id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
gao_GAO-01-735 | gao_GAO-01-735_0 | Operational test and evaluation is a key internal control to ensure that decisionmakers have objective information available on a weapon system’s performance to minimize risks of procuring costly and ineffective systems. DOD acquisition regulations generally provide that programs successfully complete these tests before starting full-rate production. Fleet Demands and Rapidly Advancing Technology Cited for the High Percentage of Low-Rate Initial Production Purchases
SPAWAR officials cited three primary reasons for high-percentage buys during low-rate initial production. Navy and SPAWAR Take Steps to Reduce Low-Rate Initial Production Risks
The Navy and SPAWAR have taken or plan to take a number steps to mitigate the risks of large low-rate initial production procurements. To add more discipline and rigor to the low-rate initial production decision process, the Command now requires program managers to use a standardized checklist and report template as part of reviewing and approving low-rate initial production purchase requests. SPAWAR has also established an Acquisition Reform Office to serve as a focal point and command-wide disseminator of lessons learned and process improvements. Conclusions
In seeking to provide new information systems to the fleet as quickly as possible, SPAWAR officials procured and fielded relatively large quantities of systems during low-rate initial production and before completing operational testing. Our subsequent review of seven of these systems found that six had experienced operational problems that negatively impacted the fleet. To obtain information about the operational testing, evaluation, interoperability, and fielding of low-rate initial production systems, we interviewed officials and obtained documentation from the Office of the Director of Navy Test, Evaluation, and Technology Requirements; the Office of the Navy Commander Operational Testing and Evaluation Force; the Office of the Program Manager for Battle Group Systems Integration Testing; and the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. | Why GAO Did This Study
During its review of the Navy's Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Command's fiscal year 2001 budget request, GAO found that many information technology systems were being procured and fielded in relatively large quantities--sometimes exceeding 50 percent of the total--during low-rate initial production and before completion of operational testing. The primary purpose of low-rate initial production is to produce enough units for operational testing and evaluation and to establish production capabilities to prepare for full-rate production. Commercial and Department of Defense (DOD) best practices have shown that completing a system's testing before producing significant quantities substantially lowers the risk of costly fixes and retrofits. For major weapons systems, statutory provisions limit the quantities of systems produced during low-rate initial production to the minimum quantity necessary. These statutory provisions also require justification for quantities exceeding 10 percent of total production. Although these provisions do not apply to non-major systems, DOD and Navy acquisition regulations encourage these programs to make use of the low-rate initial production concept. This report reviews (1) information systems being procured and fielded for SPAWAR in large numbers before operational testing, (2) what effects this practice was having on SPAWAR and the fleet, and (3) what the Navy is doing to mitigate the risks associated with this practice.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the main reason for the high percentage of low-rate initial production quantities is to more quickly respond to fleet demands for information systems improvements. Many information technology systems purchased and fielded during low-rate initial production and prior to completing operational testing experienced problems that negatively impacted fleet operations and capabilities. SPAWAR has taken several steps to mitigate the risks of high percentage low-rate initial production procurements, such as requiring program managers to use a standardized checklist and establishing an Acquisition Reform Office to serve as a focal point and command-wide disseminator of lessons learned and process improvements. |
gao_GAO-01-236 | gao_GAO-01-236_0 | Background
GPRA calls for agencies to address human capital in the context of performance-based management and specifically requires that annual performance plans describe how agencies will use their human capital to support the accomplishment of their goals and objectives. Concluding Observation
Designing, implementing, and maintaining a strategic human capital management focus are critical to maximizing the performance and ensuring the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. We found that the ways in which agencies discussed human capital challenges in their fiscal year 2001 performance plans reflected different levels of attention to the critical human capital challenges agencies face. When viewed collectively, we found that there is a need to increase the breadth, depth, and specificity of many related human capital goals and strategies. The plans’ discussions of human capital should continue to show progress in moving away from form to substance, or from simply describing human capital challenges to detailing the what, why, how, and when of the strategies to address those challenges. The discussions should also demonstrate a better link between human capital management and the agencies’ strategic and programmatic planning to maximize performance and ensure the best resource allocation. Overall, with the increasing attention to human capital, the fiscal year 2001 plans showed that substantial opportunities exist for improvements, and we expect that agencies will continue to refine their goals and strategies as they focus on a more systematic, in-depth, and continuous effort to evaluate and improve their human capital management. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Government Performance and Results Act calls for agencies to address human capital in the context of performance-based management. The act requires that annual performance plans describe how agencies will use their human capital to accomplish their goals and objectives. Designing, implementing, and maintaining a strategic human capital management focus are critical to maximizing performance and ensuring that government is accountable to the American people.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the human capital challenges described in fiscal year 2001 performance plans reflected the different levels of attention agencies are to pay this critical issue. GAO contends that the breadth, depth, and specificity of many related human capital goals and strategies needs to be increased. The plans' discussions of human capital increasingly need to focus on describing human capital challenges. The plans need to specify the what, why, how, and when of the strategies to address those challenges. The discussions should also better link human capital management and the agencies' strategic and program planning to maximize performance and ensure optimal resource allocation. Overall, the fiscal year 2001 plans showed that substantial opportunities exist for goals and strategies as they focus on a more systematic, in-depth, and continuous effort to evaluate and improve their human capital management. Agencies will need to follow up to determine whether their plans actually improve human capital management and program outcomes. |
gao_GAO-13-51 | gao_GAO-13-51_0 | Background
The Air Force and the Navy plan to replace many of their current fighter aircraft with the Joint Strike Fighter, also called the F-35. Air Force and Navy Programs Would Extend the Service Life of 450 Aircraft at a Cost of Nearly $5 billion
The Air Force currently plans to upgrade and extend the service life of 300 F-16 aircraft at an estimated cost of $2.61 billion and the Navy plans to extend the service life of 150 F/A-18 aircraft at an estimated cost of $2.19 billion. Finally, Air Force officials said that they could expand these programs to include up to 650 aircraft if needed to attain desired inventory levels. Air Force and Navy Cost Estimates Exhibit Many Characteristics of a High-Quality Cost Estimate but Do Not Reflect Some Significant Potential Costs
The Air Force’s and Navy’s cost estimates to upgrade and extend the service life of selected F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft exhibit many cost- estimating characteristics and best practices of a high-quality cost estimate, but do not reflect all the potential total costs that may occur. We assessed the Air Force estimate for capability upgrades and the Air Force estimate for the service-life extension of selected F-16 aircraft, which were prepared for the fiscal year 2013 budget request; and the Navy estimate for the service-life extension of selected F/A-18 aircraft. As a result, decision-makers do not have visibility of how much the total costs will be and how they may increase if program quantities increase or additional work is required on some aircraft, which could hinder their ability to assess budgets and affordability. However, the estimates were not fully credible because the Air Force’s analysis did not clearly show the potential range of total costs that would occur if more aircraft are included in the programs and the estimates were not compared to an independently developed estimate. Further, our past work has shown that an independent estimate tends to be higher and more accurate than a program office estimate. Specifically, the Navy told us it will assess on an aircraft-by-aircraft basis whether the F/A-18s also need capability upgrades to maintain mission effectiveness, such as adding the ability to integrate with newer aircraft. Given the uncertainties, the costs associated with this additional work are not included in the Navy’s $2.19 billion estimate nor are they included in the Navy’s spending plans through fiscal year 2017. In our prior work, we have found that an independent cost estimate is considered to be one of the most reliable validation methods. Conclusions
The Air Force and the Navy decided to upgrade and extend the service life of selected F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft to provide a capability and capacity “bridge” until the F-35 is available in sufficient numbers. Specifically, we found the estimates to be well-documented and accurate and mostly comprehensive. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve future updates of Air Force and Navy cost estimates for upgrading and extending the service life of selected F-16s and F/A-18s and to improve the ability of decision-makers to assess the potential total costs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions: Direct the Secretary of the Air Force to update its cost estimates, and in doing so: include in its sensitivity analysis an assessment of the range of possible costs if the capability-upgrade and service-life extension programs are expanded to more than 300 aircraft including up to the maximum of 650 aircraft, and obtain an independent review of the updated cost estimates. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the Air Force’s and the Navy’s plans to upgrade and extend the service life of selected F-16s and F/A-18s, we reviewed the services’ documentation of the programs’ purpose and scope including the underlying analysis of alternative approaches. To assess the extent to which the cost estimates exhibited characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, we compared how the estimates were developed to the cost estimating best practices outlined in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. | Why GAO Did This Study
Fighter aircraft are important to achieve and maintain air dominance during combat operations as well as to protect the homeland. DOD plans to replace many of its current fighter fleet with the F-35; however, the F-35 program has experienced numerous delays and cost increases. To maintain fighter capabilities and capacity, the Air Force and Navy have decided to upgrade and extend the service life of selected F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft. In this context, two subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee asked GAO to (1) describe the Air Force and Navy plans to upgrade and extend the service life of selected F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft; and (2) assess the extent to which cost estimates for these upgrades and life extensions exhibit characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate. GAO obtained documentation of the plans and estimates, compared the estimates to best practices outlined in the GAO Cost Estimating Guide, and assessed factors that could affect total costs.
What GAO Found
The Air Force plans to upgrade and extend the service life of 300 F-16 aircraft and the Navy 150 F/A-18 aircraft, at a combined cost estimated at almost $5 billion in fiscal year 2013 dollars.
The Air Force plans to extend the service life of selected F-16s by 2,000 flying hours each as well as install capability upgrades such as an improved radar. The Air Force estimates that it will complete this work by 2022 at a cost of $2.61 billion. About 28 percent of the projected costs are included in the Air Force's spending plans through 2017, with the remainder expected to be incurred in 2018-2022.
The Navy plans to extend the service life of selected F/A-18s by 1,400 flying hours each and may install capability upgrades on some of the 150 aircraft--such as adding the ability to integrate with newer aircraft. The Navy projects that it will complete the life extension by 2018 at a cost of $2.19 billion, with most of these costs included in its spending plans through 2017, but costs associated with any upgrades are not included in the Navy estimate or in its spending plans.
Air Force and Navy officials told GAO that they could ultimately extend the service life of up to 650 F-16s and 280 F/A-18s if needed to attain desired inventory levels.
The Air Force's and Navy's cost estimates to upgrade and extend the service life of selected fighter aircraft exhibit some characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate but do not reflect all potential costs. The estimates were: well-documented since they identified data sources and methodologies; accurate since they accounted for inflation and were checked for errors; and mostly comprehensive since they included the work planned and identified key assumptions. However, the estimates were not fully credible in part because they did not assess the extent to which the total costs could change if additional work is done or more aircraft are included in the programs. Another factor affecting the credibility of the estimates is that they have not been compared to an independently developed estimate. GAO's past work has shown that such an independent cost estimate is one of the best validation methods since an independent cost estimate tends to be higher and more accurate than a program office estimate. Air Force and Navy officials told GAO that they use Department of Defense and military department guidance that allows for some variation in how the estimates are developed depending on the dollar value and maturity of the program. However, these programs--which are critical to maintain fighter capability and capacity as current inventory ages--total almost $5 billion and the costs will increase if program quantities and scope increase. Without fully credible cost estimates, including an analysis of how much total costs may increase, decision makers will not have visibility into the range of potential costs, which could hinder their ability to formulate realistic budgets and make informed investment decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Air Force and Navy follow all best practices to enhance the credibility of the cost estimates for the F-16 and F/A-18 upgrades and life extensions including an assessment of the potential range of costs and seeking independent cost estimates. |
gao_RCED-98-246 | gao_RCED-98-246_0 | This initial report provides (1) an overview of FAA’s progress to date in implementing free flight, including Flight 2000 (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program), and (2) the views of the aviation community and FAA on the challenges that must be met to implement free flight cost-effectively. While working to implement the 44 recommendations, FAA and stakeholders agreed on the need to focus their efforts on deploying technologies designed to provide early benefits to users. These efforts led to consensus on a phased approach to implementing free flight—beginning with Free Flight Phase 1—including the core technologies to be used and the locations where the technologies will be deployed under this first phase, scheduled to be implemented by 2002. Since late 1995, FAA and stakeholders have been working on various free flight recommendations and many associated initiatives and, in August 1996, agreed on an action plan to guide their implementation. As a first step toward the phased implementation of free flight, FAA—in coordination with stakeholders—outlined a plan for Free Flight Phase 1 in early 1998. The challenges for FAA are to (1) provide effective leadership and management of modernization efforts—including cross-program communication and coordination; (2) develop plans—in collaboration with the aviation community—that are sufficiently detailed to move forward with the implementation of free flight—including the identification of clear goals and measures for tracking the progress of the modernization efforts; (3) address outstanding issues related to the development and deployment of technology—such as the need to improve the agency’s process for ensuring that new equipment is safe for its intended use and methods for considering human factors; and (4) address other issues, such as the need for FAA to coordinate its modernization and free flight efforts with those of the international community and integrate free flight technologies. These concerns include, among others, the need for (1) FAA—in collaboration with stakeholders—to develop clear goals and objectives for what it intends to achieve, as well as a measurement system for tracking progress, and (2) FAA and stakeholders to develop detailed plans that will allow for the cost-effective implementation of free flight. Such procedures will affect a wide range of operations. In contrast, until recently FAA and stakeholders have been sharply divided over the agency’s plans for conducting Flight 2000—a limited demonstration of free-flight-related communication, navigation, and surveillance technologies—primarily in Alaska and Hawaii. In fact, the Department of Transportation’s fiscal year 1998 appropriation act prohibited FAA from spending any fiscal year 1998 funds on the Flight 2000 program. To address these concerns, FAA has been working collaboratively with stakeholders—through RTCA—to develop a roadmap (general plans) for restructuring Flight 2000. FAA is currently considering this RTCA proposal. Stakeholders agreed with this assessment. FAA Needs to Integrate Free Flight Technologies
Some FAA officials and stakeholders told us that the agency needs to integrate free flight technologies with one another and into the operating air traffic control system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) status of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to implement free flight, including a planned operational demonstration formerly known as Flight 2000 and now called the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program; and (2) views of the aviation community and FAA on the challenges that must be met to implement free flight in a cost-effective manner.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since 1994, FAA officials and stakeholders, under the leadership of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), have been collaborating to implement free flight; (2) these early efforts led to a definition of free flight, a set of recommendations, and an action plan to gradually move toward a more flexible operating system; (3) while working to implement the recommendations, FAA and stakeholders agreed on the need to focus their efforts on deploying technologies that will provide early benefits to users; (4) in early 1998, FAA and stakeholders developed a strategy that calls for the phased implementation of free flight, beginning with Free Flight Phase 1; (5) under this first phase, FAA and stakeholders have agreed upon the core technologies that are expected to provide these early benefits, as well as the locations where they will be deployed; (6) however, until recently, FAA and many stakeholders have not agreed on how best to conduct a limited operational demonstration of free-flight-related technologies and procedures--known as the Flight 2000 Program; (7) FAA is currently prohibited from spending any fiscal year 1998 funds on the Flight 2000 demonstration itself; (8) stakeholders concurred that FAA had yet to develop a detailed plan for conducting this demonstration; (9) to address the concerns of stakeholders, FAA has been working with them--under the leadership of RTCA--to restructure the Flight 2000 demonstration; and (10) FAA and stakeholders have identified numerous challenges that will need to be met if free flight--including Flight Phase 1 and Flight 2000--is to be implemented cost-effectively: (a) stakeholders told GAO that FAA will need to provide effective leadership and management of the modernization efforts both within and outside the agency; (b) stakeholders cited the need for FAA to further develop its plans for implementing free flight, including establishing clear goals for what it intends to achieve and developing measures for tracking the progress of modernization and free flight; (c) FAA and stakeholders agreed on the need to address outstanding issues related to technology development and deployment; and (d) FAA and stakeholders also identified a range of other challenges that will need the agency's attention, including coordinating FAA's modernization and free flight efforts with those of the international community and integrating the various technologies that will be used under free flight operations with one another as well as into the air traffic control system. |
gao_GAO-07-940 | gao_GAO-07-940_0 | NASA incorporated these recommendations into the Constellation Program along with exploration activities called for in the President’s vision. In addition to the plans mentioned above, NASA has developed a communications strategy to keep the Shuttle workforce informed about the activities, intentions, and goals related to retirement of the Shuttle and transition to new exploration activities. NASA Has Developed New Decision-Making Process to Manage Supplier Base
NASA has developed a new decision-making process to manage supplier decisions related to the retirement of the Shuttle and transition to the Constellation Program. NASA considers a supplier to be a critical single source supplier if it is the only known or only certified source of particular hardware or services and has received hardware or services from them in the past 5 years or expects to do business with them again in the future. Effectiveness of NASA’s Transition Plans and Processes Not Known until Constellation’s Supplier Base Needs Become Clearer and More Decisions Have Been Processed
Whether NASA’s transition plans and processes will be effective is unclear because NASA has not set requirements for Constellation’s supplier base needs and few decisions about suppliers have worked their way through the new processes. As a result of Constellation’s lack of detailed requirements, there are cases where NASA has provided funding for certain Shuttle suppliers’ work through its prime contractor’s subcontracts because of a possible future need for the suppliers with the Constellation Program and the need to maintain the critical skills. NASA officials acknowledge that the increasing number of SMRT documents scheduled for upcoming years has the potential to overwhelm the transition decision- making process. Transition Cost Estimates
Developing cost estimates is a complex task for a transition of this magnitude. According to NASA officials, such efforts could last through 2020. Without cost estimates, NASA does not have the information needed to support the budget preparation process or assess the costs of addressing its supplier challenges. Recommendation
Given the fact that many of NASA’s transition and retirement activities will continue to occur following the Shuttle retirement in 2010, it is important that NASA identify and estimate the costs associated with these activities in an accountable and transparent manner. We would expect these estimates to be adjusted every year and have more fidelity as NASA gains more knowledge and makes more decisions. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
(1) To determine what plans and processes the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has established to effectively manage its supplier base to ensure both sustainment of the Shuttle Program and successful transition to planned exploration activities, we performed the following: Obtained and reviewed documents from NASA describing plans and processes for managing retirement and transition activities, including the Human Space Flight Transition Plan, Space Shuttle Program Transition Management Plan, Space Shuttle Program Transition and Retirement Requirements, and the Space Shuttle Program Risk Management Plan. (2) To describe factors that could impact the effectiveness of such plans and processes for managing NASA’s supplier base and to (3) identify any other issues that NASA will likely encounter as the agency transitions to and implements its planned exploration activities, we performed the following: Reviewed NASA’s 2008 Budget Request along with Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Guidance for 2008 and 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Space Shuttle Program is currently supported by over 1,500 active suppliers, some of whom are the only known or certified source of a particular material, part or service. The retirement of the Shuttle and transition to planned exploration activities, as called for in the President's Vision for Space Exploration, creates the need for NASA to begin making decisions today about its supplier base needs for the future. GAO was asked to (1) describe NASA's plans and processes for managing its supplier base through the Shuttle's retirement and the transition to the Constellation's exploration activities; (2) address factors that could impact the effectiveness of those plans and processes; and (3) identify any other issues that NASA will likely encounter as the agency transitions to and implements the Constellation Program.
What GAO Found
NASA is developing and implementing transition plans and processes to manage its supplier base through the retirement of the Shuttle and transition to the next generation of human space flight systems. Such efforts include: various transition plans; a decision-making structure that should enable the agency to make necessary supplier decisions; and a communications strategy and metrics to gauge the progress of transition activities. In addition, NASA has identified risks associated with the shuttle's retirement and has begun identifying capabilities and suppliers needed for future exploration activities. While NASA has developed plans and processes aimed at effectively managing the supplier base, several factors could impact their effectiveness. NASA may have to continue funding suppliers for work that would maintain the supplier's skills and capabilities, even when they are no longer working on Shuttle operations, until Constellation officials make a decision on whether or not they will be needed for future exploration activities due to a lack of detailed program requirements. In addition, relatively few supplier-related decisions have made it through the newly created decision-making process and NASA officials acknowledge the increasing number of decisions scheduled for upcoming years have the potential to overwhelm the transition decision-making process. Other issues have been identified that NASA will have to face in order to successfully transition from the shuttle program to its next generation human space flight systems. Challenges exist in the continued use of obsolescent materials, maintaining the overall viability of the supplier base, managing the overall workforce, disposing of property and equipment, and completing environmental cleanup. NASA has not developed cost estimates for transition and retirement activities past fiscal year 2010. Without cost estimates, NASA does not have the information needed to support the budget preparation process, assess the costs of addressing its supplier challenges, or account for how NASA will fund transition and retirement activities once the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end in 2010. Such knowledge is important because NASA and Congress will need to allocate funds among many competing priorities. In addition, it will be important for NASA to adjust its cost estimates every year as NASA gains more knowledge about its transition costs. |
gao_GAO-05-702 | gao_GAO-05-702_0 | For example, the department has implemented the provisions in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, which are aimed at increasing senior DOD leadership involvement in the program. Moreover, much remains to be accomplished until DOD’s new governance structure becomes an operational reality. Until it does, it is unlikely that the department will be able to develop an effective BEA. 2. 3. 4. 5. In particular, the department has yet to specify measurable goals and outcomes to be achieved, nor has it defined the tasks to be performed to achieve these goals and outcomes, the resources needed to perform the tasks, or the time frames within which the tasks will be performed. DOD has not assessed, as part of its program planning, the workforce capabilities that it has in place and that it needs to manage its architecture development, maintenance, and implementation efforts, nor does it have a strategy for meeting its human capital needs. Recognizing this long- standing void in planning, DOD stated that it intends to complete, by September 30, 2005, a transition plan that will include a program baseline that will be used to oversee and manage program activities. Further, the baseline was to establish program roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities and was to be used as a managerial and oversight tool to allocate resources, manage risk, and measure and report progress. 2). However, after almost 4 years of architecture products development, a configuration manager has not been assigned. Program officials, including the Configuration Control Board Chair, stated that they recognize the importance of effective configuration management. DOD Has Yet to Develop a Well-Defined BEA to Guide Its Modernization Efforts
Despite six BEA releases and two updates, DOD still does not have a version of an enterprise architecture that can be considered well defined, meaning that the architecture, for example, has a clearly defined purpose that can be linked to the department’s goals and objectives and describes both the “As Is” and the “To Be” environments; consists of integrated and consistent architecture products; and has been approved by department leadership. The March 2005 Update also did not have fully integrated products. Conclusions
Having and using a well-defined enterprise architecture are essential for DOD to effectively and efficiently modernize its nonintegrated and duplicative business operations and systems environment. However, the department does not have such an architecture, and the architecture products that it has produced to date do not provide sufficient content and utility to effectively guide and constrain the department’s ongoing and planned business systems investments. This means that despite spending almost 4 years and about $318 million to develop its BEA, the department is not positioned to meet its legislative mandates. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) has (1) established an effective governance structure; (2) developed program plans, including supporting workforce plans; (3) performed effective configuration management; (4) developed well-defined business enterprise architecture (BEA) products; and (5) addressed our other recommendations. According to program officials, the department intends to revise the governance structure, including the communications strategy, in September 2005. For example, DOD has begun to revise its governance structure to provide for improved management and oversight, such as establishing the DBSMC and assigning it accountability and responsibility for directing, overseeing, and approving the BEA; and developed a configuration management plan and the related procedures, and established a configuration control board. Description of DOD Architecture Framework Products, Version 1.0
Executive-level summary information on the scope, purpose, and context of the architecture Architecture data repository with definitions of all terms used in all products High-Level Operational Concept Graphic High-level graphical/textual description of what the architecture is supposed to do, and how it is supposed to do it Graphic depiction of the operational nodes (or organizations) with needlines that indicate a need to exchange information Information exchanged between nodes and the relevant attributes of that exchange Command structure or relationships among human roles, organizations, or organization types that are the key players in an architecture Operations that are normally conducted in the course of achieving a mission or a business goal, such as capabilities, operational activities (or tasks), input and output flows between activities, and input and output flows to/from activities that are outside the scope of the architecture One of three products used to describe operational activity—identifies business rules that constrain operations One of three products used to describe operational activity—identifies business process responses to events One of three products used to describe operational activity—traces actions in a scenario or sequence of events Documentation of the system data requirements and structural business process rules of the operational view Identification of systems nodes, systems, and systems items and their interconnections, within and between nodes Specific communications links or communications networks and the details of their configurations through which systems interface Relationships among systems in a given architecture; can be designed to show relationships of interest (e.g., system-type interfaces, planned versus existing interfaces)
Mapping of relationships between the set of operational activities and the set of system functions applicable to that architecture Characteristics of the system data exchanged between systems Systems Performance Parameters Matrix Quantitative characteristics of systems and systems hardware/software items, their interfaces, and their functions Planned incremental steps toward migrating a suite of systems to a more efficient suite, or toward evolving a current system to a future implementation Emerging technologies and software/hardware products that are expected to be available in a given set of time frames and that will affect future development of the architecture One of three products used to describe system functionality—identifies constraints that are imposed on systems functionality due to some aspect of systems design or implementation One of three products used to describe system functionality—identifies responses of a system to events One of three products used to describe system functionality—lays out the sequence of system data exchanges that occur between systems (external and internal), system functions, or human role for a given scenario Physical implementation of the Logical Data Model entities (e.g., message formats, file structures, and physical schema)
Comments from the Department of Defense
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Cynthia Jackson, Assistant Director; Barbara Collier; Joanne Fiorino; Neelaxi Lakhmani; Anh Le; Freda Paintsil; Randolph Tekeley; and William Wadsworth made key contributions to this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop, by September 2005, a well-defined business enterprise architecture (BEA) and a transition plan. GAO has made numerous recommendations to assist the department in successfully doing so. As part of ongoing monitoring of the architecture, GAO assessed whether the department had (1) established an effective governance structure; (2) developed program plans, including supporting workforce plans; (3) performed effective configuration management; (4) developed well-defined BEA products; and (5) addressed GAO's other recommendations.
What GAO Found
To effectively and efficiently modernize its nonintegrated and duplicative business operations and systems, it is essential for DOD to develop and use a well-defined BEA. However, it does not have such an architecture, and the products that it has produced do not provide sufficient content and utility to effectively guide and constrain ongoing and planned systems investments. As a result, despite spending almost 4 years and about $318 million, DOD does not have an effective architecture program. The current state of the program is due largely to long-standing architecture management weaknesses that GAO has made recommendations over the last 4 years to correct. In particular, DOD has not done the following: (1) established an effective governance structure, including an effective communications strategy, to achieve stakeholder buy-in. In particular, the structure that has been in place since 2001 lacks the requisite authority and accountability to be effective, and the key entities that made up this structure have not performed according to their respective charters; (2) developed program plans that explicitly identify measurable goals and outcomes to be achieved, nor has it defined the tasks to be performed to achieve the goals and outcomes, the resources needed to perform these tasks, or the time frames within which the tasks will be performed. DOD also has not assessed, as part of its program planning, the workforce capabilities that it needs in order to effectively manage its architecture efforts, nor does it have a strategy for doing so; (3) performed effective configuration management, which is a formal approach to controlling product parts to ensure their integrity. The configuration management plan and the charter for the configuration control board are draft; the board has limited authority; and, after 4 years of development, the department has not assigned a configuration manager; (4) developed a well-defined architecture. The latest versions of the architecture do not include products describing the "As Is" business and technology environments and a transition plan for investing in business systems. In addition, the versions that have been produced for the "To Be" environment have not had a clearly defined purpose and scope, are still missing important content, and contain products that are neither consistent nor integrated; and (5) fully addressed other GAO recommendations. DOD recognizes that these weaknesses need to be addressed and has recently assigned a new BEA leadership team. DOD also has either begun steps to or stated its intentions to (1) revise its governance structure; (2) develop a program baseline, by September 30, 2005, that will be used as a managerial and oversight tool to allocate resources, manage risks, and measure and report progress; and (3) revise the scope of the architecture and establish a new approach for developing it. However, much remains to be accomplished to establish an effective architecture program. Until it does, its business systems modernization effort will remain a high-risk program. |
gao_GAO-17-507 | gao_GAO-17-507_0 | Dedicated Staff Advise and Assist Agency Staff Implementing Initiatives and Open Innovation- Related Communities of Practice
In addition to developing relevant policies and implementation guidance, staff from OMB, OSTP, and GSA told us they also provide ongoing support for the use of open innovation strategies across the federal government by: answering questions from agency staff, sharing lessons learned, and providing advice and assistance; hosting training sessions and other events for agency staff to highlight how agencies can use open innovation strategies and how agencies have had success using them; and matching agency staff in need of assistance with mentors, advisors, or partners in other agencies. Key Guidance for Open Innovation Strategies Reflect Practices for Effective Implementation to Differing Extents
We determined that key government-wide guidance developed by OMB, OSTP, and GSA to support the implementation of various open innovation strategies reflects practices for effective implementation to differing extents. Several factors led to these variances, including differing scopes and methodologies used in their development and the dates when they were issued. As shown in figure 10, we determined that guidance for crowdsourcing and citizen science initiatives and prize competitions and challenges fully reflected these key actions. These resources—policies and implementation guidance, supporting staff and organizations, and websites—complement what exists at the government-wide level. The selected agencies have generally developed, or are developing, resources for the open innovation strategies they use frequently, to provide staff with tailored guidance and support. This helps ensure staff carry out initiatives in a manner that is informed by the agency’s previous experience and that is consistent with agency procedures. Better incorporating those practices and key actions would help ensure agency staff are aware of, and can take, the full range of steps to effectively design, implement, and assess their open innovation initiatives. We recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Administrator of the General Services Administration enhance key guidance for open data collaboration initiatives to fully reflect the following 15 key actions:
Clearly define the purpose of engaging the public;
Consider the agency’s capability to implement a strategy, including leadership support, legal authority, the availability of resources, and capacity;
Define specific and measurable goals for the initiative; Identify performance measures to assess progress;
Align goals of the initiative with the agency’s broader mission and
Document the roles and responsibilities for all involved in the initiative;
Develop a plan that identifies specific implementation tasks and time frames, including those for participant outreach and data collection;
Use multiple outlets and venues to announce the initiative;
Craft announcements to respond to the interests and motivations of
Hold regular check-ins for those involved in the implementation of the
Collect and analyze data to assess goal achievement and results of
Conduct an after-action review to identify lessons learned and
Report on results and lessons learned publicly;
Acknowledge and, where appropriate, reward the efforts and achievements of partners and participants; and
Seek to maintain communication with, and promote communication among, members of the community. In comments provided by email, OSTP’s General Counsel stated that OSTP neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations in this report. GPRAMA also includes a provision for us to periodically review how implementing the act’s requirements is affecting agency performance. To determine the extent to which government-wide policies and guidance reflect practices and key actions for effectively implementing open innovation strategies, we first, in consultation with OMB, OSTP, and GSA staff, identified those that were considered key for each type of strategy. Lastly, to identify the resources that selected agencies have put in place, we reviewed agency policies and guidance, and websites related to the use and implementation of open innovation strategies from six agencies: the Departments of Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Transportation (DOT); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). We selected these agencies based on various criteria, including the number and variety of open innovation strategies outlined in their individual agency Open Government Plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
To address the complex and crosscutting challenges facing the federal government, agencies need to effectively engage and collaborate with those in the private, nonprofit, and academic sectors; other levels of government; and citizens. Agencies are increasingly using open innovation strategies for these purposes.
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 requires agencies to identify strategies and resources they will use to achieve goals. The act also requires GAO to periodically review how implementation of the act's requirements is affecting agency performance. This report identifies the open innovation resources developed by GSA, OMB, OSTP, and six selected agencies, and examines the extent to which key guidance reflects practices for effective implementation.
To address these objectives, GAO identified various resources by reviewing relevant policies, guidance, and websites, and interviewing staff from each agency. GAO selected the six agencies based on several factors, including the number and type of open innovation initiatives outlined in their agency Open Government Plans. GAO also compared guidance to practices and key actions for effective implementation.
What GAO Found
Open innovation involves using various tools and approaches to harness the ideas, expertise, and resources of those outside an organization to address an issue or achieve specific goals. Agencies have frequently used several open innovation strategies—crowdsourcing and citizen science, ideation, open data collaboration, open dialogues, and prize competitions and challenges—to engage the public. Staff from the General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) developed resources to support agency use of these strategies:
to encourage use, clarify legal authorities, and suggest actions for designing and implementing an open innovation initiative;
staff to advise and assist agency staff implementing initiatives and open innovation-related communities of practice; and
websites to improve access to relevant information and potential participants.
Six selected agencies—the Departments of Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration—also developed resources for those strategies they frequently use. These resources complement those at the government-wide level, providing agency staff with tailored guidance and support to help ensure they carry out initiatives consistent with agency procedures.
For the open innovation strategies identified above, GAO determined that key government-wide guidance developed by GSA, OMB, and OSTP reflect to differing extents practices GAO previously identified for effectively implementing specific initiatives (see table). Several factors led to these variances, including differing scopes and methodologies used in their development, and when they were issued. Better incorporating these practices could help ensure agency staff are aware of, and are able to take, steps to effectively design, implement, and assess their initiatives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends GSA, OMB, and OSTP enhance key guidance for each open innovation strategy to fully reflect practices for effective implementation. GSA and OMB generally agreed with these recommendations. OSTP neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations. |
gao_RCED-95-192 | gao_RCED-95-192_0 | EPA Is Authorized to Modify Hazardous Waste Management Requirements in Regulating Cement Kiln Dust
RCRA specifically authorizes EPA to modify several requirements that apply to hazardous waste in regulating cement kiln dust. However, any modifications must ensure the protection of human health and the environment. EPA Has Not Determined If Dust From All Types of Kilns Should Be Regulated the Same
Even though EPA has determined that additional controls are warranted over dust from cement kilns burning hazardous waste as well as dust from those kilns that do not, it has not determined if it will impose the same standards or controls over dust from both types of kilns. Interim and possible final actions to reduce the current threat that cement kiln dust may pose at some facilities include requiring the cement kiln industry to adopt dust control standards without EPA’s first having to proceed through a lengthy regulatory development process and making greater use of existing regulatory authority to control cement kiln dust. One action EPA is considering to control this dust is the use of a cement kiln industry proposal called an enforceable agreement. After drafting the general terms of the agreement, the cement kiln industry has been working with EPA and other interested parties to negotiate what controls would be needed to protect human health and the environment. To determine whether EPA believes that dust from cement kilns that burn hazardous waste should be regulated the same as dust from those not burning such waste, we reviewed EPA’s Report to Congress on Cement Kiln Dust, its regulatory determination, and public comments received on that report as well as on other documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decisionmaking process with respect to regulating cement kiln dust, focusing on: (1) EPA priorities in making its kiln dust determination; (2) whether EPA is authorized to modify hazardous waste management requirements in regulating cement kiln dust; (3) whether EPA believes that cement kilns burning hazardous waste should be regulated the same as those not burning hazardous waste; and (4) whether interim actions can be taken to control cement kiln dust.
What GAO Found
GAO found that EPA: (1) does not give as high a priority to making a cement kiln dust determination as developing standards for other wastes considered to be of higher risk; (2) has the statutory authority to modify its hazardous waste regulations to control cement kiln dust as long as the regulations adequately protect human health and the environment; (3) believes that cement kiln dust from both types of kilns could adversely affect human health and the environment, if improperly managed; (4) has not yet determined whether it will subject the dust from the two types of kilns to the same regulations; and (5) is considering interim actions to control cement kiln dust, such as making greater use of existing regulatory authority to enforce controls over the dust and entering into an agreement with the cement kiln industry to impose additional controls over the dust. |
gao_T-GGD-97-97 | gao_T-GGD-97-97_0 | My testimony focuses on (1) our recent work on federal drug control efforts; (2) ONDCP’s efforts to implement performance measures; (3) ONDCP’s anticipated actions to lead the development of a centralized lessons-learned data system for drug control activities; and (4) whether ONDCP, which is scheduled to expire in September of this year, should be reauthorized. “1. “2. “3. “4. “5. ONDCP’s Efforts to Implement Performance Measures
We have acknowledged for many years that performance measurement in the area of drug control has been difficult. We also reported in 1993 that ONDCP’s national strategies did not contain adequate measures for assessing the contributions of component programs for reducing the nation’s drug problems. As a result, we recommended that, as part of its reauthorization of ONDCP, Congress direct the agency to develop additional performance measures. In reauthorizing ONDCP in 1994, Congress specified that ONDCP’s performance measurement system should assess changes in drug use, drug availability, the consequences of drug use, drug treatment capacity, and the adequacy of drug treatment systems. The efforts of the contractor were eventually abandoned, and in the summer of 1996 ONDCP began a new effort to develop performance measures for all drug control operations. The new effort relies on working groups, which consist of representatives from federal drug control agencies and state, local, and private organizations, to develop national drug control performance measures. As of April 15, 1997, ONDCP officials said they had not yet implemented this recommendation. Given the complexity of the issues and the fragmentation of the approach to the national drug control strategy among more than 50 agencies, we continue to believe there is a need for a central planning agency, such as ONDCP, to coordinate the nation’s drug control efforts. In addition, we have found no compelling evidence to lead us to advise against ONDCP’s reauthorization for a finite period of time. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), focusing on: (1) its recent work on federal drug control efforts; (2) ONDCP's efforts to implement performance measures; (3) ONDCP's anticipated actions to lead the development of a centralized lessons-learned data system for drug control activities; and (4) whether ONDCP, which is scheduled to expire in September 1997, should be reauthorized.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its recent work shows that there are some promising initial research results in the area of demand reduction but that international supply reduction efforts have not reduced the availability of drugs; (2) GAO's work also shows that the nation still lacks meaningful performance measures to help guide decisionmaking; (3) GAO has acknowledged that performance measurement in the area of drug control is particularly difficult for a variety of reasons; (4) notwithstanding, GAO has concluded over the years that better performance measures than the ones in place were needed; (5) in 1993, GAO recommended that Congress, as part of its reauthorization of ONDCP, direct the agency to develop additional performance measures; (6) in reauthorizing ONDCP in 1994, Congress specified that ONDCP's performance measurement system should assess changes in drug use, drug availability, the consequences of drug use, drug treatment capacity, and the adequacy of drug treatment systems; (7) ONDCP's initial effort, with a private contractor, did not prove fruitful, and, in the summer of 1996, it began a new effort involving working groups composed of representatives from federal drug control agencies and state, local, and private organizations; (8) the working groups have been tasked with establishing performance measures for the goals set forth in the 1997 national strategy articulated by ONDCP; (9) as of April 15, 1997, no new measures had been approved by the ONDCP Director; (10) given the complexity of the issues and the fragmentation of the approach to the national drug strategy among more than 50 federal agencies, GAO continues to believe that there is a need for a central planning agency, such as ONDCP, to coordinate the nation's efforts; and (11) while it is difficult to gauge ONDCP's effectiveness given the absence of good performance measures, GAO has found no compelling evidence that would lead it to advise against ONDCP's reauthorization for a finite period of time. |
gao_GAO-10-439 | gao_GAO-10-439_0 | During the material solutions phase, prior to milestone A, the 2008 policy instruction requires the analysis of alternatives to assess “manufacturing feasibility.” During the technology development phase, prior to milestone B, the instruction states the following: Prototype systems or appropriate component-level prototyping shall be employed to “evaluate manufacturing processes.”
A successful preliminary design review will “identify remaining design, integration, and manufacturing risks.”
A program may exit the technology development phase when “the technology and manufacturing processes for that program or increment have been assessed and demonstrated in a relevant environment” and “manufacturing risks have been identified.”
After milestone B, one of the purposes of the engineering and manufacturing development phase is to “develop an affordable and executable manufacturing process.” The instruction says that: “the maturity of critical manufacturing processes” is to be described in a post- critical design review assessment; system capability and manufacturing process demonstration shall show “that system production can be supported by demonstrated manufacturing processes;” and the system capability and manufacturing process demonstration effort shall end, among other things, when “manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated in a pilot line environment, prior to milestone C.”
Finally, at milestone C, the instruction establishes two entrance criteria for the production and deployment phase, which include “no significant manufacturing risks” and “manufacturing processes under control (if Milestone C is full-rate production).” Low-rate initial production follows in order to ensure an “adequate and efficient manufacturing capability.” In order to receive full-rate production approval, the following must be shown: 1. As a result, systems cost far more and take far longer to produce than estimated. These include the inattention to manufacturing during planning and design, poor supplier management, and lack of a knowledgeable manufacturing workforce. Manufacturing Contributed to Growth in Cost and Delays in Schedule
Defense acquisition programs continue to be troubled by unstable requirements, immature technology, and a lack of manufacturing knowledge early in design, resulting in more costly products that take longer to produce. These issues illustrate the major problems we discussed with defense and contractor officials, but do not encompass all the manufacturing problems experienced by the programs. MRLs Have Been Proposed to Improve the Way DOD Identifies and Manages Manufacturing Risk and Readiness
The Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel working group has proposed MRLs as new manufacturing readiness criteria that could improve weapon system outcomes by standardizing the way programs identify and manage manufacturing risks associated with developing and fielding advanced weapon systems. In addition, the Army and Air Force report that their use of MRLs on pilot programs contributed to substantial cost benefits on a variety of programs, including major acquisition programs. Analysis Shows MRLs Address Manufacturing Gaps in DOD’s Technical Reviews
An analysis conducted by the working group shows that MRLs address many of the manufacturing gaps identified in several of DOD’s technical reviews that provide program oversight and determine how well programs are meeting expected goals, particularly the reviews conducted in the early acquisition phases. The best practices they employed were focused on gathering a sufficient amount of knowledge about their products’ producibility in order to lower manufacturing risks and included stringent manufacturing readiness criteria—to measure whether the product was mature enough to move forward in its development. Best Practice: Commercial Companies Emphasize Manufacturing Criteria Early and at Every Stage of the Product-Development Life Cycle
Each commercial firm we visited developed a disciplined framework for product development that assessed producibility at each gate using clearly defined manufacturing-maturity criteria that are similar in many respects to DOD’s MRLs. This starts with a supplier self-assessment. Commercial Firms Require That Manufacturing Processes Be in Control Earlier Than DOD’s MRLs
Although the firms we visited used manufacturing readiness criteria similar to DOD's proposed MRLs, one important difference we observed is that the commercial best practice is to have manufacturing processes in control prior to the production decision, while DOD's MRLs require manufacturing processes and procedures to be established and controlled during MRL 9, which occurs after the milestone C production decision, which authorizes a program to enter low-rate initial production, or equivalent. The product is not moved into production until the firm is satisfied that these processes are in control. For example, obtaining agreement on a policy that would institutionalize MRLs defensewide has proven difficult. Concerns raised by the military-service policymakers have centered on when and how the MRL assessments would be used. Table 4 shows the decrease in the manufacturing career field across DOD from 2001 to 2007. Yet, they have not been adopted DOD-wide. Specifically, we assessed (1) the manufacturing problems experienced by DOD, (2) how manufacturing readiness levels (MRLs) can address DOD’s manufacturing problems, (3) how proposed MRLs compare to manufacturing best practices of leading commercial companies, and (4) the challenges and barriers to implementing MRLs at DOD. Each of the military services and other DOD components has been actively planning and deploying initiatives that support the DOD acquisition workforce growth strategy. Related GAO Products
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cost growth and schedule delays are prevalent problems in acquiring defense weapon systems. Manufacturing systems has proven difficult, particularly as programs transition to production. In December 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued an updated version of its acquisition policy that reflects earlier consideration of manufacturing risks. A joint defense and industry group developed manufacturing readiness levels (MRL) to support assessments of manufacturing risks. Use of MRLs on all weapon acquisition programs has been proposed. In response to a congressional request, this report assesses the manufacturing problems faced by DOD, how MRLs can address manufacturing problems, how MRLs compare to manufacturing best practices of leading commercial firms, and challenges and barriers to implementing MRLs at DOD. In conducting our work, we contacted DOD, military services, and contractors; held interviews with leading commercial firms; reviewed program documents and policy proposals; and spoke with manufacturing experts.
What GAO Found
DOD faces problems in manufacturing weapon systems--systems cost far more and take much longer to build than estimated. Billions of dollars in cost growth occur as programs transition from development to production, and unit-cost increases are common after production begins. Several factors contribute to these problems including inattention to manufacturing during planning and design, poor supplier management, and a deficit in manufacturing knowledge among the acquisition workforce. Essentially, programs did not identify and resolve manufacturing risks early in development, but carried risks into production where they emerged as significant problems. MRLs have been proposed as new criteria for improving the way DOD identifies and manages manufacturing risks and readiness. Introduced to the defense community in 2005, MRLs were developed from an extensive body of manufacturing knowledge that includes defense, industry, and academic sources. An analysis of DOD's technical reviews that assesses how programs are progressing show that MRLs address many gaps in core manufacturing-related areas, particularly during the early acquisition phases. Several Army and Air Force centers that piloted MRLs report these metrics contributed to substantial cost benefits on a variety of technologies and major defense acquisition programs. To develop and manufacture products, the commercial firms we visited use a disciplined, gated process that emphasizes manufacturing criteria early in development. The practices they employ focus on gathering sufficient knowledge about the producibility of their products to lower risks, and include stringent manufacturing readiness criteria to measure whether the product is sufficiently mature to move forward in development. These criteria are similar to DOD's proposed MRLs in that commercial firms (1) assess producibility at each gate using clearly defined manufacturing criteria to gain knowledge about manufacturing early, (2) demonstrate manufacturing processes in a production-relevant environment, and (3) emphasize relationships with critical suppliers. However, a key difference is that commercial firms, prior to starting production, require their manufacturing processes to be in control--that is, critical processes are repeatable, sustainable, and consistently producing parts within the quality standards. DOD's proposed MRL criteria do not require that processes be in control until later. Acceptance of MRLs has grown among some industry and DOD components. Yet, DOD has been slow to adopt a policy that would require MRLs across DOD. Concerns raised by the military services have centered on when and how the MRL assessments would be used. While a joint DOD and industry group has sought to address concerns and disseminate information on benefits, a consensus has not been reached. If adopted, DOD will need to address gaps in workforce knowledge, given the decrease in the number of staff in the production and manufacturing career fields. |
gao_RCED-96-19 | gao_RCED-96-19_0 | Introduction
The Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act of 1992 established the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Pilot Program and authorized it for 3 years, beginning in fiscal year 1994. The report states that the program addresses a core problem in U.S. economic competitiveness and that the existing SBIR Program does not provide a direct mechanism for technology transfer. The act required each federal agency with an STTR Program to develop, in consultation with the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the Office of Government Ethics, procedures to ensure that research and development centers (1) are free from organizational conflicts of interests relative to the STTR Program; (2) do not use privileged information gained through work performed for an STTR agency or private access to STTR agency personnel in the development of an STTR proposal; and (3) use outside peer review, as appropriate. Evaluations of STTR Proposals for Research Quality and Commercial Potential Were Favorable, but the Review Process Varied Greatly
Agencies generally rated the quality of the proposed research and commercial potential in STTR proposals highly. (2) How is the innovation exciting? Conclusions
In general, technical evaluations of STTR proposals showed favorable views of the quality of proposed research and commercial potential. Agencies Have Taken Steps to Avoid Potential Problems Resulting From R&D Center Involvement
The legislation establishing the STTR Program required agencies to develop procedures to ensure that R&D centers are free from organizational conflicts of interest. Differing Views on the Effect of and Need for the STTR Program
Agency officials expressed differing views regarding the effect of STTR on SBIR and other agency R&D. The similarities between the STTR and SBIR Programs raise a broader issue about the need for the STTR Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the implementation of the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Program, focusing on: (1) the quality and commercial potential of STTR research; (2) how agencies address potential conflicts of interest from the involvement of federally funded research and development (R&D) centers in STTR; and (3) the need for STTR in light of its similarity to the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) federal agencies rated the quality and commercial potential of STTR proposals favorably in 1994, but technical experts were concerned about the commercial potential of STTR research because of the newness of the program; (2) agencies have taken actions to avoid potential conflicts of interest arising from R&D centers' involvement in STTR, such as restricting centers' participation, preventing R&D centers from using confidential information in preparing STTR proposals, and ensuring centers' use of outside peer reviews; (3) although agencies have differing views regarding the effects of STTR on SBIR, there is no evidence of competition between STTR and SBIR for quality proposals; (4) the need for STTR is unclear due to its similarity to SBIR, and it will take years to comprehensively evaluate STTR effectiveness; and (5) Congress believes that STTR addresses a core problem in national economic competitiveness and SBIR does not provide a direct mechanism for technology transfer. |
gao_T-GGD-98-83 | gao_T-GGD-98-83_0 | Money Laundering: FinCEN’s Law Enforcement Support, Regulatory, and International Roles
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the various anti-money laundering roles of the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). of, products and services provided by FinCEN to the law enforcement community; (2) the process for developing and issuing BSA regulations; (3) FinCEN’s efforts in assessing civil penalties for BSA violations; and (4) the role FinCEN plays in promoting international awareness of money laundering. The other is Project Gateway, which provides designated state and local law enforcement officials with direct, on-line access to BSA financial data. A primary reason FinCEN officials gave for this change is that FinCEN’s staffing levels have remained fairly constant over the years, while its overall mission has expanded. Survey results generally did not indicate dissatisfaction with FinCEN’s products. These reasons included reliance on in-house capabilities and the availability of intelligence or analytical support centers other than FinCEN. According to the federal and state officials we interviewed, these self-help programs are useful to agencies in combating money laundering and other financial crimes. Further, at the time of our review, final regulations to implement several provisions of the 1994 act were still pending. Unquestionably, the intended law enforcement benefits of the MLSA amendments cannot be fully achieved until all of the regulations are implemented. We concluded that FinCEN needs to better communicate its regulatory priorities and time lines, particularly regarding regulations authorized or required by the MLSA. We are working with FinCEN to determine the reasons for the increase in processing times in recent years. A main purpose of FATF is to promote the development of effective anti-money laundering controls. FinCEN has helped establish these units, which serve as the central focal points for other countries’ anti-money laundering efforts. FinCEN’s Office of International Programs is the agency’s second largest organizational component. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the various anti-money laundering roles of the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FinCEN was established in 1990 to support law enforcement agencies by analyzing and coordinating financial intelligence information to combat money laundering; (2) in supporting law enforcement, FinCEN has issued fewer analytical products in fewer years; (3) a primary reason FinCEN officials gave for this change is that FinCEN's staffing levels have remained fairly constant, while its overall mission has expanded; (4) also, FinCEN has been encouraging and training other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to access and analyze source data directly either through FinCEN resources or their own; (5) federal and state officials GAO interviewed indicated general satisfaction with FinCEN's products and services; (6) most nonusers told GAO that they rely on in-house capabilities or use intelligence or analytical support centers other than FinCEN; (7) GAO's recent report on FinCEN's regulatory role concluded that FinCEN needs to better communicate its regulatory priorities and time lines, particularly regarding regulations authorized or required by the Money Laundering Suppression Act (MLSA) of 1994; (8) FinCEN did not meet any of the three statutory deadlines imposed by the 1994 act, and final regulations for several provisions of the act are still pending; (9) the intended law enforcement benefits of the MLSA amendments cannot be fully achieved until all of the regulations are implemented; (10) in 1992, GAO reported that Treasury was taking about 21 months, on average, to process civil penalty referrals for Bank Security Act violations; (11) since then, the average has grown to about 3 years, according to FinCEN data; (12) GAO is working with FinCEN to identify reasons for the increase in processing time; (13) FinCEN's principal international efforts include: (a) working with international organizations to promote the development of effective anti-money laundering controls; and (b) helping other nations establish financial intelligence units, which serve as the central focal points for these countries' anti-money laundering efforts; and (14) FinCEN's Office of International Programs is the agency's second largest organizational component. |
gao_GAO-08-106 | gao_GAO-08-106_0 | FEMA’s Issuance of Task Orders under MD Contracts Resulted in as Much as $16 Million in Waste
FEMA wasted as much as $16 million because it did not allocate task orders under the MD contracts to the companies with the lowest prices. Breakdowns in FEMA’s Invoice Review Process Led to about $16 Million in Improper or Potentially Fraudulent Payments
From June 2006 through January 2007, we estimate that FEMA made approximately $16 million in improper or potentially fraudulent payments to the MD contractors based on invoices that should not have been approved, according to its own payment process. This amount includes about $15 million in payments made for preventative maintenance—which includes a required monthly inspection—and over $600,000 in payments for emergency after-hours repairs. After the contract awards, FEMA provided the contractors with a temporary housing unit inspection sheet (see app. Case Studies Illustrate Excessive Costs at Group and Commercial Sites
Our four case studies show that FEMA’s placement of travel trailers at group and commercial sites can lead to excessive costs. We estimate that, on average, FEMA will spend approximately $30,000 for the life cycle of a trailer placed at one of these private sites. As shown in figure 3, FEMA paid about $14,000 to purchase each 280 square foot trailer and $12,000 to haul the trailer to the site and install it, and will spend an additional $4,000 to maintain a private site trailer through the March 2009 temporary housing occupancy extension. Part of the reason for these extreme expenses is that FEMA failed to efficiently allocate work at the sites. For example, FEMA wasted about $800,000 by inefficiently allocating trailers and pads and also could not explain why it spent over $204,000 per year to lease one group site when most of the other parks only cost about $30,000 per year to lease. In this case, FEMA spends over $576,000 per year—$72,000 per trailer—for site maintenance. Evidence of Improper Activity Related to Contract Award Process
During the course of our work on the MD and GSM contracts, we found that FEMA awarded GSM contracts to two companies that did not appear to have submitted independent bids and also made false statements on proposals submitted to FEMA. We also found that a FEMA contracting officer may have improperly awarded the UFAS contract to make the housing units accessible to individuals with disabilities, resulting in $3 million in unnecessary expenses. We also found that key personnel at both companies admitted to misrepresenting their job titles and functions in final offers submitted to FEMA, a potential violation of the False Statements Act, 18 U.S.C. For example, both companies had the same president, executive vice president, and accountant. In response to our recommendation to issue task orders to companies at the lowest cost, FEMA stated that has reallocated work under the GSM contracts on a “low price basis per site” and under the MD contracts on a “best value basis.” In response to our recommendation to inventory mobile homes and trailers, create a database, and link work assigned to the contractors with specific unit barcodes, FEMA states that it began an invoice-matching project in March 2007 and is in the process of completing an inventory count to ensure that all the temporary housing units at the sites are recorded in the agency’s existing management system. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our investigation was to determine whether there were indications of fraud, waste, and abuse related to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) oversight of the 10 MD and 5 GSM contracts in Mississippi. We also prepared case studies to determine the costs associated with the placement of travel trailers at group sites and investigated allegations of criminal and improper activity related to the contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricane Katrina destroyed or damaged 134,000 homes and 10,000 rental units in Mississippi alone. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in part responded by providing displaced individuals with temporary housing in the form of mobile homes and travel trailers, placed on both private property and at FEMA-constructed group sites. In 2006, FEMA awarded 10 contracts in Mississippi to maintain and deactivate (MD) the housing units and 5 for group site maintenance (GSM). GAO was asked to investigate whether there were indications of fraud, waste, and abuse related to FEMA's oversight of these 15 contracts. GAO analyzed FEMA's issuance of task orders, tested a representative sample of monthly maintenance inspections payments, prepared case studies detailing the costs related to trailers placed at group sites, and investigated improper activity related to the contracts.
What GAO Found
FEMA's ineffective oversight resulted in an estimated $30 million in wasteful and improper or potentially fraudulent payments to the MD contractors from June 2006 through January 2007 and likely led to millions more in unnecessary spending beyond this period. For example, FEMA wasted as much as $16 million because it did not issue task orders to the contractors with the lowest prices. In addition, GAO estimates that FEMA paid the contractors almost $16 million because it approved improper or potentially fraudulent invoices. This amount includes about $15 million spent on maintenance inspections even though there was no evidence that inspections occurred and about $600,000 for emergency repairs on housing units that do not exist in FEMA's inventory. Furthermore, FEMA's placement of trailers at group sites is leading to excessive costs. FEMA will spend on average about $30,000 on each 280 square foot trailer at a private site through March 2009, the date when FEMA plans to end temporary housing occupancy. In contrast, expenses for just one trailer at the Port of Bienville Park case study site could escalate to about $229,000---the same as the cost of a five bedroom, 2,000 square foot home in Jackson, Mississippi. Part of the reason for this expense is that FEMA placed only eight trailers at the Bienville site. FEMA wastes money when it operates sites with such a small number of trailers because GSM costs are fixed whether a site contains 1 or 50 trailer pads. At Bienville, FEMA spends over $576,000 per year--$72,000 per trailer--just for grounds maintenance and road and fence repair. GAO also found evidence of improper activity related to the contract award process. For example, FEMA awarded GSM contracts to two companies that did not appear to have submitted independent bids, as required. These companies shared pricing information prior to submitting proposals to FEMA and also shared the same president and accountant. Personnel at both companies also misrepresented their job titles and functions, a potential violation of the False Statements Act. In another case, FEMA's contracting officer awarded a $4 million contract to make the temporary housing units disabled-accessible; the contracting officer allegedly had a previous relationship with the awardee's subcontractor. GAO licensed engineers estimated that the work should have only cost about $800,000, or one-fifth of what FEMA ultimately paid. |
gao_GAO-09-213 | gao_GAO-09-213_0 | Disparate Sources of Data on HAIs in ASCs Are Available, but None Provide Information on the Problem Nationwide
We identified five disparate sources of HAI data, all of which differed from one another in the types of HAI information they collected. However, none obtained its data from a nationally representative random sample of ASCs, and therefore none could be used to develop national estimates of HAI outcomes or compliance with infection control practices that affect the risk of acquiring HAIs in ASCs. In order to provide a basis for a nationwide estimate of risks of HAIs in ASCs, a data source would need to collect its data from a nationally representative random sample. The most detailed data are provided by the two federal data sources, NHSN—the most widely recognized source of outcome data on HAIs—and the ASC pilot study. NHSN Collects Clinically Sophisticated and Standardized Data on HAI Outcomes in ASCs, but It Is Not Set Up to Collect Nationally Representative Data
A key feature of NHSN is that it collects clinically sophisticated and standardized data on HAI outcomes. Under the pilot study, CMS modified the standard survey process by introducing two innovations—the incorporation of a CDC-developed infection control assessment tool and direct observation by the surveyor of a single patient’s care from start to finish of the patient’s stay. A CMS official reported that agency officials planned to consider making some changes to CMS’s standard survey process for ASCs after reviewing the CMS and CDC analyses but did not intend to continue the pilot study’s data collection. CMS officials told us that they did not intend to continue using the tool to collect data, as was done in the pilot study. Several experts said it was more feasible to collect data on HAIs by focusing on process measures rather than outcome measures because unsafe practices may be observed with less effort and technical training than is needed to identify individual cases of HAIs. The pilot study tested the addition of an infection control assessment tool to collect detailed data on recommended practices during the course of a CMS standard survey. With the tool, specially trained state surveyors were able to identify serious lapses in recommended practices. Such lapses, which increased patients’ risks of developing HAIs, had not previously been detected through CMS’s standard surveys. If CMS and CDC do not build on their experiences with and analyses of the pilot to continue collecting such data from a subset of ASC surveys using an instrument such as the infection control assessment tool, then HHS is losing an opportunity to take advantage of the existing ASC survey process to collect information on the prevalence of infection control practices on an ongoing basis. The ability of HHS to use CMS’s standard survey process to collect nationally representative process data on infection control practices in ASCs and to make estimates about the prevalence of safe and unsafe infection control practices in ASCs nationwide also depends on introducing random selection for ASC surveys. HHS could determine the number of ASCs it would need to select at random to generate meaningful national estimates to help identify where lapses in infection control practices by ASCs across the country were most likely to be putting patients at risk of contracting HAIs. Recommendation for Executive Action
To obtain nationally representative and standardized information on the extent to which ASCs implement specific infection control practices that reduce the risk of transmitting HAIs to their patients, we recommend that the Acting Secretary of HHS develop and implement a written plan to use the data collection instrument and methodology tested in the ASC pilot study, with appropriate modifications based on the CDC and CMS analyses of that study, to conduct recurring periodic surveys of randomly selected ASCs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Health-care-associated infections (HAI) are a leading cause of death. Recent high-profile cases of HAIs in ambulatory surgical centers (ASC) due to lapses in recommended infection control practices may indicate a more widespread problem in ASCs, but the prevalence of such lapses is unknown. The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and other entities collect data on HAIs, including process data on the use of recommended practices and outcome data on HAI incidence. CMS conducts standard surveys on about half of ASCs every 3 to 4 years, assessing compliance with its standard on infection control. In this report, GAO examines the availability of data on HAIs in ASCs nationwide. GAO interviewed subject-matter experts, agency officials, and trade and professional group officials.
What GAO Found
Disparate sources of data on HAIs in ASCs are available, but none provide information on the extent of the problem nationwide. Such data are useful for guiding federal policies aimed at preventing the lapses in infection control practices--such as reusing syringes and drawing medication to be injected into multiple patients from single-dose vials--that can lead to increased risk of HAIs for patients. GAO identified five data sources--two operated by HHS, two by professional organizations, and one by a state government--all of which differ from one another in the type of HAI information they collect. In order to make nationwide estimates of HAIs and lapses in related infection control practices in ASCs, a data source would need to collect its data from a nationally representative random sample of ASCs. However, none of the five sources does so. The two professional organizations and the state source collect data from narrowly defined subsets of ASCs. The most detailed data are provided by the two federal sources, one of which collects outcome data and the other process data. Experts GAO interviewed said it was more feasible for ASCs to collect process data than outcome data. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network collects detailed, standardized data on HAI outcomes that are comparable across hospitals and other health care facilities, but it has only recently begun to collect data on ASCs and it is not set up to collect nationally representative data. The other HHS data source, a CMS ASC pilot study conducted in three states, collects detailed process data on practices that affect the risk of HAIs. The pilot study tested the application of two innovations--a CDC-developed infection control assessment tool and direct observation by the surveyor of a single patient's care from start to finish of the patient's stay--during the course of CMS's standard surveys of selected ASCs. These innovations allowed surveyors to identify serious lapses in CDC-recommended infection control practices that would not have been detected during CMS's standard surveys of selected ASCs. A CMS official told GAO that CMS officials would consider making changes to CMS's standard survey process after reviewing planned CMS and CDC analyses of the pilot study results but did not expect to collect standardized quantitative data on the extent of compliance with specific infection control practices using a data collection instrument, as was done with the assessment tool for the pilot. Even if CMS were to continue the pilot's data collection methods, the data would not be generalizable to ASCs nationwide--and thus could not provide information on the extent of the lapses--because ASCs are selected for surveys on the basis of their perceived risk for quality issues and the length of time since they were last surveyed, rather than through random selection. A random sample--the size of which CMS could determine--could generate national estimates that would identify those infection control practices where lapses by ASCs across the country were most likely to put their patients at risk of contracting HAIs. |
gao_GAO-14-86 | gao_GAO-14-86_0 | From 2008 through 2013, ISC issued a series of standards to assist federal agencies in developing and implementing physical security programs at federal facilities, including standards for facility risk assessment methodologies. As a result, these six agencies may not have a complete understanding of the risks facing their approximately 52,000 federal facilities and may be less able to allocate security resources cost-effectively either at the individual facility level or across their portfolio of facilities. Three of the Nine Selected Agencies’ Risk Assessment Methodologies Fully Align with ISC’s Risk Assessment Standards
ISC’s risk assessment standards require that federal agencies’ risk assessment methodologies (1) consider all of the undesirable events in the RMP and (2) assess the threat, consequences, and vulnerability to specific undesirable events. Six of the Nine Selected Agencies’ Risk Assessment Methodologies Do Not Fully Align with ISC’s Risk Assessment Standards
The remaining six agencies we reviewed—NRC, OPM, FEMA, FPS, VA, and DOI—do not have a risk assessment methodology that fully aligns with ISC’s standards because as shown in table 1, they contain one or more of the following limitations: they do not consider all of the undesirable events in the RMP, and they do not assess threat, consequences, and/or vulnerability to specific undesirable events. However, ISC does not know the extent to which its member agencies are complying with its standards, including its risk assessment standards, because it does not monitor agencies’ compliance with its standards. ISC officials told us that they would like to monitor agencies’ compliance with ISC standards, but limited resources and other priorities, such as developing standards and guidance, have prevented the ISC from doing so. In addition, federal internal control standards state that federal agencies should have appropriate guidance for each of their activities. Conclusions
ISC, currently comprised of 53 member federal agencies, was established to enhance the quality and effectiveness of physical security in federal facilities. Although risk assessments play a critical role in ISC’s risk management framework, ISC does not know the extent to which its member agencies’ risk assessment methodologies align with its standards because it does not monitor compliance or have an approach to do so that incorporates outreach to agencies regarding their compliance status. As the government’s central forum for sharing information and guidance on physical security, ISC has the authority to create a working group to help it conduct outreach to determine the extent of compliance with its RMP standard. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that federal agencies are developing and using appropriate risk assessment methodologies, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the ISC to take the following two actions: conduct outreach to identify which member agencies have not developed risk assessment methodologies that align with ISC standards and develop a mechanism to monitor and ensure compliance of all its member agencies, and supplement the risk assessment guidance contained in The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities with: (1) information on how to incorporate threat, consequence, and vulnerability assessments of specific undesirable events into a risk assessment methodology and (2) examples of risk assessment methodologies that ISC determines comply with its standards. Agency Comments
We sent a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security (including the Federal Protective Service and Federal Emergency Management Agency), Interagency Security Committee, Department of Energy, Department of the Interior, Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of Veterans Affairs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Office of Personnel Management for review and comment. 2) How does ISC assist member agencies in developing risk assessment methodologies and monitor their compliance with these standards? III for a list of ISC member agencies). According to ISC’s RMP, agencies’ risk assessment methodologies must: consider all the undesirable events identified in the RMP as possible risks to federal facilities; assess the threat, consequences, and vulnerability to specific produce similar or identical results when applied by various security provide sufficient justification for deviations from the ISC-defined security baseline. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2012 shooting at the Anderson Federal Building in Long Beach, California, demonstrates that federal facilities and their employees as well as the public who visit federal buildings continue to be the targets of violence. The Federal Protective Service and about 30 other federal agencies are responsible for protecting civilian federal facilities and their occupants from potential threats, in part, by assessing risks to their facilities. ISC—an interagency organization led by the Department of Homeland Security— issues standards for facility protection.
GAO was asked to examine how federal agencies assess risk to their facilities. This report assesses (1) the extent to which selected ISC member agencies' facility risk assessment methodologies align with ISC's risk assessment standards, and (2) how ISC assists member agencies in developing risk assessment methodologies and monitors compliance with these standards. GAO selected 9 of 53 ISC member agencies based on their missions and number of facilities. GAO compared each selected agency's risk assessment methodology to ISC's risk assessment standards. ISC is required to enhance security in and protection of federal facilities government-wide; recommendations GAO makes are to ISC and not its member agencies.
What GAO Found
Three of the nine selected agencies' risk assessment methodologies that GAO reviewed—the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of State (State)—fully align with the Interagency Security Committee's (ISC) risk assessment standards, but six do not—the Department of the Interior (DOI), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Federal Protective Service (FPS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). As a result, these six agencies may not have a complete understanding of the risks facing approximately 52,000 federal facilities and may be less able to allocate security resources cost-effectively at the individual facility level or across the agencies' facility portfolios. ISC's The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities ( RMP ) standard requires that agencies' facility risk assessment methodologies must (1) consider all of the undesirable events identified in the RMP as possible risks to federal facilities, and (2) assess the threat, consequences, and vulnerability to specific undesirable events. Six of the nine agencies' methodologies GAO reviewed do not align with ISC's standards because the methodologies do not (1) consider all of the undesirable events in the RMP or (2) assess threat, consequences, or vulnerability to specific undesirable events. For example, five agencies (DOI, VA, FEMA, FPS, and NRC), do not assess the threat, consequences, or vulnerability to specific undesirable events, as ISC requires. The reasons why varied; for example, VA said that its methodology was in place before ISC issued its standards. Officials from that agency told us they were working to update their methodology.
ISC has issued a series of physical security standards and guidance to assist member agencies with developing their risk assessment methodologies, but does not know the extent to which its 53 member agencies comply with its standards, including its risk assessment standards, because it does not monitor agencies' compliance. ISC does not monitor compliance or have an approach to do so that incorporates outreach to agencies regarding their compliance status. Officials stated that they would like to monitor agencies' compliance, but limited resources and other priorities, such as developing standards and guidance, have prevented them from doing so. However, ISC has the authority to create a working group from its member agencies to help it perform its duties. In the absence of ISC's monitoring, agencies' risk assessment methodologies may not align with ISC's standards. In addition, although ISC issued risk assessment guidance in August 2013, this guidance is limited. For example, the guidance does not describe how to incorporate threat, consequence, or vulnerability assessments of specific undesirable events into a risk assessment methodology. Not having appropriate guidance is inconsistent with federal internal-control standards designed to promote effectiveness and efficiency.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ISC take action to assess member agencies' compliance and provide additional risk- assessment methodology guidance. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-4 | gao_GAO-14-4_0 | DOL’s Guidance and Limitations in State Information Systems Have Resulted in Inconsistent and Incomplete National Data on WIA Participants
Flexibility in DOL’s Guidance Continues to Affect the Consistency of Data
DOL’s guidance to states, in the form of Training and Employment Guidance Letters and Training and Employment Notices, details how states should collect and report data on participants in the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs. The flexibility in the guidance stems from the flexibility inherent in WIA, which allows states and local areas to tailor service delivery to their needs. This flexibility, however, results in variations in how states and local areas report participant data, which makes it challenging for DOL to aggregate WIA data at the national level. In addition, DOL’s guidance is open to interpretation, allowing states to define and report some variables differently, further contributing to inconsistencies in the data that states report to DOL on these programs. For example, state officials that we interviewed told us that they funded core services at their American Job Centers exclusively through WIA, exclusively through a partner program, or through a blend of both WIA and partner program funds. DOL Has Increased Its Oversight Efforts and Taken Steps to Improve Data Consistency, but Data Quality Issues Have Not Been Resolved DOL Performed Various Oversight Activities, but It Did Not Consistently Use the Results to Improve the Data
To improve the quality of data on participants in the WIA Adult or Dislocated Worker Programs, DOL has enhanced its oversight efforts and introduced new initiatives including having its data contractor produce quarterly reports on data issues, requiring states to validate their WIA data on an annual basis, and engaging its regional offices in periodic reviews of case files from states. DOL requires each state to validate the data it collects and report on participants in the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs on an annual basis, but the findings from these validation efforts have not been strategically used to identify systemic issues with or to improve the quality of the data on WIA participants. DOL, however, does not know what effect state data validation efforts have had on the quality of participant data for the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs. Officials from DOL’s national office said that they were surprised by this, and that data element validation results are available to states through DOL’s reporting system. DOL’s regional offices review a sample of case files from states as part of their oversight of the quality of data for the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs, but they have not used the results of these reviews to identify systemic issues with the quality of the data on WIA participants. For example, DOL has provided general technical assistance on data reporting for the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs to states, and officials from three of the eight states said that the assistance provided by DOL’s regional offices was useful in helping them address some of the challenges related to data reporting. National and regional DOL data specialists also said they hold biweekly meetings to discuss data issues. This effort would entail upgrades to state information systems that may resolve some data reporting issues currently attributed to limited technological capacities. Conclusions
Collecting and reporting consistent and complete data is important for program oversight and management and to evaluate the effectiveness of program activities and services, but it can be difficult when federal programs are carried out in partnership with states and local areas. DOL has taken steps to improve the quality of the data on WIA’s Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs. Moreover, since 2007, two states have been piloting a new information system that tracks program participants across several of DOL’s employment and training programs, but DOL does not plan to evaluate its effects on the quality of the data collected on participants in the WIA Adult or Dislocated Worker or other programs before it expands the system to other states. DOL officials did not state whether they agreed or disagreed with our recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: (1) what factors have affected the ability to report consistent and complete data on participants in the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs, and (2) what actions has the Department of Labor (DOL) taken to improve the quality of participant data. Within each state, we visited or contacted at least one American Job Center—formerly known as a one- stop center—or a local workforce board. Appendix II: Data on Participants in the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs for Program Year 2011
We reviewed the data collected by the Department of Labor (DOL) in the Workforce Investment Act Standardized Record Data (WIASRD) system on the number of, characteristics of, and services provided to participants in the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs in program year 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Having reliable program data is important in effectively managing a program. However, there have been longstanding concerns about the quality of data on job seekers enrolled in the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs, which rely on states and local areas to track participants and the services they receive. Given these concerns and WIA's anticipated reauthorization, GAO was asked to examine the data on these WIA participants. This report addresses: (1) the factors that have affected the ability to report consistent and complete data on participants in the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs, and (2) actions that DOL has taken to improve the quality of these data. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, guidance, and documentation from DOL. GAO interviewed officials from DOL's national and regional offices and state and local workforce officials from a nongeneralizable sample of eight states. GAO also analyzed WIA data from program year 2011 to determine the number of, characteristics of, and services provided to WIA participants.
What GAO Found
Flexibility in the Department of Labor's (DOL) data reporting guidance and limitations in some state information systems continue to impair the quality of the data on participants in the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs. The flexibility in the guidance stems from the inherent nature of WIA, which allows states and local areas to tailor program design and service delivery to their needs. As a result, DOL's guidance on collecting and reporting the data allows variation in how some WIA data elements are defined, collected, and reported. Specifically, an American Job Center--formerly known as a one-stop center--can choose to provide certain basic services exclusively through WIA programs, exclusively through a partner program, or through a blend of both WIA and partner programs. However, this flexibility involves variations in data reporting that have contributed to inconsistencies among states regarding when job seekers are counted as WIA participants. Moreover, some aspects of DOL's guidance are open to interpretation, leaving it to states to define variables such as type of training service received, further contributing to data inconsistencies. In addition, some state information systems used to collect and report WIA participant data have limitations that hamper the affected states' ability to report uniform and complete data. For example, data are incomplete to the extent that states may not have information systems that can track participants who access services online without significant staff assistance. Having inconsistent and incomplete data makes it difficult for DOL to compare data on program participants across states or to aggregate the data at a national level.
DOL engages in various oversight activities designed to ensure the accuracy of states' data on participants in the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs and has taken steps to improve data consistency across states. However, DOL does not consistently use the results of its oversight to identify and resolve systemic data issues nor has it evaluated the effect of oversight on the quality of WIA participant data. Specifically, DOL requires states to validate the data they collect and report on participants in the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs on an annual basis, but it does not strategically use the findings from this effort to identify systemic data issues or improve the quality of the data. Similarly, although DOL's regional offices review a sample of each state's WIA participant files every few years to assess states' compliance with data reporting and validation requirements, DOL officials said they have not analyzed the findings from the most recent reviews to identify nation-wide reporting issues. DOL has taken steps to improve the consistency of the data by providing general technical assistance to states and local areas and through standardizing the way DOL collects WIA data. For example, since 2007, two states have been piloting a unified reporting system developed by DOL that uses standardized data definitions and is integrated across certain American Job Center programs administered by DOL. However, DOL officials said they have no plans to evaluate the system before expanding it to other states. Without an evaluation, DOL does not know what impact the pilot has had on the quality of WIA participant data.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOL take steps to improve the consistency and completeness of data reported across states and to promote a continuous process for improving the data's quality. DOL officials did not agree or disagree with GAO's overall recommendations and detailed how data quality is being addressed primarily through existing efforts. However, GAO believes that the recommendations remain valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-70 | gao_T-HEHS-99-70_0 | Health Information Is Needed for a Variety of Research Purposes
The organizations that we contacted primarily conduct health research to advance biomedical science, understand health care use, evaluate and improve health care practices, and determine patterns of disease. Federal Requirements Do Not Apply to All Research, but Some Organizations Voluntarily Apply Those Requirements to All Studies
Some of the research conducted by the organizations we contacted must conform to the Common Rule or FDA regulations because it is either supported or regulated by the federal government. While it does not have an IRB, this PBM uses external advisory boards to review its research proposals. IRB Reviews Provide Limited Oversight of Confidentiality
While many organizations have in place IRB review procedures, recent studies that pointed to weaknesses in the IRB system, as well as the provisions of the Common Rule itself, suggest that IRB reviews do not ensure the confidentiality of medical information used in research. Federal Regulations Contain Limited Provisions for Overseeing Confidentiality
Under the Common Rule, IRBs are directed to approve research only after they have determined that (1) there are provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and maintain the confidentiality of data, when appropriate, and (2) research subjects are adequately informed of the extent to which their data will be kept confidential. Organizations Conducting Research Have Measures to Reduce Access to Personally Identifiable Information
Each organization that we contacted reported that it has taken one or more steps to limit access to personally identifiable information in their research. Some have used encrypted or encoded identifiers to enhance the protection of research and survey subjects. In addition to electronic security, officials at some of the organizations told us they use various security measures to prevent unauthorized physical access to medical records-based information, including computer workstations and servers. However, while reasonable safeguards may be in place in these companies, external oversight of their research is limited. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the privacy of medical records used for health research, focusing on: (1) to what extent medical information used for research depends on personally identifiable information; (2) research that is and is not subject to current federal oversight requirements; (3) how the institutional review board (IRB) ensures the confidentiality of health information used in research; and (4) what steps organizations have taken to safeguard information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the survey revealed that a considerable amount of health research relies on personally identifiable information; (2) while some of this research is subject to IRB review--either because it is federally supported or regulated research or because the organization voluntarily applies federal rules to all of its research--some of the organizations conduct records-based research that is not reviewed by an IRB; (3) the process of IRB review does not ensure the confidentiality of medical information used in research--primarily because the provisions of the Common Rule related to confidentiality are limited; (4) according to recent studies, the IRB system on the whole is strained; and (5) nevertheless, although external review of their research is limited, most of the organizations in GAO's study told GAO that they have various security safeguards in place to limit internal and external access to paper and electronic databases, and many say they have taken measures to ensure the anonymity of research and survey subjects. |
gao_GAO-05-184 | gao_GAO-05-184_0 | Background
In fiscal year 2004, students received over $84 billion in federal loans to finance postsecondary education. FFELP Lending by Schools—Mostly Private Nonprofit Schools—Has Increased Significantly in the Last Five Years
FFELP lending by schools—chiefly private nonprofit schools providing Stafford loans to their graduate and professional students—has increased significantly between school years 1993–1994 and 2003–2004 rising from $155 million to $1.5 billion. Several schools we interviewed reported that a primary reason to become a FFELP lender was to generate more revenue for the school. School Lenders Contract with Other FFELP Participants to Provide Student Loans and Later Sell Them to Receive Money, Which May Be Used to Lower Students’ Borrowing Costs
Generally school lenders contracted with other FFELP organizations to administer their loan programs and subsequently sold their loans to receive revenue. About a third of the school lenders we interviewed used their own money to finance the loans they made, while the others obtained a line of credit, in some cases from the same organization that eventually purchased the loans originated by the school lender. Most of the school lenders interviewed reported that they used or plan to use premium money for student financial aid. However, they differed in how they allocated the money. Several Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Applicable to All Lenders and Schools, and Some Applicable Only to School Lenders, Exist to Protect the Interests of Taxpayers and Borrowers
To protect the interests of taxpayers and borrowers, a number of statutory and regulatory provisions exist regarding, among other things, application processes and audit requirements for schools and lenders; these also provide FSA and guaranty agencies the authority to review lenders and schools. Additionally, under the HEA, all FFELP lenders that originate or hold more than $5 million in FFELP loans must have an independent annual compliance audit, which examines the lender’s compliance with the HEA and relevant regulations as well as its financial management of FFELP activities. FSA Has Little Information about How School Lenders Are Complying with Laws and Regulations because It Has Not Provided Timely and Adequate Oversight of School Lenders
FSA has minimal information about how school lenders are complying with laws and regulations, and until this year, FSA had not used its authority to conduct program reviews of school lenders to assess compliance with regulations specific to them. As a result, FSA did not realize, until September 2004, that 10 of 29 school lenders had failed to submit required compliance audits for fiscal year 2002. However, during the course of our review, three regional offices asked 31 school lenders about their compliance with the regulation pertaining to the use of interest income and special allowance payments for need-based grants. To assess the extent to which schools have participated in the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) as lenders, we obtained a list from Education of schools approved to be FFELP lenders and then, using data in the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS), we analyzed the dollar amount of FFELP loans made by each school lender in each school year from 1993–1994 to 2003–2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2004, lenders made about $65 billion in loans through the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) to assist students in paying for postsecondary education. The Higher Education Act (HEA), which authorizes FFELP, broadly defined eligible lenders--including schools. The Department of Education's (Education) Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) is responsible for ensuring that lenders comply with FFELP laws and regulations. Recently, schools have become increasingly interested in becoming lenders, and this has raised concerns about whether it is appropriate for schools to become lenders given that they both determine students' eligibility for loans and in some cases set the price of attendance. In light of these concerns we determined (1) the extent to which schools have participated as FFELP lenders and their characteristics, (2) how schools have structured lending operations and benefits for borrowers and schools, and (3) statutory and regulatory safeguards designed to protect taxpayers' and borrowers' interests.
What GAO Found
Between school years 1993-1994 and 2003-2004, lending by schools has increased significantly from 22 school lenders disbursing about $155 million to 64 schools disbursing $1.5 billion in FFELP loans. Several schools we interviewed reported that a primary reason to become a FFELP lender was to generate more revenue for the school. About 80 percent of school lenders in school year 2003-2004 were private nonprofit schools, and almost all of them had graduate and professional programs in medicine, law, or business. Most school lenders have contracted with other FFELP organizations to administer their loan programs and subsequently have sold their loans to earn revenue, but school lenders differed in terms of how they financed the loans made and when they sold their loans. About a third of the school lenders we interviewed used their own money to finance the loans they made, while the others obtained lines of credit from a bank or secondary market lender, in some cases from the same organization that eventually purchased the loans disbursed by the school lender. Most schools we interviewed reported using or planning to use revenues earned from the sale of loans to lower student borrowing costs or provide need-based aid. A number of statutory and regulatory provisions applicable to all lenders and schools, and some applicable only to school lenders, exist to safeguard the interests of taxpayers and borrowers. FSA, however, has little information about how school lenders' have complied with FFELP regulations. Under the HEA, FFELP lenders that originate or hold more than $5 million in FFELP loans must submit annually audited financial statements and compliance audits. In October 2004, FSA discovered that 10 of 29 school lenders required to submit an audit for fiscal year 2002 had not done so. Moreover, FSA has not conducted program reviews of school lenders. However, during the course of our review, three regional offices asked 31 school lenders about their compliance with the regulation pertaining to the use of interest income and special allowance payments for need-based grants. |
gao_GAO-08-1014 | gao_GAO-08-1014_0 | In doing so, the FBI recognized the importance of IT to its organizational transformation efforts, and made it one of the bureau’s top 10 priorities. Among other things, we said that it will be crucial for the FBI to manage Sentinel requirements in the context of its architectural environment and the availability of commercial products, and to understand the capabilities and dependencies among the commercial products to minimize incompatibilities. Sentinel Is Implementing Key Commercial Component-Based System Acquisition Methods, but Corporate Guidance Governing These Methods Is Not Fully Defined
In acquiring Sentinel, the FBI is implementing leading practices associated with effectively acquiring commercial IT solutions. Moreover, this is occurring even though corporate policies and guidance do not address all of the methods. In implementing them, the bureau is relying on either its prime contractor’s approaches or Sentinel- specific plans. Among other things, managing system requirements includes (1) controlling changes to requirements by establishing a baseline set of requirements and formally reviewing and approving changes to the baselines in light of expected costs, benefits, and associated risks; and (2) ensuring that the different levels of requirements (e.g., high-level operational or user requirements and detailed system and technical requirements) and their associated design specifications and test cases are aligned and consistent with one another (bidirectional traceability). In addition, the second study takes into account the availability of the products. To the program office’s credit, it has taken steps to employ each of these practices on Sentinel. Program officials told us that they intend to establish agreements, ranging from informal agreements to signed memoranda of understanding, with legacy system owners to ensure that their respective systems are ready in time for integration with Sentinel. By taking steps to manage the integration of Sentinel with legacy systems, the program office will be better positioned to ensure that Sentinel is deployed on time and performs as intended. FBI Policies and Guidance Do Not Address Most Key Acquisition Methods
With the exception of the practices that relate to effective requirements management, not all of the key practices that were earlier discussed in association with (1) requirements/commercial product trade-off analysis, (2) commercial product dependency analysis, (3) commercial product modification, and (4) legacy system integration management are fully reflected in any bureauwide policy or guidance. This is especially important for the Sentinel system, which is to provide long-overdue, mission-critical intelligence and investigative services across the FBI. To the credit of Sentinel program officials, this void in corporate policies and guidance is being effectively overcome, as the program is implementing these key practices either through reliance on its prime contractor’s approaches or through Sentinel-specific plans. If these Sentinel practices are successfully incorporated into FBI-wide policies and guidance, then their chances of being employed on a repeatable basis across all applicable FBI system investments will be increased. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is employing effective methods in acquiring commercial solutions for Sentinel. We also reviewed related program documentation to substantiate data provided by program officials during interviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is 3 years into its 6-year, $451 million program known as Sentinel, which is to replace its antiquated, paper-based, legacy systems for supporting mission-critical intelligence analysis and investigative case management activities. Because of the importance of Sentinel to the bureau's mission operations, GAO was asked to conduct a series of reviews on the FBI's management of the program. This review focuses on whether the FBI is employing effective methods in acquiring commercial solutions for Sentinel. To do so, GAO researched relevant best practices; reviewed FBI policies and procedures, program plans, and other program documents; and interviewed appropriate program officials.
What GAO Found
The FBI's Sentinel program is implementing five key methods for acquiring commercial information technology solutions. In particular, it is managing Sentinel requirements by making sure that changes to established baselines are justified and approved on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks, and it is ensuring that different levels of requirements and related design specification and test cases are properly aligned with one another. In addition, the bureau is analyzing commercially available product alternatives in relation to requirements, costs, and other factors to ensure that the most cost-effective mix of products is being used to minimize requirement gaps. In doing so, it is taking steps to understand the dependencies among the commercial products, thus ensuring that they can interoperate effectively. Also, the bureau is not modifying the commercial products that it is selecting and using to develop Sentinel, which should allow it to minimize future maintenance costs by taking advantage of future product releases and other vendor product support. Last, it is taking steps to ensure that Sentinel integration with FBI legacy systems will occur when needed, for example, by establishing agreements with legacy system owners. Collectively, implementation of these acquisition methods should increase the chances of cost effectively delivering required Sentinel capabilities on time. However, the implementation of most of these acquisition methods is generally not governed by bureauwide policies and guidance that address all relevant practices. To the credit of program officials, this void in corporate policies and guidance has not affected Sentinel, as they are implementing all of the key practices either through reliance on their prime contractor's approaches or through Sentinel-specific plans. If policies and guidance relative to each of these methods for acquiring commercial component-based systems were incorporated into FBI-wide policies and guidance, the bureau could increase its chances of employing them on a repeatable basis across all applicable system investments. |
gao_GAO-08-116 | gao_GAO-08-116_0 | Background
All states, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories, and some Indian tribes have laws and/or codes requiring convicted sex offenders to register with local or state law enforcement authorities, the purpose of which is to enhance public protection and provide an additional investigative tool to law enforcement agencies. States Are Using a Variety of Driver’s License-Related Processes to Encourage Registration or Provide Additional Monitoring of Convicted Sex Offenders
As of July 2007, 22 of the nation’s 50 states were using some form of driver’s license-related process to encourage registration or provide additional monitoring of convicted sex offenders. Further, five of these nine states—Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi—also label the applicable driver’s license, identification card, or registration card with an annotation that identifies the person as a sex offender. Most States We Surveyed Report They Would Need to Modify Their Information Technology Systems to Screen Individuals against Sex Offender Databases before Issuing Driver’s Licenses; Software Modifications Would Be a Key Cost Factor
In our survey of 26 states, most of the responding motor vehicle agencies and sex offender registries reported that (1) moderate or major modifications to their current IT systems would be needed to screen driver’s license applicants against the respective state’s sex offender registry and the FBI’s NSOR before issuing a license and (2) the most significant cost factor would be software modifications. Also, the agencies generally indicated that reliable cost estimates for establishing the prospective screening system discussed in section 636 of the Walsh Act cannot be calculated until the system’s operational requirements or business rules are clearly defined. Key Design Considerations Could Affect the Success of Screening Programs Using Driver’s License Processes
Beyond the IT and cost issues discussed in the previous section, successful implementation of a driver’s license screening program for sex offenders will also hinge on how well the program incorporates key design considerations. Developing an effective nationwide screening program could be a daunting challenge given the different processes, procedures, databases, and operational environments in the motor vehicle and law enforcement agencies across the nation. For example, a recurring observation by the motor vehicle agency officials we contacted is that their offices are already overburdened. Decisions on the most optimal approach to pursue—and, if applicable, how best to integrate the design considerations discussed in this report—likely would necessitate collaboration among various stakeholders, including interested states and AAMVA as well as relevant Department of Justice components—particularly the FBI, which manages NSOR, and the SMART Office, which is responsible for administering the standards for the sex offender registration and notification program set forth in the Walsh Act. Further, AAMVA provided various technical comments, which we incorporated in this report where appropriate. Further, we reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) and the National Conference of State Legislatures. Level of Modifications to States’ Information Technology Capabilities and Key Cost Factors Regarding Prospective Federal Law
To determine what level of modifications would be needed to states’ IT capabilities to comply with a prospective federal law that would require screening individuals against the respective state’s sex offender registry and the FBI’s NSOR before issuing a driver’s license and to determine the key cost factors in implementing and maintaining this screening capability, we conducted a survey of a majority (26) of the states, which involved contacting motor vehicle agency and sex offender registry officials in each of the states (see table 1). Other Design and Implementation Factors That Could Affect the Results from Any Sex Offender Screening Program Using Driver’s License Processes
To determine what other factors, in addition to IT capabilities and costs, could affect the successful design and implementation of a process for screening individuals against a state’s sex offender registry and the FBI’s NSOR before issuing a driver’s license, we relied largely on the information we obtained during our review of Nevada’s driver’s license screening process and from our contacts with motor vehicle agency and sex offender registry officials in the 26 survey states (see table 1). | Why GAO Did This Study
To enhance public safety, all states have laws requiring convicted sex offenders to register with law enforcement authorities. Because ensuring compliance is a challenge, in part because offenders may move frequently, policy makers are considering a role for motor vehicle agencies. In response to section 636 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the Walsh Act) and as discussed with congressional committees, this report identifies (1) the various driver's license-related processes that states are using to encourage registration or provide additional monitoring of convicted sex offenders; (2) the level of modifications to states' information technology (IT) capabilities that would be needed, and the key cost factors involved, if a federal law were to require the screening of individuals against the respective state's sex offender registry and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Sex Offender Registry before issuing a driver's license; and (3) other factors that could affect successful implementation of this type of screening program. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed state statutes and surveyed motor vehicle and public safety agencies in 26 states. The 26 states reflect regional representation, among other factors. GAO also interviewed officials from various components in the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA). GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
As of July 2007, 22 of the nation's 50 states were using some form of driver's license-related process to encourage registration or provide additional monitoring of convicted sex offenders. For example, nine states specifically require convicted sex offenders to obtain a driver's license, an identification card, or a sex offender registration card issued through driver's license-related processes, and five of these nine states also label the respective document with an annotation that identifies the person as a sex offender. One of the 22 states--Nevada--has a process for screening every driver's license applicant against the state's sex offender registry before issuing a license. However, no state has a screening process whereby all applicants are screened against both the respective state's sex offender registry and the FBI's national registry before being issued a driver's license. To establish this type of screening process, most of the motor vehicle agencies and sex offender registries in the 26 states surveyed by GAO said that moderate to major modifications to their current IT systems would be needed, with software modifications being a key cost factor. Many of the responding state agencies indicated that before reliable cost estimates for this type of screening process could be developed, operational or functional requirements must be clearly defined. Moreover, a recurring observation by motor vehicle agency officials was that given competing demands for programming resources, the agencies were not positioned to handle additional projects during the next several years. In addition to addressing IT and cost issues, successful implementation of a driver's license screening program for sex offenders will also hinge on how well the program incorporates key design considerations. Developing an effective "one-size-fits-all" screening program could be a daunting challenge given the different processes, procedures, databases, and operational environments among the motor vehicle and law enforcement agencies across the nation. If the federal government were to require this type of screening process, several key design factors could affect the outcomes of the process. Among other considerations cited by federal, state, and AAMVA officials, particularly important are design factors aimed at minimizing the burden on states, maintaining customer service at motor vehicle agencies, and mitigating unintended consequences. Although not an exhaustive list, these design considerations could affect the results from and the costs of a nationwide screening program. Decisions on the most optimal approach to pursue--and, if applicable, how best to integrate the design considerations discussed in GAO's report--likely would necessitate collaboration among various stakeholders, including interested states, AAMVA, and the FBI, which manages the national sex offender registry. In commenting on a draft copy of this report, DOJ and AAMVA provided technical clarifications, which GAO incorporated where appropriate. |
gao_GGD-95-119 | gao_GGD-95-119_0 | However, some failing thrifts are resolved prior to being placed into conservatorship through the accelerated resolution program (ARP), which OTS operates jointly with RTC. We reviewed the three resolutions to determine whether RTC’s resolution process, as modified by these policy changes, provided for compliance with FDICIA’s least-cost requirements. Principal Findings
RTC Has Improved Its Resolution Process
RTC changed its corporate policies to require that uninsured depositors share in thrift losses if necessary to achieve least costly resolutions and to curtail its practice of selling performing assets during conservatorship operations. These changes brought RTC into compliance with FDICIA’s uninsured depositor requirements and enabled RTC to better conform with the act’s requirement that it evaluate other resolution methods before selling assets. In addition, RTC’s implementation of a policy to extend a preference to minority bidders when making resolution decisions appeared consistent with FDICIA’s least-cost requirements. It also changed the timing of its liquidation cost estimates. We also found that RTC explored market interest in the thrift, selected the resolution alternative it determined to be the least costly, and adequately documented its marketing rationale and the bases for its resolution decision. It also selected the resolution alternative it determined to be the least costly. It changed its treatment of uninsured depositors and now complies with related FDICIA requirements; it changed the timing of its sales of high-quality assets from thrifts in conservatorship and the timing of its liquidation cost estimates, thereby better providing for its conformance with the act’s requirements; and it improved various aspects of its resolution documentation, as we had recommended. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Resolution Trust Corporation's (RTC) compliance with a statutory requirement to: (1) resolve failed thrifts in the least costly manner; and (2) calculate and document its evaluation of alternative resolutions of failed thrifts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) RTC has improved its resolution process and curtailed its practice to sell performing loans during conservatorship in order to comply with the least cost requirement; (2) RTC policy to extend a preference to minority bidders when making resolution decisions appears consistent with the least cost requirement; (3) for the three resolutions it reviewed, RTC chose the resolution alternative it determined to be the least costly and, in response to GAO recommendations, adequately documented its marketing strategies and the bases for its resolution decisions; (4) where relevant, RTC has implemented changes to its corporate policies regarding the treatment of uninsured depositors and the timing of asset sales during conservatorships, which brought RTC into compliance with other statutory requirements as well as the least cost requirement; (5) RTC has changed the timing of its liquidation cost estimates so that it makes its initial estimate when a failed thrift is placed in conservatorship; (6) among other things, RTC initial liquidation cost estimates determine the amount of estimated losses uninsured depositors must absorb; and (7) RTC efforts to resolve failing thrifts through its accelerated resolution program have brought RTC into better conformance with the least-cost statutory requirement. |
gao_GAO-04-679 | gao_GAO-04-679_0 | A-76. Officials generally agreed about which human capital activities were suitable candidates for ASD. The general consensus was that virtually any activity could be an ASD candidate as long as it did not require an intimate knowledge of the agency or involve oversight or decision-making authority that should belong with the agency. Notwithstanding the broad conceptual agreement among the agencies, they showed differences in their choices of human capital ASD activities. Lesson learned: Understand the complexity and requirements of the activity prior to making an ASD decision. Some agencies noted using the panel award approach to select providers. OPM Has a Central Role in Assisting Agencies’ Management of ASD
OPM has a central role in agencies’ management of ASD by providing assistance and guidance in operating human capital programs. Recommendation for Executive Action
Given the need expressed by agency officials about the importance of sharing data and lessons learned concerning the use of ASD for human capital activities and consistent with OPM’s ongoing efforts in this regard, we recommend that the Director of OPM take the following action: Work with the CHCO Council to create additional capability within OPM to research, compile, and analyze information on the effective and innovative use of ASD and strengthen its role as a clearinghouse for information about when, where, and how ASD is being used for human capital activities and how ASD can be used to help agency human capital offices meet their requirements. We conducted semistructured interviews with human capital officials from the selected agencies to gather information on (1) the human capital activities for which the agencies were using ASD, (2) the basis of their decisions, (3) how they were managing the use of ASD, and (4) the lessons they had learned. The Office of Personnel Management’s Training and Management Assistance (TMA) program is an example of an interagency contract service program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Human capital offices have traditionally used alternative service delivery (ASD)--the use of other than internal staff to provide a service or to deliver a product--as a way to reduce costs for transaction-based services. GAO was asked to identify which human capital activities agencies were selecting for ASD, the reasons why, how they were managing the process, and some of the lessons they had learned. Eight agencies were selected to provide illustrative examples of ASD use.
What GAO Found
The selected agencies were using ASD for the full range of their human capital activities. Agencies generally approached their management of ASD in similar ways. They conceptually agreed that human capital activities that did not require an intimate knowledge of the agency, oversight, or decision-making authority could be considered for ASD, although in practice they showed differences in their choices of ASD activities. GAO identified several lessons the agencies had learned about ASD management, such as the importance of understanding the complexity and requirements of an activity before making an ASD decision. As the President's agent and adviser for human capital activities, OPM also has a central role in assisting agencies' management of ASD. Several agencies noted that they used OPM's Training and Management Assistance program, which provides human capital contract assistance. However, the officials also cited the need for sharing information about specific ASD efforts, useful metrics, and lessons learned. |
gao_GAO-02-805T | gao_GAO-02-805T_0 | Accordingly the Department stated that the U.S. government was prepared to enter into an agreement to transition the Internet’s name and number process to a new not-for-profit organization. Subsequently, the Department entered into an MOU with ICANN to guide the transition. ICANN Has Increased Competition, But Progress Has Been Much Slower on other Key Issues
ICANN has made significant progress in carrying out MOU tasks related to one of the guiding principles of the transition effort—increasing competition. However, progress has been much slower on activities designed to address the other guiding principles: increasing the stability and security of the Internet; ensuring representation of the Internet community in domain name policy-making; and using private, bottom-up coordination. The Department’s Public Assessment of the Transition’s Progress Has Been Limited
As mentioned previously, the Department is responsible for general oversight of work done under the MOU, as well as the responsibility for determining when ICANN, the private sector entity chosen by the Department to carry out the transition, has demonstrated that it has the resources and capability to manage the domain name system. Department officials said that they carry out their oversight of ICANN’s MOU-related activities mainly through ongoing informal discussions with ICANN officials. In response, Department officials said that they welcomed the call for the reform of ICANN and would follow ICANN’s reform activities and process closely. Until these issues are resolved, the timing and eventual outcome of the transition effort remain highly uncertain, and ICANN’s legitimacy and effectiveness as the private sector manager of the domain name system remain in question. Recommendation
In view of the critical importance of a stable and secure Internet domain name system to governments, business, and other interests, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce issue a status report detailing the Department’s assessment of the progress that has been made on transition tasks, the work that remains to be done on the joint project, and the estimated timeframe for completing the transition. One critical set of rules, collectively known as the domain name system, links names like www.senate.gov with the underlying numerical addresses that computers use to communicate with each other. The paper includes the four guiding principles of privatization: stability; competition; representation; and private, bottom-up coordination. Nov. 1998
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) incorporates in California. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses privatizing the management of the Internet domain name system.
What GAO Found
This system is a vital aspect of the Internet that works like an automated telephone directory, allowing users to reach Web sites using easy-to-understand domain names like www.senate.gov , instead of the string of numbers that computers use when communicating with each other. The U.S. government supported the development of the domain name system, and, in 1997, the President charged the Department of Commerce with transitioning it to private management. The Department issued a policy statement, called the "White Paper," that defined the four guiding principles for the privatization effort as stability, competition, representation, and private, bottom-up coordination. After reviewing several proposals from private sector organizations, the Department chose the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a not-for-profit corporation, to carry out the transition. In November 1998, the Department entered into an agreement with ICANN in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) under which the two parties agreed to collaborate on a joint transition project. Progress on and completion of each task is assessed by the Department on a case-by-case basis, with input from ICANN. The timing and eventual outcome of the transition remains highly uncertain. ICANN has made significant progress in carrying out MOU tasks related to one of the guiding principles of the transition effort--increasing competition--but progress has been much slower in the areas of increasing the stability and security of the Internet; ensuring representation of the Internet community in domain name policy-making; and using private bottom-up coordination. Although the transition is well behind schedule, the Department's public assessment of the progress being made on the transition has been limited for several reasons. First, the Department carries out its oversight of ICANN's MOU-related activities mainly through informal discussions with ICANN officials. Second, although the transition is past its original September 2000 completion date, the Department has not provided a written assessment of ICANN's progress since mid-1999. Third, although the Department stated that it welcomed the call for the reform of ICANN, they have not yet taken public position on reforms being proposed. |
gao_GAO-09-26 | gao_GAO-09-26_0 | Other HHS Agencies
In addition to ACF and CMS, other agencies within HHS have roles in sustaining the health of foster children through supporting research, providing grants, or offering technical assistance that may assist with providing necessary health care services to children in foster care, as shown below: The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality is responsible for supporting research designed to improve the quality of healthcare, reduce its costs, address patient safety and medical errors, and broaden access to essential services; the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) administers programs related to maternal and child health, as well as services specific to particular conditions, such as human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV and AIDS); and SAMHSA funds programs and services for individuals—as well as their families and communities—who suffer from or are at risk for substance abuse or mental health disorders. Specific Requirements for Health Assessments—and Using Designated Providers to Conduct Them—Are Employed to Identify Children’s Health Care Needs
To help facilitate the timely identification of foster children’s health care needs, all 10 states we examined had adopted specific policies with regard to the timing and scope of assessments, and 4 of these states also reported using designated providers to conduct the assessments. In addition to policies requiring assessments of children’s physical health, 8 of the 10 states we studied also reported requiring screening or assessments of children’s mental and developmental health shortly after entry into foster care. The ACF reviews have helped focus attention on the mental health needs of children in foster care, however, and we found that most of the 10 states we selected for study had adopted policies to screen or assess the mental health and development of children entering foster care. Some state officials commented that the use of a specific network of physicians also facilitated quality improvement efforts. Practices to Enhance Access to Services, Coordinate Care, and Monitor Use of Medications Are among Efforts to Ensure Delivery of Health Care to Foster Children
To address the challenge of ensuring delivery of appropriate health care services to children in foster care, several of the states we selected for review adopted practices designed to facilitate access to care, coordinate services, and review medications for children in foster care. Care coordination practices that the selected states identified employed either nurses or other health care managers to help ensure that children in foster care received necessary health care services. Mechanisms for Data Management and Quality Assurance Address Challenges to Documenting and Monitoring Children’s Health Care
To address the challenges of documenting and monitoring children’s health care, some states we studied shared health care data across various state systems to acquire more complete medical histories and used quality assurance mechanisms, such as medical audits or specialized case reviews, to track receipt of services. For example, through data sharing with Medicaid and other data sources, Texas has developed an electronic health record—known as the Foster Care Health Passport—that can be viewed by authorized individuals involved in the child’s care through a secure Web site. ACF Offers States Health-Related Technical Assistance as Part of Its Broader Efforts to Improve Delivery of Services
Although states are ultimately responsible for meeting the health needs of children in foster care, HHS is required by law to provide technical assistance to the extent feasible to help states develop and implement plans to improve their performance. ACF officials told us that their emphasis is on providing technical assistance that will increase the capacity of state child welfare agencies over the long term to serve the needs of children in their care. These and other agencies are listed among possible stakeholders in ACF’s reviews of state child welfare agencies. The center’s focus is on children who have or are at risk of having emotional disorders, including children in foster care. These included describing practices that selected states have adopted to address the challenges of (1) identifying health care needs, (2) ensuring delivery of appropriate health services, and (3) documenting and monitoring the health care of children in foster care. In addition, we describe technical assistance the Department of Health and Human Services’ Administration for Children and Families (ACF) provides to states to help improve their performance in providing for the health care needs of these children. | Why GAO Did This Study
Providing health care services for foster children, who often have significant health care needs, can be challenging. The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) oversees foster care, but state child welfare agencies are responsible for ensuring that these children receive health care services, which are often financed by Medicaid. In light of concerns about the health care needs of foster children, GAO was asked to study states' efforts to improve foster children's receipt of health services. This report has four objectives. It describes specific actions that some states have taken to (1) identify health care needs, (2) ensure delivery of appropriate health services, and (3) document and monitor the health care of children in foster care. It also describes the related technical assistance ACF offers to states. To address these objectives, GAO selected 10 states and interviewed state officials and reviewed related documentation regarding the nature and results of the states' practices. To describe ACF's technical assistance, GAO interviewed officials and reviewed documents from ACF, states, and relevant technical assistance centers.
What GAO Found
To identify the health needs of children entering foster care, all 10 states we studied have adopted policies that specify the timing and scope of children's health assessments, and some states use designated providers to conduct the assessments. All of the states we selected for study required physical examinations, most states we studied required mental health and developmental screens, and several of them required or recommended substance abuse screens for youth shortly after entry into foster care. Preventive health examinations for foster children were required at regular intervals thereafter, in line with states' Medicaid standards. Limited research has suggested that having assessment policies and using designated providers who have greater experience in the health needs of foster children may permit fuller identification and follow-up of children's health care needs. To help ensure the delivery of appropriate health care services, states have adopted practices to facilitate access, coordinate care, and review medications for children in foster care. Some states used specialized staff to quickly determine Medicaid eligibility; others issued temporary Medicaid cards to prevent delays in obtaining treatment. In addition, certain states had increased payments to physicians serving children in foster care to encourage more physicians to provide needed care. Nurses or other health care managers were given roles in coordinating care to help ensure that children received necessary health care services. Six states we studied also reported monitoring the use of various medications, including psychotropic medications intended for the treatment of mental health disorders. To document and monitor children's health care, several states we studied had shared data across state programs and employed quality assurance measures, such as medical audits, to track receipt of services. One state has developed a foster care health "passport" that electronically compiles data from multiple sources, including the state's immunization registry, and this passport can be accessed and updated by responsible parties through a secure Web site. Other states used electronic databases to obtain more complete and timely medical histories than otherwise available but provided more limited access to these and continued to update them through use of paper records. ACF's network of 25 technical assistance centers is intended to improve state performance in meeting children's needs, including their health care needs, by increasing the capacity of state agencies to ensure safety, wellbeing, and availability of permanent homes for children in their care. According to ACF officials, the centers are not intended to provide medical expertise, but to help state child welfare agencies collaborate with others involved with health programs. One center in ACF's network focuses exclusively on children's mental health and several others have also assisted in identifying some practices to improve the health of children in foster care. Five of the centers are newly funded and are expected to provide long-term help in implementing plans to improve agency performance in meeting children's needs. |
gao_GAO-01-557 | gao_GAO-01-557_0 | DOD has established specific goals for the cleanup of properties, including FUDS, that have hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes in the soil and water. By the time all projects are completed, the Corps estimates that it will spend at least $15 billion to $20 billion cleaning up FUDS properties. Conclusions
DOD’s annual report on the status of its environmental restoration activities can provide a misleading picture of FUDS program accomplishments. In its annual report, DOD accounts of completed projects include projects that were determined to be ineligible or that did not involve any actual cleanup effort, as well as projects that required actual cleanup actions to complete. As a result, it appears that after 15 years and expenditures of $2.6 billion, over 50 percent of the FUDS projects have been completed. In reality, only about 32 percent of those projects that required actual cleanup actions have been completed, and those are the cheapest and least technologically challenging. The Corps estimates that the remaining projects will cost over $13 billion and take more than 70 years to complete. The Corps’ reporting of completed FUDS projects reflects DOD’s reporting policies for all of its environmental cleanup programs, including those at closing bases and active installations. As such, progress on those cleanup programs may not be accurately pictured either. In addition, DOD’s range survey did not include all FUDS properties that may contain unexploded ordnance and could be former training ranges. Consequently, DOD’s inventory of FUDS training ranges is likely incomplete, and its estimated cost to clean up these ranges is likely understated. | What GAO Found
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates that it will spend as much as $20 billion to clean up contamination at thousands of properties that were once owned, leased, or operated by the Defense Department (DOD). These properties contain hazardous, toxic, and radioactive wastes in the soil and water or in containers, such as underground storage tanks. The Corps is responsible for cleaning up the hazards, including removing underground storage tanks. DOD's annual report on its environmental restoration activities can provide a misleading picture of the Corps' accomplishments. DOD's accounts of completed projects include projects that were ineligible or that did not involve any actual cleanup effort. As a result, the impression is that--after 15 years and expenditures of $2.6 billion--more than half of the projects at formerly used defense sites have been completed. In reality, only about 32 percent of those projects that required actual cleanup actions have been completed, and those are the cheapest and least technologically challenging. The Corps estimates that the remaining projects will cost more than $13 billion and take upwards of 70 years to complete. The Corps' reporting of completed projects reflects DOD's reporting policies for all of its environmental cleanup programs, including those at closing bases and active installations. As such, progress on those cleanup programs may not be accurately pictured either. In addition, DOD's range survey did not include all formerly used defense sites properties that may contain unexploded ordnance and could be former training ranges. Consequently, DOD's inventory of training ranges is likely incomplete, and its estimated cost to clean up these ranges is likely understated. |
gao_GAO-08-835 | gao_GAO-08-835_0 | The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) authorizes FDA to regulate the promotion of prescription drugs. The oversight of off- label promotions occurs within a broad review process meant to detect a wide range of promotional violations—the agency does not have separate activities designed specifically to detect off-label promotion of prescription drugs. For example, FDA lacks a tracking system to manage its review process. FDA also acknowledges that it cannot review all submissions because of the volume of materials it receives and that only a small portion of the required submissions of final promotional materials are examined for potential violations. Although the agency conducts additional monitoring and surveillance to detect violations that could not be identified through a review of submitted materials, the extent and variety of promotional activities make it difficult for FDA to monitor these in a comprehensive manner. FDA’s Oversight Process Emphasizes Reviews of Materials Submitted by Drug Companies and Is Supplemented by Monitoring and Surveillance
The primary mechanism FDA uses to oversee the promotion of drugs for off-label uses is to review promotional materials submitted to the agency by drug companies. Currently, it prioritizes its reviews based on whether the promotion involves 1. an apparent, egregious violation; 2. a drug that has undergone recent labeling changes and updates to its 3. a television advertisement disseminated for the first time for a drug or indication, or certain draft promotions that are associated with drugs approved under FDA’s accelerated approval process and that reflect central themes from a company’s promotion; 4. new promotional campaigns that reflect central themes from the company’s promotion; 5. other television advertisements and other draft campaigns submitted under the accelerated approval process; 6. other new promotional campaigns; and 7. other issues of concern. Limitations in FDA’s Oversight Process Make It Unlikely That All Off-Label Violations Are Detected
It is unlikely that FDA can detect all off-label promotion that occurs because of limitations in its oversight process for reviewing the promotion of prescription drugs. FDA’s oversight is hampered by the lack of a system or process that consistently tracks its receipt and review of submitted materials. In 2006, GAO recommended that FDA track which materials it has reviewed but the agency has not taken action to address this recommendation. This is because inappropriate promotion can take many forms and occur in a myriad of places. Regulatory and Enforcement Actions Have Been Taken in Response to Off-Label Promotions
FDA and DOJ have taken regulatory and enforcement actions against drug companies for violative off-label promotions. During calendar years 2003 through 2007, FDA issued 42 regulatory letters—23 warning letters and 19 untitled letters—in response to off-label promotions. However, it took FDA an average of about 7 months to issue these letters, during which time violative material remained in the market. For example, it took drug companies receiving warning letters issued in response to the more serious violations an average of 4 months to take corrective action. However, DOJ initiated civil and criminal enforcement actions in response to instances involving off-label promotion it identified from other sources. Eleven Settlements Related to Off-Label Promotion Have Occurred in the Past 5 Years
According to DDMAC officials, they did not refer any violations to DOJ for enforcement action during calendar years 2003 through 2007 because drug companies have generally complied with requests made in FDA’s regulatory letters during that time period. Specifically, DOJ enforcement action resulted in 11 settlements with drug companies, which involved, at least partially, allegations of off-label promotion and resulted in, among other things, a monetary settlement. First, HHS raised concerns with our finding that DDMAC staff do not systematically prioritize all of the materials they receive. Second, HHS commented that a tracking system would not improve the agency’s ability to identify promotional violations nor would it change which submissions are actually reviewed. We continue to believe that, as we recommended in 2006, a tracking system would facilitate a more systematic approach to DDMAC’s reviews, would allow FDA to more readily group materials for review, and could enhance its monitoring and surveillance efforts by providing data on materials reviewed and the findings of those reviews. In this case, violative promotional activities were cited for two different drugs, but off-label promotion was cited for only one of these drugs. Encouraged sales representatives to send medical letters and other marketing materials that were not requested by physicians in order to promote off-label uses. Promoted drug for off-label uses, such as anti-aging, cosmetic use, and athletic performance enhancement. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), regulates the promotion of prescription drugs to ensure that promotional materials are not false and misleading and that they comply with applicable laws and regulations. Among other things, FDA prohibits drug companies from promoting drugs for off-label uses--that is, for a condition or patient population for which the drug has not been approved or in a manner that is inconsistent with information found on the approved drug label. Although doctors may prescribe drugs off label, it is not permissible for drug companies to promote drugs for off-label uses. FDA may take regulatory actions for violations, and may also pursue enforcement action through the Department of Justice (DOJ). GAO was asked for information about the promotion of drugs for off-label uses. GAO reviewed (1) how FDA oversees the promotion of off-label uses of prescription drugs and (2) what actions have been taken to address off-label promotions. GAO examined documentation related to the promotion of drugs for off-label uses and FDA correspondence with drug companies on identified violations and obtained information from DOJ on relevant actions. GAO also interviewed officials at FDA and the HHS Office of Inspector General and representatives of national medical and pharmaceutical associations.
What GAO Found
FDA oversees drug promotion for off-label uses by reviewing promotional materials that drug companies submit to the agency. However, because FDA does not have separate oversight activities to specifically capture off-label promotion, its oversight occurs within a broader process that targets a variety of promotional violations. Furthermore, FDA reports it is unable to review all submissions because of the volume of materials it receives and prioritizes its reviews in order to examine those with the greatest potential impact on human health. However, FDA does not prioritize its reviews in a systematic manner but rather relies on its staff to sort through large volumes of material and select submissions for review. FDA is also hampered by the lack of a system that consistently tracks the receipt and review of submitted materials. To address these shortcomings, GAO recommended in 2006 that FDA track which materials it has reviewed. FDA has not acted on this recommendation and still lacks a standardized tracking system to monitor its review efforts. GAO believes that this recommendation remains valid. In addition to its reviews, FDA conducts monitoring and surveillance to identify violations that would not be identified through its review of submitted material--for instance, discussions between doctors and sales representatives. These efforts are also limited because FDA cannot observe all off-label promotion activities as they can take many forms and occur in a myriad of places. FDA and DOJ have taken regulatory and enforcement actions against drug companies in response to off-label promotions. During calendar years 2003 through 2007, FDA issued 42 regulatory letters in response to off-label promotions requesting drug companies to stop dissemination of violative promotions. FDA took an average of 7 months to issue these letters from the time it first drafted them. In addition, drug companies that were cited for more serious violations took an average of 4 months to take the corrective actions requested. While FDA did not refer any of these violations to DOJ for enforcement action, during calendar years 2003 through 2007, DOJ settled both civil and criminal cases that involved, at least partially, off-label promotion. These actions were initiated as a result of violations identified by sources other than FDA and resulted in 11 settlements. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS raised concerns with GAO's assessment that FDA does not systematically prioritize all of the promotional materials it receives. It also stated that a tracking system would not improve the agency's ability to identify promotional violations. GAO found that FDA does not screen all promotional materials. GAO continues to believe that a tracking system would help ensure that staff screen all material received, facilitate a more systematic approach to FDA's reviews, and help the agency manage the program. |
gao_GAO-11-427 | gao_GAO-11-427_0 | Private sector officials said minimum wage was one of a number of factors, including the high cost of goods and utilities, making it difficult to do business in American Samoa. For the entire period from 2006 to 2009, the number employed fell 35 percent. The decrease largely reflected the early 2009 closure of the CNMI’s last remaining garment factories, which employed many foreign workers. Private sector employers reported in discussion groups some layoffs and hiring freezes, and they said minimum wage increases imposed additional costs during a time in which multiple factors made it difficult to operate. Tourism employer actions. Few employers—weighted by numbers of employees— attributed their past actions largely to the minimum wage increases, and one half or less did so for each of the planned actions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report updates our 2010 report on American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) with an additional year of information and describes, since the minimum wage increases began, (1) employment and earnings, and (2) the status of key industries. Local Administrative Data
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics collects CPI data on the U.S. 50 states but not the insular areas. Data from 2010 on total employment are not yet available. Questionnaire responses show that tuna canning employment dropped by 55 percent from 2009 to 2010, reflecting the September 2009 closure of one cannery and layoffs in the remaining cannery. Average inflation-adjusted earnings in American Samoa fell by 5 percent from 2008 to 2009 and by 11 percent from 2006 to 2009. However, over both periods, the minimum wage increased by significantly more than inflation. Cannery officials we interviewed expressed concern about American Samoa’s dwindling competitive advantage in the global tuna canning industry. Though the cannery faces some near-term obstacles to relocating, our analysis suggests that relocating tuna cannery operations from American Samoa to a tariff-free country with lower labor costs would significantly reduce cannery operating costs and reduce American Samoa jobs; however, maintaining some operations in American Samoa would allow the facility to continue to compete for U.S. government contracts. Some workers said they were disappointed to see the minimum wage increase delayed in 2010 and 2011; however, more workers expressed concern over job security than favored a minimum wage increase with the potential for subsequent layoffs. Specifically, available data show that from 2008 to 2009, the total number of people employed in American Samoa fell by 19 percent (from 19,171 to 15,434) and that over the entire period from 2006 to 2009, employment fell by 14 percent (from 17,852 to 15,434, with a peak of 19,171 in 2008). American Samoa Tuna Canning Industry Has Continued to Lay off Workers and Has Considered Alternate Locations
Minimum Wage Increases through 2016 Would Affect Wages of Almost All Workers in American Samoa’s Tuna Canning Industry Employed in 2010
Minimum Wage Increases in 2007-2010 Increased Median Wage for Tuna Canning Industry Employees Without a minimum wage increase in American Samoa in 2010, there was no increase in the median wage of workers in the tuna canning industry— in both 2009 and 2010, the median tuna canning worker wage was $4.76. Inflation-adjusted average earnings of CNMI workers who maintained employment rose by 3 percent from 2008 to 2009 and remained largely unchanged, with a slight drop of .5 percent, from 2006 to 2009, according to CNMI government data. In addition, over both periods, the minimum wage increased by significantly more than inflation. Tourism questionnaire employers reported that they took cost- cutting actions from June 2009 to June 2010, including reducing hours and freezing hiring; employers also reported plans to take the same types of actions by early 2012, as well as laying off workers. If observed trends continue, payroll will represent an increasing share of total operating cost for hotels in the CNMI, due to the minimum wage increases. In discussion groups, some tourism employers and managers expressed concern about the minimum wage increases, but others said the minimum wage increases were needed and manageable and that the primary difficulty was the CNMI tourism industry’s general decline. CNMI Tourism Industry Experienced Declines in Visitor Arrivals, and Hotels Have Absorbed Minimum Wage Increases Rather than Raising Room Rates
Minimum Wage Increases in 2007-2010 Increased Median Wage for Workers in Tourism Industry, and 2010-2018 Increases Would Affect Wages of Almost All Tourism Workers
Minimum Wage Increases in 2007-2010 Increased Median Wage for Tourism Industry Employees From June 2007 to June 2010, the median hourly wage in the CNMI tourism industry rose from $3.65 to $4.60, a 26 percent increase, according to our questionnaire responses (see table 8). The future minimum wage increases would affect the wages of 95 percent of current workers by the time the minimum wage reaches $7.25 in 2016. Tourism Employers Reported Plans to Take Cost-Cutting Actions by Early 2012, and One-Half or Less Attributed Each Action Largely to the Minimum Wage Increases Hotel and other employers in the tourism industry reported in our questionnaire plans to take additional cost-cutting actions in the next 18 months, by early 2012. Tourism and Other Workers Said They Would Like Pay Increases but Were Concerned about Job Availability
Workers participating in our CNMI discussion groups expressed mixed views regarding the minimum wage increases and said they would like pay increases but were concerned about losing jobs and work hours. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2007, the United States enacted a law incrementally raising the minimum wages in American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) until they equal the U.S. minimum wage. American Samoa's minimum wage increased by $.50 three times, and the CNMI's four times before legislation delayed the increases, providing for no increase in American Samoa in 2010 or 2011 and none in the CNMI in 2011. As scheduled, American Samoa's minimum wage will equal the current U.S. minimum wage of $7.25 in 2018, and the CNMI's will reach it in 2016. Recent economic declines in both areas reflect the closure of one of two tuna canneries in American Samoa and the departure of the garment industry in the CNMI. GAO is required to report in 2010, 2011, 2013, and biennially thereafter on the impact of the minimum wage increases. This report updates GAO's 2010 report and describes, since the increases began, (1) employment and earnings, and (2) the status of key industries. GAO reviewed federal and local information; collected data from employers through a questionnaire and from employers and workers through discussion groups; and conducted interviews during visits to each area.
What GAO Found
In American Samoa, employment fell 19 percent from 2008 to 2009 and 14 percent from 2006 to 2009. Data for 2010 total employment are not available. GAO questionnaire responses show that tuna canning employment fell 55 percent from 2009 to 2010, reflecting the closure of one cannery and layoffs in the remaining cannery. Average inflation-adjusted earnings fell by 5 percent from 2008 to 2009 and by 11 percent from 2006 to 2009; however, the hourly wage of minimum wage workers who remained employed increased by significantly more than inflation. Private sector officials said the minimum wage was one of a number of factors making business difficult. In the tuna canning industry, future minimum wage increases would affect the wages of 99 percent of hourly-wage workers employed by the two employers included in GAO's questionnaire. The employers reported taking cost-cutting actions from June 2009 to June 2010, including laying off workers and freezing hiring. The employers attributed most of these actions largely to the minimum wage increases. Cannery officials expressed concern in interviews about American Samoa's dwindling global competitive advantage. Available data suggest that relocating tuna canning operations to a tariff-free country with lower labor costs would significantly reduce operating costs but reduce American Samoa jobs; however, maintaining some operations in American Samoa would allow continued competition for U.S. government contracts. Some workers said they were disappointed by the 2010 minimum wage increase delay; however, more workers expressed concern over job security than favored a wage increase with potential for layoffs. In the CNMI, employment fell 13 percent from 2008 to 2009 and 35 percent from 2006 to 2009. Average inflation-adjusted earnings rose by 3 percent from 2008 to 2009 and remained largely unchanged from 2006 to 2009. Over the same periods, the hourly wage of minimum wage workers who remained employed increased by significantly more than inflation. In discussion groups, private sector employers said minimum wage increases imposed additional costs during a time in which multiple factors made it difficult to operate. In the tourism industry, scheduled minimum wage increases through 2016 would affect 95 percent of workers employed by questionnaire respondents. Tourism employers reported that they took cost-cutting actions from June 2009 to June 2010 and planned to take additional actions, including laying off workers. Few of these tourism employers attributed past actions largely to the minimum wage increases, and one half or less did so for each of the planned actions. Available data suggest that hotels generally absorbed minimum wage costs rather than raise room rates. Hotel payroll will represent an increasing share of total operating costs due to the minimum wage increases. In discussion groups, some tourism employers expressed concern about the minimum wage increases, but others said the increases were needed and manageable and that the primary difficulty was the CNMI tourism industry's decline. Workers participating in GAO's CNMI discussion groups expressed mixed views regarding the minimum wage increases and said they would like pay increases but were concerned about losing jobs and work hours. GAO shared the report with relevant federal agencies and the governments of American Samoa and the CNMI. While generally agreeing with the findings, they raised a number of technical concerns that have been incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-858T | gao_GAO-07-858T_0 | The amount of the subsidy for premiums, deductibles, copayments, and catastrophic coverage varies, depending on income and resources. Progress Has Been Made in Approving Subsidy Applicants, despite Barriers, but Measuring Success Is Difficult
SSA has approved 2.2 million applicants for the subsidy as of March 2007, despite some barriers, but measuring their success is difficult because no reliable data are available to identify the eligible population. Because the agency lacked access to reliable data that might help target their outreach efforts more narrowly, SSA used income records and other government data to identify a broad group of potentially eligible individuals. Since its initial outreach campaign, SSA has not developed a comprehensive plan to identify its continued outreach efforts apart from other activities. Although the initial campaign has ended, SSA is continuing to solicit applications. SSA identified the target population by using income data from various government sources to screen out Medicare beneficiaries whose income made them ineligible for the Part D subsidy. SSA officials said they took this approach to ensure that all Medicare beneficiaries who were identified as potentially eligible for the subsidy were made aware of the benefit and had an opportunity to apply for it. The law, however, prohibits IRS from sharing such data with SSA to assist with outreach efforts. Given these factors, IRS officials stated that summarily sharing private taxpayer data to identify individuals who could qualify for the subsidy, and the potential cost of systems changes, would have to be weighed against the added value of the data. Other Barriers Have Limited SSA’s Solicitation Efforts
SSA’s efforts to solicit applications were hindered by beneficiaries’ confusion about applying for subsidy and the drug benefit. According to SSA field office staff and state Medicaid and advocacy group officials, many individuals were confused about the difference between the prescription drug benefit and the subsidy, and did not understand that they involved separate application processes. Measuring the Success of SSA’s Outreach Efforts is Difficult
The success of SSA’s efforts is uncertain because no reliable data exist on the total number of individuals potentially eligible for the subsidy. Some of SSA’s Application Processes and Operations Lack Key Tools for Monitoring Performance
SSA has collected data and established some goals to monitor its progress in implementing and administering the subsidy benefit, but still lacks data and measurable goals in some key areas. Appeals
SSA tracks data on the total number of appeals, the reason for appeals, the time it takes to process them, the method used to resolve them, and their final disposition. SSA officials stated that since the redeterminations process is conducted within a certain period of time, it is unnecessary to track the processing time for individual redetermination decisions. SSA Has Monitored Some Aspects of the Subsidy Program’s Impact on SSA’s Workload, and Increased Funding Helped SSA Manage the Increased Workload
SSA has monitored some aspects of the increased workload and found that implementing the low-income subsidy was manageable overall, due to increased funding for its MMA startup costs. Using the $500 million appropriation for its MMA start up costs, SSA was able to initiate the Part D subsidy and sign up 2 million people for the subsidy without adversely affecting SSA’s overall operations. For some, the subsidy application is complicated, which is due in part to the low-income subsidy eligibility requirements. We are considering recommendations for SSA to work with IRS to assess the extent to which taxpayer data could help identify individuals who might qualify for the subsidy, and help improve estimates of the eligible population; and for SSA to develop a plan to guide its continuing outreach efforts and develop key management tools to measure the results of its subsidy application processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help the elderly and disabled with prescription drug costs, the Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003, which created a voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit (Medicare Part D). A key element of the prescription drug benefit is the low-income subsidy, or "extra help," available to Medicare beneficiaries with limited income and resources to assist them in paying their premiums and other out-of-pocket costs. To assess Social Security Administration's (SSA) implementation of the Medicare Part D low-income subsidy, GAO was asked to review (1) the progress that SSA has made in identifying and soliciting applications from individuals potentially eligible for the low-income subsidy, and (2) the processes that SSA uses to track its progress in administering the subsidy. This statement is drawn from GAO's ongoing study for the committee on the Medicare Part D low-income subsidy, which is expected to be published at the end of May. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed the law, assessed subsidy data, and interviewed officials from SSA, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Internal Revenue Service, state Medicaid agencies, and advocacy groups.
What GAO Found
SSA approved approximately 2.2 million Medicare beneficiaries for the low-income subsidy as of March 2007, despite barriers that limited its ability to identify individuals who were eligible for the subsidy and solicit applications from them. However, the success of SSA's outreach efforts is uncertain because there are no reliable data to identify the eligible population. SSA officials had hoped to use Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax data to identify the eligible population, but the law prohibits the use of such data unless an individual has already applied for the subsidy. Even if SSA could use the data, IRS officials question its usefulness. Instead, SSA used income records and other government data to identify 18.6 million Medicare beneficiaries who might qualify for the subsidy, which was considered an overestimate of the eligible population. SSA mailed low-income subsidy information and applications to these Medicare beneficiaries and conducted an outreach campaign of 76,000 events nationwide. However, since the initial campaign ended, SSA has not developed a comprehensive plan to distinctly identify its continuing outreach efforts apart from other agency activities. SSA's efforts were hindered by beneficiaries' confusion about the distinction between applying for the subsidy and signing up for the prescription drug benefit, and the reluctance of some potential applicants to share personal financial information, among other factors. SSA has collected data and established some goals to monitor its progress in administering the subsidy, but still lacks data and measurable goals in some key areas. While SSA tracks various subsidy application processes through its Medicare database, it has not established goals to monitor its performance for all application processes. For example, SSA tracks the time for resolving appeals and the outcomes of its initial redeterminations of subsidy eligibility, but does not measure the amount of time it takes to process individual redetermination decisions. According to SSA officials, implementing the low-income subsidy was manageable overall due to increased funding for the outreach and application processes and did not significantly affect the agency's workload and operations. GAO is considering recommendations for SSA to work with IRS to assess the extent to which taxpayer data could help identify individuals who might qualify for the subsidy, and help improve estimates of the eligible population; and for SSA to develop a plan to guide its continuing outreach efforts and develop key management tools to measure the results of its subsidy application processes. |
gao_AIMD-98-45 | gao_AIMD-98-45_0 | Objective, Scope, and Methodology
In assessing actions taken by FAA to address the Year 2000 problem, our objective was to determine the effectiveness of FAA’s Year 2000 program, including the reliability of FAA’s Year 2000 cost estimate. FAA Does Not Know the Full Extent of Its Year 2000 Problem Because It Has Not Completed Assessment Activities
FAA has not completed key assessment activities, placing it at enormous risk of not achieving Year 2000 compliance by January 1 of that year. FAA states that it expects to complete assessment phase activities by the end of January 1998. This could result in delayed flights. Delays in Completing Awareness and Assessment Leave Little Time for Critical Renovation, Validation, and Implementation Activities
Renovation, validation, and implementation activities are the three critical final phases in correcting Year 2000 vulnerabilities. However, FAA has yet to completely define the scope of its Year 2000 program. FAA acknowledges the uncertainty of its current cost estimate due to incomplete inventory and assessment information. For example, only $18 million of the $246 million is currently in the fiscal year 1998 budget. It means that FAA has no way of knowing at this time how serious its Year 2000 date software-coding problem is—or what it will cost to address it. At a minimum, the Administrator should finalize an agencywide plan which provides the Year 2000 program manager the authority to enforce Year 2000 policies and outlines FAA’s strategy for addressing the Year 2000 date change; assess how its major business lines and the aviation industry would be affected if the Year 2000 problem were not corrected in time, and use the results of this assessment to help rank the agency’s Year 2000 activities, as well as a means of obtaining and publicizing management commitment and support for necessary Year 2000 initiatives; by January 30, 1998, complete inventories of all information systems and their components, including data interfaces; by January 30, 1998, finish assessments of all systems in FAA’s inventory to determine each one’s criticality and to decide whether each system should be converted, replaced, or retired; determine priorities for system conversion and replacement based on establish plans for addressing identified date dependencies; develop validation and test plans for all converted or replaced systems; craft Year 2000 contingency plans for all business lines to ensure continuity of critical operations; and make a reliable cost estimate based on a comprehensive inventory and completed assessments of the various systems’ criticality and handling needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effectiveness of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) year 2000 program, including the reliability of its year 2000 cost estimate.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA's progress in making its systems ready for the year 2000 has been too slow; (2) at its current pace, it will not make it in time; (3) the agency has been severely behind schedule in completing basic awareness activities, a critical first phase in an effective year 2000 program; (4) for example, FAA appointed its initial program manager with responsibility for the year 2000 only 6 months ago, and its overall year 2000 strategy is not yet final; (5) FAA also does not know the extent of its year 2000 problem because it has not completed most key assessment phase activities, the second critical phase in an effective year 2000 program; (6) it has yet to analyze the impact of systems' not being year 2000 date compliant, inventory and assess all of its systems for date dependencies, develop plans for addressing identified date dependencies, or develop plans for continuing operations in case systems are not corrected in time; (7) FAA currently estimates it will complete its assessment activities by the end of January 1998; (8) until these activities are completed, FAA cannot know the extent to which it can trust its systems to operate safely after 1999; (9) the potential serious consequences include degraded safety, grounded or delayed flights, increased airline costs, and customer inconvenience; (10) delays in completing awareness and assessment activities also leave FAA little time for critical renovation, validation, and implementation activities--the final three phases in an effective year 2000 program; (11) with 2 years left, FAA is quickly running out of time, making contingency planning for continuity of operations even more critical; (12) FAA's inventory and assessment actions will define the scope and magnitude of its year 2000 problem; since they are incomplete, FAA lacks the information it needs to develop reliable year 2000 cost estimates; and (13) FAA's year 2000 project manager currently estimates that the entire program will cost $246 million based on early estimates from managers throughout the agency. |
gao_GAO-04-598T | gao_GAO-04-598T_0 | Background
Passenger and freight rail services help move people and goods through the transportation system, which helps the economic well-being of the United States. Some security challenges are common to passenger and freight rail systems; others are unique to the type of rail system. Common challenges include the funding of security improvements, the interconnectivity of the rail system, and the number of stakeholders involved in rail security. The unique challenges include the openness of mass transit systems and the transport of hazardous materials by freight railroads. Passenger and Freight Rail Systems Also Face Unique Challenges
In addition to the common security challenges that face both passenger and rail systems, there are some challenges that are unique to the type of rail system. The size and diversity of the freight rail system make it difficult to adequately secure. 2.). Rail Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Improve Security
Since September 11, passenger and freight rail providers have been working to strengthen security. Although security was a priority before September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of transportation security for passenger and rail providers. According to representatives from the Association of American Railroads, Amtrak, and transit agencies, passenger and freight rail providers have implemented new security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities, including: Conducted vulnerability or risk assessments: Many passenger and freight rail providers conducted assessments of their systems to identify potential vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure or assets, and corrective actions or needed security improvements. The federal government has also acted to enhance rail security. In the wake of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. 1.). Risk Management and Coordination Key to Enhancing Security
Although steps have been taken to enhance passenger and freight security since September 11, the recent terrorist attack on a rail system in Spain naturally focuses our attention on what more could be done to secure the nation’s rail systems. We have advocated using a risk management approach to guide federal programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of highest priority. In particular, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets notes that protecting critical infrastructure, such as the transportation system, “requires a unifying organization, a clear purpose, a common understanding of roles and responsibilities, accountability, and a set of well-understood coordinating processes.”
We reported in June 2003 that the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security, including rail security, have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities work to enhance security. Passenger and freight rail stakeholders have acted to enhance security, but more work is needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Passenger and freight rail services are important links in the nation's transportation system. Terrorist attacks on passenger and/or freight rail services have the potential to cause widespread injury, loss of life, and economic disruption. The recent terrorist attack in Spain illustrates that rail systems, like all modes of transportation, are targets for attacks. GAO was asked to summarize the results of its recent reports on transportation security that examined (1) challenges in securing passenger and freight rail systems, (2) actions rail stakeholders have taken to enhance passenger and freight rail systems, and (3) future actions that could further enhance rail security.
What GAO Found
Securing the passenger and freight rail systems are fraught with challenges. Some of these challenges are common to passenger and freight rail systems, such as the funding of security improvements, the interconnectivity of the rail system, and the number of stakeholders involved in rail security. Other challenges are unique to the type of rail system. For example, the open access and high ridership of mass transit systems make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. Similarly, freight railroads transport millions of tons of hazardous materials each year across the United States, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these shipments to terrorist attack. Passenger and freight rail stakeholders have taken a number of steps to improve the security of the nation's rail system since September 11, 2001. Although security received attention before September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of transportation security for passenger and rail providers. Consequently, passenger and freight rail providers have implemented new security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities, including performing risk assessments, conducting emergency drills, and developing security plans. The federal government has also acted to enhance rail security. For example, the Federal Transit Administration has provided grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the largest transit agencies, among other things. Implementation of risk management principles and improved coordination could help enhance rail security. Using risk management principles can help guide federal programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of highest priority. In addition, improved coordination among federal entities could help enhance security efforts across all modes, including passenger and freight rail systems. We reported in June 2003 that the roles and responsibilities of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) in transportation security, including rail security, have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities work to enhance security. |
gao_GAO-15-401 | gao_GAO-15-401_0 | Background
Timeline and Goal of Pioneer ACO Model
The Pioneer ACO Model’s overall goal is to improve the delivery of Medicare services by reducing expenditures while preserving or enhancing the quality of care for patients. CMS designed the model for organizations with experience in providing coordinated care to beneficiaries at a lower cost to Medicare. Quality performance standards. ACOs must also meet performance standards for quality. CMS’s Oversight and Evaluation Responsibilities
CMS’s oversight and evaluation responsibilities are broadly defined in the contract between CMS and the Pioneer ACOs and in regulation. Under this provision, CMS is responsible for evaluating models to test innovative payment and service delivery, such as the Pioneer ACO Model. CMS calculates a dollar amount for each ACO’s final annual payment if the ACO generates shared savings or losses. 1.) Fewer Than Half of Pioneer ACOs Earned Shared Savings in First and Second Years, and the Pioneer ACO Model Produced Net Shared Savings
Fewer than half of the ACOs that participated in the Pioneer ACO Model in 2012 and 2013—the first two years of the model—earned savings that were shared with CMS. Of the 23 ACOs that participated in 2013, 11 (48 percent) produced about $121 million in total shared savings. The amount of shared savings that the 13 ACOs produced in 2012 ($139 million) and the amount the 11 ACOs produced in 2013 ($121 million) each represent about 4 percent of the total expenditures for the ACOs that produced shared savings in each year. For example, in 2012, CMS paid 13 ACOs $77 million of the $139 million that they produced in shared savings. ACOs Had Significantly Higher Quality Scores in the Second Year for Two- Thirds of the Quality Measures
The 23 ACOs that participated in the Pioneer ACO Model in both 2012 and 2013 had significantly higher quality scores in the second year than in the first year for two-thirds of the quality measures (22 of the 33, or 67 percent) that they reported to CMS. CMS Oversees Beneficiary Service Use and Quality, and Has Reported Some of Its Evaluation Findings Publicly
CMS oversees Pioneer ACOs by monitoring the service use of their aligned beneficiaries and the quality of care provided by the ACOs, and by investigating provider and beneficiary complaints about ACOs. As provided for by law, CMS has reported its evaluation findings publicly for the first year of the Pioneer ACO Model in 2013, and these findings addressed two of the eight research areas that CMS established for the evaluation. As of February 2015, CMS officials indicated that they had examined two reports about potentially discrepant trends in beneficiaries’ use of services. CMS also oversees Pioneer ACOs by monitoring their compliance with the model’s quality performance standards, consistent with the contract between CMS and the ACOs and CMS regulation. CMS determined that one ACO did not meet the quality performance standards in the second year of the model, because it did not meet the minimum standard in the care coordination and patient safety domain. As a result, CMS required the ACO to submit a corrective action plan to CMS. Based on its monitoring efforts, CMS has no substantiated evidence suggesting that beneficiary care has been compromised, as of February 2015. CMS Has Reported Evaluation Findings Publicly for the Pioneer ACO Model on Medicare Service Use and Expenditures and ACO Characteristics
As provided for by law, CMS has reported its evaluation findings publicly for the first year of the Pioneer ACO Model. In 2015, CMS also plans to report additional findings for the first year of the model. Agency Comments
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reviewed a draft of this report and provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Quality Scores for Pioneer Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) in 2012 and 2013
This appendix presents information on the distribution of scores for the 33 quality measures that 23 Pioneer ACOs reported to CMS in 2012 and 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
ACOs were established in Medicare to provide incentives to physicians and other health care providers to better coordinate care for beneficiaries across care settings such as doctors' offices, hospitals, and skilled nursing facilities. The Pioneer ACO Model was established as a result of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 creating CMMI in CMS to test new models of service delivery in Medicare. Thirty-two ACOs joined the model in 2012, the first year. Under the model, CMS rewards ACOs that lower their growth in health care spending while meeting performance standards for quality of care.
GAO was asked to review the results of the Pioneer ACO Model and CMS's oversight of the ACOs. In this report GAO (1) describes the financial and quality results for the first two years of the model and (2) examines how CMS oversees and evaluates the model.
To do this work, GAO analyzed data from CMS on the financial and quality results for each ACO for 2012 and 2013 (the first two years of the model). GAO analyzed ACOs' expenditures, spending benchmarks, the amount of shared savings and losses, and payment amounts for shared savings or losses. GAO also reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and documents describing CMS's oversight and evaluation role and interviewed CMS officials about the agency's oversight and evaluation activities.
What GAO Found
Health care providers and suppliers voluntarily form accountable care organizations (ACO) to provide coordinated care to patients with the goal of reducing spending while improving quality. Within the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) began testing the Pioneer ACO Model in 2012. Under this model, ACOs can earn additional Medicare payments if they generate savings, which are shared with CMS, but must pay CMS a penalty if their spending is higher than expected. ACOs must report quality data to CMS annually and meet quality performance standards.
GAO found that fewer than half of the ACOs earned shared savings in 2012 and in 2013, although overall the Pioneer ACO Model produced net shared savings in each year. Specifically,
Forty-one percent of the ACOs produced $139 million in total shared savings in 2012, and 48 percent produced $121 million in total shared savings in 2013.
In 2012 and 2013 CMS paid ACOs $77 million and $68 million, respectively, for their shared savings.
The Pioneer ACO Model produced net shared savings of $134 million in 2012 and $99 million in 2013.
GAO also found that ACOs that participated in both years had significantly higher quality scores in 2013 than in 2012 for 67 percent of the quality measures.
CMS oversees the use of Medicare services by beneficiaries receiving their care from ACOs and the quality of care that ACOs provide, consistent with the contract between CMS and ACOs and CMS regulation, and has reported publicly on findings from its evaluation of the model. CMS reviews reports on each ACO's service use, expenditures, and quality performance and investigates complaints about ACOs. As of February 2015, CMS officials said the agency had investigated two potentially discrepant trends in service use. CMS determined that one ACO did not meet the quality performance standards in 2013, and, as a result, CMS is requiring it to implement an action plan to ensure future compliance. Based on its monitoring efforts, CMS has no substantiated evidence suggesting that beneficiary care has been compromised, as of February 2015. CMS reported publicly on its evaluation findings, as provided for by law, in 2013. CMS included in this initial report findings related to Medicare service use and expenditures and ACO characteristics—two of the eight research areas that it established for the evaluation. CMS officials told GAO that the agency has shared preliminary findings within CMS for five of the six remaining areas and that it plans to report publicly on additional findings in 2015.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) emphasized the overall goal of the Pioneer ACO Model. HHS also provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_NSIAD-99-50 | gao_NSIAD-99-50_0 | In addition, DOD is developing ballistic missile defense systems that will use laser beams to destroy enemy missiles. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Ranking Minority Member, Committee on the Budget, and the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, asked us to review DOD's programs to develop laser weapons for missile defense to identify what laser weapons are being considered for missile defense and the coordination among the program offices developing the systems, determine the current status and cost of each system, and identify the technical challenges each system faces as determined by DOD program managers and analysts and other laser system experts. Additionally, in a joint effort with Israel, DOD is developing the THEL, which is to be used by Israel to defend against short-range rockets. Figure 2.1 shows the ABL concept. SBL Program
The SBL, jointly funded by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and the Air Force and managed by the Air Force, is to be capable of detecting a missile in its boost phase, tracking the missile’s path, and holding a concentrated laser beam on the missile until the beam’s heat causes the missile to be destroyed. THEL Program
The THEL, funded jointly with Israel and managed by the U.S. Army, is a ground-based laser weapon that is to be used to destroy short-range rockets toward the end of their flights. Airborne Laser: Status, Cost, and Technical Challenges
The ABL program is currently in the program definition and risk reduction (PDRR) acquisition phase. The Air Force estimates the life-cycle cost of the ABL at about $11 billion. Initial operational capability of three ABLs is scheduled for 2007; full operational capability of seven ABLs is scheduled for 2009. This schedule reflects a 1-year slip in the original PDRR schedule. Because of the complexity of the system integration task, some experts both inside and outside of DOD have noted that the planned flight testing schedule for the program is too dependent on successful tests and does not allow enough time and resources to deal with potential test failures and to prove the ABL concept. We agree with DOD’s assessment and future plans for the ABL program. Space-Based Laser: Status, Cost, and Technical Challenges
The SBL program is about a year into a $30-million study phase to define concepts for the design, development, and deployment of an SBL proof of concept demonstrator. According to SBL program officials, the weight and size constraints dictated by the size and weight limitations of existing and planned launch vehicles force the program to push the state of the art in areas such as laser efficiency, laser brightness, and deployable optics. DOD officials told us that the design, development, and deployment of an SBL readiness demonstrator would cost about $3 billion. Conclusions
The future of the SBL program is unknown at this time. Tactical High Energy Laser: Status, Cost, and Technical Challenges
The THEL is about 34 months into its $131.5 million 38-month development program. However, the shoot-down testing has been delayed 7 months due to administrative issues and technical problems with the laser and the pointer tracker. Technical Challenges Facing the THEL Program
THEL's components have been produced. However, initial testing of the laser has identified problems with the operation of chemical flow control valves and with the low-power laser that is to be used in tracking the short-range rockets. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) programs to develop laser weapons for missile defense, focusing on: (1) what laser weapons are being considered for missile defense and the coordination among the program offices developing the systems; (2) the status and cost of each system; and (3) the technical challenges each system faces as determined by DOD program managers and analysts and other laser system experts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD is developing two laser weapons--the Airborne Laser (ABL) and the Space-Based Laser (SBL)--which U.S. forces intend to use to destroy enemy ballistic missiles; (2) in a joint effort with Israel, DOD is developing a ground-based laser weapon, the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL), which Israel will use to defend its northern cities against short-range rockets; (3) ABL is funded and managed by the Air Force, SBL is jointly funded by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Air Force, and THEL is funded jointly with Israel and managed by the Army; (4) ABL, SBL, and THEL are in varying stages of development ranging from conceptual design studies to integration and testing of system components; (5) the ABL program is in the program definition and risk reduction acquisition phase and is scheduled for full operational capability in 2009, with a total of seven ABLs; (6) this schedule reflects a 1-year delay from the original schedule; (7) the Air Force estimates the life-cycle cost of the ABL to be about $11 billion; (8) the SBL program is about a year into a $30-million study phase to define concepts for the design, development, and deployment of a proof of concept demonstrator; (9) DOD estimates that it will cost about $3 billion to develop and deploy the demonstrator; (10) the future of the SBL program is unknown, pending the outcome of a DOD assessment of the program; (11) the $131.5-million THEL Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program is about 34 months into a 38-month program; (12) system components have been built, but system testing has been delayed from December 1998 to July 1999 due to administrative and technical problems; (13) laser experts agree that the ABL, SBL, and THEL face significant technical challenges; (14) the technical complexity of the ABL program has caused laser experts to conclude that the ABL planned flight test schedule is compressed and too dependent on the assumption that tests will be successful and therefore does not allow enough time and resources to deal with potential test failures and to prove the ABL concept; (15) if DOD ultimately decides to continue the SBL program, the size and weight limitations dictated by current and future launch capabilities will force the program to push the state of the art in laser efficiency, laser power, and deployable optics; and (16) initial testing of THEL's laser has identified problems with the operation of chemical flow control valves and with the low-power laser that is to be used in tracking short-range rockets the system is being designed to defeat. |
gao_GAO-14-127 | gao_GAO-14-127_0 | Subsidized Premium Rates
NFIP policies have what FEMA describes as either subsidized or full-risk premiums. Third, private insurers would need adequate consumer participation in order to manage and diversify their risk. NFIP was created in part because the catastrophic nature of flooding made it difficult for private insurance companies to develop an actuarial rate structure that could adequately reflect the risks to flood-prone properties. Private Insurers Would Need Freedom to Charge Adequate Rates and Manage Risk
Stakeholders said that private insurers would also need to be able to charge adequate rates that would reflect the full estimated risk of flood loss and allow for profit. For example, stakeholders said that state by state approval of flood insurance rates might impede insurers’ ability to obtain adequate rates. Based on our analysis of stakeholder views and other information, many property owners may also have an inaccurate perception of their risk of flooding and thus do not buy flood insurance. Several Strategies Could Encourage Private Sector Involvement, but a Governmental Role Would Likely Be Required
Stakeholders with whom we spoke or who participated in our roundtable discussion identified several strategies that could be used to help transfer some of the responsibility of providing flood insurance from the federal government to the private sector. Several Strategies Could Help Create Conditions for Private Sector Involvement
One strategy stakeholders identified, which we have also mentioned in previous reports, would be for Congress to eliminate subsidized rates, charge full-risk rates to all policyholders, and appropriate funding for a direct means-based subsidy to some policyholders. A second strategy that stakeholders identified would be for the federal government to provide only residual insurance, serving as the insurer of last resort for properties that the private sector is unwilling to insure. Finally, charging full-risk rates to all policyholders would demonstrate a property’s actual flood risk to property owners, discourage further development in high-risk areas, and encourage property owners to invest in mitigation to lower their exposure to flood risk as well as their premium rate. To address private sector concerns about being able to accurately set rates, FEMA could grant private insurers access to historical claims data. Further, because these residual policies would have the highest risk, they would require high premium rates to cover their full risk of loss, potentially reducing consumer participation. Some stakeholders said that the private reinsurance industry might be able to provide some reinsurance to private insurers, reducing the federal government’s potential role in reinsurance. However, the costs of these reinsurance premiums would likely be passed onto the policyholder, and the resulting higher rates could reduce consumer participation. Mandatory coverage. Other stakeholders discussed NFIP purchasing reinsurance from the private sector to cover exposure to catastrophic losses rather than relying on borrowing from Treasury. Catastrophe bonds. As the private sector increases its role in providing flood coverage, various government entities could collaborate on other important roles. Delaying or repealing rate increases in the Biggert-Waters Act may address affordability concerns but would likely continue to increase NFIP’s long-term burden on taxpayers. As we have suggested previously, Congress could eliminate subsidized rates, charge full-risk rates to all policyholders, and appropriate funds for a direct means-based subsidy to eligible policyholders. The movement to full-risk rates would encourage private sector participation, and the explicit subsidy would address affordability concerns, raise awareness of the risks associated with living in harm’s way, and decrease costs to taxpayers, depending on the extent and amount of the subsidy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act) mandated that GAO conduct a number of studies, including this study on assessing a broad range of options, methods, and strategies for privatizing the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). This report discusses (1) conditions needed for private sector involvement in flood insurance and (2) strategies for increasing it. The roundtable discussion focused on four broad themes that included: a policy goals framework for evaluating options for increasing private sector involvement in flood insurance, barriers to private sector involvement that would need to be options for private sector involvement and associated benefits and challenges, and the governmental role that would remain in a private flood insurance market. | Why GAO Did This Study
NFIP has accrued $24 billion in debt, highlighting structural weaknesses in the program and increasing concerns about its burden on taxpayers. As a result, some have suggested shifting exposure to the private sector and eliminating subsidized premium rates, so individual property owners--not taxpayers--would pay for their risk of flood loss. NFIP was created, in part, because private insurers were unwilling to insure against flood damage, but new technologies and a better understanding of flood risks may have increased their willingness to offer flood coverage.
The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 moves NFIP toward charging more full-risk rates. It also mandates that GAO conduct a study on increasing private sector involvement in flood insurance. This report addresses (1) the conditions needed for private sector involvement in flood insurance and (2) strategies for increasing private sector involvement. To do this work, GAO reviewed available documentation and hosted a roundtable in August 2013 that included stakeholders from FEMA, the insurance and reinsurance industries, and state insurance regulators, among others. GAO also interviewed other similar stakeholders.
What GAO Found
According to stakeholders with whom GAO spoke, several conditions must be present to increase private sector involvement in the sale of flood insurance. First, insurers need to be able to accurately assess risk to determine premium rates. For example, stakeholders told GAO that access to National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policy and claims data and upcoming improvements in private sector computer modeling could enable them to better assess risk. Second, insurers need to be able to charge premium rates that reflect the full estimated risk of potential flood losses while still allowing the companies to make a profit, as well as be able to decide which applicants they will insure. However, stakeholders said that such rates might seem unaffordable to many homeowners. Third, insurers need sufficient consumer participation to properly manage and diversify their risk, but stakeholders said that many property owners do not buy flood insurance because they may have an inaccurate perception of their risk of flooding.
Stakeholders identified several strategies that could help create conditions that would promote the sale of flood insurance by the private sector. For example,
NFIP charging full-risk rates . Congress could eliminate subsidized rates, charge all policyholders full-risk rates, and appropriate funding for a direct means-based subsidy to some policyholders. Stakeholders said full-risk NFIP rates would encourage private sector participation because they would be much closer to the rates private insurers would need to charge. The explicit subsidy would address affordability concerns, increase transparency, and reduce taxpayer costs depending on the extent and amount of the subsidy. The Biggert-Waters Act eliminates some subsidized rates, but some have proposed delaying these rate increases. Doing so could address affordability concerns, but would also delay addressing NFIP's burden on taxpayers.
NFIP providing residual insurance . The federal government could also encourage private sector involvement by providing coverage for the highest-risk properties that the private sector is unwilling to insure. Providing residual coverage could increase the program's exposure relative to the number of properties it insured, but NFIP would be insuring fewer properties, and charging adequate rates could reduce taxpayer costs.
NFIP as reinsurer . Alternatively, the federal government could serve as a reinsurer, charging a premium for assuming the risk of catastrophic losses. However, the cost of reinsurance premiums would likely be passed on to consumers, with higher rates potentially decreasing consumer participation.
Stakeholders identified other strategies including mandatory coverage requirements to ensure broad participation, NFIP purchasing reinsurance from the private sector rather than borrowing from the U.S. Treasury, and NFIP issuing catastrophe bonds to transfer risk to private investors. As the private sector increases its role in providing flood coverage, the federal government could collaborate with state and local governments to focus on other important roles, including promoting risk awareness among consumers, encouraging mitigation, enforcing building codes, overseeing land use agreements, and streamlining insurance regulations.
What GAO Recommends
While GAO makes no new recommendations in this report, GAO reiterates its previous suggestion from a June 2011 report ( GAO-11-297 ) that Congress consider eliminating subsidized rates, charge full-risk rates to all policyholders, and appropriate funds for premium assistance to eligible policyholders to address affordability issues. |
gao_GAO-11-489 | gao_GAO-11-489_0 | As a result, community banks shifted their focus to CRE lending. 2). The regulators, for example, issued guidance to banks on managing CRE concentration risks, conducted training on CRE treatment, and conducted internal reviews to better ensure examiner compliance with CRE guidance. Even with the training and reviews, a number of bank officials we interviewed stated that regulators have applied guidance rigidly since the financial crisis and have been too harsh in classifying loans and improperly applying the 2006 CRE guidance, among other issues. In addition to the 2009 CRE loan workout guidance, the regulators issued statements on lending to creditworthy borrowers and creditworthy small business borrowers to encourage prudent lending among banks and balanced supervision among examiners. Some of these reviews identified inconsistencies or other needed improvements related to examiner treatment of CRE loans. Based on this information, regulatory officials from FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and OCC believe that the 2009 CRE loan workout guidance has been helpful. Regulators Have Incorporated Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis into Supervision, Which May Explain Some Bank Officials’ Experiences of Increased Scrutiny
Regulators have been incorporating into their regulatory processes a number of lessons learned from the financial crisis, including findings from the agencies’ IGs. Regulatory Officials’ Differing Views on the Adequacy of the 2006 CRE Concentration Guidance Could Lead to Inconsistent Treatment of CRE Loans
Senior officials and field examiners have differing views on whether the 2006 CRE guidance is sufficient in addressing CRE concentration risks. However, increases in capital requirements can raise the cost of providing loans, which would lead to higher interest rates for borrowers, tighter credit terms, or reduced lending. Although limited research exists on the impact of CRE loan concentrations on a bank’s ability to lend, an existing study shows that high CRE concentrations can limit loan growth during economic downturns. Many factors can affect a bank’s decision to lend, including regulatory requirements. Although isolating the impact of bank supervision is difficult, the recent severe cycle of credit upswings followed by the downturn serves as a useful reminder of the supervisory balance needed to help ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system and support economic recovery. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve supervision of CRE-related risks, we recommend that the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Comptroller of the Currency: Enhance and either re-issue or supplement interagency CRE concentration guidance—based on agreed-upon standards by FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and OCC—to provide greater clarity and more examples to help banks comply with CRE concentration and risk-management requirements and help examiners ensure consistency in their application of the guidance, especially related to reductions in CRE concentrations and calculation of CRE concentrations. As noted in our report, the federal banking regulators all have numerous controls to help ensure examination consistency, such as training and internal reviews that FDIC highlights in its letter. As our report notes, additional capital provides an important cushion against losses, though this comes at a cost. We conducted similar analyses for commercial banks with assets more than $1 billion. To determine how the banking regulators responded to trends in the CRE market, we interviewed regulatory and bank officials and reviewed reports of examination (ROE) from a sample of banks. To obtain information on how examiner practices may affect lending, we interviewed bankers, examiners, and regulatory officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, commercial real estate (CRE) loan delinquencies have more than doubled. The federal banking regulators have issued statements and guidance encouraging banks to continue lending to creditworthy borrowers and explaining how banks can work with troubled borrowers. However, some banks have stated that examiners' treatment of CRE loans has hampered their ability to lend. This report examines, among other issues, (1) how the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) responded to trends in CRE markets and the controls they have for helping ensure consistent application of guidance and (2) the relationships between bank supervision practices and lending. GAO reviewed agency guidance, examination review procedures, reports of examination, and relevant literature and interviewed agency officials, examiners, bank officials, and academics..
What GAO Found
Aware of the potential risks of growing CRE concentrations at community banks, federal banking regulators issued guidance on loan concentrations and risk management in 2006 and augmented it with guidance and statements on meeting credit needs and conducting CRE loan workouts from 2008 to 2010. The regulators also conducted training on CRE treatment for examiners and internal reviews to help ensure compliance with CRE guidance. Nevertheless, a number of banks reported that examiners have been applying guidance more stringently since the financial crisis and believe that they have been too harsh in treatment of CRE loans. Regulators have incorporated lessons learned from the crisis into their supervision approach, which may help explain banks' experiences of increased scrutiny. GAO found that examiners generally provided support for exam findings on loan workouts, but identified some inconsistencies in applying the 2006 CRE concentration guidance-- which is similar to what some of the regulators uncovered in their internal reviews. Moreover, regulatory officials had varying views on the adequacy of the 2006 guidance, and some examiners and bankers noted that the guidance lacked clarity on how to comply with it. As a result, examiners and bankers may not have a common understanding about CRE concentration risks. Although many factors influence banks' lending decisions, research shows that the capital banks hold is a key factor. Capital provides an important cushion against losses, but if a bank needs to increase it, the cost of raising capital can raise the cost of providing loans. High CRE concentrations also can limit a bank's ability to lend because the bank may need to raise capital to mitigate the concentration risk during a downturn. Economic research on the effect of regulators' examination practices on banks' lending decisions is limited, but shows that examiners' increased scrutiny during credit downturns can have a small impact on overall lending. Although isolating these impacts is difficult, the recent severe cycle of credit upswings followed by the downturn provides a useful reminder of the balance needed in bank supervision to help ensure the banking system can support economic recovery. Federal banking regulators should enhance or supplement the 2006 CRE concentration guidance and take steps to better ensure that such guidance is consistently applied. The Federal Reserve and OCC agreed with the recommendations. FDIC said that it had implemented strategies to supplement the 2006 guidance. |
gao_GAO-06-161 | gao_GAO-06-161_0 | Seven Agencies Use Different Methodologies to Estimate How Much of the Budget Supports Combating Terrorism Activities
The seven agencies we contacted use different methods to estimate the portion of their authorized funding that supports combating terrorism activities. Because these methodologies involve estimations, some level of professional judgment is inherent throughout the process. Agencies in our review manage the process of estimating funding levels for combating terrorism activities through OMB oversight and supervisory review. OMB staff said that they currently do not review agency estimates of funding data for overseas combating terrorism activities because OMB is no longer required to report on overseas combating terrorism funding data. As a result, Congress does not receive reports on both the homeland security and overseas combating terrorism portions of combating terrorism funding. In our 2002 report, we recommended that OMB require agencies to provide information on obligations in the database used by OMB to produce the President’s annual budget request—and that OMB should include obligations as reported in this database in its annual report on combating terrorism. Without including obligation data in the Analytical Perspectives, along with funding levels authorized by Congress for agencies’ homeland security activities, it is difficult for decision makers to know (1) how much funding from prior years is still available to potentially reduce new spending requests, (2) whether the rate of spending for a program is slower than anticipated, or (3) what the level of effort (i.e., size of the program) is for a particular year as well as for a program over time. OMB staff continue to cite the effort required to produce such data. Similarly, implementation of our 2002 recommendation that OMB direct relevant departments to develop or enhance combating terrorism performance goals and measures and include such measures in the governmentwide plan would assist in determining whether funding increases have improved performance results. Although three of the seven agencies in our review told us that OMB did not direct them to develop performance measures for combating terrorism, OMB staff said that they are working with agencies on the development of combating terrorism performance measures at the agency level, primarily with DHS. However, OMB staff said that they have not yet established a timeline for developing such measures. Implementation of our 2002 recommendation to include national-level and federal governmentwide combating terrorism performance measures as a supplement to existing strategies and their future revisions would help to assess and improve preparedness at the federal and national levels. Moreover, there have been no supplements or revisions to the existing national strategies that include federal governmentwide or national-level combating terrorism performance goals and measures. A portion of these activities are considered related to counterterrorism investigations. Appendix VII: Status of 2002 Recommendations Related to Duplication of Effort and Timely Reporting of Funding Data
This appendix discusses the status of recommendations made in our 2002 report for the Office of Management and Budget to (1) include an analysis of duplication of effort related to combating terrorism activities in its annual reporting of funding data associated with such activities and (2) report this information in a timely manner to support congressional budget decisions. GAO-03-170. | Why GAO Did This Study
The President's annual budget reports on federal funding dedicated to combating terrorism activities. Identification of such funding is inherently difficult because a significant portion of combating terrorism funding is embedded within appropriation accounts that include funding for other activities as well. In 2002, GAO reported on the difficulties that the executive branch faced in reporting funding for combating terrorism to Congress (see GAO-03-170). This report updates the information contained in the 2002 report by providing information on (1) the methods agencies use to determine the portion of their annual appropriations related to combating terrorism, and (2) the status of recommendations from GAO's 2002 report.
What GAO Found
Seven of 34 agencies that reported receiving funding related to combating terrorism activities to OMB used different methodologies to estimate the portion of their authorized funding that supports such activities. These 7 agencies account for about 90 percent of the total fiscal year 2006 budget request that the 34 agencies estimate relate to combating terrorism. All of these methods involve some level of professional judgment. Agencies stated this process is managed through OMB oversight and supervisory review. OMB staff said they do not review the overseas component of combating terrorism funding data since they are no longer required to report it. As a result, Congress does not receive OMB-reviewed data on the entirety of counterterrorism funding. Three recommendations from GAO's 2002 report have not been implemented. The first recommendation requests that OMB include agencies' obligation data in its annual reporting of funding data on combating terrorism. OMB staff continue to cite the effort required to produce such data but said they might consider reporting obligation information for a targeted set of accounts. Without obligation data, it is difficult for Congress to know (1) how much funding from prior years is still available to potentially reduce new spending requests, (2) whether the rate of spending for a program is slower than anticipated, or (3) what the size of the program is for a particular year and over time. The second recommendation was for OMB to direct relevant departments to develop or enhance combating terrorism performance goals and measures and include such measures in the governmentwide plan. Three of the seven agencies told us that OMB had not directed them to develop performance measures or enhance such measures for combating terrorism activities. However, four of the seven agencies had developed such measures. OMB staff said they are working with agencies to improve performance measurement of government programs related to combating terrorism. The development of such measures would assist Congress in determining whether funding increases have improved performance results. The third recommendation calls for the inclusion of national-level and federal governmentwide combating terrorism performance measures in supplements to existing strategies and their future revisions. There have been no supplements or revisions to the existing strategies that include governmentwide or national-level combating terrorism measures. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-239 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-239_0 | Mexican drug-trafficking organizations have complete control over the production and distribution of methamphetamine. Mexico’s efforts to stop the flow of drugs have been limited by numerous problems. In November 1993, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 14, which changed the focus of the U.S. international drug control strategy from interdicting cocaine as it moved through the transit zone of the Caribbean and Mexico to stopping cocaine in the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. In Mexico, U.S. assistance and DEA activities have focused primarily on interdicting aircraft as they deliver their illicit drug cargoes. In April 1996 the United States and Mexico signed an agreement that will facilitate the transfer of military equipment and, shortly thereafter, the United States announced its intention to transfer a number of helicopters and spare parts to the Mexican government. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the results of its review of counternarcotics efforts in Mexico.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) U.S. and Mexican interdiction efforts have had little impact on the flow of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States; (2) instead of concentrating on intercepting drugs as they move through the transit zone, the United States has focused its interdiction efforts on stopping cocaine production in South America; (3) Mexico's efforts to stop the flow of drugs have been limited by widespread political corruption, lack of legislative tools to combat drug trafficking organizations, and poorly maintained aircraft; (4) U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics programs have declined over the past few years; and (5) the United States and Mexico signed an agreement in April 1996 to facilitate the transfer of military equipment to enhance counternarcotics efforts in Mexico. |
gao_GAO-02-70 | gao_GAO-02-70_0 | However, local conditions limited the effectiveness of 9 of the 13 programs. We found that programs designed for the United States faced a variety of problems because of geographic, economic, and social conditions in the FSM and the RMI. Most Programs Have Accountability Problems
We found that the FSM and the RMI’s administration of most of the 13 programs we reviewed did not ensure accountability. Nine of the programs had poor accountability, and five of the nine had instances of theft, fraud, or misuse of federal funds. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and to the secretaries of the Departments of the Interior, State, Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Health and Human Services, and Labor, as well as to the administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Postmaster General, and the presidents of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has extended to Micronesia and the Marshall Islands a number of domestic programs in such critical areas as health care, education, job training, and telecommunications.
What GAO Found
GAO found that geographic, economic, and social conditions in both countries have limited the effectiveness of nine of the 13 programs, which were originally designed for the United States. Nine of the 13 programs experienced accountability problems, including theft or misuse of program funds. The two island nations lacked the administrative skills to meet the federal government's complex accountability requirements, and federal managers did not provide the necessary training. Although some federal agencies tried to provide oversight, their efforts at ensuring accountability fell short because of several factors, including time, distance, and travel costs and the relatively small size of the programs in the region. |
gao_RCED-96-184 | gao_RCED-96-184_0 | We also found that DOE did not have a comprehensive needs assessment for ranking and funding technology development projects as effectively as possible. As a result, no comprehensive list of EM’s technology development projects had been compiled. At our request, OST compiled a comprehensive list of all DOE-funded melter projects. This list revealed that DOE had contributed funds for 60 different melters at various sites across the country and fully funded 52 of them. Within each focus area, the funding for projects has begun to be concentrated at the lead sites. The Tanks focus area used an elaborate system of technical review, but many of the reviewers were not independent. A senior technical adviser in the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Waste Management commented on our statement that, despite the promising steps taken to improve the management of technology development, it is not clear that OST can effectively coordinate technology development across EM’s program offices without EM’s leadership and support. According to the Office of Waste Management, EM has given OST leadership and support to coordinate technology development. Specifically, we determined whether EM is managing its program to prevent (1) excessive duplication and unnecessary overlap and (2) an unwarranted concentration of projects at certain field offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined how the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is managing its technology development program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) EM has not coordinated its technology development activities among its program offices; (2) there is no comprehensive listing of EM technology development projects; (3) several DOE offices have funded 60 different melter projects at various locations; (4) there is a significant increase in technology development projects at certain field sites designated as lead sites for particular focus areas; (5) DOE does not use independent reviewers to ensure that project proposals receive equal treatment; (6) DOE has scheduled a comprehensive review of all technology development projects, combined two focus areas into one, and begun closing out melter projects to reduce duplication and overlap; and (7) DOE can not coordinate technology development projects without EM leadership and support. |
gao_GAO-04-996T | gao_GAO-04-996T_0 | In fiscal year 2003, VA estimated that about 157,000 veterans were legally blind, with more than 60 percent age 75 or older. About 44,000 legally blind veterans were enrolled in VA health care. 1.) Blind Rehabilitation Outpatient Services Are Available in Few VA Locations
VA offers three types of blind rehabilitation outpatient services to legally blind veterans, but these services are available in few VA locations. The three types of services include Visual Impairment Services Outpatient Rehabilitation (VISOR), Visual Impairment Center to Optimize Remaining Sight (VICTORS), and Blind Rehabilitation Outpatient Specialists (BROS). The services range from short-term outpatient programs provided in VA facilities to home-based services. Outpatient Services Provide Opportunities to Benefit Veterans
VA officials who provide services to legally blind veterans told us that some veterans could benefit from increased access to outpatient blind rehabilitation services. We obtained this information by asking VA to review all of the veterans who, as of March 31, 2004, were on the waiting lists for admission to the five BRCs we visited and to determine whether outpatient services could meet their needs. VA officials reported that 315 out of 1,501 of these veterans, or 21 percent, could potentially be better served through access to outpatient blind rehabilitation services, if such services were available. In 1999, VA convened a Blind Rehabilitation Gold Ribbon Panel to study concerns about the growing number of legally blind veterans. Factors that Affect Expansion of Blind Rehabilitation Outpatient Services
There are two factors that affect VA’s expansion of outpatient services systemwide. One factor is the agency’s long-standing belief that rehabilitation training for legally blind veterans can be best provided in a comprehensive inpatient setting. The second reported factor is VA’s method of allocating funds for blind rehabilitation outpatient services, which provides local medical center management discretion to provide funds for them. Currently, the VIAB is working with VA’s Office of Finance and Allocation Resource Center to develop an allocation amount that would better reflect the cost of providing blind rehabilitation services on an outpatient basis, which could in turn, provide an incentive for networks and medical centers to expand outpatient rehabilitation services for legally blind veterans. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2003, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) estimated that about 157,000 veterans were legally blind, and about 44,000 of these veterans were enrolled in VA health care. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health, House Veterans' Affairs Committee, and the Ranking Minority Member, Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee expressed concerns about VA's rehabilitation services for blind veterans. GAO reviewed (1) the availability of VA outpatient blind rehabilitation services, (2) whether legally blind veterans benefit from VA and non-VA outpatient services, and (3) what factors affect VA's ability to increase veterans' access to blind rehabilitation outpatient services. GAO reviewed VA's blind rehabilitation policies; interviewed officials from VA, the Blinded Veterans Association, state and private nonprofit agencies, and visited five Blind Rehabilitation Centers (BRC).
What GAO Found
VA provides three types of blind rehabilitation outpatient training services. These services, which are available at a small number of VA locations, range from short-term programs provided in VA facilities to services provided in the veteran's own home. They are Visual Impairment Services Outpatient Rehabilitation, Visual Impairment Center to Optimize Remaining Sight, and Blind Rehabilitation Outpatient Specialists. VA reported to GAO that some legally blind veterans could benefit from increased access to outpatient blind rehabilitation services. When VA reviewed all of the veterans who, as of March 31, 2004, were on the waiting list for admission to the five BRCs GAO visited, VA officials reported that 315 out of 1,501 of them, or 21 percent, could potentially be better served through access to outpatient blind rehabilitation services, if such services were available. GAO also identified two factors that may affect the expansion of VA's outpatient blind rehabilitation services. The first involves VA's longstanding position that training for legally blind veterans is best provided in a comprehensive inpatient setting. The second reported factor is VA's method of allocating funds for medical care. VA is currently working to develop an allocation amount that would better reflect the cost of providing blind rehabilitation services on an outpatient basis. |
gao_GAO-16-1 | gao_GAO-16-1_0 | As part of their marijuana enforcement efforts, DEA and the U.S. An increasing number of states have adopted laws that legalize the use of marijuana under state law. According to ODAG officials and information DOJ has provided to Congress since issuing the August 2013 guidance, DOJ is taking actions to monitor the effects of state legalization of marijuana relative to DOJ’s marijuana enforcement policy generally in two ways. Attorneys for Colorado and Washington reported that U.S. For example, officials reported that as state recreational marijuana legalization was being implemented in Colorado, the U.S. Attorney had consulted with state and local officials to identify concerns about edible marijuana products and the potential that their sale and use could threaten federal enforcement priorities. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides the overall framework for establishing and maintaining an effective internal control system. Documenting a plan specifying its monitoring process would provide DOJ with greater assurance that control activities—such as the ways DOJ is monitoring the effect of state marijuana legalization relative to federal enforcement priorities—are occurring as intended. Moreover, leveraging existing mechanisms to make this plan available to appropriate officials from DOJ components that are providing the various data can provide ODAG with an opportunity to gain institutional knowledge with respect to its monitoring plan, including the utility of the data ODAG is using. Incorporating the feedback into its monitoring plan can help ODAG ensure it is using the most appropriate data and thus better position it to identify those state systems that are not effectively protecting federal enforcement priorities— so that DOJ can work with states to address concerns and, if necessary, take steps to challenge those systems, in accordance with its 2013 marijuana enforcement guidance. Officials reported their perspectives on factors that had affected their marijuana enforcement actions, including key public health and safety threats, local concerns regarding the commercial medical marijuana industry, and DOJ’s updated marijuana enforcement policy. Applying resources to target most significant public health and safety threats. DOJ’s updated marijuana enforcement policy. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Attorney General take the following actions: direct ODAG to document a plan specifying DOJ’s process for monitoring the effects of marijuana legalization under state law, in accordance with DOJ’s 2013 marijuana enforcement policy guidance, to include the identification of the various data ODAG will use and their potential limitations for monitoring the effects of state marijuana legalization, and how ODAG will use the information sources in its monitoring efforts to help inform decisions on whether state systems are effectively protecting federal marijuana enforcement priorities, and direct ODAG to use existing mechanisms to share DOJ’s monitoring plan with appropriate officials from DOJ components responsible for providing information DOJ reports using regarding the effects of state legalization to ODAG, obtain feedback, and incorporate the feedback into its plan. Appendix I: DOJ Field Components Contacted in Selected States
To determine the factors Department of Justice (DOJ) field officials reported affecting their marijuana enforcement actions in selected states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, we selected 6 states for our review, to include (1) Colorado and Washington because, in addition to their recreational marijuana laws, they have long-standing medical marijuana legalization laws in place, and (2) 4 additional states— Alaska, California, Maine, and Oregon—that were the earliest states to pass laws legalizing marijuana for medical purposes. We interviewed officials from the six Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) field divisions and 10 U.S. Attorneys’ offices (USAO) with jurisdiction for these selected states. | Why GAO Did This Study
An increasing number of states have adopted laws that legalize marijuana for medical or recreational purposes under state law, yet federal penalties remain. In 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize marijuana for recreational purposes. In 2013, DOJ updated its marijuana enforcement policy by issuing guidance clarifying federal marijuana enforcement priorities and stating that DOJ may challenge those state marijuana legalization systems that threaten these priorities. GAO was asked to review issues related to Colorado's and Washington's actions to regulate recreational marijuana and DOJ's mechanisms to monitor the effects of state legalization.
This report examines, among other issues, (1) DOJ's efforts to monitor the effects of state marijuana legalization relative to DOJ's 2013 guidance and (2) factors DOJ field officials reported affecting their marijuana enforcement in selected states with medical marijuana laws. GAO analyzed DOJ marijuana enforcement guidance and drug threat assessments, and evaluated DOJ's monitoring efforts against internal control standards. GAO also interviewed cognizant DOJ officials, including U.S. Attorneys and DEA officials in six states.
What GAO Found
Officials from the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) reported monitoring the effects of state marijuana legalization relative to DOJ policy, generally in two ways. First, officials reported that U.S. Attorneys prosecute cases that threaten federal marijuana enforcement priorities (see fig. below) and consult with state officials about areas of federal concern, such as the potential impact on enforcement priorities of edible marijuana products. Second, officials reported they collaborate with DOJ components, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other federal agencies, including the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and assess various marijuana enforcement-related data these agencies provide. However, DOJ has not documented its monitoring process, as called for in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government . Documenting a plan specifying its monitoring process would provide DOJ with greater assurance that its monitoring activities relative to DOJ marijuana enforcement guidance are occurring as intended. Further, making this plan available to appropriate DOJ components can provide ODAG with an opportunity to gain institutional knowledge with respect to its monitoring plan, including the utility of the data ODAG is using. This can better position ODAG to identify state systems that are not effectively protecting federal enforcement priorities and, if necessary, take steps to challenge these systems in accordance with DOJ marijuana enforcement guidance.
U.S. Attorneys and DEA officials in six states with medical marijuana laws reported their perspectives on various factors that had affected their marijuana enforcement actions. These include
applying resources to target the most significant public health and safety threats, such as violence associated with drug-trafficking organizations;
addressing local concerns regarding the growth of the commercial medical marijuana industry; and
implementing DOJ's updated marijuana enforcement policy guidance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ document a plan specifying its process for monitoring the effects of state marijuana legalization, and share the plan with DOJ components. DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-56 | gao_GAO-15-56_0 | Background
To accomplish its mission, HUD administers community and housing programs that affect millions of households each year. HUD’s Deputy Secretary is responsible for managing the department’s daily operations, annual operating budget, and approximately 8,700 employees. Key Governance Practices Outlined in GAO’s IT Investment Management Framework
GAO assessed best practices to develop the IT investment management framework to provide a method for evaluating and assessing how well an agency is selecting and managing its IT resources. HUD’s IT Governance Activities Do Not Yet Fully Address Key Practices
Since 2011, the department has taken steps to build a foundation for IT governance, including instituting investment review boards, establishing elements of a process for selecting investments, and providing investment oversight. Consistent with the IT investment management framework developed by GAO and as described previously in this report, HUD’s Office of the CIO chartered four investment boards in 2011 with defined authorities, roles and responsibilities, and operations for managing and selecting the department’s IT projects. However, the department has not ensured that its investment boards are fully operating according to their designated authority and responsibility. Specifically, according to the department’s investment review board charters, the Executive Investment Board was to establish key criteria for these boards to use in identifying (1) which IT projects best support HUD’s strategic goals and provide value to the department and (2) which projects were underperforming and should be considered for termination. However, because the Executive Investment Board has not met or conducted any business, such criteria were not established. Moreover, HUD has not yet developed all of the policies that support its IT management framework. However, 3 of the planned policies—for performance, privacy, and risk management—have not yet been developed, and HUD has not set a time frame for doing so. Elements of such a process include key practices, such as those discussed in the IT investment management framework and cost estimation guidance developed by GAO—practices for identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing IT proposals for funding. The officials attributed weaknesses in the selection process to, among other things, efforts to minimize the burden on those requesting funding, which result in limiting requirements for submitting detailed information to support project proposals; lack of an established priority for developing life-cycle cost estimates for projects (until recently); changes in senior leadership, departmental priorities, and approaches; lack of departmental oversight of the decision-making process by senior executives; and reliance on qualitative, judgmental data and inadequate consideration of key quantitative measures, such as return on investment. Officials from the Office of the CIO attributed weaknesses in oversight to, among other things, lack of a consistent, enterprise-wide way to collect and compare actual cost, benefit, schedule, or risk to estimates. We have also reported that it is important to have assurance that the data collected and reported by agencies are complete and accurate. HUD’s reported cost savings and operational efficiencies were not supported by data that were complete, accurate, and consistent. However, the agency’s reported cost savings associated with deactivated systems were not complete. Additionally, the office has partially implemented processes for selecting and overseeing investments. Fully establish a well-defined process that incorporates key practices for overseeing investments, including (1) monitoring actual project performance against expected outcomes for project cost, schedule, benefit, and risk; (2) establishing and documenting cost-, schedule-, and performance-based thresholds for triggering remedial actions or elevating project review to higher-level investment boards; and (3) conducting post-implementation reviews to evaluate results of projects after they are completed. Further, to establish an enterprise-wide view of cost savings and operational efficiencies generated by investments and governance processes, we recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development direct the Deputy Secretary and Chief Information Officer to place a higher priority on identifying governance-related cost savings and efficiencies and establish and institutionalize a process for identifying and tracking comprehensive, high-quality data on savings and efficiencies resulting from IT investments and the IT governance process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) to what extent the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has implemented key information technology (IT) governance practices, including effective cost estimation, and (2) what, if any, cost savings or operational efficiencies HUD has reported achieving as a result of its IT governance practices. This documentation included HUD’s IT Governance Policy that called for the establishment of an IT management framework and four investment review boards; the IT Management Framework and Governance Concept of Operations that identified key IT policies and processes to support IT governance and investment decision making; and charters that established the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and operations of the department’s investment review boards. | Why GAO Did This Study
HUD relies on IT to deliver services and manage programs in support of its mission of strengthening communities and ensuring access to affordable housing. However, the department has experienced shortcomings in its IT management capability and limitations in the systems supporting its mission.
A Senate report accompanying HUD's fiscal year 2012 appropriation mandated GAO to evaluate, among other things, the department's institutionalization of IT governance. In response, GAO reported on HUD's IT project management in June 2013.
GAO's objectives for this second review were to determine (1) the extent to which HUD implemented key IT governance practices, including effective cost estimation, and (2) what, if any, cost savings or operational efficiencies HUD has reported achieving as a result of its IT governance practices. To accomplish this, GAO compared HUD's approach to IT governance with best practices and the department's policies and procedures. GAO also analyzed reported cost savings and operational efficiencies, along with any available supporting documentation.
What GAO Found
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has partially established elements of key practices for effective information technology (IT) governance, as identified by GAO's IT investment management guide. However, several shortcomings remain:
Investment boards, policies, and procedures were not fully established: HUD chartered four review boards to manage the department's IT investments; however, the executive-level board, which is to be responsible for overall definition and implementation of the investment management process, has never met. Instead, the department's Deputy Secretary makes decisions about which investments to fund. The lack of an operational executive-level board has affected HUD's other active investment boards, which are operating without criteria the executive-level board was to have established for evaluating proposed investments. In addition, HUD has not yet developed all of the policies that it has identified as needed to support its IT management framework. Specifically, the department has not set a schedule for developing policies for IT investment performance, privacy, and risk management. Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) officials explained that operating without an executive-level board represents the preferred investment management approach of HUD's Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Process for selecting investments lacks key elements: HUD has developed elements of a process for selecting investments based on defined criteria; however, it has not fully defined and implemented practices for identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing proposed IT projects for funding, as recommended by GAO's IT investment management guide. CIO officials acknowledged that they have not yet fully developed a standard and well-documented process and attributed weaknesses to a variety of factors, including changes in leadership, priorities, and approaches.
Process for overseeing investments has not been fully developed: The department has not consistently compared the performance of projects to pre-defined expectations, established thresholds to trigger remedial action for underperforming investments, or reviewed projects after implementation to compare actual investment results with decision makers' expectations. These weaknesses were attributed by CIO officials to, among other things, the lack of a consistent, enterprise-wide way to collect and compare actual data with estimates.
Until effective governance practices are institutionalized, there is risk that HUD's investments in IT may not reflect department-wide goals and priorities or effectively support the department's mission.
While HUD has reported governance-related cost savings and operational efficiencies, the data to support such reports were not always accurate, consistent, or substantiated. This is due, in part, to the lack of a department-wide approach, as called for in Office of Management and Budget guidance, to identify and collect cost-savings information. Thus, it is unclear to what extent HUD has realized savings or operational efficiencies from its IT governance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HUD ensure that its investment review boards operate as intended and complete and update associated policies; fully establish processes including key elements for selecting and overseeing investments; and fully establish a process for identifying, collecting, and reporting data about cost savings and efficiencies. HUD agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-959 | gao_GAO-03-959_0 | An Enterprise Architecture Is Essential to Effectively Managing Systems Modernization
The development, maintenance, and implementation of enterprise architectures (EA) are recognized hallmarks of successful public and private organizations and as such are an IT management best practice. Managed properly, an enterprise architecture can clarify and help optimize the interdependencies and relationships among a given entity’s business operations and the underlying systems and technical infrastructure that support these operations. While Stage 1 agencies may have initiated some EA activity, these agencies’ efforts are ad hoc and unstructured, lack institutional leadership and direction, and do not provide the management foundation necessary for successful EA development. FBI Does Not Have an EA or the Management Foundation Needed to Effectively Develop, Maintain, and Implement One
The FBI has yet to develop an EA, and it does not have the requisite means in place to effectively develop, maintain, and implement one. As our prior reviews of federal agencies and research of architecture best practices show, attempts to modernize systems without an architecture, which is what the FBI is doing, increases the risk that large sums of money and much time and effort will be invested in technology solutions that are duplicative, are not well integrated, are unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface, and do not effectively optimize mission performance. Develop an architecture program management plan. Make EA an integral component of IT investment decision-making processes. The FBI is currently at Stage 1 of our maturity framework. However, it has not yet selected a development methodology or automated tool (a repository for architectural products). The state of the FBI’s EA management maturity is attributable to a lack of management commitment to having and using an architecture and to giving it priority. To do less will continue to expose the bureau’s system modernization efforts, and ultimately the effectiveness and efficiency of its mission performance, to unnecessary risk. This includes first laying an effective EA management foundation by (1) ensuring that all business partners are represented on the architecture governance board; (2) adopting an architecture development methodology and automated tool; (3) establishing an EA program office that is accountable for developing the EA; (4) tasking the program office with developing a management plan that specifies how and when the EA is to be developed and issued; (5) ensuring that the management plan provides for the bureau’s “as-is” and “to-be” environments, as well as a sequencing plan for transitioning from the “as-is” to the “to-be”; (6) ensuring that the management plan also describes the enterprise in terms of business, data, applications, and technology; (7) ensuring that the plan also calls for describing the security related to the business, data, and technology; (8) ensuring that the plan establishes metrics for measuring EA progress, quality, compliance, and return on investment; and (9) allocating the necessary funding and personnel to EA activities. Scope and Methodology
To evaluate whether Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a modernization blueprint, commonly called an enterprise architecture (EA), to guide and constrain its modernization efforts, we requested that the bureau provide us with all of its EA products. In addition, we interviewed FBI’s chief architect and other bureau officials to determine, among other things, the cause of differences between what is specified in the framework and the condition at the FBI. The FBI has acknowledged the need for an EA. The FBI plans to use the Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is in the process of modernizing its information technology (IT) systems. Replacing much of its 1980s-based technology with modern system applications and a robust technical infrastructure, this modernization is intended to enable the FBI to take an integrated approach--coordinated agencywide--to performing its critical missions, such as federal crime investigation and terrorism prevention. GAO was requested to conduct a series of reviews of the FBI's modernization management. The objective of this first review was to determine whether the FBI has an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain modernization investments.
What GAO Found
About 2 years into its ongoing systems modernization efforts, the FBI does not yet have an enterprise architecture. An enterprise architecture is an organizational blueprint that defines--in logical or business terms and in technology terms--how an organization operates today, intends to operate in the future, and intends to invest in technology to transition to this future state. GAO's research has shown that attempting to modernize an IT environment without a well-defined and enforceable enterprise architecture risks, among other things, building systems that do not effectively and efficiently support mission operations and performance. The FBI acknowledges the need for an enterprise architecture and has committed to developing one by the fall of 2003. However, it currently lacks the means for effectively reaching this end. For example, while the bureau did recently designate a chief architect and select an architecture framework to use, it does not yet have an agency architecture policy, an architecture program management plan, or an architecture development methodology, all of which are necessary components of effective architecture management. Given the state of the FBI's enterprise architecture management efforts, the bureau is at Stage 1 of GAO's enterprise architecture management maturity framework. Organizations at Stage 1 are characterized by architecture efforts that are ad hoc and unstructured, lack institutional leadership and direction, and do not provide the management foundation necessary for successful architecture development and use as a tool for informed IT investment decision making. A key for an organization to advance beyond this stage is to treat architecture development, maintenance, and implementation as an institutional management priority, which the FBI has yet to do. To do less will expose the bureau's ongoing and planned modernization efforts to unnecessary risk. |
gao_GAO-06-94 | gao_GAO-06-94_0 | I for a list of DOE sites that disposed of the majority of LLRW in fiscal years 2004 and 2005.) DOE Sites Do Not Consistently Use Life- Cycle Cost Analysis in Managing LLRW
DOE sites prepare various types of cost analyses in making LLRW management decisions, but these analyses do not consistently use complete, current, or well-documented life-cycle cost analysis to ensure that the lowest-cost LLRW management alternatives are identified. These inconsistencies have occurred, in large part, because DOE’s guidance lacks necessary detail and its oversight of contractor practices is weak. DOE LLRW generator sites we visited did not always include all life-cycle costs—including the postclosure costs of long-term maintenance and surveillance of the disposal site—and did not always consider alternative actions when deciding on how to manage and dispose of LLRW. For example, despite DOE’s guidance to include all disposal costs in its life- cycle cost analyses, DOE contractors at two sites—Rocky Flats, Colorado, and Paducah, Kentucky—did not consistently consider postclosure costs in the analyses supporting their LLRW disposal decisions for fiscal year 2004. In some cases, we could not determine how contractors incorporated cost analyses into their disposal decisions because documentation was incomplete. DOE Has Not Taken Steps to Oversee Contractors’ Use of Life-Cycle Cost Analysis, Relying Instead on Incentive-Based Contracts to Ensure Cost-Effective LLRW Decisions
DOE site offices were ineffective in overseeing contractors’ use of life- cycle cost analysis, which also contributed to ineffective implementation of the guidance. DOE Faces Challenges in Developing a National LLRW Disposition Strategy
To better coordinate disposal efforts among sites and program offices, increase efficiencies, and minimize life-cycle costs, DOE has begun developing a national LLRW disposition strategy. Although DOE expects to begin implementing this strategy by March 2006, specific schedules have not yet been established for when the strategy will be fully in place, and it faces several significant challenges. DOE Expects to Begin Implementing a Departmentwide Strategic Plan for Disposing of LLRW in 2006
DOE has recognized that its current approach---having each site responsible for developing mechanisms necessary to control costs—may result in cost inefficiencies and could limit its ability to meet departmentwide strategic objectives, such as accelerated waste cleanup and site closure. EM plans to use the strategy to evaluate predisposal, storage, treatment, and disposal options across the department. To dispose of this waste, BNFL had constructed a supercompactor, the largest of its type in the nuclear industry. Consequently, DOE may have missed a potential cost-saving opportunity. Recommendations for Executive Action
To promote cost-effective LLRW management, we are recommending that the Secretary of Energy take the following four actions: Prepare comprehensive guidance on life-cycle cost analysis that, at a minimum, specifies (1) a systematic, consistent method of analyzing all cost elements or of comparing key alternatives within these cost elements to determine the lowest cost; (2) when and under what circumstances sites should prepare cost analyses; (3) relevant DOE orders, manuals, or other reference materials that should be consulted to provide consistent direction on how and when to perform the analysis; and (4) how final LLRW management decisions should be documented to demonstrate that life-cycle cost factors were adequately weighed against noncost factors, such as safety, health, or schedule. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) disposed of more than 378,000 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste (LLRW)--contaminated building rubble, soil, and debris. In 2002, DOE directed its sites to use life-cycle cost analysis to manage LLRW. Life-cycle cost analysis examines the total cost of various options to manage LLRW over its life, including its packaging, treatment, transport, and disposal, to identify the lowest-cost alternative. GAO determined whether (1) DOE sites use life-cycle cost analysis to evaluate LLRW management alternatives and (2) DOE has a strategy for cost-effectively managing LLRW departmentwide, including state actions that may affect this strategy.
What GAO Found
The six DOE sites we visited, representing more than 70 percent of the LLRW disposed of by DOE during 2003 and 2004, did not consistently use life-cycle cost analysis because of weak DOE guidance and a lack of oversight of contractors' implementation of this guidance. As a result, DOE cannot ensure that lowest-cost LLRW management alternatives are identified, so that managers make decisions that fully weigh costs against noncost factors, such as safety and schedule. For example, DOE contractors at two sites did not consistently consider alternative transportation modes or postclosure maintenance and surveillance costs of disposal sites in their analyses for fiscal year 2004 disposal decisions. GAO also could not always determine how contractors used cost analyses in disposal decisions because of incomplete documentation. While DOE's guidance requires each site to develop the mechanisms necessary to ensure use of life-cycle cost analysis, it does not specify, for example, (1) a systematic, consistent method of analyzing all cost elements to determine the lowest cost, or (2) when analyses should be performed. Also, no such guidance was incorporated into site contracts, and DOE site offices had not evaluated contractors' use of life-cycle cost analysis. DOE has recognized that its current approach--having each site responsible for developing mechanisms necessary to control costs--may result in cost inefficiencies and may limit its ability to meet departmentwide strategic objectives. As a result, DOE plans to begin implementing a national LLRW disposition strategy by March 2006 to better coordinate disposal efforts--specific schedules have not yet been established for when the strategy will be fully in place. However, DOE faces challenges in developing and implementing this strategy. First, it needs to gather complete data on the amount of LLRW needing disposal. Second, the fact that DOE's multiple program and site offices have differing missions and oversee many contractors presents coordination challenges. For example, one program office dismantled and disposed of a supercompactor used to reduce the volume of large LLRW items without a DOE-wide assessment of LLRW compacting needs and without considering other potential cost-effective uses for the supercompactor that might benefit other DOE sites. Third, DOE faces state actions that have restricted access to disposal facilities, making it more difficult to coordinate and integrate disposal departmentwide. |
gao_GAO-15-112 | gao_GAO-15-112_0 | In order to implement the statute governing FBI whistleblower protections, in 1998, DOJ issued regulations to protect FBI whistleblowers from retaliation for reporting alleged wrongdoing, and established the process for handling FBI whistleblower retaliation complaints. DOJ Closed Majority of Complaints within a Year, Some because Employee Did Not Report Wrongdoing to Designated Official; Complaints DOJ Adjudicated Took up to 10 Years
DOJ closed the majority of the 62 complaints we reviewed within 1 year, generally because the complaints did not meet DOJ’s threshold regulatory requirements. In at least 12 of these 15 instances, the complainant reported the alleged wrongdoing to someone in management or within the complainant’s chain of command, such as the complainant’s supervisor, who was not one of the nine designated entities. FBI Employees Are Not Protected for Reporting Wrongdoing to Their Supervisors or Others in Their Chain of Command Not Designated in DOJ Regulations
Unlike employees of other executive branch agencies—including intelligence agencies—FBI employees do not have a process to seek corrective action if they experience retaliation based on a disclosure of wrongdoing to their supervisors or others in their chain of command who are not designated officials. . . provides a way to channel such disclosures to those in the field who are in a position to respond and to correct management and other problems while also providing an on-site contact in the field for making protected disclosures.”
In October 2012, the President issued Presidential Policy Directive 19, which established whistleblower protections for employees serving in the intelligence community, including, among other things, explicitly providing protection to employees who are retaliated against for reporting wrongdoing “to a supervisor in the employee’s direct chain of command up to and including the head of the employing agency.” Presidential Policy Directive 19 excluded the FBI from the scope of these protections, and instead required DOJ to report to the President on the efficacy of its regulations pertaining to FBI whistleblower retaliation and describe any proposed revisions to these regulations to increase their effectiveness. Dismissing these whistleblower retaliation complaints could deny whistleblowers access to recourse, could permit retaliatory activity to go uninvestigated, and may have a chilling effect on other potential whistleblowers. DOJ Guidance Is Not Always Clear
In the course of our review, in addition to several DOJ and FBI guidance documents that accurately describe DOJ’s FBI whistleblower regulations, we also found instances of DOJ guidance that could lead FBI employees to believe that reporting an allegation of wrongdoing to a supervisor in their chain of command would be a protected disclosure when that is not the case. DOJ Took up to 10 Years to Resolve the 4 Complaints It Adjudicated on the Merits and Did Not Provide Parties with Expected Time Frames for Its Decisions
OARM adjudicated the merits of 4 of the 62 complaints we reviewed (6 percent), and these 4 cases lasted from 2 to just over 10.6 years, from the initial filing of the complaints with OIG or DOJ-OPR to the final OARM or ODAG ruling.the whistleblower. The regulatory requirements help ensure that both complainants and the investigating office receive information necessary to make decisions regarding the complaint. According to senior DOJ-OPR officials, DOJ-OPR has taken some steps to improve its management of whistleblower retaliation cases, but does not track investigators’ compliance with specific regulatory requirements and does not have a formal oversight mechanism to do so. Specifically, we found that in 15 of the 24 final termination reports (63 percent) we reviewed for complaints OIG declined to investigate, OIG did not clearly explain the reasons for this decision. Conclusions
Whistleblowers play an important role in safeguarding the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse, but they often risk retaliation from their employers as a result of their actions. While DOJ officials’ concern about timeliness is important, they are already taking other steps to improve the efficiency of this process. More importantly, dismissing retaliation complaints made to an employee’s supervisor or someone in that person’s chain of command leaves some FBI whistleblowers with no recourse if they allege retaliation, as our review of case files demonstrated. To ensure that complainants receive the periodic updates that they are entitled to and need to determine next steps for their complaint, such as whether or not to seek corrective action from OARM, we recommend that Counsel, DOJ-OPR tailor its new case management system or otherwise develop an oversight mechanism to capture information on the office’s compliance with regulatory requirements and, further, use that information to monitor and identify opportunities to improve DOJ-OPR’s compliance with regulatory requirements. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix discusses in detail our methodology for addressing the following three objectives: determining how long the Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken to resolve Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whistleblower retaliation complaints and what factors have affected these time frames, determining the extent to which DOJ has taken steps to resolve complaints more quickly and determine the impact of any such efforts; and determining the extent to which DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Office of Professional Responsibility (DOJ-OPR) have complied with regulatory reporting requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Whistleblowers help safeguard the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse—however, they also risk retaliation by their employers. For example, in 2002, a former FBI agent alleged she suffered retaliation after disclosing that colleagues had stolen items from Ground Zero following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. DOJ found in her favor over 10 years after she reported the retaliation. GAO was asked to review DOJ's process for handling such complaints.
GAO examined (1) the time DOJ took to resolve FBI whistleblower retaliation complaints, (2) the extent to which DOJ took steps to resolve complaints more quickly, and (3) the extent to which DOJ complied with certain regulatory reporting requirements.
GAO reviewed all DOJ case files for FBI whistleblower retaliation complaints DOJ closed from 2009 to 2013, and interviewed whistleblower attorneys, advocates, and government officials about the complaint process. The interview results are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
The Department of Justice (DOJ) closed 44 of the 62 (71 percent) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whistleblower retaliation complaints we reviewed within 1 year, took up to 4 years to close 15 complaints, and took up to 10.6 years to close the remaining 3. DOJ terminated 55 of the 62 complaints (89 percent) and awarded corrective action for 3. (Complainants withdrew 4.) We found that DOJ terminated many (48 of 62) complaints we reviewed because they did not meet certain regulatory requirements. For example, DOJ terminated at least 17 complaints in part because a disclosure was made to someone in the employee's chain of command or management, such as a supervisor, who was not one of the nine high-level FBI or DOJ entities designated under DOJ regulations to receive such disclosures. Unlike employees of other executive branch agencies, FBI employees do not have a process to seek corrective action if they experience retaliation based on a disclosure of wrongdoing to their supervisors or others in their chain of command who are not designated officials. This difference is due, in part, to DOJ's decisions about how to implement the statute governing FBI whistleblowers. In 2014, DOJ reviewed its regulations and, in an effort to balance competing priorities, recommended adding more senior officials in FBI field offices to the list of designated entities, but did not recommend adding all supervisors. DOJ cited a number of reasons for this, including concerns about the additional resources and time needed to handle a possible increase in complaints if DOJ added supervisors. However, DOJ is already taking other steps to improve the efficiency of the complaint process. More importantly, dismissing retaliation complaints made to an employee's supervisor or someone in that person's chain of command leaves some FBI whistleblowers—such as the 17 complainants we identified—without protection from retaliation. By dismissing potentially legitimate complaints in this way, DOJ could deny some whistleblowers access to recourse, permit retaliatory activity to go uninvestigated, and create a chilling effect for future whistleblowers.
We also found that DOJ and FBI guidance is not always clear that FBI employees reporting alleged wrongdoing to a supervisor or someone in their chain of command may not be a protected disclosure. Ensuring that guidance always clearly explains to whom an FBI employee can report wrongdoing will help FBI whistleblowers ensure that they are fully protected from retaliation.
DOJ took from 2 to 10.6 years to resolve the 4 complaints we reviewed that DOJ adjudicated, and DOJ did not provide complainants with estimates of when to expect DOJ decisions throughout the complaint process. Providing such estimates would enhance accountability to complainants and provide additional assurance about DOJ management's commitment to improve efficiency.
Further, DOJ offices responsible for investigating whistleblower retaliation complaints have not consistently complied with certain regulatory requirements, such as obtaining complainants' approvals for extensions of time. One investigating office does not track investigators' compliance with specific regulatory requirements and does not have a formal oversight mechanism to do so. Effectively monitoring investigators' compliance with such requirements could help assure complainants that their cases are making progress and that they have the information they need to determine next steps for their complaints.
What GAO Recommends
Congress may wish to consider whether FBI whistleblowers should have means to seek corrective action if retaliated against for disclosures to supervisors, among others. Further, GAO recommends that DOJ clarify guidance to clearly convey to whom employees can make protected disclosures, provide complainants with estimated complaint decision timeframes, and develop an oversight mechanism to monitor regulatory compliance. DOJ and the Office of the Inspector General concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-257 | gao_GAO-02-257_0 | Background
For tax years beginning after 2000, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 applied a new 10-percent income tax rate to a portion of an individual’s income that was previously taxed at 15 percent. All checks were to be issued by December 31, 2001. Billions of Dollars in Advance Tax Refunds Sent to Millions of Taxpayers
IRS, through FMS, mailed out advance tax refunds according to a schedule that called for taxpayers to begin receiving checks the week of July 23, 2001. To administer the advance tax refund program, IRS, among other things, had to develop the computer programming necessary to determine taxpayer eligibility for the refund and the amount of each refund, including any related federal tax offset; arrange for printing and mailing of notices that informed taxpayers prepare adjustment notices for refunds that were offset due to federal tax whether they would receive a refund; respond to telephone calls and correspondence from taxpayers concerning the refund; resolve undelivered and returned advance refund checks; and debts. As of September 30, 2001, IRS had offset about $2.1 billion to recover delinquent federal tax. Taxpayers who called IRS during the advance tax refund period had greater difficulty reaching IRS assistors than did taxpayers who called during the same timeframe in 2000 or during the 2001 tax filing season. A small number of taxpayers received duplicate checks in the early stages of the program. Many Taxpayers Received Untimely Notices
TIGTA also determined that 5.3 million taxpayers who filed their tax returns by the April 16 filing deadline would have delays from 1 week to 9 weeks in receiving their advance refund notices. Many Advance Refund Notices and Checks Were Undeliverable
One problem that IRS encountered throughout the implementation of the advance tax refund program involved undeliverable refund notices and checks due to incorrect addresses. The problem involved duplicate checks sent to taxpayers by one of the three DFAS centers that assisted FMS in issuing the advance tax refund checks. Appendix I: Comments From the Internal Revenue Service | What GAO Found
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 directed the Treasury to issue advance 2001 tax refunds to individual taxpayers who filed a tax year 2000 return. As a result, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had to identify eligible taxpayers so that checks could be sent to these taxpayers by December 31, 2001. The Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service was to issue the checks on behalf of IRS, with the first checks to be received during the week of July 23, 2001. As of September 30, 2001, 84 million taxpayers were to have received $36 billion in advance tax funds. IRS offset about $2.1 billion from these advance tax refunds to recover delinquent federal taxes. IRS spent $104 million to run the program through September 2001, which included IRS staffing costs as well as the costs associated with contracts, postage, and printing. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration identified two initial problems that affected either the accuracy or timeliness of the advance refund notices. One involved computer programming errors that resulted in 523,000 taxpayers receiving notices indicating that they would receive larger advance tax refunds than they were entitled to receive. The IG also determined that 5.3 million taxpayers who had filled their tax returns by the April 16 filing deadline would have delays of up to nine weeks in receiving their advance refund notices. Two problems that continued throughout the advance tax refund period involved (1) undeliverable refund notices and checks due to incorrect addresses and (2) taxpayer difficulties in reaching IRS telephone assistors. Another problem that was quickly identified and corrected during the early stages of the advance tax refund period involved duplicate checks sent to about 25 taxpayers. |
gao_GAO-01-239 | gao_GAO-01-239_0 | In peacekeeping operations, mines are used against U.S. forces to slow or stop daily operations. Given the limitations of the metal detector, DOD has been conducting research and development since World War II to improve its land mine detection capability. DOD Does Not Employ An Effective Strategy For Identifying Promising Land Mine Detection Technologies
DOD’s ability to develop meaningful land mine detection solutions is limited by the absence of an effective strategy to guide its research and development program. DOD Does Not Systematically Evaluate Technological Options for Land Mine Detection Solutions
Just as DOD has failed to adequately specify countermine mission needs for assessing promising technologies, we found that it had not systematically assessed the strengths and the limitations of underlying technologies to meet mission needs. In our interviews with non-government researchers, we found that they use DOD’s announcements as their principal means for familiarizing themselves about DOD’s needs. It is Uncertain Whether DOD is Investing in the Most Promising Technologies For Land Mine Detection
Incomplete knowledge of the properties of candidate land mine detection technologies makes it difficult to assess whether DOD is investing in the most promising technologies to address countermine detection missions. Therefore, we continue to believe that the changes that we have recommended are required. Appendix I: Scope And Methodology
To determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) employs an effective strategy for identifying the most promising land mine detection technologies, we reviewed literature related to research program design and met with experts in this area. Despite these limitations and questions, DOD is developing systems that use this technology. Other Technologies
We identified four technologies that are not based on electromagnetic principles. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent U.S. military operations have shown that land mines continue to pose a significant threat to U.S. forces. U.S. land mine detection capabilities are limited and largely unchanged since the Second World War. Improving the Department of Defense's (DOD) land mine detection capability is a technological challenge This report reviews DOD's strategy for identifying the most promising land mine detection technologies.
What GAO Found
GAO found that DOD's ability to substantially improve its land mine detection capabilities may be limited because DOD lacks an effective strategy for identifying and evaluating the most promising technologies. Although DOD maintains an extensive program of outreach to external researchers and other nations' military research organizations, it does not use an effective methodology to evaluate all technological options to guide its investment decisions. DOD is investing in several technologies to overcome the mine detection problem, but it is not clear that DOD has chosen the most promising technologies. Because DOD has not systematically assessed potential land mine detection technologies against mission needs, GAO did its own assessment. GAO found that the technologies DOD is exploring are limited in their ability to meet mission needs or are greatly uncertain in their potential. GAO identified other technologies that might address DOD's needs, but they are in immature states of development and it is unclear whether they are more promising than the approaches that DOD is exploring. |
gao_GAO-08-955 | gao_GAO-08-955_0 | Testing the Medicare Enrollment Process
After establishing two fictitious DMEPOS storefronts with no inventory and no clients, our undercover investigators were able to successfully complete the Medicare enrollment process. After submitting corrective action plans addressing the standards we failed, both companies were approved for Medicare billing privileges and provided with billing numbers. Creating Fictitious DMEPOS Companies
Prior to submitting applications to CMS to become approved DMEPOS suppliers, investigators easily set up two fictitious durable medical equipment companies during April and May 2007 using undercover names and bank accounts. We created phony contracts with two fictitious DMEPOS wholesale suppliers to demonstrate that we had the capacity to supply equipment and supplies to clients. In reality, these phone numbers were unmanned extensions in the GAO building. Posing as a representative for this wholesale supplier, an undercover investigator left a vague message in response but did not confirm the existence of a contract or a credit line. Completing Electronic Test Billing
After requesting an electronic billing enrollment package and obtaining passwords from CMS, we were able to successfully complete Medicare’s often confusing test billing process for our Virginia office; we did not complete test billing for our Maryland office because we did not receive the necessary passwords from CMS by the close of our investigation in June 2008. Had we been real fraudsters, we could have fraudulently billed Medicare for substantial sums, potentially reaching millions of dollars. We did not receive any further information related to the Maryland DMEPOS company. On March 13, 2008, we received, among other things, an electronic billing submitter identification number and password for the Virginia office. Case Studies Provide Real Examples of Fraudulent DMEPOS Suppliers
As shown by four closed cases from South Florida that we obtained from the HHS IG, criminals use similar techniques to establish fictitious DMEPOS suppliers and then employ billing schemes to obtain millions of dollars in Medicare funds from the government. Specifically, once criminals have created fraudulent DMEPOS companies, they typically steal or buy Medicare beneficiary numbers and physician identification numbers in order to repeatedly submit claims. In October 2006, the owner bought a DMEPOS company that had been incorporated in August 2006 and used the original owner’s identity, billing number, and beneficiaries to submit claims in an attempt to avoid detection by CMS. This company used a utility closet as its address—HHS investigators found buckets of sand mix, road tar, and a large wrench in the room, but no medical files, office equipment, or telephone. In total, from October 2006 through March 2007, the owner submitted claims from these three companies in excess of $5.5 million and ultimately received about $77,000 from Medicare. Case Study 3: This company billed Medicare for $4.4 million dollars worth of supplies and services that were never delivered. These claims were submitted between March and July 2006 using real beneficiary numbers that the DMEPOS company owner had purchased illegally. Ultimately, Medicare paid approximately half of these claims ($2.2 million). According to HHS IG records, the only employee not involved in the scheme was a secretary who told investigators that there was never any business activity in the office and that the owner rarely visited. Corrective Action Briefing
On June 18, 2008, we informed representatives from CMS about the results of our investigation. They also acknowledged that our covert testing illustrates gaps in oversight that still require improvement and stated that they would continue to work to strengthen the entire DMEPOS enrollment process. (ii) The supplier has furnished a Medicare-covered item to the individual and the supplier is contacting the individual to coordinate the delivery of the item. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), schemes to defraud the Medicare program have grown more elaborate in recent years. In particular, HHS has acknowledged Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Service's (CMS) oversight of suppliers of durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) is inadequate to prevent fraud and abuse. Specifically, weaknesses in the DMEPOS enrollment and inspection process have allowed sham companies to fraudulently bill Medicare for unnecessary or nonexistent supplies. From April 2006 through March 2007, CMS estimated that Medicare improperly paid $1 billion for DMEPOS supplies--in part due to fraud by suppliers. Due to the committee's concern about vulnerabilities in the enrollment process, GAO used publicly available guidance to attempt to create DMEPOS suppliers, obtain Medicare billing numbers, and complete electronic test billing. GAO also reported on closed cases provided by the HHS Inspector General (IG) to illustrate the techniques used by criminals to fraudulently bill Medicare. On June 18, 2008, we briefed CMS representatives on the results of our investigation. In response, they acknowledged that our covert tests illustrate gaps in oversight that still require improvement and stated that they would continue to work to strengthen the entire DMEPOS enrollment process.
What GAO Found
Investigators easily set up two fictitious DMEPOS companies using undercover names and bank accounts. GAO's fictitious companies were approved for Medicare billing privileges despite having no clients and no inventory. CMS initially denied GAO's applications in part because of this lack of inventory, but undercover GAO investigators fabricated contracts with nonexistent wholesale suppliers to convince CMS and its contractor, the National Supplier Clearinghouse (NSC), that the companies had access to DMEPOS items. The contact number GAO gave for these phony contracts rang on an unmanned undercover telephone in the GAO building. When NSC left a message looking for further information related to the contracts, a GAO investigator left a vague message in return pretending to be the wholesale supplier. As a result of such simple methods of deception, both fictitious DMEPOS companies obtained Medicare billing numbers. After requesting an electronic billing enrollment package and obtaining passwords from CMS, GAO investigators were then able to successfully complete Medicare's test billing process for the Virginia office. GAO could not complete test billing for the Maryland office because CMS has not sent the necessary passwords. However, if real fraudsters had been in charge of the fictitious companies, they would have been clear to bill Medicare from the Virginia office for potentially millions of dollars worth of nonexistent supplies. Once criminals have similarly created fictitious DMEPOS companies, they typically steal or illegally buy Medicare beneficiary numbers and physician identification numbers and use them to repeatedly submit claims. In one case from HHS IG, a company received $2.2 million in payments from Medicare for supplies and services that were never delivered. The owner submitted these fraudulent claims from March 2006 through July 2006 using real beneficiary numbers and physician identification numbers that he had purchased illegally. The only employee not involved in the scheme was a secretary, who told HHS IG that there was no business activity in the office and that the owner was rarely there. Another case related to an individual who stole beneficiary numbers and physician identification numbers and submitted $5.5 million in claims for three fraudulent offices from October 2006 through March 2007. He operated one of these offices out of a utility closet containing buckets of sand mix, road tar, and a large wrench, but no medical files, office equipment, or telephone. |
gao_GAO-17-182 | gao_GAO-17-182_0 | For example, DHS’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) manages the entire Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) qualification process including enrollment, background checks, and credential issuance. Similarly, NRC issues regulations related to access control requirements, which are to be implemented by commercial nuclear power plants, and DOD owns and operates U.S. military installations and facilities and uses the Common Access Card (CAC) as one method to facilitate access to semi-restricted areas within the installations. Workers who need access to multiple types of critical infrastructure to realize their livelihoods—such as truck drivers and carpenters—often encounter different access control efforts. Selected Federal Access Control Efforts have Similar Processes, but Three Key Factors Had an Impact on Stakeholders
Access Control Efforts Follow Similar Processes, but Specific Characteristics of the Efforts Vary
While the six selected federally administered access control efforts we reviewed had varying purposes, standards, or agency responsibilities, they generally included the following process components or phases of DHS’s credentialing lifecycle as depicted in Figure 1. Although the six efforts we reviewed generally follow similar processes, certain characteristics within these efforts can vary. Access Control Efforts Have Different Impacts on Stakeholders Due to Varying Interests
As previously mentioned, federally-administered access control efforts generally involve two groups of stakeholders: users and operators. Users are individuals who require access to critical infrastructure as an essential function of their job. Operators are individuals or groups who own or are responsible for managing facilities, such as airports, seaports, and chemical facilities, which may be privately owned, but can also include other government-owned facilities such as military installations. Based on our interviews with stakeholder groups and associations, the issues mentioned that had an impact on users and operators included (1) operators may add access requirements to vetting and background checks already conducted for federally administered programs; (2) credentials that cannot be used within and across critical infrastructure sectors; and (3) enrollment information that has to be entered multiple times for the same user for similar purposes. During our interviews with users and operators we found that on-site operators across multiple infrastructure types have considered additional disqualifying offenses beyond federal baseline requirements. Partnership Structures Provide Opportunities for Harmonization of Access Control Efforts across Critical Infrastructure Sectors
According to NPPD senior officials, DHS voluntary partnership structures exist to discuss a variety of issues that have an impact on critical infrastructure security, but DHS has not used these structures to identify opportunities to harmonize regulated screening and credentialing efforts. As of October 2016, DHS does not have a dedicated partnership structure that allows for users to share their experiences in navigating through federal access control efforts. SCO Has Taken Actions to Harmonize DHS Access Control Efforts, but Has Not Updated Its Goals and Objectives to Support Its Strategic Framework
SCO Goals and Actions to Harmonize DHS Access Control Efforts
A role of SCO, according to DHS Office of Policy officials, is to serve as a department-wide policy advocate for coordination and harmonization of credentialing and screening efforts within DHS. SCO Has Not Updated Its Goals and Objectives to Support its Strategic Framework for Department-wide Access Control Harmonization
In its early years, SCO operated under the direction of the strategic policy vision and implementation plans laid out in the 2006 CIR and the 2008 CFI; however, since then, SCO has not updated the goals and objectives outlined in the implantation plans. SCO officials stated that the implementation plans are no longer relevant to SCO’s current role in the department. Conclusions
Balancing the need to secure critical infrastructure while promoting a harmonized screening and credentialing process to access critical infrastructure continues to pose challenges for stakeholders—users and operators—because their interests vary and are not necessarily aligned with each other. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance its ability to fulfill its role as the facilitator of cross-sector collaboration and best-practices sharing, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection, Office of Infrastructure Protection, take the following action: Explore with key critical infrastructure partners, whether and what opportunities exist to harmonize federally-administered screening and credentialing access control efforts across critical infrastructure sectors. For example, in regards to exploring whether and what opportunities exist to harmonize federally-administered screening and credentialing access control efforts across critical infrastructure sectors, DHS noted that they are working to harmonize access control efforts across critical infrastructure as much as practical and remain committed to working towards that end with interagency partners. In regards to establishing goals and objectives to support the Screening Coordination Office’s (SCO) broader strategic framework for harmonization, DHS identified actions to direct SCO to establish updated goals and objectives to support the broader strategic framework for more efficient and effective vetting. Appendix I: Life Cycle Characteristics for Selected Access Control Efforts
To address the research question related to describing key characteristics of selected federal access control efforts, we distributed a standard set of questions to three federal agencies—Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Defense (DOD). | Why GAO Did This Study
Critical infrastructure protection access controls limit access to those with a legitimate need. DHS is the lead federal agency for coordinating critical infrastructure protection efforts with other federal agencies, and partnering with nonfederal stakeholders. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 included a provision for GAO to review critical infrastructure access control efforts.
This report examines (1) key characteristics of selected federally-administered critical infrastructure access control efforts and factors that have an impact on stakeholders' use of them; (2) the extent to which DHS has taken actions to harmonize efforts across critical infrastructure sectors; and (3) the extent to which DHS's SCO has taken actions to harmonize access control efforts across DHS. GAO examined six federally-administered access control efforts across three federal departments. Efforts were selected, among other things, to represent a range of efforts that groups of users—such as truck drivers—may encounter while accessing multiple facilities. GAO interviewed DHS, NRC, and DOD officials and users and operators affected by the efforts and reviewed relevant documents.
What GAO Found
The six selected federally-administered critical infrastructure access control efforts GAO reviewed generally followed similar screening and credentialing processes. Each of these efforts applies to a different type of infrastructure. For example, the Transportation Security Administration's Transportation Worker Identification Credential controls access to ports, the Department of Defense (DOD) Common Access Card controls access to military installations, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates access to commercial nuclear power plants. GAO found that selected characteristics, such as whether a federal agency or another party has responsibility for vetting or what types of prior criminal offenses might disqualify applicants, varied across these access control efforts. In addition, these access control efforts generally affect two groups of stakeholders—users and operators—differently depending on their specific roles and interests. Users are individuals who require access to critical infrastructure as an essential function of their job; while, operators own or manage facilities, such as airports and chemical facilities. Regardless of infrastructure type, users and operators that GAO interviewed reported some common factors that can present challenges in their use of these access controls. For example, both users and operators reported that applicants requiring access to similar types of infrastructure or facilities may be required to submit the same background information multiple times, which can be costly and inefficient.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) relies on partnership models to support collaboration efforts among federal and nonfederal critical infrastructure stakeholders, but has not taken actions to harmonize federally-administered access control efforts across critical infrastructure sectors. According to DHS officials, these partnerships have not explored harmonization of access control efforts across sectors, because this has not been raised as a key issue by the members and because DHS does not have a dedicated forum that would engage user groups in exploring these issues and identifying potential solutions. DHS's partnership models offer a mechanism by which DHS and its partners can explore the challenges users and operators may encounter and determine opportunities for harmonizing the screening and credentialing processes to address these challenges.
DHS's Screening Coordination Office (SCO) has taken actions to support harmonization across DHS access control efforts, but it has not updated its goals and objectives to help guide progress toward the department's broader strategic framework for harmonization. SCO's strategic framework is based on two screening and credentialing policy documents—the 2006 Credentialing Initiative Report and 2008 Credentialing Framework Initiative. According to SCO officials, they continue to rely on these documents to provide their office with a high-level strategic approach, but GAO found that the goals and objectives outlined in the two documents are no longer current or relevant. In recent years, SCO has helped the department make progress toward its harmonization efforts by responding to and assisting with department-wide initiatives and DHS component needs, such as developing new programs or restructuring existing ones. However, without updated goals and objectives, SCO cannot ensure that it is best supporting DHS-wide screening and credentialing harmonization efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) DHS work with partners to identify any opportunities to harmonize access control efforts across critical infrastructure sectors and (2) SCO establish goals and objectives to support its broader strategic framework for harmonization. DHS concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-808T | gao_GAO-06-808T_0 | Background
About 9 months prior to Katrina’s landfall, the NRP was issued to frame the federal response to domestic emergencies ranging from smaller, regional disasters to incidents of national significance. For Katrina, the response heavily relied on the National Guard, which is consistent with DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. The Military Response Was Massive but Faced Several Challenges, Which Provide Lessons for the Future
During its massive response to Hurricane Katrina the military faced many challenges, which provide lessons for improving the future military response to catastrophic natural disasters. The Military Response Was Massive
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the military mounted a massive response that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large active duty ground units beginning on September 3, 2005, 5 days after Katrina’s landfall. Communications problems, like damage assessment problems, were also highlighted following Hurricane Andrew. Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Define and Guide Future Military Responses during Catastrophic Natural Disasters
Operational challenges are inevitable in any large-scale military deployment, but the challenges that the military faced during its response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrate the need for better planning and exercising of catastrophic incidents in order to clearly identify military capabilities that will be needed and the responsibilities that the military will be expected to assume during these incidents. Prior to Katrina, plans and exercises were generally inadequate for a catastrophic natural disaster. Moreover, the plan did not establish time frames for the response. The Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard plans appeared to be adequate for smaller disasters, such as prior hurricanes, but they were insufficient for a catastrophe and did not adequately account for the outside assistance that could be needed during a catastrophe. As a result, when Hurricane Katrina struck, a lack of understanding existed within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that the military might provide, the timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the National Guard and federal military forces. Based on our evaluation of the aforementioned plans and exercises, we made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Second, we recommended that DOD develop detailed plans and exercises to fully account for the unique capabilities and support that the military is likely to provide during a catastrophic incident, specifically addressing damage assessments, communication, search and rescue, and logistics as well as the integration of forces. Finally, we recommended that DOD identify the scalable federal military capabilities it will provide in response to the full range of domestic disasters and catastrophes. DOD Is Taking Steps to Address Lessons Learned
DOD has collected lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina from a variety of sources. Specifically, in responding to our recently issued report, DOD generally concurred with our recommendations for action and told us that it had developed plans to address them. The issues cut across agency boundaries, and thus they cannot be addressed by the military alone. Because of the complexity and long-standing nature of these problems, DOD’s planned and ongoing actions must receive sustained top- management attention, not only at DOD but across the government, in order to effect needed improvements in the military’s support to civil authorities. Appendix I: GAO’s Recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to Improve Military Support and DOD’s Response
Department of Defense (DOD) Response (dated May 5, 2006)
Provide the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security with proposed revisions to the National Response Plan (NRP) that will fully address the proactive functions the military will be expected to perform during a catastrophic incident, for inclusion in the next NRP update. The plans and exercises should specifically address the use of reconnaissance capabilities to assess damage, use of communications capabilities to facilitate support to civil authorities, integration of active component and National Guard and Reserve forces, use of search and rescue capabilities and the military’s role in search and rescue, and role the military might be expected to play in logistics. Direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to work with the state governors and adjutants general to develop and maintain a list of the types of capabilities the National Guard will likely provide in response to domestic natural disasters under state-to-state mutual assistance agreements along with the associated units that could provide these capabilities, and make this information available to the U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and other organizations with federal military support to civil authority planning responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in U.S. history. Despite a large deployment of resources at all levels, many have regarded the federal response as inadequate. GAO has a body of ongoing work that covers the federal government's preparedness and response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This statement summarizes key points from GAO's report on the military's response to Katrina (GAO-06-643), which was issued earlier this month. It addresses (1) the support that the military provided in responding to Hurricane Katrina along with some of the challenges faced and key lessons learned; (2) actions needed to address these lessons, including GAO's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense; and (3) the extent to which the military is taking actions to identify and address the lessons learned. In its report, GAO made several recommendations to improve the military response to catastrophic disasters. The recommendations called for updating the National Response Plan to reflect proactive functions the military could perform in a catastrophic incident; improving military plans and exercises; improving National Guard, Reserve, and active force integration; and resolving response problems associated with damage assessment, communication, search and rescue, and logistics issues. The Department of Defense (DOD) partially concurred with all of the recommendations.
What GAO Found
The military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives, but it also faced several challenges that provide lessons for the future. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, DOD's initial response relied heavily on the National Guard, but active forces were also alerted prior to landfall. Aviation, medical, engineering, and other key capabilities were initially deployed, but growing concerns about the disaster prompted DOD to deploy active ground units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall. Over 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active personnel participated in the response. However, several factors affected the military's ability to gain situational awareness and organize and execute its response, including a lack of timely damage assessments, communications problems, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts, unexpected logistics responsibilities, and force integration issues. A key lesson learned is that additional actions are needed to ensure that the military's significant capabilities are clearly understood, well planned, and fully integrated. As GAO outlined in its recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, many challenges that the military faced during Katrina point to the need for better plans and more robust exercises. Prior to Katrina, disaster plans and exercises did not incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully identify the military capabilities needed to respond to a catastrophe. For example, the National Response Plan made little distinction between the military response to smaller regional disasters and catastrophic natural disasters. In addition, DOD's emergency response plan for providing military assistance to civil authorities during disasters lacked adequate detail. It did not account for the full range of assistance that DOD might provide, address the respective contributions of the National Guard and federal responders, or establish response time frames. National Guard state plans were also inadequate and did not account for the level of outside assistance that would be needed during a catastrophe, and they were not synchronized with federal plans. Moreover, none of the exercises that were conducted prior to Katrina had called for a major deployment of DOD capabilities to respond to a catastrophic hurricane. Without actions to help address planning and exercise inadequacies, a lack of understanding will continue to exist within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in response to a catastrophe; the timing of this assistance; and the respective contributions of the active, Reserve, and National Guard forces. DOD is examining the lessons learned from a variety of sources and is beginning to take actions to address them and prepare for the next catastrophe. It is too early to evaluate DOD's actions, but many appear to hold promise. However, some issues identified after Katrina, such as damage assessments, are long-standing, complex problems that cut across agency boundaries. Thus, substantial improvement will require sustained attention from the highest management levels in DOD and across the government. |
gao_GAO-15-500 | gao_GAO-15-500_0 | EPA’s Procedures for Processing Congressional Requests to the SAB Do Not Ensure Compliance with ERDDAA
EPA’s procedures for processing congressional requests for scientific advice from the SAB do not ensure compliance with ERDDAA because the procedures are incomplete and do not fully account for the statutory access designated congressional committees have to the SAB. Specifically, EPA policy documents do not clearly outline how the EPA Administrator, the SAB staff office, and members of the SAB panel are to handle a congressional committee’s request for advice from the SAB. EPA’s written procedures for processing congressional committee requests to the SAB are found in the SAB charter and in the following two documents that establish general policies for how EPA’s federal advisory committees are to interact with outside parties:
EPA Policy Regarding Communication Between Members of Federal Advisory Committee Act Committees and Parties Outside of the EPA (the April 2014 policy), and
Clarifying EPA Policy Regarding Communications Between Members of Scientific and Technical Federal Advisory Committees and Outside Parties (the November 2014 policy clarification). Specifically, officials told us that EPA considers whether the questions are science or policy driven, whether they are important to science and the agency, and whether the SAB has already undertaken a similar review. In addition, under ERDDAA, the SAB is required to provide requested scientific advice to select committees, regardless of EPA’s judgment. As EPA has not fully responded to the committee’s two 2013 requests to the SAB, by clearly documenting its procedures for reviewing congressional requests to determine which questions should be taken up by the SAB and criteria for evaluating requests, the agency can provide reasonable assurance that its staff process these and other congressional committee requests consistently and in accordance with both FACA and ERDDAA. Such specificity would be consistent with federal standards of internal control that call for clearly documenting internal controls. CASAC Has Provided Certain Types of Advice Related to Air Quality Standards
CASAC has provided certain types of advice related to the review of NAAQS. The Clean Air Act requires CASAC to review air quality criteria and existing NAAQS every 5 years and advise EPA of any adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy effects that may result from various strategies for attainment and maintenance of NAAQS. According to a senior-level EPA official, CASAC has carried out its role in reviewing the air quality criteria and the NAAQS, but has never provided advice on adverse social, economic, or energy effects related to NAAQS because to date EPA has not asked CASAC to do so. In a June 2014 letter to the EPA Administrator, CASAC indicated that, at the agency’s request, it would review the impacts (e.g., the economic or energy impacts) of strategies for attaining or maintaining the NAAQS but stressed that such a review would be separate from reviews of the scientific bases of NAAQS. EPA Has Policies and Guidance to Ensure That the SAB and CASAC Maintain Their Independence from the Agency
EPA has policies and guidance to help ensure that its federal advisory committees maintain their independence from the agency when performing their work. Under GSA regulations for implementing FACA, agencies must develop procedures to ensure that the federal advisory committees are independent from the agency when rendering judgments. EPA policies and guidance to help ensure the independence of its federal advisory committees include general discussions of FACA requirements that apply to all of EPA’s federal advisory committees as well as those specifically for the SAB. This policy states that EPA prohibits managers and other agency leadership from intimidating or coercing scientists to alter scientific data, findings, or professional opinions or to inappropriately influence scientific advisory boards. Under ERDDAA, the SAB is also required to provide scientific advice to designated congressional committees when requested. Appendix I: Changes to the Science Advisory Board Charter
The Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978 (ERDDAA) mandated that EPA establish the SAB and required the SAB to provide the EPA Administrator with scientific advice as requested. | Why GAO Did This Study
EPA formulates rules to protect the environment and public health. To enhance the quality and credibility of such rules, EPA obtains advice and recommendations from the SAB and CASAC—two federal advisory committees that review the scientific and technical basis for EPA decision-making. ERDDAA requires the SAB to provide both the EPA Administrator and designated congressional committees with scientific advice as requested. Amendments to the Clean Air Act established CASAC to, among other things, provide advice to the Administrator on NAAQS.
GAO was asked to look into how the SAB and CASAC are fulfilling their statutory obligations in providing such advice. This report examines (1) the extent to which EPA procedures for processing congressional requests to the SAB ensure compliance with ERDDAA; (2) the extent to which CASAC has provided advice related to NAAQS; and (3) policies EPA has to ensure that the SAB and CASAC maintain their independence when performing their work. GAO reviewed relevant federal regulations and agency documents, and interviewed EPA, SAB, and other relevant officials.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) procedures for processing congressional requests for scientific advice from the Science Advisory Board (SAB) do not ensure compliance with the Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978 (ERDDAA) because these procedures are incomplete. For example, they do not clearly outline how the EPA Administrator, the SAB staff office, and others are to handle a congressional committee's request. While the procedures reflect EPA's responsibility to exercise general management controls over the SAB and all its federal advisory committees under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), including keeping such committees free from outside influence, they do not fully account for the specific access that designated congressional committees have to the SAB under ERDDAA. For example, EPA's policy documents do not establish how EPA will determine which questions would be taken up by the SAB. EPA officials told GAO that in responding to congressional requests, EPA follows the same process that it would apply to internal requests for questions to the SAB, including considering whether the questions are science or policy driven or are important to science and the agency. However, under ERDDAA, the SAB is required to provide requested scientific advice to select committees, regardless of EPA's judgment. By clearly documenting how to handle congressional requests received under ERDDAA consistent with federal standards of internal control, EPA can provide reasonable assurance that its staff process responses consistently and in accordance with the law.
The Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) has provided certain types of advice related to the review of national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), but has not provided others. Under the Clean Air Act, CASAC is to review air quality criteria and existing NAAQS every 5 years and advise EPA of any adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy effects that may result from various strategies for attainment and maintenance of NAAQS. An EPA official stated that CASAC has carried out its role in reviewing the air quality criteria and the NAAQS, but CASAC has never provided advice on adverse social, economic, or energy effects related to NAAQS because EPA has never asked CASAC to do so. In a June 2014 letter to the EPA Administrator, CASAC indicated it would review such effects at the agency's request.
EPA has policies and guidance to help ensure that its federal advisory committees—including the SAB and CASAC—maintain their independence from the agency when the advisory committees perform their work. Under General Services Administration regulations for implementing FACA, an agency must develop procedures to ensure that its federal advisory committees are independent from the agency when rendering judgments. EPA policies and guidance to help ensure the independence of its federal advisory committees include guidance specifically for the SAB and general requirements that apply to all of EPA's federal advisory committees, including the SAB and CASAC. For example, EPA's Scientific Integrity Policy states that EPA prohibits managers and other agency leadership from intimidating or coercing scientists to alter scientific data, findings or professional opinions, or inappropriately influencing scientific advisory boards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that to better ensure compliance with ERDDAA, EPA take steps to improve its procedures for processing congressional committee requests to the SAB for advice. EPA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-618 | gao_GAO-12-618_0 | Specifically, HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing (PIH) had total budgetary resources of approximately $71.2 billion (about 53 percent), the Office of Housing (OH) had about $32.9 billion (approximately 24 percent), and the Office of Community Planning and Development (CPD) had about $21.4 billion (approximately 16 percent). In addition, HUD programs are used to deliver funds for activities associated with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), which is one of the federal government’s key efforts to The stimulate the economy in response to the recent economic crisis. The Cabinet-level OIGs, including the HUD OIG, were established by the IG Act which, among other things, requires each OIG to report specific accomplishments in semiannual reports provided for the Congress. The OIGs also include investigative accomplishments in their semiannual reports. Comparison of the HUD OIG’s Budgets, Staffing, and Monetary Accomplishments with Other Cabinet- Level OIGs
For the 5-year period from fiscal year 2007 through 2011, the HUD OIG had total budgetary resources that were consistently fifth highest out of the 16 Cabinet-level OIGs. In comparison, the HUD OIG’s budgets increased approximately 19 percent, from about $121 million to about $144 million, or less than half of the percentage increase for the total Cabinet-level OIG budgets. When comparing the full-time-equivalent (FTE) staff of the Cabinet-level OIGs during the same period, the HUD OIG was fifth in fiscal year 2011. In prior years the HUD OIG ranked fourth, immediately ahead of the Department of Homeland Security OIG during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, and immediately behind the same OIG during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. The HUD OIG increased its level of FTEs by about 13 percent during the 5-year period, a similar but somewhat smaller increase than the approximately 17 percent average increase in FTEs for all the Cabinet-level OIGs. During each year of the 5-year period, from fiscal years 2007 through 2011, the HUD OIG’s reported monetary accomplishments compared with its total budgetary resources resulted in estimated annual returns on each total budget resource dollar received. In addition, HUD’s OIG reported that total monetary accomplishments from audits, inspections, and investigations over the 5-year period were approximately $9.2 billion. When compared to the HUD OIG’s total budgetary resources for the entire 5-year period of $675 million, the estimated average return for each total budgetary resource dollar received was about $13.62. When compared to the average 5-year return on total budgetary resource dollars for all 16 Cabinet-level OIGs, HUD OIG’s return was again similar, but somewhat higher. HUD’s OIG Reported Oversight and Accomplishments in HUD’s Three Largest Program Offices
The HUD OIG reported providing the majority of audits and inspections in HUD’s three largest program offices during fiscal years 2007 through 2011. Specifically, the OIG reported a total of 905 audit and inspection reports, which included reviews of the efficiency and effectiveness of HUD’s management and program operations, and audits of HUD’s financial statements during the 5-year period. Of these reports, 810— about 90 percent—addressed HUD programs administered by PIH, OH, and CPD. The HUD OIG also reported opening a total of 6,149 investigative cases, with most of them providing investigative coverage of HUD’s three largest program offices during the 5-year period. in potential savings from audit and inspection Of the almost $6.94 billion in reported potential monetary savings from audits and inspections, approximately $2.46 billion (about 36 percent), was in HUD’s three largest program offices. Of the remaining amount, about $4.45 billion (approximately 64 percent), was mostly from a financial control deficiency and not directly related to HUD’s large program offices. Also, over the same period, the HUD OIG reported monetary accomplishments of about $381.3 million related to OH-administered programs. Approximately $1.2 billion (about 86 percent), of these recoveries were from investigations in OH’s housing programs administered by FHA. For investigative recoveries related to other HUD offices, the OIG reported about $94.5 million in PIH- administered programs, and investigations of CPD-administered programs resulted in about $63.4 million in investigative recoveries during the same 5-year period. With respect to recent increases in HUD oversight responsibilities, the HUD OIG reported investigative activities that focused on CDBG grants that included federal funding for hurricane and disaster assistance. As a result, the OIG reported a total of 308 convictions, pleas, and mistrials and 200 administrative and civil actions during the 5-year period. Agency Comments
In written comments on a draft of this report, the HUD IG generally concurred with the report contents. | Why GAO Did This Study
The joint explanatory statement for the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, called for GAO to report on the resources of the HUD OIG in light of HUDs recently expanded roles and responsibilities. In response, GAO (1) compared the budgets, staffing levels, and monetary accomplishments of the HUD OIG to that of comparable OIGs during recent years, and (2) described the results of the HUD OIGs oversight of HUDs programs.
GAO compared the budget and staff resources of the HUD OIG with that of other Cabinet-level department OIGs for the 5-year period from fiscal year 2007 through 2011. GAO also summarized the monetary accomplishments of the HUD OIG and other OIGs as reported in their semiannual reports to the Congress, and compared the results with their total budgetary resources to obtain a return on each budget dollar received.
In addition, GAO summarized and described the HUD OIGs reported oversight coverage and monetary and nonmonetary accomplishments from audit and inspection reports and investigative cases that addressed HUDs largest program offices from fiscal year 2007 through 2011.
What GAO Found
During the 5-year period from fiscal year 2007 through 2011, the Department of Housing and Urban Developments (HUD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) had budget and staffing resources that were consistent with other OIGs, and a monetary return for each budget dollar which exceeded the average return for Cabinet-level OIGs. During the 5-year period, the HUD OIG had total budgetary resources ranging from $121 million to $144 million, consistently ranking it fifth among all Cabinet-level OIGs. However, while the total budgetary resources for all Cabinet-level OIGs increased by about 45 percent over the 5-year period, the HUD OIGs total budgetary resources increased by 19 percent. In terms of staffing, the HUD OIGs full-time-equivalent staff (FTE) consistently ranked in the top four or five of the Cabinet-level OIGs. Also, the HUD OIGs FTEs increased by about 13 percent during the 5-year period, as compared to about a 17 percent average increase for all Cabinet-level OIGs. During the same 5-year period, the HUD OIG reported an estimated average dollar return of about $13.62 for each HUD OIG total budgetary dollar received, while the 16 OIGs in the Cabinet-level departments reported an estimated average dollar return of about $11.12 for each OIG total budget dollar received over the same period.
The HUD OIG reported the majority of its audit, inspection, and investigative coverage in the three largest HUD program offices during fiscal years 2007 through 2011. Specifically, of the OIGs reported 905 total audit and inspection reports completed over the 5-year period, 90 percent addressed programs in HUDs Offices of Public and Indian Housing, Housing, and Community Planning and Development, which comprised about 93 percent of HUDs fiscal year 2011 total budgetary resources. Also, of the 6149 investigative cases opened during this same period, almost 95 percent involved programs in these same offices. In addition, the OIGs reports and investigative cases focused on HUDs responsibilities related to recent increases in hurricane and disaster relief funds and HUDs implementation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), administered through these HUD program offices. Also, of the almost $6.94 billion in reported potential monetary savings from the OIGs audits and inspections, approximately $2.46 billion (about 36 percent), were in the three largest HUD program offices. Of the remaining amount, approximately $4.45 billion (about 64 percent), was mostly from a financial control deficiency not directly related to the three large program offices, and an additional $28.4 million resulted from audits and inspections of hurricane relief and disaster assistance not reported as part of a specific HUD program. Of the OIGs reported $1.39 billion in investigative recoveries during the 5-year period, approximately $1.2 billion (about 86 percent), was related to mortgage fraud investigations in programs administered by HUDs Office of Housing. The OIG also reported an additional $866 million in potential savings from other investigative efforts throughout HUDs programs during the 5-year period. In addition, the OIG reported nonmonetary accomplishments primarily from investigations in HUDs three largest program offices, which resulted in 4,759 convictions, pleas, and mistrials, and 5,761 administrative and civil actions during the 5-year period.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. The HUD Inspector General concurred with the contents of the draft report. |
gao_GAO-12-535 | gao_GAO-12-535_0 | In federal fiscal year 2011, states used about 29 percent of their TANF funds on basic assistance that included cash assistance for needy families, and the remaining funds were spent on other purposes, such as child care, employment programs, and child welfare services. Electronic benefit cards—both EBT and EPC—generally can be used like traditional debit or credit cards, in that recipients can use them at ATMs to withdraw cash, or at retailers’ POS terminals for purchases or to receive cash by selecting a cash-back option. In its notice, HHS identified multiple questions for states to answer, including questions on the methods states use to track the locations where transactions occur, challenges states experienced when implementing any restrictions on transactions at certain locations, the initial and ongoing costs of restrictions, the effectiveness of restrictions and the factors influencing the effectiveness, and any concerns that have been raised about the restrictions, among other things. Some States Are Restricting Certain TANF Transactions, but Face Challenges Because of Data Limitations and Other Factors
Six of the 10 states we reviewed have taken steps to prevent certain types of inappropriate TANF transactions—restrictions that in some cases are broader than recent federal requirements that require states to take steps aimed at preventing transactions in casinos, liquor stores, and adult-entertainment establishments. At the time these efforts were undertaken, there were no federal requirements that required states to take steps aimed at restricting such transactions. In addition, EBT transaction data from federal fiscal year 2010 from 4 of the 10 selected states were generally incomplete or unreliable, and were of limited use to the states for systematically identifying or monitoring inappropriate locations. Some States Have Attempted to Restrict TANF Transactions
Six of the 10 states we selected and reviewed have taken steps to prevent certain types of TANF transactions; these actions vary in their degree and means of implementation, from widespread disabling of EBT access at ATMs in certain locations across a state to, according to officials from one state, passing a law without implementing steps for enforcing it. The restrictions generally involve prohibiting the use of EBT cards at certain locations or prohibiting purchases of certain goods or services, or both, as shown in figure 1 below. In 4 of the 10 selected states, there were no restrictions on TANF transactions, as no transactions were unauthorized based on the location of the transactions or the nature of the goods or services purchased. However, until HHS issues regulations or provides further guidance as to what policies and practices are sufficient to comply with the new federal requirements, it is unclear to what extent the various restrictions implemented by states would be in compliance. The experience of these states—especially any information related to the cost-effectiveness and success rates for various restrictions—could be beneficial for HHS to consider as it works toward determining what policies and practices are sufficient to comply with the new federal law. Addressing the limitations we found in transaction data that impede the identification and monitoring of certain locations could require significant resources. Therefore, restriction methods that do not rely on flawed transaction data may be the most practical, such as Washington state’s requirement for businesses to independently disable EBT access or risk losing or not obtaining their state licenses to operate. Agency and State Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. In addition, HHS stated that our report’s findings and analysis will be helpful as HHS drafts implementing regulations relevant to these TANF requirements. HHS also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. We also interviewed officials from the top 10 states in terms of TANF basic block- grant dollars—California, New York, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Florida, Texas, Massachusetts, and Washington. The industry stakeholders included: JP Morgan Chase and Affiliated Computer Services, the two largest vendors providing TANF electronic benefit card services to the states; the Electronic Funds Transfer Association, an industry trade association that conducts work related to electronic benefit card services for government agencies at the federal and state level; the National Conference of State Legislatures, a bipartisan organization that provides research and other services to state legislators and their staff; and the American Public Human Services Association, a bipartisan, nonprofit organization representing appointed state and local health and human-services agency commissioners. We selected these 4 states based on geographical diversity. The results of our analysis of these 4 states’ data cannot be generalized to other states. Such monitoring might include an assessment of the prevalence of transactions at certain locations. We also assessed whether the data would allow states to identify individual TANF transactions at certain types of locations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The TANF block grant program provides federal grants to states for various benefits and activities, including cash welfare for needy families with children. TANF is overseen at the federal level by HHS, and administered by states. Most states disburse TANF cash assistance through electronic benefit cards, which can be used to withdraw money or make purchases. Media coverage highlighted cases of cardholders accessing benefits at casinos and other locations that were considered inconsistent with the purpose of TANF. In February 2012, Congress passed a law requiring states to prevent certain transactions at casinos, liquor stores, and adult-entertainment establishments. Within 2 years of enactment, the law also requires HHS to oversee states compliance with these requirements.
GAO was asked to review the ability of TANF recipients to withdraw TANF funds at certain locations inconsistent with the purpose of TANF, such as gambling or other establishments. To do so, GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from HHS, key industry stakeholders, and the top 10 states in TANF basic block grant dollars. GAO also assessed the completeness and accuracy of EBT transaction data from federal fiscal year 2010 from 4 of the 10 states selected. GAO selected these 4 states on the basis of geographical diversity, and the results of this data analysis cannot be generalized to other states.
What GAO Found
Six of the 10 states reviewed by GAO took steps aimed at preventing certain Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) transactions determined to be inconsistent with the purpose of TANF, despite no federal requirement to do so at the time. Restrictions are based on selected states laws, executive orders, and other regulations, and generally cover certain locations or certain types of purchases such as alcohol. In some cases, states restrictions are broader than the new federal requirements. These restrictions vary in their degree and means of implementation, including widespread disabling of Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) access at automated teller machines located at certain locations across a state, such as at casinos. The other 4 states had no restrictions because no laws, executive orders, or other regulations prohibited certain transactions based on the location of the transactions or the nature of the goods or services purchased. These states did not implement restrictions due to concerns about cost-effectiveness or technical limitations, according to state officials.
Challenges experienced by states in implementing their current restrictions could inhibit future restriction efforts, including those intended to address new federal requirements. These challenges included difficulties with identifying certain locations that could be prohibited and limitations in available data. For example, the transaction data states receive do not contain information that is accurate or detailed enough for them to identify locations that can potentially be prohibited or restricted. State officials suggested that improvements in the completeness and accuracy of transaction data might better enable them to prevent such transactions. In its assessment of the EBT transaction data from 4 states, GAO found that the data are insufficient for systematic monitoring. To effectively conduct systematic monitoring, including the identification of locations that could be blocked from TANF access, data should be complete and accurate. However, addressing the limitations that GAO found in the transaction datasuch as requiring accurate merchant category codes for retailerscould involve significant resources. States that prohibit certain types of purchases generally do not have ways to track what items recipients buy with their cards, partially due to the lack of information in transaction data on specific goods or services purchased. States were also challenged in attempting to track the spending of cash withdrawn with cards. With no controls on how or where individuals spend withdrawn cash, a recipient could withdraw money at an authorized location and use it at certain locations or for certain purchases restricted by some states.
As of July 2012, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was at the beginning of its rulemaking process and did not yet know what form its regulations would take. Until HHS issues regulations or provides further guidance as to what policies and practices are sufficient to comply with new federal requirements, it is unclear to what extent the various restrictions implemented by states would be in compliance. States restrictions could help inform HHSs oversight efforts, especially any information on the cost-effectiveness and success rates for various state restrictions. Restriction methods that do not rely on flawed transaction data may be the most practical.
We provided HHS with a draft of our report for comment. HHS stated that our reports findings and analysis will be helpful as it drafts implementing regulations, and it provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-519T | gao_GAO-09-519T_0 | Selected Case Studies of Fraud and Abuse Outside the Washington, D.C., Metro Area
HUBZone program fraud and abuse continues to be problematic for the federal government. We identified 19 firms in Texas, Alabama, and California participating in the HUBZone program even though they clearly do not meet program requirements (i.e., principal office location or percentage of employees residing in the HUBZone and subcontracting limitations). Although we cannot conclude whether this is a systemic problem based on these cases, the issue of misrepresentation clearly extends beyond the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area where we conducted our initial investigation. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, federal agencies had obligated nearly $30 million to these 19 firms for performance as the prime contractor on federal HUBZone contracts. When a firm subcontracts the majority of its work to other non-HUBZone firms, it is undermining the HUBZone program’s stated purpose of stimulating development in economically distressed areas, as well as evading eligibility requirements for principal office and 35 percent residency requirement. In addition, our investigation found that no employees were located at the location listed as a principal office. SBA Has Not Incorporated Effective Fraud Controls
Our June 2008 report and July 2008 testimony clearly showed that SBA did not have effective internal controls related to the HUBZone program. To that end, SBA has hired business consultants and reached out to GAO in an attempt to identify control weaknesses in the HUBZone program and to strengthen its fraud prevention controls. As of the end of our fieldwork, SBA did not have in place the key elements of an effective fraud prevention system. For the HUBZone program this would mean (1) front-end controls at the application stage, (2) fraud detection and monitoring of firms already in the program, and (3) decertification from the program of ineligible firms and the aggressive pursuit and prosecution of individuals committing fraud. Detection and monitoring. We reported in June 2008 that the mechanisms SBA used to monitor HUBZone firms provided limited assurance that only eligible firms participate in the program. Investigation and prosecution. SBA Has Initiated Some Enforcement Actions against 10 HUBZone Firms Previously Investigated by GAO
SBA has taken some enforcement steps on the 10 firms that we found did not meet HUBZone program requirements as of July 2008. However, SBA’s failure to examine some of the most egregious cases we previously identified has resulted in an additional $7.2 million in HUBZone obligations and about $25 million in HUBZone set-aside or price preference contracts to these firms. In the written statement for the July 2008 hearing, the Acting Administrator of SBA stated that SBA would take “immediate steps to require site visits for those HUBZone firms that have received HUBZone contracts and will be instituting suspension and debarment proceedings against firms that have intentionally misrepresented their HUBZone status.” However, as of February 2009, according to SBA’s Dynamic Small Business Web site, 7 of the 10 firms that we investigated were still HUBZone certified. SBA officials stated that no action will be taken on 3 firms because SBA’s program evaluations concluded that these firms met all the eligibility requirements of the HUBZone program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Created in 1997, the HUBZone program provides federal contracting assistance to small businesses in economically distressed communities, or HUBZone areas, with the intent of stimulating economic development in those areas. On July 17, 2008, we testified before Congress that SBA's lack of controls over the HUBZone program exposed the government to fraud and abuse and that SBA's mechanisms to certify and monitor HUBZone firms provide limited assurance that only eligible firms participate in the program. In our testimony, we identified 10 firms from the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area that were participating in the HUBZone program even though they clearly did not meet eligibility requirements. Of the 10 firms, 6 did not meet both principal office and employee residency requirements while 4 met the principal office requirement but significantly failed the employee residency requirement. We reported in our July 2008 testimony that federal agencies had obligated a total of nearly $26 million in HUBZone contract obligations to these 10 firms since 2006. After the hearing, Congress requested that we perform a follow-on investigation. We describe the results of this investigation and further background about the HUBZone program in a companion report that is being made public today. This testimony will summarize our overall findings. Specifically, this testimony will address (1) whether cases of fraud and abuse in the program exist outside of the Washington, D.C., metro area; (2) what actions, if any, SBA has taken to establish an effective fraud prevention system for the HUBZone program; and (3) what actions, if any, SBA has taken on the 10 firms that we found misrepresented their HUBZone status in July 2008.
What GAO Found
In summary, we found that fraud and abuse in the HUBZone program extends beyond the Washington, D.C., area. We identified 19 firms in Texas, Alabama, and California participating in the HUBZone program that clearly do not meet program requirements (i.e., principal office location or percentage of employees in HUBZone and subcontracting limitations). In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, federal agencies obligated nearly $30 million to these 19 firms for performance as the prime contractor on HUBZone contracts and a total of $187 million on all federal contracts. Although SBA has initiated steps to strengthen its internal controls as a result of our 2008 testimonies and report, substantial work remains for incorporating a fraud prevention system that includes effective fraud controls consisting of (1) front-end controls at the application stage, (2) fraud detection and monitoring of firms already in the program, and (3) the aggressive pursuit and prosecution of individuals committing fraud. SBA has taken some enforcement steps on the 10 firms previously identified by GAO that knowingly did not meet HUBZone program requirements. However, as of February 2009, according to SBA's Dynamic Small Business Web site, 7 of the 10 firms that we investigated were still HUBZone certified. SBA's failure to promptly remove firms from the HUBZone program and examine some of the most egregious cases from our testimony has resulted in an additional $7.2 million in HUBZone obligations and about $25 million in HUBZone contracts to these firms. |
gao_GAO-07-426T | gao_GAO-07-426T_0 | Turning to Iraq, DOD has relied extensively on contractors to undertake major reconstruction projects and provide support to its troops. Reconstruction and support contracts are often cost-reimbursement-type contracts, which allow the contractor to be reimbursed for reasonable, allowable, and allocable costs to the extent prescribed in the contracts. For example, we reported that as of March 2004, about $1.8 billion had been obligated on reconstruction contract actions without DOD and the contractors reaching agreement on the final scope and price of the work. However, as our December 2006 report made clear, DOD’s guidance does not address a number of problems we have repeatedly raised—such as the need to provide adequate contract oversight personnel, to collect and share lessons learned on the use of contractors supporting deployed forces, and to provide DOD commanders and contract oversight personnel with training on the use of contractors overseas prior to their deployment. Without such visibility, senior leaders and military commanders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on contractors to support their operations. Also, when senior military leaders began to develop a base consolidation plan, officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed and therefore ran the risk of over- or under-building the capacity of the consolidated bases. A Deteriorating Security Situation Continues to Hamper Reconstruction Efforts
The security situation continues to deteriorate, impeding the management and execution of reconstruction efforts. For example, the State Department has reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi army and police forces has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to about 323,000 in December 2006. For example, the number of Iraqi army battalions in the lead for counterinsurgency operations has increased from 21 in March 2005 to 89 in October 2006. Understanding the true capabilities of the Iraqi security forces is essential for the Congress to make fully informed decisions in connection with its authorization, appropriations, and oversight responsibilities. The aggregate nature of these reports, however, does not provide comprehensive information on the capabilities and needs of individual units. This information is found in unit-level Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports. The Iraqi Government Currently Lacks the Capacity to Sustain and Continue Reconstruction and Security Efforts
While the United States has spent billions of dollars rebuilding the infrastructure and developing Iraqi security forces, U.S. and World Bank assessments have found that the Iraqi government’s ability to sustain and maintain reconstruction efforts is hindered by several factors, including the lack of capacity in Iraq’s key ministries and widespread corruption, and the inability of the Iraqi government to spend its 2006 capital budget for key infrastructure projects. Iraqi government institutions are undeveloped and confront significant challenges in staffing a competent, non-aligned civil service; using modern technology and managing resources effectively; and effectively fighting corruption. According to U.S. officials, 20 to 30 percent of the Ministry of Interior staff are ghost employees. Further, corruption in Iraq is reportedly widespread and poses a major challenge to building an effective Iraqi government and could jeopardize future flows of needed international assistance. Unclear budgeting and procurement rules have affected Iraq’s efforts to spend capital budgets effectively and efficiently, according to U.S. officials. While the Ministry of Oil’s $3.5 billion 2006 capital project’s budget targeted key enhancements to the country’s oil production, distribution, and export facilities, as of August 2006, the ministry had spent less than 1 percent of these budgeted funds. Furthermore, the U.S. and the international community will need to support the Iraqi government’s efforts to enhance its capacity to govern effectively and efficiently if it is to make a positive difference in the daily lives of the Iraqi people. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied extensively on contractors to undertake major reconstruction projects and provide support to its deployed forces, but these efforts have not always achieved desired outcomes. Further, the Iraqi government must be able to reduce violence, sustain reconstruction progress, improve basic services, and make a positive difference in the daily lives of the Iraqi people. This statement discusses (1) factors affecting DOD's ability to promote successful acquisition outcomes on its contracts for reconstruction and for support to deployed forces in Iraq, (2) the deteriorating security situation and the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, and (3) issues affecting the Iraqi government's ability to support and sustain future reconstruction progress. The testimony is based upon our work on Iraq reconstruction and stabilization efforts, DOD contracting activities, and DOD's use of support contractors spanning several years. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
The challenges faced by DOD on its reconstruction and support contracts often reflect systemic and long-standing shortcomings in DOD's capacity to manage contractor efforts. Such shortcomings result from poorly defined or changing requirements, the use of poor business arrangements, the absence of senior leadership and guidance, and an insufficient number of trained contracting, acquisition and other personnel to manage, assess and oversee contractor performance. In turn, these shortcomings manifest themselves in higher costs to taxpayers, schedule delays, unmet objectives, and other undesirable outcomes. For example, because DOD authorized contractors to begin work before reaching agreement on the scope and price of that work, DOD paid millions of dollars in costs that were questioned by the Defense Contract Audit Agency. Similarly, DOD lacks visibility on the extent to which they rely on contractors to support their operations. When senior military leaders began to develop a base consolidation plan, officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed and therefore ran the risk of over- or under-building the capacity of the consolidated bases. U.S. reconstruction efforts also continue to be hampered by a security situation that continues to deteriorate. Although the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces increased to about 323,000 in December 2006 and more Iraqi Army units have taken the lead for counterinsurgency operations, attacks on coalition and Iraqi security forces and civilians have all increased. Aggregate numbers of trained and equipped Iraqi forces, however, do not provide information on the capabilities and needs of individual units. GAO has made repeated attempts to obtain unit-level Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) without success. This information is essential for the Congress to make fully informed decisions in connection with its authorization, appropriations, and oversight responsibilities. As the U.S. attempts to turn over its reconstruction efforts, the capacity of the Iraqi government to continue overall reconstruction progress is undermined by shortfalls in the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, widespread corruption and the inability to fund and execute projects for which funds were previously budgeted. Iraqi government institutions are undeveloped and confront significant challenges in staffing a competent, nonaligned civil service; using modern technology; and managing resources and personnel effectively. For example, according to U.S. officials 20 to 30 percent of the Ministry of Interior staff are "ghost employees" whose salaries are collected by other officials. Further, corruption in Iraq poses a major challenge to building an effective Iraqi government and could jeopardize future flows of needed international assistance. Unclear budgeting and procurement rules have affected Iraq's efforts to spend capital budgets effectively and efficiently, according to U.S. officials. At the Ministry of Oil, for example, less than 1 percent of the $3.5 billion budgeted in 2006 for key enhancements to the country's oil production, distribution, and export facilities, had been spent as of August 2006. |
gao_GAO-04-707 | gao_GAO-04-707_0 | Although it is one federal program, Medicaid consists of 56 distinct state-level programs created within broad federal guidelines and administered by state Medicaid agencies. States are responsible for ensuring proper payment and recovering misspent funds. With varying levels of staff and resources, states conduct Medicaid program integrity activities that include screening providers and monitoring provider billing patterns. States have prosecuted providers that bill for services, drugs, and supplies that are not authorized or are not provided. States’ investigators have also uncovered deliberate provider upcoding—billing for more expensive procedures than were actually provided—to increase their Medicaid reimbursement. States Report a Variety of Approaches to Prevent and Detect Improper Payments
States take various approaches to conducting program integrity activities that can result in substantial cost savings. Expanded measures applied to high-risk providers include on-site inspections of the applicant’s facility prior to enrollment, criminal background checks, requirements to obtain surety bonds that protect the state against certain financial losses, and time-limited enrollment. Thirty- four of the states that completed our inventory reported using at least one of these enrollment controls. On-site Inspections
Twenty-nine states reported conducting on-site inspections for providers considered at high-risk for inappropriate billing before allowing them to enroll or reenroll in their Medicaid programs. Of the 47 states that completed our inventory, 34 reported targeting their reviews to claims from high-risk providers. These states developed data warehouses to store several years of information on claims, providers, and beneficiaries in integrated databases, and they use data-mining software to look for unusual patterns that might indicate provider abuse. For example, a state can link related service claims, such as emergency transportation invoices and hospital emergency department claims for the same client. In Some States, Legislative Initiatives Have Played an Important Role in Medicaid Program Integrity Efforts
Many states have made Medicaid program integrity a priority, either through directives to employ certain preventive or detection controls or by expanding enforcement authority to use against providers that bill improperly. CMS Pilot Links Information on Providers That Bill Both Medicare and Medicaid
In another effort to support states’ program integrity activities, CMS facilitates the sharing of health benefit and claims information between the Medicaid and Medicare programs. In addition, states use TAG to communicate and propose policy changes to CMS. However, CMS’s efforts to change the policy have not been successful. CMS conducts on-site reviews to assess whether state Medicaid program integrity efforts comply with federal requirements, such as those governing provider enrollment, claims review, utilization control, and coordination with each state’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit. From January 2000 through December 2003, CMS completed reviews of 29 states. At its current pace of conducting eight state compliance reviews each year, CMS would not begin a second round of nationwide reviews before fiscal year 2007. For fiscal year 2004, CMS allocated eight staff nationally—about four full-time equivalent (FTE) staff in headquarters and four FTEs distributed across the agency’s 10 regional offices—and an operating budget of $26,000 for overseeing the states’ Medicaid program integrity activities, including the cost of conducting compliance reviews. At the peak of its funding in fiscal year 2002, CMS’s operating budget for these activities was about $80,000. According to agency officials, the size of the federal Medicaid program integrity group relative to its responsibilities has resulted in its use of Medicare’s program integrity resources to help implement pilot projects and conduct technical assistance activities. The state agency also did not investigate potential instances of fraud and abuse identified by its SURS unit or beneficiary complaints, or make the required referrals to the state Medicaid Fraud Control Unit. CMS has pointed to its compliance reviews of the states’ program integrity activities as providing the agency with information on the states’ strengths and vulnerabilities to improper payments. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, CMS officials took issue with our observation that the level of resources devoted to federal oversight of states’ program integrity activities may be inconsistent with the financial risks to the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
During fiscal year 2002, Medicaid--a program jointly funded by the federal government and the states--provided health care coverage for about 51 million low-income Americans. That year, Medicaid benefit payments reached approximately $244 billion, of which the federal share was about $139 billion. The program is administered by state Medicaid agencies with oversight provided by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in the Department of Health and Human Services. Medicaid's size and diversity make it vulnerable to improper payments that can result from fraud, abuse, or clerical errors. States conduct program integrity activities to prevent, or detect and recover, improper payments. This report provides information on (1) the types of provider fraud and abuse problems that state Medicaid programs have identified, (2) approaches states take to ensure that Medicaid funds are paid appropriately, and (3) CMS's efforts to support and oversee state program integrity activities. To address these issues, we compiled an inventory of states' Medicaid program integrity activities, conducted site visits in eight states, and interviewed CMS's Medicaid program integrity staff.
What GAO Found
Various forms of fraud and abuse have resulted in substantial financial losses to states and the federal government. Fraudulent and abusive billing practices committed by providers include billing for services, drugs, equipment, or supplies not provided or not needed. Providers have also been found to bill for more expensive procedures than actually provided. In recent cases, 15 clinical laboratories in one state billed Medicaid $20 million for services that had not been ordered, an optical store falsely claimed $3 million for eyeglass replacements, and a medical supply company agreed to repay states nearly $50 million because of fraudulent marketing practices. States report that their Medicaid program integrity activities generated cost savings by applying certain measures to providers considered to be at high risk for inappropriate billing and by generally strengthening their program controls for all providers. Thirty-four of the 47 states that completed our inventory reported using one or more enrollment controls with their high-risk providers, such as on-site inspections of the applicant's facility, criminal background checks, or probationary or time-limited enrollment. States also reported using information technology to integrate databases containing provider, beneficiary, and claims information and conduct more efficient utilization reviews. For example, 34 states reported conducting targeted claims reviews to identify unusual patterns that might indicate provider abuse. In addition, states cited legislation that directed the use of certain preventive or detection controls or authorized enhanced enforcement powers as lending support to their Medicaid program integrity efforts. At the federal level, CMS is engaged in several initiatives designed to support states' program integrity efforts; however, its oversight of these state efforts is limited. CMS initiatives include two pilots, one to measure the accuracy of each state's Medicaid claims payments and another to identify aberrant provider billing by linking Medicaid and Medicare claims information. CMS also provides technical assistance to states by sponsoring monthly teleconferences where states can discuss emerging issues and propose policy changes. To monitor Medicaid program integrity activities, CMS teams conduct on-site reviews of states' compliance with federal requirements, such as referring certain cases to the state agency responsible for investigating Medicaid fraud. In fiscal year 2004, CMS allocated $26,000 and eight staff positions nationally for overseeing the states' Medicaid program integrity activities, including the cost of compliance reviews. With this level of resources, CMS aims to review 8 states each year until all 50 states and the District of Columbia have been covered. From January 2000 through December 2003, CMS has conducted reviews of 29 states and, at its current pace, would not begin a second round of reviews before fiscal year 2007. This level of effort suggests that CMS's oversight of the states' Medicaid program integrity efforts may be disproportionately small relative to the risk of serious financial loss. |
gao_GAO-02-793 | gao_GAO-02-793_0 | FTC’s mission is, in part, to prevent business practices that are anticompetitive, deceptive, or unfair to consumers. These applications also must be placed on the record for public comment generally for 30 days. FTC Developed Preferences for Clean Sweep Divestitures, Single Buyers, and Up- Front Buyers During the Mid-1990s
According to FTC staff, FTC decisions to use particular divestiture approaches are (1) based on the unique facts of each case and do not readily translate into written guidelines or systematic aggregation and (2) tied to proprietary company information that FTC is statutorily prohibited from disclosing to the public. Clean Sweep Divestitures, Single Buyers, and Up-Front Buyers Have Been Used Across Retail Industries, but Have Been Increasingly Used in Grocery Store Divestitures Since Fiscal Year 1996
During fiscal years 1990 through 2000, clean sweep divestitures, single buyers, and/or up-front buyers were used in the 31 divestiture orders in the four industries we reviewed—grocery stores, drug stores, funeral services, and gas stations—although up-front buyers were not used at all prior to fiscal year 1996. FTC Has Not Measured the Impact of Its Divestiture Practices Since Announcing Changes in the Mid- 1990s
FTC has not systematically measured the success or failure of the divestitures it has approved since it developed preferences for approaches like clean sweep and up-front buyers. In 1999, FTC reported the results of the Bureau of Competition staff’s study of divestiture orders made final during fiscal years 1990 through 1994 that, according to FTC staff, confirmed the need to make the changes that FTC had made starting in the mid-1990s. Consequently, FTC cannot state that recent divestiture orders have, among other things, maintained or restored competition in the affected markets, or that smaller buyers continue to be as competitive as their larger counterparts in operating the divested assets. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) the history of Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) clean sweep divestiture, single buyer, and up-front buyer practices within the context of FTC’s overall merger remedies, and the circumstances under which these practices have been used; (2) the extent of FTC’s use of these practices in the grocery store, drug store, funeral services, and gas station industries; (3) the level of small business participation in purchasing divested assets in the four industries and the factors that may explain the level of small business participation; and (4) FTC’s efforts to gauge the success or failure of these divestiture practices and the impact of these practices on the marketplace, especially small businesses. Approval Process for Proposed Consent Agreement
FTC staff negotiate a proposed consent agreement with the merging parties. Divestitures
Most orders relating to a merger will require a divestiture—the selling of a business or assets by one or both of the merging parties—in order to maintain or restore the level of competition that existed before the merger. | What GAO Found
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) seeks to prevent business practices that are anticompetitive, deceptive, or unfair to consumers. If FTC determines that a merger may harm competition in the marketplace, the agency may decide to block the merger or select a remedy that addresses the anticompetitive problems it has identified. FTC's preferred remedy is divestiture--the selling of a business or assets by one or both of the merging parties to maintain or restore competition where it might be harmed by the merger. When divestiture is chosen as a remedy, FTC usually drafts a proposed agreement with the merging parties that contains an order requiring the divestiture needed to remedy the anticompetitive problems. If all parties agree, FTC issues a proposed order which is made available to the public for comment for 30 days and, in most cases, authorizes the parties to consummate the merger. According to FTC staff, FTC decisions to use particular divestiture approaches are (1) based on the unique facts of each case and do not readily translate into written guidelines or systematic aggregation and (2) tied to proprietary company information that FTC is statutorily prohibited from disclosing to the public. From fiscal years 1990 through 2000, FTC used clean sweep divestitures, single buyers, or up-front buyers in the 31 divestiture orders announced for public comment in the grocery store, drug store, funeral services, and gas station industries (up-front buyers were not used at all in these industries prior to fiscal year 1996). Although there were too few buyers to analyze the level of smaller business participation in purchasing divested drug store, funeral services, and gas station assets for the period reviewed, GAO's analysis found that, after 1996, the smaller buyers were significantly less likely to purchase divested assets. FTC has not systematically measured the success or failure of the divestitures it has approved since it developed preferences for approaches like clean sweep and up-front buyers. In 1999, FTC reported the results of a study on divestiture orders made final during fiscal years 1990 through 1994 that found (1) FTC's divestiture orders had created viable competitors in the relevant markets and (2) smaller buyers succeeded at least at the same rate as larger buyers. However, without current information on the economic impact of its divestiture practices on the marketplace, especially given the changes it has made since the period covered by its 1999 study, FTC cannot state that divestiture orders have, among other things, restored or maintained competition in the affected markets. |
gao_GAO-09-216 | gao_GAO-09-216_0 | Overall, responsibilities for overseeing the financial services industry are shared among almost a dozen federal banking, securities, futures, and other regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations (SRO), and hundreds of state financial regulatory agencies. Changes in Financial Institutions and Their Products Have Significantly Challenged the U.S. Financial Regulatory System
Several key developments in financial markets and products in the past few decades have significantly challenged the existing financial regulatory structure. A second development has been the emergence of large and sometimes less-regulated market participants, such as hedge funds and credit rating agencies, which now play key roles in our financial markets. Finally, despite the increasingly global aspects of financial markets, the current fragmented U.S. regulatory structure has complicated some efforts to coordinate internationally with other regulators. Largely as the result of waves of mergers and consolidations, the number of financial institutions today has declined. Based on a worldwide sample of the top 500 financial services firms in assets, the study found that the percentage of the largest financial institutions in the United States that are conglomerates— financial institutions having substantial operations in more than one of the sectors (banking, securities, and insurance)—increased from 42 percent of the U.S. financial institutions in the sample in 1995 to 62 percent in 2000. Existing Regulatory System Failed to Adequately Address Problems Associated with Less-Regulated Entities That Played Significant Roles in the U.S. Financial System
A second dramatic development in U.S. financial markets in recent decades has been the increasingly critical roles played by less-regulated entities. Increased Complexity and Other Factors Have Challenged Accounting Standard Setters and Regulators
As new and increasingly complex financial products have become more common, FASB and SEC have also faced challenges in trying to ensure that accounting and financial reporting requirements appropriately meet the needs of investors and other financial market participants. Standard setters and regulators also face new challenges in dealing with global convergence of accounting and auditing standards. A Framework for Crafting and Assessing Alternatives for Reforming the U.S. Financial Regulatory System
The U.S. regulatory system is a fragmented and complex system of federal and state regulators—put into place over the past 150 years—that has not kept pace with the major developments that have occurred in financial markets and products in recent decades. In 2008, the United States finds itself in the midst of one of the worst financial crises ever, with instability threatening global financial markets and the broader economy. While much of the attention of policymakers understandably has been focused on taking short-term steps to address the immediate nature of the crisis, attention has also turned to the need to consider significant reforms to the financial regulatory system to keep pace with existing and anticipated challenges in financial regulation. As noted earlier, with multiple regulators primarily responsible for individual institutions or markets, none of the financial regulators is tasked with assessing the risks posed across the entire financial system by a few institutions or by the collective activities of the industry. Comments from Agencies and Other Organizations, and Our Evaluation
We provided the opportunity to review and comment on a draft of this report to representatives of 29 agencies and other organizations, including federal and state financial regulatory agencies, consumer advocacy groups, and financial service industry trade associations. All reviewers provided valuable input that was used in finalizing this report. In general, reviewers commented that the report represented a high-quality and thorough review of issues related to regulatory reform. For example, we enhanced our discussion of weaknesses in regulators’ efforts to oversee the sale of mortgage products that posed risks to consumers and the stability of the financial system, and we made changes to the framework to emphasize the importance of consumer protection. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our report objectives were to (1) describe the origins of the current financial regulatory system, (2) describe various market developments and changes that have raised challenges for the current system, and (3) present an evaluation framework that can be used by Congress and others to craft or evaluate potential regulatory reform efforts going forward. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States and other countries are in the midst of the worst financial crisis in more than 75 years. While much of the attention of policymakers understandably has been focused on taking short-term steps to address the immediate nature of the crisis, these events have served to strikingly demonstrate that the current U.S. financial regulatory system is in need of significant reform. To help policymakers better understand existing problems with the financial regulatory system and craft and evaluate reform proposals, this report (1) describes the origins of the current financial regulatory system, (2) describes various market developments and changes that have created challenges for the current system, and (3) presents an evaluation framework that can be used by Congress and others to shape potential regulatory reform efforts. To do this work, GAO synthesized existing GAO work and other studies and met with dozens of representatives of financial regulatory agencies, industry associations, consumer advocacy organizations, and others. Twenty-nine regulators, industry associations, and consumer groups also reviewed a draft of this report and provided valuable input that was incorporated as appropriate. In general, reviewers commented that the report represented an important and thorough review of the issues related to regulatory reform.
What GAO Found
The current U.S. financial regulatory system has relied on a fragmented and complex arrangement of federal and state regulators--put into place over the past 150 years--that has not kept pace with major developments in financial markets and products in recent decades. As the nation finds itself in the midst of one of the worst financial crises ever, the regulatory system increasingly appears to be ill-suited to meet the nation's needs in the 21st century. Today, responsibilities for overseeing the financial services industry are shared among almost a dozen federal banking, securities, futures, and other regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations, and hundreds of state financial regulatory agencies. Much of this structure has developed as the result of statutory and regulatory changes that were often implemented in response to financial crises or significant developments in the financial services sector. For example, the Federal Reserve System was created in 1913 in response to financial panics and instability around the turn of the century, and much of the remaining structure for bank and securities regulation was created as the result of the Great Depression turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s. Several key changes in financial markets and products in recent decades have highlighted significant limitations and gaps in the existing regulatory system. First, regulators have struggled, and often failed, to mitigate the systemic risks posed by large and interconnected financial conglomerates and to ensure they adequately manage their risks. The portion of firms operating as conglomerates that cross financial sectors of banking, securities, and insurance increased significantly in recent years, but none of the regulators is tasked with assessing the risks posed across the entire financial system. Second, regulators have had to address problems in financial markets resulting from the activities of large and sometimes less-regulated market participants--such as nonbank mortgage lenders, hedge funds, and credit rating agencies--some of which play significant roles in today's financial markets. Third, the increasing prevalence of new and more complex investment products has challenged regulators and investors, and consumers have faced difficulty understanding new and increasingly complex retail mortgage and credit products. Regulators failed to adequately oversee the sale of mortgage products that posed risks to consumers and the stability of the financial system. Fourth, standard setters for accounting and financial regulators have faced growing challenges in ensuring that accounting and audit standards appropriately respond to financial market developments, and in addressing challenges arising from the global convergence of accounting and auditing standards. ? Finally, despite the increasingly global aspects of financial markets, the current fragmented U.S. regulatory structure has complicated some efforts to coordinate internationally with other regulators. |
gao_GAO-13-763 | gao_GAO-13-763_0 | NORTHCOM and PACOM Are Including a Complex Catastrophe in Their Civil Support Plans but Are Delaying Identification of Capability Requirements
NORTHCOM and PACOM are updating their existing civil support plans to include a complex catastrophe, as directed, but the plans will not identify capabilities needed to execute their plans that could be provided to execute the plans, as required, until FEMA completes its regional planning efforts in 2018. NORTHCOM officials told us that they expect the command to update its civil support plan by September 2014, and that the plan would describe some general strategic-level complex catastrophe scenarios and identify general force requirements, such as the types of military units that would be needed to respond to a complex catastrophe. However, according to NORTHCOM officials, the command will not identify DOD capabilities that could be provided to civil authorities during a complex catastrophe until FEMA completes its plans. DOD has defense coordinating officers in each of FEMA’s 10 regions who work closely with federal, state, and local officials to determine what specific capabilities DOD can provide to mitigate the effects of major disasters and emergencies when FEMA requests assistance. For example, the defense coordinating officer in FEMA Region IX, one of the regions that has completed its all-hazards plan, has helped the region develop bundled mission assignments for its regional plan that pre- identify a group of capabilities the region will require from DOD for a complex catastrophe to fill an identified capability gap, such as aircraft, communications, medical, and mortuary for responding to an earthquake in southern California. This doctrine further states that DOD should interact with non-DOD agencies to gain a mutual understanding of their response capabilities and limitations. By working through the defense coordinating officers to identify an interim set of specific capabilities that DOD could provide in response to a complex catastrophe—instead of waiting for FEMA to complete its five-year regional planning processes and then updating civil support plans—NORTHCOM and PACOM can enhance their preparedness and more effectively mitigate the risk of an unexpected capability gap during the five-year period until FEMA completes its regional plans in 2018. However, the command and control structure for federal military forces during incidents affecting multiple states such as complex catastrophes is unclear because DOD has not yet prescribed the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of command elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents. This gap in the civil support framework was illustrated by recent events such as National Level Exercise 2011—which examined DOD’s response to a complex catastrophe in the New Madrid Seismic Zone— and the federal military response to Hurricane Sandy led by NORTHCOM in 2012. For example, officials from U.S. Army North told us that the exercise revealed that not having a level of command between the dual-status commanders and NORTHCOM did not work well for such a large-scale, multistate incident, in part, because NORTHCOM, in the absence of an operational-level command element, faced challenges in managing the operations of federal military forces across a widespread area. DOD after action reports covering the federal military response to Hurricane Sandy also found that the command and control structure for federal military forces operating in the affected area was not clearly defined, resulting in the degradation of situational awareness and unity of effort, and the execution of missions without proper approval. By identifying roles, responsibilities, and command relationships during multistate incidents such as complex catastrophes, DOD will be better positioned to manage and allocate forces across a multistate area, and ensure effective and organized response operations. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: (1) To reduce the department’s risk in planning for a complex catastrophe and enhance the department’s ability to respond to a complex catastrophe through at least 2018, direct the Commanders of NORTHCOM and PACOM to work through the defense coordinating officers to identify an interim set of specific DOD capabilities that could be provided to prepare for and respond to complex catastrophes while FEMA completes its five-year regional planning cycle. (2) To facilitate effective and organized civil support response operations, direct the Commander of NORTHCOM—in consultation with the Joint Staff and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs—to develop, clearly define, communicate, and implement a construct for the command and control of federal military forces during multistate civil support incidents such as complex catastrophes—to include the roles, responsibilities, and command relationships among potential command elements. DOD concurred with both recommendations and cited ongoing activities to address our recommendations. To determine the extent to which DOD has established a command and control construct for complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents, we analyzed DOD doctrine and plans related to operational planning and command and control. Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities during Disasters. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States continues to face an uncertain and complicated security environment, as major disasters and emergencies, such as the Boston Marathon bombings and Hurricane Sandy illustrate. DOD supports civil authorities' response to domestic incidents through an array of activities collectively termed civil support. In July 2012, DOD began to plan for federal military support during a complex catastrophe--such as a large earthquake that causes extraordinary levels of casualties or damage, and cascading failures of critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to assess DOD's planning and capabilities for a complex catastrophe. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) planned for and identified capabilities to respond to complex catastrophes, and (2) established a command and control construct for complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents. To do so, GAO analyzed civil support plans, guidance, and other documents, and interviewed DOD and FEMA officials.
What GAO Found
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) are updating their existing civil support plans to include a complex catastrophe scenario, as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. However, the commands are delaying the identification of capabilities that could be provided to execute the plans until the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead federal response agency, completes its regional planning efforts in 2018. NORTHCOM officials told us that the command's civil support plan would describe some general force requirements, such as types of military units, but that it will not identify specific capabilities that could be provided to civil authorities during a complex catastrophe. Similarly, according to PACOM officials, PACOM's plan also will not identify such capabilities. Still, defense coordinating officers--senior military officers who work closely with federal, state, and local officials in FEMA's regional offices--have taken some initial steps to coordinate with FEMA during its regional planning process to identify capabilities that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be required to provide in some regions. For example, a defense coordinating officer has helped one of the FEMA regions that has completed its regional plan to develop bundled mission assignments that pre-identify a group of capabilities that region will require during a complex catastrophe. DOD doctrine states that the department should interact with non-DOD agencies to gain a mutual understanding of their response capabilities and limitations. By working through the defense coordinating officers to identify an interim set of specific capabilities for a complex catastrophe-- instead of waiting for FEMA to complete its five-year regional planning process-- NORTHCOM and PACOM can enhance their preparedness and mitigate the risk of an unexpected capability gap during the five-year period until FEMA completes its regional plans in 2018.
DOD has established a command and control framework for a federal military civil support response; however, the command and control structure for federal military forces during complex catastrophes is unclear because DOD has not developed a construct prescribing the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among command elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents across multiple states. This gap in the civil support framework was illustrated by recent events such as National Level Exercise 2011--which examined DOD's response to a complex catastrophe--and the federal military response to Hurricane Sandy in 2012. For example, officials from NORTHCOM's Army component told us that the exercise revealed that the absence of an operationallevel command element created challenges for NORTHCOM in managing the operations of federal military forces during a large-scale, multistate incident. Similarly, DOD after action reports on Hurricane Sandy found that the command and control structure for federal military forces was not clearly defined, resulting in the degradation of situational awareness and unity of effort, and the execution of missions without proper approval. DOD doctrine states that operational plans should identify the command structure expected to exist during their implementation. By identifying roles, responsibilities, and command relationships during multistate incidents such as complex catastrophes, DOD will be better positioned to manage and allocate resources across a multistate area and ensure effective and organized response operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that combatant commands (1) work through the defense coordinating officers to develop an interim set of specific DOD capabilities that could be provided to prepare for and respond to complex catastrophes, as FEMA completes its five-year regional planning cycle; and (2) develop, clearly define, communicate, and implement a construct for the command and control of federal military forces during multistate civil support incidents such as complex catastrophes. DOD concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-96T | gao_GAO-08-96T_0 | CBP and APHIS Have Taken Steps Intended to Strengthen the AQI Program
CBP and APHIS have taken four major steps intended to strengthen the AQI program since the transfer of responsibilities following passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. To date, we have not done work to assess the implementation and effectiveness of these actions. First, CBP and APHIS expanded the hours of training on agricultural issues for CBP officers, whose primary duty is customs and immigration inspection, and for CBP agriculture specialists, whose primary duty is agricultural inspection. Many Agriculture Specialists Believe that the Agricultural Mission Has Been Compromised
In fiscal year 2006, we surveyed a representative sample of CBP agriculture specialists regarding their experiences and opinions since the transfer of the AQI program from APHIS to CBP. GAO has previously reported on lessons learned from major private and public sector experiences with mergers that DHS could use when combining its various components into a unified department. Among other things, productivity and effectiveness often decline in the period following a merger, in part because employees often worry about their place in the new organization. Nonetheless, based on the survey results, while 86 percent of specialists reported feeling very well or somewhat prepared for their duties as an agriculture specialist, many believed that the agriculture mission had been compromised by the transfer. We identified common themes in the agriculture specialists’ responses to our first question about what is going well with respect to their work as an agriculture specialist. Nothing. Salary and Benefits. Training. General job satisfaction. An estimated 6 percent of agriculture specialists were generally satisfied with their jobs, reporting, among other things, that they were satisfied in their working relationships with CBP management and coworkers and that they believed in the importance of their work in protecting U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and diseases. Working relationships. CBP chain of command. Training. An estimated 17 percent of agriculture specialists were concerned about a lack of equipment and supplies. Management Problems May Leave U.S. Agriculture Vulnerable to Foreign Pests and Diseases
Although CBP and APHIS have taken a number of actions intended to strengthen the AQI program since its transfer to CBP, several management problems remain that may leave U.S. agriculture vulnerable to foreign pests and diseases. Moreover, at the time of our May 2006 review, CBP had not developed sufficient performance measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program, and the agency had allowed the agricultural canine program to deteriorate. CBP agriculture specialists record monthly data in the Work Accomplishment Data System for each port of entry, including (1) arrivals of passengers and cargo to the United States via airplane, ship, or vehicle; (2) agricultural inspections of arriving passengers and cargo; and (3) inspection outcomes, i.e., seizures or detections of prohibited (quarantined) agricultural materials and reportable pests. Further, these performance measures did not provide information about changes in inspection and interception rates, which could help assess the efficiency and effectiveness of agriculture inspections in different regions of the country or at individual ports of entry. In early 2007, a joint team from CBP and APHIS agreed to implement additional performance measures for AQI activities in all major pathways at ports of entry. However, we have not evaluated the adequacy of these new performance measures for assessing the AQI program’s effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and diseases. Subsequently, CBP developed a staffing model for its ports of entry and provided GAO with its results. Specifically, as of mid-August 2007, CBP said it had 2,116 agriculture specialists on staff, compared to 3,154 such specialists needed according to the model. While morale issues, such as the ones we identified, are to be expected in the merger establishing DHS, CBP had not used key data to evaluate the program’s effectiveness and could not explain significant increases and decreases in inspections and interceptions. Homeland Security: Agriculture Specialists’ Views of Their Work Experiences after Transfer to DHS. Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. agriculture generates over $1 trillion in economic activity annually, but concerns exist about its vulnerability to foreign pests and diseases. Under the agricultural quarantine inspection (AQI) program, passengers and cargo are inspected at U.S. ports of entry to intercept prohibited material and pests. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred responsibility for inspections from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP). APHIS retained some AQI-related responsibilities, such as policy setting and training. This testimony is based on issued GAO reports and discusses (1) steps DHS and USDA took that were intended to strengthen the AQI program, (2) views of agriculture specialists of their work experiences since the transfer, and (3) management problems. As part of these reports, GAO surveyed a representative sample of agriculture specialists on their work experiences, analyzed inspection and interception data, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
CBP and APHIS have taken steps intended to strengthen the AQI program since transfer of inspection responsibilities from USDA to DHS in March 2003. Specifically, CBP and APHIS have expanded the hours and developed a national standard for agriculture training; given agricultural specialists access to a computer system that is to better target inspections at ports; and established a joint review process for assessing compliance with the AQI program on a port-by-port basis. In addition, CBP has created new agricultural liaison positions at the field office level to advise regional port directors on agricultural issues. We have not assessed the implementation and effectiveness of these actions. However, GAO's survey of CBP agriculture specialists found that many believed the agriculture inspection mission had been compromised by the transfer. Although 86 percent of agriculture specialists reported feeling very well or somewhat prepared for their duties, 59 and 60 percent of specialists answered that they were conducting fewer inspections and interceptions, respectively, of prohibited agricultural items since the transfer. When asked what is going well with respect to their work, agriculture specialists identified working relationships (18 percent), nothing (13 percent), salary and benefits (10 percent), training (10 percent), and general job satisfaction (6 percent). When asked what areas should be changed or improved, they identified working relationships (29 percent), priority given to the agriculture mission (29 percent), problems with the CBP chain of command (28 percent), training (19 percent), and inadequate equipment and supplies (17 percent). Based on private and public sector experiences with mergers, these morale issues are not unexpected because employees often worry about their place in the new organization. CBP must address several management problems to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to foreign pests and diseases. Specifically, as of May 2006, CBP had not used available inspection and interception data to evaluate the effectiveness of the AQI program. CBP also had not developed sufficient performance measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program. CBP's measures focused on only two pathways by which foreign pests and diseases may enter the country and pose a threat to U.S. agriculture. However, in early 2007, CBP initiated new performance measures to track interceptions of pests and quarantine materials at ports of entry. We have not assessed the effectiveness of these measures. In addition, CBP has allowed the agricultural canine program to deteriorate, including reductions in the number of canine teams and their proficiency. Lastly, CBP had not developed a risk-based staffing model for determining where to assign agriculture specialists. Without such a model, CBP did not know whether it had an appropriate number of agriculture specialists at each port. Subsequent to our review, CBP developed a model. As of mid-August 2007, CBP had 2,116 agriculture specialists on staff, compared with 3,154 specialists needed, according to the staffing model. |
gao_GAO-17-163 | gao_GAO-17-163_0 | Background
Federal agencies and our nation’s critical infrastructures—such as energy, transportation systems, communications, and financial services— are dependent on computerized (cyber) information systems and electronic data to carry out operations and to process, maintain, and report essential information. The National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 statutorily established the center’s role within DHS to act as a federal civilian interface for sharing information related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, analysis, and warnings with federal and nonfederal entities, and to provide shared situational awareness to enable real-time actions to address cybersecurity risks and incidents to federal and nonfederal entities. 2. DHS policy and law also states that it is to engage with critical infrastructure owners and operators; other private sector entities; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and international partners. For example, during the cyber attack against the Ukrainian power infrastructure in December 2015, the center collaborated with the Ukrainian government to determine the methods of the cyber attack. Although NCCIC Has Taken Steps to Perform Required Cybersecurity Functions, the Extent to Which It Carries Them Out In Accordance with Implementing Principles Is Unclear
NCCIC has taken steps to perform each of its 11 statutorily required cybersecurity functions. However, the extent to which NCCIC carried out these functions in accordance with the nine principles specified in the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 is unclear because the center has not consistently evaluated its performance against the principles. The center manages several programs that provide data used in developing the products and performing the services related to its cybersecurity functions. These programs include:
The National Cybersecurity Protection System, operationally known as EINSTEIN, monitors network traffic entering or exiting networks of federal agencies and provides intrusion detection and intrusion prevention services. Function 6: Provide timely technical assistance, risk management support, and incident response capabilities to federal and nonfederal entities with respect to cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and cybersecurity risks and incidents, which may include attribution, mitigation, and remediation. We identified instances where, with certain products and services, NCCIC had implemented its functions in adherence with one or more of the principles. For example, consistent with the principle that it seek and receive appropriate consideration from industry sector-specific, academic, and national laboratory expertise, NCCIC coordinated with contacts from industry, academia, and the national laboratories to develop and disseminate vulnerability alerts through the National Vulnerability Database. On the other hand, we also identified instances where the cybersecurity functions were not performed in adherence with the principles. The function is supported, in part, by Risk and Vulnerability Assessments. However, NCCIC had not established measures or other procedures for ensuring the timeliness of these assessments. Until the center determines the applicability of the implementing principles for all of its functions and develops the metrics and methods necessary to ensure that the principles are met, it will not be positioned to ensure that NCCIC is effectively meeting its statutory requirements. NCCIC Faces Impediments to Performing Its Cybersecurity Functions More Efficiently
In addition to NCCIC not having made a complete determination of how it is adhering to the principles, a number of factors impede the center’s ability to more efficiently perform several of its cybersecurity functions. However, NCCIC officials were unable to completely track and consolidate cyber incidents reported to the center, thereby inhibiting its ability to coordinate the sharing of information across the government. Obtaining contact information of all owners and operators of the most critical cyber-dependent infrastructure assets. The National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 requires NCCIC to coordinate the sharing of information across the government. Until NCCIC takes steps to overcome these impediments it may not be able to efficiently perform its cybersecurity functions and assist federal and nonfederal entities in identifying cyber-based threats, mitigating vulnerabilities, and managing cyber risks. 9. In its comments, the department concurred with all nine recommendations. If effectively implemented, these actions should enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of NCCIC in performing its statutory requirements. The two acts also contained provisions for GAO to report on NCCIC’s implementation of its cybersecurity mission. Appendix IV: Examples of How NCCIC Products and Services Address the Implementing Principles
Although the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) did not completely determine the applicability of statutory implementing principles to its products and services, table 8 below provides examples of our determination of how NCCIC products and services adhered to the principles. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cyber-based intrusions and attacks on federal systems and systems supporting our nation's critical infrastructure, such as communications and financial services, have become more numerous, damaging, and disruptive. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. This was expanded to include the protection of critical cyber infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015. The National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 and the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 require NCCIC to perform 11 cybersecurity-related functions, including sharing information and enabling real-time actions to address cybersecurity risks and incidents at federal and non-federal entities.
The two acts also contained provisions for GAO to report on NCCIC's implementation of its cybersecurity mission. For this report, GAO assessed the extent to which the NCCIC was performing the 11 required functions. To do this, GAO analyzed relevant program documentation, interviewed officials, and conducted a non-generalizable survey of 2,792 federal and nonfederal recipients of NCCIC products and services.
What GAO Found
The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken steps to perform each of its 11 statutorily required cybersecurity functions, such as being a federal civilian interface for sharing cybersecurity-related information with federal and nonfederal entities. It manages several programs that provide data used in developing 43 products and services in support of the functions. The programs include monitoring network traffic entering and exiting federal agency networks and analyzing computer network vulnerabilities and threats. The products and services are provided to its customers in the private sector; federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government entities; and other partner organizations. For example, NCCIC issues indicator bulletins, which can contain information related to cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and cybersecurity risks and incidents and help to fulfill its function to coordinate the sharing of such information across the government.
The National Cybersecurity Protection Act also required NCCIC to carry out its functions in accordance with nine implementing principles, to the extent practicable. However, the extent to which NCCIC adhered to the 9 principles when performing the functions is unclear because the center has not yet determined the applicability of the principles to all 11 functions, or established metrics and methods by which to evaluate its performance against the principles. GAO identified instances where NCCIC had implemented its functions in accordance with one or more of the principles. For example, consistent with the principle that it seek and receive appropriate consideration from industry sector-specific, academic, and national laboratory expertise, NCCIC coordinated with contacts from industry, academia, and the national laboratories to develop and disseminate vulnerability alerts. On the other hand, GAO also identified instances where the cybersecurity functions were not performed in accordance with the principles. For example, NCCIC is to provide timely technical assistance, risk management support, and incident response capabilities to federal and nonfederal entities; however, it had not established measures or other procedures for ensuring the timeliness of these assessments. Until NCCIC determines the applicability of the principles to its functions and develops metrics and methods to evaluate its performance against the principles, the center cannot ensure that it is effectively meeting its statutory requirements.
In addition, GAO identified factors that impede NCCIC's ability to more efficiently perform several of its cybersecurity functions. For example, NCCIC officials were unable to completely track and consolidate cyber incidents reported to the center, thereby inhibiting its ability to coordinate the sharing of information across the government. Similarly, NCCIC may not have ready access to the current contact information for all owners and operators of the most critical cyber-dependent infrastructure assets. This lack could impede timely communication with them in the event of a cyber incident. Until NCCIC takes steps to overcome these impediments, it may not be able to efficiently perform its cybersecurity functions and assist federal and nonfederal entities in identifying cyber-based threats, mitigating vulnerabilities, and managing cyber risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends nine actions to DHS for enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of NCCIC, including to determine the applicability of the implementing principles and establish metrics and methods for evaluating performance; and address identified impediments. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-707T | gao_GAO-16-707T_0 | Background
Expedited Screening
In 2011, TSA began developing new expedited security procedures intended to strengthen security and improve the passenger experience by shortening lines and wait times, and in October 2011, implemented its expedited screening program—known as TSA Pre®. TSA Is Taking Steps to Improve the Security Effectiveness of Expedited Screening
TSA has taken steps to improve the security effectiveness of expedited screening since we issued our December 2014 report. Specifically, TSA has begun planning for the testing of the security effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process as an overall system–ensuring that the testing adheres to established design practices. In addition, TSA has adjusted the TSA Pre ® Risk Assessment program algorithm used to assign passengers scores and identify low risk passengers because the DHS-OIG found that the algorithm allowed a high-risk individual access to expedited screening. Our December 2014 report found that TSA has tested the effectiveness of the individual Managed Inclusion security layers, but that TSA had not yet tested the Managed Inclusion process as an overall system. As a result, we recommended that TSA take steps to ensure and document that its planned testing of the Managed Inclusion process as a system adheres to established evaluation design practices. In addition, according to a TSA memorandum dated November 2015, TSA made changes to the TSA Pre ® Risk Assessment program and Managed Inclusion process to enhance aviation security as a result of the findings and recommendations included in three prior DHS-OIG audit reports. As a result of this evaluation and based on a recommendation from another DHS-OIG audit, TSA documentation shows that TSA discontinued the use of Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) devices as a method used to conduct real time threat assessments and is now limiting the use of Managed Inclusion to airports that employed canine team to detect explosives. According to the TSA administrator, these changes have resulted in a 20 percent decrease in the number of individuals who receive expedited screening. While TSA Uses TSO Screening Performance Data, It Is Constrained by Incomplete and Unreliable Data and a Lack of Data Analysis and Assessment Follow-Up
TSA utilizes data on TSO performance obtained from its various testing programs to help to ensure that individual TSOs are (1) qualified to conduct passenger and checked baggage screening based on Annual Proficiency Reviews and resulting recertifications, and (2) demonstrate proficiency, during live screening operations, in their adherence to screening standard operating procedures and other TSA guidance for detecting prohibited items. However, incomplete and unreliable data and limited analysis constrains TSA’s ability to determine the true level of TSO performance in screening passengers and baggage for prohibited items. In addition, during live screening operations, TSA also monitors individual TSO performance through (1) Threat Image Projection (TIP) testing by local TSA officials which assesses the TSOs’ proficiency at identifying prohibited items in X-ray images of passengers’ carry-on baggage, and (2) Aviation Screening Assessment Program (ASAP) covert tests which assess the TSOs’ ability to properly adhere to screening standard operating procedures and prevent the passage of prohibited items through passenger and baggage checkpoints. As shown in figure 2, some airports in all five airport risk categories did not report any TIP results nationally over the course of a year from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2013. Based on our observation of the incomplete TIP data, we recommended in May 2016 that DHS ensure that TSA officials at individual airports submit complete TIP results to the national database as required by TSA policy. DHS concurred with our recommendation on ensuring the completeness of TIP data and is taking steps to address it. TSA headquarters officials stated that they had previously not systematically analyzed TIP results data to determine any national trends for the purposes of informing future training programs or changes to screening processes or procedures. DHS concurred with this recommendation and is taking steps to address it. ASAP Covert Test Results are Unreliable
As we also reported in May 2016, TSA determined that ASAP pass rate results data were unreliable, which caused them to question the extent to which ASAP tests accurately measure TSO performance. These recommendations may include, among other things, additional training for certain points in the screening process and further testing in certain areas. Moreover, we reported that tracking the implementation of its recommendations, including the extent to which identified corrective actions are improving subsequent TSO performance and test results, will help TSA better determine the extent to which its implemented recommendations are leading to improvements in screening operations and appropriately addressing identified root causes for previous test failures. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2015, TSA screened or oversaw the screening of more than 708 million passengers at more than 450 U.S airports. In carrying out the screening process, TSA is responsible for ensuring the security of civil aviation while also managing the efficient flow of passengers. TSA employs screening personnel, called TSOs, to carry out passenger and baggage screening operations. Each year, TSA tests TSO performance as part of its efforts to monitor the effectiveness of aviation security screening. In 2011, TSA began providing expedited screening procedures to selected passengers, intended to strengthen security and improve the passenger experience by shortening lines and wait times.
This testimony addresses the extent to which TSA (1) has taken steps to improve the security effectiveness of expedited screening and (2) uses TSO performance testing data to enhance TSO performance in screening for prohibited items. This statement is based on reports GAO issued in May 2016 and December 2014, and selected updates. Among other things, GAO analyzed TSA documentation on expedited screening and TSO testing data.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken steps intended to improve the security effectiveness of expedited passenger screening since GAO reported on it in December 2014. These steps include
Adjusting the TSA Pre✓® Risk Assessment program algorithm used to assign passengers scores and identify low risk passengers;
Limiting the use of Managed Inclusion to airports that employ canine teams to detect explosives; and,
Developing plans to test the security effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process as an overall system–ensuring that the testing adheres to established design practices.
According to a TSA memorandum dated November 2015, TSA made changes to TSA Pre✓® Risk Assessment program and Managed Inclusion process as a result of the findings and recommendations included in three prior Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General audit reports. According to TSA, these changes were necessary to ensure security and resulted in a 20 percent decrease in the number of individuals receiving expedited screening. Previously, in December 2014, GAO found that TSA had not tested the overall effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process, and recommended that TSA ensure that its planned testing adhere to established evaluation design practices to yield reliable test results. DHS concurred with the recommendation and plans to begin testing the effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process as a system during fiscal year 2016.
TSA uses data on Transportation Security Officer (TSO) performance obtained from its various testing programs to ensure that individual TSOs are (1) demonstrating through annual proficiency reviews and resulting recertification that they are qualified to continue conducting passenger and checked baggage screening, and (2) demonstrating proficiency during live screening operations in adhering to screening procedures. However, in a report containing sensitive security information completed in May 2016, GAO found that TSA's ability to fully evaluate TSO performance in screening passengers and baggage for prohibited items is constrained by incomplete and unreliable testing data and a lack of data analysis. For example, some airports did not report testing data on TSOs' ability to identify prohibited items over fiscal years 2009 through 2014 as required by TSA policy. TSA officials also stated they do not systematically analyze test results to determine any national trends for informing future TSO training. In addition, TSA determined that pass rate data for one of its covert testing programs that uses role players at airports to assess TSO performance was unreliable. Specifically, testing by an independent contractor indicated that TSA's covert testing data likely overstated TSO performance. TSA is taking action to determine the root cause of the variance in the testing results and is implementing corrective actions. Further, GAO found that TSA does not track the implementation, where appropriate, of recommendations made based on the covert testing results. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations made in its May 2016 report and is planning actions to address them.
What GAO Recommends
In its May 2016 report, GAO recommended that TSA ensure that (1) airports submit complete TSO performance data, (2) the data are analyzed nationally, and (3) implementation of covert testing recommendations are tracked. DHS concurred and is taking actions to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-359 | gao_GAO-15-359_0 | In addition, the act required USPC to enact other rules and regulations as necessary to carry out a national parole policy. Number of Offenders under USPC’s Jurisdiction Declined over Time but the Number of D.C. Offenders on Supervised Release or Serving a Prison Sentence that Includes Supervised Release Generally Increased
As figure 1 shows that, from fiscal years 2002 through 2014, the total number of offenders under USPC’s jurisdiction declined 26 percent from about 23,000 to about 17,100. Figure 3 provides information on the number and composition of federal offenders under USPC’s jurisdiction for 5 of the most recent fiscal years. D.C. Offenders
As figure 4 illustrates, from fiscal years 2002 through 2014, the number of D.C. offenders on or eligible for parole declined 74 percent, from about 14,100 to about 3,700 following the abolition of parole for D.C. offenders in 2000. Number of D.C. Offenders on Supervised Release or Serving a Prison Sentence that Includes Supervised Release Has Increased
Figure 5 illustrates that, from fiscal years 2002 through 2014, following the introduction of supervised release in 2000, the total number of D.C. offenders on supervised release or serving a prison sentence that includes supervised release increased 606 percent, from about 1,700 to about 12,000 in fiscal year 2011, and then slightly declined but remained above 11,000 through fiscal year 2014. Transferring USPC’s Jurisdiction for D.C. Offenders Would Require Key Organizational Characteristics that Existing Entities Do Not Possess; Altering or Establishing a New Entity Would Pose Challenges
According to officials from USPC and criminal justice partner organizations we interviewed, any organization accepting the transfer of USPC’s jurisdiction over D.C. offenders would need to have three key organizational characteristics in place for such a transfer to be feasible. Doing so would pose challenges related to estimating costs and assessing impacts on decision making. Three Key Characteristics that Existing Entities Do Not Possess Are Necessary for an Entity to Assume Jurisdiction for D.C. Offenders
According to officials we interviewed from USPC and CSOSA, in order for another entity to feasibly assume USPC’s jurisdiction for D.C. offenders, this entity would need to have the following key organizational characteristics in place: (1) relevant statutory authority; (2) specialized processes, procedures, and personnel; and (3) formal agreements with other organizations concerning decisions for parole and supervised release cases. We found that none of the other 17 criminal justice entities currently involved with D.C. offenders possesses any of the three:
Relevant statutory authority. USPC has mechanisms in place, as well as the appropriate expertise, for handling and hearing parole and supervised release cases. Altering or Establishing a New Entity Poses Challenges
Given that no entity currently involved in the criminal justice system has the structure in place to absorb USPC’s jurisdiction for D.C. offenders, the transfer of jurisdiction is not feasible without altering the characteristics of an existing entity or establishing a new organization. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPC was established in 1976, in part to carry out a national parole policy that would govern the release of offenders to community supervision prior to completing their full custody sentences. USPC's budget is just over $13 million for fiscal year 2015.
Over time, changes in laws have abolished parole and introduced supervised release—a new form of postincarceration supervision. As a result, USPC has been reauthorized and has authority to grant and revoke parole for eligible federal and D.C. offenders and to revoke supervised release for D.C. offenders violating the terms of their release. USPC's current authorization is set to expire in 2018.
This report addresses (1) changes in the number of offenders under USPC's jurisdiction from fiscal years 2002 through 2014 and (2) the organizational characteristics needed for an entity to feasibly assume jurisdiction of D.C. offenders from USPC, and the feasibility and implications of such a transfer.
GAO analyzed USPC data on federal and D.C. offenders from fiscal years 2002-2014—the most recent years for which reliable data were available—as well as DOJ reports on USPC and USPC policies, and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. GAO also discussed with USPC and some of its criminal justice partners the feasibility of transferring USPC's jurisdiction for D.C. offenders and any related challenges.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2002 through 2014, the total number of offenders under the Department of Justice's (DOJ) U.S. Parole Commission's (USPC) jurisdiction declined 26 percent from about 23,000 to about 17,000. Specifically, following the abolition of parole, the number of offenders on or eligible for parole declined 67 percent among federal offenders, and 74 percent among D.C. offenders. However, following the introduction of supervised release, the number of D.C. offenders on supervised release or serving a prison sentence that includes supervised release increased 606 percent from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2011, and then slightly declined through fiscal year 2014.
Transferring USPC's jurisdiction for D.C. offenders would require that an entity has three key organizational characteristics to assume this jurisdiction, and altering or establishing a new entity poses challenges. Based on our discussions with officials from USPC and other organizations, including those from the D.C. government, these three key organizational characteristics are:
statutory authority for asserting jurisdiction over D.C. offenders;
processes, procedures and personnel in place for handling parole and supervised release cases; and
formal agreements with other criminal justice organizations for making parole and supervised release decisions.
We identified 17 criminal justice entities with the potential to assume USPC's jurisdiction for D.C. offenders; however none currently possesses the three key organizational characteristics. Thus, transferring jurisdiction is not feasible without altering an existing or establishing a new entity, and would pose challenges related to estimating costs and assessing impacts on decision making.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-550T | gao_GAO-15-550T_0 | they persist as FAA faces greater industry As of April 2015, FAA has made progress in addressing the Certification Process Committee’s recommendations, but as we reported in January 2015, challenges remain that could affect successful implementation of the recommendations. FAA is implementing its plan for addressing the 6 certification process recommendations, which involves completing 14 initiatives. According to an April 2015 update that FAA provided to us, 13 initiatives were completed or were on track to be completed, and one will not meet planned milestones. FAA Has Developed Plans to Address Recommendations to Improve the Consistency of Its Regulatory Interpretations, but Progress Has Been Slow
According to the January 2015 regulatory consistency implementation plan, FAA closed two recommendations—one as not implemented and one as implemented in 2013—and plans to complete the remaining 4 by July 2016. As we found in January 2015, while FAA has made some progress, it is too soon for us to determine whether FAA’s planned actions adequately address the recommendations. Industry representatives continued to indicate a lack of communication with and involvement of stakeholders as a primary challenge for FAA in implementing the committees’ recommendations, particularly the regulatory consistency recommendations. FAA has taken steps to address these concerns, but FAA’s authority to address some of the challenges is limited because each country retains control of its basic regulatory framework for approving aviation products and ensuring the safety of those products for use in their countries—effectively a recognition of the sovereignty of each country. partnership agreements that provide a framework for the reciprocal approval of aviation products imported and exported between the U.S. U.S. Companies Reported that they Experienced FCAA-Related Process, Communications, and Cost Challenges and FAA is Attempting to Address These Challenges
Representatives of the 15 selected U.S. aviation companies we interviewed for our January 2015 statement reported that their companies faced challenges related to process, communications, and cost in obtaining approvals from FCAAs. Reported FCAA process challenges. For example, in September 2014, FAA—along with Brazil, Canada, and the EU—established a Certification Management Team to provide a forum for addressing approvals and other bilateral relationship issues. Reported issues related to some BASAs. Although representatives from 11 of the 15 U.S. companies and the 3 foreign companies we interviewed reported being satisfied with the overall effectiveness of having BASAs in place or with various aspects of the current BASAs, representatives of 10 U.S. companies reported challenges related to some BASAs lacking specificity and flexibility, 2 raised concerns that there is a lack of a formal dispute resolution process, and 1 noted a lack of a distinction between approvals of simple and complex aircraft. Reported Challenges in Communicating with FCAAs. U.S. Companies Also Reported FAA-Related Challenges, Which FAA Is Taking Actions to Address
As mentioned previously, FAA provides assistance to U.S. companies by facilitating the application process for foreign approvals of aviation products. As we concluded in January 2015, to its credit, FAA has made some progress in addressing the Certification Process and Regulatory Consistency Committees’ recommendations, as well as in taking steps to address challenges faced by U.S. aviation companies in obtaining foreign It will be critically important for FAA to follow approvals of their products.through with its current and planned initiatives to increase the efficiency and consistency of its certification processes, and its efforts to address identified challenges faced by U.S. companies in obtaining foreign approvals. | Why GAO Did This Study
FAA issues certificates for new U.S.-manufactured aviation products, based on federal aviation regulations. GAO has previously reviewed the efficiency of FAA's certification process and the consistency of its regulatory interpretations. As required by the 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act, FAA chartered two aviation rulemaking committees in April 2012—one to improve certification processes and another to address regulatory consistency—that recommended improvements in 2012. FAA also assists U.S. aviation companies seeking approval of their FAA-certificated products in foreign markets. FAA has negotiated BASAs with many FCAAs to provide a framework for the reciprocal approval of aviation products. However, U.S. industry stakeholders have raised concerns that some countries conduct lengthy processes for approving U.S. products.
This testimony focuses on (1) FAA's reported progress in implementing the aviation rulemaking committees' 2012 recommendations regarding its certification process and the consistency of its regulatory interpretations and (2) the challenges that selected U.S. companies reported they have faced when attempting to obtain foreign approvals of their products, and how FAA is addressing some of the reported challenges. It is based on GAO products issued from 2010 to 2015, selectively updated in April 2015 based on FAA documents and information from FAA officials and selected industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has made progress in addressing the Certification Process and the Regulatory Consistency Committees' recommendations, but as GAO reported in January 2015, challenges remain that could affect successful implementation of FAA's planned actions.
FAA is implementing 14 initiatives for addressing 6 certification process recommendations. According to an April 2015 FAA update, 13 initiatives have been completed or are on track to be completed, and 1 will not meet planned milestones.
In January 2015, FAA published a detailed implementation plan for addressing six regulatory consistency recommendations. According to the plan, FAA closed two recommendations—one as not implemented and one as implemented in 2013—and plans to complete the remaining four by July 2016.
While FAA has made some progress, it is too soon for GAO to determine whether FAA's planned actions adequately address the recommendations. However, industry stakeholders indicated concerns regarding FAA's efforts, including concerns about a lack of communication with and involvement of stakeholders as FAA implements the two committees' recommendations. Since GAO reported in January 2015, FAA has been addressing these concerns.
In January 2015, GAO also reported that representatives of 15 selected U.S. aviation companies that GAO interviewed reported facing various challenges in obtaining foreign approvals of their products, including challenges related to foreign civil aviation authorities (FCAA) as well as challenges related to FAA.
Reported FCAA-related challenges related to (1) the length and uncertainty of some FCAA approval processes, (2) the lack of specificity and flexibility in some of FAA's bilateral aviation safety agreements (BASA) negotiated with FCAAs, (3) difficulty with or lack of FCAA communications, and (4) high fees charged by some FCAAs. Although FAA's authority to address some of these challenges is limited, FAA has been addressing many of them. For example, FAA created a certification management team with its three major bilateral partners to provide a forum for addressing approval process challenges, among other issues. FAA has also taken action to mitigate the challenges related to some BASAs by holding regular meetings with bilateral partners and adding dispute resolution procedures to some BASAs. |
gao_GAO-12-776 | gao_GAO-12-776_0 | As required in the consent orders, the foreclosure review process has two components, a file review (look-back review) and a process for eligible borrowers to request a review of their particular circumstances (borrower outreach process). For example, they noted that they did not include unnecessary legal and technical language, but said it was difficult to convey complex mortgage and legal terms in simple language that would still clearly and precisely present the intended message. Regulators did not initially solicit input from consumer and community groups when evaluating the language used in the communication materials but have since taken steps to address these groups’ concerns. As a result, representatives of some servicers we interviewed told us they could not include remediation information in the communication materials. While OCC and the Federal Reserve have acknowledged community groups as effective messengers to reach the target audience and have encouraged servicers to coordinate with these groups, servicers have leveraged outreach through community groups to varying degrees. Regulators regularly monitored the status of the outreach activities, but did not compare respondents to nonrespondents to determine whether certain groups of borrowers were underrepresented in the response to the initial outreach activities. Initial Outreach Was Largely Uniform with Limited Targeted Outreach
Regulators approved a uniform process to reach eligible borrowers, with additional targeted outreach limited to African-American and Spanish- speaking borrowers. Readability tests of the outreach letter, request-for-review form, and website indicate that a high school or even a college reading level may be required to understand them; however, the use of some complex terms may be unavoidable. In addition, although the communication materials provide information about the purpose, scope, and process for the foreclosure review, and types of financial injuries covered, as well as disclosing that borrowers could be eligible for compensation, they do not include specific information about the potential types or amounts of remediation borrowers may receive. Without specific information about remediation in communication materials, some borrowers may not be motivated to submit a request-for-review form. However, in approving the outreach plan regulators did not require servicers to conduct such analysis and although the regulators have encouraged servicers to work with community groups that have experience as trusted advisers to distressed borrowers, servicers have done so to varying degrees. The results of such analysis also could provide regulators, third-party consultants, and servicers with the information to target additional outreach to any underrepresented groups or to make changes to the file-review sampling process to ensure that all borrowers are fairly represented. Recommendations for Executive Action
OCC and the Federal Reserve have taken steps to improve the outreach from the initial roll-out. To further increase the possibility that all borrowers have a fair opportunity to request a foreclosure review, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System should take the following actions:
Enhance the readability of the request-for-review form on the independent foreclosure review website so that it is more understandable for borrowers, such as by including a plain language guide to the questions. Require servicers to identify trends in borrowers who have and have not responded by factors such as MSA, zip code, servicer, and borrower characteristics and report to the regulators on weaknesses found. Development and Content of Communication Materials
To determine the extent to which the development of the approach and content of the communication materials and foreclosure review website reflected best practices, we (1) reviewed regulator documents, engagement letters, and outreach materials; (2) conducted readability testing of the online outreach letter and request-for-review form; (3) analyzed data on the extent of limited English proficiency in the United States and the effects of limited English proficiency on financial literacy; and (4) assessed the extent to which the remediation content in the communication materials reflects best practices. Planning and Evaluation of the Outreach and Advertising Approach
To determine the extent to which the planning and evaluation of the outreach and advertising approach considered the characteristics of the target audience, we analyzed key documents discussed above as well as the indicators and analysis prepared by the third-party administrator to monitor implementation of outreach activities and meeting agendas between regulators and servicers. Interviews with Regulatory Staff and Stakeholders
To determine how well the development of the approach and content of the communication materials and website reflected best practices and the extent to which the planning and evaluation of the outreach and advertising approach considered the characteristics of the target audience, we conducted interviews with the following regulator staff and key stakeholders:
Staff from OCC and the Federal Reserve. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2011 consent orders, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Reserve, and the Office of Thrift Supervision directed 14 mortgage servicers to engage third-party consultants to review 2009 and 2010 foreclosure actions for cases of financial injury and provide borrowers remediation. To complement these reviews, the regulators also required servicers to establish an outreach process for borrowers to request a review of their case. This report examines (1) the extent to which the development of the outreach approach and content of the communications materials and website reflected best practices, and (2) the extent to which the planning and evaluation of the outreach and advertising approach considered the characteristics of the target audience. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed the design and implementation of borrower outreach activities and materials against best practices and federal guidelines and interviewed representatives of servicers, consultants, community groups, and regulators.
What GAO Found
Regulators and servicers have gradually increased their efforts to reach eligible borrowers and have taken steps to improve communication materials. Conducting readability tests or using focus groups are generally considered best practices for consumer outreach, but regulators and servicers did not undertake these activities. Staff at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) said that this was, in part, a trade off to expedite the remediation process. Regulators also did not solicit input from consumer groups when reviewing the initial communication materials. Readability tests found the initial outreach letter, request-for-review form, and website to be written above the average reading level of the U.S. population, indicating that they may be too complex to be widely understood. Regulatory staff noted limitations to such readability tests and told us they discussed using plain language, but that the use of some complex mortgage and legal terms was necessary for accuracy and precision. Clear language on the independent foreclosure review website is particularly important as current outreach encourages borrowers to submit requests for review online. Communication materials developed by mortgage servicers with input from regulators and consultants included information about the purpose, scope, and process for the foreclosure review and noted that borrowers may be eligible for compensation. However, the materials do not provide specific information about remediationan important feature to encourage responses as suggested by best practices and reflected in notification examples GAO reviewed. Without informing borrowers what type of remediation they may receive, borrowers may not be motivated to participate.
The outreach planning and evaluation targeted all eligible borrowers with some analysis conducted to tailor the outreach to specific subgroups within the population. In approving the outreach plan, regulators considered the extent to which the plan promoted national awareness and was appropriate to reach the demographics of the target audience. The outreach process was largely uniform with some targeted outreach to Spanish-speaking and African-American borrowers. GAO has previously found that effective outreach requires analysis of the audience by shared characteristics, but regulators did not call for servicers to analyze eligible borrowers by characteristics, such as limited English proficiency, that may have affected their response. While regulators have identified community groups as effective messengers and encouraged servicers to reach out to them, servicers have leveraged these groups to varying degrees. According to consumer groups, borrowers may have ignored communication materials because they did not understand who provided the information and believed the materials were fraudulent. Regulators regularly monitored the status of the outreach activities and analyzed the effect of advertising on response rates. GAO has previously found that analyzing past performance when expanding activities is important. Regulators did not analyze characteristics of respondents and nonrespondents in introducing a second wave of outreach activities. Without this analysis, regulators may not know if certain groups of borrowers are underrepresented in the review. As a result, whether additional outreach to target these groups or changes to the file review process are need.
What GAO Recommends
OCC and the Federal Reserve should enhance the language on the foreclosure review website, include specific remediation information in outreach, and require servicers to analyze trends in borrowers who have not responded and, if warranted, take additional steps to reach underrepresented groups. In their comment letters, the regulators agreed to take actions to implement the recommendations, while the Federal Reserve took issue with GAOs criteria. OCC also took issue with GAOs criteria in its technical comments. |
gao_GAO-17-56 | gao_GAO-17-56_0 | Trafficking Office Drafts Narratives and Makes Tier Ranking Recommendations but Did Not Post Information on Downgrade Waivers on State’s Website within the Required Deadline
Trafficking Office Gathers Information and Has Developed Reporting Guidance
The Trafficking Office produces initial drafts of the State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report with input compiled from a variety of sources including U.S. missions, foreign governments, and NGOs. According to State officials, the majority of disagreements are resolved at the working level. State Has Made Improvements to the Trafficking in Persons Report but Does Not Explicitly Explain the Basis for Certain Countries’ Tier Rankings or Tier Changes
State has made improvements to the Trafficking in Persons Report but does not explicitly explain the basis for certain countries’ tier rankings or, where relevant, why countries’ tier rankings changed. Our analysis of the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report found that, compared to our previous review in 2006, there were few instances in which minimum standards and criteria were not mentioned in the report country narratives. Rather, a Tier 1 ranking indicates that a government has acknowledged the existence of human trafficking, has made efforts to address the problem, and meets the TVPA’s minimum standards.” Nonetheless, we found that the narratives sometimes included language that seemed contradictory to certain standards and criteria. In addition, we found that, for countries that changed tier from one year to the next, most narratives did not provide an explicit explanation as to why State had decided to change those countries’ tier rankings. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that information should be communicated in a way that is useful to internal and external users. Report Narratives in Most Cases Do Not Explicitly Explain the Basis for the Tier Ranking of the Highest-Ranked Countries
While our analysis of the narratives for the Tier 1 countries as a group continued the trend of showing increased improvement in governments’ actions as compared to the groups of narratives for the other tiers, the narratives for most Tier 1 countries in State’s 2015 and 2016 Trafficking in Persons reports did not explicitly explain the basis for the tier rankings. Without clarity in country narratives regarding State’s assessments of governments’ compliance with the minimum standards to combat trafficking, particularly for Tier 1, which is described by the report as governments of countries that fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, the report’s usefulness could be diminished. State and Other Officials Indicate that the Trafficking in Persons Report Is a Useful Tool in Engaging with Other Countries, but State Has Not Systematically Assessed Its Effectiveness Trafficking in Persons Report Can Create Opportunities and Challenges in Encouraging Actions against Trafficking
Based on our discussions with selected officials from State, other agencies, and NGOs, the Trafficking in Persons Report has raised awareness about trafficking and that countries’ concerns about their tier ranking can spur them to make progress. Without such an assessment, the effect of the report in encouraging governments to make progress against trafficking is not well understood. However, to date, the effort has not assessed the impact of the report’s recommendations. Officials from the Trafficking Office stated that they have taken steps to more systematically assess the report’s effectiveness. First, despite a legislative requirement to do so, State has not regularly posted on its public website a detailed description of the credible evidence supporting the determination to issue a waiver to avoid an automatic downgrade to Tier 3. This lack of clarity could cause confusion about the status of country actions or State’s decision making and could limit the ability of State and others to use the report as a diplomatic tool to advance efforts to combat trafficking. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses (1) the process the Department of State (State) uses to prepare country narratives and decide tier rankings in the Trafficking in Persons Report; (2) the extent to which country narratives in the Trafficking in Persons Report clearly discuss the minimum standards to combat trafficking as enumerated in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and interpreted by State; and (3) the extent to which State assesses the effectiveness of the Trafficking in Persons Report as a diplomatic tool to encourage countries to address human trafficking. | Why GAO Did This Study
Human traffickers exploit men, women, and children for financial gain. Congress enacted the TVPA in 2000, which requires the Secretary of State to report annually on governments' efforts according to the act's minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Each year since 2001, State has published the Trafficking in Persons Report , ranking countries into one of four tiers. GAO found in 2006 that the report did not fully describe State's assessment of compliance with standards or provide complete explanations for ranking decisions.
The explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, included a provision for GAO to review the report's preparation and effectiveness. This report addresses (1) the process to develop the report, (2) the extent to which country narratives discuss minimum standards, and (3) the extent to which State assesses the report's effectiveness as a tool to address trafficking. GAO compared 220 country narratives in the 2015 and 2016 reports with the minimum standards and analyzed 82 narratives for countries that changed tier. GAO also interviewed State and other officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of State's (State) Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (Trafficking Office) compiles information on countries' actions to combat human trafficking and recommends tier rankings for the Trafficking in Persons Report but did not post information on waivers within mandated timeframes. The figure below shows the percentage of countries by tier in the 2015 and 2016 reports. Disagreements about tier rankings between the Trafficking Office and other parts of State, which have different priorities, are usually resolved at the working level, according to officials, with only a few elevated to the Secretary of State for resolution. The Secretary of State determines all final tier rankings. The Trafficking Office recommends whether to grant waivers for countries that otherwise would be automatically downgraded to the lowest tier. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) requires State to post a detailed description of the credible evidence used to support these waivers on its website annually, but State did not do so for the 2014 through 2016 reports until September 2016.
State has made improvements to the Trafficking in Persons Report since 2006 but does not explicitly explain the basis for certain countries' tier rankings or, where relevant, why countries' tier rankings changed. GAO's analysis of the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report found that, compared with GAO's previous report in 2006, there were fewer instances in which minimum standards and criteria were not mentioned in the narratives. However, most narratives for the highest-ranked, or Tier 1, countries in the 2015 and 2016 reports did not explicitly explain the basis for the tier rankings. The narratives sometimes included language that seemed contradictory to certain standards and criteria. In addition, GAO found that, for countries that changed tier from one year to the next, most narratives did not provide an explicit explanation as to why the rankings changed. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that information should be communicated in a way that is useful to internal and external users. Lacking such clarity could diminish the report's usefulness as a tool to advance efforts to combat trafficking.
State and other officials indicate that the Trafficking in Persons Report can be a useful tool to engage other countries about trafficking, but State has not systematically assessed the report's effectiveness. As a result, the effect of the report in encouraging governments to make progress in combating trafficking is not well understood. However, State officials stated that they are working on efforts to assess the report's effectiveness at achieving the goal of addressing trafficking worldwide.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations to the Secretary of State to improve the clarity and usefulness of the Trafficking in Persons Report by posting evidence to support downgrade waivers on State's website, improving explanations for tier rankings and changes, and assessing the effectiveness of the report as a tool to address trafficking. State agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_RCED-97-72 | gao_RCED-97-72_0 | IAEA has approved an additional $1.7 million in nuclear technical assistance projects for Cuba for 1997 through 1999. In addition, IAEA spent about $433,000 on research contracts for Cuba. I provides information on all nuclear technical assistance projects that IAEA provided for Cuba, by program area, from 1980 through 1996. Of this amount, the United States contributed over $16 million—about 30 percent—of the total $53 million in the technical cooperation fund. )From 1981 through 1993, the United States was required, under section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to withhold a proportionate share of its voluntary contribution to the technical cooperation fund for Cuba, Libya, Iran, and the Palestine Liberation Organization because the fund provided assistance to these entities. The United States withheld about 25 percent of its voluntary contribution to the fund, which otherwise would have helped to fund projects for Cuba and the other proscribed entities. Consequently, as of 1994, the United States was no longer required to withhold a portion of its voluntary contribution to IAEA’s technical cooperation fund for any of these entities, including Cuba. However, State Department officials continued to withhold funds in 1994 and 1995. Because IAEA’s technical cooperation fund provides nuclear technical assistance for Cuba, from 1981 through 1995, the United States withheld a total of about $2 million that otherwise would have gone for nuclear technical assistance for Cuba. IAEA’s Nuclear Technical Assistance Projects for Cuba’s Nuclear Power Reactors and U.S. Officials’ Views on This Assistance
Of the total dollar value of all nuclear nuclear technical assistance projects that IAEA has provided for Cuba, about $680,000 has been approved for four nuclear technical assistance projects for Cuba’s nuclear power reactors from 1991 through 1998. Since 1991, IAEA has assisted Cuba in undertaking a safety assessment of the reactors’ ability to respond to accidents and in conserving, or “mothballing,” the nuclear power reactors while construction is suspended. Since 1995, IAEA has assisted Cuba in designing and implementing a training program for personnel involved in the operational safety and maintenance of all nuclear installations, including the reactors, in Cuba. State Department officials responsible for IAEA’s technical cooperation program and U.S. Mission officials at the United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, Austria, told us that they did not object to IAEA’s providing nuclear safety assistance to Cuba’s reactors because the United States generally supports nuclear safety assistance for IAEA member states that will promote the establishment of a safety culture and quality assurance programs. International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Technical Assistance Projects Provided for Cuba, by Program Area
As shown in figure I.1, almost half—about $5 million—of the $10.4 million that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) spent for nuclear nuclear technical assistance projects for Cuba from 1980 through 1996 was provided in the areas of general atomic energy development and in the application of isotopes and radiation in agriculture. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to congressional requests, GAO provided information on the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear technical assistance to Cuba, focusing on: (1) the dollar value and type of all nuclear technical assistance projects IAEA provided for Cuba; (2) the sources of funding for all nuclear technical assistance projects IAEA provided for Cuba; and (3) IAEA's nuclear technical assistance projects for the Cuban nuclear power reactors and U.S. officials' views on this assistance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IAEA spent about $12 million on nuclear technical assistance projects for Cuba from 1963 through 1996; (2) about three-fourths of the assistance Cuba received through these projects consisted of equipment; (3) IAEA's assistance for Cuba was given primarily in the areas of general atomic energy development and in the application of isotopes and radiation in agriculture; (4) IAEA recently approved an additional $1.7 million for nuclear technical assistance projects for Cuba for 1997 through 1999; (5) IAEA spent about $2.8 million on training for Cuban nationals and research contracts for Cuba that were not part of specific assistance projects; (6) most of IAEA's nuclear technical assistance projects for Cuba were funded through the agency's technical cooperation fund; (7) in 1996, the United States contributed over $16 million, about 30 percent, of the $53 million in the fund; (8) from 1981 through 1993, the United States was required, under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, to withhold a share of its voluntary contribution to the fund because the fund provided assistance for Cuba, Libya, Iran, and the Palestine Liberation Organization; (9) in 1994, the act was amended to exempt IAEA from the withholding requirement; (10) although the United States was no longer required to withhold the portion of its voluntary contribution that would have gone to proscribed entities, State Department officials continued to withhold funds in 1994 and 1995 but did not withhold any of the United States' voluntary contribution to IAEA's technical cooperation fund for 1996; (11) from 1981 through 1995, the United States withheld a total of about $2 million that otherwise would have gone for assistance for Cuba; (12) of the total value of all nuclear technical assistance projects that IAEA has provided for Cuba, about $680,000 was approved for nuclear safety assistance for Cuba's nuclear power reactors from 1991 through 1998, of which about $313,000 has been spent; (13) IAEA is assisting Cuba in developing the ability to conduct a safety assessment of the nuclear power reactors and in preserving the reactors while construction is suspended; (14) IAEA is also implementing a training program for personnel involved in the operational safety and maintenance of all nuclear installations in Cuba; and (15) State Department and U.S. Mission officials in Vienna, Austria, told GAO that they did not object to IAEA's providing nuclear safety assistance to Cuba's reactors because the United States generally supports nuclear safety assistance for IAEA member states that will promote the establishment of a safety culture and quality assurance programs. |
gao_GAO-10-126 | gao_GAO-10-126_0 | For example, a colonia can be a tribal reservation, a fast-growing retirement community, or a high-poverty subdivision. Reclamation, which has been directed to provide assistance for drinking water or wastewater treatment projects in response to individual project authorizations but does not have an established program for such assistance. Federal agencies generally require the entity seeking assistance to meet with agency officials prior to submitting an application. Federal Agencies Provided at Least $1.4 Billion over 9 Years for Water and Wastewater Infrastructure in the Border Region
We found that seven federal agencies obligated at least $1.4 billion for drinking water and wastewater projects in the U.S.-Mexico border region from fiscal years 2000 through 2008. USDA and EPA obligated 78 percent, or about $1.1 billion, of the total $1.4 billion. USDA obligated about $509 million, or about 37 percent of the total federal funding. Of the $509 million total, USDA obligated about $502 million (98 percent) to public utilities or similar entities for construction or improvements to water and wastewater infrastructure. It obligated over $7 million to individuals in the border region for household projects, such as installing indoor plumbing. Federal Efforts Have Not Been Effective in Meeting the Water and Wastewater Needs of the Border Region
Federal efforts have not effectively addressed the drinking water and wastewater needs in the border region because agencies (1) have not comprehensively assessed the needs of the region, (2) lack coordinate policies and processes, and (3) in some cases have not complied with statutory requirements and agency regulations. Agencies Have Not Comprehensively As Water and Wastewater Conditions, Hampering Their Ability to Meet the Needs of the Region
O ver the years, some federal agencies have conducted assessments to identify water and wastewater conditions in the border region, but non these assessments either individually or collectively provides a comprehensive picture of the needs of the region. As a result, IHS can select projects that target the greatest need and report on effectiveness to meet the water and wastewater needs of tribal nations, including those within the border region. Agencies Lack Coordinated Policies and Processes for Providing Federal Assistance in the Border Region
The federal agencies that provide most of the funding for water and wastewater projects in the border region—EPA, USDA, and HUD—have not developed comprehensive coordinated policies and procedures, resulting in administrative burdens for applicants, duplication of efforts, and inefficient use of resources. Agencies Do Not Ensure Funds Intended for Use in the Border Region Are Provided to Those with the Greatest Need
USDA and HUD do not ensure that funds intended for use in the border region comply with statutory requirements for establishing project priorities in the border region. Further, the Corps has not established any guidance to ensure funds are targeted to those projects with the greatest need. We then collected and analyzed obligation and project location data from each of the seven agencies—the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), the Department of Health and Human Service’s Indian Health Service (IHS), the Department of Commerce’s Economic Development Administration (EDA), and the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation)—from fiscal years 2000 through 2008. To determine agencies’ efforts to enhance and sustain collaboration with other agencies, we reviewed coordination documentation, such as memorandums of agreement; reviewed program requirements; and interviewed federal officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
A serious problem for U.S. communities along the U.S.-Mexico border is the lack of access to safe drinking water and sanitation systems. Inadequate systems can pose risks to human health and the environment, including the risk of waterborne diseases. Numerous federal programs provide grants, loans, or other assistance to rural U.S. communities, including those in the border region, for drinking water and wastewater projects. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to determine (1) the amount of federal funding provided to rural U.S. communities in the border region for drinking water and wastewater systems and (2) the effectiveness of federal efforts to meet the water and wastewater needs in the region. GAO analyzed agency financial data; reviewed statutes, regulations, policies, and procedures; and interviewed federal, state, local, and private sector officials.
What GAO Found
Seven federal agencies--the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), Economic Development Administration (EDA), the Indian Health Service (IHS), and the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation)--obligated at least $1.4 billion for drinking water and wastewater projects to assist communities in the U.S.-Mexico border region from fiscal years 2000 through 2008. USDA and EPA obligated 78 percent, or about $1.1 billion, of the total $1.4 billion--with USDA obligating 37 percent, or $509 million, and EPA obligating 41 percent, or $568 million. Agencies provided assistance for a variety of drinking water and wastewater activities, such as constructing or improving treatment facilities and installing distribution lines. For example, of the $509 million total, USDA obligated about $502 million to public utilities or similar entities for construction of or improvements to water and wastewater infrastructure. It obligated over $7 million to individuals in the border region for household projects, such as repairs to indoor plumbing. Federal efforts to meet drinking water and wastewater needs in the border region have been ineffective because most federal agencies (1) have not comprehensively assessed the needs in the region, (2) lack coordinated policies and processes, and (3) in some cases have not complied with statutory requirements and agency regulations. Although federal agencies have assembled some data and conducted limited studies of drinking water and wastewater conditions in the border region, the resulting patchwork of data does not provide a comprehensive assessment of the region's needs. Without such an assessment, federal agencies cannot target resources toward the most urgent needs or provide assistance to communities that do not have the technical and financial resources to initiate a proposal for assistance. In contrast, IHS has collected data on water and wastewater conditions for each tribal reservation. As a result, the agency can select projects that target the greatest need. In addition, although some federal agencies recognize the importance of a collaborative and coordinated process to increase program effectiveness, agencies' policies and processes are generally incompatible or not collaborative with those of other agencies. For example, most federal programs require separate documentation to meet the same requirement and the agencies do not consistently coordinate in selecting projects. As a result, applicants face significant administrative burdens and project completion can be delayed. Moreover, GAO found that some agencies do not always meet the requirements stipulated in federal statutes and agency regulations concerning how they are to determine the eligibility of applicants or projects and how they are to prioritize funds. For example, USDA and HUD do not ensure that recipients' use of targeted funds intended for use in the border region complies with statutory requirements for establishing project priorities in the border region. Finally, the Corps has not established any guidance to ensure funds are targeted to those projects with the greatest need. |
gao_GAO-12-635 | gao_GAO-12-635_0 | As a result of these changing prices, among other things, the use of natural gas to produce electricity has increased and is expected to continue to increase. Power Companies Are Expected to Retrofit Many Generating Units, Retire Others, and Take Additional Actions
According to available information, power companies are projected to retrofit many coal-fueled generating units with environmental controls and retire some other units, as well as take additional actions to respond to the four key EPA regulations. Actions Taken by Power Companies Will Likely Increase Electricity Prices and May Contribute to Reliability Challenges in Some Regions
Available information suggests the actions power companies take to respond to the four key regulations will have costs, and some may be challenging to complete by the regulations’ compliance deadlines. In addition, these actions may have varied implications across the country— increasing electricity prices in some regions and contributing to some potential reliability challenges. Actions Would Likely Increase Electricity Prices in Some Regions
The actions power companies may take in response to the four key EPA regulations would likely increase electricity prices in some regions. According to EPA officials, the projected price increases associated with CSAPR and MATS are within the historical range of price fluctuations, and projected future prices overall may be below historic electricity prices. Two aspects of retrofits can cause potential reliability challenges. First, in certain cases, generating units will need to be temporarily shut down to connect new controls, and some stakeholders said that scheduling these shutdowns while maintaining reliability could be challenging in certain areas. Retirements. It is not certain what portion of the 2 to 12 percent of coal-fueled generating units expected to retire could cause reliability challenges that would need to be addressed. Several stakeholders said it could be difficult to resolve all potential reliability challenges that may arise because of retirements before the 3-year MATS compliance deadline established by statute. PJM has identified reliability concerns with 101 of these retirement requests because they may cause violations of reliability standards. Available Tools May Help Mitigate Some, but Not All, Price Increases
Various tools available to industry and regulators could help mitigate some, but not all, potential increases in the prices consumers pay for electricity. Although these planning, market, and operational tools could address many potential reliability challenges, challenges may still arise if generating units needed for reliability are not in compliance with the EPA regulations by the deadlines. Agencies Have Begun Taking Steps to Monitor Industry’s Progress but Have Not Documented Their Process, and FERC Has Not Proactively Reviewed RTO Rules
FERC, DOE, and EPA have begun taking steps to monitor industry’s progress in responding to the regulations but have not established a formal, documented process for joint and routine monitoring, and FERC has not taken steps to proactively assess RTO rules in the context of the regulations. Aspects of these regulations remain uncertain, but they, along with other industry trends such as the aging of coal-fueled generating units and lower prices for natural gas, are expected to contribute to significant changes in electricity systems in some parts of the United States in the near future. However, these tools may not fully address all potential adverse implications in some regions, for example, some reliability challenges that arise after the compliance deadlines. FERC, DOE, and EPA have taken important first steps to coordinate with RTOs, other system planners, and state regulators, among others, to better understand these issues. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following two recommendations:
To further strengthen agency efforts to understand whether existing tools are adequate, or additional tools are needed, we recommend that the Chairman of FERC, the Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator of the EPA develop and document a formal, joint process consistent with each agencies’ respective statutory authorities to monitor industry’s progress in responding to the EPA regulations until at least 2017. Regarding our first recommendation that FERC, DOE, and EPA develop and document a formal process to monitor industry's progress in responding to the EPA regulations, DOE and EPA generally agreed. However, we do not believe it is a substitute for an assessment by FERC of the adequacy of rules. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report provides information on the implications associated with four key recently proposed or finalized regulations from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): (1) the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR); (2) the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS); (3) the proposed Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing and Phase I Facilities regulation, also known as 316(b), and (4) the proposed Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities regulation (CCR). Specifically, this report addresses: (1) what available information indicates about actions power companies may take at coal-fueled generating units in response to the four key EPA regulations; (2) what available information indicates about these regulations’ potential implications on the electricity market and reliability; and (3) the extent to which EPA, FERC, DOE, and other stakeholders can mitigate adverse electricity market and reliability implications, if any, associated with requirements in these regulations. Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator. Appendix V: Comments from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
GAO Comments
1. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
EPA recently proposed or finalized four regulations affecting coal-fueled electricity generating units, which provide almost half of the electricity in the United States: (1) the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule; (2) the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards; (3) the proposed Cooling Water Intake Structures regulation; and (4) the proposed Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals regulation. Power companies may retrofit or retire some units in response to the regulations. EPA estimated two of the regulations would prevent thousands of premature deaths and generate $160-$405 billion in annual benefits. Some stakeholders have expressed concerns that these regulations could increase electricity prices and compromise reliabilitythe ability to meet consumers' demand. FERC and others have oversight over electricity prices and reliability. DOE can order a generating unit to run in certain emergencies. GAO was asked to examine: (1) actions power companies may take in response to these regulations; (2) their potential electricity market and reliability implications; and (3) the extent to which these implications can be mitigated. GAO reviewed agency documents, selected studies, and interviewed stakeholders.
What GAO Found
It is uncertain how power companies may respond to four key Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations, but available information suggests companies may retrofit most coal-fueled generating units with controls to reduce pollution, and that 2 to 12 percent of coal-fueled capacity may be retired. Some regions may see more significant levels of retirements. For example, one study examined 11 states in the Midwest and projected that 18 percent of coal-fueled capacity in that region could retire. EPA and some stakeholders GAO interviewed stated that some such retirements could occur as a result of other factors such as lower natural gas prices, regardless of the regulations. Power companies may also build new generating units, upgrade transmission systems to maintain reliability, and increasingly use natural gas to produce electricity as coal units retire and remaining coal units become somewhat more expensive to operate.
Available information suggests these actions would likely increase electricity prices in some regions. Furthermore, while these actions may not cause widespread reliability concerns, they may contribute to reliability challenges in some regions. Regarding prices, the studies GAO reviewed estimated that increases could vary across the country, with one study projecting a range of increases from 0.1 percent in the Northwest to an increase of 13.5 percent in parts of the South more dependent on electricity generated from coal. According to EPA officials, the agencys estimates of price increases would be within the historical range of price fluctuations, and projected future prices may be below historic prices. Regarding reliability, these actions are not expected to pose widespread concerns but may contribute to challenges in some regions. EPA and some stakeholders GAO interviewed indicated that these actions should not affect reliability given existing tools. Some other stakeholders GAO interviewed identified potential reliability challenges. Among other things, it may be difficult to schedule and complete all retrofits to install controls and to resolve all potential reliability concerns associated with retirements within compliance deadlines.
Existing tools could help mitigate many, though not all, of the potential adverse implications associated with the four EPA regulations, but the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Department of Energy (DOE), and EPA do not have a joint, formal process to monitor industrys progress in responding to the regulations. Some tools, such as state regulatory reviews to evaluate the prudence of power company investments, may address some potential price increases. Furthermore, tools available to industry and regulators, as well as certain regulatory provisions, may address many potential reliability challenges. However, because of certain limitations, these tools may not fully address all challenges where generating units needed for reliability are not in compliance by the deadlines. FERC, DOE, and EPA have responsibilities concerning the electricity industry, and they have taken important first steps to understand these potential challenges by, for example, informally coordinating with power companies and others about industrys actions to respond to the regulations. However, they have not established a formal, documented process for jointly and routinely monitoring industrys progress and, absent such a process, the complexity and extent of potential reliability challenges may not be clear to these agencies. This may make it more difficult to assess whether existing tools are adequate or whether additional tools are needed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that FERC, DOE, and EPA take additional steps to monitor industrys progress in responding to the regulations. DOE and EPA agreed with this recommendation, and FERC disagreed with this and another recommendation. GAO continues to believe that it is important for FERC to take the recommended actions. |
gao_GAO-09-586 | gao_GAO-09-586_0 | DOD Continues to Take Steps to Strengthen Management of Its Business Systems Modernization, but Long-standing Challenges Remain
DOD continues to take steps to comply with the requirements of the Act and to satisfy relevant systems modernization management guidance. However, the pace of DOD’s progress in defining and implementing these key modernization management controls has slowed compared with the progress the department had made, and we have reported, each of the last 4 years. In 2008, we reported that the then-current version of the BEA (version 5.0) addressed, to varying degrees, missing elements, inconsistencies, and usability issues that we previously identified, but that gaps still remained. For example, it begins to address information assurance by identifying related laws, regulations, and policies. Notwithstanding these additions and deletions, BEA 6.0 still does not provide business rules for all business processes. For example, they have selected the Department of the Army’s Defense Knowledge Online to be BTA’s federated enterprise portal, which is to be the point of access to information about all DOD and component architectures, and is to allow users to search and navigate through this information; established and are using the DOD Architecture Registry System, which is maintained by ASD(NII)/DOD CIO, as the repository to contain architecture content; conducted five pilots at three military departments and two defense agencies to evaluate various aspects of architecture federation and develop lessons learned about, for example, approaches for capturing and managing architecture metadata (Air Force pilot), and enterprise search and discovery methods (Navy pilot); and developed guidance on identifying and registering business services and, as of November 2008, identified and registered 25 business services, such as a service that provides detailed information on each aircraft at the base (e.g., an aircraft’s mission capability and maintenance status), and a service that allows aircraft maintenance data to be retrieved, created, updated, and removed. DOD Continues to Update Its ETP, but Important Elements Are Still Missing, as Are Individual Component Plans
Among other things, the Act requires DOD to develop an ETP for implementing its BEA that includes listings of the legacy systems that will and will not be part of the target business systems environment and specific time-phased milestones and performance metrics for each business system investment. In addition, the plan is missing information about some legacy systems and modernization programs. As we reported last year, the department’s fiscal year 2009 budget submission included a range of information required by the Act on business system investments. Without such visibility, DOD components risk making investment decisions that are inconsistent and not fully grounded in objective data. Annual reviews. DOD Certification and Approval Decisions Have Been Based on Limited Information
Although DOD has been meeting the Act’s requirement to certify and approve business system modernization programs, it has at times relied on limited information in doing so. According to relevant DOD guidance, the economic viability of system investments is to be analyzed on the basis of reliable estimates of costs and benefits. The information in DITPR is not always accurate, and thus does not always provide an adequate basis for informed decision making. Conclusions
The pace of DOD’s progress in defining and implementing key institutional modernization management controls has slowed relative to each of the prior 4 years, leaving much to be accomplished. Relatedly, it is important for the department to obtain independent assessments of the completeness, consistency, understandability, and usability of the federated family of business mission area architectures, including associated transition plans, and to share the results of these assessments with its authorizing and appropriations committees. In addition, to ensure that DOD continues to implement the full range of institutional management controls needed to address its business systems modernization high-risk area, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as chair of the DBSMC and as DOD’s CMO, to resolve the issues surrounding the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and relationships of the Deputy CMO and the military department CMOs relative to the BEA and ETP federation and business system investment management. Further, to ensure that business system investment reviews and related certification and approval decisions, as well as annual budget submissions, are based on complete and accurate information, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate DOD organizations to develop and implement plans for reconciling and validating the completeness and reliability of information in its DITPR and SNAP-IT system data repositories, and to include information on the status of these efforts in the department’s fiscal year 2010 report in response to the Act. Generally, these five requirements are (1) development of a business enterprise architecture (BEA), (2) development of an enterprise transition plan (ETP) for implementing the BEA, (3) inclusion of business systems information in DOD’s budget submission, (4) establishment of business systems investment review processes and structures, and (5) approval of defense business systems investments with obligations in excess of $1 million. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1995, GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) business systems modernization program as high risk, and it continues to do so today. To assist in addressing DOD's business system modernization challenges, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (the Act) contains provisions that require the department to take certain actions and to annually report to its congressional committees on these actions. The Act also directs GAO to review each annual report. In response, GAO performed its fifth annual review of DOD's actions to comply with key aspects in the Act and related federal guidance. To do so, GAO reviewed, for example, the latest version of DOD's business enterprise architecture (BEA) and transition plan, investment management policies and procedures, and information in the department's business system data repositories.
What GAO Found
The pace of DOD's progress in defining and implementing key institutional modernization management controls has slowed compared with progress made in each of the last 4 years, leaving much still to be accomplished to fully implement the Act's requirements and related guidance. In particular, the corporate BEA continues to evolve and address previously identified missing elements, inconsistencies, and usability issues, but gaps still remain. For example, while the BEA now identifies information assurance laws, regulations, and policies, it still does not include business rules for all business processes. Further, little progress has been made in the last year in extending (i.e., federating) the BEA to the entire family of business mission area architectures, including using an independent verification and validation agent to assess the components' subsidiary architectures and federation efforts. The updated enterprise transition plan continues to identify systems and initiatives, but important elements are still missing, as are individual component plans. For example, while the plan provides a range of information, such as budgets and performance measures, for key enterprisewide and component-specific investments, it is missing information on identified investments. The fiscal year 2009 budget submission included some, but omitted other, key information about business system investments, in part because of the lack of a reliable comprehensive inventory of all defense business systems. Investment approval and accountability structures have been established for DOD and the Air Force, and related policies and procedures that are consistent with relevant guidance have been partially defined. However, these structures and processes are still lacking for the Navy. Business system investments costing over $1 million continue to be certified and approved, but these decisions are not always based on complete information. For example, key Navy investments have not fully demonstrated compliance with the department's BEA, and their economic justifications were not based on reliable estimates of cost and benefits. In addition, the information in DOD's authoritative repository of system investments that is used to make these decisions is not always accurate. Department officials attributed this slowdown in large part to pending decisions surrounding the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and relationships among key senior leadership positions, such as DOD's Deputy Chief Management Officer and the military departments' Chief Management Officers. Until DOD fully implements these long-standing institutional modernization management controls provided for under the Act, addressed in GAO recommendations, and otherwise embodied in relevant guidance, its business systems modernization will likely remain a high-risk program. As a result, it is important that the department act quickly to resolve pending decisions about key positions. |
gao_GAO-17-643 | gao_GAO-17-643_0 | In 2012 NGA determined that a new NGA West would best meet the agency’s mission and resource needs. These broad sets of criteria, referred to as “evaluation factors,” were mission, security, development and sustainability, schedule, cost, and environment. 2. The NGA Director selected the St. Louis City site as the agency-preferred alternative. NGA’s AOA Process for Selecting the New NGA West Site Substantially Met Three and Partially Met One Characteristic of a High-Quality, Reliable AOA Process but Lacked Important Cost Information
Site Selection Process Substantially Met Three of the Four Characteristics for a High-Quality, Reliable AOA Process but Could Have Been Strengthened
We compared NGA’s AOA process for selecting a site for the new NGA West campus to our AOA best practices and determined that NGA’s process substantially met three and partially met one characteristic of a high-quality, reliable AOA process. NGA and Corps of Engineers officials said that they are in the process of developing full life-cycle cost estimates for the construction and design of the new NGA West campus, for the agency- preferred alternative. Site Selection Process Only Partially Met the Characteristic for a Credible AOA Because It Lacked Important Information on Cost Risks and Sensitivities
NGA’s AOA process for selecting the site for the new NGA West campus partially met the credible characteristic for an agency’s AOA process. However, NGA did not fully include key information on either the risk or the uncertainty related to cost estimates or the sensitivity to the costs and benefits identified as part of its AOA process. Although NGA’s AOA process did not reflect all of the characteristics of a high-quality process, we are not making recommendations in this report, in part because NGA plans to conduct additional cost analysis and in part because we made an applicable recommendation to DOD in 2016. Further, we continue to believe that our September 2016 recommendation that DOD develop guidance requiring the use of AOA best practices for certain military construction decisions could help ensure that future AOA processes conducted by DOD agencies like NGA are reliable and that agencies identify a preferred alternative that best meets mission needs. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report of this report to NGA for review and comment. In comments on our report, NGA stated that it valued our assessment of its AOA process, which we judged to have substantially met the characteristics of a well-documented, comprehensive, and unbiased process, and would use our findings to continue to refine and improve its corporate decision making and processes. NGA raised a concern about our assessment that its AOA process used to select the site for its new NGA West project partially met the best practices that demonstrate a credible process. While NGA may have concluded that the project’s cost was not the most important factor, the agency estimates that construction of the campus will cost about $945 million and NGA used the cost estimate as a determining factor to select from the four final alternatives. Appendix I: Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) 22 Best Practices with GAO’s Evaluation of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) AOA Process and Scores
In our earlier discussion of the extent to which NGA’s AOA process met best practices for such processes, we presented our analysis for specific best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
NGA, a defense agency and element of the Intelligence Community, provides geospatial intelligence to military and intelligence operations to support national security priorities. It currently operates out of two primary facilities—its headquarters in Springfield, Virginia, and its NGA West campus in St. Louis, Missouri. In 2012, NGA determined that a new location for its NGA West facilities was necessary to meet security standards and better support its national security mission. NGA estimates that the construction of the new campus will cost about $945 million.
GAO was asked to evaluate the AOA process that NGA used to select the site for its new campus. This report (1) describes the process NGA used, including the key factors it considered and (2) evaluates the extent to which the AOA process met best practices for such analyses.
GAO visited the existing NGA West campus and the final four alternative sites that were considered, analyzed and assessed reports and information that document NGA's AOA process for selecting the site, and interviewed relevant officials about the process. GAO evaluated NGA's process against best practices identified by GAO as characteristics of a high-quality, reliable AOA process.
What GAO Found
In 2012, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) began an analysis of alternatives (AOA) process to evaluate potential sites for its new NGA Campus West (NGA West) using key evaluation factors related to mission, security, development and sustainability, schedule, cost, and environment. NGA's process included levels of analysis and considerations to select the agency-preferred alternative from an original list of 186 potential sites, subsequently narrowed to the final four alternative sites (see figure). The process culminated in the June 2016 selection of the agency-preferred alternative, the St. Louis City site.
NGA's process for selecting a site for the new NGA West campus substantially met three of the four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable AOA process. Specifically, NGA's process substantially met the characteristics that demonstrate a well-documented, comprehensive, and unbiased AOA process. It partially met the credibility characteristic, in part because it did not fully include information on the risks and sensitivities to cost estimates. NGA officials stated that there was no comprehensive DOD guidance to inform its AOA process, and although NGA's AOA process is complete, NGA plans to develop full cost estimates as part of construction, planning, and design. In September 2016, GAO recommended that DOD develop guidance for the use of AOA best practices for certain types of military construction decisions. While DOD did not concur and the recommendation remains open, GAO continues to believe such guidance would help ensure that future AOA processes are reliable and would result in decisions that best meet mission needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations to NGA. In commenting on a draft of this report, NGA expressed concerns about GAO's assessment of NGA's estimates of cost risks and sensitivities. GAO continues to believe its assessment accurately reflects NGA's process. |
gao_GAO-13-566 | gao_GAO-13-566_0 | The current cap was set at $763,029 and was published by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy on April 23, 2012. The cap has more than doubled since 1998 in then-year dollars; when adjusted for inflation and measured in 2011 dollars, the cap has increased by about 63 percent in real terms. Number of Contractor Employees with Compensation Costs in Excess of Reduced Caps
Reducing the cap to the salaries of the U.S. President or Vice President would have substantially increased the number of employees with compensation above the cap in 2010-2012, and in turn, increased the amount of compensation costs that would have no longer been allowable Across the 27 contractors reviewed, fewer than under federal contracts.200 employees in any one year had compensation costs over the existing cap, but this number would have increased to more than 500 if the cap had been set at the President’s salary, and to more than 3,000 if the cap had been set at the Vice President’s salary. All employees with compensation costs that exceeded the existing cap were identified as executives. Contractors identified over $180 million per year in compensation costs that would have exceeded a cap set at the President’s salary, and at least $440 million per year if set at the Vice President’s salary. Government representatives generally supported reducing the cap as a means to help reduce the costs of DOD contracts, whereas industry representatives and most contractors we reviewed emphasized potential negative impacts to reducing the cap. OMB noted that the growth in the cap has outpaced the rate of inflation, the rate of growth of private sector salaries generally, and the rate of growth of federal salaries. DOD noted that it fully supported the principle of paying only reasonable compensation costs and some DOD officials supported reducing the cap, though DOD cautioned that there are limited data on the potential impacts of doing so and that the impact on the defense industry would need to be carefully monitored and assessed. For example, several contractor and industry representatives stated that even though a cap does not limit what the company can pay the employee, companies may consider limiting the compensation paid to their employees over the long term. DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. We noted in the report that our sample was not generalizable and that some findings, particularly those associated with the impact that the potential reductions of the cap may have on the large-tier contractors, are limited since the three largest contractors selected did not provide requested data. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Section 864 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directed GAO to report to Congress on the effect of reducing the allowable costs of compensation to the salary of the U.S. President or that of the U.S. Vice President, which are currently $400,000 and $230,700, respectively. This report provides (1) estimates of the number of employees of a sample of Department of Defense (DOD) contractors whose compensation would have exceeded a cap set at the salaries of either the U.S. President or Vice President, and the amount of compensation that would not have been allowable; (2) the status of DOD’s efforts to establish an exception for scientists and engineers and the extent to which scientists and engineers would be affected by reducing the cap; and (3) the views of government and contractor representatives on potential effects of a reduction in the cap. We also requested data from a stratified, random sample of 30 contractors on a number of items related to each objective. To determine government and contractor representatives’ views on the potential impacts of reducing the cap, we interviewed government representatives and industry associations. We received complete responses to our data request from 27 of the 30 contractors in our sample—seven large-tier, 10 mid-tier, and 10 small-tier. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1990s, federal law has placed a limitation, or cap, on the amount of employee compensation that contractors can charge to federal contracts. The cap increased by 63 percent in real terms since first use of the current approach in 1998. The cap was set at $693,951 in 2010 and $763,029 for 2011 and 2012.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directed GAO to provide information on the effect of reducing the cap to the salary of the U.S. President or Vice President. GAO identified, among other things, (1) estimates of the number of employees of a sample of DOD contractors whose compensation would have exceeded a cap set at the salaries of either the U.S. President or Vice President and the amount of compensation that would not have been allowable and (2) the views of government and contractor representatives on potential effects of a reduction in the cap. GAO collected data from a nongeneralizable, stratified random sample of 10 large-tier, 10 mid-tier, and 10 small-tier contractors; reviewed relevant laws and regulations, and interviewed government and contractor representatives. Data on the number of employees affected by the cap was received from 27 of the 30 contractors; the three largest contractors in GAO's sample did not provide these data.
What GAO Found
Reducing the cap to the President's salary ($400,000) or the Vice President's salary ($230,700) would have substantially increased the number of employees with compensation costs exceeding the cap in 2010-2012.
For 2010-2012, contractors identified over $180 million per year in compensation costs that would have exceeded a cap set at the President's salary, and at least $440 million per year if set at the Vice President's salary. Most affected employees were at large-tier companies; few small-tier companies had employees exceeding these caps. While employees with compensation costs in excess of the existing cap were all identified as executives by the contractors, reducing the cap would have increasingly affected compensation costs for individuals below the executive level.
Government representatives generally supported reducing the cap as a means to reduce the costs of Department of Defense (DOD) contracts, whereas industry representatives and most contractors identified negative effects that could result from reducing the cap. The Office of Management and Budget noted the growth in the cap has outpaced inflation and the rate of growth of federal salaries. DOD noted that it fully supported the principle of paying only reasonable compensation costs and some DOD officials supported reducing the cap, though DOD cautioned that there are limited data on the potential impacts of doing so and that the impact on the defense industry would need to be carefully monitored and assessed. Industry associations and contractors representatives noted that the compensation they offer to their employees is generally based on market surveys of compensation paid by private sector companies. While acknowledging that a reduced cap would not preclude them from compensating their employees above the cap, contractor representatives noted that doing so would come at the expense of company profits, which in turn may result in challenges in attracting capital from the financial markets. They also noted that reducing the cap may affect companies' ability to attract and retain top talent and, over the long term, lead companies to reassess their business and staffing models and potentially shift work or personnel from government business to their commercial sector.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. DOD and OMB commented on a draft, noting the need to pay reasonable compensation costs. DOD also cited the need for more research given GAO's sample size. GAO believes this analysis provides valuable insights into potential effects of cap changes. |
gao_GAO-16-371 | gao_GAO-16-371_0 | Under the 9/11 Commission Act, DHS is responsible for developing the QHSR and for submitting a report that is to include multiple elements, such as: a description of the threats to the assumed or defined national homeland security interests of the United States; the national homeland security strategy, including a prioritized list of the critical homeland security missions of the United States; an assessment of the organizational alignment of DHS with the applicable national homeland security strategy and the homeland security mission areas outlined; and a discussion of the status of cooperation among federal agencies in the effort to promote national homeland security, among other elements. DHS solicited input from various stakeholder groups in conducting the second QHSR. DHS’s lack of documentation also limits the reproducibility and defensibility of the results, since the assessment cannot easily be validated or the assumptions tested, further hindering DHS’s ability to improve future iterations of the assessment. The 2013 risk management supplement to the NIPP states that comparing and prioritizing the risks faced by different entities helps identify where risk mitigation is most needed and determines and helps justify the selection of the most cost-effective risk management options. The QHSR risk assessment describes a wide range of homeland security challenges and is a valuable step toward using risk information to prioritize and select risk management activities. Without determining and communicating prioritized risk analysis outcomes, DHS is missing an opportunity to more efficiently implement programs, strategies, and policies to mitigate risk and is limited in its ability to identify the resources required for addressing different levels and types of risks. DHS Budget Request and Performance Measures Align with QHSR Mission Goals
DHS’s Budget Request Aligns with the QHSR, and DHS is Taking Actions to Account for its Spending by Mission Area
The Department’s annual budget request was generally presented in alignment with the QHSR mission areas, but DHS has faced challenges accounting for its spending by mission, which it is taking actions to address. Time Constraints Present in First QHSR Persisted in Second QHSR
In 2011, we recommended that DHS provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR process to help ensure that stakeholders have the time needed to review QHSR documents and provide input into the review. Federal and nonfederal survey respondents indicated, however, that QHSR stakeholder outreach meetings did not allow for interactive exchange between stakeholders and DHS officials. In the narrative responses to our survey, 43 of 61 respondents to one question in our survey stated that collaboration with stakeholders could be improved. For example, one survey respondent noted that stakeholders were asked to react to information provided by DHS rather than participating in formulating the approach and execution of the studies. In addition, DHS’s 2014 QHSR After Action Report noted that the online tools were used to validate study findings instead of informing them as originally planned. By not fostering interactive communication with federal and nonfederal stakeholders, DHS may have missed opportunities to fully engage the entire homeland security enterprise and thereby may not have fully informed the QHSR effort. To determine the extent to which DHS has aligned its budget and performance measures with the mission goals in the QHSR, we analyzed DHS documents related to the 2014 QHSR and the fiscal years 2014- 2018 Strategic Plan, including: DHS Budget in Brief documents from 2015 through 2017 to determine DHS’s budget priorities since issuance of the first QHSR; fiscal years 2012 through 2015 Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) reports; excerpts from DHS’s fiscal years 2017-2021 and 2018-2022 resource planning guidance to determine the extent to which budget guidance reflects the DHS missions and goals; and DHS reports on its progress implementing a new common appropriations structure. The comments received from these respondents are not generalizable to the entire group of stakeholders, but the feedback provided insights into stakeholder perspectives on how QHSR stakeholder consultations were conducted and how they could be improved. | Why GAO Did This Study
Homeland security threats continue to evolve and include challenges ranging from terrorist attacks to natural disasters, emphasizing the need for DHS to periodically examine and strengthen the nation's homeland security strategy. Further, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires DHS to conduct such a review every 4 years. GAO reported in 2011 on DHS's first QHSR and recommended DHS provide sufficient time for stakeholder consultations and examine how risk information could be used to prioritize mission efforts. DHS issued its second QHSR in 2014.
GAO was asked to assess the QHSR. This report addresses the extent to which DHS (1) examined and used risk information to inform the QHSR and its implementation, (2) aligned its budget and performance measures to QHSR mission goals, and (3) collaborated with stakeholders to develop the QHSR. GAO analyzed relevant statutes and QHSR documentation; conducted a nongeneralizable survey of DHS-identified federal and nonfederal QHSR stakeholders, receiving responses from 93 of the 182 QHSR stakeholders it contacted; and interviewed officials from DHS, federal, and nonfederal entities.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assessed risk for the second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) and considered threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences; however, DHS did not document how its various analyses were synthesized to generate results, thus limiting the reproducibility and defensibility of the results. Without sufficient documentation, the QHSR risk results cannot easily be validated or the assumptions tested, hindering DHS's ability to improve future assessments. In addition, the QHSR describes homeland security hazards, but does not rank those hazards or provide prioritized strategies to address them. Comparing and prioritizing risks helps identify where risk mitigation is most needed and helps justify cost-effective risk management options. Without determining prioritized risk outcomes, DHS is missing an opportunity to more efficiently mitigate risk or identify the resources required for addressing different levels and types of risks.
The President's fiscal years 2015 and 2016 budget requests for DHS were generally presented in alignment with the QHSR. However, DHS has faced challenges accounting for its spending by mission, which it is taking actions to address, such as developing a new common appropriation structure to better link the department's funding request to the execution of its missions. DHS also developed performance measures for all of the QHSR mission areas.
DHS expanded its stakeholder outreach efforts, but 43 of 61 stakeholders who provided narrative responses to one question in GAO's survey stated that collaboration with stakeholders could be improved. For example, one respondent reported that stakeholders were asked to react to information provided by DHS rather than assist in formulating the QHSR approach and execution. DHS officials reported being limited by staff, time, and other constraints, and thus directed stakeholders to provide feedback via various web-based forums. Although the online forums allowed DHS to reach 2,000 representatives during its 2014 QHSR development process, DHS's QHSR After Action Report noted that the tools were used to validate study findings instead of informing them. Without fostering interactive communication, DHS may miss opportunities to incorporate stakeholder perspectives from the entire homeland security enterprise and thereby may not have fully informed the QHSR effort.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations, including that for future QHSRs DHS improve its risk assessment documentation, prioritize risks, and ensure stakeholder meetings are interactive. DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-159 | gao_GAO-08-159_0 | As such, the BRAC Commission continued to use DOD’s COBRA model for making its cost and savings estimates. Similarly, whereas the BRAC Commission estimated that the implementation of the BRAC 2005 recommendations would save DOD about $36 billion over a 20-year period ending in 2025, BRAC implementation is now expected to save about $15 billion, a decrease of 58 percent. DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estimated
Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and savings projections in 2005, cost estimates to implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations have increased from $21 billion to $31 billion (48 percent) compared to the BRAC Commission’s reported estimates and net annual recurring savings estimates have decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion (5 percent) compared to the BRAC Commission’s reported estimates as shown in table 1. Estimated One-time Costs Have Increased
Our analysis shows that estimated one-time costs to implement 33 BRAC recommendations, representing nearly 1/5 of all the BRAC recommendations for this round, increased by more than $50 million each compared to the BRAC Commission’s estimates. DOD’s expected costs to implement 6 of these recommendations increased by a total of about $4 billion. DOD Will Take Longer to Recoup Up-Front Costs Than the BRAC Commission Expected
DOD’s current estimates to implement the BRAC recommendations show that it will take until 2017 for the department to recoup its up-front costs—4 years longer than the BRAC Commission’s estimates indicated it would take for DOD’s up-front investments to begin to pay back. Third, environmental cleanup costs for BRAC implementation are preliminary and are likely to increase. DOD is currently estimating net savings of $116 million annually. This amount includes $2.17 billion in eliminated overhead expenses such as the costs no longer needed to operate and maintain closed or realigned bases and reductions in civilian salaries, which will free up funds that DOD can then use for other defense priorities. However, DOD’s annual recurring savings estimate also includes $1.85 billion in military personnel entitlements—such as salaries and housing allowances—for military personnel DOD plans to shift to other positions but does not plan to eliminate. While DOD disagrees with us, we do not believe that transferring personnel to other locations produces tangible dollar savings outside the military personnel accounts that DOD can use to fund other defense priorities since these personnel will continue to receive salaries and benefits. DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC, but Several Challenges Increase Risk That All Recommendations Might Not be Completed by the Statutory Deadline
DOD has made progress implementing BRAC 2005, but faces a number of synchronization and coordination challenges related to implementing many BRAC recommendations. BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC rounds, included more joint recommendations involving more than one military component, thus creating challenges in achieving unity of effort among the services and defense agencies. DOD Must Synchronize Personnel Movements with Construction Time Frames
Implementation challenges primarily stem from the complexity of synchronizing the realignment of over 123,000 personnel with the completion of over $21 billion in new construction or renovation projects. The time frames for completing many BRAC recommendations are closely sequenced and scheduled to be completed in 2011 but any significant changes in personnel movement schedules or construction delays could jeopardize DOD’s ability to meet the statutory 2011 BRAC deadline. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide more transparency over DOD’s estimated annual recurring savings from BRAC implementation, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in consultation with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to explain, in DOD’s BRAC budget submission to Congress, the difference between annual recurring savings attributable to military personnel entitlements and annual recurring savings that will readily result in funds available for other defense priorities. Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the biggest, most complex, and costliest ever. DOD viewed this round as a unique opportunity to reshape its installations, realign forces to meet its needs for the next 20 years, and achieve savings. To realize savings, DOD must first invest billions of dollars in facility construction, renovation, and other up-front expenses to implement the BRAC recommendations. However, recent increases in estimated cost have become a concern to some members of Congress. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO (1) compared the BRAC Commission's cost and savings estimates to DOD's current estimates, (2) assessed potential for change in DOD's current estimates, and (3) identified broad implementation challenges. GAO compared the BRAC Commission's estimates, which were the closest estimates available associated with final BRAC recommendations, to DOD's current estimates. GAO also visited 25 installations and major commands, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and savings estimates in 2005, DOD plans to spend more and save less, and it will take longer than expected to recoup up-front costs. Compared to the BRAC Commission's estimates, DOD's cost estimates to implement BRAC recommendations increased from $21 billion to $31 billion (48 percent), and net annual recurring savings estimates decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion (5 percent). DOD's one-time cost estimates to implement over 30 of the 182 recommendations have increased more than $50 million each over the BRAC Commission's estimates, and DOD's cost estimates to complete 6 of these recommendations have increased by more than $500 million each. Moreover, GAO's analysis of DOD's current estimates shows that it will take until 2017 for DOD to recoup up-front costs to implement BRAC 2005--4 years longer than the BRAC Commission's estimates show. Similarly, the BRAC Commission estimated that BRAC 2005 implementation would save DOD about $36 billion over a 20-year period ending in 2025, whereas our analysis shows that BRAC implementation is now expected to save about 58 percent less, or about $15 billion. DOD's estimates to implement BRAC recommendations are likely to change further due to uncertainties surrounding implementation details and potential increases in military construction and environmental cleanup costs. Moreover, DOD may have overestimated annual recurring savings by about 46 percent or $1.85 billion. DOD's estimated annual recurring savings of about $4 billion includes $2.17 billion in eliminated overhead expenses, which will free up funds that DOD can then use for other priorities, but it also includes $1.85 billion in military personnel entitlements, such as salaries, for personnel DOD plans to transfer to other locations. While DOD disagrees, GAO does not believe transferring personnel produces tangible dollar savings since these personnel will continue to receive salaries and benefits. Because DOD's BRAC budget does not explain the difference between savings attributable to military personnel entitlements and savings that will make funds available for other uses, DOD is generating a false sense that all of its reported savings could be used to fund other defense priorities. DOD has made progress in planning for BRAC 2005 implementation, but several complex challenges to the implementation of those plans increase the risk that DOD might not meet the statutory September 2011 deadline. DOD faces a number of challenges to synchronize the realignment of over 123,000 personnel with the completion of over $21 billion in new construction or renovation projects by 2011. For example, the time frames for completing many BRAC recommendations are so closely sequenced and scheduled to be completed in 2011 that any significant changes in personnel movement schedules or construction delays could jeopardize DOD's ability to meet the statutory 2011 deadline. Additionally, BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC rounds, included more joint recommendations involving more than one military component, thus creating challenges in achieving unity of effort among the services and defense agencies. |
gao_GAO-05-905 | gao_GAO-05-905_0 | To ensure that the selection criteria were consistently applied, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established a common analytical framework to be used by the three military departments and the seven joint cross-service groups. Each service and group adapted this framework, in varying degrees, to its individual activities and functions in evaluating facilities and functions and identifying closure and realignment options. DOD Developed a Generally Logical and Reasoned Process for Making BRAC Decisions
DOD’s decision-making process for evaluating its facilities and studying potential recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned, although there were delays in making the supporting data available to the Commission and to the public after the Secretary announced his proposed recommendations on May 13, 2005. It must be noted, however, that while the process largely followed the sequential process, initial difficulties associated with obtaining complete and accurate data in a timely manner added to overlap and varying degrees of concurrency between data collection efforts and other steps in the process. For example, all of the groups used the DOD-approved Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model to calculate costs, savings, and return on investment for BRAC scenarios and, ultimately, for the final 222 BRAC recommendations. As required by BRAC legislation, DOD certified the data used in the selection process and based its recommendations on the congressional specified selection criteria, its 20-year force structure plan, and gave priority consideration to the military value criteria. Issues Related to DOD’s Recommendations
We identified issues regarding various DOD’s recommendations that may warrant further attention by the BRAC Commission. Other issues are further discussed in our July 1, 2005, report on the 2005 BRAC process. Issues Related to Projected Savings
DOD projects that its proposed recommendations will produce nearly $50 billion in 20-year net present value savings, with net annual recurring savings of about $5.5 billion. Military Personnel Savings
Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating positions currently held by military personnel; but end-strength levels will not be reduced as DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas. However, the expected efficiency gains from these recommendations are based on assumptions that are subject to some uncertainty and have not been validated. Significant Challenges Ahead for Implementing BRAC Recommendations
While we realize that the BRAC Commission is charged with reviewing DOD’s proposed list of recommended BRAC actions and submitting its own list to the President by September 8, 2005, there are significant challenges ahead for implementing BRAC recommendations which I would like to bring to the Commission’s attention—challenges that will likely affect how successful this BRAC round could be viewed historically. These challenges include the need for (1) transition planning to minimize the impact of the loss of specialized human capital skills in implementing recommended actions on ongoing defense operations; (2) mechanisms to monitor implementation, including the tracking and periodic updating of savings that DOD expects from implementing BRAC recommendations; (3) plans to address and adequately fund environmental restoration of unneeded property in order to expedite property transfer and put property to productive reuse; and (4) assistance for both losing and gaining communities affected by the BRAC recommendations. With respect to savings estimates, we believe it is also critical that the department devise a mechanism to track and periodically update its savings estimates from the final recommendations in order to provide not only Congress but the public with a full accounting of the dollars saved through the BRAC process. These costs include transition assistance, planning grants, and other assistance made available to communities by DOD and other federal agencies. As previously discussed, the number of bases in the 2005 BRAC round that will gain several thousand personnel from the recommended actions could increase pressure for federal assistance to mitigate the impact on community infrastructure, such as schools and roads, with the potential for more costs than in the prior rounds. | Why GAO Did This Study
On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted 222 base realignment and closure (BRAC) recommendations, involving an unprecedented 837 BRAC actions, to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission for its review. DOD expects the proposals, if approved, would generate net annual recurring savings of about $5.5 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012 and net savings of nearly $50 billion over a 20-year period, despite an expected cost of over $24 billion to implement the recommendations. The Commission is charged with reviewing these proposals and submitting its own list to the President by September 8, 2005. The Commission requested GAO to provide testimony before the Commission summarizing the results of its report, issued on July 1, 2005, on the 2005 BRAC process. This statement presents GAO views on (1)whether DOD's selection process in developing BRAC actions was logical and reasoned, (2) selected issues regarding the recommendations, and (3) certain challenges associated with implementing the BRAC recommendations, if approved.
What GAO Found
DOD established and generally followed a logical and reasoned process for assessing its bases and considering potential BRAC actions. The process was organized in a largely sequential manner with an emphasis on ensuring that reliable data were obtained and used, with special audit assistance from military service audit agencies and the DOD Inspector General. Despite some overlap in data collection and other phases of the process, the three military departments and seven joint cross-service groups generally followed the sequential BRAC process to evaluate facilities and functions, and identify recommendations in their respective areas. DOD's analytical process also addressed requirements of the BRAC legislation regarding the certification of data, basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure plan and emphasizing use of military value criteria as a primary basis for decision making--including consideration of such facets as homeland defense and surge capabilities--which the Congress added for emphasis in 2005. GAO did, however, identify a number of issues with the proposed recommendations that may warrant attention by the BRAC Commission. For example, while GAO believes savings could be achieved from DOD's proposals, there are certain limitations associated with the magnitude of the savings projected by DOD. About 47 percent, or $2.5 billion of DOD's projected net annual recurring savings is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also reduce or eliminate dollar savings available for other uses. Sizeable savings are also projected from efficiency measures and other actions related to a variety of recommendations, but underlying assumptions have not been validated and may be difficult to track and achieve over time. GAO also identified many recommendations requiring far longer periods of time for savings to offset the costs associated with implementing the recommendations than was typical in the 1995 BRAC round, raising questions about the cost/benefit ratio of selected recommendations. There are significant implementation challenges that lie ahead, to the extent proposed recommendations are approved, which could have a bearing on the ultimate savings realized and overall success of the BRAC round. They include the need for (1) transition planning to minimize the adverse impacts on operations, including steps to mitigate the potential loss of specialized human capital skills; (2) mechanisms to monitor implementation of recommendations in line with approved actions, along with mechanisms to ensure the tracking and periodic updating of savings that DOD expects from implementing the recommendations; (3) plans to address and adequately fund environmental restoration of unneeded property in order to expedite property transfer and put property to productive reuse; and (4) assistance for both losing and gaining communities affected by BRAC recommendations, including costs to DOD and other federal agencies. |
gao_GAO-06-590 | gao_GAO-06-590_0 | 3). At the same time, despite relatively high health and education expenditures, both countries face development challenges in these sectors. As a result, FSM access to the compact infrastructure grant, for example, has been delayed for more than 2 years owing to national and state disagreements over infrastructure priorities. Similarly, the RMI government and landowners on Kwajalein Atoll have been disputing government use of leased land and management of public entities on the atoll. In both the FSM and the RMI, however, private sector activity has remained relatively stagnant and exists largely to provide services to the public sector. The JEMCO meetings have not included discussion of FSM progress toward its long-term development goals. For example, while the RMI government presented data on migration to the United States, JEMFAC did not discuss the linkage between compact education spending and improving RMI emigrant’s skills to encourage increased remittance income over the long-term. Further, despite amendments to foreign investment regulations, the regulations in both countries continue to be confusing and relatively burdensome, according to economic experts and private sector representatives. Compact Management Committees Have Not Addressed Slow FSM and RMI Progress in Implementing Reforms
To date, JEMCO and JEMFAC have not addressed the lack of FSM and RMI progress in implementing reforms that their development plans specify are needed to stimulate investment and improve tax income. Recommendations
To maximize FSM and RMI potential for budgetary self-reliance and long- term economic advancement, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs, as Chairman of JEMCO and JEMFAC, to ensure—in coordination with other U.S. agencies participating in these committees—that they fulfill their requirements in the following three areas: evaluate FSM and RMI progress in implementing policy reforms needed to improve the business environment and encourage increased investment and tax income, identify problems encountered with policy reform implementation, and recommend ways to improve U.S. assistance for these objectives. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The amended compacts implementing legislation requires that we report on political, social, and economic conditions in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) as well as the use and oversight of U.S. assistance to those nations. In compliance with the legislation’s requirement, this report examines each country’s (1) political and social environment for compact grant implementation; (2) economic conditions, including overall growth, fiscal balances, and private investment; and (3) status of economic policy reforms. To identify key aspects of the FSM and the RMI political and social environment for compact grant implementation, we reviewed the U.S., FSM, and RMI annual compact reports for 2004; U.S. Department of State reports on FSM and RMI political systems and human rights practices; political assessments by nongovernmental organizations such as Transparency International and the University of Hawaii; and information from the Pacific Islands Forum regarding FSM and RMI participation in regional agreements and organizations. Except for Palau—also a nation with a Compact of Free Association with the United States—the FSM and the RMI have the highest levels of aid per capita. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1987, the United States began providing economic aid to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) through a Compact of Free Association. In 2004, through amended compacts with the FSM and the RMI, the United States committed to provide more than $3.5 billion until 2023. Joint U.S-FSM and U.S.-RMI compact management committees are required, among other things, to monitor progress toward specified development goals and address implementation of policy reforms to stimulate investment. The legislation implementing the amended compacts (P.L. 108-188) requires that GAO periodically report on political, social, and economic conditions in the FSM and the RMI. In compliance with this requirement, GAO examined each country's (1) political and social environment, (2) economic environment, and (3) status of economic policy reforms.
What GAO Found
FSM and RMI political and social conditions challenge, respectively, effective compact grant implementation and health and education progress. Regarding political conditions, for example, the FSM states and national government have been unable to agree on implementation of the compact infrastructure grant, while the RMI government has had difficulty securing agreement from land owners regarding its use of leased land for compact-related projects. Social challenges in both countries include persistent health and education problems despite substantial expenditures. For instance, the FSM and the RMI have low immunization rates relative to other countries with similar income levels. The FSM and the RMI economies show limited potential for achieving longterm development objectives. Both economies depend on public sector expenditures--funded largely by external assistance--and government budgets have growing wage expenditures, heightening the negative fiscal impacts they will face as compact grants decline. As a result, long-term economic growth must come from the private sector and increased income sent home from FSM and RMI emigrants ("remittances"). However, poor business environments hamper private industry in both countries, and FSM and RMI emigrants' lack of marketable skills hinders increasing revenue from remittances. Compact management committees have not discussed the countries' progress toward budgetary self-reliance and long-term economic advancement at their annual meetings. FSM and RMI progress in key policy reforms has been slow. Country officials reported passing some new mortgage and bankruptcy laws, but other needed reforms have not been implemented. For example, according to economic experts, tax systems remain inequitable and inefficient and foreign investment regulations remain confusing and relatively burdensome. FSM and RMI development plans include reform objectives in each of these areas; however, compact management committees have not addressed the nations' slow progress in implementing reforms. |
gao_GAO-01-850 | gao_GAO-01-850_0 | The states and counties are responsible for identifying the requirements and developing annual requests for the critical items that they believe are needed to be fully prepared to respond to a chemical emergency. Three of the 10 states are fully prepared to respond to a chemical emergency, and 4 others are close to being fully prepared. They have not, however, been as successful in their working relations with states and local communities. This is not enough. Conclusions
While the Army and FEMA have made considerable progress in assisting state and local communities to be fully prepared to respond to a chemical emergency, thousands of people who live near at least three of the eight chemical storage sites are still at a higher risk of exposure to a chemical accident than necessary. Appendix II: CSEPP’s Funding and Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
Army Funds the CSEPP Program
Since the inception of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) in 1988, the Army has provided $761.8 million— $509 million in operation and maintenance funding and $252.7 million in procurement funding. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-managed off-post activities received $491.6 million (two-thirds) of the total. These items are now considered in the program’s benchmarks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of people who live and work near eight Army storage facilities containing 30,000 tons of chemical agents are at risk of exposure from a chemical accident. In 1988, the Army established the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) to assist 10 states with communities near these eight storage facilities. The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) share the federal government's responsibility for the program's funding and execution. Since its inception, the program has received more than $761 million in funding. One third of this amount has been spent to procure critical items. Because each community has its own site-specific requirements, funding has varied greatly. For example, since the states first received program funding in 1989, Illinois received as little as $6 million, and Alabama received as much as $108 million.
What GAO Found
GAO found that many of the states have made considerable progress in preparing to respond to chemical emergencies. Three of the 10 states in the CSEPP are fully prepared to respond to an emergency and four others are making progress and are close to being fully prepared. This is a considerable improvement since 1997, when no state was fully prepared. However, three states are still considerably behind in their efforts and will require additional technical assistance to become fully prepared to respond to a chemical accident. |
gao_GAO-10-227SP | gao_GAO-10-227SP_0 | The consequence of proceeding with system development without establishing and adhering to a sound business case is substantial. GAO and others have reported that NASA has experienced cost and schedule growth in several of its projects over the past decade, resulting from problems that include failing to adequately identify requirements and underestimating complexity and technology maturity. NASA Continues Efforts to Improve Its Acquisitions
In 2005, we reported that NASA’s acquisition policies did not conform to best practices for product development because those policies lacked major decision reviews at several key points in the project life-cycle that would allow decision makers to make informed decisions about whether a project should be authorized to proceed in the development life cycle. Further, in response to GAO’s designation of NASA acquisition management as a high risk area, NASA developed a corrective action plan to improve the effectiveness of NASA’s program/project management. As part of this initiative, NASA has taken a positive step to improve management oversight of project cost, schedule, and technical performance with the establishment of a baseline performance review reporting to NASA’s senior management. Our Observations
We assessed 19 large-scale NASA projects in this review. Four of these projects were in the formulation phase where cost and schedule baselines have yet to be established, while 15 had entered implementation. Nine of the 15 projects experienced signifi cant cost and/or schedule growth from their project baselines, while fi ve of the remaining projects had just entered implementation and their cost and schedule baselines were established in fi scal year 2009. These projects had an average development cost growth of 18.7 percent—or almost $121.1 million—and schedule growth of over 15 months, and a total increase in development cost of over $1.2 billion. Over half of this total increase in development cost—or $706.6 million—occurred in the last year. See table 1 below for the cost and schedule growth of the NASA projects in the implementation phase. These factors—characterized as project challenges—were evident in the projects that had reached the implementation phase of the project life cycle, but many of them began in the formulation phase. In part as a result of immature technologies and an unstable design, MSL delayed its launch date by 25 months, and development costs have grown by more than $660 million. On the fi rst page, the project profi le presents a general description of the mission objectives for each of the projects; a picture of the spacecraft or aircraft; a schedule timeline identifying key dates for the project; a table identifying programmatic and launch information; and a table showing the baseline year cost and schedule estimates and the most current available cost and schedule data; a table showing the challenges relevant to the project; and a project status narrative. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. We did not validate the data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In addition, NASA received an appropriation from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). Appendix III: NASA Life Cycle For Flight Systems Compared to a Knowledge-Based Approach
GAO has previously conducted work on NASA’s acquisition policy for space- fl ight systems, and in particular, on its alignment with a knowledge-based approach to system acquisitions. Examples are still limited to paper studies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to invest billions in the coming years in science and exploration space fl ight initiatives. The scientifi c and technical complexities inherent in NASA's mission create great challenges in managing its projects and controlling costs. In the past, NASA has had diffi culty meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives for many of its projects. The need to effectively manage projects will gain even more importance as NASA seeks to manage its wide-ranging portfolio in an increasingly constrained fi scal environment. This report provides an independent assessment of selected NASA projects. In conducting this work, GAO compared projects against best practice criteria for system development including attainment of knowledge on technologies and design. GAO also identifi ed other programmatic challenges that were contributing factors in cost and schedule growth of the projects reviewed. The projects assessed are considered major acquisitions by NASA--each with a life-cycle cost of over $250 million. No recommendations are provided in this report; however, GAO has reported extensively and made recommendations on NASA acquisition management in the past. GAO has designated NASA's acquisition management as a high risk area since 1990.
What GAO Found
GAO assessed 19 NASA projects with a combined life-cycle cost of more than $66 billion. Of those 19 projects, 4 are still in the formulation phase where cost and schedule baselines have yet to be established, and 5 just entered the implementation phase in fi scal year 2009 and therefore do not have any cost and schedule growth. However, 9 of the 10 projects that have been in the implementation phase for several years experienced cost growth ranging from 8 to 68 percent, and launch delays of 8 to 33 months, in the past 3 years. These 10 projects had average development cost growth of almost $121.1 million--or 18.7 percent--and schedule growth of 15 months, and a total increase in development cost of over $1.2 billion, with over half of this total--or $706.6 million--occurring in the last year. In some cases, cost growth was higher than is reported because it occurred before project baselines were established in response to the statutory requirement in 2005 for NASA to report cost and schedule baselines for projects and implementation with estimated life-cycle cost of more than $250 million. Additionally, NASA was recently appropriated over $1 billion through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Many of the projects GAO reviewed experienced challenges in developing new or retrofi tting older technologies, stabilizing engineering designs, managing the performance of their contractors and development partners, as well as funding and launch planning issues. Reducing the kinds of problems this assessment identifi es in acquisition programs hinges on developing a sound business case for a project. Based, in part, on GAO's previous recommendations, NASA has acted to adopt practices that would ensure programs proceed based on a sound business case and undertaken initiatives aimed at improving program management, cost estimating, and contractor oversight. Continued attention to these efforts and effective, disciplined implementation should help maximize NASA's acquisition investments. |
gao_T-GGD-97-164 | gao_T-GGD-97-164_0 | On the basis of our review of the draft plans, we found that each plan contained most of the components required by the Results Act. Three of the draft plans had all six components, and two draft plans had five of the components. Our analysis of individual plan components showed that the draft plans had mission statements that broadly defined the purpose of the agency and goals and objectives that were somewhat results-oriented and appropriate to the agency’s mission. For example, some agencies had useful discussions of approaches and strategies to achieve the goals and objectives, while others could have benefitted from more discussion of the resources needed. Each agency discussed key external factors but only one discussed how those factors would affect the achievement of its goals. None of the plans discussed how the external factors would be addressed. In general, two sections were most in need of improvement. Each agency could strengthen its section on the relationship between strategic and annual goals by explicitly discussing the link between these two types of goals. Also, each agency could improve its section on how program evaluations were used and a schedule for future evaluations. Due to the complex set of factors that determine regulatory outcomes, measuring the impact of a regulatory agency’s programs will be a difficult challenge going forward. However, the use of program evaluations both to derive results-oriented goals and to measure the extent those goals are achieved is a key part of the process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the draft strategic plans of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union Administration.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on the basis of its review of the draft plans, GAO found that each plan contained most of the components required by the Government Performance and Results Act; (2) three of the draft plans had all six components, and two draft plans had five of the components; (3) GAO's analysis of individual plan components showed that the plans had mission statements that broadly defined the purpose of the agency and goals and objectives that were somewhat results-oriented; (4) some agencies had useful discussions of approaches and strategies to achieve the goals and objectives, while others could have benefited from more discussion of the resources needed; (5) each agency discussed key external factors but only one discussed how those factors would affect the achievement of its goals; (6) none of the draft plans discussed how the external factors would be addressed; (7) in general, two sections were most in need of improvement; (8) each agency could strengthen its section on the relationship between strategic and annual goals by explicitly discussing the link between the two types of goals; (9) also, each agency could improve its section on how program evaluations were used and a schedule for future evaluations; (10) because of the complex set of factors that determine regulatory outcomes, measuring the impact of a regulator agency's programs will be a difficult challenge going forward; and (11) however, the use of program evaluations both to derive results-oriented goals and to measure the extent those goals are achieved is an important part of the process. |
gao_GAO-05-632 | gao_GAO-05-632_0 | Federal OEHS Policy
As a result of numerous investigations that found inadequate data on deployment occupational and environmental exposures to identify the potential causes of unexplained illnesses among veterans who served in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the federal government has increased efforts to identify potential occupational and environmental hazards during deployments. Deployed Military Services Use Varying Approaches to Collect OEHS Data and Have Not Submitted All OEHS Reports for OIF
The deployed military services generally have collected and reported OEHS data for OIF, as required by DOD policy. To increase data collection uniformity, the Joint Environmental Surveillance Working Group has made some progress in devising cross-service standards and practices for some OEHS activities. In addition, the deployed military services have not submitted all of the OEHS reports they have completed for OIF to CHPPM’s centralized archive, as required by DOD policy. However, CHPPM officials said that they could not measure the magnitude of noncompliance because they have not received all of the required quarterly consolidated lists of OEHS reports that have been completed. To improve OEHS reporting compliance, DOD officials said they were revising an existing policy to add additional and more specific OEHS requirements. For example, although one water monitoring standard has been adopted by all military services, the services have different standards for both air and soil monitoring. Each military service’s OEHS practices for implementing data collection standards also have differed, due to the varying levels of training and expertise among the service’s preventive medicine units. Deployed Military Services Have Not Submitted All Required OEHS Reports for OIF, and the Magnitude of Noncompliance Is Unknown
The deployed military services have not submitted all the OEHS reports that the preventive medicine units completed during OIF to CHPPM for archiving, according to CHPPM officials. Progress Made in Using OEHS Reports to Address Immediate Health Risks, Though Limitations Remain for Addressing Both Immediate and Long-term Health Issues
DOD has made progress using OEHS reports to address immediate health risks during OIF, but limitations remain in employing these reports to address both immediate and long-term health issues. During OIF, OEHS reports have been used as part of operational risk management activities intended to assess, mitigate, and communicate to servicemembers any potential hazards at a location. In addition, DOD’s centralized archive of OEHS reports for OIF is limited in its ability to provide information on the potential long-term health effects related to occupational and environmental exposures for several reasons, including limited access to most OEHS reports because of security classification, incomplete data on servicemembers’ deployment locations, and the lack of a comprehensive federal research plan incorporating the use of archived OEHS reports. Difficulties Exist in Linking Archived OEHS Reports to Individual Servicemembers, but Some Efforts Are Under Way to Include Information in Medical Records
Linking OEHS reports from the archive to individual servicemembers will be difficult because DOD’s centralized tracking database for recording servicemembers’ deployment locations currently does not contain complete or comparable data. No Federal Research Plan Exists for Using OEHS Reports to Follow the Health of OIF Servicemembers over Time
According to DOD and VA officials, no federal research plan that includes the use of archived OEHS reports has been developed to evaluate the long- term health of servicemembers deployed in support of OIF, including the effects of potential exposure to occupational or environmental hazards. Scope and Methodology
To describe how the military services have implemented the Department of Defense’s (DOD) policies for collecting and reporting occupational and environmental health surveillance (OEHS) data for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we reviewed pertinent DOD policies and military services’ guidance that delineated the requirements for OEHS data collection and reporting. To identify the efforts to use OEHS reports to address the more immediate health issues of servicemembers deployed in support of OIF, we reviewed DOD policies and documents describing the operational risk management process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, research and investigations into the causes of servicemembers' unexplained illnesses were hampered by inadequate occupational and environmental exposure data. In 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) developed a militarywide health surveillance framework that includes occupational and environmental health surveillance (OEHS)--the regular collection and reporting of occupational and environmental health hazard data by the military services. GAO is reporting on (1) how the deployed military services have implemented DOD's policies for collecting and reporting OEHS data for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and (2) the efforts under way to use OEHS reports to address both immediate and long-term health issues of servicemembers deployed in support of OIF.
What GAO Found
Although OEHS data generally have been collected and reported for OIF, as required by DOD policy, the deployed military services have used different data collection methods and have not submitted all of the OEHS reports that have been completed. Data collection methods for air and soil surveillance have varied across the services, for example, although they have been using the same monitoring standard for water surveillance. Variations in data collection have been compounded by different levels of training and expertise among service personnel responsible for OEHS. For some OEHS activities, a cross-service working group has been developing standards and practices to increase uniformity of data collection among the services. In addition, while the deployed military services have been conducting OEHS activities, they have not submitted all of the OEHS reports that have been completed during OIF, which DOD officials attribute to various obstacles, such as limited access to communication equipment to transmit reports for archiving. Moreover, DOD officials did not have the required consolidated lists of all OEHS reports completed during each quarter in OIF and therefore could not identify the reports they had not received to determine the extent of noncompliance. To improve OEHS reporting compliance, DOD officials said they were revising an existing policy to add additional and more specific OEHS requirements. DOD has made progress in using OEHS reports to address immediate health risks during OIF, but limitations remain in employing these reports to address both immediate and long-term health issues. OIF was the first major deployment in which OEHS reports have been used consistently as part of operational risk management activities intended to identify and address immediate health risks and to make servicemembers aware of the health risks of potential exposures. While these efforts may help reduce health risks, DOD has no systematic efforts to evaluate their implementation in OIF. In addition, DOD's centralized archive of OEHS reports for OIF has several limitations for addressing potential long-term health effects related to occupational and environmental exposures. First, access to the centralized archive has been limited due to the security classification of most OEHS reports. Second, it will be difficult to link most OEHS reports to individual servicemembers' records because not all data on servicemembers' deployment locations have been submitted to DOD's centralized tracking database. For example, none of the military services submitted location data for the first several months of OIF. To address problems with linking OEHS reports to individual servicemembers, the deployed military services have made efforts to include OEHS monitoring summaries in the medical records of some servicemembers for either specific incidents of potential exposure or for specific locations within OIF. Third, according to DOD and VA officials, no federal research plan has been developed to evaluate the longterm health of servicemembers deployed in support of OIF, including the effects of potential exposures to occupational or environmental hazards. |
gao_GAO-03-307 | gao_GAO-03-307_0 | There are no earnings limitations on Social Security benefits above age 65. In the past, a greater percentage of pension-plan participants were covered by defined benefit plans. As a result of these trends, the median age of the U.S. population, like that of other high-income nations, is projected to steadily increase in the coming decades, but it will still be lower than that of most high-income nations. Key Elements of Reforms in Other Nations Expected to Increase Labor Force Participation of Older Workers
The recently enacted retirement policy reforms in Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are expected to lead to higher labor force participation of older workers. Benefit Adjustments to National Pension Systems May Increase Labor Force Participation of Older Workers
Reforms in the United Kingdom, Japan, and Sweden that increase the age at which workers are eligible for benefits or allow flexibility in when and how pension benefits can be taken are some of the policy changes that may encourage older workers to stay in the workforce. Additional pension reforms that change benefit calculations so they reward continued work or discourage early retirement may also promote continued labor force participation by older workers. The United Kingdom adjusted its benefit calculation formula to increase the reward for those who defer drawing benefits from the national pension system. To Increase Work Incentives for Older Workers, National and Employer-Provided Pension Reforms Moved Systems Towards Defined Contribution Features While Other Reforms Addressed Disability Insurance
Each of the nations we studied implemented reforms that included defined contribution features in their national and employer-provided pension systems, although this shift was more pronounced in Sweden and the United Kingdom than in Japan. Experiences of Other Nations Suggest That the Nature of Reforms Plays a Key Role in Increasing Labor Force Participation of Older Workers
The experiences of other nations suggest that the scope and comprehensiveness of reforms, the transparency and availability of information, and the strength of the economy play important roles in encouraging labor force participation by older workers. Japan has supplemented its national pension reforms with wage subsidies to encourage older employees to continue to work. Officials from each of the three nations we studied also identified other critical labor market policies that needed to be harmonized with these changes, particularly in the area of employment age discrimination and regarding mandatory retirement ages. These eligibility age increases will be phased in over several decades. In addition, there have been changes to the structure of employer-provided pensions complementing the national pension reform. The NDC plan is financed according to pay-as-you-go principles, but the system also includes pension reserve or “buffer” funds. This means that with increasing life expectancy over time, other things being equal, individuals will have to work longer or accept lower pensions. These programs have, for the most part, always been open to workers of all ages. Sustainability: Changes to the U.K. national pension system, including raising women’s eligibility age, increasing Basic State Pension benefits in line with average price increases rather than the higher of increases in average prices or wages, and making survivors’ benefits less generous, are helping to maintain the long-term fiscal sustainability of the system. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, the challenges of aging populations have become a topic of increasing concern to the developed nations. These challenges range from the fiscal imbalance in national pension systems caused by fewer workers having to provide benefits for greater numbers of retirees, to potential economic strains due to shortages of skilled workers. Part of the solution to these challenges could be greater older worker labor force participation. GAO identified three nations--Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom--that had displayed high levels of older worker labor force participation in the past and were now implementing policy reforms that continued to emphasize the importance of older workers. The experiences of these nations suggest that the nature of the reforms, the public availability and transparency of information on the reforms, and the strength of the national economy play key roles in extending older worker labor force participation.
What GAO Found
The retirement policy reforms in Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are expected to lead to higher labor force participation of older workers. Japan is facing the most severe aging trend of the nations GAO studied, as its median population age is projected to be 28 percent higher than the United States in the coming decades. In response, Japan has enacted substantial benefit cuts to its national pension system by raising the eligibility age and reducing benefit levels to maintain fund solvency. Due to these changes, some Japanese workers will have to work to later ages. Sweden undertook the most significant reform by changing the structure of its national pension system from a traditional pay-as-you-go defined benefit plan, like the U.S. Social Security program, to a system where participants' benefits are more in line with their contributions. These reforms are expected to extend workers' careers by rewarding longer labor force participation with higher benefits. The system also incorporates flexibility by automatically adjusting benefits to changes in the economy and life expectancy to preserve financial stability. The United Kingdom will phase-in an increase in the women's national pension eligibility age so that it will be equal to the higher male age of 65. It also revised its benefit formula to raise the annual incremental increase for those who defer drawing their pension benefits. These changes either reward continued employment or discourage earlier retirement, and thus may promote continued labor force participation. However, although incentives to work to later ages have been created through reforms to their national and employer provided pension systems, officials from each nation stressed that these policy changes must be accompanied by labor market reforms and economic growth to provide job opportunities to older workers if they are to be effective. |
gao_GAO-17-48 | gao_GAO-17-48_0 | DFAST applies to a broad range of banking institutions and consists of supervisory- and company-run stress tests to generate forward-looking information about institutions’ capital adequacy for the firms’ internal use and for public disclosure. The Federal Reserve also conducts a supervisory stress test for bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the Federal Reserve to disclose a summary of its supervisory stress test results. For example, the Federal Reserve’s internal guidance instructs examiners to consider the tests as one of many tools available to assist in the assessment of a company’s capital position and planning process and not to rely primarily upon a firm’s internal stress test results in assessing overall capital adequacy or risk management. The Federal Reserve’s goals for CCAR are to ensure that large bank holding companies have sufficient capital to withstand severely adverse economic and financial conditions and continue operations, and have strong processes for assessing their capital needs and managing their capital resources. According to these staff, standardized capital assumptions are used to project capital ratios in DFAST because the purpose of the supervisory stress test under DFAST is to estimate and disclose comparable capital adequacy information, while proposed actions are used for CCAR, which also evaluates companies’ planning processes. The Federal Reserve uses the results of company-run tests in performing its CCAR quantitative assessments and has stated that a company will not receive an objection to its capital plan based on the assessment if it can meet minimum regulatory capital requirements under the company-run stress tests as well as the supervisory tests. The Federal Reserve uses the CCAR quantitative and qualitative assessments to determine whether to object or not object to an institution’s capital plan (including proposed capital actions such as dividend payments and share repurchases that affect the firm’s capital levels). In addition to the Federal Reserve, the Dodd-Frank Act called for certain financial regulatory agencies, including OCC and FDIC, to issue rules requiring the financial companies they supervise with more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets to conduct stress tests. In the CCAR quantitative assessment, the Federal Reserve can object to a company’s capital distribution plan if stress test results show the company’s post- stress capital ratios falling below required minimum levels. The assessment framework includes processes to help ensure consistency across evaluations. The Federal Reserve has provided companies with information on supervisory expectations and peer practices related to the qualitative assessment, but the infrequent timing of these communications and evolving peer practices can pose challenges to companies that must meet the expectations annually. Limited Disclosures of Information about Methodology and Objections
While the Federal Reserve has communicated some CCAR-related information to the public and directly to CCAR companies, it has not provided the level of information necessary for a clear understanding of its qualitative assessment methodology, including its framework for evaluating the extent to which companies have met supervisory expectations and determinations, and for a clear understanding of the reasons for objection determinations. Federal internal control standards state the importance of relevant, reliable, and timely communications including with external stakeholders. Federal Reserve Has Not Assessed Certain Trade-offs Associated with Scenario Severity
According to Federal Reserve staff and our review of internal documents, the Federal Reserve has not explicitly analyzed how to balance the choice of the severity of the severely adverse scenario—and its influence on the resiliency of the banking system—with any impact on the cost and availability of credit. For example, many different types of financial crises are possible, and the single selected scenario does not reflect a fuller range of possible outcomes. Yet, without assessing the sufficiency of a single severe scenario in the context of DFAST and CCAR—such as performing sensitivity analysis involving multiple scenarios—the Federal Reserve is making CCAR decisions that may not reflect the range of potential crises against which the banking system would be resilient and the magnitude of the range of outcomes that might result from different scenarios. As a result, Federal Reserve stress tests could exacerbate future financial stress by increasing requirements on stress test participants while economic conditions are deteriorating. Federal Reserve Management of Model Risk Has Not Focused on the System of Models
The Federal Reserve’s modeling process for the stress tests includes an oversight structure and internal reviews, but it has not focused its model risk management on the system of models that produce stress test results. To estimate the effect of stress test scenarios on companies’ ability to maintain capital, the Federal Reserve has developed individual component models that predict companies’ financial performance in the scenarios. The results of these component models are combined with assumed or planned capital actions of companies and form the system of models used by the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve has issued model risk-management guidance that defines model risk as the potential for adverse consequences from decisions based on incorrect or misused model outputs and states that it increases with factors such as greater model complexity and larger potential impact. Federal Reserve Does Not Address Cumulative Risk and Uncertainty from the System of Models That Produce Stress Test Results
The Federal Reserve has not focused its risk-management efforts (including those relating to model development guidance, documentation, sensitivity and uncertainty analyses, and risk tolerances) on the system of models that produce the stress test results—the post-stress capital ratios. This type of assessment is known as uncertainty analysis. Without systematically identifying and communicating acceptable levels of risk in its supervisory stress test models, the Federal Reserve may be limited in its ability to effectively evaluate and manage its model risk. Qualitative assessment disclosure and communication. Transparency is a key feature of accountability and this limited disclosure may hinder understanding of the CCAR program and limit public and market confidence in the program and the extent to which the Federal Reserve can be held accountable for its decisions. The Federal Reserve also has not regularly updated guidance to firms about supervisory expectations and peer practices related to the qualitative assessment. Scenario design. The Federal Reserve has conducted limited analysis of some decisions that are important to designing stress test scenarios. Finally, to improve the Federal Reserve’s ability to manage model risk and ensure that decisions based on supervisory stress test results are informed by an understanding of model risk, the Federal Reserve should take the following five actions:
Apply its model development principles to the combined system of models used in the supervisory stress tests. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) conducts two stress test exercises: the Dodd-Frank Stress Tests (DFAST) and the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). This report (1) compares the DFAST and CCAR exercises and discusses company and Federal Reserve views about the exercises’ costs and benefits; (2) examines the CCAR qualitative assessment, including the extent of communication and disclosure; (3) examines how the Federal Reserve designs the supervisory scenarios for the stress tests; and (4) examines the Federal Reserve’s modeling process for the stress tests. To compare DFAST and CCAR, we reviewed Section 165(i) of the Dodd- Frank Act, the Federal Reserve’s final and amended capital plan and stress test rules, and Federal Reserve policies and procedures about how it has implemented and used DFAST and CCAR in its supervision of banking institutions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Reserve has two stress test programs for certain banking institutions it supervises. DFAST encompasses stress tests required by the Dodd-Frank Act. CCAR comprises a qualitative assessment of firms' capital planning processes and a quantitative assessment of firms' ability to maintain sufficient capital to continue operations under stress. Questions have been raised about the effectiveness and burden of requiring two stress test programs. GAO was asked to review these programs and their effectiveness. This report examines how the stress test programs compare, the CCAR qualitative assessment, and the design of the stress test scenarios and models.
GAO analyzed Federal Reserve documents including rules, guidance, and internal policies and procedures on DFAST and CCAR implementation and assessed practices against federal internal control standards and other criteria. GAO also interviewed Federal Reserve staff and officials of 19 banking institutions selected based on characteristics such as their size, prior stress test participation, and history of CCAR results.
What GAO Found
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) has two related supervisory programs that involve stress testing but serve different purposes. Stress tests are hypothetical exercises that assess the potential impact of economic, financial, or other scenarios on the financial performance of a company. Stress tests of banking institutions typically evaluate if the institutions have sufficient capital to remain solvent under stressful economic conditions.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) implements statutory stress test requirements, known as the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests (DFAST) for Federal Reserve-supervised banking institutions with more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets. DFAST projects how banking institutions' capital levels would fare in hypothetical stressful economic and financial scenarios. It applies to a broad range of banking institutions and consists of supervisory- and company-run stress tests that produce capital adequacy information for firms' internal use and for public disclosure.
The Federal Reserve also conducts a Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR), which uses DFAST information to assess the capital adequacy (a quantitative assessment) and capital planning processes (a qualitative assessment) for bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. CCAR generally does not require additional stress tests and uses the same data, models, and projections used for DFAST.
While the primary purpose of DFAST is to produce and disclose comparable information on the financial condition of banking institutions (the stress test results), the Federal Reserve uses CCAR to make supervisory assessments and decisions about the capital adequacy plans (including proposed capital actions such as dividend payments) of large bank holding companies. For example, the Federal Reserve may object to a company's plan if stress test results show the company's post-stress capital ratios (regulatory measures that indicate how much capital is available to cover unexpected losses) falling below required minimum levels or if the Federal Reserve's qualitative assessment deems the firm's capital planning and related processes inadequate. An objection can result in restrictions on a firm's capital distributions. Several of the companies GAO interviewed that are subject to Federal Reserve stress tests identified benefits from the tests (such as overall improvements in risk management and capital planning) and also identified costs (including for staff resources and other expenditures necessary to conduct the tests and meet the Federal Reserve's supervisory expectations).
GAO found limitations in the Federal Reserve's stress test programs that could hinder their effectiveness.
Qualitative assessment disclosure and communication. The Federal Reserve uses a framework with multiple levels of review to assess qualitative CCAR submissions that helps ensure consistency, but it has not disclosed information needed to fully understand its assessment approach or the reasons for decisions to object to a company's capital plan. Transparency is a key feature of accountability and such incomplete disclosure may limit understanding of the CCAR assessments and hinder public and market confidence in the program and the extent to which the Federal Reserve can be held accountable for its decisions. Federal internal control standards state the importance of relevant and timely communications with external stakeholders. The Federal Reserve has not regularly updated guidance to firms about supervisory expectations and peer practices related to the qualitative assessment. For example, it has not published observations of leading capital planning practices used in CCAR since 2014. The limited communication can pose challenges to companies that must meet these expectations annually and could hinder the achievement of CCAR goals.
Scenario design. The Federal Reserve has a framework for designing stress test scenarios but its analysis of some key design decisions has been limited. For example, the Federal Reserve has not conducted analyses to determine whether the single severe scenario it uses for the supervisory stress test is sufficient to accomplish DFAST and CCAR goals. While there are advantages to using one scenario—including simplicity and transparency—many different types of financial crises are possible, and the single selected scenario does not reflect a fuller range of possible outcomes. Without additional analysis, the Federal Reserve cannot be reasonably assured that banks are resilient against a range of future risks. The Federal Reserve also has not explicitly analyzed how to balance the choice of severity—and its influence on the resiliency of the banking system—with any impact on the cost and availability of credit, which could limit its ability to avoid undesired economic effects from scenario design choices.
Model risk management. Federal Reserve supervisory guidance for banking institutions states that risk from individual models and also from the aggregate system of models should be managed. The Federal Reserve makes supervisory decisions based on the results of its own stress test models, but its management of model risk—the potential for adverse consequences from decisions based on incorrect or misused model outputs—has not focused on its system of models that produce stress test results. To estimate the effect of stress test scenarios on companies' ability to maintain capital, the Federal Reserve has developed individual component models that predict a company's financial performance in the scenarios. The results of these component models are combined with assumed or planned capital actions of companies and form the system of models used by the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve has an oversight structure for developing and using models in the supervisory stress tests but its own risk-management efforts have not targeted the system of models. For example, it has not conducted sensitivity and uncertainty analyses—important elements in the Federal Reserve's model risk management guidance—of how its modeling decisions affected overall results. Without such a focus, the Federal Reserve's ability to effectively evaluate and manage model risk and uncertainty from the entire system of stress test models will be limited. Understanding and communicating this uncertainty is critical because the outcome of the CCAR assessment can have significant implications for a company, including limiting its capital actions (such as dividend payments and share repurchases).
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 15 recommendations to help improve the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve's stress test programs, such as improving disclosures and communications to firms, considering the potential consequences of its scenario design choices, and expanding model risk management to include the entire system of models. The Federal Reserve generally agreed with the recommendations and highlighted select ongoing and future efforts. |
gao_GAO-17-445 | gao_GAO-17-445_0 | Good quality diagnostic tests that are fit for purpose and can provide accurate results can help in reducing the burden of infectious diseases. Since the Zika virus was a newly emerging infectious disease threat in the United States, and relatively little was known about the virus prior to 2016, CDC and the states were not fully equipped with information and resources needed for a rapid response at the outset of the recent outbreaks. What Is Known about the Epidemiology of Zika Virus
Knowledge about Zika virus epidemiology has increased in the past year, including information about Zika virus disease incidence and distribution of cases and its associated adverse health outcomes. Zika Virus Cases Reported in the U.S. States and Territories
Between January 1, 2015 and April 5, 2017, reported Zika virus disease cases numbered 5,197 in the United States. What Is Not Known about the Epidemiology of Zika Virus
While much has been learned about the epidemiology of Zika virus, many unknowns remain, including the total number of infections; the biological mechanisms, risks, reasons for geographic differences, and full spectrum of outcomes associated with maternal-fetal transmission; the presence and duration of the virus in different bodily fluids; the role of prior Zika virus infections or exposure to other related flaviviruses; and the full spectrum of outcomes of Zika virus infection. Characteristics of Different Diagnostic Tests Varied, Manufacturers and Users Faced Several Challenges, and FDA and CDC Did Not Consistently Communicate Sufficient Information
Authorized diagnostic tests used for the recent Zika virus outbreak varied in their performance and operational characteristics. Diagnostic test users also encountered challenges, including determining the most accurate test to use, comparing clinical performance characteristics across tests, and obtaining equipment required to conduct authorized tests. Moreover, CDC and FDA did not consistently communicate sufficient information about Zika virus diagnostic tests that could have enabled users to more easily identify the test that could detect the smallest amount of virus in a sample. These authorized diagnostic tests for the Zika virus vary in their performance and operational characteristics. 6). Manufacturers and Users Faced Several Challenges in Developing and Using Zika Diagnostic Tests
We identified five challenges that manufacturers of diagnostic tests faced related to Zika virus diagnostic testing, research, and development, and regulatory approval: (1) biological aspects of the virus and the immune response, including low levels of virus in the bodily fluids of infected patients for short periods of time and the cross-reactivity of antibodies to other flaviviruses, (2) difficulty in accessing well-characterized clinical samples, (3) getting access to EUA tests for use as a comparator assay, (4) gaining cooperation with international entities, and (5) challenges interacting with FDA during review. Mosquito Control Methods Have Strengths and Limitations, and Federal Agencies Face Several Challenges Assisting These Efforts
Mosquito Control Methods in the United States Are Often Combined Under Integrated Vector Management
Types of mosquito control methods available in the United States include: (1) physical control, or nonchemical mosquito control, (2) larval mosquito control, (3) adult mosquito control, and (4) personal protection. Each of these physical control methods has strengths and limitations. According to this study, this method may reduce mosquito-borne dengue transmission by about 90 percent. Surveillance Helps Inform Mosquito Control Efforts. According to CDC documentation, the agency developed technical guidance and provides funding and technical assistance to support state and local mosquito control activities. In response to our recommendation to establish a transparent process to provide CDC diagnostic tests to manufacturers, HHS stated that CDC will work with its existing Technology Transfer Office to implement a transparent process for providing manufacturers with approved CDC diagnostic assays. Blow, Ph.D., Director, Armed Forces Pest Management Board, Defense Pest Management, Department of Defense Michael Callahan, M.D., M.S.P.H., Director of Translational Therapeutics, Vaccine, and Immunotherapy Center, Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School Joseph M. Conlon, M.Sc., BCE, Technical Adviser, American Mosquito Control Association Durland Fish, Ph.D., Honorary D.Sc., Emeritus Professor, Yale School of Public Health Eva Harris, Ph.D., Professor, Division of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, School of Public Health and Director, Center for Global Public Health, University of California at Berkeley Anna M. Likos, M.D., M.P.H., State Epidemiologist and Interim Deputy, Secretary for Health, Florida Department of Health Jorge L. Munoz-Jordan, Ph.D., Chief, Molecular Diagnostics and Research Laboratory, Division of Vector Borne Infectious Diseases, Dengue Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Benjamin Pinsky, M.D., Ph.D., Medical Director, Clinical Virology Laboratory, Stanford University School of Medicine Brenda Rivera-García, D.V.M., M.P.H., Territorial Epidemiologist, Puerto Rico Department of Public Health Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales, M.D., Ph.D., Chair, Colombian Collaborative Network of Zika (RECOLZIKA)
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to (1) provide information on what is known and not known about the epidemiology of the Zika virus and determine the challenges, if any, in conducting surveillance and epidemiological studies, (2) determine the characteristics of different Zika virus authorized diagnostic tests and any challenges manufacturers and users faced, and the extent to which Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) followed their own communication guidance during the U.S. outbreak, and (3) identify available mosquito control methods, describe their strengths and weaknesses, and identify any challenges federal agencies and others face in assisting mosquito control efforts. We reviewed relevant documentation such as, FDA’s guidance to the manufacturers, product labels, and agencies reports on the epidemiology of the Zika virus, and interviewed officials from key federal agencies that are involved in the domestic Zika virus response. With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, we convened a meeting with 16 experts to discuss issues related to the Zika virus outbreak. Influenza: Progress Made in Responding to Seasonal and Pandemic Outbreaks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Zika virus disease can cause adverse pregnancy and neurological outcomes. Given this ongoing threat, GAO was asked to evaluate progress made and challenges faced by federal agencies in responding to the Zika virus outbreak in the United States.
GAO examined (1) information on what is known and not known about the epidemiology of the Zika virus, and any challenges with conducting surveillance and epidemiological studies, (2) characteristics of different diagnostic tests authorized during the outbreak, challenges test manufacturers and users faced, and the extent to which FDA and CDC followed their own communication guidance, and (3) the strengths and limitations of available mosquito control methods, and challenges federal agencies face supporting these efforts.
GAO reviewed literature and agency documentation, and interviewed federal and state officials about the Zika virus and the U.S. response. GAO also convened an expert meeting with the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences to discuss various issues surrounding the response to the Zika virus.
What GAO Found
Since Zika virus disease was a newly emerging disease threat in the United States, and relatively little was known about the Zika virus prior to the 2016 U.S. outbreak, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the states were not fully equipped with needed information and resources at the beginning of the outbreak. This presented several challenges for Zika virus disease surveillance and research efforts, such as challenges related to establishing a national definition for reporting cases. Knowledge about Zika virus epidemiology has increased in the past year, including information about Zika virus disease incidence and distribution of cases, and its associated adverse health outcomes. Most of the 5,197 Zika virus disease cases reported by April 5, 2017 in the United States were associated with travel from affected areas outside the continental United States. Only two states had disease cases of local, mosquito-borne transmission—216 were in Florida and 6 in Texas. While much has been learned about the epidemiology of the Zika virus, many unknowns remain, including the actual number of infections and the full spectrum of outcomes.
The 16 Zika virus diagnostic tests authorized during the outbreak varied in their performance and operational characteristics. For example, they varied in their ability to detect the virus and provide accurate results. In developing the diagnostic tests, manufacturers faced challenges in several areas, including access to clinical samples and other authorized diagnostic tests for comparison purposes. Users of the tests also encountered challenges, including determining the most accurate test to use, and obtaining equipment needed to conduct the tests. Some manufacturers raised concerns about the difficulty in developing diagnostic tests that met the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) requirements for Emergency Use Authorization and some users expressed concerns about selecting tests amongst those authorized. GAO also determined that CDC and FDA did not follow some of their guidance in communicating with users of diagnostic tests, including providing clear information that would have enabled users to more easily compare performance across different tests.
Mosquito control programs in the United States are implemented at state and local levels and are critical to mitigating the risks associated with the Zika virus. Control methods include applying pesticides, reducing available water sources for breeding, and using personal protection. Each method has its strengths and limitations. For example, some control methods are more effective at reducing mosquito populations while others help prevent individuals from mosquito bites. Similarly, each method has some limitations, for example, there is varied public opposition to the use of certain pesticides. CDC supports state and local mosquito control activities primarily by providing guidance on mosquito control methods and funding to support certain mosquito control efforts. Challenges federal agencies faced in supporting these activities include sustaining staff expertise in mosquito control during periods when there are no outbreaks, funding constraints, and effectively communicating information about the geographical distribution of mosquitoes that transmit the Zika virus.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations to FDA and CDC, including that CDC establish a transparent process for providing test manufacturers access to diagnostic tests and FDA and CDC provide information to help ensure that users of diagnostic tests can compare performance. Agencies agreed with four recommendations but raised some concerns with the fifth. GAO has addressed these concerns in the report. |
gao_NSIAD-96-124 | gao_NSIAD-96-124_0 | Moreover, larger reductions in State’s funding have been proposed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congress. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to a request from the Chairman, House Committee on the Budget, we reviewed State’s reform and cost-cutting initiatives and identified options that would enable State to adjust to reduced budgets. State Is Not Prepared to Cope With Proposed Reductions
The Department of State has not developed a comprehensive strategy to restructure its operations to adjust to potential funding reductions. Believing that substantial funding reductions would severely jeopardize its ability to conduct foreign policy and achieve U.S. goals, State has decided not to plan how it would accommodate proposed budget reductions. State does not have a plan for implementing these relocations. Opportunities for Streamlining Functions
Reducing or eliminating State’s role in some foreign policy and consular functions could lead to cost reductions at headquarters and overseas posts, where State has a broad mandate to represent and protect U.S. interests and provide services to a wide range of customers, including the Congress, other U.S. agencies, the private sector, and the American public. By eliminating the positions of 6 headquarters staff and the 45 labor attachés overseas, State could reduce costs by about $7.4 million annually. Options for Recovering Costs of Some Services
State could recover some costs by charging for selected services and products. Options for Reducing Overseas Presence
Overseas posts consume almost 70 percent of State’s budget. Ambassador to Senegal submitted a study concluding that the chiefs of mission need more authority and control over U.S. government programs, personnel, and resources under their management. State’s Support Costs Can Be Reduced
The State Department spends two-thirds of its budget on support operations. These include (1) recouping the full cost of support provided to other agencies overseas, (2) hiring more U.S. family members to fill overseas staffing positions, (3) increasing employees’ payments for medical services, (4) increasing the length of overseas tours, and (5) reducing its costs for Marine guard detachments at overseas posts by deactivating certain units or shifting its cost to the Department of Defense. These options include (1) reducing support staffing levels in headquarters, (2) reviewing employees’ benefits and allowances, (3) expanding the use of foreign nationals in support positions at overseas posts, and (4) disposing of excess and underused properties overseas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of State's reform and cost-cutting efforts and identified options that would enable State to adjust to reduced budgets.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) State does not have a comprehensive strategy to restructure and downsize its operations to meet potential funding reductions; (2) State has reduced its staff and implemented some cost reduction measures, but it has been reluctant or unable to reduce its overseas presence and the scope of its activities or change its business practices to accommodate proposed budget reductions; (3) State believes that substantial downsizing would severely hamper its achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and irreparably harm U.S. interests; (4) because of expected governmentwide budget constraints and congressional and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposals for decreases in State funding, State is unlikely to receive the level of funding needed to maintain its existing activity; (5) State could reduce costs by reducing duplication among its bureaus and with outside agencies with which it shares program responsibility, streamlining or eliminating some informational reports, eliminating or consolidating certain personnel positions, and recovering some service costs from users; (6) State has the opportunity to significantly reduce costs by closing or reducing the size of overseas posts, which consume about 70 percent of State's budget; (7) State could reduce support costs, which constitute two-thirds of its budget, by recouping support costs from other agencies, hiring more U.S. family members for overseas positions, adjusting employee benefits and allowances, increasing tour lengths, reducing costs for Marine guards at overseas posts, reducing headquarters support staff, using more foreign nationals in support positions, disposing of unneeded overseas real estate, and reengineering and outsourcing administrative functions; and (8) expanding the authority of chiefs of mission over all U.S. government fiscal and staffing resources at overseas posts would be one way to accomplish cost reductions. |
gao_RCED-96-125 | gao_RCED-96-125_0 | The researchers at the Urban Land Institute estimated that about 150,000 acres of abandoned or underused industrial land exist in major U.S. cities.This estimate excludes some commercial properties that could also be classified as brownfields; those excluded are sites with underground storage tanks, such as former gas stations, or dry cleaners. Most brownfields are not likely to be added to the list of potential NPL sites because they are not severely contaminated. To lower the barriers to brownfield redevelopment, S. 1285 would limit the liability of lenders and such property purchasers as developers under certain conditions and also would provide assistance for the state programs that encourage the voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Under CERCLA, a party (such as a bank) that holds the evidence of ownership (such as a mortgage) in the property to protect its interest, and does not participate in the management of the property, is not considered a property owner. It also places a cap on the total amount that lenders would have to pay in the event they are liable. Second, the bill would limit the liability of certain purchasers of property, such as developers, if they assess a site for contamination before buying it and find none. These problems may be even more intractable barriers to redevelopment than Superfund. Before brownfields can be redeveloped, it is necessary to perform a site assessment to determine the nature and extent of the contamination present. These plans are often subject to review and approval by the local or state government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed proposed legislation to redevelop abandoned, urban industrial sites, focusing on: (1) the number of potential sites nationwide; (2) impediments to redeveloping sites posed by the Superfund program; and (3) whether proposed loans to local governments are sufficient for conducting site assessments.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) researchers estimate that about 150,000 acres of abandoned or underused industrial land exists nationwide; (2) lenders, property buyers, and property owners are reluctant to redevelop these sites because federal and state environmental laws may require expensive cleanups of latent industrial wastes before property improvements can be made; (3) federal law limits the liability of a party that holds ownership in a property but does not manage the property; (4) proposed legislation would limit the amount lenders would have to pay in the event they are liable, limit the liability of property buyers who assess a site for contamination before buying it, and provide assistance for state programs that encourage voluntary cleanup of industrial waste sites; (5) even if the liability of lenders and property buyers is limited, abandoned industrial sites might continue to be viewed as risky investments due to the possibility of contamination; and (6) proposed legislation would provide interest-free loans to localities to conduct site assessments to determine the extent of contamination. |
gao_GAO-13-39 | gao_GAO-13-39_0 | The pollution deposited through atmospheric deposition can come from human-caused sources, such as power plants, or natural sources, such as volcanoes. EPA has issued regulations that limit mercury emissions from certain industries. Air Pollution Affects U.S. Waterbodies and Transportation and Power Plants Are Its Key Sources
Atmospheric deposition associated with NO, SO, SO, and mercury, but international sources also contribute to mercury deposition in the United States. Atmospheric Deposition Pollutes Many U.S. Waterbodies, but the Full Extent is Not Known
Atmospheric deposition, including from NO, SO For example, about 53,300 square miles of the Great Lakes are reported to be impaired, in part, because of atmospheric deposition. However, the ATTAINS database likely underestimates the extent of the problem because the states have not assessed all of their waterbodies. Additionally, states may, but are not required, to report on the sources of a pollutant to a waterbody, including whether atmospheric deposition is a reason why water quality standards are not being met or the extent to which atmospheric deposition is contributing to the problem. EPA Faces Challenges Using Clean Water Act Regulations to Address Atmospheric Deposition
Listing impaired waters and TMDLs are the primary regulatory tools EPA uses under the CWA to identify water pollution resulting from atmospheric deposition, but EPA faces challenges in using these tools, as well as other nonregulatory tools, to address the effects of atmospheric deposition. When states identify waterbodies that are impaired—that is, that do not meet CWA water quality standards with existing controls—the CWA requires states to formally identify them as impaired, and generally to set a TMDL for each pollutant that does not meet the standards. Relevant NPDES permits issued to facilities for point sources of that pollutant must be consistent with the allocations established by the TMDL, but there is no comparable permitting mechanism under the CWA directly limiting pollutants from nonpoint sources. Nevertheless, states must account for nonpoint sources of pollution in their TMDLs and may include estimated reductions from those nonpoint sources. Clean Air Act Regulations Address Atmospheric Deposition, but EPA Faces Challenges Addressing Effects on Waterbodies
Implementation of CAA regulations has reduced emissions of NOx, SO, and mercury, but most were designed to address the effect of these pollutants on air quality and related human health effects, not water quality and aquatic ecosystems. According to an EPA official, the reduced emissions of mercury have lessened the amount of mercury deposition into water because most mercury in water comes from atmospheric deposition, but estimates of the amount of mercury that has been prevented from depositing in water are difficult to determine. According to the agency, its recent efforts to establish secondary NAAQS to address acid rain and nutrient over-enrichment were not successful because of insufficient scientific data. It is unclear if the agency will be able to address the scientific uncertainties related to ecological and atmospheric modeling and limitations in available field data in time for the next 5-year interval for reviewing NAAQS and establishing a secondary NAAQS under its innovative approach. EPA announced in its 2011 notice for its proposed rule on secondary NAAQS that it would not consider establishing an additional secondary NAAQS to address other effects from atmospheric deposition associated with NO and SO to nutrient over-enrichment in aquatic ecosystems, because of the limited quantity and quality of available scientific data relative to that available for acid rain. According to an EPA official, establishing a secondary NAAQS for NOx to protect against nutrient over-enrichment in a waterbody would be difficult because there can be many sources of nitrogen unrelated to atmospheric deposition, and these sources can be the dominant contributor of nitrogen to the waterbody. The CAA provides EPA with regulatory tools to reduce airborne emissions—and this has reduced atmospheric deposition. We encourage EPA to continue its effort to develop an integrated nitrogen research strategy, which may lead to more suitable approaches to address nutrient over-enrichment. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that EPA can address atmospheric deposition of NO and SO impairing the nation’s waters, we recommend that the EPA Administrator determine whether EPA can obtain in a timely manner the data it needs to establish secondary NAAQS adequate to protect against the effects of acid rain and, if not, identify alternative strategies to do so. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) examine the extent to which the atmospheric deposition of nitrogen oxides (NO), sulfur dioxide (SO and mercury contributes to the impairment of the nation’s waters, we analyzed EPA’s Assessment, TMDL (Total Maximum Daily Load) Tracking, and Implementation System (ATTAINS) database. For additional information on the extent to which atmospheric deposition of these three pollutants contribute to the impairment of the nation’s waters, we reviewed studies from EPA and other federal agencies, the United Nations, and others. | Why GAO Did This Study
Atmospheric deposition, a process that transfers pollutants, including NOx, SO2, and mercury, from the air to the earths surface, can significantly impair the quality of the nations waters. EPA can potentially address atmospheric deposition through the CWA and the CAA, but concerns have been raised about its ability to do so. GAO was asked to examine EPAs efforts to address atmospheric deposition of pollutants that impair waterbodies. This report examines (1) the extent to which atmospheric deposition of NOx, SO2, and mercury contributes to the impairment of the nations waters and identify the key sources of these pollutants; (2) the regulatory tools that EPA uses under the CWA to address the effects of atmospheric deposition, and the challenges, if any, that it faces in doing so; and (3) the regulatory tools that EPA uses under the CAA to address the effects of atmospheric deposition, and the challenges, if any, that it faces in doing so. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed EPA data, reports, and activities and interviewed agency officials and other experts.
What GAO Found
Atmospheric deposition of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and mercury contributes to the impairment of the nation's waters, but the full extent is not known. For example, states provide EPA with data on the extent to which their waterbodies do not meet water quality standards, and some states have reported that some of their waterbodies are polluted because of atmospheric deposition. However, the states have not assessed all of their waterbodies and are not required to report on the sources of pollution. Similarly, federal studies show that atmospheric deposition of NOx, SO2, and mercury is polluting waterbodies but have data for only some waters. The main sources of NOx and SO2 are cars and other forms of transportation and coal-burning power plants. Power plants are also the largest U.S. source of mercury emissions, but international sources also contribute to the mercury deposited in U.S. waters.
EPA has sought to address atmospheric deposition through Clean Water Act (CWA) programs but faces challenges in doing so. Specifically, states typically establish water quality standards--considering EPA recommended criteria--for each waterbody. If a waterbody does not meet standards, CWA generally requires the state to set a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) that identifies the maximum amount of pollutant that can enter the waterbody and still meet standards. States are responsible for taking actions to ensure the TMDL is met. For point sources of pollution, such as a pipe from a sewer treatment plant, CWA requires new or renewed permits to be consistent with the TMDL. However, there is no similar statutory requirement for nonpoint sources of pollution, such as atmospheric deposition. States may take actions, such as providing technical or financial assistance to limit pollution from nonpoint sources, but face a challenge when atmospheric deposition pollution affecting their waters originates in emissions from a different state.
EPA has also sought to address atmospheric deposition through Clean Air Act (CAA) regulations but faces challenges in doing so. EPA issued regulations that reduced emissions of NOx, SO2, and mercury and in turn the amount of pollution in waterbodies. Even with reduced emissions, NOx, SO2, and mercury continue to pollute the nation's waterbodies. EPA's recent attempt to address atmospheric deposition by establishing secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)--standards to protect public welfare--targeting the effects of acid rain caused by NOx and SO2 on water bodies was not successful. EPA stated that uncertainty regarding atmospheric modeling and limitations in available data prevented determination of secondary NAAQS adequate to protect against the effects of acid rain, and the agency has not identified alternative strategies. EPA has begun a 5-year pilot program to gather additional scientific data, but it is unclear whether or when the agency will be able to address scientific uncertainties to enable adoption of a protective secondary NAAQS. EPA also did not set secondary NAAQS to address nutrient over-enrichment in aquatic ecosystems caused by NOx because of the limited available scientific data. Many sources of nitrogen can contribute to nutrient over-enrichment in a waterbody, including sources of nitrogen unrelated to atmospheric deposition. EPA recently announced an effort that is to lead to the development of an integrated nitrogen research strategy that includes approaches to reducing atmospheric deposition of NOx into waters impaired because of nutrient over-enrichment by nitrogen.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA determine whether EPA can obtain in a timely manner the data it needs to establish secondary NAAQS adequate to protect against the effects of acid rain and, if not, identify alternative strategies to do so. EPA agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-721T | gao_GAO-16-721T_0 | Selected VAMC’s Time Frames for Developing High- Value SSACs Can Be Significant, But VHA Has Not Established Standards for Timeliness and Does Not Collect Data
We found that the 11 high-value, long-term SSACs we selected for review from three of the five VAMCs we visited took nearly 3 years (33.8 months) on average to develop and award. According to leadership officials and contracting officers from all five of the network contracting offices we visited, establishing high-value, long- term SSACs in a timely manner has been challenging for several reasons, including (1) not always receiving a complete, actionable, and timely initial information package from the VAMC that contains information the contracting officer needs to begin acquisition planning; (2) lengthy review processes for high-value, long-term SSACs; (3) negotiation challenges with the affiliates on the price of high-value, long- term SSACs; and (4) VAMC resistance to developing and pursuing high- value, long-term SSACs. Moreover, VAMC officials from all five VAMCs we visited indicated that the length of time it takes to develop and award high-value, long-term SSACs presents many challenges for their VAMCs, including the potential for gaps in patient care and the need to repeatedly establish short-term solutions. Federal internal control standards recommend establishing and reviewing performance standards at all levels of an agency. Absent such standards, VHA cannot ensure that its high-value, long-term SSACs are being developed in a timely manner. To ensure the timely development of high-value, long-term SSACs, we recommended that VA (1) establish performance standards for appropriate development time frames for high-value, long-term SSACs and use these performance standards to routinely monitor VAMC, network contracting office, and Medical Sharing Office efforts to develop these contracts; and (2) collect performance data on the time spent in each phase of the development of high-value, long-term SSACs and periodically analyze these data to assess performance. Short-Term SSACs Have Been Used to Overcome Lengthy High-Value, Long- Term SSAC Development Time Frames, but VHA Lacks Effective Oversight for Their Development and Use
We found that short-term SSACs are used to provide coverage to bridge the gap between an expired or expiring high-value, long-term SSAC and its replacement. Specifically, we found 5 short-term SSACs we reviewed from one network contracting office where (1) a solicitation was not issued to the affiliate, (2) the affiliate did not provide VHA a formal proposal outlining its services and instead submitted a price quote, and (3) negotiations were not conducted to address potential pricing issues before awarding the final contract. We found that this contracting officer’s supervisor had reviewed all 5 of these contracts prior to their award; however, the review process did not identify the areas that did not adhere to VA and VHA policy requirements for the development of SSACs. However, without ensuring that contracting officers are adhering to VA and VHA policies and network contracting offices are effectively reviewing the development of short-term SSACs as required by VA and VHA policies, VHA may be at risk for overpaying for affiliate services provided through these contracts. To ensure the effective development and use of short-term SSACs, we recommended VA (1) develop requirements for VAMCs and network contracting offices to effectively engage in early acquisition planning for the replacement of expiring high-value, long-term SSACs, (2) prioritize the review of SSAC contract data to identify patterns of overreliance on short-term SSACs that avoid appropriate Medical Sharing Office oversight, and (3) develop standards for the minimum amount of time necessary to develop and award short-term SSACs to minimize cases of nonadherence to VA policy for these contracts. High Turnover and Limited Training Opportunities Result in Inexperienced VHA Medical Sharing Contracting Officers and Impede the Development of SSACs
We found a high level of turnover among medical sharing contracting officers in all 21 network contracting offices that was exacerbated by a high level of inexperience among contracting officers responsible for developing SSACs. We found, however, that more than half of medical sharing contracting officers had 2 years or less medical sharing contract experience and less than one-quarter had more than 4 years of experience developing medical sharing contracts. However, in contrast to these standards, VHA does not have a plan to address medical sharing contracting officer turnover. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's May 2016 report, entitled VA Health Care: Improvements Needed for Management and Oversight of Sole- Source Affiliate Contract Development (GAO-16-426).
What GAO Found
GAO found it took nearly 3 years on average to develop and award 11 selected high- value, long-term sole-source affiliate contracts (SSAC) from three of the five Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers (VAMC) GAO visited. The two remaining VAMCs GAO visited did not use high-value, long-term SSACs. High-value, long-term SSACs generally require the most oversight of all SSACs by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), have total initial values of $500,000 or more, and provide affiliate services for more than 1 year. Officials from all five VAMCs GAO visited said that the lengthy development time frames of these contracts can impact VAMCs in several ways—including creating potential gaps in patient care and the need to repeatedly establish short-term solutions. GAO found that 10 of these 11 selected high-value, long-term SSACs exceeded the informal estimates created by VHA as planning guides for the expected development time frames that high-value, long-term SSACs should take. According to VA officials, these informal estimates are not used to measure the performance of this process and VHA has not established standards for the timely development of high-value, long-term SSACs. Federal internal control standards recommend establishing and reviewing performance standards at all levels of an agency. Absent such standards, VHA cannot ensure that its high-value, long-term SSACs are being developed in a timely manner.
VHA uses short-term SSACs to overcome lengthy high-value, long-term SSAC development time frames, but lacks effective oversight for the development and use of short-term SSACs. Short-term SSACs have total initial values of less than $500,000, provide affiliate services for up to 1 year, and are not reviewed by VHA Central Office. Instead they are developed and awarded independently by contracting officers within VHA's network contracting offices. Of the 12 short-term SSACs that GAO reviewed, 7 did not adhere to VA and VHA policy for the development of short-term SSACs—including 5 where (1) a solicitation was not issued to the affiliate (a required document detailing VA's performance requirements to enable a prospective contractor to prepare its proposal); (2) the affiliate did not provide VHA a formal proposal outlining the services to be provided and instead submitted a price quote; and (3) negotiations were not conducted between the contracting officer and affiliate to address potential pricing issues before awarding the final contract. The contracting officer responsible for these five contracts cited the lack of adequate time to develop and award the contracts and a lack of contract negotiating skills as the primary factors that impacted his ability to ensure that these short-term SSACs adhered to VA and VHA policy requirements. By not developing standards for short-term SSACs, VA has limited assurance that contracting officers have enough time to develop and award these contracts and also adhere to VA and VHA policy requirements.
GAO found a high level of inexperience among contracting officers responsible for developing SSACs in all 21 of VHA's network contracting offices. Specifically, about one-third of medical sharing contracting officers had 1 year or less experience developing medical sharing contracts, including SSACs, and more than half of medical sharing contracting officers had 2 years or less medical sharing contract experience. The high level of inexperience can be attributed in part to high turnover in recent years. About one-quarter of medical sharing contracting officers working within network contracting offices either left VA or were reassigned to other contracting teams. Inconsistent with federal internal control standards, VA does not have a plan to address the retention of its contracting workforce, nor has it taken adequate steps to expand training opportunities to enhance the level of competence. |
gao_NSIAD-97-232 | gao_NSIAD-97-232_0 | As discussed below, the agencies provided clear, reasonable, and consistent reasons for excluding contracts from mandatory FACNET processing. Widespread public notice may not be required or appropriate for other types of contracts. Little Information Reported on Agencies’ EC Transactions
Available data shows limited and declining use of FACNET for contract awards. However, the lack of governmentwide data on agencies’ use of other EC purchasing methods, such as purchase cards and orders placed electronically against catalogs and indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts, impedes efforts to assess the government’s progress in moving toward doing business electronically and achieving the “single face to industry” goal. Thus, no governmentwide data is currently available on the volume and value of all EC procurements. Both GSA and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy commented that they are modifying the Federal Procurement Data System to collect EC statistical information and it may not be available until the year 2000. These were contracts where (1) widespread solicitation is inappropriate, (2) transmission of essential information through FACNET is impracticable or infeasible, or (3) alternative procurement methods, including other EC methods, are more efficient. They provided clear, reasonable, and consistent business and technical reasons to support their positions. Scope and Methodology
To address our objectives, we asked the Senior Procurement Executives at 25 federal agencies to give us information and explanations about (1) contracts they identified as not suitable for acquisition through FACNET and (2) the extent to which their agencies’ competitive contract awards between $2,500 and $100,000 were generally suitable for acquisition through a system with full FACNET capability. DOD noted that it is incorporating EC into its business practices within the simplified acquisition threshold. DOD believes agencies’ procurement officials should be allowed to determine for their agencies those classes of contracts not suitable for FACNET. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the classes of contracts in amounts greater than the micro-purchase threshold and not greater than the simplified acquisition threshold that are not suitable for acquisition through a system with full Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET) capability, focusing on: (1) characteristics of contract actions that agencies found not suitable for FACNET processing and evaluated the reasonableness and consistency of agencies' explanations why they were unsuitable for FACNET; and (2) governmentwide electronic commerce (EC) statistics to determine agencies' use of FACNET and other EC purchasing methods.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) senior procurement officials generally found contracts unsuitable for FACNET when: (a) widespread public solicitation of offers was inappropriate; (b) transmitting essential contracting information through the network was not practical or feasible; or (c) alternative purchasing methods were faster and more efficient; (2) the agencies provided clear, reasonable, and consistent business and technical reasons why numerous types of contracts should be excluded from mandatory FACNET processing; (3) available data showed continuing limited use of FACNET for contract awards; (4) however, there is no governmentwide data available on agencies' use of other EC purchasing methods; (5) consequently, it is difficult to assess the government's overall progress in doing business electronically in a standard way; and (6) governmentwide EC statistical information may not be available until the year 2000. |
gao_GAO-16-161 | gao_GAO-16-161_0 | DOD Has Identified Certain Materials as Critical but Approach Not Comprehensive
From 2011 to 2015, DOD identified certain materials, including rare earths, as critical to meet its individual statutory responsibilities, but has not taken a comprehensive approach to identify which of these materials are critical to national security. See table 4 for the rare earths that each DOD organization separately identified as critical in defense applications, critical to national security, or as strategic and critical in different reports. DOD’s identification of which rare earths, if any, are critical to national security is fragmented. According to DOD officials, rare earths from the National Defense Stockpile have not been used. Developing a comprehensive approach for ensuring a sufficient supply of rare earths for national security needs—one that can establish criticality, assess supply risks, and identify mitigating actions—would better position DOD to help ensure continued functionality in weapon system components should a disruption occur, even though supply disruptions in rare earths have not occurred over the last several years. There is not yet agreement on what constitutes “critical” rare earths. While various organizations’ definitions of critical may be similar, DOD has identified 15 of the 17 rare earths as critical over the last 5 years. This makes establishing priorities to analyze supply risk difficult. DLA- Strategic Materials does a methodical job of analyzing risks for all materials, but its focus is a four-year timeframe with stockpiling as its mitigation tool. MIBP relies on other DOD organizations to identify and elevate risks, relies primarily on the market to resolve supply disruptions, and has not put in place measures to evaluate the success of its mitigating actions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To fully identify and mitigate risks associated with the availability of rare earths, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:
Direct the SMPB to designate which, if any, rare earths are critical to national security in order to provide a common DOD understanding of those materials and focus resources. DOD concurred with all our recommendations. Such an approach would better position DOD to help ensure continued functionality in weapon system components should a disruption occur. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to review the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to identify and mitigate risks in its rare earth materials (rare earths) supply chain, including the Defense Logistics Agency-Strategic Materials’ (DLA-Strategic Materials) stockpiling efforts. We assessed the extent that DOD (1) determined which rare earths, if any, are critical to national security; and (2) has identified and mitigated risks associated with rare earths, including the effects of a potential supply disruption. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD depends on rare earths that contain one or more of 17 similar metals which have unique properties, such as magnetism at high temperatures, to provide functionality in weapon system components. Many steps in the rare earths supply chain, such as mining, are conducted in China, a situation that may pose risks to the continued availability of these materials. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for 2015 included a provision for GAO to review DOD efforts to identify and mitigate risks in its rare earths supply chain.
This report assesses the extent that DOD (1) determined which rare earths, if any, are critical to national security; and (2) has identified and mitigated risks associated with rare earths, including the effects of a potential supply disruption. GAO reviewed DOD reports from 2011-2015 and relevant legislation; and collected information from DOD, the military departments, and industry organizations.
What GAO Found
Three Department of Defense (DOD) offices have identified certain rare earth materials (rare earths) as critical for some defense applications, such as lasers, but DOD has not taken a comprehensive, department-wide approach to identifying which rare earths, if any, are critical to national security. Specifically, DOD offices have not yet agreed on what constitutes “critical” rare earths. Using different statutorily-based definitions, these offices have identified 15 of the 17 rare earths as critical over the last 5 years (see table).
DOD's current approach to identifying and mitigating risks associated with rare earths is fragmented. With different interpretations of which rare earths are critical, establishing priorities to analyze supply risk becomes difficult. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency-Strategic Materials office methodically analyzes risks for all materials, but its focus is a four-year timeframe with stockpiling as its mitigation tool. The Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy office relies on other DOD organizations to identify and elevate risks, relies primarily on the market to resolve supply disruptions, and has not put in place measures to evaluate the success of its mitigating actions. According to DOD, supply disruptions in rare earths have not occurred over the last several years. Regardless, the Strategic Materials Protection Board has not developed a comprehensive approach for ensuring a sufficient supply of rare earths for national security needs—one that can establish criticality, assess supply risks, and identify mitigating actions. Such an approach would better position DOD to help ensure continued functionality in weapon system components should a disruption occur.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD designate which rare earths are critical to national security, and develop a comprehensive approach to help ensure a secure supply by identifying risk metrics, among other activities. DOD concurred with all the recommendations in this report and provided timeframes for action. |
gao_GAO-05-243 | gao_GAO-05-243_0 | As part of MDA’s planning process, MDA defines overarching program goals for the development and fielding of BMDS block configurations. For example, MDA estimates it will need about $12.0 billion to fund Block 2008 activities over the next 7 years through 2011. Policy. To address its negative cost variance for GMD, MDA deferred some work planned for completion in fiscal year 2004 into fiscal year 2005, and, to cover these increased costs, requested and received additional money in its fiscal year 2005 budget. Based on DOD’s Future Years Defense Plan for fiscal years 2006-2011, MDA plans to request, on average, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding of about $10 billion annually. This funding supports continued development, procurement, and sustainment of hardware and software that MDA is fielding. One factor for the increasing pressure is that DOD’s acquisition programs such as ballistic missile defense are likely to be competing for a decreasing share of the federal budget. MDA Is Not Consistently Matching Cost and Fielding Goals
In assessing the extent MDA achieved its stated goals in fiscal year 2004, we observed that MDA’s cost goal for a given block is not consistently aligned with that block’s fielding goals. Of these missiles, 11 will be delivered in 2004-2005, and the remaining missiles will be delivered during 2006-2007. Similarly, funds accounted for in the Block 2006 cost goal are being used to procure 40 missiles. In addition, counter to the definition of a block as an integrated set of capabilities fielded during the 2-year block window, the Airborne Laser program will not field any capabilities during Block 2004 although Block 2004 funds are used in the program’s development. Despite this success, the performance of the system remains uncertain and unverified because of recurrent test delays and failures. To provide these capabilities, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is upgrading existing Aegis Navy ships for the BMD mission. It will also be used as a forward-deployed Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) sensor, employing its shipboard SPY-1 radar, to perform surveillance and tracking of long-range ballistic missiles in support of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) mission. Battle management/command and control (BMC2). The near-term focus of the program was shifted toward two events: (1) the achievement of a key laser demonstration known as “First Light”—the first demonstration of the integration of six individual laser modules to produce a single beam of laser energy—and (2) the initial flight test of the prototype aircraft with the BC/FC installed, which is referred to as “First Flight.” Key provisions of the restructure call for the program office to complete the following activities during the next few years: Ground test and flight test the BC/FC segment independent of high- energy laser testing activities. BMDS integration and communications. By the end of fiscal year 2004, GMD carried out planned activities needed to field an initial missile defense capability, including, as summarized below, the emplacement of interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska. History
The Department of Defense (DOD) established the National Missile Defense program in 1996 to develop a missile defense system capable of protecting the United States from ICBM attacks. DOD will use this initial capability to provide the United States with protection against a limited ballistic missile attack launched from Northeast Asia. Ground tests were conducted to ensure interoperability of element components and to verify operation and performance of component software. Cost: Our analysis of prime contractor cost performance reports shows that the contractor’s favorable cost and schedule performance eroded somewhat during fiscal year 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1985, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested $85 billion in ballistic missile defense programs, with $66.5 billion more anticipated over the next 7 years through 2011. As a major result of this investment, the Department is on the verge of activating our nation's first missile defense system for protecting the United States from intercontinental ballistic missile attacks out of Northeast Asia. This initial capability--referred to as Limited Defensive Operations (LDO)--is the first step of a national priority to develop, field, and evolve over time an overarching ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). To fulfill a congressional mandate, GAO assessed how well the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) met its cost, schedule, testing, and performance goals during fiscal year 2004. GAO assessed the program last year and will continue to provide assessments of MDA progress through 2006.
What GAO Found
By the end of fiscal year 2004, MDA carried out activities needed to field an initial missile defense capability, as planned. These included delivery and emplacement of Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors; upgrades of ground-based radars; enhancements to Aegis Navy ships for improved surveillance and tracking; development of command and control software for system operation; and tests to verify that components of this initial capability can communicate as part of an integrated whole. However, the performance of the system remains uncertain and unverified, because a number of flight tests slipped into fiscal year 2005 and MDA has not successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test using operationally-representative hardware and software. Additionally, based on our analysis of prime contractor cost and schedule performance, the development of BMDS elements cost approximately $370 million more than planned during fiscal year 2004. To cover much of this cost overrun, MDA deferred work planned for fiscal year 2004, redirected funds earmarked for other programs, and requested additional funds in its fiscal year 2005 budget to cover the cost of deferred work. In the future, MDA will likely face increased funding risks. MDA plans to request about $10 billion annually from DOD for BMDS development, procurement, and sustainment. However, DOD's acquisition programs are likely to be competing for a decreasing share of the total federal budget and MDA's programs are competing against hundreds of other DOD programs. Also, MDA continues to budget for unanticipated cost growth. For example, the Airborne Laser program plans to spend an additional $1.5 billion to develop and demonstrate a prototype aircraft. Furthermore, procurement and sustainment will demand increased funding as more missile defense components are fielded over time. MDA policy defines a block as an integrated set of capabilities fielded during the 2-year block cycle, but we observed that MDA's fielding goals do not consistently match its cost goals. For example, Block 2004 funds are used to procure 32 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense missiles, but of these missiles, 11 will be delivered in 2004-2005 and the remaining missiles will be delivered during 2006-2007. MDA officials intend to clarify the block policy in the near future to better align the cost and fielding goals. |
gao_GAO-12-343 | gao_GAO-12-343_0 | Furthermore, LMR systems provide public safety agencies “mission critical” voice capabilities—that is, voice capabilities that meet a high standard for reliability, redundancy, capacity, and flexibility. FCC has issued a series of orders and proposed rulemakings and adopted rules addressing how to develop a public safety broadband network, some of which are highlighted: In September 2006, FCC established In 2007, FCC adopted an order to create a nationwide broadband network with the 10 MHz of spectrum designated for a public safety broadband network and the adjacent 10 MHz of spectrum––the Upper 700 MHz D Block, or “D Block.” As envisioned by FCC, this nationwide network would be shared by public safety and a commercial provider and operated by a public/private partnership. Even With Investment of Significant Resources, Current Public Safety Communication Systems Provide Mission Critical Voice Capabilities but Are Not Fully Interoperable
Public Investment
Congress has appropriated billions in federal funding over the last decade to public safety in grants and other assistance for the construction and maintenance of LMR voice communication systems and the purchase of communication devices. Currently, emergency response personnel rely exclusively on their LMR systems to provide mission critical voice capabilities. These channels allow only restricted data transfer speeds, thus limiting capacity to send and receive data such as text and images, or to access existing databases. One reason for the lack of interoperability is the fragmentation of spectrum assignments for public safety, since existing radios are typically unable to transmit and receive in all these frequencies. Broadband Network Could Improve Incident Response
With higher data speeds than the current LMR systems, a public safety broadband network could provide emergency responders with new video and data applications that are not currently available. Absent mission critical voice capabilities on a broadband network, emergency responders will continue to rely on their current LMR voice systems, meaning a broadband network would supplement, rather than replace, LMR systems for the foreseeable future. To avoid a major shortcoming of the LMR communication systems, it is essential that a public safety broadband network be interoperable across jurisdictions and devices. DHS, in conjunction with its SAFECOM program, developed the Interoperability Continuum which identifies five key elements to interoperable networks— governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training, and usage—that waiver jurisdictions and other stakeholders discussed as important to building an interoperable public safety broadband network, as shown in figure 4. Creating a governance structure. Pending legislation, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, establishes a First Responder Network Authority as an independent authority within NTIA and gave it responsibility for ensuring the establishment of a nationwide, interoperable public safety broadband network. Furthermore, public safety agencies may be unable to negotiate lower prices for handheld LMR devices because they cannot exert buying power in relationship with device manufacturers. Because public safety agencies contract for handheld LMR devices in this independent manner, they sacrifice the quantity discounts that come from placing larger orders. We have repeatedly recommended joint procurement as a cost saving measure for situations where agencies require similar products because it allows them to combine their market power and lower their procurement costs. Given that DHS has expertise in emergency communications and relationships with local public safety representatives, we believe it is well-suited to facilitate opportunities for joint procurement of handheld communication devices. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that public safety agencies are not overpaying for handheld communication devices, the Secretary of Homeland Security should work with federal and state partners to identify and communicate opportunities for joint procurement of public safety LMR devices. Commerce, DHS, the Department of Justice, and FCC provided technical comments on the draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, we reviewed (1) the resources that have been provided for current public safety communication systems and their capabilities and limitations, (2) how a nationwide public safety broadband network is being planned and its anticipated capabilities and limitations, (3) the challenges to building a nationwide public safety broadband network, and (4) the factors that influence competition and cost in the development of public safety communication devices and the options that exist to reduce prices. To determine the plans for a nationwide public safety broadband network and its expected capabilities and limitations, we reviewed relevant congressional testimonies and academic articles on services and applications likely to operate on a public safety broadband network, the challenges to building, operating, and maintaining a network. Homeland Security: Challenges in Achieving Interoperable Communications for First Responders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Emergency responders across the nation rely on land mobile radio (LMR) systems to gather and share information and coordinate their response efforts during emergencies. These public safety communication systems are fragmented across thousands of federal, state, and local jurisdictions and often lack interoperability, or the ability to communicate across agencies and jurisdictions. To supplement the LMR systems, in 2007, radio frequency spectrum was dedicated for a nationwide public safety broadband network. Presently, 22 jurisdictions around the nation have obtained permission to build public safety broadband networks on the original spectrum assigned for broadband use. This requested report examines (1) the investments in and capabilities of LMR systems; (2) plans for a public safety broadband network and its expected capabilities and limitations; (3) challenges to building this network; and (4) factors that affect the prices of handheld LMR devices. GAO conducted a literature review, visited jurisdictions building broadband networks, and interviewed federal, industry, and public safety stakeholders, as well as academics and experts.
What GAO Found
After the investment of significant resourcesincluding billions of dollars in federal grants and approximately 100 megahertz of radio frequency spectrumthe current land mobile radio (LMR) systems in use by public safety provide reliable mission critical voice capabilities. For public safety, mission critical voice communications must meet a high standard for reliability, redundancy, capacity, and flexibility. Although these LMR systems provide some data services, such as text and images, their ability to transmit data is limited by the channels on which they operate. According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), interoperability among LMR systems has improved due to its efforts, but full interoperability of LMR systems remains a distant goal.
Multiple federal entities are involved with planning a public safety broadband network and while such a network would likely enhance interoperability and increase data transfer rates, it would not support mission critical voice capabilities for years to come, perhaps even 10 years or more. A broadband network could enable emergency responders to access video and data applications that improve incident response. Yet because the technology standard for the proposed broadband network does not support mission critical voice capabilities, first responders will continue to rely on their current LMR systems for the foreseeable future. Thus, a broadband network would supplement, rather than replace, current public safety communication systems.
There are several challenges to implementing a public safety broadband network, including ensuring the networks interoperability, reliability, and security; obtaining adequate funds to build and maintain it; and creating a governance structure. For example, to avoid a major shortcoming of the LMR systems, it is essential that a public safety broadband network be interoperable across jurisdictions and devices by following five key elements to interoperable networks: governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training, and usage. With respect to creating a governance structure, pending legislationthe Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, among other thingsestablishes a new entity, the First Responder Network Authority, with responsibility for ensuring the establishment of a nationwide, interoperable public safety broadband network.
The price of handheld LMR devices is highoften thousands of dollarsin part because market competition is limited and manufacturing costs are high. Further, GAO found that public safety agencies cannot exert buying power in relationship to device manufacturers, which may result in the agencies overpaying for LMR devices. In particular, because public safety agencies contract for LMR devices independently from one another, they are not in a strong position to negotiate lower prices and forego the quantity discounts that accompany larger orders. For similar situations, GAO has recommended joint procurement as a cost saving measure because it allows agencies requiring similar products to combine their purchase power and lower their procurement costs. Given that DHS has experience in emergency communications and relationships with public safety agencies, it is well-suited to facilitate joint procurement of handheld LMR devices.
What GAO Recommends
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should work with partners to identify and communicate opportunities for joint procurement of public safety LMR devices. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS agreed with the recommendation. GAO also received technical comments, which have been incorporated, as appropriate, in the report. |
gao_GAO-08-546 | gao_GAO-08-546_0 | Army Is Not Meeting All Requirements for Deploying Soldiers with Medical Conditions and Has Unresolved Problems with Medical Record Keeping
The Army allows commanders to deploy soldiers who have medical conditions that may require significant limitations in duty assignment as long as they meet requirements in the guidance, including board evaluations, suitable duty assignments, and available medical treatment in deployed locations, if needed; however, the Army is not meeting all requirements to ensure board evaluations are conducted within prescribed time frames, and various problems exist with regard to physical profile record keeping. Army Requirements for Deploying Soldiers with Medical Conditions Are Not Always Being Met
While Army guidance allows commanders to deploy soldiers with medical conditions that may require significant limitations in duty assignments, subject to certain requirements, we found that commanders are not always aware of soldiers’ medical limitations when making deployment decisions, and they do not always adhere to these requirements. In our sample, we found that of the 42 soldiers who had profile designations of permanent 3, 17 soldiers did not receive needed board evaluations prior to their deployment. In other cases, according to personnel officials, commanders were given notice of the profiles but did not take needed action on time, but we were not able to determine why this occurred. Finally, the Army is not consistent in its use of numerical designations in profiles to reflect a soldier’s ability to perform certain functional activities. Based on our random projectable sample of soldiers preparing to deploy between April 2006 and March 2007, we estimate that about 7 percent of the soldiers who were preparing for deployment at Forts Benning, Stewart, and Drum had physical profiles in their medical record showing the inability to perform functional activities yet were not designated with a score of at least 3. Although we found no evidence of widespread revision in numerical designations, in our surveys to deployed soldiers or our interviews with Army personnel officials and family members of deployed soldiers, some soldiers or family members expressed concerns to us that they were uninformed about how the Army was addressing their medical problems prior to deployment, and they knew of no venue to resolve their complaints. One In 10 Soldiers in the Projectable Sample Who Has a Medical Condition Has Deployed, but We Were Unable to Determine Duty Suitability
Based our review of medical records from Forts Benning, Stewart, and Drum, we estimate that about 10 percent of active duty soldiers with profiles indicating medical conditions that could require significant limitations in duty assignments were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to determine the extent to which they had been assigned to duties suitable for those conditions, we surveyed by e-mail a sample of deployed soldiers with medical conditions. However, we did not get a sufficiently high response rate to enable us to project findings from the survey respondents. Without timely MMRB or MEB evaluations and the retention of complete physical profile information for deploying soldiers with medical conditions, commanders who assign duties can not be fully informed of soldiers’ medical limitations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To safeguard soldiers with significant medical limitations from being deployed and assigned to duties unsuitable for their limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army: 1. direct the Office of the Army Surgeon General and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-1 to collaboratively develop an enforcement mechanism to ensure that medical providers and commanders follow procedures so that soldiers whose permanent physical profiles indicate significant medical limitations are properly referred to and complete MEB and MMRB evaluation boards prior to deployment; 2. direct the Office of the Army Surgeon General and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-1 to move forward with plans to electronically process and retain physical profiles, including specific actions and milestones, and to implement guidance to help ensure the timely distribution of profiles to commanders and the military personnel office and that the medical record keeping system include all information in the approved physical profiles, and that all profiles be retained in soldiers’ medical records; 3. direct the Army Human Resources Command to disseminate information and provide soldiers and their families access to an independent ombudsman program prior to and during deployment to ensure that they are fully informed about this resource for addressing their concerns and to add independent oversight of Army medical and deployment processes in the interests of the soldiers. To determine the extent to which the Army is deploying soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan with medical conditions requiring duty limitations, and whether it is assigning them to duties suitable to their limitations, we requested deployment data on the subset of soldiers who we identified as having a significant medical limitation from the time period of April 2001 to March 2007. We reviewed Army processes for tracking soldiers while deployed. We received responses from 24 of these soldiers, for a response rate of about 36 percent. Possesses impairments that limit functions or assignments. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The increasing need for warfighters for the Global War on Terrorism has meant longer and multiple deployments for soldiers. Medical readiness is essential to their performing needed duties, and an impairment that limits a soldier's capacities represents risk to the soldier, the unit, and the mission. Asked to review the Army's compliance with its guidance, GAO examined the extent to which the Army is (1) adhering to its medical and deployment requirements regarding decisions to send soldiers with medical conditions to Iraq and Afghanistan, and (2) deploying soldiers with medical conditions requiring duty limitations, and assigning them to duties suitable for their limitations. GAO reviewed Army guidance, and medical records for those preparing to deploy between April 2006 and March 2007; interviewed Army officials and commanders at Forts Benning, Stewart, and Drum, selected for their high deployment rates; and surveyed deployed soldiers with medical limitations.
What GAO Found
Army guidance allows commanders to deploy soldiers with medical conditions requiring duty limitations, subject to certain requirements, but the Army lacks enforcement mechanisms to ensure that all requirements are met, and medical record keeping problems obstruct the Army's visibility over these soldiers' conditions. A soldier diagnosed with an impairment must be given a physical profile form designating numerically the severity of the condition and, if designated 3 or higher (more severe), must be evaluated by a medical board. Commanders must then determine proper duty assignments based on soldiers' profile and commanders' staffing needs. From a random projectable sample, GAO estimates that 3 percent of soldiers from Forts Benning, Stewart, and Drum who had designations of 3 did not receive required board evaluations prior to being deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan for the period studied. In some cases, soldiers were not evaluated because commanders lacked timely access to profiles; in other cases, commanders did not take timely actions. The Army also had problems with retention and completeness of profiles; although guidance requires that approved profiles be retained in soldiers' medical records, 213 profiles were missing from the sample of 685 records reviewed. The Army was not consistent in assigning numerical designations reflecting soldiers' abilities to perform functional activities. GAO estimates from a random projectable sample that 7 percent of soldiers from these three installations had profiles indicating their inability to perform certain functional activities, yet carrying numerical designators below 3. While medical providers can "upgrade" numerical designations discretionarily based on knowledge of soldiers' conditions, the upgrades can mask limitations and cause commanders to deploy soldiers without needed board evaluations. While GAO found no evidence of widespread revision in profile designations, some soldiers interviewed or surveyed disagreed with their designations yet were reluctant to express concerns for fear of prejudicial treatment. The Army has instituted a program to provide ombudsmen to whom soldiers can bring medical concerns, but it is targeted at returning soldiers and is not well publicized as a resource for all soldiers with medical conditions. Without timely board evaluations and retention of profile information for deploying soldiers with medical conditions, the Army lacks full visibility and commanders must make medical readiness, deployment, and duty assignment decisions without being fully informed of soldiers' medical limitations. GAO estimates that about 10 percent of soldiers with medical conditions that could require duty limitations were deployed from the three installations, but survey response was too limited to enable GAO to project the extent to which they were assigned to suitable duties. Along with interviews, however, responses suggest that both soldiers and commanders believe soldiers are generally assigned to duties that accommodate their medical conditions. Occasional exceptions have occurred when a profile did not reflect all necessary medical information or a soldier's special skill was difficult to replace. Officials said soldiers sometimes understate their conditions to be deployed with their units, or overstate them to avoid deployment. |
gao_GAO-03-518T | gao_GAO-03-518T_0 | Figure 1 shows the historic and current flows of the Everglades ecosystem as well as the proposed restored flow. Figure 2 shows the relationship of the agencies participating in restoration, the Task Force, and the three restoration goals. Federal and State Agencies Spent $576 Million on Scientific Activities for the South Florida Ecosystem and Made Progress in Some Areas
Federal and state agencies spent $576 million from fiscal years 1993 through 2002 to conduct mission-related scientific research, monitoring, and assessment in support of the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem. Gaps Remain in the Scientific Information Needed for Restoration
While scientists made progress in developing scientific information, they also identified significant gaps in scientific information and adaptive management tools that, if not addressed in the near future, will hinder the overall success of the restoration effort. An example of a gap that could hinder systemwide restoration is information on contaminants, such as fertilizers and pesticides. Scientists need information on the amount of contaminants that could be discharged into the environment, the amounts that persist in water and sediment, and the risks faced by organisms living in areas with contaminants—even low levels of contaminants on a long- term basis. The Restoration Initiative Lacks an Effective Means to Coordinate Scientific Activities
The Water Resources Development Act of 1996 requires the Task Force to coordinate scientific research for South Florida restoration; however, the Task Force has not established an effective means to do so, diminishing assurance that key scientific information will be developed and available to fill gaps and support restoration decisions. Provide resources for carrying out its responsibilities. Appendix I: Groups Responsible for Coordinating Scientific Activities for the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration
The South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (Task Force) and participating agencies have created several groups with responsibilities for various scientific activities. One of these teams—the Science Coordination Team (SCT) created by the Task Force—is the only group responsible for coordinating restoration science activities that relate to all three of the Task Force’s restoration goals (see fig. | Why GAO Did This Study
Restoration of the South Florida ecosystem is a complex, long-term federal and state undertaking that requires the development of extensive scientific information. GAO was asked to report on the funds spent on scientific activities for restoration, the gaps that exist in scientific information, and the extent to which scientific activities are being coordinated.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 1993 through 2002, eight federal agencies and one state agency collectively spent $576 million to conduct mission-related scientific research, monitoring, and assessment in support of the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem. With this funding, which was almost evenly split between the federal agencies and the state agency, scientists have made progress in developing information--including information on the past, present, and future flow of water in the ecosystem--for restoration. While some scientific information has been obtained and understanding of the ecosystem improved, key gaps remain in scientific information needed for restoration. If not addressed quickly, these gaps could hinder the success of restoration. One particularly important gap is the lack of information regarding the amount and risk of contaminants, such as fertilizers and pesticides, in water and sediment throughout the ecosystem. The South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force--comprised of federal, state, local, and tribal entities--is responsible for coordinating the South Florida ecosystem restoration initiative. The Task Force is also responsible for coordinating scientific activities for restoration, but has yet to establish an effective means of doing so. In 1997, it created the Science Coordination Team (SCT) to coordinate the science activities of the many agencies participating in restoration. However, the Task Force did not give the SCT clear direction to carry out its responsibilities in support of the Task Force and restoration. Furthermore, unlike the full-time science coordinating bodies created for other restoration efforts, the SCT functions as a voluntary group with no full-time and few part-time staff. Without an effective means to coordinate restoration, the Task Force cannot ensure that restoration decisions are based on sound scientific information. |
gao_GAO-15-810 | gao_GAO-15-810_0 | Much of the maintenance dredging the Corps undertakes is cyclical in nature, with dredging needed annually or every few years, according to Corps officials. Corps Data on Total Maintenance Dredging Contract Costs Are Unreliable, but Corps Officials Cited Multiple Factors That Likely Contributed to Cost Changes
Cost data in the Corps’ dredging database are unreliable and, therefore, the total costs of maintenance dredging contracts during fiscal years 2004 through 2013 are unclear, but Corps officials report that multiple factors likely contributed to cost changes during this period. The Corps relies on data from its dredging database for assessing trends in maintenance dredging contract costs over time, among other things, but we found that many of the records in the database did not contain information on final costs or actual quantities of material dredged. Specifically, of the 1,405 contract records in the database that were marked as “complete,” we found that about 19 percent (264 out of 1,405) did not contain information on the final contract costs or the actual quantity of material dredged. Federal internal control standards indicate that managers should maintain quality information, including accurate and complete operational and financial data, for the effective and efficient management of their operations. Without systematic quality controls at the district-office level to regularly verify the completeness and accuracy of their maintenance dredging contract data, the Corps risks undertaking analyses on incomplete information, and may be drawing conclusions about cost trends based on unreliable information. Corps officials across many of the headquarters, division, and district offices we spoke with, as well as representatives from the dredging industry, said that during this period they believed the cost of dredging had increased for many maintenance projects. Labor, fuel, and steel prices may represent a large portion of the cost to a contractor in conducting dredging, and fluctuations in the market prices for these costs may influence contractors’ bids for contracts. Material placement costs, which are influenced by nature of the material, the type of placement method used, and the location where the material is placed, may affect contract costs with farther placement sites generally more costly because of additional time, fuel, and equipment needed to transport the material. In general, Corps officials we interviewed said it is difficult to discern which of these various factors may have led to specific cost increases for a particular contract. Corps Districts Report Undertaking Various Approaches to Manage Contract Costs
Officials from Corps district offices we spoke with reported undertaking various approaches to manage maintenance dredging contract costs, largely on a project-by-project basis. Corps officials from 11 of the 12 district offices we interviewed said that they have combined work under one or more projects that had historically had separate contracts into a single contract in an effort to manage costs. Officials estimated that combining the hopper dredge work across projects from several West Coast districts saved up to $7 million annually by having a single hopper dredge mobilize and demobilize once instead of multiple dredges for individual contracts. For example, because additional planning may be needed, it may not be feasible to combine contracts for projects with time-sensitive needs, according to the officials. For instance, Corps officials from a few districts said that, in specifying the dredging requirements of a project, they may emphasize performance requirements and not necessarily the type of equipment needed to achieve those requirements. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure the completeness and accuracy of cost and cost-related data for maintenance dredging contracts in the Corps’ Dredging Information System database, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of Civil Works of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to require that its district offices establish systematic quality controls to regularly verify the completeness and accuracy of their maintenance dredging contract data, including processes for ensuring that corrections are made when errors or omissions may be identified, such as through headquarters reviews. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) agency data available about the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) total costs of maintenance dredging contracts, and factors that contributed to any changes, during fiscal years 2004 through 2013, and (2) approaches the Corps reports it has undertaken to manage maintenance dredging contract costs. Additionally, to examine factors that contributed to any changes in contract costs during fiscal years 2004 through 2013, we interviewed the selected Corps division and district offices and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of four reoccurring maintenance dredging projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Corps maintains the navigation for thousands of miles of waterways and hundreds of ports of harbors. The Corps conducts maintenance dredging primarily under contract with private industry to remove sediment from waterways. Maintenance dredging is often cyclical in nature, with dredging needed annually or every few years.
GAO was asked to review Corps' maintenance dredging contract costs. This report examines (1) agency data available about the total costs of maintenance dredging contracts, and factors that contributed to any changes, during fiscal years 2004 through 2013, and (2) approaches the Corps reports it has undertaken to manage maintenance dredging contract costs
GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and Corps guidance; analyzed cost data from the Corps' dredging database for fiscal years 2004-2013 and assessed the reliability of these data; reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of four projects selected to reflect geographic variation and a range of contract sizes; reviewed documentation on approaches to manage costs; and interviewed Corps officials from headquarters, divisions, and districts (selected for geographic variation and range of dredging work) and dredging industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Cost data in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) dredging database are unreliable and, therefore, the total costs of maintenance dredging contracts during fiscal years 2004 through 2013 are unclear. In particular, about 19 percent (264 out of 1,405) of the contract records marked as "complete" did not contain information on the final contract costs or the actual quantity of material dredged. The Corps relies on cost data from its dredging database to assess trends in maintenance dredging contract costs over time, among other things, but its district offices do not have systematic quality control measures in place to ensure these data are complete and accurate. Federal internal control standards indicate that managers should maintain quality information, including accurate and complete operational and financial data, for the effective and efficient management of their operations. Without systematic quality controls at the district-office level to regularly verify the completeness and accuracy of their maintenance dredging contract data, the Corps risks undertaking analyses on incomplete information, and drawing conclusions about cost trends based on unreliable information.
Multiple factors likely contributed to changes in contract costs during fiscal years 2004 through 2013, according to Corps officials. Corps officials, as well as representatives from the dredging industry, told GAO that during this period they believed the cost of dredging had increased for many maintenance projects. However, Corps officials said that it is difficult to discern which factors may have led to specific cost increases for a particular contract given the many factors that influence the cost of a contract. Factors that Corps officials commonly cited as likely contributing to changes in contract costs over the 10-year period included the number of contractors available to bid on the work; fluctuations in the market prices for labor, fuel, and steel; and the costs for transporting dredged material to a placement site, with farther placement sites generally being more costly because of additional time, fuel, and equipment needed to transport the material.
Corps districts reported undertaking various approaches to manage maintenance dredging contract costs, largely on a project-by-project basis because of the unique nature of each project. For example, officials from 11 of 12 Corps district offices interviewed said they have combined work under one or more projects that had historically had separate contracts into a single contract to help manage costs. In combining contracts, Corps district officials estimated reducing total mobilization costs—the costs to transport dredge equipment—based on the need to mobilize dredge equipment once under a combined contract, instead of multiple times for individual contracts. For example, Corps officials estimated that combining dredge work across projects from several West Coast districts saved up to $7 million annually in mobilization costs. Corp officials pointed out, however, that combining contracts may not always be feasible, such as when projects have time-sensitive dredging needs. Additionally, officials from a few district offices said that, in specifying the dredging requirements for a project, they may emphasize performance requirements and not necessarily the type of equipment needed to achieve those requirements, which may result in an increase in the number of contractors available to bid on the work and, therefore, more competitive bids.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Corps require that its district offices establish systematic quality controls to regularly verify the completeness and accuracy of maintenance dredging contract data. The Department of Defense concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-336 | gao_GAO-08-336_0 | 1.) 2.) S/CT provides minimal policy guidance to help determine ATA priorities and ensure that assistance provided supports broader U.S. policy goals. In addition, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use country-specific needs assessments and program reviews to plan what types of assistance to provide partner nations in accordance with State policy guidance. However, S/CT provides little additional guidance to DS/T/ATA regarding program priorities and how to allocate program funding. S/CT Has Established Various Mechanisms to Coordinate Program Assistance
As a part of its responsibility, S/CT has established mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other U.S. government international counterterrorism training assistance and to help avoid duplication of efforts. The Training Assistance Subgroup includes representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, and other agencies. Based on our review of program documents, interviews, and meetings with officials in the four countries we visited, we did not find any significant duplication or overlap among U.S. agencies’ country-specific training programs aimed at combating terrorism. S/CT and DS/T/ATA Do Not Assess Sustainability of Capabilities
Despite progress towards establishing goals and intended outcomes, State has not developed clear measures and a process for assessing sustainability and has not integrated the concept into program planning. State Reporting on U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance Abroad Has Been Incomplete and Inaccurate
Since 1996, State has not complied with a congressional mandate to report to Congress on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance. Additionally, State’s annual reports on ATA have contained inaccurate data regarding basic program information, do not provide systematic assessments of program results, and lack other information necessary to evaluate program effectiveness. S/CT is responsible for preparing the reports on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance. 3. 4. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess State’s guidance for determining country recipients, aligning program assistance with partner nation needs, and coordinating Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) with other U.S. government counterterrorism programs, we Interviewed cognizant officials from the Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA) in Washington, D.C., including senior officials responsible for overseeing and managing ATA and ATA program managers responsible for each of the six in-country programs: Afghanistan, Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Reviewed and analyzed State planning, funding, and reporting documents concerning ATA, including relevant reports from State’s Office of Inspector General on the management and implementation of ATA; S/CT’s fiscal year 2007 tiered lists of priority countries for ATA assistance and S/CT criteria for establishing the tier list; DS/T/ATA budget information for fiscal years 2000 to 2008; a 1991 State policy memorandum delineating S/CT’s and DS/T/ATA’s roles and responsibilities for ATA; relevant sections of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual summarizing roles and responsibilities for ATA; DS/T/ATA internal policy and procedure documents, including DS/T/ATA’s Assessment, Review and Evaluations Unit’s most current (2004) standard operations procedures; State documents and U.S. embassy cables regarding the Regional Strategic Initiative; and DS/T/ATA’s Annual Reports to Congress on the ATA for fiscal years 1997 to 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of State's (State) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program's objectives are to provide partner nations with counterterrorism training and equipment, improve bilateral ties, and increase respect for human rights. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) provides policy guidance and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, (DS/T/ATA) manages program operations. GAO assessed (1) State's guidance for determining ATA priorities, (2) how State coordinates ATA with other counterterrorism programs, (3) the extent State established ATA program goals and measures, and (4) State's reporting on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed State documents and met with cognizant officials in Washington, D.C., and four ATA program partner nations.
What GAO Found
S/CT provides minimal guidance to help prioritize ATA program recipients, and S/CT and DS/T/ATA do not systematically align ATA assistance with U.S. assessments of foreign partner counterterrorism needs. S/CT provides policy guidance to DS/T/ATA through quarterly meetings and a tiered list of priority countries, but the list does not provide guidance on country counterterrorism related program goals, objectives, or training priorities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA also did not consistently use country-specific needs assessments and program reviews to plan assistance. S/CT has established mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other U.S. international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT holds interagency meetings with representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury and other agencies as well as ambassador-level regional strategic coordinating meetings. GAO did not find any significant duplication or overlap among the various U.S. international counterterrorism efforts. State has made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for the ATA program, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA do not systematically assess the outcomes and, as a result, cannot determine the effectiveness of program assistance. For example, although sustainability is a principal focus, S/CT and DS/T/ATA have not set clear measures of sustainability or integrated sustainability into program planning. State reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad has been incomplete and inaccurate. S/CT has not provided a congressionally mandated annual report to Congress on U.S. government-wide assistance related to combating international terrorism since 1996. After 1996, S/CT has only submitted to Congress annual reports on the ATA program. However, these reports contained inaccurate program information, such as the number of students trained and courses offered. Additionally, the reports lacked comprehensive information on the results of program assistance that would be useful to Congress. |
gao_GAO-08-1120 | gao_GAO-08-1120_0 | 1). 2). The flooding resulted in widespread damage for some communities in these states. Scope and Methodology
To identify insights from past disasters we interviewed officials involved in disaster recovery in the United States and Japan. See figure 3 for the locations of the six disasters that we selected for this review. Create a Clear, Implementable, and Timely Recovery Plan
After a major disaster, a recovery plan can provide state and local governments with a valuable tool to document and communicate recovery goals, decisions, and priorities. Clear recovery goals can also help state and local governments prioritize projects, allocate resources, and establish a basis for subsequent evaluations of the recovery progress. 4). The recovery plans created by the Hyogo and Kobe governments after the 1995 earthquake also helped to facilitate the funding of recovery projects. Build State and Local Capacity for Recovery
Given the lead role that state and local governments play in disaster recovery, their ability to act effectively directly affects how well communities recover after a major disaster. However, state and local governments may need certain capacities to effectively make use of this federal assistance, including having financial resources and technical know-how. More specifically, state and local governments are often required to match a portion of the federal disaster assistance they receive. Following Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and the Midwest floods earlier this year, building up these capacities may improve affected jurisdictions’ ability to navigate federal disaster programs. Enhance Local Financial Capacity
After a major disaster, state and local governments may not have adequate financial capacity to perform many short- and long-term recovery activities, such as continuing government operations and paying for rebuilding projects. Soon after the 1997 Red River flood, the state-owned Bank of North Dakota provided a line of credit totaling over $44 million to the city of Grand Forks. Implement Strategies for Business Recovery
Business recovery is a key element of a community’s recovery after a major disaster. Small businesses are especially vulnerable to these events because they often lack resources to sustain physical losses and have little ability to adjust to market changes. These strategies helped businesses adapt to postdisaster market conditions, helped reduce business relocation, and allowed businesses to borrow funds at lower interest rates than would have been otherwise available. With funding from the city of Los Angeles, the state of California, and the Small Business Administration, VEDC provided guidance on obtaining federal and local governmental financial assistance, as well as strategies for adjusting to changes in the business environment. In an effort to minimize relocations after the Red River flood, the city of Grand Forks created incentives to encourage businesses to remain in the community using funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Community Development Block Grant program and the Department of Commerce’s Economic Development Administration. In contrast, officials near Santa Cruz in the city of Watsonville did not create such temporary locations after the Loma Prieta earthquake, and as a result, businesses moved out of the downtown area to a newly completed shopping center on the outskirts of the city. Adopt a Comprehensive Approach to Combating Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
The influx of federal financial assistance available to victims after a major disaster provides increased opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. To help protect its residents from contractor fraud after the Red River flood, the city of Grand Forks established a required credentialing program for contractors. Similar to Grand Forks’ program, contractors who pass checks are issued photo identification cards. Concluding Observations
While receiving millions of dollars in federal assistance, state and local governments bear the main responsibility for helping communities cope with the destruction left in the wake of major disasters. Appendix I: Selected GAO Products Related to Disaster Recovery
Recovery from the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes
Gulf Coast Rebuilding: Observations on Federal Financial Implications. Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster Recovery Contracts. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO Work on Disaster Assistance. Earthquake Recovery: Staffing and Other Improvements Made Following Loma Prieta Earthquake. | Why GAO Did This Study
This month, Hurricanes Ike and Gustav struck the Gulf Coast producing widespread damage and leading to federal major disaster declarations. Earlier this year, heavy flooding resulted in similar declarations in seven Midwest states. In response, federal agencies have provided millions of dollars in assistance to help with short- and long-term recovery. State and local governments bear the primary responsibility for recovery and have a great stake in its success. Experiences from past disasters may help them better prepare for the challenges of managing and implementing the complexities of disaster recovery. GAO was asked to identify insights from past disasters and share them with state and local officials undertaking recovery activities. GAO reviewed six past disasters-- the Loma Prieta earthquake in northern California (1989), Hurricane Andrew in south Florida (1992), the Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles, California (1994), the Kobe earthquake in Japan (1995), the Grand Forks/Red River flood in North Dakota and Minnesota (1997), and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the Gulf Coast (2005). GAO interviewed officials involved in the recovery from these disasters and experts on disaster recovery. GAO also reviewed relevant legislation, policies, and its previous work.
What GAO Found
While the federal government provides significant financial assistance after major disasters, state and local governments play the lead role in disaster recovery. As affected jurisdictions recover from the recent hurricanes and floods, experiences from past disasters can provide insights into potential good practices. Drawing on experiences from six major disasters that occurred from 1989 to 2005, GAO identified the following selected insights: (1) Create a clear, implementable, and timely recovery plan. Effective recovery plans provide a road map for recovery. For example, within 6 months of the 1995 earthquake in Japan, the city of Kobe created a recovery plan that identified detailed goals which facilitated coordination among recovery stakeholders. The plan also helped Kobe prioritize and fund recovery projects, in addition to establishing a basis for subsequent governmental evaluations of the recovery's progress. (2) Build state and local capacity for recovery. State and local governments need certain capacities to effectively make use of federal assistance, including having sufficient financial resources and technical know-how. State and local governments are often required to match a portion of the federal disaster assistance they receive. Loans provided one way for localities to enhance their financial capacity. For example, after the Red River flood, the state-owned Bank of North Dakota extended the city of Grand Forks a $44 million loan, which the city used to match funding from federal disaster programs and begin recovery projects. (3) Implement strategies for businesses recovery. Business recovery is a key element of a community's recovery. Small businesses can be especially vulnerable to major disasters because they often lack resources to sustain financial losses. Federal, state, and local governments developed strategies to help businesses remain in the community, adapt to changed market conditions, and borrow funds at lower interest rates. For example, after the Loma Prieta earthquake, the city of Santa Cruz erected large pavilions near the main shopping street. These structures enabled more than 40 local businesses to operate as their storefronts were repaired. As a result, shoppers continued to frequent the downtown area thereby maintaining a customer base for impacted businesses. (4) Adopt a comprehensive approach toward combating fraud, waste, and abuse. The influx of financial assistance after a major disaster provides increased opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. Looking for ways to combat such activities before, during, and after a disaster can help states and localities protect residents from contractor fraud as well as safeguard the financial assistance they allocate to victims. For example, to reduce contractor fraud after the Red River flood, the city of Grand Forks established a credentialing program that issued photo identification to contractors who passed licensing and criminal checks. |
gao_GAO-16-205T | gao_GAO-16-205T_0 | Background
As you know, the cost of the Decennial Census has steadily increased during the past 40 years, in part because the nation’s population has steadily grown larger, more diverse, and increasingly difficult to enumerate. For example, at about $13 billion, the 2010 Census was the costliest U.S. census in history and was 56 percent more costly than the $8.1 billion 2000 Census (in constant 2010 dollars). Concurrent with redesigning the decennial census, the Bureau has also begun a significant effort to modernize and consolidate its survey data collection and processing functions. This is being undertaken through an enterprise-wide IT initiative called Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCAP). Bureau Faces Critical Challenges in Delivering IT Systems Needed to Support Redesign Areas
Last month’s issuance of the 2020 Census Operational Plan, which documents many key decisions about the redesign of the 2020 Census, represents progress; however, the Bureau faces critical challenges in delivering the IT systems needed to support the redesign areas. Additionally, while the Bureau has demonstrated improvements in IT management, as we have previously reported, it faces critical gaps in its IT workforce planning and information security. Timeframe to Implement the Large and Complex IT Systems Needed for 2020 Census Redesign Is Narrow
The Bureau has not prioritized key IT-related decisions, which is a trend we have reported for the past few years. Specifically, in April 2014, we reported the Bureau had not prioritized key IT research and testing needed for the design decisions planned for the end of 2015. In light of these ongoing challenges, we recommended in our April 2014 report that the Bureau prioritize its IT-related research and testing projects that need to be completed to support the design decisions and develop schedules and plans to reflect the new prioritized approach. The Bureau agreed with our recommendations and has taken steps to address them. For example, in September 2014, the Bureau released a plan that identified inputs, such as research questions, design components, and testing, that were needed to inform the operational design decisions expected in the fall of 2015. However, as we reported in February 2015, the Bureau had not yet determined how key IT research questions that had been identified as critical inputs into the design decisions—estimating the Internet self- response rate and determining the IT infrastructure for security and scalability needed to support Internet response—were to be answered. We therefore recommended that the Bureau, among other things, develop methodologies and plans for answering key IT-related research questions in time to inform key design decisions. For example, the Bureau does not plan to decide on the projected demand that the IT infrastructure and systems would need to accommodate or whether the Bureau will build or buy the needed systems until June 2016, at the earliest; the high-level design and description of the systems (referred to as the solutions architecture) until September 2016—leaving about a year to, among other things, build or acquire, integrate, and test the systems that are intended to serve as the backbone to the 2020 Census before preparations for end-to-end testing begins in August 2017; and the strategy for the use of mobile devices for field work until October 2017. We made several recommendations to address these issues, and the Bureau took actions to fully implement each of the recommendations. While the Bureau has made progress in IT workforce planning efforts, many critical IT competency gaps remain to be filled. We concluded that the Bureau had a number of weaknesses in controls intended to limit access to its systems and information, as well as those related to managing system configurations and unplanned events. However, more work remains to address the recommendations. However, with less than 2 years remaining until the Bureau plans to have all systems and processes for the 2020 Census developed and ready for end-to-end testing, it faces challenges that pose significant risk to 2020 Census program. These include the magnitude of the planned changes to the design of the census, the Bureau’s prior track record in executing large-scale IT projects, and the current lack of a permanent Chief Information Officer, among others. Consequently, it is running out of time to develop, acquire, and implement the production systems it will need to deliver the redesign and achieve its projected $5.2 billion in cost savings. | Why GAO Did This Study
The cost of the nation's decennial census has steadily increased over the past 40 years; the 2010 Census was the most expensive to date, at about $13 billion. To achieve cost savings while still conducting an accurate count of the population, the U.S. Census Bureau is planning significant changes for the design of the 2020 Decennial Census, including major efforts to implement new technologies and IT systems supporting its surveys. For example, the Bureau is planning to offer an option for households to respond via the Internet, which requires developing new applications and IT infrastructure.
This statement summarizes the critical challenges the Bureau faces in successfully delivering IT systems in time for testing redesigned 2020 Census operations. To develop this statement, GAO relied on previously published work, as well as information on steps the Bureau has taken to implement prior GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO has previously reported that the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) faces a number of critical challenges in developing and deploying the information technology (IT) systems and infrastructure it plans to rely on to conduct the significantly redesigned 2020 Census. Specifically, the Bureau has a major IT program under way to modernize and consolidate the multiple, duplicative systems it currently uses to carry out survey data collection and processing functions; however, with less than 2 years before preparations begin for end-to-end testing of all systems and operations to ensure readiness for the 2020 Census, there is limited time to implement it. While the Bureau documented many key decisions about the redesigned 2020 Census in the 2020 Census Operational Plan, released in October 2015, several key IT-related decisions have not been made. Specifically, the Bureau has not yet made decisions about the projected demand that the IT infrastructure would need to meet or whether it will build or buy the needed systems.
This lack of prioritization of IT decisions has been a continuing trend, which GAO has previously identified. For example:
In April 2014, GAO reported that the Bureau had not prioritized key IT research and testing needed for its design decisions. Accordingly, GAO recommended that the Bureau prioritize its IT-related research and testing projects. The Bureau had taken steps to address this recommendation, such as releasing a plan in September 2014 that identified research questions intended to inform the operational design decisions.
In February 2015, however, GAO reported that the Bureau had not determined how key IT research questions that were identified in the September 2014 plan would be answered—such as the expected rate of respondents using its Internet response option or the IT infrastructure that would be needed to support this option. GAO recommended that the Bureau, among other things, develop methodologies and plans for answering key IT-related research questions in time to inform design decisions. However, this has not yet happened.
In addition, while the Bureau has made improvements in some key IT management areas, it still faces challenges in the areas of workforce planning and information security. Specifically:
It has taken steps to develop an enterprise-wide IT workforce planning process, as GAO recommended in 2012. However, the Bureau has yet to fill key positions. Most concerning, it is currently without a permanent chief information officer.
The Bureau has taken steps to implement the majority of the 115 recommendations GAO made in 2013 to address information security weaknesses; however, completing this effort is necessary to ensure that sensitive information it will collect during the census is adequately protected.
With the deferral of key IT-related decisions, the Bureau is running out of time to develop, acquire, and implement the systems it will need to deliver the redesign and achieve its projected $5.2 billion in cost savings.
What GAO Recommends
In its prior work, GAO made recommendations to the Census Bureau to prioritize IT testing and research and determine how key decisions for the 2020 Census were to be answered. GAO also made recommendations to improve IT management, workforce planning, and information security. The Bureau has taken steps to address selected recommendations, but more actions are still needed to fully address these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-1067T | gao_GAO-02-1067T_0 | Time to Complete Highway Projects
According to FHWA, and based on its professional judgment, planning, gaining approval for, and constructing a federally funded major highway project that involves new construction and has a significant environmental impact typically takes from 9 to 19 years. However, these projects constitute about 3 percent of all federally funded projects, according to FHWA. Many Events May Affect Project Completion Time
Not surprisingly, officials in federal and state agencies and other knowledgeable organizations indicate that larger, more complex or controversial projects take longer to complete than is usual for most highway projects. This is because large, complex projects are subject to more requirements, involve more federal stakeholders, and attract more public interest. Federal and state transportation officials and transportation engineering organizations identified the timely resolution of environmental issues as providing the greatest opportunity for reducing the time it takes to complete highway projects. Initiatives to Improve the Timely Completion of Highway Projects
Federal and state agencies have undertaken several initiatives to improve completion times for highway construction projects. Generally, the impact of these initiatives is unclear because of the brevity of time they have been in place. | What GAO Found
The United States is the most mobile nation on the planet. Constructing, improving, and repairing roads and bridges is fundamental to meeting the nation's mobility needs to facilitate commerce, national defense, and pleasure use and to promote economic growth. Therefore, it is important that highway projects using federal financial support are completed in as timely a manner as possible. According to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and based on its professional judgment, it typically takes from 9 to 19 years to plan, gain approval for, and construct a new, major federally funded highway project that has significant environmental impacts. However, these projects constitute only 3 percent of all federally funded projects, according to FHWA. Officials in federal and state agencies and other knowledgeable organizations indicate that delivering larger, more complex or controversial projects may take longer to complete than is typical for most highway projects. In addition to needing more time because of their size and complexity, they often take longer to complete because they must comply with more federal and state requirements and because of the public interest that they may generate. Federal and state agencies have undertaken several initiatives to improve completion times for highway construction projects. Most of these initiatives address opportunities for reducing the time required to obtain environmental approvals. |
gao_GAO-07-255 | gao_GAO-07-255_0 | The board has also established standing committees to conduct certain oversight functions, such as monitoring the implementation of audit report recommendations, to help manage the agency. These delegations are extensive and have been reviewed periodically to ensure they are appropriate for FDIC’s current size and structure, and the current banking environment. The committee also oversees the agency’s financial reporting and internal controls, including reviewing and approving plans for compliance with the audit and financial reporting provisions applicable to government corporations, assessing the sufficiency of FDIC’s internal control structure, and ensuring compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and internal and external audit recommendations, all for the purpose of rendering advice to the chairman of the board of directors. However, there are some activities that the board cannot delegate. In response to the Inspector General’s recommendations, FDIC is currently reviewing specific delegations of authority. FDIC Has Taken a Number of Actions to Strengthen Its Human Capital Framework and Align Its Human Capital Strategies with Its Mission and Goals
Effective management of human capital, where the workload can shift dramatically depending on conditions in the economy and the banking industry, is critical at FDIC. FDIC Created the Corporate Employee Program to Provide a Capable and Flexible Workforce, but Its Effects on Mission Critical Functions Are Unknown
A key part of FDIC’s human capital strategy is the Corporate Employee Program, which cross trains employees in multiple FDIC divisions with the objective of training them to respond rapidly to shifting priorities and changes in workload. FDIC has also developed criteria for hiring and training new employees in certain divisions. Also, some regional and field office employees stated they had opportunities to ask questions about the program as it was being developed, provided input into the development of the Corporate Employee Program or were kept abreast of developments in the program by their managers. But some of FDIC’s evaluations were not done regularly or comprehensively. In addition to its supervision of individual institutions, FDIC also conducts broad monitoring and analysis of risks and trends in the banking industry as a whole. According to FDIC officials, the biggest dangers to the deposit insurance fund are large-scale bank failures. FDIC Reviews Some of Its Risk Assessment Activities, but Some Evaluations Were Incomplete and Responsibility for Overseeing Evaluations Is Unclear
FDIC officials told us that evaluation and monitoring of its risk assessment activities are critical parts of the agency’s mission and that such activities are ingrained in the organization. FDIC has conducted simulations designed to test its plans for addressing a key risk—increase in troubled and failed large institutions. FDIC has developed an extensive system for managing risk and has developed structures and processes to ensure that the various parts of the agency are working together to address key risks facing the agency. Clearly defining how the agency will monitor and evaluate its risk activities could assist FDIC in addressing or preventing weaknesses in its evaluations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report responds to a mandate included in the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Conforming Amendments Act of 2005 requiring the Comptroller General to report on the appropriateness of FDIC’s organizational structure. Specifically, this report focuses on three areas that influence the effectiveness of FDIC’s organizational structure and reflect key internal controls: (1) mechanisms used by the FDIC board of directors to oversee and manage the agency; (2) FDIC’s human capital strategies and how training and development programs are evaluated; and (3) FDIC’s process for monitoring and assessing risks to the industry and the deposit insurance fund and how that process is overseen and evaluated. To obtain more information on how FDIC’s board manages and oversees the agency, we conducted interviews with members of FDIC’s current board of directors and the board’s Audit Committee members. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Conforming Amendments Act of 2005 requires GAO to report on the effectiveness of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) organizational structure and internal controls. GAO reviewed (1) mechanisms the board of directors uses to oversee the agency, (2) FDIC's human capital strategies and how its training initiatives are evaluated, and (3) FDIC's process for monitoring and assessing risks to the banking industry and the deposit insurance fund, including its oversight and evaluation. To answer these objectives, GAO analyzed FDIC documents, reviewed recommended practices and GAO guidance, conducted interviews with FDIC officials and board members, and conducted site visits to FDIC regional and field offices in three states.
What GAO Found
FDIC's five-member board of directors is responsible for managing FDIC. Information and communication channels have been established to provide board members with information on the agency's operations and to help them oversee the agency. The board also has four standing committees for key oversight functions. For example, the audit committee primarily oversees the agency's implementation of FDIC Inspector General audit recommendations. Finally, because the board cannot oversee all day-to-day operations, the board delegates certain responsibilities to senior management. FDIC has procedures for issuing and revising its delegations of authority, which help ensure that the delegations are appropriate for its current structure and banking environment. FDIC has reviewed specific delegations on occasion at the request of a board member, management, and more recently in response to an Inspector General report's recommendation. Management of human capital is critical at FDIC because the agency's workload can shift dramatically depending on the financial condition of the banking industry. FDIC uses an integrated approach, where senior executives come together with division managers, to develop human capital initiatives, and the agency has undertaken activities to strengthen its human capital framework. FDIC created the Corporate Employee Program to develop new employees and provide training in multiple disciplines so they are better prepared to serve the needs of the agency, particularly when the banking environment changes. Some FDIC employees thought the program had merit, but they expressed concerns about whether certain aspects of the program could slow down the development of expertise in certain areas. FDIC, through its Corporate University, evaluates its training programs, and officials are developing a scorecard that includes certain output measures showing progress of key training initiatives towards its goals. Officials told us that they would like to have outcome measures showing the effectiveness of their key training initiatives but have faced challenges developing them. However, outcome measures could help address employee concerns and ensure that the Corporate Employee Program achieves the agency's goals. FDIC has an extensive system for assessing and monitoring external risks. FDIC's system includes supervision of individual financial institutions and analysis of trends affecting the health of financial institutions. FDIC has also developed contingency plans for handling the greatest dangers to the deposit insurance fund--particularly the failure(s) of large institutions. In addition to risk assessment, a key internal control is monitoring risk assessment activities on an ongoing basis. FDIC has evaluated several of its risk activities, but most of the evaluations we reviewed were not conducted regularly or comprehensively. For example, some simulations of its plans for handling large bank failures were either out of date or inconsistent with FDIC's guidance. Developing policies and procedures and clearly defining how it will monitor and evaluate its risk activities could assist FDIC in addressing or preventing weaknesses in its evaluations. |
gao_GAO-12-288T | gao_GAO-12-288T_0 | To implement the Medicaid Integrity Program, CMS created the Medicaid Integrity Group (MIG), which is now located within the agency’s Center for Program Integrity. The Medicaid Recovery Audit Contractor (RAC) program was established by PPACA. Figure 1 identifies the key federal and state entities responsible for Medicaid program integrity. CMS’s MIG Implemented Core Activities from 2006 through 2009 but Effective Coordination Is Needed Because of Overlap with Ongoing State Efforts
A key challenge CMS faces in implementing the statutorily required federal Medicaid Integrity Program is ensuring effective coordination to avoid duplicating state program integrity efforts. CMS established the MIG in 2006 and it gradually hired staff and contractors to implement a set of core activities, including the (1) review and audit of Medicaid provider claims; (2) education of state program integrity officials and Medicaid providers; and (3) oversight of state program integrity activities and provision of assistance. In 2011, the MIG reported that it was redesigning its national provider audit program to allow for greater coordination with states on data, policies, and audit measures. According to MIG data, overpayments identified by its review and audit contractors over the first 3 years of the national audit program were not commensurate with the contractors’ costs. One of the first activities initiated by the MIG in fiscal year 2007 was comprehensive program integrity reviews to assess the effectiveness of states’ activities, which involved eight, week-long onsite visits that year. From fiscal years 2009 through 2011, the MIG authorized 1,663 provider audits in 44 states. The MIG’s proposed redesign of the National Provider Audit Program appears to allow for greater coordination between its contractors and states on a variety of factors, including the data to be used. It remains to be seen, however, whether these changes will result in an increase in identified overpayments. Expanded Role Offers Opportunity to Enhance State Efforts, but More Consistent Data Are Needed
While the MIG’s audit program is challenged to avoid duplicating states’ own audit activities, its other core functions present an opportunity to enhance states’ efforts. The Medicaid Integrity Institute appears to address an important state training need. MIG’s Core Oversight Activities Are Broad, but the Data Collected During Reviews and Assessments Were Not Always Consistent with Each Other
The MIG’s core oversight activities—triennial comprehensive state program integrity reviews and annual assessments—are broad in scope and provide a basis for the development of appropriate technical assistance. Improved consistency will help the MIG ensure that it is targeting its training and technical assistance resources appropriately. We discussed the facts in this statement with CMS officials. Fraud Detection Systems: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Needs to Ensure More Widespread Use. Status of Fiscal Year 2010 Federal Improper Payments Reporting. Medicaid Program Integrity: State and Federal Efforts to Prevent and Detect Improper Payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that oversees Medicaid, estimated that improper payments in the federal-state Medicaid program were $21.9 billion in fiscal year 2011. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 established the Medicaid Integrity Program and gave CMS an expanded role in assisting and improving the effectiveness of state activities to ensure proper payments. Making effective use of this expanded role, however, requires that federal resources are targeted appropriately and do not duplicate state activities. GAO was asked to testify on Medicaid program integrity. GAO's statement focuses on how CMS's expanded role in ensuring Medicaid program integrity (1) poses a challenge because of overlapping state and federal activities regarding provider audits and (2) presents opportunities through oversight to enhance state program integrity efforts. To do this work, GAO reviewed CMS reports and documents on Medicaid program integrity as well as its own and others' reports on this topic. In particular, GAO reviewed CMS reports that documented the results of its state oversight and monitoring activities. GAO also interviewed CMS officials in the agency's Medicaid Integrity Group (MIG), which was established to implement the Medicaid Integrity Program. This work was conducted in November and December 2011. GAO discussed the facts in this statement with CMS officials.
What GAO Found
The key challenge faced by the Medicaid Integrity Group (MIG) is the need to avoid duplication of federal and state program integrity efforts, particularly in the area of auditing provider claims. In 2011, the MIG reported that it was redesigning its national provider audit program. Previously, its audit contractors were using incomplete claims data to identify overpayments. According to MIG data, overpayments identified by its audit contractors since fiscal year 2009 were not commensurate with its contractors' costs. The MIG's redesign will result in greater coordination with states on a variety of factors, including the data to be used. It remains to be seen, however, whether these changes will result in an increase in identified overpayments. The table below highlights the MIG's core oversight activities, which were implemented from fiscal years 2007 through 2009. The MIG's core oversight activities present an opportunity to enhance state efforts through the provision of technical assistance and the identification of training opportunities. The MIG's assessment of state program integrity efforts during triennial onsite reviews and annual assessments will need to address data inconsistencies identified during these two activities. Improved consistency will help ensure that the MIG is appropriately targeting its resources. The Medicaid Integrity Institute appears to address a state training need and create networking opportunities for program integrity staff. |
gao_GAO-07-596T | gao_GAO-07-596T_0 | For example, the U.S. Central Command is charged with identifying the ISR capabilities required to support his theater of operations. These steps are important in DOD’s efforts to formulate a strategy for meeting future ISR requirements in a more integrated manner by considering how existing and future assets will fit together to provide needed information to support combatant commanders and national decision makers. Specifically, the Roadmap does not (1) identify overall ISR requirements and how DOD plans to achieve them, (2) identify funding priorities, and (3) establish mechanisms to enforce an investment strategy or measure progress. In September 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense decided to bring ISR systems across DOD together into a capability portfolio as part of a test case for the joint capability portfolio management concept. The intent of the ISR portfolio management test case is to enable DOD to develop and manage ISR capabilities across the entire department—rather than by military service or individual program—and by doing so, to improve the interoperability of future capabilities, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. Future GAO Work Will Continue to Focus on DOD’s Approach for Developing ISR Capabilities
While our preliminary work has focused on the new processes that DOD has established to address what it has acknowledged are weaknesses in its planning for integrated future capabilities, our future work will investigate DOD’s processes for integrating requirements and developing an investment strategy. Among the issues that we plan to address are the extent to which: DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap, or other DOD initiatives, establish a framework for developing an overarching joint ISR architecture and an investment strategy; DOD’s review processes enable it to identify gaps and redundancies in DOD has considered comprehensive analyses of new ISR capabilities, to include consideration of all available ISR assets and cost/performance evaluations. Currently, DOD’s approach to allocation and tasking do not provide full visibility for managing its current ISR assets. Furthermore, DOD does not have metrics and feedback for systematically measuring the effectiveness of ISR missions. Without better visibility and performance evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate the demand for ISR assets, to ensure it is optimizing the use of existing assets, and to acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs. That process is managed by USSTRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command-ISR (JFCC-ISR), which is tasked with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate ISR resources for theater use across the combatant commands. However, while the Air Component Commander has visibility into how all theater-level ISR assets, like the Air Force’s Predator, are being used, it does not currently have visibility into how ISR assets, embedded in and controlled by tactical units, such as the Army’s Hunter, are being used on a daily basis. With greater visibility at all levels into the tasking of all ISR assets, including those tactical assets controlled by the military services, there is an opportunity for DOD to gain greater synergies and optimize the use of its ISR assets, reduce the potential for unnecessary duplicative taskings, and determine whether additional perceived demand for these assets is well-founded. ISR Development Programs Have Opportunities for Greater Synergies and Have Experienced Some Cost and Schedule Growth That Impact Legacy Systems
Without a comprehensive and integrated approach to managing current ISR assets and balancing demands for the ISR capabilities required for the future, some of DOD’s current ISR acquisitions are not benefiting from collaboration among the services that could save time and money. We also found cases where more collaboration is needed to provide greater efficiencies in developing more affordable new systems to close gaps in capabilities. Most of the 13 airborne ISR programs that we reviewed have experienced some cost and/or schedule growth. As a result of the schedule delays in some programs, the services will have to make investments in legacy systems to keep them in the inventory longer than planned. DOD’s acquisition policy endorses this knowledge-based approach to acquisition. | Why GAO Did This Study
As operations overseas continue, the Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide valuable information in support of military operations. While the 2006 Quadrennial Review emphasized the need for the ISR community to improve the integration and management of ISR assets, DOD plans to make significant investments in ISR capabilities for the future. Congress has been interested in DOD's approach for managing and integrating existing assets while acquiring new systems. This testimony addresses preliminary observations based on GAO's ongoing work regarding (1) the status of DOD initiatives intended to improve the management and integration of ISR requirements and challenges DOD faces in implementing its initiatives, (2) DOD's approach to managing current ISR assets to support military operations, and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in development and the potential for synergies between them. GAO's ongoing work included document review, interviews with officials at relevant organizations, observations of some U.S. Central Command operations, and review of 12 airborne ISR development programs.
What GAO Found
DOD's first steps to formulate a strategy for improving the integration of future ISR requirements include developing an ISR Integration Roadmap and designating ISR as a test case for its joint capability portfolio management concept. DOD developed an ISR Roadmap that assessed current and planned ISR capabilities. Our preliminary work, however, has shown that the Roadmap does not (1) identify future requirements, (2) identify funding priorities, or (3) measure progress. DOD's second initiative to improve the integration of the services' ISR programs is assigning management of ISR issues as a test case of its joint capability portfolio management concept. The intent of the test case is to explore whether managing groups of ISR capabilities across DOD will enable interoperability of future capabilities and reduce redundancies and gaps. Although in its early stages, GAO identified challenges, such as the extent to which the services will adopt suggestions from portfolio managers. DOD's approach to managing its current ISR assets limits its ability to optimize its use of these assets. U. S. Strategic Command is charged with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate to combatant commanders theater-level assets used to support operational requirements. While it has visibility into the major ISR programs supporting theater-level requirements, it does not currently have visibility into all ISR assets. Also, the commander responsible for ongoing joint air operations does not currently have visibility over how tactical assets are being tasked. Nor do tactical units have visibility into how theater-level and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked. Further, DOD lacks metrics and feedback to evaluate its ISR missions. Without better visibility and performance evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate the demand for ISR assets, to ensure it is maximizing the use of existing assets, and to acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. We have identified development programs where program managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and where less collaborative efforts could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. Additionally, most of the 12 airborne ISR development programs that we reviewed had either cost growth or schedule delays. These problems resulted from not following a knowledge-based approach to weapon system development as provided for in Defense policy. In some cases, delay in delivering new systems to the warfighter led to unplanned investments to keep legacy systems relevant. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.