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gao_RCED-95-36 | gao_RCED-95-36_0 | The costs associated with these class action suits are large, in part, because several of the suits involve multiple contractors and law firms. DOE Did Not Establish Cost Guidelines
Cost guidelines are necessary for contractors and law firms to know what costs will or will not be reimbursed; however, DOE had not developed and implemented such cost criteria. DOE was reimbursing its contractors at a much higher rate. These include costs for word processing services, overtime, utilities and supplies, and legal publications. DOE Recently Began to Control Litigation Costs
DOE has recognized that its controls over contractors’ litigation costs are problematic and has taken some actions to improve them. A staff has been assembled in headquarters to develop requirements and procedures for reviewing bills and to conduct detailed review of bills. They provided comments and information on the actions they are taking to reduce litigation costs and improve cost controls. Costs Incurred for Litigation Data Bases
Savings DOE Could Have Achieved by Requiring Discounted Professional Fees
Savings DOE Could Have Achieved If Rate for Document Duplication Had Been Standardized
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
On October 29, 1993, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, asked us to review the Department of Energy’s (DOE) expenses for outside litigation. After discussions with the Chairman’s office, we agreed to (1) determine how much DOE was spending for litigation to defend its contractors, (2) evaluate whether adequate controls are in place to ensure that all of these costs are appropriate, and (3) assess the efforts being made by DOE to improve its controls over these outside litigation costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to control its litigation costs, focusing on: (1) the amount DOE spends on litigation to defend its contractors; and (2) whether DOE controls are adequate to ensure that these legal costs are appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although DOE cannot accurately determine the total amount it reimburses contractors for their outside litigation costs, preliminary findings show that in 1992, DOE spent about $40 million on its contractor litigation costs; (2) most DOE contractor legal costs are incurred through the hiring of outside law firms; (3) DOE does not have effective cost controls for reimbursing outside legal services; (4) DOE has been billed at higher rates than other federal entities for professional legal fees, travel, word processing, document duplication, and other litigation expenses because it has not effectively overseen contractor payments or developed adequate criteria that define which costs are reimbursable; and (5) DOE efforts to improve its cost controls include issuing specific cost guidelines, instituting procedures for periodically reporting all litigation costs, establishing audit functions that enable it to conduct detailed reviews of legal bills, and consolidating cases involving multiple contractors and law firms to improve case management and reduce costs. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-222 | gao_T-HEHS-97-222_0 | In early 1996, SSA developed an ambitious 7-year plan to conduct 8.2 million CDRs during fiscal years 1996 to 2002, and, in March 1996, the Congress authorized a total of about $4.1 billion to fund SSA’s plan. SSA Met 1997 Target, Further Progress Expected
SSA data indicate that it will meet its CDR target for 1997, while also processing the newly required SSI childhood redeterminations. SSA also expects DDSs to be able to meet their 1998 hiring goals. Of this $563 million, SSA estimates it will spend $288 million to meet its goal of conducting 603,000 CDRs and will spend $235 million to process more than 235,000 SSI redeterminations—or a total of $523 million. Social Security Disability: SSA Is Making Progress Toward Eliminating Continuing Disability Review Backlogs Workload targets specified in current plan (CDRs in thousands)
Estimated average cost per CDR in FY 1998 Estimated total cost (dollars in millions)
Amount authorized (dollars in millions)
Authorized amount less estimated cost (dollars in millions)
Timely Completion of Selection Formulas Needed to Meet Future Goals
To make the CDR process more cost effective, SSA has been developing selection formulas to identify which beneficiaries should receive lower cost mailers and which should be designated for higher cost full medical reviews. SSA is still developing selection formulas for many of the other beneficiaries due for CDRs, however, and the extent of SSA’s success could affect its ability to complete its 7-year plan cost effectively and on schedule. The more quickly SSA can remove those who are no longer eligible from the rolls, the more it can save in program costs. 17, 1997). Supplemental Security Income: SSA Is Taking Steps to Review Recipients’ Disability Status (GAO/HEHS-97-17, Oct. 30, 1996). 3, 1981). Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) plan to eliminate the backlog of continuing disability reviews (CDRs) in the Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs, focusing on: (1) SSA's progress toward achieving its current 7-year plan cost-effectively and on schedule; (2) SSA's spending rate; and (3) the status of selection formulas needed to meet future goals.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SSA's experience in CDRs during fiscal year 1997 is encouraging; (2) for 1997, SSA expects to meet or exceed its goal to conduct 603,000 CDRs; (3) for 1998, SSA is planning to increase its goal because it was able to meet its 1997 goal, while also processing at least 235,000 SSI childhood eligibility redeterminations; (4) reviewing more cases sooner than planned, to the extent possible, is clearly desirable because of the high costs--in taxpayer dollars and program integrity--of continuing benefits to those who are no longer eligible; (5) in addition, SSA's spending to date and estimates of future processing costs suggest that it will be able to complete its current 7-year plan with the funds the Congress has authorized, although its revised plan will not be available until November 1997; and (6) key issues, however, such as deciding which beneficiaries should undergo a full medical review--a lengthy and costly process--are still unresolved but will determine how quickly and at what cost SSA can become current on its CDR workload. |
gao_GAO-04-890 | gao_GAO-04-890_0 | After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted legislation that resulted in changes in the federal organization and funding for transportation security R&D. TSA, DHS, and Others Are Funding Transportation Security R&D Projects and Experts Had Mixed Views about Some Projects
As the primary federal agencies responsible for enhancing the security of all modes of transportation, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent about $21 million and DHS spent about $26 million on transportation security R&D projects; for fiscal year 2004, TSA and DHS have budgeted about $159 million and $88 million, respectively. TSA and DHS were not able to estimate deployment dates for the vast majority of projects that they funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. In fiscal year 2003, DHS spent $12.6 million, or almost half, of its $26 million transportation security R&D budget for projects related to multiple modes of transportation. TSA and DHS Have Made Some Progress in Managing Their R&D Programs but Have Not Yet Fully Completed Their Efforts
TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best practices, but their efforts are incomplete in the following areas: preparing strategic plans that contain goals and measurable objectives, preparing and using risk assessments to select and prioritize their R&D maintaining a comprehensive database of R&D projects, coordinating their R&D programs with those of other government reaching out to transportation stakeholders to help identify R&D needs, accelerating R&D. According to TSA officials, TSA has completed threat assessments for all modes of transportation but has yet to complete vulnerability and criticality assessments. Although DHS is working toward complying with legal requirements and implementing best practices for managing its R&D program, it is operating without a strategic plan for its R&D program. In addition, DHS has not yet completed risk assessments of the infrastructure sectors, such as transportation. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security Administration ensure that their transportation security R&D portfolios contain projects in all phases of R&D, including basic research; complete (1) strategic plans containing measurable objectives for TSA’s and DHS’s transportation security R&D programs and (2) risk assessments—threat, vulnerability, and criticality—for all modes of transportation, and use the results of the risk assessments to help select and prioritize R&D projects; develop a database that will provide accurate, complete, current, and readily accessible project information for monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios; develop a process with DOT to coordinate transportation security R&D, such as a memorandum of agreement identifying roles and responsibilities and designating agency liaisons, and share information on the agreed-upon roles and responsibilities with transportation stakeholders; and develop a vehicle to communicate with the transportation industry to ensure that its R&D security needs have been identified and considered. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to review (1) the transportation security research and development (R&D) projects that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies funded in fiscal year 2003 and have budgeted for in fiscal year 2004; the status of these projects; and the reasonableness of the distribution of these projects by mode and (2) the extent to which TSA and DHS are managing their transportation security R&D programs according to applicable laws and best practices recommended by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council. | Why GAO Did This Study
Conducting research and development (R&D) on technologies for detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation's transportation system. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted legislation to strengthen homeland security, in part by enhancing R&D. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are the two federal agencies with primary responsibility for transportation security. GAO was asked to assess the transportation security R&D projects that TSA, DHS, and other agencies have funded and assess how TSA and DHS are managing their transportation security R&D programs according to applicable laws and best practices.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, TSA and DHS funded over 200 R&D projects designed to develop technologies for enhancing security in most modes of transportation. In fiscal year 2003, TSA spent 81 percent of its $21 million transportation security R&D budget for aviation projects, and DHS spent about half of its $26 million for projects related to more than one mode of transportation. In fiscal year 2004, TSA continued to budget most of its $159 million for aviation, and DHS also budgeted most of its $88 million for aviation. According to the National Research Council, federal R&D programs should include some basic research, but TSA and DHS do not appear to be funding any basic research for transportation security. TSA and DHS have not estimated deployment dates for the vast majority of their R&D projects. Other federal agencies, such as the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, also funded some transportation security R&D projects. Several members of an expert panel on transportation security and technology that GAO convened believed the distribution of R&D projects by transportation mode was reasonable, while others believed that aviation has been overemphasized at the expense of maritime and land modes. TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing their transportation security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best practices, but neither agency has fully complied with the laws or implemented the best practices. For example, neither agency has prepared a strategic plan for R&D that contains measurable objectives. In addition, although TSA has completed threat assessments for all modes, it has not completed vulnerability and criticality assessments. DHS also has not completed risk assessments of the infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, both TSA and DHS lack complete, consolidated data for managing their R&D projects. Finally, although TSA and DHS have made some efforts to coordinate R&D with other federal agencies, their outreach to consider the concerns of the transportation industry has been limited. |
gao_T-RCED-99-147 | gao_T-RCED-99-147_0 | Such concerns involve the accuracy and completeness of EPA’s environmental data, the fragmentation of the data across many incompatible databases, and the need for improved measures of program outcomes and environmental quality. To this end, the information office would (1) ensure that the quality of data collected and used by EPA is known and appropriate for its intended uses, (2) reduce the burden of the states and regulated industries to collect and report data, (3) fill significant data gaps, and (4) provide the public with integrated information and statistics on issues related to the environment and public health. Although agency officials acknowledge the importance of developing such a plan, they have not established any milestones for doing so. While EPA has made progress in determining the organizational structure of the office, final decisions have not been made and EPA has not yet identified the employees and the resources that will be needed. Information Plan Is Needed
Although EPA has articulated both a vision as well as key goals for its new information office, it has not yet developed an information plan to show how the agency intends to achieve its vision and goals. Needed Resources Are Still Unknown
Even though EPA has not yet determined which staff will be moved to the central information office, the transition team’s director told us that it is expected that the office will have about 350 employees. She added that staffing decisions will be completed by July 1999 and the office will begin functioning sometime in August 1999. On the basis of our prior and ongoing work, we believe that the agency must address these challenges for the reorganization to significantly improve EPA’s information management activities. Among the most important of these challenges are (1) obtaining sufficient resources and expertise to address the complex information management issues facing the agency; (2) overcoming problems associated with EPA’s decentralized organizational structure, such as the lack of agencywide information dissemination policies; (3) balancing the demand for more data with calls from the states and regulated industries to reduce reporting burdens; and (4) working effectively with EPA’s counterparts in state government. They likewise recognize that the reorganization will raise a variety of complex information policy and technology issues. EPA anticipates that the new office will substantially improve the agency’s information management activities, rather than merely centralize existing efforts to address information management issues. Senior EPA officials responsible for creating the new office anticipate that the information office will need “purse strings control” over the agency’s resources for information management expenditures in order to implement its policies, data standards, procedures, and other decisions agencywide. Overcoming Problems Associated With EPA’s Decentralized Organizational Structure
EPA will need to provide the new office with sufficient authority to overcome organizational obstacles to adopt agencywide information policies and procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) information management initiatives, focusing on the: (1) status of EPA's efforts to create a central office responsible for information management, policy, and technology issues; and (2) major challenges that the new office needs to address to achieve success in collecting, using, and disseminating environmental information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) EPA estimates that its central information office will be operational by the end of August 1999 and will have a staff of about 350 employees; (2) the office will address a broad range of information policy and technology issues, such as improving the accuracy of EPA's data, protecting the security of information that EPA disseminates over the Internet, developing better measures to assess environmental conditions, and reducing information collection and reporting burdens; (3) EPA recognizes the importance of developing an information plan showing the goals of the new office and the means by which they will be achieved but has not yet established milestones or target dates for completing such a plan; (4) although EPA has made progress in determining the organizational structure for the new office, it has not yet finalized decisions on the office's authorities, responsibilities, and budgetary needs; (5) EPA has not performed an analysis to determine the types and the skills of employees that will be needed to carry out the office's functions; (6) EPA officials told GAO that decisions on the office's authorities, responsibilities, budget, and staff will be made before the office is established in August 1999; (7) on the basis of GAO's prior and ongoing reviews of EPA's information management problems, GAO believes that the success of the new office depends on EPA addressing several key challenges as it develops an information plan, budget, and organizational structure for that office; and (8) most importantly, EPA needs to: (a) provide the office with the resources and the expertise necessary to solve the complex information management, policy, and technology problems facing EPA; (b) empower the office to overcome organizational challenges to adopting agencywide information policies and procedures; (c) balance EPA's need for data on health, the environment, and program outcomes with the call from the states and regulated industries to reduce their reporting burdens; and (d) work closely with its state partners to design and implement improved information management systems. |
gao_NSIAD-99-38 | gao_NSIAD-99-38_0 | I.2, for top country markets). MAP Brand-name Promotions Target Small Businesses
Since fiscal year 1994, FAS has significantly increased the number of small businesses participating in MAP’s brand-name program as well as their share of MAP funds. In fiscal year 1996, as required by statute, FAS discontinued providing direct assistance to large businesses other than cooperatives and certain associations, which by law are eligible to receive this assistance for brand-name promotions regardless of size. FAS requires businesses that are applying for brand-name assistance to certify that they are a small-sized entity based on their own assessment using the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) criteria.Since fiscal year 1994, FAS has increased the number of small businesses participating in MAP’s brand-name program and raised the total amount allocated to small businesses while decreasing the total amount allocated to large companies. 1). Our projection, based on FAS data, suggests that the graduation requirement could affect half of the cooperatives and about a quarter of the small businesses that used MAP funds in fiscal year 1997 to promote their brand-name products. However, FAS used its statutory authority in December 1998 and waived the graduation requirement for all cooperatives. The effect of this decision reduced the impact of the graduation requirement on program participation to $4.3 million, affecting only brand-name promotions conducted by small businesses. FAS’ Compliance Review Staff (CRS) regularly audits the participants that receive direct MAP funding and verifies that these participants and the recipients they fund have completed their certification statements. The Director reported that it is difficult to verify whether MAP funds supplement a participant’s own funds for foreign market development activities because it is hard to determine what a participant would have spent in the absence of MAP funds. As we previously reported, this approach is inconsistent with OMB cost-benefit guidelines, which instruct agencies to assume that resources would be fully employed, and leads to an overstatement of benefits of the program. Thus, it is difficult to generalize about the impact of MAP based on the results of these market-level studies. To determine the impact of the legislative requirement that MAP participants certify that MAP funds supplement, not supplant, their expenditures for promotions in foreign markets on MAP participation, we interviewed FAS officials responsible for the management and oversight of MAP, including representatives from FAS’ Commodity and Marketing Programs Division and Compliance Review Staff. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Agriculture's implementation of legislative reforms to the Market Access Program (MAP) and their impact on program participation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as directed by Congress, the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) implemented operational changes to MAP; these changes have affected program participation and distribution of funds; (2) since fiscal year (FY) 1994, FAS has increased the number of small businesses participating in MAP to promote brand-name products as well as small businesses' share of program funds; (3) as required by statute, FAS prohibited direct assistance for brand-name promotions to large companies beginning in FY 1996; (4) this prohibition does not apply to cooperatives and certain associations; (5) also, beginning in FY 1998, FAS prohibited indirect assistance to large companies; (6) FAS implemented a graduation requirement that will affect about a quarter of the small businesses with brand-name promotions totalling $4.3 million in FY 1999, as well as the number of MAP brand-name promotions conducted in individual country markets; (7) this graduation requirement also could have affected about half of the cooperatives; however, in December 1998, FAS chose to use its statutory authority and waive the graduation requirement for all cooperatives, citing special considerations; (8) since FY 1995, FAS has required all participants to self-certify that MAP funds supplement, not supplant, their activities to develop new foreign markets for their products; (9) while FAS regularly verifies that the participants and the companies they fund have completed their certification statements, FAS' Director of Compliance Review Staff reports that it is difficult to ensure that these funds are additional because it is hard to determine what would have been spent in the absence of MAP funds; (10) also, this requirement has had no apparent impact on program participation; (11) questions remain about the overall economic benefits derived from MAP funding; (12) FAS estimates of MAP's macroeconomic impact are overstated because they rely on a methodology that assumes that the resources used were not employed prior to the funding; (13) GAO noted that this is inconsistent with Office of Management and Budget cost/benefit guidelines; and (14) in addition, the evidence from market-level studies is inconclusive regarding MAP's impact on specific commodities in specific markets. |
gao_GGD-99-174 | gao_GGD-99-174_0 | Only a few of the 98 IMF borrowers trade enough to have much ability to significantly affect any individual sectors of the U.S. economy. The eight largest U.S. trade partners generally maintain moderate barriers to trade. According to the tariff and other information we analyzed, most have average tariffs between 10 percent and 20 percent and are rated by various indicators as having significant nontariff barriers. The four countries have experienced either rising trade surpluses or falling trade deficits with the United States since their financial crises began, due primarily to a large decline in U.S. exports to them. Appendix I contains more information on these and other U.S. priority import policies in Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. Trade Liberalization in Brazil’s, Indonesia’s, Korea’s, and Thailand’s Recent IMF Financing Arrangements
Countries in an IMF financing arrangement sometimes have liberalized their trade systems within the context of their arrangements, although in many cases the liberalization has not been a condition of receiving disbursements of IMF funds. These commitments, if fully implemented, could lead to increased U.S. investment in and trade with these countries. Other IMF Conditions Could Significantly Affect the Four Countries’ Trade
In addition to trade liberalization measures, as part of their IMF financing arrangements, Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand have committed to further open their economies to foreign investment and to substantially restructure their financial and corporate sectors. Potential Impact of IMF Borrowers’ Export Policies on the United States Is Difficult to Measure
The policies maintained by Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand to encourage exports could potentially distort trade and displace production by U.S. producers, even though they may benefit other U.S. companies or consumers. However, the large macroeconomic changes in these countries caused by their recent financial crises greatly complicate predicting and measuring the policies’ impact on the United States because the macroeconomic changes are likely a major reason for recent changes in trade flows. Products accounting for about16 percent of the value of U.S. imports from these four IMF borrowers registered large increases in imports and falling prices over the past year. Also, U.S. imports from Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand rose at a slower pace than overall U.S. imports in 1998, and, for Brazil and Indonesia, rose by less in 1998 than they had in previous years. Thailand
Thailand’s average tariff rate in 1998 was about 18 percent. Comments From the Department of the Treasury
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) identifies the extent to which current International Monetary Fund (IMF) borrower countries restrict international trade and the countries whose trade has the greatest potential to affect the United States; (2) describes in detail the reported trade barriers and export policies of four IMF borrowers that are among those with the greatest capacity to affect the United States—Brazil, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand—and recent actions reported to have been taken to reduce those barriers or modify policies; (3) identifies actions, in the context of their current IMF programs, the four countries have taken or are committed to take to liberalize their trading systems; and (4) determines the extent to which the impact of the four countries’ export policies on the United States can be predicted and measured and which U.S. industry sectors might be affected by changes in trade from these countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), focusing on the: (1) extent to which IMF borrower countries restrict international trade and the borrowers whose trade has the potential to affect the United States; (2) reported trade barriers and export policies of four IMF borrowers that are among those with the greatest capacity to affect the United States--Brazil, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand--and recent actions reported to have been taken to reduce those barriers or modify policies; (3) actions, in the context of their recent IMF financing arrangements, the four countries have taken or are committed to take to liberalize their trading systems; and (4) extent to which the impact of the four countries' export policies on the United States can be predicted and measured and which U.S. industry sectors might be affected by recent changes in trade from these countries.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although the 98 IMF borrowers all restrict trade to some extent, only a few are large enough traders to affect individual sectors of the U.S. economy; (2) according to IMF and other measures of trade restrictiveness, borrowers have generally reduced their tariff and nontariff barriers since 1990; (3) however, according to the IMF measure, about half still maintain moderate to restrictive barriers; (4) GAO studied four countries--Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand; (5) in 1998, Thailand had an average tariff rate of about 18 percent, Korea had an average tariff rate of about 8 percent, and Brazil's and Indonesia's rates fell in between; (6) Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand have experienced either rising trade surpluses or falling trade deficits with the United States and other countries since their recent financial crises began; (7) countries in an IMF financing arrangement sometimes have liberalized their trade systems within the context of their arrangements; (8) in addition to trade liberalization measures, as part of their IMF programs, Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand have committed to further open their economies to foreign investment and to substantially restructure their financial and corporate sectors; (9) these commitments, if fully implemented, could lead to increased U.S. investment in and trade with these countries; (10) the policies maintained by Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand to encourage exports could potentially distort trade and displace production by U.S. producers, even though they may benefit other U.S. companies or consumers; (11) however, the large macroeconomic changes in these countries caused by their recent financial crises greatly complicate predicting and measuring the policies' impact on the United States because the macroeconomic changes have probably been a more important source of recent changes in trade flows; (12) GAO's analysis of 1997-1998 trade data reveals that overall U.S. imports from Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand rose moderately in 1998, but by less than U.S. imports from other trading partners; (13) however, products accounting for about 16 percent of the value of U.S. imports from these four IMF borrowers registered large increases and falling U.S. prices during this period; and (14) some of these product sectors, notably steel, have already been subject to petitions by U.S. industry for relief from unfairly traded imports under U.S. trade law, while the executive branch is monitoring imports of others of these products, including semiconductors, chemicals, and paper and paper products. |
gao_NSIAD-95-159 | gao_NSIAD-95-159_0 | The Army plans to equip some of its Comanche helicopters with the Longbow Hellfire missile and a modified version of the Longbow radar. Missile problems include less-than-satisfactory performance against targets defended with multiple countermeasures such as smoke and active jammers. Questions have also been raised about the ability to produce the Longbow Hellfire missile’s transceiver in mass quantities. Longbow Hellfire Procurement Plan Is Inadequate
Our review indicated that the Longbow Hellfire missile procurement plan is inadequate because (1) it will procure about 3,200 missiles that are not required at an estimated cost of between $540 million and $750 million and (2) a significant number of the missiles will be produced before Longbow Apache aircraft are available and will lose up to one-half of their shelf life. According to him, the overstatement occurred because the Army used the wrong model for calculating the procurement objective. Regarding our concerns on the lack of full consideration of alternatives in the cost-effectiveness analysis of the Longbow Apache weapon system, DOD stated that the formal COEA to be done to support the October 1995 DAB review would not include the Comanche as an alternative because it could not meet the Army’s near- to mid-term heavy attack helicopter requirement. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether critical issues related to the production of the aircraft and the producibility of its missiles had been addressed, we reviewed various program research, development, and acquisition documentation related to the Longbow Apache weapon system. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of the Army's Longbow Apache weapon system, focusing on whether: (1) the Army has conducted a thorough cost-effectiveness study of the weapon system; (2) critical issues related to the production of the aircraft and the producibility of the missiles have been addressed; and (3) the Army has adequately developed its Longbow Hellfire missile procurement plan.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Army has made major program decisions concerning the Longbow Apache weapon system without fully evaluating the costs and benefits of alternative systems; (2) the Army's cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) will be of limited value because of its timing and the Army's decision not to include the Comanche helicopter as a possible attack helicopter alternative; (3) concerns have been raised about the performance of the Longbow Hellfire missile against targets with multiple countermeasures, radar capability against stationery targets, and the producibility of the missile's transceiver; and (4) the Longbow Hellfire missile procurement plan is flawed because the procurement objective is overstated by about 3,200 missiles, and the missiles stand to lose significant portions of their shelf life before the aircraft are available. |
gao_GAO-01-450 | gao_GAO-01-450_0 | In addition, the Comanche continues to experience scheduling delays and performance risks. Cost Estimate Increases
The Comanche program’s latest cost estimate, in April 2000, shows estimated costs have increased by almost $4.8 billion—from $43.3 billion to $48.1 billion—since our last report. The program office plans to use the additional development funding to at least partially address what had been unfunded requirements in three areas considered to be high risk: (1) developing and integrating the mission equipment package; (2) developing the technology to detect and isolate equipment problems (automatic fault isolation); and (3) developing and integrating satellite communication capabilities. Further, the Army’s schedule for developing and testing software for the Comanche may not be completed prior to the full-rate production decision. The Comanche continues to have several areas of high technical risk that jeopardize the achievement of several critical performance requirements. First, the Army does not yet know and it will not know until well after its low-rate initial production decision whether certain technologies being developed will fit on the helicopter and function as expected. However, at that time, the program office and the contractor will have limited experience and data relative to producing the fully developed Comanche helicopter. Until more experience and data is available, there is not a high level of confidence in the Army’s production cost estimate. Nevertheless, DOD stated that it is currently examining whether any of Comanche's requirements should be deferred, in order to reduce the risk of not meeting cost and schedule objectives. Scope and Methodology
To evaluate changes in the Comanche’s status with regard to cost, schedule, and performance and assess whether the Army has the certainty it needs to proceed with beginning production, we examined and compared program schedules, pertinent cost documents, and acquisition strategies, and discussed potential changes and causative factors with cognizant Comanche program officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of August 1, 1999, the Army's Comanche helicopter program faced significant risks related to cost overruns, scheduling delays, and degraded performance. GAO concluded that proceeding to the next development phase with high levels of uncertainty was not in accordance with best practices followed by successful commercial firms. This report evaluates changes since 1999 in the Comanche's cost, schedule, and performance, and assesses whether the Army will have the knowledge it needs to proceed with its current production plans.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Comanche program's total development and production cost estimate has increased by almost $4.8 billion. However, areas of high technical risks and unfunded requirements could further increase the program's costs. The program office does not plan to update its April 2000 current estimate to reflect these increases until January 2003. The Comanche's December 2006 full rate production decision date has not changed even though the risks of not meeting this date have increased. The Army continues to face the risk that critical performance requirements may not be met--at least for the helicopters it will initially produce. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently provided $84 million in additional development funding to help reduce some of these high-risk areas. Additionally, the Army is not likely to have the knowledge it needs to begin production when scheduled. It is also not likely to know whether some technologies being developed, such as those used for the mission equipment package, will work on the helicopter and function as expected. DOD is also unlikely to know whether the helicopter can be produced within current cost estimates. |
gao_GAO-13-412T | gao_GAO-13-412T_0 | ISCD has direct responsibility for implementing DHS’s CFATS rule, including assessing potential risks and identifying high-risk chemical facilities, promoting effective security planning, and ensuring that final high-risk facilities meet applicable standards through site security plans approved by DHS. ISCD Has Assigned Thousands of Facilities to Tiers, but ISCD’s Approach to Risk Assessment Does Not Reflect All Risk Elements
ISCD Has Tiered Thousands of High-Risk Chemical Facilities and Resolved Some Problems Using Its Risk Assessment Approach to Assign Tiers
In July 2007, ISCD began reviewing information submitted by the owners and operators of approximately 40,000 facilities. ISCD’s Risk Assessment Approach Does Not Consider All Elements of Risk
Our preliminary analyses indicates that the tiering approach ISCD uses to assess risk and assign facilities to final tiers does not consider all of the elements of risk associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. Consequence. ISCD’s risk assessment approach is also not consistent with the NIPP because it does not consider threat for the majority of regulated facilities. Vulnerability. Similar to the NIPP, the CFATS rule calls for ISCD to review facilities’ security vulnerability assessments as part of its risk-based tiering process. ISCD Has Begun to Take Actions to Examine How Its Approach Could Be Enhanced
Our preliminary work indicates that ISCD has begun to take some actions to examine how its risk assessment approach can be enhanced. For example, in addition to engaging Sandia National Laboratories to develop the framework for assessing economic consequences previously discussed, ISCD has commissioned a panel of subject matter experts to examine the strengths and weaknesses of its current risk assessment approach. Given the critical nature of ISCD’s risk assessment approach in laying the foundation for further regulatory steps in improving facility security—such as the development and approval of facility site security plans—it is important that its approach for assigning facilities to tiers is complete within the NIPP risk management framework and the CFATS rule. We will continue to monitor and assess ISCD’s efforts to examine its risk assessment approach through our ongoing work and consider any recommendations needed to address these issues. ISCD Revised Its Security Plan Review Process, but Plan Approvals Could Take Years
ISCD Revised Its Security Plan Review Process because of ISCD Managers’ Concerns, and Plans to Measure Related Improvements Moving Forward
Our preliminary work shows that ISCD has made various revisions to its security plan review process to address concerns expressed by ISCD managers about slow review times. The memorandum stated that revising the process was a top program priority because the initial security plan reviews were conducted using the risk- based standards as prescriptive criteria rather than as standards for developing an overall facility security strategy. Moving forward, ISCD officials said they intend to measure the time it takes to complete parts of the revised process and have recently implemented a plan to measure various aspects of the process. Collecting data to measure performance about various aspects of the security plan review process is a step in the right direction, but it may take time before the process has matured to the point where ISCD is able to establish baselines and assess its progress. Using ISCD’s estimated approval rate of 30 to 40 plans a month, our preliminary analysis indicates that it could take anywhere from 7 to 9 years to complete reviews and approvals for the approximately 3,120 plans submitted by facilities that have been final-tiered that ISCD has not yet begun to review. According to ISCD officials, they are actively exploring ways to expedite the speed with which the backlog of security plans could be cleared, such as potentially leveraging alternative security programs, reprioritizing resources, and streamlining the inspection and review requirements. ISCD Has Increased Its Efforts to Communicate and Work with Facilities, but Does Not Solicit Systematic Feedback on Effectiveness of Its Outreach
ISCD’s External Communication Efforts with Facilities Have Increased since 2007, but Selected Trade Associations Had Mixed Views about ISCD Efforts
Our preliminary work shows that ISCD’s efforts to communicate and work with owners and operators to help them enhance security at their facilities have increased since the CFATS program’s inception in 2007, particularly in recent years. Trade association officials reported that in general ISCD seeks informal feedback on its outreach efforts and that members provide feedback to ISCD. Specifically, our prior work on customer service efforts in the government indicates that systematic feedback from those receiving services can provide helpful information as to the kind and quality of services they want and their level of satisfaction with existing services. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Facilities that produce, store, or use hazardous chemicals could be of interest to terrorists intent on using toxic chemicals to inflict mass casualties in the United States. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations that establish standards for the security of high-risk chemical facilities. DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to assess the risk posed by these facilities and inspect them to ensure compliance with DHS standards. ISCD, which manages the program, places high-risk facilities in risk-based tiers and is to conduct inspections after it approves facility security plans. A November 2011 ISCD internal memorandum raised concerns about ISCD's ability to fulfill its mission.
This statement is based on GAO's ongoing work conducted for several congressional committees and subcommittees and provides preliminary observations regarding the extent to which DHS has (1) assigned chemical facilities to tiers and assessed its approach for doing so, (2) revised its process to review facility security plans, and (3) communicated and worked with owners and operators to improve security. To conduct this ongoing work, GAO reviewed DHS reports and plans on risk assessments, security plan reviews, and facility outreach and interviewed DHS officials. GAO received input from 11 trade associations representing chemical facilities about ISCD outreach. The results of this input are not generalizable but provide insights about DHS outreach efforts.
What GAO Found
Since 2007, the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) has assigned about 3,500 high-risk chemical facilities to risk-based tiers under its Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, but it has not fully assessed its approach for doing so. The approach ISCD used to assess risk and make decisions to place facilities in final tiers does not consider all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. For example, the risk assessment approach is based primarily on consequences arising from human casualties, but does not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation, nor does it include vulnerability, consistent with the NIPP. ISCD has begun to take some actions to examine how its risk assessment approach can be enhanced. Specifically, ISCD has, among other things, engaged Sandia National Laboratories to examine how economic consequences can be incorporated into ISCD's risk assessment approach and commissioned a panel of experts to assess the current approach, identify strengths and weaknesses, and recommend improvements. Given the critical nature of ISCD's risk assessment approach in laying the foundation for further regulatory steps in improving facility security, it is important that its approach for assigning facilities to tiers is complete within the NIPP risk management framework and the CFATS regulation.
DHS's ISCD has revised its process for reviewing facilities' site security plans-- which are to be approved by ISCD before it performs compliance inspections-- but it did not track data on the prior process so is unable to measure any improvements. The past process was considered by ISCD to be difficult to implement and caused bottlenecks in approving plans. ISCD views its revised process to be a significant improvement because, among other things, teams of experts review parts of the plans simultaneously rather than sequentially, as occurred in the past. Moving forward, ISCD intends to measure the time it takes to complete reviews, but will not be able to do so until the process matures. Using ISCD's expected plan approval rate of 30 to 40 plans a month, GAO estimated that it could take another 7 to 9 years before ISCD is able to complete reviews on the approximately 3,120 plans in its queue. ISCD officials said that they are exploring ways to expedite the process, such as reprioritizing resources.
DHS's ISCD has also taken various actions to work with facility owners and operators, including increasing the number of visits to facilities to discuss enhancing security plans, but trade associations that responded to GAO's query had mixed views on the effectiveness of ISCD's outreach. ISCD solicits informal feedback from facility owners and operators on its efforts to communicate and work with them, but it does not have an approach for obtaining systematic feedback on its outreach activities. Prior GAO work on customer service efforts in the government indicates that systematic feedback from those receiving services can provide helpful information as to the kind and quality of services they want and their level of satisfaction with existing services. GAO will continue to assess ISCD's efforts in these areas and consider any recommendations needed to address these issues. GAO expects to issue a report on its results in April 2013. |
gao_GAO-04-844 | gao_GAO-04-844_0 | In addition to the daily variation in demand, electricity demand varies seasonally, mainly because air conditioning accounts for a large share of overall electricity usage in many parts of the country during the summer. Market-Based and Reliability Programs Allow Demand to Respond to Changing Prices and Supply Shortages but Are in Limited Use
Two types of programs enable customers to respond to price variations or to supply shortages that may compromise reliable grid operations: market- based pricing and reliability-driven programs. Two of these programs---time-of- use and real-time pricing—provide customers with retail prices that reflect the changes in the cost of electricity throughout the day, as shown in figure 1. Real-time pricing programs are available in only a few locations, and the number of customers enrolled in these programs is generally small. These programs are not appropriate for all consumers, however. Demand-Response Programs Have Saved Millions of Dollars and Can Improve the Reliability of the Electricity System
Demand-response programs have saved millions of dollars and could save billions of dollars more, as well as enhance reliability in both regulated and competitive markets, according to the literature we reviewed and experts we spoke with. One study examined the electricity crisis of 2000 to 2001 in the West and estimated that, had market-based pricing been in place, the high prices seen in California during 2000 might have been reduced by 12 percent—resulting in a $2.5 billion reduction in the state’s electricity costs. Multiple Barriers Make It Difficult to Introduce and Expand Demand- Response Programs
Demand-response programs face three main barriers to their introduction and expansion: (1) regulations that shield customers from short-term price fluctuations, (2) the absence of needed equipment installed at customers’ sites, and (3) customers’ limited awareness of programs and their potential benefits. Lack of specific guidance to the tenants in GSA buildings regarding participation and the tenants’ lack of incentive to reduce consumption have also limited GSA’s involvement in these programs. Several Outside Factors Have Also Served to Limit the Benefits of Participating in Available Demand- Response Programs in Recent Years
Several factors have also reduced the incentive to participate in demand- response programs over the past several years. Federal agency tenants have little incentive to reduce their consumption. Certain Programs Show How Barriers Were Overcome and Provide Lessons on How to Cultivate New Programs
Certain demand-response programs that we reviewed illustrate how the barriers we identified were overcome and also point out three broader lessons on how to cultivate new programs. First, programs with sufficient incentives make customers’ participation worthwhile. Because demand-response programs offer potential financial benefits to the federal government and to demonstrate the federal government’s commitment to improving the functioning of electricity markets, we recommend that, for locations where the General Services Administration has significant energy consumption, its Administrator take the following four actions: Require regional energy managers to identify what demand-response programs are available to them, require building operators to determine whether they could actively participate in the programs, and quantify the benefits of that participation. Clarify the incentives for participation by defining how the GSA, its building operators, and its federal agency tenants will share the benefits and risks of participating in these programs through its leases. GSA agreed with the report’s conclusions regarding the importance of demand-response to an efficient and reliable electricity industry. GSA also stated that it agreed with the majority of our recommendations, but it expressed some concern about one of them. 1. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The efficient and reliable functioning of the more than $200 billion electric industry is vital to the lives of all Americans. As demonstrated in the 2003 black- out in the Northeast and the 2001 energy crisis in the West, changes in the cost and availability of electricity can have significant impacts on consumers and the national economy. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) supports using demand-response programs as part of its effort to develop and oversee competitive electricity markets. GAO was asked to identify (1) the types of demand-response programs currently in use, (2) the benefits of these programs, (3) the barriers to their introduction and expansion, and (4) instances where barriers have been overcome. Additionally, GAO examined the federal government's participation in these programs through the General Services Administration (GSA).
What GAO Found
There are two general types of electricity demand-response programs in use: (1) market-based pricing programs enable customers to respond to changing electricity prices and (2) reliability-driven programs allow either the customer or the grid operator to adjust electricity usage when supplies are scarce or system reliability is a concern. The federal government's GSA participates in both types of programs. Demand-response programs benefit customers by improving the functioning of markets and enhancing the reliability of the electricity system. Some recent studies show that demand-response programs have saved customers millions of dollars and could save billions of dollars more. The GSA--as only one example of federal involvement in these programs--has reported saving about $1.9 million through the participation of only a few of its buildings in demand-response programs during the past 5 years. However, GAO estimates that GSA could potentially save millions of dollars more with broader participation in these programs. While benefits from demand-response are potentially large, three main barriers limit their introduction and expansion: (1) state regulations that shield consumers from price fluctuations, (2) a lack of equipment at customers' locations, and (3) customers' limited awareness about the programs and their benefits. Regarding prices, customers do not respond to price fluctuations because the retail prices they see do not reflect market conditions but are generally set by state regulations or laws. In addition, in recent years, moderate weather conditions and other factors have kept overall electricity prices low, reducing the benefits of participating in these programs. According to GSA, its participation in demand-response programs has been limited because it lacks specific guidance on participation and tenants have little incentive to reduce their consumption since current leases do not provide a way to share in the savings that might occur. Two demand-response programs that GAO reviewed illustrate how the barriers GAO identified were overcome and also point out lessons on how to cultivate new programs. Lessons learned include the necessity to provide sufficient incentives to make participation worthwhile, working with receptive state regulators and market participants to develop programs, and designing programs to include appropriate outreach materials, necessary equipment, and easy participation. In commenting on the report, FERC and GSA agreed in general with the report's conclusions and recommendations, but GSA expressed concern about one recommendation to share potential savings with its tenants. |
gao_GAO-08-289 | gao_GAO-08-289_0 | FERC’S Merger Review and Postmerger Oversight to Prevent Cross- Subsidization in Utility Holding Company Systems Are Limited
FERC has made few substantive changes to either its merger review process or its postmerger oversight as a consequence of its new responsibilities and, as a result, does not have a strong basis for ensuring that harmful cross-subsidization does not occur. To review mergers and acquisitions, FERC officials told us that they do not intend to make changes to their process other than to require companies to disclose any existing or planned cross-subsidization and explain why it is in the public interest, and to certify in writing that they will not engage in harmful cross- subsidization. For postmerger oversight, FERC intends to continue to rely on its existing enforcement mechanisms, as expanded by EPAct, to detect potential cross-subsidies—primarily companies’ self-reporting of noncompliance and a limited number of compliance audits. FERC officials told us that they can, and sometimes do, request that applicants provide additional information or conduct additional analysis. However, on the basis of our discussions with FERC staff, this picture of risk may be somewhat limited in that it is informed only by the views of a few key staff and does not seek input from stakeholders, such as the financial community or state commissions, or reflect analysis of key data on risk. In support of the use of this information, some state regulators told us that such information has been helpful to them in identifying when companies may engage in unlawful cross-subsidies. States Vary in Their Capacities to Oversee Utilities
States utility commissions’ views of their oversight capacities vary, but many states foresee a need for additional resources to respond to changes from EPAct. Almost all states report they have some type of authority over affiliate transactions, although many states report reviewing or auditing few of these transactions. Almost half of the states report they need additional staff and funding to respond to changes stemming from EPAct. Almost All States Have Merger Approval Authority but Many States Express Concern about Future Regulation of the Resulting Companies after Merger Approval
On the basis of our survey of state commission staff, all but 3 states (out of 50 responses) have authority to review and either approve or disapprove mergers. Officials in Oregon noted that the state commission was concerned that consumers could be harmed because regulating the resulting company would be more difficult due to the financial complexity of the new ownership arrangement. Some states are concerned that they may not have sufficient authorities to oversee affiliate transactions, after the repeal of PUHCA 1935. The majority of states reported they have audited 1 percent or less of these transactions over the last 5 years and dedicated no staff time to reviews or audits over the last year. Some States Report Not Having Access to Holding Company Books and Records
All states regularly require financial reports from utilities and are able to obtain access to the financial books and records of these utilities that document costs, but access beyond the utility varies. Develop an audit reporting approach to clearly identify the objectives, scope and methodology, and the specific findings of the audit, irrespective of whether FERC takes an enforcement action, in order to improve public confidence in FERC’s enforcement functions and the usefulness of audit reports on affiliate transactions for FERC, state regulators, affected utilities, and others. To specifically determine how FERC has changed its merger review processes and postmerger oversight to prevent cross-subsidization affecting utilities, we reviewed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005 (PUHCA 2005) provisions in EPAct related to FERC’s review of mergers and acquisitions, access to the books and records of companies in holding company systems, and assessment of civil penalties on companies that violate its rules. To be clear, our draft report stated that once a merger has taken place, FERC intends to rely on its existing enforcement mechanisms—primarily (1) companies’ self-reporting and (2) compliance audits—to detect potential cross-subsidization. In addition, as noted in earlier comments, the development of a risk-based audit planning approach could also help FERC allocate its existing resources most efficiently and effectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA 1935) and other laws, federal agencies and state commissions have traditionally regulated utilities to protect consumers from supply disruptions and unfair pricing. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) repealed PUHCA 1935, removing some limitations on the companies that could merge with or invest in utilities, leaving the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which already regulated utilities, with primary federal responsibility for regulating them. Because of the potential for new mergers or acquisitions between utilities and companies previously restricted from investing in utilities, there has been considerable interest in whether cross-subsidization--unfairly passing on to consumers the cost of transactions between utility companies and their "affiliates"--could occur. GAO was asked to (1) examine the extent to which FERC changed its merger and acquisition and post merger review and oversight processes since EPAct to protect against cross-subsidization and (2) survey state utility commissions about their oversight.
What GAO Found
FERC has made few substantive changes to its merger review processes and does not have a strong basis for ensuring that utilities do not engage in harmful cross-subsidization. FERC officials told us that they plan to require merging companies to disclose existing or planned cross-subsidization and to certify in writing that they will not engage in cross-subsidization, but do not plan to independently verify such information. Once mergers have taken place, FERC intends to rely on its existing enforcement mechanisms--primarily companies' self-reporting noncompliance and a limited number of compliance audits--to detect potential cross-subsidization. FERC officials told us that they believe the threat of large fines, as allowed by EPAct, will encourage companies to investigate and self-report any non-compliance. In addition, FERC officials told us that, for 2008, FERC developed its plans to conduct compliance audits of 3 of the 36 holding companies it regulates based on informal discussions between senior agency officials and staffs in key offices. However, FERC does not formally use a risk based approach that considers factors, such as companies' financial condition or history of compliance. A risk-based audit approach is an important consideration in efficiently allocating its limited resources to detect non-compliance. In addition, we found that FERC's public audit reports often lacked a clear description of the audit objectives, scope, methodology, and findings--inhibiting their use in improving transparency with stakeholders or helping FERC staff improve their audit practices. State utility commissions' views of their oversight capacity varied, but many reported a need for additional resources, such as staff and funding, to respond to changes in their oversight after the repeal of PUHCA 1935. State regulators in all but a few states reported that utilities must seek state approval for proposed mergers. State regulators reported being mostly concerned about the impact of mergers on customer rates, but 25 of 45 reporting states also noted concerns that the resulting, potentially more complex company could be more difficult to regulate. Most states reported having some type of audit authority over the transactions between utilities and their affiliated companies, but many states currently review or audit only a small percentage of these transactions, with 28 of the 49 reporting states auditing 1 percent or less over the last five years. On the other hand, some states reported that they require periodic, specialized audits of affiliate transactions. In addition, although almost all states require financial reports from utilities and report they have access to utility companies' financial books and records, many states reported they do not have such direct access to the books and records of affiliated companies. While EPAct provides state regulators the ability to obtain such information, some states expressed concern that this access is narrow and could require them to be extremely specific in identifying needed information, thus potentially limiting their audit access. From a resources perspective, 22 of the 50 states reporting said that they needed additional staffing and funding to a carry out their oversight responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-06-435 | gao_GAO-06-435_0 | Private mortgage insurers, such as United Guaranty and Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (MGIC), were among the first to develop mortgage scorecards in the early 1990s. But TOTAL’s effectiveness could be limited by some of the choices that were made during the development process, including the fact that (1) the data FHA and its contractor used were 12 years old by the time TOTAL was implemented, (2) FHA has not developed policies and procedures for updating TOTAL, and (3) the benchmark analysis for determining TOTAL’s predictive capability may have been inadequate. Some Development and Implementation Choices Could Limit TOTAL’s Effectiveness
Although FHA and its contractor used a reasonable and generally accepted practice for developing TOTAL, some of the choices made during that process could affect FHA’s ability to maximize its use of the scorecard. However, since 1992, significant changes have occurred in the mortgage industry that have affected the characteristics of those applying for FHA-insured loans. As a result, HUD did not update TOTAL either before it was deployed or subsequently. As described in table 1, FHA’s current use of TOTAL has provided additional benefits over previous scorecards, such as less paperwork for lenders and more consistent underwriting decisions. In addition, private sector organizations use their scorecards to help inform general management decision making, set prices based on risk, and launch new products. As a result of these uses, private lenders have been able to broaden their customer base and improve their financial performance. FHA could better anticipate, understand, and react to changes in the marketplace if, like the private sector, it routinely updated TOTAL. FHA followed an accepted process in developing TOTAL and has already seen significant benefits from the scorecard. Finally, FHA has not taken steps to share credit scores utilized by TOTAL with Ginnie Mae, which could use the information to help improve the transparency of the secondary mortgage market. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve how HUD uses and benefits from TOTAL, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD take the following two actions: develop policies and procedures for updating TOTAL on a regular basis, including using updated data, testing additional variables, exploring hazard model benefits, and testing other cut points; and explore additional uses of TOTAL and the credit data it utilizes, including to help adjust cut points, implement risk-based pricing, develop new products, and enable Ginnie Mae to disclose more information about securities backed by FHA-insured loans. Scope and Methodology
To assess the reasonableness of the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) approach to developing Technology Open to Approved Lenders (TOTAL), we reviewed agency documents and interviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and contractor officials to determine (1) the process and data used to develop TOTAL, including how FHA identified and evaluated scorecard variables; (2) the reliability of the analysis used to evaluate TOTAL’s effectiveness in predicting defaults; and (3) how FHA established policies on cut points and overrides. | Why GAO Did This Study
Along with private mortgage providers, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has been impacted by technological advances that began in the mid-1990s and that have significantly affected the way the mortgage industry works. As a result, in 2004, FHA implemented Technology Open to Approved Lenders (TOTAL) Scorecard--an automated tool that evaluates the majority of new loans insured by FHA. However, questions have emerged about the effectiveness of TOTAL. Given these concerns, you asked GAO to evaluate the way the agency developed and uses this new tool. This report looks at (1) the reasonableness of FHA's approach to developing TOTAL and (2) the potential benefits to HUD of expanding its use of TOTAL.
What GAO Found
Some of the choices that FHA made during the development process could limit TOTAL's effectiveness, although overall the process was reasonable. Like the private sector, FHA and its contractor used many of the same variables, as well as an accepted modeling process, to develop TOTAL. However, the data that FHA and its contractors used to develop TOTAL were 12 years old by the time FHA implemented the scorecard, and the market has changed significantly since then. Also, FHA, among other things, (1) did not develop a formal plan for updating TOTAL on a regular basis; (2) did not include all the important variables that could help explain expected loan performance; and (3) selected a type of model that limits how the scorecard can be used. Despite potential problems with TOTAL, HUD could still see added benefits from it. As a result of TOTAL, FHA lenders and borrowers have seen two new benefits--less paperwork and more consistent underwriting decisions. However, FHA could gain additional benefits if, like private lenders and mortgage insurers, it put TOTAL to other uses. These uses include relying on TOTAL to help inform general management decision making, price products based on risk, and launch new products. Adopting these scorecard uses from the private sector could potentially generate three other benefits for FHA, including the ability to react to changes in the market, more control over its financial condition, and a broader customer base. Additionally, HUD's Government National Mortgage Association, a government corporation that guarantees securities of federally insured or guaranteed mortgage loans, could use credit scores that are used by TOTAL to help improve the transparency of the secondary mortgage market. |
gao_GAO-13-12 | gao_GAO-13-12_0 | The Innovation Center’s Activities, Funding, Organization, and Staffing Focused on Implementing 17 New Models
From the time it became operational in November 2010, through March 31, 2012, the Innovation Center’s activities and use of funding focused on implementing 17 new models to test different approaches to health care delivery and payment in Medicare and Medicaid. The Innovation Center projects that the total funding required to test and evaluate these 17 models will be $3.7 billion over their lifetime, including $2.7 billion for the 11 models selected by the Innovation Center and $1.0 billion for the 6 models specifically required by other provisions of PPACA. The expected funding for individual models ranges from $30 million to $931 million, depending on model scope and design. As of August 1, 2012, the Innovation Center was still relatively early in the process of implementing the 17 models. The Innovation Center’s Organization and Staffing Reflect Its Focus on the 17 Models and Other Key Functions That Support Model Implementation
As of March 31, 2012, the Innovation Center’s 184 staff were organized into nine groups and the Office of the Director. For example, because most of the models that the Innovation Center selected for implementation were Patient Care and Seamless Care Models, more staff were hired in those Similarly, the Rapid groups than in the Preventive Care Models Group.Cycle Evaluation Group and the Business Services Group were among the largest groups by staff size because of (1) the Innovation Center’s need for evaluation expertise when selecting which models to test as well as its responsibility for evaluating existing demonstrations and (2) the need for staff to carry out key administrative activities right away, including contract solicitation, budget development, and hiring. The Innovation Center’s Plans for Evaluating Models Include Identifying Measures Related to the Cost and Quality of Care and Hiring Contractors
As part of its evaluation of individual models, the Innovation Center plans to identify measures related to the cost and quality of care. Preliminary measures the Innovation Center identifies will be finalized with contractors responsible for evaluating models on behalf of CMS. As of August 1, 2012, the Innovation Center had contracted with evaluators for 10 of the 17 models and had finalized measures for 2 models.anticipated awarding contracts for 6 of the remaining models by the end of fiscal year 2012 and for the other remaining model—the Strong Start for Mothers and Newborns model—by March 2013. The Innovation Center’s Plans for Evaluating Its Own Performance Include Aggregating Data across Models and Monitoring Implementation of Models
The Innovation Center’s plans for evaluating its own performance include aggregating data on cost and quality measures to determine the overall impact of the center. While the center uses a number of mechanisms to coordinate with other CMS offices, it is still working on ways to make coordination more systematic. Some Innovation Center Models Overlap with Efforts of Other CMS Offices
We identified three key examples of Innovation Center models being implemented as of March 31, 2012, that overlap with efforts of other CMS offices, meaning that the efforts share similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve these goals, or target similar populations. However, these overlapping efforts also have differences, and CMS officials said they are intended to be complementary to each other. The Innovation Center Uses a Number of Mechanisms to Coordinate with Other Offices, but Is Still Working on Ways to Make Coordination More Systematic
Over the period of our review, we identified a number of mechanisms the Innovation Center uses to coordinate its work in order to avoid unnecessary duplication in models that overlap with efforts of other CMS offices. In using these mechanisms, the center has engaged in key practices that we identified in prior work as helping enhance and sustain collaboration, such as leveraging resources, establishing compatible policies and procedures, and developing ways to report on results across offices. Multi-office meetings at the staff, director, and agency level. The Innovation Center is also currently developing a process to ensure that CMS does not pay for the same service under both HEN and QIO contracts. CMS officials said that they will take steps, including potentially modifying HEN or QIO contract language, to eliminate any unnecessary duplication of effort that the review identifies and to document how this duplication was addressed. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to ensure the efficient use of federal resources, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS direct the Innovation Center to expeditiously complete implementation of its process to review and eliminate any areas of unnecessary duplication in the services being provided by HENs and QIOs in hospitals. In its written comments, HHS stated that it concurred with our recommendation to expeditiously complete implementation of its process to review and eliminate any areas of unnecessary duplication in the services being provided by HENs and QIOs. Develop an Innovation Center Investment Proposal (ICIP)
As part of this selection process, the Innovation Center reviews model types suggested in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provision that established the center, and seeks input from across the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and other federal partners and from an array of external stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA created the Innovation Center within CMS. The purpose of the Innovation Center is to test new approaches to health care delivery and payment--known as models--for use in Medicare or Medicaid. GAO was asked to review the implementation of the Innovation Center. Specifically, GAO: (1) describes the center's activities, funding, organization, and staffing as of March 31, 2012; (2) describes the center's plans for evaluating its models and its own performance; and (3) examines whether efforts of the center overlap with those of other CMS offices and how the center coordinates with other offices. GAO analyzed budget and staffing data; reviewed available documentation, such as Innovation Center policies and procedures and functional statements for CMS offices; and interviewed officials from the Innovation Center and other CMS offices, such as the Center for Medicare. GAO assessed how the Innovation Center coordinates in the context of federal internal control standards and key practices for collaboration from prior GAO work.
What GAO Found
From the time it became operational in November 2010, through March 31, 2012, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (Innovation Center) has focused on implementing 17 new models to test different approaches for delivering or paying for health care in Medicare and Medicaid. The center is still relatively early in the process of implementing these models. Eleven of the models were selected by the Innovation Center under the provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that established the center, while the remaining 6 were specifically required by other PPACA provisions. The Innovation Center projects that a total of $3.7 billion will be required to fund testing and evaluation of the 17 models, with the expected funding for individual models ranging from $30 million to $931 million. As of March 2012, the center's 184 staff were organized into four groups responsible for coordinating the implementation of different models and another five groups responsible for key functions that support model implementation. Officials said that, among other things, the center's initial hiring of staff reflected the need for leadership and for specific types of expertise, such as individuals with a background in evaluation.
The Innovation Center's plans for evaluating individual models include identifying measures related to the cost and quality of care. Officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) told GAO that the Innovation Center had developed preliminary evaluation plans for the 17 models being implemented that, among other things, identified proposed measures. According to CMS officials, these measures will be finalized by contractors responsible for evaluating, on behalf of CMS, each model's impact on cost and quality. As of August 1, 2012, the Innovation Center had contracted for the evaluation of 10 of the 17 models. The center's plans for evaluating its own performance include aggregating data across models by using a set of core measures it has developed. In addition, the Innovation Center has taken steps to monitor its progress in implementing the 17 models through biweekly reviews of standard milestones and related data, such as the number of applications to participate in a model the center has received.
GAO identified three key examples of overlap between the 17 Innovation Center models and the efforts of other CMS offices, meaning that the efforts share similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve these goals, or target similar populations. However, these overlapping efforts also have differences, and CMS officials said the efforts are intended to be complementary to each other. GAO also identified a number of mechanisms the Innovation Center uses to coordinate its work in order to avoid unnecessary duplication between its models and other efforts, such as multi-office meetings at the staff, director, and agency level. Further, through using these mechanisms, the Innovation Center has engaged in key practices for collaboration, including leveraging resources across offices. At the same time, the center is still working on ways to make its coordination more systematic. For example, largely because of questions raised during GAO's review, the Innovation Center initiated a process to ensure that CMS does not pay for the same service under the contracts in one of its models and those in another CMS office. However, officials told GAO that the center is still working on implementing this process and may need to take additional steps to eliminate any unnecessary duplication. GAO is recommending that the Administrator of CMS direct the Innovation Center to expeditiously complete its process to review and eliminate any areas of unnecessary duplication in contracts that have been awarded in one of its models. HHS agreed with this recommendation and described steps it is taking to address unnecessary duplication.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Administrator of CMS direct the Innovation Center to expeditiously complete its process to review and eliminate any areas of unnecessary duplication in contracts that have been awarded in one of its models. HHS agreed with this recommendation and described steps it is taking to address unnecessary duplication. |
gao_GAO-06-779T | gao_GAO-06-779T_0 | In March 2006, SSA published a final rule to establish DSI, which is intended to improve the accuracy, consistency, and fairness of decision making and to make correct decisions as early in the process as possible. Concerns Include Fear of Increased Court and Claimant Hardship, while SSA Believes Its New Process Will Reduce the Need for Appeal
In their written comments to SSA and discussions with us, public and stakeholder groups, such as claimant representatives and disability advocacy groups, expressed two broad areas of concern regarding the replacement of the Appeals Council with the Decision Review Board: (1) potential for increasing the workload of the federal courts and (2) anticipated hardship for claimants in terms of loss of an administrative appeal level and difficulties associated with pursuing their claims in federal court. SSA’s response to concerns regarding the federal court workload is that all changes associated with new DSI process—taken together—should reduce the need for appeal to the federal courts. At the same time, SSA plans to implement this final step gradually and with additional safeguards to minimize the impact on the courts. In response to concerns about the loss of appeal rights, SSA contends that under the new DSI process, claimants will have a new level of federal review earlier in the process, and should experience a decline in the amount of time it takes to receive a final agency decision without being overly burdened by the Decision Review Board under the new process. To reduce the likelihood of too many appeals reaching the federal court level, SSA stated in its final rule that it is pursuing a gradual rollout by implementing the DSI process in one small region—the Boston region—and plans to have the board initially review all of the ALJ decisions in that region. SSA Has Taken Constructive Steps to Implement the New DSI Process, but Its Schedule Is Ambitious and Many Details Are Not Yet Finalized
SSA has prepared in significant ways for DSI, but the agency’s timetable is ambitious and substantive work remains. SSA has moved forward in key areas that should underpin the new system—human capital development, technical infrastructure, and quality assurance. SSA Has Readied eDib for the Boston Region, but Time for Resolving Last- Minute Glitches before Rollout Will Be Limited
SSA has also taken steps, as we had previously recommended, to ensure that key technical supports, particularly an electronic disability case recording and tracking system known as eDib, are in place in time for Boston staff to adjudicate claims under DSI electronically. For example, SSA has not yet revealed the types of reports it will be able to provide decision makers based on the decision-writing tools. For example, significant aspects of the DSI rollout are consistent with our recommendations to focus resources on what is critical to improving the disability claims process, such as quality assurance and computer support. The first is quality assurance, which entails both effective monitoring and evaluation. The eventual elimination of the Appeals Council and its replacement with the Decision Review Board with a very different purpose has been a great cause of concern for a number of stakeholders. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To learn more about the public’s and stakeholders’ views with regard to the Appeals Council and the Decision Review Board, we reviewed and analyzed a large sample of comment letters they submitted to the Social Security Administration (SSA) in response to its July 2005 notice of proposed rule making on the Disability Service Improvement process (DSI) that were related to these topics. There is a risk that the Decision Review Board may not select the most appropriate cases for review. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2006, the Social Security Administration (SSA) published a rule that fundamentally alters the way claims for disability benefits are processed and considered. The rule establishes the Disability Service Improvement process (DSI)--intended to improve the accuracy, timeliness, consistency, and fairness of determinations. DSI's changes include an opportunity for an expedited decision during the initial determination process and the elimination of the Appeals Council, which had given claimants the right to appeal administrative law judge (ALJ) decisions before pursuing federal court review. DSI replaces the council with a Decision Review Board, which will selectively review ALJ decisions. However, dissatisfied claimants whose cases are not selected for board review must now appeal directly to the federal courts. Based on its ongoing work, GAO was asked to testify on (1) public and stakeholder concerns about the elimination of the Appeals Council and its replacement by the Decision Review Board and SSA's response to these concerns, as well as (2) the steps that SSA has taken to help facilitate a smooth implementation of the DSI process.
What GAO Found
Concerns regarding the replacement of the Appeals Council with the Decision Review Board--raised by the public and stakeholder groups, such as claimant representatives--generally fall into two areas: (1) potential for increasing the workload of the federal courts and (2) anticipated hardship for claimants in terms of the loss of an administrative appeal level and difficulties associated with pursuing their claim in federal court. SSA's response to concerns regarding the federal court workload is that all changes associated with the new DSI process--taken together--should reduce the need for appeal to the federal courts; at the same time, SSA plans to implement this final step gradually and with additional safeguards to minimize impact on the courts. In response to concerns about the loss of appeal rights, SSA contends that DSI introduces enhanced levels of federal review earlier in the process and that claimants should experience a decline in the amount of time it takes to receive a final agency decision. SSA has prepared in significant ways for the initial rollout of DSI in its Boston region, but the agency's timetable is ambitious and much work remains. The agency has moved forward in key areas that underpin the new system--human capital development, technical infrastructure, and quality assurance--taking actions consistent with past GAO recommendations for improving the disability determination process. For example, SSA has taken steps to ensure that key technical supports, particularly its electronic disability case processing system, are in place--even though it has allowed itself little time to address and resolve any glitches that may arise prior to implementation. SSA has also taken several steps to lay a foundation for quality assurance by centralizing its quality assurance reviews, establishing a Decision Review Board for reviewing decisions, and developing writing tools that should foster consistency and thorough documentation at all phases of the determination process. Further, we found that SSA's decision to implement DSI first in one small region prior to its introduction nationally is a good change management strategy that reflects our earlier recommendations. Additionally SSA has taken a proactive, collaborative approach to both the design and the implementation of the new determination process. Nevertheless, key facets of SSA's plan to monitor and evaluate the Boston rollout remain to be developed. For example, performance measures for assessing the execution of the rollout are still unclear to us, and mechanisms for delivering feedback to staff on the clarity and soundness of their decision writing have not yet been fully developed. |
gao_GAO-16-703T | gao_GAO-16-703T_0 | Limitations Exist in Certain CMS Screening Procedures for Preventing and Detecting Enrollment of Ineligible or Potentially Fraudulent Medicare Providers and Suppliers
In our June 2015 and April 2016 reports examining CMS screening procedures, we found weaknesses in CMS’s verification of provider practice location, physician licensure status, providers listed as deceased or excluded from participating in federal programs or health care–related programs, and criminal-background histories. These weaknesses may have resulted in CMS improperly paying thousands of potentially ineligible providers and suppliers. We made recommendations to address these weaknesses, which CMS has indicated it has implemented or is taking steps to address. According to CMS officials, they have taken some actions to remove or recover overpayments from the potentially ineligible providers and suppliers we referred to them in April 2015 and April 2016, but CMS’s review and response to the referrals are ongoing. First, we recommended that CMS modify the CMS software integrated into PECOS to include specific flags to help identify potentially questionable practice location addresses, such as CMRA, vacant, and invalid addresses. The agency concurred with this recommendation. According to CMS officials, this new DPV functionality flags addresses that may be CMRA, vacant, or invalid. By updating the address verification software, CMS can ensure that providers with ineligible practice location are not listed in PECOS. CMS has taken some actions to remove or recover overpayments from potentially ineligible providers and suppliers that we referred to it, based on our June 2015 report. Applicants’ Licensure Information Verification
In our June 2015 report, we found 147 out of about 1.3 million physicians with active PECOS profiles had received a final adverse action from a state medical board, as of March 2013. These individuals were either not revoked from the Medicare program until months after the adverse action or never removed (see fig. However, the report only provides MACs with the current status of the license that the provider used to enroll in the Medicare program. Without collecting license information on all medical licenses, regardless of the state the provider enrolled in, we concluded that CMS may be missing an opportunity to identify potentially ineligible providers who have license revocations or suspensions in other states, which can put Medicare beneficiaries at risk. In May 2016, CMS officials stated that CMS has established a process to annually review databases and has incorporated the FSMB database into its screening process. On the basis of our analysis of CMS’s updates as of May 2016, CMS has taken the following actions: taken administrative action to remove the provider or collect funds for 21 providers, determined that the provider had already been removed from the determined that the adverse actions were disclosed or partially disclosed for 71, and has ongoing reviews of 6. Deceased and Exclusion Verification Procedures
In our June 2015 report, we found that about 460 (0.03 percent) out of the 1.7 million unique providers and suppliers in PECOS as of March 2013 and DMEPOS suppliers as of April 2013 were identified as deceased at the time of the data we reviewed. Criminal-Background Screening Procedures
As part of CMS’s enrollment-screening process, CMS has controls in place to verify criminal-background information for providers and suppliers in PECOS. In our April 2016 report, we found that 16 out of 66 potentially ineligible providers we identified with criminal backgrounds received $1.3 million in potential overpayments. Before CMS revised procedures for reviewing the criminal backgrounds of existing and prospective Medicare providers and suppliers in April 2014, the agency relied on verifying applicants’ self-reported adverse legal actions by checking whether providers and suppliers had previously lost their licenses because of a conviction such as a crime against a person. Additionally, in April 2016, we reported that in April 2014 CMS implemented steps that provide more information on the criminal backgrounds of existing and prospective Medicare providers and suppliers than it obtained previously. In addition, CMS receives information from ZPICs, which provide a conviction history on providers and suppliers they investigate. As a result, CMS and its contractors obtain greater access to data about federal and state offenses and the ability to conduct a more-comprehensive review of provider and supplier criminal backgrounds than in the past. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2015, Medicare paid $568.9 billion for health care and related services. CMS estimates that $59.6 billion (about 10.5 percent) of that total was paid improperly. To establish and maintain Medicare billing privileges, providers and suppliers must be enrolled in a CMS database known as PECOS. About 1.9 million providers and suppliers were in PECOS as of December 2015, according to CMS.
GAO published reports in June 2015 and April 2016 that examined Medicare's provider and supplier enrollment-screening procedures to determine whether PECOS was vulnerable to fraud. This testimony discusses the extent to which selected enrollment-screening procedures are designed and implemented to prevent and detect the enrollment of ineligible or potentially fraudulent Medicare providers and suppliers into PECOS.
In its reports, GAO matched providers and suppliers in PECOS, as of March 2013, to several databases to identify potentially ineligible providers and suppliers, and used Medicare claims data to verify whether they were paid during this period. GAO also examined relevant documentation, interviewed CMS officials, and obtained information from the CMS contractors that evaluate provider applications. From August 2015 through May 2016, GAO obtained updated information from CMS staff and reviewed documents related to actions.
CMS has taken or has plans to take some actions to address all of GAO's recommendations and referrals of potentially ineligible providers and suppliers.
What GAO Found
In June 2015 and April 2016, GAO reported on CMS's implementation of enrollment-screening procedures that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) uses to prevent and detect ineligible or potentially fraudulent providers and suppliers from enrolling into its Provider Enrollment, Chain and Ownership System (PECOS). GAO identified weaknesses in CMS's verification of provider practice location, physician licensure status, and criminal-background histories. These weaknesses may have resulted in CMS improperly paying thousands of potentially ineligible providers and suppliers.
Specifically, in June 2015, GAO's examination of 2013 data found that about 23,400 (22 percent) of 105,234 of practice location addresses were potentially ineligible. The computer software CMS used as a method to validate applicants' addresses did not flag potentially ineligible addresses, such as those that are of a Commercial Mail Receiving Agency (such as a UPS store mailbox), vacant, or invalid. GAO recommended that CMS incorporate flags into its software to help identify potentially questionable addresses, among other things. CMS concurred with this recommendation and has replaced the PECOS address verification software.
Also, in June 2015, GAO found that, as of March 2013, 147 out of about 1.3 million physicians listed in PECOS had received a final adverse action against their medical license from a state medical board for various felonies that may have made them ineligible to bill Medicare. However, they were either not revoked from the Medicare program until months after the adverse action or never removed because CMS only collected information on the medical license numbers providers used to enroll into the Medicare program. CMS also did not collect adverse-action history or other medical licenses a provider may have in other states that were not used to enroll into Medicare. GAO recommended that CMS collect and review additional license information. CMS has incorporated a new database to obtain additional license history.
In April 2016, GAO reported on CMS's process to conduct criminal-background checks on Medicare providers and suppliers and found that opportunities exist for CMS to recover about $1.3 million in potential overpayments made to 16 out of 66 potentially ineligible providers with criminal backgrounds. In April 2014, CMS implemented procedures to obtain greater access to data to verify criminal backgrounds of existing and prospective Medicare providers and suppliers than it obtained previously; however, the results of GAO's review of the 2013 data identified an opportunity for CMS to recover potential overpayments that were made prior to putting the revised procedures in place.
In addition to its actions in response to GAO's recommendations, CMS has taken some actions to remove or recover overpayments from potentially ineligible providers and suppliers that GAO referred to it in April 2015 and April 2016, but its review and response to the referrals are ongoing. |
gao_GAO-13-289 | gao_GAO-13-289_0 | Since then, the United States has provided security assistance to Lebanon through the Foreign Military Financing program; IMET; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program; the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR) programs; and Section 1206 and Section 1207 authorities for training and equipping foreign militaries and security forces and for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries, respectively. The United States Has Kept Strategic Goals for Lebanon Constant Since 2007 and Adjusted Security Assistance in Response to Political and Security Conditions
The United States has kept strategic goals for Lebanon constant since 2007. These goals include supporting the Government of Lebanon in establishing stability and security against internal threats from militant extremists and countering destabilizing influences. U.S. Strategic Goals Are to Support a Stable, Secure, and Independent Lebanese Government
Since 2007, U.S strategic goals for Lebanon have been to support the nation as a stable, secure, and independent democracy. State and DOD Have Adjusted Implementation of Security Assistance Programs to Meet Conditions on the Ground
The goals and objectives of U.S. security assistance to Lebanon have continued to focus on supporting Lebanese sovereignty and stability and countering the influences of Syria and Iran. Agencies Allocated the Majority of Security Assistance through the Foreign Military Financing Program and Used Seven Other Programs
U.S. agencies allocated the majority (approximately 69 percent, or $641 million) of security assistance for Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012 through the Foreign Military Financing program, which provides grants and loans to the Lebanese Armed Forces to purchase U.S. equipment, services, and training. State’s evaluation policy requires periodic evaluations of certain programs, consistent with standards established in U.S. law. Evaluations can be facilitated by collecting data on appropriate performance indicators. However, we and other audit agencies have previously reported deficiencies in how State and DOD measure program performance. For example, we found in 2011 that the IMET program evaluation efforts had few of the elements commonly accepted as appropriate for measuring progress and did not objectively measure how IMET contributes to long-term desired outcomes. Neither State nor DOD has completed plans or time frames to evaluate the remaining six ongoing U.S. security assistance programs in Lebanon. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the U.S. government’s ability to determine if security assistance programs in Lebanon have been effective in achieving their specific objectives and that they constitute the best mix of security assistance to support U.S. strategic goals for the country, and to help State and DOD track progress toward established goals for Lebanon, we recommend that 1. the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, complete plans to evaluate the effectiveness of security assistance programs in Lebanon, including milestone dates for implementing the plans; 2. the Secretary of State develop performance indicators for State’s security assistance programs for Lebanon that are specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented; and 3. the Secretary of Defense develop performance indicators for DOD’s security assistance programs for Lebanon that are specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We assessed the extent to which the U.S. government, from fiscal years 2007 through 2012, (1) adjusted its strategic goals and security assistance programs in Lebanon, (2) funded assistance programs for Lebanese security forces, and (3) evaluated the effectiveness of security assistance programs in Lebanon. In addition, we interviewed officials from State and DOD in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, and DOD officials at the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following Syrias withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, U.S. agencies increased their allocations of security assistance for Lebanon from $3 million in 2005 to about $28 million in 2006. This assistance included training and equipment funded and implemented by State or DOD for the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces of Lebanon. However, questions remain regarding the effectiveness of security assistance as a tool of U.S. policy in Lebanon, including concerns about the influence of foreign actors, primarily Syria and Iran, and extremist militant groups operating in Lebanon.
GAO was asked to review U.S. security assistance to Lebanon. GAOs review, covering fiscal years 2007 through 2012, assessed the extent to which the U.S. government (1) adjusted its strategic goals and security assistance programs in Lebanon, (2) funded assistance programs for Lebanese security forces, and (3) evaluated the effectiveness of security assistance programs in Lebanon. GAO reviewed budgetary data and planning documents and interviewed U.S. and Lebanese government officials in Washington, D.C.; Tampa, Florida; and Beirut, Lebanon.
What GAO Found
The United States has kept strategic goals for Lebanon constant since 2007 and adjusted security assistance in response to political and security conditions. Since 2007, U.S. strategic goals for Lebanon have been to support the nation as a stable, secure, and independent democracy. According to U.S. officials, U.S. policy priorities include supporting the Government of Lebanon in establishing stability and security against internal threats from militant extremists and the influence of Iran and Syria. U.S. programs to help achieve these priorities include Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Antiterrorism Assistance, Counterterrorism Financing, Export Control and Related Border Security, and Section 1206 and 1207 authorities. While strategic goals have not changed, program implementation has changed to meet conditions on the ground, according to U.S. officials. For example, the Department of State (State) delayed committing Foreign Military Financing funds to Lebanon for 3 months in 2010, following an exchange of fire between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Israeli forces.
U.S. agencies allocated over $925 million for security assistance programs for Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012; State has disbursed and the Department of Defense (DOD) has committed the majority of the funds.
To date, State has evaluated only one of its security assistance programs for Lebanon, the INCLE program; neither State nor DOD has completed plans or established time frames to evaluate the other programs. State's evaluation policy requires that certain programs be evaluated periodically. Without such evaluations, State and DOD have little objective evidence to show that the programs have been effective or what the proper mix of programs should be. Evaluations can be facilitated through appropriate performance measurement. However, GAO and other agencies have previously reported deficiencies in how agencies measure program performance. For example, GAO found in 2011 that the IMET program evaluation efforts had few of the elements commonly accepted as appropriate for measuring performance. State and DOD are undertaking efforts to develop better performance indicators.
What GAO Recommends
State and DOD should complete plans with milestone dates to evaluate security assistance programs in Lebanon and develop better performance indicators to facilitate evaluation. State and DOD concurred. |
gao_GAO-11-833T | gao_GAO-11-833T_0 | National Data Collection Efforts on the Prevalence of Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Provided Limited Data, but Efforts Underway Help Address Some Information Gaps
In November 2006, we reported that since 2001, the amount of national research that has been conducted on the prevalence of domestic violence and sexual assault had been limited, and less research had been conducted on dating violence and stalking. At that time, no single, comprehensive effort existed that provided nationwide statistics on the prevalence of these four categories of crime among men, women, youth, and children. Rather, various national efforts addressed certain subsets of these crime categories among some segments of the population and were not intended to provide comprehensive estimates. For example, HHS’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National Violent Death Reporting System, which collects incident-based data from multiple sources, such as coroner/medical examiner reports, gathered information on violent deaths resulting from domestic violence and sexual assaults, among other crimes. However, it did not gather information on deaths resulting from dating violence or stalking incidents. As a result, information gaps related to the prevalence of domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence, and stalking, particularly in the areas of dating violence among victims age 12 and older and stalking among victims under age 18 existed at the time of our November 2006 report. Data Collected by Grant Programs Did Not Contain Information on the Extent to Which Victims Receive Services and Challenges Exist for Collecting Such Data
We reported in July 2007 that recipients of 11 grant programs we reviewed collected and reported data to the respective agencies on the types of services they provide, such as counseling; the total number of victims served; and in some cases, demographic information, such as the age of victims; however, data were not available on the extent to which men, women, youth, and children receive each type of service for all services. This situation occurred primarily because the statutes governing the 11 grant programs do not require the collection of demographic data by type of service, although they do require reports on program effectiveness, including number of persons served and number of persons seeking services who could not be served. Nevertheless, VAWA authorizes that a range of services can be provided to victims, and we determined that services were generally provided to men, women, youth, and children. The agencies administering these 11 grant programs—HHS and DOJ—collect some demographic data for certain services, such as emergency shelter under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act and supervised visitation and exchange under VAWA. The quantity of information collected and reported varied greatly for the 11 programs and was extensive for some, such as those administered by DOJ’s Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) under VAWA. The federal agencies use this information to help inform Congress about the known results and effectiveness of the grant programs. However, even if demographic data were available by type of service for all services, such data might not be uniform and reliable because, among other factors, (1) the authorizing statutes for these programs have different purposes and (2) recipients of grants administered by HHS and DOJ use varying data collection practices. Recipients of grants administered by HHS and DOJ use varying data collection practices. As a result of these efforts, and others, officials from both agencies reported that the quality of the recipient data has improved resulting in fewer errors and more complete data. As we reported in our July 2007 report, HHS and DOJ officials stated that they would face significant challenges in collecting and reporting data on the demographic characteristics of victims receiving services by type of service funded by the 11 grant programs included in our review. In our July 2007 report, we did not recommend that federal departments require their grant recipients to collect and report additional data on the demographic characteristics of victims receiving services by type of service because of the potential costs and difficulties associated with addressing the challenges HHS and DOJ officials identified, relative to the benefits that would be derived. In conclusion, there are important issues to consider in moving forward on the reauthorization of VAWA. Having better and more complete data on the prevalence of domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence, and stalking as well as related services provided to victims of these crimes can without doubt better inform and shape the federal programs intended to meet the needs of these victims. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses issues related to the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). In hearings conducted from 1990 through 1994, Congress noted that violence against women was a problem of national scope and that the majority of crimes associated with domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking were perpetrated against women. These hearings culminated in the enactment of VAWA in 1994 to address these issues on a national level. VAWA established grant programs within the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Health and Human Services (HHS) for state, local, and Indian tribal governments and communities. These grants have various purposes, such as providing funding for direct services including emergency shelter, counseling, and legal services for victims of domestic violence, sexual assaults and stalking across all segments of the population. Recipients of funds from these grant programs include, among others, state agencies, tribes, shelters, rape crisis centers, organizations that provide legal services, and hotlines. In 2000, during the reauthorization of VAWA, language was added to the law to provide greater emphasis on dating violence. The 2006 reauthorization of VAWA expanded existing grant programs and added new programs addressing, among other things, young victims. In fiscal year 2011, Congress appropriated approximately $418 million for violence against women programs administered by DOJ and made an additional $133 million available for programs administered by HHS. The 2006 reauthorization of VAWA required us to study and report on data indicating the prevalence of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking among men, women, youth, and children, as well as services available to the victims. Such data could be used to inform decisions regarding investments in grant programs. In response, we issued two reports in November 2006 and July 2007 on these issues, respectively. This testimony is based on these reports and selected updates we conducted in July 2011 related to actions DOJ and HHS have taken since our prior reviews to improve the quality of recipient data. This testimony, as requested, highlights findings from those reports and discusses the extent to which (1) national data collection efforts report on the prevalence of men, women, youth, and children who are victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence, and stalking, and (2) the federal government has collected data to track the types of services provided to these categories of victims and any challenges federal departments report that they and their grant recipients face in collecting and reporting demographic characteristics of victims receiving such services by type of service.
What GAO Found
In November 2006, we reported that since 2001, the amount of national research that has been conducted on the prevalence of domestic violence and sexual assault had been limited, and less research had been conducted on dating violence and stalking. At that time, no single, comprehensive effort existed that provided nationwide statistics on the prevalence of these four categories of crime among men, women, youth, and children. Rather, various national efforts addressed certain subsets of these crime categories among some segments of the population and were not intended to provide comprehensive estimates. For example, HHS's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) National Violent Death Reporting System, which collects incident-based data from multiple sources, such as coroner/medical examiner reports, gathered information on violent deaths resulting from domestic violence and sexual assaults, among other crimes. However, it did not gather information on deaths resulting from dating violence or stalking incidents. We reported in July 2007 that recipients of 11 grant programs we reviewed collected and reported data to the respective agencies on the types of services they provide, such as counseling; the total number of victims served; and in some cases, demographic information, such as the age of victims; however, data were not available on the extent to which men, women, youth, and children receive each type of service for all services. This situation occurred primarily because the statutes governing the 11 grant programs do not require the collection of demographic data by type of service, although they do require reports on program effectiveness, including number of persons served and number of persons seeking services who could not be served. Nevertheless, VAWA authorizes that a range of services can be provided to victims, and we determined that services were generally provided to men, women, youth, and children. The agencies administering these 11 grant programs--HHS and DOJ--collect some demographic data for certain services, such as emergency shelter under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act and supervised visitation and exchange under VAWA. The quantity of information collected and reported varied greatly for the 11 programs and was extensive for some, such as those administered by DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) under VAWA. The federal agencies use this information to help inform Congress about the known results and effectiveness of the grant programs. However, even if demographic data were available by type of service for all services, such data might not be uniform and reliable because, among other factors, (1) the authorizing statutes for these programs have different purposes and (2) recipients of grants administered by HHS and DOJ use varying data collection practices. |
gao_GGD-97-2 | gao_GGD-97-2_0 | Our specific objectives were to describe (1) what selected businesses and federal agencies believed were the federal regulations that applied to those businesses, (2) what those businesses believed was the impact (cost and other) of those regulations, and (3) the regulations those businesses said were most problematic to them and relevant federal agencies’ responses to those concerns. GEMI’s board of directors declined to participate but did not provide a reason. Specifically, we asked each company for information on (1) the aggregate list of regulations with which the company must comply, (2) the aggregate impact (cost and other) of all of those regulations on the company, (3) the regulations the company viewed as most problematic, (4) what the company believed government and businesses could do to correct or mitigate those problematic regulations, and (5) what the company viewed as the benefits of federal regulations. Although all 15 of the companies participating in the review identified at least some regulations that they believed were applicable to their organizations, none of the companies provided us with a complete list of applicable federal regulations. However, several of the agencies we contacted said they could not make that determination without expending a substantial amount of their limited resources. For example, the companies found it difficult to distinguish federal regulatory requirements from those of other governmental jurisdictions and from their normal business practices. However, they do suggest that serious conceptual and methodological questions need to be raised and answered before studies that attempt to measure total current regulatory costs are used to guide public policy. Similarly, a number of concerns involved both paperwork issues and regulatory costs. In response to these concerns, the agencies most frequently said that the companies had overstated regulatory compliance costs. Conclusions
The 15 participating companies provided us with a lengthy and varied list of regulatory concerns, the most common of which involved the cost of regulatory compliance. Many of the regulatory agencies indicated that they were aware of the companies’ concerns and, in a number of cases, the agencies said that they were taking or had already taken action to alleviate the problems. None could provide comprehensive data on the incremental costs of regulations. First, we believe that comprehensive, empirically based data about the cost of federal regulations to individual businesses do not readily exist and could not be developed without a great deal of time and effort on the part of both the regulators and the regulated community. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to congressional requests, GAO reviewed the cumulative impact of federal regulations on a limited number of businesses, focusing on: (1) what selected businesses and federal agencies believed were the federal regulations that applied to those businesses; (2) what those businesses believed were the cost and other impacts of those regulations; and (3) the regulations those businesses said were most problematic to them and relevant federal agencies' responses to those concerns.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) most of the businesses contacted declined to participate in the study; (2) none of the 15 participating companies developed a complete list of regulations that were applicable to them or provided comprehensive data on the cost of regulatory compliance; (3) time and resource constraints and the difficulty of disentangling federal regulatory requirements from those of other jurisdictions and other nonregulatory procedures proved to be major obstacles for the companies; (4) most federal regulatory agencies said that they could not detail which regulations applied to a particular company without a great deal of company-specific information and the expenditure of a substantial amount of resources; (5) measuring the incremental impact of all federal regulations on individual companies is extremely difficult and, therefore, decisionmakers need to be aware of the conceptual and methodological underpinnings of studies that attempt to measure total current regulatory costs; (6) many of the 15 participating companies recognized that regulations provide benefits to society and their own businesses, but all of them provided GAO with a varied list of concerns about regulatory costs and the regulatory process; (7) these concerns included perceptions of high compliance costs, unreasonable, unclear, and inflexible demands, excessive paperwork, and a tendency of regulators to focus on deficiencies; (8) the agencies responsible for the regulations the companies viewed as problematic often said that the companies misinterpreted regulatory requirements; (9) the agencies and some congressional members do not always agree on the extent to which problematic regulations are statutorily driven; and (10) the agencies said that they were aware of and were responding to a number of the companies' concerns. |
gao_GAO-13-129 | gao_GAO-13-129_0 | Some Projects Have Met or Are Expected to Meet Their Performance Targets, but EM and NNSA Did Not Clearly Document Information Needed to Determine the Performance of Others
Of the 71 EM and NNSA nonmajor projects we reviewed that were completed or ongoing for fiscal years 2008 to 2012, we were able to determine performance for 44 projects. Among these 44 projects, 21 have met or are expected to meet all three of their performance targets for the scope of work delivered, cost, and completion date, while 23 have not met or are not expected to meet one or more of their three targets. EM and NNSA Have Met or Are Expected to Meet All Performance Targets for Some Nonmajor Projects
Of the 71 nonmajor projects we reviewed, 44 projects—17 EM projects and 27 NNSA projects—had documented targets for scope, cost, and completion date, enabling us to determine their performance. These projects included a $22 million EM project to expand an existing waste disposal facility at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee and a $469 million NNSA project to construct chemical, electrical, and other laboratories and workspaces at the Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico. These projects included a $77 million EM project to construct two disposal units for storing waste at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and a $199 million NNSA project to equip the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/ Office Building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico to make it suitable for performing programmatic work. In addition, one project did not meet any of its performance targets. First, EM and NNSA did not consistently follow DOE requirements for documenting scope targets and tracking these targets using DOE’s performance database. Establishing a clearly defined target for scope is critical for an agency to accurately track and assess a project’s overall performance. Limited Documentation or Changing Performance Baselines Complicates Evaluation of 27 Projects’ Performance
We were unable to determine the extent to which 27 of the 71 nonmajor projects that EM and NNSA completed or had under way from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012 had met their scope, cost, and completion date targets for four reasons. Several Factors Affect EM and NNSA in Managing Nonmajor Projects
Several factors affected EM and NNSA in managing their nonmajor projects that were completed or ongoing from fiscal years 2008 to 2012. According to our interviews with project officials, these factors included the suitability of the acquisition strategy, contractor performance, and adherence to project management requirements. According to project officials, the fee structure under this acquisition strategy is relatively simple and gives the project team flexibility to tie incentives to different performance milestones across the multiple subprojects within the contract. For example, according to NNSA project officials at the Los Alamos site office, the M&O contractor at the Los Alamos National Laboratory decided to construct the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building project using a design-build acquisition strategy with a single prime subcontractor responsible for both design and construction. EM’s Workforce Plans Do Not Consistently Identify Mission- Critical Occupations and Skills or Shortfalls in These Areas
EM’s eight workforce plans for its federal workforce do not consistently identify (1) mission-critical occupations and skills and (2) current and future shortfalls in these areas. Notwithstanding the variations in terms for mission-critical occupations and skills in EM’s workforce plans, many of the plans indicate that EM’s federal workforce may soon face shortfalls in a number of important areas, including project and contract management. EM officials said that they recognize the need to better identify mission- critical occupations and skills and shortfalls in these areas, and that they have taken a number of steps to address these issues. For example, officials in EM’s Office of Human Capital told us that they conducted a skills assessment in 2010 that helped EM identify key occupational series to target in its succession planning efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that DOE better tracks information on its nonmajor projects, including the extent to which these projects meet their performance targets, and that EM consistently identifies mission-critical occupations and skills, as well as any current and future shortfalls in these areas, in its workforce plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following five actions:
Ensure that the department clearly defines performance targets— including targets for scope, cost, and completion date—for each of its projects and documents the targets in appropriate CD-2 documentation, as is required by DOE’s project management order. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nonmajor projects have met their scope, cost, and completion date targets, we obtained performance information on 71 nonmajor projects. Therefore, we obtained data on project scope, cost, and schedule directly from EM and NNSA officials. To evaluate the extent to which EM’s workforce plans identify mission- critical occupations and skills and any current and future shortfalls in these areas, we examined EM’s strategic workforce plans for its headquarters and site office staff, DOE’s corrective action plan for contract and project management, and the Office of Personnel Management’s Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of February 2011, EM and NNSA remained on GAO's high-risk list for contracting and project management. These two offices manage numerous construction and cleanup projects that each cost less than $750 million and are called nonmajor projects. DOE requires its program offices to establish performance targets for the expected scope, cost, and completion date of each project before starting construction or cleanup. GAO has encouraged federal agencies to use strategic workforce planning to help them meet present and future mission requirements. Two key elements of workforce planning are to identify mission-critical occupations and skills and any current and future shortfalls in these areas. GAO was asked to examine the (1) extent to which EM and NNSA nonmajor projects have met their scope, cost, and completion date targets, (2) factors affecting EM's and NNSA's management of nonmajor projects, and (3) extent to which EM's workforce plans identify mission-critical occupations and skills and any current and future shortfalls in these areas. GAO reviewed DOE documents and project data, examined EM workforce plans, toured selected DOE facilities, and interviewed DOE officials.
What GAO Found
Of the 71 nonmajor projects that the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) completed or had under way from fiscal years 2008 to 2012, 21 met or are expected to meet their performance targets for scope, cost, and completion date. These projects included a $22 million EM project to expand an existing waste disposal facility at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee and a $199 million NNSA project to equip a radiological laboratory and office building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. Another 23 projects did not meet or were not expected to meet one or more of their three performance targets for scope, cost, and completion date. Among these, 13 projects met or are expected to meet two targets, including a $548 million NNSA project to shut down a nuclear reactor in Russia for nonproliferation purposes; 8 projects met or are expected to meet one target; 1 project did not meet any of its targets; and 1 project was cancelled. Of the remaining 27 projects, many had insufficiently documented performance targets for scope, cost, or completion date, which prevented GAO from determining whether they met their performance targets. EM and NNSA often did not follow DOE requirements for documenting these performance targets, making it more difficult for GAO and DOE to independently assess project performance.
Several factors affected EM's and NNSA's management of their nonmajor projects that were completed or ongoing from fiscal years 2008 to 2012. These factors included the suitability of a project's acquisition strategy, contractor performance, and adherence to project management requirements. For example, EM officials managing an ongoing project to remediate soil and water at the Idaho National Laboratory used an acquisition strategy that tied incentives for the contractor to different performance milestones across the multiple subprojects within the contract, which will help the project meet its performance goals, according to EM officials. In contrast, NNSA encountered problems meeting its performance goals for a project to build an office building and radiological laboratory at the Los Alamos National Laboratory partly due to its acquisition strategy. According to NNSA project officials at the Los Alamos site office, the project team should have hired one contractor to design the project and solicited bids from other contractors to build the project rather than using the same contractor for both activities. The former strategy might have resulted in a more mature project design and more time to evaluate various contractors' qualifications to construct the project, according to the NNSA project officials.
EM's workforce plans do not consistently identify mission-critical occupations and skills and current and future shortfalls in these areas for its federal workforce. In addition, many EM workforce plans indicate that EM may soon face shortfalls in a number of important areas, including project and contract management. EM officials said that they recognize these issues and have taken a number of steps to address them, including conducting a skills assessment to identify key occupational series to target for succession planning. However, the inconsistent terms used to describe mission-critical occupations and skills in EM's workforce plans make it difficult for GAO and DOE to understand EM's most critical needs regarding its workforce. GAO recommends that EM and NNSA clearly define, document, and track the scope, cost, and completion date targets for each of their nonmajor projects and that EM clearly identify critical occupations and skills in its workforce plans. EM and NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EM and NNSA clearly define, document, and track the scope, cost, and completion date targets for each of their nonmajor projects and that EM clearly identify critical occupations and skills in its workforce plans. EM and NNSA agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-693 | gao_GAO-02-693_0 | In the most thorough type of manual claims review, a carrier’s clinically trained personnel perform a medical review, which involves an examination of the claim along with the patient’s medical record, submitted by the physician, to determine compliance with all billing requirements. Few Physician Practices and Few Claims Per Practice Receive Medical Reviews
In estimating the prevalence of medical reviews, data from the three carriers in our study show that more than 90 percent of physician practices—including individual physicians, groups, and clinics—did not have any of their claims selected for medical review in fiscal year 2001, and for those that did, relatively few claims were subject to review. Targeting Claims That Most Warrant Medical Review Could Be Improved
Although the carriers in our study were highly accurate in making payment determinations, they can improve their process for selecting claims for medical review that are most likely to contain billing errors. CMS Makes Claims Accuracy New Benchmark for Measuring Carrier Performance
Since 1996, the overall level of payment errors for the Medicare program has been tracked nationwide in annual audit reports issued by the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). CERT is designed to measure, for all claims, the accuracy of payment decisions made by each carrier. The CERT benchmark will allow CMS to hold the carriers accountable for the accuracy of payment decisions for all claims processed, not just those selected for review. Appendix III: Comments from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Related GAO Products
Medicare: Communications With Physicians Can Be Improved (GAO-02-249, February 27, 2002). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1990, GAO designated the Medicare program to be at high-risk for waste, fraud, and abuse. More than a decade later, Medicare remains on GAO's high-risk list. This report examines Medicare's claims review process, which is designed to detect improper billing or payments.
What GAO Found
GAO found that most physicians who bill Medicare are largely unaffected by carriers' medical reviews, with 90 percent of physician claims going unreviewed in fiscal year 2001. At the three carriers GAO studied, implementation of the progressive corrective action initiative has reduced medical reviews of claims and has increased carrier education to individual physicians. The carriers in the study generally made appropriate payment determinations in examining physician claims selected for a medical review. By targeting claims that are more likely to have errors, carriers could improve the efficiency of their own operations and reduce administrative demands on the small proportion of physician practices with claims selected for review. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is refocusing its oversight of carrier performance in processing and reviewing claims. The agency intends to hold carriers accountable for the overall level of payment errors in all the claims they process, not just the ones they review. Consistent with this approach, CMS is developing a program in which an independent contractor determines the accuracy of claims processed and paid by each carrier using quantitative performance measures. |
gao_PEMD-95-9 | gao_PEMD-95-9_0 | Some randomized studies are conducted at single centers, while others are conducted at diverse sites (that is, multiple centers). Almost 2,500 node-negative breast cancer patients were enrolled and treated in these randomized studies. Using these adjustments, we found that, on average, similar patient survival followed the two treatments. Thus, the adjusted survival rates are based on “matched” treatment groups; that is, the kinds of patients who were unlikely to receive breast-conservation therapy contribute equally to the breast- conservation and the mastectomy survival estimates—as do the kinds of patients who were much more likely to receive breast- conservation therapy. Logically, the SEER combined-treatments survival rate is not affected by internal selection bias. From table 11, it is clear that with breast-conservation and mastectomy patients taken together, the 5-year survival rate for patients in single-center randomized studies is higher than the rate for the corresponding SEER estimate—by a difference of 4.3 percentage points, which is statistically significant. We recognize that database analyses are vulnerable to hidden selection bias. Only one caveat was suggested by the results of our analyses: A minority of breast-conservation patients—the kinds of patients for whom breast-conservation therapy was relatively unlikely to be used (based on factors such as residence in areas where breast-conservation is relatively uncommon) but who nevertheless did receive it—may have achieved slightly better results with mastectomy. Asian women had lower odds than others of receiving breast-conservation therapy, although they may have somewhat better prognoses than other breast cancer patients. GAO. No. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the survival rates of patients receiving breast-conservation therapy versus mastectomy therapy, focusing on whether patients' survivability is affected by having treatment in single-center studies rather than multi-center studies.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the 5-year survival rates for breast cancer patients treated with breast-conservation therapy were similar to that of mastectomy in community medical practices; (2) patients that were treated at single-center facilities usually had slightly higher survivability rates than patients who received treatment at multi-center facilities; (3) on average, breast cancer patients appear to be at no appreciable risk by selecting breast-conservation therapy rather than mastectomy; (4) although patient survivability data were vulnerable to hidden selection bias, such bias was unlikely since the group of patients reviewed were homogeneous and adjustments were made for patients' health and demographic characteristics; and (5) although a minority of patients who voluntarily chose breast-conservation therapy over recommended mastectomy therapy could have achieved slightly better results with mastectomy, the differences were not statistically significant. |
gao_GAO-14-557 | gao_GAO-14-557_0 | Background
Structure of National School Lunch and Breakfast Programs
The National School Lunch Program was established in 1946 and the School Breakfast Program was established in 1975 to provide nutritionally balanced, low-cost or free lunches and breakfasts to children in participating schools. Participating schools provide free meals to all children, regardless of their household income. (See table 2.) Existing Data and Methods for Adjusting for Geographic Variations Could Lead to Shifts in Eligibility and Might Increase Program Costs
Existing Federal Data Sources Are Available to Adjust School Meal Eligibility Based on Geographic Differences, but They Have Weaknesses
We identified two indexes that satisfied key considerations during our process of reviewing data sources to identify those that could be used to adjust eligibility guidelines for federal school meal programs for geographic differences in the cost of living. Effects from Any Adjustments to Income Eligibility Are Hard to Predict, but They Could Increase Overall Costs and Have Negative Implications for Some Participants
Changes in Eligibility, Participation, and Costs
Adjusting eligibility thresholds based on geographic differences could result in increased or decreased eligibility, participation, and costs, depending on the cost of living in a given area and how adjustments are applied. At the same time, in states where the cost of living is lower than average, according to the indexes, such as the South and Midwest, eligibility thresholds would be lower and fewer children would qualify for the program. For example, one consideration is whether to make adjustments at the state or sub-state level. Implications for Food Security
However, children who no longer qualify for free or reduced-price school meals and who cannot pay for school meals may be provided meals or partial meals at some schools, but USDA does not reimburse schools for such meals. In the 2012-2013 school year 14.7 million children were identified as categorically eligible for free or reduced-price meals. The Cost of Delivering School Meals Varies by Geographic Region, but the Usefulness of Existing Data to Adjust Reimbursements for These Differences Is Unclear
School Foodservice Costs Can Vary Depending on School Size, School District Decisions, and Location
USDA studies have shown that there are multiple cost drivers that affect schools’ foodservice costs differently. Similarly, available geographic foodservice wage data may not reflect costs for school foodservice labor. USDA Has Discretionary Authority to Adjust Reimbursement Rates for Geographic Differences in Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. Some states provide additional school meal reimbursement using state funds. We determined that the Regional Price Parities (RPP) and Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) best satisfied these considerations and we chose to further discuss in this report how these methods could be used to adjust for variations in the cost of living for U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) school meal income eligibility and the implications of doing so. The food and wage composite index was calculated for each state as follows [{(state RPP food goods index/100) x (proportion of average school food costs/total proportion of average labor and food costs)} + {(state BLS wage/national BLS wage) x (proportion of labor costs/total proportion of labor and food costs)}] For example, to determine the composite index for the state of Alabama: To show the change to the free school lunch reimbursement rate, 1.0 was subtracted from the composite index and then multiplied by the 90.1 percent proportion of the $2.93 free lunch reimbursement rate, as follows To illustrate the change to the free lunch reimbursement rate for Alabama: This illustration shows that in the 2013-2014 school year Alabama schools would have received 18.6 cents less in reimbursement for a lunch served to a child eligible for a free lunch. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2013, 30.7 million children participated in the National School Lunch Program and 13.2 million children participated in the School Breakfast Program, partly funded by $14.6 billion from the USDA. The majority of these children came from low-income families and received school meals free or at a reduced-price. Income eligibility and school reimbursement rates for school meals are federally set and do not consider geographic differences in the cost of living (except for Alaska and Hawaii). GAO was asked to explore the potential to account for such differences through a variety of measures and cost data.
This report, therefore, looks at a variety of methods by which to identify geographic differences in living costs and the potential for using them to adjust (1) income eligibility thresholds, and (2) reimbursement rates for schools. It also examines the extent to which states and localities can make adjustments for geographic differences in costs by using existing program rules. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and literature; analyzed available data sources and methods; and interviewed knowledgeable experts.
What GAO Found
There are a number of measures by which income thresholds for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) school meal programs could be adjusted to account for geographic differences in the cost of living; doing so would likely lead to shifts in eligibility and program costs. For example, the Supplemental Poverty Measure or Regional Price Parities could be used to adjust for geographic price differences; each could result in fewer children qualifying for assistance in the South and Midwest and more children qualifying in the Northeast (see figure below). In general, the effects of any such cost-of-living adjustment are difficult to predict and would vary depending on their implementation, such as whether they were applied state-wide or at the sub-state level, or whether children were kept from losing eligibility. Overall program costs could increase if more children participated.
Although the cost of delivering school meals varies by geographic region, the usefulness of available cost data is unclear for making such adjustments. Neither the Regional Price Parities for food services and goods or the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' wage data account for some drivers of variation in costs, such as economies of scale. In addition, they may not reflect the characteristics of the food and labor components of individual school districts.
The national school lunch and breakfast program rules allow states to expand eligibility for free meals and increase reimbursements to schools using federal or state funds. Some schools have expanded eligibility by providing free meals to all students under federal program rules. At the same time, some states use state funds to provide additional per meal reimbursements to schools for meals served. However, no state has used these flexibilities to adjust for within state geographic differences.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-948 | gao_GAO-02-948_0 | The act reformed court practices and established procedures intended to improve interactions between the court and social service agencies in the District. On July 8, 2002, the Mayor issued the required plan: Supporting the Vision: Mayor’s Plan to Integrate the District of Columbia’s Social Services Information Systems with the Family Court of the D.C. Superior Court. District IT officials noted that they have not yet completed essential analyses, such as an analysis of requirements that would provide the basis for this additional information. Although the Mayor’s plan discusses a variety of short- and long-term integration strategies, it does not contain milestones for completing these activities. Current legacy system limitations. The act requires the Mayor, in consultation with the Chief Judge of the Superior Court, to ensure that representatives of the appropriate offices of the District of Columbia government that provide social services and other related services to individuals served by the Family Court are available on- site at the Family Court; to provide information to the Chief Judge of the Superior Court and to the Presiding Judge of the Family Court regarding the services of the District government that are available for the individuals and families served by the Family Court; and to appoint an individual to serve as a liaison between the Family Court and the District government for ensuring that the representatives of the appropriate offices are available on-site at the Family Court. However, the plan does not describe how the funded activities involve the use of social workers to implement family court reform. Furthermore, it is not clear in the plan how the $500,000 in appropriated funds are to be used for CFSA’s social workers to implement family court reform, as required by law. More details regarding the liaison, on-site coordination, and border agreement activities are needed to ensure that appropriated funds are used as Congress intended. To analyze the Mayor’s spending plans for integrating computer systems and supporting Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) social workers’ efforts to implement family court reform, we (1) reviewed the District’s spending plans, (2) interviewed and obtained information from officials in the District’s Office of Chief Technology Officer and CFSA, and (3) reviewed legislation related to the $700,000 in federal funds provided in the District’s Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2001. | What GAO Found
Congress passed the D.C. Family Court Act of 2001 to reform court practices and establish procedures to improve interactions between the District of Columbia's Family Court, of D.C. Superior Court, and social service agencies in the District. The act directed the Mayor to prepare a plan to integrate the computer systems of District agencies with those of the Court. The fiscal year 2002 D.C. Appropriations Act authorized $200,000 for integrating the computer systems and $500,000 for social workers to implement family court reform. The act also required the Mayor to prepare a plan for these funds and mandated that the plan be issued on July 8, 2002. The Mayor's plan provides such useful information as (1) an outline of the District's current health and human services information technology environment and its information needs and limitations regarding the Family Court, (2) planned and possible short- and long-term initiatives to integrate the District's computer systems with those of the Family Court, (3) five technological integration priorities, and (4) how the $200,000 in appropriated funds will be spent. However, the District has not yet completed essential analyses, such as a requirements analysis, that would provide the basis for additional information. Based on GAO's analysis of the Mayor's plan for using the $500,000 in appropriated funds, it is not clear how the funds are to be used for social workers to implement family court reform, as required by law. The plan discusses the District's use of funds for service liaison, on-site coordination, and border agreement activities, but provides no detail on whether and how these activities involve social workers. |
gao_OP-98-1 | gao_OP-98-1_0 | This report includes summaries highlighting the impact of GAO’s work and associated key open recommendations—those recommendations which have not been fully implemented. For its deliberations on the supplemental request for fiscal year 1997 funds, we provided Congress with the most up-to-date information on the status of costs. Key Open Recommendations
Department of Education Management
In our 1992 transition series report, we recommended that the Department of Education have information and financial management systems that provide needed data and protect the federal government’s financial interests from waste, fraud, and mismanagement. These audit procedures were sent to all credit agencies’ inspectors general. (GAO/AIMD-96-7)
See also chapter 1, Improving National Security and International Affairs Programs. (GAO/AIMD-95-222)
See also chapter 2, Improving Resources, Community, and Economic Development Programs, Food and Agriculture Issue Area. | What GAO Found
GAO reported on the conclusions and recommendations resulting from its audits and other reviews of federal departments and agencies. GAO provided summary information on the status of all recommendations that have not been fully implemented in the areas of national security, international affairs, community and economic development, natural resources, human resources, justice, general government, and financial and information management for use in congressional review of budget requests. |
gao_RCED-98-62 | gao_RCED-98-62_0 | These plants are large employers, employing 250 to 2,500 or more production workers. From 1980 to 1990, minority populations, as a percentage of their respective county populations, increased in all 16 counties with large meatpacking workforces (7 in Nebraska and 9 in Iowa). In 10 of the 16 counties, these increases were greater than the statewide increases. In Iowa, the percentage increase in the minority population in three of the nine counties with large meatpacking workforces exceeded the statewide increase of 24.8 percent. These increases ranged from 11.8 to 22.1 percent. Furthermore, the percentage of students with limited English proficiency significantly exceeded the statewide average of 1.3 percent of the total school enrollment in 5 of the 13 counties, ranging from 3.0 to 10.5 percent. Use of Medicaid
Like their states as a whole, each of the 23 counties with large meatpacking workforces in Nebraska and Iowa experienced an increase in the number of Medicaid recipients per 1,000 in population for 1996 compared with the number of recipients in 1990. Changes in Economic Conditions
From 1990 to 1995, many of the 23 counties with large meatpacking workforces in Nebraska and Iowa experienced improvements in their economic circumstances, according to two measures of economic well being—per capita incomes and retail sales (adjusted for inflation). In Nebraska, 6 of the 10 counties had increases that exceeded the statewide increases in at least one of these measures. The level of serious crime increased in five of the nine Iowa counties for which data were available, while the statewide average crime rate decreased for the periods reviewed. Community officials also noted that some workers and families who have been in the communities for several years have purchased single-family homes. While community officials characterized the physical housing conditions of the meatpacking plant workers as generally adequate, they expressed some concerns about the effect of increasing populations in their local areas on the affordability of housing and overcrowding. Illegal Aliens in the Workforce
INS has often found illegal aliens employed at meatpacking plants and has designated this industry, along with 14 others, as a priority concern in its efforts to deter the employment of illegal aliens in the United States. The District Director estimated that as many as 25 percent of the workers in meatpacking plants in Nebraska and Iowa were illegal aliens. Company officials said that despite their efforts to ensure that they hire only eligible workers, illegal aliens have gained jobs by presenting forged identification documents that the companies have not detected. Scope and Methodology
To examine changes in the Nebraska and Iowa counties with large meatpacking plant workforces, we interviewed and obtained information from officials in nine Nebraska and Iowa cities with large meatpacking workforces and obtained and analyzed data on population, school enrollments, health care, personal income, taxable retail sales, and crime from federal and state agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the population changes that have occurred in communities in Nebraska and Iowa with large meatpacking workforces; (2) the changes that have occurred in school enrollments, health care costs, economic conditions, and crime rates; (3) whether the housing conditions of plant workers and their families; and (4) if there is evidence that meatpacking companies have hired illegal aliens.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from 1980 to 1990, 5 of the 16 counties with large meatpacking workforces in Iowa and Nebraska gained population; (2) minority populations (American Indians or Alaskan Natives, Asian or Pacific Islanders, African-Americans, and Hispanics) as a percentage of the total population grew in all 16 counties; (3) despite this growth, as of 1990, the proportion of minority populations in 11 of these counties remained smaller than the statewide proportions, which were 7.5 percent for Nebraska and 4.1 percent for Iowa; (4) school enrollments in 15 of the 23 counties with large meatpacking workforces increased more rapidly than statewide enrollments between 1987 and 1997; (5) furthermore, these counties experienced a large increase in the number of students with limited proficiency in English; (6) in 13 of the 23 counties with large meatpacking workforces, the increase in the number of Medicaid recipients per 1,000 in population exceeded the statewide increase of 54 percent in Nebraska and 39 percent in Iowa between 1990 and 1996; (7) in 18 of the 23 counties with large meatpacking workforces, there were improvements in at least one of two indicators of economic well-being--per capita incomes or taxable retail sales--from 1990 to 1995; (8) in many cases these improvements exceeded statewide gains; (9) the level of serious crime increased from 1986 to 1995 in 14 of the 19 counties with large meatpacking workforces for which crime data were available; (10) despite these increases, crime in 11 of the 19 counties was below statewide levels; (11) officials of nine Nebraska and Iowa communities said that the physical condition of housing occupied by newly employed workers is generally adequate; (12) the affordability of housing is a concern, especially for newly employed workers, and overcrowding has occurred among some workers and their families; (13) the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has often found illegal aliens employed at meatpacking plants; (14) the Service's District Director for Nebraska and Iowa estimated that up to 25 percent of the workers in meatpacking plants in Nebraska and Iowa were illegal aliens; and (15) the efforts that meatpacking companies have made to avoid hiring illegal aliens have been hampered, according to INS officials, primarily because of the proliferation of forged documents and limited methods to ensure that those seeking employment are eligible to work in the United States. |
gao_GAO-11-485 | gao_GAO-11-485_0 | Federal Laws and Regulations Regarding Tax Debtors Receiving Federal Contracts and Grants
Federal law does not prohibit a contractor with unpaid federal taxes from receiving contracts from the federal government. Recovery Act Contract and Grant Recipients Are Estimated to Owe More Than $750 Million in Known Unpaid Federal Taxes
At least 3,700 recipients of Recovery Act contracts and grants are estimated to owe $757 million in known unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2009, though this amount is likely understated for reasons discussed below. This represented nearly 5 percent of the approximate 80,000 contract and grant recipients in the Recovery.gov data as of July ly 2010 that we reviewed. These approximately 3,700 recipients received over $24 billion through Recovery Act contracts and grants. Employers are subject to civil and criminal penalties if they do not remit payroll taxes to the federal government. A substantial amount of the estimated unpaid federal taxes shown in IR records owed by Recovery Act contract and grant recipients had been outstanding from several tax years. 26 U.S.C. Examples of Recovery Act Contract and Grant Recipients Involved in Abusive Activity Related to the Federal Tax System
For the 15 cases of Recovery Act recipients with outstanding tax debt that we selected for a detailed audit and investigation, we found abusive or potential criminal activity related to the federal tax system. The amount of known unpaid taxes associated with these case studies is about $40 million, ranging from approximately $400,000 to over $9 million. IRS has taken collection or enforcement activities (e.g., filing of federal tax liens, assessment of a TFRP) against all 15 of these recipients. We have referred all 15 recipients to IRS for criminal investigation, if warranted. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to: (1) determine, to the extent possible, the magnitude of known tax debt which is owed by Recovery Act contract and grant recipients; and (2) provide examples of Recovery Act contract and grant recipients who have known unpaid federal taxes. To determine, to the extent possible, the magnitude of known tax debt owed by Recovery Act contract and grant recipients, we obtained and analyzed quarterly recipient reports submitted by contractors and grantees, as available through www.recovery.gov (Recovery.gov) through July 2010. We obtained and analyzed known tax debt data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as of September 30, 2009. To provide examples of Recovery Act recipients who have known unpaid federal taxes, we selected 15 of the approximately 3,700 Recovery Act recipients for a detailed audit and investigation. Because we considered the number of delinquent tax periods in selecting these 15 recipients, we were more likely to select recipients who owed primarily payroll taxes; our prior work has shown delinquent payroll taxes to be an indicator of potential abusive or criminal activity. These case studies serve to illustrate the sizeable amounts of taxes owed by some organizations that received Recovery Act funding and cannot be generalized beyond the cases presented. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act), enacted on February 17, 2009, appropriated $275 billion to be distributed for federal contracts, grants, and loans. As of March 25, 2011, $191 billion of this $275 billion had been paid out. GAO was asked to determine if Recovery Act contract and grant recipients have unpaid federal taxes and, if so, to (1) determine, to the extent possible, the magnitude of known federal tax debt which is owed by Recovery Act contract and grant recipients; and, (2) provide examples of Recovery Act contract and grant recipients who have known unpaid federal taxes. To determine, to the extent possible, the magnitude of known tax debt owed by Recovery Act contract and grant recipients, GAO identified contract and grant recipients from www.recovery.gov and compared them to known tax debts as of September 30, 2009, from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To provide examples of Recovery Act recipients with known unpaid federal taxes, GAO chose a nonrepresentative selection of 30 Recovery Act contract and grant recipients, which were then narrowed to 15 based on a number of factors, including the amount of taxes owed and the number of delinquent tax periods. These case studies serve to illustrate the sizable amounts of taxes owed by some organizations that received Recovery Act funding and cannot be generalized beyond the cases presented. This report contains no recommendations.
What GAO Found
At least 3,700 Recovery Act contract and grant recipients--including prime recipients, subrecipients, and vendors--are estimated to owe more than $750 million in known unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2009, and received over $24 billion in Recovery Act funds. This represented nearly 5 percent of the approximately 80,000 contractors and grant recipients in the data from www.Recovery.gov as of July 2010 that GAO reviewed. Federal law does not prohibit the awarding of contracts or grants to entities because they owe federal taxes and does not permit IRS to disclose taxpayer information, including unpaid federal taxes, to federal agencies unless the taxpayer consents. The estimated amount of known unpaid federal taxes is likely understated because IRS databases do not include amounts owed by recipients who have not filed tax returns or understated their taxable income and for which IRS has not assessed tax amounts due. In addition, GAO's analysis does not include Recovery Act contract and grant recipients who are noncompliant with or not subject to Recovery Act reporting requirements. GAO selected 15 Recovery Act recipients for further investigation. For the 15 cases, GAO found abusive or potentially criminal activity, i.e., recipients had failed to remit payroll taxes to IRS. Federal law requires employers to hold payroll tax money "in trust" before remitting it to IRS. Failure to remit payroll taxes can result in civil or criminal penalties under U.S. law. The amount of unpaid taxes associated with these case studies were about $40 million, ranging from approximately $400,000 to over $9 million. IRS has taken collection or enforcement activities (e.g., filing of federal tax liens) against all 15 of these recipients. GAO has referred all 15 recipients to IRS for further investigation, if warranted. |
gao_GAO-08-519 | gao_GAO-08-519_0 | DOD’s business systems modernization is one of the high-risk areas, and it is an essential component for addressing many of the department’s other high-risk areas. Stage 5: Leveraging the enterprise architecture to manage change. The groups are architecture governance, content, use, and measurement. Use refers to core elements that provide for an architecture-centric approach to IT investment management (i.e., treating architecture as the authoritative frame of reference in guiding and constraining IT investments). 2. DOD Roles and Responsibilities for Business Enterprise Architecture Development and Use
In 2005, DOD reassigned responsibility for directing, overseeing, and executing its business transformation and systems modernization efforts to the Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) and the Business Transformation Agency. Maturity of Military Department Enterprise Architecture Programs Continues to Vary
Each of the military departments’ enterprise architecture programs is at the initial stage of our maturity framework, meaning that each has not fully satisfied all of the core elements associated with the framework’s second stage (establishing the management foundation for developing, maintaining, and using the architecture). Also, none have fully satisfied the core elements associated with Stage 3 (developing the architecture), 4 (completing the architecture), and 5 (leveraging the architecture for organizational change). As a result, none have yet to advance to a state that can be considered fully mature and effective. Although all departments are at Stage 1, the status of the three vary considerably. Specifically, the Air Force far exceeds the Navy, which generally exceeds the Army, in terms of the total number of core elements that are fully satisfied. Further, even though all three are at Stage 1, the Air Force has at least partially satisfied all of the core elements associated with Stage 3 and has partially satisfied all but three core elements across all stages. Moreover, the Air Force has made important progress in maturing its EA program over the last 2 years, while the Navy has made mixed progress, and the Army has not made progress. The Navy has at least partially satisfied 93 percent of the elements associated with Stages 2 and 3 and has in place many aspects of the core elements that support these stages, which it can use to continue establishing an effective architecture management foundation and associated plans and products. In particular, while the Army has an EA program office, the office does not have an approved charter. According to Air Force officials, the positive progress that it has made in maturing its architecture program is due, in large part, to the focus, commitment, and leadership of senior department executives, including the Secretary of the Air Force. The Air Force has a solid foundation on which to continue building, but the Navy and, even more so, the Army has much to accomplish before either will have effective and mature architecture programs. As a result, DOD, as a whole, is not as well positioned as it should be to realize the significant benefits that a well-managed federation of architecture programs can provide. Recommendation for Executive Action
Because we have outstanding recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at, among other things, having the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, and Army fully satisfy each of the core elements in our architecture framework, we are not making additional recommendations relative to our framework at this time. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, GAO designated Department of Defense (DOD) business systems modernization as a high-risk program, and the program remains on the high-risk list today. A key to successful systems modernization is having and using an enterprise architecture as an authoritative frame of reference, or blueprint, for system investment decisions. To assist DOD in modernizing its business systems, Congress passed legislation consistent with prior GAO recommendations for DOD to develop and implement a business enterprise architecture (BEA). In response, DOD developed a corporate BEA that it intends to federate, or extend, to the military departments and defense agencies. To support GAO's legislative mandate to review DOD's BEA, GAO evaluated the status of the Air Force, Navy, and Army architecture programs. To accomplish this, GAO used its Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity Framework and associated evaluation method.
What GAO Found
The enterprise architecture programs within the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, and Army have yet to advance to a level that can be considered fully mature. Specifically, all three departments are at the initial stage of GAO's architecture maturity framework. This means that they have not fully satisfied all the core elements associated with the framework's second stage (establishing the management foundation for developing, maintaining, and using the architecture) or any of the framework's higher stages: Stage 3 (developing the architecture), Stage 4 (completing the architecture), and Stage 5 (leveraging the architecture for organizational change). An organization generally needs to have achieved the fifth stage in the framework for it to have an effective architecture program because, at this stage, the management controls and structures are in place for using an approved architecture to guide and constrain system investments in a way that produces institutional results. Although each department is at Stage 1, the status of the programs vary considerably. Specifically, the Air Force far exceeds both the Navy and the Army, while the Navy generally exceeds the Army, in terms of the total percentage of core elements that are fully satisfied. Moreover, of the core elements that have not been fully satisfied by at least one of the three departments, most relate to architecture content, use, and measurement. Even though none of the departments have fully satisfied sufficient core elements to advance beyond Stage 1, the Air Force has at least partially satisfied all the core elements associated with Stages 2 and 3, as well as all but three core elements across all stages, and the Navy has at least partially satisfied all the core elements for Stage 2. In addition, the Air Force has made important progress in the last 2 years in maturing its architecture program, while the Navy's progress has been mixed, and the Army has not made any progress. Collectively, this means that DOD, as a whole, is not as well positioned as it should be to realize the significant benefits that a well-managed federation of architectures can afford its business systems modernization efforts. Individually, it means that the Air Force has a solid architectural foundation on which to continue building, while the Navy and, even more so, the Army has much to accomplish. According to Air Force officials, its progress owes largely to the architecture-related focus, commitment, and leadership of senior department executives, including the Secretary. |
gao_GAO-16-542 | gao_GAO-16-542_0 | Background
The U.S. AD/CV Duty Collection Process
The process for importing goods into the United States generally involves at least two private parties (exporters and importers) as well as the U.S. government. We Estimate $2.3 Billion in Unpaid AD/CV Duty Bills, but CBP Does Not Expect to Collect Most of That Amount
Our analysis shows that the total amount of unpaid AD/CV duty bills issued for goods that entered the United States during fiscal years 2001 through 2014 was about $2.3 billion as of May 12, 2015. Our analysis shows that AD/CV duty bills with unpaid amounts are concentrated among a small number of importers, with 20 importers accounting for about 50 percent of the $2.3 billion owed. When the final duty rate exceeds the initial estimated duty rate, importers are billed for the additional duties owed. In its Performance and Accountability Report for fiscal year 2015, CBP reported that about $1.6 billion of AD/CV duty debt was uncollectible. Various CBP Efforts to Improve AD/CV Duty Collection and to Use Bonding to Mitigate Nonpayment Risk Have Produced Limited Results
CBP has undertaken several efforts to improve its collection of AD/CV duties or to protect against the risk of uncollectible final duty bills through enhanced bonding; however, these efforts had yielded limited results as of May 2016. For example, CBP launched an initiative to reduce processing errors that result in CBP closing duty bills at the initial estimated duty rate rather than the final duty rate; in such cases, the initial duty paid may be significantly higher or lower than the final duty amount owed. Though the initiative has shown positive results, as of May 2016, its application had been limited. In addition, CBP had not collected and analyzed data systematically to help it monitor and minimize these duty processing errors. As a result, CBP does not know the extent of these errors and cannot take timely or effective action and avoid the potential revenue loss they may represent. Insufficient Risk Analysis of Unpaid AD/CV Duties Has Resulted in CBP Missing Opportunities to Mitigate Lost Revenue
CBP’s limited analysis of the risk to revenue from potentially uncollectible AD/CV duties (nonpayment risk) does not accurately assess country- and product-associated risk or risks associated with other entry characteristics and misses opportunities to identify and mitigate nonpayment risk. The standard definition of risk with regard to a negative event that could occur includes both the likelihood of the event and the significance of the consequences if the event occurs; however, CBP does not attempt to assess either of these for any given entry of goods subject to AD/CV duties entering U.S. customs. As our analysis demonstrates, a more comprehensive analysis of CBP data related to AD/CV duties is feasible and could help CBP better identify key risk factors associated with nonpayment risk. To improve risk management in the collection of AD/CV duties, CBP should, consistent with U.S. law and international obligations, take steps to use its data and risk assessment strategically to mitigate AD/CV duty nonpayment, such as by using predictive risk analysis to identify entries that pose heightened risk and taking appropriate action to mitigate the risk. In its comments, CBP concurred with all three of our recommendations. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) examines the status and composition of uncollected antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CV) duties, (2) the extent to which the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken steps to improve its billing and collection of AD/CV duties, and (3) the extent to which CBP uses and could further use its data to assess and mitigate the risk to revenue from potentially uncollectible AD/CV duties. The first ACS dataset contained AD/CV duty entry data; the second contained final assessed AD/CV duty rate data; and the third contained importer AD/CV duty billing data. We also reviewed CBP’s reports to Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States assesses AD duties on products imported at unfairly low prices (i.e., dumped) and CV duties on products subsidized by foreign governments. Nonpayment of AD/CV duties means the U.S. government has not fully remedied unfair trade practices and results in lost revenue.
GAO was asked to review CBP's efforts to improve the collection of AD/CV duties. This report (1) examines the status and composition of uncollected AD/CV duties, (2) the extent to which CBP has taken steps to improve its collection of such duties, and (3) the extent to which CBP assesses and mitigates the risk to revenue from potentially uncollectible AD/CV duties. GAO analyzed CBP AD/CV duty entry data for fiscal years 2001 through 2014, AD/CV duty billing data as of mid-May 2015, and Department of Commerce data for fiscal years 2002–2015. GAO also reviewed agency documents, interviewed agency and private sector officials, and analyzed CBP data to assess the risk of duty nonpayment.
What GAO Found
GAO estimates that about $2.3 billion in antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CV) duties owed to the U.S. government were uncollected as of mid-May 2015, based on its analysis of AD/CV duty bills for goods entering the United States in fiscal years 2001–2014. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported that it does not expect to collect most of that debt. GAO found that most AD/CV duty bills were paid and that unpaid bills were concentrated among a small number of importers, with 20 accounting for about 50 percent of the $2.3 billion uncollected. CBP data show that most of those importers stopped importing before receiving their first AD/CV duty bill. As GAO has previously reported, the U.S. AD/CV duty system involves the retrospective assessment of duties, such that the final amount of AD/CV duties an importer owes can significantly exceed the initial amount paid at the estimated duty rate when the goods entered the country.
CBP has undertaken efforts to improve its collection of AD/CV duties or to protect against the risk of unpaid final duty bills through bonding, but these efforts have yielded limited results. For example, CBP launched an initiative to reduce processing errors that result in CBP closing duty bills at the initial duty rate rather than the final duty rate, such that the initial duty paid may be significantly higher or lower than the final duty amount owed. Though the initiative has shown positive results, as of May 2016, its application had been limited. In addition, CBP had not collected and analyzed data systematically to help it monitor and minimize these duty processing errors. As a result, CBP does not know the extent of these errors and cannot take timely or effective action and avoid the potential revenue loss they may represent.
CBP's limited analysis of the risk to revenue from potentially uncollectible AD/CV duties (nonpayment risk) misses opportunities to identify and mitigate nonpayment risk. The standard definition of risk with regard to some negative event that could occur includes both the likelihood of the event and the significance of the consequences if the event occurs; however, CBP does not attempt to assess either of these risk components for any given entry of goods subject to AD/CV duties. GAO's analysis, applying standard statistical methods, demonstrates that a more comprehensive analysis of CBP data related to AD/CV duties is feasible and could help CBP better identify key factors associated with nonpayment risk and take steps to mitigate it.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP (1) issue guidance to collect and analyze data on a regular basis to find and address the causes of AD/CV duty liquidation errors and track progress; (2) regularly conduct a comprehensive risk analysis that considers likelihood as well as significance of risk factors related to duty nonpayment; and (3) take steps to use its data and risk assessment strategically to mitigate AD/CV duty nonpayment consistent with U.S. law and international trade obligations. CBP concurred with all three recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-619T | gao_GAO-02-619T_0 | Despite these issues, IRS was, for the second consecutive year, able to produce financial statements covering its tax custodial and administrative activities in fiscal years 2001 and 2000, that were fairly stated in all material respects. Strong commitment and hard work by both IRS’s senior leadership and staff continued to be the key to its ability to overcome its fundamental systems and internal control deficiencies and achieve its goal of receiving an unqualified audit opinion on its fiscal years 2001 and 2000 financial statements. Performance Management System
IRS has continued to make progress in revamping its performance management system-a system designed to measure, assess, and improve organizational and employee performance. Although Computer Security Improvements Made, Taxpayer Data Still at Risk
IRS has corrected or mitigated many of the computer security weaknesses cited in our previous reports, and is implementing a computer security program that should, when fully implemented, help it better manage its risks in this area. Business Systems Modernization
We now turn to the business systems modernization (BSM)—IRS’s ongoing, multiyear, multibillion-dollar program intended to leverage the power of information technology (IT) to revamp how the service does business. Progress has also been made over this period in establishing the modernization management controls needed to effectively acquire and implement BSM systems. | What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was, for the second consecutive year, able to prepare financial statements that received an unqualified opinion. However, this achievement once again came through the use of substantial, costly, and time-consuming processes to compensate for serious systems and control deficiencies. IRS continues to make progress in its performance management system by using a strategic planning and budgeting process to reconcile competing priorities and initiatives with available resources. In the area of computer security, IRS corrected or mitigated many of the previously reported weaknesses, including those affecting its electronic filing systems. It also is implementing a computer security program that should help manage its risks in this area. Business Systems Modernization is IRS' ongoing program to leverage information technology and is integral to IRS achieving its customer-focused vision. To date, IRS has made progress in establishing the systems infrastructure, delivering system applications, and developing the management controls and capabilities necessary to effectively acquire and deploy modernized systems. |
gao_GAO-04-557T | gao_GAO-04-557T_0 | CBP Has Layered Approach to Select and Inspect Cargo Containers
CBP is responsible for preventing terrorists and weapons of mass destruction from entering the United States. As part of its responsibility, it has the mission to address the potential threat posed by the movement of oceangoing containers. These determinations are not just based on concerns about terrorism, but also concerns about illegal narcotics and/or other contraband. The Commissioner also said it is unrealistic to expect that all containers warrant such inspection because each container poses a different level of risk based on a number of factors including the exporter, the transportation providers, and the importer. Positive Steps Taken, but Targeting Strategy Lacks Some Key Components of Risk Management and Modeling
CBP Has Taken Several Steps to Improve Its Targeting Strategy
CBP has recognized the potential vulnerability of oceangoing cargo containers and has reviewed and updated some aspects of its layered targeting strategy. CBP officials told us that, given the urgency to take steps to protect against terrorism after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, they had to take an “implement and amend” approach. The rule is intended to improve the quality and the timeliness of manifest information submitted to CBP, which is important because CBP relies extensively on manifest information for targeting. Targeting Strategy Does Not Incorporate Some Key Elements of Risk Management
While CBP’s targeting strategy incorporates some elements of risk management, our discussions with terrorism experts and our comparison of CBP’s targeting system with recognized risk management practices showed that the strategy does not fully incorporate all key elements of a risk management framework. CBP has not performed a comprehensive set of assessments for cargo containers. Targeting Strategy Faces Implementation Challenges
CBP Lacks National System to Track Cargo Container Inspections by Risk Category
We found a number of deficiencies in CBP’s national system for reporting and analyzing inspection statistics. Staff Testing and Certification Could Help Strengthen Targeting Process
CBP does not have an adequate mechanism to test or certify the competence of targeters in their national targeting training program. Not all longshoremen’s unions have safety concerns regarding VACIS inspections. In the context of possible smuggling of weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers at our nation’s seaports, it is vital that CBP use its resources to maximize the effectiveness of its targeting strategy to reduce this uncertainty. Without incorporating all elements of a risk management framework and utilizing recognized modeling practices, CBP cannot be sure that its targeting strategy is properly focused and prioritized. Finally, without instituting a national inspection reporting system, testing and certifying CBP officials that receive the targeting training, and resolving the safety concerns of longshoremen unions, the targeting system’s effectiveness as a risk management tool may be limited. One way in which the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection has already begun to manage risk is by developing and implementing the Automated Targeting System to target high-risk oceangoing containerized cargo for inspection. Mitigation selection. Appendix III: Recognized Modeling Practices Applicable to the Review of ATS
This appendix details the recognized modeling practices that GAO used to assess CBP’s computerized targeting model, known as the ATS. Simulated events could include “red teams” attempting to smuggle a fake WMD into the United States hidden in an oceangoing cargo container. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns intensified that terrorists would attempt to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. One possible method is to use one of the 7 million cargo containers that arrive at our seaports each year. Addressing the potential threat posed by the movement of oceangoing cargo containers falls to the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Since CBP cannot inspect all arriving cargo containers, it uses a targeting strategy, including an Automated Targeting System. This system targets containers for inspection based on perceived level of risk. In this testimony, GAO summarizes its work on (1) whether the development of CBP's targeting strategy is consistent with recognized key risk management and modeling practices and (2) how well the strategy has been implemented at selected seaports.
What GAO Found
CBP has taken steps to address the terrorism risks posed by oceangoing cargo containers, but its strategy neither incorporates all key elements of a risk management framework nor is it entirely consistent with recognized modeling practices. Actions CBP has taken included refining the Automated Targeting System to target cargo containers that are a high risk for terrorism, or other smuggling, for physical inspection. CBP has also implemented national targeting training and sought to improve the quality and timeliness of manifest information, which is one of the inputs for its Automated Targeting System. However, regarding risk management, CPB has not performed a comprehensive set of assessments vital for determining the level of risk for oceangoing cargo containers and the types of responses necessary to mitigate that risk. Regarding recognized modeling practices, CBP has not subjected the Automated Targeting System to adequate external peer review or testing. It has also not fully implemented a process to randomly examine containers in order to test the targeting strategy. Without incorporating all key elements of a risk management framework and recognized modeling practices, CBP cannot be reasonably sure that its targeting strategy provides the best method to protect against weapons of mass destruction entering the United States at its seaports. GAO's visits to selected seaports found that the implementation of CBP's targeting strategy faces a number of challenges. Although port officials said that inspectors were able to inspect all containers designated by the Automated Targeting System as high-risk, GAO's requests for documentation raised concerns about the adequacy of CBP's data to document these inspections. CBP lacks an adequate mechanism to test or certify the competence of students who participate in their national targeting training. Additionally, CBP has not been able to fully address longshoremen's safety concerns related to inspection equipment. Addressing these concerns is important to ensure that cargo inspections are conducted safely and efficiently. Challenges to both the development and the implementation of CBP's targeting strategy, if not addressed, may limit the effectiveness of targeting as a tool to help ensure homeland security. |
gao_GAO-07-1245T | gao_GAO-07-1245T_0 | Taken together, these acts anchor the federal government’s role in the freight rail industry by establishing numerous goals for regulating the industry, including to allow, to the maximum extent possible, competition and demand for services to establish reasonable rates for transportation by rail; minimize the need for federal regulatory control over the rail transportation system and require fair and expeditious regulatory decisions when regulation is required; promote a safe and efficient rail transportation system by allowing rail carriers to earn adequate revenues, as determined by STB; ensure the development and continuation of a sound rail transportation system with effective competition among rail carriers and with other modes to meet the needs of the public and the national defense; foster sound economic conditions in transportation and ensure effective competition and coordination between rail carriers and other modes; maintain reasonable rates where there is an absence of effective competition and where rail rates provide revenues that exceed the amount necessary to maintain the rail system and attract capital; prohibit predatory pricing and practices to avoid undue concentrations of market power; and provide for the expeditious handling and resolution of all proceedings. Railroad Industry Is Increasingly Healthy and Rail Rates Have Generally Declined Since 1985, Despite Recent Rate Increases
The changes that have occurred in the railroad industry since the enactment of the Staggers Rail Act are widely viewed as positive. In addition, rail rates have generally declined since 1985, even though rates began to increase in 2001 and experienced a 9 percent annual increase between 2004 and 2005—the largest annual increase in 20 years. Railroad Industry’s Financial Health Has Improved Substantially
There is widespread consensus that the freight rail industry has benefited from the Staggers Rail Act. In 2005, rates increased for all 13 commodities that we reviewed. 3). Reported Miscellaneous Revenue, Including Fuel Surcharges, Increased Ten- Fold Since 2000
In 2005 the amount of industry revenue reported as miscellaneous increased ten-fold over 2000 levels, rising from about $141 million to over $1.7 billion (see fig. Captive Shippers Are Difficult to Identify But Concerns Remain and Past STB Actions Have Led to Little Effective Relief
In October 2006, we reported that captive shippers are difficult to identify and STB’s efforts to protect captive shippers have resulted in little effective relief for those shippers. We also reported that economists and shipper groups have proposed a number of alternatives to address remaining concerns about competition – however, each of these alternative approaches have costs and benefits and should be carefully considered to ensure the approach will achieve the important balance set out in the Staggers Act. Some areas with access to one Class I railroad also have more than half of their traffic traveling at rates that exceed the statutory threshold for rate relief. STB Has Taken Actions to Protect Captive Shippers but Efforts Have Led to Little Effective Relief
STB has taken a number of actions to provide relief for captive shippers. STB Has Taken Steps to Address Problems, but Actions Are Too Recent to Be Evaluated
STB has taken some actions to address our past recommendations, but it is too soon to determine the effect of these actions. In October 2006 we reported that the continued existence of pockets of potential captivity at a time when the railroads are, for the first time in decades, experiencing increasing economic health, raises the question whether rail rates in selected markets reflect justified and reasonable pricing practices, or an abuse of market power by the railroads. However, in June 2007, STB stated that it intended to implement our recommendation using funding that was not available at the time of our October report to solicit proposals from analysts with no connection to the freight railroad industry or STB proceedings to conduct a rigorous analysis of competition in the freight railroad industry. It will be important that these analysts have the ability that STB has through its statutory authority to inquire into railroad practices as well as sufficient access to information to determine whether rail rates in selected markets reflect justified and reasonable pricing practices, or an abuse of market power by the railroads. We also recommended that STB review its method of data collection to ensure that all freight railroads are consistently and accurately reporting all revenues collected from shippers, including fuel surcharges and other costs not explicitly captured in all railroad rate structures. While these are positive steps, these rules did not address how surcharges are reported in the Carload Waybill Sample. As stated earlier, STB has also taken steps to refine the rate relief process since our 2006 report. While these appear to be positive steps that could address longstanding concerns with the rate relief process, it is too soon to determine the effect of these changes to the process, and we have not evaluated the effect of these changes. Freight Railroads: Updated Information on Rates and Other Industry Trends. Railroad Regulation: Economic and Financial Impacts of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. Shipper Rail Rates: Interstate Commerce Commission’s Handling of Complaints. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 largely deregulated the freight railroad industry, giving the railroads freedom to price their services according to market conditions and encouraging greater reliance on competition to set rates. The act recognized the need for railroads to recover costs by setting higher rates for shippers with fewer transportation alternatives. The act also recognized that some shippers might not have access to competitive alternatives and might be subject to unreasonably high rates. It established a threshold for rate relief and granted the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Surface Transportation Board (STB) the authority to develop a rate relief process for those "captive" shippers. GAO's reported on rates, competition, and other industry trends in reports issued in October 2006 and August 2007. This statement is based on those reports and discusses (1) the changes that have occurred in the railroad industry since the enactment of the Staggers Rail Act, including changes in rail rates since 1985, (2) the extent of captivity in the industry and STB's efforts to protect captive shippers, and (3) STB's actions to address GAO's recent recommendations.
What GAO Found
The changes that have occurred in the railroad industry since the enactment of the Staggers Rail Act are widely viewed as positive, since the financial health of the industry has improved and most rates have declined since 1985. The freight railroad industry's financial health improved substantially as railroads cut costs through productivity improvements and new technologies. However, rates began to increase in 2001, and in 2005 rates jumped nearly 9 percent--the largest annual increase in twenty years--and rates increased for all 13 commodities that we reviewed. Revenues that railroads report as "miscellaneous revenue"--a category that includes some fuel surcharges--increased more than ten-fold from $141 million in 2000 to over $1.7 billion in 2005. It is difficult to precisely determine how many shippers are "captive" because available proxy measures can overstate or understate captivity. However some data indicate that potentially captive traffic appears to have decreased, while at the same time, data also indicates that traffic traveling at rates significantly above the threshold for rate relief has increased. In October 2006, we reported that STB's rate relief process to protect captive shippers have resulted in little effective relief for those shippers. We also reported that economists and shipper groups have proposed a number of alternatives to address remaining concerns about competition--however, each of these alternative approaches have costs and benefits and should be carefully considered. STB has taken some actions to address our past recommendations, but it is too soon to determine the effect of these actions. Our October 2006 report noted that the continued existence of pockets of potentially "captive shippers" raised questions as to whether rail rates in selected markets reflected reasonable pricing practices, or an abuse of market power. We recommended that the Board undertake a rigorous analysis of competitive markets to identify the state of competition. STB has awarded a contract to conduct this study; while this is an important step, it will be important that these analysts have STB's authority and access to information to determine whether rail rates in selected markets reflect reasonable pricing practices. We also recommended that STB ensure that freight railroads are consistently reporting all revenues, including miscellaneous revenues. While STB has revised its rules on fuel surcharges, these rules did not address how fuel surcharges are reported and STB has not yet taken steps to accurately collect data on other miscellaneous revenues. STB has also taken a number of steps to revise its rate relief process. While these appear to be promising steps, it is too soon to tell what effect these changes will have and we have not evaluated them. |
gao_GAO-03-364 | gao_GAO-03-364_0 | FHFB Chair Has Greater Authority to Make Key Administrative Decisions Than the Chairs of Most Other Financial Regulators
The FHFB chairs’ authority to administer the agency is broader than that of the chairs of the other financial regulators included in our review, with the exception of the FDIC. At FCA, the board must approve major organizational changes, but the chair has the authority to make organizational changes within particular units. Delegations of Authority Serve as Basis for FHFB and FDIC Chairs’ Powers
The basis for the FHFB chair’s significant administrative power is a delegation of authority approved by the board in 1990 and 1993. That is, FHFB agreed to pay each affected employee 3 to 6 months salary in exchange for agreeing to sign the settlement agreement. . . (i) Filing a charge or complaint, including a challenge to the validity of a waiver agreement, with EEOC, or (ii) Participating in any investigation or proceeding conducted by EEOC.”
The settlement agreements also do not appear consistent with OWBPA requirements and EEOC regulations that require employers to notify employees in writing to consult with an attorney prior to agreeing to waive their rights under ADEA. In addition, FHFB did not provide information to the affected employees as is required under OWBPA and EEOC regulations. FHFB Has Announced Plans to Improve Its FHLBank Examination Program
Although we identified weaknesses in FHFB’s examination program in a 1998 report, FHFB did not address these weaknesses, and they persisted for several years. For example, the report found that FHFB examiners did not thoroughly review FHLBank internal control systems. Moreover, from 1998 through 2002, direct mortgage acquisition programs added risks to the FHLBank System and the FHLBanks developed increasingly complex approaches to manage these risks. Conclusions
Due to the delegation of authority, the FHFB chair has relatively broad administrative power, compared with most financial regulatory chairs, to appoint senior officials and reorganize the agency without obtaining a board vote or approval. That is, the board structure is designed to help ensure that key decisions benefit from the experiences and perspectives of all board members. In addition, the FHFB board’s decision will likely result in the continuation of the sometimes bitter conflicts that have periodically characterized the relationships among board members over the past 8 years. However, in 2002, current FHFB Chair Korsmo announced plans and initiated actions, such as hiring more examiners that have the potential to improve the quality of the agency’s safety and soundness oversight. We also recommend that FHFB fully comply with applicable federal age discrimination statutes and regulations in offering settlement agreements to employees subject to RIFs. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As discussed with your staff, our report objectives are to (1) compare the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) chair’s administrative authorities to those of the chairs of other financial regulators and discuss the basis for that authority; (2) assess FHFB’s compliance with selected applicable statutes and procedural requirements in connection with a reduction-in- force (RIF) that was carried out as part of an agency reorganization announced on August 7, 2002; (3) assess FHFB’s progress in enhancing its Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) safety and soundness examination program; (4) provide data showing the political contributions of FHLBank public interest directors prior to their appointments; and (5) compare FHFB’s use of Schedule C appointments and the organization of its public and congressional affairs functions with the practices of other financial regulatory agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Home Loan Bank System (System) faces additional risks due to the development of new products such as direct mortgage purchase programs. Responding to concern about the methods used for administrative decisionmaking, and the ability of the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) to fulfill its critical mission to regulate the safety and soundness of the System, GAO was asked to (1) compare the FHFB chair's administrative authorities with those of other financial regulators and discuss the basis for that authority, (2) assess FHFB's compliance with selected statutes and regulations in connection with an August 2002 reduction-in-force (RIF) carried out as part of an agency reorganization, and (3) assess FHFB's progress in enhancing its FHLBank safety and soundness examination program.
What GAO Found
FHFB's chair has greater authority to make key administrative decisions than the chairs at five of the six other financial regulators GAO reviewed. FHFB's chair has the authority to appoint and remove officials and reorganize the agency without a vote by the board. In contrast, statutes, regulations, and practices limit the chairs' authorities at most other regulators. In particular, the boards or commissions at these agencies approve most senior-level appointments and several boards approve major reorganizations. The basis for the FHFB chair's comparatively broad administrative authority is a delegation of authority, which the board passed in 1990 and 1993. The delegation allows the chair to make and implement key decisions without obtaining or benefiting from the views of all board members and has contributed to sometimes bitter conflicts among board members over the past 8 years. Although FHFB provided significant financial compensation to staff subject to the RIF, its procedures were not fully consistent with all applicable federal age discrimination statutes and regulations. For example, FHFB presented a settlement agreement to separated staff that offered 3 to 6 months salary in exchange for, among other things, the employees agreeing to waive their rights to file charges, complaints, or appeals with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). EEOC regulations implementing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act do not permit waivers of employees' rights to file charges or complaints with EEOC. In addition, FHFB did not advise the affected employees in writing to consult an attorney prior to signing the agreements as is required. Although for several years FHFB did not take steps to correct weaknesses in its FHLBank examination program that GAO identified in a 1998 report, FHFB's current Chair has recently undertaken several steps to improve its examinations. In 1998, and again in 2002, GAO found that FHFB performed limited reviews of FHLBank functions that are critical in managing the banks' financial and operational risks. Among other changes announced in 2002, FHFB plans to increase the number of examiners from 10 to 24 and revise its examination approach to focus on the major risks and quality of controls at each FHLBank. Although these changes have the potential to improve FHFB's examination program, it is too soon to assess their effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-04-229T | gao_GAO-04-229T_0 | Extent of Premium Class Travel Is Significant
As shown in table 1, DOD spent nearly $124 million on airline tickets that included at least one leg of premium class service during fiscal years 2001 and 2002. However, to put the $124 million that DOD spent on premium class travel in perspective, the amount DOD spent on premium class-related travel during these 2 fiscal years exceeded the total travel and transportation expenses—including airfare, lodging, and meals—spent by each of 12 major agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, including the Social Security Administration; the Departments of Energy, Education, Housing and Urban Development, and Labor; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The difference between the price of a premium class ticket and a comparable coach class ticket can range from negligible—particularly if the traveler traveled within Europe—to thousands of dollars. Higher-ranking civilian personnel and military officials accounted for a large part of premium class travel. Internal Control Activities Not Effectively Implemented
Control activities occur at all levels and functions of an agency. Using these guidelines, we estimated, based on our statistical sample, that an estimated 72 percent of the DOD centrally billed travel transactions containing premium class travel for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 were not properly authorized and that an estimated 73 percent were not properly justified. Considering the significant breakdown in key internal controls, it was not surprising that our audit identified numerous examples of improper premium class travel that cost DOD significantly more than what would have been spent on a coach class ticket. Weaknesses in Internal Control Environment
GAO’s Standards for Internal Controlstates that a positive control environment is the foundation for all other standards. However, we found that prior to us initiating this audit, DOD had not taken actions to encourage a strong internal control environment over premium class travel. Specifically, DOD and the military services did not (1) maintain adequate and accurate premium class travel data, (2) issue adequate policies related to the approval of premium travel, (3) require consistent documentation to justify premium class travel, and (4) perform audits or evaluations of premium class travel and did not monitor training provided to travelers, authorizing officials, and commercial travel offices employees on governmentwide and DOD premium class travel regulations. As mentioned previously, we were able to obtain such data through extensive analysis and extractions of DOD travel card transactions from databases provided by the Bank of America. The lack of effective oversight and monitoring was another contributing factor to DOD and the services’ lacking knowledge of the extent of improper premium class transactions. DOD Issued New Regulations to Better Define When Premium Class Travel is Authorized
During the course of our work, in April 2003, DOD updated the JTR and JFTR to articulate more clearly and make more stringent the circumstances under which premium class other than first class travel, that is, business class, is authorized for DOD travelers on flights to and/or from points outside the continental United States when the scheduled flight time exceeds 14 hours. As a result, millions of dollars of unnecessary costs are incurred annually. In oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD officials concurred with our recommendations to resolve the control weaknesses. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, Senator Grassley, and Ms. Schakowsky, this concludes my prepared statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Long-standing financial management problems, coupled with ineffective oversight and management of the Department of Defense's (DOD) travel card program, which GAO has previously reported on, have led to concerns about DOD's use of first and business class airfares. At the request of the Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Senator Grassley, and Representative Schakowsky, GAO performed work to identify problems in DOD's controls over premium class travel. This testimony focuses on (1) the extent of DOD premium class travel, (2) the effectiveness of key internal control activities and examples of improper premium class travel resulting from internal control breakdowns, and (3) DOD's control environment over premium class travel. In a companion report being issued today, GAO made numerous recommendations--that DOD concurred with--to strengthen key internal control activities and improve the overall control environment.
What GAO Found
Breakdowns in internal controls and a weak control environment resulted in a significant level of improper premium class travel and millions of dollars of unnecessary costs being incurred annually. Based on extensive analysis of records obtained from DOD's credit card issuer--Bank of America, GAO found that for fiscal years 2001 and 2002, DOD spent almost $124 million on about 68,000 premium class tickets that included at least one leg of premium class service, primarily business class. To put the $124 million into perspective it exceeded the total travel expenses--including airfare, lodging, and meals--spent by each of 12 major CFO agencies. The price difference between a premium class ticket and a coach class ticket ranged from a few dollars to thousands of dollars. Based on statistical sample testing, GAO estimated that 72 percent of DOD's fiscal year 2001 and 2002 premium class travel was not properly authorized, and that 73 percent was not properly justified. GAO estimated that senior civilian and military employees accounted for almost 50 percent of premium class travel. Further, our data mining showed that 27 of the 28 most frequent premium class travelers were senior DOD officials. Lack of oversight and a weak overall control environment characterized DOD's management of premium class travel. DOD and the military services (1) did not have accurate and complete data on the extent of premium class travel, (2) issued inadequate policies on premium class travel that were inconsistent with government travel regulations and with each other, (3) did not issue guidance on how to document the authorization and justification of premium class travel, and (4) performed little or no monitoring of this travel. During the course of our audit, DOD began updating its travel regulations to more clearly articulate and to make more stringent the circumstances under which premium class travel can be authorized. |
gao_GAO-05-78 | gao_GAO-05-78_0 | Coroner Referrals of Suspected Neglect, While Few in Number, Indicated Serious Care Problems
Of the approximately 4,000 nursing home deaths investigated by the Pulaski County coroner from July 1999 through December 2003, the coroner informed us that he identified and referred 86 cases (2.2 percent) of suspected resident neglect to the state survey agency and the MFCU. Many of these care indicators are similar to those examined during the state survey agency’s annual inspection of every nursing home. 1). In some of the coroner’s photos, bone or ligament was visible, as were signs of infection or dead tissue, indicating a serious stage IV pressure sore (see table 3). 2). Eleven of the 12 referrals for one home involved pressure sores. The State Survey Agency’s Investigation of Coroner Referrals Often Understated Neglect of Residents
According to Arkansas state survey agency officials, the agency received 36 coroner referrals of suspected resident neglect, less than half of the 86 referrals the coroner said he made. The agency’s investigations of these coroner referrals often understated serious care problems—both when neglect was substantiated and not substantiated (see app. In half of the referrals not substantiated by the state survey agency, either the MFCU investigation found neglect or we questioned the basis for the “not substantiated” findings, and our concerns were confirmed by a professor of nursing with expertise in long-term care. Fewer than Half of the Coroner Referrals Were Received by the State Survey Agency
Although the Pulaski County coroner told us that he had referred 86 cases of suspected resident neglect from July 1999 through December 2003, Arkansas state survey agency officials said that they received fewer than half (see table 4) and investigated all but one of the referrals they received. For the remaining 11 substantiated coroner referrals, the state survey agency cited either no deficiency for the decedent or cited a deficiency at a level lower than actual harm for the predominant care problem identified by the coroner, even though the MFCU’s investigations found neglect for six of the decedents, in effect substantiating the existence of serious care problems in these cases (see table 6). Both the MFCU and our expert noted omissions and contradictions in the medical records of some of the 14 decedents, raising a question about the state survey agency’s conclusions that the same records indicated care had been provided. Other care was also found negligent. CMS’s 1999 guidelines for complaint investigations instruct state survey agencies to refer cases to another agency when it lacks jurisdiction. We found the same systemic oversight weaknesses in the Arkansas state survey agency’s investigation of coroner referrals that our prior work on nursing home quality of care identified nationwide. These oversight weaknesses include (1) complaint investigations that understated the seriousness of the allegations and were not conducted promptly; (2) annual standard survey schedules that allowed nursing homes to predict when the next survey would occur; (3) survey methodology weaknesses, coupled with surveyor reliance on misleading medical records, that resulted in overlooked care problems; and (4) a policy that did not always hold nursing homes accountable for care problems identified after a resident’s death. 3). The Arkansas law also confirmed the systemic weaknesses in state and federal oversight of nursing home quality of care that we identified in prior reports. We confirmed that this additional referral was not received or investigated by the MFCU. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and appropriate congressional committees. California Nursing Homes: Federal and State Oversight Inadequate to Protect Residents in Homes With Serious Care Problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to assess the effectiveness of nursing home oversight by considering the effect of a unique Arkansas law that requires county coroners to investigate all nursing home deaths. Coroners refer cases of suspected neglect to the state survey agency and law enforcement entities such as the state Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU). The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) contracts with survey agencies in every state to periodically inspect nursing homes and investigate allegations of poor care or neglect. MFCUs are charged with investigating and prosecuting resident neglect. GAO examined (1) the results of Arkansas coroner investigations, (2) the state survey agency's experience in investigating coroner referrals, and (3) whether weaknesses in state and federal nursing home oversight identified in prior GAO reports were evident in the survey agency's investigation of coroner referrals.
What GAO Found
According to the Pulaski County coroner, he referred 86 cases of suspected resident neglect to the state survey agency for the period July 1999, when the Arkansas law took effect, through December 2003. Agency officials said that other state coroners referred four cases during this time period. Importantly, these 86 referrals constituted just 2.2 percent of all nursing home deaths the coroner investigated. However, the referrals included disturbing photos and descriptions of the decedents, suggesting serious, avoidable care problems; more than two-thirds of the 86 referrals listed pressure sores as the primary indicator of neglect. Some photos of decedents' pressure sores depicted skin conditions so deteriorated that bone or ligament was visible, as were signs of infection and dead tissue. The referrals involved 27 homes, over half of which had at least 3 referrals. Arkansas state survey agency officials told GAO that they received 36 (fewer than half) of the Pulaski County coroner's referrals. The 50 referrals not received described decedents' conditions similar to those the survey agency did receive. Of the 36 referrals for alleged neglect that it received, the survey agency complaint investigations substantiated 22 and eventually it closed the home with the largest number of referrals. However, the agency's investigations often understated serious care problems--both when neglect was substantiated and when it was not. For 11 of the 22 substantiated referrals, the state survey agency either cited no deficiency for the decedent or cited a deficiency at a level lower than actual harm for the predominant care problem identified by the coroner. In contrast, MFCU investigations of many of the 11 referrals found the homes negligent in caring for decedents, and the MFCU reached settlements with the owners of several homes. In half of the 14 referrals not substantiated, the MFCU or an independent expert in long-term care either found neglect or questioned the "not substantiated" finding. Moreover, they found gaps and contradictions in the medical records for some decedents, raising a question about the survey agency's conclusions that the same records indicated appropriate care had been provided. GAO's prior work on nursing home quality of care found that weaknesses in federal and state oversight nationwide contributed to serious, undetected care problems indicative of resident neglect. GAO's review of the Arkansas survey agency's investigations of coroner referrals confirmed that serious, systemic weaknesses remain. Oversight weaknesses GAO previously identified nationwide and those it found in Arkansas included (1) complaint investigations that understated the seriousness of allegations and were not timely; (2) predictable timing of annual state surveys that could enable nursing homes so inclined to cover up deficiencies; (3) survey methodology weaknesses, coupled with surveyor reliance on misleading medical records, that resulted in missed care problems; and (4) a policy that did not always hold homes accountable for neglect associated with a resident's death. |
gao_GAO-11-683 | gao_GAO-11-683_0 | This report focuses on the expanded program. IRS is clarifying the definition of collected proceeds. IRS withholds tax to reduce the risk of tax underpayment on what can potentially be large amounts of income. Whistleblower Claims Can Take Years to Process but the Whistleblower Office Does Not Have Complete Data on Claim Processing Time
Whistleblower claims can take years to go through the IRS review and award determination process. For example, as of April 25, 2011: about 66 percent of claims submitted in the first 2 years of the program, fiscal years 2007 and 2008, were still in process; less than 7 percent of claims submitted in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 that were still in process were in the Whistleblower Office final review or Whistleblower Office award evaluation steps; and 447 claims submitted in fiscal year 2010 had been in the Whistleblower Office initial claim review step at least 200 days. The Whistleblower Office and some operating divisions have time targets for their initial claim reviews; however, other operating divisions do not have targets and the Whistleblower Office does not have a systematic process to check in on claims once they are with the operating divisions for review. Restrictions on Disclosing Tax Information Limit IRS Communication on Specific Claims, but Increased Communication on Overall Results Could Improve Program Transparency
IRS is limited in what information it can share with whistleblowers and other stakeholders throughout the whistleblower claim process. According to IRS, disclosing to a whistleblower that IRS is examining a taxpayer reveals tax information; therefore, IRS does not inform whistleblowers on the progress of their claim other than to confirm that the claim is either open or closed. For example, the 2010 annual report, the most recent report available, included the number of whistleblowers and the number of taxpayers identified, but did not provide data on the time taken for claims to move through the process or specific information on rejected claims. The lack of such data limits Congress’s ability to effectively oversee the program. Other Agencies and Whistleblower Attorneys Identified Options That Could Potentially Improve IRS’s Whistleblower Program but Involve Trade-Offs
Federal and state whistleblower programs we reviewed have features with potential benefits that could improve IRS’s expanded whistleblower program. While there are potential advantages to all identified options, it is difficult to determine if the advantages outweigh the disadvantages for many options. Other steps could improve whistleblower submissions and reporting to Congress. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of IRS’s expanded whistleblower program, we recommend the Commissioner of Internal Revenue direct the Whistleblower Office Director to take the following seven actions: record time-in-step information for all claims by identified taxpayer in E-TRAK; adjust E-TRAK’s tracking feature to more accurately count the number establish a process by which the Whistleblower Office routinely of days claims remain in each step; track the reasons for claim rejections by broad categories; track the reasons claims are listed as suspended by broad categories; follows up on claims that have been in the operating division SME initial review step more than a targeted number of days; redesign Form 211 to include stand-alone questions on the following information: whether the whistleblower has submitted the information to any the relationship of the whistleblower to the target taxpayer, the employer of the whistleblower, other federal or state agencies, and whether the whistleblower has included all information relevant to provide additional summary statistics in future annual reports to Congress, including data on the length of time claims remain at each step of the review process, data on the length of time from claim receipt to payments, reasons for claim rejections, aggregate information on awards paid, and total amount of whistleblower payments. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) manages the expanded whistleblower program, including communicating within IRS, we reviewed the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, which required that IRS establish the Whistleblower Office and administer the expanded award program; reviewed IRS documents on the whistleblower program, including Internal Revenue Manual section 25.2.2, which outlines roles and responsibilities in the expanded whistleblower program; and reviewed GAO’s body of work on internal control standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 expanded the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) whistleblower program, increasing rewards for submitting information on others' tax underpayments to up to 30 percent of collected proceeds. The expanded program targets tax underpayments over $2 million and could reduce the gap between taxes owed and taxes paid. IRS's Whistleblower Office has received over 1,300 submissions qualifying for this new program since 2007. GAO was asked to assess (1) how IRS manages the expanded program, (2) how IRS communicates with whistleblowers and the public, and (3) any lessons from IRS's or other government whistleblower programs that could improve IRS's expanded whistleblower program. GAO analyzed IRS documents and data and interviewed IRS officials, whistleblower attorneys, and federal and state whistleblower program officials.
What GAO Found
Whistleblower claims can take years to go through the IRS review and award determination process. As of April 2011, about 66 percent of claims submitted in the first 2 years of the program, fiscal years 2007 and 2008, were still in process. According to IRS officials, claims can take years to process because IRS must take various steps to ensure the integrity of claim reviews and resulting taxpayer examinations. Further, taxpayers subject to examination can exercise rights that can add years to the process. IRS does not collect complete data on the time each step takes or the reasons claims are rejected. Without such data, IRS may be unable to identify potential improvements to claim processing efficiency. Furthermore, not all the IRS divisions that review whistleblower claims have time targets for their subject matter expert reviews. Nor does the Whistleblower Office have a systematic process to check in with the divisions about the time taken for their initial reviews. IRS is limited in what information it can share with whistleblowers about the status of claims because of statutes protecting the privacy of tax information. For example, because IRS cannot disclose if it is examining a taxpayer, it cannot inform whistleblowers on the progress of their claims or the reasons their claims are rejected. One mechanism through which the Whistleblower Office can communicate program results is its mandated annual report to Congress. However, the most recently released report, for fiscal year 2010, did not contain information on case processing times or specific data on why IRS rejected claims. Collecting additional data and including it in the report could improve the transparency of the program and Congress's ability to oversee it. Federal and state whistleblower programs have features with potential benefits that could improve IRS's expanded whistleblower program, including options that increase interaction or information shared with whistleblowers and options that attempt to improve the accountability for claim processing. While there are potential advantages to all identified options, it is difficult to determine if the advantages outweigh the disadvantages for many options. Furthermore, IRS would be limited by taxpayer data protections in implementing some of the options.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS collect more information--including data on the time each step takes for all claims and reasons for claim rejection--in its claim tracking system, establish a process to follow up on claims that exceed review time targets, and include more information on these issues in its annual reports to Congress. In written comments on a draft of this report, IRS generally agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-351 | gao_GAO-07-351_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the progress FDIC has made in correcting or mitigating remaining information system control weaknesses reported as unresolved at the time of our prior review in 2005 and (2) the effectiveness of the corporation’s information system controls for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive data. FDIC Has Made Substantial Progress Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses
FDIC has taken steps to address security control weaknesses. The corporation has corrected or mitigated 21 of the 26 weaknesses that we previously reported as unresolved at the completion of our calendar year 2005 audit (see app. For example, the corporation has developed and implemented procedures to prohibit the transmission of mainframe user and administrator passwords in plaintext across the network, established and implemented a process to monitor and report on vendor- supplied account/password combinations, and improved mainframe security monitoring controls. FDIC Has Made Progress in Information System Controls, However Some Weaknesses Remain
Although FDIC made substantial improvements to its information system controls, unresolved and newly identified weaknesses could limit its ability to effectively protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial and sensitive information and information systems. NFE Was Not Fully Integrated into the Corporation’s Information Security Program
Although FDIC had taken steps to develop, document, and implement a corporate information security program, it did not fully implement key control activities for NFE. Although five weaknesses from prior reports remain unresolved and new control weaknesses related to (1) e-mail security, (2) physical security, and (3) configuration management were identified, the remaining unresolved weaknesses previously reported and the newly identified weaknesses did not pose significant risk of misstatement in the corporation’s financial statements for calendar year 2006. However, the old and new weaknesses do increase preventable risk to the corporation’s financial and sensitive systems and information. Until FDIC fully integrates NFE into the security program, its ability to maintain adequate information system controls over its financial and sensitive information will be limited. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has a demanding responsibility enforcing banking laws, regulating financial institutions, and protecting depositors. As part of its audit of the calendar year 2006 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) the progress FDIC has made in correcting or mitigating information security weaknesses previously reported and (2) the effectiveness of FDIC's system integrity controls to protect the confidentiality and availability of its financial information and information systems. To do this, GAO examined pertinent security policies, procedures, and relevant reports. In addition, GAO conducted tests and observations of controls in operation.
What GAO Found
FDIC has made substantial progress in correcting previously reported weaknesses in its information security controls. Specifically, it has corrected or mitigated 21 of the 26 weaknesses that GAO had reported as unresolved at the completion of the calendar year 2005 audit. Actions FDIC has taken include developing and implementing procedures to prohibit the transmission of mainframe user and administrator passwords in readable text across the network, implementing procedures to change vender-supplied account/passwords, and improving mainframe security monitoring controls. Although FDIC has made important progress improving its information system controls, old and new weaknesses could limit the corporation's ability to effectively protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of its financial and sensitive information and systems. In addition to the five previously reported weaknesses that are in the process of being mitigated, GAO identified new weaknesses in controls related to (1) e-mail security, (2) physical security, and (3) configuration management. Although these weaknesses do not pose significant risk of misstatement of the corporation's financial statements, they do increase preventable risk to the corporation's financial and sensitive systems and information. In addition, FDIC has not fully integrated its new financial system--the New Financial Environment (NFE)--into its information security program. For example, it did not fully implement key control activities for the NFE. Until FDIC fully integrates the NFE with the information security program, its ability to maintain adequate system controls over its financial and sensitive information will be limited. |
gao_GAO-08-30 | gao_GAO-08-30_0 | 1). To achieve controlled fusion, the United States is pursuing two paths—magnetic and inertial. In November 2006, all six countries and the European Union signed the ITER agreement. NNSA maintains the United States’ inertial fusion facilities. The United States Will Contribute $1.12 Billion Over 9 Years to Help Build ITER, but Management Challenges May Affect Timing and Cost of Construction
DOE plans to spend $1.12 billion over 9 years to help build ITER, but this estimate neither reflects an independently validated cost based on a completed reactor design, nor the costs to operate and decommission the facility. The ITER Organization also faces five key management challenges to build ITER on time and on budget that may affect U.S. costs. The $1.12 billion is still a preliminary cost estimate and may not reflect the full costs of U.S. contributions to ITER. Many of these challenges stem from the difficulty of coordinating the efforts of six countries and the European Union that are designing and building components for ITER and, as members of the ITER Organization, must reach consensus before making critical management decisions. First, the ITER Organization has not yet developed quality assurance standards for manufactured parts and components. DOE completed the construction of this facility in 2006. They do not have a research plan that identifies key scientific and technological issues that must be addressed to advance inertial fusion energy and how their research activities would meet those goals. According to university scientists involved in fusion research, this decrease in funding has led to a decline in research opportunities for innovative devices. Finally, while the demand for scientists and engineers to run experiments at ITER and NIF is growing, OFES does not have a human capital strategy to address expected future workforce shortages; these shortages are likely to grow as a large part of the fusion workforce retires over the next 10 years. While OFES officials told us that inertial fusion is an attractive path to fusion energy and the only alternative to magnetic fusion, the office has limited funding for inertial fusion research because its priority is to support ITER and magnetic fusion research activities. The share of funding has dropped from 19 percent of the fusion research budget in fiscal year 2002 to 13 percent in fiscal year 2007. In addition, the decrease in funding reduced opportunities to attract students to the fusion sciences and train them to fulfill future workforce needs. DOE could better manage alternative fusion research activities. In addition, the future of alternative magnetic fusion research activities, which may lead to a simpler, less costly, or faster path to fusion energy, is uncertain. Recommendations for Executive Action
To advance U.S. efforts to develop alternative fusion energy sources, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct OFES and NNSA to develop a coordinated research plan to coordinate U.S. inertial fusion research activities and identify roles and responsibilities for each program as well as detailed research and development tasks, budget needs, and time frames for advancing inertial fusion research; NNSA to guarantee access to NIF, once it becomes operational, to scientists conducting inertial fusion energy experiments, and work with DOE to determine how to share the costs, operational time, and results of NIF to explore inertial fusion as a viable energy source; and OFES to charge DOE’s fusion energy advisory committee with independently assessing whether current funding levels between ITER- and tokamak-related research and innovative magnetic fusion research strike the right balance to meet research objectives and advance both areas of research, and, if the current share of funding is not adequate, to recommend appropriate changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is pursuing two paths to fusion energy--magnetic and inertial. On November 21, 2006, the United States signed an agreement with five countries and the European Union to build and operate the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) in Cadarache, France, to demonstrate the feasibility of magnetic fusion energy. The United States also built and operates facilities to pursue inertial fusion energy research. This report discusses (1) U.S. contributions to ITER and the challenges, if any, in managing this international fusion program and (2) the Department of Energy's (DOE) management of alternative fusion research activities, including National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) initiatives. In performing this work, GAO analyzed budget documents, briefings, and reports that focused on research and funding priorities for the fusion program. GAO also met with officials from DOE, NNSA, and the ITER Organization in France.
What GAO Found
Over 9 years, DOE estimates it will spend $1.12 billion to help build ITER, but this is only a preliminary estimate and may not fully reflect the costs of U.S. participation. This preliminary estimate has not been independently validated, as DOE guidance directs, because the reactor design is not complete. Moreover, the $1.12 billion for ITER construction does not include an additional $1.2 billion the United States is expected to contribute to operate and decommission the facility. In addition, the ITER Organization, which manages the construction and operation of ITER, faces a number of management challenges to build ITER on time and on budget that also may affect U.S. costs. For example, the ITER Organization must develop quality assurance standards, test the reliability and integrity of components built in different countries, and assemble them with a high level of precision. Many of these challenges stem from the difficulty of coordinating international efforts and the need for consensus before making critical management decisions. GAO has identified several challenges DOE faces in managing alternative fusion research activities. First, NNSA and the Office of Fusion Energy Sciences (OFES), which manage the inertial fusion program within DOE, have not effectively coordinated their research activities to develop inertial fusion as an energy source. For example, they do not have a coordinated research plan that identifies key scientific and technological issues that must be addressed to advance inertial fusion energy and how their research activities would meet those goals. Second, DOE may find it difficult to manage competing funding priorities to advance both ITER-related research and alternative magnetic fusion approaches. DOE officials told GAO they are focusing limited resources on ITER-related research activities. As a result, as funding for ITER-related research has increased, the share of funding for the most innovative alternative magnetic fusion research activities decreased from 19 percent of the fusion research budget in fiscal year 2002 to 13 percent in fiscal year 2007. According to DOE officials, this level of funding is sufficient to meet research objectives. However, university scientists involved in fusion research told us that this decrease in funding has led to a decline in research opportunities for innovative concepts, which could lead to a simpler, less costly, or faster path to fusion energy, and reduced opportunities to attract students to the fusion sciences and train them to fulfill future workforce needs. Finally, while the demand for scientists and engineers to run experiments at ITER and inertial fusion facilities is growing, OFES does not have a human capital strategy to address expected future workforce shortages. These shortages are likely to grow as a large part of the fusion workforce retires over the next 10 years. |
gao_GAO-04-519 | gao_GAO-04-519_0 | However, the State Department’s ability to assess progress toward reducing MANPADS proliferation is limited by the multilateral forums’ lack of mechanisms to monitor countries’ implementation of their commitments. The department also obtained— through bilateral diplomatic channels—foreign governments’ commitments to destroy or secure MANPADS. The multilateral forums have no mechanisms to allow them to monitor or measure members’ implementation of their political commitments. Although DOD has strengthened the requirements for monitoring Stinger missile systems after they have been sold to foreign countries, DOD has no requirement for DOD organizations responsible for end-use monitoring to keep records on the number and destinations of these Stingers. Stinger Inventory Inspections Are Impaired by Inconsistent Practices and Incomplete Inventory Records
DOD’s inventory inspection efforts are impaired because DOD lacks procedures for conducting Stinger inspections and requirements for keeping inspection records. Such challenges include establishing system requirements, maturing technology and design, and setting reliable cost estimates. In January 2004, DHS awarded the initial contracts for a 2-year program to develop and demonstrate a counter-MANPADS system for commercial aircraft. DHS faces significant challenges in adapting a military counter-MANPADS system to commercial aircraft in the initial phases of its program. Knowledge Point 2—The product design is stable. A knowledge-based approach also involves the use of controls or exit criteria to ensure that the required knowledge has been attained at each critical juncture. Beginning in 2003, U.S. multilateral and bilateral diplomatic efforts to reduce this threat of MANPADS increased foreign governments’ commitments to reduce MANPADS proliferation. Because DOD lacks Stinger inspection procedures, DOD officials overseas use inconsistent practices to perform Stinger inspections. To assess the U.S. government efforts to control the worldwide proliferation of MANPADS, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials in State Department’s Nonproliferation Bureau Office of Export Control and Conventional Arms Nonproliferation Policy, Office of Export Control Cooperation, Office of Policy, Public Affairs and Congressional Relations; the State Department’s Political and Military Affairs Bureau Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (whose MANPADS officials formerly were in the Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis until September 2003); and the State Department’s Arms Control Bureau Office of Conventional Arms Control; as well as the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Threat Reduction Agency On-site Inspection Directorate Interagency Liaison for Europe. To assess the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to develop technical countermeasures to minimize the threat of a MANPADS attack, we compared DHS’s plan for its counter-MANPADS system development and demonstration program plan against the best practices of commercial and military acquisitions identified in our past reports. GAO Comments
1. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) has been of growing concern to the United States and other governments. The United States is pursuing a wide variety of activities internationally and domestically to address this threat. GAO was asked to assess efforts by (1) the State Department to control global proliferation of MANPADS, (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) to monitor end-use of U.S.-exported Stingers, and (3) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop technical countermeasures to minimize the threat of a MANPADS attack.
What GAO Found
In 2003, the State Department made important progress in its efforts to control the global proliferation of MANPADS. Thirty-two foreign governments made multilateral commitments to better control MANPADS and prevent their acquisition by terrorists. However, the State Department's ability to assess further progress in MANPADS nonproliferation is limited because the multilateral forums have no mechanisms to monitor members' implementation of commitments. In addition, the State Department obtained foreign government commitments to destroy or better secure MANPADS. DOD is required annually to inventory every Stinger missile system sold overseas. However, DOD's inventory inspection process has flaws. First, DOD records on the number and destination of Stingers sold overseas are incomplete, unreliable, and largely in hard-copy form. Because DOD has not required DOD agencies responsible for end-use monitoring to retain these records, it does not know how many Stingers have been sold overseas. Second, DOD officials overseas use inconsistent practices when inspecting Stinger inventories because DOD lacks procedures for conducting these inspections. To develop technical countermeasures to minimize the MANPADS threat to aircraft, the DHS initiated a 2-year program to adapt military aircraft defense systems to commercial aircraft. However, DHS faces significant challenges such as establishing system requirements and setting reliable cost estimates. The department adopted GAO's January 2004 recommendations to implement a knowledge-based approach to this development program. For example, DHS plans to use GAO-recommended criteria that ensure product knowledge is attained at key points in system development. |
gao_GAO-04-566 | gao_GAO-04-566_0 | VA Policy Requires Its Facilities to Check Many Practitioners’ Professional Credentials and Personal Backgrounds
We identified key VA screening requirements that are intended to ensure that VA facilities employ health care practitioners who have valid professional credentials and personal backgrounds appropriate to deliver safe health care to veterans. Licensing boards and certifying organizations have various options for disciplining practitioners. Although the screening requirements for some occupations, such as physicians, are adequate because they require verifying all licenses by contacting state licensing boards, screening requirements for other occupations are less stringent. Physical inspection of credentials alone can be misleading; not all state licenses and national certificates indicate whether they are restricted, and licenses and certificates can be forged. In addition, VA does not require that all practitioners undergo background investigations, including fingerprinting, to check for criminal records. These gaps create vulnerabilities because VA may remain unaware of health care practitioners who could place patients at risk. VA Has Adequate Requirements for Verifying Professional Credentials of Certain Practitioners
VA’s requirements for verifying the professional credentials of applicants it intends to hire and employed practitioners in group A, such as physicians and dentists, are complete and thorough. VA has not conducted oversight of its facilities’ compliance with the key screening requirements. HIPDB is a national database that contains reports of disciplinary actions and criminal convictions involving all licensed practitioners, not just physicians and dentists. In addition, VA does not require all practitioners with direct patient care access, such as medical residents, to have their fingerprints checked against a criminal history database. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure the safety of veterans receiving health care at VA facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following four actions: expand the verification requirement that facility officials contact state licensing boards and national certifying organizations to include all state licenses and national certificates held by applicants and employed practitioners, expand the query of the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank to include all licensed practitioners that VA intends to hire and periodically query this database for continued employment, require fingerprint checks for all health care practitioners who were previously exempted from background investigations and who have direct patient care access, and conduct oversight to help ensure that facilities comply with all key screening requirements for applicants and current employees. Specifically, we (1) identified key VA screening requirements for its health care practitioners, (2) determined the adequacy of these screening requirements, and (3) assessed the extent to which selected VA facilities complied with these screening requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cases of practitioners causing intentional harm to patients have raised concerns about the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) screening of practitioners' professional credentials and personal backgrounds. GAO was asked to (1) identify key VA screening requirements, (2) evaluate their adequacy, and (3) assess compliance with these screening requirements. GAO reviewed VA's policies and identified key VA screening requirements for 43 health care occupations; interviewed officials from VA, licensing boards, and certifying organizations; and randomly sampled about 100 practitioners' personnel files at each of four VA facilities we visited.
What GAO Found
GAO identified key screening requirements that VA uses to verify the professional credentials and personal backgrounds of its health care practitioners. These requirements include verifying professional credentials; completing background investigations for certain practitioners, including fingerprinting to check for criminal histories; and checking national databases that contain reports of practitioners who have been professionally disciplined or excluded from federal health care programs. GAO found adequate screening requirements for certain practitioners, such as physicians, for whom all licenses are verified by contacting state licensing boards. However, screening requirements for others, such as currently employed nurses and respiratory therapists, are less stringent because they do not require verification of all licenses and national certificates. Moreover, they require only physical inspection of the credential rather than contacting state licensing boards and national certifying organizations. Physical inspection alone can be misleading; not all credentials indicate whether they are restricted, and credentials can be forged. VA also does not require facility officials to query, for other than physicians and dentists, a national database that includes reports of disciplinary actions involving all licensed practitioners. In addition, many practitioners with direct patient care access, such as medical residents, are not required to undergo background investigations, including fingerprinting to check for criminal histories. VA has not conducted oversight of its facilities' compliance with the key screening requirements. This pattern of mixed compliance and the gaps in key VA screening requirements creates vulnerabilities to the extent that VA remains unaware of practitioners who could place patients at risk. |
gao_AIMD-98-69 | gao_AIMD-98-69_0 | As required by OMB Circular A-11, NOAA revised its budget request to bring it into accord with these decisions. Key Events Associated With NWS’ Budget “Shortfall” and Efforts to Address It
Due to the reductions that OMB and, subsequently, the Congress made to NWS’ fiscal year 1997 budget request, as well as inflation and other cost increases, NWS believed it had a budget “shortfall.” NWS officials felt that NWS’ fiscal year 1997 budget was not sufficient to provide desired levels of services. In a May 15, 1997, hearing before the Subcommittee on Science, Space and Technology, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, some Members of Congress indicated that they were confused by the varying amounts of reported budget “shortfall.” According to NOAA and NWS officials, the varying amounts provided to the Congress responded to specific questions asked at particular points in time and did not necessarily include all known elements of the “shortfall.” For example, although a January 3, 1997, NWS memorandum to NOAA mentioned the withholding of inflationary increases and a March 18, 1997, NWS memorandum to NOAA mentioned the increased NWS contribution for NOAA-wide support services, these elements of the “shortfall” were not provided to the Congress in the February 1997 and April 1997 briefings, respectively. NWS ultimately succeeded in staying within its fiscal year 1997 budget level by implementing a number of actions. The first event centers on an NWS reprogramming request to NOAA. However, the NWS Deputy Assistant Administrator for Operations assumed that the reprogramming request would be approved by Commerce and that funds were available to hire personnel to fill vacancies in the field that had been deferred because of the “shortfall.” This official told NOAA officials on June 13, 1997, that NWS intended to start filling critical field vacancies. The second event involves NWS’ effort to obtain certification approval from NOAA to consolidate, automate, and/or close weather service offices. Upon learning that NWS would not be able to fill vacancies in the field because the aforementioned reprogramming request had not yet been approved, the NWS Deputy Assistant Administrator for Modernization recommended to the NOAA Deputy Under Secretary on June 20, 1997, that 27 of the 83 certification packages be held back. The Congress enacted appropriations that provided about $668 million in November 1997. We will also send copies to the Secretary of Commerce and to the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. Chronology of Key Events Related to the Formulation and Execution of the NWS Fiscal Year 1997 Budget
Department of Commerce’s fiscal year 1997 budget request submitted to OMB included $2 billion for NOAA’s operations, research, and facilities which included $693 million for NWS. OMB passback and subsequent discussions resulted in reductions of $16.8 and $22.3 million to NOAA and NWS budgets, respectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the key events related to the fiscal year (FY) 1997 budget shortfall of the National Weather Service (NWS), focusing on: (1) the formulation and execution of the NWS' FY 1997 budget; and (2) key events regarding NWS' FY 1997 budget shortfall and efforts to address it.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) based on guidance provided by the Department of Commerce and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) prepared a FY 1997 budget proposal for each of its components--including NWS; (2) the Department of Commerce reviewed this proposal and asked OMB to include $693 million for NWS in the President's budget; (3) based on OMB's direction regarding NOAA-wide and NWS-specific reductions, this request was revised to the $671 million that appeared in the President's budget submission to Congress; (4) Congress further reduced this amount, enacting appropriations that included $638 million in FY 1997; (5) although NWS believed it had a budget shortfall because of the reductions that OMB and Congress made to its FY 1997 budget request, as well as inflationary and other cost increases, NOAA and NWS reported varying amounts to Congress about the size of this shortfall; (6) according to NOAA and NWS officials, the information provided to Congress responded to specific questions asked at particular points in time and did not necessarily include all known elements of the shortfall; (7) NWS ultimately succeeded in staying within its FY 1997 budget level by implementing a number of temporary and permanent actions; (8) other events associated with the shortfall raised concerns among department officials and Congress; (9) the first event centered on a NWS reprogramming request to NOAA and NWS' intention to start filling critical field vacancies prior to receiving NOAA authorization; (10) NWS assumed that the reprogramming request would be approved by Commerce and funds would be available to fill these vacancies; (11) NOAA informed NWS that the vacancies could not be filled because the reprogramming request had not yet been approved; (12) the second event involved NWS' effort to obtain certification approval from NOAA to consolidate, automate, and close weather service offices; (13) upon learning that NWS would not be able to fill critical field vacancies, NWS recommended to NOAA that selected certification packages be held back because, according to NWS, this would have resulted in a degradation of weather services at locations; (14) however, Commerce noted that the certification packages, as submitted by NWS on April 22, 1997, did not indicate that there were vacancies in these offices that would preclude proceeding with certification; and (15) no link was made during this time between the ability to proceed with certification and the need for reprogramming approval by Congress. |
gao_HEHS-98-154 | gao_HEHS-98-154_0 | This transition to managed health care has made benefit determinations more critical for participants in employer-based plans. Managed care plans attempt to ensure that services provided to plan enrollees are necessary, delivered efficiently, and priced appropriately. ERISA Provides the Exclusive Remedy for All Employer-Based Health Benefit Denials
Plan participants who believe they have been denied a plan benefit can seek to reverse the denial through the plan’s claims appeal process. If participants are successful in court, the only remedy under ERISA allows them to receive the denied benefit and, at the court’s discretion, attorney fees. Consumer Groups Believe Access to Health Care May Be Denied
Benefit coverage determinations have taken on a more critical role as employers have changed from traditional fee-for-service health care to managed care. ERISA May Limit Participants’ Ability to Sue Managed Care Plans for Damages Under State Law
ERISA’s preemption clause generally prevents plan participants from holding managed care plans directly liable under state laws for the damages that result from their negligent acts or omissions, and it complicates plan participants’ ability to hold managed care plans indirectly liable for the negligence—medical malpractice—of their providers. As a result, each of these groups has its own distinct reaction to the role that ERISA’s preemption clause plays in the ability to file claims for medical malpractice and benefit denials under state law. In addition, ERISA’s remedy for injuries occurring because of benefit denials is insufficient, according to consumer advocates. They believe that providing more remedies would also improve the quality of health care that consumers would get by holding managed care plans accountable for unfair denials, limitations, or reductions in care. Amending ERISA could change this. In contrast, according to managed care and employer groups, health care costs could increase if ERISA were amended to provide compensation in its civil enforcement section or to change its preemption clause so that it does not supersede state tort laws. However, data to accurately estimate the likely extent of such potential increases are lacking. Employers say that faced with such cost increases, they might in response (1) reduce health care benefits, perhaps by excluding from coverage particular treatments and procedures; (2) provide a “defined contribution,” or a fixed amount earmarked for such costs, to employees’ health care costs; (3) shift more of the cost to employees by making them pay a higher percentage of the premiums; or (4) eliminate health care benefits completely.Consequently, plan participants could end up with expanded remedies for adverse outcomes but potentially fewer or more expensive health care benefits. However, plan participants can be left without a remedy for injuries when they occur because of benefit denials. The plans, employers, and UR providers have argued that under the preemption clause, these state remedies are not available. As managed care has emerged as a principal cost-control measure, ERISA’s federal preemption has affected the ability of participants to seek compensatory or punitive damages from managed care plans, based on a plan’s role in providing medical care. While noting that there was no simple formulation, the court identified four categories of state laws that might “relate to” a plan, as that term is used in ERISA: “(1) laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA plans; (2) laws that create reporting, disclosure, funding or vesting requirements for ERISA plans; (3) laws that provide rules for the calculation of the amounts of benefits to be paid under ERISA plans; and (4) laws and common law rules that provide remedies for misconduct growing out of the administration of the ERISA plan.” agent of the HMO is not preempted. 8-10. 6-7. 9-14. “ERISA Loophole Permits Utilization Review Firms to Avoid Liability for Malpractice.” HealthSpan, Vol. “Injury, Liability, and the Decision to File a Medical Malpractice Claim.” Law & Society Review, Vol. 11-13. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how people enrolled in employer-based managed care plans are compensated when they are improperly denied health care benefits or when they experience negligent medical care and the role that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plays, focusing on: (1) whether the transition from traditional employer-based fee-for-service health plans to managed care has changed the process of benefit determination; (2) the remedies that ERISA provides to participants in employer-based managed care plans who are improperly denied benefits; (3) whether ERISA affects the ability of participants to be compensated for injuries that result from either medical malpractice or improper benefit denials at employer-based managed care plans; and (4) the consequences of changing ERISA's remedies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) managed care plans attempt to ensure that enrollees receive services that are necessary, efficiently provided, and appropriately priced; (2) since the 1980s, employers have shifted to offering managed care plans that use such techniques as prospective utilization review (UR); (3) as a result, benefit coverage decisions have increasingly shifted from being made after services are provided to before; (4) ERISA effectively limits the remedies available when employees of private-sector firms claim to have been harmed by plans' decisions to deny coverage of a particular service; (5) under ERISA, plans must have an appeal process for participants who are dissatisfied with a benefit denial; (6) if participants are not successful, they can file a civil lawsuit; (7) ERISA's exclusive remedy for improper benefit denials is to require the plan to provide the denied service and, at the court's discretion, pay attorney fees; (8) groups representing consumers believe that ERISA's limited remedy neither provides sufficient compensation for injuries that benefit denials contribute to nor effectively deters unjustified benefit denials; (9) ERISA can affect participants' ability to be compensated for injuries sustained while in an employer-based health care plan; (10) ERISA's preemption of state laws that relate to employee health benefit plans enables managed care plans and UR firms to avoid liability under state law for medical malpractice; (11) compelling evidence is lacking on the likely effects of amending ERISA to provide either expanded remedies for losses due to disputed benefit denials or the ability to sue managed care plans for medical malpractice under state tort laws; (12) consumer groups and others assert that additional remedies could: (a) improve health care quality by holding plans accountable for the consequences of their benefit coverage decisions; and (b) provide participants with a course of remedies more comparable to state tort laws; (13) managed care plan and employer groups maintain that these additional provisions would result in increased costs or benefit reductions; and (14) to date, data are not available to accurately estimate the extent to which the quality of health care would improve or the amount by which the costs of plans, employers, and employees might change if ERISA's remedies or preemption of state laws were amended. |
gao_GAO-12-87 | gao_GAO-12-87_0 | From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010, civilian agency obligations for professional and management support service contracts increased $9.9 billion dollars, or 44 percent, to $32 billion (adjusted for inflation to 2010 dollars). 2.) Use of these services can result in the loss of government accountability and control if proper oversight is not provided. Of the 230 professional and management support service contract statements of work (SOW) we reviewed from the five agencies, at least 120 contracts—or more than half—requested services that the FAR identifies as closely supporting inherently governmental functions, including services related to budget preparation, reorganization and planning activities, evaluation of another contractor’s performance, and acquisition support. 3.) Agency Officials Generally Did Not Consider and Mitigate Risks Associated with Contracts for Professional and Management Support Services
Agency officials generally did not consider the risks of acquiring professional and management support services before awarding the 12 contracts we reviewed. In some cases, however, officials later became concerned and took steps to mitigate potential risks that contractors might perform inherently governmental functions, or that government employees might lack sufficient expertise to oversee the contractors’ work. Few Officials Considered Risks When Awarding Contracts That Closely Support Inherently Governmental Functions
For the contracts we reviewed, few of the contracting or program officials said they considered whether the services they were contracting for closely supported inherently governmental functions or took steps to address the related risks before award. The FAR requires agencies to provide enhanced management oversight for contracts that closely support inherently governmental functions, and federal internal control standards require assessments of risks. performance. The policy letter requires agencies to develop and maintain internal procedures to address the requirements of the guidance, but does not state when the procedures should be implemented. Agencies Have Responded to Multisector Workforce Initiatives to Varying Degrees
The five agencies we reviewed have participated in many of OMB’s efforts related to the multisector workforce, but only DHS has taken steps to incorporate guidance to examine its use of contractors and balance its workforce. OMB May Have Missed Opportunities to Address Cost Savings and Risk in Two Recent Initiatives
Two recent OMB efforts have highlighted a group of service codes for increased attention as agencies address their use of service contracts, but do not contain two codes—Other Professional Services and Other Management Support Services—that accounted for a significant amount of dollars obligated by civilian agencies on professional and management support service contracts in fiscal year 2010 and may contain risks to the government’s control of mission and operations. To ensure that the risks of professional and management support service contracts are more fully considered and addressed, we recommend that the Director of OMB, through the Office of Federal Procurement Policy include contracts coded in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG) as Other Professional Services and Other Management Support Services in the cost savings initiative for management support services and planned service contract inventory guidance to agencies for conducting analysis of special interest functions. We also reviewed agency and governmentwide guidance and spoke with agency and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials. To determine the extent to which civilian agencies contract for professional and management services, we compiled information from FPDS-NG on procurement spending at civilian agencies for fiscal years 2005 through 2010. To gain greater insight into the types of activities included in contracts under these codes, we judgmentally selected five civilian agencies, the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation (DOT), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Science Foundation (NSF), based in part on their obligations for professional and management support services in fiscal year 2009 as a proportion of overall service obligations, as well as to represent varying agency missions and amounts of service contract obligations. We also included service codes that were frequently used by the five agencies and that might relate to specific agency missions. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2010, civilian agencies obligated $136 billion on service contracts, including obligations for professional and management support services such as program evaluation and acquisition support. Many of these services increase the risk that contractors may inappropriately influence the government's authority, control, and accountability for inherently governmental decisions. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which civilian agencies use professional and management support service contracts and the types of activities acquired, (2) determine if agencies consider and mitigate risks associated with contractors providing these services, and (3) assess agencies' response to recent Office of Management and Budget (OMB) efforts related to acquiring these services. GAO analyzed Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG) data and selected a nongeneralizable sample of 230 statements of work and 12 case studies from five agencies with one-third of obligations for these services in fiscal year 2010. GAO also reviewed agency and governmentwide guidance and met with agency and OMB officials.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, civilian agency obligations on contracts for professional and management support services increased 44 percent, from $22 billion to $32 billion (in 2010 dollars), more than twice the rate of increase for other services. For the five agencies GAO reviewedthe Departments of Homeland Security, Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development, the United States Agency for International Development, and the National Science Foundationmore than half of the 230 statements of work for professional and management support service contracts requested services that closely support the performance of inherently governmental functions. Using these services can inappropriately influence government decisionmaking if proper oversight is not provided. The five agencies generally did not consider and mitigate risks of acquiring professional and management support services prior to awarding the 12 contracts GAO reviewed. The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires agencies to provide enhanced management oversight for contracts that closely support inherently governmental functions. For the 12 contracts, few of the officials said they considered whether contracted services included such functions. In some cases, officials said they later became concerned that contractors might perform inherently governmental functions or that government employees lacked expertise to oversee contracted work, and took steps to mitigate risks. Guidance from four of the five agencies did not include processes to identify risks or ensure enhanced management oversight when contractors perform such services.
Recent congressional and OMB guidance has emphasized the need for agencies to examine their use of service contracts and the related risks. The five agencies have participated in these efforts, including service contract inventories and multisector workforce pilots, to varying degrees, but only DHS has taken steps to incorporate related OMB efforts into processes that examine their use of professional and management support services. A September 2011 OMB policy letter requires agencies to develop procedures to improve their management of risks when contracting for these services, but does not include an implementation deadline. Further, two OMB efforts have focused on selected professional and management support service codes from FPDS-NG that require increased agency attention, but the efforts exclude two related codes that accounted for significant obligations and that may similarly contain risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB establish a deadline for its recent requirement that agencies develop procedures for services, including those that closely support inherently governmental functions, and include two FPDS-NG codes in guidance for agencies' use of service contracts and in the cost savings initiative for management support services. OMB generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-170 | gao_GAO-17-170_0 | In fiscal year 2016, Congress reiterated its requirement for DHS to submit a plan to implement a biometric entry and exit capability and established a funding mechanism available to the Secretary of Homeland Security beginning in fiscal year 2017 to develop and implement a biometric entry and exit system. Overstay Reporting and Enforcement
Federal law also requires that DHS implement a program to collect data, for each fiscal year, regarding the total number of foreign visitors who overstayed their lawful admission period in the United States; and submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of the number of foreign nationals from each country in each nonimmigrant classification who remained in the country beyond their authorized period of stay. CBP Has Made Progress Testing and Evaluating Biometric Exit Capabilities since 2013, but It is Too Early to Assess Whether Current Implementation Plans Address Long- Standing Challenges
CBP Has Conducted Biometric Pilot Programs to Inform Planning for a Biometric Exit System
Since our 2013 report on DHS’s efforts to develop a biometric exit capability, CBP has conducted four biometric pilot programs intended to inform the acquisition of a biometric exit system: (1) Biometric Exit Mobile Air Test (BE-Mobile) (mobile fingerprint reader); (2) 1 to 1 Facial Comparison Project (facial recognition upon entry); (3) Departure Information Systems Test (matching on-site facial scan to a gallery of photographs); and (4) the Southwest Border Pedestrian Exit Field Test (face and iris scanning at pedestrian exit from the United States). In particular, we and DHS have identified challenges in the areas of planning, infrastructure, and staffing that have affected DHS’s efforts to develop and implement a biometric exit capability. DHS has recognized these challenges and, according to CBP officials, is working to address them as part of its current planning process for a biometric exit system. Under this current process, as of November 2016, CBP plans to implement a biometric exit capability in at least one major airport by 2018, but has not yet finalized the approach it will take to deploy this capability in airports. We and DHS have identified challenges in CBP’s planning efforts to develop and implement a biometric exit capability. DHS concurred with this recommendation and finalized goals and implemented actions to address it. CBP has also previously faced challenges in meeting the timeframes it has identified for deploying a biometric exit capability at airports. In November 2016, CBP officials also told us the agency had changed its approach to the biometric exit capability and was working with airlines and airports on strategies for using public/private partnerships to both reduce the cost to taxpayers and give industry more control over how a biometric exit capability is implemented at airport gates. For example, CBP officials pointed out that U.S. airports generally do not have designated and secure exit areas for conducting outbound immigration inspections, nor are there checkpoints for travelers to pass through where their departure is recorded by a U.S. immigration officer and where biometric information could be captured. To address these challenges, CBP intends to use the information gained from the pilot programs to identify biometric exit technology and processes that are effective in the airport environment and minimize the impact on passenger flow and airport operations. DHS Included Some Required Information in Its First Overstay Report and Plans to Include More Information in Future Reports, and DHS Overstay Enforcement Priorities Have Not Changed Since 2013 DHS Overstay Report Includes Some Required Information, and DHS Officials Expect Future Reports to Include Additional Information
In January 2016, DHS issued its first report on estimated overstay rates that covered fiscal year 2015, which included some but not all information required by statute. We recommended that DHS assess and document the extent to which the reliability of the data used to develop any overstay estimates has improved and any remaining limitations in how the data can be used. DHS’s fiscal year 2015 overstay report describes expected overstays rates by country for foreign nationals lawfully admitted into the United States for business or pleasure through air and sea POEs and who were supposed to depart the United States in fiscal year 2015, as required. Specifically, because of data reliability concerns, the overstay report does not include required information on expected departures, overstays, and overstay rates for foreign nationals who entered the country under nonimmigrant visa categories other than for business and pleasure, such as those covering, for example, foreign students and their families (F, M, and J visas). DHS expects to start reporting overstay rates for foreign visitors who entered the country through land POEs in the fiscal year 2017 report. DHS’s Overstay Enforcement Priorities Have Remained the Same Since 2013
Since our July 2013 report, DHS has not changed its enforcement priorities with respect to potential overstays, focusing its enforcement actions on individuals that may pose a national security or public safety risk. CTCEU sent 26,982 overstay leads (about 1 percent) to HSI field offices for further investigation because they represented national security or public safety threats. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States. Overstays are individuals lawfully admitted on a temporary basis who then remain in the country beyond their authorized period of admission. DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and addressing overstays. In 2004, DHS was required to develop a plan to accelerate full implementation of an automated biometric entry-exit system. In various reports, GAO identified a range of long-standing challenges DHS has faced in its efforts to develop and deploy this capability and to use entry and exit data to identify overstays. For example, in 2013, GAO recommended that DHS establish timeframes and milestones for a biometric air exit evaluation framework and document the reliability of its overstay data. DHS concurred with the recommendations and addressed them.
GAO was asked to review DHS's progress in developing a biometric exit capability. This report examines DHS's efforts since GAO's 2013 report to (1) develop and implement a biometric exit capability and (2) report on and address potential overstays. GAO reviewed statutes and DHS documents and interviewed DHS officials about biometric exit capability development and overstays reporting. GAO also observed four biometric entry and exit pilot programs and analyzed overstay data for fiscal years 2013 through 2015 (most recent at time of review). GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report. In its comments, DHS stated that it is using a biometric verification system to confirm the departure of selected travelers at one airport and plans to release its 2016 overstays report in late February 2017.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's 2013 report on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to develop a biometric exit capability to collect biometric data, such as fingerprints, from individuals exiting the United States, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has conducted four pilot programs to inform the development and implementation of a biometric exit system. CBP has made progress in testing biometric exit capabilities, but various longstanding planning, infrastructure, and staffing challenges continue to affect CBP's efforts to develop and implement a biometric exit system. CBP set 2018 as the goal for initial implementation of a biometric exit capability in at least one airport and is working with airlines and airports on strategies for using public/private partnerships to reduce costs and give industry more control over how a biometric exit capability is implemented at airport gates. However, the agency cannot complete the planning process until these partnership agreements and implementation decisions are finalized. As GAO has also previously reported, infrastructure limitations are a challenge to implementing a biometric air exit capability. For example, CBP noted that U.S. airports generally do not have outbound designated secure areas for exiting travelers where biometric information could be captured by U.S. immigration officers. CBP recognizes these challenges and intends to use the information gained from the pilot programs to identify biometric exit technology and staffing processes that are effective in the airport environment. As CBP is in the process of finalizing its approach, it is too early to assess the agency's plans for developing and implementing a biometric exit capability and the extent to which those plans will address identified challenges.
Since GAO's 2013 report, DHS has reported some required information on potential overstays—individuals who are admitted to the country under a specific nonimmigrant category but exceed their lawful admission period—and has not changed its enforcement priorities for potential overstays. In January 2016, DHS issued its first report on estimated overstay rates that covered fiscal year 2015, which included some but not all overstay information required by statute. The report described expected overstay rates by country for foreign visitors lawfully admitted for business or pleasure through air and sea ports of entry (POE) who were expected to depart the United States in fiscal year 2015. However, because of data reliability concerns, the report did not include all information required by law, including overstay rates for foreign visitors who entered the country through land POEs or under other nonimmigrant categories. According to DHS officials, the report for fiscal year 2016 will include reliable overstay rates on foreign students arriving through air and sea POEs. DHS expects to start reporting overstay rates for foreign visitors who entered the country through land POEs in the report for fiscal year 2017. DHS has improved overstays reporting by, among other things, enhancing the systems it uses to process entry and exit biographic data for potential overstays and is exploring options to collect information from land POEs. DHS has not changed its enforcement priorities with respect to potential overstays, continuing to focus its enforcement actions on individuals that may pose a national security or public safety risk. Specifically, in fiscal years 2013 through 2015, the agency reviewed approximately 2.7 million overstay leads and sent 26,982 of them (about 1 percent) to field offices for further investigation. |
gao_GGD-97-177 | gao_GGD-97-177_0 | GPO Completed a Major Inventory Reduction in 1996
In May 1996, financial projections indicated that the sales program expected a substantial loss for fiscal year 1996, the first such loss in 15 years. Superintendent of Documents Policy No. The Superintendent further said that he subsequently verbally instructed his staff to begin the inventory reduction before the action plan was approved and told them to disregard policies that would interfere with the removal of as much excess inventory by September 30, 1996, as possible. The Superintendent of Documents said that he wanted to dispose of the excess inventory by September 30, 1996, in order to take the losses in fiscal year 1996. He also said that he wanted to identify and dispose of as much excess inventory as possible in fiscal year 1996 rather than in later years, when it otherwise would have been identified, disposed of, and charged to expense. At our recommendation, the Superintendent of Documents put his oral instructions in writing in August 1997. In addition, he said that GPO was already developing a new inventory management system that would allow publications that are to be held indefinitely to be designated as such once they have been identified. Aligning GPO’s Procedure for Considering Holding Costs of Publications With Its Policy
In a May 6, 1997, letter to Senator Byrd, the Public Printer said that, on the basis of a study GPO had done, it was more cost-effective to maintain an adequate inventory of sales publications based on their projected life cycle and to reprint if necessary, than to hold excess copies of publications in inventory. To help remedy this problem, according to the Superintendent of Documents, the Comptroller recommended that the Superintendent identify as much excess inventory as possible in fiscal year 1996 to improve the sales program’s long-term financial situation. In this regard, we noted that the printing and binding cost of the 3,258 copies of the Senate history volumes disposed of was about $83,000, and that GPO’s estimated annual storage costs attributable to these copies was about $2,500. Because of the erroneous belief of the Superintendent of Documents, who heads GPO’s sales program, that GPO had to physically remove excess publications from the GPO warehouse by September 30, 1996, in order to record them as an expense for fiscal year 1996, and because of his express instruction to disregard policies and procedures, GPO staff disposed of about 2,100 different publications without first contacting the issuing agencies of those publications. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with your offices, our objectives were to determine the facts surrounding the September 1996 inventory reduction; whether it followed existing policies and procedures; and the fate of the 3,258 copies of The Senate 1789-1989, a four-volume set written by Senator Byrd, that were destroyed as part of that reduction. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Government Printing Office's (GPO) procedures for managing its inventory of excess publications, particularly its management of a major inventory reduction that took place in September 1996, focusing on: (1) whether GPO followed existing policies and procedures; and (2) how 3,258 copies of The Senate 1789-1989, a four-volume set written by Senator Byrd, were destroyed as part of that reduction.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) when for the first time in 15 years a potential financial loss was identified in GPO's sales program in June 1996, the Superintendent of Documents, who heads the sales program, initiated several actions intended to improve the program's long-term financial condition; (2) the Superintendent of Documents said he wanted to dispose of the excess inventory by September 30, 1996, to take the losses in fiscal year (FY) 1996 rather than in later years, when it otherwise would have been identified, disposed of, and charged to expense; (3) the Superintendent of Documents also said he had erroneously believed that it was necessary to physically remove excess publications from inventory storage by September 30, 1996, in order to record them as an expense in the financial records for FY 1996; (4) although the Superintendent of Documents had policies and procedures in place to prevent the disposal of publications that the issuing agency still wanted, in June 1996 he instructed his staff to disregard those policies that would interfere with his goal of disposing of as much excess publications inventory as possible by September 30, 1996; (5) acting under the Superintendent's overall instructions, GPO sales program staff disregarded a policy that has existed since at least 1984, which provides that, before disposing of any excess copies of publications, GPO should offer them to the issuing agencies; (6) in explaining its inventory reduction to Senator Byrd, GPO said that it had found that it was generally more cost-effective to dispose of excess inventory and reprint if necessary, than to hold it in storage indefinitely; (7) however, GPO officials said that they knew that the reprint costs would substantially exceed the holding costs for these copies, given their relatively high printing and binding costs; (8) in July 1997, after Senator Byrd inquired about the major inventory reduction, the Superintendent of Documents orally instructed his staff to retain the remaining volumes of the Senate history and, at GAO's recommendation, put this instruction in writing in August 1997; and (9) the Superintendent further said that GPO was developing a new integrated processing system that would help designate publications that should not be excessed and, at GAO's recommendation, agreed to develop a systematic process for identifying publications to be held indefinitely for valid reasons. |
gao_GAO-17-3 | gao_GAO-17-3_0 | Design standards, building codes, and voluntary certifications play a role in the federal fiscal exposure to the effects of climate change. Standards- Developing Organizations Have Not Generally Used Forward-Looking Climate Information in Design Standards, Building Codes, and Voluntary Certifications
Standards-developing organizations generally have not used forward- looking climate information in design standards, building codes, and voluntary certifications and instead have relied on historical observations, according to our analysis, reports we reviewed, and representatives of standards-developing organizations we interviewed. Some standards-developing organizations periodically update the climate information they use. Some standards-developing organizations have taken preliminary steps, such as issuing guidance and statements, that may lead to the use of forward-looking climate information in standards, codes, and certifications. For example, in 2015 the American Society of Civil Engineers issued a white paper about adapting engineering practices to a changing climate that recommended, among other things, that engineers work with scientists to better understand future climate extremes to improve the planning and design of infrastructure. Reports and Representatives of Standards- Developing Organizations Identified Institutional and Technical Challenges to Using Forward-Looking Climate Information
Standards-developing organizations face institutional and technical challenges to using the best available forward-looking climate information in design standards, building codes, and voluntary certifications, according to reports we reviewed and representatives of these organizations and federal officials we interviewed. For example, representatives of one standards-developing organization told us that their members have not expressed interest in standards that use forward- looking climate information because it would require increased upfront construction costs. Representatives of one standards-developing organization told us that climate models provide a wide range of possible temperatures that is difficult to use in their standards because the technical committee does not know how to reflect this variability. Agencies Have Initiated Some Actions and Could Take More to Help Address Challenges, According to Reports, Standards- Developing Organizations, and Agency Officials
Federal agencies have initiated some actions to help standards- developing organizations address institutional and technical challenges to using forward-looking climate information. Furthermore, in November 2015, MitFLG—which FEMA chairs—issued a draft implementation strategy that seeks to encourage federal support for more resilient standards and codes, but the strategy does not specifically focus on using forward-looking climate information. First, agencies could improve interagency coordination to address institutional challenges. Federal policy directs agency standards executives—senior-level officials who coordinate agency participation in standards organizations—to coordinate their views on matters of paramount importance when they participate in the same standards activities. OMB Circular A-119 also directs the Secretary of Commerce, who has delegated this responsibility to NIST, to coordinate and foster executive branch implementation of the Circular, which addresses federal participation in the development and use of voluntary consensus standards, and to sponsor, support, and chair the Interagency Committee on Standards Policy (ICSP). Providing the Best Available Forward-Looking Climate Information to Help Address Technical Challenges Federal agencies that participate in the standards-developing process and respond to climate-related issues could help address technical challenges by providing the best available forward-looking climate information for consideration in the standards-developing process, according to reports we reviewed, our prior work, and representatives of some standards-developing organizations and federal agency officials we interviewed. We have previously found that using the best available climate information, including forward-looking projections, can be a part of a risk-management strategy for federal, state, local, and private-sector decisions and investments. For example, NIST convened a panel to, among other things, identify gaps in standards and codes to make infrastructure more resilient to extreme weather and other risks. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help reduce federal fiscal exposure by enhancing the resilience of infrastructure to extreme weather, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce, through the Director of NIST, in consultation with MitFLG and USGCRP, convene federal agencies for an ongoing governmentwide effort to provide the best available forward-looking climate information to standards-developing organizations for their consideration in the development of design standards, building codes, and voluntary certifications. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) what is known about the use of forward-looking climate information in design standards, building codes, and voluntary certifications; (2) challenges, if any, that reports and representatives of standards-developing organizations identified to using forward-looking climate information; and (3) any actions that federal agencies have taken to help address these challenges and additional actions, if any, that reports, representatives of standards-developing organizations, and agency officials identified. Global Change Research Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last decade, extreme weather cost the federal government more than $320 billion for, among other things, repairs to federal infrastructure, and according to the President's 2017 budget request, these costs may rise as the climate continues to change. GAO's prior work found that using the best available climate information, including forward-looking projections, can help manage climate-related risks.
Federal, state, local, and private decision makers use design standards, building codes, and voluntary certifications in the construction of infrastructure. Standards-developing organizations, such as professional engineering societies, issue standards, model codes, and certifications.
GAO was asked to review the use of forward-looking climate information by standards-developing organizations. This report examines (1) what is known about the use of such information in standards, codes, and certifications; (2) challenges standards organizations face to using climate information; and (3) actions federal agencies have taken to address such challenges and additional actions they could take. GAO analyzed laws and policies, reviewed reports, and interviewed representatives from 17 selected organizations and officials from agencies that address climate issues.
What GAO Found
Selected standards-developing organizations generally have not used forward-looking climate information—such as projected rainfall rates—in design standards, building codes, and voluntary certifications and instead have relied on historical observations. Further, some organizations periodically update climate information in standards, codes, and certifications, but others do not. Some standards-developing organizations have taken preliminary steps that may lead to the use of forward-looking climate information. For example, in 2015, the American Society of Civil Engineers issued a paper that recommended engineers work with scientists to better understand future climate extremes.
Standards-developing organizations face institutional and technical challenges to using the best available forward-looking climate information in design standards, building codes, and voluntary certifications, according to reports, representatives of these organizations, and federal officials. Institutional challenges include a standards-developing process that must balance various interests and can be slow to change. For example, representatives of some standards-developing organizations told GAO that their members have not expressed interest in standards that use forward-looking climate information. Technical challenges include difficulties in identifying the best available forward-looking climate information and incorporating it into standards, codes, and certifications. For example, representatives from one organization said that climate models provide a wide range of possible temperatures that is difficult to use in their standards.
Agencies have initiated some actions and could take more to help standards-developing organizations address challenges, according to various reports, representatives of standards-developing organizations, and agency officials. For example, in 2015, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) convened a panel that seeks to identify gaps in standards and codes to make infrastructure more resilient to extreme weather. In addition, officials from the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP)—which coordinates research across 13 federal agencies—told GAO they have begun discussions with representatives of standards-developing organizations on their climate information needs. In 2015, the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group (MitFLG)—which coordinates hazard mitigation efforts—issued a draft strategy to encourage federal support for more resilient standards and codes. Opportunities exist for additional agency actions that may help address the challenges organizations identified to using forward-looking climate information. Specifically, agencies that address climate issues could improve interagency coordination to help standards-developing organizations address institutional challenges and could provide the best available forward-looking climate information to help them address technical challenges. Federal policy directs agency standards executives—senior-level officials who coordinate agency participation in standards organizations—to coordinate their views when they participate in the same standards activities so as to present, whenever feasible, a single, unified position. The policy also directs the Secretary of Commerce, who has delegated the responsibility to NIST, to coordinate and foster executive branch implementation of the policy governing federal participation in the development of voluntary consensus standards. A governmentwide effort could also present a benefit by reducing the federal fiscal exposure to the effects of climate change.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NIST, in consultation with USGCRP and MitFLG, convene an ongoing governmentwide effort to provide forward-looking climate information to standards organizations. Commerce neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-206 | gao_GAO-10-206_0 | The Corps’ authority to require financial assurances to ensure compensatory mitigation differs from the authority that mining agencies have under SMCRA to require bonds for mine reclamation. Mining Agencies and the Corps Use Different Approaches to Financial Assurances for Reclamation and Mitigation
The four states in our review use different approaches to fulfill SMCRA’s requirement that mine operators provide adequate financial assurances for completing reclamation. These states primarily vary in whether they require mine operators to fulfill their financial assurance obligation strictly through a full-cost bond or whether they allow operators to use alternative bonding systems that combine bonds, taxes on coal production, and other sources of funding. Furthermore, Corps officials said the Corps has relied on other permit conditions for assurance that mitigation will be satisfactorily completed. Virginia relies primarily on a bond pool but also uses a full-cost bonding system. Kentucky relies primarily on a full-cost bonding system but also uses a bond pool. West Virginia
All mine operators must participate in the state’s alternative bond system. Corps officials told us the Corps has relied on mechanisms other than financial assurances to ensure that mitigation associated with valley fill permits will be satisfactorily completed. Federal and State Agencies Are Not Required to Monitor Former Mine Sites but Have Conducted Some Analyses of Environmental Impacts
OSM, the states’ mining or environmental agencies, EPA, and the Corps are not required to monitor former mountaintop mines with valley fills for long-term environmental degradation after reclamation and mitigation are complete and financial assurances have been released. While the agencies are not required to collect post-reclamation monitoring data, several have analyzed conditions near reclaimed mine sites with valley fills and found that (1) reforestation efforts at some reclaimed surface coal mine sites needed improvement, (2) some surface coal mine sites have contaminated streams and harmed aquatic organisms, (3) a link exists between valley fills and changes to water flow, and (4) mine operators have not always returned mine sites to their approximate original contour when required to do so under SMCRA. Several federal and state agencies have taken some actions to respond to these findings. Federal Laws May Be Available Under Limited Circumstances to Address Long-term Environmental Problems Associated with Valley Fills but Have Rarely or Never Been Needed or Used, According to Agency Officials
Several federal laws may be available, under limited circumstances, to address environmental problems associated with mountaintop mines with valley fills after SMCRA or Clean Water Act financial assurances have expired, but these have rarely been needed or used, according to federal and state officials. We selected four federal laws for analysis in this regard: SMCRA; the Clean Water Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), also commonly known as Superfund; and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The Clean Water Act Authorizes EPA or State Water Quality Regulators to Require a Permit for Discharges from Former Surface Mines
Two provisions of the Clean Water Act authorize EPA or state water quality regulators to address or monitor water quality issues associated with former mine sites. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Interior, the Department of Defense, and the Environmental Protection Agency for review and comment. The three federal agencies generally agreed with our findings, while the three state agencies were critical of what they perceived to be the message of the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix details the methods we used to examine (1) the approaches the Office of Surface Mining (OSM), the states we reviewed, and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) have taken to obtain financial assurances for surface coal mines with valley fills; (2) the extent to which federal and state agencies monitor and evaluate these mines after reclamation and mitigation are complete; and (3) the federal laws agencies may use, and have used, to address any latent environmental problems associated with these mines that may occur after Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) or Clean Water Act financial assurances have expired. In addition, we interviewed and obtained information from officials in EPA’s Office of Water in headquarters and regions 3 and 4; the U.S. Geological Survey; and state water quality regulators in Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia regarding any monitoring or evaluation of the long-term environmental impact of former surface mines with valley fills. The focus of this report was surface coal mining and not all activities that may affect water quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
Surface mining for coal in Appalachia has generated opposition because rock and dirt from mountaintops is often removed and placed in nearby valleys and streams. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) in the Department of the Interior and states with approved programs regulate these mines under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and states also regulate different aspects of coal mining, including the filling of valley streams, under the Clean Water Act. Under SMCRA, mine operators must provide financial assurances sufficient to allow mines to be reclaimed. Under the Clean Water Act, the Corps may require financial assurances that the impact of mines on streams can be mitigated. GAO was asked to examine (1) the approaches OSM, the states, and the Corps have taken to obtain financial assurances for surface coal mines with valley fills; (2) federal and state agencies' monitoring of these mines after reclamation and mitigation are complete; and (3) the federal laws agencies may use, and have used, to address latent environmental problems. GAO gathered information from state and federal agencies in Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia about their financial assurances practices, long-term monitoring, and use of federal laws to address environmental impacts at former mine sites. This report makes no recommendations.
What GAO Found
OSM, the states, and the Corps use different approaches to financial assurances for reclamation and mitigation. Under SMCRA, states have flexibility to require mine operators to provide a bond for the full cost of reclamation or participate in an alternative bonding system such as a bond pool, which may combine bonds, taxes on coal production, and other sources of funding. West Virginia relies exclusively on an alternative bonding system, while Tennessee exclusively uses a full-cost bonding system. The other two states, Virginia and Kentucky, rely on a combination of full-cost bonds and an alternative bonding system. Under the Clean Water Act, the Corps has discretion to require that mine operators provide assurances that funds will be available to mitigate the effects of burying streams with valley fills but it has not done so in the four states we reviewed. Instead, the Corps has relied on other mechanisms to ensure that mitigation will be completed satisfactorily, according to Corps officials. For example, some Corps officials said they rely on SMCRA financial assurances to ensure required mitigation. OSM, EPA, the Corps, and the four states' mining and environmental agencies are not required to monitor former mountaintop mines with valley fills for long-term environmental degradation after reclamation and mitigation are complete and financial assurances have been released. However, several of them, along with the U.S. Geological Survey, have conducted or funded analyses of conditions near reclaimed mine sites with valley fills that have shown environmental impacts. Specifically, analyses have shown that (1) reforestation efforts at some reclaimed surface coal mine sites needed improvement; (2) surface coal mine sites have contaminated streams and harmed aquatic organisms; (3) valley fills may affect water flow; and (4) mine operators have not always returned mine sites to their approximate original contour when required to do so under SMCRA. Federal and state agencies have taken some actions to respond to these findings, including adopting new guidelines for reforestation practices. Several federal laws may be available under limited circumstances to address long-term environmental problems at former mine sites. These laws include SMCRA; the Clean Water Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), also commonly known as Superfund; and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. For example, the Clean Water Act authorizes EPA or a state to require a permit if discharges are detected from a former surface mine, and CERCLA may authorize EPA to respond to certain pollution from former surface mines. According to the agencies, they have rarely or never needed to use these authorities. We provided a draft of this report to OSM, the Corps, EPA, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia for review and comment. The federal agencies generally agreed with the report, while the states were critical of what they perceived to be the message of the report. |
gao_GAO-06-277 | gao_GAO-06-277_0 | The Bureau Has Made Progress on Major Decennial Contracts, but Adherence to Contract Milestones Will Be Essential
The Bureau has awarded three of its seven major decennial contracts on time, and is working to accomplish contract milestones for these three and preparing for the award of the remaining four contracts. However, the tight systems development and testing schedule coupled with the interdependence of decennial systems may affect the Bureau’s ability to meet its ambitious schedule for completing the testing necessary for a successful census. The Bureau has twice changed the DADS II award date and contract scope. They also told us that the contract is currently on track. Consistent with the leading acquisition planning practice of strategically planning for contracts, the successful integration of decennial systems is a key factor in the Bureau’s ability to meet its internal milestones. The Bureau Has Implemented Actions to Address Changes in Business Processes Resulting from Its Increasing Reliance on Contractors
An agency’s increased reliance on contractors may result in changes to its business processes that can adversely affect staff and the performance of the contractor. For example, the Bureau did not identify its decennial acquisition workforce in its overall human capital management plan, nor did it solicit the input of the Acquisition Division in developing that plan. The Bureau has incorporated some key strategic workforce planning principles in planning for its acquisition workforce, but primarily at a division level. First, as we previously noted, the Bureau does not assess or monitor gaps in numbers by mission-critical occupation at an agencywide level. Already, aspects of the Bureau’s DADS II system will not be assessed in the dress rehearsal because of a change in the contract’s acquisition milestones, while changes to FDCA time frames have reduced the amount of time the Bureau will have to complete the work needed to prepare for, and begin the dress rehearsal. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help the Bureau improve the management of the 2010 Census, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to take the following three actions: Ensure that the key systems to be developed or provided by contractors for the 2010 Census are fully functional and ready to be assessed in concert with other operations as part of the 2008 Dress Rehearsal. Devote further attention to planning strategically for its decennial acquisition workforce by (1) assessing, at a higher level within the agency, whether it has the acquisition-related skills needed to conduct the 2010 Census by developing strategies to identify and address gaps, monitoring and evaluating progress toward closing gaps, and adjusting strategies accordingly; and (2) identifying the needs of the acquisition workforce in its human capital management plan or another acquisition-specific workforce plan and involving appropriate stakeholders in this planning effort. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to (1) determine the status of the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Bureau) major contracts related to the 2010 Census, and (2) evaluate the extent to which the Bureau is using selected leading practices to manage its acquisition planning process for the decennial census. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the 2010 Census, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) is making the most extensive use of contractors in its history to supply a number of mission-critical functions and technologies. Because of the critical role that contractors will play in the 2010 Census, GAO reviewed the Bureau's acquisition planning process. Specifically GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the status of the Bureau's major decennial contracts, and (2) evaluate the extent to which the Bureau is using selected leading practices to manage its acquisition planning for these contracts.
What GAO Found
The Bureau has awarded three of its seven major decennial contracts consistent with their award date, but has changed the award dates of two of the remaining contracts (data dissemination and communications) because of changes in its acquisition approach. Bureau officials noted that the communications contract is currently on track. Still, changes in contract milestones--coupled with the Bureau's tight systems development schedule and interdependence of those systems--could affect the Bureau's ability to develop fully functional and sufficiently mature systems to be tested in concert with other operations during the 2008 Dress Rehearsal for the 2010 Census. Already, aspects of the Bureau's data dissemination system will not be assessed during the dress rehearsal because of changes to solicitation and contract award dates. To date, the Bureau has generally followed five selected leading practices for federal acquisition planning that we evaluated. For example, the Bureau has monitored the acquisition planning process for individual contracts, involved relevant stakeholders in the planning phase, and implemented certain actions to its business processes resulting from its reliance on contractors. However, as part of its strategic planning, the Bureau does not have a schedule for documenting what and when information needs to be provided to development teams to integrate all decennial systems. Additionally, in planning for its decennial acquisition workforce--which includes staff who award or manage contracts--the Bureau has not fully implemented key strategic workforce planning principles. For example, while the Bureau took steps at the division level to plan for its acquisition workforce, it does not assess or monitor at a high level gaps in the skills needed by its decennial acquisition workforce. The Bureau also has not identified the needs of the decennial acquisition workforce in its human capital management plan and did not involve all relevant acquisition workforce stakeholders in the development of this plan. |
gao_GAO-12-505 | gao_GAO-12-505_0 | Agencies Have Provided More Rigorous Oversight of Phosphate Mining Since 1996, but Oversight Gaps Remain
Federal agencies have taken steps to strengthen their oversight of phosphate mining on federal land since selenium contamination was discovered in 1996 by requiring more detailed environmental analysis and reclamation plans, requiring financial assurances that provide more coverage, hiring additional staff, and revising land-use plans. BLM officials told us that the agency now requires mine operators that propose new mine sites to develop more comprehensive reclamation plans than operators did previously. For example, the Forest Service has, among other things, created a new position to oversee its selenium remediation efforts. Oversight Gaps Remain in Agency Policy and Coordination
We identified four gaps in the agencies’ oversight efforts that could limit their ability to address ongoing problems with selenium contamination. Without documenting its bonding practices in official agency policy, BLM cannot be assured that the current full-cost financial assurance practices for phosphate mines in Idaho will be implemented completely and consistently. For Forest Service officials, this is of particular concern because 16 leases on Forest Service land are scheduled for readjustment in the next 5 years, and once a lease is readjusted, as noted earlier, its provisions are in effect for 20 years. Agencies and Mine Operators Have Focused on Assessing Contamination, Not Conducting Remediation, and Total Cleanup Costs Are Currently Unknown
Since selenium contamination was discovered in 1996, federal agencies and phosphate mine operators in Idaho have largely taken actions focused on assessing the extent of selenium contamination at the 16 mines where such contamination has been identified, and have conducted limited remediation. The federal agencies reported having spent about $19 million on this effort, about half of which has been reimbursed by mine operators. The mine operators have incurred additional costs for assessment and remediation activities, according to agency officials, but the operators did not provide documentary evidence to support these claims. The agencies and mine operators are still in the early stages of this process—none had produced a complete remedial investigation report as of March 2012—and, according to officials, completing this process at all mines will likely require years of additional work before final cleanup remedies are selected. Agencies Have Not Developed Cost Estimates for Future Cleanup Actions Because Site Assessment Efforts Have Not Been Completed
According to EPA and Forest Service officials, they have not developed cost estimates for future cleanup actions at any of the 16 contaminated phosphate mines because agencies are still conducting assessment work, and these officials will not determine cleanup actions until they have completed this work. A total maximum daily load for selenium has not yet been established. Agencies Hold Millions of Dollars in Financial Assurances for Site Reclamation and Assessment, but Some Are in the Form of Potentially Risky Corporate Guarantees
Federal agencies reported holding financial assurances for phosphate mine operations in southeastern Idaho for about $91 million to cover (1) mine reclamation and related activities and (2) site assessment and limited remediation activities negotiated under CERCLA settlement agreements. BLM and the Forest Service Reported Holding About $80 Million in Financial Assurances for Reclamation-Related Activities
As of March 2012, BLM reported holding about $75.2 million in reclamation financial assurances for 13 of the 18 phosphate mines where federal agencies are overseeing mining operations or cleanup activities. Over 95 percent of this amount—almost $72 million—is associated with the five currently active mines, and nearly all of that amount—over $66 million—is associated with the two most recently approved active mines, the Blackfoot Bridge and Smoky Canyon mines. For example, while BLM’s practice of setting financial assurances to cover the estimated full cost of reclamation for new phosphate mines may better protect the government from future cleanup liability, the agency has not documented this practice in official agency policy—lessening the certainty that the practice will be consistently followed in the future. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of BLM to document the practice of requiring financial assurances to cover the estimated full cost of reclamation in BLM’s official agency policy; work with the Chief of the Forest Service to develop a coordinated process for (1) proposing and evaluating lease terms and conditions for phosphate mines in southeastern Idaho, and (2) sharing information on the amount and adequacy of financial assurances to provide better coordination between federal agencies regarding phosphate mine oversight; and analyze BLM’s authorities for directing operators to enter into third- party contracting mechanisms. Specifically, we were asked to provide information on the (1) extent to which federal agencies’ oversight of phosphate operations has changed since the discovery of selenium contamination in Idaho in 1996, and whether those changes appear sufficient to help the agencies prevent future contamination; (2) actions that federal agencies and mine operators have taken to assess and remediate contamination from phosphate mining on federal land, amounts they have spent on these actions, and estimated remaining costs; and (3) types and amounts of financial assurances in place for phosphate mining operations and the extent to which these assurances are likely to cover future cleanup costs. We received information on funds BLM received from mine operators from Interior’s Federal Financial System. | Why GAO Did This Study
For over 100 years in the United States, phosphate has been mined on federal land primarily for use in fertilizer and herbicides. The Department of the Interiors Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is responsible for leasing and overseeing such mines on federal land. In 1996, selenium contamination from phosphate mines was discovered in Idaho, threatening the health of livestock and wildlife. Mines in the area are now being assessed for cleanup under the Environmental Protection Agencys (EPA) Superfund program. Agencies may require mine operators to post financial assurances, which are usually in the form of a bond, to ensure they meet their leasing and cleanup obligations. GAO was asked to determine the (1) extent to which federal oversight for phosphate operations has changed since 1996; (2) actions federal agencies and mine operators have taken to address contamination, amounts spent to date, and estimated remaining costs; and (3) types and amounts of financial assurances in place for phosphate-mining operations. GAO reviewed agency data and documents, and interviewed key agency and mine operator officials.
What GAO Found
Since 1996, federal agencies have taken several actions to strengthen their oversight of phosphate mining on federal land. For example, BLM now conducts more detailed environmental analysis when evaluating new mine plans; requires phosphate mine operators to provide more comprehensive plans for reclaiming mine sites (restoring the land to a stable condition that can support other uses); and requires the mine operators to provide financial assurances that are based on the full estimated cost of reclaiming mines, in contrast to BLMs previous practice of calculating financial assurances based simply on the acreage associated with mines. However, gaps remain in agency policies and coordination that could limit the agencies efforts to address contamination from phosphate-mining operations. For example, BLM has not documented its new full-cost financial assurance practice in agency policy and therefore has limited assurance that it will be implemented consistently. BLM also has not fully coordinated with the Forest Service when establishing mine lease conditions and setting financial assurance amounts. Limited coordination is of particular concern because 16 phosphate leases in Idaho are scheduled for review and possible readjustment in the next 5 years, and once a lease is readjusted, its provisions are in effect for 20 years.
Over the last 16 years, federal agencies and mine operators have primarily focused on assessing the extent of selenium contamination in Idaho and have conducted only limited remediation actions. The agencies have conducted or overseen high-level assessments of contamination at 16 of the 18 mines where federal agencies are overseeing mining operations or cleanup activities, and at several of these mines the agencies and mine operators are now conducting more detailed assessments, known as remedial investigations and feasibility studies. However, no final cleanup actions have been chosen at any of the sites, and according to officials, most sites will require years of additional investigative work before final cleanup actions are selected. Federal agencies reported that they have spent about $19 million since 2001 to oversee these assessments and undertake a limited number of remediation actions, roughly half of which has been reimbursed by the mine operators under cleanup settlement agreements. Mine operators told GAO that they too have spent millions of dollars in additional assessment and remediation work but did not provide documentary evidence to support these claims. Agency officials told GAO that they have not developed estimates for the remaining cleanup costs because final cleanup remedies have not yet been identified. However, their informal estimates suggest that remaining cleanup costs may total hundreds of millions of dollars for the contamination from mining in Idaho.
Federal agencies reported holding about $80 million in financial assurances for reclaiming phosphate mines in Idaho. Most of this amountover $66 millionis associated with the two most recently approved phosphate mines. Agencies reported holding an additional $11.5 million in financial assurances to cover site assessment and limited cleanup activities under EPAs Superfund program, but some of these are in the form of corporate guarantees, which the agencies have determined are riskier than other types of financial assurances. No financial assurances have been established to cover future cleanup costs because remaining cleanup actions have not yet been identified, according to agency officials.
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, GAO recommends that BLM document its financial assurance practice in policy and consult with the Forest Service to better protect the federal government from cleanup costs. In commenting on a draft of this report, Interior, the Forest Service, and EPA generally agreed with GAOs findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-908T | gao_GAO-09-908T_0 | More than three quarters of the $45 billion in federal outlays has been provided through the increased Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) grant awards and the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund administered by the Department of Education. Figure 1 shows actual federal outlays as of August 28, 2009 and the original estimate. Together, these nine programs are estimated to account for approximately 87 percent of federal Recovery Act outlays to state and localities in fiscal year 2009. Since our July report and with regard to the states’ receipt of the increased FMAP, all 16 states and the District had drawn down increased FMAP grant awards of just over $19.6 billion for the period of October 1, 2008 through September 4, 2009, which amounted to almost 84 percent of funds available. Most commonly, states reported that they are using or planning to use freed-up funds to cover their increased Medicaid caseload, to maintain current benefits and eligibility levels, and to help finance their respective state budgets. Several states noted that given the poor economic climate in their respective states, these funds were critical in their efforts to maintain Medicaid coverage at current levels. In March 2009, $26.7 billion was apportioned to all 50 states and the District of Columbia (District) for highway infrastructure and other eligible projects. More recently, as of September 1, 2009, $18 billion of the funds had been obligated for almost 7,000 projects nationwide, and approximately $11 billion had been obligated for almost 3,800 projects in the 16 states and the District that are the focus of GAO’s review. Many state officials told us they selected a large percentage of resurfacing and other pavement improvement projects because they did not require extensive environmental clearances, were quick to design, could be quickly obligated and bid, could employ people quickly, and could be completed within 3 years. While officials from almost all of the states we reviewed said that they considered project readiness, including the 3-year completion requirement, when making project selections, there was substantial variation in the extent to which states prioritized projects in economically distressed areas and how they identified these areas. All states and the District have submitted their certifications. Specifically, a March fact sheet, the Secretary’s April letter to Governors, and program guidance issued in April and May mention that the purposes of the SFSF include helping stabilize state and local budgets, avoiding reductions in education and other essential services, and ensuring LEAs and public IHEs have resources to “avert cuts and retain teachers and professors.” The documents also link educational progress to economic recovery and growth and identify four principles to guide the distribution and use of Recovery Act funds: (1) spend funds quickly to retain and create jobs; (2) improve student achievement through school improvement and reform; (3) ensure transparency, public reporting, and accountability; and (4) invest one-time Recovery Act funds thoughtfully to avoid unsustainable continuing commitments after the funding expires, known as the “funding cliff.”
After meeting assurances to maintain state support for education at least at fiscal year 2006 levels, states are required to use the education stabilization fund to restore state support to the greater of fiscal year 2008 or 2009 levels for elementary and secondary education, public IHEs, and, if applicable, early childhood education programs. As an update to our July report, as of September 1, 2009, the District and 15 of the states covered by our review had received approval from Education for their initial SFSF funding applications. Pennsylvania had submitted an application to Education but it had not yet been approved. As of August 28, 2009, Education had made $21 billion in SFSF grants for Education available to the 15 states and the District. In total, over $7.7 billion, or about 36 percent of available funds had been drawn down by these states as of August 28, 2009. Officials in many school districts told us that SFSF funds would help offset state budget cuts and would be used to maintain current levels of education funding. Single Audit Reporting Will Not Facilitate Timely Reporting of Recovery Act Program Findings and Risks
The single audit reporting deadline is too late to provide audit results in time for the audited entity to take action on deficiencies noted in Recovery Act programs. Efforts to Assess the Impact of Recovery Act Spending
As recipients of Recovery Act funds and as partners with the federal government in achieving Recovery Act goals, states and local units of government are expected to invest Recovery Act funds with a high level of transparency and to be held accountable for results under the Recovery Act. Under the Recovery Act, direct recipients of the funds, including states and localities, are expected to report quarterly on a number of measures including the use of funds and an estimate of the number of jobs created and the number of jobs retained. However, we remain concerned that OMB’s planned actions would not achieve the level of accountability needed to effectively respond to Recovery Act risks and does not provide for timely reporting on internal controls for Recovery Act programs. OMB does not have a master timeline for issuing federal agency guidance. We found substantial variation both in how states identified areas in economic distress and how they prioritized project selection for these areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony is based largely on GAO's July 8, 2009 report, in response to a mandate under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). This testimony provides selected updates, including the status of federal Recovery Act outlays. The report addresses: (1) selected states' and localities' uses of Recovery Act funds, (2) the approaches taken by the selected states and localities to ensure accountability for Recovery Act funds, and (3) states' plans to evaluate the impact of Recovery Act funds. GAO's work for the report is focused on 16 states and certain localities in those jurisdictions as well as the District of Columbia--representing about 65 percent of the U.S. population and two-thirds of the intergovernmental federal assistance available. GAO collected documents and interviewed state and local officials. GAO analyzed federal agency guidance and spoke with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials and with program officials at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and the Departments of Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Labor, and Transportation.
What GAO Found
Across the United States, as of August 28, 2009, Treasury had outlayed about $45 billion of the estimated $49 billion in Recovery Act funds projected for use in states and localities in fiscal year 2009. More than three quarters of the federal outlays have been provided through the increased Medicaid Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) and the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF) administered by the Department of Education. GAO's work focused on nine federal programs that are estimated to account for approximately 87 percent of federal Recovery Act outlays in fiscal year 2009 for programs administered by states and localities. All 16 states and the District have drawn down increased Medicaid FMAP grant awards of just over $19.6 billion for October 1, 2008, through September 4, 2009, which amounted to almost 84 percent of such funds available to them. All states and the District experienced enrollment growth in this period. Several states noted that the increased FMAP funds were critical in their efforts to maintain coverage at current levels. States and the District reported they are planning to use the increased federal funds to cover their increased Medicaid caseload and to maintain current benefits and eligibility levels. As of September 1, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had obligated approximately $11 billion for almost 3,800 highway infrastructure and other eligible projects in the 16 states and the District and had reimbursed these 17 jurisdictions about $604 million. Across the nation, almost half of the obligations have been for pavement improvement projects because they did not require extensive environmental clearances, were quick to design, obligate and bid on, could employ people quickly, and could be completed within 3 years. Officials from most states considered project readiness, including the 3-year completion requirement, when making project selections and only later identified to what extent these projects fulfilled the economically distressed area requirement. We found substantial variation in how states identified economically distressed areas and how they prioritized project selection for these areas. FHWA issued clarifying guidance to address our recommendation in August 2009. As of September 1, 2009, the District and 15 of the 16 states covered by our review had received approval from Education for their initial SFSF funding applications. Pennsylvania had submitted an application to Education, but it had not yet been approved. As of August 28, 2009, Education has made $21 billion in SFSF grants for Education available to the 15 states and the District--of which over $7.7 billion had been drawn down as of August 28, 2009. School districts said they would use SFSF funds to maintain current levels of education funding, particularly for retaining staff and current education programs. They also told us that SFSF funds would help offset state budget cuts. Overall, states reported using Recovery Act funds to stabilize state budgets and to cope with fiscal stresses. The funds helped them maintain staffing for existing programs and minimize or avoid tax increases as well as reductions in services. States have implemented various internal control programs; however, federal Single Audit guidance and reporting does not fully address Recovery Act risk. The Single Audit reporting deadline is too late to provide audit results in time for the audited entity to take action on deficiencies noted in Recovery Act programs. Moreover, current guidance does not achieve the level of accountability needed to effectively respond to Recovery Act risks. Direct recipients of Recovery Act funds, including states and localities, are expected to report quarterly on a number of measures, including the use of funds and estimates of the number of jobs created and retained. |
gao_GAO-13-653T | gao_GAO-13-653T_0 | DHS Has Reported Progress in Addressing Illegal Cross-Border Activity, but Could Improve Assessment of Its Efforts
Border Patrol Has Reported Some Success in Addressing Illegal Migration, but Challenges Remain in Assessing Efforts and Identifying Resource Needs
Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim measure for border security, as reported in its annual performance reports. These data generally mirrored a decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. As we testified in February 2013, data reported by Border Patrol following the issuance of our December 2012 report showed that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012.assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend for Border Patrol apprehensions across the southwest border. Through fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol attributed decreases in apprehensions across sectors in part to changes in the U.S. economy, achievement of strategic objectives, and increased resources for border security. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between POEs and for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border, but has not yet identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. We testified in February 2013 that the interim goal and measure of number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs provides information on activity levels but does not inform program results or resource identification and allocation decisions, and therefore until new goals and measures are developed, DHS and Congress could experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability. DHS concurred with our recommendations and stated that it plans to set a date for when it will establish such milestones and time frames by November 2013. GAO is reviewing CBP’s analysis of the covert test results and other documentation as part of a congressional mandate to review actions the agency has taken to address GAO recommendations regarding CBP officer training. DHS concurred with this recommendation. We reported in November 2010 that information sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA law enforcement officials had increased in recent years. Federal agencies also established interagency agreements to strengthen coordination of border security efforts. However, we reported in November 2010 that gaps remained in implementing interagency agreements to ensure law enforcement officials had access to daily threat information to better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal activity. We recommended that DHS, DOI, and USDA provide oversight and accountability as needed to further implement interagency agreements for coordinating information and integrating operations. These agencies agreed with our recommendations, and in January 2011, CBP issued a memorandum to all Border Patrol division chiefs and chief patrol agents emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to address border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to fully satisfy the intent of our recommendation, DHS would need to take further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements to enhance border security on federal lands. Opportunities Exist to Improve DHS’s Management of Border Security Assets
DHS Has Deployed Assets to Secure the Borders, but Has Not Provided Complete Information on Plans, Metrics, and Costs
In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. SBInet was conceived as a surveillance technology to create a “virtual fence” along the border, and after spending nearly $1 billion, DHS deployed SBInet systems along 53 miles of Arizona’s border that represent the highest risk for illegal entry. In January 2011, in response to concerns regarding SBInet’s performance, cost, and schedule, DHS canceled future procurements. CBP developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. In developing the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives and outreach to potential vendors. As we reported in November 2011, without documentation of the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan, an independent party cannot verify the process followed, identify how the analysis of alternatives was used, assess the validity of the decisions made, or justify the funding requested. DHS concurred with these recommendations, and has reported taking action to address some of the recommendations. We currently have ongoing work in this area for congressional requesters and, among other things, are examining DHS’s efforts to address prior recommendations, and expect to issue a report with our final results in the fall of 2013. Related GAO Products
Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
At the end of fiscal year 2004, DHS had about 28,100 personnel assigned to patrol U.S. land borders and inspect travelers at air, land, and sea POEs, with a total security cost of about $5.9 billion. At the end of fiscal year 2011, DHS had about 41,400 personnel assigned to air, land, and sea POEs and along the borders, with a total security cost of about $11.8 billion. DHS has reported that these resources have contributed to stronger enforcement efforts on the border. However, challenges remain to secure the border. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of DHS border security programs and operations.
As requested, this statement addresses some of the key issues and recommendations GAO has made in the following areas: (1) DHSs efforts to secure the border at and between POEs; (2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security information sharing and enforcement efforts; and (3) DHS management of infrastructure, technology, and other assets used to secure the border. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from January 2008 through March 2013, along with selected updates conducted in April 2013. For selected updates, GAO reviewed DHS information on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has reported progress in stemming illegal cross-border activity, but it could strengthen the assessment of its efforts. For example, since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between ports of entry (POE) as an interim measure for border security. GAO reported in December 2012 that apprehensions decreased across the southwest border from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, generally mirroring a decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. CBP attributed this decrease in part to changes in the U.S. economy and increased resources for border security. Data reported by CBP's Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol) show that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012. It is too early to assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend. GAO testified in February 2013 that the number of apprehensions provides information on activity levels but does not inform program results or resource allocation decisions. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between POEs, but it has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them, as GAO recommended. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and said that it plans to set a date for establishing such milestones and time frames by November 2013.
According to DHS law enforcement partners, interagency coordination and information sharing improved, but challenges remain. GAO reported in November 2010 that information sharing and communication among federal law enforcement officials responsible for federal borderlands had increased; however, gaps remained in ensuring law enforcement officials had access to daily threat information. GAO recommended that relevant federal agencies ensure interagency agreements for coordinating information and integrating border security operations are further implemented. These agencies agreed, and in January 2011, CBP issued a memorandum affirming the importance of federal partnerships to address border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to fully satisfy the intent of GAO's recommendation, DHS needs to take further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements.
Opportunities exist to improve DHS's management of border security assets. For example, DHS conceived the Secure Border Initiative Network as a surveillance technology and deployed such systems along 53 miles of Arizona's border. In January 2011, in response to performance, cost, and schedule concerns, DHS canceled future procurements, and developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. GAO reported in November 2011 that in developing the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives, but it had not documented the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of technologies proposed in the Plan, which GAO recommended that it do. DHS concurred with this recommendation. GAO has ongoing work in this area, and among other things, is examining DHS's efforts to address prior recommendations, and expects to issue a report in fall 2013.
What GAO Recommends
In prior reports, GAO made recommendations to DHS to strengthen its border security programs and efforts. DHS generally concurred and has taken actions, or has actions planned or underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-08-999T | gao_GAO-08-999T_0 | DOD, DOE, and State fund, manage, and implement the global nuclear detection architecture’s international programs. DNDO Has Begun to Develop Programs to Enhance the Initial Architecture, but It Lacks an Overarching Strategic Plan for Achieving Future Architecture Improvements
In October 2005, a few months after its inception, DNDO completed its initial inventory of federal programs associated with detecting the illicit transport of radiological and nuclear materials. As part of this effort, DNDO defined the architecture’s general approach: a multilayered detection framework of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. DNDO identified several gap areas with respect to detecting potential nuclear smuggling, such as (1) land border crossings into the United States between formal points of entry, (2) small maritime craft (any vessel less than 300 gross tons) that enter the United States, and (3) international general aviation. To address the gaps identified in the domestic portions of the architecture, DNDO has initiated pilot programs to address primary areas of concern or potential vulnerability. To date, we have received briefings on each of these programs from DNDO, but we have not yet fully reviewed how they are being implemented. While each agency that has a role in the architecture may have its own planning documents, DNDO has not produced an overarching strategic plan that can guide its efforts to address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global nuclear detection architecture. For example, such a plan would define how DNDO will achieve and monitor the goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft or land borders in between ports of entry. DNDO and Other Agencies Face Coordination, Technological, and Management Challenges
DNDO and other agencies face a number of challenges in developing a global nuclear detection architecture, including (1) coordinating detection efforts across federal, state, and local agencies and with other nations, (2) dealing with the limitations of detection technology, and (3) managing the implementation of the architecture. In order for the architecture to be effective, all parts need to be well thought out, managed, and coordinated. DNDO has been charged with developing an architecture that depends on programs implemented by other agencies. This lack of control over these programs poses a challenge for DNDO in ensuring that all individual programs within the global nuclear detection architecture will be effectively integrated. In spite of these challenges, DNDO’s efforts to develop a global nuclear detection architecture have yielded some benefits, according to DOD, DOE, and State officials. Approximately $2.8 Billion in Fiscal Year 2007 Funded Programs Associated with Detecting the Transport of Radiological and Nuclear Weapons or Materials
DNDO reported that approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal year 2007 for 74 programs focused on preventing and detecting the illicit transport of radiological or nuclear materials. Specifically: $1.1 billion funded 28 programs focused on the international aspects of the $221 million funded 9 programs to support detection of radiological and nuclear material at the U.S. border; $918 million funded 16 programs dedicated to detecting and securing radiological or nuclear materials within the U.S. borders; and $577 million funded 34 cross-cutting programs that support many different layers of the architecture by, for example, research and development or technical support to users of the detection equipment. Although DNDO has taken some steps to achieve these ends, it has not done so within the larger context of an overarching strategic plan with clearly established goals, responsibilities, priorities, resource needs, and mechanisms for assessing progress along the way. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of State, develop a strategic plan to guide the development of a more comprehensive global nuclear detection architecture. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2005, a Presidential Directive established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland Security to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically and abroad. DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (State), an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture--an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities. DNDO implements the domestic portion of the architecture, while DOD, DOE, and State are responsible for related programs outside the U.S. This testimony provides preliminary observations based on ongoing work addressing (1) the status of DNDO's efforts to develop a global nuclear detection architecture, (2) the challenges DNDO and other federal agencies face in implementing the architecture, and (3) the costs of the programs that constitute the architecture. This statement draws on prior GAO reviews of programs constituting the architecture, and GAO's work on strategic planning
What GAO Found
According to GAO's preliminary work to date, DNDO has taken steps to develop a global nuclear detection architecture but lacks an overarching strategic plan to help guide how it will achieve a more comprehensive architecture. Specifically, DNDO has developed an initial architecture after coordinating with DOD, DOE, and State to identify 74 federal programs that combat smuggling of nuclear or radiological material. DNDO has also identified gaps in the architecture, such as land border crossings into the United States between formal points of entry, small maritime vessels, and international general aviation. Although DNDO has started to develop programs to address these gaps, it has not yet developed an overarching strategic plan to guide its transition from the initial architecture to a more comprehensive architecture. For example, such a plan would define across the entire architecture how DNDO would achieve and monitor its goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft or land borders in between points of entry. The plan would also define the steps and resources needed to achieve a more comprehensive architecture and provide metrics for measuring progress toward goals. DNDO and other federal agencies face a number of coordination, technological, and management challenges. First, prior GAO reports have demonstrated that U.S.-funded radiological detection programs overseas have proven problematic to implement and sustain and have not been effectively coordinated, although there have been some improvements in this area. Second, detection technology has limitations and cannot detect and identify all radiological and nuclear materials. For example, smugglers may be able to effectively mask or shield radiological materials so that it evades detection. Third, DNDO faces challenges in managing implementation of the architecture. DNDO has been charged with developing an architecture that depends on programs implemented by other agencies. This responsibility poses a challenge for DNDO in ensuring that the individual programs within the global architecture are effectively integrated and coordinated to maximize the detection and interdiction of radiological or nuclear material. According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal year 2007 for the 74 programs included in the global nuclear detection architecture. Of this $2.8 billion, $1.1 billion was budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling internationally; $220 million was devoted to programs to support the detection of radiological and nuclear material at the U.S. border; $900 million funded security and detection activities within the United States; and approximately $575 million was used to fund a number of cross-cutting activities. The future costs for DNDO and other federal agencies to address the gaps identified in the initial architecture are not yet known or included in these amounts. |
gao_GAO-03-91 | gao_GAO-03-91_0 | Housing Authorities Are Leveraging Additional Funds
According to our analysis of HUD data, housing authorities expect to leverage, for every dollar received in HOPE VI revitalization grants awarded through fiscal year 2001, an additional $1.85 in funds from other sources. Our analysis of all mixed-finance proposals HUD approved through fiscal year 2001 indicates that 79 percent of the budgeted funds came from federal sources, when low-income housing tax credit funding was included. Leveraged Funds Comprise an Increasing Percentage of Funds Budgeted for Community and Supportive Services
Overall, housing authorities that received revitalization grants in fiscal years 1993 to 2001 have budgeted a total of about $714 million for community and supportive services—$418 million in HOPE VI funds (59 percent) and $295 million (41 percent) in leveraged funds. This policy, as specified in the Act, limits the amount of public housing funds, including HOPE VI funds, that housing authorities can spend to construct public housing units. HUD Has Not Complied with the Annual Reporting Requirement
HUD has been required to report leveraging and cost information annually to the Congress since 1998; however, it has not done so. Section 535 of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 requires HUD to submit an annual report to the Congress on the HOPE VI program. As provided by the Act, this annual report is to include, among other things, the cost of public housing units revitalized under the program and the amount and type of financial assistance provided under and in conjunction with the program. In June 2002, HUD submitted a report to the House and Senate appropriation committees as directed by House Conference Report 107- 272. It also includes some of the information required in the annual report, such as the extent of leveraging. However, neither HUD’s most recent budget justification nor its most recent performance and accountability report contains detailed information on leveraging or the cost of public housing units developed under the HOPE VI program. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development provide annual reports on the HOPE VI program to the Congress as required by law and include in these annual reports, among other things, information on the amounts and sources of funding used at HOPE VI sites, including equity raised from low-income housing tax credits, and the total cost of developing public housing units at HOPE VI sites, including the costs of items subject to HUD’s development cost limits and those that are not. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe the extent to which housing authorities with HOPE VI revitalization grants have (1) leveraged funds from other sources, particularly other federal sources; (2) leveraged funds specifically for community and supportive services; and (3) complied with HUD’s funding limits for developing public housing units and budgeted additional funds not subject to these limits. We also determined the extent to which HUD has reported cost information to the Congress. Moreover, we used this data to identify trends in the use of leveraged funds for supportive services. To determine the extent to which grantees have complied with HUD’s funding limits for developing public housing units and have budgeted additional funds not subject to these limits, we reviewed HUD’s total development cost policy and established what costs are subject to the policy and what costs are excluded. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requested that we review the HOPE VI program. Because of the scope of the request, we agreed with the office of the Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, to provide the information in a series of reports. This first report focuses on the financing of HOPE VI developments. We describe the extent to which grantees have (1) leveraged funds from other sources, particularly other federal sources; (2) leveraged funds specifically for community and supportive services; and (3) complied with HUD's funding limits for developing public housing units and budgeted additional funds not subject to these limits. Because the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 requires HUD to report HOPE VI cost information to Congress, we also discuss the extent to which HUD has complied with this requirement.
What GAO Found
Housing authorities expect to leverage, for every dollar received in HOPE VI revitalization grants awarded through fiscal year 2001, an additional $1.85 in funds from other sources. HUD considers this amount to be slightly higher because it treats as "leveraged" both (1) HOPE VI grant funds competitively awarded for the demolition of public housing units and (2) other public housing capital funds that the housing authorities would receive even in the absence of the revitalization grants. Our analysis of the mixed-finance proposals HUD approved through fiscal year 2001 indicates that, when low-income housing tax credit funding is included, 79 percent of the budgeted funds are from federal sources. The remainder of budgeted funds are from nonfederal sources, including private sources and state and local governments. Housing authorities that have received revitalization grants expect to leverage $295 million in additional funds for community and supportive services and have budgeted a total of about $714 million in HOPE VI revitalization grant funds and leveraged funds for community and supportive services. Leveraging for community and supportive services increased dramatically after 1997, when HUD instituted incentives to encourage this practice--from 22 percent in FY 1997 to 59 percent in FY 2001. Housing authorities have complied with HUD's total development cost policy when developing public housing units at HOPE VI sites. However, housing authorities have often budgeted additional funds that are not subject to the funding limits in the policy. HUD's policy applies only to the use of public housing funds, and it excludes some costs from counting against the limits. Although HUD has been required to report leveraging and cost information to Congress annually since 1998, it has not done so. Section 535 of the act requires HUD to submit an annual report to Congress on the HOPE VI program. This annual report is to include the cost of public housing units revitalized under the program and the amount and type of financial assistance provided under and in conjunction with the program. HUD has not issued these required annual reports to Congress. However, in June 2002, HUD submitted a report to the House and Senate appropriation committees as directed by House Conference Report 107-272. This report includes some of the information required in the annual report, such as the extent of leveraging. However, neither HUD's most recent budget justification nor its most recent performance and accountability report contains detailed information on the amount of leveraged funds or the cost of public housing units revitalized under the HOPE VI program. |
gao_GAO-07-229T | gao_GAO-07-229T_0 | Until DOD can successfully transform its operations, it will continue to confront the pervasive, decades-old management problems that cut across all of DOD’s major business areas. Comprehensive, Integrated, and Enterprisewide Business Transformation Plan Not Fully Developed
DOD has not fully developed a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide strategy or action plan for managing its overall business transformation effort. This plan should cover all of DOD’s key business functions; contain results-oriented goals, measures, and expectations that link institutional, unit, and individual performance goals and expectations to promote accountability; identify people with needed skills, knowledge, experience, responsibility, and authority to implement the plan; and establish an effective process and related tools for implementation and oversight. While DOD has developed plans that address aspects of business transformation at different organizational levels, these plans have not been clearly aligned into a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide approach to business transformation. Due to the complexity and long-term nature of DOD’s business transformation efforts, we continue to believe DOD needs a chief management officer (CMO) to provide sustained leadership and maintain momentum. Without formally designating responsibility and accountability for results, choosing among competing demands for scarce resources and resolving differences in priorities among various DOD organizations will be difficult and could impede DOD’s ability to transform in an efficient, effective, and reasonably timely manner. DOD Has Made Progress in Complying with Business Systems Modernization and Financial Management Accountability Legislation, but Much Work Remains
The department has made important progress in complying with legislation pertaining to its financial management improvement and business systems modernization efforts. More recently, DOD issued Version 4.0 of its business enterprise architecture and ETP. While we believe that the concepts have merit and are applicable to DOD, much remains to be decided and accomplished before they can be implemented in a way to produce architectures and transition plans for each DOD component that are aligned with the department’s corporate view and that can guide and constrain component-specific investments. At the same time, DOD components continue to invest billions of dollars in new and existing business systems each year. DOD Continues to Evolve Its Business Enterprise Architecture, but Much Remains to Be Accomplished
In May 2006, we reported on DOD’s efforts to address a number of provisions in the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act. Further, the transition plan now includes the initial results of ongoing analyses of gaps between its current and target environments for most of the business enterprise priorities, in which capability and performance shortfalls and their root causes are described and the architecture solution component (such as business rules and transformation initiatives and systems) that are to address these shortfalls are identified. A major reason the department has thousands of business systems is that it has historically failed to consistently employ the range of effective institutional investment management controls, such as an architecture-centric approach to investment decision making, that our work and research show are keys to successful system modernization programs. These system acquisition management weaknesses introduce considerable risk to DOD’s ability to deliver promised DTS capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. DOD intends the FIAR Plan to provide DOD components with a framework for resolving problems affecting the accuracy, reliability, and timeliness of financial information, and obtaining clean financial statement audit opinions. Specifically, section 321 of the act limits DOD’s ability to obligate or expend any funds for the purpose of any financial management improvement activity relating to the preparation, processing, or auditing of financial statements until it has submitted to the congressional defense committees a written determination that each activity proposed to be funded is (1) consistent with the DOD financial management improvement plan required by section 376 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 and (2) is likely to improve internal controls or otherwise result in sustained improvements in the ability of the department to produce timely, reliable, and complete financial management information. In general, a MAIS is a major DOD IT program that is not embedded in a weapon system (e.g., a business system investment). However, this is not happening within DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
Of the 26 areas on GAO's high-risk list of federal programs or activities that are at risk for waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement, 8 are Department of Defense (DOD) programs or operations and another 6 are governmentwide high-risk areas that also apply to DOD. These high-risk areas relate to most of DOD's major business operations. DOD's failure to effectively resolve these high-risk areas has resulted in billions of dollars of waste each year, ineffective performance, and inadequate accountability. At a time when DOD is competing for resources in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment, it is critically important that DOD get the most from every defense dollar. DOD has taken several positive steps and devoted substantial resources toward establishing key management structures and processes to successfully transform its business operations and address its high-risk areas, but overall progress by area varies widely and huge challenges remain. This testimony addresses DOD's efforts to (1) develop a comprehensive, integrated, enterprisewide business transformation plan and its related leadership approach and (2) comply with legislation that addresses business systems modernization and improving financial management accountability. The testimony also addresses two sections included in recent legislation and other DOD high-risk areas.
What GAO Found
In the past year, DOD has made progress in transforming its business operations, but continues to lack a comprehensive, enterprisewide approach to its overall business transformation effort. Within DOD, business transformation is broad, encompassing people, planning, management, structures, technology, and processes in many key business areas. While DOD's planning and management continues to evolve, it has yet to develop a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide plan that covers all key business functions, and contains results-oriented goals, measures and expectations that link organizational, unit, and individual performance goals, while also being clearly linked to DOD's overall investment plans. Because of the complexity and long-term nature of business transformation, DOD also continues to need a chief management official (CMO) with significant authority, experience, and tenure to provide sustained leadership and integrate DOD's overall business transformation effort. Without formally designating responsibility and accountability for results, reconciling competing priorities in investments will be difficult and could impede DOD's progress in its transformation efforts. DOD is taking steps to comply with legislative requirements aimed at improving its business systems modernization and financial management; however, much remains to be accomplished. In particular, DOD recently issued updates to both the business enterprise architecture and the transition plan, which are still not sufficiently complete to effectively and efficiently guide and constrain business system investments across the department. Most notably, the architecture is not adequately linked to DOD component architectures, and the plan does not include business system information for all major DOD components. To address these shortfalls, DOD issued a strategy for "federating" or extending its architecture to the defense components. But much remains to be accomplished before a well-defined federated architecture is in place, given that GAO recently reported that select components' architecture programs are not mature. However, DOD components continue to invest billions of dollars in thousands of new and existing business system programs. The risks associated with investing in systems ahead of having a well-defined architecture and transition plan are profound and must be managed carefully, as must the wide assortment of other risks that GAO's work has shown to exist on specific DOD business system investments. While not a guarantee, GAO's work and research has shown that establishing effective system modernization management controls, such as an architecture-centric approach to investment decision making, can increase the chances of delivering cost-effective business capabilities on time and within budget. Further, with regard to legislation pertaining to financial management improvement, DOD issued and updated its Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan in fiscal year 2006 to provide components with a construct for resolving problems affecting the accuracy and timeliness of financial information and an improved audit strategy for obtaining financial statement audit opinions. |
gao_GAO-07-696 | gao_GAO-07-696_0 | 2). COCOMs Have Taken Numerous Actions to Prepare for an Influenza Pandemic
COCOMs have taken numerous management and operational actions to prepare for an influenza pandemic and the COCOMs’ efforts are evolving. However, each established or intends to establish a group to prepare for pandemic influenza. COCOMs Have Conducted Exercises for Pandemic Influenza Plans
To test their pandemic influenza plans, five of the nine COCOMs have conducted a pandemic influenza-related exercise. COCOMs have used various strategies to inform personnel about pandemic influenza, including using various media outlets, training programs, and outreach events. COCOMs Have Coordinated with Other Nations
Each of the geographic COCOMs has started to work or plans to work with nations in its area of responsibility to raise awareness about and assess capabilities for responding to avian and pandemic influenza. As a result, the unity and cohesiveness of DOD’s pandemic influenza preparation could be impaired and the potential remains for confusion among officials and gaps and duplication in actions taken by the COCOMs relative to the military services and other DOD organizations in implementing tasks, such as the actions assigned to DOD as a lead agency in the national implementation plan. While we recognize the difficulty in planning for an influenza pandemic, not yet developing options to mitigate the effects of such factors may place at risk the COCOM commanders’ ability to protect their personnel—including military and civilian personnel, contractors, dependents, and beneficiaries—or to perform their missions during an influenza pandemic. Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities of Key Organizations Relative to Others Are Not Fully and Clearly Defined
The roles, responsibilities, and authorities of key organizations involved in DOD’s pandemic influenza planning and preparedness efforts relative to other organizations leading and supporting the department’s pandemic influenza planning efforts—including NORTHCOM as the lead for DOD’s planning and the individual COCOMs—remained unclear because of the continued lack of sufficiently detailed guidance from the Secretary of Defense or his designee. DOD Has Not Identified Resources to Complete Planning and Preparedness Activities
We identified a disconnect between the COCOMs’ planning and preparedness activities and resources, including funding and personnel, to complete those activities. DOD generally concurred with our recommendation, but had not yet taken actions to address this recommendation. The continued lack of a link between the COCOMs’ planning and preparedness activities and the resources required for them may limit the COCOMs’ ability to effectively prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. These officials reported that their lack of control over DOD’s stockpile of antivirals has limited their ability to plan to use this resource. For example, if a nation decides to close its borders at the start of a pandemic, COCOMs and installations may not be able to obtain needed supplies, such as antivirals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To reduce the potential for confusion, gaps, and duplications in the COCOMs’ pandemic influenza planning and preparedness efforts and enhance the unity and cohesiveness of DOD’s efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the ASD(HD&ASA) to issue guidance that specifies the following: Which of the actions assigned to DOD in the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and other pandemic influenza-related planning tasks apply to the individual COCOMs, military services, and other organizations within DOD, as well as what constitutes fulfillment of these actions. To increase the likelihood that COCOMs are more fully prepared to protect personnel and perform ongoing missions during an influenza pandemic, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the Joint Staff to work with the COCOMs to develop options to mitigate the effects of factors that are beyond the COCOMs’ control, such as limited detailed information from other federal agencies on the support expected from DOD, lack of control over DOD’s antiviral stockpile, limited information on decisions that other nations may make during an influenza pandemic, reliance on civilian medical providers for medical care, and reliance on military services for medical materiel. | Why GAO Did This Study
An influenza pandemic could impair the military's readiness, jeopardize ongoing military operations abroad, and threaten the day-to-day functioning of the Department of Defense (DOD) due to a large percentage of sick or absent personnel. GAO was asked to examine DOD's pandemic influenza planning and preparedness efforts. GAO previously reported that DOD had taken numerous actions to prepare departmentwide, but faced four management challenges as it continued its efforts. GAO made recommendations to address these challenges and DOD generally concurred with them. This report focuses on DOD's combatant commands (COCOM) and addresses (1) actions the COCOMs have taken to prepare and (2) management challenges COCOMs face going forward. GAO reviewed guidance, plans, and after-action reports and interviewed DOD officials and more than 200 officials at the 9 COCOMs.
What GAO Found
COCOMs have taken numerous management and operational actions to prepare for an influenza pandemic, and the COCOMs' efforts are evolving. Each of DOD's nine COCOMs has established or intends to establish a working group to prepare for an influenza pandemic. Additionally, eight of the nine COCOMs have developed or are developing a pandemic influenza plan. Half of the COCOMs have conducted exercises to test their pandemic influenza plans and several are taking steps to address lessons learned. Five of the nine COCOMs have started to use various media, training programs, and outreach events to inform their personnel about pandemic influenza. Each of the geographic COCOMs has worked or plans to work with nations in its area of responsibility to raise awareness about and assess capabilities for responding to avian and pandemic influenza. Although COCOMs have taken numerous actions, GAO identified three management challenges that may prevent the COCOMs from being fully prepared to effectively protect personnel and perform missions during an influenza pandemic, two of which are related to issues GAO previously recommended that DOD address. First, the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of key organizations relative to others involved in DOD's planning efforts remained unclear in part due to the continued lack of sufficiently detailed guidance from the Secretary of Defense or his designee. As a result, the unity and cohesiveness of DOD's efforts could be impaired and the potential remains for confusion and gaps or duplication in actions taken by the COCOMs relative to the military services and other DOD organizations, such as in completing actions assigned to DOD in the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. Second, GAO identified a disconnect between the COCOMs' planning and preparedness activities and resources, including funding and personnel, to complete these activities, in part, because DOD's guidance does not identify the resources required to complete these activities. The continued lack of a link between planning and preparedness activities and resources may limit the COCOMs' ability to effectively prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic, including COCOMs' ability to exercise pandemic influenza plans in the future. Third, GAO identified factors that are beyond the COCOMs' control--such as limited detailed guidance from other federal agencies on support expected from DOD, lack of control over DOD's stockpile of antivirals, limited information on decisions that other nations may make during an influenza pandemic, reliance on civilian medical providers for medical care, and reliance on military services for medical materiel--that they have not yet fully planned how to mitigate. While GAO recognizes the challenge of pandemic influenza planning, not yet developing options to mitigate the effects of factors that are beyond their control may place at risk the COCOM commanders' ability to protect their personnel and perform missions during an influenza pandemic. For example, if a nation decides to close its borders at the start of a pandemic, COCOMs and installations may not be able to obtain needed supplies, such as antivirals. |
gao_GAO-11-332 | gao_GAO-11-332_0 | Background
The CH-53K helicopter mission is to provide combat assault transport of heavy weapons, equipment, and supplies from sea to support Marine Corps operations ashore. CH-53K Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, and Deferred Capabilities Will Affect Delivery to the Warfighter
Primarily because of decisions to increase the number of aircraft and other issues, the CH-53K program has experienced approximately $6.8 billion in cost growth and a nearly 3-year delay from original schedule estimates for delivery of IOC. The CH-53K program’s estimates of cost, schedule, and quantity have significantly grown since development started in December 2005. The majority of this increase is due to added quantities. In 2008, the Marine Corps directed the program to increase its total quantity estimate from 156 to 200 aircraft to support an increase in strength from 174,000 to 202,000 Marines. Primarily as a result of the aircraft quantity increase, the program’s procurement cost estimate has also increased by over $5 billion, or 35 percent, from nearly $14.4 billion to over $19.4 billion. CH-53K Program Started Development Before Determining How to Achieve Requirements and with Late Staffing
The program started development before determining how to achieve requirements within program constraints, which led to cost growth and schedule delays. CH-53K Program Has Made Progress and Adopted Strategies to Address Future Risk
The CH-53K program has made progress addressing the difficulties it faced early in system development. The program has also adopted mitigation strategies to address future program risk. The program’s new strategy, as outlined in the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget, lengthens the development schedule, increases development funding, and delays the production decision by 1 year. According to a program official, the program’s requested budget was reduced by approximately $30.5 million in fiscal year 2012 (and a total of $94.6 million between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2015)—funds to be applied to other DOD priorities. The President’s budget reports that while the CH- 53K program was fully funded to the OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office estimate in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget, the funding adjustments made to the program in the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget would result in a net increase of $69 million to the development cost estimate and a schedule delay of approximately 7 months. The CH-53K program’s new acquisition strategy addresses previous programmatic issues that led to early development cost growth and schedule delays. To identify the CH-53K’s current acquisition strategy and determine how this strategy will meet current program targets as well as the warfighter’s needs, we reviewed the program’s acquisition schedule and other program documents, such as Selected Acquisition Reports and test plans. We analyzed the retirement schedule of the legacy CH-53E fleet and discussed the impact of these retirements on the Marine Corps’s heavy-lift requirement with appropriate officials. We met with officials from Headquarters Marine Corps, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office at the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States Marine Corps is facing a critical shortage of heavy-lift aircraft. In addition, current weapon systems are heavier than their predecessors, further challenging the Marine Corps's current CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters. To address the emerging heavy-lift requirements, the Marine Corps initiated the CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement program, which has experienced significant cost increase and schedule delays since entering development in 2005. This report (1) determines how the CH-53K's estimates of cost, schedule, and quantity have changed since the program began development and the impact of these changes and (2) determines how the CH-53K's current acquisition strategy will meet current program targets as well as the warfighter's needs. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed the program's budget, schedules, acquisition reports, and other documents and interviewed officials from the program office, the prime contractor's office, the Marine Corps, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
What GAO Found
The CH-53K helicopter mission is to provide combat assault transport of heavy weapons, equipment, and supplies from sea to support Marine Corps operations ashore. Since the program began development in December 2005, its total cost estimate has grown by almost $6.8 billion, from nearly $18.8 billion to over $25.5 billion as a result of a Marine Corps-directed quantity increase from 156 to 200 aircraft and schedule delays. The majority of the program's total cost growth is due to added quantities. Development cost growth and schedule delays resulted from beginning development before determining how to achieve requirements within program constraints, with miscommunication between the program office and prime contractor about systems engineering tasks and with late staffing by both the program office and the contractor. The program has also deferred three performance capabilities and relaxed two maintenance-based technical performance metrics in an effort to defer cost. Delivery of the CH-53K to the warfighter is currently scheduled for 2018--a delay of almost 3 years. The CH-53K program has made progress addressing the difficulties it faced early in system development. It held a successful critical design review in July 2010 and has adopted mitigation strategies to address future program risk. The program's new strategy, as outlined in the President's fiscal year 2012 budget, lengthens the development schedule, increases development funding, and delays the production decision. However, adjustments made to the budget submitted to Congress reduce the program's fiscal year 2012 development funding by $30.5 million (and by a total of $94.6 million between fiscal years 2010 and 2015). According to information contained in the budget, this reduction would result in additional schedule delays to the program of approximately 7 months and a net increase of $69 million to the total development cost estimate. The CH-53K program's new acquisition strategy addresses previous programmatic issues that led to early development cost growth and schedule delays. |
gao_AIMD-00-166 | gao_AIMD-00-166_0 | The Process and Cost of Paying Attorneys
While SSA has been paying attorney fees for over 30 years, the payment process itself is inefficient, and the costs of the process are not known. Approving and paying attorney fees is a complex process that involves many steps; a number of staff in different units and locations; and various information systems that are not linked and that, therefore, require considerable manual intervention. We recently received information on the basis for SSA’s 6.3 percent user fee calculation and have only begun to analyze the assumptions the agency used to compute it. In order to comply with the Ticket to Work Act, SSA is currently in the process of developing a methodology to capture the current costs of administering the attorney fee provisions. Thus far, the work group has identified four components associated with the cost of administering attorney fees: (1) the time that SSA field office staff spend informing claimants that they are entitled to legal representation when filing an appeal; (2) the time it takes an ALJ to review and approve the fee; (3) the charges incurred by SSA’s Office of Systems to program systems to track attorney fee cases and related computing time to generate a payment file/tape for Treasury to use to pay the attorney; and (4) the process for calculating the attorney fee, entering relevant attorney and other key data into SSA’s information systems, and certifying related amounts for payment. Possible Changes to the Way the User Fee Is Charged
Attorneys have expressed concern about the length of time it takes SSA to process their fees and have questioned the appropriateness of charging a user fee for a service that takes so long. When considering one or both of these changes, certain policy and administrative implications would need to be addressed. Timeliness of Payments to Attorneys
According to the National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives (NOSSCR),6 individual attorneys, and SSA officials, SSA often has trouble making timely payments to attorneys. Further Efficiencies Are Possible
Aside from the delays that are outside its control, SSA is aware that there are steps it could take to make the process more efficient. According to SSA, these enhancements would automate the steps in order for systems to recognize attorney fee agreement cases, compute and withhold the 6.3 percent user fee, pay the actual attorney fee, and release the remainder of the past-due benefits immediately to the beneficiary.9 If SSA were to make the proposed system enhancements to process attorney fees, it may be advisable to revisit requirements for how quickly the agency could be expected to process an attorney fee. Changes Being Considered for Paying Attorney Fees
Attorneys, NOSSCR, and advocates have discussed various changes related to attorney fees: issuing joint checks for past-due benefits to both the attorney and the beneficiary, raising the $4,000 limit on attorney fees allowable under the fee agreement process, and extending the statutory withholding of attorney fees to the SSI program. In addition, a number of administrative issues dealing with the implementation of joint checks would need to be addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed issues involving the Social Security Administration's (SSA) process for paying attorneys representing applicants for disability benefits, focusing on three areas of the attorney payment process: (1) the process itself, including the costs of processing the payments; (2) possible changes to the way the user fee is charged; and (3) changes being considered for the attorney fee payment process overall.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while SSA has been paying attorney fees from beneficiaries' past-due benefits for over 30 years, the payment process remains inefficient, and little historical data are available to help GAO analyze proposed changes; (2) under the current procedures, the inefficiencies in processing fee payments to attorneys result from using a number of different staff in different units and various information systems that are not linked, and are not designed to calculate and process all aspects of the attorney fee payment, thus necessitating manual calculations; (3) the Ticket to Work Act includes a provision that requires SSA to charge an assessment to recover the costs of this service; (4) GAO has only begun to analyze the estimate that was used as a basis for the user fee, and SSA does not know the actual cost it incurs in processing attorney fees; (5) however, the agency is developing a methodology to better capture these costs; (6) SSA has trouble with making timely payments to attorneys, and some have questioned the appropriateness of charging a user fee for a service that takes so long; (7) a recent legislative proposal calls for eliminating the user fee if SSA does not pay the attorney within 30 days; (8) in many cases, it will be difficult for SSA to meet these timeframes; (9) attorneys need to realize that, while it is possible for SSA to improve the efficiency of the process it uses to pay them, some factors that delay their payments are outside SSA's control and are unlikely to change at this time; (10) three possible changes to the attorney fee payment process include whether: (a) joint checks for past-due benefits should be issued to the beneficiary and the attorney; (b) the dollar limit on certain attorney fees should be raised; and (c) SSA's attorney fee payment process should be expanded to the Supplemental Security Income program; (11) these changes would have both policy and administrative implications that need to be considered; (12) some of the changes could increase attorney representation for disability applicants, according to attorneys GAO spoke with; (13) however, not everyone agrees with this premise; (14) moreover, there are some drawbacks to these changes; and (15) SSA indicated it may need to make significant modifications to its information systems to issue joint checks or pay attorneys who represent SSI recipients. |
gao_GGD-95-38 | gao_GGD-95-38_0 | Among other things, the act (1) revised the minimum criteria for authorizing a bank; (2) established an advisory board, the Board of Banking Supervision, to advise the Bank on its actions; (3) amended the grounds on which the Bank might or was required to revoke authorization; (4) gave the Bank the power to restrict an authorization and set up an appeals process; (5) required banks to report their large exposures to the Bank; and (6) enhanced the Bank’s authority to obtain information from a bank. Banks audited by smaller accounting firms tend to be the smaller banks in the United Kingdom. The Bank of England Authorizes, Regulates, and Supervises Banks
Since the passage of the 1979 Act, the Bank has been formally recognized in statute as the primary regulator and sole supervisor of authorized banks in the United Kingdom. This kind of interpretation is viewed as binding on the bank. The Bank’s policy is to require full-scope records and controls reviews on an annual basis for “small or vulnerable” banks. In addition to its role in bank regulatory and supervisory matters, the Bank has responsibilities in other bank-related activities such as liquidity provision, crisis management, payments clearance, international negotiations, and lender of last resort. The Deposit Protection Board administers the deposit protection system and controls the Fund that pays out claims. The Fund receives no direct financial backing from the Bank or the U.K. taxpayer. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the structure and operations of the Bank of England, the United Kingdom's banking regulatory agency.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Bank is recognized as the primary regulator and sole supervisor of authorized banks in the United Kingdom; (2) the Bank's primary purpose is to protect the interests of depositors; (3) the Bank has the authority to examine and request information from banks and to require accounting firms to produce reports on bank records and controls; (4) full-scope, on-site bank examinations are carried out by an 11-member bank review team; (5) the Board of Banking Supervision is an independent committee that advises the Bank on its actions and is generally viewed as a valuable component of banking supervision; (6) the Board's involvement in the Bank's supervisory activities has recently been strengthened; (7) the Bank has responsibilities in other bank-related activities, such as liquidity provision, crisis management, payments settlement, international negotiations, and lender of last resort; and (8) the Bank provides staff to the deposit protection system, although the Deposit Protection Fund is privately funded through levies on authorized banks with no direct financial backing from the Bank or U.K. taxpayers. |
gao_GAO-03-396 | gao_GAO-03-396_0 | To further assess the applicability of GAO’s rightsizing framework, we selected the embassies in Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania. Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied and Used to Highlight Specific Issues at Each Embassy
Our work at the three posts in West Africa further demonstrated that our framework and corresponding questions can provide a systematic approach for assessing overseas workforce size and identifying options for rightsizing in developing countries. Officials at the embassies in Dakar, Banjul, and Nouakchott agreed that security vulnerability should be a key concern in determining the size and composition of staffing levels at the posts and should be addressed in conjunction with the other rightsizing elements of mission and cost. Another management system is the Department of State’s Mission Performance Plan (MPP). Officials in the Department of State’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs also agreed that the security, mission, cost, and option elements of the framework provide a logical basis for planning and making rightsizing decisions. The Department of State said that the rightsizing questions provide a good foundation for it to proceed in working with OMB and other agencies to improve the process for determining overseas staffing levels. Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which our framework’s questions are applicable in developing regions, we visited three West African embassies—Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania. Cost data were incomplete and fragmented. Dakar: Consideration of Rightsizing Actions and Options
Responses to the framework’s questions regarding rightsizing actions and other options at Embassy Dakar highlighted the impact of security conditions on anticipated staffing increases and the need to define and document the embassy’s growing regional responsibilities as part of the MPP process. GAO’s Comments
1. We did not set priorities for the elements in the framework that appear in this report. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the mid-1990s, GAO has highlighted the need for the Department of State and other agencies to establish a systematic process for determining their overseas staffing levels. To support this long-standing need and in support of the President's Management Agenda, GAO developed a framework for assessing overseas workforce size and identified options for rightsizing. Because the framework was largely based on work at the U.S. embassy in Paris, GAO was asked to determine whether the rightsizing framework is applicable at U.S. embassies in developing countries. To accomplish this objective, we visited three U.S. embassies in West Africa--a medium-sized post in Dakar, Senegal; and two small embassies in Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania--and applied the framework and its corresponding questions there.
What GAO Found
GAO's rightsizing framework can be applied at U.S. embassies in developing countries. Officials from the Bureau of African Affairs, and U.S. embassy officials in Dakar, Senegal; Banjul, The Gambia; and Nouakchott, Mauritania, said that the framework's questions highlighted specific issues at each post that should be considered in determining staffing levels. Officials in other State bureaus also believed that the security, mission, cost, and option components of the framework provided a logical basis for planning and making rightsizing decisions. At each of the posts GAO visited, application of the framework and corresponding questions generally highlighted (1) physical and technical security deficiencies that needed to be weighed against proposed staff increases; (2) mission priorities and requirements that are not fully documented or justified in the posts' Mission Performance Plans; (3) cost of operations data that were unavailable, incomplete, or fragmented across funding sources; and (4) rightsizing actions and other options that post managers should consider for adjusting the number of personnel. |
gao_GAO-10-357 | gao_GAO-10-357_0 | Agencies’ Reliance on Contractors to Support the Administration of Contracts and Grants in Iraq and Afghanistan Is Substantial
DOD, State, and USAID relied on contractors to perform a wide range of administration functions for contracts and grants with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, but did not know the full extent of their use of contractors to perform such functions. Contract and grant administration functions performed by contractors included on-site monitoring of contractor activities, contracting office support, program office support on contract-related matters, and awarding or administering grants. For instance, Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment officials told us that they used contractors to perform quality assurance functions for all of the center’s construction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan. Offices Used Contractors to Address Contingency- Related Challenges, but Decisions Are Not Guided by Agencywide Strategies
The decisions to use contractors to support contract or grant administration functions are largely made by individual contracting or program offices within the agencies on a case-by-case basis. The offices cited the lack of a sufficient number of government staff, the lack of in- house expertise, or frequent rotations among government personnel as key factors contributing to the decision to use contractors to support their efforts. While workforce-related challenges were cited most frequently as a reason for needing to acquire contractor support, contracting and program officials also noted that using contractors in contingency environments can be beneficial to meet unforeseen or changing needs, address safety concerns regarding the use of U.S. personnel in high-threat areas, and provide a means to overcome language barriers or help develop the local economy (see table 5). Our prior work has noted that to mitigate risks associated with using contractors, agencies have to understand when, where, and how contractors should be used given the risk of diminished institutional capacity, potentially greater costs, and mission risks. Agencies Did Not Always Mitigate Risks Related to Contractors Supporting Contract or Grant Administration Functions
DOD, State, and USAID took a number of actions to mitigate conflict of interest and oversight risks associated with contractors supporting contract and grant administration functions, but did not always fully address these risks. For example, the agencies generally complied with requirements related to organizational conflicts of interest. Additionally, some State officials were uncertain as to whether or how federal ethics laws regarding personal conflicts of interest applied to personal services contractors. In almost all cases, the agencies had designated personnel to provide contract oversight, though they did not ensure enhanced oversight for contractors that closely supported inherently governmental functions in accordance with federal requirements. In our case studies, we found that contractors managed personal conflicts of interest in a variety of ways. Specifically, we analyzed (1) the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID rely on contractors to perform administration functions for other contracts and grants in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) the reasons behind decisions to use contractors to perform these functions and whether the decisions are guided by strategic workforce planning; and (3) whether the agencies have considered and mitigated conflict of interest and oversight risks related to contractors performing contract or grant administration functions. To determine the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID rely on contractors to perform administration functions for other contracts and grants in Iraq and Afghanistan, we obtained data from the agencies on contracts and task orders with at least 1 day of performance in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year 2009 for which duties included administration functions for other contracts or grants with performance in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. Some of the contracts or task orders included the performance of functions besides contract or grant administration or the performance of administration functions for contracts or grants with performance outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, but FPDS-NG and agency obligation data were not detailed enough to allow us to isolate the amount obligated for other functions or locations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, including using contractors to help administer other contracts or grants. Relying on contractors to perform such functions can provide benefits but also introduces potential risks, such as conflicts of interest, that should be considered and managed. Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID rely on contractors to perform contract and grant administration in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) the reasons behind decisions to use such contractors and whether the decisions are guided by strategic workforce planning; and (3) whether agencies considered and mitigated related risks. GAO analyzed relevant federal and agency policies and agency contract data, and conducted file reviews and interviews for 32 contracts selected for case studies.
What GAO Found
DOD, State, and USAID'suse of contractors to help administer contracts and grants was substantial, although the agencies did not know the full extent of their use of such contractors. GAO found that the agencies had obligated nearly $1 billion through March 2009 on 223 contracts and task orders active during fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year 2009 that included the performance of administration functions for contracts and grants in Iraq and Afghanistan. The specific amount spent to help administer contracts or grants in Iraq and Afghanistan is uncertain because some contracts or task orders included multiple functions or performance in various locations and contract obligation data were not detailed enough to allow GAO to isolate the amount obligated for other functions or locations. Overall, the agencies relied on contractors to provide a wide range of services, including on-site monitoring of other contractors' activities, supporting contracting or program offices on contract-related matters, and awarding or administering grants. For example, Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment officials noted that contractors performed quality assurance for all of the center's construction projects in Iraq and Afghanistan. In another example, USAID contractors awarded and administered grants on USAID's behalf to support development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Decisions to use contractors to help administer contracts or grants are largely made by individual contracting or program offices on a case-by-case basis. In doing so, the offices generally cited the lack of sufficient government staff, the lack of in-house expertise, or frequent rotations of government personnel as key factors contributing to the need to use contractors. Offices also noted that using contractors in contingency environments can be beneficial, for example, to meet changing needs or address safety concerns regarding the use of U.S. personnel in high-threat areas. GAO has found that to mitigate risks associated with using contractors, agencies have to understand when, where, and how contractors should be used, but offices' decisions were generally not guided by agencywide workforce planning efforts. DOD, State, and USAID took actions to mitigate conflict of interest and oversight risks associated with contractors helping to administer other contracts or grants, but did not always fully address these risks. For example, agencies generally complied with requirements related to organizational conflicts of interest, but USAID did not include a contract clause required by agency policy to address potential conflicts of interest in three cases. Also, some State officials were uncertain as to whether federal ethics laws regarding personal conflicts of interest applied to certain types of contractors. In almost all cases, the agencies had designated personnel to provide contract oversight. DOD, State, and USAID contracting officials generally did not, however, ensure enhanced oversight as required for situations in which contractors provided services closely supporting inherently governmental functions despite the potential for loss of government control and accountability for mission-related policy and program decisions. |
gao_GAO-16-204T | gao_GAO-16-204T_0 | Background
The federal government invests more than $80 billion annually in IT, but many of these investments fail to meet cost and schedule expectations or make significant contributions to mission-related outcomes. We have previously testified that the federal government has spent billions of dollars on failed IT investments, such as the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Expeditionary Combat Support System, which was canceled in December 2012, after spending more than a billion dollars and failing to deploy within 5 years of initially obligating funds; the Department of Homeland Security’s Secure Border Initiative Network program, which was ended in January 2011, after the department obligated more than $1 billion to the program, because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards; the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Financial and Logistics Integrated Technology Enterprise program, which was intended to be delivered by 2014 at a total estimated cost of $609 million, but was terminated in October 2011 due to challenges in managing the program; the Farm Service Agency’s Modernize and Innovate the Delivery of Agricultural Systems program, which was to replace aging hardware and software applications that process benefits to farmers, was halted after investing about 10 years and at least $423 million, while only delivering about 20 percent of the functionality that was originally planned. Federal IT projects have also failed due to a lack of oversight and governance. Recent Legislation Can Improve Agencies’ Management of IT
Recognizing the severity of issues related to government-wide management of IT, in December 2014, Congress enacted IT reform legislation, FITARA. FITARA includes specific requirements related to seven areas. Agency CIO authority enhancements. Agency CIOs are required to (1) approve the IT budget requests of their respective agencies, (2) certify that IT investments are adequately implementing the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) incremental development guidance, (3) review and approve contracts for IT, and (4) approve the appointment of other agency employees with the title of CIO. Enhanced transparency and improved risk management. OMB and agencies are to make publicly available detailed information on federal IT investments, and agency CIOs are to categorize their IT investments by risk. Additionally, in the case of major IT investments rated as high risk for 4 consecutive quarters, the law requires that the agency CIO and the investment’s program manager conduct a review aimed at identifying and addressing the causes of the risk. Portfolio review. Agencies are to annually review IT investment portfolios in order to, among other things, increase efficiency and effectiveness, and identify potential waste and duplication. In developing the associated process, the law requires OMB to develop standardized performance metrics, to include cost savings, and to submit quarterly reports to Congress on cost savings. Federal data center consolidation initiative (FDCCI). Agencies are required to provide OMB with a data center inventory, a strategy for consolidating and optimizing the data centers (to include planned cost savings), and quarterly updates on progress made. The law also requires OMB to develop a goal of how much is to be saved through this initiative, and provide annual reports on cost savings achieved. Maximizing the benefit of the federal strategic sourcing initiative. Federal agencies are required to compare their purchases of services and supplies to what is offered under the Federal Strategic Sourcing initiative. In addition, in June 2015, OMB released guidance describing how agencies are to implement the law. In this regard, the guidance reiterates OMB’s existing guidance on PortfolioStat, the IT Dashboard, and the federal data center consolidation initiative, and expands its existing guidance on TechStat sessions. For example, agencies were required to conduct a self-assessment and submit a plan describing the changes they will make to ensure that common baseline responsibilities are implemented. As of October 30, 2015, none of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies had made their plans publicly available. IT Acquisitions and Operations Recently Added as a GAO High-Risk Area
Our government-wide high-risk area Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations highlights critical IT initiatives, four of which align with provisions in FITARA: (1) an emphasis on incremental development, (2) a key transparency initiative, (3) efforts to consolidate data centers, and (4) efforts to streamline agencies’ portfolios of IT investments. Implementing the provisions from the law, along with our outstanding recommendations, will be necessary for agencies to demonstrate progress in addressing this high-risk area. In the last 6 years we made approximately 800 recommendations to multiple agencies. As of October 2015, about 32 percent of these recommendations had been implemented. Also in our high-risk report, we stated that OMB and agencies will need to demonstrate measurable government-wide progress in the following key areas: implement at least 80 percent of GAO’s recommendations related to the management of IT acquisitions and operations within 4 years. GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
For additional information about this high-risk area, contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or [email protected], Carol Cha at (202) 512- 4456 or [email protected], or Valerie Melvin at (202) 512-6304 or [email protected]. Federal Chief Information Officers: Reporting to OMB Can Be Improved by Further Streamlining and Better Focusing on Priorities. Information Technology: Additional OMB and Agency Actions Are Needed to Achieve Portfolio Savings. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government invests more than $80 billion annually in IT. However, these investments frequently fail, incur cost overruns and schedule slippages, or contribute little to mission-related outcomes. As GAO has previously reported, this underperformance of federal IT projects can be traced to a lack of disciplined and effective management and inadequate executive-level oversight. Accordingly, in December 2014, IT reform legislation was enacted, aimed at improving agencies' acquisition of IT. Further, earlier this year GAO added improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations to its high-risk list—a list of agencies and program areas that are high risk due to their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation.
This statement provides information on FITARA and GAO's designation of IT acquisitions and operations as a high-risk area. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in these areas.
What GAO Found
The law commonly known as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) was enacted in December 2014 and aims to improve federal information technology (IT) acquisition and operations. The law includes specific requirements related to seven areas. For example, it addresses
Agency Chief Information Officer (CIO) authority enhancements . Among other things, agency CIOs are required to approve the IT budget requests of their respective agencies and certify that IT investments are adequately implementing the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) incremental development guidance.
Enhanced transparency and improved risk management . OMB and agencies are to make publicly available detailed information on federal IT investments, and agency CIOs are to categorize IT investments by risk. Additionally, if major IT investments are rated as high risk for 4 consecutive quarters, the agencies are to conduct a review of the investment.
Portfolio review. Agencies are to annually review IT investment portfolios in order to, among other things, increase efficiency and effectiveness, and identify potential waste and duplication. OMB is required to develop standardized performance metrics, to include cost savings, and to submit quarterly reports to Congress on cost savings.
Federal data center consolidation initiative. Agencies are required to provide OMB with a data center inventory, a strategy for consolidating and optimizing the data centers (to include planned cost savings), and quarterly updates on progress made. OMB is required to develop a goal of how much is to be saved through this initiative, and report on progress annually.
Maximizing the benefit of the federal strategic sourcing initiative . Federal agencies are required to compare their purchases of services and supplies to what is offered under the Federal Strategic Sourcing initiative.
OMB has released guidance for agencies to implement provisions of FITARA, which includes actions agencies are to take regarding responsibilities for CIOs. The guidance also reiterates OMB's existing guidance on IT portfolio management, a key transparency website, and the federal data center consolidation initiative; and expands its existing guidance on reviews of at-risk investments. Agencies were to conduct a self-assessment and submit a plan to OMB by August 2015 describing the changes they will make to ensure that responsibilities are implemented. Further, portions of these plans are required to be made publicly available 30 days after OMB's approval; as of October 30, 2015, none of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies had done so.
Further, FITARA's provisions are similar to areas covered by GAO's high-risk area to improve the management of IT acquisitions and operations. For example, GAO has noted that improvements are needed in federal efforts to enhance transparency, consolidate data centers, and streamline agencies' IT investment portfolios. To demonstrate progress in addressing this high-risk area, agencies will need to implement the legislation's provisions and GAO's outstanding recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
Over the last 6 years, GAO made about 800 recommendations to OMB and agencies to improve acquisition and operations of IT. As of October 2015, about 32 percent of these had been implemented. It will be critical for agencies to implement the remaining GAO recommendations and the requirements of FITARA to achieve improvements.
, Carol Cha at (202) 512-4456 or [email protected] , or Valerie Melvin at (202) 512-6304 or [email protected] . |
gao_GAO-02-733 | gao_GAO-02-733_0 | To determine the extent or magnitude of the abusive tax scheme issue, we obtained and reviewed estimates from IRS’s SB/SE division for the identified abusive tax scheme categories—Frivolous Returns, Frivolous Refunds, Abusive Domestic Trusts, and Offshore Schemes. Four Categories of Abusive Tax Schemes
Abusive tax schemes, which are generally used by individuals, fall into four major categories. According to IRS’s fiscal year 2003-2004 Small Business and Self-Employed (SB/SE) Division Strategic Assessment Report, abusive tax schemes represent a rapidly growing risk to the tax base. IRS estimates the potential revenue loss from these schemes to be in the tens of billions of dollars annually. Despite the difficulties in accurately estimating the significance of abusive tax schemes, IRS provided us with estimates in four major scheme areas— Frivolous Returns, Frivolous Refunds, Abusive Domestic Trusts, and Offshore Schemes. Furthermore, IRS has created an organization that initially will focus on developing leads and cases related to abusive scheme promoters and that will monitor abusive promoter web sites. IRS believes that flow-through entities such as trusts and partnerships are increasingly being used in abusive tax schemes. In some cases, IRS’s coordination is on an informal basis, as it is with the FTC and the SEC, and involves the sharing of certain information and detection techniques. IRS officials participate in various federal agency working groups, including a multiagency task force to share information, skills, and procedures for combating fraud on the Internet; an IRS and DOJ working group created to examine the use of civil injunctions against abusive promoters currently under criminal investigation; and a money-laundering- experts working group. Appendix: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service | What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) characterizes an abusive tax scheme as any plan or arrangement created and used to obtain tax benefits not allowable by law. According to IRS, abusive tax schemes fall into four categories: frivolous returns, frivolous refunds, abusive domestic trusts, and offshore schemes. IRS estimates the potential revenue loss from abusive tax schemes to be in the tens of billions of dollars annually. Developing accurate estimates is difficult because of the limited numbers of cases examined and investigated. IRS identifies and examines abusive tax scheme promoters and participants through its Small Business and Self-Employed Division and Criminal Investigation. In fiscal year 2000, IRS created a program that focuses on false and frivolous schemes. IRS has also created new offices that focus exclusively on abusive tax schemes that use legal structures like domestic and offshore trusts and partnerships. IRS coordinates with federal agencies to identify, monitor, and prosecute promoters and participants in abusive tax schemes. These activities range from sharing information and detection techniques with agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission to assisting in the prosecution of fraud related cases with the Department of Justice. IRS participates in work groups that share information, skills, and procedures. These work groups discuss procedures for combating fraud on the Internet and the use of civil injunctions against promoters of abusive tax schemes. |
gao_GAO-15-254T | gao_GAO-15-254T_0 | Background
In November 2013, FAA released the Roadmap that describes its three- phased approach—Accommodation, Integration, and Evolution— to facilitate incremental steps toward its goal of seamlessly integrating UAS flight in the national airspace. As we previously reported, research and development continue in areas related to a UAS’s ability to detect and avoid other aircraft, as well as in command and control technologies and related performance and safety standards that would support greater UAS use in the national airspace. 1). If this goal is met, the final rule would be issued in late 2016 or early 2017, about two years beyond the requirement of the congressional mandate. Although FAA has met the congressional mandate in the 2012 Act to issue a Comprehensive Plan and Roadmap to safely accelerate integration of civil UAS into the NAS, that plan does not contain details on how it is to be implemented, and it is therefore uncertain how UASs will be safely integrated and what resources this integration will require. FAA views the test sites as a location for industry to safely access the airspace. During our ongoing work, test site operators have told us that there needs to be incentives to encourage greater UAS operations at the test sites. Granting Exemptions for Limited Commercial UAS Operations
FAA has started to use the authority granted under section 333 of the 2012 Act to allow small UASs access to the national airspace for commercial purposes, after exempting them from obtaining an airworthiness certification. During our ongoing work, FAA has granted seven section 333 exemptions for the filmmaking industry as of December 4, 2014. FAA officials told us that there were more than 140 applications waiting to be reviewed for other industries, for uses such as precision agriculture and electric power line monitoring, and more continue to arrive. FAA and Others Have Made Some Progress in Carrying Out Research and Development in Support of UAS Integration
Several federal agencies and private sector stakeholders have research and development efforts under way to develop technologies that are designed to allow safe and routine UAS operations. FAA has cited many accomplishments in research and development in the past fiscal year, as we were conducting our ongoing work. We have previously reported that NASA and DOD have extensive research and development efforts supporting integration into the NAS.NASA has a $150-million project focused on UAS integration into the NAS. Other Countries Have Progressed in UAS Integration to Allow Some Level of Commercial Use
A number of countries allow commercial UAS operations under some restrictions. A 2014 study, conducted by MITRE for FAA, revealed that Japan, Australia, United Kingdom, and Canada have progressed further than the United States with regulations supporting integration. For example, as of December 2014, Australia had issued over 180 UAS operating certificates to businesses engaged in aerial surveying, photography, and other lines of business. These regulations require that UAS operations apply for and receive a Special Flight Operations Certificate (SFOC). Canada issued new rules for UAS operations on November 27, 2014. Appendix I: Selected Requirements and Status for UAS Integration under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, as of December 2014
Appendix I: Selected Requirements and Status for UAS Integration under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, as of December 2014 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requirement Status of action Enter into agreements with appropriate government agencies to simplify the process for issuing COA or waivers for public UAS. Publish in the Federal Register the Final Rule on small UAS. | Why GAO Did This Study
UASs are aircraft that do not carry a pilot aboard, but instead operate on pre-programmed routes or are manually controlled by following commands from pilot-operated ground control stations. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 put greater emphasis on the need to integrate UASs into the national airspace by requiring that FAA establish requirements governing them. FAA has developed a three-phased approach in its 5-year Roadmap to facilitate incremental steps toward seamless integration. However, in the absence of regulations, unauthorized UAS operations have, in some instances, compromised safety.
This testimony discusses 1) progress toward meeting UAS requirements from the 2012 Act, 2) key efforts underway on research and development, and 3) how other countries have progressed in developing UAS use for commercial purposes.
This testimony is based on GAO's prior work and an ongoing study examining issues related to UAS integration into the national airspace system for civil and public UAS operations.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has made progress toward implementing the requirements defined in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (the 2012 Act). As of December 2014, FAA had completed 9 of the 17 requirements in the 2012 Act. However, key requirements, such as the final rule for small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) operations, remain incomplete. FAA officials have indicated that they are hoping to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking soon, with a timeline for issuing the final rule in late 2016 or early 2017. FAA has established the test sites as required in the Act, sites that will provide data on safety and operations to support UAS integration. However, some test site operators are uncertain about what research should be done at the site, and believe incentives are needed for industry to use the test sites. As of December 4, 2014, FAA granted seven commercial exemptions to the filmmaking industry allowing small UAS operations in the airspace. However, over 140 applications for exemptions were waiting to be reviewed for other commercial operations such as electric power line monitoring and precision agriculture.
Previously, GAO reported that several federal agencies and private sector stakeholders have research and development efforts under way focusing on technologies to allow safe and routine UAS operations. During GAO's ongoing work, FAA has cited many accomplishments in research and development in the past fiscal year in areas such as detect and avoid, and command and control. Other federal agencies also have extensive research and development efforts supporting safe UAS integration, such as a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) project to provide research that will reduce technical barriers associated with UAS integration. Academic and private sector companies have researched multiple areas related to UAS integration.
GAO's ongoing work found that other countries have progressed with UAS integration and allow limited commercial use. A 2014 MITRE study found that Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada have progressed further than the United States with regulations that support commercial UAS operations. For example, as of December 2014, Australia had issued 180 UAS operating certificates to businesses in industries including aerial surveying and photography. In addition, Canada recently issued new regulations exempting commercial operations of small UASs weighing 25 kilograms (55 lbs.) or less from receiving special approval. |
gao_GAO-01-664 | gao_GAO-01-664_0 | Introduction
The collection of outstanding criminal debt has been a long-standing problem, with many of the issues that we have been reporting on since October 1985 still remaining. Since that time, as reported in the U.S. Attorneys’ statistical reports, the balance of outstanding criminal debt has grown from $260 million to over $13 billion (see figure 1). Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives, as agreed to by the subcommittee staff, were to determine (1) the key reasons for the growth in reported uncollected criminal debt, (2) whether adequate processes exist to collect criminal debt, and (3) what role, if any, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) plays in overseeing and monitoring the government’s collection of criminal debt. Assessment of Mandatory Restitution
Before the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), the assessment of restitution, like the assessment of fines, was typically based on an offender’s ability to pay. We found that the payment schedules set by judges can significantly influence collection efforts. State law may limit the type of property that can be seized and the amount of wages that can be garnished. However, since that effort was terminated in 1996, as noted in chapter 1, the collection responsibilities continue to be fragmented between Justice and the courts, with neither having a central management oversight role. Moreover, neither OMB nor Treasury has identified the need to take an active role in overseeing the federal government’s process for collecting the billions of dollars of outstanding criminal debt. In the interim, while the task force is being established, we are making the following specific recommendations to the entities involved in criminal debt collection: To help improve collections and stem the growth in reported uncollected criminal debt, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury, through the Department of Treasury’s (Treasury) Financial Management Service, assist the Department of Justice and the courts in identifying the types of delinquent criminal debt that would be eligible for referral to Treasury for collection actions; the Attorney General and the Director of the AOUSC continue to work together to (1) reduce duplication of data entry for collections and disbursements, (2) require the Financial Litigation Units (FLUs) and the courts to periodically reconcile payment data recorded in their separate tracking systems, and (3) revise district guidance so that the FLUs can take a more proactive role in monitoring collection efforts of probation offices; establish policies and procedures that require Justice investigating case agents and prosecuting attorneys to share relevant financial information with the FLUs within an established time frame after an offender is sentenced, require FLUs to document correspondence with case agents and prosecuting attorneys in the FLU files, including whether and why efforts were not coordinated, require FLUs to use collectibility analyses to prioritize criminal debt collection efforts on debt types deemed through historical experience to be more collectible, reinforce current policies and procedures for entering cases into criminal debt tracking systems; filing liens; issuing demand letters, delinquent notices, and default notices; performing asset discovery work; using other enforcement techniques; and using event codes, including suspense codes, revise current policies for issuing demand letters, specifying when a demand letter should be sent and within what time frames, require FLUs to establish time frames for procedures related to criminal debt collection activities that do not currently have established time frames, require FLUs to document in their files instances where asset discovery work was not performed and why it was not performed, establish a policy for the FLUs to date stamp when Judgments in a Criminal Case are received, revise interest and penalty policies so that interest and penalties are consistently assessed and reported, adequately measure criminal debt collection performance against revise the FLU’s databases to (1) capture needed information such as terms of fine and restitution order, status of offender (expected release date from prison or probation) and (2) allow FLUs to allocate outstanding amounts between amounts likely to be collected and those that are not likely to be collected, and perform an analysis to assess whether the FLU’s human capital resources and training are adequate to effectively perform their collection activities; and the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts ensure and monitor effective implementation of guidance for (1) developing pre-sentence reports, (2) establishing and monitoring offenders’ compliance with installment schedules, (3) providing financial information reported in the pre-sentence report to the FLUs within an established time frame after sentencing, and (4) notifying FLUs within an established time frame before an offender is released from supervision, revise guidance to encourage the clerk’s office to provide a copy of the Judgment in a Criminal Case to both the FLU and the prosecuting attorney within the established time frame, continue to work with the clerk’s offices to process all pre-MVRA restitution so that the same entity in all districts is responsible for receiving and disbursing pre- and post-MVRA restitution, revise the language in the Judgment in a Criminal Case forms to clarify that payment terms established by judges are minimum payments and should not prohibit or delay collection efforts, and establish cost-effective thresholds for disbursements made by check to victims for restitution payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The collection of outstanding criminal debt has been a long-standing problem for the federal government. Since October 1985, as reported in the U.S. Attorney's statistical reports, the balance of outstanding criminal debt has grown from $260 million to more than $13 billion. Currently, the receipting of collections and recordkeeping for criminal debt is primarily the responsibility of the U.S. Courts, while the Department of Justice is responsible for collecting criminal debt. This report reviews (1) the key reasons for the growth in reported uncollected criminal debt; (2) whether adequate processes exist to collect criminal debt; and (3) what role, if any, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury play in monitoring the government's collection of criminal debt.
What GAO Found
GAO found that four key factors have contributed to the significant growth of uncollected criminal debt. These factors are (1) the nature of the debt, in that it involves criminals who may be incarcerated or deported or who have minimal earning capacity; (2) the assessment of mandatory restitution regardless of the criminal's ability to pay, as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996; (3) interpretation by the Financial Litigation Units of payment schedules set by judges which limit collection activities; and (4) state laws that may limit the type of property that can be seized and the amount of wages that can be garnished. Financial Litigation Units do not always follow their policies and procedures to ensure that collection actions are prompt and adequate. The present management practices and processes do not ensure that offenders are deprived of their ill-gotten gains and that innocent victims are compensated for their losses to the fullest extent possible. Collection responsibilities continue to be divided between Justice and the courts, with neither having a central management oversight role. Neither OMB nor Treasury has identified the need to take an active oversight role in the collection of the growing balance of outstanding criminal debt. |
gao_GAO-02-522T | gao_GAO-02-522T_0 | Amtrak’s financial condition has been deteriorating over recent years. Public Benefits of Intercity Passenger Rail Service May Exist in Certain Markets
Intercity passenger rail has the potential to generate benefits to society (often called public benefits) by complementing other more heavily used modes of transportation in markets in which rail transport can be competitive. These possible benefits include reduced highway and air travel congestion, pollution, and energy dependence; increased safety; and an option for travelers to use passenger rail systems in the future. Like Other Modes, Intercity Passenger Rail Requires Substantial Investment
Intercity passenger rail systems, like other intercity transportation systems, are expensive to build, maintain, and operate. However, according to a preliminary Amtrak estimate, the capital costs to fully develop the federally designated high-speed rail corridors and the Northeast Corridor could be $50 billion to $70 billion over 20 years. As Congress debates a transformation of intercity passenger rail, including whether continued direct federal government support is warranted, initial considerations that could be of use are (1) establishing clear, non- conflicting goals for federal support for intercity passenger rail systems; (2) establishing the roles of governmental and private entities and developing funding approaches that focus on and provide incentives for results and accountability; and (3) ensuring that the strategies developed address diverse stakeholder interests, to the extent possible, and limit unintended consequences. | What GAO Found
Because of Amtrak's worsening financial condition, there is growing agreement that the current mission, funding, and structure for providing intercity passenger rail needs to be changed. Intercity passenger rail has the potential to complement other more heavily used modes of transportation in markets where rail transport can be competitive. The potential benefits include reduced air and highway congestion, reduced pollution caused by automobiles, reduced fuel consumption and energy dependency, and greater safety. Intercity passenger rail systems, like other intercity transportation systems, are expensive. Amtrak has called for $30 billion in federal capital support over 20 years to upgrade its operations and to invest in high-speed rail corridors. Amtrak also estimates that the cost to fully develop the 10 federally designated high-speed rail corridors and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor could exceed $50 billion over 20 years. Congress must determine if and how intercity passenger rail fits into the nation's transportation system. and what level of federal investment should be made in light of other competing national priorities. Key initial steps in this framework could include (1) establishing clear, non-conflicting goals for federal support of intercity passenger rail systems; (2) establishing the roles of governmental and private entities and developing funding approaches to provide incentives for results and accountability; and (3) ensuring that the strategies developed address stake holder interests and limit unintended consequences. |
gao_GAO-09-315 | gao_GAO-09-315_0 | Background
MAI, a component of the CARE Act, provides for funds to eligible grantees with the goal of reducing HIV-related health disparities among minority populations. HRSA Administration of CARE Act Funding
HRSA primarily awards CARE Act funds to grantees for core medical services, support services, and education through five primary sections of the legislation—Parts A, B, C, D, and F. In fiscal year 2007, 22 EMAs and 34 TGAs received grants under Part A; all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 7 U.S. territories received grants under Part B; 354 public and private organizations that provide services directly to individuals with HIV received grants under Part C; and 90 public and private organizations that provide services to families in which at least one member is HIV positive received grants under Part D. For Parts A, B, C, and D, programs funded by the CARE Act are the payers of last resort for care. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, as amended. Prior to the enactment of RWTMA, the MAI funds for Part A and B grantees were awarded according to a formula that solely reflected the number of living minority AIDS cases in the metropolitan area, state, or territory receiving funds. Barriers to Care
Barriers to HIV/AIDS care can delay or prevent individuals’ timely entrance into, or continuation of, core medical or support services, thus reducing the likely success of care. The New Competitive Process for Parts A and B Altered MAI Funding Amounts, Increased Administrative Requirements for Grantees, and Generally Funded the Same Initiatives
The new competitive process for Parts A and B resulted in changes in the amount of funding from what grantees would have received under the old formula-based process. Grantees that received MAI funding stated that the administrative requirements of the grant increased significantly in fiscal year 2007, and some grantees chose not to apply for MAI funds. Grantees continued funding existing initiatives to reduce health disparities for minorities rather than funding new initiatives, and grantees generally provided funding to the same service providers as they had in prior years. However, since RWTMA changed the process by which MAI funds were awarded, some grantees’ MAI grant amounts differed from what they would have been awarded under the previous formula-based process. The New Competitive Process Generally Resulted in the Funding of the Same Initiatives
Some Part A and B grantees reported that they have continued to fund the same initiatives to reduce minority health disparities that they did prior to the implementation of the new MAI competitive process. Part A grantees reported funding a range of core medical and support services under MAI. According to our survey, four of the top five services most commonly funded in fiscal year 2007 were categorized as core medical services—medical case management, outpatient and ambulatory health services, substance abuse outpatient care, and mental health services. Similar to Part A grantees, Part C and D grantees used MAI funding for a range of core medical and support services, while Part B and F grantees used MAI funding for specific services designated by the MAI provisions in the CARE Act. Part F MAI grantees told us that they use MAI funds for education efforts targeting health care professionals who are from, or primarily serve, minority communities. MAI Grantees Identified Multiple Barriers to Minorities’ Access to the Services Provided by HIV/AIDS Programs
MAI grantees identified multiple barriers that make it difficult for minorities to obtain services through HIV/AIDS programs. The comments are reprinted in appendix V. In its comments, HHS suggested that we identify the law authorizing Ryan White programs as either Title XXVI of the Public Health Service Act or the Ryan White HIV/AIDS program. Consistent with our previous work, we continue to refer to the law authorizing Ryan White programs as the CARE Act. To gather background information about the challenges to HIV/AIDS program integration experienced by CARE Act grantees, we interviewed officials from the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the Department of Health and Human Services and staff of the National Minority AIDS Council, Kaiser Family Foundation, the National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors, and the Communities Advocating Emergency AIDS Relief Coalition. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The CARE Act requires us to report on the Minority AIDS Initiative (MAI) and related issues. In this report, we are providing information on (1) the effect on grantees and service providers of the new competitive process for awarding Part A and B MAI funds, (2) the types of services grantees funded under MAI, and (3) barriers to minorities obtaining services from HIV/AIDS programs that were identified by grantees. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990 (CARE Act) makes federal funds available to assist individuals affected by HIV/AIDS. The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) awards CARE Act funding to grantees that include states, territories, and metropolitan areas. Because minorities have been disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS, the CARE Act's Minority AIDS Initiative (MAI) provides funding through five parts (A, B, C, D, and F) of the act with the goal of reducing HIV-related health care disparities among minorities. The reauthorization of CARE Act programs changed the process by which HRSA awards MAI grants under Part A (funding for metropolitan areas) and Part B (for states and territories) from a formula based solely on demographics of the metropolitan area, state, or territory to a competitive process. The CARE Act requires GAO to report on MAI and related issues. This report provides information on (1) the effect on grantees and service providers of the new competitive process for awarding Part A and B MAI funds, (2) the types of services grantees funded under MAI, and (3) barriers to minorities obtaining services from HIV/AIDS programs that were identified by grantees. GAO surveyed CARE Act grantees and interviewed selected grantee and HRSA officials. GAO also reviewed Part A and B MAI applications.
What GAO Found
The new competitive process for Parts A and B altered MAI funding amounts from what they would have been under the old formula-based process, increased administrative requirements for grantees, and resulted in continued funding for existing initiatives to reduce health disparities for minorities. In determining the award amounts under the new process, HRSA considered the number of minorities with HIV/AIDS living in the grantee metropolitan area, state, or territory, along with the MAI applications grantees were required to file. The quality of the grant applications sometimes resulted in considerable differences in grantees' share of MAI funds from what they would have received under the old process. Part A and B grantees that received MAI funding told us that the administrative requirements increased significantly because of the new process. All Part A and B grantees that applied for MAI funding received it, but some Part B grantees decided that the administrative requirements, including a separate application for MAI funds, were not worth the amount of funds that they expected to receive and therefore chose not to apply. Grantees generally funded the same service providers and initiatives to reduce minority health disparities as they had in prior years. After the reauthorization of CARE Act programs, MAI grantees continued to fund a range of core medical services, which include essential medical care services, and support services, which are services needed for individuals with HIV/AIDS to achieve their medical outcomes. Consistent with HRSA guidance, the types of services funded under MAI generally did not differ from services provided with other CARE Act funds. The five services Part A grantees funded most frequently were medical case management, outpatient and ambulatory health services, outreach services, substance abuse outpatient care, and mental health services--outreach services being the only support service among these. Part B grantees used MAI funds for efforts associated with the CARE Act-funded HIV/AIDS drug program, Part C and D grantees funded a range of core medical and support services with MAI funds, and Part F grantees used MAI funds for education efforts targeting health care professionals who are from, or primarily serve, minority communities. Grantees identified many barriers that make it more difficult for minorities to obtain services from HIV/AIDS programs, including those funded by the CARE Act. Barriers to HIV/AIDS care can delay or prevent individuals' timely entrance into, or continuation of, core medical or support services, thus reducing the likely success of care. The barriers grantees identified included the presence of other diseases that impact immune systems, housing issues, and poverty. In commenting on this report, HHS suggested that we identify the law authorizing Ryan White programs as either Title XXVI of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) or the Ryan White HIV/AIDS program. We continue to refer to the law authorizing Ryan White programs as the CARE Act, but have clarified that it refers to Title XXVI of PHSA. |
gao_GAO-15-26 | gao_GAO-15-26_0 | While immigration judges have the authority to make custody determinations, ICE also makes the initial decision as to whether to detain aliens in ICE custody or release them to the community pending removal proceedings, subject to certain laws. The contractor maintains in-person contact with the alien, which includes requiring periodic office visits and conducting unscheduled home visits, and monitoring the alien with either Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment or a telephonic reporting system. The Technology-only component offers a lower level of supervision at a lower contract cost than the Full- service component and allows ICE to monitor aliens’ compliance with the terms of their release using either telephonic reporting or GPS equipment ICE officers are responsible for providing provided by the contractor.case management, in addition to removing aliens from the country and responding to violations. ICE Expanded the ATD Program and Changed Program Use, but Has Not Monitored Implementation of Guidance Intended to Help Ensure Program Cost-Effectiveness
The number of aliens participating in the ATD program increased from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2013, in part because of increases in either enrollments or the average length of time aliens spent in one of the program’s components; and ICE changed the focus of the program to align with changes in agency priorities. Pursuant to ICE guidance in 2011, ICE also recommended that ERO field offices transition aliens among the two ATD program components—or levels of supervision—to help facilitate cost-effective use of the ATD program; however, ICE has not monitored the extent to which ERO field offices have consistently implemented the guidance. As shown in figure 3, the increase from fiscal years 2011 to 2013 was due to enrollments in the Full-service component—which increased by 60 percent during this time. Specifically, aliens enrolled in the Full-service component in fiscal year 2013 spent about 10 months in the component, and those enrolled in Technology-only in fiscal year 2013 spent about 18 months in this component. ICE Increased the Number of Aliens Terminated from the ATD Program, but Has Not Monitored Implementation of Guidance to Help Ensure Cost-Effective Program Implementation
ICE increased the number of aliens terminated from the ATD program since 2011 after guidance directed ERO field offices to more cost- effectively use the ATD program; however, ICE has not monitored the extent to which field offices have implemented the guidance. Pursuant to this guidance, ICE officials recommended that field officials reserve more intense and costly supervision options under the Full-service component for (1) aliens who are newly enrolled in ATD who do not have an order of removal or an immediate immigration court date and (2) aliens who have already received a final order of removal from the country—the latter of which is seen as a best practice, according to ICE. ICE established a program performance measure in 2004 to monitor alien compliance with requirements to appear at their immigration hearings. Data collected by ICE’s ATD contractor for the Full-service component of the ATD program from fiscal years 2011 through 2013 showed that over 99 percent of aliens with a scheduled court hearing appeared at their scheduled court hearings while participating in this component of the ATD program, with the appearance rate dropping slightly to over 95 percent of aliens with a scheduled final hearing appearing at their final removal hearing, as shown in figure 6. According to ICE officials, the agency did not require the contractor to capture similar data for the Technology-only component because when the ATD program was created, it was envisioned that most aliens would be in the Full-service component for the duration of the immigration process, and data for aliens in the Full-service component are collected by the contractor.officials stated that they did not have sufficient resources to collect such data for the Technology-only component, given other priorities. However, ICE officials will not be required to have the contractor collect these data under the contract. While ICE’s plan to expand data collection for the Technology- only component under the new contract is a positive step that will help provide more information for assessing the performance of that program component, ICE may not have complete data for assessing program performance without requirements that ICE or contractor field staff collect these data. Removals from the United States. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen ICE’s management of the ATD program and ensure that it has complete and reliable data to assess and make necessary resource and management decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary of ICE to take the following two actions: analyze data on changes in supervision levels and program terminations to monitor ERO field offices’ implementation of ICE guidance intended to ensure cost-effective management of the program, and require that field offices ensure that ICE or contractor staff collect and report data on alien compliance with court appearance requirements for all participants in the Technology-only component of the ATD program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Aliens awaiting removal proceedings or found to be removable from the United States are detained in ICE custody or released into the community under one or more options, such as release on bond and under supervision of the ATD program. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ICE is responsible for overseeing aliens in detention and those released into the community. In 2004 ICE implemented the ATD program to be a cost-effective alternative to detaining aliens. ICE administers the program with contractor assistance using case management and electronic monitoring to ensure aliens comply with release conditions—including appearing at immigration court hearings and leaving the United States if they receive a final order of removal. The Joint Explanatory Statement to the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act mandated that GAO evaluate ICE's implementation of the ATD program.
This report addresses (1) trends in ATD program participation from fiscal years 2011 through 2013 and the extent to which ICE provides oversight to help ensure cost-effective program implementation, and (2) the extent that ICE measured the performance of the ATD program for fiscal years 2011 through 2013. GAO analyzed ICE and ATD program data, reviewed ICE documentation, and interviewed ICE and ATD contractor officials.
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2013, the number of aliens who participated in the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program increased from 32,065 to 40,864, in part because of increases in either enrollments or the average length of time aliens spent in one of the program's components. For example, during this time period, the number of aliens enrolled in the Full-service component, which is run by a contractor that maintains in-person contact with the alien and monitors the alien with either Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment or a telephonic reporting system, increased by 60 percent. In addition, the average length of time aliens spent in the Technology-only program component, which offers a lower level of supervision at a lower contract cost than the Full-service program component and involves ICE monitoring of aliens using either telephonic reporting or GPS equipment provided by a contractor, increased by 80 percent—from about 10 months to about 18 months. In 2011, ICE recommended practices in guidance to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) field offices to better ensure cost-effective implementation of the program. For example, ICE recommended that field officers move aliens who have demonstrated compliance under the Full-service component to the less costly Technology-only component. GAO's work showed differences in ERO field offices' implementation of the guidance. However, ICE headquarters officials said that because of limitations in how they collect and maintain program data, they do not know the extent to which field officers have consistently implemented this guidance. ICE plans to institute new data collection requirements to address these limitations and use these data for a variety of purposes; however, ICE has not considered how to analyze these data to monitor the extent to which ERO field offices are implementing the guidance. Analyzing these data, once collected, could help ICE better monitor the extent to which ERO field offices are implementing the practices in its guidance intended to ensure more cost-effective program operation.
ICE has established ATD program performance measures to, among other things, assess alien compliance with requirements to appear in court and leave the country after receiving a final order of removal, but it has not collected complete data for assessing progress against these measures. Specifically, ICE's ATD contractor collected data for the Full-service component, and from fiscal years 2011 through 2013, these data showed that over 99 percent of aliens with a scheduled court hearing appeared in court as required. However, ICE did not collect similar performance data to report results for aliens enrolled in the Technology-only component—which composed 39 percent of the overall ATD program participants in fiscal year 2013—because when the program was first created, ICE officials stated that they envisioned that most aliens would be in the Full-service component with data tracked by the contractor. ICE plans to expand the contractor's role in data collection but does not plan to require collection of performance data for aliens enrolled in the Technology-only component; rather ICE plans to leave it to the discretion of field officials as to whether to require the contractor to collect these data. Without requirements to collect these data, ICE may not have complete information to fully assess program performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ICE analyze data to monitor ERO field offices' implementation of guidance and require the collection of data on the Technology-only component. DHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_RCED-98-68 | gao_RCED-98-68_0 | DOE Has Developed a Plan to Address Problems With Plutonium That Is Not in Pits
In 1994, both DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board noted safety problems with DOE’s storage of plutonium not in pits. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, House Committee on Commerce, asked us to review DOE’s efforts to stabilize, package, and store its plutonium, including problems the Department has encountered or anticipates in accomplishing these activities, specifically for (1) plutonium that is not in the form of nuclear weapons components, or pits, and (2) plutonium in the form of pits. DOE Is Unlikely to Meet Its Commitment Date for Stabilizing, Packaging, and Storing Its Plutonium That Is Not in Pits
DOE’s activities to stabilize, package, and store its plutonium not in pits are primarily guided by two DOE standards governing plutonium storage and the Department’s implementation plan, which commits the Department to stabilize and package its plutonium metals and oxides for long-term storage by May 2002. Various problems contribute to these delays in meeting milestones, including (1) changes from the technologies originally chosen by Rocky Flats to stabilize plutonium to meet a security requirement; (2) a suspension of plutonium stabilization operations due to safety problems at Hanford; (3) competing priorities for funding, staff, and equipment at Los Alamos; and (4) delays in obtaining a system for stabilizing and packaging plutonium at three sites. Given the inherent dangers of plutonium, such delays result in a continuing risk to workers’ health and safety and increased costs. Although DOE announced its decision to dispose of the excess plutonium, it has not finalized the criteria the plutonium must meet to be acceptable for disposition. Should that occur, the container may not contain the plutonium, thus risking workers’ exposure to it. Currently, DOE has no formal plan or schedules to repackage the remaining 95 percent of its pits. However, according to DOE officials, while a formal decision has not yet been made, the Department is developing a plan, which it intends to issue in April 1998. Because the officials hope to have the pits repackaged before this type of aggressive monitoring becomes necessary, they have decided not to implement such a program. Conclusions
Since 1989, DOE has stored its pits in containers that are not suitable for extended storage. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. We added a footnote to the report quoting DOE’s point that “It must be acknowledged that even after stabilization and packaging, some small level of risk remains associated with handling and storage of plutonium materials.” In addition, we revised the report to clarify that delays result in continuing the existing level of risk to workers’ health and safety by delaying the risk reduction that is achieved by stabilization and packaging activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to stabilize, package and store its plutonium, focusing on: (1) plutonium that is not in the form of nuclear weapons components, or pits; and (2) plutonium in pits.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although DOE has made some progress in stabilizing its plutonium, it is unlikely to meet its May 2002 target date to have its plutonium that is not in its pits stabilized, packaged, and stored; (2) DOE sites with the majority of this plutonium have experienced many delays and anticipate more in meeting their implementation plan milestones; (3) various problems contribute to these delays, including: (a) changes from the technologies originally chosen to stabilize plutonium residues at Rocky Flats to meet a security requirement; (b) a suspension of plutonium stabilization operations because of safety infractions at Hanford; (c) competing priorities for funding, staff, and equipment at Los Alamos; and (d) delays in obtaining a system for stabilizing and packaging plutonium at three sites; (4) given the inherent dangers of plutonium, such delays result in continuing the existing level of risk to workers' health and safety by delaying the risk reduction that is achieved by stabilization and packaging activities; (5) moreover, because DOE has not yet finalized the criteria the plutonium must meet to be acceptable for the disposition technologies, it is unclear if current activities to stabilize, package, and store the plutonium will be compatible with the means of converting it for disposal; (6) in addition to its delays in stabilizing and packaging its plutonium that is not in pits, DOE is currently storing approximately 10,000 pits in containers that both DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board believe are not suitable for extended storage, thus risking workers' exposure to plutonium; (7) DOE is preparing a plan, which it intends to issue in April 1998, to develop new containers and repackage the remaining 95 percent of the pits; (8) without conducting an analysis of the costs or benefits of the laboratories' recommendation for increased monitoring, DOE decided not to change its existing monitoring program, which formally examines about 30 pits per year; and (9) DOE hopes that it can repackage the pits before enhanced monitoring is necessary. |
gao_GAO-07-515 | gao_GAO-07-515_0 | Background
FEBs were established by a Presidential Directive in 1961 to improve coordination among federal activities and programs outside Washington, D.C. The boards’ overall mission includes supporting and promoting national initiatives and responding to the local needs of federal agencies and their communities. The boards are composed of the federal field office agency heads and military commanders in their cities, and the regulations state that each FEB should have a chair elected by the FEB members to serve a term not to exceed a year. The boards have no legislative charter and receive no congressional appropriation. These host agencies provide varying levels of staffing, usually one or two full-time positions—an executive director and an executive assistant. FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibilities Are Being Developed as a Core Function of the Boards
To assist in standardizing emergency activities across the FEB system, OPM and the FEBs are establishing an emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety set of activities with performance measures that will be common to all of the boards. A Defined FEB Role in National Emergency Plans Would Better Ensure That the Boards Can Effectively Carry Out Their Emergency Support Role
According to several FEMA officials we interviewed, the FEBs could carry out their emergency support role more effectively if their role was included in national emergency management plans. The FEBs’ dependence on host agencies and other member agencies for their resources also creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and committing to provide emergency support services. Of our 14 case study boards, representatives from 3 of the boards said they had recently had their host agencies withdraw funding for their boards’ executive assistant positions. The Nature of Pandemic Influenza May Make the FEBs a Particularly Valuable Asset in Pandemic Preparedness and Response
Despite the challenges the FEBs face in providing emergency support, their potential to add value to the nation’s emergency preparedness and response is particularly evident given an event like pandemic influenza. The boards also partner with community organizations and participate as a unified federal force in local civic affairs. Many of the selected FEBs cultivated relationships within their federal, state, and local governments and their metropolitan area community organizations as a natural outgrowth of their general activities. In addition, through activities such as hosting emergency preparedness training or through participation in certain committees, some of the selected FEBs reported a connection with emergency management officials, first responders, and health officials in their communities. OPM should continue its efforts to establish performance measures and accountability for the emergency support responsibilities of the FEBs before, during, and after an emergency event that affects the federal workforce outside Washington, D.C.
As an outgrowth of the above efforts and to help ensure that the FEBs can provide protection of the federal workforce in the field, OPM, as part of its strategic planning process for the FEBs, should develop a proposal for an alternative to the current voluntary contribution mechanism that would address the uncertainty of funding sources for the boards. We selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for more detailed review. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which provides direction to the federal executive boards (FEBs), is now emphasizing that in the post-9/11 environment, the boards have a transformed emergency support role. The report discusses the boards' emergency preparedness roles and responsibilities and their potential role in preparing for and responding to pandemic influenza. GAO selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for review because they coordinate the greatest number of federal employees or had recent emergency management experience.
What GAO Found
Located outside Washington, D.C., in 28 cities with a large federal presence, the federal executive boards (FEB) are interagency coordinating groups designed to strengthen federal management practices, improve intergovernmental relations, and participate as a unified federal force in local civic affairs. Created by a Presidential Directive in 1961, the boards are composed of the federal field office agency heads and military commanders in their cities. Although membership by agency heads on the boards is required, active participation is voluntary in practice. The boards generally have staff of one or two full-time personnel, including an executive director. The FEBs have no congressional charter and receive no congressional appropriation but rather rely on voluntary contributions from their member agencies. Although the boards are not intended to be first responders, the regulations that guide the FEBs state that emergency operations is one of their functions. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the FEBs have designated emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety as a core function of the boards and are continuing to work on a strategic plan that will include a common set of performance standards for their emergency support activities. All of the selected FEBs were performing emergency activities, such as organizing preparedness training, and FEB representatives and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials reported that these activities mutually advanced their missions. The FEBs, however, face key challenges in carrying out their emergency support role. First, their role is not defined in national emergency plans. According to several FEMA officials, FEBs could carry out their emergency support role more effectively if it was included in national emergency management plans. The framework within which the FEBs operate with member agencies and OPM also poses challenges in holding the boards accountable for their emergency support function. In addition, the funding sources for the boards are uncertain, affecting their ability to plan for and commit to providing emergency support services. Despite these challenges, the nature of pandemic influenza, which presents different concerns than localized natural disasters, makes the FEBs a particularly valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. Many of the selected boards had already hosted pandemic preparedness events, which included their member agencies and local community organizations. With the greatest burden of pandemic response resting on the local communities, the FEBs' outreach and their ability to coordinate across organizations suggest that they may be an important resource in preparing for and responding to a pandemic. |
gao_GAO-11-74 | gao_GAO-11-74_0 | To assess OFS’s progress in maintaining the appropriate infrastructure to manage and oversee the performance of TARP financial agents and contractors and address conflicts of interest that could arise with the use of private sector sources, we reviewed various documents and interviewed OFS officials regarding recent changes in organizational roles and responsibilities within OFS and its policies and procedures regarding (1) management and oversight of TARP financial agents and contractors and (2) monitoring and oversight activities by the OFS team responsible for financial agent and contractor compliance with TARP conflicts-of-interest requirements. As shown in table 1, participants have repaid more than $200 billion. These differences will also affect the ultimate cost of TARP. The estimated value of TARP’s $142.5 billion in direct loans and equity investments is net of a $36.7 billion subsidy cost allowance—primarily the difference between the amounts paid by OFS for the direct loans and equity investments and the reported value of such assets. The reported net cost of TARP transactions from inception through September 30, 2010, was $18.5 billion. Moreover, a number of key TARP-funded housing programs are still in the early stages of implementation. However, this stability is fragile. For example, on September 30, 2010, the Assistant Secretary of Financial Stability resigned and this key leadership position is temporarily filled. Further, filling key leadership positions that are under limited-term Senior Executive Service appointments will be a challenge. Since then, the Home Ownership Preservation Office has not yet conducted a workforce assessment, despite the recent addition of several new programs. OFS Maintained Effective Internal Control over Its Financial Reporting as of September 30, 2010, and Has Taken Steps to Develop a System of Internal Control for TARP Programs
In our December 2008 report, shortly after TARP was created, we highlighted the importance of internal control and recommended that Treasury continue to develop a comprehensive system of internal control over TARP, including policies and procedures for program activities that were robust enough to ensure that the objectives and requirements of TARP programs were being met. As a result, even as some programs have ramped up to address specific issues, many others have either expired or are already winding down. Conclusions
TARP programs implemented over the last 2 years covered a broad range of activities: they were designed to inject capital into financial institutions, address issues in the securitization markets, provide assistance to the automobile industry and AIG, and offer incentives for modifying residential mortgages, among other things. While additional programs—AIG and PPIP—remain active, others have closed but have substantial outstanding balances that will require Treasury’s ongoing attention and oversight. Although OFS has become a more stable organization over the past year, with more than 200 employees, it faces new challenges as the TARP authority to make new commitments has expired, some programs wind down, and others continue to operate. For example: OFS has begun to take steps that will help to retain staff, but staff retention could be a significant challenge for OFS, as term appointees making up more than half of its workforce. While OFS has begun to assess options for future staff needs, including succession planning for senior positions, its workforce plan has not been updated since March 2009 to reflect the changing environment. Without a plan that considers various scenarios, particularly the potential outflow of term employees, OFS may find itself unprepared to adequately manage and oversee the TARP investments and programs that remain. Treasury also had a differing view on the number of our prior recommendations that it had fully or partially implemented. Reconciliation of the status of our recommendations was ongoing at the close of our review and going forward, as we have previously discussed with OFS officials, we will continue to review and consider any additional support and documentation related to the progress of actions taken to address our recommendations and will continue to update the status of the recommendations as appropriate. Therefore, we recommend that OFS take the following action: OFS should finalize a plan for addressing how it will manage its workforce, in particular term-appointed employees and key SES positions, including plans for various staffing scenarios. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Status of Government Assistance Provided to AIG. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was implemented, GAO has issued more than 40 reports containing more than 60 recommendations to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). This report assesses the status of Treasury's implementation of GAO's recommendations and current condition of TARP. Specifically, this 60-day report provides information on (1) the condition and status of active TARP programs; (2) Treasury's progress in implementing an effective management structure, including staffing for the Office of Financial Stability (OFS), overseeing contractors, and establishing a comprehensive system of internal control; and (3) trends in the status of key relevant economic indicators. GAO reviewed relevant documentation from various TARP programs and met with OFS officials and financial regulators. GAO also used information from existing reports and ongoing work.
What GAO Found
TARP programs implemented over the last 2 years covered a broad range of activities, including injecting capital into financial institutions; addressing issues in the securitization markets; providing assistance to the automobile industry and American International Group, Inc. (AIG); and offering incentives for modifying residential mortgages, among other things. While some programs have been terminated, others remain active, including those that focus on preserving homeownership and providing assistance to AIG, and require continued monitoring. Further, the Homeownership Preservation Office has not yet conducted a workforce assessment, despite the recent addition of several new programs. In prior work GAO has identified a number of weaknesses in Treasury's implementation of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), and a number of homeowner preservation initiatives have not yet reported activity. Other TARP programs have ended or are winding down. As of September 30, 2010, OFS reported $179.2 billion in gross outstanding direct loans and equity investments with a subsidy cost allowance of $36.7 billion resulting in a net balance of $142.5 billion. The reported net cost of TARP transactions from inception through September 30, 2010, was $18.5 billion; however, the ultimate cost of TARP will change as a result of (1) differences between the estimated values and the amounts that OFS will ultimately realize (as the assumptions and estimates underlying the valuation of direct loans and equity investments are inherently subject to substantial uncertainty); and (2) further disbursements, such as those relating to the housing programs which are not subject to repayment. For example, the proposed restructuring of AIG, if implemented, will likely affect TARP's ultimate cost. Although OFS staffing has become more stable over the past year, with more than200 employees, its stability remains fragile as it faces new challenges. For example, while it has filled key leadership positions, the Assistant Secretary of Financial Stability resigned in September 2010 and this key leadership position is temporarily filled. Staffing remains important as some programs are still being implemented, while others have closed or been terminated but have assets that must be managed, repaid, and divested. OFS has begun to take steps that will help to retain staff. But staff retention could be a challenge for OFS going forward, because more than half of OFS's employees, including key leaders, are term appointments (many with 4-year term limits). OFS has also begun to address succession planning for critical senior positions, but its workforce plan has not been updated since March 2009. Without a plan that considers various scenarios, OFS may find itself unprepared to adequately manage and oversee the remaining TARP investments and programs. OFS has strengthened its management and oversight of contractors and financial agents and its system of internal control for financial reporting and compliance with program requirements. Continued progress will depend on retaining qualified staff. As TARP enters its next phase and winds down, GAO recommends that OFS take action to further enhance its ongoing operations by finalizing a plan for addressing how it will manage its workforce, in particular term-appointed and key Senior Executive Service employees. While Treasury agreed with our recommendation, we have differing views on the status of prior recommendations. We will continue to update the status of recommendations as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-15-596 | gao_GAO-15-596_0 | 2018 as schedule reserve and the $1.3 billion difference between the $8.4 billion goal and the $9.7 billion baseline as funding for that schedule reserve. The SLS Cost and Schedule Estimates Were Generally Developed in Accordance with Best Practices, but Officials Have No Plans to Update the Cost Estimate with Actual Costs
NASA generally followed best practices in preparing the SLS cost and schedule baseline estimates for the limited portion of the program life cycle covered, that is, through launch readiness for the first test flight of SLS. GAO’s cost estimating best practices call for estimates to be continually updated through the life of the project, ideally every month as actual costs are reported in earned value management reports. Unless properly updated on a regular basis, the cost estimate cannot provide decisionmakers with accurate information to assess the current status of the project. Credible: The SLS cost estimate only partially met the criteria for credibility because the SLS program did not cross-check the results of the estimate and did not commission an independent cost estimate. The purpose of developing a separate independent estimate and cross- checking the estimate is to test the program’s estimate for reasonableness and, ultimately, to validate the estimate. Cost reserves are additional funds that can be used to mitigate problems during the development of a program. The SLS program, however, is planning to use 7 of the 11 months of schedule reserve, which would delay its planned goal for launch readiness for EM-1 from December 2017 to, tentatively, July 2018. As a result, the agency would have only 4 months of schedule reserve remaining between July 2018 and November 2018 to address any further problems that it may encounter. Complex development efforts like SLS must plan to address myriad risks and unforeseen technical challenges. Earned Value Management System Remains Incomplete and Provides Limited Insight into Progress toward External Committed Cost and Schedule Baselines
NASA is using contractor earned value management (EVM) data as an additional means to monitor costs for SLS, but the EVM data remain incomplete and provide limited insight into progress toward the program’s Program officials external committed cost and schedule baselines.indicated that the current SLS contractor performance measurement baselines—which establish the program scope, schedule, and budget targets to measure progress against—are all based on the program’s more aggressive internal goal for launch readiness for EM-1 in December 2017 and not its external committed date of November 2018. Specifically, our analysis of the contractors’ EVM data for the three prime contracts— main engines, boosters, and core stage—indicates that the contracts could incur cost overruns ranging from about $367 million to about $1.4 billion, which is substantially higher than the combined overrun of $89 million that the three contractors were projecting at the time of our review. The SLS program is in the process of instituting a program-level EVM system that may improve insight into the program’s progress by providing aggregated tracking of both in-house and contractor performance on the SLS program that will present a more comprehensive assessment of program progress at least to internal cost and schedule goals. NASA officials stated that this SLS program- level EVM system would allow the program to better monitor progress relative to the committed cost and schedule baselines by comparing the aggregated EAC for both NASA and contractor work to the committed cost and schedule baselines. Both contractor and program-level EVM data, however, is only reported relative to the December 2017 date, according to program officials. To ensure that decisionmakers are able to track progress toward the agency’s committed launch readiness date, the NASA administrator should direct the SLS program to include as part of the program’s quarterly reports to NASA headquarters a reporting mechanism that tracks and reports program progress relative to the agency’s external committed cost and schedule baselines. We are encouraged that NASA plans to update its cost estimate for SLS annually. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the reliability of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) cost and schedule estimates, we determined the extent to which the estimates were consistent with best practices for cost estimating and scheduling as identified in GAO’s Cost Assessment Guide and Schedule Assessment Guide. In addition, we met with program and agency officials to discuss the baseline cost and schedule estimates, potential program schedule changes, and the program’s cost and schedule reserve postures, among other issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
SLS is NASA's first heavy-lift launch vehicle for human space exploration in over 40 years. For development efforts related to the first flight of SLS, NASA established its cost and schedule commitments at $9.7 billion and November 2018, respectively. The program, however, has continued to pursue more aggressive internal goals for cost and schedule.
GAO was asked to assess a broad range of issues related to the SLS program. This report focuses on NASA's cost estimate for the initial phases of SLS and other management tools needed to control costs. Specifically, this report examines the extent to which SLS's (1) cost and schedule estimates for its first test flight are reliable; (2) cost and schedule reserves are available to maintain progress toward this flight test; and (3) EVM data provides meaningful insight into progress. To do this work, GAO examined documents supporting the cost and schedule estimates, contractor EVM data, and other relevant program documentation, and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
The cost and schedule estimates for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) program substantially complied with five of six relevant best practices, but could not be deemed fully reliable because they only partially met the sixth best practice—credibility. While an independent NASA office reviewed the estimate developed by the program and as a result the program made some adjustments, officials did not commission the development of a separate independent estimate to compare to the program estimate to identify areas of discrepancy or difference. In addition, the program did not cross-check its estimate using an alternative methodology. The purpose of developing a separate independent estimate and cross-checking the estimate is to test the program's estimate for reasonableness and, ultimately, to validate the estimate. The continued accuracy of the estimates is also questionable because officials have no plans to update the original estimates created in 2013. GAO's cost estimating best practices call for estimates to be continually updated through the life of the program to provide decisionmakers with current information to assess status. Moreover, as stressed in prior GAO reports, SLS cost estimates only cover one SLS flight in 2018 whereas best practices call for estimating costs through the expected life of the program.
Limited cost and schedule reserves place the program at increased risk of exceeding its cost and schedule commitments. Although the SLS program is committed to a November 2018 launch readiness date, it has been pursuing an internal goal for launch readiness of December 2017, with the time between December 2017 and November 2018 being designated as schedule reserve. The SLS program expects to use a significant amount of schedule reserve, in part to address some technical challenges, and plans to shift its internal goal from December 2017 to tentatively July 2018. This shift will reduce the amount of available schedule reserve from 11 months to just 4 months. In addition, the program planned for cost reserves of less than 4 percent each year and has already allocated those funds for this year, which leaves no reserve funding available to address unanticipated issues.
Earned value management (EVM) data for SLS remains incomplete and provides limited insight into progress toward the program's external committed cost and schedule baselines because it tracks progress relative to the program's internal goals—which have proven unrealistic. EVM data is intended to provide an accurate assessment of program progress and alert managers of impending schedule delays and cost overruns. GAO analysis of available SLS contractor EVM data indicated that the contractors may incur cost overruns ranging from about $367 million to about $1.4 billion, which is significantly higher than what the contractors were reporting—$89 million. SLS is implementing a program-level EVM system that, once complete, will include all contractor work and work conducted in-house by NASA and may provide more comprehensive information on program progress relative to internal goals. Tracking to internal goals, however, provides limited information relative to progress toward external commitments. At present, the SLS program lacks comprehensive program-level reporting to alert managers of impending delays and cost overruns to external commitments.
What GAO Recommends
NASA should direct SLS program officials to update the cost and schedule estimates at least annually, and to implement a mechanism that reports progress relative to external committed cost and schedule baselines on a quarterly basis, among other actions. NASA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-243 | gao_GAO-02-243_0 | The Funds’ Beneficiaries
The Coal Act limited coverage under the Funds to retired coal miners, their spouses and dependents who were eligible for benefits under former UMWA retiree benefit plans. If an employer has gone out of business, or the premium cannot otherwise be collected, the cost of affected 1992 Benefit Plan beneficiaries is shared by other coal companies that were signatories to a prior agreement between the industry and UMWA and that have either current or potentially eligible beneficiaries under the 1992 Benefit Plan. Along Some Dimensions, the Funds’ Benefits Are More Generous than Those Offered by Major Manufacturers or Companies with Unionized Labor Forces
In four areas—premium contributions, annual deductible, the cap on beneficiary out-of-pocket expenses, and coverage for SNF care—the Funds’ benefits are more generous than those benefits typically offered to retirees and workers by major manufacturing companies or to unionized hourly workforces in other companies. In contrast, most employer-sponsored retiree plans do not offer SNF care. The Funds’ Beneficiaries Have Higher Health Care Costs than Comparable Beneficiaries
The average annual health care cost of the Funds’ beneficiaries is approximately 29 percent higher than the average cost of demographically similar Medicare retirees with employer-provided insurance. Specifically, they emphasized that coal miners traded lower pensions for better health care benefits in their labor contracts. Retiree Health Insurance: Gaps in Coverage and Availability, GAO-02-178T. Financial and Legal Issues Facing the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund, GAO/AIMD-00-280R. | What GAO Found
More than 100,000 retired coal miners and their spouses and dependents in 1992 faced a potential decrease in their employment-related health insurance coverage or loss of such coverage altogether. Some former employers had stopped mining coal or gone out of business and were no longer contributing to the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) retiree benefit funds. To ensure that these individuals would continue to receive the health benefits specified in previous collective bargaining agreements reached with coal companies, often gained in exchange for lower pensions, Congress enacted the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act). The Coal Act replaced the existing UMWA benefit funds with the Combined Benefit Fund (CBF) and the 1992 Benefit Plan. These funds' benefits requires less cost sharing by beneficiaries and provides more extensive coverage than benefit packages offered by the major manufacturing companies and companies with unionized workforces. However, the extent of coverage is generally comparable. The cost of health care for the funds' beneficiaries in 1999 was about 29 percent higher than for demographically similar Medicare beneficiaries with employer-sponsored insurance. The funds' officials have attempted to control costs largely through approaches that do not reduce or limit the benefits for beneficiaries, do not increase beneficiary cost-sharing requirements, or that have a minimal impact on beneficiaries. |
gao_GAO-11-250 | gao_GAO-11-250_0 | Problems Identifying Potential Enrollees and Reviewing Enrollment Decisions Make It Unclear Whether Those Needing FRCP Services Are Enrolled
It is unclear whether all of the eligible “severely wounded, ill, and injured” servicemembers and veterans who could benefit from the FRCP are being enrolled in the program. In addition, the FRCs must exercise judgment in applying the program’s criteria for enrollment determinations, and FRCP leadership does not systematically review these decisions to ensure that these criteria are applied appropriately so that referred individuals who could benefit from the program are enrolled, and that individuals who could be served by less intensive services are referred to other programs. The FRCP’s Potential Enrollee Population Cannot Be Readily Identified from Existing Data Sources, but the FRCP Has Taken a Number of Steps to Identify Potentially Eligible Individuals
FRCP officials have experienced difficulties in identifying the potentially eligible population of “severely wounded, ill, or injured” servicemembers and veterans, and as a result, it is unclear whether all of these individuals who could benefit from care coordination services are enrolled in the program. As a result, to identify potentially eligible individuals, the FRCP relies on referrals from others, including program officials and medical facility staff. The FRCP Faces Challenges in Determining Staffing Needs and Has Not Clearly Defined or Documented Its Processes for Managing FRCs’ Caseloads, Making Staffing Decisions, and Placing FRCs
Several challenges confront the FRCP in determining staffing needs for the program, including how to manage FRCs’ caseloads, deciding when VA should hire FRCs, and determining where to place them in the field to best serve current and potential enrollees. According to the FRCP Executive Director, an appropriate caseload is difficult to determine because care coordination is a new type of function, and there are no comparable criteria against which to measure and base caseload size for this program because of its unique activities. The FRCP Executive Director told us that the program is developing a customized workload assessment tool to help balance FRCs’ caseloads— in other words, to ensure that an FRC’s caseload mix is manageable. The FRCP Executive Director is uncertain how long it will take to develop a workload assessment tool and has not established timelines to complete this effort. The FRCP Lacks a Clear and Consistent Rationale for Making FRC Placement Decisions
Deciding where to place FRCs to best serve current and potential enrollees’ needs is another key staffing issue, despite the fact that FRCs often coordinate services for enrollees who are located throughout the country and may not be receiving care at the facility where their assigned FRC is located. 1.) FRCP officials have also decided to place some new FRCs at two VA medical centers where servicemembers and veterans with polytrauma injuries receive care, based on recommendations from DOD and VA officials. Developing a clear and consistent rationale for placing FRCs, which includes a systematic analysis of program data, should help ensure that FRCs are located where they could provide the maximum benefit to current and potential enrollees. Efforts by the FRCP to improve information sharing are ongoing. Coordination among the FRCP and DOD and VA Case Management Programs Is Impeded by Limitations on Their Ability to Share Information, and Efforts to Address These Limitations Are Ongoing
Coordination among DOD and VA programs that provide care coordination and case management is difficult because of the large number of such programs that exist to address the needs of wounded servicemembers and veterans and the limitations in the ability of these programs to share information. At two of the military treatment facilities we visited, for example, a military program serving wounded servicemembers delays referrals to the FRCP until a servicemember approaches the point when he or she is preparing to transition to another facility or VA.
Information Disclosure Requirements Limited the FRCP’s Information Sharing with DOD’s Wounded Warrior Programs
Prior to January 2011, VA had not completed public disclosure actions necessary to enable the sharing of information from the Veterans Tracking Application, the information system used by the FRCP that contains each enrollee’s personal information and Federal Individual Recovery Plan. Because enrollment decisions are not well documented or systematically reviewed by FRCP leadership, it is unclear whether referred servicemembers and veterans who need FRC services are being enrolled in the program. 2. 3. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DOD and VA each provided comments on a draft of this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2007, following reports of poor case management for outpatients at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) jointly developed the Federal Recovery Coordination Program (FRCP) to coordinate the clinical and nonclinical services needed by severely wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and veterans. The FRCP, which continues to expand, is administered by VA, and the care coordinators, called Federal Recovery Coordinators (FRC), are VA employees. This report examines (1) whether servicemembers and veterans who need FRCP services are being identified and enrolled in the program, (2) staffing challenges confronting the FRCP, and (3) challenges facing the FRCP in its efforts to coordinate care for enrollees. GAO reviewed FRCP policies and procedures and conducted over 170 interviews of FRCP officials, FRCs, headquarters officials and staff of DOD and VA case management programs, and staff at medical facilities where FRCs are located.
What GAO Found
It is unclear whether all individuals who could benefit from the FRCP's care coordination services are being identified and enrolled in the program. Because neither DOD nor VA medical and benefits information systems classify servicemembers and veterans as "severely wounded, ill, and injured," FRCs cannot readily identify potential enrollees using existing data sources. Instead, the program must rely on referrals to identify eligible individuals. Once these individuals are identified, FRCs must evaluate them and make their enrollment determinations--a process that involves considerable judgment by FRCs because of broad criteria. However, FRCP leadership does not systematically review FRCs' enrollment decisions, and as a result, program officials cannot ensure that referred individuals who could benefit from the program are enrolled and, conversely, that the individuals who are not enrolled are referred to other programs. The FRCP faces challenges in determining staffing needs, including managing FRCs' caseloads and deciding when VA should hire additional FRCs and where to place them. According to the FRCP Executive Director, appropriately balanced caseloads (size and mix) are difficult to determine because there are no comparable criteria against which to base caseloads for this program because of its unique care coordination activities. The program has taken other steps to manage FRCs' caseloads, including the use of an informal FRC-to-enrollee ratio. Because these methods have some limitations, the FRCP is developing a customized workload assessment tool to help balance the size and mix of FRCs' caseloads but has not determined when this tool will be completed. In addition, the FRCP has not clearly defined or documented the processes for making staffing decisions in FRCP policies or procedures. As a result, it is difficult to determine how staffing decisions are made, or how this process could be sustained during a change in leadership. Finally, the FRCP's basis for placing FRCs at DOD and VA facilities has changed over time, and the program lacks a clear and consistent rationale for making these decisions, which would help ensure that FRCs are located where they could provide maximum benefit to current and potential enrollees. A key challenge facing the FRCP concerns limitations on sharing information needed to coordinate services for enrollees, who may be enrolled in multiple DOD and VA case management programs. These limitations are often blamed for duplication of services and enrollee confusion, prompting two military wounded warrior programs to cease making referrals to the FRCP. One such limitation existed because VA had not completed public disclosure actions necessary to enable the sharing of information from the FRCP's information system. In January 2011, VA completed the process needed to resolve this issue. In addition, incompatibility among information systems used by different case management programs limits data sharing. Although the ultimate solution to information system incompatibility is beyond the capacity of the FRCP to resolve, the program has initiated an effort to improve information exchange.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA direct the FRCP Executive Director to establish systematic oversight of enrollment decisions, complete development of a workload assessment tool, document staffing decisions, and develop and document a rationale for FRC placement. GAO received comments from DOD and VA; VA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-778T | gao_GAO-05-778T_0 | This official is the agency’s CIO, who is to review each collection of information to certify that the collection meets 10 standards (see table 1) and to provide support for these certifications. In addition, the 1995 PRA amendments required OMB to set specific goals for reducing burden from the level it had reached in 1995: at least a 10 percent reduction in the governmentwide burden-hour estimate for each of fiscal years 1996 and 1997, a 5 percent governmentwide burden reduction goal in each of the next 4 fiscal years, and annual agency goals that reduce burden to the “maximum practicable opportunity.” At the end of fiscal year 1995, federal agencies estimated that their information collections imposed about 7 billion burden hours on the public. Reported Paperwork Burden Decreased Slightly in 2004
According to OMB’s most recent PRA report to Congress, the estimated total burden hours imposed by government information collections in fiscal year 2004 was 7.971 billion hours; this is a decrease of 128 million burden hours (1.6 percent) from the previous year’s total of about 8.099 billion hours. The reduction for fiscal year 2004 was a result of several types of changes, which OMB assigns to various categories. These results are similar to those for fiscal year 2003, in which adjustments of 181.7 million hours led to an overall decrease of 116.3 million hours (1.4 percent) in total burden estimated. Because of these limitations, the degree to which agency burden-hour estimates reflect real burden is unclear, and so the significance of small changes in these estimates is also uncertain. Nonetheless, these estimates are the best indicators of paperwork burden available, and they can be useful as long as the limitations are clearly understood. Agency Review Processes Were Not Rigorous
Among the PRA provisions intended to help achieve the goals of minimizing burden while maximizing utility are the requirements for CIO review and certification of information collections. However, in the 12 case studies that we reviewed, this CIO certification occurred despite a lack of rigorous support that all standards were met. OMB’s instructions to agencies on this part of the certification require agencies to describe any methods used to reduce burden only if the collection of information has a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” This does not appropriately reflect the act’s requirements concerning small business: the act requires that the CIO certify that the information collection reduces burden on small entities in general, to the extent practical and appropriate, and provides no thresholds for the level of economic impact or the number of small entities affected. When support for the PRA certifications is missing or inadequate, OMB, the agency, and the public have reduced assurance that the standards in the act, such as those on avoiding duplication and minimizing burden, have been consistently met. Two Agencies Have Developed Processes to Reduce Burden Associated with Information Collections
IRS and EPA have supplemented the standard PRA review process with additional processes aimed at reducing burden while maximizing utility. For example, it reports that about 95 million hours of taxpayer burden were reduced through increases in the income- reporting threshold on various IRS schedules. Instead, these officials said that the CIO staff’s focus is on fostering high awareness within the agency of the requirements associated with information collections, educating and training the program office staff on the need to minimize burden and the impact on respondents, providing an agencywide perspective on information collections to help avoid duplication, managing the clearance process for agency information collections, and acting as liaison between program offices and OMB during the clearance process. In contrast, for the 12 information collections we examined, the CIO review process resulted in no reduction in burden. Many factors have contributed to these conditions, including lack of management support, weaknesses in OMB guidance, and the CIO staff’s lack of specific program expertise. In our report, we suggested options that the Congress may want to consider in its deliberations on reauthorizing the act, including mandating pilot projects to test and review alternative approaches to achieving PRA goals. We also made recommendations to the Director of OMB, including that the office alter its current guidance to clarify and emphasize issues raised in our review, and to the heads of the four agencies to improve agency compliance with the act’s provisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Americans spend billions of hours each year providing information to federal agencies by filling out information collections (forms, surveys, or questionnaires). A major aim of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) is to minimize the burden that these collections impose on the public, while maximizing their public benefit. Under the act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is to approve all such collections and to report annually on the agencies' estimates of the associated burden. In addition, agency Chief Information Officers (CIO) are to review information collections before they are submitted to OMB for approval and certify that the collections meet certain standards set forth in the act. For its testimony, GAO was asked to comment on OMB's burden report for 2004 and to discuss its recent study of PRA implementation (GAO-05-424), concentrating on CIO review and certification processes and describing alternative processes that two agencies have used to minimize burden. For its study, GAO reviewed a governmentwide sample of collections, reviewed processes and collections at four agencies that account for a large proportion of burden, and performed case studies of 12 approved collections.
What GAO Found
The total paperwork burden imposed by federal information collections shrank slightly in fiscal year 2004, according to estimates provided in OMB's annual PRA report to Congress. The estimated total burden was 7.971 billion hours--a decrease of 1.6 percent (128 million burden hours) from the previous year's total of about 8.099 billion hours. Different types of changes contributed to the overall change in these estimates, according to OMB. For example, adjustments to the estimates (from such factors as changes in estimation methods and estimated number of respondents) accounted for a decrease of about 156 million hours (1.9 percent), and agency burden reduction efforts led to a decrease of about 97 million hours (1.2 percent). These decreases were partially offset by increases in other categories, primarily an increase of 119 million hours (1.5 percent) arising from new statutes. However, because of limitations in the accuracy of burden estimates, the significance of small changes in these estimates is unclear. Nonetheless, as the best indicators of paperwork burden available, these estimates can be useful as long as the limitations are clearly understood. Among the PRA provisions aimed at helping to achieve the goals of minimizing burden while maximizing utility is the requirement for CIO review and certification of information collections. GAO's review of 12 case studies showed that CIOs provided these certifications despite often missing or inadequate support from the program offices sponsoring the collections. Further, although the law requires CIOs to provide support for certifications, agency files contained little evidence that CIO reviewers had made efforts to improve the support offered by program offices. Numerous factors have contributed to these problems, including a lack of management support and weaknesses in OMB guidance. Because these reviews were not rigorous, OMB, the agency, and the public had reduced assurance that the standards in the act--such as minimizing burden--were consistently met. In contrast, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have set up processes outside the CIO review process that are specifically focused on reducing burden. These agencies, whose missions involve numerous information collections, have devoted significant resources to targeted burden reduction efforts that involve extensive outreach to stakeholders. According to the two agencies, these efforts led to significant reductions in burden on the public. In contrast, for the 12 case studies, the CIO review process did not reduce burden. In its report, GAO recommended that OMB and the agencies take steps to improve review processes and compliance with the act. GAO also suggested that the Congress may wish to consider mandating pilot projects to target some collections for rigorous analysis along the lines of the IRS and EPA approaches. OMB and the agencies agreed with most of the recommendations, but disagreed with aspects of GAO's characterization of agencies' compliance with the act's requirements. |
gao_GAO-17-263T | gao_GAO-17-263T_0 | Background
The federal government is likely to invest more than $89 billion on IT in fiscal year 2017. However, as we have previously reported, investments in federal IT too often result in failed projects that incur cost overruns and schedule slippages, while contributing little to the desired mission-related outcomes. FITARA Can Improve Agencies’ Management of IT
Recognizing the severity of issues related to government-wide management of IT, FITARA was enacted in December 2014. Federal data center consolidation initiative (FDCCI). Enhanced transparency and improved risk management. Further, in our February 2015 high-risk report, we identified actions that OMB and the agencies need to take to make progress in this area. Specifically, between fiscal years 2010 and 2015, we made 803 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations, including many to improve the implementation of the recent initiatives and other government-wide, cross-cutting efforts. Most agencies agreed with our recommendations or had no comments. Specifically, as of November 2015, these agencies had identified a total of 10,584 data centers, of which they reported closing 3,125 through fiscal year 2015. Further, 21 agencies collectively reported planning an additional $5.4 billion in cost savings and avoidances, for a total of approximately $8.2 billion, through fiscal year 2019. To better ensure that federal data center consolidation and optimization efforts improve governmental efficiency and achieve cost savings, we recommended that 10 of the 24 agencies take actions to complete their planned data center cost savings and avoidance targets for fiscal years 2016 through 2018. Risks Need to Be Fully Considered When Agencies Rate Their Major Investments on OMB’s IT Dashboard
To facilitate transparency across the government in acquiring and managing IT investments, OMB established a public website—the IT Dashboard—to provide detailed information on major investments at 26 agencies, including ratings of their performance against cost and schedule targets. Among other things, agencies are to submit ratings from their CIOs, which, according to OMB’s instructions, should reflect the level of risk facing an investment relative to that investment’s ability to accomplish its goals. Most agencies agreed with our recommendations or had no comments. Specifically, our assessments of risk for 95 investments at 15 selected agencies matched the CIO ratings posted on the Dashboard 22 times, showed more risk 60 times, and showed less risk 13 times. Twelve agencies generally agreed with or did not comment on the recommendations and three agencies disagreed. Agencies Need to Increase Their Use of Incremental Development Practices
OMB has emphasized the need to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk, deliver capabilities more quickly, and facilitate the adoption of emerging technologies. In 2010, it called for agencies’ major investments to deliver functionality every 12 months and, since 2012, every 6 months. More recently, in August 2016, we reported that agencies had not fully implemented incremental development practices for their software development projects. Specifically, we noted that, as of August 31, 2015, 22 federal agencies had reported on the IT Dashboard that 300 of 469 active software development projects (approximately 64 percent) were planning to deliver usable functionality every 6 months for fiscal year 2016, as required by OMB guidance. These differences were due to (1) our identification of fewer software development projects than agencies reported on the IT Dashboard and (2) the fact that information reported to us was generally more current than the information reported on the IT Dashboard. To improve the reporting of incremental data on the IT Dashboard and policies for CIO certification of adequate incremental development, we made 12 recommendations to seven agencies and OMB. In addition, the Department of Defense partially agreed with one recommendation and disagreed with another, OMB did not agree or disagree, and the Department of the Treasury did not comment on the recommendations. To their credit, agencies have taken steps to improve the management of IT acquisitions and operations by implementing key FITARA initiatives, including data center consolidation, efforts to increase transparency via OMB’s IT Dashboard, and incremental development; and they have continued to address recommendations we have made over the past several years. In addition, we will continue to monitor agencies implementation of our previous recommendations. High-Risk Series: An Update. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is likely to invest more than $89 billion on IT in fiscal year 2017. Historically, these investments have frequently failed, incurred cost overruns and schedule slippages, or contributed little to mission-related outcomes. Accordingly, in December 2014, IT reform legislation was enacted, aimed at improving agencies' acquisitions of IT. Further, in February 2015, GAO added improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations to its high-risk list. Between fiscal years 2010 and 2015, GAO made about 800 recommendations related to this high-risk area to OMB and agencies.
This statement summarizes agencies' progress in improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations. To do so, we reviewed and summarized GAO's prior and recently published work on (1) data center consolidation, (2) risk levels of major investments as reported on OMB's IT Dashboard, and (3) implementation of incremental development practices.
What GAO Found
Consolidating data centers. In an effort to reduce the growing number of data centers, OMB launched a consolidation initiative in 2010. GAO reported in March 2016 that agencies had closed 3,125 of the 10,584 total data centers and achieved $2.8 billion in cost savings and avoidances through fiscal year 2015. Agencies are planning a total of about $8.2 billion in savings and avoidances through fiscal year 2019. GAO recommended that the agencies take actions to meet their cost savings targets and improve optimization progress related to their data center consolidation and optimization efforts. Most agencies agreed with the recommendations or had no comment.
Enhancing transparency. OMB's IT Dashboard provides detailed information on major investments at federal agencies, including ratings from Chief Information Officers (CIO) that should reflect the level of risk facing an investment. GAO reported in June 2016 that agencies had not fully considered risks when rating their major investments on the IT Dashboard. In particular, of the 95 investments reviewed, GAO's assessments of risks matched the CIO ratings 22 times, showed more risk 60 times, and showed less risk 13 times. Several issues contributed to these differences, such as CIO ratings not being updated frequently. GAO recommended that agencies improve the quality and frequency of their ratings. Most agencies generally agreed with or did not comment on the recommendations.
Implementing incremental development. A key reform initiated by OMB has emphasized the need for federal agencies to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. Since 2012, OMB has required investments to deliver functionality every 6 months. In August 2016, GAO reported that 22 agencies had reported that 64 percent of 469 active software development projects planned to deliver usable functionality every 6 months for fiscal year 2016. Further, for 7 selected agencies, GAO identified significant differences in the percentages of software projects reported to GAO as delivering functionality every 6 months, compared to what was reported on the IT Dashboard. This was due to, among other things, inconsistencies in agencies' reporting on non-software development projects, and the timing of reporting data. GAO made 12 recommendations to 7 agencies and OMB to improve the reporting of incremental data on the IT Dashboard and the policies for CIO certification of adequate incremental development. Most agencies agreed or did not comment on our recommendations, and OMB did not agree or disagree.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to improve the oversight and execution of the data center consolidation initiative, the accuracy and reliability of the IT Dashboard, and incremental development policies. Most agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations or had no comments. GAO will continue to monitor agencies' implementation of these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-720T | gao_GAO-04-720T_0 | Although Available, Few Are Buying Terrorism Insurance and the Industry Has Made Little Progress Toward Post-TRIA Coverage
While TRIA has improved the availability of terrorism insurance, particularly for high-risk properties in major metropolitan areas, most commercial policyholders are not buying the coverage. Limited industry data suggest that 10 - 30 percent of commercial policyholders are purchasing terrorism insurance, perhaps because most policyholders perceive themselves at relatively low risk for a terrorist event. Some industry experts are concerned that those most at risk from terrorism are generally the ones buying terrorism insurance. In combination with low purchase rates, these conditions could result in uninsured losses for those businesses without terrorism coverage or cause financial problems for insurers, should a terrorist event occur. Moreover, even policyholders who have purchased terrorism insurance may remain uninsured for significant risks arising from certified terrorist events—that is, those meeting statutory criteria for reimbursement under TRIA—such as those involving NBC agents or radioactive contamination. Finally, although insurers and some reinsurers have cautiously reentered the terrorism risk market, insurance industry participants have made little progress toward developing a mechanism that could permit the commercial insurance market to resume providing terrorism coverage without a government backstop. TRIA requires that insurers “make available” coverage for terrorism on terms not differing materially from other coverage. Treasury is engaged in gathering data through surveys that should provide useful information about terrorism insurance prices. Although a purpose of TRIA is to make terrorism insurance available and affordable, the act does not specify a price structure. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, some legislatures in SFP states amended their laws to allow the exclusion of fire following a terrorist event from coverage. In spite of the reentry of reinsurers into the terrorism market, insurance experts said that without TRIA caps on potential losses, both insurers and reinsurers likely still would be unwilling to sell terrorism coverage because they have not found a reliable way to price their exposure to terrorist losses. Since TRIA was enacted in November 2002, terrorism insurance generally has been widely available even for development projects in high-risk areas of the country, in large part because of TRIA’s “make available” requirement. As a result, the first objective of TRIA appears largely to have been achieved. Such an assessment could be a part of Treasury’s TRIA-mandated study to “assess…the likely capacity of the property and casualty insurance industry to offer insurance for terrorism risk after termination of the Program.”
Recommendation for Executive Action
As part of the response to the TRIA-mandated study that requires Treasury to assess the effectiveness of TRIA and evaluate the capacity of the industry to offer terrorism insurance after TRIA expires, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury, after consulting with the insurance industry and other interested parties, identify for Congress an array of alternatives that may exist for expanding the availability and affordability of terrorism insurance after TRIA expires. As authorized by the Act, these groups may only provide commercial liability insurance. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, insurance coverage for terrorism largely disappeared. Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) in 2002 to help commercial property-casualty policyholders obtain terrorism insurance and give the insurance industry time to develop mechanisms to provide such insurance after the act expires on December 31, 2005. Under TRIA, the Department of Treasury (Treasury) caps insurer liability and would process claims and reimburse insurers for a large share of losses from terrorist acts that Treasury certified as meeting certain criteria. As Treasury and industry participants have operated under TRIA for more than a year, GAO was asked to describe how TRIA affected the terrorism insurance market.
What GAO Found
TRIA has enhanced the availability of terrorism insurance for commercial policyholders, largely fulfilling a principal objective of the program. In particular, TRIA has benefited commercial policyholders in major metropolitan areas perceived to be at greater risk for a terrorist attack. Prior to TRIA, we reported concern that some development projects had already been delayed or cancelled because of the unavailability of insurance and continued fears that other projects also would be adversely impacted. We also conveyed the widespread concern that general economic growth and development could be slowed by a lack of available terrorism insurance. Since TRIA's enactment, terrorism insurance generally has been widely available, even for development projects in perceived high-risk areas, largely because of the requirement in TRIA that insurers "make available" coverage for terrorism on terms not differing materially from other coverage. Although the purpose of TRIA is to make terrorism insurance available, it does not directly address prices. As part of its assessment of TRIA's effectiveness, Treasury is engaged in gathering data through surveys that should provide useful information about terrorism insurance prices in the marketplace. Despite increased availability of coverage, limited industry data suggest that most commercial policyholders are not buying terrorism insurance, perhaps because they perceive their risk of losses from a terrorist act as being relatively low. The potential negative effects of low purchase rates, in combination with the probability that those most likely to be the targets of terrorist attacks may also be the ones most likely to have purchased coverage, would become evident only in the aftermath of a terrorist attack and could include more difficult economic recovery for businesses without terrorism coverage or potentially significant financial problems for insurers. Moreover, those that have purchased terrorism insurance may still be exposed to significant risks that have been excluded by insurance companies, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical contamination. Meanwhile, although insurers and some reinsurers have cautiously reentered the terrorism risk market to cover insurers' remaining exposures, little progress has been observed within the private sector toward either finding a reliable method for pricing terrorism insurance or developing any viable reinsurance alternatives to TRIA once it expires. |
gao_GAO-08-614 | gao_GAO-08-614_0 | States are required to make DSH payments to hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low-income and Medicaid patients. CMS Reports Show $23 Billion Spent on Medicaid DSH and Non-DSH Supplemental Payments in Fiscal Year 2006, but This Amount Is Likely Understated as Information on Non- DSH Payments Is Incomplete
CMS expenditure reports show that states and the federal government spent at least $23.48 billion on DSH and non-DSH supplemental payments in fiscal year 2006, with the federal share of these payments totaling at least $13.37 billion, but states did not provide complete information on non-DSH payments. CMS officials said that they were updating reporting requirements to obtain better information on states’ supplemental payments. As of April 2008, specific implementation dates for these actions had not been established. CMS’s planned changes did not include requiring states to report facility- specific UPL payments, a gap we had identified in 2004 and recommended that CMS address. We recommended in that report that CMS improve state reporting by requiring all states to report UPL payments made to all providers and to report these payments on a facility-specific basis. Five Surveyed States Reported Distributing $12.3 Billion in Supplemental Payments in Fiscal Year 2006 for Broadly Stated Purposes, Often to Local Government Hospitals
The five states we surveyed—California, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Texas—reported making supplemental payments totaling $12.3 billion in fiscal year 2006 through 15 DSH and 33 non-DSH programs, with about half of these payments made to hospitals classified as local government by the states. The five states reported broadly stated purposes for their programs that often focused on various categories of eligible providers serving individuals on Medicaid, with low incomes, or without insurance. The purposes of the non-DSH programs for hospitals and other providers, as reported by the five states, included the following: providing supplemental payments to most of the largest Medicaid hospital providers in the state; supplementing Medicaid payments to certain types of hospitals, such as rural hospitals, pediatric specialty hospitals, and hospitals operated by the state Department of Mental Health; ensuring access by Medicaid beneficiaries to high-quality hospital or reimbursing public health clinics for their cost of providing services to Medicaid beneficiaries; providing enhanced Medicaid payments for outpatient hospital trauma and emergency services to private hospitals meeting certain criteria; reimbursing public dental clinics for their cost of providing services to Medicaid beneficiaries; providing partial reimbursement of the debt service incurred on revenue bonds for the construction, renovation, replacement, or retrofitting of eligible hospitals; and encouraging providers to make available to Medicaid recipients the most advanced forms of medical diagnostic and treatment services available through university-based medical service systems. In some cases, we found that the state Medicaid plan sections establishing the states’ supplemental payments did not clearly identify how the payments would be calculated. CMS officials said that as part of its oversight initiative started in August 2003, CMS ensures during its state plan amendment review process that states demonstrate a link between the distribution of supplemental payments and Medicaid purposes, which would include uncompensated care in the case of DSH payments. Thus, not all state supplemental payment programs have been reviewed under CMS’s 2003 initiative. Specifically, the 5 percent of providers receiving the largest supplemental payments in individual states received between 53 percent and 71 percent of all Medicaid supplemental payments. Some providers received substantial payments from more than one supplemental payment program. We also selected a nongeneralizable sample of five states and collected information about the supplemental payments made to providers from each of their supplemental payment programs. The five states each reported making more than $1.6 billion in estimated Medicaid supplemental payments in 2005. Appendix V: Extent That Supplemental Payments Were Concentrated and Providers Received Multiple Payments
Data from the five surveyed states showed that the states concentrated a large proportion of their DSH and non-DSH payments on a small percentage of providers and that over one-quarter of providers received payments from more than one supplemental payment program. Medicaid: Improved Federal Oversight of State Financing Schemes Is Needed. GAO-04-228. | Why GAO Did This Study
The financing of the $299 billion Medicaid program is shared between the federal government and states. States pay qualified providers for covered Medicaid services and receive federal matching funds from the Department of Health & Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for expenditures authorized in their state Medicaid plans. In addition to these standard Medicaid payments, most states make supplemental payments to certain providers, which are also matched by federal funds. GAO was asked for information about Medicaid supplemental payments. GAO examined (1) what information states report about supplemental payments on Medicaid expenditure reports and (2) in selected states, how much was distributed as supplemental payments, to what types of providers, and for what purposes. GAO analyzed CMS's Medicaid expenditure reports and surveyed five states that make large supplemental payments.
What GAO Found
CMS Medicaid expenditure reports show that states made at least $23 billion in supplemental payments in fiscal year 2006, with the federal share of these payments totaling over $13 billion. States made $17.1 billion in payments through Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) programs, which under federal law provide additional reimbursement, up to a cap, to hospitals that serve large numbers of low-income individuals. In addition, states made at least $6.3 billion in non-DSH supplemental payments, including payments through Upper Payment Limit (UPL) programs, under which states make payments to providers up to the upper limit for obtaining federal matching funds. However, information on non-DSH supplemental payments was incomplete. The exact amount and distribution of fiscal year 2006 non-DSH payments to states are unknown because states did not report all their payments to CMS. CMS officials said that they were updating reporting requirements to collect better information on supplemental payments, including finalizing a rule proposed in 2005 responding to federal law that required states to report more detailed information on DSH payments and seeking improved UPL payment information. As of April 2008, specific implementation dates for these actions were not known. CMS's plans did not include a requirement that states report all UPL payments on a facility-specific basis, as GAO recommended in 2004 (See Medicaid: Improved Federal Oversight of State Financing Schemes Is Needed, GAO-04-228). GAO believes this 2004 recommendation remains valid. The five states GAO surveyed--California, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Texas--reported making $12.3 billion in Medicaid supplemental payments in federal fiscal year 2006 through programs with broadly stated purposes, with half of these payments made to local government hospitals. Collectively, the five states reported making payments through 48 supplemental payment programs, with each state operating from 3 to 15 different programs that paid hospitals, nursing facilities, or other providers. The five states reported purposes for their programs that often focused on various categories of eligible providers serving individuals on Medicaid, with low incomes, or without insurance. The state Medicaid plan sections establishing the states' supplemental payments did not always clearly identify how the payments would be calculated. CMS officials said that as part of an oversight initiative started in 2003, CMS ensures that state plans demonstrate a link between the distribution of supplemental payments and Medicaid purposes. However, not all state supplemental payment programs have been reviewed under CMS's initiative. In each of the five states, supplemental payments were concentrated on a small proportion of providers: the 5 percent of providers receiving the largest amount of supplemental payments in individual states received from 53 percent to 71 percent of all supplemental payments. Some providers received substantial payments from more than one supplemental payment program. |
gao_HEHS-96-180 | gao_HEHS-96-180_0 | Companies are not required to offer all 10 plans, and many do not. Beneficiaries are informed of the 6-month open enrollment period when they enroll in Medicare. Enrollment in an HMO with a Medicare risk contract can be viewed as a substitute for a Medigap policy. However, Medicare beneficiaries who wish to change Medigap policies have at least one alternative that does not involve medical underwriting and, depending on where they live, may have several alternatives. Twelve of the 16 companies that submitted some or all of their applications to medical underwriting allowed their policyholders to switch from a prestandardized Medigap policy to a standardized Medigap policy without medical underwriting, if the benefits were comparable with or less comprehensive than those of the prestandardized policy. Medicare SELECT Policyholders Have Choices
Federal law requires insurers to offer Medicare beneficiaries who want to leave the Medicare SELECT program the option of purchasing a traditional Medigap policy. Medicare Beneficiaries Seldom Change Health Plans
Most elderly Medicare beneficiaries do not replace their private health insurance coverage but many do add to existing coverage. About 25 percent of the 19.5 million added plans to supplement those they had in 1991 (see table 2). Few Medigap Underwriting Complaints Have Been Made
Since 1993, NAIC has maintained a central database of formal complaints made to state insurance departments. One way to ensure that medical underwriting does not become a problem in the future would be to require Medigap insurers to offer policies with comparable benefit packages on a guaranteed-issue basis to individuals who have been continuously covered under Medigap. Few beneficiaries subsequently decide to change their policies, and those that do have at least one alternative for changing without being subject to medical underwriting. Methodology
To identify the extent to which medical underwriting is used in the Medigap market, we interviewed knowledgeable officials from the 25 largest sellers of Medigap insurance on their underwriting practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed Medigap policies, focusing on: (1) the extent to which Medicare beneficiaries are subject to medical underwriting when they change Medigap policies; and (2) options for modifying federal Medigap requirements to ensure that medical underwriting is not a problem in such cases.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 11 of the 25 largest Medigap insurers use medical underwriting to determine whom they will insure, 5 sell some policies without medical underwriting, and 9 sell all of their policies without medical underwriting; (2) the American Association of Retired Persons' (AARP) insurer accepts all Medicare beneficiaries who are AARP members without medical underwriting for certain Medigap policies; (3) some Medicare beneficiaries can obtain supplemental insurance from local Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans depending on where they reside; (4) federal law requires Medicare SELECT program insurers to offer participants who want to drop their SELECT policy the option of purchasing a traditional Medigap policy without medical underwriting; (5) some beneficiaries have the option of enrolling in health maintenance organizations (HMO) with Medicare risk contracts; (6) about 99 percent of Medicare beneficiaries do not change their private health insurance, but about 25 percent supplement their existing coverage; (7) few beneficiaries have made formal complaints to their state insurance departments about Medigap underwriting practices; and (8) insurers may discontinue the few policies that do not require medical underwriting in the future, since federal law does not require these insurers to offer such policies. |
gao_GAO-02-246 | gao_GAO-02-246_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned that current models the government uses do not fully account for how some marketing practices and trade affect prices U.S. cattle producers receive for their livestock, Senator Daschle asked us to determine the extent to which economic models that USDA and ITC incorporate imports, concentration in the U.S. meatpacking industry, and marketing agreements and forward contracts in predicting domestic cattle prices; the most important factors affecting cattle prices and producers’ the most important data and modeling issues in developing a comprehensive analysis to project cattle prices and producers’ incomes. One of the strengths of the Delphi method is its flexibility. This model consists of equations specifying supply and demand relationships that affect the livestock sector. Beef export and import projections are based on USDA’s link system model. The panel also identified key international trade factors that affect cattle demand and supply. The panel believed that domestic cattle demand and supply are the fundamental forces driving cattle prices and producers’ incomes. The panel’s findings underscore the importance of demand and supply relationships throughout the cattle and beef industry, from cow-calf producer to retail consumer. Other panel members pointed to the need for better data for analyzing consumer demand. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns have been raised that the economic models used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. International Trade Commission do not account for all the factors that affect cattle prices and producer incomes. GAO reviewed USDA's livestock model to determine whether it incorporates imports, market concentration, marketing agreements, and forward contracts.
What GAO Found
In reviewing best modeling practices, GAO's expert panel concluded that domestic cattle demand and supply were the fundamental forces driving cattle prices and producer incomes. The panel identified issues necessary to develop a comprehensive modeling system that predicts cattle prices and producer incomes. The panel recommended the collection of better data to quantify several important factors omitted from the model. The panel also wanted to see a more complete characterization of the supply and demand relationships connecting the cattle producer to the final consumer. The panel's emphasis on a more complete characterization of the cattle and beef industry underscores the idea that the demand for cattle is ultimately driven by consumer demand for beef and other demand and supply forces linking cattle producers to feedlots, meatpackers, and retailers. |
gao_GAO-17-178 | gao_GAO-17-178_0 | The Outreach Training Program is the agency’s primary way to offer training for workers in the basics of occupational safety and health, according to OSHA. The phases of the process included: (1) submission of a description of the online training program, target audience, and expected impact of the program; (2) submission of a detailed written description of the online training plan; (3) self-verification audit where the online training provider reviews the training against OSHA’s guidance; and (4) OSHA’s review of the completed online training to verify that the program is consistent with OSHA’s guidance. The number of workers trained more than quadrupled from 200,522 in fiscal year 2000 to 900,010 in fiscal year 2016. The number of participants taking the courses online increased from 19 percent in fiscal year 2011 to 30 percent in fiscal year 2016. GAO’s training guide identifies attributes of a well- designed training program and suggests the kinds of documentation to look for that indicate that a training program has a particular attribute in place. OSHA is not required to follow GAO’s training guide, however, we found that the program’s design reflected at least one indicator for six of the seven attributes of a well-designed training program described in the guide (see table 1). According to OSHA officials, the content of the training was selected after the agency reviewed data on the leading causes of worker deaths and the most frequently cited OSHA standards. OSHA used a combination of approaches by centrally setting the learning objectives and establishing detailed content requirements, while also allowing training providers to supplement the curriculum to meet the specific needs of their audience. In addition, although OSHA does not require any accreditation for Outreach Training providers, OSHA’s Directorate of Training and Education, which designed the Outreach Training Program, and several of the online training providers, reported that they are accredited by the International Association for Continuing Education and Training (IACET). Outreach Training Providers Use Automated and Manual Processes and Controls to Document Students’ Successful Course Completion
To obtain course completion cards, which training providers distribute to workers who complete the training, training providers must submit class documentation through either an automated or paper-based process. Outreach trainers–who deliver in-person training to workers–request cards by submitting class documentation electronically through a web- based system to the Education Center where the trainer was authorized. OSHA typically processed the course completion cards within 2 weeks of receiving the request from the online training providers, according to our analysis of OSHA data. Differences in the process for issuing course completion cards stem from the history of the program, according to OSHA officials. OSHA officials told us that they are planning to allow the online training providers to request cards electronically by having the Education Centers take over processing the course completion cards for the online training providers, but OSHA has not established a timeline for implementing this new process. Training providers and OSHA officials reported using automated and manual checks to help ensure that cards are requested only for the students who successfully complete the courses and that the courses meet OSHA’s Outreach Training Program requirements. OSHA Oversees Training Providers by Collecting Data and Investigating Complaints, and Has Taken Some Steps to Assess Program Results OSHA Oversees Training Providers by Routinely Collecting and Assessing Data and Investigating Complaints
OSHA oversees the in-person training providers on an ongoing basis by collecting and assessing data from the Education Centers, including:
Course information: OSHA collects data on the train-the-trainer courses the Education Centers deliver to individuals interested in becoming authorized Outreach trainers, including the names of the courses presented each month, training locations and dates, instructor names, total students, total instructional hours, and test results. For example, OSHA may investigate cases where an Outreach trainer fails to respond to audit requests from an Education Center or fails to provide training that meets OSHA’s requirements, such as spending enough time on required topics. OSHA Tracks the Number of Workers Trained and Requires Some Training Providers to Conduct Evaluation Activities
OSHA tracks the number of workers who take the Outreach Training courses to measure the reach of the program. According to OSHA officials, they have not used this information to assess the results of the Outreach Training Program because the agency receives paper copies of the results in different formats, and the agency does not have the resources to analyze the information in its current format. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2016, approximately 900,000 workers were trained through OSHA's Outreach Training Program, the agency's primary mechanism for training workers on the basics of occupational safety and health. OSHA offers this training through OSHA-authorized in-person and online training providers. GAO was asked to review OSHA's administration of the program.
GAO examined (1) the extent to which the program aligns with leading practices in designing an effective training program, (2) the process for documenting successful completion of the training and whether internal controls are in place to assure completion is accurately documented, and (3) how OSHA oversees training providers and assesses the results of the program. GAO compared OSHA's design and evaluation efforts for its training program with leading practices in GAO's training guide (GAO-04-546G) and federal internal control standards, and analyzed fiscal year 2012-2016 OSHA data (the most recent available) on time frames for processing completion card requests from online training providers. GAO also interviewed all nine online training providers and five in-person training providers, selected for having a high number of participants in fiscal year 2015, as well as OSHA officials.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Outreach Training Program–which offers training on job hazard recognition and avoidance–reflects many of the attributes of a well-designed training program identified in GAO's training guide. OSHA is not required to follow GAO's training guide; however, the program's design reflects at least one indicator for six of the seven attributes of a well-designed training program GAO has identified. For example, OSHA used an appropriate mix of centralized and decentralized approaches by developing core learning objectives and content requirements for the courses but allowed training providers to modify the curriculum to meet the specific needs of their audience. In addition, OSHA officials told GAO that they took into account the leading causes of worker deaths and the most common workplace safety and health violations to determine topics to be covered in the training.
OSHA documents successful course completion differently depending on whether training was delivered in-person or online, but it uses the same controls to prevent fraudulent completion cards from being issued. OSHA officials and the training providers GAO interviewed reported using several checks to prevent fraudulent completion cards from being issued, such as verifying course completion through automated and manual processes and comparing the number of cards requested to the number of registered students. Although OSHA does not require workers to complete Outreach Training, some workers may need to show proof of completion to satisfy requirements by their states, municipalities, employers, or unions. To obtain completion cards, Outreach trainers who deliver in-person training submit course information through a web-based system, while online training providers mail documentation to OSHA. OSHA processed 91 percent of the card requests from online training providers within 2 weeks, which is within the 30-day deadline OSHA has set for itself, according to GAO's analysis of OSHA data. OSHA officials reported that they plan to allow all training providers to request completion cards electronically, but the agency has not established a timeline for implementing this new process. According to OSHA officials, the agency is taking steps to modify its process for selecting online training providers and plans to incorporate electronic requests for completion cards into the new process.
OSHA oversees the performance of training providers by routinely collecting and assessing data and investigating complaints and has taken some steps to assess the results of the program. Specifically, OSHA collects data from the training providers to help ensure that the training meets the program requirements and that the trainers are delivering the Outreach Training courses as intended. OSHA also investigates complaints it receives about training providers, including issues such as the trainer not spending enough time on required safety topics. To assess program results, OSHA tracks the number of workers who take the Outreach Training courses to measure the reach of the program. According to OSHA data, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2016, the number of workers trained more than quadrupled from 200,522 to 900,010. OSHA also receives test results and student evaluations of the courses from some of the Outreach Training providers. |
gao_GAO-02-637 | gao_GAO-02-637_0 | During fiscal year 2000, OWCP’s paid workers’ compensation totaled about $2.1 billion including wage loss, medical, and death benefits stemming from job-related injuries and OWCP received approximately 174,000 new injury claims. To assist us in addressing the objectives, we reviewed a statistical sample of more than 1,200 of the estimated 8,100 appealed claims for which a decision was rendered by OWCP’s BHR or DOL’s ECAB during the period from May 1, 2000, through April 30, 2001, to determine the following: (1) the primary reasons why appealed decisions were reversed or claims were remanded to the OWCP district offices for further development, (2) the amount of time OWCP took to inform claimants of hearing decisions, (3) whether OWCP used certified and licensed physicians whose areas of specialty were consistent with the injuries evaluated, and (4) the methods OWCP uses to identify customer satisfaction and potential claimant fraud. OWCP has established two goals for the timing of notifying claimants of final hearing decisions: (1) notifying 70 to 85 percent of the claimants within 85 calendar days, and (2) informing 96 percent of claimants within 110 calendar days following the date of the hearing. OWCP claims examiners and employing agencies serve as primary information sources for identifying potentially fraudulent claims. In the 2000 survey, customers indicated a 52 percent satisfaction rate with the overall workers compensation program, and a 47 percent dissatisfaction rate. questions about or problems with initial claims decisions made at OWCP district offices, we believe it is appropriate to use reversals and remands as a combined indicator. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) paid $2.1 billion in medical and death benefits and received about 174,000 new injury claims during fiscal year 2000.
What GAO Found
GAO found that (1) one in four appealed claims' decisions are reversed or remanded to OWCP district offices for additional consideration and a new decision because of questions about or problems with the initial claims decision; (2) OWCP set a goal of informing 96 percent of claimants within 110 days of the date of the hearing; (3) nearly all doctors used by OWCP to provide opinions on injuries claimed were board certified and state licensed, and were specialists in areas consistent with the injuries they evaluate; and (4) OWCP has used mailed surveys, telephone surveys, and focus groups to measure customer satisfaction. The Labor inspector general is monitoring fraud within OWCP's workers compensation program and using the claims examiners as one source in identifying potentially fraudulent claims. |
gao_GAO-14-362 | gao_GAO-14-362_0 | Case Studies Varied in Quality of Documentation Supporting the Use of Psychotropic Medications
Expert reviews of 24 foster children’s foster and medical files in five selected states found that the quality of documentation supporting the prescription of psychotropic medication usage varied with respect to (1) screening, assessment, and treatment planning; (2) medication monitoring; and (3) informed and shared decision making. As shown in table 1, experts found that the quality of screening, assessment, and treatment planning varied among selected cases according to documentation reviewed. Experts found that medical pediatric examinations were mostly supported by documentation for 22 of 24 cases. Experts found in 2 of 24 cases the medical pediatric examinations were partially supported, such as when the medical pediatric exams were mentioned in the documentation, but not actually included in the records, preventing experts from evaluating what the examinations consisted of, and whether monitoring for psychotropic agents, such as assessing height, weight, or laboratory functions, was conducted. In one example, whereby experts scored the medical pediatric exam category as mostly supported in documentation, a child with a history of behavioral and emotional problems—including aggression and hyperactivity—was prescribed multiple ADHD medications. In this case, experts noted the child’s records had thorough psychological and pediatric assessments, with comprehensive discussions of diagnostic issues and medication rationale as well as good case-management summaries. Evidence-Based Therapies
Experts found that documentation reviewed supported that evidence- based therapies were mostly provided in 3 of 15 applicable cases where the child may have benefited from such treatment. In 1 of 15 cases, there was no documentation that evidence-based therapies were provided. For example, experts found in one case with partially supporting documentation that the monitoring of height, weight, vital signs, and metabolic effects of antipsychotic medications was lacking and that the records did not provide an adequate overview of medication risks and concerns regarding concurrent use of multiple psychotropic medications. Appropriate Dosages Used
For 13 of the 24 cases, experts found that the dosages were mostly supported for the children’s medications based on documentation reviewed. However, 14 of 20 cases included documentation that partially supported the concurrent use of multiple medications, and 1 case did not include any documentation to support concurrent use. Selected States Have Policies and Procedures Intended to Address Oversight of Psychotropic Medications to Foster Children, and HHS Issued Guidance for Monitoring Psychotropic Medications
Selected states have policies and procedures that are intended to provide oversight of psychotropic medications given to foster children. In Texas there is a single MCO used to coordinate all prescription claims and medical services for children in foster care, and this organization works closely with the state foster-care agency to identify and monitor psychotropic medication use among children in foster care. Justification for Concurrent Use of Multiple Medications
All five of the selected states have designed measures to review prescriptions for concurrent use of multiple medications to a varying extent. HHS Has Issued Guidance, Provided Technical Assistance, and Facilitated Information Sharing
In response to concerns and our December 2011 report recommendation related to the need for additional guidance for the prescribing of psychotropic medications for children in foster care, HHS’s ACF has taken actions to improve the capacity of states’ child-welfare agencies to effectively respond to the complex needs of children in foster care. Additional Guidance Could Help Officials Manage Psychotropic Medications as States Transition Prescription-Drug Benefits to Managed Care
Three of five states included in our review use, or are transitioning from fee-for-service to, MCOs to administer prescription-drug benefits for mental-health medications; however, Medicaid officials from two of those three states reported that their states had conducted limited planning to ensure appropriate oversight of MCOs administering psychotropic medications—which creates a risk that state controls instituted in recent years under fee-for-service may not apply to managed care—and could benefit from additional federal guidance. However, this guidance does not address oversight within the context of a managed-care environment, in which states rely on a third party to administer benefits such as psychotropic medications. Recommendation for Executive Action
To assist states that rely on or are planning to contract with an MCO to administer Medicaid prescription benefits, and to help provide effective oversight of psychotropic medications prescribed to children in foster care, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services issue guidance to state Medicaid, child-welfare, and mental-health officials regarding prescription-drug monitoring and oversight for children in foster care receiving psychotropic medications through MCOs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2011, GAO reported that foster children in selected states were prescribed psychotropic medications at rates higher than nonfoster children in Medicaid in 2008. GAO was asked to further examine instances of foster children being prescribed psychotropic medications.
For the five states included in GAO's 2011 report—Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, and Texas—this report: (1) assesses the extent that documentation supported the usage of psychotropic medication for selected cases; and (2) describes states' policies related to psychotropic medication and assesses HHS actions since GAO's 2011 report.
GAO contracted with two child psychiatrists who conduct mental-health research and work on issues related to foster care, to provide clinical evaluations of 24 cases that GAO selected from the population of foster children prescribed psychotropic drugs in GAO's 2011 report. The case selections were based, in part, on potential health risk indicators, and the findings are not generalizable. GAO obtained medical and child-welfare documentation spanning children's time in foster care, and redacted personally identifiable information prior to experts' review of cases. GAO also analyzed federal guidance and selected states' policies and interviewed federal and state officials.
What GAO Found
Two experts GAO contracted with reviewed foster and medical records for 24 cases in five selected states and found varying quality in the documentation supporting the use of psychotropic medications for children in foster care. Experts examined documentation related to several categories, such as (1) screening, assessment, and treatment planning; and (2) medication monitoring.
Screening, Assessment, and Treatment Planning. Experts' evaluation of this category included whether medical pediatric exams and evidence-based therapies—which are interventions shown to produce measureable improvements—were provided as needed, according to records. Experts found in 22 of 24 cases that medical pediatric exams were mostly supported by documentation. For example, in one case with mostly supporting documentation, experts found that a child with a history of behavioral and emotional problems had records documenting a medical pediatric exam and thorough psychological assessments, with comprehensive discussions of diagnostic issues and medication rationale. With regard to evidence-based therapies, experts found that 3 of 15 children who may have benefitted from such therapies were mostly provided such services, while 11 of 15 cases were scored as partial in this category, and in 1 of 15 cases there was no documentation that evidence-based therapies were provided.
Medication Monitoring. Experts' evaluation of this category included the appropriateness of medication dosage and the rationale for concurrent use of multiple medications, according to records. Experts found appropriateness of medication dosages was mostly supported by documentation in 13 of 24 cases and partially supported in the other 11 cases. The rationale for concurrent use of multiple medications was mostly supported in 5 of the 20 cases where multiple medications were used, but 14 of 20 cases included documentation that partially supported concurrent use, and 1 case did not include documentation to support concurrent use. For example, experts found for one case that a child was prescribed four psychotropic drugs concurrently, when nonmedication interventions could have been considered. The rationale for the actions taken was partially supported by documentation.
All of the five selected states—two of which pay health care providers directly through fee-for-service, and three of which use or are transitioning to a third-party managed-care organization (MCO) for prescription-drug benefits to some extent—have policies intended to address oversight of psychotropic medications for foster children. According to state officials, all five of the states require medical examinations for children in foster care. Since GAO's 2011 report, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF) has, among other things, worked with other federal agencies to provide informational webinars and technical guidance for states to improve oversight of psychotropic medications, but this guidance does not address third-party MCOs administering medications. Officials from two of the three states relying on MCOs described limited state planning for MCOs to monitor psychotropic medications. Because there are indications MCO use is increasing, additional HHS guidance that helps states implement oversight strategies within the context of a managed-care environment could help ensure appropriate monitoring of psychotropic medications prescribed to children in foster care.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS issue guidance to states regarding oversight of psychotropic medications prescribed to children in foster care through MCOs. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-02-766 | gao_GAO-02-766_0 | Most of these allegations are classified by SSA/OIG as involving either (1) SSN misuse or (2) program fraud that may contain elements of SSN misuse. No Comprehensive Data on Enforcement Results under State Identity Theft Statutes, but Case Examples Illustrate Use of Such Laws
As with the federal Identity Theft Act, we found no centralized or comprehensive data on enforcement results under state identity theft statutes. Generally, the prevalence of identity theft and the frequently multi- or cross-jurisdictional nature of such crime underscore the importance of having means for promoting cooperation or coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Generally, task forces can have participating agencies from all levels of law enforcement—federal, state, and local—and may also have private sector representation. One of the 29 referrals involved 10 individuals with the same address. Of the two categories of allegations, however, SSA/OIG generally concentrates its investigative resources on allegations of program fraud with SSN misuse potential because the protection of Social Security trust funds is a priority. Actions taken by the Social Security Administration’s Office of the Inspector General (SSA/OIG) to resolve Social Security number (SSN) misuse and other identity theft-related allegations received during fiscal year 1999. Means Used to Promote Cooperation or Coordination among Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Agencies in Addressing Identity Theft
Our literature search and discussions with federal and state law enforcement officials indicated that three principal means are used to promote cooperation or coordination among all levels of law enforcement in addressing identity theft crimes—law enforcement task forces with multi-agency participation, the Attorney General’s Identity Theft Subcommittee, and FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network and Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse database. Appendix II: Examples of Cases Prosecuted under the Federal Identity Theft Act
This appendix summarizes selected federal cases prosecuted under the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998. § 1344 (bank fraud). Then, the perpetrators used the personal information to fraudulently obtain credit cards. | What GAO Found
Identity theft or identity fraud generally involves "stealing" another person's personal identifying information--such as Social Security Number (SSN), date of birth, and mother's maiden name--and then using the information to fraudulently establish credit, run up debt, or take away existing financial accounts. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 made identity theft a separate crime against the person whose identity was stolen, broadened the scope of the offense to include the misuse of information as well as documents and provided punishment--generally a fine or imprisonment or both. GAO found no comprehensive or centralized data on enforcement results under the federal Identity Theft Act. However, according to a Deputy Assistant Attorney General, federal prosecutors are using the 1998 federal law. As with the federal act, GAO found no centralized or comprehensive data on enforcement results under state identity theft statutes. However, officials in the 10 states selected for study provided examples of actual investigations or prosecutions under these statutes. Generally, the prevalence of identity theft and the frequently multi- or cross-jurisdictional nature of such a crime underscore the importance of promoting cooperation or coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. One of the most commonly used means of coordination, task forces, can have participating agencies from all levels of law enforcement and, in some instances, can have participants from banks and other private sector entities. Although the Social Security Administration's Office of the Inspector General fraud hotline annually receives thousands of allegations involving either (1) SSN misuse or (2) program fraud with SSN misuse potential, the agency concentrates its investigative resources on the latter category of allegations because the protection of the Social Security trust funds is a priority. |
gao_HEHS-96-141 | gao_HEHS-96-141_0 | Potential Adverse Selection Effects Will Likely Be Minor and Offset by Capitation Adjustments
Our analysis of the potential effects on the USTFs of adopting the TRICARE cost shares showed that less than 10 percent of the members will disenroll, causing less than a 2-percent increase in operating costs. It also allows for negotiated adjustments in reimbursement rates for the effects of benefit and cost-sharing revisions, which may result in adverse selection. In contrast, the USTFs estimated that the new cost shares will cause about a 40-percent USTF disenrollment rate and cost increases of about 11 percent. However, the USTFs’ estimates are overstated because of weaknesses in their survey and health claims data, and the absence of out-of-pocket cost differences among the key plans that are significant enough to cause disenrollment of more than 10 percent. This is not the case. But for the USTFs to experience the 40-percent disenrollment rate they estimated, the cost differences would have to be significantly higher than what would exist between the USTFs’ new cost shares and TRICARE Standard. This estimated increase, however, will likely have no lasting negative financial impact on USTFs because DOD’s current reimbursement approach automatically adjusts USTF payments to account for changes in members’ age and gender. = 2.38). This in their opinion will increase USTF costs. The USTF and DOD beneficiary populations are already dissimilar. The USTFs serve proportionately more retirees and their dependents. But with the new USTF cost shares, the USTF population will actually move closer to the general DOD population as the healthy retirees under age 65 seek less costly medical coverage. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the potential effects of the Department of Defense's (DOD) new health care benefit and cost-sharing package, which is part of its TRICARE managed health care program, on the Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities (USTF).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the new cost-sharing arrangement might leave USTF at risk for higher costs by causing some healthy members to disenroll, an outcome known as adverse selection; (2) adverse selection probably will not have long-term negative financial effects on USTF, because less than 10 percent of current USTF members are expected to disenroll, and USTF costs would not increase by more than 2 percent; (3) DOD capitation payments will automatically adjust for higher USTF costs caused by changes in enrollment, and USTF may negotiate payment adjustments for the effects of the benefit and cost-sharing revisions; (4) USTF estimated that cost-sharing would cause about 40 percent of their members to disenroll and increase costs by about 11 percent; (5) the USTF estimates are unreliable because of data and methodological weaknesses; (6) the USTF estimates included data for large claims which are unpredictable and dramatically affect cost estimates; (7) the difference in members' out-of-pocket costs between USTF and TRICARE Standard is not expected to be great enough to cause more than an estimated 10-percent USTF disenrollment; and (8) USTF already serve proportionally more retirees and their dependents who are under age 65 than exist in the general DOD population, but cost-sharing may reduce the proportion of younger retirees and their dependents in the USTF population. |
gao_GAO-10-128 | gao_GAO-10-128_0 | TSA developed standard operating procedures and the process for screening passengers at airport checkpoints. Operational test and evaluation verifies that new systems are operationally effective, supportable, and suitable before deployment. TSA Has Taken Actions to Prioritize Investments in Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Lacks a Risk-Based Strategy
While TSA completed a strategic plan for the PSP in August 2008 that identifies a strategy for researching, developing, and deploying checkpoint screening technologies, the plan and the strategy were not developed based upon all of the key risk management principles outlined in DHS’s NIPP. While the agency is currently reviewing a draft of the Aviation Domain Risk Assessment (ADRA), as of September 2009, the ADRA had not been finalized. TSA officials could not provide an expected completion date. TSA officials acknowledged the importance of a cost–benefit analysis and performance measures to guide technology investments, and stated that they intend to develop them, but could not identify when they would be completed. However, TSA officials stated that the NIPP was not used as guidance in developing the plan. As a result, TSA does not have assurance that its efforts are focused on the highest priority security needs, as discussed below. Ten New Checkpoint Screening Technologies Are in Various Phases of RDT&E, Procurement, and Deployment, but ETP Deployment Has Been Halted
Since TSA’s creation in 2001, 10 new checkpoint screening technologies, including the ETP, have been in various phases of RDT&E, procurement, and deployment, but TSA halted deployment of the ETP due to performance problems and high installation costs. However, TSA has not completed the deployment for all of these four technologies to airports nationwide. DHS Is Addressing Coordination and Collaboration Challenges with Stakeholders to Research, Develop, and Deploy Checkpoint Screening Technologies
DHS S&T and TSA coordinated and collaborated with each other and key stakeholders on their research, development, and deployment activities for airport checkpoint screening technologies, and DHS is taking actions to address challenges and strengthen these efforts. DHS Is Using Several Approaches to Strengthen Coordination and Collaboration with Airport Operators, Technology Vendors, and Other Federal Agencies
DHS, through S&T and TSA, coordinates with airport operators, private sector partners, such as technology vendors, and other federal agencies on matters related to research and development efforts. Without conducting a risk assessment that includes all three elements of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—and completing a cost–benefit analysis to guide the PSP strategy, TSA has limited assurance that its strategy targets the most critical risks and that it invests in the most cost-effective new technologies or other protective measures. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) take a comprehensive, risk- informed approach to the RDT&E, procurement, and deployment of airport passenger checkpoint screening technologies, and to increase the likelihood of successful procurements and deployments of such technologies, in the restricted version of this report, we recommended that the Assistant Secretary for TSA take the following eight actions: Conduct a complete risk assessment, including threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments, which would apply to the PSP. (2) What new passenger checkpoint screening technologies has the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) researched, developed, tested and evaluated, procured, and deployed since its creation, and why did TSA halt the first technology deployment that it initiated—the Explosives Trace Portal (ETP)? To determine the extent to which DHS researched, developed, tested and evaluated, procured, and deployed new checkpoint screening technologies since its creation, and to identify why TSA halted deployment of the ETP, we analyzed TSA’s strategic plan for checkpoint technologies, TSA’s Passenger Screening Program (PSP) documentation, including information on the status of technologies being researched, developed, tested and evaluated, procured, and deployed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since fiscal year 2002, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have invested over $795 million in technologies to screen passengers at airport checkpoints. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is responsible, with TSA, for researching and developing technologies, and TSA deploys them. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which (1) TSA used a risk-based strategy to prioritize technology investments; (2) DHS researched, developed, and deployed new technologies, and why deployment of the explosives trace portal (ETP) was halted; and (3) DHS coordinated research and development efforts with key stakeholders. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed DHS and TSA plans and documents, conducted site visits to research laboratories and nine airports, and interviewed agency officials, airport operators, and technology vendors.
What GAO Found
TSA completed a strategic plan to guide research, development, and deployment of passenger checkpoint screening technologies; however, the plan is not risk-based. According to TSA officials, the strategic plan and its underlying strategy for the Passenger Screening Program were developed using risk information, such as threat information. However, the strategic plan and its underlying strategy do not reflect some of the key risk management principles set forth in DHS's National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), such as conducting a risk assessment based on the three elements of risk--threat, vulnerability, and consequence--and developing a cost-benefit analysis and performance measures. TSA officials stated that, as of September 2009, a draft risk assessment for all of commercial aviation, the Aviation Domain Risk Assessment, was being reviewed internally. However, completion of this risk assessment has been repeatedly delayed, and TSA could not identify the extent to which it will address all three elements of risk. TSA officials also stated that they expect to develop a cost-benefit analysis and establish performance measures, but officials could not provide timeframes for their completion. Without adhering to all key risk management principles as required in the NIPP, TSA lacks assurance that its investments in screening technologies address the highest priority security needs at airport passenger checkpoints. Since TSA's creation, 10 passenger screening technologies have been in various phases of research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, and deployment, but TSA has not deployed any of these technologies to airports nationwide. The ETP, the first new technology deployment initiated by TSA, was halted in June 2006 because of performance problems and high installation costs. Deployment has been initiated for four technologies--the ETP in January 2006, and the advanced technology systems, a cast and prosthesis scanner, and a bottled liquids scanner in 2008. TSA's acquisition guidance and leading commercial firms recommend testing the operational effectiveness and suitability of technologies or products prior to deploying them. However, in the case of the ETP, although TSA tested earlier models, the models ultimately chosen were not operationally tested before they were deployed to ensure they demonstrated effective performance in an operational environment. Without operationally testing technologies prior to deployment, TSA does not have reasonable assurance that technologies will perform as intended. DHS coordinated with stakeholders to research, develop, and deploy checkpoint screening technologies, but coordination challenges remain. Through several mechanisms, DHS is taking steps to strengthen coordination within the department and with airport operators and technology vendors. |
gao_GAO-03-749 | gao_GAO-03-749_0 | Major Changes Occurred in the Use of the Internet and Travel Agent Compensation in the Airline Ticket Distribution Industry
Since the airlines began selling their shares in the GDSs in the mid-1990s, the ticket distribution system has undergone two major changes. These changes have helped airlines, faced with generally high operating expenses, cut distribution costs. However, these changes have not eliminated the airlines’ dependence on the GDSs for the selling of air tickets. Internet Sites That Cost Airlines Less Are Increasingly Used to Book Tickets, Some without the Use of Global Distribution Systems
Airlines have developed new Internet-based ticket booking processes that bypass GDSs and their associated booking fees. Second, five major U.S. airlines collectively underwrote the development of a travel technology company called Orbitz. Consumers also typically pay a $5-$10 fee to the new on-line sites for each ticket. In 1999, on average, each ticket booked via a traditional travel agent cost an airline a total of $45.93, compared to $23.40 and $25.12 for airline Website and on-line travel agency sites, respectively. Airlines have taken steps to encourage travelers to book tickets through less expensive, on-line distribution methods. By comparison, the percentage of tickets booked on line (using both on-line travel agencies and airlines’ own Websites) increased from 7 percent to 30 percent from 1999 to 2002. Airlines Reduced Travel Agent Payments, While GDSs’ Payments to Travel Agents Increased
Travel agent reimbursement patterns have shifted significantly since the late 1990s. Changes in the Airline Ticket Distribution Industry Appear to Have Benefited Very Large Travel Agencies and Consumers Who Use the Internet
Large travel agencies and consumers who use the Internet appear to have benefited most from recent changes in the airline ticket distribution industry. Travelers who choose not to buy airline tickets on line, or who do not have Internet access, may be at a relative price disadvantage. Sufficient Data Were Not Available to Determine the Relationship between Booking Fees and Costs and the Presence and Use of Market Power
Because we lacked access to proprietary company data on costs and revenues, we could not develop the sort of evidence that would allow us to determine whether GDSs exert market power in the airline ticket distribution industry. Computing costs and travel agent incentive payments do not encompass all airline ticket booking-related costs, and we were unable to get financial data on other costs (e.g., booking-related hardware costs) related to GDSs’ airline ticket booking function, which might have allowed us to determine a relationship between booking fees and related costs and to consider what the relationship indicated about the presence and possible exercise of market power by the GDSs. DOT provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated where applicable. We limited the scope of this review to the three global distribution systems (GDS) that handle over 90 percent of U.S. airline bookings. To determine the relationship between GDSs booking fees and booking- related costs and what it may suggest about the presence and use of market power, we analyzed GDS booking fee and cost data (e.g., computing costs and travel agent incentives). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, when major U.S. airlines posted net operating losses of almost $10 billion, they paid over $7 billion to distribute tickets to consumers. Of these total distribution expenses, airlines paid hundreds of millions of dollars in booking fees to global distribution systems--the companies who package airline flight schedule and fare information so that travel agents can query it to "book" (i.e., reserve and purchase) flights for consumers. Each time a consumer purchases an airline ticket through a travel agent, the global distribution system used by the travel agent charges the airline a set booking fee. Concerns have been raised that the global distribution systems may exercise market power over the airlines because most carriers are still largely dependent on each of the global distribution systems for distributing tickets to different travel agents and consumers and therefore must subscribe and pay fees to each. Market power would allow global distribution systems to charge high, noncompetitive fees to airlines, costs that may be passed on to consumers. GAO was asked to examine changes in the airline ticket distribution industry since the late 1990s and the effects on airlines, the impact of these changes on travel agents and consumers, and what the relationship between global distribution systems' booking fees and related costs suggest about the use of market power.
What GAO Found
Since the mid-1990s, two major changes occurred in the airline ticket distribution industry, and these have produced cost savings for some major U.S. airlines. First, airlines developed less expensive Internet ticketing sites that bypass global distribution systems and their fees and encouraged passengers to book via Internet sites. Between 1999 and 2002, on average, the percentage of tickets booked on-line, including airline-owned Websites and on-line travel agencies, grew from 7 percent to 30 percent. Second, in a related effort to trim costs, airlines cut the commissions they traditionally paid to travel agencies. However, these changes have not eliminated airline dependence on global distribution systems. These changes have had mixed effects on travel agents and consumers. Very large travel agencies (those with more than $50 million in annual air travel sales revenue) appear to have benefited from volume-based incentive payments from airlines and global distribution systems, while smaller travel agencies have closed or lost business, especially to on-line travel Websites. Consumers who use the Internet have benefited from lower internet-only fares. Travelers who do not buy airline tickets on line may be at a disadvantage in not having access to these fares. Because we lacked access to proprietary company information, we could not determine the precise relationship between global distribution system booking fees and related costs, and thus could reach no conclusions about potential exercise of market power by global distribution systems in the airline ticket distribution industry. Since 1996, booking fees and some costs related to the booking function--computing costs and travel agent incentive payments--both increased. However, we could not obtain data on all expenses related to the booking function, and thus could not accurately compare these costs to booking fees. DOT provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-1195 | gao_GAO-07-1195_0 | Legislative Benchmarks
Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met one of the eight legislative benchmarks and partially met another. In addition, the Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. The benchmark requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not been met. In addition, five other legislative benchmarks have not been met. As figure 1 shows, legislation on de-Ba’athification reform has been drafted but has yet to be enacted. The Administration’s July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some of these legislative benchmarks but provided little information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Security Benchmarks
Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met two of the nine security benchmarks. 2)
The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark of providing three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations. Measuring sectarian violence is difficult since the perpetrator’s intent is not always clearly known. Economic Benchmark
The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to allocate and spend $10 billion because it allocated $10 billion in reconstruction funds when it passed its 2007 budget in February, 2007. (See appendix XVII for further information on the economic benchmark)
Conclusions
As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military progress, homeland security, foreign policy and other goals of the United States. First, the review committee’s work is not finished. The government of Iraq has not set a date for provincial elections. Status
In July 2007, the administration reported that the government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute the Baghdad security plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. commanders without political intervention. Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 (the Act) requires GAO to submit to Congress by September 1, 2007, an independent assessment of whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the Act and the status of the achievement of the benchmarks. As part of this work, we made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, including a visit from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003. Additionally, to determine if the Iraqi government is ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected, we obtained and reviewed the Administration’s report on progress in Iraq, the Iraqi constitution, and the Council of Representatives Bylaws. Security Benchmarks
intervention; (4) ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing even- handed law enforcement; (5) eliminating safe havens; (6) reducing the level of sectarian violence and eliminating militia control of local security; (7) establishing all planned joint security stations; (8) increasing the number of security units capable of operating independently; and (9) ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces, we took a number of actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1, 2007, on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. The benchmarks stem from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report in July and September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been met. To complete our work, we reviewed government documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies; the UN; and the government of Iraq. We also made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003.
What GAO Found
The January 2007 U.S. strategy seeks to provide the Iraqi government with the time and space needed to help Iraqi society reconcile. Our analysis of the 18 legislative, security and economic benchmarks shows that as of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces. The Iraqi government has met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government also partially met one other benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a review committee has not completed work on important revisions to Iraq's constitution. Further, the government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, or militia disarmament. The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some of these benchmarks but provided little information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of local security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable of independent operations, or ensured that political authorities made no false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure the perpetrator's intent and other measures of population security show differing trends. Finally, the Iraqi government has partially met the economic benchmark of allocating and spending $10 billion on reconstruction. Preliminary data indicates that about $1.5 billion of central ministry funds had been spent, as of July 15, 2007. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States. Future administration reporting to assist the Congress would be enhanced with adoption of the recommendations we make in this report. |
gao_GAO-02-348 | gao_GAO-02-348_0 | Even Start and Head Start similarly target disadvantaged populations, seeking to improve their educational outcomes. While both programs are required to provide education and literacy services to children and their families, Head Start’s goal is to prepare children to enter school while Even Start’s goal is to improve family literacy and education. Consistent with its family literacy goal, Even Start is authorized to serve low-literate parents and their young children. Grantees in Both Programs Provided Similar Early Childhood Services to Poor Children, but Adult Services Differed
In 1999–2000, both Head Start and Even Start grantees served poor families with young children, but the parents they served had different education and literacy needs and the extent to which parents received services to meet those needs differed. Information about the Effectiveness of Head Start and Even Start Is Limited
No recent, definitive, national-level research exists about the effectiveness of Head Start and Even Start for the families and children they serve. Nevertheless, their common focus on improved educational outcomes for poor children and their families calls for coordination between the two programs. While most Head Start and Even Start grantees have reported they collaborate with one another in some way, at the program sites we visited, we found that differences in participants and service areas may mean that collaboration involves only limited opportunities for program staff to work together. Local officials said this is partly due to the location of the two sites in different neighborhoods several miles apart, differences in the ages of the children served by each program, and differences in the adult education needs of the families. Recognizing that these programs serve a similar population of children, Head Start and Even Start have jointly developed similar outcome measures for children. Recommendation
We recommend that the secretaries of HHS and of Education direct the administrators of Head Start and Even Start to coordinate the development of similar performance goals and indicators for adult education and literacy outcomes and that the effort include the identification of indicators that specifically measure adult education and literacy. We are sending copies of this report to the secretaries of Health and Human Services and the Department of Education and appropriate congressional committees. | What GAO Found
The Head Start and Even Start Family Literacy programs have sought to improve the educational and economic outcomes for millions of disadvantaged children and their families. Because the two programs seek similar outcomes for similar populations, GAO has pointed out that they need to work together to avoid inefficiencies in program administrative and service delivery. Questions have also arisen about the wisdom of having similar early childhood programs administered by different departments. Head Start's goal is to ensure that young children are ready for school, and program eligibility is tied to specific income guidelines. In contrast, Even Start's goal is to improve family literacy and the educational opportunities of both the parents and their young children. Even Start eligibility is tied to parents' educational attainment. Despite these differences, both programs are required to provide similar services. Both programs have some similar and some identical performance measures and outcome expectations for children, but not for parents. Head Start and Even Start grantees provided some similar services to young children and families, but how these programs served adults reflect the variations in the need of the parents. No recent, definitive information exists on the effectiveness of either program so it is difficult to determine which program uses the more effective model to improve educational outcomes for disadvantaged children and their parents. At the local level, differences in the needs of participants and the location of neighborhoods served by the two programs may mean some Head Start and Even Start grantees find only limited opportunities to work together. At the national level, the Departments of Health and Human Services and of Education have begun to coordinate their efforts, including the funding of state-level organizations to improve collaboration among groups serving poor children and their families. |
gao_GAO-06-549T | gao_GAO-06-549T_0 | The program is also designed to foster economic self-sufficiency by assisting older workers in transitioning to unsubsidized employment. The program is administered through grants awarded to national organizations as well as state and territorial agencies. OAA Amendments Have Had Minimal Impact on Funding Distribution between National and State Grantees
The OAA Amendments have had little effect on the distribution of funds between national and state grantees, with the national grantees continuing to receive approximately 78 percent of the funding and state grantees about 22 percent. However, the distribution of funding and positions among national grantees has changed substantially. 2002 Competition Reshuffled Funds and Positions among National Grantees
Labor’s 2002 open competition for the national grants portion of SCSEP funding increased the number of national grantees administering SCSEP and substantially reshuffled positions and funding among existing grantees. Labor Has Yet to Fully Implement an Enhanced Performance Accountability System
Labor has taken steps to establish an enhanced performance accountability system for SCSEP, but has yet to implement some features fully. While Labor has introduced the new performance measures that the OAA amendments required, program year 2005—which ends on June 30, 2006—is the first year for which grantees will be held accountable for their performance. Labor has also implemented an early version of a data collection system to capture performance information, but the final version is not yet available to grantees in its intended online format. SCSEP Eligibility and Coordination with WIA Are among the Major Challenges Grantees Face
Changes to SCSEP eligibility criteria and coordination difficulties with WIA and the one-stop system pose major challenges to SCSEP grantees in managing the program. Although the OAA Amendments did not contain provisions changing the eligibility criteria for SCSEP, Labor modified some eligibility criteria to target SCSEP’s limited funds to individuals it believes are most in need of SCSEP’s intensive services. Furthermore, the majority of the 13 national and 52 state grantees surveyed also identified coordinating with WIA providers, obtaining intensive and training services at one-stop centers, implementing Labor’s new data collection system, and meeting new performance measures as being major challenges to managing the SCSEP program. Concluding Observations
The aging of the baby boom generation presents serious challenges for the nation’s workforce investment system. Older adults often have difficulty re-entering the labor force and may rely on federal employment and training programs to help them find employment, with SCSEP being the only federal employment and training program targeted exclusively to low-income older adults. These figures were provided by the Department of Labor and are included in this testimony for contextual purposes only. Redefining Retirement: Options for Older Americans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The aging of the baby boom generation and increased life expectancy pose serious challenges for our nation. Older adults often must re-enter the workforce in order to remain self-sufficient. The Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP) is the only federal program that is specifically designed to assist low-income older adults by providing part-time community service jobs and training to prepare for employment. Since passage of the 2000 Older Americans Act Amendments (OAA), SCSEP has also increasingly focused on promoting economic self-sufficiency through placement in unsubsidized employment. In 2005, Congress appropriated about $439 million to serve about 100,000 older workers. Administered by the Department of Labor (Labor), SCSEP is implemented through 69 grantees, including 13 national organizations and 56 state and territorial agencies. The Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging asked GAO to (1) determine what effect the OAA Amendments have had on the distribution of SCSEP funds to national and state grantees, (2) describe the progress Labor has made in implementing the enhanced performance accountability system, and (3) identify the challenges faced by national and state grantees in managing the SCSEP program.
What GAO Found
The 2000 OAA Amendments have had little impact on the distribution of funds between national and state grantees, with national grantees continuing to receive approximately 78 percent of the funding and states about 22 percent. However, the distribution of funding among national grantees has changed substantially as a result of Labor's 2002 open competition for the national grants portion of SCSEP funding. Labor has taken steps to establish an enhanced performance accountability system for SCSEP, but has yet to implement some features. For example, Labor introduced the new performance measures required by the OAA Amendments, but program year 2005--which ends on June 30, 2006--is the first year that grantees will be held accountable for meeting their goals. Labor has implemented an early version of a data collection system to track grantee performance, but the final Internet-based version is not yet available. Changes to the SCSEP eligibility criteria and difficulties coordinating with the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) one-stop system have posed challenges to SCSEP grantees. Labor modified some eligibility criteria to target limited program funds to individuals it believes are most in need of SCSEP services. However, grantees expressed concern that these changes had made it more difficult for them to meet their enrollment goals. Finally, GAO found that despite provisions in the OAA Amendments to strengthen connections between SCSEP and WIA, problems persist in coordinating with WIA providers and obtaining intensive and training services for older workers at one-stop centers. |
gao_GAO-12-610 | gao_GAO-12-610_0 | HHS grants management regulations and guidance govern all HHS grants, including CARE Act grants. POs may provide the TA or assist grantees in obtaining TA from HRSA consultants. According to HRSA guidance, POs are to focus on the following priorities during the grantee site visit (listed below in order of highest to lowest priority): assure grantee compliance with CARE Act provisions and HRSA guidance by reviewing compliance with the basic funding requirements, such as the presence of an adequate plan for the use of grant funds and administrative, program, and financial requirements; assure basic functioning of the Part A and Part B programs by reviewing, for example, the grantee’s ability to disburse funds to service providers in a timely fashion and the grantee’s ability to conduct program and financial monitoring of service providers; assure access to care by reviewing the grantee’s clinical quality management processes and the grantee’s assessment of unmet need for HIV/AIDS services in their jurisdiction; assure coordinated systems of care by reviewing the grantee’s efforts to coordinate with other CARE Act programs, HIV counseling, testing and prevention programs in their area, and other programs that provide access to HIV/AIDS treatment including Medicaid and Medicare; and document and report the impact of the grantees’ use of CARE Act funds including any program innovations and/or program successes. Restrictive drawdown requires that prior to spending any grant funds, grantees must submit a request for funds for HRSA review by the 20th of each month, for the upcoming month, or no less than 10 days before the grantee intends to expend the funds. HRSA officials told us that the national monitoring standards were developed in response to two HHS Office of Inspector General reports that identified the need for a specific standard regarding the frequency and nature of grantee monitoring of service providers and a clear PO role in monitoring grantee oversight of service providers.were compiled by HRSA with assistance from a national team of financial and program experts and a working group of Part A and Part B grantees. HRSA Does Not Consistently Follow Guidance on Oversight of Grantees and Faces Other Challenges
HRSA does not consistently follow HHS or its own guidance for grantee oversight when monitoring CARE Act grantees. POs do not consistently document routine monitoring or follow up on that monitoring to help grantees address problems. However, we found that most of the PO files that we reviewed did not contain documentation of routine monitoring calls—of the 25 PO files for grantees in our sample, only 4 PO files contained documentation of monitoring calls at least quarterly in the 2010 grant files we reviewed, and only 8 contained documentation of quarterly calls in the 2011 grant files. HRSA did not follow its own policies for selecting the grantees it visited from 2008 through 2011, and varied in its timeliness for providing site visit follow-up. First, HRSA did not prioritize site visits based on the amount of time that had passed since a grantee’s last visit. Specifically, although many HRSA POs we spoke with said that site visits were a valuable and effective form of oversight, we found that 44 percent of all Part A and Part B grantees did not receive a site visit from 2008 through 2011. We found that some grantees with numerous site visits had not been placed on restrictive drawdown, while other grantees with fewer site visits had. HRSA often did not communicate or document the reasons for implementing a restrictive drawdown. According to HRSA, 6 of the 52 Part A grantees and 13 of the 59 Part B grantees were on restrictive drawdown from 2008 through 2011. HRSA also has not consistently provided grantees placed on restrictive drawdown with instructions about how to meet the conditions for drawing down funds. HRSA officials said that HRSA is revising the restrictive drawdown language to be included in the NOA to include the reasons for the restriction, needed corrective actions, and the type of documentation required for the drawdown requests to be processed, and would begin using this updated language on NOAs for grantees placed on restrictive drawdown after May 1, 2012. HRSA Recently Issued National Standards for Grantee Monitoring of Service Providers, but HRSA’s Implementation Created Challenges for Grantees
Federal regulations require grantees to oversee service providers and, in April 2011, HRSA issued the National Monitoring Standards, a compilation of requirements for grantee monitoring of service providers. HRSA also verifies this information through grantee site visits and a review of a list of service providers, which grantees are required to submit annually. The standards include 133 requirements for Part A grantees and 154 requirements for Part B grantees. Despite these concerns, several grantees told us they are taking steps to comply with the requirement. However, in visiting some grantees multiple times while not visiting others, seemingly without regard to the size of the grantee or presence of problems, HRSA demonstrated a lack of a strategic, risk- based approach for selecting grantees for site visits. HRSA has provided training to assist grantees in carrying out the standards, but grantees said that they wanted more guidance and training. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve HRSA’s oversight of Part A and Part B grantees, we recommend that the Administrator of HRSA:
Ensure that the agency is implementing the key elements of grantee oversight consistent with HHS and HRSA guidance, including routine monitoring, the provision of technical assistance, site visits, and restrictive drawdown. HHS described a wide array of TA and training services that HRSA provides to grantees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, half a million people affected by human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) receive services funded by CARE Act grants. HRSA, an agency within HHS, awards CARE Act Part A grants to localities and Part B grants to states and territories. These grantees may provide services themselves or may contract with service providers. HRSA POs monitor grantees, but grantees are to monitor their service providers. PO oversight includes routine monitoring, site visits, and monitoring of special award conditions, such as restrictive drawdown. GAO was asked to 1) evaluate HRSAs oversight of CARE Act grantees and 2) examine steps HRSA has taken to assist CARE Act grantees in monitoring their service providers. GAO conducted a review of grantee files from 2010 and 2011 for 25 selected Part A and B grantees, reviewed HHS and HRSA policies, interviewed HRSA officials, analyzed HRSA data on site visits and interviewed grant officials from GAOs 25 selected grantees and 6 selected service providers.
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) does not consistently follow HHS regulations and guidance in its oversight of Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990 (CARE Act) grantees when conducting key elements of grantee oversight, including routine monitoring and implementing restrictive drawdowns. Additionally, HRSA did not demonstrate a risk-based strategy for selecting grantees for site visits. Project officers (POs) do not consistently document routine monitoring or follow up on that monitoring to help grantees address problems, as required by HHS and HRSA guidance. The purpose of routine monitoring is to enable POs to answer grantee questions about program requirements, provide technical assistance (TA), and follow up on grantee corrective actions in response to previously provided TA. However, GAO found that most POs did not document routine monitoring calls with granteesonly 4 of the 25 PO files GAO reviewed from 2010 and 8 of the 25 files GAO reviewed from 2011 contained documentation of monitoring calls at least quarterly. HRSA often did not follow HHS regulations and guidance in implementing restrictive drawdowns, a special award condition HRSA can place on grantees with serious problems. Restrictive drawdown requires that prior to spending any grant funds, grantees must submit a request, along with documentation of the need, for funds for HRSA review. Six of the 52 Part A grantees and 13 of the 59 Part B grantees were placed on restrictive drawdown from 2008 through 2011. GAO found that HRSA did not consistently provide grantees in GAOs sample that were on restrictive drawdown with the reasons the restrictive drawdown was implemented, instructions for meeting the conditions of the restrictive drawdown, or guidance on the types of corrective actions needed. This has limited the effectiveness of restrictive drawdown as a tool for improving grantee performance. Regarding the oversight of grantees through site visits, HRSA did not demonstrate a clear strategy for selecting the grantees it visited from 2008 through 2011. For example, HRSA did not appear to prioritize site visits to grantees based on the amount of time that had passed since a grantees last site visit. Although many HRSA POs GAO spoke with said that site visits were a valuable and effective form of oversight, GAO found that 44 percent of all grantees did not receive a site visit from 2008 through 2011 while others received multiple visits.
Grantees are required to oversee the service providers with whom they contract and in April 2011, HRSA issued the National Monitoring Standards for grantee monitoring of service providers. The standards describe program and financial requirements and include 133 requirements for Part A grantees and 154 requirements for Part B grantees. Though the standards were intended to improve grantee monitoring of service providers, some grantees said that a lack of training and TA has hindered its implementation. Additionally, some grantees have found the requirement for annual site visits of service providers to be challenging. HRSA officials said that they believe they provided adequate training to grantees in implementing the standards, which did not represent new requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making several recommendations, including that HRSA implement key elements of grantee oversight consistent with guidance, including restrictive drawdowns; develop a strategic approach for selecting grantees for site visits; and work to identify grantees training needs in order to comply with the National Monitoring Standards. HHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-147 | gao_GAO-17-147_0 | 1). 2). In-the-Wet versus In-the- Dry Construction Methods
The Olmsted dam is being constructed using a construction method called in-the-wet, in which concrete sections of the dam, known as shells, are built on shore and then carried out into the river and set in place in the riverbed. This method differs from traditional in-the-dry construction, which uses cofferdams to drain the riverbed to allow work, such as building the Olmsted locks. Potential costs include the outlays made to construct the project (e.g., for labor and materials) and interest during construction, which represents the hypothetical return or “benefit” that could have been earned by investing the money in some other use. The Corps later updated its estimates in 1990 (Benefit Update) and in 2012 (PACR). The Corps and Consultant Reports Identified the Construction Method, Contract Type, and Other Factors as Primary Contributors to Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
Reports by the Corps and others identified the in-the-wet construction method, the contract type, and other factors as primary contributors to cost increases and schedule delays in the Olmsted project, most of which were associated with constructing the dam. The reports by the Corps and others also identified other key factors that contributed to cost increases and schedule delays, including limited funding, changes in market conditions, and design changes. Selection of the In-the-Wet Method and Accompanying Construction Challenges Identified as Contributing to Project Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
The Corps’ 1997 decision to construct the Olmsted dam using the in-the- wet method was based on projections that this method would cost less and would allow the project to be completed more rapidly than the traditional in-the-dry method. Corps’ Decision to Use a Cost-Reimbursement Contract Seen as a Source of Increasing Management Costs
The Corps’ decision to use a cost-reimbursement contract for the dam construction after not receiving offers for a firm fixed-price contract contributed to increased administrative and overhead costs, according to the PACR and the 2008 consultant report. The PACR and the 2008 consultant report noted that the effort to manage a cost-reimbursement contract is more cost- and time-intensive than managing a firm fixed-price contract. Total Cost of Benefits Foregone from Project Delays at Olmsted Is Uncertain
The total cost of benefits foregone from project delays that have occurred at Olmsted is uncertain, primarily because the estimates that the Corps developed for the project are no longer relevant or are of limited use for estimating the benefits that might have been generated had the project become operational as planned in 2006. The Corps analyzed the benefits and costs associated with the project several times, including in a 1990 study. Corps officials said, however, that this estimate is no longer relevant for estimating the benefits foregone from past project delays. In particular, as noted in the PACR, the 1990 study did not anticipate the regulatory and market factors that reduced the demand for coal and coal shipments on the Ohio River, beginning in the 1990s. In 2012, the Corps updated its analysis of the benefits and costs associated with the Olmsted project, based on a revised operational date of 2020. Third, the benefit estimates, which are based on forecasts of barge shipments through the locks beginning in 2020, may not represent the actual traffic that transited the locks and dams in the past. Another Type of Benefit Foregone—Additional Interest Incurred during Construction—Depends on Factors Such as the Project Discount Rate
According to Corps economists, another type of benefit foregone is the additional interest during construction incurred as a result of project delays. We found the difference in interest to be about $400 million, which represents the additional interest associated with factors such as changes in the project design, spending levels, and market conditions that led to the construction delays and increased construction costs. 1985: Lower Ohio River Navigation Feasibility Report The Louisville District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) completed the Lower Ohio River Navigation Feasibility Report. The report recommended replacing Locks and Dams 52 and 53 with a single project consisting of a new set of locks and a new dam. 1988: Water Resources Development Act of 1988 The Water Resources Development Act of 1988 authorized construction of the Olmsted project at a cost of $775 million based on the Chief of Engineers Report, with the costs of construction shared equally between funds appropriated to the Corps and from the Inland Waterways Trust Fund. At the time of authorization, the Corps estimated that construction would take 7 years. The study estimated that continuing to use in-the-wet construction would cost more, but would allow the project to be completed sooner. For this reason, the Corps decided to complete the dam using the in-the-wet method. 2012: Post-authorization change report Because the project would exceed its maximum authorized cost, the Corps submitted a post-authorization change report to Congress in 2012, seeking an increase in the Olmsted project’s authorized cost to $2.918 billion, with an estimated completion date of 2024. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Corps is responsible for planning and constructing the Olmsted Locks and Dam project on the Ohio River, 17 miles upstream from the Mississippi River. The project will replace two locks and dams, which are beyond their design lives, with new locks and a new dam. According to the Corps, more tonnage passes through Olmsted annually than any other place in the nation's inland navigation system. The Water Resources Development Act of 1988 authorized the Olmsted project at a cost of $775 million. The Corps estimated construction would take 7 years. In 2012, the Corps submitted a PACR to Congress, seeking to increase the Olmsted project's authorized cost to $2.918 billion, with an estimated completion date of 2024.
The Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 included a provision for GAO to report on why the Olmsted project exceeded its budget and was not completed as scheduled, among other things. This report examines (1) the factors that the Corps and others have identified as contributing to cost increases and schedule delays and (2) what is known about the costs of benefits foregone because of project delays. GAO compared the factors cited in the PACR and three relevant Corps and consultant reports, examined the Corps' economic analyses and developed an estimate of construction interest incurred because of project delays, and interviewed Corps officials and industry representatives.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Defense had no comments to add to the report.
What GAO Found
Reports by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and consultants it hired identified the construction method, contract type, and other factors as primary contributors to cost increases and schedule delays in the Olmsted Locks and Dam project. Specifically, the 2012 Corps' post-authorization change report (PACR) and a 2012 consultant report identified the Corps' 1997 selection of an innovative in-the-wet method to construct the dam as a contributing factor. With this method, concrete sections of the dam, or shells, are built on shore, carried out into the river, and set in place in the riverbed. The Corps decided to use this method based on projections that it would cost less and allow the project to be completed sooner than the traditional in-the-dry method using temporary, watertight structures, or cofferdams, to drain the riverbed to allow work. However, the Corps' initial cost estimate was low and did not adequately consider such things as river conditions that slowed construction. A 2012 Corps study compared the in-the-wet and in-the-dry methods and found that continuing to use the in-the-wet method would cost more but would allow the project to be completed sooner. Based on this study, the Corps continued to use the in-the-wet method. In addition, the PACR and a 2008 consultant report found that the Corps' decision to use a cost-reimbursement contract for the dam construction after receiving no offers for a firm fixed -price contract contributed to increased administrative and overhead costs. The reports noted that managing a cost-reimbursement contract was more cost- and time-intensive than managing a firm fixed-price contract, which the Corps typically uses. The Corps and consultant reports also identified other contributing factors, including limited funding; market condition changes, such as unexpected and significant increases in the price of construction materials; and design changes during the dam construction in response to soil conditions and other issues.
The benefits foregone because of delays at Olmsted are uncertain, primarily because the Corps' estimates for the project are no longer relevant or are of limited use for estimating the benefits that might have been generated had the project opened as planned in 2006. The Corps estimated the benefits associated with the project several times, including in a 1990 study. Corps officials said, however, that the benefit estimates from this study are no longer relevant for estimating benefits foregone because of past project delays. In particular, the 1990 study did not anticipate the regulatory and market factors that reduced the demand for coal shipments on the Ohio River, beginning in the 1990s. In the 2012 PACR, the Corps updated its benefit estimates based on a revised opening date of 2020, but they are of limited use for estimating benefits foregone for several reasons. For example, the analysis was based on assumptions about barge forecasts that may not represent the actual traffic that transited the locks and dams during past delays. According to Corps economists, the additional interest incurred during construction because of project delays is another type of benefit foregone because it represents the hypothetical return or “benefit” that could have been earned by investing the money in some other use. GAO found that the difference in interest estimated in 1990 and in the PACR to be about $400 million, which represents an estimate of the additional interest associated with such factors as changes in the project design that led to the construction delays and increased construction costs. |
gao_RCED-98-216 | gao_RCED-98-216_0 | Background
The Title I property improvement program was established by the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. Information Needed to Manage the Program Is Not Collected by HUD
HUD is not collecting the information needed to manage the Title I program. Specifically, we found that HUD (1) collects little information when loans are made on the borrowers, properties, and loan terms; (2) does not always have accurate data on the types of loans for which claims are submitted; and (3) does not maintain information on why it denies loan claims or why it subsequently approves some of them for payment. Additional information that HUD collects on other single-family home loan insurance programs, such as the borrowers’ addresses, Social Security numbers, income, and debt, is not collected by HUD when Title I loans are made. However, the on-site monitoring reviews HUD conducted of lenders’ compliance with the program’s regulations have declined significantly over the last 3 years. HUD can deny a lender’s claim if the lender has not followed HUD’s underwriting standards in making the loan. Each of these options would increase the amount of risk lenders are exposed to and provide greater incentives for them to do a better job in the underwriting and servicing of Title I loans. HUD Is Changing the Title I Program
Under HUD’s 2020 Management Reform Plan and related efforts, the agency has been making changes to the Title I program’s operations. Conclusions
Weaknesses exist in HUD’s management of its Title I property improvement loan insurance program and in its oversight of the program’s lenders. Improve the Title I claims examination process by ensuring that (1) the documents included in the claim files clearly explain why a claim that was originally denied was subsequently paid and which program official authorized payment; (2) all documents required by the program’s guidelines and regulations, including the original loan application, inspection report, and completion certificate, are contained in the claim application package before a claim is paid; (3) the number of claims subject to an underwriting review is increased by extending the length of time after origination during which loan defaults are subjected to review, with notification of this change sent to lenders in writing; and (4) procedures are developed to routinely provide the Quality Assurance Division with the information collected during the claims examination process that is needed to monitor and target lenders for review. To determine whether options and information presented by Price Waterhouse in its HUD-commissioned study of the Title I program could provide lenders with greater incentives to improve loan underwriting and servicing, we reviewed Price Waterhouse’s report of August 1997 and the program’s regulations that influence loan risk. Our information on the efforts HUD plans or has under way to strengthen the program’s management and oversight was obtained through interviews with HUD officials in charge of the Title I program, reviewing HUD’s 2020 Management Reform Plan, and reviewing Price Waterhouse’s August 1997 report on the program. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) administration of the National Housing Act Title I program, focusing on: (1) the extent to which the information needed to manage the program was available to HUD; (2) the extent to which HUD was overseeing the program's lenders; (3) whether options and information presented by Price Waterhouse in its HUD-commissioned study of the Title I program could provide lenders with greater incentives to improve loan underwriting and servicing; and (4) whether HUD has any efforts planned or under way to strengthen its management and oversight.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HUD is not collecting the information needed for managing the Title I property improvement loan program; (2) specifically, GAO found that when loans are made, HUD collects little information on the borrowers, the properties, or the loan terms, such as the borrowers' income and the addresses of the properties being improved; (3) moreover, HUD does not maintain information on why it denies loan claims or why it subsequently approves some of those claims for payment; (4) HUD provides limited oversight of lenders' compliance with the program's regulations; (5) it conducted four on-site quality assurance reviews of lenders in fiscal year 1997 of the approximately 3,700 lenders participating in the program; (6) regarding the need for oversight of lenders' compliance, GAO found that loan claim files submitted by lenders to HUD following loan defaults often do not contain required loan documents; (7) in addition, some claims are paid by HUD even though there are indications that the lenders did not comply with the required underwriting standards when insuring the loans; (8) in August 1997, Price Waterhouse in its HUD-commissioned review of the Title I program reported, among other things, on options and provided information on how to restructure the program; (9) these options could provide greater incentives for lenders to improve the making and servicing of the program's loans; (10) under HUD's 2020 Management Reform Plan and related efforts, the agency is making significant changes in all of its single-family housing programs, including the Title I program; (11) these changes are motivated in part by HUD's goals to downsize the agency and to address long-standing agencywide management weaknesses; (12) the changes being made that affect the Title I home improvement insurance program include: (a) streamlining and automating the program's claims examination process; and (b) consolidating the agency's efforts to monitor lenders into four locations; and (13) however, it is uncertain whether these changes will affect the weaknesses GAO identified in the oversight of the Title I program. |
gao_GAO-07-386T | gao_GAO-07-386T_0 | DHS’s Use of a Risk Management Approach to Guide Investments through the Homeland Security Grant Allocation Process Is Evolving
DHS Uses a Risk-Based Approach in Distributing Urban Area Security Initiative Grants
Today, we issued a report on DHS’s use of risk management in distributing the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants. For fiscal years 2006 and 2007, DHS has used risk assessments to identify urban areas that faced the greatest potential risk, and were therefore eligible to apply for the UASI grant, and based the amount of awards to all eligible areas primarily on the outcomes of the risk assessment and a new effectiveness assessment. 2.) For the 2007 grant cycle, DHS no longer estimated asset-based and geographic risk separately, considered most areas of the country equally vulnerable to a terrorist attack, given freedom of movement within the nation, and focused on the seriousness of the consequences of a successful terrorist attack. We will initiate work later this year to assess the steps TSA has taken to better prioritize its homeland security investments in this area. While TSA has begun to establish a methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize the risks identified, the agency has not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of the U.S. passenger rail system. DHS’s Progress in Using a Risk Management Approach in Making Port Security Investments Can Be Linked to Each of Three Component’s Organizational Maturity and Task Complexity
In December 2005, we reported that three DHS components responsible for port security or infrastructure protection varied considerably in their progress in developing a sound risk management framework for homeland security. Our work reviewed the risk management approaches used by three DHS components prior to DHS’s Second Stage Review and departmental reorganization: the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for the security of the nation’s ports; Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), the former DHS component responsible for administering federal homeland security assistance programs for states and localities, including the port security grant program, and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), the former DHS component responsible for, among other things, identifying and assessing current and future threats to the homeland, mapping those threats against known vulnerabilities, and offering advice on preventive and protective action. Finally, with regard to the scope of its risk management activities, the Coast Guard’s work is specific to port locations, where it has direct and primary responsibility for carrying out security responsibilities. DHS Use of Risk Management in Making Investments in Other Mission Areas Varies by Degree and Application
We have assessed DHS’s risk management efforts across a number of other mission areas in the 4 years since the department was established-- including border security, immigration enforcement, immigration services, critical infrastructure protection, and science and technology—and found varying degrees of consideration and application of risk management principles in DHS’s investments in homeland security. DHS Has Not Provided Guidance for a Coordinated Risk Management Approach and More Work Remains to be done in Carrying Out Such an Approach
DHS Has Identified the Need for a Risk-based Approach, but Efforts to Develop Guidance to Coordinate Such an Approach Have Been Hampered by Organizational Restructuring
The need for and difficulties associated with creating a coordinated, coherent risk management approach to the nation’s homeland security have been widely acknowledged since the events of September 11, 2001, and the creation of DHS. Coordinating efforts across the federal government. It has taken further steps by incorporating risk management principles to at least some degree into making homeland security grant allocations, funding transportation and port security enhancements, and targeting federal funding across other DHS mission areas. Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS Allocate Resources to Highest Priorities. Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize Resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the federal government has provided DHS with more than $130 billion in budget authority to make investments in homeland security. However, as GAO has reported, this federal financial assistance has not been guided by a clear risk-based strategic plan that fully applies risk management principles. This testimony discusses the extent to which DHS has taken steps to apply risk management principles to target federal funding for homeland security investments (1) in making grant allocations, (2) in funding transportation and port security enhancements, (3) in other DHS mission areas, and (4) at a strategic level across DHS. This testimony summarizes previous GAO work in these areas.
What GAO Found
Risk management, a strategy for helping policymakers make decisions about assessing risk, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty, has been endorsed by Congress, the President, and the Secretary of DHS as a way to strengthen the nation against possible terrorist attacks. DHS has used risk management principles to invest millions of dollars at the state and local level as part of its Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants. For fiscal year 2006, DHS adopted a risk management approach to determine which UASI areas were eligible for funding. For the fiscal year 2007 grant process, DHS made substantial changes to its 2006 risk assessment model, simplifying its structure, reducing the number of variables considered, and incorporating the intelligence community's assessment of threats in candidate urban areas. The fiscal year 2007 model considers most areas of the country equally vulnerable to attack; its analysis focuses on the expected impact and consequences of successful attacks occurring in specific areas. DHS and the components of DHS responsible for transportation and port security have taken steps to apply risk management principles with varying degrees of progress. The Transportation Security Administration has not completed a methodology for assessing risk, and until the overall risk to the entire transportation sector is identified, it will be difficult to determine where and how to target limited resources to achieve the greatest security gains. The progress of each of DHS's three components responsible for port security varies according to organizational maturity and the complexity of its risk management task. The Coast Guard, created in 1915, was the most advanced in implementing a risk-based approach. Meanwhile, the Office for Domestic Preparedness (responsible for grants) and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (responsible for all sectors of the nation's critical infrastructure) were brought to or established with DHS in 2003 and lagged behind the Coast Guard in applying risk management to port security. Other DHS mission areas GAO has assessed include border security, immigration enforcement, immigration services, critical infrastructure protection, and science and technology; the extent to which a risk management approach has been implemented in each area varies. While DHS has called for using risk-based approaches to prioritize its resource investments, and for developing plans and allocating resources in a way that balances security and freedom, DHS has not comprehensively implemented a risk management approach--a difficult task. However, adoption of a comprehensive risk management framework is essential for DHS to assess risk by determining which elements of risk should be addressed in what ways within available resources. |
gao_GAO-02-796 | gao_GAO-02-796_0 | These codes then assist members of the health care industry in identifying health-related services on medical claims for payment and analyzing service utilization, outcomes, and cost. 3 and CPT Were Practical Options for Standard Code Sets, Despite Some Limitations
Both ICD-9-CM Vol. 3 and CPT meet almost all of the criteria for standard code sets recommended by HHS’s HIPAA implementation teams. In addition, these codes sets each meet a criterion for procedural code sets recommended by NCVHS. 1). For example, the ICD-9-CM Vol. 3 and CPT have been supported by most representatives of the health care industry as acceptable options for HIPAA standard code sets given the practical considerations, since 1993 NCVHS and other representatives of the health care industry have argued that a single procedural code set for reporting inpatient hospital procedures, physician services, and other medical services including outpatient hospital procedures would streamline data reporting and facilitate research across providers and sites of service. In addition, these procedural code sets meet almost all of the criteria recommended for HIPAA standard code sets—that they improve the efficiency and meet the needs of the health care industry, are recognized by the public and private organizations that will maintain the code sets, have low additional costs and administrative burdens associated with their implementation, are independent of computer programs, and are consistent with other HIPAA standard code sets. Appendix I: Code Set Standards for Health- Related Services Adopted under HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accessibility Act of 1996 (HIPAA) required the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to adopt standard code sets for describing health-related services in connection with transactions such as filing claims for payment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Consistently classifying, defining, and distinguishing among the range of medical services provided today--from diagnoses to treatments--is critical for reimbursing providers and analyzing health care utilization, outcomes, and cost. Codes serve this role by assigning each distinct service a unique identifier. Health care providers, such as hospitals and physicians, report medical conditions and the health-related services they have provided to patients on medical records. In August 2000, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) adopted two standard code sets for reporting medical procedures: (1) the International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification, Volume 3 (ICD-9-CM Vol. 3); and (2) the Current Procedural Terminology (CPT). Despite HIPAA's goals for administrative simplification, many representatives of the health care industry have expressed concern that the individual limitations of these code sets result in inefficiencies in record keeping and data reporting.
What GAO Found
GAO found that, given the 18-month time frame allotted to HHS under HIPAA for adopting standard code sets, ICD-9-CM Vol. 3 and CPT were practical options for HIPAA standard code sets despite some limitations. Both code sets meet almost all of the criteria for standard code sets recommended by HHS's HIPAA implementation teams. For example, they improve the efficiency and meet the needs of the health care industry, have low additional costs and administrative burdens associated with their implementation, and are consistent with other HIPAA standards. In addition, each of these codes sets meets a criterion for procedural code sets recommended by the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics. |
gao_GAO-14-101 | gao_GAO-14-101_0 | Individual Agencies Are Responsible for Developing and Maintaining OEPs, and the Majority of Selected Facilities’ OEPs Generally Reflect Federal Guidance
The federal agencies that occupy federal facilities are responsible for preparing and maintaining OEPs; ISC, GSA, and FPS provide guidance or assistance to the agencies in developing OEPs, and FPS can periodically review OEPs. Agencies Are Responsible for OEPs with Assistance from ISC, GSA, and FPS
Ensuring that each of the approximately 9,600 GSA-owned and -leased facilities protected by FPS has emergency plans to safely evacuate occupants is a complex undertaking. According to federal regulations, designated officials are responsible for developing, In the event of implementing, and maintaining the OEP for the facility.an emergency, the designated official is expected to initiate appropriate action according to the OEP, including the evacuation and relocation of facility occupants. GSA also plays a role in coordinating directly with facilities to provide guidance on OEPs and participates in emergency planning efforts. FPS is responsible for assisting federal agencies with guidance, training, exercises, and drills, and also conducts periodic facility security assessments that include checking OEPs. Of the 20 facilities we visited, officials at 14 reported using FPS guidance or feedback on their OEPs, for example, using the FPS template as a base for their OEPs and officials at 5 facilities reported using their own agency guidance for OEP development. Officials at 1 facility reported not using FPS or other agency guidance for OEP development. According to FPS officials, recommendations about OEPs and evacuation processes, such as suggestions to change assembly points in the event of an evacuation, may be made during facility security assessments. The Majority of Selected Facilities’ OEPs Generally Reflect Federal Guidance
All 20 facilities we visited had written OEPs, as required by regulation, which included evacuation procedures. We analyzed the extent to which the selected facilities’ OEPs incorporated elements that should be in an OEP according to the ISC 2010 standard, which outlines 10 minimum elements: 1. purpose and circumstances for activation, 2. command officials and supporting personnel contact information, 3. occupant life safety options (e.g., evacuation, shelter-in-place), 4. local law enforcement and first responder response, 5. special needs individuals (e.g., those with disabilities, or who are 7. special facilities (e.g., child care centers), 8. assembly and accountability, 9. security during and after incident, and 10. training and exercises. Seven of the facilities did not address at least one OEP element in the ISC 2010 standard in their OEPs or other documents. That an element was not in the plan or in related documents for 7 facilities does not necessarily indicate potential vulnerabilities for these facilities because other procedures or facility services may address the intent of the OEP element. As another example, at 2 facilities where training or exercises were not included in the OEPs, officials at both facilities (which were housed in leased GSA space) said that building management conducts drills and that they participate. We did observe some commonality in the 20 facility OEPs we reviewed, based on facility characteristics such as security level, whether the facility was GSA owned or leased, and occupant characteristics, as shown in table 1. A Majority of Officials in Our Review Reported Responding to Challenges Identified during Their Facility Drills and Evacuations
Officials at 14 of 20 facilities in our review identified challenges, and all but one reported responding to challenges they encountered in developing and implementing emergency evacuation procedures. Officials at 6 facilities said that they did not identify any challenges. These officials said that they have since researched proper earthquake procedures, and have revised or are in the process of revising their OEPs accordingly. Officials at all but 1 facility provided additional detail regarding actions they are taking to mitigate facility evacuation challenges. Officials at 10 of the 20 selected facilities cited apathy as a challenge they encountered, such as employees not participating in or responding quickly to drills; not wanting to stop working or leave the building; not reporting to the assembly area (e.g., going for a coffee break during an evacuation drill); and not volunteering for emergency team responsibilities, such as becoming a floor warden. Keeping emergency contact information updated. To address this challenge, officials at 6 facilities said they review and update contact information at various points, such as when staff leave; before drills; or on a daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly basis at different facilities. Emerging threats. DHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Department of Homeland Security, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, selected congressional committees, and other interested parties. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
1. who is responsible for ensuring that federal facilities have occupant emergency plans (OEP) in place and the extent to which selected facilities’ OEPs reflect federal guidance and 2. evacuation challenges, if any, that selected facilities experienced and what actions, if any, they reported taking to address these issues. We interviewed relevant senior agency officials regarding their agencies’ role in ensuring federal facilities have OEPs in place, including ISC officials in Washington, D.C.; officials from FPS and GSA in their headquarters; and FPS and GSA officials in the three field locations where we conducted site visits to selected federal facilities, as described below. While the findings from our 20 case studies are not generalizable to all GSA-owned and -leased facilities, they provide specific examples of how selected facilities have addressed emergency plan requirements and provide insights from a range of federal facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent emergencies, such as earthquakes in the nation's capital, have raised concerns about how prepared federal agencies are in the 9,600 facilities owned or leased by GSA and protected by the Department of Homeland Security's FPS to safely evacuate occupants in federal buildings. All federal agencies are required to prepare OEPs for their facilities, which describe actions agencies should take to plan for a safe evacuation during an emergency.
GAO was asked to provide information on how prepared GSA-owned and -leased facilities are to evacuate occupants during an emergency. This report describes (1) who is responsible for ensuring that federal facilities have OEPs in place and the extent to which selected facilities' OEPs reflect federal guidance, and (2) the evacuation challenges, if any, selected facilities experienced and what actions, if any, they reported taking to address these issues.
GAO reviewed federal regulations and guidance on OEPs, including documents from ISC, GSA, and FPS, which develop governmentwide physical security standards and policies, such as minimum elements for OEPs. GAO also reviewed OEPs and interviewed facility officials at 20 GSA-owned and -leased facilities, selected based on geographic dispersion, recent evacuations, and facility security level. While not generalizable to all GSA-owned and -leased facilities the results provided perspectives of varying facilities.
DHS written and technical comments were incorporated, as appropriate. GSA did not have any comments.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies occupying facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA) are responsible for preparing and maintaining occupant emergency plans (OEP), with assistance or guidance from the Federal Protective Service (FPS) and others, and the majority of selected federal facilities' OEPs GAO reviewed reflect federal guidance. As required by federal regulations, all 20 selected facilities had OEPs and had designated officials, who are responsible for maintaining OEPs and initiating action according to the OEP in the event of an emergency, including the evacuation of facility occupants. Consistent with federal guidance, officials at 19 of the 20 selected facilities reported that they review and update OEPs at least annually, and officials at 1 facility said they were in the process of updating their OEP. When requested, FPS provides OEP guidance, such as templates to facility officials. Officials at 14 facilities reported using FPS guidance or feedback for their OEPs, officials at 1 facility reported not using FPS guidance, and officials at 5 facilities said they used their own agency's guidance. FPS also checks OEPs during periodic facility security assessments--conducted at least every 3 to 5 years-- to assess overall facility risk. GSA officials said they have a role in coordinating directly with facilities to provide guidance and feedback on OEPs, and to help facility officials plan drills and exercises. To assist agency officials as they develop OEPs that best fit individual facilities and agency needs, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC), a Department of Homeland Security-chaired policy development organization, in April 2010 identified 10 minimum elements, such as exercises or evacuating occupants with special needs, that should be addressed in an OEP. Thirteen of the 20 selected facilities addressed all 10 minimum elements in OEPs or related documents. Seven facilities' OEPs did not address at least 1 of the 10 elements; however, lack of an element does not necessarily indicate potential vulnerabilities for that facility because the intent of the element may be addressed by other procedures or modified based on facility characteristics. For example, evacuation exercises were not included in OEPs for 2 facilities located in leased GSA space; however, officials said they participate in drills conducted by building management. The 20 selected facility OEPs were unique to each facility and how OEPs addressed particular elements.
Officials at 14 of 20 facilities identified evacuation challenges. The most frequently cited challenges included employee apathy toward participating in drills, accounting for employees, and keeping contact information updated. Officials at all but one facility, which was updating its OEP, reported various ways they addressed evacuation challenges, including using technology such as entry scan systems and radios to track and communicate with employees and making evacuation training more interesting to employees. Other incidents and emerging threats also prompted officials to change OEPs or evacuation training. For example, during the 2011 Washington, D.C., earthquake, officials at selected facilities in the D.C. area said that the lack of employee training on earthquake procedures may have exposed employees to potential hazards when they self-evacuated. Officials reported revising their OEPs to include procedures for earthquakes. Recent shootings also prompted facility officials to revise their OEPs and participate in FPS awareness training on active shooter incidents. Officials at 6 facilities did not report challenges. |
gao_GAO-15-744 | gao_GAO-15-744_0 | Background
The mission of IRS’s collection program, as set forth in the fiscal year 2015 collection program letter, is “to collect delinquent taxes and secure delinquent tax returns through the fair and equitable application of the tax laws, including the use of enforcement tools when appropriate, provide education to customers to enable future compliance, and thereby protect and promote public confidence in the American tax system.”
IRS collects unpaid tax debts through a complex, three-phase process: (1) a notice phase, (2) a telephone phase (ACS), and (3) an in-person phase (Field collection). ACS Managers Aim to Balance Workload to Achieve Case Closure and Taxpayer Service Measures
Although the ACS prioritization process is largely automated, IRS managers responsible for case prioritization and selection have some discretion in choosing the number and type of cases worked to ensure that ACS meets two key performance measures: (1) the number of balance due and nonfiler case closures and (2) the level of service, which measures the quality of collection representatives’ interactions with taxpayers who call into ACS. Priority Cases Accounted For Half of Case Closures in Fiscal Year 2014, and IRS Performed Better at Closing Priority Individual Cases Than Priority Business Cases
In fiscal year 2014, almost half of the 3.5 million cases closed or transferred out of ACS were high-priority cases, such as high-income nonfiler and trust fund cases. IRS collected almost $6.2 billion in delinquent revenue for the federal government from those cases closed in fiscal year 2014. The Collection Program and ACS Lack Clearly Documented Objectives, and the Key Term of Fairness Is Undefined
According to internal control standards, having clearly documented and communicated program objectives is a precondition of any further internal control activity, such as risk assessment, and is key to helping entities meet their mission, objectives, and goals. IRS officials responsible for the collection program and ACS were unable to produce documentation regarding collection program or ACS objectives. However, the term “fairness” was not defined or operationalized in any ACS or collection program documents as it relates to case selection. First, without clearly formulated and communicated program objectives, IRS cannot know how well ACS contributes to the collection program mission and is not able to effectively assess the risks ACS may face or its overall effectiveness. Ensuring that the multistep ACS prioritization and selection process is documented will allow IRS to communicate the concept of fairness consistently and reduce the risk that the case selection and prioritization process is perceived as unfair. IRS has established a management infrastructure for both assessing risk and monitoring performance. IRS officials acknowledged that they have little formal documentation along these lines to comprehensively describe the ACS process. Without adequate documentation, it is also difficult to determine whether the ACS case prioritization and selection process effectively supports collection program and ACS missions and objectives. In addition, if the prioritization and selection process is not periodically evaluated over time, it could lose its value and usefulness. Conclusions
ACS is one of IRS’s primary enforcement tools for compelling noncompliant taxpayers to file their tax returns and pay their taxes. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure the IRS collection program meets its mission and selects cases fairly, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following four actions related to ACS: 1. Establish, document, and implement procedures to complete periodic evaluations of the ACS case prioritization and selection process and structure. However, IRS did not believe that the level of current documentation has undercut the effectiveness of ACS. In response to our recommendation to establish, document, and implement objectives for the collection program and ACS, IRS said it will review its current objectives for both, which it identifies as the collection program priorities, to identify and implement any additional objectives. IRS also noted that any evaluation of the ACS case prioritization and selection process completed will be based on a risk assessment at that time. Given that components of the ACS case prioritization and selection process have been in place since at least 2000 without being evaluated, ACS may be missing opportunities to better prioritize its workload and improve collection results through periodic evaluations, and ensuring follow up for ad hoc evaluations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the Automated Collection System (ACS) process to prioritize and select collection cases and the results of that process for fiscal year 2014, and (2) determine how well the ACS case prioritization and selection process supports the collection program mission and objectives. To determine IRS’s definition of fairness as it applies to collection activities, we reviewed the ACS procedures and process for case prioritization and selection. We also interviewed relevant IRS officials concerning their understanding of the mission, objectives, and internal controls of the collection program and ACS, and about the extent to which procedures exist to monitor ACS case prioritization and selection. Depending on the function unit, ACS may take a number of actions, such as searching for contact information and a levy source, contacting taxpayers, or issuing levies or liens as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS's ACS is one of the primary means for pursuing taxpayers who failed to fully pay their taxes or file their tax return in a timely manner. From fiscal years 2012 through 2014, ACS staff has declined 20 percent while the number of unresolved collection cases at year-end has increased 21 percent. Given these trends, IRS must make informed decisions about the collection cases it pursues to ensure the program is meeting its objectives and mission.
GAO was asked to review the ACS process for prioritizing and selecting collection cases. This report (1) describes the ACS process to prioritize and select collection cases and the results of that process for fiscal year 2014, and (2) determines how well the ACS case prioritization and selection process supports the collection program mission and objectives. GAO reviewed IRS guidance, processes, and controls for prioritizing and selecting collection cases, reviewed ACS data, assessed whether IRS's controls followed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , and interviewed IRS officials.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Automated Collection System (ACS) has a multistep, automated process to prioritize and select cases of unpaid taxes and unfiled tax returns to pursue. ACS assesses cases to determine the order to work cases based on IRS's collection program priorities, the likelihood the case will be resolved, and the type of tax and amount owed. ACS also reviews cases to determine what action to take based on whether a levy source or contact information is known for taxpayers. ACS will then contact taxpayers according to its assigned priority and may issue a levy or lien against the taxpayer.
ACS managers balance cases worked to ensure ACS achieves its case closure and taxpayer service measures. These decisions include how many notification and enforcement actions to take and how many cases to assign to IRS staff so that cases are worked in a timely manner. About half of the cases closed in ACS in fiscal year 2014 were high priority, including such issues as employers not paying federal employment taxes. Of the 3.5 million cases closed or transferred out of ACS in fiscal year 2014, IRS collected almost $6.2 billion. IRS generally had more success in collecting from individual taxpayers than from business taxpayers. However, because IRS has not identified objectives for the collection program and ACS, it is difficult to assess the program's overall effectiveness.
ACS has processes for managing risk and reviewing performance, but has not implemented other key internal controls. This increases the risk that the collection program's mission of fair and equitable application of the tax laws will not be achieved. GAO identified deficiencies in the following internal control areas.
Collection program and ACS objectives, and key term of fairness are not defined: IRS officials responsible for the collection program and ACS were unable to produce documentation of collection program or ACS objectives. Although fairness is specified in the collection mission statement, IRS has not defined or operationalized it in any ACS or collection program documents. In the absence of clearly documented objectives and a clearly communicated definition of fairness, IRS cannot know how well ACS contributes to the collection program mission and ensure the case prioritization and selection process is fair. The lack of clearly articulated objectives undercuts the effectiveness of IRS efforts to assess risks and monitor ACS performance.
ACS case prioritization and selection process is not documented: IRS has little formal documentation that describes the ACS prioritization and selection process. Without adequate documentation, it is difficult for IRS to determine whether the ACS case prioritization and selection process effectively supports the collection program mission.
Effectiveness of ACS process is not periodically evaluated: IRS has no procedures for periodically evaluating the ACS case prioritization and selection process and has not acted on implementing recommendations from a recent ad hoc study. Given that key components of the ACS process have remained relatively unchanged since its creation, IRS may be missing opportunities to better prioritize its workload, which could improve collection results.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS take four actions to help ensure the collection program meets its mission, such as establishing, documenting, and implementing objectives for the collection program and ACS, and establishing, documenting, and implementing procedures to complete periodic evaluations of the ACS case prioritization and selection process. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS said it generally agreed with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-108 | gao_GAO-17-108_0 | The result is a final fuel product. Advanced: renewable fuel, other than ethanol derived from corn starch, that has life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions at least 50 percent lower than traditional petroleum-based fuels. Such fuels, known as “drop-in” fuels, include renewable diesel, renewable jet fuel, and renewable gasoline. For example, cellulosic ethanol, like corn-starch ethanol, faces limits on the amount that can be blended into gasoline, in part because it is more corrosive. Drop-in fuels do not face this limitation because they are compatible with current infrastructure. In addition to the RFS, there are federal tax incentives to promote the production and use of advanced biofuels. Recent Federal Support for R&D Related to Advanced Biofuels Has Been Through Direct Research and Grants, and the Focus Is Shifting toward Drop- In Fuels
The federal government has supported R&D related to advanced biofuels through direct research and grants in recent years, with the focus of this R&D shifting away from cellulosic ethanol, an advanced biofuel that is not fully compatible with current vehicle engines and fuel distribution infrastructure, and toward drop-in biofuels, which are compatible with this infrastructure. Agency officials said that they are focusing on drop-in fuels in part because of this compatibility. As figure 4 shows, the federal government obligated about $1.1 billion for R&D related to advanced biofuels in fiscal years 2013 through 2015, of which DOE obligated over $890 million, or about 80 percent of the total. It supports this research primarily through collaboration with national laboratories, universities, and industry. For example, scientists in Peoria, Illinois, developed a novel process that increased production of butanol—a drop-in fuel—from corn stover and lowered estimated production costs from $4.39 per gallon to $3.42 per gallon. NSF, DOD, and EPA Obligated Smaller Amounts for R&D Related to Advanced Biofuels
NSF, DOD, and EPA obligated less for R&D related to advanced biofuels than DOE and USDA; combined, these three agencies accounted for about 5 percent of the federal funds obligated for such R&D in fiscal years 2013 through 2015. Experts Agreed Several Advanced Biofuels Are Technologically Well Understood, but They Cited Several Factors That Make It Challenging to Significantly Increase Production
Experts said that several advanced biofuels are technologically well understood but noted that among those currently being produced there is limited potential for increased production in the near term. In addition, current advanced biofuel production is far below overall RFS target volumes, and those volumes are increasing every year. Given expert views on the limited potential for increased production and current production volumes, it does not appear possible to meet the targets in the RFS for advanced biofuels under current market and regulatory conditions. Several Advanced Biofuels Are Technologically Well Understood, but They Are Not Being Produced at the Overall Volumes Called for in the RFS
Several advanced biofuels are technologically well understood, according to experts, and some are being commercially produced in significant quantities, but the overall volume being produced falls short of the volume target in the RFS. Cellulosic biofuels—specifically cellulosic ethanol and renewable natural gas from landfills—are also technologically well understood, according to experts, but current production is far below the volume needed to meet the target for these fuels. Both of these fuels are considered drop-ins. These factors include the following:
Low price of fossil fuels relative to advanced biofuels. High cost of converting cellulosic feedstocks. Uncertainty about government policy. This uncertainty affects all stages of biofuel production. Specifically, it describes (1) how the federal government has supported advanced biofuels R&D in recent years and where its efforts have been targeted and (2) expert views on the extent to which advanced biofuels are technologically understood and the factors that will affect the speed and volume of production. To describe how the federal government has supported advanced biofuels R&D in recent years and where its efforts have been targeted, we reviewed documents and obligations data and interviewed officials from the following agencies: the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Agricultural Research Service and National Institute of Food and Agriculture; the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy, Bioenergy Technologies Office, Office of Science, and Vehicle Technologies Office; the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Transportation and Air Quality; and the National Science Foundation (NSF). To describe expert views on the extent to which advanced biofuels are technologically understood and on the factors that will affect the speed and volume of production, we contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a group of 20 experts for a 2-day meeting in May 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
The RFS generally mandates that domestic transportation fuels be blended with increasing volumes of biofuels through 2022, with the goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and expanding the nation's renewable fuels sector while reducing reliance on imported oil. Blending of conventional renewable fuels, primarily ethanol derived from corn starch which is required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent compared with petroleum-based fuels, has nearly reached the maximum called for under the RFS. Further growth in renewable fuels is to come from advanced biofuels, which must reduce life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50 percent compared with petroleum-based fuels to qualify under the RFS. However, production of advanced biofuels has not kept pace with statutory targets. To promote the development and commercialization of advanced biofuels, the federal government has supported R&D efforts for biofuels since the 1970s.
GAO was asked to review issues related to advanced biofuels R&D. This report describes (1) how the federal government has supported advanced biofuels R&D in recent years and where its efforts have been targeted and (2) expert views on the extent to which advanced biofuels are technologically understood and the factors that will affect the speed and volume of production. GAO interviewed DOD, DOE, EPA, NSF, and USDA officials and worked with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a meeting of experts from industry, academia, and research organizations.
EPA generally agreed with the report.
What GAO Found
The federal government has supported research and development (R&D) related to advanced biofuels through direct research or grants, and the focus is shifting away from cellulosic ethanol and toward drop-in biofuels. Unlike corn starch-based or cellulosic ethanol, drop-in fuels such as renewable gasoline are fully compatible with existing infrastructure, such as vehicle engines and distribution pipelines. In fiscal years 2013 through 2015, the federal government obligated more than $1.1 billion for advanced biofuels R&D. Of this amount, the Department of Energy (DOE) obligated over $890 million. For example, DOE's Office of Science funds three bioenergy research centers affiliated with universities and national labs that conduct basic research for all stages of biofuel production. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) obligated over $168 million in fiscal years 2013 through 2015 to support advanced biofuels. For example, USDA scientists developed a novel process to increase production of butanol, a drop-in fuel that lowered production costs by over 20 percent. The remaining federal obligations during these years were through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Science Foundation (NSF), which obligated relatively less for such R&D. According to agency officials, agencies are shifting their focus to drop-in fuels in part because they are compatible with existing infrastructure. Officials from one federal funding agency said this compatibility makes drop-in fuels more desirable than cellulosic ethanol.
Experts said that several advanced biofuels are technologically well understood and some are being commercially produced, but they noted there is limited potential for increased production in the near term and cited several factors that will make significant increases challenging. Given that current advanced biofuel production is far below Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) targets and those targets are increasing every year, it does not appear possible to meet statutory target volumes for advanced biofuels in the RFS under current market and regulatory conditions. Biofuels that are technologically well understood include biodiesel, renewable diesel, renewable natural gas, cellulosic ethanol, and some drop-in fuels. A few of these fuels, such as biodiesel and renewable diesel, are being produced in significant volumes, but it is unlikely that production of these fuels can expand much in the next few years because of feedstock limitations. Current production of cellulosic biofuels is far below the statutory volumes and, according to experts, there is limited potential for expanded production to meet future higher targets, in part because production costs are currently too high. Experts told GAO that technologies for producing other fuels, such as some drop-in fuels, are technologically well understood but that these fuels are not being produced because production is too costly. Among the factors that will affect the speed and volume of production, experts cited the low price of fossil fuels relative to advanced biofuels. This disparity in costs is a disincentive for consumers to adopt greater use of biofuels and also a deterrent for private investors entering the advanced biofuels market. Experts also cited uncertainty about government policy, including whether the RFS and federal tax credits that support advanced biofuels will remain in effect. While such policies should encourage investment, investors do not see them as reliable and thus discount their potential benefits when considering whether to invest. |
gao_GAO-09-949 | gao_GAO-09-949_0 | However, unlike the GRRS program, NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security does not fund or install security upgrades at research reactors overseas. NNSA Has Improved the Security of Research Reactors and Plans to Continue Upgrading the Security of Additional Reactors
As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18 of the 22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost of approximately $8 million. Security upgrades we observed during our visits to reactors in the GRRS program included, among other things, construction of new, heavily reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel; installation of motion detector sensors and security cameras to detect unauthorized entry into reactor buildings and provide the ability to remotely monitor activities in those buildings; replacement of glass entry doors with hardened steel doors equipped with magnetic locks and controlled by card readers or keypads; and upgrades or construction of new fortified central alarm stations that allow on-site guards to monitor alarms and security cameras, and communicate with response forces. At two reactors, however, no emergency response exercises had been conducted between the on-site guard force and off-site response forces, such as the national police, potentially limiting the effectiveness of these forces in an actual emergency. In addition, one of these reactors lacked any formal plans for emergencies involving attempts to steal HEU fuel or to sabotage reactors. However, personnel at one research reactor we visited did not search visitors or their belongings before granting them access to restricted areas where nuclear material is present, thereby potentially compromising the security upgrades made through NNSA assistance. At the same reactor, according to foreign government officials, the government agency charged with regulating the operation of the research reactor had neither developed safety and security regulations, nor had the country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities—including licensing, inspections, and emergency exercise procedures—as called for by IAEA guidelines. NNSA and Sandia officials responsible for making security upgrades at these reactors acknowledged that, even with NNSA-funded upgrades, these continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security. However, these visits generally have not been used to assist the facilities in developing security policy and procedures that comply with IAEA security guidelines, and there are no specific plans to continue these visits after security upgrades at the remaining reactors are completed in 2010. NNSA Coordinates with Other Countries to Implement Upgrades but Faces Challenges in Addressing Security Weaknesses at Some Research Reactors
NNSA officials and the physical security experts at Sandia coordinate with foreign government research reactor operators to design, install, and sustain physical security upgrades. Because the GRRS program is voluntary and cooperative, NNSA officials told us that in some cases they face challenges in obtaining foreign governments’ commitment to complete security upgrades in a timely manner. For example, progress to secure a research reactor in one country we visited has been delayed by as many as 4 years for two reasons. Consequently, NNSA has recently begun working with IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security to establish a sustainability program. IAEA plans to conduct pilot projects of the sustainability program at three research reactors in 2009, evaluate the results of the pilot projects, and then potentially expand the program in 2010 to all reactors in the GRRS program that still possess HEU. NNSA will continue to support sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the completion of security upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010. Recommendations for Executive Action
To resolve remaining security weaknesses at foreign research reactors that use HEU fuel, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Administrator of NNSA to take the following three actions: While continuing to emphasize and accelerate NNSA efforts to convert reactors to LEU fuel use and return HEU fuel to its country of origin, we recommend that NNSA work with foreign government officials and research reactor operators in countries where security upgrades are in progress or have been completed to (1) take immediate action to address any remaining security weaknesses, including those that we identified in this report; and (2) ensure that security policies and procedures, including those for emergency response to security incidents, fully meet IAEA guidelines. | Why GAO Did This Study
Worldwide, about 165 research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Because HEU can also be used in nuclear weapons, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Global Research Reactor Security (GRRS) program to make security upgrades at foreign research reactors whose security did not meet guidelines established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NNSA's efforts to secure foreign research reactors, (2) the extent to which selected foreign research reactors with NNSA security upgrades meet IAEA's security guidelines, and (3) the extent to which NNSA coordinates the GRRS program with other countries and the IAEA. GAO reviewed NNSA and IAEA documents and visited five of the 22 research reactors in the GRRS program, which were selected on the basis of when upgrades had been completed and because the reactors still possess HEU.
What GAO Found
As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18 of the 22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost of approximately $8 million. NNSA plans to complete physical security upgrades at the remaining reactors by 2010 at an additional cost of $6 million. Security upgrades that GAO observed during its site visits include heavily reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel, motion detector sensors and security cameras to detect unauthorized access, and fortified central alarm stations that allow on-site guards the ability to monitor alarms and security cameras and communicate with response forces. Foreign research reactors that have received NNSA upgrades where GAO conducted site visits generally meet IAEA security guidelines; however, in some cases, critical security weaknesses remain. At four of the five reactors visited, GAO identified security conditions that did not meet IAEA guidelines. For example, (1) at two reactors, no emergency response exercises had been conducted between the on-site guard force and off-site emergency response force, and one of these reactors lacked any formal response plans for emergencies involving attempts to steal HEU fuel; and (2) personnel at one research reactor did not search visitors or their belongings before granting them access to restricted areas where nuclear material is present. Furthermore, the government agency charged with regulating the operation of one research reactor has neither developed safety and security regulations nor has the country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. NNSA and Sandia National Laboratories officials responsible for making security upgrades at these reactors acknowledged that these continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security at these reactors. Although the officials stressed the importance of NNSA continuing to work with these countries, there are no specific plans to do so after security upgrades at the remaining reactors are completed in 2010. NNSA officials coordinate with foreign government research reactor operators to design, install, and sustain security upgrades. Because the GRRS program is a voluntary and cooperative program, in some cases, NNSA faces challenges obtaining foreign governments' commitment to complete security upgrades in a timely manner. For example, progress to secure a research reactor in one country GAO visited has been delayed by as many as 4 years due to foreign government reluctance in accepting NNSA assistance and delays approving the designed security upgrades. Recently, NNSA has begun working with IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security to establish a sustainability program to help ensure the continued effectiveness of NNSA-funded security upgrades and to help research reactor operators implement security procedures. IAEA plans to conduct pilot programs at three research reactors in 2009 and then expand the program. NNSA will continue to support sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the completion of security upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010. |
gao_GAO-15-288 | gao_GAO-15-288_0 | Background
In 2007, we identified eight key programs that aim to protect critical technologies: Arms and Dual-Use Export Controls, Anti-Tamper Policy, the Foreign Military Sales Program, the National Disclosure Policy Committee, the Militarily Critical Technologies Program, the National Industrial Security Program, and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. As shown in table 1, multiple agencies either have the lead or are stakeholder agencies for the programs for the identification and protection of critical technologies. Agencies Have Made Progress in Addressing Previously Identified Weaknesses for Critical Technologies Programs, But Face Some Implementation Challenges
The cognizant agencies have taken actions in each of the programs designed to protect critical technologies since our January 2007 high-risk update, in response to changes in law, our prior recommendations, or their own internal identification of weaknesses. For instance, initiatives are under way in the area of export controls, which comprises two of the eight programs, based on an April 2010 framework announced by the administration. However, some of these eight programs are facing implementation or additional challenges. An additional three categories of the U.S. GAO, Export Controls: U.S. U.S. A Newly Created Steering Group Supports the Foreign Military Sales Program and National Disclosure Policy Process
Each year, the U.S. government sells billions of dollars of defense articles and services to foreign governments through the Foreign Military Sales program. However, DOD has not formally determined the best approach to meet users’ needs for a technical reference and to ensure that resources are coordinated and efficiently devoted to sustain the approach chosen. Interagency Collaboration Exists among Agencies but Improvements Could Be Made
Recent initiatives in response to identified weaknesses in the critical technologies programs have resulted in improved interagency collaboration. Some Agencies’ Policies and Mechanisms Support Interagency Collaboration in the Critical Technologies Portfolio
There are both existing mechanisms and new initiatives among the critical technologies programs that support collaboration. Collaboration among Lead and Stakeholder Agencies Remains a Challenge Across the Critical Technologies Portfolio
Agencies have taken steps to collaborate with other agencies to manage their individual critical technologies programs; however, current collaboration mechanisms do not involve direct communication among all the programs in the protection of critical technologies portfolio. Past work on interagency collaboration notes that many of the results that the federal government seeks to achieve require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency and often more than one sector and level of government. For these reasons, it is important that the agencies responsible for the protection of critical technologies continue to promote and strengthen mechanisms for effective collaboration, both within their programs and agencies, as well as across the interagency community. Doing so would improve their ability to protect critical technologies and national security interests. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure a consistent and more collaborative approach to the protection of critical technologies, we recommend that the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, State, and the Treasury; as well as the Attorney General of the United States, who have lead and stakeholder responsibilities for the eight programs within the critical technologies portfolio, take steps to promote and strengthen collaboration mechanisms among their respective programs while ongoing initiatives are implemented and assessed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the federal government spends billions of dollars to develop and acquire advanced technologies in order to maintain U.S. superiority in military technology. The U.S. government permits and facilitates the sale and transfer of its technologies to allies in order to promote U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic interests. However, these technologies can be targets for theft, espionage, reverse engineering, illegal export, and other forms of unauthorized transfer. Accordingly, the U.S. government administers programs to identify and protect its critical technologies.
GAO (1) assessed the progress of the various agencies' efforts and identified implementation challenges, if any, to reform programs and processes to protect critical technologies; and (2) determined the extent to which cognizant agencies are coordinating with stakeholder agencies on their respective reform efforts to ensure effective collaboration. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and guidance, as well as documentation of agency initiatives to reform programs that protect critical technologies and interviewed officials from lead and stakeholder agencies.
What GAO Found
The agencies responsible for eight programs designed to protect critical technologies have implemented several initiatives since 2007, but face some implementation challenges. Agencies have made progress addressing previously identified weaknesses in response to changes in law, GAO recommendations, or agencies' own internal identification of them. For instance, the area of export controls has seen significant action for reform, based on an April 2010 framework announced by the administration. Other programs, such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, have undergone reform through legislative requirements. As shown in the table below, multiple agencies have responsibility for these eight programs designed to protect critical technologies.
However, some of these eight programs have additional challenges that remain to be addressed. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not yet completed an evaluation of the Militarily Critical Technologies List or potential alternatives in response to GAO recommendations regarding the need to determine the best approach for meeting users' requirements for a technical reference. Further, DOD and the Department of Homeland Security still need to take additional actions to improve shipment tracking and verification procedures of arms sales to foreign allies for the Foreign Military Sales program.
Both existing mechanisms and some new initiatives among the critical technologies programs support collaboration, but collaboration among lead and stakeholder agencies remains a challenge. GAO's September 2012 work on interagency collaboration mechanisms notes that many of the meaningful results the federal government seeks to achieve require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency. Recent initiatives have resulted in improved interagency collaboration. For example, DOD offices now communicate with non-DOD agencies through a formally instituted group to discuss potential technology transfers to foreign governments. However, current collaboration mechanisms do not involve direct communication among all the programs in the protection of critical technologies portfolio. Improved collaboration among the programs and agencies involved in the protection of critical technologies could help increase their efficiency and effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends
To ensure a consistent and collaborative approach to the protection of critical technologies, GAO recommends that agencies with lead and stakeholder responsibilities take steps to promote and strengthen collaboration mechanisms among their respective programs. |
gao_GAO-06-133 | gao_GAO-06-133_0 | In the past 10 years, the annual number of U.S. intercountry adoptions has consistently increased and nearly tripled, from more than 8,000 in fiscal year 1994 to more than 22,000 in fiscal year 2004 (see fig. 1). 3). Various factors, such as different foreign government’s requirements, contribute to varying lengths of time required for the process and the varying costs incurred by adoptive parents. U.S. USCIS has taken measures to review the quality of the adoptions process but lacks a structured quality assurance program where results are summarized and communicated to senior agency officials. The program eliminates the application and fee for citizenship certificates for about 70 percent of children adopted by U.S. citizens. Factors in Some Foreign Countries May Contribute to Abuses in U.S. Intercountry Adoptions
While the U.S. immigration law covering intercountry adoptions is designed to ensure that adopting parents are suitable and fit to provide proper care of the child and that the foreign-born child is an orphan, conditions in some countries—such as corruption and the lack of a legal framework over intercountry adoptions—may lead to abuses in the intercountry adoption process. Both Agencies Have Taken Steps to Strengthen Intercountry Adoption Safeguards in Foreign Countries, but USCIS Has Not Formally and Systematically Documented Incidents of Potential Abuses
USCIS and State have taken various steps to strengthen safeguards against abuses associated with adoptions from foreign countries. United States and Some U.S. Top Sending Countries Have Not Ratified Multilateral Convention That Establishes Minimum Intercountry Adoption Standards
The Hague Convention, which governs intercountry adoptions, establishes minimum standards designed to help alleviate some of the risk associated with foreign governments’ adoption processes. The United States signed the Convention in 1994. Since its creation, 66 countries (which represented about 39 percent of all U.S. intercountry adoptions in fiscal year 2004) have ratified the Convention. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the management of the U.S. intercountry adoption process, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following actions working with the Director of USCIS to formalize its quality assurance mechanisms so that the agency can assess the quality of the intercountry adoption process over time, ensure that senior officials from USCIS and State are aware of the outcomes of the quality assurance process, and identify opportunities where additional training or guidance may be warranted; and consider establishing a formal and systematic approach to document specific incidents of problems in intercountry adoptions that it has identified in foreign countries to retain institutional knowledge and analyze trends of individuals or organizations involved in improper activities. DHS noted that both agencies have improved interagency coordination and efforts to communicate with parents, developed standard operations procedures, conducted training, and streamlined the process. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Department of State (State) officials in Washington, D.C., with responsibilities for managing intercountry adoptions cases. To describe the Hague Convention and the statuses of U.S. and top sending countries’ implementation of the Convention, we analyzed the text of the Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption to identify the purpose and standards of the Convention. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. intercountry adoptions nearly tripled from more than 8,000 to more than 22,000 between fiscal years 1994 and 2004. While the Department of State (State) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) manage the process, factors ranging from corruption to inadequate legal frameworks in foreign countries could lead to abuses such as the abduction of children. GAO (1) describes the U.S. intercountry adoption process, (2) assesses the U.S. government's efforts to manage the intercountry adoption process, (3) assesses U.S. efforts to strengthen safeguards and mitigate against the potential for fraudulent adoptions, and (4) describes the Hague Convention (Convention) and the statuses of U.S. and top sending countries' implementation of the Convention.
What GAO Found
Adoptive parents must meet domestic and foreign government requirements to complete intercountry adoptions. However, factors such as foreign governments' procedures may contribute to varying time frames for adoptions. USCIS and State are the domestic agencies responsible for intercountry adoptions. USCIS and State made efforts to enhance the process by improving interagency coordination and communication with parents and developing additional guidance on adoptions. In addition, USCIS streamlined the intercountry adoption process by eliminating the application and fees for parents to obtain U.S. citizenship certificates for eligible children. While USCIS has taken measures to review the quality of the adoptions process, GAO found that the agency does not have a formal quality assurance program in place where results are summarized and reported to senior agency officials so that an assessment of the quality of the intercountry adoption process can be made over time. Factors in foreign countries' environments may allow for abuses in adoptions. To reduce the likelihood of such abuses, USCIS and State have taken such steps as holding diplomatic discussions with foreign governments and imposing additional U.S. procedural requirements. However, USCIS has not established a formal and systematic process for documenting specific incidents of problems in foreign countries. Such a process would allow for a systematic approach to analyze problematic trends and retain institutional knowledge. The Hague Convention governing intercountry adoptions establishes minimum standards designed to help alleviate some of the risk associated with the adoption process. The United States has signed the Convention and taken several steps toward implementing the Convention; however, key steps remain, including formal ratification of the Convention. Since its creation, 66 countries (which represented about 39 percent of all U.S. intercountry adoptions in fiscal year 2004) have ratified the Convention. |
gao_GAO-03-219 | gao_GAO-03-219_0 | This means that for some programs the current cash- and obligation-based budget does not recognize the full costs up front when decisions are made or provide policymakers the information to compare the full costs of a proposal with their judgment of its benefits. Because these cleanup costs are not usually paid until many years after the government has committed to the operation creating the waste, policymakers have not been provided complete cost information when making decisions about undertaking the waste-creating operation. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine ways that budgeting might be improved for environmental liabilities, we focused on three key questions: (1) What are the federal government’s reported environmental liabilities? With respect to primary budget data, agencies do not reflect associated cleanup costs in their budget requests for new waste- producing assets. Alternative Approaches to Consider Environmental Liabilities
Alternative approaches to promote more complete consideration of the full costs of environmental cleanup and disposal associated with the acquisition of new assets fall along a continuum from provision of supplemental information to accrual of those costs in budget authority up front, as assets are acquired. Each Approach Has Potential Benefits and Challenges
Each of the three approaches described offer both potential benefits and challenges to consider. Although agencies are required to develop these estimates for financial statement purposes, they are not developed until after the asset is purchased. The third approach, accruing budget authority over the life of the asset, represents the largest departure from current budgeting practices. Agencies generally do not yet have experience in estimating future cleanup/disposal costs up front, before the decision to purchase the waste- producing asset is made. Ultimately, accruing budget authority for the tail-end cleanup/disposal costs along with the front-end purchase costs of assets would best ensure that the cleanup/disposal costs are considered before the government incurs the liability, but raises significant implementation challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although environmental liabilities resulting from federal programs and activities represent the third largest category of the federal government's liabilities, the current cash- and obligation-based budget does not provide information on estimated cleanup costs before waste-producing assets are purchased. As a result, policymakers do not have the opportunity to weigh the full costs of a proposal with their judgment of its benefits. The Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget asked GAO to examine and report on various ways budgeting might be improved for environmental cleanup costs, including some of the benefits, limitations, and challenges associated with each.
What GAO Found
The federal government is legally required to clean up hazardous wastes that result from its operations. Agencies are currently required to report these environmental liabilities in their financial statements, but these estimates are not recognized until after a waste-producing asset is placed into service. Although agencies are supposed to consider cleanup and disposal costs associated with these assets as part of the acquisition process, they typically do not request the related budget authority until many years after the government has committed to the operation creating the waste, when cleanup is imminent. Alternative approaches to promote up-front consideration of the full costs of environmental cleanup and disposal for assets being proposed for purchase fall along a continuum ranging from supplemental information to enactment of additional budget authority. While each approach has potential benefits and challenges, agencies' lack of experience in estimating future cleanup/disposal costs up front suggest starting at the more modest end of the continuum--providing supplemental information to decision makers. Eventually, however, accruing budget authority for the tail-end cleanup/disposal cost along with the front-end purchase cost estimates would do the most to ensure that these costs are considered before the government incurs the liability. |
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