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gao_GAO-02-41 | gao_GAO-02-41_0 | Key system capabilities are to include, among other things, interagency e-mail, post-specific news and information web-based links, crisis coordination support, policy formulation support, and various administrative functions (e.g., accounting, contract management, training, and travel). According to State, as the principal foreign affairs agency, its role is to provide administrative and management leadership and support for near- term prototype and pilot-testing activities, and it is the agent for bringing the foreign affairs agencies together. As noted earlier, given the stated purpose and scope of these near-term activities and State’s leadership role, this definition of roles is not currently a significant issue. According to modernization officials, preliminary plans provide for acquiring and investing in the overseas knowledge management system in three increments: pilot, full-scale implementation, and deferred. The working group has also begun surveying its agency partners to obtain general information on architectural requirements of overseas locations. We verified that State has been using one of these tools to track program- related tasks. Attempting to acquire the operational system solution without these controls risks not delivering needed system capabilities on time and within budget. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report (reprinted in appendix II), State’s Acting Chief Financial Officer agreed with our findings and conclusions that its management controls over near-term prototype and pilot-testing activities are adequate, but disagreed with our finding and conclusion that State’s existing controls are not adequate for effectively managing the more demanding next phase of the program—acquisition and deployment of the operational system. As a result, it is widely recognized that the level of management control to effectively put in place an operational system, particularly a system like the overseas knowledge-management system that involves multiple agencies, is greater than is needed to prototype or pilot test the system. Appendix II: Comments From the Department of State
GAO Comments
1. | What GAO Found
To promote U.S. interests in the face of rapid economic, political, technological, and environmental change, 24 federal agencies are engaged in foreign affairs activities at 255 overseas locations in 162 countries. The Department of State is responsible for coordinating and supporting federal agencies' international activities and providing a means for effective interagency information sharing. State is leading a multiagency program to modernize the information technology (IT) environment supporting federal agencies' overseas operations. State is in the early, formative stage of a long-term plan to acquire and deploy a common knowledge management system for overseas-based agencies. This system is to provide basic Internet access and e-mail to mission-critical policy formulation and crisis management support. In the near-term, State is using informal management controls, which are adequate given the department's stated purposes and scope of these activities. However, acquiring and deploying system capabilities for operational use, particularly a system that involves multiple agencies and performs mission-critical functions, requires a much greater level of management discipline than that needed for system prototyping and pilot testing. It is appropriate that State has not yet established these rigorous management controls because its focus has been on evaluating system prototypes. Without these more rigorous controls, however, it is unlikely that State and its agency partners will deliver needed operational system capabilities on time and within budget. |
gao_GAO-16-698 | gao_GAO-16-698_0 | At the top of this framework is an Executive Steering Committee—consisting of OMB’s Controller and Treasury’s Fiscal Assistant Secretary. OMB and Treasury Have Not Fully Documented Processes and Controls for Their Review of Agency DATA Act Implementation Plans
Although OMB directed federal agencies to submit implementation plans (through issuance of OMB Memorandum M-15-12), as of July 2016, OMB had not determined the complete population of agencies that are required to report spending data under the DATA Act and submit implementation plans to OMB. However, on June 15, 2016, OMB requested that the 24 CFO Act agencies submit updates to key components of their implementation plans by August 12, 2016. Not knowing the complete population of agencies that are required to report under the DATA Act and not having fully documented processes and controls for reviewing and using agency DATA Act implementation plans increase the risk that the purposes and benefits of the DATA Act may not be fully achieved and could result in incomplete spending data being reported. Further, without updated implementation plans, including revised cost estimates and project plans to reflect the impacts of new technical requirements and guidance, from all agencies that are required by the DATA Act to report spending data, OMB and Treasury may not have the information needed to assist them in properly monitoring resource needs and agencies’ progress in implementing new requirements government-wide. In addition, OMB staff stated that the agencies’ general counsels could work with OMB to help agencies make these determinations. OMB staff noted that the purpose for directing agencies to submit implementation plans was to use the implementation plan cost estimates to assist them in formulating the fiscal year 2017 budget. OMB Requested Updated Agency Implementation Plans, but Only from CFO Act Agencies
OMB and Treasury staff initially told us that they were not going to require or request that agencies submit updated implementation plans for review although new requirements and information were subsequently released, such as additional guidance on DATA Act reporting that OMB issued in May 2016. Agency DATA Act Implementation Plans Were Not Fully in Accordance with OMB and Treasury Guidance
None of the 42 implementation plans we received and reviewed contained all 51 plan elements described in OMB and Treasury guidance. Based on OMB’s DATA Act Implementation Plans Guidance and Treasury’s Data Act Implementation Playbook (Version 1.0), we identified 51 plan elements to be reported within these four categories. For example, many agencies’ cost estimates were incomplete as the agencies did not provide assumptions for their estimates; identify resource requirements, such as full-time and part-time employees needed to assist implementation; or differentiate between their business process costs and technology costs. To help ensure effective implementation of the DATA Act by the agencies and facilitate the further establishment of overall government-wide governance, we recommend that the Director of OMB, in collaboration with the Secretary of the Treasury, take the following three actions related to monitoring and use of agency implementation plans: establish documented policies and procedures for the periodic review and use of agency implementation plans to facilitate and monitor agency progress against the plans; request that non-CFO Act agencies required to report federal spending data under the DATA Act submit updated implementation plans, including updated timelines and milestones, cost estimates, and risks, to address new technical requirements; and assess whether information or plan elements missing from agency implementation plans are needed and ensure that all key implementation plan elements are included in updated implementation plans. The objectives of this review were to determine (1) the extent to which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have processes and controls in place to review agencies’ implementation plans, monitor agencies’ progress, provide feedback to the agencies, and respond to challenges reported by the agencies; (2) the extent to which selected federal agencies’ DATA Act implementation plans were prepared in accordance with OMB and Treasury guidance; and (3) challenges agencies have reported that may affect their ability to implement the DATA Act and mitigating strategies they have reported to address such challenges. Monitoring and developing guidance. Electronic Government: Implementation of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government annually spends over $3.7 trillion on its programs and operations. To help increase the transparency of online spending information, the DATA Act requires agencies to begin reporting spending data by May 2017, using new data standards established by OMB and Treasury. In May 2015, OMB directed federal agencies to submit DATA Act implementation plans by September 2015. OMB and Treasury subsequently issued guidance to agencies to help them develop plans.
This report is part of a series of products that GAO will provide to Congress in response to a statutory provision to review DATA Act implementation. This report discusses OMB's and Treasury's efforts to facilitate implementation of the DATA Act and the consistency of agency implementation plans with OMB and Treasury guidance, among other things. GAO evaluated OMB's and Treasury's processes against project management and internal control criteria, assessed selected agency implementation plans against OMB and Treasury guidance, and interviewed staff and officials at OMB and Treasury.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have not designed and implemented controls or fully documented processes related to the review and use of agency implementation plans for the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act). These controls and processes are to be used for reviewing agencies' implementation plans and monitoring agencies' progress against these plans. In addition, as of July 2016, OMB had not determined the complete population of agencies that are required to report spending data under the DATA Act and submit implementation plans to OMB. OMB staff stated that their purpose for directing agencies to submit implementation plans was to use the implementation cost estimates to assist them in formulating the fiscal year 2017 budget, while Treasury officials stated that the purpose of their review of the plans was to facilitate discussions with the agencies. In addition, OMB and Treasury staff initially informed GAO that they were not going to request that agencies submit updated implementation plans that considered new technical requirements and guidance that was released on April 29, 2016. However, on June 15, 2016, OMB requested updated implementation plans by August 12, 2016, but only from Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies. Lacking fully documented controls and processes as well as a complete population of agencies that are required to report under the DATA Act increases the risk that the purposes and benefits of the DATA Act may not be fully achieved, and could result in incomplete spending data being reported. Further, without updated implementation plans, including revised timelines and milestones, cost estimates, and risks that reflect the impacts of new technical requirements and guidance, from all agencies that are required to report under the DATA Act, OMB and Treasury may not have the information needed to assist them in properly monitoring resource needs and agencies' progress in implementing new requirements government-wide.
Based on OMB and Treasury guidance, GAO identified 51 plan elements in four separate categories—timeline, cost estimate, narrative, and project plan—to be included in agency implementation plans. None of the 42 implementation plans GAO received and reviewed contained all 51 plan elements described in OMB and Treasury guidance. For example, many agencies' cost estimates did not provide all the elements for cost estimates, including total work years and a list of assumptions, or did not differentiate between their business process costs and technology costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB, in collaboration with Treasury, determine the population of agencies required to report under the DATA Act, establish fully documented controls and processes to help ensure agencies' effective implementation of the DATA Act, and request updated plans from non-CFO Act agencies. OMB generally concurred with the recommendations and Treasury deferred to OMB. |
gao_GAO-09-711T | gao_GAO-09-711T_0 | More Money and Time Will Be Needed to Complete JSF Development, While DOD Plans to Accelerate Procurement
JSF development will cost more and take longer to complete than reported to the Congress in April 2008, primarily because of contract cost overruns and extended time needed to complete flight testing. DOD is also significantly increasing annual procurement rates and plans to buy some aircraft sooner than reported last year. Total development costs are projected to increase between $2.4 billion and $7.4 billion and the schedule for completing system development to be extended from 1 to 3 years, according to estimates made in late 2008—one by the JSF Program Office and one by a joint team of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Air Force, and Navy officials. Appendixes 1 and 2 provide an historical track of cost and schedule estimates. The department first proposed canceling the alternate engine program in the 2007 budget and has not asked for funding in the budgets since then. The administration does not believe an alternate engine is needed as a hedge against the failure of the main engine program and believes savings from competition would be small. The Congress has added funding each year since 2007 to sustain the alternate engine development, including $465 million for fiscal year 2009. To date, the two contractors have spent over $8 billion on engines development—over $6 billion with the main engine contractor and over $2 billion with the second source contractor. As a result, we remain confident that competitive pressures could yield enough savings to offset the costs of competition over the JSF program’s life. Continued Manufacturing Inefficiencies Will Make it Difficult for the Program to Meet Its Production Schedule
Manufacturing of JSF development test aircraft is taking more time, money, and effort than planned. The contractor has not yet demonstrated mature manufacturing processes, or an ability to produce aircraft consistently at currently planned annual rates. It has taken steps to improve manufacturing processes, the supplier base, and schedule management; however, given the manufacturing challenges, we believe that DOD’s plan to accelerate procurement in the near term adds considerable risk and will be difficult to achieve. The contractor has delivered four development flight test aircraft and projects delivering the remaining nine aircraft in 2009 and early 2010. Use of Cost Contracts for Production Aircraft Elevates the Government’s Financial Risk
DOD is procuring a substantial number of JSF aircraft using cost reimbursement contracts. Cost reimbursement contracts place most of the program’s financial risk on the buyer—DOD in this case—who is liable to pay more than budgeted should labor, material, or other incurred costs be more than expected when the contract was signed. Despite an improved test plan, JSF flight testing is still in its infancy. DOD may procure 273 aircraft at a total estimated cost of $41.9 billion before development flight testing is completed. DOD needs to ensure that the prime contractor can meet expected development and production expectations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is the Department of Defense's (DOD's) most costly acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop, produce, and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The total expected U.S. investment is now more than $300 billion to develop and procure 2,456 aircraft over the next 25 years. GAO's most recent report in March of this year discussed increased development costs and schedule estimates, plans to accelerate procurement, manufacturing performance and delays, and development test strategy. A recurring theme in GAO's work has been concern about what GAO believes is undue concurrency of development, test, and production activities and the heightened risks it poses to achieving good cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. This testimony discusses: (1) current JSF cost and schedule estimates; (2) engine development; (3) manufacturing performance; (4) contracting issues for procurement of aircraft; (5) and test plans. This statement draws from GAO's March 2009 report, updated to the extent possible with new budget data and a recently revised procurement profile directed by the Secretary of Defense.
What GAO Found
JSF development will cost more and take longer to complete than reported to the Congress in April 2008, primarily because of contract cost overruns and extended time needed to complete flight testing. DOD is also significantly increasing annual procurement rates and plans to buy some aircraft sooner than reported last year. Total development costs are projected to increase between $2.4 billion and $7.4 billion and the schedule for completing system development extended from 1 to 3 years. The department has not asked for funding for the alternate engine program in the budgets since 2007 arguing that an alternate engine is not needed as a hedge against the failure of the main engine program and that the savings from competition would be small. Nonetheless, the Congress has added funding each year since then to sustain its development. Our prior analysis indicates that competitive pressures could yield enough savings to offset the costs of competition over the JSF program's life. To date, the two contractors have spent over $8 billion on engine development--over $6 billion with the main engine contractor and over $2 billion with the second source contractor. Manufacturing of development test aircraft is taking more time, money, and effort than planned, but officials believe that they can still deliver the 9 remaining test aircraft by early 2010. The contractor has not yet demonstrated mature manufacturing processes, or an ability to produce at currently planned rates. It has taken steps to improve manufacturing; however, given the manufacturing challenges, DOD's plan to increase procurement in the near term adds considerable risk and will be difficult to achieve. DOD is procuring a substantial number of JSF aircraft using cost reimbursement contracts. Cost reimbursement contracts place most of the risk on the buyer--DOD in this case--who is liable to pay more than budgeted should labor, material, or other incurred costs be more than expected when the contract was signed. JSF flight testing is still in its infancy and continues to experience flight testing delays. Nonetheless, DOD is making substantial investments before flight testing proves that the JSF will perform as expected. DOD may procure 273 aircraft costing an estimated $42 billion before completing flight testing. |
gao_GAO-15-236 | gao_GAO-15-236_0 | 1). 2). FHWA Has Established Some Federal Vehicle Size and Weight Requirements, Oversees State Enforcement, and Provides Some Assistance to States
FHWA has established some federal vehicle size and weight requirements, collects some information on state enforcement practices, and provides some technical assistance to states related to truck size and weight issues. FHWA Has Established Some Federal Size and Weight Requirements for Vehicles
Federal laws and FHWA regulations establish standards for vehicle width, weight, and length on some of the nation’s highways. The regulation provides only that states may not require permits for vehicles with trailers that are less than a specific length, which depends on the type of vehicle. FHWA officials said that the decision to not have a federal height standard goes back to a decision made in the 1950’s when the Interstate System was being constructed and the height clearances already varied from state to state. According to these officials, permitting practices are largely a state matter, and thus they do not keep records of states’ permitting requirements or provide technical assistance on permitting to states. States Set Varying Vehicle Size and Weight Requirements
All 50 states and the District of Columbia (D.C.) have state laws or regulations, based on applicable federal regulations, that set size and weight limits for vehicles operating in that state. State Departments of Transportation are often responsible for issuing permits. For example, states reported that state DOTs issue permits in 31 states and D.C. The number of permits issued annually varies greatly among states. For example, online systems allow carriers to apply online, and some may issue permits without review from a permitting official for certain oversize or overweight vehicles traveling on established routes. Of the 10 states we reviewed, two have such a requirement. In some areas, states follow similar practices and requirements: for example, most states make use of online permitting systems and escort vehicles. However, other processes and requirements differ and state officials we interviewed did not always agree on the benefits of various practices, such as automated routing systems and escort vehicle driver certification. We have identified key steps agencies can take to improve agency performance; one of them includes identifying best practices to help identify changes that might be needed to improve performance. FHWA officials told us that although they collect limited information on state permitting practices, they do not have research or data that compare state permitting information or identify best practices due to lack of authority over state permitting. However, FHWA has authority to conduct transportation research, including research on issues with national implications that could lead to improvements in highway safety, and in the past has worked with the trucking industry and others to identify best practices for related issues such as escort vehicles. By conducting this type of research, FHWA would be better positioned to help states make sound decisions to improve safety and protect infrastructure in a cost-effective manner. Conclusion
FHWA’s policy is to provide a safe and efficient highway system that accommodates large vehicles, in part by regulating some aspects of vehicle size and weight and ensuring state enforcement of federal standards. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve stewardship over the nation’s highways and bridges, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FHWA Administrator to take the following action:
Conduct a study on state oversize- and overweight-permitting practices, including automated vehicle routing and escort driver certification, to identify areas of best practice and share the results with states. DOT also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) how DOT regulates and provides oversight of oversize vehicles and loads on highways and bridges and (2) how state agencies regulate oversize vehicles and loads on highways and bridges. To determine how DOT regulates and provides oversight of oversize vehicles and loads on highways and bridges, we reviewed relevant legislation, obtained program documents from and conducted interviews with FHWA and FMCSA officials to obtain information on current policies, procedures, and practices for monitoring the transportation of oversize and overweight vehicles and loads. | Why GAO Did This Study
In May 2013, a truck carrying an oversize load crashed into an interstate bridge in Washington state causing it to collapse. This crash raised issues about oversize vehicles and public safety. DOT develops regulations on vehicle size and weight, and states enforce these standards with some oversight from DOT. States also issue their own regulations on vehicle size and weight and issue permits for oversize and overweight vehicles.
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required GAO to review the role of federal and state agencies in overseeing oversize vehicles. This report discusses (1) how DOT regulates and provides oversight of oversize vehicles and (2) how states regulate oversize vehicles.
GAO collected information from 50 states and the District of Columbia about their permitting practices; reviewed relevant federal legislation and DOT regulations and documents; and interviewed DOT and state officials from a non-generalizable sample of 10 states, chosen based on a variety of considerations, including geographic diversity and types of permitting requirements.
What GAO Found
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has established some federal vehicle size and weight requirements and oversees some state activities. Based on current legislation, FHWA has established rules and regulations for vehicle width, truck trailer length, and vehicle weight standards for certain federal-aid highways aimed at protecting highways and bridges from damage while providing a safe and efficient highway network. FHWA does not, however, have the authority to establish a height requirement, a decision that goes back to the Interstate System's construction in the 1950's, when height clearances already varied from state to state. FHWA also oversees states' processes for enforcing these standards by reviewing states' documentation of enforcement operations. However, FHWA has more limited involvement in individual states' permitting processes and requirements, which the agency considers largely a state matter. For example, it does not provide technical assistance on permitting to states.
State laws and regulations set varying size and weight limits and permitting requirements for vehicles that exceed these limits and that operate on highways and bridges. Specifically, GAO found that the vehicle size and weight limits set by state laws and regulations vary by state, although they are within the parameters of federal requirements. For example, states' length standards vary between the minimum federal standard of 48 feet and 65 feet for a semitrailer. GAO also found that permitting practices for oversize vehicles often vary by state. In some cases, states follow similar practices; for example, most states make use of online permitting systems and escort vehicles that travel with an oversize or overweight vehicle. However, other permitting practices vary by state—such as states' use of automated routing systems to provide a route for oversize vehicles. A National Transportation Safety Board investigation reported that differences among states on the various aspects of truck permitting could be a safety concern. State officials GAO interviewed did not always agree on the benefits of the various permitting practices, and some spoke of the need for more information on this topic. While FHWA is (1) conducting some research on the potential effect of changes to truck size and weight limits and (2) working with the trucking industry to update a best practices guide on escort vehicle operations, it has not studied permitting best practices across states due to lack of authority over state permitting. In GAO's prior work on improving agency performance, GAO found that identifying best practices can help identify changes that might be needed to improve performance. By conducting this type of research, FHWA would be better positioned to help states make sound decisions to improve safety and protect infrastructure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOT conduct a study on states' oversize- and overweight-permitting practices, including automated vehicle routing and escort driver certification, to identify areas of best practice and share the results with states. DOT agreed with GAO's recommendation and provided clarifying comments, which GAO incorporated. |
gao_GAO-10-431 | gao_GAO-10-431_0 | Background
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 established the authority for the Section 1206 and 1207 programs. Section 1206 and 1207 Programs Are Generally Consistent with U.S. Strategic Priorities
The Section 1206 and 1207 programs have generally been consistent with U.S. strategic priorities relating to combating terrorism and addressing instability. DOD and State have devoted 82 percent of Section 1206 counterterrorism resources spent through fiscal year 2009 to addressing specific terrorist threats, primarily in countries designated as priorities by the U.S. government. DOD, State, and USAID devoted 77 percent of Section 1207 program resources to relatively unstable countries, mostly those the U.S. government has identified as vulnerable to state failure. Furthermore, we found that most Section 1206 counterterrorism resources have been directed to countries that the U.S. intelligence community has identified as priority countries for the counterterrorism effort. The Section 1207 program is not distinct from other programs, as it has funded reconstruction, stability, and security-related activities that are virtually indistinguishable from those of other foreign aid programs in their content and time frames. Furthermore, using Section 1207 program funding for these projects has entailed additional implementation costs and funding delays. Section 1206 Program Is Generally Distinct from Other Train and Equip Programs
According to DOD and State guidelines for fiscal year 2009, the Section 1206 program should be distinct from security assistance programs in that its projects (1) address U.S. military priorities; (2) respond to urgent and emergent needs; (3) do not overlap with other State and DOD train and equip programs, such as FMF, by “backfilling” lower-priority projects unfunded by those programs; and (4) are administered with a dual key, or DOD and State interagency process, to ensure they accord with U.S. foreign policy. Although DOD and embassy officials we interviewed consistently explained why there was no overlap between Section 1206 projects and other programs, project proposals we reviewed have not always documented the distinctions. However, they did not provide any documentation to support this claim. For the Section 1207 program, since State, USAID, and DOD are not restricted by law or agency policy from drawing on a variety of overlapping funding sources to continue and expand Section 1207 projects, sustainment risks are not as significant. Availability of Funding to Sustain Section 1206 Projects Is Uncertain
According to State planning documents, including department- and bureau-level performance plans, helping partner nations achieve sustainable counterterrorism capabilities is a key foreign policy objective. For the Section 1207 program, State requires quarterly reporting on project implementation but has not analyzed this information or reported results to DOD to inform program management and funding decisions. As a result of these deficiencies, U.S. agencies have made decisions to sustain and expand both Section 1206 and 1207 projects without formal assessments of project progress or impact. For the Section 1206 program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, (1) develop and implement specific plans to monitor, evaluate, and report routinely on Section 1206 project outcomes and their impact on U.S. strategic objectives; (2) base further decisions about sustaining existing Section 1206 projects on the results of such monitoring and evaluation; (3) estimate the cost of sustaining projects at the time they are proposed and, where possible, obtain a commitment from partner nations to fund those costs; and (4) seek further guidance from the Congress on what funding authorities are appropriate to sustain Section 1206 projects when the Secretary determines that (a) projects address specific terrorist and stabilization threats in high-priority countries, (b) reliable monitoring and evaluation have shown that projects are effective, and (c) partner nation funds are unavailable. To select countries to visit, we ranked all 62 countries based on the following criteria: (1) the amount of Section 1206 and 1207 program funding a country had received in order to include countries representing a significant portion of total funding, as well as both large and small individual projects from each program; (2) the year when a country’s projects began, in order to visit mature projects; (3) the presence of both Section 1206 and Section 1207 projects in a country, in order to use our time efficiently in visiting projects from both programs in single country visits; (4) DOD and State suggestions; (5) recent GAO or DOD and State Inspectors General visits, to reduce the burden on embassies; (6) congressional interest; (7) security considerations; and (8) opportunities to consolidate the fieldwork of multiple GAO engagements. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, the United States created two new programs, authorized in Sections 1206 and 1207 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, to respond to the threats of global terrorism and instability. These programs have provided over $1.3 billion in military and nonmilitary aid to 62 countries and are due to expire in 2011 and 2010, respectively. The Congress mandated that GAO assess the programs. This report addresses the extent to which the programs (1) are consistent with U.S. strategic priorities, (2) are distinct from other programs, (3) address sustainment needs, and (4) incorporate monitoring and evaluation. GAO analyzed data and program documents from the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and interviewed U.S. and host country officials.
What GAO Found
The Section 1206 and 1207 programs have generally been consistent with U.S. strategic priorities. The Section 1206 program was established to build the military capacity of foreign countries to conduct counterterrorism and stabilization operations. DOD and State have devoted 82 percent of this program's funds to address specific terrorist threats, primarily in countries the U.S. intelligence community has identified as priorities for the counterterrorism effort. The Section 1207 program was established to transfer DOD funds to State for nonmilitary assistance related to stabilization, reconstruction, and security. DOD, State, and USAID have devoted 77 percent of this program's funds to countries at significant risk of instability, mostly those the United States has identified as vulnerable to state failure. Based on agency guidelines, the Section 1206 program is generally distinct from other programs, while the Section 1207 program is not. In most cases, Section 1206 projects addressed urgent and emergent counterterrorism and stabilization priorities of combatant commanders and did so more quickly than other programs, sometimes in a year, whereas Foreign Military Financing (FMF) projects can take up to 3 years to plan. DOD and embassy officials GAO spoke to consistently explained why projects do not overlap those of FMF and other programs, although project proposals GAO reviewed did not always document these distinctions. Section 1207 projects are virtually indistinguishable from those of other foreign aid programs in their content and time frames. Furthermore, the Section 1207 program has entailed additional implementation costs and funding delays beyond those of traditional foreign assistance programs, while the 1206 program has not. The uncertain availability of resources to sustain Section 1206 projects poses risks to achieving long-term impact. Enabling nations to achieve sustainable counterterrorism capabilities is a key U.S. policy goal. The long-term viability of Section 1206 projects is threatened by (1) the limited ability or willingness of partner nations to support new capabilities, as 76 percent of Section 1206 projects are in low- or lower-middle-income countries, and (2) U.S. legal and policy restrictions on using FMF and additional Section 1206 resources for sustainment. In contrast, sustainment risks for Section 1207 projects appear minimal, because State, USAID, and DOD are not restricted from drawing on a variety of overlapping funding sources to continue them. DOD and State have incorporated little monitoring and evaluation into the Section 1206 and 1207 programs. For Section 1206 projects, the agencies have not consistently defined performance measures, and results reporting has generally been limited to anecdotal information. For Section 1207 projects, the agencies have defined performance measures and State requires quarterly reporting on project implementation. However, State has not fully analyzed this information or provided it to DOD to inform program management. As a result, agencies have made decisions to sustain and expand both Section 1206 and 1207 projects without documentation of progress or effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-07-1258T | gao_GAO-07-1258T_0 | Amended Compacts of Free Association: 2004- 2023
In 2003, the United States approved separate amended compacts with the FSM and RMI that (1) continue the defense relationship, including a new agreement providing U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI through 2086; (2) strengthen immigration provisions; and (3) provide an estimated $3.6 billion in financial assistance to both nations from 2004 through 2023, including about $1.5 billion to the RMI (see app. Financial assistance is provided in the form of annual sector grants and contributions to each nation’s trust fund. In addition, the RMI has not enacted economic policy reforms needed to improve its growth prospects. The RMI development plan identifies fishing and tourism as key potential private sector growth industries. Although the RMI has undertaken efforts aimed at economic policy reform, it has made limited progress in implementing key tax, land, foreign investment, and public sector reforms that are needed to improve its growth prospects. The RMI Faces Challenges to Effectively Implementing Compact Assistance for Its Long-Term Development Goals
The RMI has allocated funds to priority sectors, although several factors have hindered its use of the funds to meet long-term development needs. Lack of planning for declining U.S. assistance. The usefulness of the RMI’s quarterly performance reports has also been limited by incomplete and inaccurate information. Staff and skill limitations have constrained the RMI’s ability to provide day-to-day monitoring of sector grant operations. RMI Trust Fund May Not Provide Sustainable Income After Compact Grants End
Market volatility and choice of investment strategy could lead to a wide range of RMI trust fund balances in 2023 (see app. Although the RMI has supplemented its trust fund balance with additional contributions, other sources of income are uncertain or entail risks. Our analysis indicates that, under various scenarios, the RMI’s trust fund could fall short of the maximum allowed disbursement level—an amount equal to the inflation- adjusted compact grants in 2023—after compact grants end, with the probability of shortfalls increasing over time (see fig. As of June 2007, the RMI trust fund committee had not appointed an independent auditor or a money manager to invest the fund according to the proposed investment strategy. However, the RMI faces significant challenges in working toward the compact goals of economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance as the compact grants decrease. Largely dependent on government spending of foreign aid, the RMI has limited potential for private sector growth, and its government has made little progress in implementing reforms needed to increase investment opportunities and tax income. Because the trust fund’s earnings are intended as a main source of U.S. assistance to the RMI after compact grants end, the fund’s potential inadequacy to provide sustainable income in some years could impact the RMI’s ability to provide government services. Prior Recommendations
Our prior reports on the amended compacts include recommendations that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs, as chair of the RMI management and trust fund committees, to, among other things, ensure that JEMFAC address the lack of RMI progress in implementing reforms to increase investment and tax income; coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMFAC to work with the the RMI to establish plans to minimize the impact of declining assistance; coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMFAC to work with the RMI to fully develop a reliable mechanism for measuring progress toward compact goals; and ensure the RMI trust fund committee’s assessment and timely reporting of the fund’s likely status as a source of revenue after 2023. For example, in August 2006, JEMFAC discussed the RMI’s slow progress in implementing economic reforms. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, the U.S. government extended its economic assistance to the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) through an Amended Compact of Free Association. From 2004 to 2023, the United States will provide an estimated $1.5 billion to the RMI, with annually decreasing grants as well as increasing contributions to a trust fund. The assistance, targeting six sectors, is aimed at assisting the country's efforts to promote economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance. The trust fund is to be invested and provide income for the RMI after compact grants end. The Department of the Interior (Interior) administers and oversees this assistance. Drawing on prior GAO reports ( GAO-05-633 , GAO-06-590 , GAO-07-163 , GAO-07-513 , GAO-07-514R), this testimony discusses (1) the RMI's economic prospects, (2) implementation of the amended compact to meet long-term goals, and (3) potential trust fund earnings. In conducting its prior work, GAO visited the RMI, reviewed reports, interviewed officials and experts, and used a simulation model to project the trust fund's income. Prior GAO reports recommended, among other things, that Interior work with the RMI to address lack of progress in implementing reforms; plan for declining grants; reliably measure progress; and ensure timely reporting on the fund's likely status as a source of revenue after 2023. Interior agreed with GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
The RMI has limited prospects for achieving its long-term development goals and has not enacted policy reforms needed to achieve economic growth. The RMI economy depends on public sector spending of foreign assistance rather than on private sector or remittance income. At the same time, the two private sector industries identified as having growth potential--fisheries and tourism--face significant barriers to expansion because of a costly business environment. RMI emigrants also lack marketable skills needed to increase revenue from remittances. Despite declining grants under the compact, RMI progress in implementing key policy reforms to improve the private sector environment, such as tax or land reform, has been slow. In August 2006, the RMI's compact management committee began to address the country's slow progress in implementing reforms. Although the RMI has made progress in implementing compact assistance, it faces several challenges in allocating and using this assistance to support its long-term development goals. RMI grant allocations have reflected compact priorities by targeting health, education, and infrastructure. However, political disagreement over land use in Kwajalein Atoll, where the United States has a missile testing facility, and over management of public entities has negatively affected infrastructure projects. The RMI also has not planned for long-term sustainability of services that takes into account declining compact assistance. Inadequate baseline data and incomplete performance reports have further limited the RMI's ability to adequately measure progress. Although single-audit reporting has been timely, insufficient staff and skills have limited the RMI's ability to monitor day-to-day sector grant operations. Interior's Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) has conducted administrative oversight of the sector grants but has been constrained by competing oversight priorities. The RMI trust fund may not provide sustainable income for the country after compact grants end. Market volatility and the choice of investment strategy could cause the RMI trust fund balance to vary widely, and there is increasing probability that in some years the trust fund will not reach the maximum disbursement level allowed--an amount equal to the inflation-adjusted compact grants in 2023--or be able to disburse any income. In addition, although the RMI has supplemented its trust fund income with a contribution from Taiwan, other sources of income are uncertain or entail risk. Trust fund management processes have also been problematic; as of June 2007, the RMI trust fund committee had not appointed an independent auditor or a money manager to invest the fund according to the proposed investment strategy. |
gao_GAO-07-816 | gao_GAO-07-816_0 | Higher Rates of Poverty, Lack of Support Services, and Racial Bias Viewed as Increasing African American Children’s Entry into Foster Care
In responding to our survey, states considered three main groups of factors as contributing to African American children’s entry into foster care: These groups included high rates of poverty and other poverty- related issues, challenges in accessing supports and services in impoverished communities, and racial bias or cultural misunderstanding among decision makers. Using subsidized guardianship as an alternative to adoption may hold particular promise for reducing disproportionality, and more than half of the states surveyed (30) reported using this strategy. Nearly all of the states we visited had assistance from local universities or research institutes in analyzing data on disproportionality. These IV-B prevention funds can help divert children from foster care by providing services to their families and also help children exit foster care by providing supports to adoptive families and guardians. Yet the majority of federal funding for child welfare is distributed as payments for maintaining children already in foster care homes under another part of the law, Title IV-E.
Twenty-five states we surveyed reported that the limited use of Title IV-E funds for other purposes besides making maintenance payments to foster care families, such as providing services to families, contribute to the proportion of African American children in care. Other researchers and officials told us they opposed the law’s intent and were concerned about the detrimental effects of placing children with parents of another race on a child’s well being. Some African American families, especially relatives, are reluctant to adopt because they do not want to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parent, according to officials and researchers we interviewed. However, unless states are one of the seven that have a current federal demonstration waiver for assisted guardianship or kinship permanency programs, states cannot use federal child welfare funds to provide subsidies to legal guardians. States considered federal policies on the licensing and the use of relatives to provide foster care as increasing the proportion of African American children in foster care. States report being constrained by the lack of federal subsidies for legal guardianship similar to those provided for adoption. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
For this study, we were asked to analyze (1) the major factors that have been identified as influencing the proportion of African American children entering and remaining in foster care compared to children of other races and ethnicities; (2) the extent that states and localities have implemented strategies that appear promising in addressing African American representation in foster care; and (3) the ways in which key federal child welfare policies may have influenced African American representation in foster care. | Why GAO Did This Study
A significantly greater proportion of African American children are in foster care than children of other races and ethnicities, according to HHS and other research. Given this situation, GAO was asked to analyze the (1) major factors influencing the proportion of African American children in foster care, (2) extent that states and localities have implemented promising strategies, and (3) ways in which federal policies may have influenced African American representation in foster care. GAO's methodologies included a nationwide survey; a review of research and federal policies; state site visits; analyses of child welfare data; and interviews with researchers, HHS officials, and other experts.
What GAO Found
A higher rate of poverty is among several factors contributing to the higher proportion of African American children entering and remaining in foster care. Families living in poverty have greater difficulty accessing housing, mental health, and other services needed to keep families stable and children safely at home. Bias or cultural misunderstandings and distrust between child welfare decision makers and the families they serve are also viewed as contributing to children's removal from their homes into foster care. African American children also stay in foster care longer because of difficulties in recruiting adoptive parents and a greater reliance on relatives to provide foster care who may be unwilling to terminate the parental rights of the child's parent--as required in adoption--or who need the financial subsidy they receive while the child is in foster care. Most states we surveyed reported using strategies intended to address these issues, such as involving families in decisions, building community supports, and broadening the search for relatives to care for children. HHS provides information and technical assistance, but states reported that they had limited capacity to analyze data and formulate strategies, and states we visited told us they relied on assistance from universities or others. States reported that the ability to use federal funding for family support services was helpful in keeping African American children safely at home and that federal subsidies for adoptive parents helped move children out of foster care. However, they also expressed concerns about the inability to use federal child welfare funds to provide subsidies to legal guardians. As an alternative to adoption, subsidized guardianship is considered particularly promising for helping African American children exit from foster care. States were also concerned about the lack of flexibility to use federal foster care funds to provide services for families, although states can use other federal funds for this purpose if they consider it a priority. |
gao_T-AIMD-97-176 | gao_T-AIMD-97-176_0 | In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Medicare operations and better address fraud and abuse, HCFA planned to develop one unified computer system to replace the existing systems. The MTS project encountered problems from the very beginning. Ongoing HCFA Technology Initiatives to Combat Fraud and Abuse
While the MTS termination delays one means of possibly combatting fraud and abuse, HCFA has two other independent information technology initiatives in this area that are continuing. These separate initiatives are analyzing the potential for using existing commercial software and exploring the possibilities for developing antifraud software. Although senior HCFA officials voiced their support for our recommendation to use modern information technology to strengthen payment controls, they did not begin to test the feasibility of using commercial code manipulation-detection software to process Medicare claims until about a year after we reported on its potential. Furthermore, any positive results from this testing are not expected to be implemented nationally for at least several years. Rather than trying to adopt the commercially available software, HCFA chose to enter into an agreement that allowed it to explore the possibility of developing such software. Specifically, HCFA signed a 2-year, $6-million interagency agreement with the Los Alamos National Laboratory to assess the potential for identifying patterns of fraud. Usable results from this effort appear to be years away because, once the system’s design is complete, HCFA would have to award another contract to a software developer to create software from the Los Alamos design. Further, according to laboratory officials, HCFA will have to acquire separate computers to implement any Los Alamos-based fraud detection system because its approaches, which were originally to become part of MTS, are not designed to be integrated with the standard part A and part B Medicare claims-processing systems to which HCFA is now transitioning. Strong Management Essential Regardless of Project Direction
HCFA’s negative experience with its automation projects represents a pattern we see throughout the federal sector: it is weaknesses in management, not technology itself, that stymie effective systems development and implementation. Together, Clinger-Cohen and these other laws provide a powerful framework under which federal agencies have the best opportunity to improve the management and acquisition of information technology. HCFA has recognized the need to more effectively manage its information technology acquisitions and has taken several important steps. However, much remains to be done to ensure that HCFA’s initiatives—or those of any agency—are cost-effective and serve its mission. HCFA has not yet implemented our recommendations in establishing investment processes that will allow it to maximize the value and manage the risks of its information technology acquisitions, and tightly control spending. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) Medicare Transaction System (MTS) and the recommendations GAO made to correct serious weaknesses in its management identified as part of a GAO review; (2) two continuing HCFA initiatives to combat fraud and abuse; and (3) underlying information technology management issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Medicare operations and better address fraud and abuse, HCFA planned to develop one unified computer system to replace the existing system, but the project encountered problems from the beginning; (2) HCFA assessed the project's viability and decided to terminate both the request for proposals for the MTS sites and the entire software-development contract; (3) HCFA has two other independent information technology initiatives in the areas of fraud and abuse that are continuing--analyzing the potential for using existing commercial software and exploring the possibilities for developing antifraud software; (4) HCFA did not begin to test the feasibility of using commercial code-manipulation software to process Medicare claims until about 1 year after GAO reported on its potential; (5) any positive results from this testing are not expected to be implemented nationally for at least several years; (6) HCFA chose to enter an agreement with Los Alamos National Laboratory that allowed it to explore developing such software; (7) results from this program appear to be years away because once the system's design is complete, HCFA would have to award another contract to a software developer to create from the Los Alamos design; (8) HCFA would have to acquire new computers to implement any Los Alamos-based fraud detection system because its approaches, which were originally to become part of MTS, are not designed to be integrated with the Medicare claims processing systems to which HCFA is transitioning; (9) HCFA's negative experience with its automation projects represents a pattern of weaknesses GAO sees throughout the federal sector; weaknesses in management that stymie effective systems development and implementation; (10) the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, and the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act, provide a powerful framework under which federal agencies have the best opportunity to improve the management and acquisition of information technology; (11) HCFA has recognized the need to more effectively manage its information technology acquisitions, and has taken several important steps, but much remains to be done to ensure that HCFA's initiatives are cost-effective and serve its mission; and (12) HCFA has not yet implemented GAO's recommendations in establishing investment processes that will allow it to maximize the value, manage the risks of its information technology acquisitions, and tightly control spending. |
gao_GAO-09-614 | gao_GAO-09-614_0 | Several federal transportation agencies play significant roles in air cargo safety. Air Cargo Accidents and Fatal Accidents Declined from 1997 through 2008
Annually, air cargo accidents decreased 63 percent, from 62 in 1997 to 23 in 2008. 2.) 4.) Accident Rates Have Fluctuated for Large Cargo Carriers but Are Not Available for Small On- demand Cargo Carriers
The accident rate per departure for large air cargo carriers has fluctuated over the last 25 years, but the overall trend has been downward, and in 2007 was roughly the same as for passenger carriers. Pilot Performance, Accumulated Risk, and Other Factors Have Contributed to Air Cargo Accidents
Our review of NTSB and FAA air cargo accident and incident data as well as our interviews with industry officials and analyses of industry documents revealed that pilot performance was a prominent factor in air cargo accidents. Specifically, we found that NTSB cited pilot performance as the probable cause for about 53 percent of non- fatal and about 80 percent of fatal air cargo accidents. Our Analysis Indicates That Most Fatal Accidents Involved Multiple Risk Factors
We analyzed NTSB reports of the 93 fatal air cargo accidents that occurred from 1997 through 2008 using FAA’s Flight Risk Assessment Tool and identified three or more risk factors in 63 of the accidents and four or more risk factors in 41 accidents. Consequently, most of the accidents in Alaska involved small aircraft. Alaska is also subject to unusual weather conditions. FAA does not use incident data to identify precursors to aviation accidents, because the data were not developed for this purpose. FAA Safety Improvement Efforts Focus Primarily on Large Carriers and, According to Experts, Vary in Effectiveness
Many government and industry efforts to improve safety focus primarily on large carriers. Experts Rate Voluntary Disclosure Programs as One of the Most Effective Cargo Safety Programs, but Primarily Large Carriers Participate
The intent of voluntary disclosure programs is to identify and correct safety problems in a nonpunitive way and to provide additional safety information to FAA. Some airports are also implementing SMSs. Many experts who responded to our survey indicated that better data on part 135 cargo flight and operations could improve air cargo safety. (3) What have FAA and the industry done to improve air cargo safety, and how do experts view the effectiveness of these efforts? From these data we identified 443 fixed-wing aircraft accidents, including 93 fatal accidents. Third, for indications of other factors contributing to air cargo accidents, we surveyed a panel of air cargo experts, which is discussed in more detail later below; analyzed documents and interviewed officials from FAA, PHMSA, NTSB, air cargo industry associations, air cargo carriers, airports, an employee group, and others; and conducted site visits to Alaska, Ohio, and Texas (see the previous paragraph). The experts rated and provided relative rankings on the effectiveness of current efforts to improve air cargo safety, the severity of safety challenges faced by the air cargo sector of aviation, and the potential improvements that additional efforts could have on air cargo safety. a. | Why GAO Did This Study
The air cargo industry contributed over $37 billion to the U.S. economy in 2008 and provides government, businesses, and individuals with quick delivery of goods. Although part of an aviation system with an extraordinary safety record, there have been over 400 air cargo accidents and over 900 incidents since 1997, raising concerns about cargo safety. GAO's congressionally requested study addresses (1) recent trends in air cargo safety, (2) factors that have contributed to air cargo accidents, (3) federal government and industry efforts to improve air cargo safety and experts' views on the effectiveness of these efforts, and (4) experts' views on further improving air cargo safety. To perform the study, GAO analyzed agency data, surveyed a panel of experts, reviewed industry and government documents, and interviewed industry and government officials. GAO also conducted site visits to Alaska, Ohio, and Texas.
What GAO Found
From 1997 through 2008, 443 accidents involving cargo-only carriers occurred, including 93 fatal accidents. Total accidents declined 63 percent from a high of 62 in 1997 to 23 in 2008. Small cargo carriers were involved in the vast majority of the accidents--79 percent of all accidents and 96 percent of fatal accidents. Although accident rates for large cargo carriers fluctuated during this period, they were comparable to accident rates for large passenger carriers in 2007. GAO could not calculate accident rates based on operations or miles traveled for small carriers because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not collect the necessary data. Although several factors contributed to these air cargo accidents, our review of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data found that pilot performance was identified as a probable cause for about 80 percent of fatal and about 53 percent of non-fatal cargo accidents. Furthermore, GAO's analysis of NTSB reports for the 93 fatal accidents, using an FAA flight-risk checklist, identified three or more risk factors in 63 of the accidents. Risk factors included low pilot experience, winter weather, and nighttime operations. Alaska's challenging operating conditions and remotely located populations who rely on air cargo are also a contributing factor. Many federal efforts to improve air cargo safety focus on large carriers. Air cargo experts that GAO surveyed ranked FAA's voluntary disclosure programs--in which participating carriers voluntarily disclose safety events to FAA--as the most effective effort to improve air cargo, but two of the three main voluntary disclosure programs are used typically by large carriers. Several industry initiatives, however, focus on carriers with smaller aircraft, such as the Medallion Foundation, which has improved small aircraft safety in Alaska through training and safety audits. The two actions experts cited most often to further improve air cargo safety were installing better technology on cargo aircraft to provide additional tools to pilots and collecting data to track small cargo carrier operations. Using flight risk checklists can also help pilots assess the accumulated risk factors associated with some cargo flights. |
gao_OCE-98-83 | gao_OCE-98-83_0 | Long-Term Simulations
Long-term simulations are useful for comparing the potential outcomes of alternative fiscal policies within a common economic framework. While long-term simulations provide a useful perspective that is often lacking in budget debates, they should be interpreted carefully. Since our October report was issued, CBO’s 10-year budget projections have shown continued improvement in the short term. CBO now projects that the budget is already virtually in balance and that, in a few years, we could experience a period of budget surpluses on a unified budget basis. Currently, however, the dramatic drop in the deficit and the expected budget surpluses for the near future have changed the fiscal policy climate. While our no action path remains an unsustainable policy over the long term, it does include a period of budget surpluses over the next 15 years, consistent with CBO’s current baseline. Thus, as agreed with your office, we present two alternatives to the no action simulation in this testimony. Unlike no action and no surplus, the maintain balance simulation is one example of a sustainable fiscal path under which government activities can be maintained without a continual rise in the debt as a share of GDP. Long-Term Commitments Not Adequately Reflected in Budget Reporting
To some degree, the long-term fiscal policy of the nation is determined by the spending or revenue paths inherent in the design of federal programs. Without adequate information about the long-term cost implications of specific program (or revenue) designs, fiscal policy may not follow the expected path. Just as the current long-term projections are driven by a combination of demographics and the design of Social Security and federal health care programs, so future projections may also be affected by the long-term costs of other programs. Possible Budget Process and Reporting Improvements
The broad range of long-term federal commitments complicates the challenge of integrating more complete information on their expected future cost into the budget process. The diverse nature of the commitments, combined with the varying quality and amount of information available outside the budget process, suggests that across-the-board changes in budget reporting or process may not be the most effective way to proceed. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its work on long-term budget issues, focusing on the: (1) results of GAO's simulations updated to incorporate the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) new budget projections; and (2) programmatic composition and design of federal spending--for which policymakers need to consider the long-term fiscal and spending implications of the government's commitments.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) long-term simulations are useful for comparing outcomes of alternative fiscal policies within a common economic framework; (2) while long-term simulations provide a useful perspective that is often lacking in budget debates, they should be interpreted carefully; (3) since GAO's October 1997 report was issued, CBO's 10-year budget projections have shown continued improvement in the short term; (4) CBO now projects that the budget is already virtually in balance and that, in a few years, there could be a period of budget surpluses on a unified budget basis; (5) the dramatic drop in the deficit and the expected budget surpluses for the near future have changed the fiscal policy climate; (6) while GAO's no action path remains an unsustainable policy over the long term, it does include a period of budget surpluses over the next 15 years, consistent with CBO's current baseline; (7) GAO presents two alternatives to the no action simulation; (8) under the no surplus scenario, the deficit would reach 10 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) 8 years earlier than the no action plan; (9) the maintain balance simulation is an example of a sustainable fiscal path under which government activities can be maintained without a continual rise in the debt as a share of GDP; (10) to some degree, the long-term fiscal policy of the nation is determined by the spending or revenue paths inherent in the design of federal programs; (11) without adequate information about the long-term cost implications of specific program designs, fiscal policy may not follow the expected path; (12) just as the current long-term projections are driven by a combination of demographics and the design of Social Security and federal health care programs, so future projections may also be affected by the long-term costs of other programs; (13) the broad range of long-term federal commitments complicates the challenge of integrating more complete information on their expected future cost into the budget process; and (14) the diverse nature of these commitments, combined with the varying quality and amount of information available outside the budget process, suggests that across-the-board changes in budget reporting or process may not be the most effective way to proceed. |
gao_GAO-02-224 | gao_GAO-02-224_0 | In 2000, about 5 million disabled workers received DI cash benefits totaling about $50 billion, with average monthly cash benefits amounting to $787 per person. For example, we found that about 13 percent of working beneficiaries who had earnings between 75 and 100 percent of the annualized SGA level in 1985 still had earnings near the SGA level in 1995, even though the SGA had increased from $300 to $500 a month during this period. Even after the SGA level was increased in 1990, a small proportion of these beneficiaries continued to have earnings between 75 to 100 percent of the new annualized SGA level. While beneficiary deaths and conversions to retirement benefits accounted for most program exits, the percentage of exits caused by medical improvement or a return to work increased gradually, from 1.9 percent in 1985 to 9.2 percent in 1996, and then rose sharply to 19.9 percent in 1997. However, the aggregation of medical improvement and return-to-work data prevent us from obtaining a full understanding of the link between the SGA and DI program exit behavior. The large increase in the percentage of beneficiaries returning to work or medically improving for 1997 may be related, in part, to an increase in the number of continuing disability reviews that occurred during 1997. These include data that identify the monthly earnings of beneficiaries and whether a beneficiary is blind, is participating in a trial work period, or has exited the DI program based on a return to work. Analysis of the Effect of the SGA on Beneficiaries’ Earnings
To analyze the effects of the SGA on the earnings of DI beneficiaries, we attempted to determine whether DI beneficiaries engage in “parking,” that is, whether they limit their earnings to a level at or just below the SGA limit in order to maintain eligibility for benefits. Analysis Of the Effect of the SGA on Program Entry and Exit
To examine the effects of the SGA on DI program entry and exit rates, we looked at the rate of entry and exit both before and after the increase in the SGA. Appendix II: Comments From the Social Security Administration | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Administration's (SSA) Disability Insurance (DI) program paid $50 billion in cash benefits to more than five million disabled workers in 2000. Eligibility for DI benefits is based on whether a person with a severe physical or mental impairment has earnings that exceed the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) level. SSA terminates monthly cash benefit payments for beneficiaries who return to work and have earnings that exceed the SGA level--$1,300 per month for blind beneficiaries and $780 per month for all other beneficiaries.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the SGA level affects the work patterns of only a small proportion of DI beneficiaries. However, GAO also found that the SGA may affect the earnings of some beneficiaries. About 13 percent of those beneficiaries with earnings near the SGA level in 1985 still had earnings near the SGA level in 1995, even though the level was increased during that period. The absence of key information identifying the monthly earnings of beneficiaries, their trial work period status, and whether they are blind limited GAO's ability to definitively identify a relationship between SGA levels and beneficiaries' work patterns. Data limitations also make the effect of the SGA on DI program entry and exit rates difficult to isolate. Although the rate of program entry increased in the years immediately following a 1990 increase in the SGA level, it then gradually declined to a level below the pre-1990 entry rates. Since 1990, DI exit rates continue to be driven largely by beneficiary death and conversion to retirement benefits. However, the percentage of all exits caused by improvements in medical conditions or a return to work increased slowly, from 1.9 percent in 1985 to 9.2 percent in 1996, and then rose dramatically to 19.9 percent in 1997. A substantial increase in the number of continuing disability reviews done by SSA may account, in part, for this 1997 upturn, but data limitations preclude GAO from obtaining a full understanding of the link between the SGA and exit behavior. |
gao_AIMD-98-155 | gao_AIMD-98-155_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) whether FAA is effectively managing physical security at ATC facilities and systems security for its current operational systems, (2) whether FAA is effectively managing systems security for future ATC modernization systems, and (3) the effectiveness of FAA’s management structure and implementation of policy for computer security. FAA is not effectively managing physical security at ATC facilities. Known physical security weaknesses exist at many ATC facilities. ATC Operational System Security Is Ineffective and Systems Are Vulnerable
FAA policy requires that all ATC systems be certified and accredited. FAA officials told us that this assessment is an accurate depiction of the agency’s knowledge regarding operational systems security. Accordingly, less than 4 percent of the 90 operational systems are certified. For example, FAA’s officials responsible for maintaining the nine FAA-owned and leased communication networks told us that only one has been assessed. Sound overall security guidance, including a security architecture, security concept of operations, and security standards, is needed to ensure that well formulated security requirements are included in specifications for all new ATC systems. FAA’s Management Structure Is Not Effectively Implementing and Enforcing Computer Security Policy
FAA’s management structure and implementation of policy for computer security has been ineffective: the Office of Civil Aviation Security has not adequately enforced the security policies it has formulated; the Office of Air Traffic Services has not adequately implemented security policy for operational ATC systems; and the Office of Research and Acquisitions has not adequately implemented policy for new ATC systems development. FAA has not analyzed the threats and vulnerabilities, or developed safeguards to protect 87 of its 90 operational ATC computer systems and 8 of its 9 operational ATC telecommunications networks. FAA does not have a well-defined security architecture, a security concept of operations, or security standards, and does not consistently include well formulated security requirements in specifications for new ATC systems. None of the three organizations responsible for ATC security have discharged their respective security responsibilities effectively: the Office of Civil Aviation Security has not adequately enforced FAA policies that require the assessment of (1) physical security controls at all ATC facilities and (2) vulnerabilities, threats, and safeguards of all operational ATC computer systems; the Office of Air Traffic Services has not implemented FAA policies that require it to analyze all ATC systems for security vulnerabilities, threats, and safeguards; and the Office of Research and Acquisitions has not implemented FAA policy that requires it to formulate requirements for security in specifications for all new ATC modernization systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) computer security practices, focusing on: (1) whether FAA is effectively managing physical security at air traffic control (ATC) facilities and systems security for its current operational systems; (2) whether FAA is effectively managing systems security for future ATC modernization systems; and (3) the effectiveness of FAA's management structure and implementation of policy for computer security.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA is ineffective in all critical areas included in GAO's computer security review--facilities physical security, operational systems information security, future systems modernization security, and management structure and policy implementation; (2) in the physical security area, known weaknesses exist at many ATC facilities; (3) FAA is similarly ineffective in managing systems security for its operational systems and is in violation of its own policy; (4) an October 1996 information systems security assessment concluded that FAA had performed the necessary analysis to determine system threats, vulnerabilities, and safeguards for only 3 of 90 operational ATC computer systems, or less than 4 percent; (5) FAA officials told GAO that this assessment is an accurate depiction of the current state of operational systems security; (6) according to the team that maintains FAA's telecommunications networks, only one of the nine operational ATC telecommunications networks has been analyzed; (7) without knowing the specific vulnerabilities of its ATC systems, FAA cannot adequately protect them; (8) FAA is also not effectively managing systems security for future ATC modernization systems; (9) it does not consistently include well formulated security requirements in specifications for all new ATC modernization systems, as required by FAA policy; (10) it does not have a well-defined security architecture, a concept of operations, or security standards, all of which are needed to define and ensure adequate security throughout the ATC network; (11) FAA's management structure and implementation of policy for ATC computer security is not effective; (12) security responsibilities are distributed among three organizations, all of which have been remiss in their ATC security duties; (13) the Office of Civil Aviation Security is responsible for developing and enforcing security policy, the Office of Air Traffic Services is responsible for implementing security policy for operational ATC systems, and the Office of Research and Acquisitions is responsible for implementing policy for ATC systems that are being developed; (14) the Office of Civil Aviation Security has not adequately enforced FAA's policies that require the assessment of physical security controls at all ATC facilities and vulnerabilities, threats, and safeguards for all operational ATC computer systems; and (15) the Office of Research and Acquisitions has not implemented the FAA policy that requires it to formulate requirements for security in specifications for all new ATC modernization systems. |
gao_GAO-16-86 | gao_GAO-16-86_0 | Moreover, we found that DOD may not always appropriately consider the manufacturing arsenals as a source of manufacture in a given situation, because it does not have clear, step-by-step implementing guidance on how to conduct make-or-buy analyses to determine whether to procure an item from the arsenals or the private sector. In response to the manufacturing arsenals’ inability to generate sufficient revenue to recover their operating expenses, Congress appropriated funds in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 to help recover the arsenals’ operating expenses and allow them to maintain competitive rates. Actions to Assign Work Have Not Generated Sufficient Revenue, and DOD May Not Always Appropriately Consider the Manufacturing Arsenals as a Source of Manufacture
The various actions that DOD has taken to assign work to the manufacturing arsenals, as described above, have not generated sufficient revenue to recover the arsenals’ operating expenses and do not ensure that DOD is appropriately considering the arsenals as a source of manufacture. While DOD’s efforts to assign work have increased revenue, the increases have been small relative to the manufacturing arsenals’ operating expenses. Pine Bluff Arsenal: $10 million in fiscal year 2014 and $10 million in fiscal year 2015. However, unless it identifies and documents these fundamental elements by including information that would be useful in determining DOD’s progress toward achieving its stated goals and objectives, the department is not strategically positioned to sustain the manufacturing arsenals’ critical capabilities. Because DOD has not identified the manufacturing arsenals’ critical capabilities or determined the minimum levels of workload needed to sustain these capabilities, as called for in the strategic plan, DOD is not positioned to achieve the strategic plan’s other goals and objectives. DOD’s Report Addresses Statutory Reporting Elements, but Additional Information Would Have Made It More Consistent with Relevant Research Presentation Standards
DOD’s September 2014 Report on Manufacturing Arsenal Study met the statutory requirements to address seven different reporting elements. However, we found that additional information and coordination would have made the report more consistent with relevant generally accepted research presentation standards for a defense research study, and therefore would have helped decision makers to identify and evaluate the information presented. For the remaining five reporting elements, we found that DOD’s September 2014 report is not consistent with the relevant presentation standards for soundness, completeness, and clarity. Additionally, the report does not disclose that, as previously discussed, DOD has not developed and implemented a process for identifying the manufacturing arsenals’ critical capabilities. Conclusions
As a result of the decline in demand for materiel, DOD is facing challenges in assigning work to its three manufacturing arsenals. These critical capabilities help ensure that DOD is able to respond to national emergencies and obtain products and services that it could not otherwise acquire from private industry in an economical manner. After falling short in prior efforts, DOD has an effort under way to develop a process to identify critical capabilities and a method for determining the minimum workload needed to sustain them, but that effort has been delayed. Additionally, had DOD coordinated its results with participants and stakeholders, they could have provided comments or corrections to misstatements, as needed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help DOD ensure that it appropriately considers the manufacturing arsenals as a source of manufacture and is strategically positioned to sustain the manufacturing arsenals’ critical capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
The Secretary of the Army to issue clear, step-by-step implementing guidance, such as an instruction or guidebook, on the process for conducting make-or- buy analyses in a consistent manner and identify and document fundamental elements—such as steps, interim milestones, time frames, and resources—for implementing the Army’s Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan 2012-2022 and
The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Maintenance Policy and Programs—in coordination with the military services, as appropriate, to complete DOD’s ongoing effort to establish a process for identifying the manufacturing arsenals’ critical capabilities and a method for determining the minimum workload needed to sustain these capabilities and develop and issue guidance, such as a DOD instruction, to implement the process for identifying the manufacturing arsenals’ critical capabilities and the method for determining the minimum workload needed to sustain these capabilities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report assesses (1) actions, if any, that the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken to assign work to the manufacturing arsenals to generate sufficient revenue to recover their operating expenses; (2) the extent to which DOD is strategically positioned to sustain the manufacturing arsenals’ critical capabilities; and (3) the extent to which DOD’s September 2014 report meets the requirements to address the statutory reporting elements and is consistent with relevant generally accepted research presentation standards for a defense research study. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's three manufacturing arsenals provide manufacturing, supply, and technical support services for the military services and allies during national emergencies and contingency operations. The Fiscal Year 2014 NDAA required DOD to report to Congress on its arsenals and included a provision for GAO to review DOD's report. This report assesses (1) actions DOD has taken to assign work to the manufacturing arsenals to generate sufficient revenue to recover their operating expenses, (2) the extent to which DOD is strategically positioned to sustain the manufacturing arsenals' critical capabilities, and (3) the extent to which DOD's September 2014 report addresses statutory reporting elements and is consistent with relevant research presentation standards for a defense research study. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed documentation, visited the arsenals, and interviewed relevant DOD officials. GAO assessed DOD's September 2014 report against the statutory elements and generally accepted research standards.
What GAO Found
Since 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken various actions to assign work to its three manufacturing arsenals—Pine Bluff Arsenal, Rock Island Arsenal Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center, and Watervliet Arsenal Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center—in an attempt to generate sufficient revenue to recover operating expenses following a significant decline in demand for materiel, as well as to maintain manufacturing skills to sustain readiness. For example, the Army directed acquisition programs to assign work to the arsenals consistent with the arsenals' capabilities. While these actions have increased revenue, the increases have been small relative to operating expenses. Further, DOD may not always appropriately consider the arsenals as a source of manufacture, because it has not developed clear, step-by-step implementing guidance on conducting make-or-buy analyses to determine whether to purchase items from an arsenal or the private sector, which potentially limits the arsenals' ability to generate revenue. Because DOD's actions as of September 2014 did not generate sufficient revenue, Congress provided $375 million collectively in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 to help recover the arsenals' operating expenses.
DOD is not strategically positioned to sustain the manufacturing arsenals' critical capabilities, as it has not identified fundamental elements for implementing its strategic plan or identified these capabilities. Such capabilities help ensure that DOD can respond to emergencies and obtain products and services it could not otherwise acquire from private industry in an economical manner. DOD has a strategic plan that includes goals and objectives related to sustaining the arsenals' critical capabilities; however, it has not identified fundamental elements, such as milestones and resources, needed to implement the plan. As a result, DOD lacks information that would be useful in determining progress in achieving the plan's stated goals and objectives for the arsenals. Moreover, DOD's past efforts to identify the arsenals' critical capabilities had shortcomings, such as each arsenal using a unique method to do so. DOD has an effort under way to develop a process for identifying these critical capabilities and determining a minimum level of workload needed to sustain them, but this effort has been delayed to allow for coordination with stakeholders. Until such a process is developed and implemented, for example through an instruction, DOD is not positioned to determine the minimum workload levels needed or to appropriately adjust the arsenals' equipment and personnel level to sustain these capabilities.
DOD's September 2014 Report on Army Manufacturing Arsenal Study met the statutory requirements to address seven reporting elements within the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014. However, GAO found that additional information would have made the report more consistent with relevant generally accepted research presentation standards for a defense research study and helped decision makers to identify and evaluate information presented in the report. For example, DOD did not disclose that it has not developed a process for identifying the arsenals' critical capabilities. Also, had stakeholders seen the report before it was issued, as called for by the standards, they would have been informed of its results and could have provided comments, as needed, to allow DOD to present a more sound, complete, and clear report.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD issue implementing guidance for make-or-buy analyses; identify fundamental elements for implementing its strategic plan; and develop and implement its process for identifying critical capabilities and the minimum workload level needed to sustain them. DOD concurred with the recommendations but disagreed with some statements in the report. GAO believes the statements are accurate, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-15-571 | gao_GAO-15-571_0 | Authorized Special Operations Military Positions Have Increased since 2001
Our analysis of data provided by SOCOM and its service component commands shows that the number of authorized special operations positions for military personnel increased from approximately 42,800 in fiscal year 2001 to approximately 62,800 in fiscal year 2014. Army Special Operations Command, U.S. In fiscal year 2001, special operations military positions constituted 1.9 percent of the services’ total authorized force levels. Special Operations– Specific Funding Has Increased Markedly since Fiscal Year 2001, but DOD Does Not Have Information on the Total Funding to Support SOF
While the size of SOF has increased by about 47 percent since fiscal year 2001, our analysis shows that the special operations–specific funding to support the force has more than tripled. We found that SOF–specific funding increased from about $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $9.8 billion in fiscal year 2014. DOD Has Little Visibility over Total Funding Devoted to SOF
Information on funding to support SOF exists, but funding data are tracked and managed across various organizations in a decentralized manner, and neither DOD nor the military services have systematically collected, estimated, or reported total SOF funding needs. Until DOD has more complete information on the total funding necessary to support SOF, decision makers will be unable to effectively identify and assess justification materials for future funding needs, or weigh priorities and assess budget trade-offs within anticipated declining resources. SOCOM Has Taken Steps to Manage the Effect of SOF Deployments, but Some Portions of SOF Are Still Heavily Deployed
In a May 2014 report to Congress, DOD noted that SOF personnel have come under significant strain in the years since September 11, 2001. DOD Has Not Fully Assessed Opportunities to Reduce the Demand for SOF
Opportunities may exist to better balance the workload across the force because the activities assigned to SOF can be similar to the types of activities assigned to conventional forces. Our work identified two factors that inhibit the department’s ability to share the burden of SOF deployments with conventional forces. Second, DOD’s current force-allocation process does not systematically consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate alternative to meet requests for SOF. Unless the department has a requirement to more fully assess whether opportunities exist to better balance operational demands across the joint force, the demand for SOF—and the high pace of deployments that results—is likely to continue. Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with SOCOM and the military services, to evaluate whether opportunities exist for certain types of activities traditionally conducted by SOF to be transferred to or shared with conventional forces and revise the validation criteria outlined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.06A to include a requirement that the Joint Staff consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate alternative to meet requests for SOF before validating combatant commander requests. Regarding DOD’s point about potential benefits for decision making, we continue to believe that having information on total funding to support SOF would help officials determine whether needs are realistic and feasible within identified budgetary constraints. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We conducted this work in response to a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, section 1086, to review organization, capabilities, structure, and oversight of special operations forces (SOF). This report (1) examines trends since fiscal year 2001 in authorized positions for special operations military personnel and how special operations force levels have compared with the military services’ total force levels, (2) evaluates the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has determined the total costs to support SOF, and (3) examines the extent to which DOD has taken steps to manage the pace of SOF deployments. To evaluate the extent to which DOD has taken steps to manage the pace of SOF deployments, we obtained and reviewed data from SOCOM on average weekly SOF deployments. | Why GAO Did This Study
SOF are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in hostile or politically sensitive environments. Since 2001, DOD has increased the size and funding of SOF and emphasized SOF's importance to meet national security needs. SOF deployments have focused on the Middle East and placed significant demand on the force during this period.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision that GAO review SOF force structure. This report examines (1) trends since FY 2001 in authorized special operations military positions; (2) the extent to which DOD has determined total funding for SOF; and (3) the extent to which DOD has taken steps to manage the pace of SOF deployments, among other issues.
GAO analyzed data for FYs 2001 through 2014 on SOF authorized positions, funding, and deployment data. GAO reviewed data on service-provided SOF funding and policies and other documentation and interviewed officials regarding processes for managing SOF deployments.
What GAO Found
GAO analysis of the resources devoted to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) found that the number of authorized special operations military positions increased from about 42,800 in fiscal year (FY) 2001 to about 62,800 in FY 2014, which includes combat and support personnel. Even with this growth, special operations military positions constituted less than 3 percent of the military services' FY14 total authorized force levels.
Special operations–specific funding has increased markedly, but the Department of Defense (DOD) has not determined the total funding used to support special operations forces (SOF). Funding provided to SOCOM for special operations–specific needs has more than tripled from about $3.1 billion in FY 2001 to about $9.8 billion in FY 2014 constant dollars, including supplemental funding for contingency operations. However, these totals do not include funding provided by the services, which SOCOM estimates is more than $8 billion annually. GAO found that DOD has little visibility over total funding to support SOF, primarily because it has not established a requirement or methodology to capture and report this information. Until DOD has more complete information on total funding to support SOF, decision makers will be unable to effectively identify and assess resource needs or weigh priorities and assess budget trade-offs.
DOD has taken some steps to manage the increased pace of special operations deployments, but opportunities may exist to better balance the workload across the joint force because activities assigned to SOF can be similar to activities assigned to conventional forces. Average weekly deployments of SOF personnel have increased from about 2,900 in FY 2001 to about 7,200 in FY 2014. SOCOM has taken steps to manage the effect of SOF deployments, but DOD reported that some portions of the force are still heavily deployed. GAO identified two factors that inhibit DOD's ability to potentially share the burden of SOF deployments with the conventional force. First, DOD has not evaluated since 2003 whether activities performed by SOF could be conducted by conventional forces. Second, DOD's current force-allocation process provides the Joint Staff with criteria to validate force requests, but does not systematically consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate alternative to meet some requests for SOF. Unless the department more fully assesses whether opportunities exist to better balance demands across the joint force, the demand for SOF and the high pace of deployments that results is likely to continue.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD improve visibility in total funding to support SOF and determine whether opportunities exist to balance deployments across the joint force. DOD partially concurred, stating that existing processes that guide funding and force allocation decisions are appropriate, but that it would review these processes and consider opportunities for improvement. GAO continues to believe that actions are needed, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-06-108 | gao_GAO-06-108_0 | 2. However, many work in unstable, low-wage jobs with few benefits and advancement opportunities. Programs Used Four Strategies Designed to Help TANF Clients Move into Higher Wage Employment or Build Financial Assets
Based on our interviews with experts and our site visits, we identified four strategies used to help TANF clients find well-paying jobs and improve their financial condition: training, post-secondary education, self- employment, and financial asset building. Many programs we visited used a combination of one or more of the four strategies. A Network of Non- Profits, TANF Agencies, Employers, and Community Colleges Is Key to Operating Programs
The programs we visited relied on a network of support to help TANF clients prepare for and attain well-paying jobs. Typically, the programs we visited were run by non-profit organizations providing services to TANF clients either under contract with a TANF agency or using a mix of public and private funding sources. Some state and local welfare agencies, through adopting specific policy provisions such as allowances for post- secondary education, also played a key role in fostering the strategies in this report. In addition to core services, local non-profits and TANF agencies either directly provided or helped link clients to services such as child care, housing, and on-the-job support. Partnerships with Local Employers and Community Colleges Yield Additional Resources for TANF Clients
As part of the broader network, local non-profit programs and TANF offices often forged partnerships with local employers to open up job opportunities for their clients. Although HHS has several efforts underway, more needs to be known about the effectiveness of strategies for building individuals’ skills and earnings capacity and how to incorporate them as options within state and local TANF programs. HHS Conducts and Shares Research on Employment and Asset-building Strategies
HHS is engaging in several research projects focused on helping TANF clients and other low-income individuals find higher-wage employment and build their assets. For example, research could help identify (1) more information on specific education and training strategies that work and what the key program elements are that lead to success and that can be replicated; (2) ways to incorporate education and training strategies into the lives of low-income individuals, whether as part of a welfare-to work program or in combination with part- or full-time work; (3) which strategies work best for those with varying skill levels, including how best to target educational and training skills to specific job needs, particularly for those who may not succeed in a classroom setting; and (4) which service delivery approaches are the most effective and cost-efficient, including understanding more about the most appropriate provider or access point, such as the welfare, educational, or employment and training systems or some combination of these. HHS Provides Targeted Grants That Encourage Use of Strategies
HHS also supports strategies designed to help TANF clients raise their incomes through targeted grants. In addition to the TANF grant—one of the most significant and likely sources of funding for welfare programs— the agency also offers two smaller grant programs that directly support the employment and asset-building strategies discussed in this report. Regional offices sometimes collaborate with other federal agencies in these efforts. While HHS has provided some technical assistance to facilitate use of these strategies, the overall emphasis of welfare reform on work rather than education and training is sometimes perceived by programs as a barrier to implementing these strategies for TANF recipients. Because of these factors, HHS officials may find it increasingly challenging to gather and disseminate information on promising practices or to provide technical assistance for local programs wishing to implement these promising strategies. It is more difficult, but important, to reach all of the parties now involved in delivering welfare-to- work services in this more decentralized environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following major welfare reform in 1996, the number of families receiving cash assistance was cut in half to 2 million. While many former recipients now rely more on their earnings, they often work at low-wage jobs with limited benefits and advancement opportunities. To better understand how to help these individuals and their families attain economic self-sufficiency, GAO is reporting on (1) strategies designed to increase income for TANF recipients through employment; (2) the key factors related to implementing and operating such strategies; and (3) actions the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has taken to facilitate the use of these strategies. GAO consulted experts to gather information about promising strategies and visited 26 programs.
What GAO Found
Based on interviews with experts and site visits, we identified four strategies that aimed to increase incomes for recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)--training, post-secondary education, self-employment, and financial asset building. Training strategies often targeted services to particular groups or job market needs. Other programs used post-secondary education to position clients for higher-wage jobs. Some programs we visited gave participants the tools to run their own businesses as a way out of poverty. Finally, asset building strategies aim to help clients save and invest money to pursue career goals and support their families. The 26 programs we visited used one or more of these strategies. A broad network of local non-profits, state and local TANF offices, employers, and community colleges is key to operating these strategies. Some of the programs we visited were non-profits under contract with the TANF office. Others relied on a mix of public and private funds, some because of concerns that TANF's emphasis on work was a barrier to providing education and training options. State and local TANF offices, for their part, sometimes set policies and provide additional funding to encourage the strategies discussed in this report. Local non-profits and TANF agencies either directly provided or helped link clients to supplemental services such as child care, housing, on-the-job support, and transportation. As part of the broader network, local non-profits and TANF offices often forged links with employers and community colleges to leverage additional resources for their clients, including training curricula, career ladders, and work opportunities. HHS is supporting these strategies through research, targeted grants, and technical assistance. Efforts by other federal agencies, such as the Departments of Education and Labor, also support some of the strategies discussed in this report. HHS has several research projects focused on helping low-income individuals find higher-wage employment and build their assets. While these efforts are important, more needs to be known about the effectiveness of specific strategies, such as those identified in this report, in increasing TANF recipients' earnings capacity. In addition to the TANF block grant, HHS has two small grant programs that support employment and asset-building strategies. While HHS has provided some technical assistance to facilitate the use of these strategies, it is not clear whether service providers understand ways they can incorporate education and training in a work-focused welfare system. Furthermore, HHS faces some challenges disseminating information on new research or promising strategies to all of the organizations providing services to TANF clients in the more decentralized welfare environment. |
gao_GAO-13-603 | gao_GAO-13-603_0 | CBP Public Reporting of Border Crossing Wait Time Data
CBP defines border wait time as the time it takes for a vehicle to travel from the end of the queue—which may be in Mexico or the United States, depending on the length of the line—to the CBP primary inspection point in the United States. CBP’s Wait Time Data Are Unreliable for Informing the Public and CBP Management Decisions, and CBP Has Not Assessed the Feasibility of Automated Data Collection Options
Wait Time Data Are Unreliable and of Limited Usefulness; CBP Has Not Taken Steps to Improve Its Current Wait Time Estimation Methodology
CBP policy identifies two methodologies to be used by ports of entry for manually calculating wait times for commercial vehicles; however, challenges in implementing these methodologies contribute to CBP wait time data being of limited usefulness for public reporting and management decision making across border crossings. The recommendations directed CBP to, among other things (1) use closed-circuit television cameras to measure wait time in real time; (2) provide a standardized measurement and validation tool, such as a useful and well-documented benchmarking system; and (3) continue to monitor and evaluate applications of transportation technologies at the border that allow for better measurement and reporting of wait times.from three offices—the office that sponsored the report (Land Border Integration), the office in charge of cargo operations (Cargo Conveyance and Security), and the office that maintains the agency’s wait time data (Planning Program Analysis and Evaluation)—were all unclear as to the steps, if any, that had been taken to address the first two recommendations and which office was responsible for implementing them. CBP Has Not Assessed the Feasibility of New Automation Options
In February 2008, FHWA, in coordination with state DOTs and CBP, initiated pilot projects to develop automated wait time data collection methods at select southwest border crossings. Given that CBP officials have stated that automated data collection is the most effective method for obtaining standardized and reliable wait time data, conducting an assessment of the feasibility of the methods piloted by FHWA or other automation methods, in consultation with FHWA and state DOTs, could help CBP determine how to best achieve its goal of improving the reliability of its publicly reported wait time data. CBP Analyses and Officials Identified Some Infrastructure and Staff Needs, but the Methodology Used to Allocate Staff across Ports of Entry Has Not Been Documented
CBP Analyses and Officials Indicated Need for Additional Infrastructure at Some Crossings, and Our Analysis of Data on Primary Lane Use Generally Supported These Assessments
CBP analyses and port officials identified needs for additional infrastructure—such as more lanes—at some border crossings, and our analysis of CBP data on lane use generally supported agency views on the extent to which CBP opens lanes at the six crossings we visited. Further, our analysis supports CBP officials’ statements that they generally open and close primary inspection lanes in response to fluctuations in commercial traffic volume, but some port officials cited constraints to opening more lanes during times of peak traffic. CBP and GSA assessments and officials identified current infrastructure limitations affecting commercial vehicle processing at three of the six crossings we visited. They further reported actively working to adjust staff allocations across locations to better ensure that staffing levels are matched to areas of greatest need. However, this official explained that this process is not documented and there is no guidance clearly defining this methodology, the factors considered, or the rationale for making staff allocation decisions. OMB and our guidance recommend the use of outcome-oriented performance measures to promote accountability for results. Taking steps to help CBP port officials implement CBP’s existing mechanisms for collecting wait time data, consistent with agency guidance, could improve data reliability and usefulness for these purposes. In addition, it is difficult for CBP or others to gauge the agency’s progress in meeting its trade facilitation goal because CBP does not have outcome-oriented measures for its trade facilitation efforts. To better ensure that CBP’s OFO’s staffing processes are transparent and to help ensure CBP can demonstrate that these resource decisions have effectively addressed CBP’s mission needs, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP document the methodology and process OFO uses to allocate staff to land ports of entry on the southwest border, including the rationales and factors considered in making these decisions. To facilitate transparency and performance accountability for its trade facilitation programs and meeting CBP’s goal of balancing its trade and security missions, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP develop outcome-oriented performance measures or proxy measures to capture the impact of CBP’s trade facilitation efforts, such as measures to determine the extent to which CBP trusted shipper programs have met their goals. However, the actions DHS identified will not address the intent of one of these recommendations. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following questions:
To what extent are CBP wait time data reliable for public reporting and informing CBP decisions on staffing and infrastructure investments? To what extent has CBP identified infrastructure and staffing needed to process current commercial traffic volume at southwest border crossings with high traffic volume? To what extent do CBP performance measures address progress toward its goal of facilitating trade? 2. 4. (These are also called strategic measures within the department.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Trade with Mexico is important to the United States' economy. Most of this trade crosses the border by truck, and studies have shown that long waits at border crossings can negatively affect the U.S. economy. CBP is responsible for securing U.S. borders at ports of entry to prevent illegal entry of persons and contraband while also facilitating legitimate trade and travel. GAO was asked to examine CBP data on and actions taken to address wait times at southwest border crossings. This report addresses the extent to which (1) CBP wait time data are reliable for public reporting and informing CBP decisions, (2) CBP has identified infrastructure and staffing needed to process current commercial traffic volumes, and (3) CBP performance measures assess progress toward its trade facilitation goal. GAO assessed the reliability of CBP's wait time data; visited six land border crossings (not generalizable, but selected largely for high traffic volume); analyzed CBP documentation, including needs assessments; and interviewed stakeholders and CBP officials.
What GAO Found
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) data on commercial vehicle wait times--the time it takes to travel from the end of the queue to the CBP primary inspection point at land border crossings--are unreliable for public reporting and CBP management decisions across border crossings. These data--which are collected manually by CBP officers--are unreliable because CBP officers inconsistently implement an approved data collection methodology, and the methodologies used vary by crossing. For example, five of the six crossings GAO visited require observation of the end of the queue to estimate wait times, but officials at these crossings reported the lines extended beyond their view at times. As a result, these data are generally not used by the private sector and are of limited usefulness for CBP management decisions on staffing and infrastructure investments. Determining and taking steps to help CBP officials overcome challenges to consistent implementation of existing methodologies could improve the reliability and usefulness of CBP's current wait time data. CBP officials have identified automated wait time data collection technology as the best way to improve data reliability. The Department of Transportation (DOT), in coordination with state DOTs and CBP, has ongoing pilot projects to use technology to gather more reliable wait time data at some border crossings. However, CBP has not assessed the feasibility of replacing current methods with automated data collection. Doing so, consistent with program management standards, could help CBP determine how to best improve data reliability.
CBP officials report and analyses indicate infrastructure and staff needs, but documenting CBP's staff allocation process could improve transparency and facilitate review and validation by CBP and others. CBP officials and analyses identify needs for additional infrastructure--such as more lanes--at some crossings, and GAO analysis of CBP data on lane use generally supported agency views on the extent to which CBP opens lanes at the six crossings GAO visited. Further, GAO analysis of lane use and traffic volume data generally supported CBP officials' statements that they open and close primary inspection lanes in response to fluctuations in commercial traffic volume. CBP analyses identified a need for 3,811 additional officers, and CBP headquarters officials told GAO all southwest border ports require additional staff, but CBP field and port managers at three of six crossings GAO visited reported having sufficient staff. CBP human capital officials reported that they adjust staff allocations across locations to better ensure that staff levels match areas of greatest need, but CBP has not documented this process, and there is no guidance defining the methodology used or factors considered when allocating staff across ports. Documenting this process, consistent with internal control standards, could improve transparency, helping CBP and others to better ensure that scarce staff resources are effectively allocated to fulfill mission needs across ports.
CBP does not have outcome-oriented performance measures to determine the extent to which the agency is facilitating trade. The Office of Management and Budget and GAO guidance recommend using outcome-oriented measures to promote accountability for results. In the absence of such measures, it is difficult for the agency or others to gauge CBP's progress in meeting its stated goal of facilitating trade.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP (1) determine and take steps to helpensure consistent implementation ofexisting wait time data collection methodologies, (2) assess the feasibility of replacing current methodologies with automated methods, (3) document its staff allocation process and rationale, and (4) develop outcome-oriented performance measures. DHS agreed with these four recommendations and identified steps to address them, although the planned actions will not address the intent of one. |
gao_GAO-10-840T | gao_GAO-10-840T_0 | The first block, known as Block 1, is to include a mix of surveillance technologies (e.g., cameras, radars, and sensors) and C3I technologies that are to produce a common operating picture—a uniform presentation of activities within specific areas along the border. In January 2010, the DHS Secretary ordered a departmentwide reassessment of the program to include a comprehensive assessment of alternatives to SBInet to ensure that the department utilizes the most efficient and effective technological and operational solutions to secure the border. In September 2008, we reported that the scope of SBInet was becoming more limited without becoming more specific, thus making it unclear and uncertain what system capabilities would be delivered when and to what locations. To its credit, the SPO subsequently defined the scope of the first incremental block of SBInet capabilities that it intended to deploy and make operational; however, these capabilities and the number of geographic locations to which they are to be deployed have continued to shrink. However, DHS has not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of Block 1. Without a meaningful understanding of SBInet costs and benefits, DHS lacks an adequate basis for knowing whether the initial system solution is cost-effective. In particular: The SPO revised its Systems Engineering Plan, which documents its life cycle management approach for SBInet definition, development, testing, deployment, and sustainment, in November 2008, and this plan is largely consistent with DHS and other relevant guidance. In summary, we recommended that DHS limit future investment in SBInet to work that is either already under contract and supports the completion of Block 1 activities for deployment to TUS-1 and AJO-1 and/or provides a basis for a departmental decision on what, if any, expanded investment in SBInet is justifiable as a prudent use of DHS’s resources for carrying out its border security and immigration management mission. Further, we recommended that DHS decide whether proceeding with expanded investment in SBInet represents a prudent use of the department’s resources, and report the decision, and the basis for it, to the department’s authorization and appropriations committees. To DHS’s credit, it has initiated actions to address our recommendations. To minimize the program’s exposure to risk, it is imperative for DHS to follow through on its stated commitment to ensure that SBInet, as proposed, is the right course of action for meeting its stated border security and immigration management goals and outcomes, and once this is established, for it to ensure that the program is executed in accordance with proven acquisition management best practices. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is intended to help secure the 6,000 miles of international borders that the contiguous United States shares with Canada and Mexico. The program, which began in November 2005, seeks to enhance border security and reduce illegal immigration by improving surveillance technologies, raising staffing levels, increasing domestic enforcement of immigration laws, and improving physical infrastructure along the nation's borders. Within SBI, the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) is a multibillion dollar program that includes the acquisition, development, integration, deployment, and operation of surveillance technologies--such as unattended ground sensors and radar and cameras mounted on fixed and mobile towers--to create a "virtual border fence." In addition, command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) software and hardware are to use the information gathered by the surveillance technologies to create a real-time picture of what is transpiring within specific areas along the border and transmit the information to command centers and vehicles.
What GAO Found
The testimony summarizes our most recent report on SBInet, which provided a timely and compelling case for DHS to rethink the plans it had in place at the beginning of this year for investing in SBInet. In this regard, we showed that the scope of the initial system's capabilities and areas of deployment have continued to shrink, thus making it unclear what capabilities are to be delivered when. Moreover, DHS had yet to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the proposed SBInet solution, and thus whether the considerable time and money being invested represented a prudent use of limited resources. Further, DHS had not employed the kind of acquisition management rigor and discipline needed to reasonably ensure that the proposed system capabilities would be delivered on time and within budget. Collectively, we concluded that these limitations increased the risk that the proposed solution would not meet the department's stated border security and immigration management goals. To minimize the program's exposure to risk, we recommended that DHS determine whether its proposed SBInet solution satisfied the department's border security needs in the most cost-effective manner and that the department improve several key life cycle management areas. DHS largely agreed with our recommendations. More importantly, since receiving these recommendations in a draft of our report in March 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security has taken action to limit the department's near-term investment in SBInet pending its completion of an analysis of alternative investment options. This and other planned actions are consistent with the intent of our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-763 | gao_GAO-11-763_0 | 1.) DEA and ICE Have Taken Actions to Implement Cross- Designation, Information-Sharing, and Deconfliction Provisions of the 2009 Agreement
DEA and ICE have taken actions to implement the 2009 Agreement’s provisions. The agencies have implemented the Agreement’s cross- designation provisions through a revised process that is more streamlined and has resulted in enhanced flexibility in maximizing investigative resources, according to ICE Narcotics and Contraband Smuggling Unit officials. ICE has also implemented the Agreement’s Fusion Center and Special Operations Division information-sharing provisions by sharing required data with these organizations. Additionally, DEA and ICE developed and implemented local deconfliction protocols and used a variety of mechanisms to deconflict counternarcotics investigations in accordance with the Agreement. DEA and ICE headquarters and field office management officials interviewed generally reported that the implementation of the Agreement and local deconfliction protocols had generally improved deconfliction. DEA Operations and Management officials reported that the cross-designation process is more efficient since DEA now reviews one consolidated list of agents instead of numerous individual requests. According to El Paso Intelligence Center and ICE Homeland Security Investigations officials, ICE is working with the Center to complete the data transfer by fall 2011. Agencies deconflict to (1) ensure officer safety and (2) prevent one agency’s law enforcement activity from compromising the other agency’s ongoing investigation because agencies invest extensive time and resources in sophisticated law enforcement operations. The worksheet provides information on the investigation (e.g., the violation, suspect, and ICE office carrying out the investigation, among other things). Field management or first-line supervisors in other ICE offices reported that they deconflicted by providing DEA with plans for a law enforcement activity. She explained that nexus issues associated with a specific case are resolved at the local level. DEA and ICE Have Primarily Used Established Processes to Monitor the Agreement, and the Headquarters Review Team Did Not Identify Any Systemic Issues
According to DEA and ICE officials, the agencies have each primarily used established processes to monitor the implementation of the 2009 Agreement. According to DEA and ICE headquarters officials, the May 2011 meeting of the HRT constituted a review of the 2009 Agreement and affirmed that there were no overarching or systemic issues of coordination or deconfliction requiring headquarters-level intervention. The 2009 Agreement provides for monitoring through the HRT, which is to periodically review the performance of the Agreement. Additionally, ICE provided written technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. This report addresses the following questions: 1. 2. To make our selection we used the following criteria: geographic dispersion (e.g., northern border, southern border, and interior); the number and proportion of ICE agents cross-designated to conduct counternarcotics investigations; unique provisions in the local deconfliction protocols, which vary from the template DEA and ICE headquarters distributed to the field offices; metropolitan areas most often identified as originating and receiving drug shipments by the Department of Justice’s 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment; and sites recommended by DEA or ICE headquarters officials to illustrate different enforcement situations that could affect implementation of the Agreement. To assess the extent to which DEA and ICE have taken actions to monitor the implementation of the 2009 Agreement in domestic offices and make any needed adjustments, we analyzed the 2009 Agreement to identify actions to be taken to monitor its implementation and any documentation, such as guidance or communications to the field from DEA and ICE headquarters describing how the implementation of the Agreement has been monitored and any mechanisms in place to obtain information on how the Agreement is working in the field. Information from the interviews is not generalizable to all DEA and ICE field offices nationwide, but provided illustrative examples of these efforts. DEA and ICE Disseminated Information on the 2009 Agreement
After the signing of the 2009 Agreement, DEA and ICE headquarters disseminated information about the Agreement through their respective chains of command, communicated with field management about its provisions, and directed the SACs in corresponding DEA and ICE field offices to develop local deconfliction protocols to implement the Agreement, as previously discussed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment stated that the availability of illicit drugs is increasing. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in the Department of Justice (DOJ), works with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to carry out drug enforcement efforts. DEA and ICE signed a 2009 Interagency Agreement (Agreement) that outlined the mechanisms to provide ICE with authority to investigate violations of controlled substances laws (i.e., cross-designation). The Agreement also required DEA and ICE to deconflict (e.g., coordinate to ensure officer safety and prevent duplicative work) counternarcotics investigations, among other things. GAO was asked to assess the Agreement's implementation. This report addresses the extent to which DEA and ICE have taken actions (1) to implement the Agreement's cross-designation, deconfliction, and information-sharing provisions and (2) to monitor implementation of the Agreement and make needed adjustments. GAO analyzed documents such as the 2009 Agreement, related interagency agreements, and directives to field offices. GAO also interviewed DEA and ICE Headquarters officials as well as management officials and first line supervisors in 8 of the 21 DEA and 8 of 26 ICE field offices, based on geographic dispersion. Though not generalizable to all DEA and ICE offices, the interviews provided insights.
What GAO Found
DEA and ICE have taken actions to fully implement the cross-designation and deconfliction provisions of the Agreement, and are finalizing efforts to complete the information-sharing provisions. The Agreement allows ICE to select an unlimited number of agents for cross-designation consideration by DEA. The agencies have implemented these cross-designation provisions through a revised process that (1) elevated the levels at which requests are exchanged between the agencies and (2) consolidated multiple requests into one list of ICE agents. This new process is more streamlined and has resulted in enhanced flexibility in maximizing investigative resources, according to ICE officials. Also, DEA and ICE implemented local deconfliction protocols and used a variety of mechanisms (e.g., local deconfliction centers) to deconflict investigations. Further, in May 2011 DEA and ICE convened the Headquarters Review Team (HRT), comprised of senior managers from both agencies, who are, among other things, to resolve deconfliction and coordination issues that cannot be resolved at lower levels because they require management decisions. DEA and ICE headquarters and field office management officials GAO interviewed generally reported that the implementation of the Agreement and local deconfliction protocols had generally improved deconfliction by (1) ensuring officer safety and (2) preventing one agency's law enforcement activity from compromising the other agency's ongoing investigation. ICE has also partially implemented the Agreement's information-sharing provisions by sharing required data with two DOJ organizations that target drug trafficking organizations, and taking steps to share its drug-related data with a DEA organization focused on disrupting drug trafficking by fall 2011. DEA and ICE have conducted ongoing monitoring of the Agreement's implementation through established processes (e.g., supervisory chains of command) and according to officials from these agencies, the HRT did not identify any systemic issues. Specifically, DEA and ICE headquarters officials routinely coordinated with each other and their respective field offices to monitor the Agreement's implementation. DEA and ICE headquarters officials also said that the May 2011 meeting of the HRT, which is to periodically review the Agreement's implementation, constituted a review of the Agreement and affirmed that there were no overarching or systemic issues of coordination or deconfliction requiring headquarters-level intervention. DEA and ICE provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-15-252 | gao_GAO-15-252_0 | For example, government-wide waiver authority was contained in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 and allows agencies to waive offset requirements on a temporary basis. Use of Reemployed Annuitants Increased Between 2004 and 2013 with Most Concentrated in the Department of Defense
Our analysis of OPM’s data indicate that agencies’ use of reemployed annuitants has increased, with the number of on-board uniformed and civil service annuitants rising from over 95,000 in September 2004 to around 171,000 in September 2013 (from about 5 percent to 8 percent of the federal workforce). This is inclusive of reemployed annuitants with and without dual compensation waivers, as well as retired uniformed service members whose retirement or retainer pay is not subject to reduction. More than half of these reemployed civilian annuitants, specifically DOD’s civil service reemployed annuitants, would not be covered under OPM’s waiver authority. DOD accounted for 83 percent of the increase in annuitants from 2004 to 2013— of this increase, approximately 3 percent were civil service annuitants and about 98 percent were uniformed service annuitants. OPM Does Not Conduct Trend Analysis of Dual Compensation Waiver Requests and Has Not Developed Policies and Procedures to Manage Waiver Documentation
OPM officials said that they do not conduct trend analysis of dual compensation waiver requests because each waiver is so unique that there is no trend or pattern to analyze. While there is no specific statutory requirement for OPM to conduct trend analysis, without such analysis, OPM may be missing opportunities to analyze this information that can help guide the human capital management tools and guidance it develops and provides to agencies government-wide. Ensuring OPM is identifying challenges and assisting agencies as issues emerge is especially important given the increasing number of retirement-eligible employees across the federal government. OPM officials said that they do not have a systematic and reliable process for maintaining dual compensation waiver documentation. Given OPM’s document management challenges, as previously discussed, OPM was unable to provide us with a representative sample of waiver approval letters to determine whether OPM consistently established time limits on the delegation of waiver authority provided to agencies and, if not, whether there were instances where monitoring or oversight was necessary. Given the increasing use of reemployed annuitants and the impending wave of retirements, OPM is missing an opportunity to leverage the information gained through the review and approval of dual compensation waivers to inform and improve upon the assistance it provides federal agencies in their management of human capital. 2. In written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II, OPM did not concur with one recommendation and partially concurred with one. We continue to believe that OPM should take action to fully address this recommendation and comply with federal internal control standards. To evaluate the extent to which OPM analyzes trends in the reasons for waiver requests and provides related guidance, we reviewed OPM’s policies and procedures for evaluating waiver requests, analyzed documentation from OPM, and interviewed officials. To evaluate the extent to which OPM ensures compliance with conditions under which the waivers were granted, we reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, OPM’s policies and procedures for reviewing waiver requests, and interviewed OPM officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal workforce has a large number of retirement-eligible employees that could potentially result in a loss of skills hindering federal agencies' ability to meet their missions. Agencies can mitigate this challenge by hiring uniformed and civil service retirees. Generally, when an agency reemploys a retired civil service employee, their salary rate is subject to offset by the amount of the annuity received. Upon request, OPM has authority to waive offsets, allowing dual compensation (annuity and full salary). Dual compensation is also permitted under other authorities not administered by OPM, such as the authority provided to Defense.
GAO was asked to provide information on the use of rehired annuitants and OPM's dual compensation waiver authority. This report: (1) describes the trends in rehired annuitants for fiscal years 2004 to 2013; (2) identifies the extent to which OPM analyzes trends in the reasons for waiver requests, and provides guidance to agencies, and (3) evaluates the extent to which OPM ensures agencies' compliance with the conditions under which the waivers were granted. GAO analyzed OPM data, reviewed OPM documentation, and interviewed OPM officials.
What GAO Found
Agencies' use of reemployed annuitants has increased, with the number of on-board retired uniformed and civil service annuitants increasing from over 95,000 in fiscal year 2004 to around 171,000 in fiscal year 2013 (from about 5 percent to 8 percent of the federal workforce). This is inclusive of reemployed annuitants with and without dual compensation waivers. The Department of Defense (DOD) accounted for about 80 percent of rehired annuitants in 2013; ninety-eight percent of which were retired uniformed service members whose retirement pay is not subject to reduction. More than half of the total reemployed civilian annuitants in 2013, including DOD's civil service reemployed annuitants, would not be covered under the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) dual compensation waiver authority.
OPM officials said that they do not conduct trend analysis of dual compensation waiver requests and they provide related guidance only as needed. While OPM is not required to conduct trend analysis, given the increasing number of retirement-eligible federal employees, without such analysis OPM may be missing opportunities to analyze information that can inform decisions about the human capital management tools it develops and provides for agencies government-wide. OPM's ability to conduct trend analysis is limited by its lack of a systematic and reliable process for maintaining dual compensation waiver documentation. The lack of policies and procedures is inconsistent with federal internal control standards and made OPM unable to timely retrieve the documentation for GAO's review.
OPM is not required by statute to monitor agencies' implementation of individual dual compensation waivers to determine whether relevant requirements are followed. OPM regulations provide for limited oversight in delegated situations, where waiver authority is delegated to agencies without a time limit.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OPM analyze trends in agencies' use of dual compensation waivers and establish policies and procedures for maintaining waiver documentation. OPM did not concur with the first and partially concurred with the second recommendation. GAO maintains that OPM should implement these actions as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-05-344 | gao_GAO-05-344_0 | Drinking water is provided to District of Columbia residents under a unique organizational structure: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Washington Aqueduct draws water from the Potomac River that it filters and chemically treats to meet EPA specifications. Because WASA and property owners in the District share ownership of the water service lines, the rule required WASA to replace the portion of the lines that it owns, and to offer to replace the portion of the lines controlled by the homeowners at the homeowners’ expense. Agencies Have Improved Coordination, but Challenges Remain in Reducing Lead Levels
WASA and other government agencies implementing the act’s regulations for lead have taken steps to improve their coordination. The order required WASA to improve its selection of sampling locations and reporting of water testing results to EPA, create a strategy to improve its public education efforts, physically replace an additional 1,615 lead service lines by the end of fiscal year 2006, develop a plan and a schedule to identify additional lead service lines, and, in collaboration with the D.C. Department of Health, develop a plan to set priorities for replacing lead service lines. Inspector General’s January 2005 report. WASA and Other Agencies Are Taking Steps to Identify At- Risk Populations and Reduce Their Lead Exposure
WASA is identifying those most at risk for exposure to lead in drinking water by updating its inventory of lead service lines. WASA Is Updating Its Lead Service Line Inventory
WASA and EPA officials are focusing on lead service lines as the primary source of lead in drinking water in the District of Columbia. However, to reduce exposure to lead in drinking water for those residents most vulnerable to lead’s health effects, WASA agreed, as part of the consent order, to develop in consultation with the D.C. Department of Health a system for setting priorities for lead service line replacement and to replace 1,000 lead service lines by the end of fiscal year 2006 on a priority basis. Experiences of Other Water Systems Highlight Ways to Better Educate the Public
Other water systems use innovative methods to educate their customers about lead in drinking water. These practices include using a variety of media to inform the public, forming partnerships with government agencies and community groups, and targeting educational materials to the audience most susceptible to lead exposure through drinking water. These practices tend to go well beyond the provisions of the Lead and Copper Rule, which require public notification language that is difficult to understand and do not require utilities to notify individual homeowners of the lead concentrations in their homes’ drinking water. EPA has not evaluated the effectiveness of the public education requirements of the rule since it was implemented in 1991. Although Lead Exposure Causes Serious Health Effects, Research on Low-Level Exposure to Lead in Drinking Water Is Limited
Much is known about the health effects of lead exposure, particularly lead’s impact on brain development and functioning in young children. However, according to experts we interviewed, limited studies have been conducted on the heath effects of exposure to low levels of lead in drinking water. This study was designed to determine the extent to which lead in drinking water was contributing to blood lead levels of District residents. Since that time, local agencies and EPA have improved their coordination. However, the timetable for completing these projects is not clear, and it is also not clear how this work will fit into a broader research agenda or if this agenda will involve other key organizations such as CDC. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide timely information to communities on how to improve communication of lead health risks, we recommend, as part of its comprehensive re-examination of the Lead and Copper Rule’s public education requirements, that the Administrator of EPA direct the Office of Water to identify and publish best practices that water systems are using to educate the public about lead in drinking water. To determine how other drinking water systems that have exceeded the action level for lead conducted public education and outreach, we met with parties knowledgeable about the Lead and Copper Rule, including EPA headquarters and regional staff and relevant industry groups, in part to find water systems with particularly innovative and effective public education and outreach programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Media reports on elevated lead in the District of Columbia's drinking water raised concern about how local and federal agencies are carrying out their responsibilities. The Lead and Copper Rule requires water systems to protect drinking water from lead. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Washington Aqueduct treats and sells water to the District Water and Sewer Authority (WASA), which delivers it to District residents. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Region III Office oversees these agencies. GAO examined (1) what agencies implementing the rule in the District are doing to improve their coordination and reduce lead levels, (2) the extent to which WASA and other agencies are identifying populations at greatest risk of exposure to lead in drinking water and reducing their exposure, (3) how other drinking water systems that exceed EPA's action level for lead conduct public education, and (4) the state of research on lead exposure and how it applies to drinking water.
What GAO Found
WASA and other government agencies have improved their coordination, but significant challenges remain. According to EPA officials, WASA has thus far met the terms of a June 2004 consent order by enhancing its coordination with EPA and the D.C. Department of Health. For example, WASA developed a plan to improve its public education efforts and collaborated with the department to set priorities for replacing lead service lines. EPA expects the August 2004 addition of a corrosion inhibitor to eventually reduce lead in drinking water, though it may take more than one year for full improvements to be observed. Tap water test results reported in January 2005 show that D.C. drinking water still exceeds the standard for lead. WASA is identifying those customers most at risk from exposure to lead in drinking water and reducing their exposure. WASA is focusing on lead service lines as the primary source of lead in drinking water. It is updating its inventory of lead service lines, accelerating its rate of service line replacement, and providing priority replacement for customers most vulnerable to lead's health effects. However, questions remain about the success of the replacement program because, by law, WASA can only pay to replace the portion of the service line that it owns. Homeowners may pay to replace their portion of the service line, but few homeowners chose to do so in 2003 and 2004. Other water systems use innovative methods to educate their customers and to judge the effectiveness of their efforts. These practices include using a variety of media to inform the public, forming partnerships with government and nonprofit agencies, and targeting and adapting information to the audiences most susceptible to lead exposure through drinking water. Many of these practices go well beyond the requirements of the Lead and Copper Rule. In this connection, water industry representatives and others noted several shortcomings with the rule's public education provisions, including confusing language and the lack of a requirement to notify homeowners of the specific lead levels in their drinking water. Additionally, EPA has not evaluated water systems' public education efforts on lead in drinking water since the rule was established more than a decade ago. Much is known about the health effects of lead exposure, particularly its impact on brain development and functioning in young children. However, limited studies have been conducted on the health effects of exposure to low levels of lead in drinking water. EPA plans to prepare a health advisory document to help utilities explain the risks of lead exposure to the public, and a paper summarizing lead research conducted since the Lead and Copper Rule was published in 1991. However, the timetable for these projects is not clear, and it is also not clear how this work will fit into a broader research agenda, or if this effort needs to involve other key organizations, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. |
gao_AIMD-97-20 | gao_AIMD-97-20_0 | Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA’s Modernization Program (GAO/RCED-94-167FS, Apr. To determine if FAA’s estimates were based on good policies and practices, we researched current literature and interviewed project estimating experts to identify the key components of good cost estimating practices; obtained and analyzed FAA’s policies and practices for estimating costs to determine what criteria (directives, orders, instructions, and implementing procedures), if any, FAA has in place to guide managers in developing projects’ cost estimates; assessed FAA’s cost estimating policies, practices, tools, and techniques to determine if they incorporate the key components of good cost and schedule estimating practices advocated by SEI and other experts; and selected FAA’s five largest (based on latest life cycle cost estimates) ongoing ATC modernization projects and one project that was the subject of another GAO review, and interviewed project managers and assessed project documentation on these six projects to determine (1) how the current life cycle cost baseline was estimated and (2) how this estimating approach compared to the SEI project-level questions. To determine whether the actual costs of ATC modernization projects are being properly accumulated, we obtained and reviewed (1) selected reports and testimonies issued by GAO, the Department of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector General, and the Defense Contract Auditing Agency, (2) related policies and procedures issued by the Department of Transportation, (3) applicable accounting standards and guidance, and (4) applicable OMB directives; reviewed FAA’s policies and procedures governing ATC financial management and interviewed program managers and financial accounting staff to determine (1) their roles and responsibilities for recording and managing ATC cost information and (2) the financial processes used to accumulate and record ATC costs; and reviewed available information for the five largest (based on life cycle cost estimates) ongoing ATC projects and determined if costs are properly accumulated by (1) obtaining available financial information on the projects and identifying the cost elements included and excluded and (2) assessing reconciliation procedures among varying sources of information. We performed our work at the Federal Aviation Administration in Washington, D.C., and the Software Engineering Institute in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, between February and December 1996. FAA’s cost estimating processes used on its ATC modernization projects do not meet SEI criteria. These weaknesses are exacerbated by FAA’s practice of presenting cost estimates as precise, point estimates. By doing so, FAA obscures the estimates’ inherent uncertainty and may mislead decisionmakers. Policies and Practices for Estimating Costs Do Not Satisfy “Best Practices” Requisites
FAA’s institutional processes for estimating ATC projects’ costs do not fully satisfy any of the six SEI requisites. Further, what limited information is available on actual cost performance is not an integral part of the project estimating process, and the information on cost estimates that is retained by the central estimating organization is not readily available to the project personnel that are responsible for updating estimates after the initial investment decision has been made. As a result, projects’ use and calibration of the models is inconsistent. Individual ATC Projects’ Cost Estimating Approaches Are Inconsistent and Sometimes Unreliable
Because FAA does not have well-defined, institutional processes for estimating information technology projects’ costs, the approaches used and the reliability of the estimates are inconsistent. The result is uninformed, and thus potentially unwise, investment decisions. They also stated that this report will be useful as FAA strives to improve its cost estimating capabilities. FAA Is Not Adequately Accounting for ATC Project Costs
Agencies are required to maintain adequate systems of accounting and internal controls to provide managers and other decisionmakers with reliable financial information to effectively measure performance and make sound investment decisions. As a result, the full costs of “restructured” ATC projects are understated. FAA does not have a cost accounting system capable of reliably accumulating full project cost information, and therefore cannot reliably estimate future project costs, ensure that investment decisions are sound, or manage projects effectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the reliability of the cost information critical to capital investment decisionmaking on air traffic control (ATC) projects, focusing on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) processes for estimating what projects will cost and the related accounting for actual project costs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FAA's ATC modernization program's cost estimating processes do not satisfy recognized estimating requisites, and its cost accounting practices do not provide for proper accumulation of actual project costs; (2) the result is an absence of reliable project cost and financial information that the Congress has legislatively specified and that leading public-sector and private-sector organizations point to as essential to making fully informed investment decisions among competing ATC projects; (3) without this information, the likelihood of poor ATC investment decisions is increased, not only when a project is initiated but also throughout its life cycle; (4) with respect to cost estimating, FAA fails to meet five of the six process requisites that the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) says should be institutionally entrenched and consistently used for information technology projects; (5) in the absence of such institutional policies to guide ATC project cost estimating, FAA has adopted a cost estimating process that allows each ATC project to approach cost estimating in whatever manner its estimators choose; (6) the result is inconsistency in the rigor and discipline with which ATC project cost estimates are derived, which in turn means estimates of varying degrees of reliability; (7) when comparing the approaches that six ATC projects used to derive their current official life cycle cost estimates to SEI's project-specific criteria, GAO found that two were too poorly documented to permit any comparative analysis, while none of the remaining four satisfied all of the criteria SEI associates with highly credible estimates; (8) compounding these estimating process weaknesses is FAA's practice of presenting cost estimates as precise, point estimates; (9) by doing so, FAA fails to disclose the estimates' inherent uncertainty and risks, thus further limiting the estimates' decisionmaking value and credibility; (10) with respect to cost accounting, FAA is not accumulating all ATC project costs, and FAA does not have a cost accounting system for capturing and reporting the full cost of its ATC projects; (11) instead, FAA decisionmakers use accounting and financial management systems that omit relevant project costs, such as those associated with FAA project management; and (12) the result is that FAA cannot reliably measure the ATC projects' actual cost performance against established baselines, and cannot reliably use information relating to actual cost experiences to improve future cost estimating efforts. |
gao_GAO-04-799 | gao_GAO-04-799_0 | Recent investigations of mutual fund trading by the SEC and some state attorneys general have revealed cases of abusive trading practices. The asset of the plan is the issued security, not any of the assets held by the investment company. Mutual Fund Trading Abuses Affected Pension Plan Participants but the Extent Is Unclear
The cost to long-term mutual fund investors of late trading and market timing is unclear, however it does not appear that these trading abuses affected pension plan participants differently than other long-term investors. While costs of individual instances of late trading and market timing may not have a noticeable effect on the value of fund shares held by long-term investors, the cumulative effect of abusive trading may have been significant. Ultimately, the effect of late trading and market timing on the savings of retirement plan participants and other long-term fund shareholders is a function of which funds they invested in and for how long. Among 34 brokerage firms surveyed by SEC, including some of the largest in the nation, more than 25 percent reported instances of illegal late trading at their firms. Market timing can also be difficult to identify because, among other reasons, the omnibus accounts of intermediaries obscure individual account transactions. Regulators Are Taking Actions to Address Abusive Mutual Fund Trading
SEC and DOL have each taken steps to address abusive trading in mutual funds, and SEC has proposed regulations that aim to eradicate late trading and curb market timing. SEC’s proposed regulations on late trading would amend the rule that governs how mutual funds price and receive orders for share purchases and redemptions. To try to curb market timing, a separate SEC proposal would require mutual funds to impose a 2-percent redemption fee on the proceeds of shares redeemed within 5 business days of purchase. SEC officials told us that more enforcement actions are pending. In addition to its enforcement actions, SEC has issued guidance and new regulations that address the negative impact of market timing on long-term shareholders. DOL is not involved in the process of drafting the proposed late-trading and market-timing regulations because it does not regulate mutual funds. Plan participants could be distinctly affected by the late trading proposal because it creates potential complications for the processing of certain transactions unique to defined contribution plans, such as loans. In addition, plan participants may pay fees intended to deter short-term trading, including market timing, even on certain transactions where there is clearly no intent to engage in abusive trading. New Regulations Are Expected to Impose Costs on Service Providers and Investors
SEC’s proposed regulations on late trading and market timing are expected to create additional costs for mutual funds and fund intermediaries, including pension plan record keepers, which would likely result in increased costs for all mutual fund investors, plan participants, and plan sponsors. As a result of this demand, plan record keepers fear that they would not be able to compete with mutual fund companies, who offer their own funds and record-keeping services to pension plans and could therefore allow plan participants to submit orders until 4:00 p.m. Officials of one mutual fund company that also serves as a record keeper expressed concerns that plan participants may demand alternative investment products to mutual funds if they were to no longer be able to place orders for fund transactions until the market closing time. To explain the regulatory actions taken by SEC and DOL to address late trading and market timing, we interviewed SEC and DOL officials and reviewed documents from both agencies. Appendix III: Comments from the Securities and Exchange Commission | Why GAO Did This Study
Mutual fund investments represent more than 20 percent of Americans' pension plan assets. Since late 2003, two abusive trading practices in mutual funds have come to light. Late trading allowed some investors to illegally place orders for funds after the close of trading. Market timing allowed some investors to take advantage of temporary disparities between the value of a fund and the value of its underlying assets despite stated policies against such trading. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed regulations intended to stop late trading and reduce market timing. We were asked to (1) report on what is known about how these practices have affected the value of retirement savings of pension plan participants, (2) describe the actions taken by SEC and the Department of Labor (DOL) to address these practices, and (3) explain how plan participants may be affected by SEC's proposed regulations.
What GAO Found
The cost of late trading and market timing to long-term investors in mutual funds is unclear; however, it does not appear that these abuses affected pension plan participants more than other investors. While individual instances of abusive trading may not have had a noticeable effect on the value of funds held by long-term investors, the cumulative effect of such trading may be significant. Among 34 brokerage firms surveyed by the SEC, more than 25 percent reported instances of illegal late trading at their firms. However, numerous fund intermediaries that are not regulated by the SEC may also have permitted late trading. Trading abuses can be difficult to identify because, among other reasons, fund brokers aggregate the transactions of their clients and often do not share details of individual transactions with mutual fund companies. Ultimately, the effect of trading abuses on the savings of plan participants and other long-term fund shareholders is a function of which funds they invested in and for how long. SEC and DOL have taken steps to address abusive trading in mutual funds, and SEC has proposed regulations that aim to stop late trading and curb market timing. SEC and DOL are investigating these trading abuses, and SEC has already reached several settlements. DOL has issued guidance to pension plan sponsors and other plan fiduciaries on how they can fulfill their legal requirements to act "prudently" and in the best interests of plan participants who invest in mutual funds. To stop late trading, SEC has proposed that all fund transactions be received by mutual funds or designated processors before 4:00 p.m. eastern time in order for investors to receive the same day's price. To curb short-term trading, including market timing, SEC has proposed regulations that would impose a 2-percent fee on the proceeds of fund shares redeemed within 5 business days of purchase. DOL is not involved in the process of drafting these regulations because it does not regulate mutual funds, but it is considering how the proposals would affect pension plans. To the extent that SEC's proposed regulations stop late trading and market timing, they would benefit long-term mutual fund investors; however, the new rules could also affect such investors adversely, and pension plan participants more than others. The new regulations are expected to increase costs (e.g., for technology upgrades) that would be passed on to long-term mutual fund investors. In addition, plan participants could be distinctly affected by the late trading proposal because it creates potential complications in processing certain transactions unique to pension plans (e.g., loans). Further, the market timing proposal may result in plan participants paying fees intended to deter market timing, even when there is clearly no intent to engage in abusive trading. SEC officials told us that they are considering changes and alternatives to the proposed regulations that would address these concerns. |
gao_GGD-96-230 | gao_GGD-96-230_0 | This section of our statement discusses the following three areas: (1) patent pendency—the amount of time that PTO spends in examining an application to determine whether an invention should receive a patent; (2) PTO’s resources committed to the patent process, the trademark process, the dissemination of information, and executive direction and administration; and (3) PTO’s workload and examination process in comparison with those of other industrialized countries. Current Patent Pendency Statistics Do Not Provide Information Needed
In analyzing patent pendency, we found that the overall pendency statistics being reported by PTO do not provide inventors and decisionmakers with enough information. We found that calculating pendency by using the parent filing date rather than the current filing date raises pendency significantly. In fiscal year 1995, about three-fourths of PTO’s funding—all of which now is generated by fees—and staff were devoted to the patent process. PTO’s annual obligations have increased steadily in recent years. In the 10-year period from fiscal year 1986 to fiscal year 1995, PTO’s annual obligations increased from $212 million to $589 million, an average annual increase of nearly 20 percent. Methods for computing pendency also differ between the three patent offices. Among the issues that Booz-Allen addressed in its review that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary expressed interest in were: (1) the potential for the Copyright Office to be transferred from the Library of Congress to another organization; (2) the possible additional revenues that the Copyright Office could charge if it recovered all costs; and (3) the impact on the Library, including the Copyright Office, from revisions to its competitive selection process as a result of the settlement of a class-action discrimination suit. Within this context, Booz-Allen looked at various aspects of the Library’s organizational components and the Library’s fee structure. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) patent examination issues at the Department of Commerce's Patent and Trademark Office (PTO); and (2) examined the fees that PTO and the Library of Congress's Copyright Office charge for their services.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) PTO patent pendency statistics do not provide inventors and decisionmakers with enough information; (2) reported pendency depend on the computation method used, type of invention, filing date, and the amount of time it takes for applicants to answer additional requests for information; (3) calculating pendency using the patent filing date significantly increases pendency; (4) three-fourths of PTO funding and staff were devoted to the patent process in 1995; (5) since 1986, PTO annual obligations have increased from $212 million to $589 million, an average annual increase of 20 percent; and (6) PTO examines patent applications and computes pendency differently from its counterparts in other industrialized countries. GAO also noted that: (1) the Library's fees do not fully recover the cost of copyright registrations; (2) the Library could generate additional revenue by increasing the copyright registration fee; (3) the Library's hiring process has been adversely affected by a settlement that requires it to revise its competitive selection process; and (4) the Library's actions in response to the settlement have resulted in prospective employees taking other jobs and added additional costs to Library operations. |
gao_GAO-13-11 | gao_GAO-13-11_0 | DHS Is Developing a Resilience Policy, but an Implementation Strategy Could Help Ensure Consistency and Accountability
High-Level Documents Promote Resilience, and DHS Has Begun to Develop a Resilience Policy
National high-level documents currently promote resilience as a key national goal. Specifically, two key White House documents emphasize resilience on a national level—Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) and the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. Since 2009, DHS has also emphasized the concept of resilience through two high-level documents—the NIPP and QHSR. The NIPP identifies resilience as a national objective for critical infrastructure protection and defines resilience as the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity or a change in conditions. DHS took steps to foster departmentwide resilience initiatives by creating two internal entities—the Resilience Integration Team (RIT) and the Office of Resilience Policy (ORP). Specifically, ORP saw a need to establish a policy that provides component agencies with a single, consistent, departmentwide understanding of resilience; clarifies and consolidates the concepts from the four high-level guiding documents discussed above; and helps components understand how their activities address DHS’s proposed resilience objectives. The policy is currently in draft status, and ORP officials hope to have an approved policy in place later this year. Developing a Strategy Could Help Guide Components’ Efforts in Implementing DHS’s Resilience Policy
Although DHS is developing a policy to establish a departmentwide resilience framework, DHS officials stated that they currently have no plans to develop an implementation strategy for DHS’s resilience policy. An implementation strategy that defines goals, objectives, and activities could help ensure that the policy is adopted consistently and in a timely manner by components, and that all components share common priorities and objectives. As DHS implements its resilience policy, an implementation strategy with these characteristics could provide ORP with a clear and more complete picture of how DHS components are implementing this policy, as well as how the various programs and activities are helping to enhance critical infrastructure resilience in their areas of responsibility. The Coast Guard and IP Have Addressed Some Aspects of Critical Infrastructure Resilience, but Could Better Coordinate to Promote Portwide Resilience
The Coast Guard Works with Stakeholders to Address Aspects of Resilience
The Coast Guard works with asset owners and operators to assess and enhance various aspects of port critical infrastructure resilience—such as security protection, port recovery, and risk analysis efforts, as described in table 1. RRAP. These assessments are conducted to assess vulnerability to help improve resilience and allow for an analysis of infrastructure “clusters” and systems in various regions. For example, an RRAP review could involve compiling information from reviews of critical infrastructure assets—such as electricity providers and transport companies—to form an overall assessment of a key transportation and energy corridor within a state. DHS Components Have Opportunities to Collaborate and Leverage Existing Tools to Assess Port Resilience
While the Coast Guard and IP have collaborated on some regional resilience assessments, there may be opportunities for further collaboration and use of existing tools to conduct portwide resilience assessment efforts. For example, IP and the Coast Guard could leverage some of the expertise and tools discussed above—such as the RRAP approach—to develop assessments of the overall resilience of one or more specific port areas. Identifying opportunities to leverage tools and resources to collaboratively conduct portwide resilience assessments could enhance stakeholders’ understanding of interdependencies with other port partners, and help to focus scarce resources to enhance resilience for the port area. Conclusions
DHS has taken initial steps to emphasize the concept of resilience among its components by developing a resilience policy. Developing an implementation strategy for this new policy is the next key step that could help strengthen DHS’s resilience efforts. At the port level, U.S. ports, waterways, and vessels are part of a major economic engine, and a significant disruption to this system could have a widespread impact on the U.S. economy, as well as global shipping, international trade, and the global economy. Coast Guard and IP actions have addressed some aspects of critical infrastructure resilience, but the Coast Guard and IP could take additional action to enhance their collaboration and use existing tools and resources to promote portwide resilience. Having relevant agencies collaborate and leverage one another’s resources to conduct joint portwide resilience assessments could further all stakeholders’ understanding of interdependencies with other port partners, and better direct scarce resources to enhance port resilience. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. ports are part of an economic engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, and a disruption to port operations could have a widespread impact on the global economy. DHS has broad responsibility for protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. Within DHS, the Coast Guard is responsible for the maritime environment, and port safety and security, and IP works to enhance critical infrastructure resilience. Recognizing the importance of the continuity of operations in critical infrastructure sectors, DHS has taken initial steps to emphasize the concept of resilience. GAO was asked to review port resilience efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS has provided a road map or plan for guiding resilience efforts, and (2) the Coast Guard and IP are working with port stakeholders and each other to enhance port resilience. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed key legislation and DHS documents and guidance. GAO conducted site visits to three ports, selected based on geography, industries, and potential threats; GAO also interviewed DHS officials and industry stakeholders. Information from site visits cannot be generalized to all ports, but provides insights.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is developing a resilience policy, but an implementation strategy is a key next step that could help strengthen DHS resilience efforts. DHS defines resilience as the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or adapt to adversity, and some high-level documents currently promote resilience as a key national goal. Specifically, two key White House documents emphasize resilience on a national level--the 2011 Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the 2012 National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. Since 2009, DHS has emphasized the concept of resilience and is currently in the process of developing a resilience policy, the initial steps of which have included creating two internal entities--the Resilience Integration Team and the Office of Resilience Policy (ORP). According to ORP officials, they saw a need to establish a policy that provides component agencies with a single, consistent, departmentwide understanding of resilience that clarifies and consolidates resilience concepts from high-level guiding documents, and helps components understand how their activities address DHS's proposed resilience objectives. ORP officials hope to have an approved policy in place later this year. However, DHS officials stated that currently there are no plans to develop an implementation strategy for this policy. An implementation strategy that defines goals, objectives, and activities; identifies resource needs; and lays out milestones is a key step that could help ensure that DHS components adopt the policy consistently and in a timely manner. For example, an implementation strategy with goals and objectives could provide ORP with a more complete picture of how DHS components are implementing this policy.
The Coast Guard and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) work with stakeholders to address some aspects of critical infrastructure resilience, but they could take additional collaborative actions to promote portwide resilience. The Coast Guard is port focused and works with owners and operators of assets, such as vessels and port facilities, to assess and enhance various aspects of critical infrastructure resilience in ports--such as security protection, port recovery, and risk analysis efforts. In contrast, IP, through its Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP), conducts assessments with a broader regional focus, but is not port specific. An RRAP assessment is conducted to assess vulnerability to help improve resilience and allow for an analysis of infrastructure "clusters" and systems in various regions--for example, a regional transportation and energy corridor. The Coast Guard and IP have collaborated on some RRAP assessments, but there may be opportunities for further collaboration to conduct port-focused resilience assessments. For example, IP and the Coast Guard could collaborate to leverage existing expertise and tools--such as the RRAP approach--to develop assessments of the overall resilience of specific port areas. Having relevant agencies collaborate and leverage one another's resources to conduct joint portwide resilience assessments could further all stakeholders' understanding of interdependencies with other port partners, and help determine where to focus scarce resources to enhance resilience for port areas.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS develop an implementation strategy for its resilience policy and that the Coast Guard and IP identify opportunities to collaborate to leverage existing tools and resources to assess port resilience. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-509T | gao_GAO-11-509T_0 | Federal efforts to improve teacher quality have led to the creation and expansion of a variety of programs across the federal government. However, there is no governmentwide strategy to minimize fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication among these many programs. Specifically, GAO identified 82 distinct programs designed to help improve teacher quality, either as a primary purpose or as an allowable activity, administered across 10 federal agencies. Many of these programs share similar goals. The proliferation of programs has resulted in fragmentation that can frustrate agency efforts to administer programs in a comprehensive manner, limit the ability to determine which programs are most cost effective, and ultimately increase program costs. However, given the large number of teacher quality programs and the extent of overlap, it is unlikely that improved coordination alone can fully mitigate the effects of the fragmented and overlapping federal effort. Congress could help eliminate some of these barriers through legislation, particularly through the pending reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and other key education bills. Education has already proposed combining 38 programs into 11 programs in its reauthorization proposal, which could allow the agency to dedicate a higher portion of its administrative resources to monitoring programs for results and providing technical assistance. Most of these programs are administered by the Departments of Labor, Education, and HHS. In the 1990s, GAO issued a series of reports that identified program overlap and possible areas of resulting inefficiencies. GAO recently updated information on these programs, found overlap among them, and examined potential duplication among three selected large programs—HHS’s Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the Department of Labor’s Employment Service and Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Adult programs. Forty-four of the 47 federal employment and training programs GAO identified, including those with broader missions such as multipurpose block grants, overlap with at least one other program in that they provide at least one similar service to a similar population. Colocating services and consolidating administrative structures may increase efficiencies and reduce costs, but implementation can be challenging. To facilitate further progress by states and localities in increasing administrative efficiencies in employment and training programs, we recommended in 2011 that the Secretaries of Labor and HHS work together to develop and disseminate information that could inform such efforts. Options for Congress to Consider as it Addresses Fragmentation, Overlap, and Potential Duplication
This Committee has authority over a wide range of programs intended to help many of our neediest and most vulnerable citizens. Today, I would like to highlight 3 of these approaches: 1. enhancing program evaluations and performance information, 2. fostering coordination and strategic planning for program areas that span multiple federal agencies, and 3. consolidating existing programs or coordinating service delivery. Consolidating Existing Programs or Coordinating Service Delivery
Consolidating existing programs or coordinating service delivery are other options for Congress to address fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. In conclusion, removing and preventing unnecessary duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among federal teacher quality and employment and training programs is clearly challenging. Sustained attention and oversight by Congress will be critical also. As the nation rises to meet its current fiscal challenges, GAO will continue to assist Congress and federal agencies in identifying actions needed to address these issues. Multiple Employment Programs. Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's recent report entitled "Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue." This report delineates dozens of areas across government where fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication merit the attention of Congress and the Administration spanning a range of government missions: agriculture, defense, economic development, energy, general government, health, homeland security, international affairs, and social services. The report also describes other opportunities for federal departments, agencies or Congress to consider taking action on that could either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury. Taking actions on these opportunities and reducing or eliminating duplication, overlap, or fragmentation could save billions of tax dollars annually and help agencies provide more efficient and effective services. With regard to issues of specific interest to this Committee, GAO found fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication in the areas of federal programs to improve teacher quality and employment and training. Each of these areas is characterized by a large number of programs with similar goals, beneficiaries, and allowable activities that are administered by multiple federal agencies. Fragmentation of programs exists when programs serve the same broad area of national need but are administered across different federal agencies or offices. Program overlap exists when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries. Overlap and fragmentation among government programs or activities can be harbingers of unnecessary duplication. Given the challenges associated with fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication, careful, thoughtful actions will be needed to address these issues. This testimony draws upon the results of our recently issued report and will address what is known about fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication among federal teacher quality and employment and training programs. It also addresses options for Congress to help minimize fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication and how it can use recent legislative tools to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of federal programs.
What GAO Found
1) We identified 82 distinct programs designed to help improve teacher quality administered across 10 federal agencies, many of which share similar goals. However, there is no governmentwide strategy to minimize fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication among these many programs. The fragmentation and overlap of teacher quality programs can frustrate agency efforts to administer programs in a comprehensive manner, limit the ability to determine which programs are most cost effective, and ultimately increase program costs. Congress could address these issues through legislation, particularly through the pending reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and the Department of Education (Education) has already proposed combining 38 programs into 11 programs in its reauthorization proposal. (2) We found that 44 of the 47 employment and training programs we identified overlap with at least one other program in that they provide at least one similar service to a similar population. To facilitate further progress by states and localities in increasing administrative efficiencies, we recommended that the Secretaries of Labor and Health and Human Services (HHS) work together to develop and disseminate information that could inform such efforts. As part of its proposed changes to the Workforce Investment Act, the Administration proposes consolidating nine programs into three. In addition, the budget proposal would transfer the Senior Community Service Employment Program from Labor to HHS. (3) Sustained congressional oversight is pivotal in addressing these issues. Specifically, this Committee can look for opportunities to enhance program evaluations and performance information, foster coordination and strategic planning for program areas that span multiple federal agencies, and consolidate existing programs or coordinate service delivery. |
gao_GAO-04-1061T | gao_GAO-04-1061T_0 | More Public Diplomacy Resources Shifting to Muslim- Majority Countries
Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim- majority countries that are considered strategically important in the war on terrorism. State has also launched a number of new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly Muslim countries—that include expanding exchange programs targeting citizens of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies in the war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims share certain values. The BBG has also targeted recent initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the Afghanistan Radio Network; and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States rely on such programs and activities to vigorously defend our ideals abroad, just as the United States did during the Cold War. State Has Increased Resources and Programs in the Middle East
Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its resources and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim countries. This program uses space in public libraries and other public buildings abroad to provide information about the United States. In fiscal year 2004, State is planning to establish 58 American Corners in the East and South Asia. Planning Deficiencies, Inability to Gauge Progress Toward Goals Hinder U.S. Public Diplomacy Efforts
While the growth in programs to the Muslim world marks the recognition of the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population, there still is no interagency strategy to guide State’s and all federal agencies’ communication efforts and ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. We agree with the 9/11 Commission recommendation that the U.S. government must define its message. In addition, we found that , although BBG has a strategic plan, the plan lacks a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board’s success in increasing audience size. Since our report, however, the Board revised its strategic plan and has improved its ability to gauge its program effectiveness measures by adding broadcast credibility and audience awareness measures. The absence of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages and thus achieving mutually reinforcing benefits. State Does Not Have an Integrated Strategy to Guide Public Diplomacy Operations
After September 11, State acknowledged the need for a strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy is still in the development stage. State Lacks Measures of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals
We also found that State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. First, the Board created a single strategic goal to focus on the key objective of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest to the United States and made audience size a key performance measure. A Number of Internal Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities
Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities and the need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy strategy with measurable indicators of progress. The Board’s key challenge in executing its strategy is how to generate large audiences while dealing with a number of media market, organizational, and resources issues. Outdated Broadcast Services and Structure Pose Challenges to Expanding in Priority Markets
The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy challenges, key among them is how to gain large audiences in priority markets while dealing with (1) a collection of outdated and noncompetitive language services, (2) a disparate organizational structure consisting of seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal agency and grantee organizations that are managed by a part-time Board of Governors, and (3) the resource challenge of broadcasting in 97 language services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide. | Why GAO Did This Study
Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9/11 suggested that many or most people had a favorable view of the United States and its fight against terrorism. By 2003, opinion research indicated that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, viewed the United States unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined (1) changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11, 2001, within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG); (2) the U.S. government's strategies for its public diplomacy programs and measures of effectiveness; and (3) the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. GAO made several recommendations to State and the BBG to address planning and performance issues. Both agencies agreed with these recommendations and have made some progress in implementing them. On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its report and recommendations. Two of the Commission's recommendations relate to the management of U.S. public diplomacy. For this testimony, GAO was asked to discuss its prior work as it relates to these recommendations.
What GAO Found
Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South Asia and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. These initiatives are consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendation that the United States rebuild its scholarship, library, and exchange programs overseas. Since 9/11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa and Arabic language television in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. The 9/11 Commission report highlights these broadcast efforts and recommends that funding for such efforts be expanded. While State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism, we found that there is no interagency strategy to guide State's, BBG's, and other federal agencies' communication efforts. The absence of such a strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages to overseas audiences. Likewise, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States do a better job defining its public diplomacy message. In addition, we found that State does not have a strategy that integrates and aligns all its diverse public diplomacy activities. State, noting the need to fix the problem, recently established a new office of strategic planning for public diplomacy. The BBG did have a strategic plan, but the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the key focus of its plan. We also found that State and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States. The BBG subsequently made audience size a key performance goal and added broadcaster credibility and plans to add other performance measures that GAO recommended. In addition, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language proficiency. State officials are trying to address staffing gaps through increased recruitment. The BBG also faces a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. It has developed a number of solutions to address these challenges. |
gao_GAO-10-134 | gao_GAO-10-134_0 | DOD Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Internal Safeguards into DCIPS, but Two Safeguards and Monitoring Have Not Been Fully Implemented
Although DOD has taken some steps to implement internal safeguards to ensure that the DCIPS performance management system is fair, effective, and credible, opportunities exist to improve DOD’s implementation of 2 of the 10 safeguards. We have previously reported that continued monitoring of such systems’ safeguards is needed to help ensure DOD’s actions are effective as implementation proceeds. However, during our nongeneralizable discussion groups with employees, we found that employee perceptions of training were somewhat mixed, as participants at 9 of our 13 discussion group sites stated that too many questions regarding DCIPS went unanswered, including questions posed during training. Without continuous employee involvement in the implementation of DCIPS, employees may experience a loss of ownership over the system, which could ultimately undermine its credibility. Until DOD specifies these steps in its guidance, the intelligence components may not follow a consistent approach in these areas, the department may be unable to fully determine whether potential barriers to fair and equitable ratings exist, and employees may lack confidence in the fairness and credibility of the DCIPS and its ratings. According to DOD officials, they do not expect to execute the evaluation plan until after the first payout, in January 2010. DOD Had Several Mechanisms to Provide Information to Employees, but These Did Not Comprehensively Identify Employee Perceptions of DCIPS, and Future Mechanisms Do Not Include Some Needed Questions
At the time of our review, DOD had several mechanisms to engage employees and provide information. Specifically, the defense intelligence components conducted numerous town hall meetings to brief employees on DCIPS—covering such topics as the performance management cycle and roles and responsibilities of employees/supervisors---and to understand their concerns. USD(I) also maintained a Web site that contained frequently asked questions submitted by employees and USD(I)’s response. However, USD(I) does have plans to implement additional mechanisms that will be discussed later in this report. Employees Generally Expressed Positive Views about the Concept of Pay-for- Performance but Were Concerned About the Pace of Implementation
At 7 of the 13 locations visited, discussion group participants generally expressed positive views about the concept of pay for performance. However, participants in 9 of 13 discussion groups felt that DCIPS was being implemented too quickly. However, at the end of this review, legislation was signed by the President that contained provisions that affect DCIPS. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s implementation of internal safeguards in DCIPS, and mechanisms to identify employee perceptions of it, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence take the following four actions: Issue guidance to institutionalize a process to involve employees continually in future design and implementation changes to DCIPS; Issue guidance on its analysis of finalized ratings that explains how the demographic analysis of ratings is to be conducted, to help ensure equity, fairness, and non-discrimination in ratings; Finalize and execute its evaluation plan with metrics to assess the system, including the implementation of internal safeguards, to help ensure the department evaluates the impact of DCIPS; and Expeditiously implement mechanisms—including the four surveys— that comprehensively and accurately identify and measure employee perceptions; and ensure those mechanisms include questions regarding certain safeguards, such as the internal grievance process and employees’ acceptance of DCIPS. Our draft noted both of these points. 1. Extent to which DOD Incorporated Internal Safeguards into DCIPS
To determine the extent to which DOD has incorporated internal safeguards and accountability mechanisms into DCIPS, we used the following internal safeguards and accountability mechanisms, which were derived from our previous work on pay-for-performance management systems in the federal government: Assure that the agency’s performance management system links employee objectives to the agency’s strategic plan, related goals, and desired outcomes; Implement a pay-for-performance evaluation system to better link individual pay to performance, and provide an equitable method for appraising and compensating employees; Provide adequate training and retraining for supervisors, managers, and employees in the implementation and operation of the performance management system; Institute a process for ensuring ongoing performance feedback and dialogue between supervisors, managers, and employees throughout the appraisal period and setting timetables for review; Assure that the agency’s performance management system results in meaningful distinctions in individual employee performance; Provide a means for ensuring that adequate agency resources are allocated for the design, implementation, and administration of the performance management system; Assure that there is an independent and credible employee appeals Assure that there are reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms in connection with the results of the performance management process, including periodic reports on internal assessments and employee survey results relating to performance management and individual pay decisions while protecting individual confidentiality; Involve employees in the design of the system, to include employees directly involved in validating any related implementation of the system; and Adhere to the merit principles set forth in section 2301 of title 5 of the U.S. Code. Extent to which DOD has Mechanisms to Identify Employee Perceptions about DCIPS
To determine the extent that DOD had developed mechanisms to identify and address employee perceptions about DCIPS, we evaluated two primary sources of information. As noted, we conducted 26 discussion groups with employees and supervisors of DOD civilian intelligence personnel at the 13 DOD sites we visited. (U) In 2001 GAO identified human capital as a "High Risk Area" across the executive branch, and it has been a champion of civil service reform ever since. Posthearing Questions Related to Strategic Human Capital Management. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, Government Accountability Office (GAO) has designated strategic human capital management as a high-risk area because of the federal government's long-standing lack of a consistent approach to such management. In 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) began developing a human capital system--called the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS)--to manage Department of Defense (DOD) civilian intelligence personnel. In response to a congressional request, GAO examined the extent to which DOD has (1) incorporated internal safeguards into DCIPS and monitored the implementation of these safeguards and (2) developed mechanisms to identify employee perceptions about DCIPS. GAO analyzed guidance, interviewed appropriate officials, and conducted discussion groups with employees at select DOD components. At the end of GAO's review, legislation was enacted that impacts, among other things, how DCIPS employees will be paid.
What GAO Found
While early in its implementation of DCIPS, DOD has taken some positive steps to incorporate 10 internal safeguards to help ensure the fair, effective, and credible implementation of the system; however, opportunities exist to immediately improve the implementation of two of these safeguards, and continued monitoring of all is needed. For example, one safeguard requires employees to be trained on the system's operations, and GAO noted that DOD had provided extensive training to employees on DCIPS to include several Web-based and classroom courses. For another safeguard--which requires ongoing performance feedback--GAO noted that DOD's guidance requires feedback between employees and supervisors at the midpoint and at the close of the performance rating cycle. However, GAO determined that in the case of two safeguards--involving employees and fully implementing the merit principles--DOD could immediately improve its implementation. First, while DOD has leveraged mechanisms like town hall meetings and "brown bags" to involve employees in DCIPS, its guidance does not identify a formalized process for the continuous involvement of employees in the system implementation--which could ultimately undermine its credibility. Second, while DOD has stated that it will conduct an analysis of final ratings utilizing demographic data, DOD does not have a written policy outlining how this will be accomplished, and therefore may be unable to fully determine whether potential barriers to fair and equitable ratings exist. Without steps to improve implementation of this safeguard, employees may lack confidence in the system. Finally, GAO previously reported--for systems like DCIPS--that continued monitoring of such systems' safeguards is needed to help ensure agency actions are effective. In October 2009, DOD provided GAO with a draft DCIPS evaluation plan that would be executed after the first payout in January 2010. Without finalizing and executing the plan, DOD will not know if it has achieved desired outcomes from the system. DOD has used several mechanisms to provide employees with information; however, these mechanisms do not comprehensively identify and address employee perceptions of DCIPS. For example, USD(I), among other things, maintains a Web-site that contains frequently asked questions submitted by employees and responses by USD(I). Absent, however, are mechanisms to systematically identify employee perceptions. The nongeneralizable results of the discussion groups GAO conducted with employees and supervisors yielded mixed views. For example, participants generally expressed positive views about the concept of pay for performance. But participants at most of the Intelligence Components noted that DCIPS was being implemented too quickly or many questions went unanswered. Although DOD officials have drafted surveys that will allow them to more comprehensively collect employee perceptions about DCIPS, these surveys lack questions that would provide insight about employee perceptions of certain safeguards and overall acceptance of DCIPS. Without including such questions and expeditiously implementing its surveys, DOD will not have clear insight into employee perceptions. |
gao_GAO-15-492T | gao_GAO-15-492T_0 | Background
Over the last decade, DOD space system acquisitions have been characterized by the long-standing problem of program costs increasing significantly from original cost estimates. Current Status and Cost of Space System Acquisitions
Most of DOD’s major space programs are in the mature phases of acquisition and are now producing and launching satellites. Cost and schedule growth—a significant problem for these programs in past years—is not currently as prevalent, though still a problem for some programs. Several of DOD’s space system acquisitions have largely overcome challenges—such as matching resources to requirements, facilitating competition, and parts quality issues—and are in the process of producing and launching satellites. In September 2010, we found that the Global Positioning System (GPS) III satellite program took a number of steps to avoid past problems with GPS satellite acquisitions, such as adopting higher quality standards and better managing requirements. The program office reports that early testing of a satellite prototype helped identify problems sooner, but a complete GPS III satellite has yet to be tested. Though the program had taken steps to include in its initial cost and schedule estimates the impacts of addressing problems in development, it is now rebaselining those estimates—expected to be completed in July 2015—as a result of this delay and associated increased costs. In our ongoing work, we are finding that the GPS Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX), the next ground system for GPS, has experienced significant schedule delays and cost growth, and is still encountering technical challenges. This means some satellite capability will likely go unutilized for several years while the capability of the ground system catches up to the functionality of the satellites. The delayed delivery of the initial block of the ground system—intended to facilitate processing of integrated data from legacy Defense Support Program satellites, SBIRS GEO satellites, and SBIRS sensors in highly elliptical orbit—means complete and usable data from a critical sensor will not be available until June 2016, based on DOD’s December 2014 Selected Acquisition Report, over 5 years after the first SBIRS GEO satellite was launched. DOD Faces Challenges and Uncertainty for Addressing Future Space-Based Mission Needs
Fiscal constraints and growing threats to space systems have led DOD to consider alternatives for acquiring and launching space-based capabilities. These include disaggregating—or breaking up—large satellites into multiple, smaller satellites or payloads, and introducing competition into the acquisition of launch services. One way DOD is assessing disaggregation is through various analyses of alternatives (AOA), or reviews that compare the operational effectiveness, suitability, and life cycle cost of solutions to satisfy capability needs. To allow enough time to institute potential changes in contracting and development approaches, and maintain continuity of service, DOD is faced with making decisions over the next several years about the way forward. If decisions are not timely, DOD may be forced to continue with existing approaches for its next systems, effectively continuing with legacy systems. Additionally, we reported in April 2015 that DOD’s minimal investment in planning for technology insertion on SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6 limited the options available to upgrade technologies on these satellites. For example, disaggregating satellites may require more complex ground systems and user terminals. DOD’s culture has generally been resistant to changes in acquisition approaches, as we have reported, and fragmented responsibilities in DOD space programs have made it difficult to implement new processes and coordinate and deliver interdependent systems. DOD has begun implementing efforts to address some leadership challenges more recently. However, in both cases, it is too early to tell whether such efforts will be effective. Key contributors for the previous work on which this testimony is based are listed in the products cited. Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, but Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments are Optimized. Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's space systems provide critical capabilities to military and other government operations. Over the last decade, DOD space system acquisitions have been characterized by the long-standing problem of program costs increasing significantly from original cost estimates. Given this, DOD must manage system acquisition carefully and avoid repeating past problems.
This testimony focuses on (1) the current status and cost of major DOD space system acquisitions and (2) how DOD will address future space-based mission needs. It is based on GAO reports on space programs and weapon system acquisition best practices over the past 6 years; space-related work supporting GAO's 2015 weapon system assessments and GAO's 2014 report on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation; updates on cost increases and improvements; and preliminary observations from ongoing work. The updates are based on GAO analysis of DOD funding estimates for selected major space system acquisition programs for fiscal years 2014 through 2019. Ongoing work includes analyzing program status documents, reviewing acquisition strategies, and interviewing relevant DOD officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
In recent and ongoing work, GAO has found that several space system acquisitions have largely overcome acquisition challenges—such as matching resources to requirements, facilitating competition, and parts quality issues—and are producing and launching satellites. But other programs continue to face difficulties, both in technology development and in ensuring ground and user systems are delivered in time to maximize a satellite's capability. Specifically:
GAO reported in 2015 that, while the most recent Global Positioning System (GPS) III satellite program took steps to avoid past problems with satellite acquisitions, it is facing more than a 2-year delay for its satellite launch due to development problems. A complete GPS III satellite has not yet been tested, and the program is now rebaselining its cost estimates as a result of the schedule delay and associated increased costs.
The next-generation ground system needed to operate GPS satellites has experienced significant schedule delays and cost growth, and is still facing technical challenges. During development, the contractor encountered problems that led to significant rework, delaying the delivery of the ground system. As a result, as GAO's ongoing work for this committee is finding, some GPS satellite capability will likely go unused for several years while the capability of the ground system catches up to the functionality of the satellites.
While new missile warning satellites are now on orbit after years of delays and significant cost growth, the ground system needed to operate the satellites is still in development, meaning the satellites cannot be fully utilized—complete and usable data from the satellites will not be available until over 5 years after the first satellite was launched, based on recent updates.
The Department of Defense (DOD) also faces challenges in providing future space-based capabilities. In October 2014, GAO reported that fiscal constraints and growing threats to space systems have led DOD to consider alternatives such as disaggregating—or breaking up—large satellites into multiple, smaller satellites or payloads, and introducing competition into the acquisition of launch services. DOD is assessing options for future capabilities in several key mission areas through analyses of alternatives, comparing multiple potential solutions to satisfy capability needs. However, the time frames for making decisions about the way forward are narrowing, and if not made in time, DOD may be forced to continue with existing approaches for its next systems, as GAO reported in April 2015. Implementing any new approaches will be difficult if DOD does not overcome long-standing leadership problems for its space programs, including cultural resistance to acquisition process changes and fragmented responsibilities. More recently, DOD has taken steps to address some of these leadership challenges, though it is too early to tell whether such efforts will be effective.
What GAO Recommends
Past GAO reports have generally recommended that DOD adopt best practices for developing space systems. DOD has agreed and is currently implementing those practices. Consequently, GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-03-640T | gao_GAO-03-640T_0 | Background
FHWA is the DOT agency responsible for federal highway programs— including distributing billions of dollars in federal highway funds to the states—and developing federal policy regarding the nation’s highways. Research Community Promotes Use of Best Practices for Developing Research Agendas and Evaluating Research Outcomes
Leading organizations that conduct scientific and engineering research, other federal agencies with research programs, and experts in research and technology have identified and use best practices for developing research agendas and evaluating research outcomes. Although the uncertain nature of research outcomes over time makes it difficult to set specific, measurable program goals and evaluate results, the best practices we identified are designed to ensure that the research objectives are related to the areas of greatest interest and concern to research users and that research is evaluated according to these objectives. Developing Research Agendas Through the Involvement of External Stakeholders
External stakeholder involvement is particularly important for FHWA because its research is expected to improve the construction, safety, and operation of transportation systems that are primarily managed by others, such as state departments of transportation. In its 1999 report, the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy also stated that expert review is widely used to evaluate: (1) the quality of current research as compared with other work being conducted in the field, (2) the relevance of research to the agency’s goals and mission, and (3) whether the research is at the “cutting edge.”
External Stakeholders’ Involvement in Developing FHWA’s Research Agendas Has Been Limited
Although FHWA engages external stakeholders in elements of its research and technology program, the agency currently does not follow the best practice of engaging external stakeholders on a consistent and transparent basis in setting its research agendas. As we reported in May 2002, FHWA acknowledges that its approach to preparing research agendas is inconsistent and that the associate administrators of FHWA’s program offices primarily use input from the agency’s program offices, resource centers, and division offices. It appears that FHWA has committed to taking the necessary steps to adopt the best practice of developing a systematic process for involving external stakeholders in the agenda setting process. However, because FHWA’s plan has not been finalized, we cannot comment on its potential effectiveness in involving external stakeholders. FHWA Lacks a Systematic Approach to Evaluating Research Outcomes
As we reported last year, FHWA does not have an agency wide systematic process to evaluate whether its research projects are achieving intended results that uses such techniques as peer review. In our May 2002 report, we recommended that FHWA develop a systematic process for evaluating significant ongoing and completed research that incorporates peer review or other best practices in use at federal agencies that conduct research. According to FHWA’s assistant director for Research, Technology, and Innovation Deployment, the agency is using the results of this report to develop its own systematic approach for evaluating its research and technology program. FHWA is still in the process of developing, defining, and adopting a framework for measuring performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improvement and innovation based on highway research have long been important to the highway system. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is the primary federal agency involved in highway research. Throughout the past decade, FHWA received hundreds of millions of dollars for its surface transportation research program, including nearly half of the Department of Transportation's approximate $1 billion budget for research in fiscal year 2002. Given the expectations of highway research and the level of resources dedicated to it, it is important to know that FHWA is conducting high quality research that is relevant and useful. In May 2002, GAO issued a report on these issues and made recommendations to FHWA, which the agency agreed with, aimed at improving its processes for setting research agendas and evaluating its research efforts. GAO was asked to testify on (1) best practices for developing research agendas and evaluating research outcomes for federal research programs; (2) how FHWA's processes for developing research agendas align with these best practices; and (3) how FHWA's processes for evaluating research outcomes align with these best practices.
What GAO Found
Leading organizations, federal agencies, and experts that conduct scientific and engineering research use best practices designed to ensure that research objectives are related to the areas of greatest interest to research users and that research is evaluated according to these objectives. Of the specific best practices recommended by experts--such as the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy and the National Science Foundation--GAO identified the following practices as particularly relevant for FHWA: (1) developing research agendas in consultation with external stakeholders to identify high-value research and (2) using a systematic approach to evaluate research through such techniques as peer review. FHWA's processes for developing its research agendas do not always consistently include stakeholder involvement. External stakeholder involvement is important for FHWA because its research is to be used by others that manage and construct transportation systems. FHWA acknowledges that its approach for developing research agendas lacks a systematic process to ensure that external stakeholders are involved. In response to GAO's recommendation, FHWA has drafted plans that take the necessary steps toward developing a systematic process for involving external stakeholders. While the plans appear responsive to GAO's recommendation, GAO cannot evaluate their effectiveness until they are implemented. FHWA does not have a systematic process that incorporates techniques such as peer review for evaluating research outcomes. Instead, the agency primarily uses a "success story" approach to communicate about those research projects that have positive impacts. As a result, it is unclear the extent to which all research projects have achieved their objectives. FHWA acknowledges that it must do more to measure the performance of its research program, however, it is still in the process of developing a framework for this purpose. While FHWA's initial plans appear responsive to GAO's recommendation, GAO cannot evaluate their effectiveness until they are implemented. |
gao_GAO-14-807 | gao_GAO-14-807_0 | According to DOE, the SPR held crude oil valuded at almost $73 billion dollars as of May, 2014. Monthly domestic crude oil production has increased from an average of about 5 million barrels per day in 2008 to about 8.4 million barrels per day in April 2014, an increase of almost 68 percent. In 2014, prices for these benchmark crude oils narrowed somewhat, and WTI averaged $101 through June 13, 2014, while Brent averaged $109. Removing Crude Oil Export Restrictions Is Expected to Increase Domestic Crude Oil Prices and Could Decrease Consumer Fuel Prices
The studies we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed generally suggest some domestic crude oil prices would increase if crude oil export restrictions were removed, while consumer fuel prices could decrease, although the extent of consumer fuel price changes are uncertain and may vary by region. On the other hand, some stakeholders suggested that the U.S. refining industry will not be able to keep pace with increasing U.S. light crude oil production. Specifically, estimates in these studies of the increase in domestic crude oil prices due to removing crude oil export restrictions range from about $2 to $8 per barrel. Given the size of the global crude oil market, this stakeholder suggested that U.S. exports would have little to no effect on international crude oil prices. Removing Crude Oil Export Restrictions Is Expected to Increase Domestic Production and Have Other Effects
The studies we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed generally suggest that removing crude oil export restrictions would increase domestic crude oil production and may affect the environment and the economy. Projections of this increase varied in the studies we reviewed—from a low of an additional 130,000 barrels per day on average between 2015 and 2035, according to the ICF International study, to a high of an additional 3.3 million barrels per day on average between 2015 and 2035 in NERA’s study. Some stakeholders told us that removing export restrictions would increase the risk for crude oil spills by rail and other modes of transportation such as tankers. As discussed previously, removing export restrictions is expected to increase domestic crude oil production. Trade: According to the studies we reviewed, removing export restrictions would contribute to further declines in net petroleum (i.e., crude oil, consumer fuels, and other petroleum products) imports and reduce the U.S. trade deficit. Changing Market Conditions Raise Questions about the Size, Location, and Composition of the SPR
Changing market conditions—most importantly the significant increase in domestic production of crude oil from shale—have implications for the role of the SPR, including its appropriate size, location, and composition. Size: Increased domestic crude oil production and falling net petroleum imports may affect the ideal size of the SPR—how much the SPR should hold to optimize the benefits of protecting the economy from damage with the costs of holding the reserves. One measure of the economy’s vulnerability to oil supply disruptions is to assess net petroleum imports— imports minus exports. Net petroleum imports have declined from a peak of 60 percent of consumption in 2005 to about 30 percent in the first half of 2014. However, imports have declined and, according to EIA’s most recent forecast, are expected to remain well below 2005 import levels into the future. As discussed above, removing crude oil export restrictions would be expected to contribute to additional decreases in net petroleum imports in the future. As a member of the IEA, the United States is required to maintain reserves of crude oil or petroleum products equaling at least 90 days of net imports, which it does with a combination of public and private reserves. DOE Has Taken Steps to Reexamine Some Aspects of the SPR but Has Not Recently Reexamined Its Size
DOE has taken some steps to assess the appropriate location and composition of the SPR in view of changing market conditions, but has not recently re-examined its size. DOE concurred with the recommendation. If DOE were to assess the appropriate size of the SPR and find that it held excess crude oil, the excess oil could be sold to fund other national priorities. Recommendation for Executive Action
In view of recent changes in market conditions and in tandem with DOE’s ongoing activities to assess the content, connectivity, and other aspects of the SPR, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy undertake a comprehensive reexamination of the appropriate size of the SPR in light of current and expected future market conditions. Appendix I: Additional Information on Four Studies of the Implications of Removing Crude Oil Export Restrictions
We identified four studies that examined the price and other implications of removing crude oil export restrictions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Almost 4 decades ago, in response to the Arab oil embargo and recession it triggered, Congress passed legislation restricting crude oil exports and establishing the SPR to release oil to the market during supply disruptions and protect the U.S. economy from damage. After decades of generally falling U.S. crude oil production, technological advances have contributed to increasing U.S. production. Meanwhile, net crude oil imports—imports minus exports—have declined from a peak of about 60 percent of consumption in 2005 to 30 percent in the first 5 months of 2014. According to Energy Information Administration forecasts, net imports are expected to remain well below 2005 levels into the future.
GAO was asked to provide information on the implications of removing crude oil export restrictions. This report examines what is known about (1) price implications of removing crude oil export restrictions; (2) other key potential implications; and (3) implications of recent changes in market conditions on the SPR. GAO reviewed four studies on crude oil exports, including two sponsored by industry, and summarized the literature and views of a nonprobability sample of stakeholders including academic, industry, and other experts.
What GAO Found
The studies GAO reviewed and stakeholders interviewed suggest that removing crude oil export restrictions is likely to increase domestic crude oil prices but decrease consumer fuel prices. Prices for some U.S. crude oils are lower than international prices—for example, one benchmark U.S. crude oil averaged $101 per barrel in 2014, while a comparable international crude oil averaged $109. Studies estimate that U.S. crude oil prices would increase by about $2 to $8 per barrel—bringing them closer to international prices. At the same time, studies and some stakeholders suggest that U.S. prices for gasoline, diesel, and other consumer fuels follow international prices, so allowing crude oil exports would increase world supplies of crude oil, which is expected to reduce international prices and, subsequently, lower consumer fuel prices. Some stakeholders told GAO that there could be important regional differences in the price implications of removing crude oil export restrictions. Some stakeholders cautioned that estimates of the implications of removing export restrictions are uncertain due to several factors such as the extent of U.S. crude oil production increases, how readily U.S. refiners are able to absorb such increases, and how the global crude oil market responds to increasing U.S. production.
The studies GAO reviewed and stakeholders interviewed generally suggest that removing crude oil export restrictions may also have the following implications:
Crude oil production. Removing export restrictions would increase domestic production—8 million barrels per day in April 2014—because of increasing domestic crude oil prices. Estimates range from an additional 130,000 to 3.3 million barrels per day on average from 2015 through 2035.
Environment. Additional crude oil production may pose risks to the quality and quantity of surface groundwater sources; increase greenhouse gas and other emissions; and increase the risk of spills from crude oil transportation.
The economy. Removing export restrictions is expected to increase the size of the economy, with implications for employment, investment, public revenue, and trade. For example, removing restrictions is expected to contribute to further declines in net crude oil imports, reducing the U.S. trade deficit.
Changing market conditions have implications for the size, location, and composition of Department of Energy's (DOE) Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). In particular, increased domestic crude oil production and falling net imports may affect the ideal size of the SPR. Removing export restrictions is expected to contribute to additional decreases in net imports in the future. As a member of the International Energy Agency, the United States is required to maintain public and private reserves of at least 90 days of net imports but, as of May 2014, the SPR held reserves of 106 days—worth about $73 billion—and private industry held reserves of 141 days. DOE has taken some steps to assess the implications of changing market conditions on the location and composition of the SPR but has not recently reexamined its size. GAO has found that agencies should reexamine their programs if conditions change. Without such a reexamination, DOE cannot be assured that the SPR is sized appropriately and risks holding excess crude oil that could be sold to fund other national priorities.
What GAO Recommends
In view of changing market conditions and in tandem with activities to assess other aspects of the SPR, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy reexamine the size of the SPR. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-743 | gao_GAO-17-743_0 | In our 2013 survey of a stratified random sample of federal managers, we found that most federal managers reported lacking recent evaluations of their programs. The act changed agency performance management roles, planning and review processes, and reporting to ensure that agencies use performance information in decision making and are held accountable for achieving results and improving government performance. We estimate that 40 percent of federal managers reported having access to recent evaluations of their programs, while another 39 percent reported that they did not know if an evaluation had been conducted. Managers Report Access to Evaluation Unchanged Since 2013
In 2017, an estimated 40 percent of federal managers reported that an evaluation had been completed within the past 5 years for any of the programs, operations, or projects they were involved in—statistically unchanged from the 2013 survey (37 percent). For the 40 percent of managers who reported having evaluations, the results are very similar to the results of our 2013 survey: federal managers with evaluations credited them with contributing to a great or very great extent to assessing program effectiveness or implementing changes to improve program management or performance (48 and 54 percent, respectively), with no statistically significant changes since 2013. For the estimated 40 percent of managers who reported having evaluations, the factor that they most often reported hindering the use of program evaluations to a great or very great extent was a lack of resources to implement evaluation findings (29 percent), which was also the most commonly reported factor in 2013 (33 percent, difference not statistically significant). About a third of the full sample of federal managers reported that they had no basis to judge whether lack of congressional support for using performance information hindered its use. In 2017, federal managers who reported having evaluations most frequently reported that agency leadership support for evaluation, staff involvement, and evaluation relevance to decision makers facilitated evaluation use. In the 2017 survey, managers with evaluations rated consultation with stakeholders on the agency’s evaluation agenda high for facilitating evaluation use (28 percent to a great or very great extent), although 22 percent responded they had no basis to judge. However, 23 percent reported that such requests facilitated use to a great or very great extent. Because the majority of agency managers who reported having evaluations also reported that they contributed to improving program performance (54 percent), this lack of evaluation capacity constitutes a lost opportunity to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of limited government resources. The survey results reinforce lessons from our previous reports: involving agency staff and executives in planning and conducting evaluations helps ensure that those evaluations are relevant, credible, and used in agency decision making. GAO, as well as OMB, AEA, and the Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking, has noted that it is important to develop an evaluation plan or agenda to ensure that even an agency’s scarce research and evaluation resources are targeted to its most important issues and can shape budget and policy priorities and management practices. Although only some agencies have developed agency-wide evaluation agendas, evaluators who have them have found that consulting with stakeholders on their evaluation agendas helps ensure evaluation credibility and relevance, and facilitates the use of evaluation results. Congressional consultation on agency evaluation plans could increase the studies’ credibility and relevance for those audiences. OMB’s guidance envisions strategic reviews as a more comprehensive assessment of a broad range of evidence on and factors influencing progress on an agency’s desired results. Recommendation
To help ensure that federal agencies obtain the evidence needed to address the most important questions to improve program implementation and performance, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget direct each of the 24 Chief Financial Officer Act agencies to prepare an annual agency-wide evaluation plan that describes the key questions for each significant evaluation study that the agency plans to begin in the next fiscal year, and congressional committees; federal, state and local program partners; researchers; and other stakeholders that were consulted in preparing their plan. Because OMB has encouraged agencies to conduct and use evaluations in decision making for several years with mixed success, we believe that a more directive approach is needed. Program Evaluation: Strategies to Facilitate Agencies’ Use of Evaluation in Program Management and Policy Making. | Why GAO Did This Study
GPRAMA aims to ensure that agencies use performance information in decision making to achieve results and improve government performance. GPRAMA requires GAO to evaluate the act's implementation; this report is one in a series on its implementation. GAO examined the extent of agencies' use of program evaluations—a particular form of performance information—and factors that may hinder or facilitate their use in program management and policy making.
GAO surveyed a stratified random sample of 4,395 federal civilian managers and supervisors to obtain their perspectives on several results-oriented management topics, including the extent of and factors influencing evaluation use. GAO compared the results to those of a similar GAO survey of federal managers in 2013 and a GAO survey of Performance Improvement Officers in 2014. GAO also interviewed OMB staff and reviewed guidance on using evaluation in decision making.
What GAO Found
In a 2017 government-wide survey, GAO found that most federal managers lack recent evaluations of their programs. Forty percent reported that an evaluation had been completed within the past 5 years of any program, operation, or project they were involved in. Another 39 percent of managers reported that they did not know if an evaluation had been completed, and 18 percent reported having none. Managers who reported having evaluations also reported that those evaluations contributed to a great or very great extent to improving program management or performance (54 percent) and to assessing program effectiveness or value (48 percent). These figures are not statistically different from the results of GAO's 2013 survey.
Of the 40 percent of managers who reported having evaluations, the factor most often rated as having hindered use to a great or very great extent, as in 2013, was lack of resources to implement the evaluation findings (29 percent). Managers reported limited knowledge of congressional support for using their results; 35 percent were not able to judge whether lack of support was a barrier.
Federal managers who reported having evaluations most frequently reported that agency leadership support for evaluation, staff involvement, and an evaluation's relevance to decision makers facilitated evaluation use. GAO previously reported that involving agency staff in planning and conducting evaluations helps to ensure they are relevant, credible, and used in decision making. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) encouraged agencies to use the annual strategic reviews the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires to assess evidence gaps and inform their strategic decisions and budget making.
GAO and OMB have noted the importance of developing an evaluation plan or agenda to ensure that an agency's scarce research and evaluation resources are targeted to its most important issues. While 28 percent of managers with evaluations rated consultation with stakeholders high for facilitating use, another 22 percent reported having no basis to judge. GAO previously noted limited knowledge of agency consultation with the Congress. While 23 percent of managers with evaluations reported congressional requests or mandates facilitated evaluation use, more (31 percent) reported having no basis to judge.
GAO concludes that
Agencies' continued lack of evaluations may be the greatest barrier to their informing managers and policy makers and constitutes a lost opportunity to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of limited government resources.
Although only some agencies have developed agency-wide evaluation plans, evaluators who have them found that obtaining stakeholder input helped ensure evaluation relevance and facilitate use of their results.
Congressional consultation on agency evaluation plans could increase the studies' credibility with those whose support is needed to implement program reforms.
An agency's annual strategic review provides a good opportunity to help target its evaluation agenda to its management, budget, and policy priorities.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure that agencies obtain the evidence needed to address important questions to improve program implementation and performance, GAO recommends that the Director of OMB direct federal agencies to prepare an annual agency-wide evaluation plan that describes the congressional and other stakeholders that were consulted.
OMB staff stated that agencies should be encouraged, rather than directed, to create an annual evaluation plan. Because OMB has already been encouraging evaluation, GAO believes a more directive approach is needed. |
gao_GAO-14-345 | gao_GAO-14-345_0 | For example, NIOSH conducts research on the causes of work-related diseases and injuries; researches, develops, and tests new technologies and equipment designed to improve mine safety; and recommends occupational safety and health standards, such as the exposure limit for coal mine dust. In addition, to estimate the prevalence of lung disease among underground coal miners and to study the relationship between miners’ lung disease and their level of exposure to coal mine dust, NIOSH developed the National Study of Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis. There are two primary types of underground coal mining in the United States: continuous mining and longwall mining. MSHA Did Not Use Recent CWP Trend Data as a Basis for Its Proposed Exposure Limit on Coal Mine Dust, Which Was Appropriate
Appropriately, MSHA did not use NIOSH’s surveillance data as the basis for its proposed new coal mine dust limit, although the data served to inform MSHA’s decision to take action. However, as we reported in August 2012, the data MSHA used to support its proposal were from two reports, which relied on six epidemiological studies, not the surveillance data. For example, because the data do not include individual miners’ past exposures to coal mine dust, they cannot be used to estimate disease risk for individual miners. Experts Identified Various Approaches that Could Reduce Overall Coal Mine Dust Levels, as Well as Individual Miners’ Exposure to Dust
Experts Identified Various Engineering Controls That Could Help Reduce Overall Coal Mine Dust Levels
Experts identified various engineering controls that could further reduce the overall level of coal mine dust, but they said reductions would likely be incremental. However, they noted that these options would not help mines reduce the overall level of coal mine dust in the mine environment, and therefore would not help mine operators comply with MSHA’s exposure limit. Personal protective equipment includes items such as respirators and air stream helmets. The experts also said that personal dust monitors could be used to reduce individual miners’ exposure to dust because they provide workers with real time data on dust levels in the area of the mine in which they are working. The experts also noted that administrative controls could limit miners’ exposure to coal mine dust, although they do not control the overall level of dust in the mine. Both agencies generally concurred with the findings of the report, but provided no formal written comments. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretaries of Labor and Health and Human Services. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to: (1) determine the extent to which the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) used recent coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (CWP) trend data as a basis for its proposed exposure limit on coal mine dust, and (2) obtain experts’ views on ways to lower the level of dust in coal mines, including their associated advantages, disadvantages, and cost. To address our first objective, we reviewed MSHA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the proposed exposure limit and related documents, updated the literature search from our prior report, and interviewed officials from MSHA and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to identify recent data on the prevalence of coal worker respiratory diseases. We also reviewed our prior report and the analyses that supported it, and interviewed MSHA and NIOSH officials to determine what role, if any, recent CWP trend data had in developing the proposal to lower the exposure limit. | Why GAO Did This Study
Underground coal miners face the threat of being overexposed to coal mine dust, which can cause CWP and other lung diseases, collectively referred to as black lung disease. In October 2010, MSHA—the federal agency responsible for setting and enforcing mine safety and health standards—proposed lowering the exposure limit for respirable coal mine dust to reduce miners' risk of contracting black lung. In August 2012, GAO reported that the evidence MSHA used supported its conclusion that lowering the exposure limit on coal mine dust would reduce miners' risk of disease. However, some have questioned whether and how recent NIOSH trend data on CWP were used in developing the proposed limit.
In May 2013, GAO was asked to provide additional information on MSHA's proposal. GAO examined (1) the extent to which MSHA used recent CWP trend data as a basis for its proposed exposure limit, and (2) expert views on ways to lower the level of dust in coal mines, including their associated advantages, disadvantages, and cost. GAO reviewed MSHA's proposal and related documents; updated a previous GAO literature search; interviewed MSHA and NIOSH officials; and, with the help of the National Academies, convened a group of experts knowledgeable about underground coal mining and methods for reducing coal mine dust. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report, and MSHA and NIOSH both generally concurred with the findings.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) appropriately did not use recent trend data on coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP) as a basis for its proposal to lower the permissible exposure limit for respirable coal mine dust. These recent data from the Department of Health and Human Services' National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) are inappropriate for this purpose because they do not include the types of detailed information about individual miners needed to estimate the likelihood that miners would develop CWP at different exposure levels, such as historical dust exposures. MSHA primarily based its proposed new limit on two reports and six epidemiologic studies, which each concluded that lowering the limit on exposure to coal mine dust would reduce miners' risk of developing disease. MSHA's proposed coal mine dust limit was supported by these reports and studies because, unlike recent CWP trend data, they included information needed to conduct a reliable epidemiological analysis of disease risks associated with different levels of exposure to coal mine dust.
Experts identified various approaches that could incrementally reduce overall coal mine dust levels as well as individual miners' exposure to dust. They said that air and water are the primary engineering controls used to reduce overall coal mine dust levels in the mine environment, which are used in various mining equipment, such as sprays. The experts also said that no one technology or approach would result in substantially lower dust levels, but instead could have a cumulative impact if used together. They also noted that all the approaches may not be effective in all types of mines, and that there are a number of cost drivers that would have to be considered, such as machine maintenance and training. The experts also identified other approaches, such as personal protective equipment and administrative controls, which could reduce individual miners' exposure to dust. Personal protective equipment includes respirators and air stream helmets; administrative controls include rotating workers and using remote control devices. However, they noted that these approaches would not help mine operators comply with MSHA's exposure limit because they would not reduce the overall level of coal mine dust in the mine environment. |
gao_GAO-09-504 | gao_GAO-09-504_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine the nature and purpose of TARP activities from January 30, 2009, through March 27, 2009, unless noted, and the status of actions taken in response to our recommendations from our prior reports, we reviewed documents from OFS that described the amounts, types, and terms of Treasury’s purchases of preferred stocks and warrants under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program (SSFI), the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP), the Targeted Investment Program (TIP), the Capital Assistance Program (CAP), and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). 1). Treasury’s Strategy for Deploying TARP Funds Continues to Evolve, Though CPP Remains the Key Effort to Stabilize the Financial Markets
As of March 27, 2009, Treasury had announced several programs under TARP with a maximum announced total funding of $667.4 billion of its $700 billion. As of March 27, 2009, Treasury had disbursed about 80 percent of the $250 billion it had allocated for CPP to purchase almost $198.8 billion in preferred shares of 532 qualified financial institutions. Participating institutions are required to comply with the terms of these agreements, and we recommended that Treasury develop a process to monitor and enforce them. To date, they had not yet hired any asset managers. Treasury has an opportunity to negotiate additional requirements into its latest agreement, including that AIG seek additional concessions from others for the up to $30 billion in additional federal assistance. 2). 3). OFS Has Made Progress in Strengthening Oversight of Contractors and Financial Agents
In response to the recommendation in our January 2009 report that Treasury improve its oversight of contractors, Treasury has taken steps to help ensure that sufficient personnel are assigned to facilitate effective management and oversight of TARP contracts and financial agency agreements. According to these officials, fixed-price arrangements may not be appropriate for many TARP contracts. We note, however, that OFS does not have fully developed procedures for capturing its decisions on potential conflicts of interest. In addition, OFS continues to refine, develop, and document its internal control framework over financial reporting and compliance, including its risk assessment activities. Documentation of Certain Internal Control Procedures and Guidance Is Not Consistent With Actual Practice
We noted two areas in which OFS’s documentation of certain internal control procedures and guidance pertaining to determining warrant exercise prices were not updated to be consistent with actual practice. In Treasury has continued to take significant steps to address all the r particular, Treasury has recently expanded the scope of the month ly CPP surveys of the 20 largest institutions to include all institutions participatin in the program. Treasury officials told us that asset managers are to play a role in monitoring the participating institutions’ compliance with the agreements. Treasury has also continued to take steps to articulate a more clearly defined vision for TARP, and in February 2009, provided its strategy for using its remaining funds. For example, TARP had received approximately $2.9 billion in dividend payments through March 20, 2009, but this information has not been reported to the Congress and the public. To improve transparency, Treasury should publicly announce the amounts, such as dividends, it has received from TARP participants. inally, we again note that while isolating the effect of TARP’s activities F continues to be difficult, developments in the credit markets have generally been mixed since our January 2009 report. Some indicato demonstrate that the cost of credit has increased in interbank and corporate bond markets and decreased in mortgage markets, while perceptions of risk (as measured by premiums over Treasury securit ies) have declined in interbank and mortgage markets and risen in corporate debt markets. In addition, although Federal Reserve survey data suggest that lending standards remained tight, the largest CPP recipients extende over $240 billion in new loans to consumers and business in both December 2008 and January 2009, according to the Treasury’s new survey. Attributing any of these changes directly to TARP continues to beproblematic because of the range of actions that have been and are being taken to address the current crisis. While these indicators may be suggestive of TARP’s ongoing impact, no single indicator or set of indicators will provide a definitive determination of the program’s impact. Therefore, we recommend that Treasury take the following actions as it continues to improve the integrity, accountability, and transparency of the program. GAO-09-296. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure Integrity, Accountability, and Transparency. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's third report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) follows up on recommendations from the January 28, 2009, report (GAO-09-296). It also reviews (1) the nature and purpose of activities that had been initiated under TARP as of March 27, 2009; (2) the Department of Treasury's Office of Financial Stability's (OFS) hiring efforts, use of contractors, and progress in developing an internal control system; and (3) TARP performance indicators. For this work, GAO reviewed signed agreements and other relevant documentation and met with officials from OFS, contractors, and federal agencies. As of March 27, 2009, Treasury had disbursed $303.4 billion of the $700 billion in TARP funds. Most of the funds (almost $199 billion) went to purchase preferred shares of 532 financial institutions under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), Treasury's primary vehicle under TARP for stabilizing financial markets.
What GAO Found
Treasury has continued to improve the integrity, accountability and transparency of TARP. For example, it recently expanded monthly surveys of the largest institutions' lending activity to cover all CPP participants, as GAO recommended. These surveys should provide additional important information about how the capital investments are impacting participants' lending activities and capital levels. Treasury also continues to develop a process to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreements but has not yet hired asset managers. Treasury officials told GAO that these managers will have a role in helping ensure that institutions were honoring dividend and stock repurchase requirements. In February 2009, Treasury announced its broad strategy for using the remaining TARP funds and in the following weeks provided details for its major components. While articulating its plan was an important step, Treasury continues to struggle with developing an effective overall communication strategy that is integrated into TARP operations. Without such a strategy, Treasury may face challenges should it need additional funding for the program. Finally, as Treasury finalizes the terms of the agreement with American International Group, Inc. (AIG) for $30 billion in additional assistance, it should require that AIG seek additional concessions from employees and existing derivatives counterparties, as appropriate. GAO's January 2009 report also included recommendations about OFS's management infrastructure, including hiring, contract oversight, and internal controls. Treasury has continued to take steps to address GAO's recommendations. First, it has continued to hire additional permanent staff to address OFS's long-term organizational needs. Second, Treasury has enhanced its capacity to manage vendors by using trained oversight personnel and looking for opportunities to use fixed-price arrangements. Further actions are needed to complete its review of existing vendor conflict-of-interest mitigation plans and to improve documentation of decisions relating to potential conflicts. Third, OFS continued to refine, develop, and document its internal control framework over financial reporting and compliance, including its risk assessment activities. However, GAO noted that certain internal control procedures and the guidance pertaining to determining warrant exercise prices had not been updated to be consistent with actual practice. GAO also noted that Treasury had not publicly reported that through March 20, 2009, it had received dividends totaling almost $2.9 billion from TARP participants. Further steps in these areas are needed to improve the program's transparency and integrity. GAO again notes the difficulty of measuring the effect of TARP's activities. Developments in the credit markets have generally been mixed since the January 2009 report. Some indicators revealed that the cost of credit has increased in interbank and corporate bond markets and decreased in mortgage markets, while perceptions of risk have declined in interbank and mortgage markets and risen in corporate debt markets. In addition, although Federal Reserve survey data suggest that lending standards remained tight, the largest CPP recipients extended roughly $245 billion in new loans to consumers and businesses in both December 2008 and January 2009, according to the Treasury's new loan survey. However, attributing any of these changes directly to TARP continues to be problematic because of the range of actions that have been and are being taken to address the current crisis. While these indicators may be suggestive of TARP's ongoing impact, no single indicator or set of indicators can provide a definitive determination of the program's impact. |
gao_GAO-04-1004T | gao_GAO-04-1004T_0 | The task force recommends certain screening, immunization, and counseling services for people age 65 or older. Most Beneficiaries Receive Some but Not All Recommended Preventive Services
Nationally representative survey data show that Medicare beneficiaries visit physicians often and that most report receiving “routine checkups.” These data do not show, however, which specific services were delivered during those “checkups.” Despite the frequency of visits, many Medicare beneficiaries do not receive the full range of recommended preventive services. From 2000 survey data and U. S. Bureau of the Census estimates of people age 65 or older, we estimated that beneficiaries visited a physician at least six times that year, on average, mainly for illnesses or medical conditions. Our analysis of additional data for our 2003 report showed that many Medicare beneficiaries still did not receive certain recommended preventive services. For example, data from CDC’s NHANES for 1999–2000 show that, of beneficiaries participating in this nationally representative survey who, as part of the survey, had a physical examination and were found to have elevated blood pressure readings at that time, 32 percent reported that no physician or other health professional had told them about the condition before. Similarly, 32 percent of those found by the survey to have a high cholesterol level reported that no one had told them that they had high cholesterol. Projected nationally, this percentage translates into 2.1 million Medicare beneficiaries who may have had high cholesterol without knowing it (see fig. An Initial Examination May Improve Preventive Care, but Follow-up Is Also Key
A one-time initial preventive care examination covered by Medicare may offer opportunity to deliver some preventive services but alone is not enough to ensure better health among beneficiaries. It could be used to orient new beneficiaries to Medicare and encourage them to make informed choices about providers and plans. Nevertheless, a one- time examination does not ensure delivery of the full range of preventive services. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the agency conducted a congressionally mandated demonstration to test varied health promotion and disease prevention services, such as free preventive visits, health risk assessment, and behavior counseling, to see if they would increase use of preventive services, improve health, or lower health care expenditures for Medicare beneficiaries. CMS is exploring an alternative for Medicare preventive care that would provide systematic health risk assessments to fee-for-service beneficiaries through a means other than examination by a physician. In addition, the study stated that to be effective, risk assessment questionnaires must be coupled with follow-up interventions, such as referrals to appropriate services. A one-time preventive care examination will add a dedicated opportunity for delivering preventive care and could help reduce the gap in the preventive services that Medicare beneficiaries receive. | Why GAO Did This Study
Preventive care depends on identifying health risks and on taking steps to control these risks. In contrast, Medicare, the federal health program insuring almost 35 million beneficiaries age 65 or older, was established largely to help pay beneficiaries' health care costs when they became ill or injured. Congress has broadened Medicare coverage over time to include specific preventive services, such as flu shots and certain cancer-screening tests, and the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) added coverage for several preventive services, including a one-time preventive care examination for new enrollees, which will start in 2005. GAO's work, done before MMA, included analyzing data from four national health surveys to examine the extent to which Medicare beneficiaries received preventive services through physician visits. GAO also interviewed officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and other experts and reviewed the results of past demonstrations and studies to assess expected benefits and limits of different delivery options for preventive care, including a one-time preventive care examination.
What GAO Found
Most Medicare beneficiaries receive some but not all recommended preventive services. Our analysis of year 2000 data shows that nearly 9 in 10 Medicare beneficiaries visited a physician at least once that year; beneficiaries made, on average, six visits or more within the year. Still, many did not receive recommended preventive services, such as flu or pneumonia vaccinations. Moreover, many are apparently unaware that they may have conditions, such as high cholesterol, that preventive services are meant to detect. In one 19992000 nationally representative survey where people were physically examined and asked a series of questions, nearly one-third of people age 65 or older whom the survey found to have high cholesterol measurements said they had not before been told by a physician or other health professional that they had high cholesterol. Projected nationally, this percentage translates into about 2.1 million people who may have had high cholesterol without knowing it. A one-time preventive care examination may help orient new beneficiaries to Medicare and provide further opportunity for beneficiaries to receive some preventive services. Covering a one-time preventive care examination does not ensure, however, that beneficiaries will receive the recommended preventive services they need over the long term or consistently improve health or lower costs. CMS is exploring an alternative that would provide beneficiaries with systematic health risk assessments by means other than visits to physicians. A key component of this early effort involves the coupling of risk assessments with follow-up interventions, such as referrals for follow-up care. |
gao_GAO-07-21 | gao_GAO-07-21_0 | Investment Fees Account for Most 401(k) Plan Fees and Are Usually Borne by Plan Participants
Investment fees—which are charged by companies that manage mutual funds or other investment products for all services related to operating the fund—comprise the majority of fees in 401(k) plans and are typically borne by participants. Plan record-keeping fees generally account for the next largest portion of plan fees. These fees cover the cost of various administrative activities carried out to maintain participant accounts. Although plan sponsors often pay for record- keeping fees, participants bear them in an increasing number of plans. In addition to investment and record-keeping fees, there are a number of other fees charged to administer the plan as a whole, including trustee fees that are charged by an individual, bank, or trust company to securely maintain plan assets; audit fees that are imposed by a service provider in connection with the annual audit that is required of ERISA-covered plans with more than 100 participants; legal fees that are charged by an attorney or law firm to provide legal support for administrative activities, such as ensuring the plan is in compliance with ERISA or representing the plan in a divorce settlement; investment consulting fees that are charged by an advisor, often a pension consultant, hired to help the plan sponsor select funds for the plan and to monitor investments; and communication fees that cover the cost of educating participants about the plan. Required Disclosures Provide Limited Fee Information to Assist Participants in Comparing Investment Options
The fee information that ERISA requires 401(k) plan sponsors to disclose is limited and does not provide participants with an easy comparison of investment options. Although they often contain some information on fees, these documents are not required to disclose the fees borne by individual participants. Additional fee disclosures are required for certain—but not all—plans in which participants direct their investments. These disclosures are provided to participants in a piecemeal fashion and do not provide a simple way for participants to compare plan investment options and their fees. Labor Has Authority over 401(k) Plan Fees and Certain Types of Business Arrangements, but Lacks Information for Effective Oversight
Labor has authority under ERISA to oversee 401(k) plan fees and certain types of business arrangements involving service providers, but lacks the information it needs to provide effective oversight. However, the information reported to Labor does not identify all fees charged to 401(k) plans and therefore has limited use for effectively overseeing fees and identifying undisclosed business arrangements among consultants or other service providers. Labor has several initiatives underway to improve the information it has on fees and the various business arrangements among service providers. Labor does this in a number of ways, including collecting information on fees from plan sponsors, investigating participants’ complaints or referrals from other agencies on questionable 401(k) plan practices, and conducting outreach to educate plan sponsors about their responsibilities. Without disclosing these arrangements, service providers may be steering plan sponsors toward investment products or services that may not be in the best interest of participants. | Why GAO Did This Study
American workers are increasingly relying on 401(k) plans, which allow pre-tax contributions to individual accounts, for their retirement income. As workers accrue earnings on their investments, they also pay a number of fees that may significantly decrease their retirement savings. Because of concerns about the effects of fees on participants' retirement savings, GAO examined (1) the types of fees associated with 401(k) plans and who pays these fees, (2) how information on fees is disclosed to plan participants, and (3) how the Department of Labor (Labor) oversees plan fees and certain business arrangements. GAO reviewed industry surveys on fees and interviewed Labor officials and pension professionals about disclosure and reporting practices.
What GAO Found
Investment fees, which are charged by companies managing mutual funds and other investment products for all services related to operating the fund, comprise the majority of fees in 401(k) plans and are typically borne by participants. Plan record-keeping fees generally account for the next largest portion of plan fees. These fees cover the cost of various administrative activities carried out to maintain participant accounts. Although plan sponsors often pay for record-keeping fees, participants bear them in a growing number of plans. The information on fees that 401(k) plan sponsors are required by law to disclose is limited and does not provide for an easy comparison among investment options. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires that plan sponsors provide participants with certain disclosure documents, but these documents are not required to contain information on fees borne by individual participants. Additional fee disclosures are required for certain--but not all--plans in which participants direct their investments. These disclosures are provided to participants in a piecemeal fashion and do not provide a simple way for participants to compare plan investment options and their fees. Labor has authority under ERISA to oversee 401(k) plan fees and certain types of business arrangements that could affect fees, but lacks the information it needs to provide effective oversight. Labor collects information on fees from plan sponsors, investigates participants' complaints or referrals from other agencies on questionable 401(k) plan practices, and conducts outreach to educate plan sponsors about their responsibilities. However, the information reported to Labor does not include all fees charged to 401(k) plans and therefore has limited use for effective oversight and for identifying undisclosed business arrangements among service providers. Without disclosing these arrangements, service providers may steer plan sponsors toward investment products or services that may not be in the best interest of participants and may cause them to pay higher fees. Labor has several initiatives underway to improve the information it has on fees and the various business arrangements among service providers. |
gao_GAO-17-742 | gao_GAO-17-742_0 | Broadband provides Internet connectivity at various speeds. Fixed service can also be provided by non-wired means, such as via satellites. The process of gaining access to such infrastructure or installing wires or cable can require permits from local or other government entities or utility companies. Figure 1 illustrates several different types of fixed services through which consumers can access broadband. 2). Selected Experts and Stakeholders Said Costs Can Limit Broadband Competition and Cited Industry Consolidation and Similarity of Fixed and Mobile Service as Emerging Factors
Experts and Stakeholders Identified High Costs of Infrastructure, Spectrum, and Video Content as Limiting Competition
Experts and stakeholders told us that access and associated costs related to infrastructure, spectrum, and video content are barriers to entry in the broadband market. Competition may increase in such a scenario because increasing similarity could result in the two services becoming substitutes, and therefore lead to fixed providers facing competitive pressure from mobile providers. FCC Has Undertaken Rulemakings and Other Actions to Promote Competition but Lacks Information on Their Effectiveness and Competition’s Effect on Consumers
FCC Has Used Rulemakings, Spectrum Auctions, and Merger Reviews to Promote Competition but Lacks Information on the Effectiveness of These Actions
FCC has used its rulemaking process and other actions to develop regulations and rules intended to reduce costs and delays associated with deploying broadband infrastructure, for example: In 2014, FCC issued new regulations that, among other things, aimed to quicken environmental and historic reviews related to deployment of wireless infrastructure and clarify FCC’s timelines for states and municipalities to complete review of wireless applications. As discussed above, about half of Americans have access to only one fixed broadband provider, and although most Americans have access to multiple choices for mobile broadband service, FCC and experts acknowledge that fixed and mobile service are not fully substitutable for one another. FCC Assesses Some Indicators of Consumers’ Broadband Service Experience but Lacks Information on How Competition Affects Service Price and Quality
FCC has reported that competition can help consumers get lower prices and higher service quality from their broadband providers; however, the agency has not identified an approach to regularly examine how competition affects broadband prices and service quality. This report shows that the number of broadband providers varies considerably depending on where a consumer is located, with urban areas generally having more provider options than rural areas. FCC’s data and reports, as discussed, provide information on the extent of broadband deployment and other indicators of consumer experience with broadband service, but these data and reports do not show how broadband prices and service quality vary based on the number of choices that consumers have for broadband service. Moving forward, FCC could take steps to better understand how well its actions to promote broadband competition are working. Such information could help FCC and other decision makers better prioritize and focus FCC’s various efforts to promote broadband competition to secure lower prices and higher quality service for consumers in a rapidly evolving market. (Recommendation 1)
As part of its annual reporting on the broadband market, FCC should solicit and report on the views of stakeholders and others on how varying levels of broadband deployment affect broadband prices and service quality. How can industry support competitive broadband markets? What is the appropriate role, if any, for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with regard to broadband competition? Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report covers (1) selected experts’ and stakeholders’ views on the factors currently affecting broadband competition and the factors that may affect it in the future and (2) the actions FCC has taken to promote broadband competition and assess the effectiveness of its actions, as well as to examine consumers’ experience with broadband competition. To obtain expert and stakeholder views on factors that affect competition in broadband, we convened a meeting of 19 experts and interviewed 23 stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
FCC has a role in promoting competition in the market for broadband, which provides consumers with high-speed Internet through fixed service at home and mobile service through devices such as smartphones. FCC data indicate that about 90 percent of Americans had access to fixed service as of December 2015, but that less than half had more than one choice for such service. As of that time, FCC reported that multiple providers offered mobile broadband coverage to most Americans. Mobile service increasingly allows access to Internet content that was previously accessed primarily through fixed service.
GAO was asked to examine factors affecting broadband competition. This report covers (1) selected experts' and stakeholders' views on factors affecting broadband competition and (2) how FCC promotes broadband competition and examines consumers' experience with it. GAO analyzed FCC data as of December 2015; reviewed relevant statutes and FCC documentation; interviewed FCC officials and 23 stakeholders selected to include various types of broadband providers and associations representing industry and consumers; and convened a meeting of 19 experts from academia, industry, and consumer groups with assistance from the National Academy of Sciences.
What GAO Found
Selected experts and stakeholders told GAO that infrastructure costs and other factors can limit broadband deployment and the extent of broadband competition. Factors these individuals identified included providers' costs to deploy antennas, install wires or cables, and obtain permits to access existing infrastructure. Such infrastructure includes utility poles needed for deploying wired components of broadband networks. These costs can limit competition, particularly in non-urban and less populated areas, where providers' return on investment can be lower due to fewer potential customers. Experts and stakeholders also identified industry consolidation and increasing similarity of fixed and mobile broadband as factors that are likely to affect broadband competition moving forward.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has undertaken rulemakings, spectrum auctions, and merger reviews to help promote competition, but lacks information on how well these actions promote competition. Despite such actions, about half of Americans have access to only one fixed provider (see figure). FCC has a process for seeking stakeholders' and others' input on broadband-related topics and annually reporting on these views, but does not solicit such input on its actions to promote competition. Such input could help FCC determine if any changes are needed to its actions to support competition relative to current and emerging factors in the broadband market. Further, FCC's annual reports contain some information on consumers' experience with broadband competition, such as the number of provider options. However, these reports do not include stakeholder input on how the number of provider options affects prices and service. Some stakeholders said that competition was important to securing lower prices and better service, while others said competition does not necessarily lead to these benefits because some providers offer the same pricing and service quality everywhere regardless of whether they face competition in a particular location. Regularly seeking stakeholder input on how varying levels of broadband deployment affect price and service quality, could help FCC to better focus its efforts to secure lower prices and higher service quality service for consumers.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should annually solicit and report on stakeholder input regarding (1) its actions to promote broadband competition and (2) how varying levels of broadband deployment affect prices and service quality. FCC concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-96-113 | gao_HEHS-96-113_0 | Psychological services address issues such as PTSD, drug and alcohol abuse, and sexual trauma. RCS reported that nearly 283,000 new veteran clients visited Vet Centers during fiscal years 1993 through 1995. First, many veterans have social concerns that can be addressed in three or fewer visits with staff. Vet Center staff may draw on their own resources to assist with these problems or may refer clients to other VA and non-VA programs, thus limiting the number of visits needed. As a result, the core group of veterans who use the largest portion of Vet Centers’ staff resources are not readily identifiable, and managers and supervisors may lack information needed to oversee the program and monitor staff activities. Furthermore, the workload reporting system does not collect information to determine how Vet Center staff resources are used. However, some clients’ records are not well documented, and RCS has not developed a systematic approach for demonstrating that the Vet Center program is effective, on a continuing basis, in meeting the psychological needs of its clients. When compared with medical centers, Vet Centers serve different roles, purposes, and benefits by being located in small, community-based storefront facilities; providing care to all veterans who served during the authorized eras of conflict without regard to their income (generally, to receive free medical center services for non-service-connected illness, veterans must have incomes below a specified amount); providing counseling to veterans’ family members and significant others to assist with the veterans’ readjustment (medical centers seldom include others in veterans’ treatment); providing counseling for social and economic needs such as employment and VA benefits, which is generally not provided by medical centers; performing outreach activities to identify veterans who could benefit from Vet Center or other VA services (medical centers perform little or no outreach); establishing close ties with local service providers and linking veterans with the services they need; hiring a staff of team leaders and counselors of whom about 60 percent are veterans of Vietnam and later conflicts; and if needed, working with veterans for longer periods than medical centers generally do. A Program Evaluation of the Department of Veterans Affairs Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Vet Center program, focusing on: (1) the individuals served and the services provided; and (2) VA methodology for determining whether Vet Center services are appropriate and effective.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) vet centers help certain veterans make a successful transition from military to civilian life; (2) vet center services range from assistance with basic needs and benefits to drug and alcohol abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) counseling; (3) veterans who have more serious psychological problems, such as PTSD, visit vet centers more often than veterans with employment or benefit concerns; (4) about 283,000 new clients used vet centers during fiscal years 1993 through 1995; (5) many veterans have social concerns that can be addressed by other VA and non-VA programs, thus limiting the number of center visits needed; (6) client visits are generally recorded accurately in the workload reporting system, but program managers and supervisors lack the information needed to oversee the program and monitor staff activities and resources; and (7) VA has established standards for determining whether treatment plans are appropriate, but it has not developed a systematic approach for demonstrating that vet center services are effective in meeting veterans' psychological needs. |
gao_GAO-02-1001 | gao_GAO-02-1001_0 | In contrast with a cyclical imbalance caused by temporary economic downturns, the District suggests its imbalance is more fundamental in nature. These officials assert that the District faces a fiscal structural imbalance as the result of several factors, many stemming from the federal government’s presence in the city, the absence of a state to provide funding for the state-like services provided by the District, and restrictions on the District’s tax base. The District also points to its uniqueness and the fiscal issues stemming from its being the nation’s capital and having the federal presence, as well as its responsibility for services ordinarily provided by state government. These projected shortfalls are premised on the continuation of current budget policy over a long-term period spanning economic cycles. Although District officials have not formally estimated the size of their reported fiscal imbalance, they have cited the following expenditure responsibilities as the primary factors contributing to such an imbalance: the District is not directly compensated for services provided to the federal government such as public works and public safety, which the District values at $240 million annually; the District is responsible for state-like services such as human services, mental health services, Medicaid, and the University of the District of Columbia, which the District values at $487 million annually; and the District estimates that approximately 400,000 out-of-state vehicles travel on city roads per day and do not pay for road repair the District values at $150 million per year. In addition to the amount of nontaxable property in the District, the District government, unlike state governments, is prohibited by federal law from taxing the income earned in the District by nonresident individuals. However, the District’s estimates of its costs to provide services to the federal government and its costs of providing state-like services are not supported with detailed data or analysis. Also under the Revitalization Act, the federal government assumed financial and administrative responsibilities for one of the District’s largest fiscal burdens, which it inherited from the federal government as part of the transition to Home Rule in 1973—its unfunded pension liability for vested teachers, police, firefighters, and judges. In addition, the Revitalization Act was part of a larger act— the Balanced Budget Act of 1997—that increased the federal share of District Medicaid payments from 50 to 70 percent. The changes to the District’s finances resulting from the Revitalization Act impacted both the District’s revenues and expenditures. Fiscal Structural Imbalance: More Comprehensive Approaches Should be Explored
The District’s estimates of its fiscal structural imbalance point to many specific factors but do not constitute a comprehensive assessment of underlying imbalances between its expenditures and revenue capacity. The District has not yet determined whether even under the constraints they assert, it has the capacity to provide a level of services comparable to those provided by other cities with similar needs and costs. | What GAO Found
The District of Columbia has historically faced many challenges due to its unique circumstances and role as the nation's capital. After several years of struggling with financial crises and insolvency in the early 1990s, the District has significantly improved its financial condition by achieving five consecutive balanced budgets, an upgraded bond rating, and unqualified or "clean" opinions on its financial statements. More recently, however, District officials have asserted that the District faces a fiscal structural imbalance as a result of several factors, some stemming from the federal government's presence in the city, the absence of a state to provide funding for the state-like services provided by the District, and restrictions on the District's tax base. The District argues that it faces a fiscal structural imbalance between revenues and its expenditures that undermines its capacity to meet its current responsibilities. In contrast with a cyclical fiscal imbalance caused by temporary economic downturns, the District suggests that its imbalance is longer term and more fundamental and, therefore, structural in nature. The District's estimated measures of fiscal structural imbalance are based on the continuation of current budget policy over a longer term period spanning economic cycles, but do not consider the results of policy alternatives. District officials have cited constraints they face in raising revenues as well as what they assert are unique expenditure responsibilities stemming from the District's position as a federal city that must also provide state-like functions. On the revenue side, unlike state governments, the District is prohibited by federal law from taxing the incomes of nonresidents working in the District. On the spending side, the District officials state that they are uniquely burdened by the responsibilities of a state and by requirements to provide services to the federal establishment. However, the District's estimated costs associated with providing state-like services are not supported by detailed analysis and data, and they are derived from cost allocation formulas largely based on the judgment of District officials. The District received some federal relief through the National Capital and Self-Government Improvement Revitalization Act of 1997, which required the federal government to take over certain services in such areas as criminal justice, transferring their financing from D.C. taxpayers as a whole. In addition, the federal government assumed financial and administrative responsibilities for one of the District's largest fiscal burdens, which it inherited from the federal government as part of the transition to Home Rule in 1973--its unfunded pension liability for vested teachers, police, firefighters, and judges. Also, the federal government's share of the District's Medicaid payments was increased from 50 to 70 percent. Although the District's estimates point to many specific factors, they do not constitute a comprehensive assessment of imbalances between expenditures and revenue capacity. The District has not performed the analysis to determine whether it has the capacity to provide a level of services comparable to those provided by other cities with similar needs and costs. As a practical matter, such an analysis is key to determining the presence of an underlying structural imbalance in the District's finances. |
gao_GAO-09-769 | gao_GAO-09-769_0 | The 1986 act was amended the next year to include dollar limits on the amount of home mortgage debt for which interest payments can be deducted. Table 1 also summarizes the deductibility of points. IRS’s Enforcement and Research Programs Do Not Provide an Overall Picture of Mortgage Interest Deduction Noncompliance
Although IRS’s enforcement and research programs found some mortgage interest deduction compliance problems, the methods leave gaps in what is known about the extent and specific nature of noncompliance. The four main programs that IRS uses to enforce or research mortgage interest deduction compliance include the following. IRS’s National Research Program (NRP), the main ongoing study of taxpayer compliance based on examinations of a random sample of tax returns: IRS found that between 12 and 14 percent of individual taxpayers who claimed home mortgage interest on line 10 of Schedule A misreported the amount. Two special compliance initiative projects (CIP) primarily examining acquisition debt for a limited segment of individual taxpayers with high mortgage interest deductions or high adjusted gross incomes: About 9,000 examinations were closed in fiscal year 2008 for both projects. The effects of the problems, however, are uneven. Although many taxpayers might encounter few problems, others could face many more. Problems cited by tax practitioners and in our review of articles on deducting home mortgage interest included the following: Taxpayers need to distinguish between acquisition and home equity debt but did not always do so. Taxpayers deducted interest on loans exceeding the limitations, including the acquisition, home equity, and two-home limits. Taxpayers who were subject to the AMT and thus not eligible to deduct home equity interest claimed it nonetheless. Tax practitioners also missed the limitations and did not comply with the AMT rules. Depending on the circumstances, some taxpayers and practitioners faced extensive recordkeeping and calculations related to such matters as refinancing, the AMT, business use of the home, other uses of loan proceeds, and the periodic use and repayment of home equity lines of credit. Taxpayers may have been unaware that they might need documentation on matters such as how proceeds of home equity loans are spent to properly determine the amount of the mortgage interest deduction on their tax returns. Mortgage interest deduction limits based on debt amounts are not directly comparable with the information on Form 1098, which lists interest paid. If taxpayers’ debts exceed the limits, taxpayers must calculate how much interest they can deduct. Options Exist for Expanding Mortgage Information Reporting and Using Private Sector Data to Enhance Enforcement
Additional information about taxpayers’ mortgages could help IRS identify the most productive cases to examine and determine whether taxpayers are claiming the correct amount of mortgage interest deduction. IRS could obtain more helpful information about taxpayers’ mortgages by expanding information collected on Form 1098. IRS officials said that in implementing certain additional reporting requirements, the agency would need to meet the terms of the Paperwork Reduction Act, which requires agencies to minimize the paperwork burden they impose on the public and maximize the practical utility of the information they collect. IRS’s Guidance to Taxpayers and Training Materials for Examiners Did Not Indicate the Range of Possible Mortgage Interest Deduction Situations
Taken as a whole, IRS taxpayer guidance—Schedule A and its instructions, Publication 17, Your Federal Income Tax, and Publication 936, Home Mortgage Interest Deduction—generally informed taxpayers that mortgage interest deductions are subject to limits. Even though the guidance was generally sufficient, Schedule A does not explicitly mention the limitations. Overall, examiners we interviewed were satisfied with training and guidance on the mortgage interest deduction. Tax Software Differed in the Ease of Navigating Mortgage Interest Deduction Instructions
The three companies’ tax preparation software for individuals that we analyzed differed from each other in how they treated the limitations on the amount of debt for which interest can be deducted. However, consideration of statutory changes was beyond the scope of this report. Specifically, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue revise NRP’s case selection system so that a tax return’s mortgage interest deduction is not automatically excluded as an examination issue if it matches information reported on Form 1098; revise Form 1098 to require third parties to provide information on mortgage balances, the address of a home securing a mortgage, and an indicator of whether the mortgage is for a current year refinancing; investigate whether using information from private sources would be productive in detecting mortgage interest noncompliance, especially for home equity debt; revise the wording on Schedule A to clearly state that the mortgage interest deduction is subject to limitations; conduct a test to evaluate whether mortgage interest deduction-related outreach programs to taxpayers and tax return preparers could be a cost-effective way to reduce noncompliance; outreach might include sending correspondence covering key rules and common mistakes or promoting seminars on common types of misreporting; set a date to complete the Chief Counsel determination on whether the acquisition debt limit is $1 million or $1.1 million when used in combination with the home equity debt limit; and revise examiner training materials by adding examples cited as common problems by auditors and paid tax return preparers, such as those involving multiple homes or home-based businesses, and after the Chief Counsel’s final determination on the acquisition limit, revise examiner training and the worksheet in guidance to reflect the project’s outcome. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To provide information on how IRS detects taxpayers’ noncompliance with the home mortgage interest deduction rules and what IRS knows about the extent of noncompliance and to identify problems, if any, that taxpayers face in attempting to comply with the deduction and describe IRS’s challenges in detecting mortgage interest deduction noncompliance, we reviewed IRS documents and interviewed agency officials to determine how IRS checks taxpayers’ compliance with deduction rules and if there were issues affecting its ability to detect noncompliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The home mortgage interest deduction is the third most expensive federal income tax expenditure, with the government expected to forgo about $80 billion of revenue for the deduction in 2009.1 Subject to various limitations, taxpayers may deduct interest on home-secured loans, such as mortgages, mortgage refinancings, and home equity loans, including those taken as lump sum amounts and home equity lines of credit. The rules that taxpayers must follow in determining the proper amount of mortgage interest to deduct can be complex. For example, there are limitations on the amount of debt for which interest can be deducted, special rules for refinancing, situations where alternative minimum tax (AMT) considerations apply, and rules on the deductibility of prepaid interest amounts called points. In general, complex tax rules increase the potential for noncompliance. Congress asked us to study the home mortgage interest deduction to determine if there are administrative issues that need to be addressed to improve taxpayer compliance and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement. For this report, we (1) provide information on how IRS detects taxpayers' noncompliance with the home mortgage interest deduction rules and what it knows about the extent of noncompliance; (2) identify the problems, if any, taxpayers face in attempting to comply with the deduction and describe IRS's challenges in detecting mortgage interest deduction noncompliance; (3) assess options to give IRS more information to enforce compliance with the rules; (4) determine whether IRS's guidance to taxpayers and its examiners' guidance and training on the deduction provide enough information to properly calculate the taxpayers' allowable mortgage interest deduction; and (5) describe how tax-return preparation software programs handle the deduction. Congress also asked us to provide descriptive information on taxpayers' mortgage interest deductions and mortgage interest payments reported on Form 1098, Mortgage Interest Statement. Appendix V provides this information. Consideration of statutory changes was beyond the scope of our report.
What GAO Found
Although IRS's enforcement and research programs found some mortgage interest deduction compliance problems, the methods leave gaps in what is known about the extent and specific nature of noncompliance. The four main programs that IRS uses to enforce or research mortgage interest deduction compliance include the following. (1) A computer matching program designed to identify taxpayers whose mortgage interest deduction exceeds amounts reported on Form 1098; (2) IRS's National Research Program (NRP), the main ongoing study of taxpayer compliance based on examinations of a random sample of tax returns; (3) Routine examinations done by correspondence, in an IRS office, or on site; and (4) Two special compliance initiative projects (CIP) primarily examining acquisition debt for a limited segment of individual taxpayers with high mortgage interest deductions or high adjusted gross incomes. The mortgage interest deduction rules create compliance problems for taxpayers, reflecting the deduction's complexity. The effects of the problems, however, are uneven. Although many taxpayers might encounter few problems, others could face many more. Problems cited by tax practitioners and in our review of articles on deducting home mortgage interest included the following: (1) Taxpayers need to distinguish between acquisition and home equity debt but did not always do so. (2) Taxpayers deducted interest on loans exceeding the limitations, including the acquisition, home equity, and two-home limits. (3) Taxpayers who were subject to the AMT and thus not eligible to deduct home equity interest claimed it nonetheless. (4) Tax practitioners also missed the limitations and did not comply with the AMT rules. (5) Depending on the circumstances, some taxpayers and practitioners faced extensive recordkeeping and calculations related to such matters as refinancing, the AMT, business use of the home, other uses of loan proceeds, and the periodic use and repayment of home equity lines of credit. (6) Taxpayers may have been unaware that they might need documentation on matters such as how proceeds of home equity loans are spent to properly determine the amount of the mortgage interest deduction on their tax returns. (7) Mortgage interest deduction limits based on debt amounts are not directly comparable with the information on Form 1098, which lists interest paid. If taxpayers' debts exceed the limits, taxpayers must calculate how much interest they can deduct. Additional information about taxpayers' mortgages could help IRS identify the most productive cases to examine and determine whether taxpayers are claiming the correct amount of mortgage interest deduction. IRS could obtain more helpful information about taxpayers' mortgages by expanding information collected on Form 1098. IRS officials said that in implementing certain additional reporting requirements, the agency would need to meet the terms of the Paperwork Reduction Act, which requires agencies to minimize the paperwork burden they impose on the public and maximize the practical utility of the information they collect. Taken as a whole, IRS taxpayer guidance--Schedule A and its instructions, Publication 17, Your Federal Income Tax, and Publication 936, Home Mortgage Interest Deduction--generally informed taxpayers that mortgage interest deductions are subject to limits. Even though the guidance was generally sufficient, Schedule A does not explicitly mention the limitations. IRS's examiners' guidance and training materials included information for identifying and calculating home-equity and the acquisition-debt limitations. Overall, examiners we interviewed were satisfied with training and guidance on the mortgage interest deduction. The three companies' tax preparation software for individuals that we analyzed differed from each other in how they treated the limitations on the amount of debt for which interest can be deducted. |
gao_GAO-17-364 | gao_GAO-17-364_0 | Background
NWS is the nation’s official and authoritative source for watches and warnings during severe weather and is responsible for providing weather and climate data and issuing forecasts and warnings for the protection of life and property and enhancement of the national economy. Specifically, we determined that across NWS’s 168 operational units, vacancies increased from about 5 percent (211 positions) at the end of fiscal year 2010, to about 11 percent (455 positions) at the end of fiscal year 2016. The officials explained that from fiscal years 2010 through 2016, NWS did not have resources to support all of the positions included in its organizational table. To address this issue, NWS developed additional vacancy data that factored in its available resources. Based on these data, the vacancy rate across operational units was approximately 0.6 percent in fiscal year 2010 and increased to about 7 percent in fiscal year 2016. However, taking these steps, according to managers and staff, at times led to their inability to complete other key tasks, such as providing severe weather information support to state and local emergency managers. NWS Operational Unit Managers and Staff Reported Taking Steps to Help Ensure Forecasts and Warnings Were Issued in Light of Vacancies
Most NWS officials we interviewed indicated that vacancies in operational units remained unfilled for extended periods, stretching from several months to a few years. Operational unit managers we interviewed said that information on the status of their hiring requests was critical to their ability to allocate resources and manage work schedules. WFMO data for fiscal year 2016 show that the time it took to fill hiring requests once they were selected for processing averaged 232 days (around 8 months) and ranged from 64 to 467 days. According to federal standards for internal control, management should internally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. The WFMO director said the Department of Commerce plans to develop the new system, potentially in 2017, but the design and capabilities have yet to be finalized. In the interim, without access to complete and real-time information on the status of their requests throughout the three phases of the hiring process, NWS operational unit managers are limited in their ability to plan for and distribute their unit’s workload in the most efficient and effective manner. Combining multiple hiring requests into a single job announcement. NWS officials said they believe the hiring actions to date have helped allow the agency to streamline hiring but said they have not evaluated the actions. Conclusions
In light of vacancies that have increased since fiscal year 2010, NWS operational managers and staff have taken several steps to help ensure forecasts and warnings are issued. NWS intends to develop a strategic human capital plan that may, in part, provide a framework for integrating and evaluating the effectiveness of the various hiring actions, but officials do not have a time frame for its development. In the interim, by evaluating whether its actions are reducing the hiring backlog or achieving the goal of sustaining a highly skilled workforce, NWS would have better assurance that its actions were achieving expected results and could better determine where to devote resources. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce take the following two actions: To enhance information available to operational unit managers, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the director of NOAA’s WFMO to ensure that complete information on hiring requests is routinely communicated to NWS managers throughout the three phases of the hiring process, such as by supporting the development of improved tracking and reporting capabilities in the planned new Commerce-wide data system. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) information available on vacancies at National Weather Service (NWS) operational units for fiscal years 2010 through 2016; (2) steps, if any, NWS operational unit management and staff have taken to address the impact of vacancies at their units; (3) the extent to which National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Workforce Management Office (WFMO) makes information available to operational unit managers on the status of hiring requests; and (4) the extent to which NOAA’s WFMO and NWS are taking actions to address the hiring backlog at operational units. To examine the extent to which NOAA’s WFMO makes information available to operational unit managers on the status of hiring requests and the extent to which NOAA’s WFMO and NWS have taken actions to address the hiring backlog at operational units, we examined documentation regarding the process for hiring at NWS operational units, as well as any actions NWS and WFMO have taken to address the hiring backlog. | Why GAO Did This Study
NWS has the critical responsibility of issuing weather forecasts and warnings to help protect life and property, especially as severe weather unfolds. Most NWS operational units across the nation operate 24 hours every day to issue forecasts and warnings. NOAA's WFMO processes NWS hiring requests and other actions related to human capital.
GAO was asked to review vacancies and hiring at NWS operational units. This report examines (1) information available on vacancies at NWS operational units for fiscal years 2010 through 2016, (2) any steps NWS operational unit management and staff have taken to address the impact of vacancies at their units, (3) the extent to which NOAA's WFMO makes information available to managers on the status of hiring requests, and (4) the extent to which NOAA's WFMO and NWS are taking actions to address the hiring backlog at operational units. GAO analyzed available vacancy data for fiscal years 2010 through 2016 and assessed the data's reliability; examined relevant documentation and interviewed NOAA, WFMO, and NWS officials; and visited a nongeneralizable sample of nine units selected to reflect geographic diversity and varying vacancy levels.
What GAO Found
Available data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Weather Service (NWS) indicate that the number of vacancies across its operational units has increased since fiscal year 2010. Specifically, agency data show that vacancies—unfilled positions at a point in time—increased from about 5 percent of the total number of positions at the end of fiscal year 2010 to about 11 percent in 2016. NWS officials reported that they did not have the resources to fill all of these vacancies and therefore developed additional data that factored in available resources. Based on these data, the vacancy rate across operational units was approximately 0.6 percent in fiscal year 2010 and increased to about 7 percent in fiscal year 2016.
NWS operational unit managers and staff GAO interviewed said they had taken several steps to address the impact of vacancies that remained unfilled for months, and in some cases, more than a year. These steps included managers and staff performing additional tasks to ensure forecasts and warnings were issued, staff adjusting their work and leave schedules, and managers requesting temporary staff from other units. However, taking these steps, according to managers and staff, at times led to their inability to complete other key tasks, such as providing severe weather information support to state and local emergency managers.
NOAA's Workforce Management Office (WFMO) makes limited information available to NWS managers on the status of their hiring requests. NWS managers said such information was critical for allocating resources and managing work, particularly in light of the length of the NWS hiring process. For example, agency data show that filling hiring requests selected for processing ranged from 64 to 467 days in fiscal year 2016. GAO found that complete information was often not available to managers, such as when the processing of a new hiring request was scheduled to begin. This is not consistent with federal internal control standards that call for management to communicate necessary quality information to achieve an entity's objectives. A WFMO official said the agency is working with the Department of Commerce to develop a new department-wide data system, potentially in 2017 that could provide improved tracking and reporting capabilities, but the design of the new system has not been finalized. In the interim, without complete information on the status of their requests, NWS operational unit managers are limited in their ability to plan for and distribute their unit's workload in the most efficient and effective manner.
NOAA's WFMO and NWS have taken some actions to help address NWS's hiring backlog. For example, NWS has combined job announcements for similar positions into one announcement. NWS officials said they believe such actions have allowed them to streamline hiring, but they have not evaluated the extent to which their actions have achieved expected results, consistent with federal internal control standards. NWS intends to develop a strategic human capital plan, which officials said could provide a framework for evaluating its hiring actions, but does not have a time frame for its development. In the interim, by evaluating whether its actions are reducing the hiring backlog, NWS would have better assurance that its actions were achieving expected results, and the agency could better determine where to devote resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NOAA (1) ensure that complete information on hiring requests is routinely communicated to NWS managers and (2) evaluate whether NWS actions to reduce the hiring backlog are achieving expected results. NOAA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-570 | gao_GAO-06-570_0 | Unclear Guidance and Inconsistent Application of Cost- Sharing Methods Can Have Significant Financial Consequences for Entities Involved
Federal and nonfederal entities included in our review used a variety of methods to share the costs of fighting fires that burned or threatened both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. Although master agreements between federal and nonfederal entities provided the framework for cost sharing and, typically, listed several cost-sharing methods, the agreements often lacked clear guidance for officials to follow in deciding which cost- sharing method to apply to a specific fire. Master Agreements Provided Cost-Sharing Framework, but Those We Reviewed Lacked Clear Guidance
Master agreements provide the framework for federal and nonfederal entities to work together and share the costs of fighting wildland fires. As a result, federal entities will bear the total increase. Methods used to share suppression costs for fires with similar characteristics also varied among states. In contrast, federal and state officials in Colorado shared suppression costs for both of the fires we reviewed in that state using guidance they had developed and officially adopted in 2005, called “fire cost share principles.” Under these principles, aviation costs for fires burning in the wildland-urban interface are shared equally for 72 hours, and other fire suppression costs, such as firefighting personnel and equipment, are shared on the basis of acres burned. The Cost-Sharing Method Used Can Lead to Significantly Different Financial Outcomes
Having clear guidance as to when particular cost-sharing methods should be used is important because the type of method ultimately agreed upon for any particular fire can have significant financial consequences for the firefighting entities involved. According to federal and state officials, the nonfederal entities bore a larger share of the cost than they would have under an acres-burned method because (1) substantial aircraft, fire engines, and personnel were used to protect nonfederal lands and resources, primarily in the wildland-urban interface, and (2) the costs for protecting these nonfederal lands and resources were assigned to the nonfederal entities. Finally, some federal officials expressed concern that the current framework for sharing costs insulates state and local governments from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface, thereby reducing their incentive to take steps that could help mitigate fire risks and reduce suppression costs in the wildland-urban interface. Nonfederal Officials Were Concerned about Increased Costs and Equity among States
While federal officials expressed the need for further guidance on how to share costs, nonfederal officials were concerned that the emergence of alternative cost-sharing methods was leading state and local entities to bear a greater share of suppression costs than in the past, and they questioned whether such an increase was appropriate. Cost-Sharing Framework May Reduce Incentives to Mitigate Fire Risks in the Wildland-Urban Interface
In addition to the concerns raised about obtaining equitable cost-sharing agreements and about the increased costs to nonfederal entities, federal officials said that the current cost-sharing framework insulates state and local governments from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface. Both federal and nonfederal officials noted, however, that greater use of fire-resistant building materials and landscaping could help reduce the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface. Officials’ Concerns May Reflect Ambiguity over Financial Responsibilities
On the basis of our review of previous federal reports and interviews with federal and nonfederal officials, we believe that the concerns we identified may reflect a more fundamental issue—that federal and nonfederal firefighting entities have not clearly defined their financial responsibilities for wildland fire suppression, particularly those for protecting the wildland-urban interface. We agree that a certain amount of flexibility is needed. Because we were primarily interested in the relative proportions of fire costs borne by federal and nonfederal entities using different cost-sharing methods, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this study. | Why GAO Did This Study
Wildland fires burn millions of acres each year, requiring substantial investments of firefighting assets. Since 2000, federal suppression costs alone have averaged more than $1 billion annually. Wildland fires can burn or threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources, including homes in or near wildlands, an area commonly called the wildland-urban interface. Cooperative agreements between federal and nonfederal firefighting entities provide the framework for working together and sharing costs. GAO was asked to (1) review how federal and nonfederal entities share the costs of suppressing wildland fires that burn or threaten both of their lands and resources and (2) identify any concerns that these entities may have with the existing cost-sharing framework.
What GAO Found
Federal and nonfederal entities used a variety of methods to share the costs of fighting wildland fires affecting both of their lands and resources. Cooperative agreements between federal and nonfederal firefighting entities--which are developed and agreed to by the entities involved--provide the framework for cost sharing and typically list several cost-sharing methods available to the entities. The agreements GAO reviewed, however, often lacked clear guidance for federal and nonfederal officials to use in deciding which method to apply to a specific fire. As a result, cost-sharing methods were applied inconsistently within and among states, even for fires with similar characteristics. For example, GAO found that in one state, the costs for suppressing a large fire that threatened homes were shared solely according to the proportion of acres burned within each entity's area of fire protection responsibility. Yet, costs for a similar fire within the same state were shared differently. For this fire, the state agreed to pay for certain aircraft and fire engines used to protect the wildland-urban interface, while the remaining costs were shared on the basis of acres burned. In contrast to the two methods used in this state, officials in another state used yet a different cost-sharing method for two similar large fires that threatened homes, apportioning costs each day for personnel, aircraft, and equipment deployed on particular lands, such as the wildland-urban interface. The type of cost-sharing method ultimately used is important because it can have significant financial consequences for the entities involved, potentially amounting to millions of dollars. Both federal and nonfederal agency officials raised a number of concerns about the current cost-sharing framework. First, some federal officials were concerned that because guidance is unclear about which cost-sharing methods are most appropriate in particular circumstances, it can be difficult to reach agreement with nonfederal officials on a method that all parties believe distributes suppression costs equitably. Second, some nonfederal officials expressed concerns that the emergence of alternative cost-sharing methods is causing nonfederal entities to bear a greater share of fire suppression costs than in the past. In addition, both federal and nonfederal officials believed that the inconsistent application of these cost-sharing methods has led to inequities among states in the proportion of costs borne by federal and nonfederal entities. Finally, some federal officials also expressed concern that the current framework for sharing costs insulates state and local governments from the increasing costs of protecting the wildland-urban interface. Therefore, nonfederal entities may have a reduced incentive to take steps that could help mitigate fire risks, such as requiring homeowners to use fire-resistant materials and landscaping. On the basis of a review of previous federal reports and interviews with federal and nonfederal officials, GAO believes that these concerns may reflect a more fundamental issue--that federal and nonfederal entities have not clearly defined their financial responsibilities for wildland fire suppression, particularly those for protecting the wildland-urban interface. |
gao_GAO-09-784 | gao_GAO-09-784_0 | 1). 2.) Insufficient Data Prevent Complete Assessment of the Time It Takes Projects to Move through the Process, but Congress and FTA Have Taken Action to Expedite the Process
There is insufficient data available to determine the time it takes for a project to move through the New Starts process. Nevertheless, 9 of the 40 projects that have received a FFGA since 1997, and with complete data available, had milestone dates that ranged from about 4.5 to 14 years to complete the project development phases. However, the data from these 9 projects are not generalizeable to the 40 New Starts projects. In addition, we found that project sponsors do not systematically retain milestone data for projects that have completed the New Starts process. Congress and FTA have taken action to expedite projects through the New Starts process through Penta-P and training workshops for project sponsors. Limited Milestone Data on Projects Available through FTA or Project Sponsors
FTA has not historically retained all milestone data, such as the dates that project sponsors apply to enter a project development phase, and FTA’s subsequent approval, in a consistent or comprehensive manner. Although not required, FTA has also retained milestone data from some, but not all, projects longer than 2 years. We were unable to obtain complete and reliable project milestone data from FTA. FTA officials acknowledged that while not historically perfect; the agency has retained sufficient milestone data to help manage the New Starts program. Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of having complete milestone data to better understand and improve the project development process, FTA has taken several steps in recent years to more consistently collect and retain such data. SAFETEA-LU also established the Public-Private Partnership Pilot Program (Penta-P) to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of public-private partnerships for certain new fixed guideway capital projects funded by FTA. FTA has also implemented administrative changes designed to expedite the New Starts process. FTA has also developed checklists for project sponsors to improve their understanding of the requirements of each phase of the New Starts process. Although each of these options could streamline the New Starts evaluation and rating process, each option has advantages and disadvantages to consider. Combining Project Development Phases
Project sponsors and transit consultants cited combining project development phases, such as preliminary engineering and final design, as an option for expediting the New Starts project development process. Consider Greater Use of Letters of Intent and Early Systems Work Agreements
The linear, phased evaluation process of the New Starts program has historically hampered project sponsors’ ability to utilize alternative project delivery methods, such as design-build, according to project sponsors. As such, it is possible that, with more frequent use of letters of intent, FTA’s commitment authority could be depleted earlier than expected, which could affect the anticipated funding stream for future projects. Apply Policy and Guidance Changes Only to Future Projects
Project sponsors told us that the frequent policy and guidance changes to the New Starts program can result in additional costs and delays as project sponsors are required to redo analyses to reflect the changes. However, FTA must also strike the appropriate balance between expediting project development and maintaining the rigor and accountability of the New Starts program. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the time it has generally taken for projects to move through the New Starts process we collected and attempted to verify FTA data on New Starts projects that have advanced through the New Starts process and received FFGAs after June 1997 to determine the length of time each project spent in each stage of the process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The New Starts program is an important source of new capital investment in mass transportation. To be eligible for federal funding, a project must advance through the different project development phases of the New Starts program, including alternatives analysis, preliminary engineering, and final design. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) evaluates projects as a condition for advancement into each project development phase of the program. FTA has acted recently to streamline the process. This report discusses the (1) time it has generally taken for projects to move through the New Starts process and what Congress and FTA have done to expedite the process and (2) options that exist to expedite the process. In response to a legislative mandate, GAO reviewed statutes, FTA guidance and regulations, and project data. GAO also interviewed Department of Transportation (DOT) officials, projects sponsors, and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Insufficient data are available to describe the time it has taken for all projects to move through the New Starts process. Nevertheless, 9 of 40 projects that have received full funding grant agreements since 1997, and had complete data available, had milestone dates that ranged from about 4 to 14 years to complete the project development phases. However, the data from these 9 projects are not generalizeable to the 40 New Starts projects. FTA has not historically retained all milestone data for every project, such as the dates that project sponsors apply to enter preliminary engineering and FTA's subsequent approval. Although not required by its records retention policy, FTA has retained milestone data from some projects longer than 2 years. However, GAO was unable to obtain complete and reliable project milestone data from FTA. FTA officials acknowledged that, while not historically perfect, the agency has retained sufficient milestone data to help manage the New Starts program. Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of having complete milestone data, FTA has taken several steps in recent years to more consistently collect and retain such data. In addition, GAO found that project sponsors do not consistently retain milestone data for projects that have completed the New Starts process. Congress and FTA have taken action to expedite projects through the New Starts process. For example, legislative action created the Public-Private Partnership Pilot Program (Penta-P) to study the benefits of using public-private partnerships for certain new fixed-guideway capital projects, such as accelerating project delivery. In addition, FTA has implemented administrative changes to expedite the New Starts process. For example, FTA has developed and offered training workshops for project sponsors and has introduced project delivery tools. These tools include checklists for project sponsors to improve their understanding of the requirements of each phase of the New Starts process. Project sponsors and industry stakeholders GAO interviewed identified options to help expedite project development within the New Starts program. These options include tailoring the New Starts evaluation process to risks posed by the projects, using letters of intent more frequently, and applying policy and guidance changes only to future projects. Each option has advantages and disadvantages to consider. In addition, FTA must also strike the appropriate balance between expediting project delivery and maintaining the accountability of the program. For example, by signaling early federal support of projects, letters of intent could help project sponsors use potentially less costly and time-consuming alternative project delivery methods, such as design-build. However, such early support poses some risk. It is possible that with more frequent use of letters of intent, FTA's commitment authority could be depleted earlier than expected, which could affect the anticipated funding stream for future projects. Furthermore, some options, like combining one or more statutorily required project development phases, would require legislative action. |
gao_GAO-03-1176T | gao_GAO-03-1176T_0 | Background
Infectious diseases include naturally occurring outbreaks, such as SARS, as well as diseases from biological agents that are intentionally released by a terrorist, such as smallpox. Health care providers would report any illness patterns or diagnostic clues that might indicate an unusual infectious disease outbreak associated with the intentional release of a biologic agent to their state or local health departments. In order to be adequately prepared for emerging infectious diseases in the United States, state and local public health agencies need to have several basic capabilities, whether they possess them directly or have access to them through regional agreements. The federal government also has a role in preparedness for and response to major public health threats. Despite Improvements, Gaps Remain in Disease Surveillance Capabilities of State and Local Public Health Agencies
In the cities we visited, state and local officials reported varying levels of public health preparedness to respond to outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases such as SARS. They recognized gaps in preparedness elements that have been difficult to address, including the disease surveillance and laboratory systems and the response capacity of the workforce. We found that planning for regional coordination was lacking between states. States and local areas were addressing gaps in communication. In addition, state and local health agencies were working with CDC to build the Health Alert Network (HAN), an information and communication system. Some State and Local Contingency Planning Underway, but Regional Coordination Is Lacking
As part of the effort to prepare for a possible outbreak of an infectious disease, there is contingency planning at the state and local levels. Hospital Preparedness Improved, but Limitations in Response Capacity Remain
Because those with symptoms of an infectious disease might go to emergency departments for treatment, hospital personnel would likely be some of the first healthcare workers with the opportunity to identify an emerging infectious disease outbreak. Most hospitals reported training their staff and planning coordination efforts with other public health entities. However, even with these preparations in place, hospitals lacked the capacity to respond to large-scale infectious disease outbreaks. Hospitals Provide Vital Disease Surveillance Capacity
The disease surveillance capacities of many state and local public health systems may depend, in part, on the surveillance capabilities of hospitals. Concluding Observations
Efforts at the state and local level have improved the ability to identify and respond to infectious disease outbreaks and bioterrorism. These improvements have included upgrades to laboratory facilities and communication systems. We found that some disease surveillance systems may be inadequate, that there are shortages of key personnel in some localities, and that most hospital emergency departments across the country have experienced some degree of overcrowding, which could be exacerbated during a disease outbreak. Hospital Emergency Departments: Crowded Conditions Vary among Hospitals and Communities. Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent challenges, such as the SARS outbreak and the anthrax incidents in the fall of 2001, have raised concerns about the nation's preparedness for a large-scale infectious disease outbreak or bioterrorism event. In order to be adequately prepared for such a major public health threat, state and local public health agencies need to have several basic capabilities, including disease surveillance systems, laboratory facilities, communication systems and a sufficient workforce. GAO was asked to examine the capacity of state and local public health agencies and hospitals to detect and report illnesses or conditions that may result from a large-scale infectious disease outbreak or bioterrorism event. This testimony is based largely on recent work, including a report on state and local preparedness for a bioterrorist attack; preliminary findings from current work on updates of bioterrorism preparedness at the state and local levels; and findings from a survey GAO conducted on hospital emergency department capacity and emergency preparedness.
What GAO Found
The efforts of public health agencies and health care organizations to increase their preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks and bioterrorism have improved the nation's ability to recognize such events. However, gaps remain in state and local disease surveillance systems, which are essential to public health efforts to respond to disease outbreaks or bioterrorist attacks. Other essential elements of preparedness include laboratory facilities, workforce, and communication systems. State and local officials report that they are addressing gaps in communication systems. However, there are still significant workforce shortages in state and local health departments. GAO also found that while contingency plans are being developed at the state and local levels, planning for regional coordination for disease outbreaks or bioterrorist events was lacking between states. The disease surveillance capacities of many state and local pubic health systems depend, in part, on the surveillance capabilities of hospitals. Whether a disease outbreak occurs naturally or due to the intentional release of a harmful biological agent by a terrorist, much of the initial response would occur at the local level, particularly at hospitals and their emergency departments. Therefore, hospital personnel would be some of the first healthcare workers with the opportunity to identify an infectious disease outbreak or a bioterrorist event. Most hospitals reported training their staff on biological agents and planning coordination efforts with public health entities; however, preparedness limitations may impact hospitals' ability to conduct disease surveillance. In addition, hospitals still lack the capacity to respond to large-scale infectious disease outbreaks. Also, most emergency departments across the country have experienced some degree of overcrowding, which could be exacerbated during a disease outbreak or bioterrorist event if persons with symptoms go to emergency departments for treatment. |
gao_GAO-09-445 | gao_GAO-09-445_0 | In turn, insurance companies use this money to cover their overhead expenses, such as payroll and rent, and to pay commissions to insurance agencies and agents. In 2008, RMA provided about $2.0 billion in A&O allowances and an estimated $1.5 billion in underwriting gains to crop insurance companies. State insurance regulators also expressed concerns that the plans constituted a legal form of rebating, the practice of offering something of monetary value to farmers to attract their business. Higher Crop Prices Sharply Raised A&O Allowances, and Insurance Companies Used a Large Share of These Increases to Compete for More Business
Companies’ A&O allowances nearly tripled from 2000 to 2009, primarily because the method that RMA uses to calculate A&O allowances considers the value of the crop and not the crop insurance industry’s actual expenses for selling and servicing policies. The change from 2006 to 2009 was particularly large, rising from an average of $836 per policy to an expected $1,417 per policy. The current method for calculating A&O allowances has caused allowance payments to increase along with crop prices, but without a proportional increase in the number of policies, acres, or coverage levels. In terms of commission dollars, the average commission paid per policy from 2006 to 2007 increased more in the 5 major Corn Belt states overall than in the other states, rising by a total of 86 percent in these 5 states compared with 43 percent in the other 45 states. Companies’ Reported Expenses Exceeded A&O Allowances, but High Commissions and Expenses That Were Inconsistent with RMA Guidance Explain This Difference
Despite the increases in A&O allowances, insurance companies reported to RMA that their expenses for delivering federal crop insurance for 2007 exceeded their A&O allowances by about $244 million. Insurance Agencies’ Commissions Have Outpaced Expenses, and Higher Commissions Can Create More Incentive for Rebating
The modest increase from 2000 through 2009 in insurance agencies’ expenses for selling policies has not been commensurate with the dramatic increase in their commissions. That is, the actual commissions increased by an average of about 16 percent per year from 2000 through 2009, compared with an increase of about 3 percent per year for commissions assumed to increase at the same rate as insurance agents’ wages. For 2007 through 2009, estimated commission payments exceed the adjusted commissions by about $2.87 billion. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to examine (1) the reasons for the substantial increases in administrative and operating (A&O) allowances in recent years, and the purposes for which insurance companies use these allowances, and (2) insurance agencies’ expenses for selling federal crop insurance policies, and questionable practices, if any, that agencies use to compete for business among farmers. Department of Agriculture: Status of Efforts to Address Major Financial Management Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers the federal crop insurance program with private insurance companies, which, in turn, work with insurance agencies that sell crop insurance. In 2008, according to USDA, the program cost $6.5 billion, including about $2.0 billion in allowances to insurance companies to cover their administrative and operating (A&O) expenses, such as salaries and sales commissions to agencies. GAO was asked to examine (1) the reasons for recent substantial increases in A&O allowances, and the purposes for which insurance companies use these allowances, and (2) insurance agencies' expenses for selling federal crop insurance policies, and questionable practices, if any, that agencies use to compete for business among farmers. GAO analyzed USDA and private insurers' data, among other things.
What GAO Found
Between 2000 and 2009, companies' A&O allowances nearly tripled, primarily because USDA's calculation method for A&O allowances considers the value of the crop, rather than the crop insurance industry's actual expenses for selling and servicing policies, which generally remained stable. This increase in the A&O allowances occurred without a proportional increase in the number of policies, acres, or amount of insurance coverage purchased. The higher A&O allowances occurred because of higher crop prices since 2006. Per policy, the allowance rose from a national average of $836 in 2006 to an expected $1,417 in 2009. Companies have used most of the higher allowances to raise commissions, in an effort to compete for insurance agencies' portfolios of crop insurance policies. USDA data show that commissions increased more sharply in states with historically larger insurance underwriting gains, which add to company profits. For example, the average commission paid per policy in 5 Corn Belt states increased by 86 percent from 2006 to 2007, and by 43 percent in the other 45 states. Companies reported to USDA that their expenses to administer the program in 2007 exceeded their allowances. However, GAO determined that these expenses exceeded allowances largely because of the higher commissions paid to insurance agencies. According to GAO's analysis, crop insurance agencies' sales commissions have outpaced their expenses for selling policies. Commissions per policy increased by an average of about 16 percent per year from 2000 to 2009, compared with an increase of about 3 percent per year for insurance agents' wages, which are the largest factor in agencies' expenses. For 2007 through 2009, commissions will exceed wage-adjusted commissions by $2.87 billion. According to USDA officials, higher commissions can create more incentive for rebating, which is the practice of offering something of monetary value to farmers to attract their business. USDA prohibits this practice, as do most states. USDA and state insurance regulators are working to reduce the potential for this practice. |
gao_GAO-02-705 | gao_GAO-02-705_0 | We did not independently test the reliability of the database. Reporting single audit results and recipient actions to correct audit findings to agency management provides management with valuable information for use in assessing program risks and identifying areas needing action. Agencies’ Efforts to Ensure That Single Audit Findings are Corrected
Education, HUD, and Transportation had procedures in place that established responsibility for obtaining, distributing, and reviewing single audit findings and for communicating that information to appropriate officials for action. However, although required by OMB Circular A-133, agencies often did not issue written management decisions or have documentary evidence of their evaluations of and conclusions on recipient actions to correct the audit findings. | What GAO Found
In examining the efforts of the Departments of Education, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation to ensure that recipients corrected single audit report findings, GAO found that each agency had procedures for obtaining and distributing the audit reports to appropriate officials for action. However, they often did not issue the required written management decisions or have documentary evidence of their evaluations of and conclusions on recipients' actions to correct the audit findings. In addition, program managers did not summarize and communicate information on single audit results and recipient actions to correct audit findings to agency management. |
gao_GAO-14-328T | gao_GAO-14-328T_0 | Background
U.S. Indemnification Policy
The 1988 amendments to CSLA established the current U.S. policy to provide federal payment, subject to appropriations—known as indemnification—for a portion of claims by third parties for injury, damage, or loss that result from a commercial launch-related incident. The second tier of coverage is provided by the U.S. government, and it covers any third party claims in excess of the specific first tier amount up to a limit of $1.5 billion adjusted for post-1988 inflation; in 2013, the inflation-adjusted amount was approximately $3 billion. 3.) The United States Provides Less Liability Coverage Than Foreign Competitors Due to a Cap on Government Indemnification
As of July 2012, the United States provided less total third party liability coverage than China, France, or Russia—the primary countries that have conducted commercial space launches in the last 5 years—according to published reports. China, France, and Russia had a first tier of insurance coverage that a commercial launch company must obtain, similar to the United States. For all these countries, their commitments to pay have never been tested. Potential Cost of Indemnification by the Federal Government Depends on a Variety of Factors
Catastrophic Events and Congressional Appropriations
The federal government’s potential costs under CSLA depend on (1) the occurrence of a catastrophic launch failure with third party claims that exceed the first tier of coverage and (2) Congress appropriating funds to cover the government’s liability under the second tier of coverage. For our July 2012 report, we identified several issues that raised questions about the soundness of FAA’s maximum probable loss methodology:
FAA used a figure of $3 million when estimating the cost of a single potential casualty—that includes either injury or death—which FAA officials said had not been updated since they began using it in 1988. Use of a casualty estimate that is based on 2002 data, however, still raises questions about whether this figure is outdated, which could result in underestimating the cost of casualties. They agreed that such a review could be beneficial, and that involvement of outside experts might be helpful for improving their maximum probable loss methodology. Current Private Market Capacity for Coverage Is Generally $500 Million per Launch, but a Large Loss Could Decrease Capacity
Private Capacity
In our prior review, some insurers and brokers suggested that the maximum amount of private sector third party liability coverage the industry is currently willing to provide was generally around $500 million per launch. According to FAA data on commercial launches, the average maximum probable loss is about $82 million. As a result, in the absence of CSLA indemnification, insurers could still provide some of the coverage currently available through the government under CSLA. For example, according to a broker and a risk expert, a lack of loss experience complicates possible ways of addressing commercial space launch third party liability risk, and according to another risk expert, any alternative approaches for managing this risk would need to consider key factors, including the number of commercial space launch companies and insurers and annual launches among which to spread risk and other associated costs; lack of launch and loss experience and its impact on predicting and measuring risk, particularly for catastrophic losses; and potential cost to private insurers, launch companies and their customers, and the federal government. Officials from two launch companies stated that they did not believe that on-orbit activities need to be regulated by FAA or that federal indemnification coverage should be provided. Ending Indemnification Could Potentially Decrease U.S. Competitiveness
Based on work for our July 2012 report, the actual effects that eliminating CSLA indemnification would have on the competitiveness of U.S. commercial launch companies are unknown. In addition, we do not know whether or to what extent launch customers might choose foreign launch companies over U.S. companies. The same participants said that two key factors—launch price and launch vehicle reliability— generally determine the competitiveness of launch companies. Launch company officials said their costs would increase as a result of their likely purchase of greater levels of insurance to protect against the increased potential for third party losses, as the launch companies themselves would be responsible for all potential third party claims, not just those up to the maximum probable loss amount. Two said they might be more likely to choose a foreign provider if the price of U.S. launches rose. It is also possible, however, that certain events, such as a launch failure with large losses, could reduce insurance industry capacity for this type of coverage. An inaccurate maximum probable loss value can increase the cost to launch companies by requiring them to purchase more coverage than is necessary, or result in greater exposure to potential cost for the federal government. Thus, we continue to believe that our July 2012 recommendation that FAA periodically review and update as appropriate its methodology for calculating launch providers’ insurance requirements has merit and should be fully implemented. | Why GAO Did This Study
A catastrophic commercial launch accident could result in injuries or property damage to the uninvolved public, or "third parties." In anticipation of such an event, a launch company must purchase a fixed amount of insurance for each launch, per calculation by FAA; the federal government is potentially liable for claims above that amount up to an additional $1.5 billion, adjusted for inflation, subject to congressional appropriations. As of 2013, the inflation-adjusted amount is about $3 billion. CSLA provides for this payment, called indemnification.
This testimony is based on a July 2012 report and January 2014 updates to FAA launch data, FAA progress on implementing GAO recommendations, and insurance industry capacity. It discusses (1) the U.S. government's indemnification policy compared to policies of other countries, (2) the federal government's potential costs for indemnification, (3) the ability and willingness of the insurance market to provide additional coverage, and (4) the effects of ending indemnification on the competitiveness of U.S. launch companies.
What GAO Found
According to studies, the United States in 2012 provided less commercial space launch indemnification for third party losses than China, France, and Russia. These countries put no limit on the amount of government indemnification coverage which in the U.S. is limited by the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA). Governments' commitments to pay have never been tested because there has not been a third party claim that exceeded a private launch company's insurance.
The potential cost to the federal government of indemnifying third party losses is currently unclear. This is because it depends in part on the method used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to calculate the amount of insurance that launch companies must purchase, which may not be sound. FAA had used the same method since 1988 and has not updated crucial components, such as the cost of a casualty. Estimating probable losses from a rare catastrophic event is difficult, and insurance industry officials and risk modeling experts said that FAA's method was outdated. An inaccurate calculation that understates the amount of insurance a launch provider must obtain would increase the likelihood of costs to the federal government; a calculation that overstates the amount of insurance needed would raise the cost of insurance for the launch provider. FAA officials said that their method was reasonable and conservative, but agreed that a review could be beneficial and that involving outside experts might be helpful. FAA officials said that subsequent to GAO's 2012 report they have taken initial steps to improve their methodology for estimating probable losses.
The insurance market is generally willing and able to provide up to about $500 million per launch as coverage for third party liability, according to industry representatives. Because the amount of insurance FAA requires launch providers to obtain averages about $82 million per launch, and coverage available through CSLA is about $3 billion above that, insurers could provide some of the coverage currently available through CSLA. However, the amount and price of insurance that could be provided could change quickly if a large loss were to occur, according to insurance industry representatives.
The effects on global competition from the United States eliminating CSLA indemnification are unknown. However, launch companies and customers GAO contacted believe that ending federal indemnification could lead to higher launch prices for U.S.-based launch companies, making them less price competitive than foreign launch companies. Although the cost of third party liability insurance for launch companies has been about 1 percent of the dollar amount of coverage they purchased, how much this cost might increase in the absence of federal coverage is not clear. Launch customers said that price and vehicle reliability were key factors in their choice of a launch company. Launch companies reported that additional costs would be passed along to customers, but whether this increase alone would be sufficient reason for a launch customer to choose a foreign company over a U.S. company is not clear.
What GAO Recommends
GAO continues to believe that its July 2012 recommendation that FAA periodically review and update as appropriate its methodology for calculating launch providers' insurance requirements has merit and should be fully implemented. |
gao_GAO-11-650 | gao_GAO-11-650_0 | Many of these activities may be subject to legal challenge. According to the stakeholders we interviewed, a number of factors—particularly presidential administration, the passage of new regulations or amendments to laws, or EPA’s failure to meet statutory deadlines—affect the number of environmental litigation cases each year and the type of plaintiffs who bring them. As shown in figure 2, most cases against EPA were brought under the Clean Air Act, which represented about 59 percent of the approximately 2,500 cases that were filed during the 16-year period of our review. On Average, Justice Spent at Least $3.3 Million a Year Defending EPA against Environmental Litigation in Fiscal Year 1998 through Fiscal Year 2010
Our analysis of data from Justice’s Environment and Natural Resources Division found that from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2010, Justice spent at least $3.3 million on average annually to defend EPA against environmental litigation, for a total of $43 million. Justice maintains separate, decentralized databases containing environmental case information and does not have a standard approach for collecting and entering data on these cases. Without a standard approach, it is it difficult to identify and summarize the full set of environmental litigation cases and costs managed by the department agencywide. As a result, it is impossible to gather complete data on all environmental litigation cases and costs from these databases. By employing an iterative electronic and manual process to standardize the court numbers associated with all cases and matching cases from the two systems by these numbers, we were ultimately able to merge the two sets of data on environmental litigation cases managed by Justice’s Environment and Natural Resources Division and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for purposes of this report. Justice officials said, however, that they do not plan to change their approach to managing the data because they use the data in each system to manage individual cases, not to identify and summarize agencywide data on cases or trends. On Average, Treasury Paid Successful Plaintiffs $1.8 Million Annually from the Judgment Fund over the Last 8 Years, and EPA Paid about $280,000 a Year over the Last 5 Years
In addition to Justice’s costs of defending EPA, costs of litigation include payment of attorney fees and court costs to plaintiffs who prevail in lawsuits against EPA. For most of the claims under the 10 environmental statutes in this report, payments to successful plaintiffs were made from Treasury’s Judgment Fund. Treasury paid a total of about $14.2 million out of its Judgment Fund to prevailing plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs related to these cases (see fig. 4). Officials said that through this process of negotiation, the department pays plaintiffs, in the majority of cases, an amount that is much lower than requested. EPA did not provide comments, and Justice and Treasury had technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report describes (1) trends, if any, in environmental lawsuits against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2010, as well as stakeholders’ views of factors affecting any trends, and (2) Justice’s recent costs for representing EPA in defensive environmental lawsuits and the federal government’s recent payments to plaintiffs. We obtained and analyzed data from these databases for lawsuits: filed in federal court from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2010 (Oct. 1, 1994, through Sept. 30, 2010); in which EPA was the lead defendant, excluding cases in which EPA was a defendant but the lead defendant identified by Justice was another agency, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; brought under 10 major environmental statutes implemented by or applying to EPA, including the Clean Air Act; Clean Water Act; Safe Drinking Water Act; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund); Emergency Planning and Community Right- to-Know Act; Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; Toxic Substances Control Act; and the Endangered Species Act as it applies to EPA. Appendix III: Department of the Treasury and Environmental Protection Agency Payments
This appendix provides data on payments for attorney fees and court costs made by the Department of the Treasury for fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2010 and by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. Table 6 shows payments from the Judgment Fund. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) faces numerous legal challenges as it implements the nation's environmental laws. Several statutes, such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, allow citizens to file suit against EPA to challenge certain agency actions. Where EPA is named as a defendant, the Department of Justice provides EPA's legal defense. If successful, plaintiffs may be paid for certain attorney fees and costs. Payments are made from the Department of the Treasury's Judgment Fund--a permanent fund available to pay judgments against the government, as well as settlements resulting from lawsuits--or EPA's appropriations. For this review, GAO was asked to examine (1) the trends in and factors affecting environmental litigation for fiscal years 1995 through 2010 and (2) Justice's recent costs and recent plaintiff payments from the Judgment Fund and EPA. To conduct this review, GAO obtained and analyzed data from two Justice databases on cases filed under 10 key environmental statutes. To gain stakeholder views on any trends and factors that might affect them, GAO interviewed representatives of environmental and industry groups, state attorneys general, and other experts. GAO estimated the costs of litigation handled by Justice attorneys and payments made for attorney fees and court costs from the Judgment Fund and EPA funds.
What GAO Found
No trend was discernible in the number of environmental cases brought against EPA from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2010, as the number of cases filed in federal court varied over time. Justice staff defended EPA on an average of about 155 such cases each year, or a total of about 2,500 cases between fiscal years 1995 and 2010. Most cases were filed under the Clean Air Act (59 percent of cases) and the Clean Water Act (20 percent of cases). According to stakeholders GAO interviewed, a number of factors--particularly a change in presidential administration, new regulations or amendments to laws, or EPA's not meeting statutorily required deadlines--affect environmental litigation. The costs borne by Justice, EPA, and Treasury also varied without a discernible trend from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2010. Justice spent at least $43 million, or $3.3 million annually, to defend EPA in court during this time. In addition, owing to statutory requirements to pay certain successful plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs, Treasury paid about $14.2 million from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2010--about $1.8 million per fiscal year--to plaintiffs in environmental cases. EPA paid approximately $1.4 million from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010--about $280,000 per fiscal year--to plaintiffs for environmental litigation claims under relevant statutes. (All amounts are given in constant 2010 dollars.) Justice officials said that they negotiate payments with the successful plaintiffs, who generally receive less than originally requested. Complicating efforts to analyze trends in cases and costs is that Justice maintains data on environmental cases in two separate data systems and does not have a standard approach for maintaining the data. As a result, it is difficult to identify and summarize the full set of cases and costs managed by Justice. Nonetheless, using an iterative electronic and manual process, GAO was able to merge the two sets of data for its purposes. Justice officials said that they do not need to change their approach to managing the data, however, because they do not use it to summarize case data agencywide. Moreover, the officials said they lack resources to adapt their aging systems to accept additional data.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to the agencies for comment. Justice and Treasury had technical comments, which were incorporated, while EPA had no comments. |
gao_GAO-14-179 | gao_GAO-14-179_0 | Background
Homeowners Insurance Policies
Homeowners insurance provides consumers with financial protection against unexpected losses. Other structures. Personal property. Replacement cost. Homeowners Policies Typically Cover a Range of Perils
Homeowners insurance policies typically cover a range of perils and are critical to providing financial protection against losses such as fire and theft, among others. Losses that are not catastrophic. Homeowners Policies Also Exclude Other Perils
Despite covering a range of perils, insurers also exclude a number of perils. Other risks are excluded because they could raise moral hazard issues if they were covered and because they are not accidental. Second, they suggested that manufacturers are responsible for defects in their products, and product warranties and commercial general liability insurance can help affected homeowners. Policy Exclusion Impacts Could Be Reduced by Expanding Homeowner Coverage, but Premiums Would Likely Increase
Losses due to policy exclusions can financially impact homeowners by causing significant out-of-pocket expenses. Expanded coverage could offer homeowners more protection, potentially reducing the cost of repairs that homeowners would have to cover with their own resources. Some industry participants said that excluded losses can cause significant damage to homes and possessions. One industry organization said that catastrophes can cause shortages of building contractors and building supplies that can delay reconstruction. In addition, when some homeowners do not rebuild, communities may experience a diminution of the tax base. Government Coverage of Excluded Losses Can Involve Costs and Risks to Taxpayers
Both the federal and some state governments offer disaster assistance and other programs to help homeowners with some of the perils that private insurers do not cover, and this support can rely on taxpayer as well as policyholder resources. In addition to providing disaster assistance, the federal government also offers flood insurance to homeowners through NFIP, a program that involves significant costs for the government and ultimately for taxpayers. Assuming homeowners purchased expanded private coverage without government subsidies, these policies could also reduce reliance on federal and state programs. In addition to having benefits at the federal level, greater private coverage could also reduce or eliminate the need for state-based insurance mechanisms, such as state wind pool coverage, and the insurer and policyholder assessments they can involve. Multiple Challenges Make Expanding Private Coverage Difficult
Several factors make it challenging for private insurers to offer all-perils homeowners insurance, or even more comprehensive policies. A few industry participants with whom we spoke said that insurers and others are discussing possibilities for expanding private homeowners insurance, but cautioned that policy premium rate, affordability, and other conditions would need to be addressed. Two industry organizations said that mitigation efforts, effective building codes, and sound land-use policies could also help reduce risks from natural catastrophes. The catastrophic nature of flood and other natural catastrophe losses, according to industry participants, may require a continuing role for federal and state government in financing coverage. A mix of factors—financial risk, large potential losses, political and regulatory issues, policy affordability, and consumer demand—has thus far made it challenging for private-sector insurers in the U.S. to offer flood insurance to homeowners, let alone more comprehensive or all-perils policies. Addressing this important challenge and ensuring a collective response to losses caused by disasters and other perils will require the cooperation and resources of government, homeowners, and insurers, as well as balance in the assumption of risk and cost by each of these parties. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) at the Department of the Treasury. Both provided technical comments which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report we examined (1) the perils homeowners policies typically cover and exclude; (2) the impacts of exclusions on homeowners and taxpayers and the potential benefits of more comprehensive coverage for homeowners; and (3) the additional perils insurers might be willing to cover and the challenges associated with such coverage. We reviewed documents by insurance industry organizations and professional associations, including the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the Insurance Information Institute (III). | Why GAO Did This Study
Homeowners insurance protects against a range of perils, but policies do not insure against all risks. Owners whose homes are damaged by natural and other disasters not covered by their insurance can be exposed to serious financial losses. Federal and state initiatives provide some assistance for catastrophes, which can involve significant taxpayer expense. With coastal populations growing and the possibility of more frequent and severe weather, more homeowners could experience heavy losses not covered by homeowners insurance, putting increasing financial pressure on government programs and thus on taxpayers.
GAO was asked to study the possibility of private insurers providing more comprehensive insurance. This report addresses (1) what perils homeowners policies typically cover and exclude, (2) how exclusions impact homeowners and taxpayers and the potential benefits of more comprehensive coverage, and (3) what additional perils insurers might be willing to cover and what challenges are associated with expanding policies. GAO reviewed homeowners insurance policies and conducted interviews with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, other industry organizations, consumer advocates, and risk experts, among others.
GAO requested comments on a draft of this report from the Federal Insurance Office and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Both provided technical comments which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Homeowners insurance policies typically protect homes, garages and other structures, and personal belongings from damage caused by perils such as fire, hail, lightning, explosion, and theft, among others. The insurance industry considers these perils insurable because they are accidental, predictable, and do not involve catastrophic losses. These policies also typically exclude losses from a number of perils, including disasters caused by floods, earthquakes, and war. Industry officials said that such events are difficult to predict and involve extensive losses that are a challenge for private insurers to cover. Insurers also exclude losses from defective products, which industry participants said could be addressed by manufacturer warranties and commercial general liability insurance. Intentional losses; damage from wear, tear, or neglect; and losses caused simultaneously by covered and uncovered perils, such as wind (covered) and flood (uncovered) during a hurricane are also generally excluded.
Policy exclusions can impact homeowners, communities, and state and federal governments. When excluded losses occur, they can create significant costs for homeowners to repair homes and replace possessions. Wide-scale catastrophes can also cause shortages of building materials and contractors that delay reconstruction and substantially increase the costs of repairing homes. When damage to properties caused by excluded losses is not repaired, affected communities may experience blight and face reduced tax revenue. When federal and state governments have stepped in to cover what private insurers exclude, taxpayers may face a significant expense. In addition to federal disaster assistance, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) paid more than $7 billion in claims after Superstorm Sandy. In Florida, insurers and policyholders can be assessed extra charges to help pay for state efforts to cover wind damage where it is not covered by insurers. Industry participants suggested that expanded private coverage could provide additional protection for homeowners and reduce reliance on government programs, but the resulting policy premiums would likely be prohibitively expensive for many homeowners.
Multiple factors make expanding private coverage challenging and several conditions would need to be addressed for insurers to offer more comprehensive insurance. A main challenge is that expanded coverage would have higher costs, potentially limiting consumer demand. Even if insurers charged higher rates that were based on risk, the severity and unpredictability of catastrophic losses could still jeopardize insurers' solvency. Some industry participants said that insurers and others are discussing possibilities for expanding private homeowners coverage, with a focus on risk-based premiums, mitigation efforts, effective building codes, and sound land use policies. The challenging mix of financial risk, political and regulatory issues, policy cost, and consumer demand has thus far prevented private sector insurers in the U.S. from offering flood insurance to homeowners, let alone more comprehensive or all-perils policies. Because of this mix of factors, some in the insurance industry have suggested that a continuing financial role by federal and possibly state governments may be required, and that ensuring a response to the impact of disasters and other perils will require the cooperation and resources of government, homeowners, and insurers, as well as balance in the assumption of risk and cost by each of these parties. |
gao_GAO-09-801T | gao_GAO-09-801T_0 | Under Real Property Initiative, Agencies Have Taken Actions to Strategically Manage Real Property and Address Some Long-standing Problems
Major real property-holding agencies and OMB have made progress toward strategically managing federal real property. In April 2007, we found that in response to the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) real property initiative and a related executive order, agencies covered under the executive order had, among other things, designated senior real property officers, established asset management plans, standardized real property data reporting, and adopted various performance measures to track progress. According to OMB, the federal government disposed of excess real property valued at $1 billion in fiscal year 2008, bringing the total to over $8 billion since fiscal year 2004. OMB also reported success in developing a comprehensive database of federal real property assets, the Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP). However, it may take some time for these actions to result in consistently reliable data, and, as described later in this testimony, in recent work we have continued to find problems with the reliability and usefulness of FRPP data. Longstanding Problems in Real Property Management Persist
In spite of some progress made by OMB and agencies in managing their real property portfolios, our recent work has found that agencies continue to struggle with the long-standing problems that led us to identify federal real property as high-risk: an over-reliance on costly leasing—and challenges GSA faces in its leasing contracting; unreliable data; underutilized and excess property and repair and maintenance backlogs; and ongoing security challenges faced by agencies and, in particular, by the Federal Protective Service (FPS), which is charged with protecting GSA buildings. However, our work over the years has shown that building ownership often costs less than operating leases, especially for long-term space needs. For fiscal year 2008, GSA reported that for the first time, it leased more space than it owned. GSA’s Initial Implementation of the National Brokers Services Contracts Demonstrated Need for Numerous Improvements
With GSA’s ongoing reliance on leasing, it is critical that GSA manage its in-house and contracted leasing activities effectively. However, in January 2007, we identified numerous areas in GSA’s implementation of four contracts for national broker services that warranted improvement. As figure 2 shows, GSA has implemented 7 of these 11 recommendations; has taken action to implement another recommendation; and, after consideration, has decided not to implement the remaining 3. We are encouraged by GSA’s actions on our recommendations but have not evaluated their impact. Moreover, last week we testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that preliminary results show that the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) ability to protect federal facilities is hampered by weaknesses in its contract security guard program. GAO investigators carrying the components for an improvised explosive device successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS’s guards at each of the 10 level IV federal facilities where we conducted covert testing. Underlying Obstacles Hamper Agencies’ Real Property Reform Efforts Governmentwide
As GAO has reported in the past, real property management problems have been exacerbated by deep-rooted obstacles that include competing stakeholder interests, various legal and budget-related limitations, and weaknesses in agencies’ capital planning. While reforms to date are positive, the new administration and Congress will be challenged to sustain reform momentum and reach consensus on how the ongoing obstacles should be addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2003, GAO designated federal real property as a high-risk area because of long-standing problems with excess and underutilized property, deteriorating facilities, unreliable real property data, over-reliance on costly leasing, and security challenges. In January 2009, GAO found that agencies have taken some positive steps to address real property issues but that some of the core problems that led to the designation of this area as high risk persist. This testimony focuses on (1) progress made by major real property-holding agencies to strategically manage real property, (2) ongoing problems GAO has identified in recent work regarding agencies' efforts to address real property issues, and (3) underlying obstacles GAO has identified through prior work as hampering agencies' real property reform efforts governmentwide.
What GAO Found
OMB and real property-holding agencies have made progress in strategically managing real property. In response to an administration reform initiative and related executive order, agencies have, among other things, established asset management plans, standardized data, and adopted performance measures. According to OMB, the federal government disposed of excess real property valued at $1 billion in fiscal year 2008, bringing the total to over $8 billion since fiscal year 2004. OMB also reported success in developing a comprehensive database of federal real property assets and implemented a GAO recommendation to improve the reliability of the data in this database by developing a framework to validate these data. GAO also found that the Veterans Administration has made significant progress in reducing underutilized space. In another report, GAO found that six agencies reviewed have processes in place to prioritize maintenance and repair items. While these actions represent positive steps, some of the long-standing problems that led GAO to designate this area as high risk persist. Although GAO's work over the years has shown that building ownership often costs less than operating leases, especially for long term space needs, in 2008, the General Services Administration (GSA), which acts as the government's leasing agent, leased more property than it owned for the first time. Given GSA's ongoing reliance on leasing, it is critical that GSA manage its leasing activities effectively. However, in January 2007, GAO identified numerous areas that warranted improvement in GSA's implementation of four contracts for national broker services for its leasing program. GSA has implemented 7 of GAO's 11 recommendations to improve these contracting efforts. Although GAO is encouraged by GSA's actions on these recommendations, GAO has not evaluated their impact. Moreover, in more recent work, GAO has continued to find that the government's real property data are not always reliable and agencies continue to retain excess property and face challenges from repair and maintenance backlogs. Regarding security, GAO testified on July 8, 2009, that preliminary results show that the ability of the Federal Protective Service (FPS), which provides security services for about 9,000 GSA facilities, to protect federal facilities is hampered by weaknesses in its contract security guard program. Among other things, GAO investigators carrying the components for an improvised explosive device successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS's guards at each of the 10 federal facilities where GAO conducted covert testing. As GAO has reported in the past, real property management problems have been exacerbated by deep-rooted obstacles that include competing stakeholder interests, various budgetary and legal limitations, and weaknesses in agencies' capital planning. While reforms to date are positive, the new administration and Congress will be challenged to sustain reform momentum and reach consensus on how such obstacles should be addressed. |
gao_GAO-05-434 | gao_GAO-05-434_0 | The law establishes DHS’s responsibilities for critical infrastructure protection, a role that includes strengthening the security of our nation’s information infrastructure. NCSD also serves as the government lead on a public/private partnership supporting the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and as the lead for federal government incident response. However, DHS has not yet developed national cyber threat and vulnerability assessments or developed and exercised government and government/industry contingency recovery plans for cybersecurity, including a plan for recovering key Internet functions. DHS Continues to Face Challenges in Establishing Itself as a National Focal Point for Cyberspace Security
DHS faces a number of challenges that have impeded its ability to fulfill its cyber CIP responsibilities. Key challenges include achieving organizational stability; gaining organizational authority; overcoming hiring and contracting issues; increasing awareness about cybersecurity roles and capabilities; establishing effective partnerships with stakeholders (other federal, state, and local governments and the private sector); achieving two-way information sharing with these stakeholders; and providing and demonstrating the value DHS can provide. DHS has identified steps in its strategic plan for cybersecurity that can begin to address these challenges. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve DHS’s ability to fulfill its mission as an effective focal point for cybersecurity, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security implement the following three steps: engage appropriate stakeholders to prioritize key cybersecurity responsibilities so that the most important activities are addressed first, including responsibilities that are not detailed in the cybersecurity strategic plan: (1) perform a national cyber threat assessment; (2) facilitate sector cyber vulnerability assessments—to include identification of cross-sector interdependencies; and (3) establish contingency plans for cybersecurity, including recovery plans for key Internet functions; require NCSD to develop a prioritized list of key activities for addressing the underlying challenges that are impeding execution of its responsibilities; and identify performance measures and milestones for fulfilling its prioritized responsibilities and for performing activities to address its challenges, and track organizational progress against these measures and milestones. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) roles and responsibilities for cyber critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and national information security, as established in law and policy, and determine the specific organizational structures DHS has created to fulfill them; (2) the status of DHS’s efforts to protect the computer systems supporting the nation’s critical infrastructures and to strengthen information security both inside and outside the federal government and the extent to which such efforts and DHS’s organizational structures adequately address its responsibilities; and (3) the challenges DHS faces in fulfilling its cybersecurity roles and responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasing computer interconnectivity has revolutionized the way that our government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. While the benefits have been enormous, this widespread interconnectivity also poses significant risks to our nation's computer systems and, more importantly, to the critical operations and infrastructures they support. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and federal policy established DHS as the focal point for coordinating activities to protect the computer systems that support our nation's critical infrastructures. GAO was asked to determine (1) DHS's roles and responsibilities for cyber critical infrastructure protection, (2) the status and adequacy of DHS's efforts to fulfill these responsibilities, and (3) the challenges DHS faces in fulfilling its cybersecurity responsibilities.
What GAO Found
As the focal point for critical infrastructure protection (CIP), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has many cybersecurity-related roles and responsibilities that we identified in law and policy. DHS established the National Cyber Security Division to take the lead in addressing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures. While DHS has initiated multiple efforts to fulfill its responsibilities, it has not fully addressed any of the 13 responsibilities, and much work remains ahead. For example, the department established the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team as a public/private partnership to make cybersecurity a coordinated national effort, and it established forums to build greater trust and information sharing among federal officials with information security responsibilities and law enforcement entities. However, DHS has not yet developed national cyber threat and vulnerability assessments or government/industry contingency recovery plans for cybersecurity, including a plan for recovering key Internet functions. DHS faces a number of challenges that have impeded its ability to fulfill its cyber CIP responsibilities. These key challenges include achieving organizational stability, gaining organizational authority, overcoming hiring and contracting issues, increasing awareness about cybersecurity roles and capabilities, establishing effective partnerships with stakeholders, achieving two-way information sharing with these stakeholders, and demonstrating the value DHS can provide. In its strategic plan for cybersecurity, DHS identifies steps that can begin to address the challenges. However, until it confronts and resolves these underlying challenges and implements its plans, DHS will have difficulty achieving significant results in strengthening the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructures. |
gao_GAO-11-400 | gao_GAO-11-400_0 | Workers entering retirement today typically face greater responsibilities for managing their retirement savings than those who retired in the past. For example, retirees will no longer need to save for retirement and their payroll and income tax liability will likely fall. Experts Recommend Retirees Balance Draw Down of Savings and Use of Lifetime Retirement Income Options
Experts we interviewed tended to recommend that retirees draw down their savings strategically and systematically and that they convert a portion of their savings into an income annuity to cover necessary expenses or opt for the annuity provided by an employer-sponsored DB pension, rather than take a lump sum. The experts also frequently recommended that retirees delay receipt of Social Security benefits until they reach at least full retirement age. However, according to the experts, the combination of these strategies depends on an individual’s household circumstances, such as the standard of living the household seeks, its financial resources, and its tolerance for risks such as investment, inflation, and longevity risk. The systematic drawdown of financial assets can be based on a “smooth” and sustainable level of income throughout retirement or on a retiree’s remaining life expectancy. 3.) Most Retirees Have Chosen Reduced Social Security Benefits, though Increasing Numbers of Retirement Age Individuals Work
The experts we talked with frequently recommend that retirees delay taking Social Security to increase their lifetime retirement income, but most of today’s retirees took Social Security before their full retirement age, which has committed many to substantially lower monthly benefits than if they had waited. By taking the benefits on or before their 63rd birthday, 49.5 percent of beneficiaries born in 1943 passed up increases of at least 25 to 33 percent in monthly inflation-adjusted benefits that would have been available, had they waited until their full retirement age. 4.) 6.) In some cases some of the retirees may have purchased annuities at a later time. Even with the widespread availability of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid benefits, in 2009 an estimated 3.4 million people aged 65 or older lived in poverty. The poverty rate for this age group (8.9 percent), however, was lower than for all U.S. residents (14.3 percent). Various Proposed Policies Would Seek to Promote Access to Annuities through Defined Contribution Plans and Improve Financial Literacy about Retirement Income
Proposed Options for Promoting Access to Annuities through Employer DC Plans Take Many Forms
Multiple experts told us about increasing lifetime retirement income by purchasing an annuity, but DC plans typically do not offer access to annuities and their participants infrequently use annuities when leaving employment and retiring. Proposed Approaches Vary to Improve Individuals’ Understanding about Retirement Income
Improving individuals’ financial literacy can be one important component in helping them manage retirement income appropriately. According to Labor and Treasury officials, plan sponsors are not required to provide a notice to participants on managing pension assets in retirement, such as the general financial risks and choices they face. Require Sponsors to Provide an Estimate of Lifetime Annuity Income on Benefit Statements
Given the rise of DC plans which provide pension benefits as an account balance, many industry, consumer, and academic groups noted that an estimate on the participant benefit statement could present, or “frame,” the pension benefit as a stream of income in retirement rather than just an account balance, which could help to change how participants in DC plans perceive or ultimately withdraw their benefit at retirement. As part of these interviews, to ensure we identified strategies that apply to households across the net wealth spectrum and with both defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) pension plans, we randomly selected five households from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) conducted by the University of Michigan in the lowest, middle, and highest net wealth quintiles with different combinations of pension plans in the middle and highest quintiles. For example, for the lowest quintile, median net wealth was $2,000 so we selected households with net wealth in the $1,800 to $2,200 range. To review the choices retirees have made for managing their pension and financial assets for generating income, we analyzed data from the HRS, reviewed others’ analyses of the HRS, and analyzed data from the Social Security Administration, compiled by the Office of the Chief Actuary. To identify policy options that are available to ensure income throughout retirement as well as their advantages and disadvantages, we collected and reviewed information representing a variety of academic, consumer, industry, and government sources. Retirement Income: Challenges for Ensuring Income throughout Retirement. | Why GAO Did This Study
As life expectancy increases, the risk that retirees will outlive their assets is a growing challenge. The shift from defined benefit (DB) pension plans to defined contribution (DC) plans also increases the responsibility for workers and retirees to make difficult decisions and manage their pension and other financial assets so that they have income throughout retirement. GAO was asked to review (1) strategies that experts recommend retirees employ to ensure income throughout retirement, (2) choices retirees have made for managing their pension and financial assets for generating income, and (3) policy options available to ensure income throughout retirement and their advantages and disadvantages. GAO interviewed experts about strategies retirees should take, including strategies for five households from different quintiles of net wealth (assets less debt); analyzed nationally representative data and studies about retirees' decisions; and interviewed experts and reviewed documents about related policy options.
What GAO Found
Financial experts GAO interviewed typically recommended that retirees systematically draw down their savings and convert a portion of their savings into an income annuity to cover necessary expenses, or opt for the annuity provided by an employer-sponsored DB pension instead of a lump sum withdrawal. Experts also recommended that individuals delay receipt of Social Security benefits until reaching at least full retirement age and, in some cases, continue to work and save, if possible. For example, for the two middle net-wealth households GAO profiled with about $350,000 to $375,000 in net wealth, experts recommended purchase of annuities with a portion of savings, drawdown of savings at an annual rate, such as 4 percent of the initial balance, use of lifetime income from the DB plan, if applicable, and delay of Social Security. To navigate the difficult choices on income throughout retirement, they noted strategies depend on an individual's circumstances, such as anticipated expenses, income level, health, and each household's tolerance for risks, such as investment and longevity risk. Regarding the choices retirees have made, GAO found that most retirees rely primarily on Social Security and pass up opportunities for additional lifetime retirement income. Taking Social Security benefits when they turned 62, many retirees born in 1943, for example, passed up increases of at least 33 percent in their monthly inflation-adjusted Social Security benefit levels available at full retirement age of 66. Most retirees who left jobs with a DB pension received or deferred lifetime benefits, but only 6 percent of those with a DC plan chose or purchased an annuity at retirement. Those in the middle income group who had savings typically drew down those savings gradually. Nonetheless, an estimated 3.4 million people (9 percent) aged 65 or older in 2009 had incomes (excluding any noncash assistance) below the poverty level. Among people of all ages the poverty rate was 14.3 percent. To help people make these often difficult choices, policy options proposed by various groups concerning income throughout retirement include encouraging the availability of annuities in DC plans and promoting financial literacy. Certain proposed policies seek to increase access to annuities in DC plans, which may be able to provide them at lower cost for some individuals. However, some pension plan sponsors are reluctant to offer annuities for fear that their choice of annuity provider could make them vulnerable to litigation should problems occur. Other proposed options aim to improve individuals' financial literacy, especially to better understand risks and available choices for managing income throughout retirement in addition to the current emphasis on saving for retirement. Proposed options include additional federal publications and interactive tools, sponsor notices to plan participants on financial risks and choices they face during retirement, and estimates on lifetime annuity income on participants' benefit statements. |
gao_GAO-09-456T | gao_GAO-09-456T_0 | Ensuring the Credibility of Carbon Offsets Poses Challenges in the U.S. Voluntary Market
Our August 2008 report identified four primary challenges with the U.S. voluntary market. First, the concept of a carbon offset is complicated because offsets can involve different activities, definitions, greenhouse gases, and timeframes for measurement. A carbon offset project is generally considered “additional” if it decreases emissions of greenhouse gases below the quantity that would have been emitted in a projected business-as-usual scenario. The lack of standardization in the U.S. market may also make it difficult for consumers to determine whether offsets are fully fungible— interchangeable and of comparable quality—a characteristic of an efficient commodity market. Third, there are economic and environmental tradeoffs associated with using offsets in a regulatory program to limit greenhouse gas emissions. In many cases, regulated entities may find it economically advantageous to buy offsets instead of reducing emissions themselves. Other studies show similar results. In the short term, lower prices make compliance with a policy to reduce emissions less expensive. Fourth, allowing the use of offsets could compromise the environmental certainty of a regulatory program to limit emissions of greenhouse gases if the offsets do not meet requirements that underpin their integrity. The CDM’s Environmental and Economic Effects Provide Important Lessons About the Role of Carbon Offsets in Mandatory Programs to Limit Emissions
Our November 2008 report discussed the environmental and economic effects of the CDM and identified lessons learned about the role of carbon offsets in mandatory programs to limit emissions. First, with respect to environmental effects, the overall effect of the CDM on international emissions is uncertain, largely because it is nearly impossible to determine the level of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of each offset project. This resource- and time-intensive process, however, has involved challenges. While the CDM project review process may provide greater assurance of credible projects, available evidence suggests that some credits have been issued for emission reduction projects that were not additional. Second, carbon offset programs involve important tradeoffs and the use of such programs may be, at best, a temporary solution to addressing climate change. There is general consensus among climate change experts that both industrialized and developing countries must be engaged in emission reduction efforts to meet international emission reduction goals. Third, the CDM’s approval process may not be a cost-effective model for achieving emission reductions. GAO’s Reviews of Carbon Offset Markets Have Identified Matters for Congressional Consideration in Developing Climate Change Legislation
Our reports on two different markets for carbon offsets—the U.S. voluntary market and the CDM under the Kyoto protocol—have identified matters for the Congress to consider as it deliberates legislation to limit greenhouse gas emissions. While carbon offsets have the potential to lower compliance costs for entities that could be affected by regulatory limits on emissions, their use for compliance in a mandatory emissions reduction scheme could undermine the program’s integrity if the offsets lack credibility. The experience with both markets demonstrates the importance of ensuring the credibility of offsets, but this remains a challenge for both markets because of the inherent uncertainty associated with estimating emissions reductions relative to projected business-as- usual baselines. Using offsets in a mandatory emissions reduction program would involve fundamental trade-offs between offset credibility and compliance costs. As we have reported, to the extent that the Congress chooses to develop a program that limits greenhouse gas emissions while allowing the use of carbon offsets for compliance, it may wish to establish (1) clear rules about the types of offset projects that regulated entities can use for compliance, as well as standardized quality assurance mechanisms for these allowable project types; (2) procedures to account and compensate for the inherent uncertainty associated with offset projects, such as discounting or overall limits on the use of offsets for compliance; (3) a standardized registry for tracking the creation and ownership of offsets; and (4) procedures for amending the offset rules, quality assurance mechanisms, and registry, as necessary, based on experience and the availability of new information over time. Specifically, Congress may wish to consider that (1) the existing program may not be the most direct or cost-effective means of achieving reductions in emissions, (2) the use of carbon offsets in a cap-and-trade system can undermine the system’s integrity, given that it is not possible to ensure that every credit represents a real, measurable, and long-term reduction in emissions; and (3) while proposed reforms may significantly improve the CDM’s effectiveness, carbon offsets involve fundamental tradeoffs and may not be a reliable long-term approach to climate change mitigation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Carbon offsets--reductions of greenhouse gas emissions from an activity in one place to compensate for emissions elsewhere--can reduce the cost of regulatory programs to limit emissions because the cost of creating an offset may be less than the cost of requiring entities to make the reductions themselves. To be credible, however, an offset must be additional--it must reduce emissions below the quantity emitted in a business-as-usual scenario--among other criteria. In the U.S., there are no federal requirements to limit emissions and offsets may be purchased in a voluntary market. Outside the U.S., offsets may be purchased on compliance markets to meet requirements to reduce emissions. The Congress is considering adopting a market-based cap-and-trade program to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Such a program would create a price on emissions based on the supply and demand for allowances to emit. Under such a program, regulated entities could potentially substitute offsets for on-site emissions reductions, thereby lowering their compliance costs. Today's testimony summarizes GAO's prior work examining (1) the challenges in ensuring the quality of carbon offsets in the voluntary market, (2) the effects of and lessons learned from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), an international offset program, and (3) matters that the Congress may wish to consider when developing regulatory programs to limit emissions.
What GAO Found
In an August 2008 report, GAO identified four primary challenges related to the United States voluntary carbon offset market. First, the concept of a carbon offset is complicated because offsets can involve different activities, definitions, greenhouse gases, and timeframes for measurement. Second, ensuring the credibility of offsets is challenging because there are many ways to determine whether a project is additional to a business-as-usual baseline, and inherent uncertainty exists in measuring emissions reductions relative to such a baseline. Related to this, the use of multiple quality assurance mechanisms with varying requirements may raise questions about whether offsets are fully fungible--interchangeable and of comparable quality. Third, including offsets in regulatory programs to limit greenhouse gas emissions could result in environmental and economic tradeoffs. For example offsets could lower the cost of complying with an emissions reduction policy, but this may delay on-site reductions by regulated entities. Fourth, offsets could compromise the environmental certainty of a regulatory program if offsets used for compliance lack credibility. In a November 2008 report, GAO examined the environmental and economic effects of the CDM--an international program allowing certain industrialized nations to pay for offset projects in developing countries--and identified lessons learned about the role of carbon offsets in programs to limit emissions. While the CDM has provided cost containment in a mandatory emissions reduction program, its effects on emissions are uncertain, largely because it is nearly impossible to determine the level of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of each project. Although a rigorous review process seeks to ensure the credibility of projects, available evidence from those with experience in the program suggests that some offset projects were not additional. In addition, the project approval process is lengthy and resource intensive, which significantly limits the scale and cost-effectiveness of emissions reductions. The findings from these two reports illustrate how challenges in the voluntary offset market and the use of offsets for compliance--even in a rigorous, standardized process like the CDM--may compromise the environmental integrity of mandatory programs to limit emissions and should be carefully evaluated. As a result of these challenges, GAO suggested that, as it considers legislation that allows the use of offsets for compliance, the Congress may wish to consider, among other things, directing the establishment of clear rules about the types of projects that regulated entities can use as offsets, as well as procedures to account and compensate for the inherent uncertainty associated with offset projects. Further, GAO suggested that the Congress consider key lessons from the CDM, including the possibility that, (1) due to the tradeoffs involving cost savings and the credibility of offsets, their use in mandatory programs may be, at best, a temporary solution to achieving emissions reductions, and (2) the program's approval process may not be a cost-effective model for achieving emission reductions. |
gao_GAO-05-259 | gao_GAO-05-259_0 | Similarly, of all employers aware of the one-stops, about three-quarters of large employers are likely to use one-stop services, while approximately one-half of medium and one-quarter of small employers are likely to do so. Employers of all sizes primarily use one-stop services to help fill job vacancies. Large and Medium- Sized Employers Are More Likely than Small Employers to Know About and Use Their Local One-Stops and Other Resources of the Workforce System
While about half of all employers are aware of their local one-stops, awareness levels increase with employer size, with about half of small, two-thirds of medium, and three-quarters of large employers knowing about their local one-stops. In addition, most employers who use one-stop services would likely use them again, and about one-third of employers who are aware of one-stop services but do not use them would consider using them in the future. Among employers who are aware of one-stop services, very few decline to use them because of concerns about the quality of services. Instead, many of these employers choose not to use one-stops because they rely on other resources to hire and train workers or do not have enough information about the services one-stops offer. Most Employers Are Satisfied with One-Stop Services
Overall, about 78 percent of employers in the United States who have used one-stops are satisfied with the services they received. These employers are most satisfied with one-stop efforts to provide timely services and respond to their needs. Labor has developed partnerships with businesses and industry to provide employers easier access to the resources of the one-stop system. To measure how the one-stop system is meeting the needs of employers, Labor requires states to collect information on employer satisfaction with the one-stop system but not on employer use of the system. Labor’s employer satisfaction measure provides a high-level indicator of whether employers are satisfied with the one-stop services they receive. It does not, however, provide enough information on the services employers use to help Labor manage its resources. Labor Has Initiatives to Support Employer Awareness and Use of the One-Stop System
Labor has developed a number of initiatives to support employer awareness and use of the one-stop system but has limited information about the extent to which employers use the system. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) the extent to which employers, including small businesses, are aware of and using the one-stop system; (2) the degree to which employers who use one-stop services report satisfaction and what factors cause employers not to use them; and (3) what Labor has done to support employer awareness and use of the workforce system and how Labor measures its success in meeting the needs of employers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The economy of the United States is fueled by 8 million private sector businesses that employ 106 million of the nation's 137 million workers. Employers are seeking better ways to meet their workforce needs as they compete in the global economy. This report examines (1) the extent to which employers, including small businesses, are aware of and using the one-stop system; (2) the degree to which employers who use one-stop services report satisfaction and what factors cause employers not to use them; and (3) what Labor has done to support employer awareness and use of the workforce system and how Labor measures its success in meeting the needs of employers.
What GAO Found
While about half of all employers are aware of their local one-stops, awareness increases with employer size, with about half of small, two-thirds of medium, and three-quarters of large employers knowing about their local one-stops. Similarly, of all employers aware of the one-stops, about three-quarters of large employers are likely to use one-stop services, while approximately one-half of medium and one-quarter of small employers are likely to do so. Employers of all sizes primarily use one-stop services to help fill job vacancies. Overall, about three-quarters of employers who use one-stop services are satisfied with the services they receive. These employers are most satisfied with one-stop efforts to provide timely services and respond to their needs. In addition, most employers who have used one-stop services would likely use them again, and about one-third of employers who are aware of one-stop services, but have not used them, would consider using them in the future. Among employers who are aware of one-stop services, very few decline to use them because of concerns about the quality of services. Instead, many of these employers choose not to use one-stops because they rely on other resources to hire and train workers or do not have enough information about the services one-stops offer. Labor has initiatives to support employer awareness and use of the one-stop system but does not know the extent to which employers use the system. Labor has developed partnerships with businesses and industry to provide employers easier access to the resources of the one-stop system. To measure how the one-stop system is meeting the needs of employers, Labor requires states to collect information on employer satisfaction with the one-stop system, but not on employer use of the system. Labor's employer satisfaction measure provides a high-level indicator of whether employers are satisfied with the one-stop services they receive; it does not, however, provide enough information on the services employers use to help Labor manage its resources. |
gao_GAO-14-82 | gao_GAO-14-82_0 | 3. Investments Have Been Made to Improve Guam’s Public Infrastructure, but Deficiencies and Regulatory Compliance Issues Persist
While some investments have been made to improve Guam’s public infrastructure in recent years, many deficiencies continue to exist. The reliability, capacity utilization, and age of much of Guam’s public infrastructure indicates a need for additional upgrades to ensure that Guam can meet the demands of its current and future population, regardless of how many Marines and dependents are moved to Guam. In addition, some of Guam’s public infrastructure sectors, such as its Waterworks Authority face issues complying with federal regulations. Other sectors, such as the fire and police departments are experiencing shortages in infrastructure, vehicles, and staffing. DOD Generally Provides Planning and Technical Assistance Support to Affected Communities While Public Infrastructure Projects Are Typically Funded by Other Federal Programs or the Communities
Historically, the majority of DOD’s support to defense-affected communities has been to provide technical assistance and support community planning and coordination efforts due to Base Realignment However, OEA officials identified a few and Closure (BRAC) decisions.examples in the past where DOD has provided direct funding to defense- affected communities to provide additional capacity specifically needed to support DOD growth. However, in the case of Guam, some challenges have been identified as affecting its ability to raise funds for such projects. Other Federal Funding Sources Have Been Used to Fund Guam Infrastructure Projects
According to OEA officials, DOD’s position is that local communities should largely be responsible for obtaining funding for public infrastructure requirements related to DOD basing decisions. However, the projects included in these budget requests were validated based on the 2006 realignment plan, and DOD has not revalidated public infrastructure requirements for Guam to reflect the revised realignment plan or differentiated between requirements to address long-standing conditions in Guam’s public infrastructure and those specifically related to additional capacity for the realignment. Even so, DOD has requested over $400 million for Guam infrastructure projects in its budget requests for fiscal years 2012 through 2014. Congress has restricted the use of funds until further information is provided related to the realignment plan and imposed other restrictions on use of the funding. However, it is unclear if other projects, such as the water and wastewater improvements and the mental health facility, are still necessary or necessary to the same extent given the significant reduction in forces under the revised realignment plan and the as yet undetermined location of the main Marine Corps installation on the island. However, this base handles all of its own wastewater needs and gets its potable water from its own wells and the Fena Reservoir, thus not requiring DOD to rely on the public water and wastewater systems. DOD’s Cost Estimate to Improve Guam’s Water and Wastewater Infrastructure Is Not Reliable
The cost estimate, DOD has used to support its budget requests for water and wastewater infrastructure projects on Guam, did not fully adhere to best practices for developing a reliable cost estimate, which is at the core of successfully managing a project within cost and affordability guidelines. In assessing the estimate against best practices, we determined that this estimate is not reliable because it does not include all relevant costs, is based on limited data, and, as documented, lacks many of the key characteristics to be considered a reliable cost estimate. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide DOD and Congress with sufficient information regarding the requirements and costs associated with DOD’s current Guam realignment plans and the public infrastructure necessary to support that realignment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Department of the Navy’s JGPO in concert with OEA take the following three actions:
Revalidate the need and scope of Guam public infrastructure projects included in DOD budget requests based on the reduced number of Marines and dependents DOD intends to relocate to Guam. DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation to fully incorporate the best practices identified by GAO for developing high quality cost estimates, as future cost estimates for Guam public infrastructure projects are developed. For our third objective to assess DOD’s efforts to revalidate its public infrastructure requirements under the revised realignment plan and differentiate between requirements needed to address Guam’s existing public infrastructure deficiencies and those related to the realignment, we reviewed information on DOD and the Government of Guam’s planning activities related to public infrastructure improvements needed to support the revised realignment plan and compared this information to previous public infrastructure lists developed by the Government of Guam, DOD, and other federal entities to support the 2006 Roadmap realignment plan. characteristics representing practices that help ensure that a cost estimate is (1) comprehensive, (2) well documented, (3) accurate, and (4) credible. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, the United States and Japan planned to relocate 17,600 U.S. Marines and dependents from Japan to Guam. However, in 2012, representatives from the countries developed a revised plan under which 6,300 Marines and dependents would relocate to Guam.
The Conference Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that GAO evaluate what Guam public infrastructure projects are needed to support DOD's plans. This report (1) describes Guam's public infrastructure; (2) describes the types of assistance DOD generally provides and other funding sources that have been used to fund Guam projects; (3) assesses DOD's efforts to revalidate Guam projects under the revised realignment plan; and (4) assesses the cost estimate for Guam's public water and wastewater infrastructure improvements used to support DOD budget requests. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed policies, technical studies, and budget requests. GAO also interviewed DOD and other relevant federal officials as well as visited Guam and met with Guam officials.
What GAO Found
Some investments have been made to improve Guam's public infrastructure in recent years, but many deficiencies and regulatory compliance issues continue to exist. The reliability, capacity, and age of much of the public infrastructure--especially the island's utilities--indicate a need for additional upgrades to be able to meet current and future demands related to the realignment. Further, some infrastructure sectors, such as water and wastewater, face issues complying with federal regulations. Other sectors, such as the fire and police departments, are experiencing staffing and other shortages that affect their ability to serve Guam's current population.
The majority of the Department of Defense's (DOD) support to defense-affected communities has been historically to provide technical assistance and support community planning and coordination efforts. However, in a few instances DOD has provided public infrastructure funding to communities where proposed basing decisions would generate significant public infrastructure needs that the communities could not support. Generally, DOD's position is that communities should be largely responsible for obtaining funding for public infrastructure requirements related to DOD basing decisions. This funding can come from other federal programs or communities can raise the funds on their own. In the case of Guam, however, some challenges related to limited government revenues and debt capacity has been identified as affecting its ability to do so.
Despite the reduction of Marines and dependents relocating to Guam, DOD has not yet revalidated the public infrastructure requirements based on the revised realignment plan or differentiated between requirements needed to address long-standing conditions and those related to the realignment. This revalidation is not expected to be completed until 2015. Even so, DOD has requested over $400 million for Guam public infrastructure projects in its budget requests since fiscal year 2012. It is unclear if all of these projects are necessary to the same extent given the reduction in forces. For example, if DOD decides to locate the Marines on the naval base that handles all of its own water/wastewater needs, public water/wastewater improvements would not be needed to support the Marines. Congress has placed limitations on the use of funding, in part until certain information is provided related to the realignment. Without revalidating and differentiating between requirements, DOD cannot clearly identify what Guam public infrastructure requirements are needed to directly support the realignment.
The $1.3 billion cost estimate for improvements to Guam's water and wastewater systems that DOD has used to support budget requests for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 is not reliable. GAO assessed that the estimate minimally met the best practice criteria for three of the four key characteristics--comprehensive, well documented, and accurate--for a reliable cost estimate as identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and did not satisfy best practice criteria for the fourth characteristic of being credible. GAO determined that officials adhered to some best practices for a reliable estimate but did not, for example,
include all relevant costs,
sufficiently explain why certain assumptions and adjustments were made,
incorporate any actual costs or inflation adjustments, or
adequately address risk and uncertainty.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD take actions to revalidate public infrastructure needs on Guam based on the revised realignment size and ensure best practices are used to develop future cost estimates. DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified future plans. However, GAO believes further opportunities exist as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-12-651T | gao_GAO-12-651T_0 | The Tax Gap Is Spread across Various Types of Taxpayers and Taxes
Characteristics of the Tax Gap
The gross tax gap has grown in dollar terms since IRS’s previous estimate for tax year 2001, increasing from $345 billion to $450 billion for tax year 2006. However, given the growth of the economy and total federal tax liability over that period, the percentage of taxes owed that taxpayers paid voluntarily and on time, known as the voluntary compliance rate, has remained relatively constant—83.7 percent in 2001 and 83.1 percent in 2006. For example, in general, refund fraud related to identity theft would not be included in the tax gap estimate because it does not involve evading a tax liability. As shown in table 1, noncompliance does not come from a single source but rather occurs across different types of taxes and taxpayers. However, corporate income tax and employment tax also contributed a significant portion. Nearly 40 percent, or $179 billion, of the 2006 gross tax gap can be attributed to these types of business taxpayers who underreport their business income tax, and by extension their self-employment tax, on their individual income tax returns. For example, misreporting of non-corporate business income tax can be largely attributed to sole proprietors who understated receipts or overstated expenses. Unlike wage and some investment income, sole proprietors’ income is not subject to withholding and only a portion is subject to information reporting to IRS by third parties. As shown in figure 1, the extent to which individual taxpayers accurately report their income is related to the extent to which the income is reported to them and IRS by third parties or taxes on the income are withheld. Various Strategies Are Required to Reduce the Tax Gap
Multiple approaches are needed to reduce the tax gap. No single approach is likely to fully and cost-effectively address noncompliance since the noncompliance has multiple causes and spans different types of taxes and taxpayers. While the tax gap will remain a challenge into the future, the following strategies could help. These strategies would require actions by Congress or IRS. Enhancing Information Reporting by Third Parties to IRS
Information reporting is a powerful tool that reduces tax evasion and helps taxpayers comply voluntarily. Considerations include whether any third parties have accurate information available in a timely manner, the burden of reporting on the third parties, and whether IRS can enforce the reporting requirement. Ensuring High-Quality Services to Taxpayers
Ensuring high-quality taxpayer services, such as by telephone and correspondence or online, can help taxpayers who wish to comply with tax laws but do not understand their obligations. Tax law changes and other funding priorities have affected IRS’s ability to provide quality taxpayer services. Devoting Additional Resources to Enforcement
Devoting additional resources to enforcement would enable IRS to contact millions of potentially noncompliant taxpayers that it currently identifies but cannot contact given resource constraints. However, determining the appropriate level of enforcement resources to provide IRS requires taking into account factors such as how effectively and efficiently IRS is currently using its resources, how to strike the proper balance between IRS’s taxpayer service and enforcement activities, and competing federal funding priorities. The intent is to allow IRS to match those information returns to tax returns during tax return filing season rather than after the filing season is complete.will be discussed later, this approach could also help IRS address identity theft-related fraud and could also allow IRS to use its enforcement resources on other significant compliance problems. However, the Commissioner made clear that his vision for more prerefund compliance checks will take considerable time to implement, will require a major reworking of some fundamental IRS computer systems, and could impose some additional burden on third parties. Paid tax return preparers prepare approximately 60 percent of all tax returns filed, and IRS has acknowledged that paid preparers’ actions have an enormous impact on its ability to administer tax laws effectively. Tax whistleblowers can help improve tax compliance by providing information to IRS on others’ suspected tax noncompliance. According to IRS officials, Among other benefits, replacing its electronic filing system will posting more comprehensive information from individual income tax returns to its computer systems could facilitate the examination process, expedite taxpayer contacts for faster resolution, and potentially better define specific tax gap issues. Efforts to simplify or reform the tax code may help reduce the tax gap by making it easier for individuals and businesses to understand and voluntarily comply with their tax obligations. For example, eliminating or combining tax expenditures, such as exemptions, deductions, and credits, could help taxpayers reduce unintentional errors and limit opportunities for tax evasion. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2012, IRS estimated that the gross tax gapthe difference between taxes owed and taxes paid on timewas $450 billion for tax year 2006. IRS estimated that it would collect $65 billion through enforcement actions and late payments, leaving a net tax gap of $385 billion. From 2001 to 2006, IRS estimated that the gross tax gap increased by $105 billion. However, the percentage of taxes owed that were paid on time remained relatively constant at 83.1 percent in 2006, compared to 83.7 percent in 2001.
Given persistent levels of noncompliance and large and growing structural deficits, it will be important to understand the causes of tax noncompliance and develop new approaches to minimize it.
This testimony addresses two questions: (1) What types of taxpayers are responsible for the tax gap, and what is the nature of their noncompliance? (2) What are strategies for reducing the tax gap? The statement also discusses potential long-term strategies to prevent refund fraud related to identity theft. This statement is based largely on GAOs recent reports and recommendations on tax noncompliance and updates GAOs 2011 testimony on the tax gap.
What GAO Found
Noncompliance does not have a single source but occurs across different types of taxes and taxpayers. For example, individual income tax accounts for the largest portion of the tax gap, but corporate income tax and employment tax are also significant. Further, misreporting by individuals involves business income, non-business income, deductions, and credits. The extent of misreporting depends on the extent to which income tax is withheld or reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by third parties. For example, nearly 40 percent, or $179 billion, of the 2006 gross tax gap is due to misreporting of non-corporate business income and related self-employment taxes. Much of this misreporting can be attributed to sole proprietors underreporting receipts or over-reporting expenses. Unlike wage and some investment income, sole proprietors income is not subject to withholding and only a portion is reported to IRS by third parties.
Because noncompliance has multiple causes and spans different types of taxes and taxpayers, multiple approaches are needed to reduce the tax gap. The following strategies could help and will require actions by Congress or IRS.
Enhancing information reporting by third parties to IRS could reduce tax evasion and help taxpayers comply voluntarily. However, identifying additional reporting opportunities can be challenging because third parties may not have accurate information available in a timely manner. Also, adding reporting requirements creates burden for both third parties and IRS.
Ensuring high-quality services to taxpayers , such as by telephone and correspondence or online, can help taxpayers who wish to comply with tax laws but do not understand their obligations. However, tax law changes and funding priorities have recently affected IRSs ability to provide quality taxpayer services.
Devoting additional resources to enforcement would enable IRS to contact millions of potentially noncompliant taxpayers it identifies but cannot contact. To determine the appropriate level of enforcement resources, policymakers would need to consider how to balance taxpayer service and enforcement activities and how effectively and efficiently IRS currently uses its resources.
Expanding compliance checks before IRS issues refunds would involve matching information returns to tax returns during, rather than after, the tax filing season. This approach would require a major reworking of some fundamental IRS computer systems but could help address identity theft-related fraud and allow IRS to use enforcement resources on other compliance problems.
Leveraging external resources, such as paid tax return preparers and whistleblowers , can help improve tax compliance because paid preparers actions have an enormous impact on IRSs ability to effectively administer tax laws, and whistleblowers provide IRS information on suspected noncompliance.
Modernizing information systems would allow IRS to post more comprehensive tax return information to its computer systems, which could facilitate the examination process and expedite taxpayer contacts for faster resolution.
Simplifying the tax code could help taxpayers understand and voluntarily comply with their tax obligations and limit opportunities for tax evasion.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous prior recommendations regarding actions to close the tax gap. Congress and IRS have acted on some, while others are reflected in the strategies presented in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-04-568T | gao_GAO-04-568T_0 | Subsidy cost estimates are calculated based on the present value of estimated net cash flows to and from the government that result from providing loans to borrowers. For FFELP consolidation loans, cash flows include, for example, fees paid by lenders to the government and a special allowance payment by the government to lenders to provide them a guaranteed rate of return on the student loans they make. For FDLP consolidation loans, cash flows include borrowers’ repayment of loan principal and payments of interest to Education, and loan disbursements by the government to borrowers. The subsidy costs of FDLP consolidation loans are also affected by the interest Education must pay to Treasury to finance its lending activities. Another type of cost pertaining to consolidation loans is administration, which includes such items as expenses related to originating and servicing direct loans. Borrowers’ Rates Have Dropped, and Loan Volume Has Risen
Recent years have seen a drop in interest rates for student loan borrowers along with dramatic overall growth in consolidation loan volume. From July 2000 to June 2003, the interest rate for consolidation loans dropped by more than half, with consolidation loan borrowers obtaining rates as low as 3.50 percent as of July 1, 2003. From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2003, the volume of consolidation loans made (or originated) rose from $5.8 billion to over $41 billion. FDLP consolidation loan volume for fiscal year 2003 decreased, but loan volume in the larger FFELP increased, resulting in total consolidation loan volume of well over $41 billion. The dramatic growth in consolidation loan volume in recent years is due in part to declining interest rates that have made it attractive for many borrowers to consolidate their variable rate student loans at a low, fixed rate. Changes in Interest Rates and Loan Volume Affect FFELP and FDLP Costs in Different Ways, but in the Aggregate, Estimated Costs Increased
While the estimated future costs for consolidation loans can vary greatly from year to year, low interest rates and recent loan volume changes have resulted in substantial increases in overall costs to the federal government. For FDLP, the result was a narrowing of the net difference between the estimated interest payments paid by consolidated loan borrowers to Education and the costs paid by Education to Treasury to finance direct loans. FFELP Subsidy Costs Affected by Increased Special Allowance Payments to Lenders and Increased Loan Volume
Estimated subsidy costs for FFELP consolidation loans rose from $0.651 billion for loans made in fiscal year 2002 to $2.135 billion for loans made in fiscal year 2003. The government’s cost of borrowing is determined by the interest rate Education pays Treasury to finance direct student loans, which is equivalent to the discount rate. In both years, borrower interest rates for FDLP consolidation loans were somewhat higher than the discount rate, resulting in a net gain to the government. However, while Education continued to benefit from lending at interest rates higher than its cost of borrowing for FDLP consolidation loans made in fiscal year 2003, the size of this benefit declines from $571 million in fiscal year 2002 to $543 million in fiscal year 2003. Education’s current cost accounting system does not specifically track administration costs incurred by each of the student loan programs. While consolidation loans may be an important tool to help borrowers manage their educational debt and thus reduce the cost of student loan defaults, the surge in the number of borrowers consolidating their loans suggests that many borrowers who face little risk of default are choosing consolidation as a way of obtaining low fixed interest rates—an economically rational choice on the part of borrowers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Consolidation loans, available under the Department of Education's (Education) two major student loan programs--the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) and the William D. Ford Direct Loan Program (FDLP)--help borrowers manage their student loan debt. By combining multiple loans into one loan and extending the repayment period, a consolidation loan reduces monthly repayments, which may lower default risk and, thereby, reduce federal costs of loan defaults. Consolidation loans also allow borrowers to lock in a fixed interest rate, an option not available for other student loans. Consolidation loans under FFELP and FDLP accounted for about 48 percent of the $87.4 billion in total new student loan dollars that originated during fiscal year 2003. Two main types of federal cost pertain to consolidation loans. One is "subsidy"--the net present value of cash flows to and from the government that result from providing these loans to borrowers. For FFELP consolidation loans, cash flows include, for example, fees paid by lenders to the government and a special allowance payment by the government to lenders to provide them a guaranteed rate of return on the student loans they make. For FDLP consolidation loans, cash flows include borrowers' repayment of loan principal and payments of interest to Education, and loan disbursements by the government to borrowers. The subsidy costs of FDLP consolidation loans are also affected by the interest Education must pay to the Department of Treasury (Treasury) to finance its lending activities. The second type of cost is administration, which includes such items as expenses related to originating and servicing direct loans. This testimony focuses on two key issues: (1) recent changes in interest rates and consolidation loan volume and (2) how these changes have affected federal costs for FFELP and FDLP consolidation loans.
What GAO Found
Recent years have seen a drop in interest rates for student loan borrowers along with dramatic overall growth in consolidation loan volume. From July 2000 to June 2003, the interest rate for consolidation loans dropped by more than half, with consolidation loan borrowers obtaining rates as low as 3.50 percent as of July 1, 2003. From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2003, the volume of consolidation loans made (or "originated") rose from $5.8 billion to over $41 billion. The dramatic growth in consolidation loan volume in recent years is due in part to declining interest rates that have made it attractive for many borrowers to consolidate their variable rate student loans at a low, fixed rate. Recent trends in interest rates and consolidation loan volume have affected the cost of the FFELP and FDLP consolidation loan programs in different ways, but in the aggregate, estimated subsidy and administration costs have increased. For FFELP consolidation loans, subsidy costs grew from $0.651 billion for loans made in fiscal year 2002 to $2.135 billion for loans made in fiscal year 2003. Both higher loan volumes and lower interest rates available to borrowers in fiscal year 2003 increased these costs. Lower interest rates increase these costs because FFELP consolidation loans carry a government-guaranteed rate of return to lenders that is projected to be higher than the fixed interest rate paid by consolidation loan borrowers. When the interest rate paid by borrowers does not provide the full guaranteed rate to lenders, the federal government must pay lenders the difference. FDLP consolidation loans are made by the government and thus carry no interest rate guarantee to lenders, but changing interest rates and loan volumes affected costs in this program as well. In both fiscal years 2002 and 2003, there was no net subsidy cost to the government because the interest rate paid by borrowers who consolidated their loans was greater than the interest rate Education must pay to the Treasury to finance its lending. However, the drop in loan volume and interest rates that occurred in fiscal year 2003, contributed to cutting the government's estimated net gain from $570 million in fiscal year 2002 to $543 million for loans made in fiscal year 2003. Administration costs are not specifically tracked for either consolidation loan program, but available evidence indicates that these costs have risen, primarily reflecting increased overall loan volumes. |
gao_NSIAD-96-29 | gao_NSIAD-96-29_0 | This downsizing has taken place largely through the base closure and realignment (BRAC) process. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, House Committee on National Security, requested that we (1) assess the reliability of DOD’s depot closure cost and savings estimates; (2) obtain information on the policies and programs used to provide employment and training opportunities to employees at closing depots; (3) determine if the military services can increase depot closure savings by using competitions between DOD depots (public-public competitions) and between DOD depots and the private sector to redistribute closing depots’ workloads; and (4) determine if the military services adequately consider other services’ depots when they use methods other than public-public or public-private competitions to redistribute their closing depots’ workloads. The current budget estimates indicate that closing the 10 depots will result in a net savings of $222.4 million during the 6-year implementation period allowed by law and an annual savings of $656 million after that. However, actual savings are still uncertain because (1) the budget estimates do not include many closure-related costs, (2) DOD has not updated the annual savings estimates since it submitted the initial budget estimates to Congress, and (3) DOD has not developed an effective methodology for estimating the cost of accomplishing closing depots’ workloads at new sources of repair. Estimates of annual recurring savings after the 6-year implementation period have also been reduced. Efforts to Limit Involuntary Separations Have Been Successful, but Costly
DOD has thus far been successful in limiting the number of employees that must be involuntarily separated when depots close. In addition, other actions can be taken to further improve the competitions and ensure their fairness. Further, the Air Force is privatizing most of AGMC’s depot maintenance workload. DOD terminated its public-private competition program in May 1994. They acknowledged that this two-step process is not as efficient as transferring the work directly to the private sector, but they believe it is necessary. Conclusions
The military services can substantially increase the savings from closing unneeded depots by transferring the work to the most cost-effective source of repair. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense maximize the use of competitive procedures and merit-based selection criteria by including military depots in determining the most cost-effective source of repair for workloads that have not yet been transferred from closing depots and require the services to reengineer workloads that are redistributed from closing depots on any basis other than competition, starting with the largest and most stable workloads. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed maintenance depot closures and realignments, focusing on: (1) the reliability of the Department of Defense's (DOD) depot closure cost and savings estimates; (2) DOD efforts to provide employment and training opportunities at closing depots; (3) whether the military services can increase savings by using competitions between DOD depots and the private sector when redistributing closing depots' workloads; and (4) whether the military services adequately consider other services' depots when redistributing the workloads.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD has substantially reduced its initial estimates for the net savings that depot closures will achieve during the 6-year implementation period allowed by law and, to a lesser extent, for the annual savings after the implementation period has been completed; (2) although DOD believes its estimates have improved, current estimates still do not accurately reflect potential savings because some closure-related costs are not included, and some estimates have not been updated to reflect major changes in such areas as the expected cost of doing the work after it is transferred to new sources of repair; (3) as a result, the magnitude of savings is uncertain; (4) by offering a comprehensive and costly outplacement program for displaced employees, that provides assistance, benefits, and separation incentives, DOD has greatly facilitated this transition and has thus far successfully limited the number of depot employees who were involuntarily separated; (5) the military services can substantially increase their savings by ensuring that closing depots' workloads are transferred to the most cost-effective source of repair; (6) they can accomplish this goal by conducting public-public and public-private competitions for the work or by analyzing the cost-effectiveness of moving the work to not only their own depots but also those of the other services; (7) in addition, they can improve the efficiency of their operations and reengineer workloads that are transferred from closing depots without competition; and (8) neither DOD nor the military services have taken action to maximize these savings: (a) public-public and public-private competition programs were discontinued in May 1994; (b) the Air Force is implementing a privatization-in-place plan that will likely increase maintenance costs; (c) the military services rarely consider interservicing alternatives when they redistribute workloads; and (d) neither DOD nor the services require depots to reengineer workloads they receive from closing depots. |
gao_GAO-07-407 | gao_GAO-07-407_0 | Background
AOC is responsible for the operation, maintenance, renovation, and new construction of the buildings and grounds of the Capitol Hill complex. Congress subsequently directed GAO to conduct a review of the management of AOC’s operations and, later, to monitor AOC’s progress in addressing recommendations that arose from the review. Our January 2003 report contained 35 recommendations designed to assist AOC in transforming itself into a more strategic and accountable organization. AOC Is Making Progress in Becoming More Strategic and Accountable, but Completing the Management Transition and Other Critical Actions Remain
During the last year, AOC has filled nine key leadership positions, revised its strategic plan to better align its activities with its mission and goals, and continued initiatives to improve internal controls and accountability. These actions have furthered AOC’s progress in establishing a foundation for becoming a more strategic and accountable organization. In general, the Architect’s responsibilities include overall management of AOC, support and representation on boards and commissions—including the Capitol Police Board—and management of the CVC project, while the COO’s responsibilities involve developing the agency’s strategic and performance plans, proposing organizational and staffing changes needed to carry out AOC’s mission, and reviewing and directing the operational functions of AOC. Given these factors, it will be challenging for one person to fulfill the critical roles of the Architect and the COO in completing the CVC and continuing AOC’s progress in becoming more strategic and accountable. While AOC has defined its mission and goals in its revised strategic plan, the agency has not identified how best to deliver the services—through outsourcing or in-house resources—that support the mission and goals and has not determined whether its workforce has the skills and capacity to deliver those services. Further Progress in Improving Financial Management, IT Management, and Project Management Requires Ongoing Commitment
AOC has made progress in financial management, IT management, and project management, but sustained commitment is required to continue progress on the long-term efforts in these areas, many of which are needed to improve AOC’s internal controls and accountability. Implementing this key effort impacts other AOC initiatives. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In responding to a draft of this report, AOC generally agreed with our assessment of the agency’s overall progress, but noted that 2 additional recommendations—1 on institutionalizing financial management practices to support budgeting, financial, and program management and 1 on developing a rigorous approach for collecting worker safety data—should be considered implemented. Appendix I: Status of AOC’s Progress on Recommendations
Since January 2003, we have made 64 recommendations in nine areas to improve the Architect of the Capitol’s (AOC) strategic management and accountability framework, which is needed to drive the agency’s transformation effort and address long-standing program issues. Over the past year, AOC has implemented 21 recommendations, bringing the total number of implemented or closed recommendations to 43 out of 64, or 67 percent. As a result, AOC has implemented 6 of our strategic management recommendations over the year. However, AOC’s senior management needs to continue supporting the full implementation of key financial management and accountability efforts that are critical to AOC’s operations. However, more work remains to fully implement our recommendations. For example, AOC has established performance measures, including measures to track the quality and costs of projects. The performance measures are also in AOC’s revised strategic plan and the Senate and House business plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Architect of the Capitol (AOC) is responsible for the operation, maintenance, renovation, and new construction of the Capitol Hill complex, including the U.S. Capitol, the Library of Congress, and the Senate and House Office Buildings. In 2003, at the request of Congress, GAO issued a management review of AOC that contained recommendations designed to help AOC become more strategic and accountable. Subsequently, Congress directed GAO to monitor AOC's progress in implementing recommendations. This is the fourth status report on AOC's progress and summarizes GAO's assessment of AOC's overall progress and remaining actions in becoming more strategic and accountable, including AOC's responses to specific recommendations GAO made in January 2003 and subsequently. To assess AOC's progress, GAO analyzed AOC documents; interviewed AOC officials; and relied on the results of related GAO reviews, including reviews of the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC). AOC generally agreed with GAO's assessment of its progress, but noted that 2 additional recommendations--1 on financial management practices and 1 on collecting worker safety data--should be considered implemented. GAO acknowledges AOC's efforts in these areas, but maintains that further steps are necessary to fully implement these recommendations.
What GAO Found
AOC has made progress in becoming more strategic and accountable, but critical actions are needed to sustain and build on this progress. To date, AOC has filled key leadership positions, revised its strategic plan, improved communication, and continued initiatives to improve internal controls and accountability. AOC is thus establishing a foundation for becoming more strategic and accountable. However, completing the transition to new leadership--including the transition to a new Architect of the Capitol (a position that is now vacant)--and other actions remain to bring about lasting improvements in performance. For example, AOC must integrate nine new managers into the agency while ensuring its continued progress. In addition, the Chief Operating Officer faces the challenge of performing the Architect of the Capitol's responsibilities and his own during the CVC project's completion and AOC's management transition. Furthermore, although AOC has revised its strategic plan to better focus on its mission and goals, it has not determined whether it can better deliver the services that support its mission and goals through outsourcing or in-house resources. Finally, a continued focus on communication and other areas that are key to greater internal control and accountability--including financial, information technology, and project management--is needed to sustain and further AOC's progress to date. For example, full implementation of AOC's cost accounting system--a key financial management initiative--is needed to more accurately track facilities management cost measures. Improvements in project management could be achieved, in part, by applying lessons learned in managing the CVC project. Appendix I of this report summarizes AOC's progress on recommendations that GAO has made since January 2003 to help AOC establish a strong strategic management and accountability framework. This year, AOC has implemented 21 recommendations. For example, AOC implemented 6 of the strategic management recommendations, including the development of congressional protocols and the involvement of stakeholders in developing the revised strategic plan. For project management, AOC implemented 7 recommendations, including the development of performance measures. Implementing these 21 recommendations brings the total number of implemented or closed recommendations to 43 out of 64. |
gao_GAO-02-558 | gao_GAO-02-558_0 | Background
Under tax law, married couples who file joint tax returns are treated as a single unit, which means that each spouse becomes individually responsible for paying the entire amount of the tax associated with his or her joint return. IRS procedures require that its staff establish a separate, individual tax account for the taxpayer who was judged responsible for the tax liability and transfer the tax liability to that account. The principal initiatives that IRS undertook to improve its management of the innocent spouse case workload included centralizing case processing within one W&I location—its Cincinnati site in Covington, Kentucky—and bringing more of the program staff under the project manager’s direction; developing an automated decision-making and case-building tool; developing a model to estimate future workload and staffing needs and monitor program performance; and measuring the quality of case decision making, including adherence to procedures and the accuracy of decisions. TRRs are to perform a variety of services at IRS field locations throughout the country. IRS decided 61,423 cases in fiscal year 2001, or about 21 percent more than the 50,840 cases it received, reducing some of the backlog from previous years. To some extent, IRS also was able to reach decisions on more innocent spouse cases than it received in fiscal year 2001 because the portion of innocent spouse cases it receives that are not eligible for relief has been increasing. On the basis of our review of IRS’s procedures and our inspection of the process used at the Cincinnati processing site for transferring tax liabilities when innocent spouse relief was approved, we concluded that the procedures conform with the federal guidance for managing information processing. As a result, IRS does not know how useful the site is to taxpayers or what effect, if any, it has had on lessening taxpayer confusion about innocent spouse eligibility. The Innocent Spouse Program Web site, which went on-line in December 1999, was developed to help taxpayers determine their eligibility for innocent spouse relief. Although the Web site’s enhancements may provide IRS with more useful information than it currently has, the agency’s plans did not call for obtaining directly from taxpayers any information on the Web site’s usefulness. | What GAO Found
By law, married persons who file joint tax returns are each fully responsible for the accuracy of the tax return and for the full tax liability. This is true even though only one taxpayer may have earned the wages or income shown on the tax return. Under the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Innocent Spousal Program, IRS can relieve taxpayers of tax debts on the basis of equity considerations, such as not knowing that their spouse failed to pay taxes due. Since passage of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, IRS has received thousands of requests from taxpayers for innocent spouse relief. IRS's inability to provide timely responses to such requests has generated concerns among taxpayers, Congress, and other stakeholders. IRS reached decisions on 21 percent more cases than it received in fiscal year 2001, reducing some of its backlog from previous years. The agency accomplished this through a variety of initiatives, including a substantial staffing commitment, centralization and specialization, automated tools, and routine estimating of future workload and staffing needs. IRS's procedures conform to applicable guidance for transferring tax liabilities from joint tax accounts to individual tax accounts when innocent spouse relief has been granted. The procedures follow federal internal control guidelines by requiring a mix of checks, verifications, reconciliations, and documentation to support steps throughout the process. The Web site for IRS's Innocent Spouse Program--part of IRS's agency wide Web site--went on-line in December 1999 to help taxpayers determine their eligibility for innocent spouse relief. Because IRS has not evaluated the Web site, the agency does not know how useful the Web site has been to taxpayers in determining their eligibility for innocent spouse relief. |
gao_GAO-04-209T | gao_GAO-04-209T_0 | Auditors’ Assessments of FFMIA Compliance for Fiscal Year 2002
For fiscal year 2002, Inspectors General and their contract auditors reported that the systems for 19 of the 24 CFO Act agencies did not comply substantially with at least one of the FFMIA requirements—federal financial management systems requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, or the SGL. Nonintegrated Financial Management Systems
The CFO Act calls for agencies to develop and maintain an integrated accounting and financial management system that complies with federal systems requirements and provides for (1) complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information that is responsive to the financial information needs of the agency and facilitates the systematic measurement of performance, (2) the development and reporting of cost management information, and (3) the integration of accounting and budgeting information. Agencies face significant challenges implementing these standards. Agency Efforts to Implement New Core Financial Systems
The continuing trend of noncompliance with FFMIA indicates the overall long-standing poor condition of agency financial systems. Across government, agencies have many efforts underway to implement or upgrade financial systems to alleviate long-standing weaknesses in financial management. As we recently reported, as of September 30, 2002, 17 agencies advised us that they were planning to or were in the process of implementing a new core financial system. Nevertheless, it is imperative that agencies adopt leading practices to help ensure successful systems implementation. In the past, federal agencies have experienced setbacks and delays in their implementation processes. Congressional Oversight
The leadership demonstrated by the Congress has been an important catalyst to reforming financial management in the federal government. To achieve the financial management improvements envisioned by the CFO Act, FFMIA, and more recently, the President’s Management Agenda, agencies need to modernize their financial systems to generate reliable, useful, and timely financial information throughout the year and at year-end. However, as we have discussed today, agencies are facing significant challenges in implementing new financial management systems. Continued attention to these issues will be critical to sustaining momentum on financial management reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) requires Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies to implement and maintain financial management systems that comply substantially with (1) federal financial management systems requirements, (2) federal accounting standards, and (3) the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger. Most federal agencies face long-standing challenges, which are discussed in greater detail in our mandated September 2003 report, Sustained Efforts Needed to Achieve FFMIA Accountability (GAO-03-1062). In light of these circumstances, Congress asked GAO to testify about recurring financial management systems problems and agencies' efforts to upgrade their systems.
What GAO Found
The results of the fiscal year 2002 FFMIA assessments performed by agency inspectors general or their contract auditors again show that the same types of problems continue to plague the financial management systems used by the CFO Act agencies. While much more severe at some agencies than others, the nature and severity of the problems indicate that overall, agency management lacks the full range of information needed for accountability, performance reporting, and decision making. Audit reports highlight six recurring problems that have been consistently reported for those agencies whose auditors reported noncompliant systems. Agencies have recognized the seriousness of the financial systems weaknesses, and have many efforts underway to implement or upgrade financial systems to alleviate long-standing problems. As of September 30, 2002, 17 CFO Act agencies advised us they were planning to or were in the process of implementing a new core financial system. It is imperative that agencies adopt leading practices, such as top management commitment and business process reengineering, to ensure successful systems implementation and to avoid complicating factors, such as poor communication and inadequate project planning, that have hampered some agencies' efforts in the past. Congressional oversight, the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program Principals, and the President's Management Agenda are driving forces behind several governmentwide efforts now underway to improve federal financial management. Continued attention by these key drivers is critical to sustaining agencies efforts to improve their financial management systems. |
gao_GAO-05-190 | gao_GAO-05-190_0 | Statistically significant differences do not prove or disprove discrimination; rather, they provide information at an aggregate level about differences in personnel actions and may indicate a need for further investigation. Half of the Laboratories Showed Differences in Merit Pay Increases for Either Women or Minorities or Both Compared with Men and Whites
While our analysis showed that the merit pay increases for full-time and nontemporary managerial and professional women and minorities tended to be statistically comparable to merit pay increases for their respective counterparts at three of the laboratories, results were mixed at the other three laboratories. Merit pay increases were higher for women and minorities at one, higher for women at another, and lower for minorities at the third compared with men and Whites. Separation Patterns for Women and Minorities Were Generally Comparable to Men and Whites
Managerial and professional women tended to separate from their jobs (leave) at a comparable rate as men at five of the six laboratories. However, at one laboratory, women were more likely to leave than men, and at another laboratory, minorities were more likely to leave than Whites. Laboratory Staff Raised a Number of EEO Concerns
Women and minority staff expressed a number of concerns about their fair and equitable treatment at the laboratories, focusing primarily on underrepresentation, the lack of career development opportunities, and the need to improve the laboratory work environment. The highest number of external cases filed dealt with sex or race matters. As table 6 shows, pay and termination were the two issues cited most often. OFCCP and DOE staff met to discuss the implementation of the recommendation and the possible creation of a more formal relationship through a memorandum of understanding. As a result of its review, the Office of the Solicitor raised questions about DOE’s legal authority to monitor and to enforce Executive Order 11246, as amended. As a result, OFCCP has not sent the draft memorandum to DOE for coordination. OFCCP believes that DOE’s diversity plan requirements and policy may put DOE in the position of evaluating contractors’ compliance with the requirements of the EEO laws that OFCCP is solely responsible for enforcing and encroach upon OFCCP’s enforcement authority. While our findings of statistically significant differences in salaries, merit pay increases, and separation patterns for managerial and professional women and minorities compared with men and Whites and our finding of a difference at one laboratory in promotion rates for certain minority groups compared with White men do not prove or disprove discrimination, they may indicate a need for further investigation. Although we commend DOE for its desire to have a diverse workforce and its initiative for including contract clauses to achieve that goal, the departments of Labor and of Energy need to clarify and reach agreement about DOE’s role concerning its contractors’ diversity activities. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
This appendix details the methods we used to (1) determine whether there were differences in salaries, merit pay increases, and separation patterns for women and minorities when compared with men and Whites, and in the promotion rates of groupings of laboratory staff by race/ethnicity and sex compared with White men, for fiscal years 2001 through mid-2004; (2) describe equal employment opportunity (EEO) concerns raised by laboratory staff; and (3) determine the actions the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) have taken to implement our earlier recommendation to work more collaboratively to ensure the laboratories’ compliance with EEO. Internal complaint data include complaints filed and investigated within the laboratory. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2002, GAO identified the need to strengthen equal employment opportunity (EEO) oversight at three Department of Energy (DOE) national weapons laboratories and recommended that DOE and the Department of Labor's (DOL) Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) collaborate to ensure the laboratories complied with EEO requirements. GAO was subsequently asked to examine six other DOE laboratories and determine (1) whether differences exist for managerial and professional women and minorities compared with men and Whites in salaries, merit pay increases, separation patterns, and promotion rates; (2) what EEO concerns laboratory women and minorities have raised; and (3) what DOE and OFCCP have done to implement GAO's earlier recommendation.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 2001 through mid-2004, GAO found some statistically significant differences in salaries, merit pay increases, and separation patterns for managerial and professional women and minorities when compared with men and Whites, and differences in promotion rates when compared with White men. These differences remained despite holding constant factors such as age, education, and occupational category. Women were paid 2 to 4 percent less than men at five of the six laboratories, while minorities were paid about 2 percent less than Whites at one laboratory. Merit pay increases were comparable for all groups at three of the six laboratories. At the other three laboratories, merit pay increases were higher for women and minorities at one, higher for women at another, and lower for minorities at the third. Separation patterns for women and minorities were generally comparable to men and Whites. However, at one laboratory, women were more likely to leave than men, and at another laboratory, minorities were more likely to leave than Whites. At one laboratory, selected minority groups were promoted at a rate less than 80 percent of the rate for White men (a "rule of thumb" used by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and OFCCP). Statistically significant differences do not prove or disprove discrimination; rather, they provide information at an aggregate level and may indicate a need for further investigation into their practical significance. Concerns of women and minority staff at the laboratories focused primarily on underrepresentation, the lack of career development opportunities, and the need for an improved laboratory work environment. Complaints investigated or resolved within the laboratories varied among the laboratories and included issues such as sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. Complaints filed with outside agencies such as EEOC most often cited concerns with pay and terminations. The highest number of external complaints filed dealt with sex or race matters. As a result of GAO's April 2002 recommendation, OFCCP and DOE staff met to discuss the possible creation of a more formal relationship through a memorandum of understanding. While reviewing OFCCP's draft memorandum, the Department of Labor raised questions about DOE's authority and responsibility for EEO matters at the laboratories, and as a result, OFCCP has not sent the draft memorandum to DOE for coordination. OFCCP maintains that Executive Order 11246, as amended, made DOL solely responsible for enforcing federal contractors' compliance with EEO requirements, and this authority has been delegated to OFCCP by DOL. DOE officials agree, but maintain that DOE's requirement for its contractors to promote diversity through diversity plans is independent from OFCCP's jurisdiction. Accordingly, GAO believes that the departments of Labor and of Energy need to clarify and reach agreement about DOE's role concerning its contractors' diversity activities. |
gao_GAO-09-643T | gao_GAO-09-643T_0 | DOD Continues to Face Challenges in Employing Sound Practices When Contracting For and Managing Service Contracts
It is essential that DOD employ sound practices when using contractors to support its missions or operations to ensure the department receives value. Collectively, these problems expose DOD to unnecessary risk and make it difficult for the department to ensure that it is getting value for the dollars spent. Furthermore, DOD lacks basic data about its service contracts that could help it determine how it contracts for services and how reliant it is on contractors. For example, at this time, the department does not have complete and accurate information on the number of services contracts in use, the services being provided by those contracts, the number of contractors providing those services, and the number and types of contracts awarded. The absence of well-defined requirements and clearly understood objectives complicates efforts to hold DOD and contractors accountable for poor acquisition outcomes. These types of contract actions, known as undefinitized contract actions, are used to meet urgent needs or when the scope of the work is not clearly defined. In fact, DOD decided to pay the contractor nearly all of the $221 million in questioned costs after making a determination based on additional information. Selected Contract Type and Business Arrangements Not Always Appropriate
When contracting for services, DOD has a number of choices regarding the contracting arrangements to use. DOD reported that it obligated nearly $10 billion under time-and-materials contracts in fiscal year 2005, acquiring, among other services, professional, administrative, and management support services. According to DOD, time-and- materials contracts are considered high risk for the government because they provide no positive profit incentive to the contractor for cost control or labor efficiency and their use is supposed to be limited to cases where no other contract type is suitable. In 2007, we also reported that DOD needed to improve its management and oversight of undefinitized contract actions (UCAs), under which DOD can authorize contractors to begin work and incur costs before reaching a final agreement on contract terms and conditions, including price. If surveillance is not conducted, is insufficient, or not well documented, DOD is at risk of being unable to identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. As a result, incoming contract administration personnel did not know whether the contractors were meeting their contract requirements effectively and efficiently and therefore were limited in their ability to make informed decisions related to award fees, which can run into the millions of dollars. These are positive steps, but inconsistent implementation has hindered past DOD efforts to address these high-risk areas. To improve outcomes on the whole, DOD must ensure that these policy changes and others are consistently put into practice and reflected in decisions made on individual acquisitions. We have ongoing work assessing DOD’s efforts to implement a service acquisition management approach, including its development of a structure for reviewing its major services acquisitions, as well as its use of different types of contract arrangements. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2008 required DOD to take additional actions to improve its visibility over the department’s reliance on services contractors as well as its management and oversight of its services acquisitions. We have also made numerous recommendations over the past 10 years aimed at improving DOD’s management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces, including the need for (1) DOD-wide guidance on how to manage contractors that support deployed forces, (2) improved training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel, and (3) a focal point within DOD dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to improve the management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. DOD has recognized that it faces challenges with contract management and the department has taken steps to address these challenges, including those outlined in this testimony. While DOD has generally agreed with our recommendations intended to improve contract management, much remains to be done. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) obligated over $200 billion on contracts for services, which accounted for more than half of its total contract obligations. Given the serious budget pressures facing the nation, it is critical that DOD obtain value when buying these services. Yet DOD does not always use sound practices when acquiring services, and the department lacks sufficient people with the right skills to support its acquisitions. Although DOD has ongoing efforts to improve its planning, execution, and oversight of service acquisitions, many concerns that prompted GAO to put DOD contract management on its high-risk list in 1992 remain. The committee asked GAO to address challenges facing DOD in measuring the value from and risks associated with its contracting for services. This testimony provides an overview of key concerns GAO cited in its previous reports. Specifically it focuses on (1) challenges DOD faces in following sound contract and contracting management practices and (2) recent actions DOD has taken to improve its management of service contracting. GAO has made numerous recommendations over the past decade aimed at improving DOD's management and oversight of service contracts, but it is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
DOD continues to face challenges in employing sound practices when contracting for and managing service contracts. The department has obtained services based on poorly defined requirements, used inappropriate business arrangements and types of contracts, and failed to adequately oversee and manage contractor performance. For example: (1) DOD sometimes authorized contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on the contract terms and conditions, including price. These arrangements, known as undefinitized contract actions, are used to meet urgent need or when the scope of the work is not clearly defined. In July 2007, GAO reported that DOD paid contractors nearly $221 million in questioned costs under one of these arrangements. (2) In fiscal year 2005, DOD obligated nearly $10 billion for professional, administrative, management support, and other services under time-and-materials contracts--contracts that are high risk for the government because they provide no profit incentive to the contractor for cost control or labor efficiency. As such, their use is supposed to be limited to cases where no other contract type is suitable and specific approvals are obtained. However, DOD frequently failed to provide such justification, and GAO's findings indicated the contracts were often used for expediency. (3) In a 2008 review, GAO found that incomplete contract files at some Army contracting offices hindered incoming contract administration personnel's assessments of contractors to make informed decisions related to award fees, which can run into the millions of dollars. These challenges expose DOD to unnecessary risk and may impede the department's efforts to manage the outcomes of its service contracts. For example, the absence of well-defined requirements complicates efforts to hold DOD and contractors accountable for poor acquisition outcomes. Use of inappropriate contract types, in addition to other factors, can result in DOD not obtaining the best value for its contract spending. Finally, failure to provide adequate oversight makes it difficult to identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. While DOD has taken some actions to respond to GAO's recommendations and congressional legislation, inconsistent implementation has hindered past DOD efforts to address these high-risk areas. To improve outcomes on the whole, DOD must ensure that these policy changes and others are consistently put into practice and reflected in decisions made on individual acquisitions. In addition, DOD needs to develop basic data about its service contracts to help inform how it contracts for services and its reliance on these contractors. GAO continues to assess DOD's efforts to implement a service acquisition management approach and the department's management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-183 | gao_T-HEHS-98-183_0 | Head Start Initiatives Reflect Increased Focus on Results, but Still Provide Too Little Information About Whether Program Makes a Difference
The Congress has recently acted to strengthen Head Start’s emphasis on achieving program purposes by, for example, requiring the program to develop performance measures. In response to this emphasis on performance assessment, Head Start has developed a framework that links program activities of local Head Start grantees to the program’s overall strategic mission and goal. The FACES survey, however, will collect information only at the national level. HHS officials told us, however, that they intend in the future to require local agencies to assess what outcomes they have achieved, as some agencies already do. In addition, these HHS initiatives will not address the need for information on Head Start’s impact, limiting its ability to assess how well the program is achieving its purpose. That is, the initiatives will not explain what caused any improved outcomes—whether the same outcomes would have occurred if children and families were in other kinds of early childhood programs or none at all. Although we acknowledge the difficulty of conducting impact studies of programs such as Head Start, we believe that research could be done that would assure the Congress and HHS that the current $4 billion federal investment in Head Start is achieving its purpose. program impact will be unclear. Changed Social Environment Raises Questions About Head Start’s Role
Head Start operates in a social environment that differs greatly from that of 30 years ago when the program was established: more parents are working full time, either by choice or necessity, and many more social service programs exist to address the needs of disadvantaged children and their families. 3). Just as Head Start is not the only community program providing specific services to disadvantaged children and their families, it is also not the only program that uses a community’s network of services to facilitate access to a comprehensive set of services. HHS has no information about the number of community programs providing comprehensive services, nor did we obtain this information in our recent study; we plan to explore this further in another study. Lack of Information Hinders Decisionmakers’ Response to Social Trends
While recognizing that these social changes may significantly affect Head Start now and in the future, the Congress and Head Start lack information needed to decide what specific actions to take in response to them. Information is lacking about families’ needs for services, how well Head Start’s current structure can respond to those needs, and the array of options available to disadvantaged children and their families. In addition, only limited anecdotal information exists about Head Start agencies’ initiatives for responding to these trends and the success of those initiatives. Additional copies are $2 each. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its work on the Head Start program, focusing on: (1) how well the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) ensures that the Head Start program is achieving its purpose; and (2) how well Head Start is structured to meet the needs of program participants in today's social context, which differs significantly from that of 30 years ago.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Head Start has, through the years, provided a comprehensive array of services and, as envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act, has in recent years substantially strengthened its emphasis on determining the results of those services; (2) its processes still provide too little information, however, about how well the program is achieving its intended purposes; (3) HHS has developed a performance assessment framework that effectively links program activities with the program's overall strategic mission and goal; (4) this framework also includes measurable objectives for how the program will be implemented and what outcomes will be achieved; (5) HHS has new initiatives that will, in the next few years, provide information not previously available on outcomes such as gains made by children and their families while in the program; (6) currently, however, these initiatives are limited to assessing outcomes at the national level, not at the local agency level; (7) in addition, GAO is not convinced that these initiatives will provide definite information on impact, that is, whether children and their families would have achieved these gains without participating in Head Start; (8) although obtaining this kind of impact information would be difficult, the significance of Head Start and the sizeable investment in it warrant conducting studies that will provide answers to questions about whether the program is making a difference; (9) in addition to questions about the program's impact, questions exist about whether Head Start is structured to meet the needs of today's participants who live in a society much changed since the mid-1960s when the program was created; (10) families' needs have changed as more parents are working full time either by choice or necessity; (11) in addition, children and their families can now receive services similar to Head Start's from a growing number of other programs; (12) these social trends raise questions about how well Head Start is structured to meet participants' needs and, if changes are needed, what those changes should be; and (13) a lack of information about the array of community programs available and about actions local Head Start agencies have already taken hinders decisionmakers' ability to respond to these trends. |
gao_GAO-08-987 | gao_GAO-08-987_0 | RTO Expenses and Investments in Property, Plant, and Equipment Varied Considerably
From 2002 to 2006, RTO expenses totaled $4.8 billion when adjusted for inflation and varied considerably depending on the size of the RTO and functions it carried out. RTOs also made major investments in property, plant, and equipment—$1.6 billion when adjusted for inflation as of December 2006. Furthermore, though RTO budgets offer one tool FERC could use to revisit whether rates remain just and reasonable between rate proceedings, the extent to which FERC reviews proposed expense information in RTO budgets varies. 1s for accuracy or completeness. FERC officials told us it is the RTOs’ responsibility to ensure that the FERC Form No. Experts, Industry Participants, and FERC Lack Consensus on the Benefits of RTOs
Experts, industry participants, and FERC lack consensus about whether RTOs have provided net benefits to consumers. Many key experts and industry participants agree that RTOs can provide certain benefits, such as more efficient management of the transmission grid and improved access by independent generators. A state-by-state analysis of electricity prices reveals differences between RTO and non-RTO regions that have likely led to concerns about the impact of RTO markets on electricity prices. FERC Believes RTOs Have Produced Benefits but Has Not Conducted a Study or Developed a Comprehensive Set of Publicly Available Measures for Tracking RTO Performance
FERC officials believe that RTOs have resulted in benefits to the economy, such as new efficiencies in operating the regional transmission grid; however, it has not conducted an empirical analysis or developed a comprehensive set of performance measures to analyze these benefits. We acknowledge that FERC’s review of RTO decisions that affect electricity prices and consideration of stakeholder comments and complaints sometimes results in new rules designed to improve the ability of RTOs to deliver benefits to their regions. To provide a foundation for FERC to evaluate the effectiveness of its decision to encourage the creation of RTOs and help Congress, industry stakeholders, and the public understand RTO performance and net benefits, we recommend the Chairman of FERC take the following two actions: work with RTOs, stakeholders, and other experts to develop standardized measures that track the performance of RTO operations and markets and report the performance results to Congress and the public annually, while also providing interpretation of (1) what the measures and reported performance communicate about the benefits of RTOs and, where appropriate, (2) changes that need to be made to address any performance concerns. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
At the request of the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, we reviewed (1) Regional Transmission Organizations’ (RTO) key expenses and investments in property, plant, and equipment; (2) how RTOs and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) review RTO expenses and decisions that may affect electricity prices; and (3) the extent to which there is consensus about what benefits RTOs have provided. To determine how FERC and RTOs review RTO expenses and decisions and discuss other aspects of RTO costs and benefits, we collected general information, interviewed representatives from the six RTOs, and spoke to the ISO/RTO Council about how FERC and the RTOs review proposed budget expenses and consider how RTO decisions affect electricity prices. Found no reliable or convincing evidence that consumers are better off as a result of restructuring the U.S. electric power industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1999, as a part of federal efforts to restructure the electricity industry, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) began encouraging the voluntary formation of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)--independent entities to manage regional networks of electric transmission lines. FERC oversees six RTOs that cover part or all of 35 states and D.C. and serve over half of U.S. electricity demand. As electricity prices increase, stakeholders-- organizations and individuals with financial and regulatory interest in the electricity industry--have voiced concerns about RTO benefits and how RTO expenses and decisions influence electricity prices. GAO was asked to review (1) RTO expenses and key investments in property, plant, and equipment from 2002 to 2006, the most current data available; (2) how RTOs and FERC review RTO expenses and decisions that may affect electricity prices; and (3) the extent to which there is consensus about RTO benefits. To do so, GAO reviewed documentation and data and spoke with FERC officials and experts.
What GAO Found
RTO expenses and investments in property, plant, and equipment vary, depending on the size of the RTO and its functions. Expenses for the six RTOs FERC oversees totaled $4.8 billion from 2002 to 2006, and property, plant, and equipment investments totaled $1.6 billion as of December 2006. RTOs and FERC rely on stakeholder participation to identify and resolve concerns about RTO expenses and decisions that affect electricity prices, such as decisions about reliability and whether to develop markets for electricity and other services. The stakeholders GAO spoke with in two RTO regions value the opportunity for input but have concerns about the resources and information required to participate. Moreover, although regular review of RTO budgets could help FERC with its responsibility to ensure RTO rates remain just and reasonable or determine if a new rate proceeding is needed, FERC's review of RTO budgets varies. Furthermore, while FERC requires RTOs to report actual expenses annually, it does not regularly review this information for accuracy or reasonableness and is at risk of using and providing to the public inaccurate and incomplete information. FERC officials, industry participants, and experts lack consensus on whether RTOs have brought benefits to their regions. Many agree that RTOs have improved the management of the transmission grid and improved generator access to it; however, there is no consensus about whether RTO markets provide benefits to consumers or how they have influenced consumer electricity prices. FERC officials believe RTOs have resulted in benefits; however, FERC has not conducted an empirical analysis of RTO performance or developed a comprehensive set of publicly available, standardized measures to evaluate such performance. Without such measures, FERC will remain unable to demonstrate the extent to which RTOs provide consumers and others with benefits--information that could aid FERC in its evaluation of its decision to encourage the creation of RTOs and help address divisions about which benefits RTOs have provided. |
gao_GAO-08-1062 | gao_GAO-08-1062_0 | As part of its May 2008 bylaw revision, the board of directors more clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of its members, representatives, and director. In addition, the new bylaws explicitly define the role and responsibilities of the director and the corporation’s senior officer positions. Our July 2007 report also asked Congress to consider restructuring the board of directors to appoint additional members of diverse backgrounds who possess knowledge and expertise useful to PBGC’s responsibilities and can provide the attention needed for strong corporate oversight. In response to these findings, PBGC contracted with a consulting firm to review governance models and provide a background report to assist the board in its review of alternative corporate governance structures. Board’s Limited Ability to Provide Policy Direction and Oversight Persists
Our July 2007 report found that PBGC’s board has limited time and resources to provide policy direction and oversight and has not established procedures and mechanisms to monitor PBGC operations. Further, we reported that the board relies on PBGC’s executive committees and working groups for monitoring and reviewing PBGC’s operations. PBGC may also be exposed to challenges as the board, its representatives, and director will likely change with the upcoming presidential transition in January 2009, thus limiting institutional knowledge of the challenges facing the corporation. PBGC management has experienced partial leadership transitions in recent years, and in anticipation of the forthcoming complete leadership change, PBGC is developing additional materials to include in its official transition package for newly appointed officials. This additional information could help the new board members and their representatives better understand the vulnerabilities and challenges facing the corporation. Congress Has Overseen PBGC in Several Ways, but Some Other Government Corporations Have Additional Reporting Requirements
Congressional oversight of PBGC in recent years has ranged from formal congressional hearings to the use of its support agencies, such as GAO, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). However, unlike some other government corporations, PBGC does not have certain reporting requirements for providing additional information to Congress. Congress Has Overseen PBGC in a Variety of Ways
Since 2002, PBGC officials have testified 19 times before various congressional committees—mostly on broad issues related to the status of the private sector defined benefit pension policy and its effect on PBGC (see table 1). The Millennium Challenge Corporation is required to formally notify the appropriate congressional committees 15 days prior to the allocation or transfer of funds related to the corporation’s activities. Unlike PBGC’s advisory committee, the advisory boards or committees of other government corporations—such as the Export-Import Bank and FDIC— are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act and some submit formal reports to their board chair and directors (see table 2). In addition to government corporations, some government agencies with retirement-related responsibilities—such as the Social Security Administration (SSA), the Railroad Retirement Board, and the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board—have advisory committees as part of their governance structures, which annually report to their respective overseeing bodies. Despite PBGC’s efforts to improve its bylaws, the three-member board of directors is still one of the smallest and least diverse of any government corporation. Other government corporations’ governance structures include oversight mechanisms, such as standing committees, and additional reporting requirements to conduct certain oversight functions and assist their boards of directors. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that recently identified management and financial challenges facing PBGC are shared with those newly appointed, we recommend that PBGC provide Office of Inspector General and GAO reports on the corporation’s financial and management challenges to the newly appointed board members, board representatives, and director so that they can take appropriate action as needed. Testimony on Multiemployer Pension Plans. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the Federal Budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures the pension benefits of 44 million private sector workers and retirees in over 30,000 employer-sponsored pension plans. In July 2007, GAO reported that PBGC's governance structure needed improvements, and asked Congress to consider expanding the board of directors to include additional members. GAO also recommended that the board develop policies and mechanisms consistent with corporate governance practices, and develop formal guidelines to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the board chair, members, their representatives, and the director. On the basis of that work, this report addresses (1) the steps PBGC has taken to improve policy direction and oversight and (2) how Congress applies oversight to PBGC and what other oversight mechanisms exist for government corporations. GAO reviewed PBGC's new corporate bylaws and the structure and reporting requirements of selected government corporations. GAO also interviewed PBGC and Department of Labor officials.
What GAO Found
Although PBGC's board has strengthened the corporation's governing bylaws, the three-member board of directors is still limited in its ability to provide policy direction and oversight to PBGC. In implementing our earlier recommendation, the board revised the corporation's bylaws to more clearly define the roles and responsibilities of PBGC's board members, representatives, director, and senior management. PBGC also contracted with a consulting firm to provide a background report to assist the board in its review of alternative corporate governance structures, including restructuring the board of directors as GAO suggested in 2007. However, because of its small size, the board has not been able to develop procedures and mechanisms to monitor PBGC's operations, such as standing committees, which are mechanisms used by other government corporations. PBGC may also be exposed to challenges as the board, its representatives, and the director will likely change with the upcoming presidential transition in January 2009. While PBGC management has experienced a partial leadership change in recent years and provides operational and financial information to those newly appointed, PBGC Inspector General and GAO reports have recently identified additional financial and operational challenges facing the corporation. This additional information could help the new board members better understand the vulnerabilities and challenges facing the corporation. PBGC is subject to routine congressional oversight, but certain other government corporations have other types of reporting requirements in place--such as congressional notifications and reporting protocols for their advisory committees--to ensure effective communication exist between the corporations and Congress. Congressional oversight of PBGC in recent years has ranged from formal committee hearings to investigations and studies conducted by its congressional support agencies. For example, since 2002, PBGC officials have testified 19 times before several different committees on issues such as the status of its financial condition. Further, GAO, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service have issued a variety of reports and testimonies on PBGC financial and operational matters. However, PBGC does not have reporting requirements applied to other government corporations for providing additional information to Congress. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Commodity Credit Corporation are required to notify Congress prior to conducting certain financial transactions. The advisory committee of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation formally reports to its board of directors, while the Export-Import Bank of the United States' advisory committee formally reports to its board and Congress each year on matters related to their respective organizations. In addition, the advisory boards of other government entities with retirement-related responsibilities--such as the Social Security Administration, the Railroad Retirement Board, and the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board--provide reports to their overseeing bodies. |
gao_GAO-12-64 | gao_GAO-12-64_0 | U.S. Census Data Show Compact Migrants throughout U.S. Areas, with Growing Populations in Guam and Hawaii
Compact Migrants Reside throughout States and Territories
The combined data from Census’ 2005-2009 ACS and the 2008 required enumerations in Guam and the CNMI estimated approximately 56,000 compact migrants—nearly a quarter of all FAS citizens—living in U.S. areas, with the largest populations in Guam and Hawaii. Use of two different methods. Limited comparability with prior enumeration. In 2008, Census did not collect information on characteristics of compact migrants in Guam and the CNMI beyond that required for the enumerations. Preliminary Approach for 2013 Also Has Strengths and Limitations
Although Interior has not yet selected an approach for its 2013 enumeration of compact migrants in the affected jurisdictions, Interior and Census officials are discussing a preliminary approach that would have strengths and limitations similar to those we found in the 2008 approach. Estimates of Rising Compact Impact Costs Have Weaknesses, and Guidance on Impact Reporting Is Lacking
Guam and Hawaii Report Rising Costs, Primarily for Education and Health
For 2004 through 2010, the affected jurisdictions’ reports to Interior show more than $1 billion in costs for services related to compact migrants. Federal funding. Compact migrants participate in local economies through taxation, but reliable data quantifying their effect are not available. Government Officials, Service Providers, and Compact Migrants Suggested Approaches to Directly Address Challenges Related to Compact Migration
Compact migrants confront complex challenges related to the compact migrants’ unfamiliarity with local language and culture, limited job skills, and difficulty in accessing available services, according to various government officials, services providers, and compact migrants. Job training. Sector Grants to the FSM and the Marshall Islands Indirectly Address Compact Impact
Sector grants awarded in fiscal years 2004 through 2010 may have helped mitigate compact impact by supporting the health and education sectors and, in some instances, directly targeted issues related to compact impact in the affected jurisdictions. In allocating sector grants for fiscal years 2004 through 2010, the joint management committees did not formally address the needs of compact migrants or their impact on U.S. states and territories, according to Interior officials. In 2011, the committees formally placed compact impact on their annual meeting agendas; however, as of September 2011 they had not allocated 2012 sector grant funding to directly address issues that concern the compact migrants or the affected jurisdictions. Interior’s compact impact grants have generally been used for affected jurisdictions’ budget support, projects, and purchases in the areas of education, health, and public safety. Comments from U.S. Areas
Hawaii
The government of Hawaii generally agreed with our recommendations and made several related observations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report describes migration to U.S. areas from the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Marshall Islands, and Palau under those countries’ compacts of free association with the United States; reviews approaches to enumerating these compact migrants; evaluates reporting of these migrant’s impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI); and reviews Department of the Interior (Interior) grants related to compact migration. To estimate the populations of affected jurisdictions, FSM, and the Marshall Islands in 2003 and 2008, we used the 1999 Marshall Islands census, an estimate from the Marshall Islands’ embassy to the U.S. for the 2011 population, and 2000 and 2010 censuses for the FSM and the affected jurisdictions, assumed that the population changed at a constant rate, and interpolated the population counts for the years in between. Accuracy. Revenue. However, some agency costs were reported in subsequent fiscal year reports. Appendix VII: Interior-Awarded Compact Impact Grants to Affected Jurisdictions from 2004 to 2011
Interior distributed the compact impact grants to the affected jurisdictions in 2004 through 2010 as follows: From fiscal year 2004 through 2009, based on the results of 2003 enumeration, Interior annually awarded approximately $14 million to Guam, $10.6 million to Hawaii, and $5.2 million to the CNMI. The Department of the Interior suggested that our report’s use of the terms “compensation” and “reimbursement” to describe compact impact funds could give the impression that these funds were intended to fully reimburse the affected jurisdictions for their added expenses when the amended compacts' enabling legislation states that compact impact grants are “to aid in defraying costs incurred by affected jurisdictions as a result of increased demands placed on health, educational, social, or public safety services or infrastructure related to such services due to the residence in affected jurisdictions” of compact migrants. 3. 2. 12. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. compacts with the freely associated states (FAS)--the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Marshall Islands, and Palau--permit FAS citizens to migrate to the United States and its territories (U.S. areas) without regard to visa and labor certification requirements. Thousands of FAS citizens have migrated to U.S. areas (compact migrants)--particularly to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, and Hawaii, which are defined as affected jurisdictions. In fiscal year 2004, Congress appropriated $30 million annually for 20 years to help defray affected jurisdictions' costs for migrant services (compact impact). Though not required, affected jurisdictions can report these costs to the Department of the Interior (Interior), which allocates the $30 million as impact grants in proportion to compact migrant enumerations required every 5 years. This report (1) describes compact migration, (2) reviews enumeration approaches, (3) evaluates impact reporting, and (4) reviews Interior grants related to compact impact. GAO reviewed U.S. agency data, recent enumerations, impact reports, and grants and it also interviewed officials, employers, and migrants in the affected jurisdictions.
What GAO Found
Combined data from the U.S. Census Bureau's (Census) 2005-2009 American Community Survey (ACS) and the required enumeration in 2008 estimate that a total of roughly 56,000 compact migrants from the FSM, the Marshall Islands, and Palau--nearly a quarter of all FAS citizens--were living in U.S. areas. Compact migrants resided throughout U.S. areas, with approximately 58 percent of all compact migrants living in the affected jurisdictions. According to the 2008 required enumeration, compact migrant populations continued to grow in Guam and Hawaii and were roughly 12 percent of the population of Guam and 1 percent of the population of Hawaii. Working under agreements with Interior, Census used a different approach for the most recent enumeration than for prior enumerations, employing two methods in 2008: (1) a one-time survey in Guam and the CNMI and (2) a tabulation of existing multiyear ACS data for Hawaii. The affected jurisdictions opposed the change in approach. The 2008 approach allowed for determining the precision of the estimates but did not yield comparable results across jurisdictions or detailed information on compact migrants. Interior and Census officials have a preliminary plan for the required 2013 enumeration but Interior has not determined its cost or assessed its strengths and limitations. The methods used by affected jurisdictions to collect and report on compact impact have weaknesses that reduce their accuracy. For fiscal years 2004 through 2010, Hawaii, Guam and the CNMI reported more than $1 billion in costs associated with providing education, health, and social services to compact migrants. However, some jurisdictions did not accurately define compact migrants, account for federal funding that supplemented local expenditures, or include revenue received from compact migrants. Although Interior is required to report to Congress any compact impacts that the affected jurisdictions report to Interior, it has not provided the affected jurisdictions with adequate guidance on estimating compact impact. Compact migrants participate in local economies through employment, taxation and consumption, but data on these effects are limited. From fiscal years 2004 to 2010, Interior awarded approximately $210 million in compact impact grants to the affected jurisdictions, which used the funds primarily for budget support, projects, and purchases in the areas of education, health, and public safety. In Guam and Hawaii, government officials, service providers, and compact migrants discussed approaches to more directly address challenges related to migration by bridging language barriers, providing job training, and increasing access to services. The amended compacts also made available $808 million in sector grants for the FSM and the Marshall Islands from fiscal years 2004 to 2010. Sector grants are jointly allocated by the joint U.S.-FSM and U.S.-Marshall Islands management committees and have been used primarily in the FAS for health and education. Few sector grants directly address issues that concern compact migrants or the affected jurisdictions. The committees had not formally placed compact impact on their annual meeting agendas until 2011 and have not yet allocated any 2012 sector grant funds to directly address compact impact.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Interior assess the 2013 enumeration approach, disseminate adequate guidance on estimating compact impact, and encourage uses of grants that better address compact migrants' impact and needs. Interior generally agreed with the report but did not support the recommendation on grant uses. |
gao_GAO-11-654 | gao_GAO-11-654_0 | For example, as part of supplemental regulation specific to SEC, former SEC employees (within 2 years of separating from the agency) must submit a notice of appearance, also referred to as an 8b letter, to request approval to appear before SEC for purposes of representational activity. SEC’s Ethics Office serves as the agency’s focal point in carrying out these responsibilities. Among other tenets, these rules outline standards for an accountant’s independence, integrity, and objectivity. These reports did not conclude that former SEC employees violated post- employment restrictions; although, the reports noted some related concerns based on reviews of particular SEC investigations and the actions of former employees, including the following: The SEC IG’s report found that the SEC’s lack of documentation resulted in an unclear record of what projects a former associate director in the Division of Trading and Markets recused herself from and on what projects she continued to work during employment negotiations with a trading firm. While Employee Movement between SEC and the Private Sector Offers Potential Benefits to Each Side, It Also Raises Questions
SEC Only Recently Has Begun to Collect Future Employer Information from Departing Employees
SEC only recently began asking separating employees—on an agencywide basis—for future employer information. About 37 percent of these employees were included in occupation categories that captured examiners, accountants, economists, and attorneys—occupations relevant to SEC’s examination and investigative efforts—who separated from SEC due to resignation, retirement, or removal. Using sources such as letters from former employees requesting to appear before SEC, Web-based search results, and interviews with those knowledgeable about SEC, we found that former SEC employees frequently obtained employment with financial entities or law or consulting firms that represent them. Sixteen entities accounted for approximately 35 percent of the individuals filing notices of appearance during this period. We also conducted searches for a nongeneralizable sample of 150 former employees who separated from SEC between October 2005 and September 2010, and found that many of these employees later obtained employment at law, consulting, or financial firms. SEC officials also stated that former employees go to work for various firms, such as financial or accounting firms, after separating from the agency. SEC Officials and Others Cited Both Benefits and Challenges of Movement between SEC and Regulated Entities or Firms That Represent Them
Collectively, SEC officials, academic researchers, citizen advocacy groups, and representatives from financial firms and law firms with whom we spoke said that there are a number of benefits and challenges of employee movement between SEC and the private sector. SEC officials, academic researchers, and representatives from financial firms and law firms cited the following benefits: Better regulatory understanding and compliance. Although SEC Has Multiple Controls Related to Conflicts of Interest, Documentation of Ethics Issues Varies
SEC Provides Information to Employees on Post- Employment Requirements and Restrictions but Has Not Consistently Documented Ethics Advice
SEC has a number of controls for managing post-employment and conflict-of-interest issues. The SEC Ethics Office currently provides information about ethics rules and regulations (as well as conflict-of- interest and post-employment restrictions) to employees through the SEC intranet and by e-mail. According to SEC managers and employees with whom we spoke, systems for documenting key decisions, multiple levels of review, and controls for staff involvement and communication reduce the likelihood that any individual employee could exert undue influence on SEC decisions related to examinations and investigations. According to the SEC Ethics Counsel, ethics officials frequently advise current and former employees about issues related to their involvement in SEC matters. This information then can be used as part of the exit interview to advise departing staff about potential conflicts of interest related to their SEC experience they may encounter in their new positions. 2). While SEC’s controls are similar to many of those of other agencies, there are some differences. Better documentation of ethics advice could improve SEC’s ability to demonstrate that its officials are providing appropriate advice to current and former employees, and that the agency is taking steps to minimize the potential for post- employment violations or conflicts of interest. Recommendation for Executive Action
To promote transparency and help strengthen SEC’s procedures for documenting events related to potential current and post-employment issues associated with the movement of employees between SEC and other employers, we recommend that the SEC Chairman establish standards for documentation of ethics advice. To describe internal controls SEC has in place to manage potential conflicts of interest associated with the movement of employees to the private sector, we obtained documentation on controls related to managing potential post-employment and conflict-of-interest issues. We selected SEC divisions and offices to review based on our analysis of SEC separation data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) employees leave the SEC each year, and some of these former employees go to work for firms regulated by SEC or the law or consulting firms that represent them. This practice raises questions about the potential impact on SEC's ability to effectively carry out its mission, including the potential for undue influence by former SEC employees on SEC matters or cases. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act required GAO to examine the movement of former SEC employees to regulated firms and the associated concerns. Among other things, this report examines (1) the extent to which employees leave SEC to work for or represent regulated entities and the potential issues associated with such movements and (2) internal controls SEC has in place to manage potential conflicts of interest and how these controls compare across other agencies. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed data on former SEC employees, reviewed SEC's and other agencies' internal controls, and interviewed current and former SEC officials.
What GAO Found
Because SEC historically has not collected future employer information from separating employees on an agencywide basis, complete information on where former SEC officials obtained employment is not currently available. Based on available SEC attrition data, about 37 percent of the more than 2,000 employees who separated from SEC between October 2005 and September 2010 were in occupation categories that included examiners, accountants, economists, or attorneys--occupations particularly relevant to SEC examinations and investigations. GAO analyzed notice of appearance requests--which are required when former SEC employees wish to appear before SEC, within 2 years of their separation, for purposes of representing their firm or client--submitted between October 2005 and October 2010. Sixteen entities, consisting primarily of law and consulting firms, accounted for approximately 35 percent of the individuals filing these notices. GAO also selected a nongeneralizable sample of 150 former employees from occupation categories relevant to SEC's examination and investigative efforts and searched publicly available sources for information about their post-SEC employment. These individuals frequently obtained positions with financial, consulting, or law firms that represent firms regulated by SEC. According to SEC officials, representatives from law and financial firms, and academic researchers with whom GAO spoke, the potential benefits of employees moving between SEC and the private sector include bolstering SEC's ability to attract experts to help fulfill its mission and increasing understanding of SEC rules and regulations among industry participants. Academic researchers and citizen advocacy groups described potential challenges of such movements, such as the appearance of potential conflicts of interest when former SEC staff work for or represent regulated firms. SEC has a number of controls for managing post-employment and conflict-of-interest issues, and many of SEC's controls are similar to those of other agencies. For example, the SEC Ethics Office provides information to employees about ethics rules and regulations as well as agency-specific conflict-of-interest and post-employment restrictions. Also, some SEC divisions and offices take steps through staffing and work processes to manage potential conflicts of interest and have multiple levels of review and systems for documenting key decisions, such as closing SEC investigations. As previously recommended by GAO, SEC also recently began collecting future employer information from separating employees. This information can be used as part of SEC's mandatory exit interviews to advise departing staff about potential conflicts of interest they might encounter in their new positions related to their SEC experience. While SEC ethics officials routinely advise current and former employees on post-employment and conflict-of-interest issues, SEC has not consistently documented this advice. The agency's lack of documentation standards could limit SEC's and employees' ability to demonstrate that appropriate consultation occurred and could contribute to questions about the movement of employees between SEC and the private sector.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SEC establish standards for documentation of ethics advice on current and post-employment issues associated with the movement of employees between SEC and other employers. SEC generally agreed with GAO's recommendation and stated that it has begun drafting standards. |
gao_GAO-06-404 | gao_GAO-06-404_0 | US-VISIT Relationships with Other DHS and Non- DHS Agencies
Since its inception, US-VISIT has relied extensively on contractors to deliver system and other program capabilities; these contractors include both contractors managed directly by the program office and those managed by other DHS and non-DHS agencies. US-VISIT Established and Implemented Key Controls for Contracts That It Managed Directly, but It Did Not Have Controls for Overseeing Contracts Managed by Others or for Effective Financial Management
Given the US-VISIT program’s dependence on contracting, it is extremely important for the program office to effectively manage and oversee its contracts via the establishment and implementation of key contractor management and oversight controls. Without effective oversight, the program office cannot adequately ensure that program deliverables and associated mission results will be produced on time and within budget. Further, the program office and other agencies did not implement effective financial controls. The program office and other agencies managing US- VISIT–related work were unable to reliably report the scope of contracting expenditures. In addition, some agencies improperly paid and accounted for related invoices, including making a duplicate payment and making payments for non-US-VISIT services from funds designated for US-VISIT. According to the US-VISIT program official responsible for contract matters, the program office has initially focused on contracts that it manages directly. For US-VISIT contracts managed by other agencies, the program office has decided to rely on those agencies to manage the contracts and associated financial matters. Specifically, the program office did not know the full range of US-VISIT–related contract actions that had been completed and were under way, and it had not performed key practices associated with gaining visibility into and understanding of contractor performance in meeting the terms of these contracts. For example, these agencies did not always implement effective controls for ensuring that contractor deliverables satisfy established requirements. Program Office and Other DHS Agencies Did Not Adequately Track Billings and Expenditures
Of the DHS agencies we reviewed, the program office and two others managing US-VISIT–related contracts on the program’s behalf did not track contract billings and expenditures in a way that was accurate, reliable, and useful for contract oversight and decision making. The department characterized as misleading our statements that US-VISIT (1) depended on other agencies to manage financial matters for their respective contracts and (2) relied on another agency for US-VISIT’s own financial management support. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established and implemented effective controls for managing and overseeing contracts related to the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a multibillion-dollar program--U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to control and monitor the pre-entry, entry, visa status, and exit of foreign visitors. To deliver system and other program capabilities, the program relies extensively on contractors, some of whom are managed directly by US-VISIT and some by other agencies (including both DHS agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection, and non-DHS agencies, such as the General Services Administration). Because of US-VISIT's heavy reliance on contractors to deliver program capabilities, GAO was asked to determine whether DHS has established and implemented effective controls for managing and overseeing US-VISIT-related contracts.
What GAO Found
US-VISIT-related contracts have not been effectively managed and overseen. The US-VISIT program office established and implemented certain nonfinancial controls for those contracts that it managed directly, such as verifying that contractor deliverables satisfied established requirements. However, it did not implement effective controls for overseeing its contracts managed by other DHS agencies and by non-DHS agencies. Moreover, effective financial controls were not in place on any contracts that GAO reviewed. The program office did not know the full extent of US-VISIT-related contract actions, and it had not performed key nonfinancial practices associated with understanding contractor performance in meeting the terms of these contracts. This oversight gap was exacerbated by the fact that the other agencies had not always established and implemented effective controls for managing their respective contracts. These other agencies directly managed more than half (56 percent) of the total US-VISIT-related contract obligations reported to GAO. The program office and other agencies did not implement effective financial controls. Without these controls, some agencies were unable to reliably report US-VISIT contracting expenditures. Further, the program office and these other agencies improperly paid and accounted for related invoices, including making duplicate payments and payments for non-US-VISIT services with funds designated for US-VISIT. According to the US-VISIT program official responsible for contract matters, the program office has focused on contracts that it manages directly and decided to rely on the responsible agencies to manage the other contracts. Further, it has decided to use other agencies to properly manage financial matters for their respective contracts, and it also decided to rely on another agency for its own financial management services. Without effective contract management and oversight controls, the program office does not know that required program deliverables and mission results will be produced on time and within budget, and that proper payments are made. |
gao_GAO-04-958 | gao_GAO-04-958_0 | NIOSH, as part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention within the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for performing several technical and policy-making roles in support of Labor’s program, including establishing by regulation methods for arriving at reasonable estimates of radiation doses received by an individual at a covered facility; establishing by regulation guidelines to be used by Labor to determine whether an individual sustained a cancer in the performance of duty for purposes of the compensation program if, and only if, the cancer was “at least as likely as not” related to the radiation dose received by the employee; establishing procedures for considering petitions to be added to the special exposure cohort; and providing the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health with administrative and other necessary support services. Labor Has Fully Processed Most Claims Not Referred to NIOSH for Dose Reconstructions and Has Generally Met its Timeliness Goals for Claims Processing
As of January 31, 2004, Labor had fully processed 83 percent of the nearly 30,000 claims for benefits under Subtitle B that had not been referred to NIOSH for dose reconstruction. Forty-two percent of claims with final decisions were approved, resulting in more than $625 million in lump-sum compensation payments. The remaining 58 percent were denied, in most instances because they did not meet medical or employment eligibility criteria. On average, it took about 7 months to fully process claims not needing dose reconstruction. Labor Has Taken Steps to Ensure Consistency, Including Accountability Reviews and a Major Update of its Procedures Manual
Labor has taken several steps to help ensure that Subtitle B claims are processed consistently. Claims Needing Dose Reconstructions Face Large Processing Backlog
In the first 2½ years of the program—July 31, 2001, through January 31, 2004—Labor and NIOSH fully processed about 9 percent of the claims referred to NIOSH for dose reconstruction, leaving a large backlog of these claims. However, NIOSH’s time frame for completing the remaining profiles is uncertain, and as a result, some claims associated with facilities that do not have site profiles may take a considerable period of time to be fully processed. To ensure the consistency of claim decisions, NIOSH’s Advisory Board is overseeing an effort to evaluate dose reconstruction decisions and site profiles. In some cases where a site profile has not yet been developed, these claims are essentially on hold until the site profile is developed. Fifty-one percent of claims with final decisions as of January 31, 2004, were approved, resulting in $65 million in lump-sum compensation payments. Forty-nine percent were denied because the results of the dose reconstruction were used by Labor to determine that the claimed illness was not “at least as likely as not” to have been caused by work-related radiation exposure. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how well the Department of Labor’s (Labor) procedures and practices ensure the timely and consistent processing of claims that are not referred to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for dose reconstruction but are being processed by Labor, we reviewed Labor’s regulations, procedures, and practices related to processing claims. To determine how well Labor’s and the NIOSH procedures and practices ensure the timely and consistent processing of claims that are referred to NIOSH for dose reconstruction, we reviewed Labor’s and NIOSH’s regulations, procedures, and practices related to processing claims. We did not assess the quality of Labor’s claims decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Subtitle B of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act, administered by the Department of Labor (Labor), provides eligible workers who developed illnesses from their work, or their survivors, with a onetime total payment of $150,000, and coverage for medical expenses related to the illnesses. For some claims, Labor uses radiation exposure estimates (dose reconstructions) performed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), part of the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), to determine if the illness claimed was "as least as likely as not" related to employment at a covered facility. GAO was asked to determine (1) how well Labor's procedures and practices ensure the timely and consistent processing of claims that are not referred to NIOSH for dose reconstruction but are being processed by Labor and (2) how well Labor's and NIOSH's procedures and practices ensure the timely and consistent processing of claims that are referred for dose reconstruction. GAO did not assess the quality of Labor's claims decisions.
What GAO Found
In the first 2 and 1/2 years of the program--July 31, 2001, through January 31, 2004--Labor had fully processed 83 percent of the nearly 30,000 claims that had not been referred to NIOSH for dose reconstruction; these claims correspond to nearly 23,000 cases for individual workers. (Multiple claims can be associated with a case as eligible survivors may each file claims.) Labor took an average of 7 months to fully process these claims. About 42 percent of claims with final decisions were approved, resulting in $625 million in lump-sum compensation payments. The remaining 58 percent of claims with final decisions were denied--the majority because they did not meet medical or employment eligibility criteria. Labor generally met its timeliness goals for processing claims and is working to ensure that claims are processed consistently by conducting accountability reviews and creating a task force to update its procedure manual. In the first 2= years of the program, Labor and NIOSH had fully processed about 9 percent of the more than 21,000 claims (which correspond to about 15,000 cases) that were referred to NIOSH for dose reconstructions, taking an average of 17 months to fully process claims. Fifty-one percent of the processed claims were approved, and Labor has paid out about $65 million in lump-sum compensation. Forty-nine percent were denied because it was determined that the claimed illness was not at least as likely as not related to employment at a covered facility. A backlog of claims needing dose reconstruction developed because NIOSH needed time to get the necessary staff and procedures in place to complete the dose reconstructions and develop site profiles. Efforts are under way to develop site profiles that contain facility-specific information that is useful in completing dose reconstructions. However, processing claims associated with facilities that do not have site profiles, in some instances, has essentially stopped, and NIOSH has not established a time frame for completing these remaining site profiles because of limited expert resources and site complexities. As a result, some claimants could wait a considerable period of time to have their claims fully processed. To help ensure the consistency of claim decisions, HHS's Advisory Board is conducting an independent external evaluation of dose reconstruction decisions and site profiles. |
gao_GAO-11-95 | gao_GAO-11-95_0 | Monitoring adverse events. Several FDA centers and offices were involved in the response to the contaminated heparin crisis. FDA Took Multiple Steps to Protect U.S. Consumers from Additional Contaminated Heparin, but Faced Limitations in Oversight and Collaboration
FDA took several actions during the first half of 2008 to protect the public health in response to the heparin crisis. In addition, FDA collaborated with its international regulatory partners to exchange information. Because of limitations related to conducting inspections and investigations of heparin firms in China, FDA could not determine the original source of the heparin contamination. FDA Took Action through the First Half of 2008 to Protect the Public Health in Response to the Heparin Crisis
To respond to the heparin crisis, FDA took action related to its responsibility to protect the public health by ensuring the safety and security of the nation’s drug and medical device supplies by taking various actions from January through May 2008. During that month, FDA also formed an internal task force to coordinate the agency’s response to the heparin crisis and reached out to external scientists to assist the agency in identifying the unknown contaminant and to develop tests to detect this contaminant. 2). FDA Coordinated Resources to Respond to the Heparin Crisis, but Did Not Adequately Address Risks Related to Working with Certain External Entities
FDA coordinated internal and external resources to respond to the contaminated heparin crisis, but did not adequately address risks related to working with certain external entities with ties to heparin firms. Not adequately addressing these risks could have affected the public’s confidence in FDA’s response efforts and in its other activities related to the regulation of heparin products and also left FDA open to claims for payment for services that these external entities provided to FDA on a voluntary basis. FDA was unable to link any of the adverse events to contaminated heparin because it was unable to establish a causal relationship due to data limitations and confounding factors involving the individual patients. FDA also monitored trends in the number of reports of adverse events associated with heparin drug products and heparin-containing medical devices that FDA received before, during, and after the crisis. FDA Analyzed Adverse Events Associated with Heparin and Heparin- Containing Medical Devices, but Was Unable to Link Them with Contaminated Heparin Due to Data Limitations and Confounding Factors Involving Patients
FDA conducted analyses of adverse events, including deaths, associated with heparin drug products and heparin-containing medical devices. The agency increased its activities related to oversight of heparin firms by increasing the number of inspections and investigations and monitoring heparin imports, and worked with drug and device manufacturers to recall contaminated products while ensuring that an adequate supply of heparin was available. With the help of external entities, FDA identified the unknown contaminant and developed tests to screen heparin products. Although FDA has issued standards on collaboration with external entities in other contexts and governmentwide standards govern the acceptance of services free of charge, FDA did not take steps to ensure that these standards were considered and applied in connection with the heparin crisis. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) received a draft of this report and provided comments, which are reprinted in appendix IV. Therefore, in our draft report, we recommended that FDA develop adequate controls to help avoid exposure to these risks when working with external entities in future situations similar to the heparin crisis. FDA addressed the draft recommendation by issuing guidance on October 15, 2010, for FDA staff to follow when working with external scientific and other experts in emergency situations when the services are provided on a gratuitous basis. 5 for details of FDA’s MAUDE analysis). | Why GAO Did This Study
In early 2008, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) responded to a crisis involving the contamination of heparin, a medication used to prevent and treat blood clots, when the agency received multiple reports of adverse events involving severe allergic reactions. The crisis took place from January 2008 through May 2008, during which time FDA took several actions in its response to the crisis. GAO was asked to review FDA's management of the heparin crisis. This report examines (1) how FDA prevented additional contaminated heparin from reaching U.S. consumers, (2) how FDA coordinated its response to the contaminated heparin crisis, and (3) FDA's monitoring and analysis of adverse events associated with heparin. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed relevant FDA documents, regulations, and guidance; analyzed FDA data; and interviewed FDA officials and other experts involved in the crisis and knowledgeable about drug quality standards.
What GAO Found
In its response to the heparin crisis, FDA took several actions related to its responsibility to protect the public health by ensuring the safety and security of the nation's drug and medical device supplies. FDA increased its activities related to oversight of heparin firms by conducting inspections and investigations and monitoring heparin imports, and worked with drug and device manufacturers to recall contaminated products while ensuring that an adequate supply of uncontaminated heparin was available. With the help of external entities, FDA identified the unknown contaminant and developed tests to screen all heparin products. Additionally, the agency reached out to its international regulatory partners during the crisis. However, FDA faced some limitations in its efforts to inspect heparin firms in China and collaborate internationally, and the agency was unable to determine the original source of contamination. FDA coordinated internal and external resources to respond to the contaminated heparin crisis, but did not address risks related to working with certain external entities with ties to heparin firms. The agency has issued standards of ethics regarding collaboration with external entities and governmentwide standards apply to the acceptance of services provided free of charge. Despite these existing standards, FDA did not have processes in place to ensure that it considered or applied them when it accepted assistance from external entities with ties to heparin firms on a voluntary basis during the heparin crisis. Not adequately addressing these risks could have affected the public's confidence in FDA's response efforts and in its other activities related to the regulation of heparin products and also left FDA open to claims for payment for services that these external entities provided to FDA. FDA monitored trends in the number of reports of adverse events associated with heparin drug products and heparin-containing medical devices that it received before, during, and after the crisis. FDA also conducted analyses of adverse events, including deaths, associated with heparin drug products and heparin-containing medical devices. However, FDA was unable to determine if any of the adverse events or deaths were linked to contaminated heparin because of data limitations and confounding factors regarding the individual patients, such as the natural course of the underlying disease or condition. In the draft report we provided to the Department of Health and Human Services for comment, we recommended that FDA develop adequate controls to help avoid exposure to risks when working with external entities in future situations similar to the heparin crisis. In response, FDA issued guidance on October 15, 2010, for FDA staff to follow when working with external scientific and other experts in emergency situations when the services are provided on a gratuitous basis. FDA also stressed the unprecedented nature of the heparin crisis and noted various actions it took in response to the crisis. |
gao_RCED-96-89 | gao_RCED-96-89_0 | How Is the United States Assisting the Newly Independent States to Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls? Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) review the nature and extent of problems with controlling nuclear materials in the NIS; (2) determine the status and future prospects of U.S. efforts to help strengthen controls over direct-use nuclear material in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus; and (3) assess plans for consolidating these efforts in DOE. To meet our objectives, we reviewed U.S. assessments of the nature and extent of nuclear material control problems in the NIS; pertinent program documents, including agreements between DOD and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the Ukrainian State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety, the Ministry of Defense of Kazakstan, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, and between DOE and Gosatomnadzor (GAN); program plans; trip reports; quarterly progress reviews and State Department cables; and program budget, obligation, and expenditure data for the CTR-sponsored government-to-government program and for DOE’s lab-to-lab program. U.S. officials are concerned that social and economic changes in the NIS have increased the threat of theft and diversion of nuclear material, and with the breakdown of Soviet-era MPC&A systems, the NIS may not be as able to counter the increased threat. Nature and Extent of the Problem
The Soviet Union produced up to 1,200 metric tons of HEU and 200 metric tons of plutonium. Much of this material is outside of nuclear weapons, and the stockpile of material outside of weapons is expected to grow rapidly as Russia proceeds to dismantle its weapons. Nuclear facilities rely on antiquated accounting systems and practices that cannot quickly detect and localize nuclear material losses. The NIS May Not Have Accurate and Complete Inventories
The NIS may not have accurate and complete inventories of the direct-use material they inherited from the former Soviet Union. DOE also signed an agreement with GAN, the Russian nuclear regulatory agency, in June 1995 to cooperate on the establishment of a national nuclear materials control and accounting system in Russia. The government-to- government program has provided working group meetings, site surveys, physical protection equipment, computers, and training for projects in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. At Obninsk, the program has upgraded MPC&A systems for a research reactor facility that houses several thousand kilograms of direct-use material. Prospects for MPC&A Upgrades Are Improving
While the CTR-sponsored government-to-government program has gotten off to a slow start controlling direct-use material, the U.S. government is making progress in expanding participation in the program to more facilities with direct-use material in the NIS. DOE Faces Uncertainties in Managing an Expanded U.S. Assistance Program
In fiscal year 1996, the United States substantially increase its MPC&A assistance program to include all facilities in the NIS known to contain direct-use nuclear material. DOE plans to request from Congress $400 million for the program over 7 years. DOE’s priorities are to (1) improve controls at facilities in the NIS handling direct-use material, (2) help the Russians develop and deploy current MPC&A equipment and technology to these facilities, and (3) assist the NIS in developing a national MPC&A regulatory system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to strengthen controls over nuclear materials in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, focusing on the: (1) nature and extent of problems with controlling direct-use nuclear materials in the newly independent states; (2) status and future prospects of U.S. efforts in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus; and (3) executive branch's consolidation of U.S. efforts in the Department of Energy (DOE).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Soviet Union produced about 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and 200 metric tons of plutonium; (2) much of this material is outside of nuclear weapons and is highly attractive to theft, and the newly independent states may not have accurate and complete inventories of the material they inherited; (3) with the breakdown of Soviet-era material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) systems, the newly independent states may not be as able to counter the increased threat of theft; (4) nuclear facilities cannot quickly detect and localize nuclear material losses or detect unauthorized attempts to remove nuclear material; (5) while there is not yet direct evidence of a black market for nuclear material in the newly independent states, the seizures of direct-use material in Russia and Europe have increased concerns about theft and diversion; (6) U.S. efforts to help the newly independent states improve their MPC&A systems for direct-use material started slowly; (7) the Department of Defense's (DOD) government-to-government Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program obligated $59 million and spent about $4 million from fiscal years (FY) 1991 to 1995 for MPC&A improvements in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus, and provided working group meetings, site surveys, physical protection equipment, computers, and training; (8) the program began to gain momentum in January 1995 when CTR program and Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) officials agreed to upgrade nuclear material controls at five high-priority facilities handling direct-use material; (9) DOE and Russia's nuclear regulatory agency have also agreed to cooperate on the development of a national MPC&A regulatory infrastructure; (10) DOE's lab-to-lab program, which obligated $17 million and spent $14 million in FY 1994 and 1995, has improved controls at two zero-power research reactors, and begun providing nuclear material monitors to several MINATOM defense facilities to help them detect unauthorized attempts to remove direct-use material; (11) in FY 1996, the program is implementing additional projects in MINATOM's nuclear defense complex; (12) the United States expanded the MPC&A assistance program in FY 1996 to include all known facilities with direct-use material outside of weapons; (13) management and funding for the expanded program were consolidated within DOE, which plans to request $400 million over 7 years for the program; and (14) DOE is responding to uncertainties involving the program's overall costs and U.S. ability to verify that assistance is used as intended by developing a long-term plan and a centralized cost reporting system and implementing a flexible audit and examination program. |
gao_GAO-08-304 | gao_GAO-08-304_0 | Established in 1971, the network is composed of libraries and repositories located in the agency’s headquarters, regional offices, research centers, and laboratories throughout the country. Furthermore, some of these libraries have digitized, dispersed, or disposed of their materials. Sixteen EPA libraries have not changed. After making these changes, EPA has begun to develop a common set of agencywide policies and procedures for the library network. In addition, OPPTS officials decided to close the Chemical Library; however, this closure was not noted in the plan. EPA Did Not Effectively Justify Its Decision to Reorganize Its Library Network
EPA’s primary rationale for reorganizing its library network was to generate cost savings by creating a more coordinated library network and increasing the electronic delivery of library services. EPA did not fully complete its assessments, however, before it closed libraries and began to reorganize the network. However, EPA is currently reaching out to both EPA staff and external stakeholders. EPA’s communication procedures were limited or inconsistent because EPA acted quickly to make changes in response to a proposed fiscal year 2007 funding reduction, and because of the decentralized nature of the library network. More specifically, the plan did not inform readers that OPPTS would close its Chemical Library, and that other libraries would reduce their hours of operation or make other changes to their library services; provide any detail on which additional libraries would, in an effort to align to the new library service model, change their operations or library collections in the future; and inform stakeholders of the intended outcome of the reorganization effort, including what the final configuration of the reorganized library network would look like, and the implementation goals and timeline needed to achieve this final configuration. In addition, EPA generally did not communicate with and solicit views from external stakeholders, such as the public, before and during the reorganization because the agency was moving quickly to make changes in response to proposed funding cuts. EPA Lacks a Strategy to Ensure Continuity of Library Services and Does Not Know Whether Its Actions Have Impaired Access to Environmental Information
EPA does not have a strategy to ensure the continuity of library services and does not know the full effect of the reorganization on library services. Finally, EPA may have inadvertently limited access to information because it did not determine whether federal property management regulations applied to the dispersal and disposal of library materials and hence may have disposed of materials that should have been retained. EPA Program Offices Are Responsible for Funding Their Libraries and Their Reorganization Through Their Support Budgets
The several different program offices responsible for the EPA libraries in the network generally decide how much of their available funding to allocate to their libraries out of larger accounts that support multiple activities. EPA did not allocate funds specifically to help the closing libraries manage their collections. However, because of a proposed reduction in funding for the OEI headquarters and regional office libraries in fiscal year 2007, EPA did not fully implement these procedures, instead it acted quickly to make changes. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that critical library services are provided to EPA staff and other users, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA continue the agency’s moratorium on changes to the library network until the agency incorporates and makes public a plan that includes the following four actions: Develop a strategy to justify its reorganization plans by (1) evaluating and determining user needs for library services; (2) taking an inventory of EPA information resources and determining the extent to which these resources are used; (3) evaluating technological factors, such as digitization procedures and integration of online databases, to ensure an optimal level of services; (4) evaluating and conducting a benefit-cost assessment for each alternative approach for the network, including the approach that existed before the reorganization; and (5) reviewing and revising, as appropriate, the existing policy and procedures that guide the library network. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To review the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) library network reorganization, we (1) determined the status of, and plans for, the library network reorganization; (2) evaluated EPA’s rationale for its decision to reorganize the library network; (3) assessed the extent to which EPA communicated with and solicited views from EPA staff and external stakeholders in planning and implementing the reorganization; (4) evaluated the steps EPA has taken to maintain the quality of library services following the reorganization, both currently and in the future; and (5) determined how EPA is funding the library network and its reorganization. | Why GAO Did This Study
Established in 1971, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) library network provides staff and the public with access to environmental information. Its 26 libraries contain a wide range of information and resources and are located at headquarters, regional offices, research centers, and laboratories nationwide. In 2006, EPA issued a plan to reorganize the network beginning in fiscal year 2007. The plan proposed closing libraries and dispersing, disposing of, and digitizing library materials. GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of, and plans for, the network reorganization; (2) EPA's rationale for reorganizing the network; (3) the extent to which EPA has communicated with and solicited the views of EPA staff and external stakeholders in conducting the reorganization; (4) EPA's steps to maintain the quality of library services after the reorganization; and (5) how EPA is funding the network and its reorganization. For this study, GAO reviewed pertinent EPA documents and interviewed EPA officials and staff from each of the libraries.
What GAO Found
Since 2006, EPA has implemented its reorganization plan to close physical access to 4 libraries. In the same period, 6 other libraries in the network decided to change their operations, while 16 have not changed. Some of these libraries have also digitized, dispersed, or disposed of their materials. Since the reorganization, EPA has begun drafting a common set of agencywide library procedures and has hired a program manager for the network. While these procedures are under development, however, EPA has imposed a moratorium on further changes to the network in response to congressional and other expressions of concern. EPA's primary rationale for the library network reorganization was to generate cost savings by creating a more coordinated library network and increasing the electronic delivery of services. However, EPA did not fully follow procedures recommended in a 2004 EPA study of steps that should be taken to prepare for a reorganization. In particular, EPA did not fully evaluate alternative models, and associated costs and benefits, of library services. EPA officials stated that they needed to act quickly to reorganize the library network in response to a proposed fiscal year 2007 funding reduction. EPA did not develop procedures to inform staff and the public on the final configuration of the library network, and EPA libraries varied considerably and were limited in the extent to which they communicated with and solicited views from stakeholders before and during the reorganization effort. In particular, EPA's plan did not include information that the Chemical Library was to close, and EPA did not inform staff or the public until after the fact. EPA's communication procedures were limited or inconsistent because EPA acted quickly to make changes in response to a proposed fiscal year 2007 funding reduction, and because of the decentralized nature of the library network. EPA is currently increasing its communication efforts. EPA does not have a post-reorganization strategy to ensure the continuity of library services and has not yet determined the full effect of the reorganization on library services. Moreover, EPA has recently made several changes that could have impaired user access to library materials and services. For example, EPA did not determine whether federal property management regulations applied to the dispersal and disposal of library materials before it closed the libraries. Furthermore, EPA lacked oversight of the reorganization process and does not have procedures that would allow the agency to measure performance and monitor user needs. Several different EPA offices are responsible for the libraries in the network. Each office generally decides how much funding to allocate to the libraries for which it is responsible and how to fund their reorganization. However, when faced with a proposed budget reduction of $2 million in fiscal year 2007, EPA specifically directed that these offices reduce funding for their libraries and did not specify how to achieve the reduction. Additional funds were not allocated to assist offices in closing their libraries. |
gao_GAO-06-91 | gao_GAO-06-91_0 | General Lack of Uniform Guidance on Risk Management
Although the Homeland Security Act and subsequent strategies advocate the use of risk management to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources, they did not define how this was to be accomplished. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies integrating federal infrastructure protection and risk management activities. Although risk management has long been used for assessing risk in some sectors, such as environmental issues, health care, finance, and the insurance industry, the application of risk management principles to the homeland security area is relatively new. Methodology for Developing a Risk Management Framework
Given that there is no established universally agreed upon set of requirements or processes for a risk management framework specifically related to homeland security and combating terrorism, we developed a framework that would be applicable by reviewing, analyzing, and synthesizing several sources of information. We consulted the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993; the Government Auditing Standards, 2003 Revision, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (November 1999); guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); the work of the President’s Commission on Risk Management; consulting papers; and the enterprise risk management approach of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission. Currently, it is difficult to translate plans and actions into a clear sense of how we are progressing in making our nation more secure. Criticality assessments are important because they provide, in combination with the framework’s threat and risk assessments, the basis for prioritizing which assets require greater protection relative to finite resources and provide information for later stages in the risk management process. When dealing with Bayesian probability estimates, this is critical. Ideally, a risk management strategy would also identify appropriate mechanisms to allocate resources, such as grants based on identified needs. Cost-benefit analysis—-part of the management decision-making process in which the costs and benefits of each countermeasure alternative are compared and the most appropriate alternative is selected. It is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Related GAO Products
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Addressing Cybersecurity. Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive Planning. Information Security: Progress Made, but Challenges Remain to Protect Federal Systems and the Nation’s Critical Infrastructures. Building Security: Interagency Security Committee Has Had Limited Success in Fulfilling Its Responsibilities. Maritime Security
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy Asset Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition Challenges Remain. Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request. Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions. Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It Transitions to the New Department. Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress and the President have called for various homeland security efforts to be based on risk management--a systematic process for assessing threats and taking appropriate steps to deal with them. GAO examined how three Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components were carrying out this charge: the Coast Guard, which has overall responsibility for security in the nation's ports; the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which awards grants for port security projects; and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), which has responsibility for developing ways to assess risks across all types of critical infrastructure. GAO's work focused on identifying the progress each DHS component has made on risk management and the challenges each faces in moving further.
What GAO Found
The three DHS components GAO studied varied considerably in their progress in developing a sound risk management framework for homeland security responsibilities. The varied progress reflects, among other things, each component's organizational maturity and the complexity of its task. The Coast Guard, which is furthest along, is the component of longest standing, being created in 1915, while IAIP came into being with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. IAIP, which has made the least progress, is not only a new component but also has the most complex task--addressing not just ports but all types of infrastructure. The Coast Guard and ODP have a relatively robust methodology in place for assessing risks at ports; IAIP is still developing its methodology and has had several setbacks in completing the task. All three components, however, have much left to do. In particular, each component is limited in its ability to compare and prioritize risks. The Coast Guard and ODP can do so within a port but not between ports; IAIP has not demonstrated that it can do so either within or between all infrastructure sectors. Each component faces many challenges in making further progress. Success will depend partly on continuing to improve various technical and management processes that are part of risk management. For example, obtaining better quality data from intelligence agencies would help DHS components estimate the relative likelihood of various types of threats--a key element of assessing risks. In the longer term, progress will depend increasingly on how well risk management is coordinated across agencies, because current approaches in many ways are neither consistent nor comparable. Also, weaving risk-based data into the annual budget cycle of program review will be important. Supplying the necessary guidance and coordination is what the Department of Homeland Security was set up to do and, as the Secretary of Homeland Security has stated, what it now needs increasingly to address. This is a key issue for the department as it seeks to identify relative risks and take appropriate actions related to the nation's homeland security activities. |
gao_GAO-02-497T | gao_GAO-02-497T_0 | The problems with the department’s financial management operations date back decades, and previous attempts at reform have largely proven to be unsuccessful. The department continues to rely on a far-flung, complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management information systems— 80 percent of which are not under the control of the DOD Comptroller— to gather the financial data needed to support day-to-day management decision-making. This network was not designed, but rather has evolved into the overly complex and error-prone operation that exists today, including (1) little standardization across DOD components, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the same data stored in multiple systems, (4) manual data entry into multiple systems, and (5) a large number of data translations and interfaces which combine to exacerbate problems with data integrity. Defense Business Operations Fund. Actions on many of the key areas central to successfully achieving desired financial management and related business process transformation goals —particularly those that rely on longer term systems improvements—will take a number of years to fully implement. | What GAO Found
Financial management problems at the Department of Defense (DOD) are complex, long-standing, and deeply rooted throughout its business operations. DOD's financial management deficiencies represent the single largest obstacle to achieving an unqualified opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements. So far, none of the military services or major DOD components have passed the test of an independent financial audit because of pervasive weaknesses in financial management systems, operations, and controls. These problems go back decades, and earlier attempts at reform have been unsuccessful. DOD continues to rely on a far-flung, complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management information systems for financial data to support day-to-day management and decision-making. This network has evolved into an overly complex and error-prone operation with (1) little standardization across DOD components, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the same data stored in multiple systems, (4) manual data entry into multiple systems, and (5) a large number of data translations and interfaces, which combine to exacerbate problems with data integrity. Many of the elements that are crucial to financial management reform and business process transformation--particularly those that rely on long-term systems improvements--will take years to fully implement. |
gao_GAO-05-264 | gao_GAO-05-264_0 | Historically, MARAD has disposed of its obsolete ships primarily by selling them to overseas scrapping companies. As of September 2004, MARAD had submitted two reports to Congress. In the absence of a comprehensive management approach that includes all of these key elements, MARAD’s ship disposal program lacks the vision needed to sustain a long-term effort. As table 2 shows, we estimate that MARAD will likely have more than 100 obsolete ships in its inventory in September 2006. While MARAD has stated this general goal, it has not developed specific performance measures with targets to track its progress toward achieving this goal. These challenges include domestic disposal capacity limitations; environmental, legal, and regulatory restrictions on export; and similar restrictions on other disposal options. In addition, MARAD has not been able to provide Congress and other stakeholders with a reasonable timetable and the associated annual funding requirements needed to meet the 2006 deadline, nor has it clearly articulated the areas that congressional assistance may be needed to expedite the disposal of these deteriorating ships that continue to pose potentially costly environmental threats to the waterways near the sites where these ships are stored. MARAD Has Made Limited Use of Alternative Disposal Methods because of Several Barriers
Although Congress directed MARAD in fiscal year 2001 to consider alternative methods in designing its ship scrapping program, the program has made only limited use of these methods—artificial reefing, deep-sea sinking, and donations—because of a number of environmental, financial, and legislative barriers. Despite these positive steps, MARAD may still be years away from increasing the number of disposals using these alternative methods. MARAD Has Not Developed an Overall Plan to Increase Usage of Alternative Disposal Methods
Despite the steps it has taken recently, MARAD faces some additional challenges to using alternative disposal methods. MARAD’s Use of PRDAs to Scrap Ships Is Inappropriate
Since fiscal year 2002, MARAD has inappropriately used a procurement method—PRDA—to acquire most of its ship disposal services rather than other procurement methods that are appropriate for acquiring such services. Our analysis of MARAD’s PRDAs and contracts awarded under PRDAs through February 2004 showed that MARAD was not using PRDAs to acquire research or development but to procure conventional ship scrapping services. In addition to being inconsistent with CICA and the FAR, MARAD’s use of PRDAs to acquire ship scrapping services has led to a lack of transparency and raised questions about the fairness of MARAD’s contract award process. Since fiscal year 2002, MARAD has used PRDAs as its primary procurement method. We also found that MARAD did not award contracts that required innovation or research or development. Consequently, firms are often unable to determine why their proposal was not selected over another proposal. Overseas Competition Just One Factor Contributing to Lower Prices
While we could not isolate the specific impact of foreign competition and other factors on reducing the cost of ship disposal, MARAD attributes the overall decrease in ship disposal costs almost exclusively to overseas competition. However, other factors, such as larger annual program funding allowing for more ships per contract and increases in the scrap value of steel, may have also played a role. Conclusions
Although MARAD’s ship disposal program has made some strides in reducing its inventory of obsolete and deteriorating merchant ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet, it has managed to dispose of only 12 percent of its original 2001 inventory, and it is unlikely to meet the already extended deadline of September 30, 2006, to get rid of the entire inventory. Develop a comprehensive approach to manage MARAD’s ship disposal identify a strategy and an implementation plan to dispose of all existing obsolete ships and future transfers in a timely manner, maximizing the use of all available disposal methods; determine the needed resources, the associated funding plan, and specific milestones for this disposal; establish a framework for decision making that would delineate roles and responsibilities and establish guidance and procedures; identify external factors that could impede program success and develop plans to mitigate them; and annually evaluate results and implement corrective actions. We reviewed MARAD’s responses and reviewed the criteria in the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 and the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 1. 2. 3. 4. We believe that MARAD lacks an integrated strategy for disposing of all of its ships using its available disposal methods. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) has more than 100 obsolete and deteriorating ships awaiting disposal that pose potentially costly environmental threats to the waterways near where they are stored. Congress, in 2000, mandated that MARAD dispose of them by September 30, 2006. While MARAD has various disposal options available, each option is complicated by legal, financial, and regulatory factors. In this report, GAO assesses (1) whether MARAD will meet the September 2006 disposal deadline for these ships and, if not, why not; (2) the extent that MARAD has used alternative disposal methods other than scrapping, and barriers to using other methods; (3) the appropriateness of MARAD's methods for procuring ship disposal services; and (4) the impact of foreign competition and other factors on reducing disposal costs.
What GAO Found
MARAD is unlikely to meet its statutory deadline of September 30, 2006. As of September 2004, MARAD had disposed of 18 ships from its inventory, with over 100 ships left to dispose of by the deadline. MARAD's current approach is not sufficient for disposing of these remaining ships within the next 2 years. MARAD's slow progress is due primarily to program leaders not developing a comprehensive management approach that could address the myriad of environmental, legal, and regulatory challenges that the program faces. MARAD's approach lacks an integrated strategy with goals, milestones, performance measures, and a mitigation plan for overcoming anticipated impediments. In the absence of this comprehensive approach, MARAD's ship disposal program lacks the vision needed to sustain a long-term effort. Consequently, MARAD has not been able to assure Congress that it can dispose of these ships in a timely manner to reduce the threat of a costly environmental event, nor has it clearly articulated what additional congressional assistance, such as funding, may be needed. While MARAD has considered alternative disposal methods to scrapping, it has made limited use of these methods because of a number of environmental, financial, and legislative barriers. Since fiscal year 2001, MARAD has disposed of 17 ships through scrapping, but only 1 through artificial reefing. MARAD has not disposed of ships using deep-water sinking and donations to historic organizations. MARAD has taken positive steps to reduce barriers limiting its use of these methods but still may be years away from increasing the number of disposals using these alternative methods because it has not developed an overall plan for expanding their use. Consequently, MARAD may be losing opportunities that could expedite the disposal of the obsolete ships in its inventory. Since fiscal year 2002, MARAD has relied almost entirely on an inappropriate procurement method--Program Research and Development Announcements (PRDA)--to acquire ship scrapping services. The Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 generally require that MARAD use other methods for acquiring these types of services. PRDAs may only be used to contract for research or development. According to MARAD, PRDAs provide greater flexibility and allow firms to propose innovative solutions to ship disposal. GAO found, however, that MARAD was not contracting for research or development but instead was acquiring ship scrapping services. MARAD's use of PRDAs has also resulted in a lack of transparency in the contract award process and has raised concerns among firms as to the fairness of MARAD's processes. While GAO was unable to isolate the specific impact of foreign competition and other factors on reducing ship disposal costs, MARAD attributes the decrease in ship disposal prices almost exclusively to foreign competition. However, other factors, such as larger annual program funding and increases in the scrap value of steel, may have also played a role. |
gao_GAO-06-674 | gao_GAO-06-674_0 | Financial Institutions Use Information Resellers for Eligibility Determinations, Fraud Prevention, PATRIOT Act Compliance, and Marketing
Financial institutions in the banking, credit card, securities, and insurance industries use personal data purchased from information resellers primarily to help make eligibility determinations, comply with legal requirements, prevent fraud, and market their products. Consumer Reports Sold by Credit Bureaus and Other CRAs Are Used to Make Credit and Insurance Eligibility Decisions
Banks, credit card companies, and other lenders rely on credit reports sold by the three nationwide credit bureaus—Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion—when deciding whether to offer credit to an individual, at what rate, and on what terms. Federal Privacy and Information Security Laws Apply to Many Information Reseller Products, Depending on Their Use and Source
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) are the primary federal laws governing the privacy and security of personal data collected and shared by information resellers. Specifically, FCRA applies to companies that furnish, contribute to, or use “consumer reports”—reports containing information about an individual’s personal and credit characteristics used to help determine eligibility for such things as credit, insurance, employment, licenses, and certain other benefits. Since 1972, FTC has initiated numerous formal enforcement actions against information resellers for providing consumer report information without adequately ensuring that their customers had a permissible purpose for obtaining the data. FTC has civil penalty authority for violations of FCRA and, in limited situations, the FTC Act, but it does not have such authority for GLBA, which may inhibit its ability to most effectively enforce that law’s privacy and security provisions. Unlike FTC, other regulators have civil penalty authority to enforce violations of GLBA. Federal banking regulators have overseen compliance with the privacy and security provisions of GLBA and FCRA by issuing rules and guidance, conducting examinations, and taking formal and informal enforcement actions when needed. For example, the banking agencies issued a guide on small entities’ compliance with GLBA’s privacy provision to help companies identify and comply with the requirements. Requiring information resellers to safeguard all of the sensitive personal information they hold would help ensure that explicit data security requirements apply more comprehensively to a class of companies that maintains large amounts of such data. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our report objectives were to examine (1) how financial institutions use data products supplied by information resellers, the types of information contained in these products, and the sources of the information; (2) how federal laws governing the privacy and security of personal data apply to information resellers, and what rights and opportunities exist for individuals to view and correct data held by resellers; (3) how federal financial institution regulators and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) oversee information resellers’ compliance with federal privacy and information security laws; and (4) how federal financial institution regulators, state insurance regulators, and FTC oversee financial institutions’ compliance with federal privacy and information security laws governing consumer information, including information supplied by information resellers. The three nationwide credit bureaus were included in this definition. | Why GAO Did This Study
The growth of information resellers--companies that collect and resell publicly available and private information on individuals--has raised privacy and security concerns about this industry. These companies collectively maintain large amounts of detailed personal information on nearly all American consumers, and some have experienced security breaches in recent years. GAO was asked to examine (1) financial institutions' use of resellers; (2) federal privacy and security laws applicable to resellers; (3) federal regulators' oversight of resellers; and (4) regulators' oversight of financial institution compliance with privacy and data security laws. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed representatives from 10 information resellers, 14 financial institutions, 11 regulators, industry and consumer groups, and others.
What GAO Found
Financial institutions such as banks, credit card companies, securities firms, and insurance companies use personal data obtained from information resellers to help make eligibility determinations, comply with legal requirements, prevent fraud, and market their products. For example, lenders rely on credit reports sold by the three nationwide credit bureaus to help decide whether to offer credit and on what terms. Some companies also use reseller products to comply with PATRIOT Act rules, to investigate fraud, and to identify customers with specific characteristics for marketing purposes. GAO found that the applicability of the primary federal privacy and data security laws--the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)--to information resellers is limited. FCRA applies to information collected or used to help determine eligibility for such things as credit or insurance, while GLBA only applies to information obtained by or from a GLBA-defined financial institution. Although these laws include data security provisions, consumers could benefit from the expansion of such requirements to all sensitive personal information held by resellers. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the primary federal agency responsible for enforcing information resellers' compliance with FCRA's and GLBA's privacy and security provisions. Since 1972, the agency has initiated formal enforcement actions against more than 20 resellers, including the three nationwide credit bureaus, for violating FCRA. However, FTC does not have civil penalty authority under the privacy and safeguarding provisions of GLBA, which may reduce its ability to enforce that law most effectively against certain violations, such as breaches of mass consumer data. In overseeing compliance with privacy and data security laws, federal banking and securities regulators have issued guidance, conducted examinations, and taken formal and informal enforcement actions. A recent national survey sponsored by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) identified some noncompliance with GLBA by insurance companies, but state regulators have not laid out clear plans with NAIC for following up to ensure these issues are adequately addressed. |
gao_GAO-02-87 | gao_GAO-02-87_0 | The Trust is managed by a 7-member Board of Directors. The Presidio Trust Has Made Significant Progress in Preserving, Protecting, and Improving the Presidio
Infrastructure Improvements and Building Renovations
From 1997 through March 30, 2001, the Trust spent about $15.4 million to repair and replace the Presidio’s infrastructure, upgrading roads and grounds, telecommunications systems, electrical, and water and sewer systems. To preserve the Presidio’s many historic buildings and generate the revenues needed to achieve financial self-sufficiency by 2013, the Trust has spent about $23 million to repair and rehabilitate residential housing units and commercial buildings for lease. Mountain Lake Restoration
Mountain Lake is one of the few remaining natural lakes within the city of San Francisco. Working in partnership with the Trust, the Park Service developed the Vegetation Management Plan to preserve and enhance native landscapes and to extend the life of the park’s forest over the coming decades. While the Trust has been successful in leasing residential and commercial space, it still has a considerable amount available for rehabilitation and leasing. Similarly, the Trust has 2.2 million square feet of commercial space that could be made available once a decision is made on the use of the space and it is repaired or rehabilitated. Implementation Plan and Financial Projections Indicate That the Trust Should Become Financially Self-Sufficient by 2013
In July 2000, the Trust began a planning process to create a plan for the future development of its portion of the Presidio. Financial Self-Sufficiency Expected
As part of the planning process, the Trust used a financial model to prepare a financial projection for each alternative. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Presidio Trust--a wholly owned government corporation--was created in 1996 to manage a large part of the Presidio grounds using sound principles of land use planning and management while maintaining the area's scenic beauty and historic and natural character. The Trust is responsible for leasing, maintaining, rehabilitating, repairing, and improving the property it controls. The Trust must become financially self-sufficient by 2013.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Trust has made significant progress in preserving, protecting, and improving the Presidio. It has launched major efforts to repair and upgrade the Presidio's infrastructure and to repair and rehabilitate residential housing and commercial space. So far, the Trust has converted about half of the former military buildings into useable residential and commercial space. The rehabilitation, repair, and leasing of the remaining 300 residential units and about 2.2 million square feet of undeveloped commercial space is critical to the Trust's efforts to achieve financial self-sufficiency. The Trust has also begun several environmental initiatives, including the cleanup of military contamination and the restoration of Mountain Lake--one of the few remaining natural lakes within the San Francisco city limits. The Trust is also working with the Park Service to revitalize vegetation throughout the Presidio and to replace aging trees in the 300-acre forest. The Trust should meet its goal of financial self-sufficiency by 2013, according to financial projections prepared by the Trust. |
gao_GAO-07-504T | gao_GAO-07-504T_0 | One element of SBI is SBInet, the program within CBP that is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system. The SBInet program is managed by the SBInet Program Management Office (PMO). Moreover, the expenditure plan did not include a baseline measure of miles under control of the border. SBInet Has Followed Some but Not All Federal Acquisition Requirements and Related Best Practices
Our statement will now focus on DHS’s use of federal acquisition requirements and related program management best practices. As of December 2006, SBInet was using several acquisition best practices. However, we reported that the SBInet systems integration contract did fully satisfy an acquisition requirement to contain a specific number of units that may be ordered or a maximum dollar value. However, he stated that he was committed to putting these processes in place and further stated that the program plans to develop a plan for defining and implementing critical acquisition planning processes by the spring of 2007. SBInet’s Acquisition Approach Calls for Considerable Concurrency that Introduces Additional Risk
The SBInet PMO plans to execute SBInet activities through a series of concurrent task orders that will be managed by a mix of government and contractor staff. SBI and SBInet officials told us that they understand the risks inherent in concurrency and are addressing these risks. However, as of December 2006, they had not provided evidence that identified the dependencies among their concurrent activities and that they were proactively managing the associated risk. We found that Congress and DHS are not in the best position to use the plan as a basis for measuring program success, accounting for the use of current and future appropriations, and holding program managers accountable for achieving effective control of the southwest border because the plan has not provided information on explicit and measurable commitments relative to the capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual SBInet program activities. Specifically, DHS needs to provide sufficient details on such things as planned activities and milestones, anticipated costs and staffing levels, and expected mission outcomes. DHS has not fully established the capabilities needed to effectively mitigate risks and to successfully manage the program. We reported that although the SBInet contract was generally competed in accordance with federal requirements, the contract does not fully satisfy federal regulations. DHS’s approach to SBInet introduces additional risk because the program’s schedule entails a high level of concurrency. With multiple related and dependent projects being undertaken simultaneously, SBInet is exposed to possible cost and schedule overruns and performance problems. Without assessing this level of concurrency and how it affects project implementation, SBInet runs the risk of not delivering promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes GAO's February 2007 report on SBInet, one element of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI). SBInet is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system. By legislative mandate, GAO reviewed SBInet's fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan. This testimony focuses on (1) the extent that the plan provided explicit and measurable commitments relative to schedule and costs, (2) how DHS is following federal acquisition regulations and management best practices, and (3) concurrency in SBInet's schedule. GAO assessed the plan against federal guidelines and industry standards and interviewed program officials.
What GAO Found
SBInet's December 2006 expenditure plan offered a high-level and partial outline of a large and complex program that forms an integral component of the broader multiyear initiative. However, the SBInet expenditure plan, including related documentation and program officials' statements, lacked specificity on such things as planned activities and milestones, anticipated costs and staffing levels, and expected mission outcomes. This, coupled with the large cost and ambitious time frames, adds risk to the program. Without sufficient and reliable information on program goals, status and results, Congress and DHS are not in the best position to use the plan as a basis for assessing program outcomes, accounting for the use of current and future appropriations, and holding program managers accountable for achieving effective control of the border. As of December 2006, SBInet was using, at least to some extent acquisition best practices, but DHS had not fully established the range of capabilities needed to effectively mitigate risks and to successfully manage the program. To its credit, the SBInet contract was generally competed in accordance with federal requirements. However, the SBInet contract does not fully satisfy the federal regulatory requirement to specify a maximum dollar value or the number of units that may be ordered. We also reported that important management controls provided for in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and best practices were not yet in place, although the program manager stated that he was committed to doing so. Until they are in place, the program is at increased risk of failure. DHS's plan to execute SBInet activities through a series of concurrent task orders introduces additional risk. With multiple related and dependent projects being undertaken simultaneously, SBInet is exposed to possible cost and schedule overruns and performance problems. Without assessing this level of concurrency and how it affects project implementation, SBInet runs the risk of not delivering promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. SBI and SBInet officials told us that they understand the risks inherent in concurrency and are addressing these risks. However, as of December 2006, they had not provided evidence that identified the dependencies among their concurrent activities and that they were proactively managing the associated risk. |
gao_GAO-06-701T | gao_GAO-06-701T_0 | UN procurement spending has more than tripled since 1997, peaking at $1.6 billion in 2005. Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of the UN Internal Auditors
The UN is vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement due to a range of weaknesses in existing oversight practices. The General Assembly mandate creating OIOS calls for it to be operationally independent. Funding Arrangements Hinder OIOS’s Flexibility to Respond to Changing Circumstances and Reallocate Resources to Address High-Risk Areas
In addition to funding from the UN regular budget, OIOS receives extrabudgetary funding from 12 different revenue streams. 1). Reliance on Other Entities for Funding Could Infringe on OIOS’s Independence
OIOS is dependent on UN funds and programs and other UN entities for resources, access, and reimbursement for the services it provides. By denying OIOS funding, UN entities could avoid OIOS audits or investigations, and high-risk areas could potentially be excluded from timely examination. Effective oversight demands reasonable adherence to professional auditing standards. OIOS Has Developed Annual Work Plans, but Has Not Fully Implemented a Risk Management Framework
OIOS has adopted a risk management framework to link the office’s annual work plans to risk-based priorities, but it has not fully implemented this framework. OIOS Not Reporting on Status of Overall Risk and Control Issues Facing the UN
Although OIOS’s annual reports contain references to risks facing OIOS and the UN organization, the reports do not provide an overall assessment of the status of these risks or the consequence to the organization if the risks are not addressed. For instance, in February 2005, the Independent Inquiry Committee reported that many of the Oil for Food program’s deficiencies, identified through OIOS audits, were not described in the OIOS annual reports submitted to the General Assembly. OIOS Lacks a Mechanism to Determine Appropriate Resource Levels
While OIOS officials have stated that the office does not have adequate resources, they do not have a mechanism in place to determine appropriate staffing levels to help justify budget requests, except for peacekeeping oversight services. The Control Environment Over UN Procurement Is Weak
UN funds are unnecessarily vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement because of weaknesses in the UN’s control environment for procurement. Specifically, the UN lacks an effective organizational structure for managing procurement, has not demonstrated a commitment to improving its professional procurement workforce, and has failed to adopt specific ethics guidance for procurement officials. The UN Has Weaknesses in Key Procurement Processes
We found weaknesses in key UN procurement processes or control activities. The UN Has Not Established an Independent Bid Protest Process
The UN has not established an independent process to consider vendor protests, despite the 1994 recommendation of a high-level panel of international procurement experts that it do so as soon as possible. UN Does Not Consistently Implement Its Process for Helping to Ensure That It Conducts Business with Qualified Vendors
The UN does not consistently implement its process for helping to ensure that it is conducting business with qualified vendors. Long-standing weaknesses in the UN’s internal controls over procurement have left UN procurement funds highly vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN work with member states to: support budgetary independence for OIOS, and support OIOS’s efforts to more closely adhere to international auditing standards; and encourage the UN to establish clear lines of authority, enhance training, adopt ethics guidance, address problems facing its principal contract- review committee, establish an independent bid protest mechanism, and implement other steps to improve UN procurement priorities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has strongly advocated that the United Nations (UN) reform its management practices to mitigate various program and financial risks. The findings of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the Oil for Food Program have renewed concerns about UN oversight, and the 2005 UN World Summit proposed actions to improve the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). Furthermore, over the past decade, as UN procurement more than tripled to $1.6 billion in response to expanding UN peacekeeping operations, experts have called on the UN to correct procurement process deficiencies. We examined (1) whether UN funding arrangements for OIOS ensure independent oversight; (2) the consistency of OIOS's practices with key auditing standards; and (3) the control environment and processes for procurement.
What GAO Found
The UN is vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement due to a range of weaknesses in existing management and oversight practices. In particular, current funding arrangements adversely affect OIOS's budgetary independence and compromise its ability to investigate high-risk areas. Also, weaknesses in the control environment and UN procurement processes leave UN funds vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. UN funding arrangements constrain OIOS's ability to operate independently as mandated by the General Assembly and required by international auditing standards OIOS has adopted. First, while OIOS is funded by a regular budget and 12 other revenue streams, UN financial rules severely limit OIOS's ability to respond to changing circumstances and reallocate resources among revenue streams, locations, and operating divisions. Thus, OIOS cannot always direct resources to high-risk areas that may emerge after its budget is approved. Second, OIOS depends on the resources of the funds, programs, and other entities it audits. The managers of these programs can deny OIOS permission to perform work or not pay OIOS for services. UN entities could thus avoid OIOS audits or investigations, and high-risk areas can be and have been excluded from timely examination. OIOS has begun to implement key measures for effective oversight, but some of its practices fall short of the applicable international auditing standards it has adopted. OIOS develops an annual work plan, but the risk management framework on which the work plans are based is not fully implemented. Moreover, OIOS annual reports do not assess risk and control issues facing the UN organization, or the consequences if these are not addressed. OIOS officials report the office does not have adequate resources, but they also lack a mechanism to determine appropriate staffing levels. Furthermore, OIOS has no mandatory training curriculum for staff. UN funds are vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement because of weaknesses in the UN's control environment for procurement, as well as in key procurement processes. The UN lacks an effective organizational structure for managing procurement, has not demonstrated a commitment to improving its procurement workforce, and has not adopted specific ethics guidance. While the UN Department of Management is responsible for UN procurement, field procurement staff are supervised by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which lacks the expertise and capacity to manage field procurement. Also, the UN has not established procurement training requirements or a career path, and has yet to adopt new ethics guidance for procurement staff, despite long-standing General Assembly mandates. In addition, the UN has not established an independent process to consider vendor protests despite a 1994 recommendation by a high-level panel to do so as soon as possible. Further, the UN does not consistently implement its process for helping to ensure it conducts business with qualified vendors. |
gao_GAO-11-1 | gao_GAO-11-1_0 | As a result of these policies, information on local nationals working under USAID contracts and assistance instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan is still not being tracked in SPOT. To address the shortcomings identified in our 2009 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the USAID Administrator jointly develop and execute a plan with associated time frames for the continued implementation of the NDAA for FY2008 requirements, including: ensuring the agencies’ criteria for entering contracts and contractor personnel into SPOT are consistent with the NDAA for FY2008 and with the agencies’ respective information needs for overseeing contracts and contractor personnel, revising SPOT’s reporting capabilities to ensure they fulfill statutory requirements and agency information needs, and establishing uniform requirements on how contract numbers are to be entered into SPOT so that contract information can be pulled from FPDS-NG. They cited ongoing coordination efforts and planned upgrades to SPOT as sufficient. DOD, State, and USAID Data on Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan Are Incomplete
DOD, State, and USAID reported to us that as of March 2010 there were 262,681 contractor and assistance personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, 18 percent of whom were performing security functions. We determined that caution should be exercised when identifying trends or drawing conclusions about the number of contractor and assistance personnel in either country based on the data the agencies reported to us. Several factors, many of which are similar to the challenges with SPOT, hindered the agencies’ ability to collect accurate and reliable personnel data, including difficulty obtaining information on the number of local nationals, low response rates to agency surveys, and limited ability to verify the accuracy or completeness of the personnel data reported. For example, officials with one State office noted that none of its Afghan grant recipients provided personnel numbers. Although agency officials acknowledged that not all contractor and assistance personnel were being tracked over the course of our review period, they still considered the data provided to our requests for personnel information to be more accurate than SPOT. Only State and USAID Reported Data on Killed and Wounded Contractors and Assistance Personnel
Although DOD, State, and USAID are required to track the number of personnel killed or wounded while working on contracts and assistance instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan, only State and USAID tracked this information during our review period. Both agencies noted For that some of the reported casualties resulted from nonhostile actions. Absent a reliable system for tracking killed or wounded contractor personnel, DOD officials referred us to Labor for data on cases filed under DBA for killed or injured contractors—as they have for our prior reports. The three agencies reported that they generally used competitive procedures when awarding their contracts. did not report competition information. State and USAID Relied Heavily on Grants and Cooperative Agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan
State and USAID reported obligations of $1.8 billion on 668 grants and cooperative agreements with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year 2010. With SPOT not yet fully implemented, the agencies have relied on other methods of collecting data that have their own shortcomings to respond to our requests for required information, and in some cases, data were not provided. Over the past year, SPOT’s implementation has continued to be undermined by a lack of agreement among the agencies on how to proceed and how best to meet their respective data needs to fulfill statutory requirements and improve oversight and management of contracts and assistance instruments. Therefore, we believe the recommendation in our 2009 report still applies, and we are not making any new recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as amended, directs GAO to review and report on matters relating to Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In response to this mandate, we are assessing the status of the three agencies’ efforts to implement the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) and providing the results of our analysis of agency-reported data for fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year 2010 on (1) the number of personnel, including those performing security functions, working under DOD, State, and USAID contracts and assistance instruments with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) the number of such personnel who were killed or wounded; and (3) the number and value of contracts and assistance instruments that were active or awarded during our 18-month review period and the extent of competition for new awards. Due to the lack of other available and reliable data sources, we could not independently verify whether USAID’s and State’s data were accurate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements for a wide range of services in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, as GAO previously reported, the agencies have faced challenges in obtaining sufficient information to manage these contracts and assistance instruments. As part of our third review under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, as amended, GAO assessed the implementation of the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) and data reported by the three agencies for Afghanistan and Iraq for FY 2009 and the first half of FY 2010 on the (1) number of contractor and assistance personnel, including those providing security; (2) number of personnel killed or wounded; and (3) number and value of contracts and assistance instruments and extent of competition for new awards. GAO compared agency data to other available sources to assess reliability.
What GAO Found
While the three agencies designated SPOT as their system for tracking statutorily required information in July 2008, SPOT still cannot reliably track information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan. As a result, the agencies relied on sources of data other than SPOT to respond to our requests for information. The agencies' implementation of SPOT has been affected by some practical and technical issues, but their efforts also were undermined by a lack of agreement on how to proceed, particularly on how to track local nationals working under contracts or assistance instruments. The lack of agreement was due in part to agencies not having assessed their respective information needs and how SPOT can be designed to address those needs and statutory requirements. In 2009, GAO reported on many of these issues and recommended that the agencies jointly develop a plan to improve SPOT's implementation. The three agencies reported to GAO that as of March 2010 there were 262,681 contractor and assistance personnel working in Iraq and Afghanistan, 18 percent of whom performed security functions. Due to limitations with agency-reported data, caution should be used in identifying trends or drawing conclusions about the number of personnel in either country. Data limitations are attributable to agency difficulty in determining the number of local nationals, low response rates to agency requests for data, and limited ability to verify the accuracy of reported data. For example, a State office noted that none of its Afghan grant recipients provided requested personnel data. While agency officials acknowledged not all personnel were being counted, they still considered the reported data to be more accurate than SPOT data. Only State and USAID tracked information on the number of contractor and assistance personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during the review period. State reported 9 contractor and assistance personnel were killed and 68 wounded, while USAID reported 116 killed and 121 wounded. Both agencies noted that some casualties resulted from nonhostile actions. DOD still lacked a system to track similar information and referred GAO to Department of Labor data on cases filed under the Defense Base Act for killed or injured contractors. As GAO previously reported, Labor's data provide insights but are not a good proxy for the number of contractor casualties. DOD, State, and USAID obligated $37.5 billion on 133,951 contracts and assistance instruments with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during FY2009 and the first half of FY2010. DOD had the vast majority of contract obligations. Most of the contracts were awarded during the review period and used competitive procedures. State and USAID relied heavily on grants and cooperative agreements and reported that most were competitively awarded. While DOD and State did not comment on the draft report, USAID commented on the challenges of implementing SPOT and provided revised personnel data that GAO reviewed and included in the report. In response to GAO's 2009 report, DOD, State, and USAID did not agree with the recommendation to develop a plan for implementing SPOT because they felt ongoing coordination efforts were sufficient. GAO continues to believe a plan is needed to correct SPOT's shortcomings and is not making any new recommendations. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-60 | gao_T-AIMD-96-60_0 | They achieved these improvements by consolidating travel management and processing centers, eliminating unnecessary review layers, simplifying the travel process, and streamlining and automating the expense reporting process and integrating it with the financial system. Most federal agencies’ administrative travel costs and processes, on the other hand, lag behind those of leading organizations, although some agencies have begun to close the gap. Many federal agencies use numerous processing centers, require multiple travel documents, and fill out these travel documents manually or maintain travel systems that do not have an agencywide automated interface with the financial system. In doing so, the leading organizations shared many of the same characteristics: they generally assessed travel management as part of a larger, financial management reengineering effort, they benchmarked themselves against other recognized organizations, and they instituted a common set of best practices. Some federal agencies have already begun to implement many of the best practices and reduce administrative costs. We also strongly urge agencies to study and implement the practices and approaches identified by the JFMIP travel improvement team. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed efforts for improving governmentwide travel management, focusing on a comparison of civilian federal agencies' and private-sector travel management practices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) private-sector organizations have cut travel processing costs and time by consolidating travel management and processing centers, eliminating unnecessary review layers, simplifying travel processing, and streamlining and automating the expense reporting process; (2) many federal agencies have not identified their administrative travel costs and processes; (3) many federal agencies use numerous processing centers, require multiple travel documents, and lack automated systems that interface with their financial systems; (4) private-sector organizations approach travel cost reduction by assessing travel management as part of the larger financial management system, benchmarking themselves against other organizations, and instituting a common set of best practices; (5) legislative and regulatory changes may be needed for federal agencies to implement some travel management improvements; and (6) some agencies have implemented changes or initiated pilots to improve travel management. |
gao_GAO-15-292 | gao_GAO-15-292_0 | PARM is designated by MD 102 as the lead body responsible for overseeing the acquisition process of major acquisition programs. DHS Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of Major Acquisition Programs, but Lacks Written Guidance and Cost Oversight Mechanism for Some Programs
Although DHS has taken steps to improve oversight of major acquisition programs, such as clarifying the role of the CAEs, it lacks written guidance for a consistent approach to oversight. PARM started conducting monthly high visibility meetings to discuss programs that require immediate or additional management attention. Sustainment costs can account for more than 80 percent of total costs, and all but one of these programs lack an approved cost estimate. DHS Lacks Written Guidance for a Consistent Approach to Ongoing Oversight
While DHS has made progress in defining and documenting roles and responsibilities in the oversight of major acquisitions, such as issuing guidance describing the roles of CAEs, the roles and responsibilities of PARM and other DHS headquarters organizations are not clear. We found that their involvement and relationships with components varies significantly. DHS Lacks Cost Oversight Mechanism for Programs in Sustainment
DHS does not have a structure in place for overseeing the costs of 42 programs whose acquisition documentation requirements were waived This waiver through a memorandum issued by the USM in May 2013.covered certain programs in sustainment, meaning that these acquisition programs have been developed and delivered and they are being operated and maintained through the disposal phase. We have previously reported that cost estimates are necessary to support decisions about program funding, develop annual budget requests, and evaluate resource requirements. Program Data PARM Provided to DHS and Congressional Decision Makers Were Not Consistently Accurate and Up-to-Date
PARM’s fiscal year 2014 CASR, a report mandated by Congress, provided the status of 82 DHS major acquisition programs but contained data that were inaccurate and out-of-date. However, data issues—including inconsistent participation among the programs responsible for entering data—have led to inaccurate information in nPRS. Finally, DHS provided insufficient information to address certain CASR reporting requirements. We found a number of problems with the data. Holding programs accountable for maintaining their cost, schedule, and performance data, and presenting contextual information would help make the CASR a more effective instrument for DHS and congressional oversight. To make the CASR more useful, starting with the report reflecting fiscal year 2015 program data, adjust the CASR to do the following:
Report an individual rating for each program’s cost, schedule,
Report a best estimate of procurement quantities or indicate why this is not applicable, as appropriate;
Report all programs’ significant changes in acquisition cost, quantity, or schedule from the previous CASR report by determining a means to account for programs that lack acquisition program baselines;
Report major program events that are included in acquisition program baselines, such as scheduled acquisition decision events; and
Report the level at which the program’s life-cycle cost estimate was approved. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this review was to assess the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) oversight of its major acquisition programs. Specifically, this review focused on DHS’s Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) and its day-to-day program oversight, rather than the oversight it conducts at key points in the acquisition life cycle as defined in policy. We assessed (1) steps DHS has taken to improve oversight and what gaps, if any, exist and (2) whether the data PARM provides to DHS and congressional decision makers to carry out their oversight responsibilities on program cost, schedule, and performance are accurate and up-to-date. To address our first objective, we selected nine DHS components with responsibility for at least one Level 1 acquisition—a program with a reported life-cycle cost estimate exceeding $1 billion—and interviewed their Component Acquisition Executives (CAE) or designees. In order to assess acquisition oversight across the spectrum of DHS programs, we selected case study programs with a variety of characteristics. For the second objective, we collected and reviewed data from DHS’s official system of record for its acquisition programs, the Next Generation Periodic Reporting System (nPRS), and compared that data to the fiscal year 2014 CASR. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2014, DHS reported it planned to spend approximately $10.7 billion on its major acquisition programs. DHS acquires systems to reduce the probability of a terrorist attack, protect against disease, mitigate natural hazards, and secure borders. Partially in response to GAO recommendations, the department has taken steps to improve acquisition management in recent years, but has not yet implemented many of these recommendations.
GAO was asked to review DHS's oversight of its major acquisition programs. This report addresses (1) steps DHS has taken to improve oversight and gaps that exist, if any, and (2) whether the data PARM provides to DHS and congressional decision makers are accurate and up-to-date.
GAO reviewed DHS policies and procedures and interviewed oversight and acquisition officials from all nine DHS components with at least one major acquisition program with a life-cycle cost estimate exceeding $1 billion. From these components, GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of nine major acquisition programs with a variety of characteristics to compare PARM oversight activities and review program data.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken steps to improve oversight of major acquisition programs, but it lacks written guidance for a consistent approach to day-to-day oversight. Federal Standards for Internal Control call for organizations to define and document key areas of responsibility in order to effectively plan, direct, and control operations to achieve agency objectives. DHS has defined the role of the Component Acquisition Executive, the senior acquisition official within each component, and established monthly meetings to discuss programs that require management attention. However, DHS has not defined all of the roles and responsibilities of the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM)—the lead body responsible for overseeing the acquisition process and assessing the status of acquisition programs—and other headquarters organizations. GAO also found that officials' involvement and relationships with components varied significantly. DHS does not have a structure in place for overseeing the costs of 42 programs in sustainment (that is, programs that have been fielded and are operational) for which acquisition documentation requirements were waived in 2013. Sustainment costs can account for more than 80 percent of total costs, and all but one of these programs lack an approved cost estimate. GAO also previously reported that cost estimates are necessary to support decisions about program funding and resources.
The most recent data that PARM provided to DHS and congressional decision makers for oversight were not consistently accurate and up-to-date. Specifically, PARM's fiscal year 2014 Comprehensive Acquisition Status Report (CASR), which was based on fiscal year 2013 data, contained inaccurate information on DHS acquisition programs. To develop the CASR, PARM drew from DHS's official system for acquisition program reporting, the Next Generation Periodic Reporting System (nPRS); however, the system is hampered by data issues, including inconsistent participation by program officials responsible for entering the data. Further, DHS has not provided useful information for certain CASR reporting requirements. DHS interpreted one requirement in a way that eliminated the need to report cost, schedule, or performance changes for almost half of the programs in the CASR. Holding programs accountable for maintaining their data in nPRS and providing decision makers with more in-depth information would enhance future acquisition reports and render the CASR a more effective instrument for DHS and congressional oversight.
GAO Assessment of the DHS Comprehensive Acquisition Status Report Development Process
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS take a number of actions including developing written guidance for a consistent approach to oversight, addressing programs in sustainment, and enhancing data quality and reports to Congress. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-771 | gao_GAO-02-771_0 | Our analysis of SEC data found that, as of November 2001, SEC apparently had collected approximately $424 million, or 14 percent, of the $3.1 billion in disgorgement that was ordered from 1995 through 2001 (fig. According to SEC data, the disgorgement collection rate varied greatly from year to year. An analysis of these collection rates shows that SEC’s success in collecting large individual disgorgement orders can greatly influence the collection rate. Factors Beyond SEC’s Control Make It Unlikely That SEC Will Collect All Disgorgement
Another limitation in the adequacy of the collection rate as a measure of the effectiveness of SEC’s disgorgement collection efforts is that factors beyond SEC’s control limit its ability to collect the full amount of disgorgement ordered in some cases. Securities law violators can lack the ability to pay for a variety of reasons. SEC Lacks Strategic Guidance, Clear Policies and Procedures, and an Effective Monitoring Mechanism for the Disgorgement Collection Process
Although disgorgement is intended to help deter fraud by forcing violators of the securities laws to return illegal profits, we found weaknesses in SEC’s disgorgement collection program. First, SEC lacks clearly defined strategic objectives and measurable goals for its collection program. However, SEC’s strategic and annual plans do not clarify the priority disgorgement collection should have in relation to SEC’s other goals. SEC Has Improved Its Process for Selecting and Monitoring Receivers but Does Not Have a Central Monitoring System
SEC has improved its process for selecting individuals to recommend as court-appointed receivers. Although we acknowledge that the collection rate is not likely the best measure for assessing the effectiveness of SEC’s disgorgement collection activities, improving the process for entering and updating the information in DPTS would provide accurate and current information for SEC to use to monitor progress on individual cases. However, in addition to depriving violators of their illegally obtained funds, returning money to harmed investors is an important element of the disgorgement program. We also spoke with SEC attorneys to learn what actions had been taken to monitor receivers and to review receiver fee applications. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every year investors lose money to individuals and corporations that violate federal securities laws. One mission of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to deter such violations and return lost funds to investors. SEC's primary tool is the disgorgement order, which requires violators to give up money obtained through securities law violations. In order for disgorgement to succeed, SEC must have an effective disgorgement collection program. Although the courts have ordered billions of dollars in disgorgement in the last decade, concerns exist about SEC's success in collecting these funds. For several reasons, SEC's disgorgement collection rate is not an adequate measure of the effectiveness of SEC's disgorgement program.
What GAO Found
First, while SEC data showed a collection rate of 14 percent for the $3.1 billion in disgorgement ordered in 1995-2001--compared with the 50 percent collection rate GAO reported in its 1994 report--GAO found that the rate varied widely from year to year and was influenced by large individual disgorgement orders. Second, the data used to calculate the collection rate was not reliable because of weaknesses in entering and updating information in SEC's disgorgement tracking database. Third, factors beyond SEC's control, including violators' inability to pay, reduce the likelihood that SEC will be able to collect the full amount of disgorgement ordered. To deprive securities law violators of illegally obtained funds, SEC needs an effective collection program with clearly defined objectives and measurable goals, specific policies and procedures for its staff, and systems to allow management to monitor performance. However, SEC's strategic and annual performance plans do not address disgorgement collection or clarify its priority relative to other activities. SEC has improved its process for recommending receivers and has taken steps to monitor receivers' actions, but lacks a mechanism for tracking receiver fees. In response to concerns noted in a recent internal report, SEC also has improved its waiver recommendation process for disgorgement orders. |
gao_GAO-08-251 | gao_GAO-08-251_0 | NORTHCOM Has Completed Major Plans but Faces Considerable Challenges That Increase the Overall Risk to Its Ability to Execute Its Plans
NORTHCOM has completed—or is in the process of revising—all of its major plans. However, NORTHCOM does not regularly track or assess the required supporting plans from other DOD commands and agencies. NORTHCOM and DOD have some risk mitigation efforts under way in each of these areas that partially address the challenges we found. However, it could take additional steps to reduce the remaining level of risk to its ability to effectively achieve its mission. As we report in a separate letter, NORTHCOM has also not systematically reviewed state emergency plans in order to obtain detailed information about the specific challenges it may face in conducting homeland defense or civil support operations. NORTHCOM’s Ability to Monitor the Readiness of Forces to Respond to Civil Support Missions Is Hampered
NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of individual military units because in part, few requirements or units that may respond to a request for civil support have been identified. Because no mission tasks exist for general civil support missions, NORTHCOM and DOD face greater uncertainty about their ability to execute these plans. This may further assist NORTHCOM in more accurately determining its capability requirements for civil support missions. NORTHCOM’s Planning Personnel Have Adequate Staff Level and Are Expanding Experience and Training
NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the command is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for staff needed to perform the command’s planning function. NORTHCOM’s planning staff is assigned at over 96 percent of the command’s authorized staffing level. The military personnel who serve as NORTHCOM planners receive basic planning-related training similar to that of planners in other combatant commands. NORTHCOM has sought to address this challenge by integrating personnel from the National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard into NORTHCOM’s headquarters staff. In addition, NORTHCOM has developed a training curriculum for each of its planning personnel. NORTHCOM’s efforts to provide additional training and education for its staff should help the command expand its experience in planning and conducting operations with partners at the international, federal, and state levels. NORTHCOM Has Taken Actions to Improve Interagency Coordination but Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure That Coordination Efforts Are Adopted
NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal agencies. This planning system is required to 1. provide common processes for developing plans; 2. serve to implement phase one of DHS’s Homeland Security 3. national planning doctrine and planning guidance, instruction, and process to ensure consistent planning across the federal government; a mechanism that provides for concept development to identify and analyze the mission and potential courses of action; a description of the process that allows for plan refinement and proper execution to reflect developments in risk, capabilities, or policies, as well as to incorporate lessons learned from exercises and actual events; a description of the process that links regional, state, local, and tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans to inform the development of federal plans; a process for fostering vertical and horizontal integration of federal, state, local, and tribal plans that allows for state, local, and tribal capability assessments to feed into federal plans; and a guide for all-hazards planning, with comprehensive, practical guidance and instruction on fundamental planning principles that can be used at federal, state, local, and tribal levels to assist the planning process. This is important because responding to a major disaster in the United States—natural or man-made—is a shared responsibility of many government agencies with states often requiring federal assistance from DHS and DOD. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help NORTHCOM reduce the level of risk to its homeland defense and civil support planning efforts, in conjunction with the new national planning requirements of the National Response Framework and the national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, we are making three recommendations: We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of NORTHCOM to complete the process to track the status of all supporting plans, coordinate the completion of those plans by other commands and agencies, and assess the suitability of those plans to meet the intent and objectives of NORTHCOM’s major plans. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has prepared plans to execute its homeland defense and civil support missions, we reviewed NORTHCOM’s available major plans and supporting plans, comparing them to established Department of Defense (DOD) joint operational planning criteria for completeness and adequacy. Forces for Domestic Military Missions. | Why GAO Did This Study
It has been 5 years since the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions in the United States. Planning operations in the United States poses unique challenges for traditional military planning. GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NORTHCOM's plans and the challenges it faces in planning and conducting operations, (2) the number, experience, and training of planning personnel, and (3) the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies. To do this, GAO reviewed available NORTHCOM plans, compared them to joint operational planning criteria, compared planning staff with those at other commands, and reviewed documentation and mechanisms for interagency coordination.
What GAO Found
NORTHCOM has completed--or is in the process of revising--all of the major plans it is required to prepare for its homeland defense and civil support missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning for and conducting these missions. NORTHCOM has completed its nine required plans. However, NORTHCOM does not know whether supporting plans that must be developed by other DOD organizations to assist NORTHCOM are complete because it has only recently begun to develop a process to track and assess these plans. NORTHCOM faces challenges in three key planning areas. First, NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in part because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the states on the specific requirements needed from the military in the event of a disaster. Second, NORTHCOM has few regularly allocated forces and few capabilities allocated to its plans. DOD could allocate forces to NORTHCOM and assign specific forces to the command's plans, but this would not guarantee that those forces would not have to be deployed elsewhere. However, it would provide DOD and the NORTHCOM commander with a better basis on which to assess the risk that the command would be unable to successfully execute one or more of its missions. Third, NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of military units for its civil support mission because its plans do not specify mission tasks against which units can be assessed. NORTHCOM has undertaken mitigation efforts to address each challenge, and new national planning guidance may further assist NORTHCOM and DOD in addressing the challenges. Nevertheless, NORTHCOM and DOD can take additional actions to reduce the risk from these gaps and reduce the risk due to the overall uncertainty that stems from the nature of its mission. NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the command is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for staff needed to perform the command's planning function. NORTHCOM's planning staff is filled at over 96 percent of its authorized positions. NORTHCOM's military planning staff receives the same planning training and education as planners in other combatant commands. To draw upon experience in planning and conducting domestic operations, NORTHCOM has integrated National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard personnel into its headquarters staff. NORTHCOM has also developed a curriculum for required mission-related training courses. Although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve coordination of its homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal agencies, it lacks formalized guidance and procedures--such as memorandums of understanding or charters--to help ensure that interagency coordination efforts or agreements that are reached can be fully relied on. This is important because responding to a major disaster in the United States--natural or man-made--is a shared responsibility of many government agencies with states often requiring federal assistance from DHS and DOD. |
gao_GAO-17-518T | gao_GAO-17-518T_0 | In addition, cyber threats to systems supporting the federal government are evolving and becoming more sophisticated. This year marks the 20th anniversary of when GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. We expanded this high-risk area to include safeguarding the systems supporting our nation’s critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015. Specifically, with certain exceptions, DHS is to administer the implementation of agency information security policies and practices for information systems including: monitoring agency implementation of information security policies and providing operational and technical guidance to agencies; operating a central federal information security incident center; and deploying technology upon request to assist the agency to continuously diagnose and mitigate cyber threats and vulnerabilities. In addition, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 requires DHS to deploy, operate, and maintain for use by any federal agency, a capability to (1) detect cybersecurity risks in network traffic transiting to or from agency information systems and (2) prevent network traffic with such risks from traveling to or from an agency information system or modify the traffic to remove the cybersecurity risk. NCPS Capabilities and Adoption Could Be Improved
Operated by DHS’s United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), NCPS is intended to detect and prevent cyber intrusions into agency networks, analyze network data for trends and anomalous data, and share information with agencies on cyber threats and incidents. In addition, NCPS did not monitor several types of network traffic and therefore would not have detected malicious traffic embedded in such traffic. NCPS also did not examine traffic for certain common vulnerabilities and exposures that cyber threat adversaries could have attempted to exploit during intrusion attempts. To enhance the functionality of NCPS, we made six recommendations to DHS, which if implemented, could help the agency to expand the capability of NCPS to detect cyber intrusions, notify customers of potential incidents, and track the quality, efficiency, and accuracy of supporting actions related to detecting and preventing intrusions, providing analytic services, and sharing cyber-related information. DHS concurred with the recommendations. In January 2016, we also reported that federal agencies had adopted NCPS to varying degrees. Effective Implementation of the CDM Program Could Improve Information Security at Agencies
The CDM program provides federal agencies with tools and services that are intended to provide them with the capability to automate network monitoring, correlate and analyze security-related information, and enhance risk-based decision making at agency and government-wide levels. As we reported in May 2016, most of the 18 agencies covered by the CFO Act that had high-impact systems were in the early stages of CDM implementation. Additionally, according to survey responses, 14 of the 17 had deployed products to automate hardware and software asset configuration settings and common vulnerability management. However, only 2 of the 17 agencies reported that they had completed installation of agency and bureau/component-level dashboards and monitored attributes of authorized users operating in their agency’s computing environment. Agencies also noted that expediting the implementation of CDM phases could be of benefit to them in further protecting their high-impact systems. By continuing to make these tools and capabilities available to federal agencies, DHS can also have additional assurance that agencies are better positioned to protect their information systems and information. In May 2016, we reported that although participation varied among the 18 agencies we surveyed, most of those that chose to participate generally found these services to be useful in aiding the cybersecurity protection of their high-impact systems. All 18 agencies participated in the CyberStat reviews, and most found the service very or somewhat useful. We believe that by continuing to make these services available to agencies, DHS will be better able to assist agencies in strengthening the security of their information systems. Enhancing NCPS’s capabilities and greater adoption by agencies will help DHS achieve the full benefit of the system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cyber-based intrusions and attacks on federal systems are evolving and becoming more sophisticated. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. This was expanded to include the protection of cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015.
DHS plays a key role in strengthening the cybersecurity posture of the federal government. Among other things, DHS has initiatives for (1) detecting and preventing malicious cyber intrusions into agencies' networks and (2) deploying technology to assist agencies to continuously diagnose and mitigate cyber threats and vulnerabilities.
This statement provides an overview of GAO's work related to DHS's efforts to improve the cybersecurity posture of the federal government. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work, as well as information provided by DHS on its actions in response to GAO's previous recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is spearheading multiple efforts to improve the cybersecurity posture of the federal government. Among these, the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) provides a capability to detect and prevent potentially malicious network traffic from entering agencies' networks. In addition, DHS's continuous diagnostics and mitigation (CDM) program provides tools to agencies to identify and resolve cyber vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis.
In January 2016, GAO reported that NCPS was limited in its capabilities to detect or prevent cyber intrusions, analyze network data for trends, and share information with agencies on cyber threats and incidents. For example, it did not monitor or evaluate certain types of network traffic and therefore would not have detected malicious traffic embedded in such traffic. NCPS also did not examine traffic for certain common vulnerabilities and exposures that cyber threat adversaries could have attempted to exploit during intrusion attempts. In addition, at the time of the review, federal agencies had adopted NCPS to varying degrees. GAO noted that expanding NCPS's capabilities, such as those for detecting and preventing malicious traffic and developing network routing guidance, could increase assurance of the system's effectiveness in detecting and preventing computer intrusions and support wider adoption by agencies. By taking these steps, DHS would be better positioned to achieve the full benefits of NCPS.
The tools and services delivered through DHS's CDM program are intended to provide agencies with the capability to automate network monitoring, correlate and analyze security-related information, and enhance risk-based decision making at agency and government-wide levels. In May 2016, GAO reported that most of the 17 civilian agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act that also reported having high-impact systems were in the early stages of CDM implementation. For example, 14 of the 17 agencies reported that they had deployed products to automate hardware and software asset inventories, configuration settings, and common vulnerability management but only 2 had completed installation of agency and bureau/component-level dashboards. Some of the agencies noted that expediting CDM implementation could be of benefit to them in further protecting their high-impact systems. GAO concluded that the effective implementation of the CDM program can assist agencies in resolving cybersecurity vulnerabilities that expose their information systems and information to evolving and pernicious threats. By continuing to make available CDM tools and capabilities to agencies, DHS can have additional assurance that agencies are better positioned to protect their information system and information.
In addition, DHS offered other services such as monthly operational bulletins, CyberStat reviews, and cyber exercises to help protect federal systems. In May 2016, GAO reported that although participation varied among the agencies surveyed, most agencies had found that the services were very or somewhat useful. By continuing to make these services available to agencies, DHS is better able to assist agencies in strengthening the security of their information systems.
What GAO Recommends
In a January 2016 report, GAO made nine recommendations related to expanding NCPS's capability to detect cyber intrusions; notifying customers of potential incidents; providing analytic services; and sharing cyber-related information, among other things. DHS concurred with the recommendations and is taking actions to implement them. |
gao_GAO-16-131 | gao_GAO-16-131_0 | For example, information is collected on recreational fishing effort and catch rates. Among other things, the council recommended the redesign of all marine recreational fishing surveys funded by NMFS. Several Challenges with NMFS’ Fisheries Data Collection Efforts Have Been Identified
Since the 2006 National Research Council report, NMFS and some state officials have identified several challenges related to collecting data to manage marine recreational fisheries, such as obtaining quality recreational fishing data to inform scientific analyses and produce credible effort and catch estimates. NMFS faces a challenge in obtaining complete information on the universe of recreational anglers. According to NMFS officials, NMFS relies on state angler registries to identify the universe of recreational anglers in those exempted states. In light of this difficulty, Louisiana does not collect recreational angler discard data as part of its own recreational fisheries data collection program because of concerns about the quality of angler self-reported data, according to a state official. NMFS, some state officials, and some other stakeholders, such as private recreational anglers, have also identified challenges in how NMFS communicates with stakeholders about its fisheries data collection efforts. Some private recreational anglers also told us that NMFS has not always sufficiently communicated with the public about its activities, creating concerns about a lack of transparency regarding NMFS’ fisheries management decisions. For example, according to a Texas fisheries official, Texas withdrew from NMFS’ recreational data collection program and implemented its own data collection program in the late 1970s because it did not believe that NMFS’ data collection methods suited Texas’ needs for managing recreational fisheries. NMFS Has Taken Steps Aimed at Improving Data Collection, but Some Challenges Persist and NMFS Does Not Have a Comprehensive Strategy to Guide Improvement Efforts
NMFS has taken several steps aimed at improving data collection to manage marine recreational fisheries and addressing challenges related to communicating with stakeholders. NMFS Has Taken Steps Aimed at Improving Recreational Fisheries Data Collection, but Some Challenges Persist
NMFS has taken steps to address some of the challenges it faces in collecting data for managing marine recreational fisheries, including steps aimed at collecting quality data to support scientific analyses and producing credible effort and catch estimates, improving the timeliness of data collection, and improving communication with stakeholders. During this same period, NMFS made recommendations to the states on improving their recreational angler databases. For example, the report recommended that NMFS develop a plan for providing the data necessary for conducting fish stock assessments. NMFS officials told us that they are also working collaboratively with Louisiana to perform a side-by-side comparison of MRIP data with data collected under Louisiana’s LA Creel data collection program, to determine whether LA Creel can be used as an alternative to MRIP surveys. NMFS officials told us that NMFS intends to develop strategic planning documents to guide future individual initiatives, using NMFS’ experiences with the transition to the new mail-based Fishing Effort Survey as a template, but they did not provide information about how, or whether, they planned to integrate these documents into a comprehensive strategy or how they would communicate such a strategy to NMFS’ stakeholders. Without a comprehensive strategy, NMFS may have difficulty ensuring that the variety of steps it is taking to improve data collection are prioritized so that the most important steps are undertaken first and may find it difficult to determine the extent to which these steps will help address challenges. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve NMFS’ ability to capitalize on its efforts to improve fisheries data collection for managing marine recreational fisheries, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct NOAA’s Assistant Administrator for Fisheries to develop a comprehensive strategy to guide NMFS’ implementation of its marine recreational fisheries data collection program efforts, including a means to measure progress in implementing this strategy and to communicate information to stakeholders. I), we selected federal and state agencies and regional organizations to interview based on such factors as geographic representation and locations of large volumes of recreational fishing. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the challenges that have been identified with the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) data collection efforts for managing marine recreational fisheries and (2) the steps NMFS has taken to improve data collection and challenges that remain. To conduct our work, we reviewed and analyzed relevant laws, agency policies, guidance, and other documentation related to fisheries data collection, including documentation related to specific federal and state marine recreational fisheries data collection projects. We compared this information with the framework of leading practices in federal strategic planning contained in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010, and Office of Management and Budget guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Almost 11 million anglers made nearly 71 million marine recreational fishing trips in the continental United States in 2013. Pressure on many fish stocks from fishing has increased demand for quality and timely data that can be used to assess the status of various fish stocks as part of managing marine recreational fisheries. The many modes of marine recreational fishing—in which anglers fish from private boats or boats with guides, the shoreline, private property, and public docks—make collecting the data needed to effectively manage recreational fisheries both complex and challenging.
GAO was asked to review NMFS' marine recreational fisheries data collection program. This report examines (1) challenges that have been identified with the agency's data collection efforts for managing marine recreational fisheries and (2) steps the agency has taken to improve data collection and challenges that remain. GAO reviewed laws, policies, and guidance related to federal and state recreational fisheries data collection methods; reviewed NMFS and other documents on recreational fisheries data collection; and interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of federal and state recreational fisheries officials and other stakeholders, selected to provide geographic representation, among other things, to obtain their views on NMFS' data collection efforts.
What GAO Found
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) within the Department of Commerce faces several challenges related to fisheries data collection, according to reports GAO reviewed and NMFS officials and stakeholders GAO interviewed. These challenges include collecting quality recreational fishing data that are timely for managing marine recreational fisheries and communicating with stakeholders. Regarding the collection of quality data, for example, NMFS faces a challenge identifying the universe of anglers from which to collect information about their marine recreational fishing activity. NMFS relies in part on state registries to identify anglers, but some states exempt certain anglers from registering, and therefore NMFS does not have a complete list of recreational anglers. NMFS officials and other stakeholders have also identified challenges in communicating with stakeholders in collecting recreational fisheries data. For example, several stakeholders told GAO that NMFS has not always communicated with the public about its activities, creating concerns about a lack of transparency regarding NMFS' fisheries management decisions. Reflecting this challenge, in 2014, Louisiana withdrew from the federal fisheries data collection program and implemented its own program because of concerns about federal recreational fisheries data, according to a Louisiana fisheries official.
NMFS has taken several steps aimed at improving data collection to manage marine recreational fisheries and addressing challenges related to communicating with stakeholders. For example, to help improve the quality of the state data it relies on to identify the universe of anglers, NMFS made recommendations to states on improving their recreational angler databases and provided funds to the states to support data quality improvement projects, according to NMFS documents. NMFS has also taken steps to improve communication, including working with Louisiana to perform a side-by-side comparison of federal data with Louisiana's data to determine whether Louisiana's data can be used as an alternative to federal data. However, some challenges persist, including challenges in validating data the NMFS collects and communicating about upcoming NMFS initiatives. More broadly, the agency does not have a comprehensive strategy to guide its efforts to improve recreational fisheries data collection. Such a strategy is consistent with the framework of leading practices in federal strategic planning, as described in the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010, Office of Management and Budget guidance, and practices GAO has identified. Based on GAO's discussions with NMFS officials and review of NMFS documents, the agency has not developed a comprehensive strategy because it has been focused on other priorities such as improving its data collection methods. NMFS officials told GAO that NMFS recognizes the need to enhance its strategic planning but did not provide information about how, or whether, they plan to develop a comprehensive strategy. Without a comprehensive strategy that articulates NMFS' goals to improve data collection and methods for measuring progress toward the goals, NMFS may have difficulty ensuring that the various steps it is taking to improve data collection are prioritized so that the most important steps are undertaken first, and it may find it difficult to determine the extent to which these steps will help it address the challenges it faces.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NMFS develop a comprehensive strategy to guide its data collection efforts. The agency agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-15-215 | gao_GAO-15-215_0 | As shown in table 1, the federal government’s crop insurance costs generally increased for fiscal years 2003 through 2013. From 2005 through 2013, government costs per dollar of crop value in areas with higher crop production risks were over two and a half times the costs in other areas. However, RMA does not monitor and report on the government’s crop insurance costs in these higher risk areas. RMA Premium Rate Changes in Areas with Higher Production Risks May Not Cover Expected Losses
RMA implemented changes to premium rates in 2014, decreasing some rates and increasing others, but our analysis of RMA data shows that, for some crops, RMA’s higher risk premium rates may not cover expected losses. RMA made changes to premium rates from 2013 to 2014, but its practice of phasing in changes to premium rates over time could have implications for actuarial soundness. Many County Base Premium Rates Are Less Than the County Target Premium Rates
When county base premium rates are lower than county target premium rates, RMA is required by statute to limit annual increases in premium rates to 20 percent of what the farmer paid for the same coverage in the previous year. However, we also found that from 2013 to 2014, RMA did not raise county base premium rates as high as the law allows for many of the higher risk premium rates. For example, in analyzing data on premium dollars for 2013, our analysis showed that had the county base premium rates been aligned with the county target premium rates in higher risk counties, the federal government could have potentially collected tens of millions of dollars in additional premiums. Conclusions
Federal crop insurance plays an important role in protecting farmers from losses from natural disasters and price declines, and the federal crop insurance program has become one of the most important programs in the farm safety net. Without sufficient increases to premium rates, where applicable, RMA may not be taking all the actions available to achieve greater actuarial soundness. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better inform Congress in the future about crop insurance program costs, reduce present costs, and ensure greater actuarial soundness, we recommend that the Administrator of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Risk Management Agency take the following two actions:
Monitor and report on crop insurance costs in areas that have higher crop production risks. We continue to believe RMA can and should do more to monitor and report on crop insurance costs in higher risk areas, where we found government costs to be substantially higher than in other areas. In addition, RMA commented on our analysis of the government’s cost of the crop insurance program in higher risk areas. RMA agreed with our second recommendation that, as appropriate, RMA increase its adjustments of premium rates in areas with higher crop production risks by as much as the full 20 percent annually that is allowed by law, saying it mirrors how premium rate adjustments are currently administered. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine, for areas with higher crop production risks, (1) the government’s cost of the crop insurance program and (2) the extent to which RMA’s premium rates, as implemented, cover expected losses. Finally, to address the first objective we interviewed RMA officials, reviewed USDA’s and other studies that examined the costs of the crop insurance program and the role of premium subsidies, and consulted documents from other stakeholders, including farm industry groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federally subsidized crop insurance program, which helps farmers manage the risk inherent in farming, has become one of the most important programs in the farm safety net. Since 2000, the government's costs for the crop insurance program have increased substantially. The program's cost has come under scrutiny as the nation's budgetary pressures have been increasing.
GAO was asked to identify the costs to the federal government for insuring crops in areas with higher production risks. This report examines, for these areas, (1) the government's cost of the crop insurance program and (2) the extent to which RMA's premium rates, as implemented, cover expected losses. GAO analyzed RMA crop insurance program data from 1994 through 2013 (the most recent year with complete program data) and premium rate data for 2013 and 2014; reviewed relevant studies, RMA documents, and documents from stakeholders including farm industry groups; and interviewed RMA officials.
What GAO Found
The federal government's crop insurance costs are substantially higher in areas with higher crop production risks (e.g., drought risk) than in other areas. In the higher risk areas, government costs per dollar of crop value for 2005 through 2013 were over two and a half times the costs in other areas. The figure below shows the costs during this period. However, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA)—the agency that administers the crop insurance program—does not monitor and report on the government's crop insurance costs in the higher risk areas.
RMA implemented changes to premium rates in 2014, decreasing some rates and increasing others, but GAO's analysis of RMA data shows that, for some crops, RMA's higher risk premium rates may not cover expected losses. RMA made changes to premium rates from 2013 to 2014, but its plans to phase in changes to premium rates over time could have implications for improving actuarial soundness. USDA is required by statute to limit annual increases in premium rates to 20 percent of what the farmer paid for the same coverage in the previous year. However, GAO found that, for higher risk premium rates that required an increase of at least 20 percent to cover expected losses, RMA did not raise these premium rates as high as the law allows to make the rates more actuarially sound. Without sufficient increases to premium rates, where applicable, RMA may not fully cover expected losses and make the rates more actuarially sound. Furthermore, in analyzing data on premium dollars for 2013, GAO found that had RMA's higher risk premium rates been more actuarially sound, the federal government could have potentially collected tens of millions of dollars in additional premiums.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that RMA (1) monitor and report on crop insurance costs in areas that have higher crop production risks and (2), as appropriate, increase its adjustments of premium rates in these areas by as much as the full 20 percent annually that is allowed by law.
RMA disagreed with GAO's first recommendation and agreed with the second. GAO continues to believe that RMA can and should do more to monitor and report on crop insurance costs in higher risk areas, where government costs were found to be substantially higher. |
gao_GAO-01-847 | gao_GAO-01-847_0 | DFAS, a component of DOD, has responsibility for providing finance and accounting services to all other DOD components, including the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) issues the DOD Financial Management Regulation containing DOD’s policies and procedures in the area of financial management. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the progress DFAS Denver has made in improving its processes for reconciling the transaction activity in the Air Force General Funds and (2) whether any of DFAS Denver’s reconciliation concepts or policies could be used in reconciling the Fund Balance with Treasury activity of the other DOD components. Over the past few years, by increasing management attention on the reconciliation process, DFAS Denver has made improvements in both parts of the process and has reported a corresponding reduction in its unreconciled differences. Without first identifying the transactions, DFAS Denver cannot reconcile the activity. DFAS Denver’s Process Improvements Transferable to Other DFAS Centers
The FBWT reconciliation concepts, policies, and procedures developed at DFAS Denver could be used by other DFAS centers, which have not made as much progress in reconciling their FBWT activity, according to DFAS reports and officials. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further improve the reconciliation of the activity in Air Force Fund Balance with Treasury General Fund accounts and to ensure that the process is comprehensive and institutionalized with continuity of effort, we recommend that the Director, DFAS, direct the Director, DFAS Denver, to further refine the reconciliation process to identify and include all transactions that make up the differences between Air Force and Treasury records and resolve these differences within established time frames; and document the entire Fund Balance with Treasury General Funds activity reconciliation process, including specific procedures for the various reconciliations within the overall process. Financial Audit: Issues Regarding Reconciliations of Fund Balances With Treasury Accounts (GAO/AIMD-99-3, October 14, 1998). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has had longstanding problems in reconciling the transaction activity in its Fund Balance with Treasury accounts. These reconciliation problems hamper DOD's ability to prepare auditable financial statements and have prompted GAO to place DOD financial management on its list of government activities at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. In August 1998, DOD developed a strategic plan to improve the reconciliation process for the activity in its Fund Balance with Treasury accounts. DOD reported that the Defense Finance and Accounting Service's (DFAS) Denver Center, which provides support for the Air Force, has made the most progress in implementing this plan and that its process for reconciling the activity in the Air Force General Funds is more comprehensive than that of the other DOD components. This report reviews the Denver center's reconciliation processes to determine (1) the progress the Denver center has made in reconciling the transaction activity in the Air Force General Funds and (2) whether the Denver center's reconciliation concepts, policies, and practices could be used in reconciling the Fund Balance with Treasury activity of other DOD components.
What GAO Found
GAO found that (1) the Denver center has made progress in developing a comprehensive reconciliation process for the Air Force General Funds' transaction activity in the Fund Balance with Treasury accounts, primarily by increasing management attention. GAO also found that the concepts and policies developed by the Denver center to identify and resolve transaction differences could improve the reconciliation processes of the other DFAS centers that have not made as much progress. |
gao_GAO-08-136 | gao_GAO-08-136_0 | Reported Leverage Measures Lacked Transparency Because Agencies Generally Did Not Disclose Data Limitations or Calculation Methods
The leverage measures (such as ratios) HUD and Treasury reported for the selected programs in performance, budget, and other documents lacked transparency because the agencies generally did not disclose the limitations of the data or the methods used to calculate them. We also found that while the agencies generally reported measures that described the ratio of all other funds (federal, state, local, and private funds) to program funds, alternative measures that described the total federal investment or total private investment in a program provided considerably different results—also potentially of value to decision makers—about the extent of leveraging in a program. Further, no agency- specific or governmentwide guidance directs what agencies should disclose about the leverage measures they report for the selected programs; however, we regularly have reported that clearly communicating data limitations and their potential impact may foster appropriate use of data. Consequently, absent specific information on how these measures were calculated and their limitations, decision makers would not have sufficient information to understand their meaning and determine how they could and should be used in performance assessment, budgeting, and other contexts. HUD and Treasury Did Not Always Disclose Limitations of Data Used to Determine Leverage Measures for the Selected Programs
Based on our review of available leveraging data and interviews with HUD and Treasury officials, we found that the leverage measures the agencies reported for the selected programs were based on incomplete data and did not capture the actual extent of leveraging that may have occurred in each of the programs. For all of the programs we reviewed, leverage measures can describe inputs, or the resources used to support program activities, and may be useful for conveying basic financial information. To the extent that leveraging is a goal or core (expected) activity of a program (as in the three Treasury programs), leverage measures generally can describe program outputs, or the products or services delivered (such as total leveraged funds), and may be used along with other performance indicators to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of a program in meeting its goals. In cases where leveraging is not clearly and appropriately linked to program goals and activities (as in the three HUD programs), use of such measures to describe program outputs could be misleading and result in adverse consequences, such as giving funding priority to projects that leverage more over those that leverage less, but which may fill a greater or more immediate need within a community. Although leveraging had limited relevance to the goals and activities of the selected HUD programs, we found that OMB and the agency often cited leverage measures for the programs in performance- and budget-related reviews and documents. Their continued use of leverage measures in these contexts could unnecessarily encourage HUD to place more importance on leveraging than meeting the stated goals of the CDBG, HOME, and HOPE VI programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the leverage measures the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) reported for the selected housing and community and economic development programs and the transparency of the data and methods used to calculate them and (2) the relevance of leverage measures in assessing the performance of the selected programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
This is the second of two reports on the leveraging of federal funds in housing and community and economic development programs. Leveraging involves using a source of funds to attract other funds or combining multiple sources of funds. This report examines (1) the leverage measures and the transparency of the data and methods used to calculate them, and (2) the relevance of such measures in assessing performance that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) reported for six selected programs. To complete this work, GAO reviewed agency policies and reports, interviewed officials, and analyzed agency data.
What GAO Found
The leverage measures (such as ratios) HUD and Treasury reported for the selected programs in performance, budget, and other documents lacked transparency because the agencies generally did not disclose the limitations of the data or the methods used to calculate them. Based on its review of available leveraging data and interviews with HUD and Treasury officials, GAO found that the leverage measures the agencies reported for the selected programs were based on incomplete data and thus did not capture the actual extent of leveraging in the programs. GAO also found that while the agencies generally reported measures that described the ratio of all other funds (federal, state, local, and private funds) to program funds, alternative measures that described the total federal investment or total private investment in a program provided considerably different results--also potentially of value to decision makers--about the extent of leveraging in a program. GAO regularly has reported that clearly communicating data limitations and their potential impact may foster appropriate use of data; however, no agency-specific or governmentwide guidance directs what agencies should disclose about the leverage measures they report for the selected programs. Consequently, absent specific information on how these measures were calculated and their limitations, decision makers would not have sufficient information to understand their meaning and determine how they could and should be used in performance assessment, budgeting, and other contexts. Leverage measures can provide basic information about the programs GAO reviewed; however, their relevance in assessing the performance of these programs varies considerably. For all of the programs GAO reviewed, leverage measures can describe inputs, or the resources used to support program activities, and may be useful for conveying basic financial information. To the extent that leveraging is a goal or expected activity of a program (as in the three Treasury programs), leverage measures generally can describe program outputs, or the products or services delivered (such as total leveraged funds), and may be used along with other performance indicators to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of a program in meeting its goals. In cases where leveraging is not clearly and appropriately linked to program goals and activities (as in the three HUD programs), use of such measures to describe program outputs could be misleading and result in adverse consequences. Although leveraging had limited relevance to the goals and activities of the selected HUD programs, GAO found that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the agency often cited leverage measures for the programs in performance- and budget-related reviews and documents. Their continued use of leverage measures in these contexts could unnecessarily encourage HUD to place more importance on leveraging than meeting the stated goals of the selected programs. |
gao_GAO-11-693T | gao_GAO-11-693T_0 | U.S. law authorizes the imposition of AD/CV duties to remedy these unfair trade practices, namely dumping (i.e., sales at less than normal value) and foreign government subsidies. By contrast, other major U.S. trading partners have AD/CV duty systems that, although different from one another, are fundamentally prospective in that AD/CV duties assessed at the time a product enters the country are essentially treated as final. New shipper review: After an initial rate is established, a new shipper (i.e., a shipper who has not previously exported the product to the United States during the initial period of investigation and is not affiliated with any exporter who exported the subject merchandise) who is subject to the “all others” rate can request that Commerce conduct a review to establish the shipper’s own individual AD/CV duty rate. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for collecting the AD/CV duties. In addition, importers purchasing from the new shipper can pay estimated AD/CV duties by providing a bond in lieu of paying cash to cover the duties—an option known as the new shipper bonding privilege. Past Initiatives to Improve AD/CV Duty Collection Have Made Little Progress
CBP, Congress, and Commerce have undertaken several initiatives to address the problem of uncollected AD/CV duties. However, these initiatives have not resolved the problems associated with collections. CBP’s goal was to increase protection for securing AD/CV duty revenue for certain imports when the final amount of duties owed exceeds the amount paid at the time of importation, without imposing an “excessive burden” on importers. The enhanced bonding requirement was subject to domestic and World Trade Organization (WTO) litigation, and CBP decided to terminate the requirement in April 2009. Congress Temporarily Suspended New Shipper Bonding Privilege
Congress partially addressed the risk that CBP would not be able to collect AD/CV duties from new shippers by suspending the new shipper bonding privilege from August 2006 to July 2009. The Treasury stated in a 2008 report to Congress that the added risk associated with the bond compared with the cash deposit is low. Additional Options Exist for Improving Collection of AD/CV Duties
There are two key components of the U.S. AD/CV duty system that have not been addressed but could improve the collection of AD/CV duties: the retrospective nature of the system and the new shipper review process. As discussed earlier, importers pay the estimated amount of AD/CV duties when products enter the United States, but the final amount of duties owed is not determined until later. The long time lag between the initial entry of a product and the final assessment of duties heightens the risk that the government will be unable to collect the full amount owed, as importers may disappear, cease business operations, or declare bankruptcy. This process allows new manufacturers or exporters to petition for their own separate AD/CV duty rate. As a result, a shipper can be assigned an individual duty rate based on a minimal amount of exports—as little as one shipment, according to Commerce—and can intentionally set a high price for this small amount of initial exports. This creates additional risk by putting the government in the position of having to collect additional duties in the future rather than at the time of importation. Concluding Observations
The existence of a substantial amount of uncollected AD/CV duties undermines the effectiveness of the U.S. government’s efforts to remedy unfair foreign trade practices for U.S. industry. Some additional options exist that Congress could pursue to further protect government revenue. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since fiscal year 2001, the federal government has been unable to collect over $1 billion in antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CV) duties imposed to remedy injurious, unfair foreign trade practices. These include AD duties imposed on products exported to the United States at unfairly low prices (i.e., dumped) and CV duties on products exported to the United States that were subsidized by foreign governments. These uncollected duties show that the U.S. government has not fully remedied the unfair trade practices for U.S. industry and has lost out on a substantial amount of duty revenue to the U.S. Treasury. This statement summarizes key findings from prior GAO reports on (1) past initiatives to improve AD/CV duty collection and (2) additional options for improving AD/CV duty collection.
What GAO Found
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Congress, and Commerce have undertaken several initiatives to address the problem of uncollected AD/CV duties, but these initiatives have not resolved the problems associated with collections. Some of these initiatives include the following: (1) Temporary adjustment of standard bond-setting formula. Importers generally provide a general bond to secure the payment of all types of duties, but CBP determined in 2004 that the amount of this bond inadequately protected AD/CV duty revenue. CBP took steps to address this by revising its standard bond-setting formula and tested it on one product (shrimp) to increase protection for AD/CV duty revenue when the final amount of duties owed exceeds the amount paid at the time of importation. The enhanced bonding requirement was subject to domestic and World Trade Organization litigation, and CBP decided to terminate the requirement in 2009. (2) Temporary suspension of new shipper bonding privilege. Importers purchasing from "new shippers"--shippers who have not previously exported products subject to AD/CV duties--are allowed to provide a bond in lieu of cash payment to cover the initial AD/CV duties assessed, which is known as the new shipper bonding privilege. Congress partially addressed the risk that CBP would not be able to collect initial AD/CV duties from such importers by suspending the new shipper bonding privilege for 3 years and requiring cash deposits for initial AD/CV duties, but the privilege was reinstated in July 2009. The Department of the Treasury stated, however, that the added risk associated with the bond compared with the cash deposit is low. Additional options exist for improving the collection of AD/CV duties. First, the retrospective nature of the U.S. system could be revised. Under the existing U.S. system, importers pay the estimated amount of AD/CV duties when products enter the United States, but the final amount of duties owed is not determined until later, a process that can take more than 3 years on average. This creates a risk that the importer may disappear, cease business operations, or declare bankruptcy before the government can collect the full amount owed. Other major U.S. trading partners have AD/CV duty systems that, while different from one another, treat as final the AD/CV duties assessed at the time a product enters the country. Second, Congress could revise the level of exports required for exporters applying for new shipper status. Under U.S. law, new shippers to the United States can petition for their own separate AD/CV duty rate. According to Commerce, a shipper can be assigned an individual duty rate based on as little as one shipment, intentionally set at a high price, resulting in a low or 0 percent duty rate. This creates additional risk by putting the government in the position of having to collect additional duties in the future rather than at the time of importation. |
gao_GAO-15-530 | gao_GAO-15-530_0 | In this regard, DOD and VA have initiated work focused on near-term objectives including standardizing their existing health data and making them viewable by both departments’ clinicians in an integrated format. Further, the IPO has issued guidance outlining the technical approach for achieving interoperable capabilities between the departments’ systems. Even with the actions taken, however, the two departments did not, by the October 2014 deadline established in the fiscal year 2014 NDAA for compliance with national data standards, certify that all health care data in their systems complied with national standards and were computable in real time. DOD, VA, and the IPO have Taken Actions to Achieve Interoperability
As part of the approach toward achieving interoperability between their electronic health record systems, both DOD and VA, along with the IPO, have taken actions focused on near-term objectives including standardizing data and expanding the functionality and availability of patient health information. VA officials stated that the department plans to certify that it has met the requirement later in calendar year 2015. For example, among these metrics, the Health Data Interoperability Management Plan calls for tracking the percentage of data domains within the departments’ current health information systems that are mapped to selected national standards. While the IPO has developed process metrics and begun reporting the departments’ progress related to standardizing and exchanging health data, the office has not specified outcome-oriented metrics and established goals that are important to gauging the impact that increased interoperability has on improving health care services. Conclusions
DOD and VA, with guidance from the IPO, have taken actions to increase interoperability between their electronic health record systems, as called for in the fiscal year 2014 NDAA. To address the 2016 requirement, DOD has issued plans and announced the award of a contract for acquiring a modernized system to include interoperability capabilities across military operations. VA, for its part, has issued plans describing an incremental approach to modernizing its existing electronic health records system. While IPO officials have said that a team has been tasked to identify metrics that would be more meaningful for determining the impact of increased interoperability, no time frame has been identified for when this team will report its results and when the IPO plans to incorporate these metrics into its guidance. Without defining outcome-oriented metrics and related goals and incorporating these into the current approach, the departments and the IPO will not be positioned to assess and report on the status of interoperability-related activities and determine areas that need improvement. Recommendations for Executive Action
To facilitate oversight and inform decision making regarding their respective department’s interoperability-related activities, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs, working with the Interagency Program Office, take the following three actions: establish a time frame for identifying outcome-oriented metrics, ensure related goals are defined to provide a basis for assessing and reporting on the status of interoperability-related activities and the extent to which interoperability is being achieved by the departments’ modernized electronic health record systems, and update IPO guidance to reflect the metrics and goals identified. For example, the department contended that its limited initial deployment of the new system, combined with the pending documentation of interoperability, will satisfy the statutory requirement to “deploy modernized electronic health record software supporting clinicians of the departments by no later than December 31, 2016, while ensuring continued support and compatibility with the interoperability platform and full standards-based interoperability.” We disagree with DOD’s position and reaffirm our finding that DOD’s and VA’s plans—if implemented as currently described—indicate that deployment of the new systems will not be completed across the departments until after 2016 and that much additional work is needed to extend access to the modernized software to all relevant users and department locations. To evaluate the actions taken with regard to planning for electronic health record interoperability between the departments’ systems, we reviewed our previous work related to electronic health records and DOD and VA efforts to develop health information systems, interoperable health records, and interoperability standards to be implemented in federal health care programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD and VA operate two of the nation's largest health care systems, serving approximately 16 million veterans and active duty service members and their beneficiaries, at a cost of more than $100 billion a year. For almost two decades, the departments have been engaged in various efforts to advance DOD and VA electronic health record interoperability. Among their most recent efforts, the DOD and VA Secretaries have committed the departments to achieving interoperability between their separate electronic health record systems.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act , 2014, and accompanying Joint Explanatory Statement, included a provision for GAO to review the departments' efforts. GAO evaluated the actions taken by DOD, VA, and the IPO to plan for and measure the progress toward achieving interoperability between the departments' electronic health record systems. GAO reviewed relevant program documents and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA), with guidance from the Interagency Program Office (IPO) that is tasked with facilitating the departments' efforts to share health information, have taken actions to increase interoperability between their electronic health record systems. Among other things, DOD and VA have initiated work focused on near-term objectives, including standardizing their existing health data and making them viewable by both departments' clinicians in an integrated format. The departments also have developed longer-term plans to modernize their respective electronic health record systems. For its part, the IPO has issued guidance outlining the technical approach for achieving interoperability between the departments' systems.
Even with the actions taken, DOD and VA did not, by the October 1, 2014, deadline established in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 for compliance with national data standards, certify that all health care data in their systems complied with national standards and were computable in real time. Both departments stated that they intend to do so later in calendar year 2015. Further, the departments' system modernization plans identify a number of key activities to be implemented beyond December 31, 2016—the deadline established in the NDAA for the two departments to deploy modernized electronic health record software to support clinicians while ensuring full standards-based interoperability. Specifically, DOD has issued plans and announced the contract award for acquiring a modernized system to include interoperability capabilities across military operations. In addition, VA has issued plans describing an incremental approach to modernizing its existing electronic health records system. These plans—if implemented as currently described—indicate that deployment of the new systems with interoperability capabilities will not be completed across the departments until after 2018.
The IPO has taken steps to develop process metrics intended to monitor progress related to the data standardization and exchange of health information consistent with its responsibilities. For example, it has issued guidance that calls for tracking metrics, such as the percentage of data domains within the departments' current health information systems that are mapped to national standards. However, the office has not yet specified outcome-oriented metrics and established related goals that are important to gauging the impact that interoperability capabilities have on improving health care services for shared patients. IPO officials said this work is ongoing and that a team is working with DOD, VA, and subject matter experts to identify metrics that would provide more meaningful measures of the impact of increased interoperability. However, the IPO has not identified a time frame for when this team will report its results and when the IPO plans to incorporate these metrics and goals into its guidance. Without ensuring that outcome-oriented metrics and related goals are defined and incorporated into the current approach, the departments and the IPO will not be positioned to assess and report on the status of interoperability-related activities and determine areas that need improvement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and VA, working with the IPO, establish a time frame for identifying outcome-oriented metrics; define related goals to provide a basis for assessing and reporting on the status of interoperability; and update IPO guidance to reflect the metrics and goals identified. DOD and VA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-96-87 | gao_NSIAD-96-87_0 | Yuma Proving Ground tests aircraft armaments and sensor systems. While awaiting formal approval of the single-site consolidation at Yuma, in the spring 1995, the Army Secretary’s staff updated TECOM’s cost and savings analyses of two options: the single-site at Yuma and a dual-site at Fort Rucker and Yuma. While various Army officials and Army testing consolidation studies point to Yuma Proving Ground as providing the optimum testing environment for the Army, we found no indication that testing could not be conducted safely at the other locations. Likewise, Congress has urged DOD to downsize and consolidate testing activities. However, the services have been unable to agree on how best to achieve such consolidations. Of more immediate concern to DOD was the Army Secretary’s June 1995 tentative decision to consolidate Army aviation testing at Fort Rucker/Yuma. We believe that this is an appropriate approach to fully account for expected costs and savings. To broaden our perspective on aviation test and evaluation issues and future requirements, we held discussions with key testing officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army’s Aviation and Troop Command, the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base, and the Naval Air Warfare Center at Patuxent River, Maryland. These changes produced significant increases in projected annual recurring and long-term savings to the Army. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Secretary of the Army's tentative decision to move aviation testing activities now at Edwards Air Force Base, California, to Fort Rucker, Alabama, and retain Yuma Proving Ground.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Army failed to fully account for savings from consolidating its aviation testing activities; (2) consolidation at Fort Rucker and Yuma Proving Ground will result in the greatest short-term and significant long-term savings; (3) single-site consolidation at Yuma will result in the greatest long-term savings and an optimum testing environment for future testing; (4) the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have not reached consensus about how best to consolidate and downsize test activities; (5) excess aviation testing capacity within DOD signals that consolidation is necessary to reduce this excess; and (6) the Secretary of Defense will need stronger commitment and leadership to evaluate whether these options or other options will serve DOD best. |
gao_GAO-15-759 | gao_GAO-15-759_0 | DOD Has Initiated the Process to Determine DHA Personnel Requirements, but Cannot Determine the Effect of the DHA’s Establishment on MHS Administrative and Headquarters Personnel Levels
DOD has initiated a process for assessing the personnel requirements of the DHA, but it continues to operate without information that would allow it to determine the effect of the DHA’s establishment on the number of headquarters and administrative personnel in the MHS. However, the DHA has just begun its personnel requirements assessment, and DOD does not have a baseline estimate of MHS administrative and headquarters personnel levels that existed before the DHA was established. DOD Has Initiated a Process for Assessing the DHA’s Personnel Requirements, but This Process Has Been Delayed and Does Not Have a Detailed Timeline for Completion
DOD has initiated the process of assessing personnel requirements for the DHA, but this analysis will not be finished by the DHA’s proposed full operating capability in October 2015, and does not include a finalized timeline for its completion. According to DHA officials, the assessment will not be completed until September 2016. DOD concurred with the recommendation but has not yet implemented it. DOD Has Developed a Business Case Analysis Approach to Help Achieve Cost Savings in Eight of the Ten Shared Services but Has Not Taken Fundamental Steps for the Remaining Two
DOD has developed a business case analysis approach to help achieve cost savings and has applied this approach to eight of its ten shared services; DOD has not, however, developed comprehensive business case analyses for the remaining two shared services—Public Health and Medical Education and Training. In November 2013, we highlighted concerns regarding the basis of cost savings estimates and the potential impact of implementation costs on the DHA’s shared service projects. In November 2013, we reported that, while the information in DOD’s implementation plans generally reflected key characteristics of business case analyses, DOD did not present sufficient information to explain the basis for its cost-savings estimates. By sustaining its current approach to shared services, DOD can help ensure it has a framework to help it achieve cost savings. The DHA Has Made Progress in Developing Performance Measures to Assess Shared Services, but These Measures Do Not Fully Demonstrate Key Attributes of Successful Performance Measures
The DHA has made progress in developing measures to assess the progress of its ten shared services toward achieving their respective goals; however, these measures continue to not fully demonstrate key elements that can contribute to success in assessing performance. Since our November 2013 review, DHA has made progress in developing performance measures to assess its shared services. Specifically, all ten shared services have measures that demonstrate at least some of these attributes; however, collectively, they do not demonstrate all of the attributes, as we had previously recommended. Clarity. Measurable Target. DOD’s further development of performance measures for the ten DHA shared service projects shows progress toward addressing our prior recommendation—to develop and present to Congress performance measures that fully exhibit those key attributes identified in our prior work. Further, the DHA has made significant improvements to its approach to achieving cost savings through shared services. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide decision makers with appropriate and more complete information on the continuing implementation, management, and oversight of the DHA, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to take the following five actions:
Develop a timeline for completion of the personnel requirements assessment that includes milestones and interim steps;
Develop a comprehensive requirements assessment process that accounts for needed future skills through the consideration of potential organizational changes and helps ensure appropriate consideration of workforce composition through the determination of the final status of military personnel within the DHA;
Develop a plan for reassessing and revalidating personnel requirements as the missions and needs of the DHA evolve over time;
Develop information concerning the number and cost of administrative and headquarters personnel within the MHS and provide this information as an annual exhibit in the President’s budget; and
Determine the future of the Public Health and Medical Education and Training shared services by either identifying common functions to consolidate to achieve cost savings or by developing a justification for the transfer of these functions from the military services to the DHA that is not premised on cost savings. In concurring with our recommendation that DOD develop a timeline for completion of the personnel requirements assessment that includes milestones and interim steps, DOD stated that it had developed a project plan to track progress in this area. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation is valid. GAO-10-696. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2013, DOD created the DHA to provide administrative support for the services' respective medical programs and combine common “shared” services to achieve cost savings. House Report 113-446 included a provision that GAO review DOD's progress in implementing the DHA. This report addresses the extent to which DOD has made progress in (1) assessing the personnel requirements of the DHA and its effect on MHS personnel levels; (2) developing an approach to achieving cost savings through shared services; and (3) fully developing performance measures to assess its shared services.
GAO reviewed DOD's personnel requirements assessment process, business case analyses, and performance measures for the DHA's shared services. GAO compared this information with key management practices and DOD guidance. Additionally, GAO interviewed officials from the DHA and the military services.
What GAO Found
Nearly 2 years after the creation of the Defense Health Agency (DHA), the Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress toward completing its implementation process, but has not addressed issues related to GAO's past recommendations regarding personnel requirements, an approach to cost savings, and performance measures.
Personnel - The DHA has initiated the process of assessing personnel requirements, but this process has been delayed, does not have a detailed timeline for completion with milestones and interim steps, and is not comprehensive. It does not address key issues—such as the effect of possible personnel growth in the DHA and workforce composition issues. DOD cannot determine the DHA's effect on the Military Heath System's (MHS) administrative and headquarters staff levels because (1) the DHA has not completed the personnel requirements assessment process and (2) it has not, as GAO recommended in November 2013, developed a baseline estimate of personnel in the MHS before the DHA was created. DOD stated that the requirements assessment process will not be completed until September 2016. Further, although DOD does not plan to develop a baseline estimate and is not tracking personnel-related savings, DOD can take steps that would contribute to the development of comprehensive personnel information, such as including information concerning the number and cost of administrative and headquarters personnel within the MHS in annual budget documents.
Approach to help achieve cost savings - The DHA has developed a business case analysis approach to help it achieve cost savings for 8 of its 10 DHA shared services. This approach largely addresses GAO's November 2013 recommendations that DOD provide more information on its cost savings estimates and monitor implementation costs. However, the DHA has not developed comprehensive business case analyses for 2 shared services—Public Health, and Medical Education and Training. Specifically, the DHA has proposed the transfer of their functions from the military services, but has not identified common functions to consolidate in order to achieve cost savings, which is the primary purpose of establishing shared services.
Performance measures – The DHA has made progress in developing measures to assess the progress of its10 shared services toward achieving their respective goals; however, these measures do not demonstrate some key elements that GAO has found can contribute to success in assessing performance, such as clarity, measurable targets, and baseline data. Specifically, all 10 DHA shared services have measures that demonstrate at least some of these attributes; however, collectively, they do not demonstrate all of the attributes, as GAO recommended in November 2013. These key attributes can help ensure that DOD officials have the information necessary to measure progress toward achieving the stated goals of the shared services. While DOD has made progress in the development of these performance measures, GAO's November 2013 recommendation that DOD develop performance measures that fully exhibit those key attributes is valid and should be completely implemented.
What GAO Recommends
In addition to GAO's prior recommendations, GAO is making a number of recommendations related to the DHA's personnel requirements and approach to achieving cost savings. DOD concurred with all but one recommendation to develop a plan for reassessing its personnel requirements, partially concurring and citing existing guidance. GAO continues to believe that current guidance in this area is insufficient, and that DOD would benefit from a plan for reassessing its personnel needs as the DHA's missions and needs evolve. |
gao_GAO-12-344 | gao_GAO-12-344_0 | Termination of the Project
While the New Jersey governor had affirmed support for the ARC project in an April 6, 2010, letter to the Secretary of Transportation, on October 27, 2010, the governor announced the cancellation of the project, citing potential cost growth and the state’s fiscal condition. Anticipated Benefits of ARC Project
Regional Travel Demand and Mobility
According to the studies we reviewed, the ARC project would have provided a significant increase in rail capacity for moving commuters between New Jersey and New York. NJT and other planning organization officials said that increases in capacity were a key mobility benefit of the project. With this increase in capacity, projections made as part of the project’s environmental study showed an anticipated increase in transit ridership as follows:
Daily trips between New Jersey and New York Penn Station would have increased from about 174,000 without the project to about 254,000 (a 46 percent increase) with the project by 2030. Economic Activity
Studies estimated the ARC project would have generated economic activity in the region that would have affected jobs and personal income, business activity, and home values, among other things. Another study estimated that the project would generate about 5,700 construction- related jobs each year during the 9-year construction.years after completion of the project, the same study estimated the region would gain 44,000 new jobs as a result of improved access, which would make the region more competitive compared to other In addition, 10 The same study estimated that 10 years after completion, regions.the project would have added almost $4 billion in personal income to the region, in 2006 dollars. Environmental Effects
The ARC environmental study estimated the project would have created limited, but mostly positive environmental effects. FTA determined that these short-term negative effects were adequately addressed by mitigation plans. Project Cost Estimates Increased Over Time and about Half the Planned Funding Was from Federal Sources
In 2003, the first cost estimates for the concept of a new commuter rail tunnel between New Jersey and New York—developed by NJT and other local agencies in the major investment study—ranged from $2.9 billion to $3.6 billion (in year 2000 dollars). ARC project cost estimates increased over time as shown in table 1. Third, project cost estimates are sensitive to factors such as changes to the scope of the project. After discussions, FTA and NJT agreed upon a baseline cost estimate of $8.7 billion in 2009. After considering comments from NJT, FTA revised the cost range to $9.8 billion to $12.4 billion. As of April 2010, about half the estimated cost of about $8.7 billion would have come from federal sources with the remainder divided at the local and state levels between the Port Authority and the New Jersey Turnpike Authority. Planning Documents Did Not Determine the Source of Funding of Potential Cost Growth
The general project agreement, which was a document prepared as part of the New Starts process and signed by NJT and the Port Authority in 2009, addressed potential cost growth. The additional funding options discussed included increased funding by the federal government, New Jersey, and the Port Authority; a federal railroad loan; or a public-private Because the project was terminated before a partnership contribution.full funding grant agreement was entered into between FTA and NJT, there was no final agreement by all the parties on the issue of responsibility for ARC cost growth. Agency Comments
The Department of Transportation reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report. Appendix I: Federal Transit Administration’s New Starts Process
The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) provided federal funding for a portion of the Access to the Region’s Core costs through its New Starts program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Studies have estimated that transit travel demand between New Jersey and Manhattan will increase by 38 percent by 2030. The Access to the Regions Core commuter rail project was designed to help meet that rising demand. In October 2010, the governor of New Jersey, citing potential cost growth and the states fiscal condition, withdrew state support and cancelled the project. The New Jersey Transit (NJT) was the lead agency for the project, supported by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority). The project was to be partially funded under the Federal Transit Administrations (FTA) New Starts program.
GAO was asked to examine (1) what would have been the mobility, economic, and environmental benefits of the project according to major planning studies; (2) the project cost estimates over time; and (3) how, if at all, documents prepared as part of the New Starts process addressed potential cost growth for the project.
GAO reviewed the literature and major project planning studies, FTA reports, and economic and cost estimates by NJT and other planning organizations. GAO interviewed officials from FTA, state and local transit agencies, and local planning organizations. GAO is making no recommendations in this report.
The Department of Transportation provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated in the report.
What GAO Found
Studies estimated that the Access to the Regions Core commuter rail project would have provided mobility benefits, but other benefits would either have been limited or are difficult to measure. According to various studies:
The project would have helped meet the projected increase in travel demand and improved mobility by doubling the number of daily peak period trains, and significantly increasing daily trips between New Jersey and Manhattanfrom about 174,000 without the project to 254,000 with the project by 2030while reducing transfers and station crowding and improving reliability of service.
The project potentially would have generated economic activity in the region in the form of jobs and income, business activity, and increased home values, but many economic effects were hard to predict with certainty. For example, the extent to which the project would shift the location of economic activity, versus providing additional net economic activity, is uncertain.
The project was estimated to have created limited but mostly positive environmental effectsin particular, improved air qualityand included measures to mitigate negative effects such as noise and storm water runoff.
Over time, the cost estimates for the project increased from an initial estimate of $7.4 billion in 2006. In 2008 and 2010, FTA performed risk assessments and revised the cost estimate. FTA and NJT agreed upon a baseline cost estimate of $8.7 billion in 2009. After considering comments from NJT, which projected lower costs than FTA, FTA revised its estimate and issued a cost estimate of $9.8 billion to $12.4 billion in October 2010. As of April 2010, federal sources were expected to fund about half the cost, with the remainder divided between New Jersey Turnpike funds and the Port Authority.
Because the project was terminated before FTA and NJT entered into a full funding grant agreement, there was no final agreement by all the parties on the issue of responsibility for project cost growth. While the Secretary of Transportation and the governor of New Jersey held discussions on additional funding options, planning documents did not address the source of funding of potential cost growth for the project. |
gao_GAO-10-586T | gao_GAO-10-586T_0 | Disability Insurance (Disability)—provides benefits to eligible workers who have qualifying disabilities, and their eligible family members. They also may use the Internet to file for benefits, or visit a Social Security Card Center to request a Social Security card. Recent Hiring Has Helped Field Offices Manage Growing Claims Workloads, but Work Quality and Customer Service Have Declined
Since we last examined service at SSA field offices, SSA has expanded the level of staffing, and encouraged greater use of automated services. However, rapidly rising workloads have adversely affected customer service and the quality of some work, despite SSA’s efforts. In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, SSA hired a combined number of 4,931 staff for field offices, which helped to almost restore field offices to their fiscal year 2005 staffing level. 1). SSA Has Used Several Different Strategies to Manage Growing Workloads
Even with the increases in field office staffing in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, and some increases in average productivity by employees, many field office managers, responding to a survey conducted in February 2010 by the National Council of Social Security Management Association, Inc. (NCSSMA), stated that staffing levels are inadequate to deal with the growing public service challenges they face daily in field offices. 2). According to SSA’s fiscal year 2008/2009 field office caller survey, 58 percent of callers got a busy signal or a recording that lines were busy when they called field offices—up from 45 percent in fiscal year 2007, and 55 percent in fiscal year 2008. Because SSA based its results only on customers who were ultimately able to get through to the field offices, the actual percentage of customers that had unanswered calls was likely higher. SSA Has Not Developed a Plan to Describe How It will Address Future Service Delivery Challenges
SSA has not yet offered a plan to detail how it will continue to do more work with fewer resources and achieve its strategic goals. In our 2009 report and prior reports, we recommended that SSA develop a service delivery plan to outline how it would deliver quality service while managing growing work demands and limited resources. However, because of a continuing concern about the agency’s lack of a consolidated plan to address service and staffing, SSA agreed to develop a single document to describe its plan for addressing future service delivery challenges. SSA officials did not provide us with an update on where the agency stood in developing this plan. With projected increases to SSA’s workload from retirement and disability filings from the nation’s baby boom generation, and a continued wave of retirements of experienced staff, the need for such a plan is greater than ever. As we stated in our January 2009 report, it will be more difficult for SSA to meet higher workload challenges as a result of the anticipated retirement of many of the agency’s most experienced field office workers. Based on SSA’s projections, 22 percent of SSA’s current workforce will retire by fiscal year 2013, and the figure will grow to 41 percent by fiscal year 2018. Concluding Observations
While SSA is managing increasing workloads resulting from growing retirement and disability claims, it still faces the challenge of providing quality service. Such challenges make it essential for SSA to develop a plan to manage its increasing workload. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of people rely on the services of Social Security Administration (SSA) field offices. In fiscal year 2009, SSA's approximately 1,300 field offices provided service to a record 45.1 million customers. People visit field offices to apply for Social Security cards, apply for retirement and disability benefits, request replacement benefit checks, and a host of other services. Over the last several years, growing workloads have challenged field offices' ability to manage work while continuing to deliver quality customer service. The Subcommittee asked GAO to discuss our January 2009 report on SSA field office service delivery challenges. Specifically, this testimony will discuss (1) the state of SSA field office operations, and (2) the status of SSA's efforts to develop a plan to address future service delivery challenges. To respond to the request, GAO relied primarily on the January 2009 report titled Social Security Administration: Service Delivery Plan Needed to Address Baby Boom Retirement Challenges ( GAO-09-24 , Jan. 2009), and updated it with additional information provided by SSA. In that report, GAO recommended that SSA develop a service delivery plan that explains how it will deliver quality service while managing growing work demands. SSA agreed to develop a document that describes service delivery and staffing plans. No new recommendations are being made in this testimony.
What GAO Found
Since we last examined service at SSA field offices, SSA has expanded the level of staffing, and encouraged greater use of automated services. However, rapidly rising workloads have adversely affected customer service and the quality of some work, despite SSA's efforts. Recent hiring by SSA nearly restored field offices to their fiscal year 2005 level, but field offices have experienced rapid growth in their retirement and disability claims workloads. SSA used various strategies to manage the growing workload, including deferring some reviews of beneficiaries' continuing eligibility. However, deferring these reviews means that beneficiaries who no longer qualify for benefits may still receive payments erroneously. Key customer service indicators were also affected. In fiscal year 2009, more than 3 million customers waited over 1 hour to be served. Further, SSA's Field Office Caller Survey found that 58 percent of customers calling selected field offices had at least one earlier call that had gone unanswered, but for methodological reasons, the unanswered call rate was likely even higher. SSA has not yet offered a plan to detail how it will address future service delivery challenges as GAO recommended in January 2009. With projected increases to SSA's workload from retirement and disability filings from the nation's baby boom generation, and a continued wave of retirements of experienced staff, the need for such a plan is greater than ever. SSA estimates about a 14 percent rise in Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Disability Insurance (Disability), and Supplemental Security Income claims over the next 10 years, rising from a combined total of 9.4 million, in fiscal year 2008 to 10.7 million in fiscal year 2017. In addition, based on SSA's projections, 41 percent of the current workforce will retire by fiscal year 2018. With such challenges, it is critical for SSA to develop a plan to discuss how it will address future challenges. SSA officials did not provide GAO with an update on where the agency stood in developing such a plan. |
gao_GAO-11-309 | gao_GAO-11-309_0 | A cost estimate is: e when it accounts for all possible costs associated with a project, is structured in sufficient detail to ensure that costs are neither omitted nor double-counted, and the estimating teams’ composition is commensurate with the assignment; well documented when supporting documentation is accompani narrative explaining the process, sources, and metho the estimate and contains the underlying data used to develop the estimate; accurate when it is based on an assessment of the costs most likely d and not overly conservative or too optimistic; and credible when it has been cross-checked with an independent cost estimate, the level of confidence associated with the point estim been identified through a risk and uncertainty analysis, and a sensitivity analysis has been conducted—that is, the project has ate has examined the effect of changing one assumption related to eac activity while holding all other variables constant in order to iden which variable most affects the cost estimate. GAO Estimates One-Time Costs to Be Between $258.7 Million and $356.0 Million, Lower Than the Navy’s Estimate
Our independent cost estimate suggests that the total one-time cost of homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport will be between $258.7 million and $356.0 million, in base year 2010 dollars. The Navy’s estimate of the one-time costs is $537.6 million, also in base year 2010 dollars, which is outside the upper range of our estimate. Unlike our estimate, the Navy did not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis on its one-time costs; as a result, its estimate does not include a range. GAO Estimates Recurring Costs to Be Between $9.0 and $17.6 Million Per Year, and the Navy’s Estimate Falls Within This Range
Our independent cost estimate indicates that the annual recurring cost of homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport is expected to be between $9.0 million and $17.6 million each year, and the Navy’s $15.3 million per year estimate of the annual recurring cost is within the range of our estimate. Since the Navy determined this cost as a percentage of total building construction costs for their estimates, the Navy’s higher cost results from its higher estimate for construction of the controlled industrial facility and the ship maintenance support buildings. Navy’s Estimate Does Not Fully Meet Any of the Four Characteristics for Producing a High- Quality Cost Estimate
The Navy’s estimate did not fully meet any of the four characteristics— comprehensive, accurate, well documented, and credible—for producing a high-quality cost estimate. The Navy’s Estimate Is Partially Comprehensive
The Navy’s estimate partially meets the criteria for being comprehensive. Some elements of the estimate are based on a historical record of cost estimating and actual experiences from other comparable programs. The documentation contains very little step- by-step description of how the estimate was developed so that a cost analyst unfamiliar with the program could understand what was done and replicate it. Moreover, Navy officials had to recreate several portions of the estimate to provide us with supporting documentation. The Navy's Estimate Does Not Meet GAO's Best Practices for a Credible Estimate
Overall, the Navy's estimate does not meet the GAO best practices’ criteria for a credible estimate, because it does not include a sensitivity analysis and was not compared by the Navy to an independent cost estimate conducted by a group outside the acquiring organization. Additionally, without detailed documentation that describes how the estimate was derived, the Navy can neither present a convincing argument of the estimate’s affordability, nor credibly answer decision makers’ and oversight groups’ questions about specific details in the estimate. DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to improve the (1) comprehensiveness of the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimate for the planned homeporting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport by including all potential recurring costs and clearly describing the ground rules and assumptions underlying the estimation of each cost element and (2) quality and transparency of the Navy’s estimate by thoroughly documenting the life-cycle costs associated with the planned homeporting. We therefore believe this recommendation remains valid. To determine to what extent the estimate adheres to the characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, we evaluated the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimate to determine whether it met key characteristics identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Appendix II: Additional Information on GAO’s Independent Cost Estimate
Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier
Contents
Purpose of the Estimate Program Characteristics Estimating Structure Ground Rules and Assumptions Methodology Overview Comparison of GAO’s 65 Percent Confidence Level
Purpose of the Estimate
Satisfy the direction in House Report 111-491, accompanying
a proposed bill for the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136), to develop an independent estimate of the total direct and indirect costs to be incurred by the federal government for the proposed homeporting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review called for the Navy to provide more warfighting assets more quickly to multiple locations. Subsequently, the Navy made a preliminary decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, which was affirmed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. In House Report 111-491, accompanying a proposed bill for the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136), GAO was directed to develop an independent estimate of the total federal costs for the proposed homeporting. GAO's objectives were to (1) develop an independent estimate of the full life-cycle costs to homeport a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport and (2) determine to what extent the Navy's estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate. To do this, GAO worked with a firm experienced in preparing life-cycle cost estimates for major federal acquisitions and compared the Navy's cost estimating practices with the best practices in GAO's "Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide."
What GAO Found
GAO's independent cost estimate suggests that the total one-time cost of homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport is expected to be between $258.7 million and $356.0 million, in base year 2010 dollars. The Navy's estimate of the one-time cost is $537.6 million--also in base year 2010 dollars--which is outside the upper range of GAO's estimate. Unlike GAO's estimate, the Navy did not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis on its one-time costs; as a result, its estimate does not include a range. The largest difference between GAO's estimate of one-time costs and the Navy's estimate is the cost of constructing new facilities at Mayport. Based on the historical costs of constructing similar facilities, GAO estimates at the 65 percent confidence level that the cost for constructing the controlled industrial facility will be $70.5 million, and the cost for constructing the ship maintenance support facilities will be $45.6 million. The Navy estimates the construction costs to be much higher at $139.1 million and $157.2 million, respectively. Navy officials told GAO the difference is due to the increased cost involved in protecting the buildings from a potential storm surge associated with a Category 4 hurricane. GAO included a hurricane factor in its estimate to account for this increase, but GAO and the Navy used different estimating methods in developing the estimates for the construction costs. GAO used adjusted actual costs from similar construction projects, while the Navy used a detailed engineering estimate. For recurring costs, GAO's independent cost estimate suggests that the total is expected to be between $9.0 million and $17.6 million per year. The Navy's estimate of $15.3 million per year is within GAO's estimated range. The Navy's estimate did not fully meet any of the four characteristics-- comprehensive, accurate, well documented, and credible--for producing a high-quality cost estimate. Specifically, although the estimate included almost all of the life-cycle costs related to homeporting a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport, it partially met the criteria for being comprehensive because it does not fully describe the cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions. The estimate was only minimally accurate and well documented in that although many elements of the estimate are based on actual experiences from other comparable programs, it is difficult to say if the cost estimates are the most likely costs since the Navy did not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis. Further, the estimate contains very little step-by-step description of how the estimate was developed so that a cost analyst unfamiliar with the program could independently replicate it. The Navy had to recreate several portions of the estimate in order to provide GAO with supporting documentation. Further, the Navy's estimate does not meet the GAO best practice for a credible estimate because it does not include a sensitivity analysis and was not compared by the Navy to an independent cost estimate conducted by a group outside the Navy. Without fully meeting the characteristics of a high-quality estimate, the Navy's ability to present a convincing argument of the estimate's affordability and credibly answer decision makers' and oversight groups' questions about the estimate is hampered.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD take several actions to improve the quality of its Mayport cost estimate. DOD partially concurred with two recommendations and disagreed with one, generally stating that additional direction or change is not required. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-15-602 | gao_GAO-15-602_0 | Following the crosscutting review, NASA’s Chief Operating Officer (COO) determined final ratings during a briefing attended by the PIO and each of the strategic objective leaders. Clarify and Clearly Define Measurable Outcomes for Each Strategic Objective to Be Reviewed
A strategic review starts with framing the outcome or impact the agency seeks to achieve. In some cases, defining and measuring the outcome related to a strategic objective may be relatively straightforward. According to PIO staff, for the success statements, objective leaders and staff were asked to characterize or define the outcomes of success in implementing their objectives in the next 10 years by answering questions such as, “What will the agency have completed, obtained, contributed, advanced?” NASA officials told us that because it can be difficult to measure progress towards long-term, scientific discovery-oriented outcomes, they also rely on underlying multiyear performance goals, annual performance indicators, and milestones to better plan for and understand near-term progress towards those objectives. Identify the Strategies and Other Factors That Influence the Outcomes and Determine Which Are Most Important
It is critical to identify, at a conceptual level, the various strategies and factors that can help or hinder achievement of the strategic objective. As illustrated in figure 5, the logic model shows how the output of FNS’s programs (left column) contribute to relevant near-term and long-term outcomes (the three columns to the right). Identify Key Stakeholders to Participate in the Review
Because the achievement of outcomes may be complex and involve a variety of contributors from within an agency, or include other federal agencies, levels of government, and sectors, it is critical to consider which key stakeholders should be involved in a strategic review. Although no one outside of HUD directly participated in the review, HUD officials stated that they leveraged their existing relationship with officials at the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (Interagency Council) and the 18 other federal agencies that comprise it to better understand how other federal programs are contributing to progress in ending This included attending and homelessness for the target populations.participating in various meetings, including quarterly meetings with the Interagency Council principals, staff-level coordinating meetings, and targeted working groups, such as bimonthly meetings of the chronic and family homelessness working group. For its objective to promote sustainable and livable communities, OSWER officials developed what they called a “ladder of evidence”—a framework and inventory of relevant performance information, scientific studies, academic research, and program evaluations, which they then assessed and categorized by strength. Assess Effectiveness in Achieving Strategic Objectives and Identify Actions Needed to Improve Implementation and Impact
Using relevant evidence, strategic review participants should assess whether strategies are being implemented as planned and whether they are having the desired effect, as well as whether other factors are influencing results. DHS Is Developing New Performance Measures to Address Gaps in Data Identified during Strategic Review
Although CBP, TSA, ICE, and Coast Guard officials determined during their review that sufficient progress was being made on DHS’s Goal 2.2 to Safeguard and Expedite Lawful Trade and Travel, they also identified gaps to address in performance monitoring. For example, agencies could use their existing quarterly performance review processes to monitor progress on strategic review action items, in line with the emphasis in OMB’s guidance for using existing agency management processes for strategic reviews. HUD’s performance staff told us they work with responsible parties to update the status of each action item and provide a report to the Deputy Secretary regularly. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of the report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Department of Education, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for comment. OMB staff and officials from the six agencies generally agreed with the findings presented in this report. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
We are required to review implementation of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) at several critical junctures. Our specific objective for this report was to identify and illustrate, through case agency examples, practices that facilitate effective strategic reviews by federal agencies. To identify practices, we analyzed and synthesized information gathered from a literature review we conducted, which covered public administration and public policy journals, business administration journals, our body of work on performance management and program evaluation, and other sources on policies and practices that can facilitate or challenge the effectiveness of strategic reviews as a decision-making tool. As a proxy, we used relevant agency-level results on selected items from our 2013 survey of federal managers on performance and management issues to approximate if agencies had robust review processes and selected agencies with varying levels of robustness. We also considered the extent to which agency strategic review processes had a greater chance of addressing areas of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, and high-risk issues identified in our past work. We also conducted interviews with officials involved in conducting strategic reviews at the six selected agencies—which included agency Performance Improvement Officers and their staff, strategic objective leaders, and strategic review participants—and staff from OMB and the PIC. | Why GAO Did This Study
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) provides important tools that can help inform federal decision making. In implementing GPRAMA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established a strategic review process in which agencies, beginning in 2014, were to annually assess their progress in achieving each strategic objective—the outcome the agency is intending to achieve—in their strategic plans.
GPRAMA requires GAO to periodically review its implementation. This report identifies and illustrates practices that facilitate effective strategic reviews.
To identify such practices, GAO analyzed and synthesized information from a variety of sources, including GPRAMA's requirements; OMB guidance; a review of relevant literature; and interviews with experts in performance management and evaluation and OMB staff. To refine and illustrate the practices, GAO reviewed strategic review documentation and interviewed relevant officials from six selected agencies: USDA, Education, DHS, HUD, EPA, and NASA. GAO selected these agencies based on several factors. This included the extent to which agency strategic review processes had a greater chance of addressing areas identified in GAO's work on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication or high-risk issues, and agency results on selected items in GAO's 2013 survey of federal managers on performance and management issues.
In commenting on a draft of this report, OMB and the six selected agencies generally agreed with the findings.
What GAO Found
GAO identified seven practices federal agencies can employ to facilitate effective strategic reviews and illustrated aspects of those practices through examples from the strategic review processes conducted at the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Education (Education), Homeland Security (DHS), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
1. Establish a process for conducting strategic reviews. NASA developed a strategic review process that involved senior leaders in individual assessments and a rating of each strategic objective, a crosscutting review to identify themes and provide independent rating recommendations, and a briefing to the Chief Operating Officer to determine final ratings.
2. Clarify and clearly define measurable outcomes for each strategic objective. NASA officials defined what would constitute success in 10 years for each strategic objective and used underlying performance goals, indicators, and milestones to better plan for and understand near-term progress towards their long-term scientific outcomes.
3. Review the strategies and other factors that influence the outcomes and determine which are most important. USDA's Food and Nutrition Service developed a model showing how the output of its programs contribute to relevant near-term and long-term outcomes related to the department's objective to improve access to nutritious foods. The model also identifies external factors that could influence progress, such as food prices.
4. Identify and include key stakeholders in the review. Contributors from various agencies, levels of government, and sectors may be involved in achieving an outcome. While the six agencies involved internal stakeholders in their strategic reviews, GAO did not find instances of external stakeholder involvement. In some cases, agencies took steps to incorporate external perspectives, such as HUD leveraging its existing relationship with officials at the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness to better understand how other federal programs are contributing to progress towards its objective to end homelessness for target populations.
5. Identify and assess evidence related to strategic objective achievement. For EPA's objective to promote sustainable and livable communities, officials developed a framework and inventory of relevant performance information, scientific studies, academic research, and program evaluations, which they then assessed and categorized by strength.
6. Assess effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives and identify actions needed to improve implementation and impact. For DHS's goal to safeguard and expedite lawful trade and travel, officials determined that sufficient progress was being made, but identified gaps in monitoring efforts, such as a lack of performance measures related to travel. DHS officials are taking steps to develop measures to address the gaps.
7. Develop a process to monitor progress on needed actions. HUD broadened its existing process for tracking progress on actions items identified at its quarterly performance reviews to also cover those from strategic reviews. HUD staff update the status of each action item regularly—planned to be biweekly following the 2015 strategic reviews. |
gao_GAO-04-925 | gao_GAO-04-925_0 | Background
The Stryker family of vehicles consists of 10 eight-wheeled armored vehicles mounted on a common chassis that provide transport for troops, weapons, and command and control. The Army’s original operational requirements for Stryker vehicles included (1) the capability of entering, being transportable in, and exiting a C-130 aircraft; (2) the vehicle’s combat capable deployment weight must not exceed 38,000 pounds to allow C-130 transport of 1,000 miles; and (3) the Stryker vehicles must be capable of immediate combat operations after unloading. The Army has similar operational requirements for its Future Combat Systems’ vehicles. The Army plans to form four more Stryker brigades from 2005 through 2008. Acquisition of Stryker Production Vehicles Is about Two-thirds Complete, Though Overall Program Costs Have Increased, and Operational Cost Estimates Are Not Yet Reliable
Acquisition of the eight Stryker production vehicle configurations is about two-thirds complete with about 68 percent of the over 1,800-planned production vehicles ordered, and a low rate of production for the two developmental Strykers is scheduled for September 2004. However, the Army does not yet have reliable estimates for the Stryker’s operating costs, such as for vehicle maintenance, because of limited peacetime operational experience with the vehicles. Stryker Vehicle Program’s Costs Have Increased from Earlier Estimates
The Stryker vehicle program’s total costs increased, in then-year dollars, from the original November 2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to the December 2003 estimate of $8.7 billion—or about 22 percent. Mobile Gun System Development and Testing Schedule Ongoing but Delayed
Although developmental testing is ongoing, the development and testing schedule of the Mobile Gun System has been delayed, resulting in more than a 1-year delay in meeting planned production decision milestone dates, with initial limited production to start in September 2004. The delay was primarily due to additional time needed to develop and test the vehicle’s nuclear, biological, and chemical sensor systems. 6). Regardless, with the added weight of the armor even in ideal flight conditions, the aircraft would be too heavy to take off. These same weight concerns would also apply to the Army’s Future Combat Systems vehicles, which according to the Army’s operational requirements should be no larger than 38,000 pounds and be transportable by a C-130. Once reconfigured, units of the Stryker brigade also demonstrated the ability to conduct immediate combat operations. During our review, Army officials acknowledged the significant challenges and limitations of meeting expectations for transporting Stryker vehicles— and beyond 2010, the Future Combat Systems—on C-130 aircraft in terms of limited flight range, the size force that could be deployed, and the challenges of arriving ready for combat. Provide to Congress information that clarifies the expected C-130 tactical intratheater deployment capabilities of Stryker brigades and Stryker vehicles and describes probable operational missions and scenarios using C-130 transport of Stryker vehicles that are achievable, including the size of a combat capable C-130 deployable Stryker force; describes operational capability limitations of Stryker brigades given the limits of C-130 transport; and identifies options for, and the feasibility of, alternative modes of transportation—such as C-17 aircraft— for transporting Stryker brigades within an operational theater. Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its transformation to a more responsive and mobile force, the Army plans to form 6 Stryker Brigade Combat teams equipped with a new family of armored vehicles known as Strykers. The Stryker--which provides transport for troops, weapons, and command and control--was required by the Army to weigh no more than 38,000 pounds and be transportable in theater by C-130 cargo aircraft arriving ready for immediate combat operations. The Army plans to equip its future force with a new generation of vehicles--Future Combat Systems--to also be transportable by C-130s. GAO was asked to assess (1) the current status of Stryker vehicle acquisition, including the most current Stryker vehicle program and operating cost estimates; (2) the status and results of Stryker vehicle tests; and (3) the ability of C-130 aircraft to transport Stryker vehicles within a theater of operations. This report also addresses the transportability of the Army's Future Combat Systems on C-130 aircraft.
What GAO Found
The acquisition of the Stryker vehicles is about two-thirds complete; with about 1,200 of 8 production vehicle configurations ordered and 800 delivered to units. In addition, limited quantities of two developmental vehicles--the Mobile Gun System and the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicle prototypes--have also been ordered for testing. Stryker program costs have increased about 22 percent from the November 2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to the December 2003 estimate of $8.7 billion. Total program costs include acquisition costs--procurement, research, development, and test and evaluation--as well as military construction costs related to Strykers. The Army does not yet have reliable estimates of the Stryker's operating costs because of limited peacetime use to develop data. As of June 2004, testing of the eight production Strykers was mostly complete, with the vehicles meeting Army operational requirements with limitations. However, development and testing schedules of the two developmental Strykers have been delayed, resulting in an over 1-year delay in meeting the vehicles' production milestones and fielding dates. While the Army has demonstrated the required transportability of Strykers by C-130 aircraft in training exercises, in an operational environment, the Stryker's average weight of 38,000 pounds--along with other factors such as added equipment weight and less than ideal flight conditions--significantly limits the C-130's flight range and reduces the size force that could be deployed. These factors also limit the ability of Strykers to conduct combat operations immediately upon arrival as required. With the similar maximum weight envisioned for Future Combat System vehicles intended for the Army's future force, the planned C-130 transport of those vehicles would present similar challenges. |
gao_GAO-04-933 | gao_GAO-04-933_0 | The Kennedy Center receives federal funding annually for capital improvement projects based on its Building Plan. Kennedy Center Has Received Over $150 Million for Capital Projects
The Kennedy Center has received approximately $152 million in federal appropriations for capital projects since it took responsibility for these projects in fiscal year 1995. The Kennedy Center has the flexibility to change the projects or sequence of projects it plans to fund on the basis of such factors as the need to minimize disruptions to the operations of the Center and budget constraints. Seventeen projects are planned for fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and include several large projects with life safety components, such as the installation of sprinklers. Finally, we believe the funding anticipated in the Building Plan may not be sufficient to complete all of the planned projects. The Comprehensive Building Plan Is of Limited Use in Understanding the Status of the Kennedy Center’s Renovations
The Building Plan is of limited use in understanding the Kennedy Center’s progress in implementing its plan to renovate the Center because it does not include the status of projects identified in prior plans or provide budget information for individual projects. For example, the Kennedy Center combined several life safety projects identified in the Building Plan into one project that is currently under way and the Center expects to be completed in fiscal year 2006. Kennedy Center Will Likely Request Additional Operations and Maintenance Funding for Its New Plaza Project
In fiscal year 2004, the Kennedy Center received about $16 million for operations and maintenance costs for the existing Center and will likely need additional federal appropriations for O&M expenses when the new plaza project is complete. O&M Costs for the Proposed Plaza Project Could Range from $6 Million to $11 Million
On the basis of data from a survey of museum facility management practices and Kennedy Center data, we calculate that the potential O&M costs for the proposed plaza project could range from $6 million to $11 million, in current dollars. This is due, in part, to changes in the sequence of its planned projects. In addition, the letter did not agree with how we counted the projects identified in the Comprehensive Building Plan. Scope and Methodology
To determine the amount of federal appropriations the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (Center) requested and received for capital projects for fiscal years 1995 to 2004, we reviewed the Kennedy Center’s annual budget justification to Congress and Comprehensive Building Plan and its updates; federal authorization and appropriation laws; and the Kennedy Center’s audited financial statements. Finally, we relied on the Kennedy Center’s 2002 Comprehensive Building Plan to determine the amount of federal appropriations the Center expects to request through fiscal year 2008. Finally, we compared the information the Kennedy Center provided on the status of the capital projects in the Building Plan and its updates and capital appropriations received since fiscal year 1995 to evaluate the likelihood that the plan would be fully implemented as planned by the end of fiscal year 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since fiscal year 1995, the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (Center) has been responsible and received federal funding for implementing capital improvement projects and operations and maintenance activities. The Kennedy Center's Comprehensive Building Plan identifies capital projects needed to renovate the Center and bring it into compliance with current life safety and accessibility codes. The Kennedy Center currently is planning to construct, with private funds, two new buildings to open in 2013 on a new plaza to be built adjacent to the existing facility. The Kennedy Center expects federal funding to operate and maintain these buildings. GAO was asked to examine (1) how much the Center has received in federal appropriations for capital projects, (2) the status of the Comprehensive Building Plan and updates, and (3) the potential impact of the Center's plaza project on the need for future operations and maintenance funding.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 1995 through 2004, the Kennedy Center received approximately $152 million in federal appropriations for capital projects identified in its Comprehensive Building Plan. According to its fiscal year 2002 Comprehensive Building Plan, the Kennedy Center will need an additional $57 million in federal appropriations from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2008 to complete its planned capital projects. The Kennedy Center has completed many of the capital projects identified in the Comprehensive Building Plan and has many more ongoing. However, we do not expect the Center to be able to complete all of the capital projects identified in the plan by fiscal year 2008. This is in part because the Kennedy Center reprioritized the sequence of its planned projects to minimize disruptions to its patrons. Several of the projects that will likely not be completed include components, such as the installation of sprinklers, that are important in meeting the Kennedy Center's goal of bringing the facility into compliance with current life safety codes. However, the Comprehensive Building Plan does not discuss changes to its prioritization of projects or the impact of those changes on completing its planned renovations. In addition, the updates to the plan do not include information on the status of projects identified in earlier plans or provide budget information for individual projects. As a result, the Comprehensive Building Plan is of limited use for understanding the Kennedy Center's progress in completing its planned renovations. Operations and maintenance costs for the plaza project, including two new buildings, could range from $6 million to $11 million annually, in current dollars, based on data from a survey of museum facility management practices and Kennedy Center data. The Kennedy Center expects to request additional annual federal appropriations for these costs. However, because the project is currently in the early planning phase, the operations and maintenance estimate could change as designs are finalized. In fiscal year 2004, the Center received about $16 million for the operations and maintenance costs of the existing facility. |
gao_GAO-11-238T | gao_GAO-11-238T_0 | DHS Has Made Progress in Harmonizing International Aviation Security and Facilitating Compliance through Foreign Airport Assessments, but Can Further Strengthen Assessment Efforts
DHS Has Made Progress in Its Efforts to Harmonize International Aviation Security Standards and Practices
DHS has increased its global outreach efforts. In the wake of the December 2009 incident, DHS increased its outreach efforts. Further, in early 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security participated in five regional summits—Africa, the Asia/Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere—with the Secretary General of ICAO, foreign ministers and aviation officials, and international industry representatives to discuss current aviation security threats and develop an international consensus on the steps needed to address remaining gaps in the international aviation security system. Through the declaration, member states recognized the need to strengthen aviation security worldwide and agreed to take nine actions to enhance international cooperation to counter threats to civil aviation, which include, among other things strengthening and promoting the effective application of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, with particular focus on Annex 17, and developing strategies to address current and emerging threats; strengthening security screening procedures, enhancing human factors, and utilizing modern technologies to detect prohibited articles and support research and development of technology for the detection of explosives, weapons, and prohibited articles in order to prevent acts of unlawful interference; developing and implementing strengthened and harmonized measures and best practices for air cargo security, taking into account the need to protect the entire air cargo supply chain; and providing technical assistance to states in need, including funding, capacity building, and technology transfer to effectively address security threats to civil aviation, in cooperation with other states, international organizations and industry partners. TSA has increased coordination with foreign partners to enhance security standards and practices. TSA has also worked with foreign governments to draft international air cargo security standards. Moreover, following the October 2010 bomb attempt in cargo originating in Yemen, DHS and TSA, among other things, reached out to international partners, IATA, and the international shipping industry to emphasize the global nature of transportation security threats and the need to strengthen air cargo security through enhanced screening and preventative measures. In addition, TSA has focused on harmonizing air cargo security standards and practices in support of its statutory mandate to establish a system to physically screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft—including the domestic and inbound flights of United States and foreign passenger operations—by August 2010. In response to the December 2009 incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security has emphasized through outreach efforts the need for nations to develop and deploy enhanced security technologies. As a result, several nations, including Australia, Canada, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Germany, Poland, Japan, Ukraine, Russia, Republic of Korea, and the UK, have begun to test or deploy AIT units or have committed to deploying AITs at their airports. For example, because the AIT presents a full-body image of a person during the screening process, concerns have been expressed that the image is an invasion of privacy. We also reported that TSA did not consistently track and document host government progress in addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA airport assessments. As such, we made several recommendations to help TSA strengthen oversight of its foreign airport assessment program, including, among other things, that TSA develop controls to track the status of foreign airport assessments from initiation through completion; and develop a standard process for tracking and documenting host governments’ progress in addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments. Challenges Related to the Harmonization Process and TSA’s Foreign Airport Assessment Program May Affect DHS’s Progress
Challenges Related to Harmonization
A number of key challenges, many of which are outside of DHS’s control, could impede its ability to enhance international aviation security standards and practices. Harmonization depends on voluntary participation. As we reported in 2007 and 2010, some foreign governments do not share the United States government’s position that terrorism is an immediate threat to the security of their aviation systems, and therefore may not view international aviation security as a priority. Resource availability affects security enhancement efforts. Legal and cultural differences among nations may hamper DHS’s efforts to harmonize aviation security standards. Challenges Related to TSA’s Foreign Airport Assessment Program
Our 2007 review of TSA’s foreign airport assessment program identified challenges TSA experienced in assessing security at foreign airports against ICAO standards and recommended practices, including a lack of available inspector resources and host government concerns, both of which may affect the agency’s ability to schedule and conduct assessments for some foreign airports. We plan to further assess this issue, as well as other potential challenges, as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s foreign airport assessment program, which we plan to issue in the fall of 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
The attempted December 25, 2009, terrorist attack and the October 2010 bomb attempt involving air cargo originating in Yemen highlight the ongoing threat to aviation and the need to coordinate security standards and practices to enhance security with foreign partners, a process known as harmonization. This testimony discusses the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and challenges in harmonizing international aviation security standards and practices and facilitating compliance with international standards. This testimony is based on reports GAO issued from April 2007 through June 2010, and ongoing work examining foreign airport assessments. For this work, GAO obtained information from DHS and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and interviewed TSA program officials, foreign aviation officials, representatives from international organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and industry associations, about ongoing harmonization and TSA airport assessment efforts and challenges.
What GAO Found
In the wake of the December 2009 terrorist incident, DHS and TSA have strived to enhance ongoing efforts to harmonize international security standards and practices through increased global outreach, coordination of standards and practices, use of enhanced technology, and assessments of foreign airports. For example, in 2010 the Secretary of Homeland Security participated in five regional summits aimed at developing an international consensus to enhance aviation security. In addition, DHS and TSA have coordinated with foreign governments to harmonize air cargo security practices to address the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on U.S.-bound passenger aircraft by August 2010, which TSA aims to meet by 2013. Further, in the wake of the December 2009 incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security has encouraged other nations to consider using advanced imaging technology (AIT), which produces an image of a passenger's body that screeners use to look for anomalies such as explosives. As a result, several nations have begun to test and deploy AIT or have committed to deploying AIT units at their airports. Moreover, following the October 2010 cargo bomb attempt, TSA also implemented additional security requirements to enhance air cargo security. To facilitate compliance with international security standards, TSA assesses the security efforts of foreign airports as defined by ICAO international aviation security standards. In 2007, GAO reported, among other things, that TSA did not always consistently track and document host government progress in addressing security deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and recommended that TSA track and document progress in this area. DHS and TSA have made progress in their efforts to enhance international aviation security through these harmonization efforts and related foreign airport assessments; however, a number of key challenges, many of which are beyond DHS's control, exist. For example, harmonization depends on the willingness of sovereign nations to voluntarily coordinate their aviation security standards and practices. In addition, foreign governments may view aviation security threats differently, and therefore may not consider international aviation security a high priority. Resource availability, which is a particular concern for developing countries, as well as legal and cultural factors may also affect nations' security enhancement and harmonization efforts. In addition to challenges facing DHS's harmonization efforts, in 2007 GAO reported that TSA experienced challenges in assessing foreign airport security against international standards and practices, such as a lack of available international inspectors and concerns host governments had about being assessed by TSA, both of which may affect the agency's ability to schedule and conduct assessments for some foreign airports. GAO is exploring these issues as part of an ongoing review of TSA's foreign airport assessment program, which GAO plans to issue in the fall of 2011. In response to prior GAO recommendations that TSA, among other things, track the status of foreign airport assessments, DHS concurred and is working to address the recommendations. TSA provided technical comments on a draft of the information contained in this statement, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
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