies are using HRstat to identify and close skills gaps. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documentation; interviewed OPM officials; and reviewed the implementation of HRstat meetings at Commerce, DOE, and USAID.
What GAO Found
Lessons learned from initial efforts to try to close skills gaps could strengthen future approaches. For example, the Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) Council Working Group (Working Group) identified skills gaps in six government-wide occupations, such as cybersecurity and auditors. Although this effort was an important step forward, GAO's work has identified skills gaps in nearly two dozen occupations with significant programmatic impact. In some cases, such as cybersecurity, the skills gaps GAO identified were consistent with the Working Group's findings. But GAO's work has also identified additional skills gaps. For example, a decline in telecommunication expertise at multiple agencies contributed to delays and cost overruns of 44 percent when those agencies were transitioning to a new network of telecommunications services. The Working Group did not address a more comprehensive list of skills gaps because of various methodological shortcomings that included insufficient analysis of workforce data early in the process. In 2015, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the CHCO Council plan to identify and address a new set of government-wide skills gaps. It will be important that key lessons learned from the initial efforts to identify skills gaps inform this next round of work, including the need to (1) use a data-driven approach early in the process, (2) prioritize occupations using criteria that consider programmatic impact, and (3) consult with subject matter experts and other stakeholders prior to the identification of skills gaps in occupations.
Key features of OPM's efforts to predict emerging skills gaps are in the early planning stages. GAO has previously reported that further progress in closing skills gaps will depend on, among other things, the extent to which OPM develops a capacity to predict emerging skills gaps beyond those areas already identified. A re-named interagency group, known as the Federal Agency Skills Team, plans to strengthen the methodology used to identify emerging skills gaps. Additionally, OPM officials are discussing plans to modify OPM's workforce database to capture government-wide staffing data. However, OPM will need to establish a schedule for modifying this database to ensure its implementation. OPM officials also stated that because agencies' capacity to assess workforce competencies varies, OPM does not have government-wide data on competency gaps, which is needed to identify emerging cross-agency skills gaps. In conjunction with agencies' CHCOs, OPM will need to strengthen agencies' ability to assess their competency needs that are critical to successfully achieving their mission and goals.
OPM and selected agencies that GAO reviewed—the Departments of Commerce (Commerce) and Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—could improve efforts to address skills gaps by strengthening their use of quarterly data-driven reviews, known as HRstat meetings. Specifically, the metrics used by the selected agencies during their HRstat meetings vary from agency to agency, making it difficult for OPM to assess agencies' progress in closing skills gaps government-wide. Although it is important for agencies to have their own HRstat metrics, OPM should work with the CHCO Council to develop a core set of HRstat metrics that all agencies use so that OPM may have the ability to analyze skills gap data across the government.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OPM (1) strengthen its methodology for identifying and addressing skills gaps, (2) establish a schedule and process for collecting government-wide staffing and competency data, and (3) develop a core set of metrics for use in agencies' HRstat reviews. OPM generally concurred with the first and third recommendations but did not concur with the second recommendation because of funding implications. GAO acknowledges there may be funding constraints; however, GAO's recommendation may help OPM address these constraints. |
gao_GAO-17-132 | gao_GAO-17-132_0 | Regulations also require carriers to conduct comprehensive inspections of their vehicles annually. FMCSA uses the data on violations submitted by inspectors to rank carriers’ relative safety performance in seven categories and assign carriers to a percentile in each. While Potential Safety Impact of a Self- Reporting System Is Difficult to Determine, FMCSA and Selected Stakeholders Suggested Safety Benefits Are Unlikely
Identifying Potential Safety Impact of a System for Self-Reporting Equipment Problems Is Challenging
One of the challenges in assessing the safety impact of a potential system for self-reporting equipment problems is its hypothetical nature. We assumed that a self-reporting system would: apply only to problems identified during a driver’s day, that is between the pre-trip inspection and the end of the day when the driver vehicle inspection report is completed; not apply to equipment problems that would result in out-of-service require drivers to report equipment problems and repairs through a telephone hotline or Internet website or other electronic platform; require repairs to be made before the beginning of the next day on duty (e.g., within a day of when the problem was reported, if the driver ended his trip that evening and planned another trip the following day); still result in a carrier receiving a violation for the equipment problem if pulled over for a roadside inspection, but once a self-reported equipment problem was repaired within the requisite time frame and FMCSA was so notified, FMCSA would exclude the violation from the carrier’s relative safety ranking (i.e., BASIC percentile for vehicle maintenance); and not prompt FMCSA to take action if a carrier or driver self-reported an equipment problem, but never received a violation for that equipment problem. 2. Representatives from five of six industry and safety associations we interviewed said they would be unlikely to support a self-reporting system as outlined above. Most Carriers and Drivers Anticipated No Significant Safety Benefits of a Self- Reporting System, and FMCSA and Other Stakeholders Said It May Negatively Impact Safety
To impact safety, a self-reporting system would also have to prompt drivers and carriers to change the way they identify and repair equipment problems, yet the majority of carriers and drivers we interviewed said the system would not change, for example, how quickly they made repairs. For example, three drivers thought a self-reporting system could potentially yield some safety benefits if it incentivized drivers to do more thorough pre-trip or en route inspections. Representatives from safety associations said that carriers and drivers might delay making repairs until the end of any permitted time period or might engage in distracted driving while typing or calling in an en route equipment problem on their cell phones. FMCSA Has the Statutory and Regulatory Capability to Establish a Self- Reporting System, but FMCSA and System Users May Face Challenges, and Costs are Unknown
We Did Not Identify Any Statutory or Regulatory Barriers to Establishing a System for Self-Reporting Equipment Problems
Neither we nor FMCSA identified any statutory or regulatory barriers to establishing a system for self-reporting equipment problems. Creating a self-reporting system could place new demands on FMCSA’s information technology resources. Developing a self-reporting system could further delay these software improvements. If the system were a web application, drivers would need smartphones to report an equipment problem, but some drivers may not have one. Carriers or drivers could also face challenges accurately entering required information. Additionally, drivers would need to identify the violation that most closely matched their equipment problem, out of more than 300 potential vehicle maintenance violations. While we cannot estimate costs for the type of self-reporting system described in this report with any degree of confidence, FMCSA broadly estimated that a self-reporting system would cost between $5 and $10 million to establish and operate for the first year. DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2015, more than 4,000 people were killed in crashes involving large trucks. To identify carriers with the highest crash risk, FMCSA uses information from roadside inspections and crashes to rank each carrier's safety performance relative to other carriers in seven categories, including one on vehicle maintenance. Some stakeholders have proposed a system for carriers or their drivers to self-report en route vehicle equipment problems to FMCSA. Reported equipment problems that were repaired within a certain time period would not affect the carrier's relative ranking, potentially incentivizing carriers to make repairs more quickly.
The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act included a provision for GAO to examine the cost and feasibility of establishing a system for carriers or drivers to self-report vehicle equipment problems to FMCSA. This report examines (1) the potential safety impacts of a self-reporting system and (2) factors that could affect its feasibility and cost.
GAO reviewed relevant regulations, information on other existing DOT self-reporting systems, and prior related GAO work. GAO also interviewed a non-generalizable sample of representatives from six industry and safety associations, six carriers, and six drivers about this potential system for self-reporting equipment problems. GAO selected carriers to include those with diverse fleet sizes and average distances traveled, and drivers from six additional carriers.
DOT provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Establishing a system that would provide incentives for trucking companies to self-report equipment problems may not necessarily yield safety benefits. Most stakeholders GAO interviewed—including selected carriers and drivers—thought a self-reporting system would be unlikely to produce safety benefits, stating that it would not incentivize quicker repairs. If repairs are not made more quickly, there would be no positive impact on safety. Three drivers, however, thought a self-reporting system could yield some safety benefits if it incentivized drivers to do more thorough inspections of their vehicles. Officials from industry groups and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) noted that a self-reporting system could negatively impact safety, such as by encouraging distracted driving if drivers report equipment problems on their cell phones while driving. Moreover, estimating the potential safety impacts of such a system requires information that is not currently available, such as how equipment problems that would be permitted to be self-reported are related to crashes.
Example of a Driver Receiving a Violation for a Previously Identified Equipment Problem under Current System and under a Self-Reporting One
FMCSA has the statutory and regulatory authority to establish a system for self-reporting equipment problems, and technology exists to create it, but its costs are unknown. Also, establishing such a system could pose challenges for FMCSA, carriers, and drivers. For example, developing a new system could delay efforts FMCSA has under way to improve its information technology, and carriers or drivers may have difficulty selecting their specific equipment problem from the more than 300 potential vehicle maintenance violations. Further, without information on key design features of a self-reporting system, such as whether reporting would be through a telephone hotline or a web-application, it is not possible to estimate costs with any reasonable degree of confidence. FMCSA developed a rough estimate that a self-reporting system would cost between $5 and $10 million to establish and operate for the first year. |
gao_GAO-10-421 | gao_GAO-10-421_0 | In addition to paying no less than locally prevailing wages, contractors for construction projects that are subject to the Davis-Bacon Act must pay their workers on a weekly basis and submit weekly certified payroll records. The prevailing wage provision in section 1606 of the Recovery Act broadly applies Davis-Bacon requirements to all construction projects funded directly or assisted by the federal government under Division A of the act. Federal Agency Officials Reported That 40 Programs Are Newly Subject to Davis-Bacon Requirements because of the Recovery Act’s Prevailing Wage Provision
According to federal agency officials, 40 programs are newly subject to Davis-Bacon requirements as a result of the Recovery Act’s prevailing wage provision, as shown in table 1. These programs are spread across 12 of 27 federal agencies that received funding under Division A of the ac Most of the programs existed prior to the Recovery Act and are subject to Davis-Bacon requirements for the first time under the act, while some are newly created programs. Program Officials Differed on Whether Davis-Bacon Requirements Would Increase Programs’ Costs
Federal officials responsible for programs that are newly subject to Davis- Bacon requirements—the prevailing wage rate requirement and the administrative requirements associated with weekly payroll processes— had mixed views on the extent to which they expected these requirements to affect program costs, as table 2 shows. According to other program officials, the impact would be small because a relatively small amount of program funds are to be spent on construction activities that are subject to Davis-Bacon requirements. Officials from the Department of Energy’s Weatherization Assistance Program explained that the prevailing wage rate requirement will have at least a moderate impact on program costs. They explained that weatherization projects in buildings taller than four stories will require that workers be paid commercial prevailing wage rates that are higher than the wage rates that would otherwise be used for weatherization projects. Department of Energy officials responsible for the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants program anticipated a potentially large impact as a result of the large number of grantees and significant proportion of funds that would be spent on construction labor wages. Federal officials responsible for the Weatherization Assistance Program and the Lead Hazard Reduction Program said Davis- Bacon administrative requirements would require a more detailed payroll tracking system, which would be particularly burdensome for small companies. To accommodate this increase, the agency is in the process of increasing the cap on how much recipients can spend on administrative costs from 10 to 15 percent of their award. State and local officials we interviewed and collected data from also reported that the Davis-Bacon requirements would generally have little impact on their ability to achieve program and Recovery Act goals. Conversely, Michigan state weatherization officials said the requirements might affect their ability to support the Recovery Act goal of job creation, especially for smaller businesses and contractors. For example, officials with the Department of Energy’s Weatherization Assistance Program stated that Davis-Bacon requirements had significantly affected their program’s timing because the program is newly subject to the requirements so prevailing wage rates for weatherization workers were not immediately available. Officials with the Department of Energy’s Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants and State Energy Program also expected Davis-Bacon requirements to affect the timing of their Recovery Act efforts, while officials with the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Lead Hazard Reduction Program reported that grantees were provided additional time to complete their work plans to ensure contractors understood the requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) has the broad purpose of stimulating the economy. It includes substantial appropriations for construction projects that, under the act's prevailing wage provision, are subject to Davis-Bacon Act requirements. That is, contractors must pay laborers and mechanics who work on those projects at least the prevailing wage rates set for their local area by the Secretary of Labor. In addition, contractors must submit certified payrolls and pay their workers weekly. Prior to the Recovery Act, some federal programs with construction projects were already subject to Davis-Bacon Act requirements. Others, however, are subject to the requirements for the first time because the Recovery Act extended the requirements to all construction projects supported by the act. GAO was asked to (1) identify the programs that are newly affected by the Recovery Act's prevailing wage provision and (2) examine the extent to which that provision is expected to affect each of those newly affected programs. GAO obtained data from 27 agencies and spoke with federal, state, and local officials as well as contractors involved with the newly affected programs. Although GAO is not making recommendations in this report, these findings may be helpful in considering and designing legislation with similar objectives.
What GAO Found
Fortyprograms are newly subject to Davis-Bacon requirements as a result of the Recovery Act's prevailing wage provision, according to federal agency officials. Of these, 33 programs existed prior to the Recovery Act and are subject to Davis-Bacon requirements for the first time under the act, while 7 are newly created programs. Together, the 40 programs account for about $102 billion of the $309 billion that was appropriated by the Recovery Act for projects and activities. However, a smaller amount of these funds will be subject to Davis-Bacon requirements because not all of the funds will be used for construction activities and only a portion of those funds will be used to pay labor wages. For those programs that are newly subject to Davis-Bacon requirements, officials had mixed views on the impact of these requirements on program costs and goal achievement. In some cases, officials said Davis-Bacon requirements would have little or no impact on program costs for a few reasons, such as (1) the program having a small amount of construction activities, (2) prevailing wage rates that were in line with expectations, and (3) companies' previous experience with weekly payrolls. In other cases, officials said the requirements would have a moderate to large impact on program costs and/or goals. For example, officials from the Department of Energy's (DOE) Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants program anticipated a potentially large cost impact as a result of the significant amount of funds to be spent on construction labor wages. Officials from DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program reported that weatherization projects in buildings taller than four stories will require workers to be paid a commercial prevailing wage rate under the Davis-Bacon Act that is higher than what would otherwise be used and could potentially reduce the number of homes weatherized. Additionally, weatherization officials said that Davis-Bacon requirements affected the program's timing because prevailing wage rates for weatherization workers were not fully available until September 2009. Further, officials from the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Lead Hazard Reduction Program noted that Davis-Bacon requirements would require a more detailed payroll tracking system that could be particularly burdensome for small companies. Those officials also explained that because administrative costs are likely to increase, the department is in the process of increasing the cap on how much recipients can spend on administrative costs. |
gao_GAO-04-505T | gao_GAO-04-505T_0 | At the 5 pilot program airports, we also interviewed representatives of the private screening contractors. Private Screening Contractors Have Had Little Opportunity to Demonstrate Innovations and Achieve Efficiencies
A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences in the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for those differences. TSA officials stated that they had not granted contract officials more flexibility because they wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well coordinated, and consistently implemented throughout all airports to achieve consistent security. However, TSA recently requested input from the private screening contractors about the additional flexibilities they would like to implement. Flexibilities Have Been Provided to Private Screeners in a Few Areas
Although, overall, TSA has not provided private screening contractors with much operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some airport-specific practices. Practices implemented by the private screening contractors include screening candidates before they are hired though the assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order to utilize baggage screeners more efficiently, and promoting screener supervisors from within rather than hiring them directly from the assessment center. These practices have enabled the private screening contractors to achieve efficiencies that are not currently available to FSDs at airports with federal screeners. During the initial hiring of screeners, TSA’s hiring contractor selected screener supervisors for both the airports with federal and private screeners. Little Information Exists to Measure Differences in Performance of Private and Federal Screeners
Little performance data are currently available to compare the performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. The primary source of performance data currently available is the results of the covert tests performed by TSA’s OIAPR, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat objects through screening checkpoints and in checked baggage. Although the results of the covert testing cannot be generalized either to the airports in which the tests have been conducted or to airports nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance in detecting threat objects. TSA has recognized the need to enhance screener performance and has taken steps in this direction, including enhancing its recurrent training program. The results indicate that, in general, private and federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, the testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private and federal screeners to detect threat objects. TSA is currently considering developing performance indexes for representing the performance of passenger and baggage screeners. Further, the program was not designed to achieve its intended mission, as defined by TSA—to test the effectiveness of increased operational flexibility at the airport level that contractors may provide. | Why GAO Did This Study
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in fundamental changes in the way the United States screens airport passengers and their property. One of the most significant changes was the shift from using private screeners to using federal screeners at all but five commercial airports in the United States. These five airports are part of a pilot program, where private screeners perform screening functions. The mission of the Private Screening Pilot Program, as defined by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), is to test the effectiveness of increased operational flexibility at the airport level that contractors may provide. GAO was asked to describe (1) the challenges and limitations of the private screening pilot program, (2) the operational flexibilities TSA has provided to the private screening companies, and (3) the performance of private and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. This testimony is based on our prior and ongoing work on TSA airport passenger and baggage screeners.
What GAO Found
A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences in the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for those differences. TSA provided the screening contractors with little opportunity to demonstrate innovations, achieve efficiencies, and implement initiatives that go beyond the minimum requirements of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. TSA officials said they had not granted contract officials more flexibility because they wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well coordinated, and consistently implemented throughout all airports to achieve consistent security. However, TSA recently requested input from the private screening contractors about the additional flexibilities they would like to implement. Although TSA has provided private screening contractors with only limited operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some airport-specific practices. These practices include screening candidates before they are hired through the assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order to utilize baggage screeners more efficiently, and, during the initial hiring, selecting screener supervisors from within their screener workforce rather than relying on the decisions of TSA's hiring contractors. These practices have enabled the private screening contractors to achieve efficiencies that are not currently available at airports with federal screeners. Little performance data are currently available to compare the performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. The primary source of available performance data is the results of the covert tests performed by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat objects through screening checkpoints. Although the test results cannot be generalized either to the airports where the tests have been conducted or to airports nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance in detecting threat objects and indicate that, in general, private and federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, the testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private and federal screeners to detect threat objects. TSA recognized the need to improve screener performance and has taken steps in this direction, including enhancing its training programs. |
gao_GAO-07-649T | gao_GAO-07-649T_0 | JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning NextGen, but Faces Several Challenges
JPDO has made progress in planning NextGen by facilitating collaboration among its partner agencies, working to finalize key planning documents, and improving its collaboration and coordination with FAA. Among the challenges JPDO faces are institutionalizing collaboration among the partner agencies, and identifying and exploring questions related to which entity will fund and conduct the research and development needed to meet NextGen requirements. First, JPDO has taken several actions that are consistent with practices that facilitate interagency collaboration—an important point given how critical such collaboration is to the success of JPDO’s mission. The enterprise architecture follows from the concept of operations and will describe the system in more detail (using the federal enterprise architecture framework). The draft concept of operations has been posted to JPDO’s Web site for stakeholder review and comment. According to JPDO, an expanded version of the enterprise architecture is expected in mid-2007. Progress has also been made in improving the collaboration and coordination between JPDO and FAA—the agency largely responsible for the implementation of NextGen systems and capabilities. FAA has expanded and revamped its Operational Evolution Plan (OEP)—renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership—to become FAA’s implementation plan for NextGen. The OEP is being expanded to apply to all of FAA and is intended to become a comprehensive description of how the agency will implement NextGen, including the required technologies, procedures, and resources. Challenges for JPDO Include Institutionalizing Interagency Collaboration and Exploring Potential Gaps in Research and Development Needs for NextGen
Although JPDO has established a framework for collaboration, it has faced a challenge in institutionalizing this framework. Still another challenge facing JPDO is ensuring that all relevant stakeholders are involved in the effort. Successful implementation will depend, in part, on how well FAA addresses its challenges of institutionalizing its recent improvement in managing air traffic control modernization efforts, addressing the cost challenges of implementing NextGen while safely maintaining the current air traffic control system, and obtaining the expertise needed to implement a system as complex as NextGen. FAA’s management improvements are relatively recent developments, and the agency will have lost two of its significant agents for change—the Administrator and the COO—by the end of September. This continued commitment to change is critical over the next few years, as foundational NextGen systems begin to be implemented. It is important to note that while FAA must manage the costs associated with the NextGen transformation, it must simultaneously continue to fund and operate the current national airspace system. 1). FAA Needs to Explore Whether It Has the Technical and Contract Management Expertise Necessary to Implement NextGen
In the past, a lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA’s management of air traffic control modernization efforts, and industry experts with whom we spoke questioned whether FAA will have the technical expertise needed to implement NextGen. | Why GAO Did This Study
The skies over America are becoming more crowded every day. The consensus of opinion is that the current aviation system cannot be expanded to meet this projected growth. Recognizing the need for system transformation, in 2003 Congress authorized the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and requires the office to operate in conjunction with multiple federal agencies, including the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. JPDO is responsible for coordinating the related efforts of these partner agencies to plan the transformation to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen): a fundamental redesign of the national airspace system. FAA will be largely responsible for implementing the policies and systems necessary for NextGen, while safely operating the current air traffic control system. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) the progress that JPDO has made in planning NextGen and some challenges it continues to face and (2) the challenges that FAA faces transitioning to NextGen. GAO's statement is based on our recent reports as well as ongoing work, all of which has been conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
JPDO has made substantial progress in planning NextGen, but continues to face several challenges. JPDO has established a framework to facilitate federal interagency collaboration and is involving nonfederal stakeholders in its planning efforts. JPDO has begun leveraging the resources of its partner agencies and is finalizing key planning documents such as the concept of operations and the enterprise architecture. The draft concept of operations has been posted to JPDO's Web site for public comment and the enterprise architecture is expected to be completed in the next few months. JPDO and FAA have improved their collaboration and coordination by expanding and revamping FAA's Operational Evolution Plan--renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership--which is intended to provide an implementation plan for FAA for NextGen. Among the challenges JPDO faces are institutionalizing the interagency collaboration that is so central to its mission, developing a comprehensive cost estimate, and addressing potential gaps in research and development for NextGen. In transitioning to NextGen, FAA faces several challenges. Although FAA has taken several actions to improve its management of current air traffic control modernization efforts, institutionalizing these improvements will require continued strong leadership, particularly since the agency will have lost two of its key agents for change by September 2007. Costs are another challenge facing FAA as it addresses the resource demands that NextGen will likely pose, while continuing to maintain the current air traffic control system. Finally, determining whether it has the technical and contract management expertise necessary to implement NextGen is a challenge for FAA. |
gao_GAO-08-812T | gao_GAO-08-812T_0 | SSA Continues to Approve Applications and Improve Processing Efforts and Has Improved Some Measures for Processing Benefits
SSA continues to approve low-income subsidy applications; of the applicants who were denied benefits, most exceeded income limits and others exceeded resource limits. To monitor its progress in implementing and administering the subsidy benefit, SSA has collected key data and established some goals. Excess Income Was the Predominant Reason That Applicants Were Denied the Subsidy in Fiscal Year 2007
Of the approximately 7.2 million applicants filing for the subsidy as of March 2008, SSA approved 2.8 million. Table 2 shows the extent to which applicants were denied subsidy eligibility because their income was too high. No Reliable Data Are Available to Identify Eligible Population for Outreach Efforts, and Millions May Have Not Yet Applied
No reliable data are available to help SSA identify the eligible population for its outreach efforts, and millions who may be eligible have not yet applied, in part due to privacy concerns and application complexity. SSA is working with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to determine whether tax data can help target individuals eligible for the subsidy. While SSA agreed with the recommendation in theory, it maintains that it would be unable to implement specific goals and measures due to the lack of reliable data on the eligible population. Several barriers may prevent potentially eligible Medicare beneficiaries from applying for the subsidy. A 2007 Mathematica study conducted for AARP, also found that reluctance to share personal financial information, the stigma associated with applying for public benefits, and inadequate availability of one-on-one assistance for completing the subsidy application, and resource limits affected individuals’ decision not to apply for the subsidy. SSA Initially Conducted Focused Outreach Efforts, But Now Incorporates Such Efforts into Overall Social Security Outreach
From the outset of the low-income subsidy program, SSA conducted a broad outreach campaign to inform as many potentially eligible people as possible about the subsidy and how to apply for it. SSA conducted its initial outreach campaign from May 2005 to August 2006. Recent staffing reductions in field offices may have left SSA with limited resources to assist individuals with the subsidy and conduct local outreach efforts. CMS and CBO estimate, respectively, that about 2.6 million to over 4 million individuals who may be eligible for the subsidy are still not receiving the benefit. The IRS and SSA study may help determine if tax data could help identify individuals who may qualify for the subsidy and target outreach efforts. Medicare: Communications to Beneficiaries on the Prescription Drug Benefit Could Be Improved. Social Security Administration: Medicare Part D Subsidies. Retiree Health Benefits: Options for Employment-Based Prescription Drug Benefits under the Medicare Modernization Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help the elderly and disabled with prescription drug costs, the Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), which created a voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit (Medicare Part D). A key element of the prescription drug benefit is the low-income subsidy, or "extra help," available to Medicare beneficiaries with limited income and resources to assist them in paying their premiums and other out-of-pocket costs. To assess the Social Security Administration's (SSA) implementation of the subsidy, GAO is providing information on (1) the number of applicants approved for or denied the low-income subsidy and (2) challenges of identifying individuals eligible for the subsidy and targeting outreach efforts. This statement is based on a prior GAO report on the subsidy and associated spending issued in May 2007, selected aspects of which we updated in May 2008.
What GAO Found
Of the approximately 7.2 million applicants for the low-income subsidy, SSA approved approximately 2.8 million as of March 2008, and SSA has improved some key measures for its subsidy application processes. SSA approved about 570,000 applicants, denied about 403,000 applicants, and determined that no decision was required for about 281,000 applicants in fiscal year 2007. Excess income was the primary reason applicants were denied benefits, while many other applicants were denied benefits because their resources exceeded program limits. Further, SSA has collected data and established some goals to monitor its progress in implementing and administering the subsidy benefit. No reliable data are available to help SSA identify the eligible population for its outreach efforts, and millions who may be eligible have not yet applied. SSA maintains that it would not be able to establish specific goals and measures for its outreach activities, as we recommended in our May 2007 report because, of the lack of reliable data on the total eligible population. Responding to another of our recommendations, SSA is working with the Internal Revenue Service to determine if tax data can help target individuals eligible for the subsidy. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and the Congressional Budget Office have estimated, respectively, that about 2.6 million to over 4 million individuals who may qualify for the subsidy are not receiving it. Various barriers, such as reluctance to disclose personal financial information or lack of knowledge of the subsidy, may prevent potentially eligible Medicare beneficiaries from applying for the subsidy. To solicit applications from individuals potentially eligible for the subsidy, SSA conducted an extensive outreach campaign from May 2005 to August 2006, but has decreased its outreach activities since then. Staffing constraints in SSA field offices may also limit SSA's ability to assist individuals with the subsidy and conduct local outreach to inform the public about the subsidy. |
gao_NSIAD-97-17 | gao_NSIAD-97-17_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested, we reviewed selected aspects of the military retirement system. Specifically, we addressed (1) military retirement costs, (2) the role of military retirement in shaping and managing U.S. forces, and (3) proposed changes to modernize the system and contribute to more efficient force management. We reviewed historical data and the current projections of future retirement costs from the DOD Actuary. Federal Outlays for Military Retirees
In fiscal year 1996, the United States paid $29 billion to military retirees and their survivors. This decline is due to more service members being under less generous retirement plans and changes made in actuarial assumptions to reflect experience. Military Retirement’s Role in Shaping and Managing the Force
The military retirement system strongly influences the broad shape of the force. The retirement system provides an increasing incentive for service members to stay in the military as they approach 20 years of service and encourages them to leave thereafter, helping DOD to retain midcareer personnel and yielding a relatively young force. However, the system can also impede effective force management. Because military personnel are not entitled to any retirement benefits unless they have served 20 years, the services have been reluctant to involuntarily separate personnel with less than 20 years of service beyond a certain point. Moreover, some analysts, including several roundtable participants, believe the military retirement system is an obstacle to achieving a force of the right size and composition because it provides the same strong career length incentive to all categories of personnel. Analysis suggests that some types of earlier vesting could be offered with little or no increase to DOD’s retirement costs, although the ultimate cost impacts to DOD depend on retention and force composition effects. Some analysts, including several roundtable participants, have called for more far-reaching structural changes to the retirement system, possibly with other changes in compensation and personnel policy, to accommodate different career lengths for different personnel. These changes could increase effectiveness or reduce costs through yielding a force of a different composition and size than today’s force. A common feature of several proposals is that members would be vested earlier in a portion of their retirement benefits so that the sharp rise in the value of military retirement benefits at 20 years of service would be somewhat leveled. These issues included DOD’s beliefs that (1) the current system has been effective in retaining experienced personnel while simultaneously avoiding stagnation among senior personnel; (2) the existing retirement system, augmented by temporary authorities established for the ongoing force drawdown, has provided adequate flexibility in managing force levels; (3) the 1986 changes to the retirement system increase the incentive for service beyond 20 years; (4) changes to the retirement system, such as those discussed in our report, could result in increased cost of other programs; and (5) changes in the retirement system are not needed to allow DOD to adequately vary career lengths according to specialty, given other available compensation and management tools. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed selected aspects of the military retirement system, focusing on: (1) military retirement costs; (2) the role of military retirement in shaping and managing U.S. forces; and (3) proposed changes to modernize the system and contribute to more efficient force management.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) payments from the military retirement fund to military retirees and their survivors totaled $29 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1996; (2) these payments have been rising over several decades as both the number of military retirees and the average payment to individual retirees have increased and are expected to peak at slightly more than $30 billion (in FY 1995 dollars) in 2007; (3) since FY 1985, the accrual accounting concept has been used to reflect the cost of future retirement payments for current service members in the Department of Defense's (DOD) military personnel budget; (4) these annual DOD budgetary costs have declined for several reasons, including lower benefits for new entrants, changes in economic and actuarial assumptions to reflect experience, and recent decreases in force size; (5) the military retirement system strongly influences the broad shape of the force, since it provides an increasing incentive for service members to stay in the military as they approach 20 years of service and encourages them to leave thereafter, helping DOD to retain midcareer personnel and yielding a relatively young force; (6) however, the system can also impede effective force management because military personnel are not entitled to any retirement benefits unless they have served 20 years, and the services have been reluctant to involuntarily separate personnel with less than 20 years of service beyond a certain point due to the financial consequences for service members and the impact on morale; (7) some analysts, including several of GAO's roundtable participants, believe the military retirement system is an obstacle to achieving the right force size and composition because the system provides the same career length incentive for all categories of personnel; (8) proposals to change the military retirement system are intended to improve efficiency and flexibility in force management, increase fairness or attractiveness to service members, and reduce costs; (9) earlier vesting of at least a portion of military retirement benefits is a common feature of proposed changes; (10) cost estimates done by the DOD Actuary, at GAO's request, suggest that some type of earlier vesting could be offered with little or no increase to DOD's retirement costs; (11) the total impact on DOD's budget of the proposed changes depends on their effect on retention and force composition; (12) some analysts have called for more fundamental changes to the retirement system, possibly with other changes in compensation and personnel policy, to accommodate different career lengths for different personnel; and (13) these changes could increase effectiveness or reduce costs by yielding a force of a different composition and size than today's force. |
gao_GAO-13-231 | gao_GAO-13-231_0 | The Administrator of OFPP is also required to ensure that agencies collect and maintain standardized information on the acquisition workforce. Its efforts include strengthening workforce planning requirements and setting standards for core acquisition training by establishing certification requirements. FAI efforts include: improving the collection and management of training information, including cost data and course evaluations; streamlining the communication of acquisition training guidance; and coordinating efforts to maximize acquisition workforce training investments government-wide. OFPP Promotes Government-wide Practices for Acquisition Workforce Training and Development
The Federal Acquisition Certification requirements were issued in 2005 for contracting professionals and 2007 for Contracting Officer’s Representatives and Program/Project Managers. The other government entities may provide training to an agency without seeking additional reimbursement, as is the case with FAI, DAU, and some federal agencies; however, others, such as the VA, charge a fee to attend their training to recoup their costs.15 Of the remaining 6 agencies, 5 reported that they hold agency-sponsored courses to provide the majority, if not all, of their acquisition workforce training, and one agency did not report. In response to our questionnaire, most agencies—17 of 23—reported that they are able to find sufficient courses to do this. Agencies Face Challenges with Having Adequate Training Resources, Identifying the Acquisition Workforce, and Staff Having Time to Attend Training
The top challenges reported by agencies in obtaining training for their acquisition workforces were having sufficient resources—both staffing to manage the training program and budgetary resources—to provide training. Specifically, 20 agencies reported that obtaining adequate funding is a challenge, and 19 reported that obtaining sufficient staff to manage the acquisition workforce training is a challenge. Lack of Comparable Cost Data and Limited Insights On Benefits of Training Hinder Efforts to Maximize Resources Government-wide
Agencies collect some training cost data and limited information about the benefits of their acquisition workforce training. In addition, some agencies do not have metrics to assess the effectiveness of their training. data eventually provided by the agencies included different cost components, which did not lend themselves to comparative analysis. Due to the limited response on cost data, FAI initiated a subsequent data call. FAI officials noted that collecting cost data from agencies is an evolving process and that having comparable training cost data is important to help FAI in its efforts to maximize the use of acquisition workforce training dollars government-wide. OFPP, FAI, and the agencies need basic information on how much agencies are spending to train the acquisition workforce. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that agencies collect and report comparable cost data and perform a minimal assessment of the benefits of their acquisition training investments to aid in the coordination and evaluation of the use of resources government-wide, we recommend the Director of the Office of Management and Budget direct the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Acquisition Institute, to take the following two actions: provide further guidance, including definitions, on the types of costs that agencies should include in their Acquisition Human Capital Plan submission to help determine total training investment; and require all agencies, at a minimum, to collect and analyze participant evaluations of all acquisition workforce training as a first step to help assess the effectiveness of their training investment. Specifically, this report addresses the (1) role of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) in promoting Federal Acquisition Certification (FAC) standards and assisting agencies in meeting acquisition workforce training requirements; (2) approaches agencies use to provide training to their acquisition workforces; and (3) the extent to which agencies track information on the costs and benefits of their acquisition training. To gather illustrative examples and more detailed explanations regarding training approaches and data tracked related to costs and benefits, we selected four agencies—the Departments of Education (Education), Homeland Security (DHS), the Treasury (Treasury), and Veterans Affairs (VA)—for further review. DHS, Treasury, and VA are agencies that operate dedicated acquisition workforce training facilities—permanent centers with dedicated resources that provide training specifically for the agency’s acquisition workforce. Of the eight leading practices GAO identified, we focused on the four practices dealing primarily with determining costs and effectiveness of training: (practice 1) identifying the appropriate level of investment to provide for training and development efforts and prioritize funding so that the most important training needs are addressed first; (practice 4) having criteria for determining whether to design training and development programs in-house or obtain these services from a contractor or other external source; (practice 6) tracking the cost and delivery of its training and development programs agency-wide; and (practice 7) evaluating the benefits achieved through training and development programs, including improvements in individual and agency performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The acquisition workforce manages and oversees billions of dollars in acquisition programs and contracts to help federal agencies get what they need, at the right time, and at a reasonable price; therefore, it is important that agencies provide adequate training to this workforce. In this review, GAO identified (1) the role of OFPP and the FAI in assisting agencies in meeting certification requirements; (2) agencies' approaches to providing training; and (3) the extent to which agencies collect information on the costs and benefits of their acquisition training. To determine OFPP and the FAI roles, GAO analyzed relevant legislation. GAO obtained information from 23 federal agencies on their training approaches through a questionnaire, and selected 4 agencies--the Departments of Education and the Treasury, DHS, and VA--to provide illustrative examples. GAO used its questionnaire and a subsequent data call to obtain information on how agencies collect information on the costs and benefits of their training.
What GAO Found
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) sets standards and policies for the federal acquisition workforce, and has established certification requirements, including minimal training, for the three main acquisition roles--contracting staff, Contracting Officer's Representatives, and Program/Project Managers--to promote the development of government-wide core acquisition competencies and facilitate mobility across agencies. DOD follows separate certification standards. The Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI), which is responsible for fostering and promoting the training and development of the acquisition workforce, works closely with OFPP and has initiatives underway to improve the collection and management of training information, including cost data and course evaluations; streamline communication of acquisition training guidance; and coordinate efforts to leverage acquisition workforce training resources throughout the government.
To support efforts for the acquisition workforce to attain and maintain federal certification requirements, most agencies (17 of 23) provide the majority of their acquisition training using external sources--vendors, FAI, the Defense Acquisition University, or other agencies. The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA) operate their own permanent centers with dedicated resources that train the agency's acquisition workforce. Education reported using a different approach to providing acquisition training--it gets most of its training from other government entities. Federal agencies face similar challenges in providing training to their acquisition workforce. The top challenges reported by agencies in obtaining training for their acquisition workforce involved having sufficient resources. Twenty of 23 agencies identified obtaining adequate funding and 19 of 23 identified obtaining sufficient staff to manage training as challenging. In addition, almost half of the agencies reported that the fundamental step of identifying the acquisition workforce is a challenge especially when members of the workforce are involved in acquisitions as a secondary and not primary duty.
The training cost data that agencies collect is not comparable and agencies have limited information on the benefits of their acquisition workforce training investments. Although almost all agencies provided some cost data in response to GAO's questionnaire and subsequent data call, the agencies' cost data did not allow for government-wide assessment of their training investment. To date, FAI's efforts to collect training cost data has also met with limited success. Cost data collected in 2012 by GAO and FAI included different cost components-- such as facilities, travel, and instructors--which do not allow for government-wide analysis. Having comparable training cost data are important to inform FAI efforts to establish government-wide contracts for training. As for determining benefits of training, 7 of 23 federal agencies reported having no metrics, not even basic endof- course evaluations. Without basic data, agencies do not have insight into the benefits of their acquisition workforce training efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OFPP help ensure that agencies collect and report comparable cost data and assess the benefits of acquisition training by (1) providing further guidance on the cost data agencies are to report annually, and (2) requiring agencies to analyze course evaluations, at a minimum, to help assess the benefits of training investments. OFPP concurred with the recommendations and indicated it has started to take actions to provide additional guidance. |
gao_GAO-06-381 | gao_GAO-06-381_0 | Schedule C: Appointments are generally noncompetitive and are for excepted service positions graded GS-15 and below that involve determining policy or that require a close confidential relationship with the agency head or other key officials of the agency. Limited Emergency SES: Appointments may be made for up to 18 months to meet a bona-fide, unanticipated, urgent need. For career excepted service (non-Schedule C) positions, agencies are not required to follow OPM’s hiring regulations for the competitive service; however, they must apply veteran’s preference and follow merit system principles when making most of these appointments. Agencies Made 144 Noncareer to Career Conversions from May 2001 through April 2005
Twenty-three of the 41 agencies we reviewed reported 144 conversions of individuals from noncareer to career positions from May 1, 2001, through April 30, 2005. The other 18 agencies reported no conversions during this period. Four agencies, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) accounted for 95, or 66 percent, of the total 144 conversions reported, as seen in figure 1. Of the 144 reported conversions, individuals were converted from the following categories of noncareer positions: 47 Limited Term SES positions 25 other statutory at-will positions 6 Limited Emergency SES positions The 144 reported conversions were made to the following categories of career positions: 64 career SES positions 33 career excepted service (non-Schedule C) positions Appendix III provides more detail on the characteristics of the noncareer and career positions to which the individuals were converted, e.g., title of positions, grades, salaries, and appointment dates. For 19 conversions, agencies did not provide us with enough information to make a determination—many of these conversions were to excepted service positions where agencies develop their own hiring procedures and have limited documentation requirements. In 93 Conversions, Agencies Appeared to Have Used Appropriate Authorities and Followed Proper Procedures
For 93 of the 130 conversions at the GS-12 level and above, our review of the merit staffing files and official personnel files at the respective agencies indicated that the agencies generally followed the procedural requirements associated with each appointing authority called for by federal law and regulations, including merit system principles such as fair and open competition and fair and equitable treatment of applicants. More details on these conversions can be found in appendix V. Sixteen of these conversions were to career excepted service (non- Schedule C) positions at DOJ. Although OPM requires agencies to maintain records of the rating, ranking, and selection process for competitive service appointments, these documentation requirements do not apply to the excepted service. For the 3 remaining conversions, HHS could not locate certain files. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that federal agencies are following appropriate authorities and proper procedures in making conversions of noncareer to career positions, we recommend that the Director, OPM: review the 18 conversions we identified where it appears that certain agencies did not use appropriate authorities and/or follow proper procedures in making these conversions and determine whether additional actions are needed, and determine whether conversions to career excepted service positions should be subject to OPM review—such as through the pre-appointment review OPM conducts of other conversions during presidential election periods, and/or during OPM’s periodic audits of agencies’ examining and hiring activities, and if so, determine what information agencies should provide on such conversions. For example, Limited Term Senior Executive Service (SES) and Limited Emergency SES positions are often filled by federal employees who have previously held career positions (prior to being appointed to the noncareer positions from which they were being converted). Conversions Where Appropriate Authorities and Proper Procedures May Not Have Been Followed
For 18 of these conversions, it appears that agencies did not follow proper procedures or may have violated other statutory or regulatory requirements. Seven of the 18 conversions were subject to OPM review and approval; 2 because they fell within the presidential election pre-appointment review period as prescribed by OPM and 5 because they were to SES level positions. | Why GAO Did This Study
A federal employee conversion occurs whenever an individual changes from one personnel status or service to another without a break in federal government service of more than 3 days. This report focuses on conversions of individuals from noncareer to career positions. Federal agencies must use appropriate authorities and follow proper procedures in making these conversions. GAO was asked to determine for departments and selected agencies (1) the number and characteristics of all noncareer to career conversions occurring during the period from May 1, 2001, through April 30, 2005, and (2) whether appropriate authorities were used and proper procedures were followed in making these conversions at the GS-12 level and above.
What GAO Found
Twenty-three of the 41 departments and agencies selected for review reported converting 144 individuals from noncareer to career positions from May 1, 2001, through April 30, 2005. The other 18 departments and agencies reported making no conversions during this period. Four agencies accounted for 95, or 66 percent, of the 144 reported conversions: the Departments of Health and Human Services (36), Justice (23), Defense (21), and Treasury (15). Of the 144 reported conversions, almost two-thirds were from Limited Term Senior Executive Service (SES) positions (47) and Schedule C positions (46). Limited Term SES appointments may be made for up to 36 months and can include federal employees who previously held career positions. Schedule C appointments are generally noncompetitive and are for positions graded GS-15 and below that involve determining policy or that require a close confidential relationship with key agency officials. Of these 144 individuals, 64 were converted to career SES positions, 47 to career competitive service positions, and 33 to career excepted service (non-Schedule C) positions. Agencies used appropriate authorities and followed proper procedures in making the majority (93) of the 130 conversions reported at the GS-12 level or higher. However, for 37 of these conversions it appears that agencies did not follow proper procedures or agencies did not provide enough information for us to make an assessment. For 18 of the 37 of these conversions, it appears that agencies did not follow proper procedures. Some of the apparent improper procedures included: selecting former noncareer appointees who appeared to have limited qualifications and experience for career positions, creating career positions specifically for particular individuals, and failing to apply veteran's preference in the selection process. Seven of the 18 conversions were subject to OPM review and approval; 2 because they fell within the presidential election pre-appointment review period as prescribed by OPM and 5 because they were to SES level positions. For the remaining 19 conversions, agencies did not provide enough information for GAO to fully assess the process used by the agency in making the conversion. This was largely attributable to the types of appointments involved. Sixteen of these 19 conversions were to career excepted service (non-Schedule C) positions at the Department of Justice. For appointments to excepted service positions, OPM does not require agencies to follow OPM's competitive hiring provisions or to maintain records of the rating, ranking, and selection process, as it requires for competitive service appointments (although most of these conversions are subject to the merit system principles). These unique hiring procedures and limited documentation requirements for excepted service positions resulted in GAO having insufficient information to reconstruct the Department of Justice's decision-making process to convert these individuals. For the remaining three cases, the Department of Health and Human Services could not locate certain files. |
gao_GAO-17-217 | gao_GAO-17-217_0 | The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve Face Several Challenges with Implementation of Their Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs
The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have implemented sexual assault prevention and response programs, but face challenges in areas such as staffing, budget management, and investigation timeliness that may hinder program implementation. The Reserve Components Face Staffing Challenges Due to Workload Imbalances Associated with the Number and Location of Full-Time SARCs and VAs and Unfilled Collateral Duty Positions
The National Guard and the Army Reserve have staffed their sexual assault prevention and response programs with a mix of full-time and collateral-duty personnel, but their staffing approach has produced sizeable workload disparities among full-time program personnel, and the collateral-duty positions have not been fully filled. Specifically, Rhode Island has just over 1,000 square miles of land area and an Army National Guard population of about 2,000 soldiers and is assigned the same number of staff—one full-time SARC and one full-time VA—as Texas, which has more than 260,000 square miles of land area and a Guard population of about 18,600 soldiers. For example, the 807th Medical Command has one full-time SARC who is responsible for more than 9,000 soldiers assigned to units located in 16 states, whereas the 81st Regional Support Command has one full-time SARC who is responsible for fewer than 300 soldiers located in 4 states. In addition to issues with budget guidance, we found that the Department of the Army’s SHARP office has limited visibility over the use of SHARP program funds by the states and territories in the National Guard and by the Army Reserve commands. While OCI helps to fill a gap in investigating sexual assault cases involving National Guard members, timely investigations are a challenge that may affect the extent to which OCI is used to conduct investigations. According to National Guard guidance, OCI investigations should typically be completed in 3 weeks. However, OCI investigation data show that of the 79 investigations it conducted in fiscal year 2015, 57 percent or 45 cases took 6 to 9 months from the time a case was referred until when the investigation was completed, and 39 percent or 31 cases took 3 to 6 months to complete. However, the Army and National Guard Bureau have not reassessed OCI’s resources and timeliness since 2014 to take into account OCI’s growing caseload and to determine how to improve the timeliness of sexual assault investigations in light of the increased number of requests for investigations conducted by OCI. In addition, sexual assault victims serving in the Army National Guard or in the Army Reserve must go through a process to determine whether they are eligible for any follow-up or long- term medical and mental health care related to the assault that is provided by or paid for by DOD; the Army National Guard established an expedited process to make this determination, but the Army Reserve has not, which can delay a soldier’s access to services. However, their eligibility for follow-up or long-term medical and mental health-care services that are paid for or provided by DOD varies based on the victim’s duty status at the time of the assault. As of September 2016, Army Reserve officials said that they plan to include an expedited process for line-of-duty determinations for Army Reserve sexual assault victims in the Army Reserve chapter of the new Army SHARP regulation that is currently being drafted. However, Army Reserve officials did not elaborate on the details about the planned process or provide any documentation about how this process would be implemented for the Army Reserve. Without an expedited line-of-duty determination process in the Army Reserve that provides for more timely decisions, along with a method for tracking the length of time to make the determinations so that officials have visibility over the extent that they are meeting the required time frames, sexual assault victims in the Army Reserve may continue to have to pay for their care up front, even if an assault occurred during an eligible duty status, or else face delayed access to care provided or paid for by DOD. Specifically, the Army has not evaluated the use of program staff by its active and reserve components, thus limiting its ability to discern, for example, how workload disparities affect responsiveness to victims and its capacity to address such issues within current resource levels. To help ensure that Army National Guard and Army Reserve program staff have the necessary information to develop their budgets and to help ensure the efficient and effective use of program funds, direct the Secretary of the Army to (1) direct the Army National Guard SHARP Program Office to communicate and disseminate its guidance on budget development and execution for the SHARP program to all full-time SHARP program personnel (2) direct the Army Reserve SHARP Program Office to develop clear guidance on budget development and execution for the SHARP program and disseminate this guidance to its full-time SHARP program personnel and (3) direct the Director of the Army SHARP Program Office to expand the scope of the midyear review to include monitoring and providing oversight of SHARP program expenditures at the Army National Guard state and Army Reserve command level. In written comments, DOD concurred with three recommendations, partially concurred with two recommendations, and did not concur with one recommendation. 9. Military Personnel: Prior GAO Work on DOD’s Actions to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Assault in the Military. | Why GAO Did This Study
Sexual assault in the Army is often discussed in terms of its incidence among active-duty forces. Sexual assault is a crime that similarly confronts the more than 550,000 members who collectively serve in the Guard and Reserve, who together reported 604 sexual assault incidents in fiscal year 2015; however, sexual assault is generally an underreported crime. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review sexual assault prevention and response in the Army's reserve components.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) the Guard and Reserve face any challenges implementing programs to prevent and respond to sexual assault; and (2) medical and mental health-care services are available to victims in the Guard and Reserve. GAO reviewed DOD and Army policies; administered two web-based surveys; conducted site visits to four installations; and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The Army National Guard (Guard) and Army Reserve (Reserve) have implemented sexual assault prevention and response programs, but face challenges in areas such as staffing, budget management, and investigation timeliness that may hinder program implementation.
Staffing: The Guard and the Reserve have staffed their sexual assault prevention and response programs, but their use of full-time and collateral-duty personnel has produced sizeable workload disparities. For example, the Guard allots two full-time staff to each state and territory, which provides Rhode Island—a state with about 2,000 soldiers—the same number of staff as Texas, which has about 18,600 soldiers. Similar imbalances exist in the Reserve, with one full-time staff at one command responsible for about 9,000 soldiers located in 16 different states, while the one full-time staff member at another command is responsible for 300 soldiers in 4 states. Officials said that collateral-duty personnel are used to mitigate workload disparities, but these positions are not always filled in the Guard, and the Reserve does not know the number filled. Without evaluating their staffing structures, the Army does not know the extent of such issues and their effect.
Budget Management: The Guard has developed budget guidance on the use of funds but has not effectively communicated it to program staff, and the Reserve has not developed or distributed this guidance to its staff. Thus, Guard and Reserve program staff do not have information needed to develop their budget allocations and help ensure the efficient use of program funds.
Investigation Timeliness: Data on Guard cases investigated by its Office of Complex Administrative Investigations (OCI) in fiscal year 2015 show that 57 percent, or 45 of 79 cases, took 6 to 9 months to complete; 39 percent, or 31 of 79 cases, took 3 to 6 months; and the remaining 4 percent (3 of 79 cases) took longer than 9 months. According to OCI officials, investigations take longer to complete because OCI does not have enough personnel to handle its growing caseload, which more than doubled from 2014 to 2015. The Army and the Guard have not reassessed OCI's resources since the increase in investigation requests to help ensure it has the staff needed to complete investigations within 3 weeks, as required by OCI guidance.
Eligibility for follow-up or long-term health-care services paid for or provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) varies based on a Guard or Reserve victim's duty status at the time of an assault. Victims in the Guard and Reserve must go through a process, known as a line of duty determination, to determine their eligibility for care. The Guard has established an expedited process for making a determination within 72 hours of the process being initiated. However, the Reserve's process is lengthy, and in prior work GAO found that 80 percent of these determinations were overdue. Reserve officials said they plan to include an expedited process in the new Army regulation that is being drafted; however, Reserve officials did not provide details about the planned process or documentation about how it would be implemented. Without an expedited process to provide more timely decisions, sexual assault victims in the Reserve may continue to pay for their care up front, or else face delayed access to care.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD evaluate program staffing structure, communicate and develop budget guidance, assess the Guard's investigation timeliness and resources, and develop an expedited process for determining Reserve eligibility for healthcare services. DOD concurred with three recommendations partially concurred with two, and did not concur with assessing Guard investigation timeliness, stating that the Army has limited authority over OCI. GAO continues to believe that actions are needed to fully address the two recommendations, and redirected the OCI recommendation to the Guard, as recommended by DOD. |
gao_GAO-08-497T | gao_GAO-08-497T_0 | Ongoing Operations Have Challenged DOD’s Ability to Sustain Readiness of Ground Forces, Particularly for Nondeployed Forces
To meet the challenges of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has taken steps to increase the availability of personnel and equipment for units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly with regard to the Army and Marine Corps. It has also transferred equipment from nondeployed units and prepositioned stocks to support deployed units. The Army and Marine Corps have refocused training to prepare deploying units for counterinsurgency missions. DOD has also relied more on Navy and Air Force personnel and contractors to help perform tasks normally handled by Army or Marine Corps personnel. DOD Has Adjusted Policies to Increase Availability of Personnel, but Long-Term Implications Are Unclear
For the past several years, DOD has continually rotated forces in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan to maintain required force levels. Since September 11, 2001, DOD has made a number of adjustments to its personnel policies, including those related to length of service obligations, length of deployments, frequency of reserve component mobilizations, and the use of volunteers. However, it is unclear whether longer deployments or more frequent involuntary mobilizations or other adjustments will affect recruiting and retention. We also have reported that while the Army and Marine Corps continue to meet mission requirements and report high readiness rates for deployed units, nondeployed units have reported a decrease in reported readiness rates, in part due to equipment shortages. As a result, units are not necessarily developing and maintaining the skills for a fuller range of missions. In October 2007, DOD estimated the number of DOD contractors in Iraq to be about 129,000. Actions Based on Transparency, Sound Plans, and Measurable Outcomes Are Needed to Guide DOD’s Efforts to Rebuild Readiness of Ground Forces
Given the change in the security environment since September 11, 2001, and related increases in demands on our military forces as well as the ongoing high level of commitment to ongoing operations, rebuilding readiness of U.S. ground forces is a long-term prospect. While there are no quick fixes to these issues, we believe the department has measures it can take that will advance progress in both the short and long terms. Over the past several years, we have reported and testified on a range of issues related to military readiness and made multiple recommendations aimed at enhancing DOD’s ability to manage and improve military readiness. Recommended Actions to Improve Strategic Decision Making and Address Specific Readiness Concerns
A common theme in our work has been the need for DOD to take a more strategic approach to decision making that promotes transparency and ensures that programs and investments are based on sound plans with measurable goals, validated requirements, prioritized resource needs, and performance measures to gauge progress against the established goals. Because significant resources will be needed to provide the personnel, equipment, and training necessary to restore and maintain readiness, and because DOD is competing for resources in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment, we also recommended that the plans contain specific investment priorities, prioritized actions that the services believe are needed to achieve the plans’ readiness goals and time frames, and measures to gauge progress in improving force readiness. The Army needs to revise and adjust its training strategy to include a plan to support full-spectrum training during extended operations, and clarify the capacity needed to support the modular force. DOD must develop a strategy and plans for managing near-term risks and management challenges related to its prepositioning programs. DOD agreed with some recommendations, but has yet to fully implement them. For others, particularly when we recommended that DOD develop more robust plans linked to resources, DOD believed its current efforts were sufficient. We continue to believe such plans are needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. military forces, and ground forces in particular, have operated at a high pace since the attacks of September 11, 2001, including to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2001 and July 2007, approximately 931,000 U.S. Army and Marine Corps servicemembers deployed for overseas military operations, including about 312,000 National Guard or Reserve members. To support ongoing military operations and related activities, Congress has appropriated billions of dollars since 2001, and through September 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) has reported obligating about $492.2 billion to cover these expenses, of which a large portion are related to readiness. In addition, DOD's annual appropriation, now totaling about $480 billion for fiscal year 2008, includes funds to cover readiness needs. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the readiness implications of DOD's efforts to support ongoing operations; and (2) GAO's prior recommendations related to these issues, including specific actions that GAO believes would enhance DOD's ability to manage and improve readiness. This statement is based on reports and testimonies published from fiscal years 2003 through 2008. GAO's work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
While DOD has overcome difficult challenges in maintaining a high pace of operations over the past 6 years and U.S. forces have gained considerable combat experience, our work has shown that extended operations in Iraq and elsewhere have had significant consequences for military readiness, particularly with regard to the Army and Marine Corps. To meet mission requirements specific to Iraq and Afghanistan, the department has taken steps to increase the availability of personnel and equipment for deploying units, and to refocus their training on assigned missions. For example, to maintain force levels in theater, DOD has increased the length of deployments and frequency of mobilizations, but it is unclear whether these adjustments will affect recruiting and retention. The Army and Marine Corps have also transferred equipment from nondeploying units and prepositioned stocks to support deploying units, affecting the availability of items for nondeployed units to meet other demands. In addition, they have refocused training such that units train extensively for counterinsurgency missions, with little time available to train for a fuller range of missions. Finally, DOD has adopted strategies, such as relying more on Navy and Air Force personnel and contractors to perform some tasks formerly handled by Army or Marine Corps personnel. If current operations continue at the present level of intensity, DOD could face difficulty in balancing these commitments with the need to rebuild and maintain readiness. Over the past several years, GAO has reported on a range of issues related to military readiness and made numerous recommendations to enhance DOD's ability to manage and improve readiness. Given the change in the security environment since September 11, 2001, and demands on U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuilding readiness will be a long-term and complex effort. However, GAO believes DOD can take measures that will advance progress in both the short and long terms. A common theme is the need for DOD to take a more strategic decision-making approach to ensure programs and investments are based on plans with measurable goals, validated requirements, prioritized resource needs, and performance measures to gauge progress. Overall, GAO recommended that DOD develop a near-term plan for improving the readiness of ground forces that, among other things, establishes specific goals for improving unit readiness, prioritizes actions needed to achieve those goals, and outlines an investment strategy to clearly link resource needs and funding requests. GAO also made recommendations in several specific readiness-related areas, including that DOD develop equipping strategies to target shortages of items required to equip units preparing for deployment, and DOD adjust its training strategies to include a plan to support full-spectrum training. DOD agreed with some recommendations, but has yet to fully implement them. For others, particularly when GAO recommended that DOD develop more robust plans linked to resources, DOD believed its current efforts were sufficient. GAO continues to believe such plans are needed. |
gao_NSIAD-98-13 | gao_NSIAD-98-13_0 | DOD approved the program to begin low-rate initial production (LRIP) in April 1997 and will purchase 25 V-22 aircraft in 4 LRIP lots of 5, 5, 7, and 8 through fiscal year 2000. This is particularly true because, as discussed later, the aircraft design is not yet stable and further changes are expected as the test program continues. Resolution of performance and operational issues will likely increase V-22 program costs. The following are some issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made as to whether the V-22 will satisfy the services’ stated requirements. However, our review showed that in order for the aircraft to meet key performance parameters, such as range, trade-offs are being considered. Due to the significant limitations of these early operational assessments, their reliability as the basis for deciding to proceed into LRIP is questionable and future production decisions should be based on more realistic tests. In that report, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, concluded that V-22 testing had concentrated on system integration and flight envelop expansion, but had “not extensively investigated mission applications of tiltrotor technology and potential operational effectiveness and suitability of the EMD V-22.” The report also highlighted the following operational test and evaluation limitations relative to the operational assessments of the V-22. The key to efficient production and the efficient use of the funds Congress has provided for the V-22 is program stability. However, after 15 years of development effort, the V-22 design has not been stabilized. Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense provide in the Department’s next request for V-22 funds an explanation of how it plans to (1) introduce more realistic testing earlier into the V-22 program schedule and (2) achieve the production efficiencies desired by Congress. Given the artificial nature of the prior operational testing that was used to justify LRIP lot 1 production and the fact that earlier tests were conducted using nonproduction representative aircraft developed under the earlier V-22 full-scale development program, we believe that DOD should expand the LRIP lot 2 criteria to introduce more realistic testing into the program, using aircraft produced under the EMD phase of the program. 3. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reported on the V-22 Osprey Program, which is intended to provide the armed services with 523 new tilt-rotor aircraft, focusing on: (1) the status of the program and areas of potential cost increases or performance challenges; and (2) whether the aircraft being developed will meet the stated requirements of each of the services.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the V-22 has been in development for almost 15 years; (2) although Congress has provided significant funding and support to the Department of Defense (DOD), the system has not yet achieved program stability in terms of cost or aircraft design; (3) there are large disparities among the cost estimates from the program office, the contractors, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense; (4) these estimates range from about $40 million to $58 million for each aircraft; (5) the design of the aircraft will not be stabilized until further testing is completed and several important performance and operational issues, such as payload capability, aerial refueling, and downwash are resolved; (6) resolution of these issues, which could also require mission trade-offs or changes to planned operational concepts, will likely escalate program costs and extend the program schedule; (7) the April 1997 low-rate initial production (LRIP) decision was based, in large part, on the results of early operational testing using aircraft produced under an earlier full-scale development program; (8) however, those aircraft are not representative of the aircraft currently being developed during the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the V-22 program; (9) furthermore, the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), has characterized the tests on which the LRIP decision was based as extremely artificial because of significant test limitations; and (10) future production decisions for the V-22 should be based on more realistic testing. |
gao_GAO-01-1025 | gao_GAO-01-1025_0 | Pay Practices for Postmasters
The vast majority of postmasters were paid under the Service’s EAS, which has 26 pay grades and covers essentially all supervisory and management employees. This change resulted in the basic pay minimums of EAS-15 and EAS-16 exempt supervisors being less than the basic pay maximum of a grade 5 clerk, which was the most populated grade and pay level of the largest bargaining unit. The SDA policy provided that EAS-15 exempt supervisors and above were to be paid no less than 5 percent more than the basic pay maximum of a grade 5 clerk. Conclusions
Although the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 requires that supervisors and other managerial personnel be paid salaries that provide them an adequate and reasonable difference in pay over that of clerks and carriers, the act did not specify what constitutes an adequate and reasonable difference or whether the difference should apply to basic or gross pay. Postmasters’ pay included basic pay; variable pay; merit awards; and premium pay, including overtime. Two craft employees earned more in basic pay than their local
postmasters in 1999. About one-half of 1 percent of craft employees earned more in gross pay than their local postmasters. The five organizations we selected had pay policies to minimize
instances of craft employees earning more than their supervisors. The five organizations indicated that craft employees will occasionally earn more than their supervisors, but this is the exception and not the norm. In 1996, the Service lowered the the basic pay minimums of the EAS. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to be in a better position to evaluate its SDA policy and the pay differences between postmasters and their craft employees, we recommend that the Postmaster General use postal payroll and any other comparable data to periodically: determine the extent to which clerks and carriers may be earning more than their local postmasters, and the reasons why, if applicable; and reassess the adequacy and reasonableness of the pay differences between postmasters and the clerks and carriers they supervise. Comparison of Current Law to the Proposed Postmasters’ Fairness and Rights Act and Views on the Proposed Act
Under the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, the Service is required to provide a program of consultation with organizations representing supervisors and postmasters under which the organizations are entitled to participate directly in the planning and development of pay policies and schedules, fringe benefits, and other programs relating to their members (39 U.S.C. | What GAO Found
The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the Postal Service to pay wages comparable to those of the private sector. It also requires the Service to provide adequate and reasonable pay differences between clerks and carriers and their supervisors, such as postmasters, although the act does not specify what constitutes adequate and reasonable differences. Furthermore, the act requires the Service to consult with supervisor and postmaster organizations when planning and developing pay policies and other programs affecting their members. Since the mid-1970s, two postmaster organizations have voiced concerns that adequate and reasonable pay differences do not exist between postmasters and the clerks and carriers they supervise. Recently, the organizations took their concerns to Congress. The resulting Postmasters' Fairness and Rights Act would make substantive changes in the way postmasters' pay is determined. Most postmasters are now paid under the Service's Executive and Administrative Schedule (EAS), which is the salary schedule that applies to nearly all supervisory and management employees. Generally, postmaster pay consists of basic pay; pay-for-performance; lump-sum merit awards; and supplemental pay, such as overtime. In 1996, the Service lowered the minimum basic pay of the 26 EAS grades. This resulted in the minimum basic pay of EAS-15 and EAS-16 supervisors being less than the maximum basic pay of a grade 5 clerk, which was the most populated grade and pay level of the largest bargaining unit. Because of this and the 1970 Act's requirement that an adequate and reasonable pay difference be maintained, the Service established a Supervisory Differential Adjustment (SDA) policy for EAS-15 and above supervisors who are not eligible to receive overtime pay. This policy provides that these supervisors will be paid no less than five percent more than the maximum basic pay of a grade 5 clerk. GAO's analyses showed that two craft employees earned more in basic pay than did their local postmasters in 1999, and about one-half of one percent of craft employees earned more in gross pay than did their local postmasters. The five organizations that GAO selected to discuss pay practices had pay policies to minimize instances of craft employees earning more than their supervisors. These organizations indicated that craft employees only occasionally earned more than their supervisors. |
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