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gao_HEHS-98-24 | gao_HEHS-98-24_0 | The valuation estimates generally represent a benchmark for the not-for-profit hospital to use in negotiating a purchase price. Of the 14 hospitals, 7 received more than one bid. The not-for-profit and for-profit parties to the purchase agreements are relying on the new for-profit hospital boards of directors to monitor compliance and ensure that the terms of the agreements are enforced.Although the for-profit entities and board members are responsible for fulfilling the terms of the agreements, for-profit boards are also responsible for the interests of stockholders and the profitability of the hospital. Specifically, they said public participation in the sales transactions could be detrimental to the value of the selling hospital or result in the disclosure of trade secrets. Of the 14 conversions in our review, 12 directed proceeds to foundations. Some Attorneys General Have Exercised Their Authority to Oversee Conversions
State attorneys general generally have authority to review not-for-profit conversions and, where appropriate, to enforce state requirements that protect charitable benefits. Attorneys general in four states in our review (Alabama, California, South Carolina, and Tennessee) reported that authority to oversee and monitor hospital conversions is granted through state provisions related to not-for-profit corporations. The Virginia attorney general has authority to review conversion transactions through common law. According to the American Hospital Association, hospital officials should (1) ensure that they have devised a plan for providing charity care and other essential community services, (2) obtain a valuation of charitable assets by an independent party, (3) ensure that the resulting charitable entity continues to serve the appropriate health needs of the community, (4) disclose publicly the terms of the agreement and provide an opportunity for public comment, and (5) inform the appropriate state official of the terms of the conversion. For all three joint ventures we reviewed, the charitable foundation board members also participated on the for-profit joint venture board. Joint operating agreements (JOA) raise similar private benefit and conflict-of-interest issues. In carrying out their oversight roles, FTC and Justice investigate and challenge, where appropriate, potentially anticompetitive hospital mergers and acquisitions. IRS officials responded that the report generally reflects the agency’s position. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to concerns surrounding not-for-profit hospital conversions, we were asked to determine for these conversions the methods used to value assets, to what extent funds from the sale of hospital assets are directed to foundations, to what extent the proceeds from hospital conversions are fulfilling their charitable missions, and what role federal and state governments play in the conversion of hospitals from not-for-profit to for-profit status. As part of our review of the conversion process, we also reviewed the processes used for soliciting interest and receiving bids; the terms negotiated as part of the sales agreement, including provisions for charity care; and the extent of community involvement. To determine the methods used to value assets, the processes used for soliciting interest and receiving bids, the terms negotiated as part of the sales agreement, and the extent of community involvement in the conversion process, we interviewed for-profit hospital chief executive officers (CEO); attorneys who represented the not-for-profit hospitals in the conversion transactions; and other hospital, university, city, and foundation officials with knowledge of the not-for-profit hospital conversion process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the process that some not-for-profit hospitals have used in converting to for-profit status, focusing on: (1) the method used to value assets; (2) the process used to solicit interest and obtain bids; (3) the terms negotiated as part of the sales agreement, including provisions for continued charity care; (4) the extent of community involvement in the process; (5) how the proceeds from the sale were used to fulfill charitable missions; and (6) the role state and federal governments play in regulating and monitoring hospital conversions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the process of converting from a not-for-profit hospital to a for-profit hospital was similar among the transactions GAO reviewed; (2) most transactions were carried out between boards and executives of the selling hospitals and representatives of the for-profit purchasers and not routinely subject to public disclosure; (3) standard industry methodologies were used to estimate the value of the 14 not-for-profit hospitals GAO reviewed; (4) 8 of the 14 hospitals received multiple bids, and almost all of the hospitals reported accepting a purchase price greater than the valuation estimate; (5) in negotiating conversion terms, most hospitals included provisions for continued charity care and services in the agreement; (6) the for-profit hospital or joint venture boards resulting from the conversions are responsible for monitoring compliance with these agreements and ensuring that they are enforced; (7) except for members of the boards of directors, community involvement in conversion decisions was limited; (8) net proceeds reported from the conversions totalled about $950 million; (9) of the 14 transactions, 12 directed net proceeds to charitable foundations; (10) in most states, attorneys general have authority to monitor and oversee hospital conversions through common law and not-for-profit corporation law; (11) for nine of the conversions reviewed, five state attorneys general exercised their authority to review the conversion process; (12) states are beginning to increase the authority of attorneys general through specific conversion legislation, allowing a state official to review the terms of the deal and the direction of the charitable proceeds; (13) the federal government's role in monitoring hospital conversions is carried out mostly by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) which oversee tax and antitrust issues; (14) IRS officials stated that the operation of the joint venture may result in more than incidental benefit to the for-profit partner, thereby creating a basis for denying or revoking the tax status of the charitable entity; (15) another issue related to joint ventures involves the participation of individuals on both not-for-profit and for-profit boards, creating a potential conflict of interest; and (16) FTC officials reported that antitrust issues related to hospital conversions do not differ from other mergers and acquisitions, and the agency's involvement has generally been limited to a routine oversight role. |
gao_GGD-96-86 | gao_GGD-96-86_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the extent of concessions operations in the federal government, (2) the rate of return received by the federal government from concessions and the factors affecting the rate of return, (3) how the federal government’s rate of return compared to other governments’ rates of return, and (4) the extent of agencies’ nonconcessions activities that generated income in fiscal year 1994 and whether they offered opportunities for the agencies to handle them like concessions. As shown in table 1, 10,427 (over 92 percent) of the total 11,263 reported concessions agreements were with the 6 land management agencies. The reported $82.5 million of government receipts includes funds that concessioners deposited into special accounts that officials said are primarily used for repairs and improvements to facilities on government property. Nine of the 42 agencies or agency components also estimated that concessioners provided an additional $4.7 million in nonfee compensation by maintaining government property. Our analysis of the reported data showed a rate of return of 2.8 percent for the 6 land management agencies’ concessions, 9.2 percent for the nonland management agencies’ concessions, and 3.1 percent for the 50 concessions with the largest reported amount of gross revenues in our survey. Four states and Canada reported on average a 12.7 percent rate of return. Competition Resulted in a Higher Rate of Return From Concessions Operations
As shown in appendix VI, concessions agreements entered into on a competitive basis had higher rates of return than those that were not competed. The information showed that nonland management agencies entered into 101 of the agreements and competed 96 percent of them, and the land management agencies initiated 2,133 of these concessions agreements and competed 8.6 percent of them. They estimated that activities generating $175 million, or about 1 percent of the $20.5 billion in income, could be converted into concessions operations. Forty-two departments and agencies responded because some had more than one component managing concessions. Some agencies reported that gross revenue data were not available because concessioners paid a flat concessions fee and the agency had no requirement to track gross revenues. It charged a flat concessions fee. All 75 agencies responded to our request. 27, 1991). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on government concession contracting in 1994, focusing on: (1) the extent of government concession operations; (2) the amount of and factors that affect federal concession returns; (3) how federal concession return rates compare with other governments' return rates; and (4) whether agencies' non-commission income gathering operations could be converted into concessions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) 27 of the 75 federal departments and agencies surveyed had entered into concessioning agreements; (2) 42 of these agencies and agency components managed a total of 11,263 concessions programs; (3) 92 percent of these concession agreements were held by 6 land management agencies; (4) gross revenue from the concessions totalled $2.2 billion, but agencies lacked sufficient data to determine the gross revenues of all concession operations; (5) concessioners paid the government $82.5 million, including $64.6 million in concession fees and $17.9 million for facility repair and improvement; (6) concessioners provided the government with an additional $4.7 million in non-fee compensation by maintaining government property; (7) the government's return rate on concessioners' gross revenues was 3.6 percent; (8) other governments surveyed had average concession return rates of 12.7 percent; (9) competitively awarded concession agreements where fees were considered in the competition had higher return rates than those that were not competed; (10) although 96 percent of non-land-management-agency concessions were awarded competitively, only 8.6 percent of land management agencies concessions were awarded competitively; (11) the agencies able to retain more than 50 percent of their concessions fees had higher return rates than those agencies required to deposit their returns into treasury funds; and (12) 29 of the 75 agencies had income generating-operations other than concessions, but many of these activities could not be concession contracted because of security and privacy concerns. |
gao_GAO-03-932T | gao_GAO-03-932T_0 | In the mid-1990s, DOE began a series of contracting reforms to improve its contractors’ performance. DOE Has Competed FFRDC Contracts for Three Main Reasons
DOE has had three main reasons for competing its FFRDC contracts instead of extending the contracts noncompetitively: when the contractor operating the laboratory is a for-profit entity, when mission changes warrant a review of the capabilities of other potential contractors, or when the incumbent contractor’s performance is unsatisfactory. DOE has considerable flexibility in deciding whether to compete a management and operating contract for one of its FFRDC laboratories. This preference for competition is an outcome of DOE’s contract reform initiative, which concluded that DOE needed to expand the use of competition in awarding or renewing contracts. Among other things, the 1996 guidance specifies that, before a noncompetitive contract extension can occur, DOE must provide a certification that full and open competition is not in the best interest of a detailed description of the incumbent contractor’s past performance, an outline of the principal issues and/or significant changes to be negotiated in the contract extension, and in the case of FFRDCs, a showing of the continued need for the research and development center in accordance with criteria established in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. For the 16 remaining FFRDC contracts that DOE sponsors, DOE has competed 6 of them and is planning to compete two additional contracts in 2004 and 2005. Congressional committees and others have called for DOE to compete these contracts. In April 2003, the Secretary of Energy decided to open the Los Alamos National Laboratory contract to competition when the current contract expires in September 2005. DOE has also decided to restructure the FFRDC contracts supporting work at the Idaho National Laboratory. DOE plans to restructure the two contracts so that one focuses on the nuclear energy research mission and the other focuses on the cleanup mission at the site. DOE also plans to include the activities at Argonne West in the contract competition for the site’s research mission and to remove the Argonne West scope of work from DOE’s existing contract with the University of Chicago to operate Argonne National Laboratory. Competing Its Contracts Is One of Several Mechanisms DOE Has to Address Contractor Performance, but Effective Oversight and Improved Outcome Measures Are Also Needed
Competing contracts is one of several mechanisms DOE can use to address contractor performance problems or strengthen contract management. However, competing a contract does not ensure that contractor performance will improve. Other steps DOE has taken as part of its contract reform initiative to address contractor performance issues include changing the type of contract, such as from a cost-reimbursement to a fixed-price contract, or establishing or strengthening performance- based incentives in the contract. Even these changes to DOE’s contracts do not by themselves ensure that contractor performance will improve. We have reported that DOE must also (1) effectively oversee its contractors’ activities in carrying out projects and (2) use appropriate outcome measures to assess overall results and apply lessons learned to continually improve its contracting practices. DOE is still working to put a best-practices approach in place. Therefore, the department has compelling reasons to ensure that it has in place an effective set of contracting and management practices and controls. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE is the largest civilian-contracting agency in the federal government, and relies primarily on contractors to operate its sites and carry out its diverse missions. For fiscal year 2003, DOE will spend about 90 percent of its total annual budget, or $19.8 billion, on contracts, including $9.4 billion to operate 16 of its research laboratories (called federally funded research and development centers). Since 1990, GAO has identified DOE's contract management as high-risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In 1994, DOE began reforming its contracting practices to, among other things, improve contractor performance and accountability. As part of that effort, DOE has at times used competition in awarding contracts to manage and operate its research laboratories. In September 2002, GAO reported on the status of contract reform efforts in DOE. (Contract Reform: DOE Has Made Progress, but Actions Needed to Ensure Initiatives Have Improved Results) (Sep. 2002, GAO-02-798) This testimony discusses some of the findings in that report. GAO was asked to testify on DOE's rationale for deciding whether to compete a laboratory research contract, the extent to which DOE has competed these contracts, and the role of competition and other mechanisms in improving contractor performance.
What GAO Found
DOE has competed its research laboratory contracts in three main situations--when the contractor operating the laboratory is a for-profit entity, when mission changes warrant a review of the capabilities of other potential contractors, or when the incumbent contractor's performance is unsatisfactory. DOE guidance requires that to extend a contract noncompetitively, the department must present a convincing case for doing so to the Secretary of Energy. Among other things, DOE must certify that competing the contract is not in the best interests of the government and must describe the incumbent contractor's past successful performance. Of the 16 research laboratory contracts currently in place, DOE has competed 6. The remaining 10 contracts have not been competed since the contractors began operating the sites--in some cases, since the 1940s. DOE recently decided to compete 2 of the 10 contracts that had never before been competed--contracts to operate the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Argonne West Laboratory, located at the Idaho National Laboratory. DOE decided to compete the Los Alamos contract because of concerns about the contractor's performance, and to compete the Argonne West contract as part of an overall effort to separate the Idaho National Laboratory's nuclear energy research mission from the environmental cleanup mission at the Idaho site. Competing contracts is one of several mechanisms DOE can use to address contractor performance problems or strengthen contract management. However, just competing a contract does not ensure that contractor performance will improve. Other aspects of DOE's contract reform initiative intended to improve contractor performance included greater use of fixed-price contracts instead of cost-reimbursement contracts and establishing or strengthening performance-based incentives in existing contracts. In addition, GAO has reported that DOE must (1) effectively oversee its contractors' activities in carrying out projects and (2) use appropriate outcome measures to assess overall results and apply lessons learned to continually improve its contracting practices. GAO's recent evaluation of DOE's contract reform efforts indicates that DOE is still working to put these management practices and outcome measures in place. |
gao_GGD-99-87 | gao_GGD-99-87_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine what regulators were doing to oversee the Year 2000 readiness of the insurance industry, we interviewed officials of NAIC and reviewed available information on the organization’s efforts to facilitate states’ Year 2000 activities and summarize information in the area. To determine the status of the insurance industry’s Year 2000 readiness, we interviewed regulatory officials who were responsible for Year 2000 oversight in the 17 states and reviewed available documentation on the readiness of the industry. Regulatory Approaches Varied Widely by State, Creating Year 2000 Oversight Challenges
Regulatory approaches and the level of oversight activity directed to the insurance industry’s Year 2000 readiness varied widely in the states we visited. The 17 states also differed in how they assessed and prioritized companies for regulatory attention in terms of Year 2000 readiness. Such variations raise a question about the extent to which states can rely on one another’s judgments regarding the preparedness of nondomiciled companies doing business in their states. This would be especially problematic when relying on states where the level of Year 2000 oversight activity is relatively limited or the criteria for assessing readiness may be considered too lax. State regulators’ efforts to validate the Year 2000 readiness of insurance companies began later than those of the banking and securities regulators. Information on the Year 2000 Readiness of the Insurance Industry Has Limitations, but the Industry Is Viewed as Generally on Track
Regulatory information on the Year 2000 readiness of the nation’s insurance industry does not provide the necessary information to judge whether the industry will be ready for 2000. Some Insurers Face Potentially Large Year 2000 Liability Costs; Effects of Related Mitigation Efforts Are Uncertain
Within the insurance industry, major concerns and preparations related to the Year 2000 date change are not limited to readiness issues, but also include liability exposure issues. Year 2000-Related Liability Exposures and Legal Costs Are Not Yet Estimable but May Be Significant for Some Insurers
Industry professionals and observers acknowledge that the magnitude of Year 2000-related exposures cannot be estimated at this time. State regulators and industry observers report that the insurance industry is in reasonably good condition with respect to Year 2000 readiness. Although many insurers have taken actions to reduce their potential liability exposures, the effectiveness of these mitigation efforts remains uncertain. Ultimately, insurers’ Year 2000-related liability exposures will depend on decisions made to resolve key legal questions and numerous pending legislative initiatives. Specifically, the state insurance regulators we visited were less active in their efforts to promote Year 2000 readiness and efforts to validate information on the status of companies’ readiness. They were also less active in planning for and pursuing formal enforcement actions against companies identified as inadequately preparing for Year 2000 and at a high risk of not being ready for the millenium change. Moreover, variations in oversight approaches among state regulators also made it difficult to ascertain the overall status of the insurance industry’s Year 2000 preparedness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the readiness of the insurance industry to meet the year 2000 date change, focusing on: (1) what state regulators were doing to oversee the year 2000 readiness of the insurance industry; (2) how the regulatory oversight of the insurance industry's year 2000 readiness compared with the oversight of the banking and securities industries; (3) the status of the insurance industry's year 2000 readiness; and (4) the nature and extent of year 2000 liability exposures that insurers face and the mitigation efforts taken to address such exposures.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the 17 state insurance regulators GAO visited differed in their approach and level of oversight activity directed to the insurance industry's year 2000 readiness; (2) these state regulators also differed in how they assessed and ranked insurance companies in terms of year 2000 readiness; (3) such variations raise a question about the extent to which states can rely on one another's judgments regarding the preparedness of nondomiciled insurance companies doing business in their states; (4) this question is especially applicable to those states where the level of year 2000 oversight is relatively limited or the criteria for assessing readiness may be considered lax; (5) variations in oversight approaches among state regulators also made it difficult to ascertain the overall status of the insurance industry's year 2000 readiness; (6) regulatory oversight of the insurance industry's year 2000 readiness began later than the oversight of the banking and securities industries; (7) the state insurance regulators GAO visited were less active in their efforts to promote year 2000 readiness and efforts to validate information on the status of companies' readiness; (8) they were also less active in planning for and pursuing formal enforcement actions against companies identified as inadequately preparing for 2000 and at a high risk of not being ready for the millenium change; (9) regulatory information on the year 2000 readiness of the nation's insurance industry, consisting primarily of self-reported information obtained through surveys, does not provide the necessary information to judge whether the industry will be ready for 2000; (10) insurance regulators and other observers GAO contacted generally have a favorable view of the industry's year 2000 readiness; (11) these regulators and industry observers expressed confidence that companies were actively preparing for the year 2000 date change because of competitive pressures and the business need to process date-sensitive information before 2000; (12) the magnitude of insurers' year 2000-related liability exposures cannot be estimated at this time, and the effectiveness of efforts to mitigate these exposures remains uncertain; (13) costs associated with year 2000-related exposures could be substantial for some property-casualty insurers, due to potential claims and legal defense costs; and (14) despite efforts to mitigate potential exposures, the year 2000-related costs that may be incurred by insurers will remain uncertain until key legal issues and actions on pending legislative initiatives are resolved. |
gao_GAO-06-268 | gao_GAO-06-268_0 | Background
Education administers discretionary grants both through competitions and through consideration of unsolicited proposals. A budget analysis is also required to be conducted to ensure that no grant funds are awarded for unallowable purposes. Process for Making Awards Based on Unsolicited Proposals
Education’s policy is to award the vast majority of discretionary grant funds through the competitive process, however it may also fund grants based on unsolicited proposals. In 2001 and 2002, Education Made Exceptions to Its Policies in Awarding the Three Grants
Education made progress since 2003 in improving its policies for awarding discretionary grants; however, prior to these improvements we found that Education made exceptions to its policies that benefited the grantees in question. For the two competitive grants, we found that Education officials reduced funding to all of the grantees to accommodate awards to lower-rated grantees and did not conduct analyses to assess the impact of these reductions on the ability of the applicants to achieve the goals of their projects. In doing so, Education broke from established practice by altering its selection methodology after it had developed a list of grantees recommended for funding. With regard to the third grant, which was an unsolicited proposal, we found that Education made the award with approval from only one of three independent reviewers and lacked a process for reconciling differences among peer reviewers’ ratings. Furthermore, Education awarded four unsolicited grants in 2001 that had not been recommended for funding by any one of the three reviewers, contrary to departmental regulations. In addition, we found many of the grant files lacked documentation documented evidence that Education had conducted three standard procedures for screening potential grantees: (1) a review of the applicant’s compliance with audit requirements; (2) a review of the applicant’s eligibility for the program; and (3) a review of requested costs and expenses to determine whether they were allowable. Nor did we find any instances in which Education officials re-reviewed peer reviewers’ initial assessments. Formal Plans That Govern Grant Competitions Frequently Were Not Finalized As Required
In 2003 and 2004 we found no evidence that competition plans—the procedural and scoring blueprint for each grant competition and a key management control—were changed after the expert reviews were completed. Education Selected Unsolicited Proposals That Varied Greatly in Content and Provided Extensive Technical Assistance
While Education has taken steps to centralize and improve its process for reviewing unsolicited proposals, it based its screening decisions on proposals that varied greatly and frequently provided extensive technical assistance. We also found that OII provided extensive technical assistance to some applicants. In 2004, 10 of the 27 applicants failed to garner the reviewers’ support. Of those 10 grantees, 2 declined to resubmit their applications—citing time constraints—and were not approved. The remaining eight applicants revised their proposals and were subsequently recommended for approval by peer reviewers after the revisions were submitted. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix discusses in detail our scope and methodology for (1) reviewing Education’s grant award decisions for the 2001 and 2002 grants in question to determine whether the department had followed its policies in place at the time, (2) assessing the department’s policies and procedures in place in 2003 and 2004 for the competitive awards process and determining whether Education followed them in making such awards in those years, and (3) assessing Education’s process for reviewing unsolicited proposals in 2003 and 2004. During this 2-year period, a total of 521 grants were awarded. Department of Education Grant Award. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the past 3 years, Education awarded an average of $4.8 billion annually in discretionary grants through its competitive awards process and through consideration of unsolicited proposals. GAO assessed Education's policies and procedures for both competitive awards and unsolicited proposals awarded by its Office of Innovation and Improvement in 2003 and 2004 and determined whether it followed them in awarding grants in those years. GAO also reviewed Education's grant award decisions for several 2001 and 2002 grants to determine whether the department followed its own policies.
What GAO Found
In 2003 and 2004, Education took steps to improve its procedures for awarding discretionary grants through competitions but certain procedures were not always followed. During this time, after Education introduced some new management controls to its competitive grants procedures, we found it generally adhered to these new policies. For example, GAO did not find evidence that Education reduced any applicant's request without first conducting a budget analysis, as required, or that Education rescored applications after they had been peer reviewed. However, certain procedures were not always followed; for example, Education frequently did not finalize its plans for conducting competitions before starting the competitions--a step that would help ensure transparency in making awards. In addition, many files lacked documentation that the department screened the applicants, as required, to identify incompetent applicants, ineligible grantees, or unallowable expenditures. Since 2003, Education has also taken steps to reform its process for awarding grants based on unsolicited proposals, but it based its screening decisions on proposals that vary greatly and frequently provided extensive technical assistance. Following a departmental reorganization, Education established a centralized process for reviewing unsolicited proposals. However, these proposals, which Education used as a basis to certify that there is a substantial likelihood that the application will meet regulatory requirements, varied greatly in content and detail. GAO also found that Education provided extensive technical assistance to applicants, in some instances, providing applicants with the notes of peer reviewers and allowing applicants to revise and resubmit applications. Specifically, in 2004, 10 of the 27 applicants did not get reviewers' support and were provided a chance to re-apply. Of those 10 applicants, 8 revised their proposals, received favorable recommendations, and were subsequently funded. Prior to 2003, Education made exceptions to some of its policies in awarding three grants, totaling about $12.3 million, where particular allegations were raised. Two of the grants were awarded through a competitive process, but GAO found that Education reduced funding to all of the grantees to expand the number of grantees funded and to accommodate awards to lower rated grantees. In doing so, Education altered its selection methodology after it developed and recommended a list of grantees. In one case, Education rescored and reversed the order of selected grantees after the peer reviewers had completed their assessments. Education awarded the third grant based on an unsolicited proposal and regulations require that the department seek recommendations from peer reviewers prior to funding. In this case, the peer reviewers could not agree on a recommendation. GAO found that Education lacked a process to reconcile disagreements among reviewers and awarded a grant that two of three reviewers did not recommend. Moreover, Education awarded four grants in 2001 for unsolicited proposals that had not been recommended for funding by any one of the three reviewers. |
gao_GAO-04-1099T | gao_GAO-04-1099T_0 | In addition, SSNs are used as breeder information to create additional false identification documents, such as drivers’ licenses. Private Sector Entities Routinely Obtain and Use SSNs, and Certain Laws Affect The Disclosure of This Information
Private sector entities such as information resellers, CRAs, and health care organizations routinely obtain and use SSNs. We found that these entities usually use SSNs for various purposes, such as to build tools that verify an individual’s identity or match existing records. Certain federal laws have limited the disclosures private sector entities are allowed to make to their customers, and some states have also enacted laws to restrict the private sector’s use of SSNs. Private Sector Entities Obtain SSNs from Public and Private Sources and Use SSNs for Various Purposes
Private sector entities such as information resellers, CRAs, and health care organizations generally obtain SSNs from various public and private sources and use SSNs to help identify individuals. We also found that Internet-based resellers rely extensively on public sources and records displayed to the public. Large information resellers said that they generally use the SSN as an identity verification tool. In addition, given the open nature of certain government records, SSNs appear in some records displayed to the public. Given the potential for misuse, some government agencies are taking steps to limit their use and display of SSNs and prevent the proliferation of false identities. Public Sector Entities Are Required by Laws and Regulations to Obtain SSNs and Use SSNs for Various Purposes
Government agencies obtain SSNs because a number of federal laws and regulations require certain programs and federally funded activities to use the SSN for administrative purposes. For example, personnel departments of these agencies use SSNs to help them maintain internal records and provide employee benefits. Documents that record financial transactions, such as tax liens and property settlements, also contain SSNs to help identify the correct individual. Moreover, not all agencies use the SSN as their primary identification number for record-keeping purposes. We proposed that Congress convene a representative group of officials from all levels of government to develop a unified approach to safeguard SSNs used in all levels of government and particularly those displayed in public records. However, the more frequently SSNs are obtained and used, the more likely they are to be misused. Accordingly, policy makers will have to balance the potential benefits of restrictions on the use of SSNs on the one hand with the impact on legitimate needs for the use of SSNs on the other. These permissible uses include: for use by any government agency in carrying out its functions; for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft; motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories; motor vehicle market research activities, including survey research; for use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business, but only to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to the business and, if such information is not correct, to obtain the correct information but only for purposes of preventing fraud by pursuing legal remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the individual; for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any federal, state, or local court or agency; for use in research activities; for use by any insurer or insurance support organization in connection with claims investigation activities; for use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles; for use by a private investigative agency for any purpose permitted under the DPPA; for use by an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain information relating to the holder of a commercial driver’s license; for use in connection with the operation of private toll transportation facilities; for any other use, if the state has obtained the express consent of the person to whom a request for personal information pertains; for bulk distribution of surveys, marketing, or solicitations, if the state has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains; for use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates that it has obtained the written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains; for any other use specifically authorized under a state law, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1936, the Social Security Administration (SSA) established the Social Security number (SSN) to track workers' earnings for social security benefit purposes. Today, private and public sector entities frequently ask individuals for SSNs in order to conduct their businesses and sometimes to comply with federal laws. Although uses of SSNs can be beneficial to the public, SSNs are also a key piece of information in creating false identities either for financial misuse or for assuming an individual's identity. The retention of SSNs in the public and private sectors can create opportunities for identity theft. In addition, the aggregation of personal information, such as SSNs, in large corporate databases, as well as the public display of SSNs in various records accessed by the public, may provide criminals the opportunity to easily obtain this personal information. Given the heightened awareness of identity crimes, this testimony focuses on describing (1) how private sector entities obtain, use, and protect SSNs, and (2) public sector uses and protections of SSNs.
What GAO Found
Private sector entities rely extensively on SSNs. We reported early this year that entities such as information resellers, consumer reporting agencies, and health care organizations routinely obtain SSNs from their business clients and public sources, such as government records that can be displayed to the public. These entities then use SSNs for various purposes, such as to verify an individual's identity or to match existing records, and have come to rely on the SSN as an identifier, which helps them determine a person's identity for the purpose of providing the services they offer. There is no single federal law that regulates the overall use or restricts the disclosure of SSNs by private sector entities. However, certain federal laws have helped to place restrictions on the disclosures of personal information private sector entities are allowed to make to their customers, and certain states have enacted laws to restrict the private sector's use of SSNs. Public sector entities also extensively use SSNs. All three levels of government use the SSN to comply with certain federal laws and regulations, as well as for their own purposes. These agencies rely on the SSN to manage records, verify benefit eligibility, collect outstanding debt, and conduct research and program evaluations. In addition, given the open nature of certain government records, SSNs appear in records displayed to the public such as documents that record financial transactions or court documents. Despite the widespread reliance on and use of SSNs, government agencies are taking steps to safeguard the SSN. For example, some agencies are not using the SSN as the primary identification number. In a previous report, we proposed that Congress consider developing a unified approach to safeguarding SSNs used in all levels of government and particularly those displayed in public records, and we continue to believe that this approach has merit. The use of SSNs by both private and public sector entities is likely to continue, but the more frequently SSNs are used, the more likely they are to be misused given the continued rise in identity crimes. In considering restrictions to SSN use, policy makers will have to balance the protections that could occur from such restrictions with legitimate business needs for the use of SSNs. |
gao_GAO-08-671 | gao_GAO-08-671_0 | In recent years, the H5N1 strain and other strains of the influenza virus have emerged or re-emerged. During a pandemic, it may be necessary to use a vaccine that was developed prior to a pandemic and therefore may not be well-matched to the pandemic-causing strain. HHS Plans to Make Federal Stockpiles of Pharmaceuticals Accessible to State and Local Jurisdictions, but Faces Challenges with Implementation
Once a pandemic begins, HHS plans to make accessible to state and local jurisdictions federal stockpiles of antivirals and pre-pandemic vaccine until a pandemic vaccine becomes widely available. According to HHS, public-sector stockpiles of antivirals are intended to be used primarily for the treatment of sick individuals. HHS intends to oversee the distribution and administration of federally owned pre-pandemic vaccine to individuals identified as members of the critical workforce; that is, workers in sectors that are necessary for society to continue functioning. However, HHS faces challenges with implementing its strategy for using pharmaceutical interventions, such as the lack of vaccine manufacturing capacity within U.S. borders and the length of time experts anticipate will be needed to manufacture a pandemic vaccine. HHS has established a national goal of stockpiling 75 million treatment courses of antivirals in public-sector stockpiles—meaning those in the SNS and in jurisdictional stockpiles. Because these stockpiles will be entirely under each jurisdiction’s control, officials there may choose to use some of these antivirals as prophylaxis—as proposed in HHS’s draft guidance on antiviral use during a pandemic—in an attempt to slow the spread of the pandemic by providing them to healthy individuals who have been exposed to the pandemic-causing strain. The National Infrastructure Advisory Council estimates that the critical workforce includes about 20 million people. The department is currently making large investments in domestic vaccine manufacturing capacity for this purpose. HHS Has Made Progress on Revising Guidance for Target Groups for Use of Pandemic Vaccine, but Has Not Finalized Guidance for Using Pre-Pandemic Vaccine and Antivirals
HHS has made progress on revising its 2005 guidance to state and local jurisdictions for identifying target groups for the use of pandemic vaccine, but has not finalized guidance for using antivirals and pre-pandemic vaccine. Since the publication of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, there has been wide recognition that other factors should be considered, such as protecting those critical workers needed to keep society functioning, including health care and law enforcement personnel. HHS Has Provided Guidance to Help State and Local Jurisdictions Overcome Difficulties with Implementing Nonpharmaceutical Interventions
HHS will rely on state and local jurisdictions to utilize nonpharmaceutical interventions to help slow the spread of disease and to lessen the burden on the nation’s health care system until a pandemic vaccine is widely available. HHS has developed guidance and is investing in research on the general use and effectiveness of nonpharmaceutical interventions, thereby helping jurisdictions make more informed decisions. In this guidance, HHS introduces its “community mitigation framework” that is based upon a targeted, layered strategy involving the direct application of multiple, partially-effective nonpharmaceutical interventions, initiated early and maintained consistently throughout a pandemic. According to HHS, the findings from this research will be used to update existing guidance. A severe pandemic, such as that of 1918-19, has the potential to result in widespread illness and death and is expected to overwhelm the nation’s ability to respond. According to HHS, initial batches of the most effective protective measure—a pandemic vaccine—may take as long as 20 to 23 weeks after the start of the pandemic to become available. In 2008, HHS released guidance on prioritizing target groups for pandemic vaccine and draft guidance for public comment on how antivirals may be used during a pandemic. | Why GAO Did This Study
The emergence of the H5N1 avian influenza virus (also known as "bird flu") has raised concerns that it or another virus might mutate into a virulent strain that could lead to an influenza pandemic. Experts predict that a severe pandemic could overwhelm the nation's health care system, requiring the rationing of limited resources. GAO was asked to provide information on the progress of the Department of Health and Human Services's (HHS) plans for responding to a pandemic, including analyzing how HHS plans to (1) use pharmaceutical interventions to treat infected individuals and protect the critical workforce and (2) use nonpharmaceutical interventions to slow the spread of disease. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed government documents and scientific literature, and interviewed HHS officials, state and local public health officials, and subject-matter experts on pandemic response.
What GAO Found
HHS plans to make existing federal stockpiles of pharmaceutical interventions available for distribution once a pandemic begins. These interventions would include antivirals, which are drugs to prevent or reduce the severity of infection, and pre-pandemic vaccines, which are vaccines produced prior to a pandemic and developed from influenza strains that have the potential to cause a pandemic. HHS has established a national goal of stockpiling 75 million treatment courses of antivirals in the Strategic National Stockpile and in jurisdictional stockpiles. According to HHS, these public sector stockpiles are intended to be used primarily for the treatment of individuals sick with influenza. HHS intends to oversee the distribution and administration of pre-pandemic vaccine to individuals identified as members of the critical workforce. Members of the critical workforce--estimated to be about 20 million--include workers in sectors that are considered necessary to keep society functioning, such as health care and law enforcement personnel. HHS's strategy for using pre-pandemic vaccine is to keep society functioning until a pandemic vaccine--a vaccine specific to the pandemic-causing strain--becomes widely available. HHS anticipates that initial batches of a pandemic vaccine may not be available until 20 to 23 weeks after the start of the pandemic. As batches of the pandemic vaccine become available, HHS plans for state and local jurisdictions to provide it to members of targeted groups based on factors such as occupation and age, instead of making it available to the general public. HHS faces challenges implementing its strategy for using pharmaceutical interventions during a pandemic, including the lack of vaccine manufacturing capacity in the United States. HHS is currently making large investments to expand domestic vaccine manufacturing capacity. In 2008, HHS released guidance on prioritizing target groups for pandemic vaccine and draft guidance on antiviral use during a pandemic. HHS has not yet released draft guidance for public comment on prioritizing target groups for pre-pandemic vaccine. HHS will rely on state and local jurisdictions to utilize nonpharmaceutical interventions, such as isolation of sick individuals and voluntary home quarantine of those exposed to the pandemic strain. To assist state and local jurisdictions with implementing nonpharmaceutical interventions, HHS has developed guidance that describes the department's "community mitigation framework." The framework involves the early initiation of multiple nonpharmaceutical interventions, each of which is expected to be partially effective and to be maintained consistently throughout a pandemic. HHS faces difficulties, including helping jurisdictions develop ways to ensure community compliance. HHS is investing in several initiatives to increase the nation's knowledge about the general use and effectiveness of nonpharmaceutical interventions. The findings from this research will be used to update existing guidance. |
gao_GAO-13-597 | gao_GAO-13-597_0 | The GOES-R series is the next generation of satellites that NOAA is planning. The program estimates that the development for all four satellites in the GOES-R series—GOES-R, GOES-S, GOES-T, and GOES-U—is to cost $10.9 billion through 2036, an increase of $3.2 billion over its prior life cycle cost estimate of $7.67 billion for the two-satellite program. Improving communications with external users. Developing contingency plans. In that report, we noted that NOAA had established a contingency plan for a potential gap in the GOES program, but it needed to demonstrate its progress in coordinating with the user community to determine their most critical requirements, conducting training and simulations for contingency operations scenarios, evaluating the status of viable foreign satellites, and working with the user community to account for differences in product coverage under contingency operations scenarios. NOAA Has Made Progress in Developing GOES-R, but Continues to Face Challenges that Could Increase the Risk of a Satellite Data Gap
NOAA has completed its design of the GOES-R program, and has made progress in building components of the flight and ground segments. However, key information on reserves has not been reported to management. These challenges have the potential to impact the expected launch date of the first GOES-R satellite, which would delay the availability of an on-orbit backup and increase the potential for a gap in GOES satellite coverage should either of the two operational satellites fail prematurely. NOAA has improved elements of the schedules for both components. Without a full complement of operational GOES satellites, the nation’s ability to maintain the continuity of data required for effective weather forecasting could be compromised. These changes involved strengthening or relaxing specifications on selected products, finalizing a decision not to develop 31 products, and modifying programmatic requirements not tied to any individual product. By doing so, satellite data users can establish plans to mitigate any shortfalls in data and minimize the impact of the changes on their operations. When compared to best practices, NOAA’s satellite and ground system contingency plans had many strengths and a few weaknesses. Given the potential for a delay in the launch of the GOES-R satellite and the expectation that there will be at least a year with no backup satellite in orbit, it is important that NOAA consider ways to prevent a delay in the GOES-R launch, and ensure its contingency plans are fully documented, tested, and communicated to affected stakeholders. As the agency closes in on its expected launch date, technical issues in developing the space and ground segments and scheduling problems could make it more difficult to launch on schedule, and program officials now acknowledge that the launch date may be delayed by 6 months. Specifically, internal NOAA and external satellite data users were not fully informed about changes in GOES-R requirements and did not have a chance to communicate their concerns about the impact these changes could have on their ability to perform their missions. Until NOAA improves its outreach and communication with external satellite data users, its changes in requirements could cause unexpected impacts on critical user operations. They also did not identify alternative solutions or time lines for preventing a delay in the GOES-R launch date. NOAA concurred with all four of our recommendations and identified steps that it is taking to implement them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) progress in developing the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) program and in addressing key cost and schedule risks that we identified in a prior report, (2) evaluate the program’s efforts to manage changes in requirements and whether any significant changes have recently occurred, and (3) evaluate the adequacy of GOES-R contingency plans. We also identified concerns about these changes from a subset of satellite data users. | Why GAO Did This Study
NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), is procuring the next generation of geostationary weather satellites. The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of satellites (called GOES-13, -14, and -15), which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in 2015. This new series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of satellite data required for weather forecasting through 2036.
GAO was asked to evaluate GOES-R. GAO's objectives were to (1) assess GOES-R progress and efforts to address key cost and schedule risks; (2) evaluate efforts to manage changes in requirements and whether any significant changes have recently occurred; and (3) evaluate the adequacy of GOES-R contingency plans. To do so, GAO analyzed program and contractor data, compared GOES-R schedules, requirements changes, and contingency plans to best practices by leading organizations, and interviewed officials at NOAA, NASA, and at other federal agencies that rely on GOES.
What GAO Found
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has completed the design of its Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series and made progress in building flight and ground components. While the program reports that it is on track to stay within its $10.9 billion life cycle cost estimate, it has not reported key information on reserve funds to senior management. Also, the program has delayed interim milestones, is experiencing technical issues, and continues to demonstrate weaknesses in the development of component schedules. These factors have the potential to affect the expected October 2015 launch date of the first GOES-R satellite, and program officials now acknowledge that the launch date may be delayed by 6 months. A launch delay would increase the time that NOAA is without an on-orbit backup satellite. It would also increase the potential for a gap in GOES satellite coverage should one of the two operational satellites (GOES-14 or -15) fail prematurely - a scenario given a 36 percent likelihood of occurring by an independent review team.
While the GOES-R program has established a process for managing requirements changes, it has not effectively involved key satellite data users. Since 2007, the GOES-R program decided not to develop 31 of the original set of GOES products and modified specifications on 20 remaining products. For example, NOAA decreased the accuracy requirement for the hurricane intensity product and decreased the timeliness of the lightning detection product. However, key satellite data users were not fully informed about changes and did not have a chance to communicate their concerns about the impact of these changes on their operations. Until NOAA improves its communication with external satellite data users, obtains input from the users, and addresses user concerns when considering product changes, its changes could cause an unexpected impact on critical user operations.
NOAA has established contingency plans for the loss of its GOES satellites and ground systems that are generally in accordance with best practices; however, these plans are missing key elements. For example, NOAA did not work with the user community to address potential reductions in capability under contingency scenarios or identify alternative solutions for preventing a delay in the GOES-R launch date. Until NOAA addresses the shortfalls in its contingency plans and procedures, the plans may not work as intended in an emergency and satellite data users may not obtain the information they need to perform their missions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that NOAA address weaknesses in managing reserves and scheduling, improve communications with satellite data users, and address shortfalls in contingency planning. NOAA concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified steps it is taking to implement them. |
gao_GAO-14-679T | gao_GAO-14-679T_0 | In response to the task force recommendations, in May 2013, VHA launched the Consult Management Business Rules Initiative to standardize aspects of the consult process, with the goal of developing consistent and reliable information on consults across all VAMCs. This initiative required VAMCs to complete four specific tasks between July 1, 2013, and May 1, 2014:
Review and properly assign codes to consistently record consult requests in the consult system;
Assign distinct identifiers in the electronic consult system to differentiate between clinical and administrative consults;
Develop and implement strategies for requesting and managing requests for consults that are not needed within 90 days—known as “future care” consults; and
Conduct a clinical review as warranted, and as appropriate, close all unresolved consults—those open more than 90 days. At the time of our December 2012 review, VHA measured outpatient medical appointment wait times as the number of days elapsed from the patient’s or provider’s desired date, as recorded in the VistA scheduling system by VAMCs’ schedulers. GAO’s Ongoing Work Indicates That Veterans Did Not Always Receive Outpatient Specialty Care in Accordance with VHA Timeliness Standards, and in Some Cases, Did Not Receive Care at All
Our ongoing work has identified examples of delays in veterans receiving requested outpatient specialty care at the five VAMCs we reviewed. We found consults that were not processed in accordance with VHA timeliness guidelines—for example, consults were not reviewed within 7 days, or completed within 90 days. Of the 150 consults we reviewed, the consult records indicated that VAMCs did not meet the 7-day requirement for 31 consults (21 percent). We found that veterans received care for 86 of the 150 consults we reviewed (57 percent), but in only 28 of the consults (19 percent) veterans received care within 90 days of the date the consult was requested. For the remaining 64 consults (43 percent), the patients did not receive the requested care. For 4 of the 10 physical therapy consults we reviewed for one VAMC, we found that between 108 and 152 days elapsed, with no apparent actions taken to schedule an appointment for the veteran. VAMC officials cited increased demand for services, patient no-shows, and cancelled appointments, among the factors that hinder their ability to meet VHA’s guideline for completing consults within 90 days. Officials at these facilities indicated that they try to mitigate backlogs by referring veterans to non-VA providers for care. December 2013 – VAMC approved non-VA care and referred the patient to a local hospital for surgery. Limitations in VHA’s Implementation of the Consult Business Rules Impedes Its Ability to Assess Delays in Care
Our ongoing work has identified variation in how the five VAMCs in our review have implemented key aspects of VHA’s business rules, which limits the usefulness of the data in monitoring and overseeing consults system-wide. As previously noted, VHA’s business rules were designed to standardize aspects of the consult process, thus creating consistency in VAMCs’ management of consults. For example, VAMCs have developed different strategies for managing future care consults—requests for specialty care appointments that are not clinically needed for more than 90 days. Based on our discussions with VHA officials, it is not clear the extent to which they are aware of the various strategies that VAMCs are using to comply with this task. Overall, our ongoing work indicates that oversight of the implementation of VHA’s consult business rules has been limited and has not included independent verification of VAMC actions. Reliability of Reported Outpatient Medical Appointment Wait Times and Scheduling Oversight Need Improvement, and VA Has Initiated Actions to Address Related GAO Recommendations
In December 2012, we reported that VHA’s reported outpatient medical appointment wait times were unreliable and that inconsistent implementation of VHA’s scheduling policy may have resulted in increased wait times or delays in scheduling timely outpatient medical appointments. Finally, we recommended that the Secretary of VA direct the Under Secretary for Health to take actions to ensure that VAMCs provide oversight of telephone access, and implement best practices to improve telephone access for clinical care. Although VA has initiated actions to address our recommendations, we believe that continued work is needed to ensure these actions are fully implemented in a timely fashion. Ultimately, VHA’s ability to ensure and accurately monitor access to timely medical appointments is critical to ensuring quality health care to veterans, who may have medical conditions that worsen if access is delayed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to timely medical appointments is critical to ensuring that veterans obtain needed medical care. Over the past few years, there have been numerous reports of VAMCs failing to provide timely care to veterans, and in some cases, these delays have reportedly resulted in harm to patients. As the number of these reports has grown, investigations have been launched by VA's Office of Inspector General and VA to examine VAMCs' medical appointment scheduling and other practices.
In December 2012, GAO reported that improvements were needed in the reliability of VHA's reported medical appointment wait times, as well as oversight of the scheduling process. In May 2013, VHA launched the Consult Management Business Rules Initiative to standardize aspects of the consults process and develop system-wide consult data for monitoring.
This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work to update information previously provided to the Committee on April 9, 2014, including information on VHA's (1) process for managing consults; (2) oversight of consults; and (3) progress made implementing GAO's December 2012 recommendations. To conduct this work, GAO has reviewed documents and interviewed VHA officials. Additionally, GAO has interviewed officials from five VAMCs for the consults work and four VAMCs for the scheduling work that varied based on size, complexity, and location. GAO shared the information it used to prepare this statement with VA and incorporated its comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO's ongoing work examining the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) process for managing outpatient specialty care consults has identified examples of delays in veterans receiving outpatient specialty care. GAO has found consults—requests for evaluation or management of a patient for a specific clinical concern—that were not processed in accordance with VHA timeliness guidelines. For example, consults were not reviewed within 7 days, or completed within 90 days. For 31 of the 150 consults GAO reviewed (21 percent), the consult records indicated that VA medical centers (VAMC) did not meet the 7-day review requirement. In addition, GAO found that veterans received care for 86 of the 150 consults (57 percent), but in only 28 of the consults (19 percent) was the care provided within 90 days. For the remaining 64 consults (43 percent), the patients did not receive the requested care. For 4 of the 10 physical therapy consults GAO reviewed for one VAMC, between 108 and 152 days elapsed with no apparent actions taken to schedule an appointment for the veteran. For 1 of these consults, several months passed before the veteran was referred for care to a non-VA health care facility. VAMC officials cited increased demand for services, and patient no-shows and cancelled appointments among the factors that lead to delays and hinder their ability to meet VHA's guideline of completing consults within 90 days of being requested. VA officials indicated that they may refer veterans to non-VA providers to help mitigate delays in care.
GAO's ongoing work also has identified limitations in VHA's implementation and oversight of its new consult business rules designed to standardize aspects of the clinical consult process. Specifically, GAO has identified variation in how the five VAMCs reviewed have implemented key aspects of the business rules, such as strategies for managing future care consults—requests for specialty care appointments that are not clinically needed for more than 90 days. However, it is not clear the extent to which VHA is aware of the various strategies that VAMCs are using to comply with this task. Furthermore, oversight of the implementation of the business rules has been limited and does not include independent verification of VAMC actions. Because this work is ongoing, GAO is not making recommendations on VHA's consult process at this time.
In December 2012, GAO reported that VHA's outpatient medical appointment wait times were unreliable and recommended that VA take actions to: (1) improve the reliability of its outpatient medical appointment wait time measures; (2) ensure VAMCs consistently implement VHA's scheduling policy, including the staff training requirements; (3) require VAMCs to routinely assess scheduling needs and allocate staffing resources accordingly; and (4) ensure that VAMCs provide oversight of telephone access, and implement best practices. As of June 2014, VA has reported ongoing actions to address these recommendations, but GAO found that continued work is needed to ensure these actions are fully implemented in a timely fashion. Ultimately, VHA's ability to ensure and accurately monitor access to timely medical appointments is critical to ensuring quality health care is provided to veterans, who may have medical conditions that worsen if care is delayed. |
gao_GAO-05-275 | gao_GAO-05-275_0 | 1). 2. 3. U.S. troops experienced shortages of seven of the nine items GAO selected for review. According to the 2004 National Military Strategy, U.S. forces expect to have sufficient quantities of the right items at the right time. However, demand for the seven items exceeded availability sometime between October 2002 and September 2004. For example, while units in the 3rd Infantry Division reported that tire shortages affected their mission by forcing them to abandon equipment, the 4th Infantry Division reported that their tire shortages had no affect on their mission. The shortages reduced the operational capabilities of these vehicles and negatively impacted operations in Iraq. Inaccurate and Inadequately Funded Army War Reserve Requirements for Spare Parts Led to Early Shortages during OIF
The inaccurate requirements for and poor funding of war reserves affected the availability of three of the supply items (armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires). Annual updates of the Army’s war reserve requirements for supply items have not been conducted and, as a result, the Army did not have an accurate estimate of the spare parts and other items needed for a contingency such as OIF. In prior reports, we have identified problems with the Army’s process for computing the war reserve spare parts requirements. While we did not evaluate the changes’ potential for success, we observed that the majority of them focus on the distribution aspects of logistics problems, not the full range of supply deficiencies we identified. Ineffective distribution. We also recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions and specify when they will be completed: revise current joint logistics doctrine to clearly state, consistent with policy, who has responsibility and authority for synchronizing the distribution of supplies from the U.S. to deployed units during operations, develop and exercise, through a mix of computer simulations and field training, deployable supply receiving and distribution capabilities including trained personnel and related equipment for implementing improved supply management practices, such as radio frequency identification tags that provide in-transit visibility of supplies, to ensure they are sufficient and capable of meeting the requirements in operational plans, and establish common supply information systems that ensure the DOD and the services can requisition supplies promptly and match incoming supplies with unit requisitions to facilitate expeditious and accurate distribution. We judgmentally selected the nine items because we believed they presented possible shortages with operational impacts based on our prior work on OIF logistics and other sources such as military “after-action” reports on OIF operations, military and contractor “lessons learned” studies, briefings, congressional testimonies, and interviews with Department of Defense (DOD) and military service officials covering the time period between October 2002 and September 2004. To determine what actions DOD has taken to improve the availability of supplies for current and future operations, we collected data from military service and joint command headquarters personnel to identify short- and long-term efforts to address supply shortages. Marine Corps Helicopter Rotor Blades
Background
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Marine Corps relied on a variety of helicopters to support its forces during combat operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has identified spare parts supply as a long-standing Department of Defense (DOD) management problem. In December 2003, GAO reported on problems with Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) logistics support including shortages of spare parts and supplies in Iraq. This report expands on that effort by assessing (1) what supply shortages were experienced by U.S. forces in Iraq between October 2002 and September 2004 and what impact the shortages had on their operations, (2) what primary deficiencies in the supply system contributed to any identified supply shortages, and (3) what actions DOD has taken to improve the timely availability of supplies for current and future operations. To address these objectives, GAO judgmentally selected nine items based on lessons learned and after-action reports that represented possible shortages with operational impacts.
What GAO Found
U.S. troops experienced shortages of seven of the nine items GAO reviewed. According to the 2004 National Military Strategy, U.S. forces expect to have sufficient quantities of the right items at the right time. However, demand for the seven items exceeded availability sometime between October 2002 and September 2004. The documented impact of these shortages varied between combat units. For example, while units in the 3rd Infantry Division reported that tire shortages reduced their operational capability, forcing them to abandon equipment, the 4th Infantry Division reported no similar effect. GAO identified five systemic deficiencies that contributed to shortages of the reviewed items, including inaccurate Army war reserve spare parts requirements and ineffective distribution. Annual updates of Army war reserve parts requirements have not been conducted since 1999. As a result, the war reserves did not contain enough track shoes, batteries, and tires to support U.S. forces during initial operations. Effective distribution relies on a seamless process to promptly move supplies from the United States to a customer. GAO found that conflicting doctrinal responsibilities for distribution management, improperly packed shipments, insufficient transportation personnel and equipment, and inadequate information systems prevented the timely availability of four of the items. While U.S. troops developed short-term solutions to manage item shortages during OIF, DOD and the services have begun to undertake systemic, long-term changes to fix some supply problems identified. While GAO did not evaluate their potential for success, the majority of the changes are focused on distribution, and not on the full gamut of systemic deficiencies GAO identified. |
gao_GAO-04-664 | gao_GAO-04-664_0 | Some agencies have begun to recognize the need to pay more attention to fleet management and are taking steps to review their guidelines in an effort to provide better criteria to determine vehicle needs and to manage their fleets more efficiently. Decisions about whether to acquire and retain vehicles are made at the local level with little or no headquarters oversight. The Navy and the Forest Service conduct periodic assessments of fleet size, but the results of the assessments are either not enforced or not conducted in a systematic manner. Opportunities Exist to Dispose of Underutilized Vehicles and Realize Potential Savings
Our work and reviews by inspectors general identified numerous instances where agencies had an excessive number of vehicles in their fleets. If these vehicles were disposed of, agencies could realize savings ranging from thousands to millions of dollars, as illustrated in the following examples: In February 2004, the Department of the Interior’s Inspector General reported that a significant portion of the department’s fleet of approximately 36,000 vehicles is underutilized and estimated savings of $34 million. However, because these reductions were not based on the application of utilization criteria to identify vehicle needs, there is no guarantee that the fleets are the right size to meet the agencies’ missions. Governmentwide Initiatives to Improve Fleet Management Practices
As a result of a review of governmentwide fleet practices, GSA’s Office of Governmentwide Policy (OGP) and OMB are taking actions to require agencies to better manage and improve the cost-efficiency of their fleets. Based on the survey results, OGP is currently revising the Federal Management Regulation to require agencies to improve fleet management practices by, among other things, (1) appointing a central fleet manager, (2) periodically reviewing fleet size, and (3) funding a fleet management information system. However, we anticipate strong opposition to this requirement, based on our discussions with agency officials outside of GSA. In 2002, OMB began requiring agencies, as part of their budget submission, to report the size, composition, and cost of their fleets for the current year and to project costs for the next 3 fiscal years. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help agencies determine the appropriate size and composition of their fleets, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA direct the Office of Governmentwide Policy to include in the revised Federal Management Regulation the following two requirements for agencies develop utilization criteria related to the missions of the vehicles and conduct periodic assessments of the number and type of vehicles in their fleets using these criteria. To ensure that agency fleets are the right size and composition to meet their missions, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs take the following three actions establish guidance and policies that include clearly defined utilization criteria to be used in validating the need for vehicles based on their missions; require fleet managers to use these criteria in determining the need for vehicles and in conducting periodic fleet assessments; and establish effective oversight mechanisms to ensure that the utilization criteria are defined and fleet assessments are carried out. We focused our review on the key revisions directly related to the justification for acquiring and retaining vehicles. The Department of Defense agreed with our recommendations. $1.7 million annually. The state office did not complete its required annual review and was not managing its vehicle fleet efficiently. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies spend about $1.7 billion annually to operate a fleet of about 387,000 vehicles. During the last decade, concerns have been raised about whether agencies have more vehicles than they need. In an April 2002 letter to federal agencies, the Office of Management and Budget stated that the size of the federal fleet seemed excessive. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which agencies ensure that their fleets are the right size to meet agency missions, (2) whether potential savings could result from the disposal of unneeded vehicles, and (3) what actions are being taken on a governmentwide basis to improve fleet management practices. GAO focused its review on the justification for acquiring and retaining vehicles at the Departments of Agriculture, Army, Homeland Security, Navy, and Veterans Affairs.
What GAO Found
Because of a lack of attention to key vehicle fleet management practices, the agencies GAO reviewed cannot ensure their fleets are the right size or composition to meet their missions. Industry practices for cost-efficient fleets include the development of utilization criteria related to the mission of a vehicle and periodic fleet assessments using these criteria to determine the appropriate fleet size and composition. If unneeded vehicles are identified, they are disposed of. However, the agencies GAO reviewed have not established policies that contain clearly defined utilization criteria that would allow them to determine the number and type of vehicles they need. Further, agencies are not routinely conducting periodic fleet assessments. Two agencies, the Navy and the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture, conduct assessments; however, these assessments are either inconsistently applied or the results are not enforced. Some agencies have begun to recognize the need to revise their guidelines to provide better criteria for determining their vehicle needs. GAO's work and reviews by inspectors general identified numerous instances where agencies were retaining vehicles they did not need, with potential savings ranging from thousands to millions of dollars if these vehicles were eliminated. For example, the Department of the Interior's Inspector General reported that a significant portion of the department's 36,000 vehicles were underutilized and estimated savings of $34 million annually if these vehicles were disposed of. GSA's Office of Governmentwide Policy and the Office of Management and Budget have recently taken a number of actions to require agencies to better manage and improve the cost-efficiency of their fleets. The Office of Governmentwide Policy is currently revising the Federal Management Regulation to require agencies to (1) appoint a central fleet manager with control over all aspects of fleet management, including fleet budgets, which are now generally controlled at the local level; (2) establish utilization criteria and periodically review fleet size; and (3) fund a fleet management information system. The Office of Governmentwide Policy plans to work in a cooperative effort with agencies to implement the revised regulation. However, based on discussions with officials from the agencies GAO reviewed, GAO anticipates that GSA will face opposition to its requirement for centralized budget control over the fleets. In 2002, the Office of Management and Budget began requiring agencies to report, as part of their budget submissions, the size, composition, and cost of their fleets for the current year and to project costs for the next 3 fiscal years. |
gao_GAO-01-923 | gao_GAO-01-923_0 | Background
The Department budgets billions of dollars each year to purchase and repair spare parts and has established various programs to help ensure product quality throughout the acquisition and repair processes. Specifically, the program data were incomplete and of limited value because they were underreported, did not include information on parts that failed prematurely, and omitted key data on the causes of failures. To a large extent, the program’s ineffectiveness can be attributed to limited training and incentives to report deficiencies, lack of management emphasis, and competing priorities for the staff resources needed to carry out the program. The Program Does Not Report Parts That Fail Prematurely
The Navy does not attempt to use the Product Quality Deficiency Reporting Program to collect a major category of quality deficiencies— those involving parts that failed prematurely, that is, after some operation but before the end of their expected design life. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Navy’s Product Quality Deficiency Reporting Program has been effective in gathering the data needed for analyses, correction, and prevention of deficiencies in spare parts, we analyzed the completeness of the quality deficiency data contained in the Navy’s Product Deficiency Reporting and Evaluation Program database. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) budgets billions of dollars each year to purchase and repair the spare parts needed to maintain its weapons systems and support equipment. The quality of the spare parts can greatly determine if the Department's investment of funds is effective, efficient, and economical. This report examines the Navy's Product Quality Deficiency Reporting Program and the extent to which the program has gathered the data needed for the analysis, correction, and prevention of deficiencies in spare parts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that data on parts defects identified at the time of installation were underreported. Data on parts that failed after some operation but before their expected design life were not collected as part of this program. In the quality reports GAO reviewed, some key information was omitted on the cause of the parts' failures and some reports did not identify who was responsible for the defects. To a large extent, the program's ineffectiveness can be attributed to lack of management, limited training and incentives to report deficiencies, and competing priorities for the staff resources needed to carry out the program. |
gao_GAO-14-443 | gao_GAO-14-443_0 | Some Aspects of GSA’s Leasing Rates, Terms, and Services Support Agency Efforts to Reduce Fleet Costs, While Others Do Not
GSA’s leasing rates, terms, and services help agencies keep fleet costs down in a variety of ways. For example, GSA procures the vehicles it leases at a discount and passes those savings on to its customers, provides agencies with data analyses that can be used to eliminate unnecessary vehicles, and identifies fraud, waste, and abuse related to leased vehicles. However, we identified two areas where GSA’s rates and terms have not encouraged agency efforts to reduce fleet costs. First, GSA’s monthly mileage rate, which covers agency fuel costs, does not provide incentives for agencies to reduce some fuel costs, such as costs associated with idling. Second, lack of clear GSA guidance on what constitutes excessive wear and tear of leased vehicles can limit the ability of agencies to determine whether it is less expensive to lease or own vehicles. Principles for designing government fees suggest that having each agency pay for the fuel it actually uses could foster greater efficiency by increasing 1) awareness of the costs of fuel and 2) incentives to reduce fuel costs not reflected in miles traveled. Telematics Use Might, in Some Cases, Result in Cost Savings to Vehicle Fleets Leased from GSA
The experts we consulted agreed that in some cases, telematics could facilitate cost savings by providing fleet managers with information needed to reduce fleet size, fuel use, misuse of vehicles, and unnecessary maintenance. GSA is taking steps to reduce telematics’ costs, but does not currently collect and share information about agencies’ experiences with telematics. 1). Federal Fleet Managers Agreed That Telematics Can Reduce Costs and Suggested GSA Do More to Support Use of This Technology
The federal fleet managers on our two panels agreed that the use of telematics has the potential to reduce costs in the federally leased fleet.While GSA currently provides leasing customers with various types of information, such as information on fuel use and potential fraud, based on data collected through its fleet payment card, fleet managers told us that telematics can provide information that is more detailed. at Idaho National Laboratory reported that telematics data have helped inform decisions to eliminate 65 vehicles since fiscal year 2011, with an estimated average annual savings of approximately $390,000 (including the cost of telematics on the remaining vehicles). Lower the cost of telematic devices: Both panels of federal fleet managers proposed that GSA lower the cost of telematic devices to improve the likelihood of achieving a cost-effective solution and to help allay management concerns about cost and return on investment. Provide information on federal agencies’ experiences with telematics: Both panels noted that it would be helpful if GSA were to collect information on federal agencies’ experiences in using telematics in their fleets and share this information. One such objective is for GSA to enhance relationships with its customers, in part by improving customer knowledge, and sharing information that drives improved decision-making and performance in the fleet policy area. Without an examination of the trade-offs of changing this rate structure so that agencies pay for the fuel they actually consume, GSA may be missing an opportunity to encourage agencies to minimize fuel costs and save taxpayer dollars or ensure that its leasing rate structure is the most appropriate one. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help reduce costs associated with vehicles leased from GSA, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA take the following two actions: 1. examine and document the trade-offs of changing GSA’s vehicle leasing rate structure so that each agency pays for the fuel that it actually uses, and 2. request information from agencies on their experiences with telematics in their fleets, such as studies or estimates of cost savings achieved, and share this information with agencies through GSA’s website or other methods. In addition, GSA provides various services to its leasing customers, including: support of fleet service representatives, located in regional offices, throughout the vehicle leasing process, including the selection of vehicles, maintenance, and disposal; provision and management of fleet cards to purchase fuel and maintenance and repair services; tracking of fuel, maintenance, and repair expenses; and identification of fraud, waste, and abuse; access to GSA’s Fleet Drive-thru system, which contains automated information on agencies’ fleets, including mileage, inventory, fuel consumption, and agency incurred expenses (such as bills for damage to leased vehicles); analyses of fleet data that, among other things, may identify underutilized vehicles to be eliminated or shared through examination of mileage and usage data; management of accident-related needs and maintenance, including authorizing and tracking repairs, working with third parties and insurance company officials to collect payments (for accidents in which a third party is at fault) and an automated vehicle recall program with major manufacturers; and access to GSA Fleet Solutions, which provides additional services such as a short-term rental program and telematics. Overhead expenses accounted for about 0.4 percent of total expenses in fiscal year 2012. Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) whether and how GSA’s leasing rates, terms, and services support or encourage agency efforts to reduce fleet costs and (2) the views of selected experts regarding the cost savings potential of telematics for fleets and the possible implications for GSA’s leasing program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies (excluding the U.S. Postal Service) spent about $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2012 to lease about 190,000 vehicles from GSA. Recent legislative proposals have called for reductions in the cost and size of federal agencies' fleets. Agencies may choose to have telematic devices installed in leased vehicles; the data these devices provide can be used to manage fleets.
GAO was asked to review GSA's vehicle-leasing program. This report addresses (1) whether and how GSA's leasing rates, terms, and services support agency efforts to reduce fleet costs and (2) the views of selected experts regarding the cost-savings potential of telematics for fleets and the possible implications for GSA's leasing program. GAO reviewed program policies; interviewed GSA officials; held two panel discussions with fleet managers from 10 agencies representing 80 percent of the leased fleet in fiscal year 2011; and interviewed 19 experts with knowledge about telematics or fleet management, as demonstrated by recommendations from fleet management associations, among other considerations. Responses from the panelists and experts are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
Some aspects of the General Service Administration's (GSA) leasing rates, terms, and services support agency efforts to reduce fleet costs, while others do not. For example, GSA procures the vehicles it leases at a discount and passes those savings on to its customers, provides agencies with data analyses that can be used to eliminate unnecessary vehicles, and identifies fraud, waste, and abuse related to leased vehicles. However, GAO identified two areas where GSA's rates and terms have not encouraged agency efforts to reduce fleet costs. First, under GSA's leasing-rate structure, fuel costs are covered by a monthly fee based on miles traveled, among other things, but not on actual fuel used. This rate structure does not provide incentives for agencies to reduce some fuel costs that may not be fully reflected by miles travelled, such as costs associated with idling or speeding. Principles for designing government fees suggest that having each agency pay for the fuel it actually uses could increase incentives to reduce fuel costs. GAO has previously found that government fee decisions also involve considering trade-offs and that other considerations, such as administrative burden, are important. Without examining the trade-offs of changing GSA's rate structure so that agencies pay for the fuel they actually consume, GSA may be missing an opportunity to encourage agencies to minimize fuel costs and save taxpayer dollars. Second, lack of clear GSA guidance on what constitutes excessive wear and tear of leased vehicles can limit the ability of agencies to determine whether it is less expensive to lease or own vehicles. GSA just developed this guidance and is taking steps to implement it.
The experts and federal fleet managers GAO consulted agreed that the use of telematics can facilitate cost savings for some fleets by providing fleet managers with information—such as data on vehicle location, speed, or condition—that they can use to reduce fleet size, fuel use, misuse of vehicles, and unnecessary maintenance. For example, a fleet manager at the Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory reported that since fiscal year 2011, telematics data have helped officials at that facility decide to eliminate 65 leased vehicles for an estimated annual savings of approximately $390,000. However, various factors—such as telematics' cost, characteristics of the fleet, and the level of management support—influence the potential of telematics to facilitate cost savings for a given fleet. The federal fleet managers on GAO's panels suggested that GSA lower the costs of telematic devices to improve the likelihood of achieving cost savings and to help allay management's concerns about return on investment. They also suggested that GSA provide information on agencies' experiences with telematics, such as studies or estimates of cost savings, to further support telematics' adoption in the federal fleet. GSA officials noted that they are currently engaged in efforts to obtain lower prices on telematic devices, and while officials do not currently collect information on agencies' experiences with telematics, they would be able to request it and share any information agencies voluntarily provide. One of GSA's strategic objectives is to enhance relationships with its customers, in part by sharing information that drives improved decision-making. By not collecting and sharing information on federal agencies' experiences with telematics, GSA may be missing an opportunity to help agencies determine whether to adopt telematics in their fleets and identify which devices or approaches have the greatest potential to facilitate cost savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA (1) examine the trade-offs of changing GSA's lease-rate structure so that agencies pay for their actual fuel use and (2) request information on agencies' experiences with telematics in their fleets and share this information with agencies. GSA agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-339 | gao_GAO-13-339_0 | They represent revenue the federal government forgoes from these tax provisions. More Than Two- Thirds of Corporate Tax Expenditures Are Also Used by Individuals
Estimated corporate revenue losses in 2011, which totaled $181.4 billion, were approximately the same size as the amount of corporate income tax revenue the federal government collected that year. Of the 80 tax expenditures used by corporations, 56 were also used by individuals, as shown in figure 3. Modifying any of these 56 tax expenditures as part of broader corporate tax reform would likely affect both corporate and individual taxpayers to some degree. Corporate Tax Expenditures Span Many Budget Functions; One-Third of Corporate-Only Tax Expenditures Share a Similar Purpose with Federal Spending Programs
Corporate Tax Expenditures Span Many Budget Functions, and Estimated Corporate Revenue Losses Are Concentrated in Two Budget Functions
Corporate tax expenditures span a majority of federal mission areas, but their relative size differs across budget functions. The 80 corporate tax expenditures had estimated revenue losses in 12 of the 18 budget functions in 2011, as shown in table 2. Of the $181 billion in estimated corporate tax revenue losses, 81 percent was concentrated in the international affairs and housing and commerce budget functions. For example, seven corporate-only tax expenditures are aimed at encouraging or supporting the production of specific energy sources or the development of technology or infrastructure for certain energy sectors. These tax expenditures also have broader purposes such as promoting domestic energy production and energy security. Other corporate-only tax expenditures provide support for certain types of entities, such as insurance companies or credit unions. Applying an even broader national purpose, such as encouraging domestic energy production, could further increase the number of federal spending programs, as well as other federal activities, such as federal regulations and tax expenditures, which may share a similar purpose. Treasury provided technical comments which we incorporated; IRS had no comments on the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report: (1) describes trends in the number of corporate tax expenditures and aggregate corporate revenue losses since 1986; (2) describes the use of corporate tax expenditures in 2011; and (3) compares the size of corporate tax expenditures to federal spending by budget function and, for tax expenditures used only by corporations, identifies spending programs with similar purposes. Fiscal Year 2011 Analysis of Treasury Tax Expenditure Estimates and Internal Revenue Service Data on Number of Recipients
For 2011, we analyzed those tax expenditures with only estimated corporate revenue losses and those with both corporate and individual revenue losses.those that Treasury reported had estimated revenue losses for corporations in 2011; we describe any tax expenditures that Treasury estimated lost only corporate tax revenue as corporate-only tax expenditures. To identify the reported purpose of corporate-only tax expenditures, we reviewed their legislative histories and prior work by GAO, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), including the CRS’s 2010 tax expenditure compendium, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that discussed the intended purpose or rationale of the tax expenditure. The list of nontax programs we identified that appear to share a similar specific reported purpose has not been reviewed by the agencies responsible for them. The federal spending programs and activities identified may also have multiple reported purposes, and only a component of the program or activity may appear to specifically share a similar reported purpose to the tax expenditure. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tax expenditures--special exemptions and exclusions, credits, deductions, deferrals, and preferential tax rates claimed by corporations, individuals, or both--support federal policy goals but result in revenue forgone by the federal government. Congress and the administration are reexamining tax expenditures used by corporations as part of corporate tax reform. GAO was asked to examine issues related to corporate tax expenditures. This report: (1) describes trends in the number of corporate tax expenditures and estimated corporate revenue losses since 1986; (2) describes the use of corporate tax expenditures in 2011; and (3) compares the size of corporate tax expenditures to federal spending by budget function and, for tax expenditures used only by corporations, identifies spending programs with similar purposes. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed Department of the Treasury estimates of tax expenditure revenue losses from 1986 to 2011 and Internal Revenue Service 2010 data and interviewed agency officials. GAO also reviewed the legislative history and relevant studies to determine the reported purpose of corporate-only tax expenditures, and searched federal program lists to identify federal spending programs that appear to share a reported specific purpose similar to corporate-only tax expenditures. The programs identified as related were not reviewed by the agencies responsible for the programs.
What GAO Found
Estimated tax revenue that the federal government forgoes resulting from corporate tax expenditures increased over the past few decades as did the total number of corporate tax expenditures. In 2011, the Department of the Treasury estimated 80 tax expenditures resulted in the government forgoing corporate tax revenue totaling more than $181 billion. Many of these tax expenditures are broadly available to both corporate and individual taxpayers. More than twothirds or 56 of the 80 tax expenditures used by corporations in 2011 were also used by individual taxpayers, such as other types of businesses not organized as corporations. Modifying any of these 56 tax expenditures as part of broader corporate tax reform would likely affect both corporate and individual taxpayers to some degree.
Corporate tax expenditures span a majority of federal mission areas, but their relative size differs across budget functions. The 80 corporate tax expenditures had estimated revenue losses in 12 of the 18 budget functions in 2011. Of the $181 billion in estimated corporate tax revenue losses, 81 percent was concentrated in the international affairs and housing and commerce budget functions, exceeding federal outlays in those budget functions. The 24 tax expenditures used only by corporations in 2011 provide support intended to encourage certain activities, such as energy production, or provide support for certain entity types, such as credit unions. A corporate tax expenditure may have multiple purposes: one narrowly focused on a specific activity or entity as well as broader or additional purposes pursuing national priorities or other activities. For example, 7 of the 24 corporate-only tax expenditures are aimed at encouraging or supporting specific energy sources and technologies, and these tax expenditures may also have broader national purposes such as promoting domestic energy production and energy security. In examining their narrowly focused reported purposes, one-third of the 24 corporate-only tax expenditures appear to share a similar purpose with at least one federal spending program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made no recommendations in this report. Treasury provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate; IRS had no comments. |
gao_GAO-17-300 | gao_GAO-17-300_0 | In November 2010, a National Engagement Task Force, led by DHS and DOJ, was established to help coordinate community engagement efforts to counter violent extremism. The interagency CVE Task Force was established to: (1) synchronize and integrate whole-of-government CVE programs and activities; (2) conduct ongoing strategic planning; and (3) assess and evaluate CVE efforts. Moreover, as of December 2016, there had been no comprehensive assessment of the federal government’s CVE efforts’ effectiveness. The 44 domestically-oriented tasks identified in the 2011 SIP were focused on addressing three core CVE objectives: community outreach, research and training, and capacity building. For example, DOJ expanded CVE activities to communities targeted by violent extremism through a series of outreach meetings led by the U.S. Attorney’s offices. For example, DHS aims to build relationships with the high-tech and social media industry and continues to meet with officials to discuss how to address violent extremism online. Despite progress in 7 of 8 capacity building tasks, action had not yet been taken on a task related to learning from former violent extremists to directly challenge violent extremist narratives. The Federal CVE Effort Lacks a Cohesive Strategy with Measureable Outcomes and a Process for Assessing Progress
A Cohesive CVE Strategy with Measurable Outcomes Has Not Been Established
Although we were able to determine the status of the 44 domestically focused CVE tasks from the 2011 SIP, we could not determine the extent to which the United States is better off today as a result of its CVE effort than it was in 2011. That is because no cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes has been established to guide the multi-agency CVE effort towards its goals. However, DHS’s CVE strategy does not demonstrate how these activities will integrate with the overall federal CVE effort. DHS, in its comment letter, recognized that such a process will drive an understanding of the contributions of individual activities in the federal CVE effort. As noted in our report, the CVE Task Force’s approach of providing guidance on evaluations might enhance the evaluation efforts of individual programs, but establishing a process that assesses progress and effectiveness across the federal CVE effort can provide better insight into the successes and gaps within this multi- agency collaborative effort. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the extent to which (1) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other key stakeholders tasked with Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in the United States have implemented the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has developed a process for assessing overall progress. To assess the extent to which DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States implemented the 2011 SIP, we collected and analyzed information from each agency responsible for leading a task in the 2011 SIP, which included DHS, DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). To determine the extent to which the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities and the CVE Task Force has developed a process for assessing overall progress, we reviewed the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, the 2011 and 2016 Strategic Implementation Plans for the strategy, and other documents related to the creation and activities of the CVE Task Force. From December 2011 through December 2016, federal agencies implemented 19 tasks, had 23 tasks in progress, and had not yet taken action on 2 tasks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Violent extremism—generally defined as ideologically, religious, or politically- motivated acts of violence—has been perpetrated in the United States by white supremacists, anti-government groups, and radical Islamist entities, among others. In 2011, the U.S. government developed a national strategy and SIP for CVE aimed at providing information and resources to communities. In 2016, an interagency CVE Task Force led by DHS and DOJ was created to coordinate CVE efforts.
GAO was asked to review domestic federal CVE efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States have implemented the 2011 SIP and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has assessed progress. GAO assessed the status of activities in the 2011 SIP; interviewed officials from agencies leading CVE efforts and a non-generalizable group of community-based entities selected from cities with CVE frameworks; and compared Task Force activities to selected best practices for multi- agency efforts.
What GAO Found
As of December 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation, and National Counterterrorism Center had implemented 19 of the 44 domestically-focused tasks identified in the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for countering violent extremism (CVE) in the United States. Twenty-three tasks were in progress and no action had yet been taken on 2 tasks. The 44 tasks aim to address three core CVE objectives: community outreach, research and training, and capacity building. Implemented tasks include, for example, DOJ conducting CVE outreach meetings to communities targeted by violent extremism and DHS integrating CVE content into law enforcement counterterrorism training. Tasks in progress include, for example, DHS building relationships with the social media industry and increasing training available to communities to counter violent extremists online. Tasks that had not yet been addressed include, implementing CVE activities in prisons and learning from former violent extremists. Federal CVE efforts aim to educate and prevent radicalization before a crime or terrorist act transpires, and differ from counterterrorism efforts such as collecting evidence and making arrests before an event has occurred.
The federal government does not have a cohesive strategy or process for assessing the overall CVE effort. Although GAO was able to determine the status of the 44 CVE tasks, it was not able to determine if the United States is better off today than it was in 2011 as a result of these tasks. This is because no cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes has been established to guide the multi-agency CVE effort. Such a strategy could help ensure that the individual actions of stakeholder agencies are measureable and contributing to the overall goals of the federal government's CVE effort. The federal government also has not established a process by which to evaluate the effectiveness of the collective CVE effort. The CVE Task Force was established in part to evaluate and assess CVE efforts across the federal government, but has not established a process for doing so. Evaluating the progress and effectiveness of the overall federal CVE effort could better help identify successes, gaps, and resource needs across stakeholder agencies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ direct the CVE Task Force to (1) develop a cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes and (2) establish a process to assess the overall progress of CVE efforts. DHS and DOJ concurred with both recommendations and DHS described the CVE Task Force's planned actions for implementation. |
gao_GAO-01-826T | gao_GAO-01-826T_0 | Background
The X-33 and X-34 programs were part of an effort that began in 1994— known as the Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology/Demonstrator Program (Reusable Launch Vehicle Program)—to pave the way to full- scale, commercially-developed, reusable launch vehicles reaching orbit in one stage. NASA subsequently started a new X-34 program with a smaller vehicle design. Without realistically estimating costs and risks, and providing the reserves needed to mitigate those risks, management may not be in a position to effectively deal with the technical problems that cutting-edge projects invariably face. Specifically: NASA did not develop realistic cost estimates in the early stages of the X- 33 program. For example, we reported in August 1999 that NASA’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan did not include performance targets that established a clear path leading to a reusable launch vehicle and recommended such targets be established. Also, NASA is still in the process of developing the documentation required for the program, including a risk mitigation plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) X-33 and X-34 reusable launch vehicle programs.
What GAO Found
The two programs experienced difficulties achieving their goals primarily because NASA did not develop realistic cost estimates, timely acquisition and risk management plans, and adequate and realistic performance goals. In particular, neither program fully (1) assessed the costs associated with developing new, unproven technologies, (2) provided for the financial reserves needed to deal with technical risks and accommodate normal development delays, (3) developed plans to quantify and mitigate the risks to NASA, or (4) established performance targets showing a clear path leading to an operational reusable launch vehicle. As a result, both programs were terminated. Currently, NASA is in the process of taking steps in the Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Program to help avoid problems like those encountered in the X-33 and X-34 programs. |
gao_AIMD-97-8 | gao_AIMD-97-8_0 | Regulatory Framework
Derivatives dealers and end-user financial institutions may be regulated by federal bank regulators, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), depending on how the institutions are organized. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our May 1994 report on derivatives identified the need for (1) strengthened corporate governance and internal controls for derivatives dealers and major end-users, (2) improved regulation of major U.S. derivatives dealers, (3) comprehensive federal oversight of major U.S. derivatives dealers that are unregulated affiliates of securities firms and insurance companies, (4) comprehensive and consistent accounting and disclosure requirements for derivatives, and (5) international harmonization of regulatory and accounting standards. To determine the current accounting standards for derivatives, we reviewed existing and proposed generally accepted accounting principles and other accounting guidance relevant to derivatives. That report recommended specific derivatives risk-management practices as benchmarks for entities’ use. SEC has acknowledged that there may be benefits associated with management or auditor reports on internal control systems of SEC registrants that are major dealers and end-users of complex derivative products, as GAO recommended. However, SEC has stated that it is focusing on accounting for and providing greater disclosure of market risk for derivative products, which it views as a more appropriate priority at this time. Bank Regulatory Oversight Continues to Improve
OCC, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OTS have made progress in improving their oversight of derivatives activities consistent with the recommendations we made to financial regulators in our 1994 report.They have expanded their risk-based capital standards to more accurately reflect risk exposures and to include market risk. We found that the 1994 examinations were more clearly focused on the banks’ derivatives risk-management and internal control systems. We said the immediate need was for Congress to bring the unregulated OTC derivatives activities of securities firm and insurance company affiliates under the purview of one or more of the existing federal financial regulators and to ensure that derivatives regulation is consistent and comprehensive across regulatory agencies. With regard to disclosure of derivatives activities in financial statements, we reported that two existing FASB disclosure standards required disclosure of information about the extent and nature of an entity’s financial instruments, including derivative products, with off-balance-sheet risk of accounting losses and about fair values of financial instruments. Although the proposed standard was an improvement over the existing requirements, it was our view that there were additional disclosures that would provide financial statement users with a more complete understanding of derivatives. FASB’s proposed standard is a step toward this solution. They also would require disclosure outside the financial statements of qualitative and quantitative information about market risk inherent in derivatives and other financial instruments. 1.) 4.) IOSCO has been involved in follow-up work relating to the areas identified by the regulators and has issued reports on some of these issues. The Barings crisis spurred efforts to improve international regulatory coordination, primarily through formal information-sharing agreements. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO conducted a follow-up review of the regulation of financial derivative products, focusing on actions taken or proposed since May 1994 to: (1) strengthen corporate governance and internal controls for derivatives dealers and major end-users; (2) improve regulation of major U.S. derivatives dealers; (3) provide federal oversight of major derivatives dealers that are unregulated affiliates of securities firms and insurance companies; (4) promulgate comprehensive and consistent accounting and disclosure requirements for derivatives; and (5) harmonize regulatory and accounting standards internationally.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) market participants, regulators, and others have taken or proposed a number of actions to improve the management, oversight, and disclosure of derivatives risks consistent with GAO's prior recommendations; (2) federal bank regulators are: (a) requiring capital that more accurately reflects derivatives risks; (b) collecting more extensive information on bank derivatives activities; and (c) examining banks using guidelines that are better focused on derivatives risks; (3) the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has issued enhanced disclosure rules, as GAO recommended, and has proposed an accounting standard for derivatives that should help stem misleading accounting practices and would require that all derivatives be recorded in financial statements; (4) the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has also proposed more qualitative and quantitative disclosures about derivatives use by public companies; (5) internationally, there has been progress toward greater regulatory harmonization and coordination, as evidenced by major international regulatory initiatives and information-sharing agreements; (6) although market participants, regulators, and others have acted to improve the management, oversight, and disclosure of derivatives risks, many of the concerns that GAO identified in its 1994 report still remain; (7) compliance with guidelines and recommended risk management practices is essentially voluntary for derivatives dealers and end-users other than regulated entities; (8) SEC has acknowledged that there may be benefits associated with management or auditor reports on internal control systems of SEC registrants that are major dealers and end-users of complex derivative products as GAO recommended, but has stated that it is focusing on accounting for and providing greater disclosure of market risk for derivative products; (9) the over-the-counter derivatives dealing activities of securities firm and insurance company affiliates, which are still growing, continue to be largely unregulated; (10) FASB has proposed, but still has not issued, comprehensive accounting standards for derivatives that would provide financial statement users with appropriate, consistent financial information on which to base their investment, management, or oversight decisions; and (11) many of the concerns expressed in GAO's 1994 report are still valid; it is too soon to determine the effectiveness of many of the actions taken or proposed to date; and some of GAO's recommendations have yet to be fully implemented. |
gao_RCED-97-210 | gao_RCED-97-210_0 | For EPA, the MOBILE model is a tool for evaluating the adequacy of a state’s emissions inventory estimate, motor vehicle control strategies, and implementation plans. They pointed out that EPA has updated the estimating capabilities of its MOBILE source emissions model 10 times since the model was first introduced in 1978. Table 1 briefly summarizes the areas in which major limitations exist, as well as EPA’s plans to address these limitations in its next revision to the model, MOBILE6, due to be issued in late 1998. While acknowledging that some vehicle emissions-producing activities are not accounted for in the current model and that other emissions-producing activities are not adequately represented in the current model on the basis of the most recent information, EPA officials said that it is important to note that EPA has conducted and/or partially funded some of the studies that have led to the new data that now question the old estimates and assumptions. Additionally, they said that EPA has work under way to address most of these limitations. The SAB executive director and the ORD project director told us that in their opinion, there are specific actions—most of which were recommended by the SAB in its 1989 resolution—that, when followed, can enhance a model’s predictive capabilities. Among other things, these actions include the following:
Obtaining external stakeholders’ input to ensure that the model’s assumptions and formulas receive critical review by those not involved in the model’s development. Documenting the implicit and explicit assumptions so that others can evaluate the basis of the formulas embedded in the model. The agency has set in motion a three-pronged approach to improve the implementation of peer review agencywide, including peer review of the next MOBILE model. In addition to being uncertain about the amount of emissions related to road grade, EPA officials explained that obtaining the basic data from instrumented cars and chase cars to make such adjustments would be expensive at this time and that because of the cost and length of time required for these studies, the impact of road grade will probably not be addressed until MOBILE7. According to a 1993 CARB study, the FTP may underestimate hydrocarbon, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxide emissions by 27, 68, and 17 percent, respectively. However, as discussed below, the agency will not be able to quantify the uncertainty associated with its MOBILE model estimates, primarily because of the complexity and timing of factors affecting vehicle emissions and the high cost of vehicle studies. Comments From the Environmental Protection Agency
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Commerce, asked us to (1) describe the major limitations in the current version of EPA’s MOBILE model and (2) describe EPA’s process for improving both current and future versions of the MOBILE model. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) MOBILE series of complex computer models to estimate motor vehicle emissions, focusing on the model's major limitations and EPA's process for improving the current and future versions of the model.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) EPA and a group of stakeholders have identified 14 major limitations in the current MOBILE model; (2) some vehicle emissions-producing activities are not accounted for in the current model, and other emissions-producing activities may not be adequately represented on the basis of the most recent information; (3) according to EPA, much of this information has become available since MOBILE5a was released; (4) these limitations cause the model to underestimate vehicle emissions in some cases and overestimate them in others; (5) other studies indicate that some activities are inadequately represented in the model; (6) another study indicates that carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions from higher mileage vehicles may be significantly less than the model's estimates; (7) EPA plans to address most of these limitations in its next revision to the MOBILE model, however, according to agency officials, three of the limitations will probably not be addressed until later because of a combination of factors; (8) according to agency officials, these include the negligible impact on emissions inventory predictions, a relatively low priority ascribed by EPA and stakeholders, the cost and length of time required for these studies relative to the schedule for release of MOBILE6, and the emergence of new technologies that will make the improvements more feasible or cost effective in a few years; (9) EPA officials pointed out that they have updated the estimating capabilities of the MOBILE model 10 times since it was first introduced in 1978; (10) irrespective of these limitations, there are specific actions, most of which were recommended by the Science Advisory Board in its 1989 resolution, that, when followed, can enhance a model's estimating capabilities; (11) among other things, these actions involve documenting the implicit and explicit assumptions that are the basis of the formulas contained in the model, obtaining external stakeholders' input during the model's development, and having the model peer reviewed before it is used; (12) EPA officials acknowledged that, primarily because of resource limitations, until recently such actions have been delayed or forgone; (13) however, EPA is developing the next model, MOBILE6, with significantly increased openness and input from other stakeholders; and (14) EPA also plans to carry out the actions recommended by the Science Advisory Board, such as peer review, as part of its program for developing MOBILE6, due to be issued in late 1998. |
gao_GAO-02-1041 | gao_GAO-02-1041_0 | DOD and the Navy have issued clarifying guidance to these regulations. Cardholders are to make purchases, maintain supporting documentation, and reconcile their monthly statements. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, November 1999)
We found that the Navy and Marine Corps units we audited had not established an effective internal control environment in fiscal year 2001, and although significant improvements have been made, further action in several areas is necessary. In response to this issue, command level agency program coordinators told us that they did not have sufficient time to perform their transaction reviews. The statement also said that he did not authorize the purchase of any food. In addition, the existence of similar improper, and abusive or questionable transactions in our Navy-wide data mining of selected transactions provides additional indications that a weak control environment and ineffective specific controls exist throughout the Navy. Potentially fraudulent transactions can also involve vendors charging purchase cards for items that cardholders did not buy. As previously stated, one of the benefits of using purchase cards versus traditional contracting and payment processes is lower transaction processing costs and less red tape for both the government and the vendor. Conclusions
We support the use of a well-controlled purchase card program. However, the Navy program is not well controlled and as a result is vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Nonetheless, the control environment at the Navy has improved over the last year. However, further actions are needed to achieve an effective control environment. According to the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that during fiscal year 2001 it used purchase cards for more than 10.7 million transactions, valued at $6.1 billion. Our review of key purchase card controls for the Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, NAVSEA, and the Marine Corps covered the overall management control environment, including (1) management’s attitude in establishing the needed controls, (2) the numbers of cardholder and approving officials, (3) cardholder and approving official credit limits, (4) training for cardholders and approving officials, (5) monitoring and audit of purchase card activity, and (6) effectiveness of purchase card infrastructure; tests of statistical samples of key controls over purchase card transactions made during the first 11 months of fiscal year 2001 including (1) screening for required vendors, (2) documentation of independent confirmation that items or services paid for with the purchase card were received, (3) proper certification of the monthly purchase card statement for payment, and (4) substantive tests of pilferable property items included in our sample transactions to verify whether they were recorded in an accountable record; analytical reviews of transactions entered into during the last month of fiscal year 2001; data mining of the population of fiscal year 2001 transactions to identify potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive or questionable transactions; analysis and audit work related to invoices and other information obtained from Franklin Covey, from which, based on interviews with cardholders and our review of other transactions, we had reason to believe that the units at the four commands had made improper and abusive or questionable purchases during fiscal year 2001; analysis of the population of fiscal year 2001 purchase card transactions, for the four command units, to identify purchases that were split into two or more transactions to avoid the micropurchase threshold or other spending limits; and analysis of the population of Navy-wide fiscal year 2001 purchase card transactions to determine whether the Navy was effectively managing its purchases with frequently used vendors. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) is promoting departmentwide use of purchase cards for obtaining goods and services. It reported that for the year ended September 30, 2001, purchase cards were used by 230,000 cardholders to make 10.7 million transactions valued at more than $6.1 billion. The benefits of using purchase cards versus traditional contracting and payment processes are lower transaction processing costs and less red tape for both the government and the vendor community. Although GAO supports the purchase card program concept, it is important that agencies have adequate internal controls in place to protect the government from fraud, waste, and abuse. A weak overall control environment and breakdowns in key internal controls leave the Navy vulnerable to potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive purchases. In response to GAO's previous findings, DOD and Navy have begun improving the control environment over the purchase card program. However, further improvements are needed to achieve an effective control environment. GAO determined that the Navy did not provide cardholders, approving officials, and agency program coordinators with sufficient human capital resources--time and training--to effectively perform oversight and manage the program. The weaknesses in the Navy's purchase card control environment at the units audited led to a significant breakdown in key control activities in fiscal year 2001. GAO determined that (1) cardholders did not screen for the availability of goods from required sources, (2) cardholders did not document that someone independent of the cardholder received and accepted the goods and services, (3) many Navy units did not maintain accountability over pilferable property acquired with the purchase card, and (4) cardholders did not reconcile monthly purchase card statements to supporting documentation and approving officials did not review the cardholders' reconciled bills prior to payment certification. The weak control environment and breakdown in key internal controls contributed to potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive or questionable transactions that went undetected at units in all three Navy commands and the Marine Corps base GAO audited. GAO's site-specific and Navy-wide data mining transactions reviews identified other potentially fraudulent transactions including the purchase of computers, cell phones, food, cameras, power tools, televisions, personal digital assistants, clothing, and stereos. GAO also identified abusive and questionable transactions at all three Navy commands and the Marine Corps base audited and in GAO's Navy-wide data mining. The purchase card transactions that GAO considered to be questionable generally did not include and explanation or advance authorization that would justify these purchases or permit a determination of whether the purchases were improper or abusive. |
gao_HEHS-95-257 | gao_HEHS-95-257_0 | Background
Because most Americans receive their health insurance from their employers, changing jobs can disrupt their health care coverage. As shown in figure 1, most of these preexisting condition exclusions last for 1 year or more. Federal and State Laws Promote Health Insurance Portability
The Congress and the states have taken several initiatives to improve the portability of health care coverage. State Initiatives
Recently, we reported that most states enacted small group health insurance reforms between 1990 and 1994. Estimating the Number of Individuals Affected by National Health Insurance Standards
Overall, we estimate that as many as 21 to 25 million people per year could be affected by national portability standards, should they be enacted. In response to these concerns, S. 1028 as approved by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources includes a provision that requires anyone converting to an individual health plan to have had continuous group health care coverage for the preceding 18 months for the portability standards to be effective. Although many states have enacted portability standards for insurance carriers, ERISA preemption prevents states from applying the standards to self-funded employer-based health plans. We estimate that as many as 21 million to 25 million Americans a year could possibly benefit from proposed national portability standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the protections offered by current state and federal health insurance portability reforms; (2) the number of people who could be affected by broader national portability standards; and (3) other issues related to the design of national portability standards.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although current federal and state laws have improved the portability of health insurance, an individual's health care coverage can still be reduced when changing jobs; (2) 40 states enacted small group insurance regulations between 1990 and 1994 that included portability standards, but the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 prevents states from applying these standards to the health plans of employers who self fund; (3) up to 21 million Americans a year would benefit from federal legislation that would waive preexisting condition exclusions for individuals who have had continuous health care coverage; and (4) as many as 4 million Americans who have been unwilling to leave their jobs because of concerns about losing their health care coverage would benefit from national portability standards. |
gao_GAO-16-83 | gao_GAO-16-83_0 | VA Lacks Reliable Data on Medical Facilities’ Primary Care Panel Sizes and Does Not Have Effective Oversight Processes to Verify and Use Facilities’ Data to Monitor Primary Care Data Reported by VA Facilities on Primary Care Panel Sizes Are Unreliable
We found that VA lacks reliable data on primary care panel sizes across its facilities because the data that facilities record and report to VA Central Office and networks are sometimes inaccurate. We found that actual panel sizes across the six facilities varied from 23 percent below to 11 percent above their respective modeled panel size. Primary Care Operations Office officials pointed out that because the data are self- reported, facilities can and sometimes do record the data inaccurately or in a manner that does not follow VA’s policy on panel management. Growing patient demand: Officials at all three facilities stated that the growing number of patients seeking primary care services at their facilities has required them to assign a larger number of patients to each provider. VA’s panel management policy requires facilities to ensure the reliability of their reported panel size data, but the policy does not assign oversight responsibility to VA Central Office or the networks for verifying the reliability of these data or for using the data for monitoring purposes. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility, ensure that reliable information is available, and assess the quality of performance over time. Across the seven networks that oversee the seven selected facilities for which we conducted a more in-depth analysis, we also identified variations in the extent to which the networks verified facilities’ panel size data and used the data to monitor and address panel sizes that were too high or too low. Absent a robust oversight process that assigns responsibility, as appropriate, to VA Central Office and networks for verifying facilities’ panel size data and using the data to monitor facilities’ management of primary care—such as, examining wide variations from modeled panel sizes—VA lacks assurance that facilities’ data are reliable and that they are managing primary care panels in a manner that meets VA’s goals of providing efficient, timely, and quality care to veterans. VA’s Encounter and Expenditure Data Show Wide Variation across Medical Facilities, and VA Central Office and Networks Do Not Use These Data to Monitor Primary Care
Expenditures per Primary Care Encounter Varied Widely across VA Facilities
Based on our review of fiscal year 2014 VA-wide primary care expenditure and encounter data, we found that expenditures per primary care encounter varied widely across VA facilities, from a low of $150 to a high of $396, after adjusting to account for geographic differences in labor costs. Among other things, this variation may indicate that primary care is being delivered efficiently at facilities with relatively low expenditures per encounter or inefficiently at facilities with relatively high expenditures per encounter. VA Central Office and Networks Verify and Use Facilities’ Encounter and Expenditure Data for Financial Purposes, But Not to Monitor Primary Care
While VA Central Office and networks verify and use facilities’ encounter and expenditure data for financial purposes, VA’s policies governing primary care do not require VA Central Office and networks to use these data to monitor facilities’ management of primary care. Federal internal control standards state that agencies need both operational and financial data to determine whether they are meeting strategic goals and should use such data to assess the quality of performance over time. Using panel size data in conjunction with encounter and expenditure data, would allow VA Central Office and networks to assess facilities’ capacity to provide primary care services and the efficiency of care delivery. VA Central Office and the networks are also missing opportunities to use readily available encounter and expenditure data to potentially improve the efficiency of primary care service delivery. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, direct the Undersecretary for Health to take the following two actions to improve the reliability of VA’s primary care panel size data and improve VA Central Office and the networks’ oversight of facilities’ management of primary care: Incorporate in policy an oversight process for primary care panel management that assigns responsibility, as appropriate, to VA Central Office and networks for (1) verifying each facility’s reported panel size data currently in PCMM and in web-PCMM, if the software is rolled- out nationally, including such data as the number of primary care patients, providers, support staff, and exam rooms; and (2) monitoring facilities’ reported panel sizes in relation to the modeled panel size and assisting facilities in taking steps to address situations where reported panel sizes vary widely from modeled panel sizes. Review and document how to use encounter and expenditure data in conjunction with panel size data to strengthen monitoring of facilities’ management of primary care. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA's 150 medical facilities manage primary care services provided to veterans. VA requires facilities to record and report data on primary care panel sizes to help facilities manage their workload and ensure that veterans receive timely and efficient care. VA also requires facilities to record and report data on primary care encounters and expenditures.
GAO was asked to examine these data and VA's oversight of primary care. This report examines (1) VA's panel size data across facilities and how VA uses these data to oversee primary care, and (2) VA's encounter and expenditure data across facilities and how VA uses these data to oversee primary care. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2014 data on primary care panel size, encounters, and expenditures for all VA facilities. GAO also conducted a more in-depth, nongeneralizable analysis of data and interviewed officials from seven facilities, selected based on geographic diversity and differences in facility complexity. GAO also interviewed VA Central Office and network officials to examine their oversight of primary care, including the extent to which they verify the data and use it to monitor the management of primary care.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) data on primary care panel sizes—that is, the number of patients VA providers and support staff are assigned as part of their patient portfolio—are unreliable across VA's 150 medical facilities and cannot be used to monitor facilities' management of primary care. Specifically, as part of its review, GAO found missing values and other inaccuracies in VA's data. Officials from VA's Primary Care Operations Office confirmed that facilities sometimes record and self-report these data inaccurately or in a manner that does not follow VA's policy and noted that this could result in the data reliability concerns GAO identified. GAO obtained updated data from six of seven selected facilities, corrected these data for inaccuracies, and then calculated the actual panel sizes for the six facilities. GAO found that for these six facilities the actual panel size varied from 23 percent below to 11 percent above the modeled panel size, which is the number of patients for whom a provider and support staff can reasonably deliver primary care as projected by VA. Such wide variation raises questions about whether veterans are receiving access to timely care and the appropriateness of the size of provider workload at these facilities.
Moreover, GAO found that while VA's primary care panel management policy requires facilities to ensure the reliability of their panel size data, it does not assign responsibility to VA Central Office or networks for verifying the reliability of facilities' data or require them to use the data for monitoring purposes. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility, ensure that reliable information is available, and use this information to assess the quality of performance over time. Because VA's panel management policy is inconsistent with federal internal control standards, VA lacks assurance that its facilities' data are reliable and that the facilities are managing primary care panels in a manner that meets VA's goals of providing efficient, timely, and quality care to veterans.
In contrast to VA's panel data, GAO found that primary care encounter and expenditure data reported by all VA medical facilities are reliable, although the data show wide variations across facilities. For example, in fiscal year 2014, expenditures per primary care encounter—that is, a professional contact between a patient and a primary care provider—ranged from a low of $150 to a high of $396 after adjusting to account for geographic differences in labor costs across facilities. Such wide variations may indicate that services are being delivered inefficiently at some facilities with relatively higher per encounter costs compared to other facilities. However, while VA verifies and uses these data for financial purposes, VA's policies governing primary care do not require the use of the data to monitor facilities' management of primary care. Federal internal control standards state that agencies need both operational and financial data to determine whether they are meeting strategic goals and should use such data to assess the quality of performance over time. Using panel size data in conjunction with encounter and expenditure data would allow VA to assess facilities' capacity to provide primary care services and the efficiency of their care delivery. By not using available encounter and expenditure data in this manner, VA is missing an opportunity to potentially improve the efficiency of primary care service delivery.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA verify facilities' panel size data, monitor and address panel sizes that are too high or too low, and review and document how to use encounter and expenditure data to help monitor facilities' management of primary care. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations and described its plans to implement them. |
gao_RCED-97-12 | gao_RCED-97-12_0 | 2.) As discussed with the staff of the Majority and Ranking Minority members of the Senate and House committees having jurisdiction over these matters, to fulfill the requirements of the act, we examined • whether Reclamation’s determination of the impact of various flow alternatives on selected resources was reasonable and • what, if any, concerns still exist on the part of key interested parties about the final EIS. Therefore, we believe that these limitations are not significant enough to render the final impact statement unusable to the Secretary of the Interior as a decision-making document. To address these uncertainties, Reclamation intends to initiate a process of “adaptive management” that would provide for long-term monitoring and research to measure the actual effects of the selected alternative. We did note, however, some shortcomings in the economic assumptions used in the hydropower analysis and in Reclamation’s implementation of certain methodologies. These shortcomings, combined with the inherent uncertainty in making economic forecasts, reduce the precision of the estimated economic impacts. Some of the data used in making the impact determinations were dated, preliminary, or incomplete. Reclamation recognizes that uncertainties still exist about the impact of the various flow alternatives on resources. However, while expressing their support, some organizations still had concerns about the final EIS. Several Concerns Remain About the Implementation of the Dam’s New Operating Procedures
While respondents to our survey were generally positive about the selection of a preferred alternative and the process used by Reclamation to develop the EIS, some were still concerned about the preferred alternative and the Glen Canyon Dam’s final environmental impact statement. These concerns focus on the manner in which compliance with the Endangered Species Act will be achieved, the economic impact of reducing the Glen Canyon Dam’s hydroelectric power capacity, the lack of consideration in the EIS of other causes of downstream adverse impacts other than water releases from Glen Canyon Dam, the simultaneous changing of two of the dam’s operating parameters very late in the EIS process, the adequacy of the flood frequency reduction measures, the need for selective withdrawal structures, and issues related to adaptive management, including future research and monitoring. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO evaluated the Bureau of Reclamation's final environmental impact statement (EIS) on the operations of the Glen Canyon Dam, focusing on: (1) whether the Bureau's determination of the impact of various operating alternatives on selected resources was reasonable; and (2) key interested parties' concerns about the final impact statement.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in general, Reclamation used appropriate methodologies and the best available information in determining the potential impact of the dam's various flow alternatives on selected resources; (2) GAO identified some shortcomings and controversy in Reclamation's application of certain methodologies, and some of the data Reclamation used in making its impact determinations were dated, preliminary, or incomplete; (3) these limitations, combined with the inherent uncertainty associated with making forecasts, reduce the precision of the impacts in the statements, and some uncertainty remains; (4) according to GAO's analysis and the opinions of experts, these limitations are not significant enough to alter the relative ranking of the flow alternatives or render the final EIS unusable as a decisionmaking document; and (5) Reclamation recognizes that uncertainties still exist and intends to initiate a process of adaptive management that would provide for long-term monitoring and research to measure the actual effects of the selected alternative. GAO also found that, many of the key interested parties affected by the Glen Canyon Dam's EIS support the process used by Reclamation to develop the EIS as well as the implementation of the preferred alternative; however, while expressing their support, some interested parties raised specific concerns that still exist about the final EIS, including: (1) achieving compliance with the Endangered Species Act; (2) the economic impact of reducing the dam's hydroelectric power capacity; (3) the consideration of other possible causes of adverse downstream impacts; (4) the difficulties in measuring the impact of changes in the dam's operations; (5) the adequacy of measures for reducing the frequency of unscheduled floods; (6) the need for installing multilevel water intake structures on the dam to raise the downstream water temperature; and (7) the implementation of the adaptive management program. |
gao_GAO-02-289T | gao_GAO-02-289T_0 | In fiscal year 2001, 6.7 million individuals received almost $28 billion in SSI benefits. We believe that sustained management attention is necessary to improve SSI program integrity. In recent years, SSA has taken action to strengthen its research and policy development role in these and other areas. These are, in general, the same challenges we have been highlighting since SSA became an independent agency. SSA has made disappointing progress on (1) its efforts to improve its disability claims process, (2) the need to better integrate return-to-work strategies into all phases of the disability process, and (3) the need to better plan for future service delivery pressures and changes. Supplemental Security Income: Long-Standing Issues Require More Active Management and Program Oversight. Information Technology Management: Social Security Administration Practices Can Be Improved. | What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) provided $450 billion in benefits to 50 million recipients in fiscal year 2001. Since 1995, when SSA became an independent agency, GAO has called for effective leadership and sustained management attention to several unresolved management challenges, including the redesign of its disability claims process, management and oversight problems with its SSI program, future service delivery demands, and implementing its information technology and research and policy development capacity. SSA has much more to do and will need to take bolder action or make more fundamental changes to existing programs. |
gao_GAO-15-830T | gao_GAO-15-830T_0 | Background
CERCLA requires EPA to compile a list of contaminated and potentially contaminated federal facilities. EPA has established 18 months as a reasonable time frame for agencies to complete the preliminary assessment. Four Departments Have Identified Thousands of Contaminated and Potentially Contaminated Sites
USDA, Interior, DOD, and DOE have identified thousands of contaminated and potentially contaminated sites on land they manage, but there is not a complete inventory of sites, in particular, for abandoned mines. We found in our January 2015 report that there were at least 1,491 contaminated sites on land managed by USDA. In addition, in January 2015, we reported that the Forest Service had not developed a complete, consistent, or usable inventory of abandoned mines and had no plans and procedures for developing such an inventory because, according to Forest Service officials, they did not have the resources to complete a comprehensive inventory of all potentially contaminated abandoned mines on the agency’s lands. The Forest Service estimated that there were from 27,000 to 39,000 abandoned mines on their lands—approximately 20 percent of which may pose some level of risk to human health or the environment, based on the professional knowledge and experience of agency staff. Interior
We found in our January 2015 report that Interior had identified 4,722 sites with confirmed or likely contamination. In June 2014, DOD reported to Congress that it had 38,804 sites in its inventory of sites with contamination from hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants at active installations, formerly used defense sites, and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) locations in the United States, as well as munition response sites that were known or suspected to contain unexploded ordnance, discarded military munitions, or munitions constituents., Of these 38,804 sites, DOD’s report shows that 8,865 have not reached the department’s response complete milestone—which occurs when a remedy is in place and required remedial action operations, if any, are complete. Four Departments Have Reported Spending Millions Annually for Cleanup at Federal Sites and Have Estimated Future Costs from Hundreds of Millions to Billions of Dollars
The four departments reported allocating and spending millions of dollars annually on environmental cleanup. They also estimated future costs in the hundreds of millions of dollars or billions to clean up sites and address their environmental liabilities. In fiscal year 2013, USDA allocated over $22 million to environmental cleanup efforts. In its fiscal year 2013 financial statements, USDA reported a total of $176 million in environmental liabilities. Interior
We reported in January 2015 that Interior allocated about $13 million for environmental cleanup efforts in fiscal year 2013. As we found in our January 2015 report, Interior reported $192 million in environmental liabilities in its fiscal year 2013 financial statements. For example, in July 2010, we reported that DOD spent almost $30 billion from 1986 to 2008 across all environmental cleanup and restoration activities at its installations, including NPL and non-NPL sites. In its Agency Financial Report for fiscal year 2014, DOD reported $58.6 billion in total environmental liabilities. According to DOE’s fiscal year 2016 Congressional budget request, DOE received an annual appropriation of almost $5.9 billion in fiscal year 2015 to support the cleanup of radioactive and hazardous wastes resulting from decades of nuclear weapons research and production. In 2014, DOE estimated that its total liability for environmental cleanup, the largest component of which is managed by EM, is almost $300 billion and includes responsibilities that could continue beyond the year 2089. EPA’s Oversight Role Includes Maintaining a List of Potentially Hazardous Sites and Ensuring that Preliminary Assessments Are Completed
As part of its oversight role in maintaining the list of contaminated and potentially contaminated federal sites and ensuring that preliminary assessments of such sites are complete, EPA has compiled a docket of over 2,300 federal sites that may pose a risk to human health and the environment. EPA is responsible for ensuring that the federal agencies assess these sites for contamination. However, in March 2009, we reported that EPA officials from two regions told us that some agencies such as DOD may take 2 to 3 years to complete a preliminary assessment because EPA does not have independent authority under CERCLA to enforce a timeline for completion of a preliminary assessment. In March 2009, we suggested that Congress consider amending CERCLA section 120 to authorize EPA to require agencies to complete preliminary assessments within specified time frames. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government owns over 700 million acres of land. Some of this land—which is primarily managed by USDA, Interior, DOD, and DOE—is contaminated with hazardous waste from prior uses, such as landfills and mining.
To respond to problems caused by improper disposal of hazardous substances in the past, in 1980, Congress passed CERCLA, also known as Superfund. Among other things, CERCLA requires owners and operators of hazardous waste sites to notify the federal EPA—which manages the Superfund program—of the existence of their facilities, as well as known, suspected, or likely releases of hazardous substances.
This testimony focuses on (1) numbers of contaminated and potentially contaminated federal sites for four departments; (2) spending and estimates of future costs for cleanup at these federal sites; and (3) EPA's role in maintaining the list of contaminated and potentially contaminated federal sites and ensuring that preliminary assessments of such sites are complete. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports issued from March 2009 through March 2015.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Agriculture (USDA), the Interior, Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) have identified thousands of contaminated and potentially contaminated sites on land they manage but do not have a complete inventory of sites, in particular, for abandoned mines. GAO reported in January 2015 that USDA had identified 1,491 contaminated sites and many potentially contaminated sites. However, USDA did not have a reliable, centralized site inventory or plans and procedures for completing one, in particular, for abandoned mines. For example, officials at USDA's Forest Service estimated that there were from 27,000 to 39,000 abandoned mines on its lands—approximately 20 percent of which may pose some level of risk to human health or the environment. GAO also reported that Interior had an inventory of 4,722 sites with confirmed or likely contamination. However, Interior's Bureau of Land Management had identified over 30,000 abandoned mines that were not yet assessed for contamination, and this inventory was not complete. DOD reported to Congress in June 2014 that it had 38,804 sites in its inventory of sites with contamination. DOE reported that it has 16 sites in 11 states with contamination.
These four departments reported allocating and spending millions of dollars annually on environmental cleanup and estimated future costs in the hundreds of millions of dollars or more in environmental liabilities. Specifically:
GAO reported in January 2015 that, in fiscal year 2013, USDA allocated over $22 million to environmental cleanup efforts and reported in its financial statements $176 million in environmental liabilities to address 100 sites.
GAO reported in January 2015 that Interior in fiscal year 2013 allocated about $13 million for environmental cleanup efforts and reported $192 million in environmental liabilities in its financial statements to address 434 sites.
In July 2010, GAO reported that DOD spent almost $30 billion from 1986 to 2008 across all environmental cleanup and restoration activities at its installations. In its fiscal year 2014 Agency Financial Report , DOD reported $58.6 billion in total environmental liabilities.
DOE reported receiving an annual appropriation of almost $5.9 billion in fiscal year 2015 to support cleanup activities. In 2014, DOE estimated its total liability for environmental cleanup at almost $300 billion.
As part of maintaining the list of contaminated and potentially contaminated federal sites, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) compiled 2,323 federal sites that may pose a risk to human health and the environment, as of August 2015, according to EPA officials. EPA is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies assess these sites for contamination and has established 18 months as a reasonable time frame for agencies to complete a preliminary assessment. However, in March 2009, GAO reported that according to EPA officials, some agencies, such as DOD, may take 2 to 3 years to complete an assessment and that EPA does not have independent authority under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to enforce a timeline for completing the preliminary assessment. In March 2009, GAO suggested that Congress consider amending CERCLA section 120 to authorize EPA to require agencies to complete preliminary assessments within specified time frames.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations. Previously, GAO made numerous recommendations to ensure that contaminated sites were identified and assessed, and some of these recommendations have not been fully implemented. GAO will continue to monitor implementation. |
gao_GAO-17-452 | gao_GAO-17-452_0 | Generic Drug Review Activities
FDA begins review of a generic drug when a generic drug applicant submits an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). 1 for a summary of the generic drug application review process.) GDUFA Increased Generic Drug Program Resources Significantly, but the Agency Lacks a Plan for Administering Its Carryover User Fees Supported an 85 Percent Increase in Generic Drug Program Obligations, Increasing FDA’s Reliance on Such Fees During the Implementation Period
GDUFA supported an 85 percent increase in total FDA obligations for its generic drug program in the first 4 years of implementation. Total obligations for FDA’s generic drug program (from both regular appropriations and generic drug user fee appropriations) increased by about 85 percent in the 4 years following GDUFA’s implementation, from about $267 million in fiscal year 2013 to about $494 million in fiscal year 2016. Obligations from generic drug user fees grew in both absolute terms and as a share of total program obligations, from about $121 million (45 percent of total obligations) in fiscal year 2013 to about $373 million (76 percent of total obligations) in fiscal year 2016. Despite the large carryover amounts, FDA has not developed a planning document on how it will administer its carryover—one that includes a fully documented analysis of program costs and risks to ensure that its carryover reflects expected operational needs and probable contingencies. We have previously found that when unobligated balances are used as carryover, it is important for entities to establish a target range for the carryover to ensure user fee resources are used efficiently and responsibly and that the amounts carried over into the following year are reasonable to meet program needs, risks, and probable contingencies. However, agency officials also stated that their internal management report, which is used to report its user fee cash flows, was sufficient to analyze the program’s needs. FDA Implemented Various Changes to Improve the Generic Drug Application Process and Made Additional Refinements in Response to Applicant Concerns
FDA has made changes to the generic drug program since the enactment of GDUFA in order to establish a better-managed drug application review process. According to FDA officials, the launch of the platform has provided the following benefits to FDA and to stakeholders: (1) faster review times, (2) easier collaboration and communication with industry, (3) improved application review consistency, and (4) more predictable application review times and target completion dates due to having all pertinent information regarding an application in one location that is accessible to all FDA reviewers. Generic Drug Application Review Times Have Decreased, with FDA Meeting Its GDUFA Performance Goals for Fiscal Year 2015
FDA’s review times for generic drug applications have decreased since the implementation of GDUFA, with FDA surpassing multiple fiscal year 2015 GDUFA performance goals as described in table 4. With respect to ANDA review times, the average time for FDA to complete the first review cycle decreased from 26 months for ANDAs submitted in fiscal year 2013 to about 14 months for those submitted in fiscal year 2015. As of December 31, 2016, FDA had also acted on 89 percent of all ANDAs submitted in fiscal year 2015 within 15 months of receipt, exceeding its GDUFA goal of acting on 60 percent of ANDAs received in fiscal year 2015 within 15 months. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure efficient use of generic drug user fees, facilitate oversight and transparency, and plan for risks, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA develop a plan for administering user fee carryover that includes analyses of program costs and risks and reflects actual operational needs and contingencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nearly 90 percent of prescription drugs dispensed in the United States are generic drugs. According to FDA, an increasing volume of generic drug applications over the past decades stressed its ability to review applications efficiently. GDUFA granted FDA the authority to collect user fees from the generic drug industry to supplement resources for the generic drug program. In return, FDA committed to meeting certain performance goals related to the timely review of generic drug applications and to implementing review process improvements.
GAO was asked to examine FDA's implementation of GDUFA. In this report, GAO (1) examines how user fees supported the generic drug program, (2) describes FDA's improvements to the generic drug application review process, and (3) analyzes changes in generic drug application review times. GAO reviewed laws and regulations; FDA policy, guidance, the GDUFA Commitment Letter, and GDUFA financial reports from fiscal years 2013 through 2016; FDA data on application review times from fiscal years 2012 through 2015; and interviewed officials from FDA, generic drug manufacturers, and trade associations.
What GAO Found
Since the enactment of the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012 (GDUFA), the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) reliance on user fees has increased from $121 million in fiscal year 2013 to $373 million in fiscal year 2016, or 45 percent of total program obligations in fiscal year 2013 to 76 percent in fiscal year 2016. FDA carried over $174 million in unobligated user fees at the end of the fourth year of the GDUFA 5-year period. GAO found that although FDA uses an internal management report to track user fee cash flows for internal purposes, it lacks a plan for administering its carryover—one that includes a fully-documented analysis of program costs and risks to ensure that program operations can be sustained in case of unexpected changes in collections or costs. GAO previously found that it is important for entities with carryover to establish appropriate target amounts based on program needs, risks, and contingencies. FDA's approach is inconsistent with best practices for managing federal user fees. Without a carryover plan, FDA lacks reasonable assurance that the size of its carryover is appropriate to ensure the efficient and responsible use of resources.
Dollars in millions
FDA took steps to improve the timeliness and predictability of generic drug application reviews. FDA restructured the generic drug program by building a more robust organizational infrastructure, upgrading information technology systems, and implementing communication reforms. As FDA implemented these changes, it made additional refinements in response to applicants' feedback.
Generic drug application review times have improved under GDUFA. FDA's review time for a new generic drug application (known as an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)) decreased from 28 months for applications submitted in fiscal year to 2012 to about 14 months for those submitted in fiscal year 2015. FDA also surpassed multiple GDUFA performance goals. For example, FDA committed to reviewing 60 percent of ANDAs submitted in fiscal year 2015 within 15 months of their receipt. GAO found that FDA had taken action on 89 percent of such ANDAs for which it committed to conducting a substantive review by December 31, 2016, thereby surpassing this goal.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA develop a plan for administering user fee carryover that includes analyses of program costs and risks and reflects operational needs and contingencies. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-14-564 | gao_GAO-14-564_0 | VA is required to provide certain health care benefits—including home care, hospital care, nursing home care, outpatient care, preventive care, habilitative and rehabilitative care, case management, and respite care— for spina bifida beneficiaries. However, VHA has conducted limited outreach with key stakeholder groups that have a relationship with potentially eligible individuals who are not already enrolled. VHA Provides Information and Updates to Enrolled Spina Bifida Beneficiaries on Covered Health Care Services
VHA provides information on the available health care benefits to beneficiaries who are enrolled in its spina bifida program using three primary methods: (1) the initial mailing of information upon program enrollment, (2) the program website, and (3) contact with beneficiaries regarding updates to covered services. VHA Has Conducted Limited Outreach with Key Stakeholders regarding Spina Bifida Benefits
VHA has conducted limited outreach with key stakeholder organizations, and representatives of these organizations told us that this has contributed to lack of awareness among some individuals who may be eligible to receive health care benefits under the spina bifida program. Administrative and clinical review. Total Spina Bifida Claims Payments and Number of Claims Paid Have Increased from Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013, with Outpatient Services Making Up the Majority of Claims
From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, total payments for spina bifida claims increased by 43 percent—from about $19.4 million to about $27.8 million. VHA officials told us they attribute the growth in the spina bifida program to an increasing number of claims and payments in the years following the 2008 legislative expansion of health care coverage under the program, as well as increasing health care costs for beneficiaries as they age and their health care needs become more varied and complex. In fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the percentages of paid and denied claims remained steady, with paid claims representing about 90 percent of all claims submitted each fiscal year. VHA Primarily Uses Claims Audits to Oversee Its Spina Bifida Claims Process, but Does Not Have Written Guidance for Audit Follow-up
VHA conducts annual audits of spina bifida program claims, and VHA officials told us these audits and associated audit follow-up activities are Auditors from the the primary means of oversight for the claims process.VHA CBOPC’s Department of Audits & Internal Controls conduct audits of the spina bifida claims process annually. Auditors then complete a report that documents the audit’s findings, including corrective actions and recommendations. There is currently no written guidance on how CBOPC staff are to document the status of audit follow-up activities—corrective actions and recommendations outlined in audit reports—to ensure their completion. In addition, without written guidance for audit follow-up activities related to the spina bifida claims process, VHA cannot be assured that these activities have been successfully completed or that the corrective actions and recommendations outlined in audit reports have been appropriately implemented. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve awareness of the spina bifida program’s health care benefits among potentially eligible individuals and to help them obtain the benefits to which they may be entitled, we recommend that the Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Acting Under Secretary for Health to conduct outreach with key stakeholder groups regarding the program and its benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA provides health care benefits to children diagnosed with spina bifida—a birth defect that can cause physical and neurological issues—born to Vietnam and certain other veterans. Legislation requires the provision of certain health care benefits—including home care, hospital care, outpatient care, and case management—for spina bifida beneficiaries. VHA administers the Spina Bifida Health Care Program for enrolled beneficiaries by processing and paying claims for covered services from private sector providers.
GAO was asked to evaluate VHA's administration of spina bifida health care benefits. In this report, GAO examined for the spina bifida program: (1) the extent to which VHA conducts outreach about available benefits, (2) what is known about health care claims that have been processed, and (3) what, if any, oversight, VHA conducts of the claims process. GAO reviewed the spina bifida program handbook and claims audit reports, analyzed data on submitted, paid, and denied claims from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and interviewed VHA officials and representatives from key stakeholder organizations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) provides information and updates on covered health care services to beneficiaries enrolled in its spina bifida program, but has conducted limited outreach with key stakeholder organizations. VHA provides information on health care benefits to enrolled beneficiaries through the program website, for example. However, VHA has conducted limited outreach with key stakeholder organizations—such as the Spina Bifida Association—that have relationships with individuals who are potentially eligible for the spina bifida program and its benefits but are not enrolled. Representatives of these organizations told GAO this has contributed to lack of awareness of eligibility and available benefits. Without this outreach, VHA may miss important opportunities to help potentially eligible individuals obtain health care benefits to which they may be entitled.
For the spina bifida program, both total claims payments, as well as the total number of claims paid, increased by more than 40 percent from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. VHA officials attributed the increase to a 2008 legislative expansion of health care coverage under the program, and growing health care costs for beneficiaries as they age. During this 5-year period, paid claims represented about 90 percent of all claims submitted each fiscal year.
VHA primarily uses claims audits to oversee its spina bifida claims process. Auditors review a sample of claims and prepare a report with the audit's findings and any necessary follow-up activities. However, VHA does not have written guidance on how staff are to document the status of these follow-up activities to ensure their completion. Without such written guidance, VHA cannot be assured that these activities have been successfully completed or that any recommendations outlined in audit reports have been appropriately implemented.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA conduct outreach with key stakeholder groups regarding the spina bifida program and its benefits, and develop written guidance for completing and documenting the status of follow-up activities related to claims audits. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-787T | gao_GAO-11-787T_0 | The statement is a key tool for communicating with the public about these benefits and the long-term financial challenges the system faces. In our 2005 review of the statement’s understandability, we again found weaknesses in the statement’s design and recommended that SSA develop a plan for regularly evaluating and revising the statement. SSA is Preparing to Make the Statement Available Online
Since SSA suspended mailings of the statement in March 2011, the agency has been assessing the feasibility of making the statement available online. SSA is developing a new electronic authentication system and a “MySocialSecurity” Web page to allow individuals to access personalized SSA information online. Because officials do not know how long the testing phase will last, they could not provide a date for when the statement will be available to the public online. While SSA officials reported that upcoming tests of the portal will focus on its user-friendliness, they do not have plans in place for publicizing the online statement. In addition, key officials involved in the online statement project could not provide information on any other plans SSA is developing to address Internet access issues. Further, SSA officials in charge of drafting the new contract for mailing statements acknowledged that it is unknown how many workers will request mailed statements once the online statement is available, as that number will depend on factors such as individuals’ willingness and capability to access the statement online. Beyond Format Enhancements, SSA is Taking Only Limited Steps to Improve the Statement’s Usefulness
SSA officials said they expect to improve the usefulness of the statement for some by moving it to an online format. While SSA is making these limited changes, the project lead said the first publicly released version of the online statement will be as similar to the current mailed statement as possible. However, in our prior work, using graphics to replace text and make information more quickly and easily understandable was a common theme that emerged in the suggestions made by focus groups and a benefits consulting firm. However, we and others have previously identified ways in which SSA could modify the design of the paper statement to improve its usefulness for recipients. According to a 2009 report from the Social Security Advisory Board, “information is presented as a laundry list of facts and data, rather than cogent summaries of things that people need to know to make informed decisions.”
Furthermore, even though we and others have previously reported that certain information contained in the statement is confusing, SSA has no plans at this time to change its content in either the paper or online version. SSA’s own financial literacy initiative also provides detailed information on opportunities for improving the statement’s usefulness, particularly to help people plan for retirement, and SSA considers the statement to be a key component of this initiative. However, the extent to which staff from the office in charge of the initiative have been consulted on the design or content of the online statement, or on decisions about which groups should continue to receive a print statement, is unclear. Therefore, as SSA considers moving forward with an online statement, we recommend the following: the Commissioner of SSA should take steps to ensure access to the statement for all eligible workers, including those without Internet access or English proficiency. Doing so will assure that the statement remains an important tool for communicating with all workers about the Social Security program. We provided a draft of this testimony to SSA for review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Statement (the statement) is the federal government's main document for communicating with more than 150 million workers about their Social Security benefits. Provided annually, it serves as a key financial literacy tool that can educate the public about Social Security Administration (SSA) program benefits, aid in financial planning, and ensure that workers' earnings records are complete and accurate. The statement is also a key tool for communicating with the public about the long-term financial challenges the Social Security system faces. However, due to budget constraints, SSA chose to suspend mailings of the statement in March 2011. GAO examined (1) the current status of the statement and (2) ways SSA plans to improve the usefulness of the statement. To address these issues, GAO interviewed SSA officials and reviewed agency documents and our prior work on the statement's understandability. GAO also provided a draft of this testimony to SSA for review and comment.
What GAO Found
SSA is currently preparing to make the statement available online; however, the agency does not yet know the timeline for implementation and has not finalized its plans for publicizing its availability or addressing access issues. SSA is developing a new Web portal to allow individuals to access personalized SSA information online. However, because the portal and online statement are currently in the initial development phases and thus have not yet been fully tested, agency officials do not know when the online statement will be available to the public. In addition, SSA does not yet have plans in place for publicizing the online statement or ensuring access for individuals without Internet access or English proficiency. Finally, because the agency does not have a total cost estimate for the online statement project, and it is unclear how many workers will request mailed statements after this information is made available online, it is unknown if SSA will realize the budget savings it expects from suspending statement mailings, at least in the short-term. Although SSA expects to improve the usefulness of the statement for some by moving it to an online format, the agency is taking only limited steps to improve the statement's overall content and design. A key agency official said that the first publicly released version of the online statement will be as similar to the mailed paper statement as possible, and SSA has no plans to update the paper statement's content or design at this time. However, over the years, GAO and others have reported that the design of the statement could be modified and certain information contained in the statement could be clarified to improve the statement's usefulness for recipients. For example, focus group participants in our prior study suggested that using graphics to replace text would make information more easily understandable. Furthermore, while SSA's own financial literacy initiative also provides detailed information on ways to improve the statement's usefulness in helping people plan for retirement, the extent to which staff from SSA's office responsible for this initiative have been consulted on the design or content of the online statement is unclear. As SSA considers moving forward with an online statement, we recommend that the Commissioner of SSA ensure access to the statement for all workers, including those without Internet access or English proficiency. In comments, SSA noted that paper statements will continue to be available, on request, in English and Spanish. |
gao_GAO-09-48 | gao_GAO-09-48_0 | State has 31 additional ongoing construction contracts for new facilities and plans to build approximately 90 more facilities from 2009 to 2023. In this context, a U.S. person is defined, in part, as a company that is incorporated or legally organized under the laws of the United States; has its principal place of business in the United States; has performed within the United States or at a U.S. diplomatic or consular establishment abroad administrative and technical, professional, or construction services similar in complexity, type, and value to the project being bid; has total business volume equal to or greater than the value of the project being bid in 3 years of the 5-year period before the specified date; employs U.S. citizens (1) in at least 80 percent of its principal management positions in the United States and (2) in more than half of its permanent, full-time positions in the United States; will employ U.S. citizens in at least 80 percent of the supervisory positions on the project site; and has the existing technical and financial resources in the United States to perform the contract. State Has Generally Met the Adequate Competition Requirement for Awarding NEC Contracts, but the Level of Contractor Participation Has Declined
Although State has generally received at least two bids for NEC projects since 1999, which meets the adequate competition clause, the number of contractors participating in the State’s program has declined. We also found that the number of firms per project prequalified to bid also declined during that period. Officials from these companies cited insufficient profits and disagreements with State’s management of the program as factors contributing to decisions to withdraw. State officials did report that from 1999-2008, the department received at least two bids—the legislatively defined minimum number for adequate competition—for all but one NEC project solicited as an open competition. State’s revised proposal would, in effect, open competition for NEC awards to smaller U.S. firms. Relations with Foreign Governments
Contractors also cited problems dealing with foreign governments as a challenge. Absent such support, it is unclear how State’s proposed amendment would affect the NEC program. In our analysis, we found that contractor participation declined in recent years for two reasons. First, increasing construction costs have made it more difficult for some firms to qualify for awards. Second, contractors reported that State management and construction processes undermine their ability to turn a profit, which is their primary incentive for participating in the program. While these changes may increase contractor participation, their full effects on the NEC construction process may not be apparent for a number of years, and State will need to monitor their effectiveness. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of State conduct a systematic review of the embassy construction contractor base that (1) demonstrates whether the U.S. contractor base that is both capable of meeting current requirements and willing to participate in the NEC program is adequate; (2) estimates the expected benefits and identifies the potential risks associated with the legislative proposal; and (3) details how the risks would be mitigated. Absent such support, it is unclear how the proposed changes would affect State’s program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address the first objective—how the contractor participation in the NEC program changed in recent years—we assessed the number of firms that prequalified and the number of contract proposals (bids) submitted for each new embassy compound (NEC), new consular compound (NCC), and new office building (NOB) awarded from 2002 to 2008. We determined that these data on the numbers of prequalifying firms and bids received were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To address the second objective—the degree to which State has assessed the need for or potential outcomes of its proposed amendment to the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986—we reviewed State documents on legal requirements to qualify for NEC awards, State’s proposed amendments to these legal requirements, and State’s contract solicitation and award processes. To address the fourth objective—actions State has taken to address the reported decline in contractors willing to participate in the NEC program—we reviewed documentation and conducted interviews with knowledgeable State officials on (1) rules and regulations outlining the embassy construction process, including public laws, Federal Acquisition Regulations, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and State reports and decision memos; (2) delivery methods and partnering policies employed by other federal agencies and supported by leading industry groups; (3) State’s efforts to improve communications with the contractor community, including meetings with industry groups and individual contractors; (4) State’s reorganization of planning offices, including the development of a new project management group and project manager positions; and (5) State efforts to improve construction processes, including lengthening project schedules, streamlining the contract solicitation process, and clarifying contract documents. State questioned why we chose to highlight the declines in the number of firms prequalifying to bid on NECs from 2006 to 2008 when that decline was not statistically significant. | Why GAO Did This Study
To provide safe and secure workplaces for overseas posts, the Department of State (State) has built 64 new embassy compounds (NEC) and other facilities since 1999, has 31 ongoing projects, and plans to build at least 90 more. In 2007, State reported the U.S. contractor pool for building NECs had reached its limit and proposed legislation to amend the criteria to qualify for NEC awards. GAO was asked to examine (1) how contractor participation in the NEC program changed in recent years, (2) the degree to which State assessed the need for and potential outcomes of its proposed amendment, (3) factors contractors consider when deciding to participate in the program, and (4) actions State has taken to address reported declines in contractor participation. GAO examined two indicators of contractor participation; reviewed State documents and proposed legislation; and interviewed State officials and U.S. firms that won NEC awards from 2001-2007.
What GAO Found
State received at least two bids--the legislatively specified minimum for adequate competition--for 60 of the 61 NEC projects it awarded from 1999-2008, and received three or more bids for at least 49 of the 61. Nonetheless, there was a statistically significant decline in the number of bids per NEC project from 2002 to 2008. GAO also found that the number of firms prequalified to bid on NEC projects also declined during this period. While many factors could affect contractor participation, GAO found the declines in the number of prequalifying firms and bids received were due, in part, to rising construction costs, which made it more difficult for some firms to meet qualification criteria. In addition, officials from five firms cited insufficient profits and State management practices as reasons for their recent withdrawals from the program. State has not systematically assessed the need for, or the possible outcomes of, its legislative proposal that would open competition for NEC awards to construction firms that cannot meet current qualification criteria. Although State identified several factors it believed reduced contractor participation, it has not assessed whether a sufficient number of contractors capable of meeting current requirements exists or how its legislative proposal would affect the NEC program. Specifically, State has not assessed the potential benefits or identified the potential risks of its legislative proposal, and has not stated how the risks would be mitigated. Absent these analyses, it is unclear whether the proposed amendment, including its December 2008 revision, would benefit State's embassy construction program. Contractors interviewed by GAO cited various incentives and challenges that affected their decision to participate in the NEC program. Although making profits was cited as the primary incentive for participating, contractors reported losing money on 42 percent of the contracts they performed. Contractors also cited several significant challenges that affected their decisions to submit contract proposals, including meeting State's shortened construction schedules, supplying labor and material to remote locations, finding and retaining cleared American workers, managing financial constraints, and dealing with foreign governments. Firms also expressed concerns with State's processes, including unclear solicitation documents and contract requirements, laborious design reviews, and State's 2001 decision to end formal partnering relationships with contractors. State has made several recent efforts to encourage contractors' participation in the NEC program. State has begun new outreach efforts to improve relations with contractors, and undertaken several changes to its management practices and organizational structures, including lengthening project schedules, improving clarity of contract requirements, and establishing a project management group to provide coordination and oversight throughout each phase of a project. While these changes address some contractor complaints, their full effects may not be apparent for a number of years. |
gao_GAO-07-53 | gao_GAO-07-53_0 | As shown on the left in figure 2, in a legitimate food stamp transaction, recipients run their EBT card, which works much like a debit card, through an electronic point-of-sale machine at the grocery checkout counter, and enter their secret personal identification number to access their food stamp accounts and to authorize the transfer of food stamp benefits from a federal account to the retailer’s account to pay for the eligible food items. FNS Reports That the Rate of Food Stamp Trafficking Declined between 1995 and 2005
FNS’s most recent estimate suggests that the food-stamp-trafficking rate was 1.0 cent on the dollar for calendar years 2002 to 2005 and that this rate and the total estimated benefits trafficked have declined in recent years. FNS’ first trafficking study in 1995 estimated that about 3.8 cents of every dollar of food stamp benefits issued was trafficked in 1993. Small stores, including small grocery, convenience, specialty, and gas/grocery stores have an estimated trafficking rate of 7.6 cents per dollar. In contrast, supermarkets and large grocery stores have an estimated rate of 0.2 cents per dollar. EBT Has Changed How Food Stamps Are Trafficked
The nationwide implementation of EBT has changed the way some food stamp benefits are trafficked. FNS Has Taken Advantage of New EBT Data to Improve Retailer Monitoring, While Other Federal Entities Have Focused on Fewer, High-Impact Investigations
FNS has taken advantage of new technology to improve its monitoring and sanctioning of food stamp retailers, but other federal agencies’ have been investigating and prosecuting fewer traffickers. These EBT cases now account for more than half of the permanent disqualifications by FNS (see fig. However, as FNS’s ability to detect trafficking has improved, the number of suspected traffickers investigated by other federal entities, such as the USDA Inspector General and the U.S. Secret Service have declined. Despite the Progress That Has Been Made against Trafficking, Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Program
Despite the declining FNS estimates of retailer trafficking, retailers can still enter the program intending to traffic and do so, often without fear of severe criminal penalties. In addition, Secret Service officials said that some merchants quickly learn that they do not need to restock their stores to continue to redeem food stamps because stores aren’t routinely checked for 5 years unless there is some indication of a problem with the store. Oversight of retailers’ entry into the program and early operations is important because newly authorized retailers can quickly ramp up the amount of food stamps they traffic, and there is no limit on the value of food stamps a retailer can redeem in 1 month. However, it is now at a point where it can begin to formulate more sophisticated analyses to identify high risk areas and target its resources. In one case, a store in the District of Columbia had 10 different owners who were each disqualified for trafficking, consuming FNS’s limited compliance-monitoring resources. Available FNS Penalties May Not Deter Traffickers
FNS penalties alone may not be sufficient to deter traffickers. For example, in the food-stamp-trafficking ramp-up case previously cited, this retailer redeemed almost $650,000 of food stamps over the course of 9 months before being disqualified from the program in November 2004. This inaction by some states allows recipients suspected of trafficking to continue the practice, and such inaction also leaves a pool of recipients ready and willing to traffic their benefits as soon as a disqualified store reopens under new management. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Secret Service for review and comment. Food Stamp Program: Information on Trafficking Food Stamp Benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every year, food stamp recipients exchange hundreds of millions of dollars in benefits for cash instead of food with retailers across the country, a practice known as trafficking. From 2000 to 2005, the Food Stamp Program has grown from $15 billion to $29 billion in benefits. During this period of time, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) replaced paper food stamp coupons with electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards that work much like a debit card at the grocery checkout counter. Given these program changes and continuing retailer fraud, GAO was asked to provide information on (1) what is known about the extent and nature of retailer food stamp trafficking, (2) the efforts of federal agencies to combat such trafficking, and (3) program vulnerabilities. To do this, GAO interviewed agency officials, visited 10 field offices, conducted case file reviews, and analyzed data from the FNS retailer database.
What GAO Found
FNS's estimates suggest trafficking declined between 1995 and 2005 from 3.8 cents per dollar of benefits redeemed to 1.0 cent, resulting in an estimated $241 million in food stamps trafficked in 2005. The rate of trafficking in small grocery and convenience stores is 7.6 cents per dollar, significantly higher than the rate for large stores, where it is estimated to be 0.2 cents per dollar. In addition, the use of EBT cards has changed the way some benefits are trafficked, for example eliminating middlemen who used to collect and redeem large amounts of paper coupons from program participants willing to sell them. FNS has taken advantage of EBT data to improve its ability to detect and disqualify trafficking retailers, while law enforcement agencies have conducted a decreasing number of investigations. Cases using only EBT transaction data now account for more than half of trafficking disqualifications, supplementing traditional, but more time-consuming, undercover investigations. Other federal entities, such as the USDA's Inspector General and the U.S. Secret Service, have reduced the number of traffickers they pursue in recent years and focused their efforts on high-impact cases. This has resulted in fewer cases referred for federal prosecution and fewer federal convictions for retailer trafficking. Despite FNS progress, the program remains vulnerable because retailers can enter the program intending to traffic, often without fear of severe criminal penalties. FNS authorizes some stores with limited food supplies so that low-income participants in areas with few supermarkets have access to food, but may not inspect these stores again for 5 years unless there is some indication of a problem. Oversight of early operations is important because newly authorized retailers can quickly ramp up the amount of benefits they traffic. One location that FNS disqualified for trafficking redeemed almost $650,000 in 9 months. In addition, FNS has not conducted analyses to identify high risk areas and to target its limited compliance-monitoring resources. Furthermore, disqualification, FNS's most severe penalty, may not be a sufficient deterrent, and FNS must rely upon others for prosecution. Finally, states' failing to pursue trafficking recipients leaves a pool of recipients willing to traffic when a disqualified store reopens. |
gao_GAO-07-137 | gao_GAO-07-137_0 | The Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to make HCOP grants “for the purpose of assisting individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds . The 1998 reauthorization of HCOP emphasized the importance of outreach activities by adding a funding preference for HCOP applications for projects that “involve a comprehensive approach by several public or private nonprofit health or educational entities to establish, enhance and expand educational programs that will result in the development of a competitive applicant pool of individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds who desire to pursue health professions careers.” Applications qualifying for this funding preference have an advantage because they must be considered for funding ahead of applications that do not. HRSA Followed a Standard Process to Award HCOP Grants
For fiscal years 2002 through 2005, HRSA followed a standard process to award HCOP grant funds, distributing the program’s available funds on a noncompetitive basis to continue funding existing grant projects, then awarding the remaining funds on a competitive basis. For competitive HCOP grants, HRSA published criteria and relied on the assessment of independent reviewers. Grants were awarded in accordance with the applications’ rank order as determined by the independent reviewers. HRSA’s Process for Awarding Competitive Grants Relied on Assessment by Independent Reviewers
For fiscal years 2002 through 2005, HRSA’s standard process for awarding competitive HCOP grants relied on independent reviewers to assess applications against the agency’s published review criteria. According to a HRSA official responsible for administering the HCOP program, the agency could have used this discretion to depart from the rank-order list resulting from the independent review process but did not do so for fiscal years 2002 through 2005. About One-Third of Competitive HCOP Grants Were Awarded to Minority- Serving Institutions
For fiscal years 2002 through 2005, minority-serving institutions submitted a total of 25 percent of all applications for competitive HCOP grants and received about 30 percent of awards. Among minority-serving institutions, historically black colleges and universities submitted the most applications and received the most awards, followed by Hispanic-serving institutions (see table 4). III), HRSA stated that the report met the goals of describing the award process and outlining the number and characteristics of HCOP applicants and grantees. We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator of HRSA and appropriate congressional committees. We compared these lists with the data we obtained from HRSA on HCOP grant applicants and recipients. Related GAO Products
Health Professions Education Programs: Action Still Needed to Measure Impact. Health Professions Education: Clarifying the Role of Title VII and VIII Programs Could Improve Accountability. | Why GAO Did This Study
To support the education and training of health professionals, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), administers health professions education programs authorized under title VII of the Public Health Service Act. One of these programs, the Health Careers Opportunity Program (HCOP), provides grants to health professions schools and other entities to help students from disadvantaged backgrounds prepare for health professions education and training. Funding preference is given to grant applications that demonstrate a comprehensive approach involving other educational or health-related partners. Congressional committees have encouraged HRSA to give priority to applications from schools with a historic mission of educating minority students for health professions. In 2004, the appropriations conference committee asked GAO to review HRSA's process for awarding grants. This report addresses, for fiscal years 2002 through 2005, (1) HRSA's process for awarding HCOP grants and (2) the number and characteristics of HCOP applicants and grantees. GAO reviewed data from HRSA, interviewed HRSA officials, and reviewed relevant federal laws and agency documents from HHS and the Department of Education.
What GAO Found
HRSA followed a standard process to award HCOP grants, distributing funds on a noncompetitive basis to continue funding existing HCOP grants within their approved project periods, and then awarding the remaining funds on a competitive basis. For each of fiscal years 2002-05, HRSA competitively awarded between $4 million and $15 million from the approximately $34 million annually available for HCOP. To award competitive grants, HRSA used independent reviewers who assessed applications against published criteria, scored applications that met minimum criteria, and determined if they qualified for the funding preference. HRSA ranked the applications from highest to lowest score--putting those with the funding preference first--and awarded grants in decreasing rank order until the available funds were exhausted. Although HRSA had discretion to award grants out of rank order, the agency did not do so for fiscal years 2002-05. For fiscal years 2002-05, HRSA awarded a total of 99 competitive HCOP grants from 439 grant applications reviewed. Overall, minority-serving institutions submitted about 25 percent of the applications reviewed and received about 30 percent of the competitive grants; historically black colleges and universities were the most numerous grantees among minority-serving institutions, followed by Hispanic-serving institutions. HRSA commented that a draft of this report met the goals of describing the award process and outlining the number and characteristics of HCOP applicants and grantees. |
gao_GAO-09-628T | gao_GAO-09-628T_0 | Progress Made in Estimating and Reducing Improper Payments
Federal agencies reported improper payment estimates of $72 billion for fiscal year 2008, which represented about 4 percent of the $1.8 trillion of reported outlays for the related programs and a $23 billion increase from the fiscal year 2007 estimate of about $49 billion. These efforts represent a positive step to improve transparency over the full magnitude of federal improper payments so that appropriate corrective actions can be put in place. This increase was primarily attributable to (1) a $12 billion increase in the Medicaid program’s estimate for its Fee-for-Service and managed care payments and payments related to incorrect eligibility determinations; and (2) 10 newly reported programs with improper payment estimates totaling about $10 billion. Of the 35 agency programs reporting improper payment estimated error rates for each of the 5 fiscal years—2004 through 2008—24 programs, or about 69 percent had reduced error rates when comparing fiscal year 2008 error rates to the initial error rates reported for fiscal year 2004. Further, we found the number of programs with error rate reductions totaled 35 when comparing fiscal years 2008 and 2007 error rates. Challenges Remain in Meeting IPIA
While federal agencies have shown progress, major challenges remain in meeting the goals of IPIA and ultimately provide reasonable assurance as to the integrity of payments. Specifically, while improved, the total improper payment estimate reported in fiscal year 2008 does not yet reflect the full scope of improper payments across executive branch agencies; noncompliance issues with IPIA implementation continue to exist; and agencies continue to face challenges in the design or implementation of internal controls to identify and prevent improper payments. Not all agencies have yet developed improper payment estimates for all of the programs and activities they identified as susceptible to significant improper payments. As shown in table 1, the fiscal year 2008 total improper payment estimate of $72 billion did not include any amounts for 10 risk-susceptible programs—including the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit program—with fiscal year 2008 outlays totaling about $61 billion. Over half of the OIGs for agencies required to report under IPIA identified management or performance challenges that could increase the risk of improper payments, including challenges related to internal controls. Implementation of IPIA in Medicare and Medicaid Programs
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) annually reports on improper payments in its Agency Financial Report (AFR). Collectively, HHS reported improper payment estimates for Medicare and Medicaid totaling about $36 billion for fiscal year 2008. This represents about 50 percent of the total $72 billion in reported improper payments. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a component of HHS, administers Medicare and oversees Medicaid at the federal level. CMS has a long-history of estimating improper payments for its Medicare FFS program that predate IPIA. Beginning in 1996, HHS’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) estimated improper payments in the Medicare FFS program as part of its annual financial statement audit. For fiscal year 2008, CMS estimated improper payments for fee-for- service providers, managed care plans, and for ineligible recipients—and reported an error rate of 10.5 percent or $18.6 billion as the federal share of these improper payments. CMS has taken steps to enhance its program integrity efforts, but further work remains to put in place the controls necessary to effectively identify and detect improper payments. Likewise, our review of enrollment of Medicare’s durable medical equipment suppliers found weaknesses in Medicare’s screening process that exposed the program to potentially paying millions of dollars for medical equipment and supplies that were not necessary or were not provided to beneficiaries. As we previously reported, measuring improper payments within the Medicaid program is critical to recouping and reducing them. The magnitude of the program’s payment errors indicates that CMS and the states face significant challenges to address the program’s vulnerabilities. Appendix I: Improper Payment Estimates Reported in Agency Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008 Performance and Accountability Reports, Agency Financial Reports, or Annual Reports
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2007 error rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2008 error rate millions) (percent)
3 Grants and Cooperative Agreements Child and Adult Care Food Program Conservation Security Program (previously Farm Security and Rural Investment)
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2007 error rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2008 error rate millions) (percent)
Fiscal year 2008 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2007 error rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2008 error rate millions) (percent)
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 48 Customs and Border Protection— Custodial—Refund & Drawback and Continued Dumping & Subsidy Offset Act & Payments to Wool Manufacturers Federal Emergency Management Agency—Assistance to Firefighters Grants Federal Emergency Management Agency—Homeland Security Grant Program Federal Emergency Management Agency—Individuals and Households Program Federal Emergency Management Agency—Infrastructure Protection Program Federal Emergency Management Agency—National Flood Insurance Program Federal Emergency Management Agency—Public Assistance Programs Federal Emergency Management Agency—Vendor payments Immigration and Customs Enforcement— Detention and Removal Operations Immigration and Customs Enforcement— Federal Protective Service Immigration and Customs Enforcement— Investigations Transportation Security Administration— Aviation Security—Payroll 60 United States Coast Guard—Active Duty 61 United States Coast Guard—Contract 62 Community Development Block Grant (Entitlement Grants, States/Small Cities)
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2007 error rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2008 error rate millions) (percent)
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2007 error rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2008 error rate millions) (percent)
Fiscal year 2008 error rate millions)
Fiscal year 2007 error rate (percent) millions) (percent)
108 Non-VA Care Civilian Health and Medical Program (CHAMPVA) | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's work over the past several years has demonstrated that improper payments are a long-standing, widespread, and significant problem in the federal government. The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) has increased visibility over improper payments by requiring executive branch agency heads, using guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, to identify programs and activities susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate amounts improperly paid, and report on the amounts of improper payments and their actions to reduce them. This testimony addresses (1) progress made in agencies' implementation of IPIA for fiscal year 2008, and (2) several major challenges that continue to hinder full reporting of IPIA information. GAO was also asked to provide an overview of Medicare and Medicaid programs' implementation of IPIA. This testimony is based primarily on GAO products, Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit reports, and agencies' fiscal year 2008 reported improper payment information, including information reported by the Department of Health and Human Service's (HHS) Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). GAO also analyzed fiscal year 2008 governmentwide improper payment information to identify trends and reviewed Medicare and Medicaid programs' reported actions to identify, estimate, and reduce improper payments.
What GAO Found
Agencies reported improper payment estimates of $72 billion for fiscal year 2008, which represented about 4 percent of the $1.8 trillion of reported outlays for the related programs. This represents a significant increase from the fiscal year 2007 estimate attributable to (1) a $12 billion increase in the Medicaid program's estimate and (2) 10 newly reported programs with improper payment estimates totaling about $10 billion. (1) Progress made in estimating and reducing improper payments. The governmentwide improper payment estimates rose about $23 billion from fiscal year 2007 to 2008. This represents a positive step to improve transparency over the full magnitude of the federal government's improper payments. Further, of the 35 agency programs reporting improper payment estimated error rates for each of the 5 fiscal years since implementation of IPIA--2004 through 2008--24 programs (or about 69 percent) reported reduced error rates when comparing fiscal year 2008 error rates to fiscal year 2004 error rates. Also, the number of programs with error rate reductions totaled 35 when comparing fiscal year 2008 error rates to fiscal year 2007 rates. (2) Challenges remain in meeting the goals of IPIA governmentwide. The total improper payment estimate does not yet reflect the full scope of improper payments across executive branch agencies; noncompliance issues with IPIA continue; and agencies continue to face challenges in the design or implementation of internal controls critical to identifying and preventing improper payments. The fiscal year 2008 total improper payment estimate of $72 billion reported for fiscal year 2008 did not include any estimate for ten programs--including the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit program--with fiscal year 2008 outlays totaling about $61 billion that were identified as susceptible to significant improper payments. Over half of the agencies' OIGs identified management or performance challenges that could increase the risk of improper payments, including challenges related to effective internal controls. (3) Medicare and Medicaid programs' implementation of IPIA and its challenges. Medicare and Medicaid comprise 50 percent of reported governmentwide improper payments in fiscal year 2008. HHS reported improper payment amounts of $10.4 billion in Medicare Fee-for-Service and $6.8 billion in Medicare Advantage. HHS also reported in its agency financial report that it issued its first full-year Medicaid improper payment rate estimate of 10.5 percent, or $18.6 billion for the federal share of expenditures for fiscal year 2008. This Medicaid improper payment estimate represents the largest amount that any federal agency reported for a program in fiscal year 2008. While CMS has taken steps to enhance its program integrity efforts, further work remains to put in place the internal controls necessary to effectively identify and detect improper payments. For example, GAO's work on Medicare's home health care administration and enrollment of durable medical equipment suppliers found weaknesses that exposed the program to significant improper payments. The magnitude of Medicaid improper payments indicates that CMS and the states face significant challenges in addressing the program's vulnerabilities in estimating national improper payment rates for diverse state-administered programs. |
gao_AIMD-98-168 | gao_AIMD-98-168_0 | USDA later disbanded the Info Share program. Service Center IT Modernization Is Massive and Complex
USDA’s service center IT modernization consists of four major projects, undertaken concurrently since fiscal year 1996: (1) developing new business processes, (2) acquiring and installing telecommunications equipment, (3) acquiring, implementing, and maintaining a common computing environment at about 3,100 locations, and (4) acquiring and developing geospatial data. Overall Life-Cycle Costs Estimated to Exceed $3 Billion
USDA’s life-cycle cost estimates show that the department could ultimately spend more than $3 billion on its four service center IT modernization projects from 1996 to 2011. Specifically, the department (1) has acquired, and plans to continue acquiring, new technology without first reengineering its processes to provide one-stop service in all service centers; (2) is not managing its service center IT modernization projects as investments using cost, benefit, risk, and performance information to select, control, and evaluate projects throughout their life-cycle; (3) lacks a comprehensive plan for its service center IT modernization that specifies dependencies among projects, critical milestones, and resources required; (4) is not following an incremental approach in acquiring technology using cost justifications and performance measures for each increment to reduce risks associated with large-scale acquisitions or projects; and (5) has not established the management structure with the requisite responsibility, accountability, and authority for managing and coordinating the separate service center IT modernization projects and ensuring that critical tasks are completed on time and within budget. Specifically, USDA has not assigned a senior-level official with overall responsibility, authority, and accountability for managing and coordinating the separate service center IT modernization projects and ensuring that critical tasks are completed on time, within budget, and in accordance with the Clinger-Cohen mandates. As a result, the plan had still not been completed as of May 31, 1998. Conclusions
USDA’s effort to modernize business processes and IT for its service centers is expected to be the biggest, most costly and complex IT modernization effort in its history, with estimated costs ultimately exceeding $3 billion. Until the department corrects these weaknesses, it is unlikely to achieve an adequate return on its investment, meet the needs of its customers, or achieve the Secretary’s vision of one-stop service. USDA also agreed to complete a comprehensive plan identifying critical milestones, project dependencies, and resources required for the modernization. 7. 8. USDA has misread the clear language of the report which correctly states that the department plans to spend over $200 million in fiscal years 1998 and 1999. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) effort to modernize information technology (IT) at its field service centers, focusing on: (1) USDA's plans and ongoing efforts, including estimated costs, to modernize IT for its service centers; and (2) any significant risks in these plans and ongoing efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) USDA's service center IT modernization effort, as currently being planned, will be the biggest, most costly, and complex in the department's history; (2) it involves projects to: (a) develop new business processes; (b) acquire and install telecommunications equipment; (c) acquire, implement, and maintain a common computing environment at about 3,100 locations; and (d) acquire and develop geospatial data; (3) USDA's life-cycle cost estimates show that the department could ultimately spend more than $3 billion for these projects by 2011; (4) the department reported spending about $145 million since starting its service center IT modernization in 1996, and plans to spend over $200 million more during fiscal years 1998 and 1999; (5) USDA's multibillion dollar undertaking faces significant risks; (6) specifically: (a) USDA continues to acquire new technology before it has reengineered business processes for providing one-stop service in all of its service centers; (b) USDA is not managing its IT-related projects for its service centers as investments, using cost, benefit, risk, and performance information to select, control, and evaluate projects throughout their life-cycle; (c) USDA has not completed a comprehensive plan identifying critical milestones, project dependencies, and resources required for the modernization; (d) in acquiring technology, USDA is not following an incremental approach that uses cost justifications and performance measures for each increment to reduce risks associated with large-scale acquisitions or projects; and (e) USDA lacks the project management structure needed to manage a modernization of this magnitude; specifically, USDA has not assigned a senior-level official with overall responsibility, authority, and accountability for managing and coordinating the separate, service center IT modernization projects and for ensuring that the Clinger-Cohen mandates have been met and that critical tasks are completed on time and within budget; (7) as a result of these risks, even after spending billions of dollars on its service center IT modernization, the department may not obtain an adequate return on its investment, meet the needs of its customers, or achieve the Secretary of Agriculture's vision of one-stop service; and (8) many of the weaknesses GAO identified are similar to those that caused USDA's earlier Info Share program, which cost more than $100 million, to fail. |
gao_GAO-12-846 | gao_GAO-12-846_0 | Past studies evaluated veterans’ with service-connected disabilities average loss of earnings and found that not all veterans were being equitably compensated. VA Has Begun to Update Its Disability Criteria, but Faces Delays and Lacks Complete Planning in Key Areas
VA Has Begun a Comprehensive Update of Its Disability Criteria with Medical and Earnings Information
In response to a directive from the Secretary, VA initiated an effort in 2009 to comprehensively revise all 15 body systems in its disability rating schedule. In recognition of medical advances and current research on disability, VA is considering revising its criteria to reflect a more modern view of disability that gives greater consideration to a veteran’s ability to function with a service-connected disability. However, as of July 2012, VBA had not fully implemented this new system. Selected Policy Approaches for Updating VA’s Benefit Structure Present Both Opportunities and Challenges
Three key approaches for modernizing VA’s disability programs—as recommended by disability commissions and others—present opportunities and challenges. See figure 3 for an overview of what VA does now and what these approaches would do. Nevertheless, some experts said that combining the approaches could create a more integrated, comprehensive benefits package and could also mitigate challenges associated with any one approach. § 1155, VA is required, as far as is practicable, to base its disability ratings on the average impairments of earning capacity resulting from various types of injuries. Two experts we interviewed said that benefits currently provided to veterans outside of the rating schedule, such as enhanced monthly compensation payments, could be viewed as compensation for loss in quality of life. At the same time, achieving consensus for this approach may be difficult. Several veteran groups and experts also expressed concerns about VA’s capacity to administer this approach. For example, VA is implementing recommendations to comprehensively revise the rating schedule. According to VA officials, they currently are not acting on these approaches because they fall outside the VA’s statutory requirement to compensate veterans for average earnings loss. Specifically, without sufficient capacity to conduct research on earnings loss, VA may be unable to make fact-based and timely revisions to its rating schedule. Nevertheless, without a rating schedule that reflects advances in medicine and changes in the labor market, VA may continue to overcompensate some veterans while undercompensating others. However, a system that maximizes equity, balances fiscal pressures, and ultimately serves individual veterans effectively will benefit from deliberations informed by more modern views about disability. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To the extent that Congress wishes to consider various options to modernize VA’s disability benefits program, Congress could direct the VA to conduct focused studies on these or other policy approaches and, if necessary, propose relevant legislation for congressional consideration. To ensure that decisions about veteran disability compensation benefits are informed by current earnings loss information, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs take necessary steps to increase research capacity to determine the impact of impairments on earnings in a timely manner and develop a more complete plan for conducting earnings loss and validation studies for the entire rating schedule. To ensure the rating schedule revisions are sustained beyond the current update project, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs establish a formal policy, procedure, or mechanism to revise the rating schedule—with updated medical and earnings loss information—at regular intervals. VA also agreed with our recommendation to develop a written implementation strategy that could include steps to mitigate the possible effects of rating schedule revisions on agency operations, including an increase in the number of claims received. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we (1) identified the progress that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made in revising the criteria used to determine eligibility for veterans’ disability benefits with updated medical and economic information, and (2) discussed the opportunities and challenges associated with selected policy approaches that disability commissions and others have raised for updating VA’s disability benefits structure. To address our first reporting objective, we reviewed VA’s strategic goals, plans, policies, Federal Register notices, and other relevant program documentation and interviewed VA officials. We selected approaches from the following reports:
Advisory Committee on Disability Compensation, Biennial Report dated 27, July 2010; Interim Report dated 7 July, 2009;
CNA, Final Report for the Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission: Compensation, Survey Results, and Selected Topics (August 2007);
Economic Systems Inc., A Study of Compensation Payments for Service-Connected Disabilities (September 2008);
GAO, SSA and VA Disability Programs: Re-Examination of Disability Criteria Needed to Help Ensure Program Integrity, GAO-02-597 (August 2002); Institute of Medicine, Committee on Medical Evaluation of Veterans for Disability Compensation, A 21st Century System for Evaluating Veterans for Disability Benefits and PTSD Compensation and Military Service (2007);
President’s Commission on Care for America’s Returning Wounded Warriors (Dole-Shalala Commission), Serve, Support, Simplify: Report of the President’s Commission on Care for America’s Returning Wounded Warriors (July 2007); and
Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission, Honoring the Call to Duty: Veterans’ Disability Benefits in the 21st Century (October 2007). These sources offered numerous recommendations intended to improve VA’s disability benefits structure. The following summarizes key questions raised during our discussions with experts and veteran groups about the possible design of programs for providing quality of life payments, providing integrated vocational services with transitional cash assistance, and factoring the effects of assistive technology and medical interventions systematically into rating decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA administers one of the nations largest federal disability compensation programs, providing veterans with a cash benefit based on average loss of earning capacity as a result of service-connected disabilities. However, concerns exist that VAs rating schedulethe criteria used to assign degree of work disabilityis not consistent with changes in medicine and the labor market. Due in part to these types of challenges, GAO designated federal disability programs as high risk. Consequently, GAO examined (1) VAs progress in revising its rating schedule with updated medical and economic information; and (2) the opportunities and challenges of various policy approaches proposed by commissions and others for updating VAs disability benefits structure. To do this, GAO reviewed literature and VA documents, and relevant federal laws and regulations, as well as interviewed VA officials, disability experts, and veteran groups.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) initiated a comprehensive effort in 2009 to revise its disability rating schedule with both updated medical and earnings information, but faces hurdles with several key aspects. The current revision effort takes a more comprehensive and empirical approach than VAs past efforts. VA has hired full-time staff to revise the rating schedules medical information and plans to conduct studies to evaluate veterans average loss of earnings in todays economy. As part of this effort, VA is considering modifying the rating schedulecurrently based largely on degree of medical severityto include a veterans ability to function in the workplace. Moving in this direction is more consistent with how experts conceive of disability. However, this change, in part, has resulted in VA falling behind schedule. As of July 2012, VA is over 12 months behind in revising criteria for the first categories of impairments. In addition, VA has not developed its capacity to produce timely research on the impact of impairments on earnings. Moreover, VA lacks a complete planwith specific activities and updated time framesfor conducting earnings loss and related studies. VA also does not have a written strategy to address the possible effects that revisions may have on agency operations, including impacts on an already strained claims workload. Finally, although VA intends to conduct medical and earnings updates beyond the current effort, VA lacks a formal mechanism to guide its commitment to do so. It is important that VA update and maintain its rating schedule to reflect current medical and labor market information to avoid overcompensating some veterans with service-connected disabilities while undercompensating others.
Three key approaches for modernizing VAs disability programs recommended by disability commissions and othersproviding quality of life payments, providing integrated vocational services with transitional cash assistance, and systematically factoring the effects of assistive technology and medical interventions into rating decisionshold opportunity and challenges. Experts and veteran groups GAO interviewed believe each approach holds at least some opportunity for serving veterans more fairly, equitably, and effectively. However, challenges exist. For example, they noted that it could be difficult to achieve consensus for specific design elements among the diverse set of stakeholders. Also, VAs capacity to administer these approacheswhich could increase the complexity and/or number of claimsis questionable. Importantly, costs of each approach were raised. Some interviewees also noted that two or more of the approaches could be combined into a comprehensive benefits package that may mitigate concerns raised by the implementation of any single approach. For example, if factoring assistive technology into disability ratings resulted in lower disability compensation payment levels for some, a quality of life payment could offset that loss. VA officials told GAO they are not considering these approaches because they fall outside of VAs legal responsibility to compensate for loss of earning capacity. However, a system that maximizes equity, balances fiscal pressures, and ultimately serves individual veterans effectively will benefit from deliberations informed by more modern views about disability.
What GAO Recommends
Congress may wish to direct VA to conduct focused studies on various approaches to modernize disability benefits and, if necessary, propose relevant legislation. GAO is also making several recommendations to improve VAs capacity to revise the rating schedule now and in the future. These include completing plans for conducting earnings loss studies and developing a written strategy for implementing revisions to the rating schedule. VA agreed with the recommendations and noted plans to address them. |
gao_GAO-09-733 | gao_GAO-09-733_0 | Without more specific and accurate information on the immediate and long-term goals of the program and the outcomes expected from its resulting efforts, NARA will be hindered in effectively monitoring and reporting on the cost, schedule, and performance of the ERA system, and congressional appropriators will lack information necessary to evaluate the agency’s requests for funds. Although NARA certified that the EOP portion of the ERA system had achieved initial operating capability as planned in December 2008, the system has been of limited use because of delays in ingesting electronic records into the system. This major information system is estimated to cost more than $550 million and is intended to preserve and provide access to massive volumes of all types and formats of electronic records, including presidential records, independent of their original hardware or software. As mandated by the Omnibus Appropriations Act, NARA is required to submit an expenditure plan before obligating multiyear funds for the ERA program. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology determine whether NARA’s fiscal year 2009 expenditure plan satisfies the provide an update on NARA’s progress in implementing our prior expenditure plan provide any other observations about the expenditure plan and the ERA acquisition. To assess compliance with the legislative conditions, we reviewed NARA’s fiscal year 2009 exhibit 300 submissionto OMB to determine the extent to which the agency has complied with OMB’s capital planning and investment control requirements; obtained and reviewed data on NARA’s enterprise architecture to determine the status of the agency’s enterprise architecture efforts; reviewed NARA’s enterprise systems development life cycle methodology that includes processes for managing system investments, configuration management, and risks, and reviewed related documentation concerning how these processes were implemented for the ERA project, such as minutes of oversight boards and the risk management plan; reviewed internal assessments of ERA; obtained and reviewed OMB’s approval of the expenditure plan; and reviewed and analyzed the fiscal year 2009 expenditure plan submitted by the agency in March 2009. develop n exhiit 300, o known as the Cpitl Asset Plnd Business CasSummry, to justify ech reqt for jor informtion technology invetment. In addition, we interviewed NARA officials. NARA’s fiscal year 2009 plan satisfies the six legislative conditions contained in the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act. NARA implemented one of the recommendations we made last year, and partially implemented the other: We recommended that NARA develop a risk mitigation plan to ensure indexing and searching of records from the Bush Administration in the event that the EOP system was not complete in time for the January 2009 presidential transition. We recommended that, to improve the utility of information provided to Congress, NARA include summary measures of project performance against ERA cost and schedule estimates in its monthly reports. The plan does not specifically identify whether completed increments included all previously planned functionality or what functionality will be provided in future increments. For example, the plan does not specify what outcomes NARA expects to achieve with the remainder of its fiscal year 2009 funding. NARA’s expenditure plan states that it relies on Earned Value Management (EVM), an important tool for project management and control that is intended to provide, among other things, objective reports of program status. However, NARA is fully addressing only 5 of the 13 practices required to effectively implement EVM, which limits the reliability of its progress reports. Without consistently following these best practices, NARA will be hindered in accurately monitoring and reporting on the cost, schedule, and performance of the ERA system. Less than 3 percent of the Bush Administration electronic records NARA received have been successfully ingested into the system. In the interim, NARA is primarily supporting search, processing, and retrieval of presidential records using the replicated systems described in the risk mitigation plan we recommended the agency develop last year, which cost less than $600,000 to put in place, compared to nearly $40 million it has obligated for EOP. Until NARA completely and accurately ingests the Bush Administration presidential records into EOP, it will be unable to use the system for its intended purpose and will incur additional costs maintaining the systems it is now using to support requests for these records. NARA lacks a contingency plan for the ERA system in the event of a system failure or disruption. While NARA identified 11 security weaknesses related to contingency planning during acceptance testing and listed actions planned to address them, NARA has completed only one of the 11 planned actions. Further, NARA does not have a fully functional backup and restore process for the ERA system, a key component of planning for system availability in the event of a failure or disruption. Increment 2 includes the EOP system, which was designed to handle records from the Executive Office of the President. Observation 4: NARA lacks a contingency plan for ensuring continuity of the ERA system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has been developing an Electronic Records Archive (ERA) to preserve and provide access to massive volumes of electronic records independent of their original hardware and software. The ERA system is to include a base system for federal records and a separate system for presidential records, known as the Executive Office of the President (EOP) system. The 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act requires NARA to submit an expenditure plan for ERA to congressional appropriation committees. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine whether NARA's fiscal year 2009 plan meets the legislative conditions set forth in the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, (2) provide an update on NARA's progress in implementing recommendations made in GAO's review of NARA's 2008 expenditure plan, and (3) provide any other observations about the expenditure plan and the ERA acquisition. To do this, GAO reviewed the expenditure plan, interviewed NARA officials, and reviewed program data and documentation.
What GAO Found
NARA's fiscal year 2009 expenditure plan satisfies the six legislative conditions in the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act. NARA implemented one of GAO's prior recommendations and partially implemented the other. Specifically, NARA developed a risk mitigation plan for the EOP system in the event that it was not ready in time for the presidential transition in January 2009. In addition, NARA began including summaries of performance against ERA cost and schedule estimates in its monthly reports to Congress. However, during its review, GAO found methodological weaknesses that could limit NARA's ability to accurately report on program cost, schedule, and performance. GAO made four observations on NARA's expenditure plan and the ERA acquisition: (1) The expenditure plan does not specifically identify whether completed system increments include all planned functionality or what functionality will be included in future increments, including the outcomes NARA expects from the remainder of its fiscal year 2009 funding. Until NARA fully describes the outcomes expected from this funding, Congress will lack important information for evaluating the agency's requests for funds. (2) The expenditure plan states that it relies on Earned Value Management (EVM), a tool for project management intended to provide objective reports of program status. However, NARA is not fully implementing practices necessary to make effective use of EVM, limiting the reliability of its progress reports. Without consistently following these best practices, NARA will be hindered in accurately monitoring and reporting on the cost, schedule, and performance of the ERA system. (3) Although NARA certified initial operating capability for the EOP system in December 2008, less than 3 percent of the electronic records from the Bush Administration had been ingested into the system at the time of GAO's review, and NARA did not expect the remainder to be ingested until October 2009. In the interim, NARA is using systems developed in accordance with its risk mitigation plan to support the search, processing, and retrieval of presidential records. These systems cost less than $600,000, compared with the $40 million NARA has obligated for the EOP system. Until NARA completely ingests the Bush Administration records into EOP, it will be unable to use the system for its intended purpose. (4) NARA lacks a contingency plan for the ERA system in the event of a failure or disruption. While NARA identified 11 security weaknesses related to contingency planning during system testing and planned actions to address them, it has completed only 1 of the 11 planned actions. Further, NARA does not have a fully functional backup and restore process for ERA, a key component for ensuring system availability. Until NARA fully develops and tests a contingency plan, it risks prolonged unavailability of the ERA system in the event of a failure or disruption. |
gao_RCED-99-92 | gao_RCED-99-92_0 | The quantity of service, as measured by the number of both departures and available seats, had increased for all airport groups. The quality of service, as measured by factors such as the number of destinations served nonstop and the type of aircraft used, showed mixed results, especially for airports serving small and medium-sized communities. Average airfares (expressed in constant dollars and in cents per mile) fell about 21 percent in constant dollars from 1990 through the second quarter of 1998. On average, airports serving medium-large communities had the greatest decrease in fares, and airports serving small communities, the smallest decline. For example, for passengers flying to or from airports in communities of similar size on trips of similar distances in 1998, one passenger traveling from one airport may have paid almost 3 times as much as a passenger traveling from a different airport. At some airports, the decrease was especially large. At many airports, the decline coincided with the introduction of competing service, often from a low-fare carrier, which, in most cases, was Southwest Airlines. At 3 of the 171 airports we examined, average airfares have increased since 1990. Whether the overall average airfare for the airport may have increased or decreased over time depends on the number of passengers flown on all of those routes and the fares they paid. Similarly, we were not able to examine differences in the extent to which certain destinations (such as Las Vegas or Orlando) tend to be more heavily dominated by leisure travel than by business travel. Although average airfares decreased for most communities throughout the period, since 1994 average airfares increased for certain segments of the traveling public—mostly for passengers making short trips to or from medium-large and large communities. Large and Medium-Large Communities Have More and Better Air Service, but the Trends for Small and Medium-Sized Communities Are Mixed
Our review of air service quality factors for scheduled airline departures from May 1978 though May 1998 indicates that the overall quality at most communities served by the airports we reviewed has improved since deregulation. However, the extent to which the overall quality of air service has improved for the 171 airports that we reviewed varies by the size of the community served. In the past, we reported that competition is constrained at these airports because of long-term gate leases or limits on the number of available takeoff and landing slots. Airport officials and one airline told us that other marketing factors—not gate-leasing arrangements—acted as barriers to entry. In other words, passengers pay a premium to fly to and from these airports. Similarly, the overall quality of air service has improved except for that in some small and medium-sized communities. To analyze changes in the quality of air service for these same 171 airports, we obtained data on scheduled airline service from DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Cents per passenger mile (constant dollars)
Number of Scheduled Departures and Available Seats at Airports Serving Small, Medium-Sized, Medium-Large, and Large Communities, May 1978 Through May 1998
Total seats, May 1998 (continued)
Total seats, May 1998 (continued)
Total seats, May 1998 (continued)
Total seats, May 1998 (continued)
Total seats, May 1998 (continued)
Number of Destinations for Nonstop and One-Stop Flights at Airports Serving Small, Medium-Sized, Medium-Large, and Large Communities, May 1978 Through May 1998
Number of Scheduled Jet and Nonjet Departures at Airports Serving Small, Medium-Sized, Medium-Large, and Large Communities, May 1978 Through May 1998
Nonjet departures, May 1998 (continued)
Nonjet departures, May 1998 (continued)
Nonjet departures, May 1998 (continued)
Nonjet departures, May 1998 (continued)
Major Contributors to This Report
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C.
Office of the General Counsel
Related GAO Products
Aviation Competition: Effects on Consumers From Domestic Airline Alliances Vary (GAO/RCED-99-37, Jan. 15, 1999). Airline Competition: Higher Fares and Reduced Competition at Concentrated Airports (GAO/RCED-90-102, July 11, 1990). U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed and updated its previous work on airfares and service and reexamined the effect that certain barriers have had on these measures, focusing on: (1) how airfares have changed since 1990 for travel to and from 171 airports serving various U.S. communities; (2) how the quality of air service has changed since 1978 for travel to and from these airports; and (3) the extent to which certain barriers to entry--restrictive gate-leasing arrangements, controls on the number of allowable takeoffs and landings at some airports, and the limits on the distance that flights from some airports can be--influence competition at affected airports.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) overall, average airfares declined about 21 percent in constant dollars from 1990 to the second quarter of 1998; (2) not all airports realized a similar decreases in airfares; (3) airports serving medium-large communities had the greatest average decrease in fares, and airports serving small communities had the least average decline; (4) average airfares declined at 168 of the 171 airports GAO examined, often with the introduction of competing service from a low-fare carrier; (5) on the other hand, since 1994, average airfares increased for passengers traveling from 39 airports and generally for passengers making short trips to or from airports serving medium-large and large communities; (6) for passengers flying to or from airports in communities of similar size on trips of similar distances in 1998, one passenger travelling from one airport may have paid almost 3 times as much as a passenger travelling from a different airport; (7) while GAO identified such differences in fares, it should be noted that in developing this report, GAO was unable to account for all factors that may have contributed to them, such as the presence of low-cost competition on particular routes or the extent to which travel on routes tended to reflect generally lower-fare leisure travel or more costly business traffic; (8) the overall quality of air service has improved for airports serving large and medium-large communities, but indicators are mixed for airports in small and medium-sized communities; (9) the quantity of the air service available, as measured by the number of departures and available seats has increased for most of the 171 airports GAO reviewed; (10) airports in large and medium-large communities have experienced a substantial increase in the amount of air service; (11) however, some airports have less air service today than they did in 1978, when the industry was deregulated; (12) other indicators of the quality of air service, including those that measure the number of destinations served by nonstop flights and the type of aircraft used, generally show that quality has improved substantially for airports serving large and medium-large communities; (13) for airports serving small and medium-sized communities the results are mixed; (14) at the 10 airports that, in 1996, GAO reported had restrained competition either because of restrictive gate-leasing arrangements or limits on the number of available takeoff and landing times, competition has changed little; and (15) airfares at these 10 airports continue to be consistently higher than airports of comparable size without constraints. |
gao_GAO-12-483 | gao_GAO-12-483_0 | VA Has Departmentwide Policy for Convening and Conducting AIB Investigations
VA has departmentwide policy and procedures for convening and conducting AIB investigations. According to VA officials, the policy and procedures achieve their intended purpose, while also providing VA convening authorities—medical center directors, or any authorities senior to them within networks or headquarters—sufficient flexibility and discretion to tailor an investigation to effectively meet diverse informational needs. For example, convening authorities are required to select AIB members who are impartial and objective, but they have flexibility to vary the number of members appointed to each AIB based on the matter being investigated. General Counsel said the department plans to maintain flexibility in its AIB process. 1 for an overview of VA’s process for convening and conducting AIB investigations.) Convening an AIB investigation involves determining its need, scope, and board composition. VA Does Not Collect and Analyze Aggregate Data on AIB Investigations or the Deficiencies They Identify
VA does not collect and analyze aggregate data on AIB investigations, including data on the number of AIB investigations conducted, the types of matters investigated, and whether the matters were substantiated, or on any systemic deficiencies identified by AIBs. Without these data, VA is unable to adequately assess the causes or factors that may contribute to deficiencies occurring within all of its medical centers and networks. Information on AIB investigations is maintained by different offices across VA. For example, each medical center or network maintains the investigation report for each AIB investigation that it conducts related to VHA staff at the GS-15 level and below. In the absence of having aggregate data on AIB investigations, VHA administered a web-based survey to medical centers and networks, in response to our request for AIB data. VHA officials told us that although it administered the web-based survey in response to our request for data, the department has no plans to collect and analyze aggregate data on AIB investigations conducted within VHA. According to the VHA survey data, the types of matters investigated by AIBs during fiscal years 2009 through 2011 included inappropriate employee behavior involving patients and other employees; individual employee wrongdoing, such as theft and fraud; and systemic deficiencies. VA Has Used the Results of AIB Investigations to Inform Corrective Actions, but Does Not Share Information about Improvements More Broadly
VA has used the results of AIB investigations to inform corrective actions taken at individual medical centers and networks to address both individual employee misconduct and system deficiencies. However, the department does not share information about improvements made in response to AIB investigations conducted at certain medical centers and networks that could have broader applicability. Information provided by VA officials from the medical centers included in our review showed that the results of the 49 AIB investigations conducted during fiscal years 2009 through 2011 have been used, along with other information, to inform 67 employee corrective actions.Suspension and training were among the most common corrective actions that were informed by AIB investigations taken at these medical centers. Such missed opportunities come with a cost when information from these investigations is not used to improve the quality and efficiency of VHA operations, including the delivery of care to veterans. Recommendations for Executive Action
To systematically gauge the extent to which deficiencies identified by individual AIBs may be occurring throughout VHA; and to maximize opportunities for sharing information across VHA to improve its overall operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following two actions for AIB investigations conducted within VHA: establish a process to collect and analyze aggregate data from AIB investigations, including the number of investigations conducted, the types of matters investigated, whether the matters were substantiated, and systemic deficiencies identified; and establish a process for sharing information about systemic changes, including policies and procedures implemented in response to the results of AIB investigations, which may have broader applicability throughout VHA. Administrative investigation reports do not provide recommendations for disciplinary action, but may provide recommendations for other corrective actions, such as employee training. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA may use an AIB to determine the facts surrounding alleged employee misconduct or potential systemic deficiencies related to VA policies or procedures. AIBs do not determine corrective actions, such as individual disciplinary actions or procedural changes, but AIB investigation results, including evidence, may be used to inform such actions, making it critical for AIBs to be convened and conducted appropriately.
You expressed interest in the number of AIB investigations and their results. In this report, GAO examines (1) the process VA uses to convene and conduct AIB investigations, (2) the extent to which VA collects data on AIB investigations, and (3) how VA has used the results of its AIB investigations. GAO focused on AIB investigations conducted within VHA; reviewed VA documents, including policies and procedures, and VHA data on AIBs conducted during fiscal years 2009 through 2011; and interviewed VA officials from headquarters and four medical centers. To ensure data reliability, GAO reviewed VHAs methods to collect AIB data.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has departmentwide policy and procedures for convening and conducting administrative investigation boards (AIB). The departments procedures contain requirements for convening and conducting AIB investigations, but according to VA officials, they also provide the flexibility to tailor an investigation to effectively meet diverse informational needs. For example, the VA official convening an AIB investigation is required to select AIB members who are impartial and objective, but has flexibility to vary the number of members appointed to each AIB based on the matter being investigated. VA is currently updating its AIB policy and procedures, but officials said the department plans to maintain flexibility in its AIB process.
VA does not collect and analyze aggregate data on AIB investigations, including data on the number of AIB investigations conducted, the types of matters investigated, and whether the matters were substantiated, or on any systemic deficiencies identified by AIBs. Having aggregate data could provide VA with valuable information to systematically gauge the extent to which matters investigated by AIBs may be occurring throughout VAs Veterans Health Administration (VHA) and to take corrective action, if needed, to reduce the likelihood of future occurrences. Without such data, VA is unable to adequately assess the causes or factors that may contribute to deficiencies occurring within its medical centers and health care networks. Information on AIB investigations is maintained by different offices across VA. For example, each medical center or network maintains information on each AIB investigation that it conducts. In response to GAOs request for AIB data, VHA administered a web-based survey that collected data from all its medical centers and networks on AIB investigations they reported conducting during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. Survey data showed that medical centers and networks conducted more than 1,100 investigations during this time period, and the types of matters investigated included allegations of inappropriate employee behavior involving patients and other employees; individual employee wrongdoing, such as theft and fraud; and systemic deficiencies. VHA officials told us that although it administered the web-based survey, the department has no plans to collect and analyze aggregate data on AIB investigations conducted within VHA.
VA has used the results of AIB investigations to inform corrective actions, but does not share information about improvements made that could have broader applicability. Specifically, VA has used the results of AIB investigations to inform systemic changes at the medical centers and networks where AIB investigations have been conducted. For example, VA has developed new policies and procedures for improving patient and employee safety and developed new training programs to expand employees knowledge of VA policies and procedures. However, VA does not share information about these improvements that may have relevance for other areas within VHA. Such information could be used to improve not only the quality of patient care provided, but also the efficiency of VHAs overall operations. For example, one medical center included in GAOs review implemented a tracking system to ensure surgical instruments are delivered promptly to the operating room and a checklist to ensure the availability of needed equipment prior to starting surgery.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA establish processes to (1) collect and analyze aggregate data from AIB investigations conducted within VHA, and (2) share information about improvements that are implemented in response to the results of AIB investigations. VA concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-673T | gao_GAO-10-673T_0 | By contrast, VA’s authorities under the 2006 Act apply both to SDVOSBs and other VOSBs. VA Exceeded Its Veteran Contracting Goals since FY07, but Faces Challenges in Monitoring Interagency Agreements
For FY07, VA established a contracting goal for VOSBs at 7 percent––that is, VA’s goal was to award 7 percent of its total procurement dollars to VOSBs. 2). The increase of awards to VOSBs and SDVOSBs largely was associated with the agency’s greater use of the goals and preference authorities established by the 2006 Act. 3). In the Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 2008 (the 2008 Act) Congress enhanced the 2006 Act’s provisions by requiring that any agreements VA enters with other government entities on or after January 1, 2009, to acquire goods or services on VA’s behalf, must require the agencies to comply, to the maximum extent feasible, with VA’s contracting goals and preferences for SDVOSBs and VOSBs. However, VA did not ensure that all interagency agreements include the 2008 Act’s required language or monitor the extent to which agencies comply with the requirements. VA Has Made Limited Progress in Implementing Its Verification Program and Has Not Developed a Thorough and Effective Program
In May 2008—approximately a year and a half after the 2006 Act was enacted and a year after the provisions discussed here became effective— VA began verifying businesses and published interim final rules in the Federal Register, which included eligibility requirements and examination procedures, but did not finalize the rules until February 2010 (see fig. The slow implementation of the program appears to have contributed to VA’s inability to meet the requirement in the 2006 Act that it use its veteran preference authorities to contract only with verified businesses. However, in its December 2009 rule VA committed to awarding contracts using these authorities only to verified businesses as of January 1, 2012. As of April 8, 2010, VA had verified about 2,900 businesses––approximately 14 percent of VOSBs and SDVOSBs in the VetBiz.gov database. Site visits further investigate control and ownership for select high-risk businesses. Because of this delay, it currently has a large backlog of businesses awaiting site visits and some higher-risk businesses have been verified months before their site visits occurred or were scheduled to occur. To summarize our observations concerning VA’s verification efforts, the agency has been slow to implement a comprehensive program to verify the veteran status, ownership, and control of small businesses and maintain a database of such businesses. The weaknesses in VA’s verification process reduce assurances that verified firms are, in fact, veteran owned and controlled. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006 (the 2006 Act) requires the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to give priority to veteranowned and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (VOSB and SDVOSB) when awarding contracts to small businesses. This testimony discusses preliminary views on (1) the extent to which VA met its prime contracting goals for SDVOSBs and VOSBs in fiscal years 2007-2009, and (2) VA's progress in implementing procedures to verify the ownership, control, and veteran status of firms in its mandated database. GAO obtained and analyzed data on VA's contracting activities, and reviewed a sample of verified businesses to assess VA's verification program.
What GAO Found
VA exceeded its contracting goals with SDVOSBs and VOSBs for the past 3 years, but faces challenges in monitoring agreements with other agencies that conduct contract activity on VA's behalf. The increase of awards to SDVOSBs and VOSBs was associated with the agency's use of the unique veteran preferences authorities established by the 2006 Act. However, GAO's review of interagency agreements found that VA lacked an effective process to ensure that interagency agreements include required language that the other agencies comply to the maximum extent feasible with VA's contracting goals and preferences for SDVOSBs and VOSBs. VA has made limited progress in implementing its verification program. While the 2006 Act requires VA to use veteran preferences authorities only to award contracts to verified businesses, VA's regulation does not require that this take place until January 1, 2012. To date, VA has verified about 2,900 businesses-- approximately 14 percent of businesses in its mandated database of SDVOSBs and VOSBs. Among the weaknesses GAO identified in VA's verification program were files missing required information and explanations of how staff determined that control and ownership requirements had been met. VA's procedures call for site visits to investigate the ownership and control of higher-risk businesses, but the agency has a large and growing backlog of businesses awaiting site visits. Although site visit reports indicate a high rate of misrepresentation, VA has not developed guidance for referring cases of misrepresentation for enforcement action. Such businesses are subject to debarment under the 2006 Act. |
gao_T-RCED-98-218 | gao_T-RCED-98-218_0 | The Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act of 1992 reauthorized the SBIR program through fiscal year 2000. It Appears That Agencies Are Adhering to Statutory Funding Requirements; However, the Definition of Extramural R&D on Which the Funding Levels Are Based May Not Be Consistently Applied
The agencies’ SBIR officials reported that they have adhered to the act’s requirement of not using SBIR funds to pay for the administrative costs of the program, such as salaries and support services used in processing awards. The program officials also believe that they are adhering to the statutory requirement to fund the program at 2.5 percent of agencies’ extramural research budget. Some of the officials expressed concern because they believe that agencies are using different interpretations of the “extramural budget” definition. This may lead to incorrect calculations of their extramural research budgets. Only Two of the Agencies We Reviewed Have Conducted Audits of Their Extramural Budgets
Of the five agencies we reviewed, only two have recently audited their extramural R&D budgets. Application Review Process and Current Funding Cycles Are Not Adversely Affecting Recipients’ Financial Status or the Commercialization of Projects
Most of the SBIR officials we interviewed believed that neither the application review process nor current funding cycles are having an adverse effect on award recipients’ financial status or their ability to commercialize their projects. SBIR officials did say that some recipients had said that any interruption in funding awards, for whatever reason, affects them negatively. As a result, most of the participating SBIR agencies have established special programs and/or processes in an effort to mitigate any adverse effect(s) caused by funding gaps. Overall, 515 responses, or 35 percent, indicated that their projects had resulted in sales of products or processes, while 691, or 47 percent, had received additional developmental funding. Agencies are currently using various techniques to foster commercialization, although there is little or no empirical evidence suggesting how successful particular techniques have been. This analysis shows that the multiple-award recipients and the non-multiple-award recipients are commercializing at comparable rates. According to both surveys, multiple-award recipients receive additional developmental funding at higher rates than the non-multiple-award recipients. Solicitations Rarely Result in Single-Proposals
When an agency funds research for a given solicitation topic where only one proposal was received, it may appear that there was a lack of competition. All of the Agencies Promote Program Participation by Women-Owned and Socially and Economically Disadvantaged Small Businesses
One of the purposes of the 1992 act was to improve the federal government’s dissemination of information concerning the SBIR program, particularly with regard to program participation by women-owned small businesses and by socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses. SBIR Programs Promote the Critical Technologies
Most of the SBIR agency officials we interviewed stated that they use the two listings of critical technologies as identified by DOD and the National Critical Technologies Panel in developing their respective research topics. The other agencies believed that the research being conducted falls within one of the two lists. Geographic Distribution of SBIR Awards
A recent SBA study stated that one-third of the states received 85 percent of all SBIR awards and SBIR funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, focusing on: (1) agencies' adherence to statutory funding requirements; (2) agencies' audits of extramural (external) research and development (R&D) budgets; (3) the effect of the application review process and funding cycles on award recipients; (4) the extent of companies' project activity after receiving SBIR funding and agencies' techniques to foster commercialization; (5) the number of multiple award recipients and the extent of project activity after receiving SBIR funding; (6) the occurrence of funding for single proposal awards; (7) participation by women-owned business and socially and economically disadvantaged business; (8) SBIR's promotion of the critical technologies; (9) the extent foreign firms benefit from SBIR results; and (10) the geographical distribution of SBIR awards.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) agencies have adhered to the Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act's funding requirements; (2) agency program officials reported that they are not using SBIR funds to pay for administrative costs of the program; (3) program officials believe that they are adhering to the statutory requirement to fund the program at 2.5 percent of agencies' extramural budget; (4) some officials believe that agencies are using different interpretations of the extramural budget definition, which may lead to incorrect calculations; (5) of the five agencies reviewed, only two have conducted audits of their extramural budgets; (6) while most SBIR officials interviewed said that neither the application review process nor current funding cycles have had an adverse effect on award recipients' financial status or ability to commercialize, some recipients have said that any interruption in funding awards affects them negatively; (7) most participating SBIR agencies have established programs to minimize funding gaps; (8) companies reported that approximately 50 percent of their projects had sales of products or services related to research or received additional developmental funding after receiving SBIR funding; (9) the agencies identified various techniques to foster the commercialization of SBIR-funded technologies; (10) the number of companies receiving multiple awards had grown from 10 companies in 1989 to 17 in 1996; (11) multiple-award recipients and non-multiple-award recipients commercialized at almost identical rates; (12) agencies rarely fund research for a given solicitation topic where only one proposal was received; (13) of the five agencies examined, all reported engaging in activities to foster the participation of women-owned or socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses; (14) all agencies' SBIR officials believed that the listings of critical technologies are used in developing their respective research topics or that the research being conducted falls within one of the two lists; (15) little evidence of foreign firms benefiting from technology or products developed as a direct result of SBIR-funded research; (16) a Small Business Administration study reported that one-third of the states received 85 percent of all SBIR awards and funds; and (17) previous studies of SBIR have linked the concentration of awards to local characteristics. |
gao_GAO-10-774 | gao_GAO-10-774_0 | Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act)—the latest in a series of congressional actions taken to strengthen the defense acquisition system. Some requirements, such as the establishment of the two new offices, have been fully implemented. As shown in table 1, many of the requirements that have been implemented will require ongoing efforts. The directors have the responsibility for reviewing and approving systems engineering and developmental test and evaluation plans as well as the ongoing responsibility to monitor the systems engineering and developmental test and evaluation activities of major defense acquisition programs. Two provisions, one of which is discretionary, have not been completed. The Reform Act requires that the directors, in coordination with the newly established office of the Director for Program Assessments and Root Cause Analysis, issue joint guidance on the development of detailed, measurable performance criteria that major acquisition programs should include in their systems engineering and testing plans. Finally, the Reform Act gives DOD the option of permitting the Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation to serve as the Director of the Test Resource Management Center. However, many current and former DOD systems engineering and developmental testing officials we spoke with believe the offices should be closely linked to weapon acquisition programs because most of their activities are related to those programs. DOD has not established any performance criteria that would help gauge the success of the new directors’ offices, making it difficult to determine if the offices are properly aligned within the department or if the Reform Act is having an impact on program outcomes. 2). Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD AT&L)
Director of Defense Research and Engineering Believes Offices Are Properly Aligned
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering is aware of the challenges of placing the offices under an organization whose primary mission is to develop and transition technologies to acquisition programs, but believes that the current placement makes sense given congressional and DOD desires to place more emphasis on activities prior to the start of a new acquisition program. Military Services Face Workforce and Resource Challenges as They Strive to Strengthen Their Systems Engineering and Developmental Testing Efforts
The military services, the Directors of Systems Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation, and we have identified a number of workforce and resource challenges that the military services will need to address to strengthen their systems engineering and developmental testing activities. For example, it is unclear whether the services have enough people to perform both systems engineering and developmental testing activities. Even though the services reported to the directors that they have enough people, they do not have accurate information on the number of people performing these activities. Second, the director is concerned that DOD does not have the capacity to train and certify an estimated 800 individuals expected to be converted from contractor to government employees within the required time frame. Current and former systems engineering and developmental testing officials offer compelling insights concerning the placement of the new directors’ offices under the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, but it is still too soon to judge how effective the offices will be at influencing outcomes on acquisition programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to determine the effectiveness of the newly established offices, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Directors of Systems Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation to take the following five actions: Ensure development and implementation of performance criteria for systems engineering plans and developmental test and evaluation master plans, such as those related to technology maturity, design stability, manufacturing readiness, concurrency of development and production activities, prototyping, and the adequacy of program resources. Report to Congress on the status of these efforts in future joint annual reports required by the Reform Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
In May 2009, Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act). The Reform Act contains a number of systems engineering and developmental testing requirements that are aimed at helping weapon programs establish a solid foundation from the start of development. GAO was asked to examine (1) DOD's progress in implementing the systems engineering and developmental testing requirements, (2) views on the alignment of the offices of the Directors of Systems Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation, and (3) challenges in strengthening systems engineering and developmental testing activities. In conducting this work, GAO analyzed implementation status documentation and obtained opinions from current and former DOD systems engineering and testing officials on the placement of the two offices as well as improvement challenges.
What GAO Found
DOD has implemented or is implementing the Reform Act requirements related to systems engineering and developmental testing. Several foundational steps have been completed. For example, new offices have been established, directors have been appointed for both offices, and the directors have issued a joint report that assesses their respective workforce capabilities and 42 major defense acquisition programs. Many other requirements that have been implemented will require sustained efforts by the directors' offices, such as approving systems engineering and developmental testing plans, as well as reviewing these efforts on specific weapon programs. DOD is studying the option of allowing the Director, Developmental Test and Evaluation, to serve concurrently as the Director of the Test Resource Management Center. The directors have not yet developed joint guidance for assessing and tracking acquisition program performance of systems engineering and developmental testing activities. It is unclear whether the guidance will include specific performance criteria that address long-standing problems and program risks, such as those related to concurrency of development and production activities and adequacy of program resources. Current and former systems engineering and developmental testing officials offered varying opinions on whether the new directors' offices should have been placed under the Director of Defense Research and Engineering organization--an organization that focuses primarily on developing and transitioning technologies to acquisition programs. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering believes aligning the offices under his organization helps address congressional and DOD desires to increase emphasis on and strengthen activities prior to the start of a new acquisition program. Most of the officials GAO spoke with believe the two offices should report directly to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics or otherwise be more closely aligned with acquisition programs because most of their activities are related to weapon programs. They also believe cultural barriers and staffing issues may limit the effectiveness of the two offices under the current organizational structure. Currently, DOD is not reporting to Congress on how successfully the directors are effecting program changes, making it difficult to determine if the current placement of the offices makes sense or if the Reform Act is having an impact. The military services face a number of challenges as they try to strengthen systems engineering and developmental testing activities on acquisition programs. Although the services believe they have enough staff to perform both of these activities, they have not been able to clearly identify the number of staff that are actually involved. The Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation does not believe the military services have enough testing personnel and is concerned that DOD does not have the capacity to train the large influx of contractors that are expected to be converted to government employees. |
gao_GAO-14-85 | gao_GAO-14-85_0 | FRA’s Rail-Safety Oversight Framework Relies on Compliance- Based Inspections
FRA conducts inspections to ensure railroads’ compliance with federal safety regulations. Thirty states also partner with FRA in providing FRA- certified state railroad-safety inspectors, who have been delegated authority to enforce federal safety regulations. Many railroads have additional safety programs, rules, and technologies beyond the required federal standards. By FRA’s own estimation, its inspectors have the ability to inspect less than 1 percent of the federally-regulated railroad system. Railroads are required to comply with the safety standards set in federal safety regulations. SOFA is a voluntary, non-regulatory, workplace-safety partnership with railroads, rail labor organizations, industry associations, and FRA. FRA Uses A Risk- Based Approach to Direct Inspections, but Has Been Slow to Implement Broader Risk Reduction Planning
Since 2006, FRA has developed a risk-based approach to help direct its inspection efforts, but FRA regional officials expressed concerns about how well its risk-based model appropriately balances inspector needs in their regions. However, FRA has not yet issued the final rule directing railroads to develop such plans, which, under RSIA, was to be issued by October 2012. FRA’s National Inspection Plan and Staffing Allocation Model Incorporate an Assessment of Risk
FRA has developed a risk-based approach to its inspection program using two quantitative tools to help direct its inspection efforts. These challenges include how FRA will: respond to highway-rail grade crossing and trespasser fatalities; accommodate adverse weather conditions; adjust its resources to industry changes like increasing rail traffic flows; adapt to the new safety implications posed by technology changes in the railroad industry, such as Positive Train Control (PTC); implement its new comprehensive safety risk reduction program; and ensure it has enough inspectors to fulfill its current and future oversight workload. While FRA has developed long-term rail safety goals, FRA’s ability to meet those goals and to respond to these challenges is hampered by its lack of strategic human capital planning. As we have previously reported, PTC is a communications-based system designed to prevent certain types of rail accidents caused by human factors, such as train-to-train collisions. The speed of the hiring process is important since FRA officials estimate that 150 inspectors (about 30 percent of the current field safety workforce) will be eligible to retire over the next 5 years. To address this issue, we have determined that successful strategic human capital plans should: 1. involve top management, employees, and other stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing the strategic workforce plan; 2. determine the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future programmatic results; 3. develop strategies that are tailored to address gaps in number, deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for enabling and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies; 4. build the capability needed to address administrative, educational, and other requirements important to support workforce strategies; and 5. monitor and evaluate the agency’s progress toward its human capital goals and the contribution that human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic goals. In addition, FRA may not have enough specialists to oversee the rail industry’s implementation of both PTC and railroad safety risk reduction plans. While the agency expects to complete the regulations in 2015, FRA has not developed a detailed strategy to manage the oversight of this effort to avoid further delays in issuing the regulations and to ensure the timely evaluation and approval of the railroads’ risk reduction plans when they are developed. Without a plan, FRA risks not having a skilled and trained workforce, deployed in the right technical domains, to meet present and future challenges to the FRA’s rail-safety oversight framework, especially to oversee the railroad industry’s implementation of positive train control and comprehensive rail safety risk reduction plans. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the Federal Railroad Administration timely and effectively implements oversight of railroad risk reduction programs, manages its limited resources, and accounts for the evolving rail safety environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration to: (1) develop an implementation plan for oversight of risk reduction programs for passenger and freight railroads, including interim milestones for finalizing its rulemaking and milestones for the review and approval of the plans; and (2) develop a strategic human capital plan that identifies and prioritizes FRA’s human capital needs and links them to FRA’s strategic goals and objectives. This plan should include specific approaches for how FRA will recruit, train, and retain both its current inspectors as well as its new workforce of PTC and safety risk management specialists. DOT agreed to consider our recommendations and also provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. 3) What are the challenges to FRA’s current safety framework, and what are the ongoing and emerging issues FRA faces in railroad safety oversight? We also reviewed and analyzed reportable accident and incident data from 2003 through 2012 obtained from the FRA’s Railroad Accident and Incident Reporting System (RAIRS) database. To determine the overall railroad safety framework that FRA, the states, and the railroads use to ensure safety of railroad operations and infrastructure, we examined applicable laws and regulations including the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008, FRA guidance, and other documentation, including a recent Department of Transportation Inspector General report and prior GAO reports describing the oversight mechanisms that FRA uses to ensure railroad safety. To determine the extent to which FRA and the railroads assess safety risks and allocate their resources to address those risks, we reviewed FRA documentation on the NIP process and the SAM model and interviewed FRA Office of Safety Analysis officials as well as all FRA regional administrators and FRA regional specialists in FRA Regions 3, 4 and 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Railroad accidents pose significant safety risks to railroads, their employees, passengers, and the public. FRA oversees safety of the nation's railroads. In light of three high profile accidents in 2012 involving fatalities or hazardous materials, GAO was asked to review FRA's oversight processes and the challenges to railroad safety. This report examines (1) the overall framework that FRA, the states, and the railroads use to ensure rail safety; (2) the extent to which FRA and the railroads assess safety risks and allocate resources to address those risks; and (3) what challenges, if any, exist to FRA's current safety framework, and what ongoing and emerging issues FRA faces. GAO analyzed FRA accident and incident data, reviewed the analytical models FRA uses to incorporate risk into its inspection program, and interviewed FRA headquarters and field safety staff, officials from the 7 largest freight railroads and 11 smaller railroads, industry associations and 7 rail labor organizations.
What GAO Found
The Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) rail-safety oversight framework relies on inspections to ensure railroads comply with federal safety regulations. FRA inspects railroad infrastructure and operations, identifies safety defects, and may, if warranted, cite the railroads for violations of federal safety regulations. The agency estimates that its inspectors have the ability to annually inspect less than 1 percent of the railroad activities covered in regulation. As a result, railroads have the primary responsibility for safety of the railroad system. To formulate regulations, FRA instituted the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, a forum for FRA, the railroads, rail labor organizations, and other stakeholders to arrive at a consensus on proposed rules. Thirty states partner with FRA in providing FRA-certified railroad safety inspectors who are also authorized to enforce federal safety regulations. Finally, many railroads have additional safety programs, rules, and technologies to ensure safety beyond the required federal standards.
FRA has developed a risk-based approach to direct its inspection efforts, but the agency has been slow to implement broader risk reduction planning. FRA has two tools to help direct its inspection efforts--the National Inspection Plan (NIP) and the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM). The NIP process uses past accident and other data to target FRA's inspection activities, and the SAM estimates the best allocation of the different types of inspectors across FRA regions in order to minimize damage and casualties from rail accidents. However, all eight FRA regional administrators expressed concerns about FRA's staffing process that relies primarily on the SAM to predict appropriate regional inspector needs, and that does not allow the flexibility needed to accommodate the regions' changing resource needs. In addition, the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008 mandated safety risk reduction plans primarily for large freight and passenger railroads. FRA has not yet issued the final rule directing railroads to develop the plans, which was mandated to be issued by October 2012. According to FRA, the rulemaking was delayed due to concerns by railroads over their potential liability. Although FRA anticipates completing approval of railroad's plans by 2016, the agency has not developed an interim plan with specific timeframes to ensure that there are no further delays in issuing regulations and that timely evaluation and approval of the railroads' risk reduction plans occurs.
FRA faces several rail safety challenges, including how it will: (1) implement its oversight of positive train control (PTC), a technology designed to prevent certain types of rail accidents caused by human factors, and risk reduction plans; (2) adjust to changing rail traffic flows; and (3) ensure it has enough inspectors for its current and future oversight workload, as FRA expects 30 percent of field safety staff will be eligible to retire in 5 years. While FRA has long-term rail safety goals, its ability to meet those goals and respond to challenges is hampered by its lack of a strategic human capital plan. FRA officials stated that due to uncertainties about their budget, PTC implementation, and risk reduction plans, they plan for human capital needs in their annual budget request, rather than through a strategic human capital plan. However, without a plan, FRA may not make well-informed decisions about its workforce needs including having inspectors with the right skills for its current oversight activities and enough specialists to oversee the rail industry's implementation of PTC and safety risk reduction plans.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FRA develop (1) a plan for finalizing its rulemaking and interim steps to implement its oversight of safety risk reduction programs, and (2) a strategic human capital plan that identifies and prioritizes FRAs human capital needs, links them to FRAs strategic goals and objectives, and includes approaches for how FRA will recruit, train, and retain inspectors and its new workforce of PTC and safety risk management specialists. DOT agreed to consider the recommendations and provided technical and other comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-04-536 | gao_GAO-04-536_0 | The act does not require that long-range transportation plans contain projects and strategies that protect and enhance the environment, and provides no guidance on how planners are to consider ecosystem conservation. 2.) 3.) In addition to considering ecosystem conservation in transportation planning through corridor studies or as a means to screen potential projects, these 22 planning agencies reported using one or more of the following common methods either in addition to or in combination with corridor studies or screening: using resource agencies as stakeholders in developing transportation considering the views of environmental interest groups in developing using resource agency data to determine mitigation requirements, develop alternative locations, or to avoid planning projects with unacceptably high ecosystem impact; using geographic information systems to determine ecological resource providing funding for ecological impact studies; having planning agency or resource agency personnel conduct site visits to determine or confirm the location of ecological resources; and incorporating in transportation plans local plans that have considered ecosystem conservation. Federal Agencies Encourage Consideration of Ecosystem Conservation in Transportation Planning
Although federal law does not specifically require planners to consider ecosystem conservation in transportation plans, the Federal Highway Administration encourages state and metropolitan planners to do so by identifying and promoting exemplary initiatives that are unique, innovative, attain a high-level environmental standard, or are recognized as particularly valuable from an environmental perspective, according to the agency’s fiscal year 2004 performance plan. These officials listed fewer negative effects. For example, planners and state resource agency officials reported preventing irreparable habitat damage in New York by changing planning from a five-lane highway to planning for a lower-impact two-lane boulevard after a study revealed that the original project would be detrimental to the surrounding habitat, and updated traffic studies indicated that the wider highway was not needed to ensure mobility; decreasing habitat fragmentation in North Carolina by using geographic information system data on state ecological resources during project planning to avoid or mitigate unacceptable potential impacts on habitat; and working with the state resource agency in Nebraska to identify preferred times for construction in order to reduce impacts on the breeding of certain species. Fifteen transportation planners and state resource agency officials reported that considering ecosystem conservation improves a project’s cost and schedule estimates. For example, improved relationships through partnership and coordination among stakeholders can help resolve environmental issues in a timely and predictable manner. The cost in staff time and money was the most often reported discouraging factor for agencies that reported considering ecosystem conservation. Planners in Oregon and New Mexico attributed their consideration of ecosystem conservation partly to the pro- environment culture in their states. Transportation planners also listed encouraging factors that were similar to the positive effects that were discussed earlier in this report. A few other planners cited additional discouraging factors. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The Department of Transportation and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had no comments on a draft of this report. The Department of the Interior generally agreed with the information in a draft copy of this report and provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. We would now like to discuss the effects of considering ecosystem conservation in the pre-NEPA phase. RA5) What metropolitan planning organizations are you involved with? We defined ecosystems as plants and animals and the habitats that support them. We defined planning as activities associated with developing the federally required long-range transportation plan, short-range transportation improvement program, and the nonfederally required project planning that some jurisdictions perform just prior to beginning the environmental review required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), as well as any activities, such as corridor studies, that are performed concurrently with, but independently of, federally mandated transportation planning activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's roads, highways, and bridges are essential to mobility but can have negative effects on plants, animals, and the habitats that support them (collectively called ecosystems in this report). Federally funded transportation projects progress through three planning phases: long range (20 or more years), short range (3 to 5 years), and early project development, (collectively defined as planning in this report) before undergoing environmental review (which includes assessing air and water quality, ecosystems, and other impacts) required under the National Environmental Policy Act. Federal law requires planners to consider protecting and enhancing the environment in the first two phases, but does not specify how and does not require such consideration in the third phase. GAO reported on (1) the extent to which transportation planners consider ecosystem conservation in planning, (2) the effects of such consideration, and (3) the factors that encourage or discourage such consideration. GAO contacted 36 planning agencies (24 states and 12 of approximately 380 metropolitan planning organizations), as well as officials in 22 resource agencies that maintain ecological data and administer environmental laws. The Department of Transportation and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had no comments on a draft of this report. The Department of the Interior generally agreed with the contents of our draft report.
What GAO Found
Of the 36 transportation planning agencies that GAO contacted, 31 considered ecosystem conservation in transportation planning, using a variety of methods. For example, Colorado conducts studies that incorporate ecosystem issues to guide future transportation decisions, uses advance planning to avoid or reduce impacts, and actively involves stakeholders. New Mexico uses planning studies to identify locations where wildlife are likely to cross highways and design underpasses to allow safe crossings. In the absence of specific requirements, federal agencies encourage ecosystem consideration in planning. Planners and state resource agency officials most frequently reported reduced ecosystem impacts and improved cost and schedule estimates as positive effects. For example, planners in New York changed a planned fivelane highway to a lower-impact two-lane boulevard after weighing the area's mobility needs and the project's impact on the surrounding habitat. In Massachusetts, resource agency officials said that addressing ecological requirements in planning improved schedule certainty during the federally required environmental review. Furthermore, planners and resource agency officials reported that working together has improved relationships between their agencies, thereby allowing ecosystem concerns to be resolved in a more timely and predictable manner. Officials also listed negative effects, such as higher project costs and more work for resource agencies. Constituent support from agency staff, political appointees, or the public was the most frequently reported factor (27 instances) that encouraged planners to consider ecosystem conservation. For example, New Mexico's "pro-environment" culture reportedly encourages planners to consider ecosystem conservation. The cost in time and resources of considering ecosystem conservation was most often cited as a discouraging factor (23 instances). For example, Colorado planners cited the significant amount of time needed to collect and maintain access to ecosystem data. |
gao_GAO-15-502 | gao_GAO-15-502_0 | Most of this energy was produced from non-Indian resources, but Indian energy resources hold significant potential for future development. Additional factors, generally outside of BIA’s management responsibilities, have also hindered Indian energy development, including (1) a complex regulatory framework, (2) fractionated ownership interests, (3) tribes’ limited access to capital and federal tax credits, (4) dual taxation by states and tribes, (5) tribal capacity, and (6) infrastructure limitations. BIA Does Not Have Comprehensive Data Identifying Ownership and Use of Indian Resources
BIA does not have the data it needs to verify ownership of some oil and gas resources, easily identify resources available for lease, or easily identify where leases are in effect. BIA Does Not Have a Documented Process or Data to Track Its Review and Response Times
BIA review and approval is required throughout the development process, including the approval of leases, ROW agreements, and appraisals; however, BIA does not have a documented process or the data needed to track its review and response times. A few stakeholders we interviewed and some literature we reviewed identified that BIA’s review and approval process can be lengthy and increase development costs and project development times, resulting in missed development opportunities, lost revenue, and jeopardized viability of projects. For example, in 2011, the President for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe in South Dakota, reported that it took 18 months for BIA to review a wind lease. According to the developer of the project, the review time caused the project to be delayed and resulted in the project losing an interconnection agreement with the local utility. Without this agreement, the project has not been able to move forward, resulting in a loss of revenue for the tribe. In another example, in 2014, the Acting Chairman for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe reported that BIA’s review of some of its energy-related documents took as long as 8 years. In yet another example, BIA took more than 3 years to review and approve a lease for a proposed wind project and, according to a tribal official, the lease was only reviewed and approved after multiple calls and letters from the tribe to BIA headquarters. Long review times can contribute to uncertainty about the continued viability of the project because data used to support the economic feasibility and environmental impact of the project can become too old to accurately reflect current conditions. A Variety of Factors Have Deterred Tribes from Entering into TERAs
A variety of factors have deterred tribes from entering into TERAs, including: (1) uncertainty about TERA regulations, (2) limited tribal capacity and costs associated with assuming activities currently conducted by federal agencies, and (3) a complex application process, according to some of the literature we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed. Specifically, TERA regulations authorize tribes to assume responsibility for energy development activities that are not “inherently federal According to officials from one tribe we interviewed, the tribe functions.”has repeatedly asked Interior for additional guidance on the activities that would be considered inherently federal functions under the regulations. Without additional clarification to address these concerns Limited tribal capacity and associated costs. IEED Has Provided TEDC Grants to 25 Tribes, but Their Effectiveness at Building Tribal Capacity Is Unknown
IEED allocated more than $2 million through 29 grants provided to 25 tribes from 2007 through 2013 under the TEDC program, but the effectiveness of the program is unknown because Interior has not tracked the benefit of the grants and does not have a documented process to assess whether the grants have moved tribes closer to building the capacity needed to pursue a TERA. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the Director of the Office of the Indian Energy and Economic Development, as appropriate, to take the following seven actions:
To ensure it can verify ownership in a timely manner and identify resources available for development, BIA should (1) take steps to complete its GIS mapping module in TAAMS and (2) work with BLM to identify cadastral survey needs. Interior also agreed with our recommendations for a documented process to evaluate the effectiveness of TEDC grants and to improve the agency’s data collection efforts. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what factors have hindered Indian energy development and factors that have deterred tribes from seeking Tribal Energy Resource Agreements (TERA), we searched literature relevant to Indian energy development, including fossil sources, such as oil and gas, as well as renewable sources. We also obtained information from BIA documents and officials to identify its process for tracking its review of energy-related documents. We compared this information with an executive order and best practices for modernizing the federal permitting and review process identified by an interagency committee, and the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Indian energy resources hold significant potential for development, but remain largely undeveloped. Interior's BIA reviews and approves leases and other permits required for development. Other Interior components and federal agencies also have roles in this process.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided the opportunity for interested tribes to pursue TERAs—agreements between a tribe and Interior that allow the tribe to enter into energy leases and agreements without review and approval by Interior. The act also authorizes Interior to provide grants to tribes to develop the capacity needed to enter into a TERA. However, no tribe has entered into a TERA.
GAO was asked to review Indian energy development. This report examines (1) factors that have hindered Indian energy development, (2) factors that have deterred tribes from pursuing TERAs, and (3) the effectiveness of Interior's efforts to build tribes' capacity to enter into TERAs. GAO analyzed federal data; reviewed federal, academic, and other literature; and interviewed tribal, federal and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) management shortcomings and other factors—such as a complex regulatory framework, tribes' limited capital and infrastructure, and varied tribal capacity—have hindered Indian energy development. Specifically, BIA does not have the data it needs to verify ownership of some Indian oil and gas resources, easily identify resources available for lease, or identify where leases are in effect, as called for in Secretarial Order 3215 and internal guidance. BIA also faces staff limitations and does not have a documented process or the data needed to track its review and response times, as called for in implementation guidance for Executive Order 13604, and therefore it cannot ensure transparency in its review of energy-related documents. These shortcomings can increase costs and project development times, resulting in missed development opportunities, lost revenue, and jeopardized viability of projects. Examples are as follows:
Missed development opportunities: According to a tribal official, BIA took 18 months to review a wind lease. According to the developer of the project, the review time caused the project to be delayed and resulted in the project losing an interconnection agreement with the local utility. Without this agreement, the project has not been able to move forward, resulting in a loss of revenue for the tribe.
Lost revenue: According to a tribal official, BIA's review of some of its energy-related documents took as long as 8 years. In the meantime, the tribe estimates it lost more than $95 million in revenues it could have earned from tribal permitting fees, oil and gas severance taxes, and royalties.
Jeopardized viability of projects: One lease for a proposed utility-scale wind project took BIA more than 3 years to review and approve. According to a tribal official, the long review time has contributed to uncertainty about the continued viability of the project because data used to support the economic feasibility and environmental impact of the project became too old to accurately reflect current conditions.
Several factors have deterred tribes from seeking tribal energy resource agreements (TERA). These factors include uncertainty about some TERA regulations, costs associated with assuming activities historically conducted by federal agencies, and a complex application process. For instance, one tribe asked the Department of the Interior (Interior) for additional guidance on the activities that would be considered inherently federal functions—a provision included in Interior's regulations implementing TERA. Interior officials told GAO that the agency has no plans to provide additional clarification.
Interior's Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development (IEED) provided grants to build tribal energy development capacity to 25 tribes from 2007 through 2013, but the effectiveness of the grants to move tribes closer to demonstrating that they have the capacity to enter into TERAs is unknown. The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for agencies to compare actual performance with planned or expected results and to monitor performance; however, IEED has not tracked how, if it all, the grants have eliminated capacity gaps.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Interior take steps to address data limitations, track its review process, provide clarifying guidance, and evaluate the effectiveness of grants. Interior generally agreed with most but not all of the recommendations because it is taking other actions to address some data limitations. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-17-209 | gao_GAO-17-209_0 | School districts or private contractors can operate school buses transporting public school students. These regulations apply in very limited circumstances such as for contractors hired by schools who provide transportation for extracurricular activities across state lines. Detailed Data Are Limited on School Bus Crashes, but Fatal School-Bus Crashes Are a Very Low Percentage of All Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes
While Little Federal Data Exist beyond School Bus Fatalities, State Data May Contain More Detailed Information
At the federal level, both NHTSA and FMCSA collect data on motor vehicle crashes that include crashes involving school buses. When we extended our analysis to include 2011 to 2014, the average fell slightly to 115 fatal crashes each year, which is 0.3 percent of the 34,835 fatal motor-vehicle crashes that occurred on average each year during this time. Seventy-four percent of fatal crashes from 2000 to 2010 occurred during home-to- school and school-to-home travel times. We found that all 50 states require school bus inspections, and most states also require driver training. NHTSA has reported that new school buses have to meet more vehicle safety standards than any other type of new motor vehicle. Beyond home-to-school and school-to-home transportation, the type of operator—whether it is a private contractor or a school district or other governmental entity—and the type of trip—including whether the trip will cross state lines—determine whether all Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations apply. Building on Federal Requirements, States Set Requirements for School Bus Safety That Vary by State but Generally Not by Type of Operator
States build upon federal laws and regulations and usually set additional, state-specific requirements for school bus safety that generally apply to both school districts and contractors, according to stakeholders we spoke with. For example, in Illinois, the State Board of Education and Secretary of State oversee school bus driver training, and the Department of Transportation oversees school bus inspections, while in Pennsylvania the Department of Transportation oversees school bus driver training and the State Police oversees school bus inspections. Vehicle Standards for Maximum Age and Capacity
In our search of state laws and regulations, we found six states that set a requirement for the maximum vehicle age for when a school bus must be replaced or no longer used. The Department of Transportation provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act included a provision for GAO to conduct a review of school bus safety, including examining any differences in the safety performance of different types of school bus operators—that is, school districts and contractors—and what safety requirements apply to them. We examined: (1) data federal and state agencies collect on school bus crashes and the number and characteristics of fatal school-bus crashes that have occurred since 2000; (2) federal and state laws and regulations pertaining to school bus inspections, vehicles, and drivers, as well as state data on inspections’ outcomes; and (3) sources for leading practices for safe school-bus transportation, as identified by stakeholders and literature, as well as any areas where further federal guidance could be useful. First, we analyzed Buses Involved in Fatal Accidents (BIFA) data from the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) for calendar years 2000 to 2010 to describe the attributes of crashes involving school buses. To describe federal school bus safety requirements, we reviewed federal laws and regulations on school bus inspections, driver training, and vehicle standards—specifically, vehicle age and seating capacity of school buses. To describe state laws and regulations, we systematically searched laws and regulations for all 50 states to determine the extent to which states set requirements for school bus inspections, driver training, and vehicle standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
School buses transport over 26 million students to school and other activities every day. While school buses have a strong safety record, crashes with fatalities and injuries do occur. Since school buses transport precious cargo—our children—government and industry strive to further improve their safety. Federal and state agencies both oversee school bus safety, and locally, school buses can be operated by school districts or private contractors, working on behalf of school districts.
The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act included a provision for GAO to review school bus safety. GAO examined (1) fatal crashes involving school buses for 2000 to 2014 and (2) federal and state school-bus-related laws and regulations, among other objectives. GAO analyzed two sets of data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute on fatal school bus crashes for 2000 to 2014, the latest year for which data were available; reviewed federal laws and regulations; and systematically searched state laws and regulations on school-bus inspections, driver training, and maximum vehicle age and capacity in all 50 states. GAO also interviewed federal officials from the Department of Transportation (DOT), school bus industry associations and manufacturers, and other stakeholders.
DOT reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO's analysis of data for 2000 to 2014, 115 fatal crashes involved a school bus on average each year—which is 0.3 percent of the 34,835 total fatal motor-vehicle crashes on average each year. The school-bus driver and school-bus vehicle (e.g., a defect) were cited as contributing factors in 27 percent and less than 1 percent of fatal school-bus crashes, respectively. Seventy-two percent of fatal crashes occurred during home-to-school and school-to-home travel times. Limited national data on school bus crashes exist beyond data on fatal school-bus crashes, but some states have richer data—for example, on the type of bus or whether the operator was a school district or private contractor.
Federal laws and regulations set requirements for certain aspects of school bus safety, and state laws and regulations in many cases go beyond the federal requirements. Federal regulations for school-bus vehicle standards and driver licensing apply to both school districts and contractors. DOT has reported that new school buses must meet more Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards than any other type of new motor vehicle. Federal safety regulations for commercial motor-vehicle operations apply in certain cases, such as for contractors hired by schools to provide transportation for extracurricular activities across state lines. Based on a systematic search of state laws and regulations, GAO found that all 50 states require school bus inspections while most states—GAO found 44—require refresher training for school bus drivers. However, GAO found that less than a quarter of states set specific requirements for the maximum age and seating capacity of school buses. Overall, according to stakeholders GAO interviewed, states' requirements vary by state for school bus inspections, driver training, and vehicles but tend not to differ based on the type of operator. |
gao_GAO-03-926 | gao_GAO-03-926_0 | These programs include individual assistance to victims affected by a disaster and hazard mitigation funds to state and local governments to take steps to prevent future disasters. The assistance is to be provided to repair, restore, reconstruct, or replace eligible facilities. $7.4 Billion in Public Assistance-Related Funding Provided for Broad Range of Activities
The approximately $7.4 billion of public assistance and public assistance- related work funded through FEMA is providing a broad range of aid to the NYC area. Based on our analysis, we categorize the public assistance and related funding for NYC into six general areas: debris removal operations and insurance; reconstruction of the Lower Manhattan transportation infrastructure under an interagency agreement with DOT; reimbursement of police and fire department costs; reimbursement of expenses incurred by NYC agencies other than the Departments of Design and Construction, Sanitation, Police and Fire for such activities as DNA and forensic testing to identify victims and exterior building cleaning; reimbursement of expenses to agencies that are not part of the NYC government (i.e., New York state agencies, the Port Authority, and private non profits) for disaster-related costs such as transportation work not covered under the interagency agreement discussed above; and reimbursement of public assistance-related expenses authorized by Congress that would not otherwise have been eligible for assistance (i.e. We provide additional perspective on how aspects of this interagency agreement differ from FEMA’s traditional public assistance response to major disasters on page 28 of this report. Reimbursements to Other NYC Government Agencies
Although the NYC Departments of Design and Construction, Sanitation, Fire, and Police were the city agencies that received the largest amounts of FEMA public assistance funding for debris removal and insurance and for emergency response losses and expenses related to the terrorist attacks, FEMA also provided direct public assistance to a number of other NYC agencies for a wide range of work totaling almost $300 million. Reimbursements for Public Assistance- Related Work Authorized by Congress
Lastly, $1.2 billion was made available in June 2003 as a result of FEMA’s early close out of its traditional public assistance program to NYC and state for congressionally authorized costs associated with the terrorist attacks. While FEMA followed traditional processes for considering most applications, the public assistance response in the NYC area after the terrorist attacks differed significantly from the traditional approach FEMA has used in providing assistance under the Stafford Act after major natural disasters. Congress provided FEMA with specific appropriations for the terrorist attacks that resulted in a capped funding amount of $8.8 billion for its efforts to aid the NYC area from the President’s pledge of at least $20 billion in federal assistance. Reimbursement for instructional time for students to make up for days missed after the terrorist attacks ($19.3 million). With respect to the effectiveness of the Stafford Act in dealing with a major terrorist event of an impact equal to or greater than the World Trade Center attacks, the officials from NYC involved in the response and recovery efforts whom we interviewed did not believe that the act fully addressed the needs of the city and did not think it should be used to respond to major terrorist events unless it had significant amendments to address the unique challenges related to terrorist events. The key issue is whether the differences in the ways the public assistance program in the NYC area was delivered will serve a baseline for the federal approach in the event of another major terrorist event. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what activities the Federal Emergency Management (FEMA) supported through its public assistance program, we analyzed published FEMA reports and FEMA’s National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS) data. To determine how the federal government’s response to the terrorist event differed from FEMA’s traditional approach to funding public assistance in other disasters, we selected 10 projects for detailed review from an issue matrix created by the public assistance officer at the World Trade Center Federal Recovery Office. | Why GAO Did This Study
The terrorist attacks on New York City created the most costly disaster in U.S. history. In response, the President pledged at least $20 billion in aid to the city. Approximately $7.4 billion of this aid is being provided through the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) public assistance program, which provides grants to state and local governments to respond to and recover from disasters. The Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works requested that GAO determine (1) what activities FEMA supported in the New York City area through its public assistance program after the terrorist attacks; (2) how the federal government's response to this terrorist event differed from FEMA's traditional approach to providing public assistance in past disasters; and (3) what implications FEMA's public assistance approach in the New York City area may have on the delivery of public assistance should other major terrorist attacks occur in the future.
What GAO Found
FEMA has supported many activities through its $7.4 billion in public assistance-related funding to the New York City area. Activities funded include grants to state and local governments for emergency response, such as debris removal, and permanent work, such as the repair of disaster-damaged public facilities. FEMA also provided public assistance-related funding specifically directed by Congress that would not otherwise have been eligible for assistance (e.g. reimbursing costs of instructional time for students who lost school time after the terrorist attacks). The major uses for this funding are as follows: $1.7 billion for debris removal operations and insurance; $2.8 billion to repair and upgrade the transportation infrastructure of Lower Manhattan; $0.6 billion to the New York City Police and Fire Departments for such purposes as emergency efforts and replacing destroyed vehicles; $0.3 billion to miscellaneous city agencies for a wide range of activities (e.g., instructional time for students and building cleaning); $0.7 billion for non-New York City agencies for many purposes (e.g. office relocations and repair of damaged buildings); and $1.2 billion available on June 30, 2003, for public assistance-related reimbursements to New York City and state (work to be decided). The provision of public assistance to the New York City area differed in three significant ways from FEMA's traditional approach. FEMA and New York City officials agreed that FEMA's public assistance approach in the New York City area creates uncertainties regarding the delivery of public assistance in the event of another major terrorist event. They differed on the effectiveness of using the public assistance program as currently authorized as the vehicle for federal disaster response to a future major terrorist event. Key New York City officials said that the program needed major revisions, while FEMA officials said it worked well along with the congressional prerogative to provide additional assistance. Nevertheless, FEMA has begun to consider ways to redesign the program to make it better able to address all types and sizes of disasters, including terrorist attacks. |
gao_GAO-12-1035T | gao_GAO-12-1035T_0 | HHS Has Increased Its Use of Title 42, but More Reliable Data Could Improve HHS’s Oversight
During calendar year 2010, HHS had 6,697 employees who were appointed under sections 209(f) or (g).served at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), while the remaining employees served in the Office of the Secretary or within other operating divisions, as shown in figure 1. At the time of our study, EPA had appointed 17 fellows in its Office of Research and Development from 2006 to 2011 under section 209(g) and all 17 fellows remained with EPA. According to EPA officials, the agency has identified mission critical personnel needs and is actively recruiting to fill the 13 remaining authorized Title 42 positions. In appointing Title 42 fellows, EPA generally followed appointment guidance described in its Title 42 Operations Manual. To address this issue, we recommended that EPA, as part of its efforts to improve postappointment ethics oversight, develop and document a systematic approach for ensuring Title 42 employees are compliant with ethics requirements after appointment. EPA disagreed with our recommendation, citing certain actions already taken, such as a plan to require proof of compliance with ethics agreements. We acknowledged EPA’s plans to address these issues, but maintained the recommendation was needed to ensure implementation because the two ethics issues we reported occurred over 2 years ago. Legal Opinion Whether There are Statutory Caps on Pay for Consultants and Scientists Appointed under Title 42
Our legal opinion, issued on July 11, 2012, responded to a Congressional request for our views on whether there are statutory caps on pay for consultants and scientists appointed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. With regard to individuals not subject to this cap, we concluded further that two other pay limitations set forth in Title 5 of the U.S. Code that we considered do not apply to appointments made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections 209(f) and (g) of title 42 were enacted in 1944 and have not been amended since that time. § 5376.” This cap currently limits base pay to $155,500. §§ 209(f) or (g) in all but three of the Public Health Service Agencies. § 209(f). 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) or (g) appointees. § 5373 pay cap to apply to consultants and scientists hired pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) and (g). As one court has observed, “although some pay systems are ‘linked’ to one another,” they have not been “fastidiously integrated” to achieve uniform federal compensation policies.” In this case, the issues raised – in particular the applicability of the two title 5 limitations on the title 42 authority to hire special consultants and fellows – reflect the difficulty of applying distinct statutory schemes to determine whether specific pay limits apply. Thus if Congress desires upper pay limits for appointments under sections 209(f) and (g), it may wish to consider amending these provisions to specifically establish such limits. Concluding Observations
Both HHS and EPA have used Title 42 to recruit and retain highly skilled, in-demand personnel to government service in order to execute their missions. At the same time, HHS’s lack of complete data and guidance on its use of Title 42 may limit the agency’s ability to strategically manage its use and provide oversight of the authority. Effective monitoring of the use of Title 42 is particularly important in light of HHS’s increasing use of the authority and the number of employees earning salaries higher than most federal employees. EPA generally followed its Title 42 policies and has incorporated some modifications to improve its appointment and compensation practices; however, EPA’s current ethics guidance does not sufficiently ensure Title 42 employees meet ethics requirements after appointment. Going forward, our recommendations to HHS and EPA to strengthen certain practices under Title 42, if implemented, should help strengthen the management and oversight of this special hiring authority. | Why GAO Did This Study
HHS and EPA have been using special hiring authority provided under 42 U.S.C. §§209(f) and (g)referred to in this testimony as Title 42to appoint individuals to fill mission critical positions in science and medicine and, in many cases, pay them above salary limits usually applicable to federal government employees. GAO was asked to review the extent to which HHS and EPA have (1) used authority under Title 42 to appoint and compensate employees since 2006, and (2) followed applicable agency policy, guidance, and internal controls for appointments and compensation. GAO was also asked to determine if there are statutory caps on pay for consultants and scientists appointed pursuant to Title 42.
This testimony is based on GAOs July 2012 report (GAO-12-692) and a legal opinion on whether there are statutory caps on pay for consultants and scientists appointed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) or (g). (B-3223357)
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) use of special hiring authorities under 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) and (g) has increased in recent years, from 5,361 positions in 2006 to 6,697 positions in 2010, an increase of around 25 percent. Nearly all HHS Title 42 employees work in one of three HHS operating divisions: the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Title 42 employees at HHS serve in a variety of areas, including scientific and medical research support and in senior, director-level leadership positions. At NIH, one-quarter of all employees, and 44 percent of its researchers and clinical practitioners, were Title 42 appointees.
HHS reported that Title 42 enables the agency to quickly fill knowledge gaps so medical research can progress and to respond to medical emergencies. HHS further reported Title 42 provides the compensation flexibility needed to compete with the private sector. In 2010, 1,461 of HHSs Title 42 employees earned salaries over $155,500. The highest base pay amount under the General Schedule the system under which most federal employees are paid was $155,500 in 2010. Under certain types of Title 42 appointments, statutory pay caps may apply. 2010 was the last year of HHS data available at the time of GAOs review.
HHS does not have reliable data to manage and provide oversight of its use of Title 42. Moreover, HHS did not consistently adhere to certain sections of its Title 42 section 209(f) policy. For example, the policy states that 209(f) appointments may only be made after non-Title 42 authorities have failed to yield a qualified candidate, but GAO found few instances where such efforts were documented. HHS has recently issued updated 209(f) policy that addresses most of these issues. HHS is developing agencywide policy for appointing and compensating employees under Title 42 section 209(g), but it is not clear the policy will address important issues such as documenting the basis for compensation.
Since 2006, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has used section 209(g) to appoint 17 employees. Fifteen of EPAs 17 Title 42 employees earned salaries over $155,500 in 2010. EPA appointment and compensation practices were generally consistent with its guidance; however, EPA does not have post-appointment procedures in place to ensure Title 42 employees meet ethics requirements to which they have previously agreed.
In its legal opinion, GAO concluded that an appropriations pay cap applies to certain, but not all, employees appointed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) and (g). If Congress desires upper pay limits for appointments not currently subject to the pay cap, it may wish to consider legislation to specifically establish such limits.
What GAO Recommends
In the report on which this testimony is based, GAO made recommendations to HHS to improve oversight and management of its Title 42 authority and a recommendation to EPA to improve enforcement of its ethics requirements. HHS agreed with GAOs recommendations, while EPA disagreed, citing actions already taken. GAO acknowledged EPAs plans to address these issues, but maintained the recommendation was needed to ensure implementation. |
gao_GAO-12-210 | gao_GAO-12-210_0 | According to OMB, these data are intended to provide a near-real-time perspective on the performance of these investments, as well as a historical perspective. Further, we recommended that OMB improve how it rates investments related to current performance and schedule variance. Most Dashboard Ratings Were Accurate, but Did Not Emphasize Recent Performance
Most of the cost and schedule ratings on the Dashboard were accurate, but did not provide sufficient emphasis on recent performance to inform oversight and decision making. However, we generally found fewer such discrepancies than in previous reviews, and in all cases the selected agencies found and corrected these inaccuracies in subsequent submissions. In the case of GSA, officials did not disclose that performance data on the Dashboard were unreliable for one investment because of an ongoing baseline change. If fully implemented, OMB’s recent and ongoing changes to the Dashboard, including new cost and schedule rating calculations and updated investment baseline reporting, should address this issue. As shown above, the Dashboard’s cost ratings for four of the eight selected investments were accurate, and four did not match the results of our analyses during the period from October 2010 through March 2011. In all of these cases, the Dashboard’s cost ratings showed poorer performance than our assessments. Without proper disclosure of pending baseline changes and resulting data reliability weaknesses, OMB and other external oversight groups will not have the appropriate information to make informed decisions about these investments. Such continued diligence by agencies to report accurate and timely data will help ensure that the Dashboard’s performance ratings are accurate. Furthermore, our work has shown cost and schedule performance information from the most recent 6 months to be a reliable benchmark for providing this perspective on investment status. Moreover, combining more recent and historical performance can mask the current status of the investment. Further analysis of the Financial and Business Management System’s schedule performance ratings on the Dashboard showed that because of the amount of historical performance data factored into its ratings as of July 2011, it would take a minimum schedule variance of 9 years on the activities currently under way in order to change its rating from “green” to “yellow,” and a variance of more than 30 years before turning “red.”
We have previously recommended to OMB that it develop cost and schedule Dashboard ratings that better reflect current investment performance. We plan to evaluate the new version of the Dashboard once it is publicly available in 2012. Conclusions
Since our first review in July 2010, the accuracy of investment ratings on the Dashboard has improved because of OMB’s refinement of its cost and schedule calculations, and the number of discrepancies found in our reviews has decreased. Reasons for inaccurate Dashboard ratings included missing or incomplete agency data submissions, erroneous data submissions, and inconsistent investment baseline information. Additionally, the Dashboard’s ratings calculations reflect cumulative investment performance—a view that is important but does not meet OMB’s goal of reporting near-real-time performance. OMB’s Dashboard changes could be important steps toward improving insight into current performance and the utility of the Dashboard for effective executive oversight. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better ensure that the Dashboard provides accurate cost and schedule performance ratings, we are recommending that the Administrator of GSA direct its CIO to comply with OMB’s guidance related to Dashboard data submissions by updating the CIO rating for a given GSA investment as soon as new information becomes available that affects the assessment, including when an investment is in the process of a rebaseline. As a result, we selected the Departments of Commerce, Education, the Interior, and State, as well as the General Services Administration (GSA). To assess the accuracy and currency of the cost and schedule performance ratings on the Dashboard, we evaluated, where available, agency or contractor documentation related to cost and schedule performance for 8 of the selected investments to determine their cumulative and current cost and schedule performance and compared our ratings with the performance ratings on the Dashboard. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year the federal government spends billions of dollars on information technology (IT) investments. Given the importance of program oversight, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established a public website, referred to as the IT Dashboard, that provides detailed information on about 800 federal IT investments, including assessments of actual performance against cost and schedule targets (referred to as ratings). According to OMB, these data are intended to provide both a near-real-time and historical perspective of performance. In the third of a series of Dashboard reviews, GAO was asked to examine the accuracy of the Dashboard's cost and schedule performance ratings. To do so, GAO compared the performance of eight major investments undergoing development from four agencies with large IT budgets (the Departments of Commerce, the Interior, and State, as well as the General Services Administration) against the corresponding ratings on the Dashboard, and interviewed OMB and agency officials.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's first report in July 2010, the accuracy of investment ratings has improved because of OMB's refinement of the Dashboard's cost and schedule calculations. Most of the Dashboard's cost and schedule ratings for the eight selected investments were accurate; however, they did not sufficiently emphasize recent performance for informed oversight and decision making. (1) Cost ratings were accurate for four of the investments that GAO reviewed, and schedule ratings were accurate for seven. In general, the number of discrepancies found in GAO's reviews has decreased. In each case where GAO found rating discrepancies, the Dashboard's ratings showed poorer performance than GAO's assessment. Reasons for inaccurate Dashboard ratings included missing or incomplete agency data submissions, erroneous data submissions, and inconsistent investment baseline information. In all cases, the selected agencies found and corrected these inaccuracies in subsequent Dashboard data submissions. Such continued diligence by agencies to report complete and timely data will help ensure that the Dashboard's performance ratings are accurate. In the case of the General Services Administration, officials did not disclose that performance data on the Dashboard were unreliable for one investment because of an ongoing baseline change. Without proper disclosure of pending baseline changes, OMB and other external oversight bodies may not have the appropriate information needed to make informed decisions. (2) While the Dashboard's cost and schedule ratings provide a cumulative view of performance, they did not emphasize current performance--which is needed to meet OMB's goal of reporting near-real-time performance. GAO's past work has shown cost and schedule performance information from the most recent 6 months to be a reliable benchmark for providing a near-real-time perspective on investment status. By combining recent and historical performance, the Dashboard's ratings may mask the current status of the investment, especially for lengthy acquisitions. GAO found that this discrepancy between cumulative and current performance ratings was reflected in two of the selected investments. For example, a Department of the Interior investment's Dashboard cost rating indicated normal performance from December 2010 through March 2011, whereas GAO's analysis of current performance showed that cost performance needed attention for those months. If fully implemented, OMB's recent and ongoing changes to the Dashboard, including new cost and schedule rating calculations and updated investment baseline reporting, should address this issue. These Dashboard changes could be important steps toward improving insight into current performance and the utility of the Dashboard for effective executive oversight. GAO plans to evaluate the new version of the Dashboard once it is publicly available in 2012.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the General Services Administration disclose on the Dashboard when one of its investments is in the process of a rebaseline. Since GAO previously recommended that OMB improve how it rates investments relative to current performance, it is not making further recommendations. The General Services Administration agreed with the recommendation. OMB provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-12-149T | gao_GAO-12-149T_0 | Management of EPA’s Workload, Workforce, and Real Property
With respect to its workload and workforce, EPA has struggled for years to identify its human resource needs and to deploy its staff throughout the agency in a manner that would do the most good. We noted that the agency had not comprehensively analyzed its workload and workforce since the late 1980s to determine the optimal numbers and distribution of staff agencywide. We recommended, among other things, that EPA link its workforce plan to its strategic plan and establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate its workforce planning efforts. EPA generally agreed with these recommendations. For example, in July 2011, we reported that EPA had made considerable progress in meeting goals to contain and control contamination at high-risk hazardous waste sites. An assessment could also help EPA develop budget estimates and requests that align with program needs. EPA operates a laboratory enterprise consisting of 37 laboratories housed in 170 buildings and facilities located in 30 cities across the nation. Specifically, we reported that EPA did not have basic information on its laboratory workload and workforce, including demographic data on the number of federal and contract employees working in its laboratories. Because of the challenges identified in this report, we made recommendations to address workforce and workload planning decisions. Finally, our July 2011 report on EPA laboratories also identified challenges related to EPA’s management of its real property. The need to better manage federal real property was underscored in a June 2010 presidential memorandum that directed agencies to accelerate efforts to identify and eliminate excess properties to help achieve a total of $3 billion in cost savings by 2012. We made several recommendations for EPA to improve its physical infrastructure and real property planning, including improving the completeness and reliability of operating-cost and other data needed to manage its real property and report to external parties. Coordination with Other Agencies to More Effectively Leverage Limited Resources
EPA relies on other federal and state agencies to help implement its programs. Given the federal deficit and the government’s long-term fiscal challenges, it is important that EPA improve coordination with its federal and state partners to reduce administrative burdens, redundant activities, and inefficient uses of federal resources. In a September 2011 report on Chesapeake Bay restoration efforts, for example, we found that federal and state agencies were not working toward the same strategic goals. We recommended, among other things, that EPA work with federal and state stakeholders to develop common goals and clarify plans for assessing progress. We recommended that EPA establish a work group or formal mechanism to coordinate research on pharmaceuticals in drinking water. In a 2009 report on rural water infrastructure, we reported that, from fiscal years 2000 through 2008, EPA and six federal agencies obligated $1.4 billion for drinking water and wastewater projects to assist communities in the U.S.-Mexico border region. As a result, we suggested that Congress consider establishing an interagency task force to develop a plan for coordinating funding to address the region’s most pressing needs. In March 2011, we issued our first annual report to Congress in response to a new statutory requirement that GAO identify federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives—either within departments or government-wide—which have duplicative goals or activities. Over the years, our periodic review of EPA’s budget justification documents has led to two recurring observations. First, EPA has not consistently provided detailed justification for its activities when requesting new or expanded funding. In some cases, we have noted that such requests have not included (1) clear justification for the amount of funding requested or a detailed description of the type and scope of activities the funding would support, or (2) information on the management controls, such as a schedule for spending the requested funds, EPA would use to ensure the efficient and effective use of requested funding. Second, our reviews have often focused on the agency’s efforts to make use of unliquidated balances, or those funds that have been appropriated and properly obligated but not expended. We have also observed that such information could be useful to Congress because the availability of recertified amounts could partially offset the need for new funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) faces a number of management and budgetary challenges, which are particularly important as Congress seeks to decrease the cost of government while improving its performance. EPA operates in a highly complex and controversial regulatory arena, and its policies and programs affect virtually all segments of the economy, society, and government. From fiscal years 2000 through 2010, the agency's budget rose in nominal terms from $7.8 billion to $10.4 billion, but has remained relatively flat over this period in real terms. This testimony highlights some of the major management challenges and budgetary issues facing a range of EPA programs and activities today. This testimony focuses on (1) management of EPA's workload, workforce, and real property; (2) coordination with other agencies to more effectively leverage limited resources; and (3) observations on the agency's budget justifications. This testimony is based on prior GAO products and analysis..
What GAO Found
Recent GAO work has identified challenges with EPA's efforts to manage its workload, workforce, and real property and made recommendations to address these challenges. In 2010, GAO reported that EPA had not comprehensively analyzed its workload and workforce since the late 1980s to determine the optimal numbers and distribution of staff agencywide. GAO recommended, among other things, that EPA link its workforce to its strategic plan and establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate their workforce planning efforts. A 2011 review of EPA's efforts to control contamination at hazardous waste sites found that the program was making progress toward its goals but that EPA had not performed a rigorous analysis of its remaining workload to help inform budget estimates and requests in line with program needs. Regarding real property management--an area that GAO has identified as part of its high-risk series--GAO reported that EPA operated a laboratory enterprise consisting of 37 laboratories housed in 170 buildings and facilities in 30 cities. GAO found that EPA did not have accurate and reliable information on its laboratories to respond to a presidential memorandum directing agencies to accelerate efforts to identify and eliminate excess properties. The report recommended that EPA address management challenges, real property planning decisions, and workforce planning. GAO has reported on opportunities for EPA to better coordinate with other federal and state agencies to help implement its programs. Given the federal deficit and the government's long-term fiscal challenges, it is important that EPA improve its coordination with these agencies to make efficient use of federal resources. In a September 2011 report on the Chesapeake Bay, GAO found that federal and state agencies were not working toward the same strategic goals and recommended that EPA establish a working group or formal mechanism to develop common goals and clarify plans for assessing progress. In a 2009 report on rural water infrastructure, GAO reported that EPA and six other federal agencies had funded water and wastewater projects in the U.S.-Mexico border region. GAO suggested that Congress consider establishing an interagency task force to develop a plan for coordinating this funding. These findings were included in GAO's March 2011 report to Congress in response to a statutory requirement for GAO to identify federal programs with duplicative goals or activities. Periodic GAO reviews of EPA's budget justifications have led to two recurring observations. First, with respect to proposals for new or expanded funding that GAO has examined, EPA has not consistently provided clear justification for the amount of funding requested or information on the management controls that the agency would use to ensure the efficient and effective use of requested funding. Second, GAO's reviews have found that EPA's budget justification documents do not provide information on funds from appropriations in prior years that were not expended and are available for new obligations. Such information could be useful to Congress because these funds could partially offset the need for new funding. The work cited in this testimony made a number of recommendations intended to address management and related budget challenges, including improving the agency's workforce and workload planning, as well as its coordination with other federal agencies. EPA generally agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-815T | gao_GAO-08-815T_0 | Representation of Women and Minorities Governmentwide and at DHS in 2003 and 2007
DHS, one of the 24 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies, was formed from 22 agencies, including the following agencies or parts of agencies: the U.S. Customs Service, which was formerly located in the Department of the Treasury; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the Coast Guard; and most of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which was formerly located in the Department of Justice. The members of the career SES are the highest nonpolitically appointed leaders in the federal workforce, and we recently looked more closely at their representation governmentwide. Table 5 shows the total number of career SES and the percentage of women and minority SES in DHS and at the 23 other CFO Act agencies in 2003 and 2007. Representation in the Career SES Developmental Pool Governmentwide and at DHS
The vast majority of potential successors for career SES positions will come from the GS pay plan for grades GS-15 and GS-14, the levels that serve as the SES developmental pool. The percentage of women in the governmentwide SES developmental pool increased by 3.9 percentage points between 2003 and 2007, but the percentage of men in this developmental pool decreased by this same amount. Unlike the total number of employees in the governmentwide SES developmental pool, those in DHS’s SES developmental pool increased by more than half. While we did not analyze factors that contributed to changes in DHS workforce from September 2003 through September 2007, OPM and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in their oversight roles require federal agencies, including DHS, to analyze their workforces. DHS Has Reported Taking Steps to Affect the Diversity of Its Workforce That Are Consistent with Leading Diversity Management Practices
A high-performance organization relies on a dynamic workforce with the requisite talents and up-to-date skills to ensure that it is equipped to accomplish its mission and achieve its goals. DHS’s Acting Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) testified in April 2008 on actions the Department is taking to create and manage its workforce. These actions are consistent with leading diversity management practices in four areas: (1) a diversity strategy as part of its strategic plan, (2) recruitment, (3) employee involvement, and (4) succession planning. We have not conducted a review of DHS’s diversity management efforts; therefore, we cannot comment on the effectiveness of DHS’s implementation of these practices. Diversity strategy as part of the strategic plan. DHS established an objective in its 2004 Strategic Plan to “ensure effective recruitment, development, compensation, succession management and leadership of a diverse workforce to provide optimal service at a responsible cost.” In an August 2007 progress report on implementation of mission and management functions, we indicated that DHS had taken action to satisfy most of the elements related to developing a results-oriented strategic human capital plan. The Diversity Strategy outlines DHS’s policy of encouraging a diverse workforce and the value of a diverse workforce in accomplishing DHS’s mission. For DHS, in addition to the changes that will occur as a result of the upcoming new administration, several factors including recent turnover and expected retirements provide opportunities for DHS to affect the diversity of its workforce and highlight the importance of succession planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created from a disparate group of agencies with multiple missions, values, and cultures into a cabinet department whose goals are to, among other things, protect U.S. borders and infrastructure, improve intelligence and information sharing, and prevent and respond to potential terrorist attacks. GAO designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk area in 2003, and it remains so. While DHS has made progress, it continues to face challenges in transforming into an effective, integrated organization. In response to a request to provide information on diversity in DHS and steps DHS is taking to create and manage a diverse workforce, GAO is providing demographic data related to the federal government as a whole and DHS's workforce. GAO obtained these data from the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Central Personnel Data File (CPDF). GAO used its past work on leading diversity management practices (GAO-05-90) and reviewed data from DHS on its diversity management practices.
What GAO Found
Data in OPM's CPDF show that as of September 2007, the overall percentages of women and minorities have increased in the career SES governmentwide, the highest nonpolitically appointed leaders in the federal workforce, and the SES developmental pool for potential successors since September 2003. As part of GAO's recent analysis of the diversity of the SES and the SES developmental pool, GAO reviewed career, or permanent, SES appointments at DHS and DHS's SES developmental pool. During this 4-year period, the total number of career SES and those in the SES developmental pool for potential successors increased at DHS. The percentage of women in the SES increased, while the percentage of minorities decreased. For the SES developmental pool, the percentage of women and minorities increased. While GAO did not analyze the factors that contributed to changes in DHS's workforce for this period, OPM and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in their oversight roles require federal agencies, including DHS, to analyze their workforces. As part of a strategic human capital planning approach, agencies need to develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, motivating, and retaining a diverse workforce. An agency's human capital planning should address the demographic trends that the agency faces with its workforce, especially retirements, which provide opportunities for agencies to affect the diversity of their workforces. DHS reported taking steps to affect the diversity of its workforce. These steps are consistent with several leading diversity management practices: (1) a diversity strategy as part of its strategic plan, (2) recruitment, (3) employee involvement, and (4) succession planning. For example, DHS cited its use of intern programs for recruiting and its implementation of two leadership development programs for managing succession. GAO has not conducted a review of DHS's diversity management efforts; therefore, it cannot comment on the effectiveness of DHS's implementation of these practices. |
gao_GAO-01-361 | gao_GAO-01-361_0 | The Water Resources Development Act of 1996 formalized the Task Force; expanded its membership to include state, local, and tribal representatives; and charged it with coordinating and facilitating the efforts to restore the ecosystem. Conclusions
The initial strategic plan developed by the Task Force is a good start. However, because the plan does not contain all the elements that we recommended, it does not fulfill the requirement placed on the Secretary of the Interior, as the Task Force Chair, by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. We recognize that the plan is a “work in progress” and that the Task Force will continue to refine and improve its strategic plan as it learns more about the ecosystem and how the ecosystem is responding to the Task Force’s efforts. Revising the plan when it is updated in 2002 to include all the elements would fulfill the Committees’ requirement and provide the Task Force with a basis for better assessing the progress of the restoration and determining what refinements are needed. It will also help smooth the transitions that will occur as the restoration progresses and Task Force members are replaced because new and replacement members could more quickly gain an understanding of what is needed to restore the ecosystem. | What GAO Found
The South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Initiative is a complex, long-term effort to restore the South Florida ecosystem--including the Everglades--that involves federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as public and private interests. In response to growing signs of the ecosystem's deterioration, federal agencies established the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force in 1993 to coordinate ongoing federal activities. The Task Force is charged with coordinating and facilitating the overall restoration effort. The Task Force's strategic plan is a good start. However, because the plan does not contain all the elements that GAO recommended in a previous report, it does not fulfill the requirement placed on the Secretary of the Interior, as the Task Force Chair, by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. GAO recognizes that the plan is a "work in progress" and that the Task Force will continue to refine and improve its strategic plan as it learns more about the ecosystem and how the ecosystem is responding to the Task Force's efforts. Revising the plan when it is updated in 2002 to include all the elements would fulfill the Committees' requirement and provide the Task Force with a basis for determining what refinements are needed. It will also help smooth the transitions that will occur as the restoration progresses and the Task Force members are replaced because new and replacement members could more quickly gain an understanding of what is needed to restore the ecosystem. |
gao_GAO-06-982 | gao_GAO-06-982_0 | Ensuring that only workers that do not pose a terrorist threat are allowed unescorted access to secure areas is important in helping to prevent an attack. 1). DHS and Industry Stakeholders Face Challenges in Addressing Testing Problems and Ensuring Key Components of the TWIC Program Work Effectively
DHS and industry stakeholders face three major challenges in addressing problems identified during TWIC program testing and ensuring that key components of the TWIC program can work effectively. The first challenge is enrolling and issuing TWIC cards to a significantly larger population of workers in a timely manner than was done during testing of the TWIC program. DHS Recognizes Stakeholder Concerns Regarding TWIC Implementation, but Plans No Further Program Testing
DHS officials acknowledged that there are challenges in ensuring that the TWIC technology works effectively in a maritime environment. Problems in Planning for and Overseeing the Contract to Test the TWIC Program
TSA experienced problems in planning for and overseeing the contract to test the TWIC program. However, it is not clear to what extent these actions will ensure that the contract to implement the TWIC program will include comprehensive and clearly defined contract requirements. However, TSA did not effectively oversee the contractor’s performance to ensure that key components of the program were tested. The independent contractor’s assessment confirmed this component was not tested. Evaluating contractor performance. However, until TSA develops its plans for monitoring contractor performance, it is not clear to what extent these actions will ensure that contractor performance and costs will be closely monitored. Postponing the issuance of requirements for TWIC access control technologies will afford the maritime industry additional time to comment on these requirements. TSA’s decision to rapidly move forward with implementation of the TWIC program without developing and testing solutions to identified problems could lead to additional problems, increased costs, and further program delays without achieving the program’s intended goals. In developing and testing these solutions, TSA should: ensure that the TWIC program will be able to efficiently enroll and issue TWIC cards to large numbers of workers; ensure that the technology necessary to operate the TWIC program will be readily available to industry stakeholders and will function effectively in the maritime sector, including biometric card readers and the capability to link facility access control systems with the national TWIC database; ensure that the TWIC program balances the added security it provides with the potential effect that the program could have on the flow of maritime commerce; and closely coordinate with maritime industry stakeholders— particularly those that are currently implementing or using biometric access control systems—to learn from their experiences. 2. To address our first objective, to identify the problems, if any, during testing of the TWIC program and the challenges, if any, DHS and industry stakeholders face in implementing the program, we interviewed TSA and Coast Guard officials regarding the development of the TWIC program, results of TWIC program testing, and challenges identified with implementing the program. To address our second objective, to determine to what extent, if at all, the contract to test the TWIC program identified contract planning and oversight problems that should be addressed before implementing the program, we interviewed TSA officials regarding the planning for and oversight of the contract to test the TWIC program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to ensure that only workers that do not pose a terrorist threat are allowed to enter secure areas of transportation facilities. TSA completed TWIC program testing in June 2005 and is moving forward with implementing the program in the maritime sector by the end of this year. To evaluate the status of the TWIC program, GAO examined (1) what problems, if any, were identified during TWIC program testing and what key challenges, if any, do the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and industry stakeholders face in implementing the program; and (2) to what extent, if at all, did TSA experience problems in planning for and overseeing the contract to test the TWIC program. To address these issues, GAO interviewed DHS officials and industry stakeholders, reviewed documentation regarding TWIC testing, and conducted site visits to testing locations.
What GAO Found
DHS and industry stakeholders face three major challenges in addressing problems identified during TWIC program testing and ensuring that key components of the TWIC program can work effectively in the maritime sector. First, enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards in a timely manner to a significantly larger population of workers than was done during testing of the TWIC program. Second, ensuring that the TWIC technology, such as biometric card readers, works effectively in the maritime sector. TSA has obtained limited information on the use of biometric readers in the maritime sector because most facilities that tested the TWIC program did not use these types of readers. Thirs, balancing the added security components of the TWIC program with the potential impact that the program could have on the flow of maritime commerce. An independent contractor's assessment found deficiencies with TWIC program testing and recommended that additional testing be conducted to determine its effectiveness. TSA has acknowledged that there are challenges to implementing the TWIC program and has taken some actions to address these issues, including allowing more time to consider requirements for installing TWIC access control technologies. However, TSA plans no additional testing of the TWIC program. Rapidly moving forward with implementation of the TWIC program without developing and testing solutions to identified problems to ensure that they work effectively could lead to further problems, increased costs, and program delays without achieving the program's intended goals. TSA experienced problems in planning for and overseeing the contract to test the TWIC program. Specifically, TSA made a number of changes to contract requirements after the contract was awarded, contributing to a doubling of contract costs, and TSA did not ensure that all key components of the program were tested. TSA has acknowledged that problems with contractor oversight occurred because the agency did not have sufficient personnel to monitor contractor performance. TSA has taken some actions to address this problem. However, until TSA issues the contract for TWIC implementation and develops its plans for monitoring contractor performance, it is not clear to what extent these actions will ensure that the contract to implement the TWIC program will include comprehensive and clearly defined requirements and that contractor performance will be closely monitored to ensure that the program is implemented successfully and costs are controlled. |
gao_GAO-03-1000 | gao_GAO-03-1000_0 | Oversight of the Academies
Oversight of the academies is the responsibility of three principal organizations: OUSD/P&R, the service headquarters, and the board of visitors of each academy. DOD Lacks a Complete Framework for Oversight of the Academies
The OUSD/P&R, the services, and the academies’ boards of visitors conduct many oversight activities, but they lack a complete oversight framework. The service headquarters use a number of mechanisms to oversee academy performance. The reports provide OUSD/P&R and the services with information on current and past performance for academy operations, but apart from officer accession goals, neither OUSD/P&R nor the services have specific stated performance goals against which to compare the information provided in the assessment reports, thus they do not have an explicit basis for judging the adequacy of their performance. Whole Person Approach Allows Academies Flexibility to Admit Students with a Range of Qualifications
The academies do not grant waivers from academic criteria but do not have absolute minimum scores for admission. Under the whole person approach, the academies can admit some applicants whose academic scores are lower than might normally be competitive for admission, but who in their totality (academics, physical aptitude, and leadership potential) are deemed an acceptable risk and qualified to attend an academy. Academy data show that the academic quality of the applicants has remained high over the past 4 years, and the competitive ranges for academic scores used by the academies have remained the same or have increased during this time. No Significant Differences in Admissions and Academy Performance between Various Groups of Students
In our review of the academy classes that started in 1998 (class of 2002), we found differences among various groups of students in their admissions scores and similar differences in their performance while at the academies, but the differences were not significant in magnitude. We also found differences in performance after admission to the academies between selected groups and the class as a whole. Some groups—such as minorities, preparatory school graduates, recruited athletes, and students in the lower 30 percent of their class in terms of academic admissions scores—performed at lower levels on average in all categories than the class as a whole, but these differences varied between academies and by category and were not sizable. Key contributors are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which DOD oversees the service academies’ operations and performance, we interviewed officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; the Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters; and the U.S. Military, U.S. In addition, we assessed the relationship between admissions scores and performance at the academies by using the whole person admission score and the academic component of the admissions score. DOD Service Academies: Status Report on Reviews of Student Treatment. Service Academies: Historical Proportion of New Officers During Benchmark Periods. | Why GAO Did This Study
Graduates of the service academies operated by the Army, Navy, and Air Force currently make up approximately 18 percent of the officer corps for the nation's armed services. The academies represent the military's most expensive source of new officers. The Department of Defense (DOD) pays the full cost of a student's 4-year education at the academies; and the related cost has increased over the past 4 years. Admission to the academies is highly competitive. The academies use a "whole person" method to make admission decisions. Recent studies by the Air Force raised questions about possible adverse effects of whole person admissions policies on student quality. GAO was asked to review all three service academies and specifically address the extent to which (1) DOD oversees the service academies, (2) applicants are granted waivers of academic standards, and (3) various groups of students differ in admissions scores and academy performance.
What GAO Found
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD/P&R), the services, and the academies' boards of visitors conduct considerable oversight of the academies' operations and performance, but they lack a complete oversight framework. A complete oversight framework includes performance goals and measures against which the academies' performance could be better assessed. OUSD/P&R and the services use the number and type of commissioned officers as the primary measure of academy performance. OUSD/P&R requires and receives reports on academy performance from the services. While data submitted in these reports provide perspective on current performance compared with past performance, without stated performance goals and measures, these reports do not offer OUSD/P&R or the services as good an insight into the academies performance as they could. Additionally, though the academy boards of visitors serve as an external oversight mechanism to focus attention on a wide range of issues, they also do not assess the academies' performance against established performance goals and measures. The academies do not grant waivers from academic criteria or have absolute minimum scores for admission. However, under the whole person approach, the academies can admit some applicants whose academic scores are lower than might normally be competitive for admission, but who in their totality (academics, physical aptitude, and leadership) are evaluated by academy officials as being capable of succeeding at the academy. In our review of the academy classes that started in 1998 (class of 2002), we found that despite differences among various groups of students in their admissions scores and similar differences in their performance while at the academies, the differences in performance were not sizable. Some groups, such as females, performed better in some categories than the class as a whole and worse in others. Some groups (minorities, preparatory school graduates, recruited athletes, and students in the lower 30 percent of their class in terms of academic admissions scores) performed at lower levels on average in all categories than the class as a whole. |
gao_NSIAD-98-53 | gao_NSIAD-98-53_0 | Specifically, we determined whether (1) the analysis and recommendations in the study were appropriately linked, (2) the study considered all options in meeting the requirements for various lift assets, and (3) improvements could enhance the study’s value as a decision-making tool. This recommendation is not supported by the analysis in the study. Finally, dedicating a squadron of large airlifters, such as the C-17, for intratheater use could be an inefficient use of the asset. Conclusions
The ILA does not adequately fulfill congressional direction to develop intratheater lift requirements and establish an integrated plan to meet them because the study’s recommendations are not supported by the analysis. The updated ILA, planned as part of the 1999 Mobility Requirements Study, will provide a good opportunity for DOD to reconsider the basis for intratheater lift requirements and ensure that they are linked appropriately to the study’s analysis. As a result, the study’s requirements and solutions may be overstated. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the 1999 updated ILA (1) consider HNS as a means of accomplishing intratheater lift and ensure that HNS assumptions are consistent with those in intertheater lift studies; (2) include the potential contribution of the C-5 airlifter and planned fleet of 120 C-17s; and (3) reflect the role, capability, and requirements for Army watercraft in an intratheater role, including an analysis of the extent to which these assets can alleviate identified shortfalls in tactical wheeled vehicles. However, because the ILA requirements and solutions were stated as absolute numbers rather than ranges, the study does not reflect the dynamic and often unpredictable nature of intratheater lift requirements. In addition, the ILA did not include a cost-effectiveness analysis to assess tradeoffs between various lift alternatives. The 1999 updated ILA will provide an opportunity to address these concerns so that decisionmakers can have a more substantive basis on which to determine DOD acquisition strategies. Our recommendation is directed at system tradeoff analyses that would provide decisionmakers information on the relative costs and capabilities of systems in light of identified requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis (ILA), focusing on whether: (1) the analysis and recommendations in the study were appropriately linked; (2) the study considered all options in meeting the requirements for various lift assets; and (3) improvements could be made to enhance the study's value as a decisionmaking tool.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the ILA does not adequately fulfill the congressional directive to determine lift requirements and develop an integrated plan to meet them; (2) the study contains recommendations that would cost billions of dollars to implement, but the study's analysis generally did not support these recommendations; (3) the disconnect between the analysis and recommendations is especially evident in the information regarding tactical wheeled vehicles and outsize airlift capability; (4) in addition, the study's analysis did not incorporate several assets that can contribute significantly to the intratheater lift mission; as a result, the study's requirements and solutions may be overstated; (5) the analysis did not consider: (a) commercial vehicles provided by host nation support (HNS); (b) the use of the current and planned fleet of outsize-capable intertheater airlifters such as the C-5 and C-17; and (c) the extent to which Army watercraft could reduce the need for alternative sources of lift; (6) furthermore, improvements could enhance the study's value to decisionmakers; (7) these improvements include requirements stated as a range rather than as absolute numbers and tradeoff assessments based on the cost and capability of the various lift assets; (8) a range would have better reflected the dynamic nature of intratheater requirements, and system tradeoff assessments would have provided choices based on cost and capability; and (9) the 1999 Mobility Requirements Study and updated ILA will afford DOD a good opportunity to address these issues and provide Congress with a basis for acquisition decisionmaking in future budget cycles. |
gao_GAO-13-789 | gao_GAO-13-789_0 | However, the active business income earned by foreign subsidiaries is generally eligible for deferral from U.S. tax until it is distributed, usually in the form of dividends, to the When income is U.S. parent corporation or other U.S. shareholders.repatriated in this way, it may have already been taxed in the foreign country where it was earned. Currently, it is often viewed by tax experts and in the research that we reviewed as promoting competitiveness. Deferral provides no benefit to these purely domestic or exporting U.S corporations. However, these studies may not indicate who ultimately benefits from deferral and, further, whether deferral is fair and equitable. Deferral Adds Complexity to the Tax Code
There is widespread agreement among tax experts that the U.S. system for taxing foreign source income is complex and adds burden for IRS and taxpayers. Deferral Does Not Overlap Directly with Other Federal Programs
Our prior work on corporate tax expenditures identified no related federal activities sharing the same reported purpose as the two deferral tax expenditures.as an area of potential duplication and overlap, these programs are focused primarily on small companies rather than U.S. multinational Although we have highlighted export promotion programs corporations.multinational corporations, and interacts with a number of other tax provisions, such as Subpart F. When considering reform to this system, changes to deferral would need to be coordinated with changes to other tax provisions. No Consensus Exists on Which Agency Should Evaluate Deferral
No federal agency has been tasked to evaluate deferral. Evaluation of Graduated Corporate Income Tax Rate Schedule
The Graduated Corporate Income Tax Rate Schedule’s Purpose Is Viewed as Supporting Small Businesses, but It May Not Be Well Targeted to That Purpose
The purpose of the graduated corporate income tax rate schedule has generally been described in the academic literature and by tax experts as supporting small businesses by reducing their tax burden. Evidence is mixed on whether the lower corporate tax rates provided by the graduated rate schedule increases business formation. The graduated rates could be justified on efficiency grounds if, from society’s point of view, without the incentive too few small businesses are formed given their potential for profit and innovation. Informed Judgments about the Graduated Rates’ Equity Require Information about Ultimate Beneficiaries
As with the deferral tax expenditures, studies that specifically estimate the distribution of the benefits from the graduated corporate income tax rate schedule are unavailable. This clustering of filers around certain tax rates may be the result of tax planning that increases compliance costs. A 2007 study of businesses with assets of less than $10 million in 2002 found that small businesses initially face significant fixed compliance costs, which increase at a decreasing rate as the business grows.However, the specific administrative and compliance costs of the graduated rates may not be a large part of these costs compared with other, more complicated provisions of the tax code. Graduated Rates Are Related to a Number of Spending Programs but the Relative Effectiveness of the Tax Expenditure Has Not Been Assessed
Our prior work on corporate tax expenditures found no related federal spending program sharing the same reported purpose as the graduated rates of supporting small businesses that adopt the corporate form of legal organization. Treasury, IRS, JCT, and external experts provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report uses our tax expenditures evaluation guide to determine what is known about following three tax expenditures: (1) the deferral of income for controlled foreign corporations; (2) deferred taxes for certain financial firms on income earned overseas; and (3) the graduated corporate income tax rate. What is the tax expenditure’s purpose and is being achieved? 2. 3. 4. What are the consequences for the federal budget of the tax expenditure? 5. What data are needed to evaluate the tax expenditure? Previous work by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). As discussed above, the experts we interviewed agreed and economic theory suggests that any corporate tax system’s overall effect on efficiency depends on its relative effect on different types of investment decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress and the administration are reexamining tax expenditures used by corporations as part of corporate tax reform. These tax expenditures-- special exemptions and exclusions, credits, deductions, deferrals, and preferential tax rates--support federal policy goals, but result in revenue forgone by the federal government.
GAO was asked to examine issues related to certain tax expenditures. This report uses GAO's tax expenditures evaluation guide to determine what is known about: (1) the deferral of income for controlled foreign corporations; (2) deferred taxes for certain financial firms on income earned overseas; and (3) the graduated corporate income tax rate. GAO combined the two deferral provisions for evaluation purposes.
GAO's guide suggests using five questions to evaluate a tax expenditure: (1) what is its purpose and is the purpose being achieved; (2) does it meet the criteria for good tax policy; (3) how is it related to other federal programs; (4) what are its consequences for the federal budget; and (5) how is its evaluation being managed? To address these questions, GAO reviewed the legislative history and relevant academic and government studies, analyzed 2010 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, and interviewed agency officials and tax experts.
What GAO Found
Deferral : Both deferral tax expenditures confer the benefit of effectively reducing taxes by delaying the taxation of certain income of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations until it is repatriated to the U.S. parent as dividends.
1. While views on the purpose of deferral have changed over time, currently, it is often viewed by experts as promoting the competitiveness of U.S. multinational corporations. Some experts argue that this view is too narrow. For example, this definition of competitiveness ignores the effect on other corporations that cannot use deferral, such as those that are purely domestic or export without foreign subsidiaries. Further, it ignores impacts on the wider economy.
2. Good tax policy has several dimensions. By delaying the tax on foreign source income, deferral could distort corporate investment and location decisions in a way that lower taxes, but favor less productive activities over more productive ones. Informed judgments about deferral's effect on the fairness of the tax system cannot be made because who benefits from deferral, after accounting for such factors as changes in prices and wages, has not been determined. However, there is widespread agreement among experts and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that deferral adds complexity to the tax code.
3. GAO did not identify other federal spending programs that provide similar support to U.S. multinational corporations.
4. Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 2011 estimates show relatively modest consequences for the federal budget.
5. No federal agency has been tasked with evaluating deferral.
Graduated corporate income tax rate schedule : The graduated tax rates lower tax rates for corporations with less than $10 million in taxable income.
1. The purpose of the graduated corporate income tax rate schedule is viewed by the sources GAO reviewed as supporting small businesses. However, evidence is mixed on whether it achieves this purpose. The tax rates may not be well targeted toward supporting small businesses because corporations that are large in terms of assets and gross receipts may have taxable income that is small enough to qualify for the rates.
2. The economic efficiency of the graduated rates depends on whether they correct for a market failure. This includes too few small businesses forming, given their potential for profit and innovation, which offsets the possible distortions from its advantaging one type of business organization over others. GAO did not identify any studies of the efficiency effects or those that specifically estimate the distribution of the benefits from the graduated rates. According to IRS staff, while the graduated rates present little complexity, some evidence of tax planning to avoid higher rates has been found.
3. The graduated rates may be related to a number of federal spending programs also targeted to small businesses.
4. JCT 2011 estimates also show modest consequences for the federal budget.
5. No federal agency has been tasked with evaluating the graduated rates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made no recommendations. Treasury, IRS, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and external experts provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-10-844T | gao_GAO-10-844T_0 | CMS Faces Challenges in Implementing Strategies to Prevent Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
GAO has identified key strategies to help CMS address challenges it faces in preventing fraud, waste, and abuse, and ultimately to reducing improper payments. These strategies are: (1) strengthening provider enrollment processes and standards, (2) improving pre-payment review of claims, (3) focusing post-payment claims review on most vulnerable areas, (4) improving oversight of contractors, and (5) developing a robust process for addressing identified vulnerabilities. In the course of our work, we have found that CMS has made progress in some of these areas, and recent legislation may provide it with enhanced authority. Checking the background of providers at the time they apply to become Medicare providers is a crucial step to reduce the risk of enrolling providers intent on defrauding or abusing the program. Improving Pre-Payment Review of Claims
Pre-payment reviews of claims are essential to helping ensure that Medicare pays correctly the first time; however, these reviews are challenging due to the volume of claims. This is a valuable addition to the program’s safeguards, but additional pre-payment controls, such as using thresholds for unexplained increases in billing, could further enhance CMS’s ability to identify improper claims before they are paid. Focusing Post-Payment Claims Review on Most Vulnerable Areas
Post-payment reviews are critical to identifying payment errors to recoup overpayments. We recommended that CMS require that physicians receive a statement of services beneficiaries received based on the physicians’ certification, but to date, the agency has not taken action. Improving Oversight of Contractors
Because Medicare is administered by contractors, such as drug plan sponsors, overseeing their activities to address fraud, waste, and abuse and prevent improper payment is critical. All drug plan sponsors are required to have programs to safeguard the Medicare prescription drug program from fraud, waste, and abuse. CMS’s oversight of these programs has been limited but is expanding. Developing a Robust Process for Addressing Identified Vulnerabilities
Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to improper payment is critical to program management, but CMS has not developed a robust process to specifically address identified vulnerabilities that lead to improper payment. As we reported in March 2010, CMS did not establish an adequate process during its initial recovery audit contracting demonstration or in planning for the national program to ensure prompt resolution of identified improper payment vulnerabilities. CMS concurred with this recommendation. Medicare Part D: CMS Oversight of Part D Sponsors’ Fraud and Abuse Programs Has Been Limited, but CMS Plans Oversight Expansion. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare as a high-risk program since 1990, in part because the program's size and complexity make it vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Fraud represents intentional acts of deception with knowledge that the action or representation could result in an inappropriate gain, while abuse represents actions inconsistent with acceptable business or medical practices. Waste, which includes inaccurate payments for services, also occurs in the Medicare program. Fraud, waste, and abuse all can lead to improper payments, overpayments and underpayments that should not have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount. In 2009, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--the agency that administers Medicare--estimated billions of dollars in improper payments in the Medicare program. This statement, will focus on challenges facing CMS and selected key strategies that are particularly important to helping prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, and ultimately to reducing improper payments, including challenges that CMS continues to face. It is based on nine GAO products issued from September 2005 through March 2010 using a variety of methodologies, including analysis of claims, review of relevant policies and procedures, stakeholder interviews, and site visits. GAO received updated information from CMS in June 2010.
What GAO Found
GAO has identified challenges and strategies in five key areas important in preventing fraud, waste, and abuse, and ultimately to reducing improper payments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in these areas. CMS has made progress in some of these areas, and recent legislation may provide the agency with enhanced authority. However, CMS faces continuing challenges. 1. Strengthening provider enrollment process and standards. Checking the background of providers at the time they apply to become Medicare providers is a crucial step to reduce the risk of enrolling providers intent on defrauding or abusing the program. In particular, GAO has recommended stricter scrutiny of providers identified as particularly vulnerable to improper payments to ensure they are legitimate businesses. 2. Improving pre-payment review of claims. Pre-payment reviews of claims are essential to helping ensure that Medicare pays correctly the first time. GAO has recommended that CMS further enhance its ability to identify improper claims through additional automated pre-payment claim review before they are paid. 3. Focusing post-payment claims review on most vulnerable areas. Post- payment reviews are critical to identifying payment errors and recouping overpayments. GAO has recommended that CMS better target claims for post payment review on the most vulnerable areas. 4. Improving oversight of contractors. Because Medicare is administered by contractors, overseeing their activities to address fraud, waste, and abuse is critical. GAO found that CMS's oversight of prescription drug plan sponsors' compliance programs has been limited. However, partly in response to GAO's recommendation, CMS oversight of these programs is expanding. 5. Developing a robust process for addressing identified vulnerabilities. Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to improper payment is vital to program management, but CMS has not developed a robust process to specifically address these. GAO has recommended that CMS establish an adequate process to ensure prompt resolution of identified improper payment vulnerabilities. |
gao_NSIAD-99-36 | gao_NSIAD-99-36_0 | Introduction
Between 1988 and 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD), acting under special legislative authorities, conducted four rounds of base realignments and closures (BRAC). At the request of Mr. John E. Sununu, House of Representatives, we are providing information that addresses (1) DOD’s progress in completing action on BRAC recommendations and transferring unneeded base property to other users, (2) the precision of DOD’s estimates of BRAC costs and savings, (3) environmental cleanup progress and estimated associated costs, and (4) reported trends in economic recovery in communities affected by base closures. To assess the completeness of DOD’s cost and savings estimates for BRAC-related actions, we reviewed data included in the estimates. The comments have been summarized in chapters 2 through 5 and are presented in their entirety in appendix V.
Most BRAC Recommendations Completed, but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is Proceeding Slowly
By the end of fiscal year 1998, DOD had completed action on about 85 percent of 451 BRAC commissions’ recommendations for the four BRAC rounds. About 464,000 acres were designated as unneeded real property at closing or realigning locations, but, as of March 1998, only about 31 percent of the property designated for nonfederal users had actually been transferred by formal deed, and only 8 percent of the property designated for federal entities had actually been transferred. According to a DOD official, DOD has completed 77 of 152 major recommendations. As of September 30, 1997, 46 percent, or about 213,000 acres, of the unneeded BRAC property was to be retained by the federal government; 33 percent, or about 154,000 acres, was slated for nonfederal users such as state and local authorities or private parties; and the disposition of 21 percent, or about 98,000 acres had not yet been determined. BRAC Savings Estimates Are Not Routinely Updated, but Evidence Points to Substantial Savings
Through 2001, DOD estimates it will achieve a net savings of about $14 billion as a result of BRAC actions. Beyond 2001, DOD expects to save about $5.7 billion annually. While these costs are incurred by the federal government, they are not funded through BRAC budget accounts. 3.1). 4 for a discussion of DOD’s environmental program for BRAC bases). Although DOD has not compiled a total cost estimate, available DOD data indicate that BRAC environmental costs are likely to exceed $9 billion, of which at least $2.4 billion is needed to continue restoration after the BRAC implementation authority expires in fiscal year 2001. Cleanup is expected to continue many years beyond that time and the potential for higher costs exists, given uncertainties associated with the extent of cleanup of UXO and monitoring of cleanup remedies needed at selected sites. The type of contamination also affects cleanup costs. While the services noted that estimates were initially developed based on the expectation that property would be cleaned to the highest standard, this has not always occurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) progress in completing action on military base realignments and closures (BRAC) recommendations and transferring unneeded base property to other users; (2) the precision of DOD's estimates of BRAC costs and savings; (3) environmental cleanup progress and estimated associated costs; and (4) reported trends in economic recovery in communities affected by base closures.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) by September 30, 1998, DOD had completed actions on about 85 percent of the four BRAC commissions' 451 recommendations; (2) in taking actions on the recommendations, DOD declared about 464,000 acres of base property as excess; (3) as of September 30, 1997, 46 percent of the unneeded BRAC property was to be retained by the federal government, 33 percent was slated for nonfederal users, and the disposition of 21 percent had not yet been decided; (4) 8 percent of the property slated for federal use has been transferred, while 31 percent of the property slated for nonfederal use has been transferred; (5) DOD officials noted a number of obstacles that must be overcome before transfer can occur; (6) by 2001, DOD estimates it will have spent $23 billion on BRAC and saved $37 billion in costs it would have incurred if BRAC actions had not occurred, for a net savings of $14 billion; (7) beyond 2001, when the last of the four rounds is complete, DOD expects to save $5.7 billion annually as a result of BRAC actions; (8) however, the cost estimates exclude certain types of federally incurred costs, some of which are funded outside of DOD BRAC budget accounts, while the savings estimates have not been routinely updated and thus are not precise; (9) a major cost factor in BRAC actions, as well as a major obstacle to the disposal of unneeded property, is the need for environmental cleanup at BRAC bases; (10) both the eventual cost and the completion date for the BRAC-related environmental program are uncertain; (11) however, available DOD data indicate that the total environmental cost will likely exceed $9 billion and that cleanup activities will extend well beyond 2001; (12) the potential for higher costs exists, given uncertainties associated with the extent of cleanup of unexploded ordnance and monitoring of cleanup remedies needed at selected sites; (13) DOD has made progress since the earlier BRAC years when it was investigating sites for contamination; and (14) the majority of communities surrounding closed bases are faring well economically in relation to the national average, according to the latest data available at the time of GAO's analysis, and show some improvement since the time closures were beginning in 1988. |
gao_RCED-96-136 | gao_RCED-96-136_0 | 1). Cost of Replacing the Cypress Viaduct Has Increased Significantly
As of March 1996, Caltrans estimated that the total cost of replacing the Cypress Viaduct will be $1.13 billion. Of this amount, $1.01 billion, or about 90 percent, will be federally financed through the emergency relief program; California will finance the remainder. Most of these increases have occurred because Caltrans incurred additional costs for construction, traffic management, and relocation of the rail yards once construction began. FHWA’s Guidance Provides Inconsistent Information on Using Emergency Relief Funds
FHWA’s regulations allow the use of emergency relief funds for betterments. However, when community opposition and environmental concerns precipitated a call for alternatives, FHWA did not approve the relocation on the basis of the emergency relief regulations, which allow for relocations only when they are clearly economically justified to prevent recurring damage. Conclusions
The project to replace the Cypress Viaduct has taken longer and cost more to complete than initially estimated because local opposition, environmental requirements, and railroad relocation activities have delayed construction and expanded the scope of the project. The existing regulations state that “emergency relief reimbursement is limited to the cost of a new facility to current design standards of comparable capacity and character to the destroyed facility.” Following the regulations, FHWA could have estimated the costs of replacing the Cypress Viaduct with a facility built to current design standards along the original alignment and limited the use of emergency relief funding to those costs. In other words, if a situation persists with no corrective action for an extended period of time, it may be unreasonable to continue to classify it as a disaster related emergency, but rather as a long-term need to be funded with regular Federal-aid.”
Statements Consistent With FHWA’s Actions on the Cypress Viaduct Project
“In cases where a categorical exclusion classification is not appropriate, an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement must be prepared.” “Betterments resulting from environmental or permit requirements beyond the control of the highway agency are eligible for ER funds if these betterments are normally required when the Agency makes repairs of a similar nature in its own work.”
Scope and Methodology
For information on the current status of the project, its estimated completion date, and the reasons for any delays, we interviewed officials at FHWA and the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), performed in-depth file reviews, and reviewed Caltrans’ construction status reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the replacement of the Cypress Viaduct in Oakland, California, focusing on the: (1) expected completion date and reasons for construction delays; (2) estimated cost of the project and reasons for any cost growth; and (3) guidance governing the Federal Highway Administration's (FHwA) use of emergency relief funds.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) has completed one-third of the Cypress Viaduct's construction and expects to have the project completed by 1998; (2) the replacement of the Cypress Viaduct has been hampered by public opposition, environmental concerns, and railroad negotiations; (3) Caltrans estimates total project costs will be $1.13 billion, 90 percent of which is federally financed through an emergency relief program; (4) construction costs are higher than originally planned because Caltrans underestimated the costs of constructing the freeway, managing traffic, and relocating rail yards; (5) Caltrans risks incurring additional costs because the project is in the early construction stages; (6) FHwA approved funding for the Cypress Viaduct without determining whether it was economically justified to prevent recurring damage and without placing limits on the use of emergency relief funds; (7) FHwA based its funding decision on the emergency relief manual and whether improvements could be performed using emergency relief funds or traditional transportation funds; and (8) the alternative that FHwA approved resulted in more extensive construction, higher costs, and greater risk of delay than would have occurred in rebuilding the structure prior to the earthquake. |
gao_GAO-08-1020 | gao_GAO-08-1020_0 | The agency’s IT budget for fiscal year 2008 is approximately $1 billion. The agency expects to spend about 80 percent of its acquisition budget on infrastructure. SSA’s Current Investment Management Approach
SSA’s investment management process is intended to meet the objectives of the Clinger-Cohen Act by providing a framework for selecting, controlling, and evaluating investments that helps to ensure it meets the strategic and business objectives of the agency. SSA Has Taken Key Steps to Manage Investments, but Gaps Remain in Oversight and in Defining Policies and Procedures
SSA has executed a majority of the key practices—82 percent––needed to effectively manage its IT projects as investments, but it has not fully implemented many of the related oversight responsibilities and procedures that our ITIM framework outlines. Also, the agency has made progress in establishing the critical processes and key practices for managing IT investments as a portfolio. It is executing 18 out of 27 key practices from this stage of the ITIM. However, it has not established enterprisewide portfolio selection criteria and has executed few key practices for evaluating the portfolio. Specifically, it is not evaluating IT investments, including performing postimplementation reviews. However, the agency has not executed nine key practices, including establishing enterprisewide selection criteria and managing all of its investments as an enterprisewide portfolio. SSA is executing the seven key practices associated with creating the portfolio. More Than Half of SSA’s IT Budget Is Not Subject to Its Current Investment Management Process
Even though SSA is executing most Stage 2 and Stage 3 key practices for the work year budget managed by its investment board, IT products and services acquired with the acquisition budget ($610 million in acquisitions in fiscal year 2008—58 percent of the IT budget) are not managed as investments under SSA’s CPIC process, and are not reviewed by the ITAB. Conclusions
Given the importance of IT to SSA’s mission, it is vital that the agency manages its investments effectively. To its credit, SSA has established many of the basic practices needed to build the foundation for managing its projects as investments and for managing its investments as a portfolio. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen SSA’s investment management capability and address weaknesses discussed in this report, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security take the following actions: To fully implement the key practices for building the investment foundation (Stage 2) for current and project-level future IT investments’ success, direct the Chief Information Officer to establish comprehensive policies and procedures for defining the investment governance process that specify (1) investment board operating procedures, (2) delegations of authority, and (3) criteria for prioritizing new and ongoing investments; strengthen and expand the board’s oversight responsibilities for underperforming projects and evaluations of projects; and establish a mechanism for tracking corrective actions for underperforming investments. As we previously noted, by the agency not applying its investment management process to the acquisition budget, it limits the ability of SSA’s executive management tasked with overseeing the agency’s investments to ensure that this portion of the budget is spent in the most efficient and effective manner. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether Social Security Administration’s (SSA) investment management approach is consistent with leading investment management best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Administration (SSA) spends about $1 billion annually to support its information technology (IT) needs. Given the size and significance of the agency's ongoing and future investments in IT, it is crucial that the agency manages these investments wisely. Accordingly, GAO was requested to determine whether SSA's investment management approach is consistent with leading investment management best practices. To accomplish this, GAO used its IT investment management framework and associated methodology, with a focus on the framework's Stages 2 and 3, which are based on the investment management provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.
What GAO Found
SSA's investment management approach is largely consistent with leading investment management practices. It has established most of the practices needed to manage its projects as investments and is making progress towards managing IT investments as a portfolio; however, it is not applying its investment management process to all of its investments. Specifically: (1) The agency is executing a majority of the key practices needed to build the foundation for managing its IT projects as investments. Of the 5 processes and their 38 associated key practices, SSA is executing 31 practices. However, the agency's investment board, which should provide executive oversight of investments, is not adequately monitoring the performance of IT projects. (2) SSA has made progress in establishing the key practices for managing investments as a portfolio--it is executing 18 out of 27 key practices. The agency has made important progress in defining and creating the investment portfolio, but it has not developed enterprisewide portfolio selection criteria. The agency also has not established procedures for evaluating the portfolio, and its postimplementation reviews do not determine whether projects meet the agency's strategic goals. (3) SSA is not applying its investment management process to a major portion of its IT budget. Specifically, IT products and services acquired with its acquisition budget ($610 million of the $1 billion IT budget for fiscal year 2008) are not managed by the board as investments. SSA's executive-level review board is not responsible for overseeing the acquisition budget. Consequently, executive management has limited insight into investments acquired with these funds, and the agency has limited ability to ensure that the budget is spent in the most efficient and effective manner. Until it establishes oversight of all investments and fully defines policies and procedures for overseeing both individual projects and an agencywide portfolio, SSA risks not being able to select and control these investments consistently and completely, thus increasing the chance that investments will not meet mission needs in the most cost-effective and efficient manner. |
gao_GAO-03-764T | gao_GAO-03-764T_0 | Background
FHWA provides funding to the states for roadway construction and improvement projects through various programs collectively known as the federal-aid highway program. The responsibility for choosing projects to fund generally rests with state departments of transportation and local planning organizations. Under both options, TEA-21 requires FHWA and each state to enter into an agreement documenting the types of projects for which the state will assume oversight responsibilities. Issues Identified with the Costs and Oversight of Major Highway and Bridge Projects
Our work has raised issues concerning the cost and oversight of major highway and bridge projects, including the following: Cost growth has occurred on many major highway and bridge projects. Although cost growth has occurred on many major highway and bridge projects, overall information on the amount of and reasons for cost increases on major projects is generally not available because neither FHWA nor state highway departments track this information over the life of projects. While many factors can cause costs to increase, we have found, on projects we have reviewed, that costs increased, in part, because initial cost estimates were not reliable predictors of the total costs or financing needs of projects. Rather, these estimates were generally developed for the environmental review—whose purpose was to compare project alternatives, not to develop reliable cost estimates. In many instances, states construct a major project as a series of smaller projects, and FHWA approves the estimated cost of each smaller project when it is ready for construction, rather than agreeing to the total cost of the major project at the outset. In some instances, by the time FHWA approves the cost of a major project, a public investment decision may, in effect, already have been made because substantial funds have already been spent on designing the project and acquiring property, and many of the increases in the project’s estimated costs have already occurred. FHWA implemented TEA- 21’s requirement that states develop an annual finance plan for any highway or bridge project estimated to cost $1 billion or more. Options to Enhance Federal Oversight of Major Projects
In my testimony of May 2002, I presented options for enhancing FHWA’s role in overseeing the costs of major highway and bridge projects, should Congress, in reauthorizing TEA-21, determine that such action is needed and appropriate. Each of these options would be difficult and possibly costly; each represents a commitment of additional resources that must be weighed against the option’s potential benefits. Adopting any of these options would require Congress to determine the appropriate federal role—balancing the states’ sovereign right to select its projects and desire for flexibility and more autonomy with the federal government’s interest in ensuring that billions of federal dollars are spent efficiently and effectively. Establish a process for the federal approval of major projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improving the oversight and controlling the costs of major highway and bridge projects is important for the federal government, which often pays 80 percent of these projects' costs. Widespread consensus exists on the need to fund such projects, given the doubling of freight traffic and worsening congestion projected over the next 20 years, yet growing competition for limited federal and state funding dictates that major projects be managed efficiently and cost effectively. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) provides funding to the states for highway and bridge projects through the federal-aid highway program. This funding is apportioned to the states, and state departments of transportation choose eligible projects for funding. FHWA provides oversight to varying degrees, and, under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), FHWA and each state enter into an agreement documenting the types of projects the state will oversee. This statement for the record summarizes cost and oversight issues raised in reports and testimonies GAO has issued since 1995 on major highway and bridge projects and describes options that GAO has identified to enhance federal oversight of these projects, should Congress determine that such action is needed and appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO and others have reported that cost growth has occurred on major highway and bridge projects; however, overall information on the amount of and reasons for cost increases is generally not available because neither FHWA nor state highway departments track this information for entire projects. GAO has found that costs grow, in part, because initial cost estimates, which are generally developed to compare project alternatives during a required environmental review phase, are not reliable predictors of projects' total costs. In addition, FHWA approves the estimated costs of major projects in phases, rather than agreeing to the total costs at the outset. By the time FHWA approves the total cost of a major project, a public investment decision might, in effect, already have been made because substantial funds could already have been spent on designing the project and acquiring property. FHWA's implementation of a TEA-21 requirement that states develop annual finance plans for major projects estimated to cost $1 billion or more has improved the oversight of some major projects, and FHWA is incorporating more risk assessment in its day-to-day oversight activities. Should Congress determine that enhancing federal oversight of major highway and bridge projects is needed and appropriate, GAO has identified options, including improving information on the cost performance of selected major projects, improving the quality of initial cost estimates, and enhancing and clarifying FHWA's role in reviewing and approving major projects. Adopting any of these options would require balancing the states' sovereign right to select projects and desire for flexibility and more autonomy with the federal government's interest in ensuring that billions of federal dollars are spent efficiently and effectively. In addition, the additional costs of each of these options would need to be weighed against its potential benefits. |
gao_GAO-07-1015 | gao_GAO-07-1015_0 | Subsequently, the House conference report accompanying the 2004 military construction appropriation bill also directed the department to prepare comprehensive master plans with yearly updates through fiscal year 2009. The Senate report also directed GAO to monitor the comprehensive master plans being developed and implemented for the overseas regional commands and to provide the congressional defense committees with a report each year giving an assessment of the plans. The Senate report also directed GAO to review DOD’s master planning effort for Guam as part of its annual review of DOD’s overseas master plans. Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes in Overseas Basing Strategies and Requirements, Key Challenges, and Our Prior Recommendations
The fiscal year 2008 master plans, which provide infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas regional commands’ area of responsibility, reflect changes—to include recent decisions in the U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements—and they generally describe the challenges that DOD faces in implementing the plans as well as our prior recommendations for improving the plans. U.S. First, the master plans do not address the issue of residual value—the value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its reuse of property. Consequently, as we have noted in the past, DOD officials believe that residual value cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not be assumed in the master plans. Second, while PACOM’s master plan provided details on other challenges, it did not describe the challenges the command faces in addressing training limitations for the Seventh Air Force in South Korea, although senior officials told us that these limitations could cause the United States to pursue alternatives, such as training in other locations, downsizing, or relocating, which could affect overseas basing plans. Even though our prior recommendations have not been fully addressed, we continue to believe that they have merit and that Congress would benefit from disclosure of this information. Planning Effort for Guam Is in Its Initial Stages with Many Key Decisions and Challenges to Be Addressed
DOD’s planning effort for the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. Third, DOD officials said that additional time is needed to fully address the challenges related to funding uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam’s unique economic and infrastructure requirements. According to Navy officials, a new carrier pier with additional capabilities will need to be constructed in order to accommodate this plan. However, we have previously recommended that overseas regional commands address the extent to which they are seeking residual value compensation for U.S. capital improvements at installations returned to host nations and that PACOM explain how it plans to address existing training limitations that may affect infrastructure and funding requirements. In July 2006, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to provide a master plan on the military buildup in Guam. Completion of a Guam master plan depends on the outcome of the environmental impact assessments and statement that could take up to 3 years to complete, on decisions that finalize the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam, and on efforts that address challenges associated with the military buildup, including funding, operational requirements, and local economic and infrastructure needs. However, to further facilitate annual review and oversight by Congress and other users of the overseas master plans, Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to ensure that (1) future overseas master plans address the extent to which the regional commands are seeking residual value compensation for U.S. capital improvements at installations returned to host nations and (2) future PACOM plans address existing training limitations in its area of responsibility and the potential effects of those limitations on infrastructure and funding requirements. To help ensure the best application of limited federal funds and the leveraging of all available options for supporting the military buildup on Guam until DOD prepares a master plan, Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to report periodically to all the defense committees on the status of DOD’s planning efforts for Guam, including DOD’s efforts to complete its environmental impact statement, identify the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam and the associated infrastructure required, and address the various challenges associated with the military buildup. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the next several years, implementation of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will result in the realignment of U.S. forces and the construction of new facilities costing billions of dollars at installations overseas. The Senate and House reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to monitor DOD's overseas master plans and to provide congressional defense committees with assessments each year. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews. This report, first, examines how the overseas plans have changed and the extent to which they address the challenges faced by DOD and, second, assesses the status of DOD's planning effort and the challenges associated with the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam.
What GAO Found
The fiscal year 2008 overseas master plans, which provide infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas regional commands' area of responsibility, have been updated to reflect U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements as well as GAO's prior recommendations for improving the plans. The plans also address DOD's challenges to a greater extent than they did in previous years. However, two areas continue to be of concern. First, the master plans do not address the issue of residual value--that is, the value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its reuse of property. Although DOD officials believe that residual value cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not be in the master plans, compensation received for U.S capital improvements at installations returned to host nations could affect U.S. funding requirements for overseas construction. Second, the master plan for PACOM, which provides details on the command's training limitations in Japan and several other challenges, does not provide details regarding training limitations for the Air Force in South Korea, which could cause the United States to pursue alternatives, such as training in other locations, downsizing, or relocating that could affect overseas basing plans. Without addressing the residual value issue and providing details on these training challenges, DOD cannot provide Congress a comprehensive view enabling it to make informed decisions regarding funding. GAO has previously recommended that overseas regional commands address residual value issues and that PACOM explain how it plans to address existing training limitations. Because these recommendations have not been fully addressed, GAO considers them to be open and believes that they still have merit. DOD's planning effort for the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. Among the challenges to be addressed is completing the required environmental impact statement, initiated in March 2007. According to DOD officials, this statement and associated record of decision could take up to 3 years to complete and will affect many of the key decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military infrastructure development--decisions needed to develop a master plan for the military buildup on Guam. DOD and the services are still determining the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam, needed in order to identify the housing, operational, quality of life, and services support infrastructure required for the Marine Corps realignment and the other services' buildup. DOD officials said that additional time is needed to fully address other challenges associated with the Guam military buildup, including funding requirements, operational requirements, and community impact. Until the environmental assessment and initial planning efforts are completed, Congress will need to be kept abreast of developments and challenges affecting infrastructure and funding decisions to make appropriate funding and oversight decisions. |
gao_GAO-15-69 | gao_GAO-15-69_0 | Background
Advances in computing technology have increased speed and storage capacity for mobile devices, enhancing consumers’ abilities to perform a wide range of online tasks, such as shopping, banking, and accessing government services, primarily via the following mobile broadband technology:
Smartphones: Consumers can use smartphones to run a wide variety of general and special-purpose software applications, including accessing websites on the Internet. These are DOI, DOT, NWS (within the Department of Commerce) and FEMA (within the Department of Homeland Security). The other two agencies—FMC and NEA—do not. Internet Access Using Cellphones Is Increasing, with Some Populations Using Them More Than Others
Access to the Internet Using Mobile Devices Is Rising due to Lower Cost, Convenience, and Technological Advances, according to Stakeholders and Literature
According to the Pew Research Center, as of January 2014, 90 percent of American adults own a cell phone. Technological advances: Advances in the technological capabilities of mobile devices have also contributed to this trend, allowing consumers to carry out an ever broadening range of interactions, which previously required the use of a desktop or laptop computer. Young, Above-Average- Income, College- Educated, and African- American Populations Use Smartphones to Access the Internet More Than Other Demographic Groups
Pew reported that in 2013, those who are young (18-29 years old), earn over $75,000, have a college degree or higher, or are African American have the highest rates of accessing the Internet with cellphones (see fig. Use of cellphones to access the Internet is lower among senior, less educated, or rural populations, compared to other demographic groups. Although More Individuals Use Mobile Devices to Access Selected Agencies’ Information and Services, Challenges Still Exist
Although Individuals Still Primarily Use Desktop Computers to Access Selected Government Websites, Access by Mobile Users Is Increasing
Individuals accessing the selected agencies’ websites primarily used desktops and laptops to do so. For example, the number of visitors using smartphones and tablets to access NEA information and services—such as applying for grants and tracking grant applications—increased from 3,376 in 2010 to 287,932 in 2013 (see fig. Similarly, individuals using smartphones and tablets to access DOI’s information increased from 57,428 in 2011 to 1,206,959 in 2013. Further, excess information on government websites that have not been optimized can make it challenging for mobile internet users. Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Access to Government Information and Services via Mobile Devices
OMB’s 2012 Digital Government Strategy Has Resulted in Actions to Enhance Access to Government Services for Those Using Mobile Devices
In response to the milestones specified in the Digital Government Strategy, OMB created the Digital Services Advisory Group, which, along with the Federal CIO Council and the Federal Web Managers Council, created digital governance guidelines for all federal agencies to use. GSA’s Office of Citizen Services and Innovative Technology (OCSIT) has also taken the following actions to enhance access to government services via mobile devices in response to the Digital Government Strategy: website to help federal agencies build the capacity to implement effective and innovative digital services. Provided guidance and on-line training and shared best practices and other resources to assist agencies seeking to enhance their websites for mobile technologies. However, mobile users can still access the agencies’ information and services. Specifically, we addressed 1) available data about the demographics of mobile users and the factors that might be associated with the increased use of mobile devices; 2) what devices consumers use to access government services and the challenges consumers face when accessing these services via mobile devices; and 3) what actions the federal government has taken to enhance access to government services via mobile devices. Office of Management and Budget, Digital Government: Building A 21st Century Platform to Better Serve the American People (May 23, 2012, Washington, D.C.). | Why GAO Did This Study
Today, millions of Americans use mobile devices like smartphones and tablet computers on a daily basis to communicate and obtain information. Further, due to recent technical advances in mobile technology, consumers can use these devices to carry out a broad range of activities that previously required a desktop or laptop computer—including shopping, banking, and accessing government services. Given these trends, providing government information and services “anytime, anywhere, and on any device,” has become increasingly important, particularly as some mobile users may not have any other means of online access.
GAO reviewed information on mobile users and how they access government information and services. This report describes (1) the demographics of mobile users and the factors that might be associated with the increased use of mobile devices, (2) the devices individuals are using to access government services and the challenges people face, and (3) the actions the federal government has taken to enhance access to government services via mobile devices. GAO reviewed pertinent federal legislation and guidance and conducted a review of literature; interviewed, analyzed and reviewed information from six randomly selected federal agencies; and interviewed officials from other federal agencies and consumer advocacy groups.
What GAO Found
According to Pew Research Center, in 2013, some demographic groups relied more on cellphones to access the Internet than others. Those who are young, earn more income, have a graduate degree, or are African American had the highest rate of mobile access. In contrast, according to Pew, those who used cellphones to access the Internet in 2013 at lower rates tended to be seniors, the less educated, or rural populations. Only 22 percent of seniors ages 65 and older accessed the Internet using cellphones, compared to 85 percent of young people. GAO also found that access to the Internet using cellphones has increased, primarily due to lower cost, convenience, and technical advances.
Although desktop and laptop computers are still the primary means of access, consumers are increasingly using mobile devices to access websites with government information and services. For example, the number of individual visitors using smartphones and tablets to access the Department of the Interior's information and services increased significantly from 57,428 visitors in 2011 to 1,206,959 in 2013. Even so, mobile Internet users reportedly face a range of challenges accessing government services online. For example, viewing any website that has not been “optimized” for mobile access—in other words, redesigned for smaller screens—can be challenging.
Federal agencies—which have more than 11,000 websites—have taken a range of actions to enhance access to information and services via mobile devices. The Office of Management and Budget, in response to the milestones laid out in its Digital Government Strategy , created the Digital Services Advisory Group, which—together with the General Services Administration‘s Office of Citizen Services and Innovative Technology—has provided federal agencies with guidance, resources, and tools to enhance access to government services via mobile devices. In addition, five of the six agencies GAO interviewed have taken steps to improve access to their websites via mobile devices. For example, in 2012, the Department of Transportation (DOT) redesigned its main website, www.do t.gov, to p rovide a platform for mobile access. Three of the other agencies GAO interviewed have also redesigned websites to better accommodate mobile devices and the other two agencies have plans to do so.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-16-36 | gao_GAO-16-36_0 | These include reports on the numbers of enlistment waivers, recruiting resources, recruiting production data, and recruiter irregularities. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations but did not implement them. The ARNG Has Recently Taken Steps to Increase Oversight of the Recruiting Process but Has Not Permanently Established a Program to Monitor State-Level Activities
The ARNG Strength Maintenance Division has recently taken steps to increase oversight of how states and territories adhere to recruiting policies and procedures; however, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division has not permanently established the Recruiting Standards Branch to ensure ongoing monitoring of state-level recruiting activities. As of July 16, 2015 this office had completed inspections in 16 states. The approval for permanent staff may not take place until early 2017. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that they believe that continued oversight of state recruiting activities is important and that currently they are using positions for the ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch that are intended for use in other areas. Without permanently establishing an entity, such as the ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch or other entity, to conduct inspections of state-level recruiting activities, the Director, ARNG may be limited in its ability to ensure that ARNG policies and procedures are being properly implemented by the states. The ARNG Has Had Mixed Results in Meeting Goals for Recruiting and Nearly Met Goals for Completing Training, but Does Not Track Completion of Initial Term of Service
The ARNG had mixed results in meeting its overall recruiting goals and nearly met its goals for initial military training; however, the ARNG does not track whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service or military obligation. Further, from fiscal years 2011 through 2014, the ARNG nearly met its goals for completion of initial military training, but we found that the ARNG does not have consistent, complete, and valid data on why soldiers do not complete training and when soldiers separate during the training process. Our analysis for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 is consistent with this historical trend as ARNG only met its recruiting goals in 2 of the 5 years. Having this information could be particularly important in light of our analysis above showing that about 40 percent of soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001 through 2007 did not complete their initial term of service. ARNG Has Not Ensured That Recruiters Understand Financial Incentives, and OSD, Army and ARNG Have Not Conducted Oversight of ARNG’s Financial Incentives Programs
The ARNG has some internal controls for processing its financial incentives but has not ensured that recruiting officials understand available financial incentives to fill critical military positions, and OSD, the Department of the Army, and ARNG-HRM have not exercised all of their oversight responsibilities for ARNG financial incentives programs. Financial incentives are a tool available to recruiters, and ARNG incentives policy states that the incentives assist leadership in meeting and sustaining ARNG readiness requirements and provides incentives to assist in filling critical shortages. The Department of the Army and the ARNG Have Not Evaluated and Documented the Effectiveness of the ARNG’s Financial Incentives Programs
The Department of the Army has reviewed and approved the ARNG’s financial incentives policy and has recently issued a directive that expands its oversight; however, the Department of the Army and ARNG- HRM have not evaluated and documented the effectiveness of the financial incentives programs in achieving overall objectives. To help ARNG officials in using financial incentives to fill critical positions as required by Army and National Guard regulation, direct the Director, ARNG, to provide recruiters with training to better enable the use of available financial incentives. To help determine whether ARNG officials are effectively using financial incentives, in conjunction with the Director, ARNG, exercise their oversight responsibilities by evaluating and documenting the effectiveness of ARNG’s incentives program in meeting its goals. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to evaluate the extent to which (1) the Army National Guard (ARNG) has provided oversight of its recruiting process; (2) the ARNG met its goals for recruiting, completion of initial military training, and completion of initial term of service in recent years; and (3) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department of the Army, and ARNG have conducted their oversight responsibilities of the ARNG’s financial incentives programs. Except in the case of reasons why soldiers left the ARNG before completing their military training and data on when soldiers separated during the training process, we found that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining (1) the extent to which enlisted soldiers completed their initial military training; (2) the length of time it took these soldiers to complete their initial military training and become qualified for their military occupational specialty; (3) the extent to which enlisted soldiers completed their initial term of service; (4) the length of time enlisted soldiers who did not complete their initial term of service served in the ARNG; and (5) the reasons why enlisted soldiers who graduated from their training but did not complete their initial term of service left the ARNG. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recruiters are often referred to as the “face” of the ARNG. In the past, there have been allegations of recruiter misconduct and misuse of financial incentives, making it important for recruiters to ensure procedures are followed when working with applicants and that incentives to join the ARNG are awarded properly and effectively.
House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review the ARNG's recruiting practices. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) ARNG has provided oversight of its recruiting process; (2) ARNG met its goals for recruiting, completion of initial military training, and initial term of service; and (3) OSD, Department of the Army, and ARNG have conducted oversight of ARNG's enlistment financial incentives programs. For this work, GAO reviewed DOD and ARNG recruiting policy and procedures and interviewed cognizant officials. GAO analyzed data on recruiting from FY2010 through FY2014, training from FY2011 through FY2014, and initial term of service for FY2015. GAO visited four states representing a range of size and locations.
What GAO Found
The Army National Guard (ARNG) has taken steps to increase oversight of its recruiting process primarily conducted by recruiters dispersed at the state-level but has not established a permanent program to monitor state-level recruiting activities. In June 2014, the ARNG created a Recruiting Standards Branch that has started to conduct inspections of state offices. The Recruiting Standards branch completed inspections in 16 states from October 2014 through July 2015 and found that 2 states did not achieve full compliance in their inspections. However, this is not a permanent program, and ARNG officials stated that they are using positions to staff it intended for use in other areas. The ARNG is seeking approval for permanent staff by early 2017 to continue its oversight. Continued monitoring of state-level recruiting activities, such as through a permanent recruiting standards branch, will be important to ARNG's oversight functions.
The ARNG had mixed results in meeting its overall recruiting goals and nearly met its goals for initial military training; however, the ARNG does not track whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service or military obligation. The ARNG met its recruiting goals in 2 of the 5 years from fiscal years (FY) 2010 through 2014. While the ARNG nearly met its goals for training completion from FY 2011 through 2014, GAO found that the ARNG does not have complete, consistent, and valid data on why soldiers do not complete training and when they separate during training. Without consistent, complete, and valid data, decision makers do not have information to determine why a higher number of soldiers are not completing training. The ARNG also does not track whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service. GAO's analysis shows that about 40 percent of enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from FY 2001 through 2007 did not complete their initial term of service. Without tracking completion of initial term of service, ARNG officials cannot assess whether their programs are effective in meeting personnel requirements and do not have visibility to ensure the ARNG is maximizing its investment in its soldiers.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department of the Army (Army), and ARNG have not fully conducted their oversight responsibilities of ARNG enlistment financial-incentives programs. OSD has not enforced a requirement that ARNG report incentives obligated through the ARNG incentives programs. Further, although Army and National Guard regulations require evaluations of the effectiveness of the ARNG financial incentives programs, the Army and ARNG have not evaluated and documented the effectiveness of the programs. Without evaluating and documenting the effectiveness of ARNG incentives programs, officials may not know whether changes are needed for effective use of incentives or they may determine that certain financial incentives are not needed. Moreover, the ARNG has not ensured that recruiters have an understanding of available financial incentives. Financial incentives are a tool available to recruiters and agency policy states that incentives are available to assist in meeting and sustaining readiness requirements and to assist in filling critical shortages. ARNG has not provided recruiters with training on using financial incentives. With additional training, recruiters could better understand when and how to offer financial incentives to fill critical positions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that ARNG take actions to collect consistent, complete, and valid data on soldiers who do not complete training and initial term of service, and evaluate and document its incentives programs. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations but stated that it did not concur with the report due to GAO's depiction of waivers. GAO disagrees with DOD's characterization as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-06-311 | gao_GAO-06-311_0 | Agencies Have Spent About $178 Million to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to 36 Countries, but Future Spending Requirements for Some Programs Are Uncertain
Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million to provide radiation detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort to combat nuclear smuggling. The Threat of Corruption, Technological Limitations, Maintenance Problems, and Site Infrastructure Issues Challenge U.S. Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
U.S. programs that provide radiation detection equipment to foreign governments face a number of challenges that affect the installation and effective operation of radiation detection equipment, including: the threat of corruption of border security officials in some foreign countries, technical limitations of radiation detection equipment previously deployed by State and other agencies, inadequate maintenance of some handheld equipment, and the lack of infrastructure necessary to operate radiation detection equipment and harsh environmental conditions at some border sites. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. In addition, DOD and State also include anticorruption courses as part of the radiation detection training they provide to foreign border security personnel. Some Border Crossings Remain More Vulnerable to Nuclear Smuggling Because DOE Has Not Upgraded Less Sophisticated Equipment Installed by Other U.S. Agencies
In 2002, DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining some radiation detection equipment previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies in 23 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, its ability to carry out its role as lead interagency coordinator is limited by deficiencies in the strategic plan for interagency coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection assistance. Additionally, State has not maintained accurate information on the operational status and location of all radiation detection equipment provided by U.S. programs. State Coordinates U.S. Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance through an Interagency Working Group and In- Country Advisors
As the lead coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate the efforts of U.S. programs that provide this type of assistance to foreign countries. Without the development of a comprehensive interagency list of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess the equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance, may unknowingly provide duplicative sets of equipment, and cannot determine if the equipment is being used for its intended purpose or is in need of maintenance and repair. While in Macedonia, we interviewed Macedonian officials and toured one border site where radiation detection equipment had previously been provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of State. Once these portal monitors are installed in fiscal year 2006, DOE will maintain the equipment within its Second Line of Defense “Core” program. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials. Three U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State (State), have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel in other countries. GAO examined the (1) progress U.S. programs have made in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, including the current and expected costs of these programs; (2) challenges U.S. programs face in this effort; and (3) steps being taken to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries.
What GAO Found
Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have provided radiation detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort to combat nuclear smuggling. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, these agencies had spent about $178 million on this assistance through seven different programs. Primary among these programs is DOE's Second Line of Defense "Core" program, which has installed equipment mostly in Russia since 1998. U.S. efforts to install and effectively operate radiation detection equipment in other countries face a number of challenges including: corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, inadequate maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. In addition, State and other agencies have installed equipment at some sites that is less effective than equipment installed by DOE. Since 2002, DOE has maintained the equipment but has only upgraded one site. As a result, these border sites are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than sites with more sophisticated equipment. Further, while DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining most U.S.-funded equipment, some handheld equipment provided by State and DOD has not been maintained. Lastly, many border sites are located in remote areas that often lack infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection equipment. As the lead interagency coordinator of all U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate U.S. efforts. However, its ability to carry out its role as lead coordinator is limited by shortcomings in the strategic plan for interagency coordination. Additionally, State has not maintained an interagency master list of all U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment overseas. Without such a list, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess if equipment is operational and being used as intended; determine the equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance; or detect if an agency has unknowingly supplied duplicative equipment. |
gao_GAO-14-826 | gao_GAO-14-826_0 | Accordingly, deploying radiation detection equipment at the U.S. border is part of DHS’s strategy for addressing the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Fla.
OFTD is responsible for conducting covert operations at U.S. ports of entry and checkpoints to test the capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials smuggled into the United States, as well as testing capabilities in foreign locations. Covert Operations Provide Limited Assessments of Capabilities to Detect and Interdict Smuggled Nuclear and Radiological Materials
Covert Operations Assessed Detection and Interdiction Capabilities at Certain Locations and Showed Varying Rates of Success
OFTD conducted 144 covert operations at air, land, and sea ports of entry, checkpoints, and other sites to assess capabilities to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border between fiscal years 2006 and 2013, as shown in table 1.OFTD’s covert operations were conducted using radiological materials; however, OFTD officials said they conducted one or two tests using special nuclear material surrogates—radiation test sources with characteristics similar to those of SNM—each year. Covert Operations May Not Sufficiently Account for the Most Critical Nuclear Materials, Potential High- Risk Locations, or Key Nuclear and Radiological Detection Technology
CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform the decision- making process for prioritizing the materials, locations, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. DHS policy requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, CBP’s methodology for choosing locations was not clearly linked to these differences in capability and federal investment. OFTD has issued three periodic reports that summarize results from covert operations testing capabilities to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological materials smuggled across the border ports of entry: (1) the Summary Report of OFTD Seaport Assessments for fiscal years 2007 through 2008; (2) the Comprehensive Report on Radiation Testing, which summarized the results of covert operations conducted at air, land, and sea ports of entry from fiscal years 2009 through 2011; and (3) the Comprehensive Report on Radiation Testing, which summarized the results of covert operations conducted at air, land, and sea ports of entry from fiscal years 2012 and 2013. OFTD officials stated that they have not yet issued a report on results of covert operations conducted at checkpoints and are in the process of developing the report recommendations. By assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department’s risk management policies. In addition, establishing appropriate reporting time frames of covert operations results, and developing a mechanism to track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective actions, could help CBP ensure accountability and inform management decision making on the need for further investments or actions to protect U.S. borders from these potential consequences. To help ensure that CBP has the information necessary to provide oversight and accountability for implementing corrective actions to address weaknesses identified by covert operations we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP: determine time frames for OFTD reporting of covert operation results and status of corrective actions necessary to timely address border security weaknesses and work with OFTD to address any barriers to meeting these time frames, and develop a mechanism to track the corrective actions taken to address all weaknesses identified through covert operations at the ports of entry and checkpoints. We provided a draft of this report with redacted sensitive information to DHS for a sensitivity review. Appendix II: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) Steps for Conducting a Covert Operation
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national priority. To address this threat, DHS has deployed radiation detection equipment and trained staff to use it. CBP conducts covert operations to test capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials at air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States as well as checkpoints. GAO was asked to review CBP's covert testing operations. This report assesses the extent to which (1) CBP covert operations assess capabilities at air, land, and sea ports and checkpoints to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border and (2) CBP reports its covert operations results and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions are implemented. GAO analyzed documents, such as test summaries, directives, and planning and guidance papers and interviewed DHS, CBP, and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) covert operations provide limited assessment of capabilities to detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) conducted 144 covert operations at 86 locations from fiscal years 2006 through 2013, selecting its locations from a total of 655 U.S. air, land, and sea port facilities; checkpoints; and certain international locations. These operations allowed OFTD to assess capabilities for detecting and interdicting—or intercepting—nuclear and radiological materials at locations tested. Results showed differences in the rate of success for interdicting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials across facility types. CBP had a $1 million budget for covert operations of various activities—including nuclear and radiological testing—covering fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and DHS policy requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, CBP testing does not inform capabilities across all border locations, and CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform and prioritize the locations, materials, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. Given limited resources, assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department's risk management policies.
OFTD has not issued reports annually as planned on covert operation results and recommendations, limiting CBP oversight for improving capabilities to detect and interdict smuggling at the border. OFTD has issued three reports on the results of its covert operations at U.S. ports of entry since 2007. However, OFTD officials stated that because of resource constraints, reports have not been timely and do not include the results of covert tests conducted at checkpoints. Furthermore, OFTD tracks the status of corrective actions taken to address recommendations in these reports; however, CBP does not track corrective actions identified from their individual covert operations that were not included in these reports. Establishing appropriate time frames for reporting of covert operations results and addressing barriers to meeting these time frames would help enhance CBP's accountability for its covert testing operations. Further, developing a mechanism to track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective actions could help inform management decision making on the need for further investments in equipment or personnel training to protect U.S. borders.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS inform priorities for covert operations by using an assessment of risk, determining time frames for reporting results, addressing barriers for meeting time frames, and developing a mechanism to track corrective actions. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-206 | gao_GAO-06-206_0 | In the first few years of DHS’s existence, the S&T Directorate focused on the urgency of organizing itself to meet the nation’s homeland security research and development requirements, and had few resources devoted to developing its management infrastructure, including the management controls to guard against conflicts of interest. DHS’s S&T Directorate Can Do More to Improve Its Management Controls Related to Conflicts of Interest for Its IPA Portfolio Managers
DHS’s S&T Directorate has implemented several management controls to help its IPA portfolio managers comply with conflict of interest laws and regulations. § 208. DHS officials told us that S&T Directorate employees, including those hired under the IPA, are offered the same new employee and annual ethics training as are all new DHS employees. Importantly, the process for determining where R&D projects and funds are directed, including the role of the IPA portfolio managers, has never been finalized. Further, the S&T Directorate is only now seeking waivers, where appropriate, and considering whether to grant authorizations or take other actions for their portfolio managers hired under the IPA. IPA Portfolio Managers’ Role in Determining Where R&D Projects and Funds Were Directed Was Unclear
The recent changes and further improvements to the S&T Directorate’s ethics-related management controls are critical because we found that the role of the IPA portfolio managers in determining where R&D projects and associated funds were directed was unclear. This was due to several factors, as discussed in more detail below. First, the process that was to be followed by IPA portfolio managers when determining where R&D projects and funds are directed, and the decision- making role of the IPA portfolio managers within such a process, has never been finalized. Third, the testimony regarding the extent of the IPA portfolio managers’ involvement in the decision-making process was inconsistent and, at times, vague. Because we could not determine whether or not the IPA portfolio managers participated “personally and substantially” in the decision-making process, however, we contacted the Acting Director of OGE in September 2005 and suggested that OGE review this matter further in conjunction with its planned ethics program review of DHS. In December 2005, OGE officials told us that they plan to examine, among other matters, the transparency and accountability issues in DHS’s ethics program raised by our findings. Further, once hired, IPA employees must understand how the ethics laws address their unique situations; namely, that they have an agreement for future employment with an entity that stands to benefit from the S&T Directorate’s funding. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help IPA portfolio managers comply with the conflict of interest law, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Undersecretary of the S&T Directorate to improve the S&T Directorate’s management controls related to potential conflicts of interest by finalizing the S&T Directorate’s R&D process and defining and standardizing the role of the IPA portfolio managers in this process; developing a system to document how decisions are made within the determining, in consultation with DHS’s DAEO and OGE, whether waivers of 18 U.S.C. Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to examine (1) the management controls that have been established within the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to help guard against conflicts of interest for portfolio managers hired under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), and (2) the role of the IPA portfolio managers (particularly those from the national laboratories) in determining where research and development (R&D) projects and associated funds are directed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate was established to focus on areas such as addressing countermeasures for biological threats. To do this, it hired experts from the national laboratories under the authority of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA). The Directorate is organized into portfolios, led by portfolio managers. Questions have been raised about potential conflicts of interest for these individuals, since a portion of the Directorate's research funds have gone to the national laboratories. GAO was asked to examine (1) the management controls established within the Directorate to help guard against conflicts of interest for IPA portfolio managers; and (2) the role of the IPA portfolio managers, particularly those from national laboratories, in determining where research and development projects were directed.
What GAO Found
DHS's S&T Directorate is working to improve its management controls to help guard against conflicts of interest for its IPA portfolio managers, but it can do more. In the first few years of DHS's existence, the S&T Directorate focused on the urgency of organizing itself to meet the nation's homeland security research and development requirements, and had few resources devoted to developing its management infrastructure, including the management controls to guard against conflicts of interest. In the past year, steps have been taken to improve these controls. For example, in June 2005, DHS implemented a new process for hiring IPA employees. Although the S&T Directorate is taking steps to improve its ethics-related management controls, several conditions still need to be addressed to better ensure that its IPA portfolio managers comply with the conflict of interest laws. First, the process for determining where research and development projects and funds are directed, including the role of the IPA portfolio managers, has never been finalized. Second, the S&T Directorate does not require documentation of how determinations are made about where research and development projects and funds are directed. Third, S&T Directorate officials are only now seeking waivers, where appropriate, and considering whether to take other actions that would allow IPA portfolio managers to participate in certain matters. Finally, DHS officials told us that S&T Directorate employees, including those hired under the IPA, are offered the same new employee and annual ethics training as are all DHS employees. However, employees hired under the IPA do not receive regular training that addresses their unique situation; namely that they have an agreement for future employment with an entity that may benefit from the S&T Directorate's funding. The role of the IPA portfolio managers, five of whom came from the national laboratories, in determining where research and development projects and associated funds were directed was unclear. This was due to several factors. First, as previously discussed, the S&T Directorate has never finalized a standard process for determining where research and development projects and funds are directed, or the decision-making role of the IPA portfolio managers within such a process. Second, the extent of the IPA portfolio managers' participation in making these determinations was unclear because there was no documentary evidence of how these determinations were actually made. Third, the testimonial evidence on the extent of the IPA portfolio managers' involvement was inconsistent and, at times, vague. Because we could not determine whether or not the IPA portfolio managers participated "personally and substantially" in the decision-making process, which is precluded by 18 U.S.C. 208, GAO contacted the Acting Director of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) in September 2005. GAO suggested that OGE review this matter further in conjunction with its planned ethics program review of DHS. In December 2005, OGE officials told us that they plan to examine, among other matters, the transparency and accountability issues in DHS's ethics program raised by our findings. |
gao_GAO-12-156 | gao_GAO-12-156_0 | Oil and Gas Wells Generate a Significant Amount of Produced Water, but the Volume and Quality of the Water Produced at a Given Well Varies
A significant amount of water is produced daily as a byproduct from onshore drilling of oil and gas, but the volume produced by a given well will vary depending on the type of hydrocarbon being produced, the geographic location of the well, and the method of production used. However, because the Argonne study is based on limited and, in some cases, incomplete data, it likely underestimates the current total volume of produced water being generated by oil and gas operations today. Produced Water Is Generally of Poor Quality, with the Levels of Contaminants Varying Widely
The quality of produced water from oil and gas production is generally poor, and in most situations, it cannot be readily used for other purposes without prior treatment. The specific quality of water generated by a given well, however, can vary widely according to the same three factors that impact the volume of water produced from the well: the hydrocarbon being produced, the geographic location of the well, and method of production used. Produced Water Can Be Managed in a Number of Ways, although Underground Injection Is the Most Common Practice
Over 90 percent of the water produced during oil and gas operations is managed through underground injection practices; the remaining water is generally discharged to surface water, stored in surface impoundments, reused for irrigation, or reused for hydraulic fracturing. In its 2009 report, Argonne National Laboratory estimated, and EPA officials that we spoke with concurred, that most produced water is managed by injecting it underground into wells that are designated to receive this water. According to producers and agency officials we spoke with, how produced water is managed and treated is primarily an economic decision, made within the bounds of federal and state regulations. EPA and the States We Reviewed Regulate the Management of Produced Water through a Variety of Means
The management of produced water is regulated by EPA and the states we reviewed through a variety of means, depending on how the water is disposed of or reused. Other management practices, such as disposal of the water into surface impoundments, irrigation, and reuse of the water for hydraulic fracturing, are primarily regulated by the state authorities. Underground Injection Is Regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act
The management of produced water through underground injection is subject to the Safe Drinking Water Act’s Underground Injection Control program. This program is designed to prevent contamination of aquifers that supply, or could supply in the future, public water systems by ensuring the safe operation of injection wells. Under this program, EPA or authorized states generally require producers to obtain permits for their injection wells by, among other things, meeting technical standards for constructing, operating, and testing and monitoring wells. Federal research also has focused on developing and describing new and existing technologies for treating produced water. Federal Research Efforts Have Examined the Characteristics of Produced Water
Several federal agencies, including USGS, the Bureau of Reclamation, a number of DOE national laboratories, and EPA, have issued or sponsored studies describing the characteristics of produced water from oil and gas operations––particularly the volume and quality of produced water. None of these agencies provided written comments to include in our report; however, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Interior provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives for this review were to describe (1) what is known about the volume and quality of produced water from oil and gas production; (2) what practices are generally used to manage and treat produced water, and what factors are considered in the selection of each; (3) how the management of produced water is regulated at the federal level and in selected states; and (4) what federal research and development efforts have been undertaken during the last 10 years related to produced water. In addition, we interviewed federal and state regulatory officials; federal scientists from the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Research and Development and the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Argonne National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, National Energy Technology Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories; officials from oil and gas exploration and production companies; officials from water treatment facilities; and other experts with experience related to produced water. Produced Water Management and Beneficial Use. | Why GAO Did This Study
Water is a significant byproduct associated with oil and gas exploration and production. This water, known as produced water, may contain a variety of contaminants. If produced water is not appropriately managed or treated, these contaminants may present a human health and environmental risk.
GAO was asked to describe (1) what is known about the volume and quality of produced water from oil and gas production; (2) what practices are generally used to manage and treat produced water, and what factors are considered in the selection of each; (3) how produced water management is regulated at the federal level and in selected states; and (4) what federal research and development efforts have been undertaken during the last 10 years related to produced water. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed studies and other documents on produced water and interviewed federal and state regulatory officials, federal scientists, officials from oil and gas companies and water treatment companies, and other experts. GAO focused its review on the nine states that generate nearly 90 percent of the produced water, and conducted site visits in three states.
What GAO Found
A significant amount of water is produced daily as a byproduct from drilling of oil and gas. A 2009 Argonne National Laboratory study estimated that 56 million barrels of water are produced onshore every day, but this study may underestimate the current total volume because it is based on limited, and in some cases, incomplete data generated by the states. In general, the volume of produced water generated by a given well varies widely according to three key factors: the hydrocarbon being produced, the geographic location of the well, and the method of production used. For example, some gas wells typically generate large volumes of water early in production, whereas oil wells typically generate less. Generally, the quality of produced water from oil and gas production is poor, and it cannot be readily used for another purpose without prior treatment. The specific quality of water produced by a given well, however, can vary widely according to the same three factors that impact volumehydrocarbon, geography, and production method.
Oil and gas producers can choose from a number of practices to manage and treat produced water, but underground injection is the predominant practice because it requires little or no treatment and is often the least costly option. According to federal estimates, more than 90 percent of produced water is managed by injecting it into wells that are designated to receive produced water. A limited amount of produced water is disposed of or reused by producers in other ways, including discharging it to surface water, storing it in surface impoundments or ponds so that it can evaporate, irrigating crops, and reusing it for hydraulic fracturing. Managing produced water in these ways can require more advanced treatment methods, such as distillation. How produced water is ultimately managed and treated is primarily an economic decision, made within the bounds of federal and state regulations.
The management of produced water through underground injection is subject to the Safe Drinking Water Acts Underground Injection Control program, which is designed to prevent contamination of aquifers that supply public water systems by ensuring the safe operation of injection wells. Under this program, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the states require producers to obtain permits for their injection wells by, among other things, meeting technical standards for constructing, operating, and testing and monitoring the wells. EPA also regulates the management of produced water through surface discharges under the Clean Water Act. Other management practices, such as disposal of the water into surface impoundments, irrigation, and the reuse of the water for hydraulic fracturing, are regulated by state authorities.
Several federal agencies, including EPA; the Department of Interiors Bureau of Reclamation and U.S. Geological Survey; and a number of Department of Energy national laboratories, have undertaken research and development efforts related to produced water. These efforts have included sponsoring and issuing studies that describe the volume and quality of produced water, options for managing produced water and associated regulatory issues, as well as options for improving existing technologies for treating produced water and developing new technologies, such as more cost-effective filters.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. A draft was provided to the Departments of Energy and the Interior, and EPA for review. None of these agencies provided written comments. EPA and Interior provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_NSIAD-96-42 | gao_NSIAD-96-42_0 | As a result, Congress established the Variable Reenlistment Bonus program in 1965. The Secretary of Defense has established three eligibility zones for the payment of SRBs. The cost of the SRB program varies considerably by service. To determine whether SRBs are awarded only where needed to overcome shortages, we applied two measures to each skill category that received SRBs in either fiscal year 1994 or 1993: (1) overall fill rate at the beginning of the fiscal year (defined as the percent of required positions that were filled) and (2) whether individuals in that same skill category had been given financial incentives to leave the service. Figures 4 and 5 show the percentage of new SRB contracts by service that went to personnel in skill categories having high fill rates and where other personnel in the same skill categories received separation incentives in fiscal years 1994 and 1993. However, the services have not defined which skills require higher fill rates than the 90-percent criterion used for readiness reporting. OSD Guidance and Oversight of the SRB Program Are Lacking
OSD is not providing adequate direction and oversight of the SRB program. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed whether the Department of Defense (DOD) has effectively managed the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the services have awarded some SRB to personnel in high-skill categories where a high percentage of the required positions are already filled; (2) in fiscal year (FY) 1994, 43 percent of the new SRB contracts went to service members in skill categories where 90 percent or more of the required positions were filled and in which many higher skill level service members were paid incentives to leave the service; (3) each SRB program is targeted to different segments of the military, including personnel in different grades and year groups; and (4) the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not provided adequate oversight of the SRB program, having performed only one skills review in FY 1991. |
gao_GGD-96-11 | gao_GGD-96-11_0 | Scope and Methodology
To obtain information on the nature and extent of counterfeiting of U.S. currency abroad, as well as U.S. efforts to combat this activity, we obtained views and material from (1) U.S. government agencies in the United States and abroad; (2) foreign law enforcement and financial organization officials in seven European countries, as referred to us by U.S. embassy officials; (3) Interpol officials in the United States and abroad; and (4) individuals researching the Superdollar case, including the author of the House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare reports on the Superdollar. The Nature of Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency Abroad Is Diverse
The nature of counterfeiting of U.S. currency abroad is diverse, including various types of perpetrators, uses, and methods. For example, an office worker may use a copying machine to counterfeit U.S. currency. Counterfeit U.S. currency is used for economic gain and is sometimes linked to other crimes. However, the offset printing method generally results in the highest quality counterfeits, whether produced abroad or domestically. High-quality counterfeit notes are difficult for the general public to discern, but according to Federal Reserve officials, the notes can be detected by experienced bank tellers. Secret Service and Federal Reserve data showed that, in fiscal year 1994, of the $380 billion in circulation, $208.7 million had been identified as counterfeit notes, a figure which represented less than one one-thousandth of the currency in circulation. These recent efforts include redesigning U.S. currency; increasing exchanges of information abroad; augmenting the Secret Service presence abroad; and undertaking efforts to stop production and distribution of counterfeit currency, including the Superdollar. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on counterfeiting of U.S. currency abroad and U.S. efforts to deter these activities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) counterfeit U.S. currency is used for economic gain and illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, arms sales, and terrorist activity; (2) there are several techniques used to counterfeit U.S currency, including photocopying, the raised note technique, computer assisted printing, bleaching and reprinting, and photomechanics; (3) the offset printing method offers the highest quality of counterfeit notes and can only be detected by experienced bank tellers; (4) it is difficult to determine the extent of counterfeiting abroad because of the lack of accurate counterfeit detection data and foreign officials reluctance to view counterfeiting as a serious problem; (5) of the $380 billion in U.S. currency circulated in fiscal year 1994, $208.7 million was counterfeit, which represented less than one one-thousandth of U.S. currency in circulation at that time; and (6) the U.S. government is involved in various counterfeit deterrence activities, including redesigning U.S. currency, increasing the presence of the Secret Service and the exchange of information abroad, and seizing the production and distribution capabilities used in counterfeiting of U.S. currency. |
gao_GAO-04-952 | gao_GAO-04-952_0 | In addition, Congress passed the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999. State Has Built Compounds in Stages
State has built new embassy compound facilities in separate stages to accommodate the lack of USAID funding, according to State and USAID officials. Building nonconcurrently can result in a second expensive mobilization of contractor staff and equipment, additional work to procure building materials, and added construction management oversight. Concurrent Construction of Future USAID Annexes Could Save Millions of Dollars
OBO estimates that future USAID annex projects now scheduled for nonconcurrent construction will increase costs to taxpayers by $35 million. Extrapolating from these data, we project that annex construction costs could rise between $68 million to $78 million if all 18 future annexes were delayed. Including USAID Space within a Larger Chancery Rather Than Constructing a Separate USAID Annex May Decrease Costs
Depending on a number of factors, building a separate annex for USAID increases costs over designing additional space for USAID within the chancery. For example, some officials expressed concern about the safety of USAID employees who remain in interim facilities after other U.S. government personnel have moved to the new embassy compounds. Terrorists continue to look for targets, according to the security officials, and an interim USAID facility might be perceived to be a “softer” target than a new, more secure embassy, thus making USAID employees more vulnerable to attack. Subsequent construction of the USAID annex on the compound results in more workers, vehicles, and equipment on site, which may increase the vulnerability of the overall embassy compound and its personnel by giving terrorists the opportunity to conduct surveillance or attack the embassy, according to State and USAID officials. Opportunities Exist for More Concurrent Construction
OBO acknowledged that it would be advantageous to the U.S. government to build embassy compounds concurrently. OBO said it may revise its schedule to allow for more concurrent construction and consider on a case-by-case basis whether USAID should have a separate annex if the Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program is funded. Concurrent construction will help State and USAID comply with the colocation requirement. However, even if the plan is not implemented, opportunities exist to schedule the construction of more projects concurrently. Matter for Congressional Consideration
In order to minimize costs and further improve security associated with building new embassy compounds, if the Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program is not implemented in fiscal year 2005, Congress may wish to consider alternative funding approaches to support concurrent construction of new embassy compounds. Scope and Methodology
To examine State’s efforts to incorporate office space for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) into the construction of new embassy compounds and to assess the cost and security implications of its approach, we reviewed the State Department’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) construction documents and the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plans for fiscal years 2002 to 2007, years 2003 to 2008, and 2004 to 2009; interviewed State Department and USAID officials regarding completed, ongoing, and planned new embassy compound projects that include a separate annex for USAID, including operational, cost, and security issues arising from nonconcurrent construction and the issues involved in housing USAID in separate buildings; interviewed officials from several U.S. construction firms experienced in building new embassy projects regarding the costs of OBO construction scheduling practices; and analyzed OBO estimates of the cost differentials between concurrent and nonconcurrent construction. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa, the State Department embarked on a multibillion-dollar, multiyear program to build new, secure facilities on compounds at posts around the world. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 generally requires that all U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), colocate offices within the newly constructed compounds. This report discusses how State is incorporating office space for USAID into the construction of new embassy compounds and the cost and security implications of its approach.
What GAO Found
State has built new embassy compounds in separate stages--scheduling construction of the USAID annex after work has begun (or in many cases after work has been completed) on the rest of the compound. State and USAID attributed this practice to a lack of full simultaneous funding for construction at nine locations through fiscal year 2004. Concurrent construction of USAID annexes could help decrease overall costs to the government and help achieve security goals. Concurrent construction would eliminate the second expensive mobilization of contractor staff and equipment and added supervision, security, and procurement support expenses that result from nonconcurrent construction. State has estimated that if nine future USAID annexes scheduled for nonconcurrent construction are built concurrently, it could save taxpayers $35 million. Extrapolating from data provided by State, GAO estimated a total cost savings of around $68 million to $78 million if all 18 future USAID projects are built concurrently. GAO also found that designing additional space for USAID within the main office building, or chancery, may cost less than erecting a separate annex, depending on a number of factors, including the size and configuration of the planned buildings. In addition to cost considerations, concurrent construction could help State and USAID comply with the colocation requirement and decrease the security risks associated with staff remaining outside of the embassy compound. For example, USAID staff who remain in a temporary USAID facility after other U.S. government personnel move into a new embassy compound may be more vulnerable to terrorist attack because the temporary facility does not meet security standards for new buildings and may be perceived to be a "softer" target relative to the new, more secure embassy compound. State's current plans call for continued nonconcurrent construction through fiscal year 2009. State acknowledged that there are substantial advantages to concurrent construction and has indicated that it may revise its building schedule to allow for more concurrent construction if a new cost-sharing proposal to fund new embassies by allocating construction costs among all agencies having an overseas presence is implemented in fiscal year 2005. However, even if cost sharing is not implemented, there are still opportunities for building some USAID facilities concurrently with the overall construction of the embassy compound if State, with congressional consent, revised its plan and rescheduled some projects. |
gao_GAO-12-420 | gao_GAO-12-420_0 | In 2003, we deemed SSA’s and other federal disability programs as high-risk areas, in part, because their programs continue to emphasize medical conditions in assessing work capacity, without adequate consideration of work opportunities afforded by advances in medicine, technology, and changes in the labor market. The DOT has not had a major update since 1977 the Department of Labor (Labor) replaced it with a new database in 1998 called the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). However, SSA determined that O*NET is not sufficiently detailed for evaluating DI and SSI disability claims, so SSA has begun developing its own occupational information system to better reflect the physical and mental demands of work in the national economy. First, the agency is using a two-tiered system for ongoing revisions to the listings. Under this system, SSA first completes a comprehensive listings update for a body system, which entails reviewing all the diseases and disorders listed within that system and making necessary revisions. As of early March 2012, SSA had begun the ongoing review process to identify opportunities for targeted revisions for 8 of the 14 adult body systems that were recently comprehensively revised. For example, SSA contracted with the Institute of Medicine to study its medical criteria for determining disability and to make recommendations for improving the timeliness and accuracy of its disability decisions, resulting in a 2007 report with recommendations and a symposium of experts in 2010. SSA Has Experienced Delays with Its Revision Process
SSA has made progress, but continues to face delays in completing both comprehensive and ongoing targeted updates. SSA Has Begun an Ambitious Project to Develop Updated Occupational Information, but Many Uncertainties Remain
SSA is Designing a New Occupational Information System, but Has Fallen behind with Some Activities
In 2008, SSA began a multiyear project to research and design a new source of occupational information that will replace the outdated information currently being used to determine if claimants are able to do their past work or any other work in the national economy. SSA officials told us that they did not have enough staffing to complete all of the 2012 planned activities within the estimated schedule. We compared SSA’s cost estimate to three best practices for assuring a reliable cost estimate and found SSA only minimally or partially met each of these (see table 3). Other federal information systems provide some basis for estimating the cost of producing or maintaining an OIS. SSA Has Taken Other Steps to Modernize Criteria but Faces Limitations
SSA Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Modern Concepts of Disability into Eligibility Criteria
Although SSA’s adult disability programs were initially built upon the assumption that certain severe medical conditions equate to work incapacity, through its medical listings updates and ongoing research, SSA has taken steps to modify its eligibility criteria. Updates to the medical listings have been one vehicle through which SSA can include an assessment of an individual’s functional abilities to determine whether an impairment prevents work. SSA Faces Constraints to Incorporating Modern Concepts
Consistent with modern views of disability, a key consideration in assessing disability is that the environment can hinder or enhance an individual’s ability to function. To achieve the goal of updating listings for each body system within SSA’s 5-year time frame, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security explicitly identify the resources needed to achieve this goal, such as staff, contractors, and technology aids, and its plans to overcome any resource limitations. 2. To ensure that its work to revise occupational information is feasible and cost effective, and to improve its chance for success, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security: formally assess risks to the success of the OIS—addressing such challenges as related to controlling cost, acquiring expertise, managing project complexity, and coordinating with ongoing and related SSA research—and develop appropriate mitigation strategies, and develop a comprehensive and reliable cost estimate and schedule for the life cycle of the project, in accordance with best practices. SSA also provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix V.
SSA agreed with the first two recommendations and disagreed with the third recommendation that the agency should conduct limited and focused studies on the availability and effects of considering more fully assistive devices and workplace accommodations in its disability determinations. SSA stated that conducting such studies is inconsistent with Congress’ intentions. SSA asserts that because Congress has made no effort to change the balance between its disability programs and the ADA in the past 22 years, it would be inappropriate for SSA to spend its limited administrative resources on “an initiative that would undermine the balance Congress chose to strike.”
Notwithstanding SSA’s response, we continue to believe that SSA should conduct limited and focused studies on the availability and effects of considering more fully assistive devices and workplace accommodations in its disability determination process. Specifically, we examined the status and management of efforts to update its medical listings to reflect current medical knowledge and develop a new occupational information system (OIS) to reflect labor market changes, and we identified other steps taken by SSA to incorporate a modern view of disability into its eligibility criteria. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA administers two of the largest federal disability programs. GAO designated federal disability programs as a high-risk area, in part because eligibility criteria had not been updated to reflect medical and technological advances and labor market changes. Given the size and cost of its disability programs, SSA needs updated criteria to appropriately determine who qualifies for benefits. GAO has been asked to assess SSAs efforts to update its medical criteria and develop a new occupational information system, and to identify other steps taken to modernize disability determination criteria. To do this, GAO reviewed relevant publications and federal laws and regulations; assessed agency plans, cost estimates, schedules, and other documentation against established project management criteria; and interviewed SSA officials, experts, and stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has taken steps that hold promise for improving the process for updating its medical criteria, but continues to face challenges ensuring timely updates. SSA now uses a two-tiered system for ongoing revisions to its medical listings. First, it completes a comprehensive review of all medical conditions listed within each of 14 body systems, making needed revisions. For subsequent updates for a body system, the agency uses a targeted approach, selecting for review and revision only those medical conditions most in need of change. To date, SSA has completed comprehensive revisions for 8 of the 14 body systems and now is reviewing conditions under them to determine where targeted revisions are appropriate. However, some of these targeted revisions have experienced delays. Moreover, SSA has yet to complete comprehensive revisions for six body systems that have been ongoing for 19 to 33 years. SSA officials attributed delays to a lack of staff and expertise, along with the complexity and unpredictability of the regulatory process.
SSA has embarked on an ambitious plan to design by 2016 an occupational information system for use in its disability decision-making process, but has fallen short of best practices for estimating costs, maintaining a schedule, and considering risks and alternatives. SSA currently relies on occupational information developed by the Department of Labor which has not had a major update since 1977. In 2008, SSA initiated a project to develop its own occupational information system (OIS), which SSA expects will provide up-to-date information on the physical and mental demands of work to support its decision-making process. To guide the creation of its OIS, SSA established an advisory panel, collaborated with outside experts and other agencies, and in July 2011 issued a research and development plan detailing relevant activities through 2016. SSA has made progress on some baseline activities in the plan. However, SSAs cost estimate and schedule had key deficiencies, such as not including any estimate of the cost of producing, maintaining, and operating the system, which can inform design options. SSA also did not adequately consider inherent risks or potential alternatives, which could heighten the risk of additional costs or project failure.
Consistent with modern views of disability, SSA has taken some concrete steps toward greater consideration of an individuals ability to function with a disability but faces constraints in fully modernizing. SSA has incorporated some criteria into its medical listings to determine whether a claimants impairments result in functional limitations that can prohibit the ability to work. SSA is also sponsoring research through the National Institutes of Health to evaluate how functional abilities can further be considered in determining disability. One project aims to develop a computerized tool to assist adjudicators in evaluating how various impairments affect an individuals function and ability to work. However, SSA officials maintain that other modern concepts of disability cannot be fully incorporated into SSAs disability decisions. Specifically, SSA faces constraints considering the extent to which assistive devices and workplace accommodations can mitigate work disability, because these are not universally available and SSA lacks the resources to conduct individualized assessments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SSA (1) explicitly identify resources needed to achieve its 5-year time frame for updating its medical listings; (2) follow best practices in its cost estimate, schedule, and risk assessment for the occupational information system; and (3) conduct limited, focused studies on how to more fully consider assistive devices and workplace accommodations in its disability determinations. SSA agreed with the first two recommendations and disagreed with the third, stating that such studies would be inconsistent with Congress intentions. GAO continues to believe the recommendation has merit, as discussed more fully within the report. |
gao_NSIAD-97-18 | gao_NSIAD-97-18_0 | In 1985, the Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and establish a management organization within the Army to be responsible for the disposal programs. 1.2.) Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been made to change the program’s basic approach to destruction. Historically, reaching agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. In addition, the Army is developing other measures to improve program effectiveness and efficiency. The Army cannot implement some of the more significant cost-reduction initiatives without the cooperation and approval of state regulatory agencies. 3.1.) 3.2.) Conclusions, Matters for Congressional Consideration, and Agency Comments
Conclusions
While there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical stockpile and related nonstockpile materiel, progress has slowed due to the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and localities about the destruction method that should be used. As a result, the cost and schedule for the disposal programs are uncertain. However, the programs are likely to cost more than the estimated $24.4 billion above current expenditures and take longer than currently planned. The key factors impacting the programs include public concerns about the safety of incineration, compliance with environmental laws and regulations, legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal technologies. The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule are largely driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in agreement with the proposed disposal method. Furthermore, the recent congressional direction in the 1997 Authorization and Appropriations Acts to research and develop alternative technologies to destroy assembled chemical munitions indicates that there is continued public concern about the proposed disposal method. Until DOD and the affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method for individual sites, the Army will not be able to predict the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule with any degree of accuracy. Moreover, many of the problems experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to affect the Army’s ability to implement the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program. However, the suggestions create tradeoffs for decision makers and would require changes in existing legal requirements. These suggestions have included deferring plans for additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national or regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying existing laws and regulations to standardize environmental requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO assessed the Department of Defense's (DOD) programs for destroying the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and planning for the disposal of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel, focusing on: (1) the programs' cost and schedule; (2) alternatives for improving program effectiveness and efficiency; and (3) actions the Army has and is taking to improve the programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) while there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical stockpile and related materiel, progress has slowed due to the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and localities about the destruction method that should be used; (2) as a result, the cost and schedule for the disposal programs are uncertain; however, they will cost more than the estimated $24.4 billion above current expenditures and take longer than currently planned; (3) key factors impacting the programs include public concerns over the safety of incineration, compliance with environmental laws and regulations, legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal technologies; (4) the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule are largely driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in agreement with the proposed disposal method at the remaining stockpile sites; (5) based on program experience, reaching agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated; (6) congressional direction to research and develop alternative technologies to destroy assembled chemical munitions indicates that there are continued public concerns about the proposed disposal method; (7) until DOD and the affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method for the remaining stockpile sites, the Army will not be able to predict the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule with any degree of accuracy; (8) many of the problems experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to affect the Army's ability to implement the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program; (9) recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving public concerns associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been made to change the programs' basic approach to destruction; (10) however, the suggestions create trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in existing legal requirements; (11) these suggestions have included deferring plans for additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national or regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying existing laws and regulations to standardize environmental requirements; (12) DOD and the Army have taken actions in response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations to improve program management; and (13) however, the Army cannot implement some of the more significant initiatives without the cooperation and approval of state regulatory agencies. |
gao_GAO-02-305 | gao_GAO-02-305_0 | Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac direct their servicers to initiate foreclosure proceedings at earlier stages than FHA, VA, and RHS. FHA, VA, and RHS officials said that they have public missions and obligations to their customers, such as low-income Americans, veterans, and rural residents, and take additional time to initiate foreclosure proceedings. FHA Property Custody Procedures Delay Maintenance and Marketing
VA, RHS, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac follow a similar approach in that the organizations, or servicers in the case of RHS, have custody of and are responsible for maintaining foreclosed properties from the time of the foreclosure sale until the properties are sold to home buyers or investors. In contrast, FHA divides property custody and maintenance responsibilities between its servicers and contractors, which operate largely independently of one another. In contrast, by dividing responsibility between servicers and contractors, FHA procedures prevent the initiation of all maintenance necessary to protect foreclosed properties and sell them quickly. Available Data Suggest FHA Takes Longer to Sell Foreclosed Properties
Determining the organizations’ comparative performance in selling foreclosed properties is difficult because FHA and RHS do not collect all of the data necessary to do so. On the basis of available data, we estimate that it takes about 55 to 110 days longer to sell foreclosed FHA properties than is the case for the other organizations. Available Data Suggest FHA Foreclosed Property Sales Performance Is Comparatively Slow
Table 6 provides available data on the time that elapsed in acquiring and selling FHA, VA, RHS, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac foreclosed properties in 2000, and the data indicates that FHA properties took the longest to sell, at 292 days. Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs | What GAO Found
Federal programs in the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Rural Housing Service (RHS) promote mortgage financing for low-income, first-time, minority, veteran, and rural home buyers. Congress has also chartered private corporations--Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac--to provide mortgage lending and to promote homeownership opportunities. Many homeowners fall behind in their mortgage payments each year due to unemployment, health problems, or the death of a provider. To avoid high cost foreclosure proceedings when home buyers fall behind on their obligations, FHA, VA, and RHS instruct mortgage servicers, typically large financial institutions, to assist the home buyers in bringing their mortgage payments current. Despite these efforts, in 118,000 cases in 2000 the mortgage servicers engaged in various foreclosure proceedings under the direction of the organizations. FHA procedures delay the initiation of critical steps necessary to preserve the value of foreclosed properties and to sell them quickly. Although Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, VA, and RHS designate one entity as responsible for the custody, maintenance, and sale of foreclosed properties, FHA divides these responsibilities between its mortgage servicers and management and marketing contractors, which operate largely independently of one another. Determining the organizations' comparative performance in selling foreclosed properties is difficult because FHA and RHS do not collect all of the data necessary for comparison. However, on the basis of available data, it takes nearly 90 days longer to acquire and sell FHA foreclosed properties than VA properties, and about 130 to 145 days longer to acquire and sell FHA properties than RHS, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac properties. |
gao_GAO-08-668 | gao_GAO-08-668_0 | The four key components we identified follow: Hospital capacity: Following a mass casualty event, hospitals may need the ability to adequately care for a large number of additional patients. The Federal Government Has Provided States with Funding, Guidance, and Other Assistance to Prepare for Medical Surge
The federal government has provided funding, guidance, and other assistance to help states prepare their regional and local health care systems for medical surge in a mass casualty event. From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, the federal government awarded the states about $2.2 billion through ASPR’s Hospital Preparedness Program to support activities to meet their preparedness priorities and goals, including medical surge. Further, the federal government developed, or contracted with experts to develop, guidance that was provided for states to use when preparing for medical surge. AHRQ also published Reopening Shuttered Hospitals to Expand Surge Capacity, which contains an action checklist that can be used by states and local entities to identify organizations that have an interest or responsibility in preparing for medical surge, and to determine what resources each could provide. Many States Have Made Efforts to Increase Hospital Capacity, Plan for Alternate Care Sites, and Develop Electronic Medical Volunteer Registries, but Fewer Have Planned for Altered Standards of Care
Many states have made efforts related to three of the key components for preparing for medical surge, that is, increasing hospital capacity, planning for alternate care sites, and developing electronic medical volunteer registries, but fewer have implemented the fourth, planning for altered standards of care. However, only 7 of the 20 states had adopted or were drafting altered standards of care for specific medical interventions to be used in response to a mass casualty event. All States Were Making Efforts to Expand Hospital Capacity
More than half of the states met or were close to meeting the criteria for the five surge-related sentinel indicators for hospital capacity that we reviewed from the Hospital Preparedness Program 2006 midyear progress reports, the most recent available data at the time of our analysis. In our further review of 20 states, all 20 states reported that they had developed or were developing bed reporting systems to track their hospital capacity—the first of four key components related to preparing for medical surge. For example, one state had assigned 2 of 955 volunteers at Level 1. States Reported Concerns Related to All Four Key Components When Preparing for Medical Surge
While the Hospital Preparedness Program has been operating since 2002, state officials in the 20 states we surveyed reported that they faced continuing challenges in preparing for medical surge in a mass casualty event. State officials also reported concerns about reimbursement for medical services provided at alternate care sites, which are not accredited health care facilities. According to state officials, some volunteers do not want to be part of a national database because they are concerned that they might be required to provide services outside their own state. Altered Standards of Care Concerns
Some state officials reported that they had not begun work on altered standards of care guidelines, or had not completed drafting guidelines, because of the difficulty of addressing the medical, ethical, and legal issues involved. While some states reported using AHRQ’s Mass Medical Care with Scarce Resources: A Community Planning Guide to assist them as they developed altered standards of care guidelines, some states also reported that they needed additional assistance. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine what assistance the federal government has provided to help states prepare their regional and local health care systems for medical surge in a mass casualty event, particularly related to four key components—hospital capacity, alternate care sites, electronic medical volunteer registries, and altered standards of care—we reviewed and analyzed national strategic planning documents and identified links among federal policy documents on emergency preparedness. We also reviewed and analyzed studies and reports related to medical surge capacity issued by the Congressional Research Service, the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of Inspector General, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), the Joint Commission, and other experts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Potential terrorist attacks and the possibility of naturally occurring disease outbreaks have raised concerns about the "surge capacity" of the nation's health care systems to respond to mass casualty events. GAO identified four key components of preparing for medical surge: (1) increasing hospital capacity, (2) identifying alternate care sites, (3) registering medical volunteers, and (4) planning for altering established standards of care. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the primary agency for hospital preparedness, including medical surge. GAO was asked to examine (1) what assistance the federal government has provided to help states prepare for medical surge, (2) what states have done to prepare for medical surge, and (3) concerns states have identified related to medical surge. GAO reviewed documents from the 50 states and federal agencies. GAO also interviewed officials from a judgmental sample of 20 states and from federal agencies, as well as emergency preparedness experts.
What GAO Found
Following a mass casualty event that could involve thousands, or even tens of thousands, of injured or ill victims, health care systems would need the ability to "surge," that is, to adequately care for a large number of patients or patients with unusual medical needs. The federal government has provided funding, guidance, and other assistance to help states prepare for medical surge in a mass casualty event. From fiscal years 2002 to 2007, the federal government awarded the states about $2.2 billion through the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response's Hospital Preparedness Program to support activities to meet their preparedness priorities and goals, including medical surge. Further, the federal government provided guidance for states to use when preparing for medical surge, including Reopening Shuttered Hospitals to Expand Surge Capacity, which contains a checklist that states can use to identify entities that could provide more resources during a medical surge. Based on a review of state emergency preparedness documents and interviews with 20 state emergency preparedness officials, GAO found that many states had made efforts related to three of the key components of medical surge, but fewer have implemented the fourth. More than half of the 50 states had met or were close to meeting the criteria for the five medical-surge-related sentinel indicators for hospital capacity reported in the Hospital Preparedness Program's 2006 midyear progress reports. For example, 37 states reported that they could add 500 beds per million population within 24 hours of a mass casualty event. In a 20-state review, GAO found that all 20 were developing bed reporting systems and most were coordinating with military and veterans hospitals to expand hospital capacity, 18 were selecting various facilities for alternate care sites, 15 had begun electronic registering of medical volunteers, and fewer of the states--7 of the 20--were planning for altered standards of medical care to be used in response to a mass casualty event. State officials in GAO's 20-state review reported that they faced challenges relating to all four key components in preparing for medical surge. For example, some states reported concerns related to maintaining adequate staffing levels to increase hospital capacity, and some reported concerns about reimbursement for medical services provided at alternate care sites. According to some state officials, volunteers were concerned that if state registries became part of a national database they might be required to provide services outside their own state. Some states reported that they had not begun work on or completed altered standards of care guidelines due to the difficulty of addressing the medical, ethical, and legal issues involved in making life-or-death decisions about which patients would get access to scarce resources. While most of the states that had adopted or were drafting altered standards of care guidelines reported using federal guidance as they developed these guidelines, some states also reported that they needed additional assistance. |
gao_GAO-15-55 | gao_GAO-15-55_0 | MDD is characterized by the presence of depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure along with other symptoms for a period of at least 2 weeks that represent a change in previous functioning. The MDD CPG includes approximately 200 recommendations to provide information and assist in decision making for clinicians who provide care for adults with MDD.assessments of depressive symptoms, such as the nine item Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9), should be used at the initial assessment of MDD symptoms, to monitor treatment response at 4-6 weeks after initiation of treatment, after each change in treatment, and periodically For example, the CPG recommends that standardized thereafter until full remission is achieved.assessment is effective 4-6 weeks after initiation of treatment, making timely follow-up visits an important part of clinicians’ ability to assess whether the current treatment plan is effective or should be modified. VA Data Show That 10 Percent of Veterans Had MDD and Most Were Prescribed at Least One Antidepressant, but VA Data May Underestimate MDD Prevalence
Data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 show that about 10 percent of veterans who received health care services through VA were diagnosed with MDD, and of those, 94 percent were prescribed an antidepressant. VA’s Data May Not Fully Reflect the Extent to Which Veterans Have MDD Due to a Lack of Diagnostic Coding Precision by Clinicians
Based on our review of the documentation in 30 veterans’ medical records from VA’s medical record system, we found that over one-third (11) had diagnostic coding discrepancies. Additionally, VA does not know the extent to which veterans with MDD who have been prescribed antidepressants are receiving care as recommended in the CPG, and VA Central Office has not developed mechanisms to determine the extent to which mental health care delivery conforms to the recommendations in the MDD CPG. VA policy states that antidepressant treatment must be consistent with VA’s current, evidence-based CPG. Through our review of 30 medical records from the six VAMCs we selected, we found examples of deviations from the CPG recommendations for almost all veterans in our review.depicts the specific recommendations we reviewed and the number of veterans that did not receive care consistent with the corresponding CPG recommendation. Demographic and Clinical Data VA Collects on Veteran Suicides Were Not Always Complete or Accurate, and VAMCs Applied Instructions for Gathering Suicide Data Differently
We found that demographic, clinical, and other data submitted to VA Central Office on veteran suicides were not always completely or correctly entered into the BHAP Post-Mortem Chart Analysis Templates— a mechanism by which VA Central Office collects veteran suicide data from VAMCs’ review of veterans’ medical records. Moreover, VAMCs interpreted and applied instructions for completing the BHAP templates differently. Incomplete data limits VA Central Office’s ability to identify information that can be used to help VA Central Office develop policy and procedures to prevent veteran deaths. Incorrect date of death: Six BHAP templates included a date of death that was incorrect based on information in the veteran’s medical record. This veteran would be included in the BHAP interim report as having a mental health visit, and, as a result, VA’s data would include an inaccurate count of the number of veterans with mental health visits in the last 30 days.accurate information, VA cannot use this information to determine whether policies or procedures need to be changed to ensure that Without veterans at high risk for suicide are being seen more frequently by a mental health provider to help prevent suicides in the future. VAMCs, VISNs, and VA Central Office Do Not Review Suicide Data
We found that BHAP templates are not being reviewed by VA officials at any level for accuracy, completeness, and consistency. Additionally, VA does not have mechanisms in place to ensure that the Department is able to identify deviations from CPG-recommended care and remedy those that could impede veterans’ recovery. To improve VA’s efforts to inform its suicide prevention activities, VA should ensure that VAMCs have a process in place to review data on veteran suicides for completeness, accuracy, and consistency before the data are submitted to VA Central Office, clarify guidance on how to complete BHAP templates to ensure that VAMCs are submitting consistent data on veteran suicides, and implement processes to review data on veteran suicides submitted by VAMCs for accuracy and completeness. Characteristics of veterans diagnosed with MDD. VA’s Oversight of the Extent to Which Veterans with MDD Prescribed Antidepressants Are Receiving Care As Recommended in the CPG
To examine the extent to which VAMCs are providing care to veterans with MDD who are prescribed antidepressants as recommended in the CPG, we reviewed relevant VA policy documents. Information VA Requires VAMCs to Collect on Veteran Suicides
To analyze the information VA requires VAMCs to collect on veteran suicides, we first reviewed VA policies, guidance, and documents related to VA’s suicide prevention efforts to identify the mechanisms by which VA collects veteran suicide data from VAMCs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2013, VA estimated that about 1.5 million veterans required mental health care, including services for MDD. MDD is a debilitating mental illness related to reduced quality of life and productivity, and increased risk for suicide. VA also plays a role in suicide prevention. GAO was asked to review how VA tracks veterans prescribed antidepressants and what suicide data VA uses in its prevention efforts.
This report examines (1) VA's data on veterans with MDD, including those prescribed an antidepressant; (2) the extent that veterans with MDD who are prescribed antidepressants receive recommended care and the extent to which VA monitors such care; and (3) the quality of data VA requires VAMCs to collect on veteran suicides. GAO analyzed VA data, interviewed VA officials, and conducted site visits to six VAMCs selected based on geography and population served. From each of these six VAMCs, GAO also reviewed five randomly selected medical records for veterans diagnosed with MDD and prescribed an antidepressant in 2012, as well as all completed BHAP templates. The results cannot be generalized across VA but provide insights.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 shows that about 10 percent of veterans who received VA health care services were diagnosed with major depressive disorder (MDD). MDD is characterized by depressed mood or loss of interest along with other symptoms for 2 weeks or more that represent a change in the way individuals function from their previous behaviors. Because GAO found diagnostic coding discrepancies in 11 of the 30 veterans' medical records it reviewed from six VA medical centers (VAMC), VA's data may understate the prevalence of MDD among veterans being treated through VA, to the extent that such discrepancies may permeate VA's data. One treatment for MDD is the use of medications such as antidepressants. According to GAO's analysis, 94 percent of veterans diagnosed with MDD were prescribed at least one antidepressant.
VA policy states that antidepressant treatment must be consistent with VA's current clinical practice guideline (CPG); however, GAO's review of 30 veterans' medical records identified deviations from selected MDD CPG recommendations for most veterans reviewed. For example, 26 of the 30 veterans were not assessed using a standardized assessment tool at 4 to 6 weeks after initiation of treatment, as recommended in the CPG. Additionally, 10 veterans did not receive follow up within the time frame recommended in the CPG. GAO found that VA does not have a system-wide process in place to identify and fully assess whether the care provided is consistent with the CPG. As a result, VA does not know the extent to which veterans with MDD who have been prescribed antidepressants are receiving care as recommended in the CPG and whether appropriate actions are taken by VAMCs to mitigate potentially significant risks to veterans.
The demographic and clinical data that VA collects on veteran suicides were not always complete, accurate, or consistent. VA's Behavioral Health Autopsy Program (BHAP) is a quality initiative to improve VA's suicide prevention efforts by identifying information that VA can use to develop policy and procedures to help prevent future suicides. The BHAP templates are a mechanism by which VA collects suicide data from VAMC's review of veteran medical records. GAO's review of 63 BHAP templates at five VAMCs found that 40 of the templates that VAMCs submitted to VA Central Office had incomplete data. Also, GAO found that the BHAP templates VAMCs submitted contained inaccurate data. For example, 6 BHAP templates included a date of death that was incorrect based on information in the veteran's medical record, and 9 BHAP templates included an incorrect number of outpatient VA mental health visits in the last 30 days. Moreover, GAO found that VAMCs submitted inconsistent information because they interpreted VA's guidance on completing the BHAP templates differently. This situation was further exacerbated because BHAP templates prepared by VAMCs are generally not being reviewed at any level within the Department for completeness, accuracy, and consistency. Lack of complete, accurate, and consistent data and poor oversight can inhibit VA's ability to identify, evaluate, and improve ways to better inform its suicide prevention efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA identify and address MDD coding discrepancies; implement processes to review data and assess deviations from recommended care; and implement processes to improve completeness, accuracy, and consistency of veteran suicide data. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations and described its plans to implement them. |
gao_GAO-11-386 | gao_GAO-11-386_0 | The act—designed to improve energy efficiency— requires that 75 percent of light-duty vehicles acquired for federal fleets in major metropolitan areas be capable of using alternative fuels. USPS’s Delivery Fleet Primarily Consists of LLVs That Are Approaching the End of Their 24-Year Expected Operational Lives
LLVs, Flex-Fuel Vehicles, and Minivans Are the Principal Components of USPS’s Delivery Fleet
The number of half ton and smaller vehicles in USPS’s delivery fleet— mostly LLVs, flex-fuel vehicles (FFV), and minivans—has remained relatively constant over the past 5 fiscal years, ranging from 182,517 to 189,712 vehicles, despite about 13,400 fewer delivery routes. 2). Most of USPS’s minivans are E85-capable, meaning that they can operate on either E85 or gasoline. According to USPS officials, while USPS has a variety of pilot programs underway to explore other alternative fuel vehicle technologies (other than E85-capable vehicles), almost all of its other alternative fuel vehicles are capable of using compressed natural gas in addition to gasoline. USPS Has Acquired Alternative Fuel Vehicles in Response to Requirements, but Has Experienced Challenges
USPS Has Acquired E85- Capable Vehicles and Increased E85 Use, but Has Not Always Used E85 because of Logistical and Cost Issues
Since 2000, USPS has consistently purchased E85-capable delivery vehicles to satisfy the legislative requirement that at least 75 percent of its vehicle acquisitions be alternative fuel vehicles, and it had a total of 39,149 E85-capable vehicles in its delivery fleet as of September 30, 2010. 5). However, Vehicle Programs officials acknowledged that, due to operational requirements and cost issues, this latter requirement is not always followed. USPS’s Approach for Addressing Its Delivery Fleet Needs Has Financial, Operational, and Environmental Trade- offs
USPS’s Approach Is to Maintain Its Current Vehicles While Planning How to Address Its Longer Term Delivery Fleet Needs
USPS’s current approach is to sustain operations of its delivery fleet— through continued maintenance—for the next several years, while planning how to address its longer term delivery fleet needs. Other federal agencies also face challenges complying with fleet requirements. According to USPS Finance officials, USPS incurred about $1.05 billion in maintenance and fuel costs for its delivery fleet in fiscal year 2010—which comes to about $18 per vehicle per day. To reduce operational costs, USPS, like other fleet operators, attempts to minimize unscheduled maintenance. However, according to a September 30, 2010, VMAS report, about 31 percent of USPS’s annual maintenance costs were for unscheduled maintenance—11 percentage points more than USPS’s goal. Specifically, because USPS does not currently have the funds available to acquire new custom-built, right-hand-drive vehicles, it now has 22,100 left-hand-drive minivans in its delivery fleet. Without Significant Improvement in USPS’s Financial Condition, There Are No Clear Options to Fund a Major Vehicle Replacement
USPS’s Financial Condition Poses a Significant Barrier to Funding a Delivery Fleet Replacement
USPS’s financial condition poses a significant barrier to its ability to fund a major acquisition of its delivery fleet—a cost USPS recently estimated would be about $5.8 billion to replace about 185,000 delivery vehicles with new gasoline-powered custom-built vehicles, at a cost of about $31,000 per vehicle (in 2011 dollars). USPS and Others See Little Potential to Finance a Fleet Replacement through Grants or Partnerships, Including Joint Procurements
By statute, USPS is generally not subject to federal contracting and budgeting laws. However, depending on the specific actions adopted, USPS’s follow-up, and the results, such an agreement could help enable the funding of a major acquisition of delivery vehicles. As we have reported, Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a package of actions to restore USPS’s financial viability, which will enable USPS to align its costs with revenues, manage its growing debt, and generate sufficient funding for capital investment, including the inevitable replacement or refurbishment, of its delivery fleet. USPS agreed with our findings and recommendation to develop a strategy and timeline for addressing its delivery fleet needs. Our custom query of VMAS showed about $497 million in direct maintenance costs in fiscal year 2010, or about $2,600 per vehicle. Table 4 identifies the nonfederal organizations whose representatives we interviewed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States Postal Service (USPS) has the world's largest civilian fleet, with many of its delivery vehicles reaching the end of their expected 24-year operational lives. USPS is subject to legislative requirements governing the federal fleet, including a requirement in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which provides that 75 percent of USPS's vehicle acquisitions be alternative fuel vehicles, capable of operating on a fuel other than gasoline. USPS is also facing serious cost pressures in maintaining a national network of processing and retail operations. Asked to review USPS's delivery fleet, GAO (1) profiled the fleet; (2) assessed USPS's response to alternative fuel vehicle requirements and described its experiences with these vehicles; (3) identified USPS's approach for addressing its delivery fleet needs, including trade-offs; and (4) determined options to fund a major acquisition of delivery vehicles. GAO analyzed USPS data; visited USPS facilities in three locations; and interviewed officials from USPS, the Department of Energy, and other organizations, including fleet operators and manufacturers.
What GAO Found
USPS's delivery fleet is largely composed of custom-built, right-hand-drive vehicles designed to last for 24 years, including about 141,000 gasoline-powered vehicles 16 to 23 years old and 21,000 flex-fuel vehicles capable of running on gasoline or 85-percent ethanol (E85) that are about 10 years old. The fleet also includes 22,000 left-hand-drive minivans, many of which are also capable of running on E85, and 3,490 delivery vehicles capable of running on other alternative fuels. Delivery vehicles are driven an average of about 17 miles per day and cost about $1 billion to maintain and fuel in fiscal year 2010. USPS met the 75 percent acquisition requirement for alternative fuel vehicles by purchasing about 40,000 flex-fuel vehicles and minivans that can operate on E85 or gasoline. However, USPS does not always use E85 in these vehicles because E85 is not readily available and can cost more to use due to less fuel efficiency, according to USPS officials. USPS has a variety of limited experiences with other alternative fuel vehicles, such as compressed natural gas and plug-in electric vehicles, most of which have higher life-cycle costs than gasoline vehicles. USPS's approach for addressing its delivery fleet needs is to maintain its current fleet until it determines how to address its longer term needs. USPS has incurred small increases in direct maintenance costs over the last 5 years, which were about $2,600 per vehicle in fiscal year 2010. However, it is increasingly incurring costs for unscheduled maintenance because of breakdowns, which can disrupt operations and increase costs. In fiscal year 2010, at least 31 percent of USPS's vehicle maintenance costs were for unscheduled maintenance, 11 percentage points over USPS's 20 percent goal. USPS's financial challenges pose a significant barrier to a major delivery vehicle replacement or refurbishment, estimated to cost $5.8 billion and (in 2005) $3.5 billion, respectively. USPS and other federal and nonfederal officials see little potential to finance a fleet replacement through grants or partnerships. GAO has reported that Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a package of actions to move USPS toward financial viability. Depending on the specific actions adopted, USPS's follow-up, and the results, such an agreement could enhance its ability to invest in new delivery vehicles. USPS should develop a strategy for addressing its delivery fleet needs that considers the effects of likely operational changes, legislative fleet requirements, and other factors. USPS agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-1171T | gao_GAO-03-1171T_0 | Background
In 1993, we reported that USAID had not adequately managed changes in its overseas workforce and recommended that USAID develop a comprehensive workforce planning system to better identify staffing needs and requirements. USAID’s workforce, particularly its U.S. direct-hire foreign service officers, has decreased over the years; but in recent years program dollars and the number of countries with USAID activities have increased. USAID Faces Challenges in Workforce Planning
Since 1990, USAID has continued to evolve from an agency in which U.S. direct-hire foreign service employees directly implemented development projects to one with a declining number of direct-hire staff who oversee the contractors and grantees carrying out most of its day-to-day activities. As a result of the decreases in U.S. direct-hire foreign service staff levels, increasing program demands, and a mostly ad-hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID now faces several human capital vulnerabilities. For example, the attrition of its more experienced foreign service officers, its difficulties in filling overseas positions, and limited opportunities for training and mentoring have sometimes led to the deployment of direct- hire staff who do not have essential skills and experience and the reliance on contractors to perform many functions. In addition, USAID lacks a “surge capacity” to enable it to respond quickly to emerging crises and changing strategic priorities. As a result, according to USAID officials and a recent overseas staffing assessment, the agency is finding it increasingly difficult to manage the delivery of foreign assistance. USAID’s Workforce Planning Efforts
In response to the President’s Management Agenda, USAID has taken steps toward developing a comprehensive workforce planning and human capital management system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges and achieve its mission, but progress so far is limited. USAID’s Operating Expense Account Does Not Reflect the Full Cost of Delivering Foreign Assistance
USAID’s operating expense account does not fully reflect the agency’s cost of delivering foreign assistance, primarily because the agency pays for some administrative activities done by contractors with program funds. Because USAID’s cost of doing business is not always separated from its humanitarian and development programs—the original intent behind establishing the separate operating expense account, the amount of program funds that directly benefits a foreign recipient is likely overstated. | Why GAO Did This Study
USAID oversees humanitarian and economic assistance--an integral part of the U.S. global security strategy--to more than 160 countries. GAO recommended in 1993 that USAID develop a comprehensive workforce plan; however, human capital management continues to be a high-risk area for the agency. GAO was asked to testify on how changes in USAID's workforce over the past 10 years have affected its ability to deliver foreign aid, the agency's progress in implementing a strategic workforce planning system, and whether its reported operating expenses reflect the full costs of delivering foreign aid.
What GAO Found
USAID has evolved from an agency in which U.S. direct-hire staff directly implemented development projects to one in which U.S. direct-hire staff oversee the activities of contractors and grantees. Since 1992, the number of USAID U.S. direct-hire staff declined by 37 percent, but the number of countries with USAID programs doubled and, over the last 2 years, program funding increased more than 78 percent. As a result of these and other changes in its workforce and its mostly ad-hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several human capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of experienced foreign service officers and inadequate training and mentoring have sometimes led to the deployment of staff who lack essential skills and experience. The agency also lacks a "surge capacity" to respond to evolving foreign policy priorities and emerging crises. With fewer and less experienced staff managing more programs in more countries, USAID's ability to oversee the delivery of foreign assistance is becoming increasingly difficult. USAID has taken steps toward developing a workforce planning and human capital management system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges and achieve its mission, but it needs to do more, such as conducting a comprehensive skills assessment and including its civil service and contracted employees in its workforce planning efforts. USAID's reported that operating expenses do not always reflect the full costs of administering foreign assistance because the agency pays for some support and oversight activities done by contractors with program funds. As a result, the amount of program funds directly benefiting foreign recipients is likely overstated. |
gao_GAO-13-403T | gao_GAO-13-403T_0 | However, in recent years this dynamic may be changing. 3). The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Review Is a Critical Step in the Airline Merger and Acquisition Process
The DOJ’s review of airline mergers and acquisitions is a key step for airlines hoping to consummate a merger. For airlines, as with other industries, DOJ uses an analytical framework set forth in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the Guidelines) to evaluate merger proposals. The five factors considered by DOJ are: the relevant product and geographic markets in which the companies operate and whether the merger is likely to significantly increase concentration in those markets, which in the case of airlines principally applies to city-pair markets; the extent of potential adverse competitive effects of the merger, such as whether the merged entity will be able to charge higher prices or restrict output for the product or service it sells; whether other competitors are likely to enter the affected markets and whether they would counteract any potential anticompetitive effects that the merger might have posed; the verified “merger specific” efficiencies or other competitive benefits that may be generated by the merger and that cannot be obtained through any other means; and whether, absent the merger or acquisition, one of the firms is likely to fail, causing its assets to exit the market. For example, a proposed merger of United Airlines and US Airways was opposed by DOJ, which found that, in its view, the merger would violate antitrust laws by reducing competition, increasing air fares, and harming consumers on airline routes throughout the United States. Financial Benefits to Shareholders Drive Airline Mergers
On February 13, 2013, American and US Airways announced an agreement to merge the two airlines. The new airline would retain the American name and headquarters in Dallas-Fort Worth while the current US Airways Chief Executive Officer would keep that title with the new airline, and the current American CEO would become Chairman of the new American. A key financial benefit that airlines consider in a merger is the potential for increased revenues through additional demand (generated by more seamless travel to more destinations), increased market share, and higher fares on some routes. The American–US Airways merger is estimated by airline executives to generate $1.12 billion in revenue synergies from improved network connectivity, increased corporate and frequent flier loyalty, and optimization in the use of their aircraft. In the case of the American–US Airways merger, airline executives estimate that the merger will allow $640 million in cost savings from reducing overlapping facilities at airports and in combining purchasing, technology, and corporate activities. Passenger Airline
If approved by DOJ, the merged American-US Airways would surpass United as the largest U.S. passenger airline. Table 2 shows that combining American and US Airways Airlines would create the largest U.S. airline based on data for the four quarters ending October 2012, as measured by capacity (available seat miles) and operating revenues. Based on 2011 and 2012 ticket sample data, for 13,963 airport-pairs with a minimum level of passenger traffic per year, there would be a loss of one effective competitor in 1,665 airport pair markets affecting more than 53 million passengers by merging these airlines (see fig. 7). The combination of the two airlines would also create a new effective competitor with at least a combined 5 percent market share in 210 airport-pairs affecting 17.5 million passengers. The DOT has authority to approve antitrust immunity applications, but DOJ may also comment if it has antitrust concerns. Related GAO Products
Airline Mergers: Issues Raised by the Proposed Merger of United and Continental Airlines. Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect Competition. | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2013, American and US Airways announced plans to merge the two airlines and entered into a merger agreement. Valued at $11 billion, the merged airline would retain the American name and be headquartered in Dallas-Fort Worth. This follows the mergers of United Airlines and Continental Airlines in 2010 and the acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Delta Air Lines (Delta) in 2008. This latest merger, if not challenged by DOJ, would surpass these prior mergers in scope to create the largest passenger airline in the United States. The passenger airline industry has struggled financially over the last decade and these two airlines believe a merger will strengthen them. However, as with any merger of this magnitude, this proposal will be examined by DOJ to determine if its potential benefits for consumers outweigh the potential negative effects.
This testimony focuses on (1) the role of federal authorities in reviewing merger proposals, (2) key factors motivating airline mergers in recent years, and (3) the implications of merging American and US Airways. To address these objectives, GAO drew from its previous reports on the potential effects of prior airline mergers and the financial condition of the airline industry issued from July 2008 through May 2010. GAO also analyzed DOT's airline operating and financial data, airline financial documents, and airline schedule information since 2002.
What GAO Found
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) antitrust review will be a critical step in the proposed merger between American Airlines (American) and US Airways. DOJ uses an integrated analytical framework set forth in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines to determine whether the merger poses any antitrust concerns. Under that process, DOJ assesses, among other things, the extent of likely anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger in the relevant markets, in this case, airline city-pair markets, and the likelihood that other airlines may enter these markets and counteract any anticompetitive effects, such as higher fares. DOJ also considers efficiencies that a merger or acquisition could bring--for example, consumer benefits from an expanded route network. The Department of Transportation (DOT) aids DOJ's analysis.
Airlines seek mergers to reduce costs and improve revenues. GAO has previously reported that mergers can result in increased revenues by offering improved network connections and schedules, but also through higher fares on some routes. Cost savings can be generated by eliminating redundancies and operational efficiencies, including reducing service, but can be muted by problems in combining different aircraft, technologies, and labor forces. In the case of US Airways and American, they estimate that a merger would yield $1.4 billion in annual benefits from increased revenues and reduced costs.
If not challenged by DOJ, the merged American would surpass United to become the largest U.S. passenger airline by several measures. While US Airways and American overlap on only 12 nonstop routes, no other nonstop competitors exist on 7 of those 12. Our analysis of 2011 and 2012 ticket data also showed that combining these airlines would result in a loss of one effective competitor (defined as having at least 5 percent of total airport-pair traffic) in 1,665 airport-pair markets affecting more than 53 million passengers while creating a new effective competitor in 210 airport-pairs affecting 17.5 million passengers. However, the great majority of these markets also have other effective competitors. |
gao_NSIAD-98-202 | gao_NSIAD-98-202_0 | The U.N. Specifically, we examined (1) the contributions USAID has made to the global effort to prevent HIV/AIDS, and the methods USAID uses to provide financial oversight for its HIV/AIDS prevention activities; and (2) the extent to which UNAIDS has met its goal of leading an expanded and broad-based, worldwide response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. To determine whether UNAIDS has achieved its goal to lead an expanded and broad-based, worldwide response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, we measured progress against criteria set forth in the U.N.’s Economic and Social Council resolution endorsing the creation of a Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, the memorandum of understanding signed by the six cosponsoring agencies, and the strategic plans of the UNAIDS Secretariat and the cosponsoring agencies. USAID’s main contributions have been (1) support for research that helped to identify interventions ultimately proven in clinical trials to prevent HIV transmission; and (2) implementation of projects at the country level that increased awareness of the disease, reduced risky behaviors, and increased access to treatment of sexually transmitted diseases (STD) and to condoms, which have helped slow the spread of the disease in target groups. Under the terms of these agreements, the primary responsibility for financial oversight rests with recipients. Recipient organizations have the primary responsibility for financial management. OIG officials said that there were no indications from audits conducted of systemic problems. USAID managers primarily rely on pre-award evaluations, review of quarterly expenditure reports, and annual audits for their financial oversight of its funding recipients. The Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS Has Made Limited Progress
UNAIDS has made limited progress toward achieving its goal of leading a broad-based, expanded worldwide response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In some countries, cosponsor agencies are just beginning to work together in theme groups. Finally, the UNAIDS Secretariat has not been very successful in providing technical assistance and other support to facilitate theme group activities and has only started to establish a framework to measure performance. U.N. However, data are not available for 1997. Thus, it is not possible to determine whether UNAIDS’ first year’s efforts have led to increased spending by donors. We saw examples of private, in-country activities that indicated that companies could play an important role in the U.N.’s efforts to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS. As an international organization, the United Nations is not required to comply with the U.S. U.N. 3.2). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) prevention activities of the Agency for International Development (AID) and the United Nations' (U.N.) Joint Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), focusing on the: (1) contributions AID has made to the global effort to prevent AIDS and the methods AID uses to provide financial oversight over its AIDS prevention activities; and (2) extent to which the United Nations has met its goal of leading an expanded and broad-based, worldwide response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) AID has made important contributions to the fight against HIV/AIDS; (2) AID-supported research helped to identify interventions proven to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS that have become the basic tools for the international response to the epidemic; (3) applying these interventions, AID projects have increased awareness of the disease; changed risky behaviors; and increased access to treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and to condoms, which have helped slow the spread of the disease in the target groups; (4) under the terms of cooperative agreements with private implementing organizations, AID managers are expected to closely monitor projects, but the major responsibility for internal financial management and control rests with recipient organizations; (5) AID's financial oversight primarily consists of conducting preaward evaluations of prospective funding recipients, reviewing quarterly expenditure reports, and requiring audits; (6) officials from AID's Office of Inspector General said that there were no indications of systemic problems from audits conducted; (7) in its first 2 years of operation, the U.N. has made limited progress in achieving its goal of leading a broad-based, expanded global effort against HIV/AIDS; (8) while data indicate that spending by the cosponsors has not increased, data are not yet available to measure the U.N.'s progress in increasing spending by donor countries, the private sector, or affected countries; (9) moreover, theme groups, the forum for coordinating U.N. efforts in the field, have had a difficult start and, in some countries, cosponsor agencies are just beginning to work together; (10) the UNAIDS Secretariat has not been successful in providing technical assistance and other support to facilitate theme group activities and performance measures for the U.N.'s HIV/AIDS programs; and (11) despite the U.N.'s limited progress in meeting its objectives, GAO observed innovative and low-cost activities that were implemented by cosponsor agencies. |
gao_GAO-03-498T | gao_GAO-03-498T_0 | Of the workers in the roughly 2,300 separate state and local retirement plans nationwide, about one-third are not covered by Social Security. Nationwide Extent of Transfers to Avoid the GPO Unknown, but Expected to Grow
While we could not definitively confirm the extent nationwide that individuals are transferring positions to avoid the GPO, we found that 4,819 individuals in Texas and Georgia had performed work in Social Security-covered positions for short periods to qualify for the GPO last-day exemption. SSA officials also acknowledged that use of the exemption might be possible in some of the approximately 2,300 state and local government retirement plans in other states where such plans contain Social Security-covered and noncovered positions. In most schools, teachers typically worked a single day in a nonteaching position covered by Social Security to use the exemption. Officials told us that teachers generally agreed to work for approximately 1 year in another teaching position in a school district covered by Social Security to use the GPO exemption. Cost of Transfers to the Social Security Trust Fund is Growing, but Options Exist to Address Potential Abuse
The transfers to avoid the GPO we identified in Texas and Georgia could increase long-term benefit payments from the Social Security Trust Fund by about $450 million. 743, is to change the last-day provision to a longer minimum time period. The second option our report identified is to use a proportional approach to determine the extent to which the GPO applies. Conclusions
The GPO “loophole” raises fairness and equity concerns for those receiving a Social Security pension and currently subject to an offset of their spousal Social Security benefits. The exemption allows a select group of individuals with a relatively small investment of work time and only minimal Social Security contributions to gain access to potentially many years of full Social Security spousal benefits. While this currently represents a relatively small percentage of the Social Security Trust Fund, costs could increase significantly if the practice grows and begins to be adopted by other states and localities. Considering the potential for abuse of the last-day exemption and the likelihood for its increased use, we believe timely action is needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Government Pension Offset (GPO) exemption was enacted in 1977 to equalize the treatment of workers covered by Social Security and those with government pensions not covered by Social Security. Congress asked GAO to (1) assess the extent to which individuals retiring from jobs not covered by Social Security may be transferring briefly to covered jobs in order to avoid the GPO, and (2) estimate the impact of such transfers on the Social Security Trust Fund.
What GAO Found
Because no central data exists on use of the GPO exemption by individuals in approximately 2,300 state and local government retirement plans nationwide, GAO could not definitively confirm that this practice is occuring in states other than Texas and Georgia. In those two states, 4,819 individuals had performed work in Social Security-covered positions for short periods to qualify for the GPO last-day exemption. In Texas, teachers typically worked a single day in nontechnical positions covered by Social Security, such as clerical or janitorial positions. In Georgia, teachers generally agreed to work for approximately 1 year in another teaching position in a school district covered by Social Security. Officials in both states indicated that use of the exemption would likely continue to grow as awareness increases and it becomes part of individuals' retirement planning. For the cases GAO identified, increased long-term benefit payments from the Social Security Trust Fund could be $450 million over the long term and would likely rise further if use of the exemption grows in the states GAO visited and spreads to others. SSA officials acknowledged that use of the exemption might be possible in other state and local government retirement plans that include both those positions covered by Social Security and those not. The GPO "loophole" raises fairness and equity concerns for those receiving a Social Security pension and are currently subject to the spousal benefit offset. In the states we visited, individuals with a relatively minimal investment of work time and Social Security contributions can gain access to potentially many years of full Social Security spousal benefits. The last-day exemption could also have a more significant impact if the practice grows and begins to be adopted by other states and localities. Considering the potential for abuse, our report presented options for revising the GPO exemption, such as changing the last-day provision to a longer minimum time period or using a proportional approach based on the number of working years spent in covered and noncovered employment for determining the extent to which the GPO applies. |
gao_GAO-04-875T | gao_GAO-04-875T_0 | Background
OPS, within the Department of Transportation’s Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), administers the national regulatory program to ensure the safe transportation of natural gas and hazardous liquids by pipeline. In December 2002, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act increased these amounts to $100,000 and $1 million, respectively. Key Management Elements Are Needed to Determine the Effectiveness of OPS’s Enforcement Strategy
The effectiveness of OPS’s enforcement strategy cannot be determined because OPS has not incorporated three key elements of effective program management—clear performance goals for the enforcement program, a fully defined strategy for achieving these goals, and performance measures linked to the goals that would allow an assessment of the enforcement strategy’s impact on pipeline safety. However, although OPS began to implement these changes in 2000, it has not yet developed a policy that defines this new, more aggressive enforcement strategy or describes how the strategy will contribute to the achievement of the agency’s performance goals. To date, the agency has completed an initial set of enforcement guidelines for its operator qualification standards and has developed other draft guidelines. The three measures that OPS is considering could provide more information on the intermediate outcomes of the agency’s enforcement strategy, such as the frequency of repeat violations and the number of repairs made in response to corrective action orders, as well as other aspects of program performance, such as the timeliness of enforcement actions. While OPS’s new measures may produce better information on the performance of its enforcement program than is currently available, OPS has not adopted key practices for achieving these characteristics of successful performance measurement systems: Measures should demonstrate results (outcomes) that are directly linked to program goals. OPS Has Increased Its Use of Civil Penalties; the Effect on Deterrence Is Unclear
In 2000, in response to criticism that its enforcement activities were weak and ineffective, OPS increased both the number and the size of the civil monetary penalties it assessed. OPS Now Assesses More and Larger Civil Penalties
OPS assessed more civil penalties during the past 4 years under its current “tough but fair” enforcement approach than it did in the previous 5 years, when it took a more lenient enforcement approach. From 2000 through 2003, OPS assessed 88 civil penalties (22 per year on average) compared with 70 civil penalties from 1995 through 1999 (about 14 per year on average). Civil penalties represent about 14 percent (216 out of 1,530) of all enforcement actions taken over the past 10 years. The Effect of OPS’s Larger Civil Penalties on Deterring Noncompliance Is Unclear
Although OPS has increased both the number and the size of the civil penalties it has imposed, the effect of this change on deterring noncompliance with safety regulations, if any, is not clear. The stakeholders we spoke with expressed differing views on whether the civil penalties deter noncompliance. Pipeline safety advocacy groups that we talked to also said that the civil penalty amounts OPS imposes are too small to have any deterrent effect on pipeline operators. As discussed earlier, for 2000 through 2003, the average assessed penalty was about $29,000. | Why GAO Did This Study
Interstate pipelines carrying natural gas and hazardous liquids (such as petroleum products) are safer to the public than other modes of freight transportation. The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), the federal agency that administers the national regulatory program to ensure safe pipeline transportation, has been undertaking a broad range of activities to make pipeline transportation safer. However, the number of serious accidents--those involving deaths, injuries, and property damage of $50,000 or more--has not fallen. Among other things, OPS takes enforcement action against pipeline operators when safety problems are found. OPS has several enforcement tools to require the correction of safety violations. It can also assess monetary sanctions (civil penalties). This testimony is based on ongoing work for the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and for other committees, as required by the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002. The testimony provides preliminary results on (1) the effectiveness of OPS's enforcement strategy and (2) OPS's assessment of civil penalties.
What GAO Found
The effectiveness of OPS's enforcement strategy cannot be determined because the agency has not incorporated three key elements of effective program management--clear program goals, a well-defined strategy for achieving goals, and performance measures that are linked to program goals. Without these key elements, the agency cannot determine whether recent and planned changes in its strategy will have the desired effects on pipeline safety. Over the past several years, OPS has focused primarily on other efforts--such as developing a new risk-based regulatory approach--that it believes will change the safety culture of the industry. But, OPS also became more aggressive in enforcing its regulations, and now plans to further strengthen the management of its enforcement program. In particular, OPS is developing an enforcement policy that will help define its enforcement strategy and has taken initial steps toward identifying new performance measures. However, OPS does not plan to finalize the policy until 2005 and has not adopted key practices for achieving successful performance measurement systems, such as linking measures to goals. Incorporation of Key Program Management Elements into OPS's Enforcement Strategy OPS increased both the number and the size of the civil penalties it assessed against pipeline operators over the last 4 years (2000-2003) following a decision to be "tough but fair" in assessing penalties. OPS assessed an average of 22 penalties per year during this period, compared with an average of 14 per year for the previous 5 years (1995-1999), a period of more lenient "partnering" with industry. In addition, the average penalty increased from $18,000 to $29,000 over the two periods. About 94 percent of the 216 penalties levied from 1994 through 2003 have been paid. The civil penalty is one of several actions OPS can take when it finds a violation, and these penalties represent about 14 percent of all enforcement actions over the past 10 years. While OPS has increased the number and the size of its civil penalties, stakeholders--including industry, state, and insurance company officials and public advocacy groups--expressed differing views on whether these penalties deter noncompliance with safety regulations. Some, such as pipeline operators, thought that any penalty was a deterrent if it kept the pipeline operator in the public eye, while others, such as safety advocates, told us that the penalties were too small to be effective sanctions. |
gao_GAO-04-260 | gao_GAO-04-260_0 | IAFIS is a national, computerized system for storing, comparing, and exchanging fingerprint data in a digital format. 1). That is, the FBI’s goal is to achieve electronic (paperless) processing of all fingerprint data—and to provide a response within 2 hours to users who submit criminal fingerprints electronically. Maximizing the benefits of rapid responses under IAFIS depends largely on how quickly criminal fingerprints are submitted by local and state law enforcement agencies after arrests are made. IAFIS Processing of Criminal Fingerprints Is Important for Updating and Providing Complete Criminal History Information and Can Provide Positive Identification of Arrestees
IAFIS processing of criminal fingerprints is important to local and state law enforcement agencies not only for updating national criminal records databases but also for obtaining an individual’s complete criminal history—and, at times, for obtaining positive identification of arrestees and for immediate warrant notification. For the recent 8-month period we studied (October 2002 through May 2003), law enforcement agencies wanted a response from the FBI for 78 percent of the approximately 5.3 million criminal fingerprint sets submitted. This information can be used by various justice system officials as a basis for making fundamental decisions about detention, charging, bail, and sentencing. The extent to which law enforcement agencies use IAFIS responses to either positively identify arrestees or obtain an arrestee’s criminal history record is unclear. However, as examples, the FBI provided us summary information regarding two actual cases where quick identification responses from IAFIS prevented the release of individuals who gave false names when they were arrested and were wanted fugitives from another jurisdiction (see fig. 2). 3). Progress Has Been Made in Achieving Paperless Fingerprint Processing, with Many Factors Influencing Progress
Local and state law enforcement agencies have made progress toward the FBI’s goal of electronic (paperless) processing of criminal fingerprints in the IAFIS environment, although there is room for substantial improvement. For the recent 8-month period we studied (October 2002 through May 2003), the overall average submission time for criminal fingerprints was 40 days—whereas prior to the implementation of IAFIS, average submission times were significantly higher (e.g., 118 days in 1997). However, for many jurisdictions, delays in submitting fingerprints to IAFIS have been attributable to various factors, including lack of automation, competing priorities and resource constraints, backlogs of paper fingerprint cards to be processed, and other factors. Various Efforts Are Under Way to Improve the Timeliness of Criminal Fingerprint Submissions to IAFIS
In recent years, to encourage law enforcement agencies to submit criminal fingerprints electronically to IAFIS, the FBI has provided states with network connections, promoted the benefits of IAFIS at national conferences, and provided states with other technical assistance. The need for positive, fingerprint-based identifications— providing linkages to complete criminal history records—is not likely to diminish in the foreseeable future, given that significant numbers of arrestees have multistate criminal histories, the incidence of identity theft or identity fraud is growing, and homeland security concerns and noncriminal justice demands are increasing. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
At the request of the Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations, we addressed the following questions regarding the submission of criminal fingerprints by local and state law enforcement agencies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for processing by the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS): Why is IAFIS processing of criminal fingerprints important to local and state law enforcement agencies? What efforts are being made to improve the timeliness of criminal fingerprint submissions from local and state law enforcement agencies? | Why GAO Did This Study
By positively confirming identifications and linking relevant records of arrests and prosecutions, fingerprint analysis provides a basis for making fundamental criminal justice decisions regarding detention, charging, bail, and sentencing. In 1999, the FBI implemented the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)--a computerized system for storing, comparing, and exchanging fingerprint data in a digital format. The FBI's goal under IAFIS is to ultimately achieve paperless processing and to provide a response within 2 hours to users who submit criminal fingerprints electronically. Maximizing the benefits of rapid responses under IAFIS depends largely on how quickly criminal fingerprints are submitted by local and state law enforcement agencies. Concerns have been raised that, after arrests are made by some local or state law enforcement agencies, periods of up to 6 months may elapse before the criminal fingerprints are submitted for entry into IAFIS. GAO examined (1) the importance of IAFIS processing to local and state law enforcement agencies, (2) the progress these agencies have made toward the goal of paperless fingerprint processing, and (3) efforts being made to improve the timeliness of criminal fingerprint submissions.
What GAO Found
IAFIS processing of criminal fingerprints is important to local and state law enforcement not only for updating national databases but also for obtaining an individual's criminal history and, at times, for obtaining positive identification of arrestees. For a recent 8-month period (October 2002 through May 2003) that GAO reviewed, law enforcement agencies wanted a response from the FBI for 78 percent of the approximately 5.3 million sets of criminal fingerprints submitted to IAFIS. The extent to which these responses were used to either positively identify arrestees or obtain criminal history records is unknown. However, the FBI provided GAO with examples of how IAFIS responses prevented the premature release of individuals who had used false names at arrest and were wanted in other jurisdictions. Law enforcement agencies have made progress toward the FBI's goal of paperless processing of criminal fingerprints, although there is room for substantial improvement. The percentage of criminal fingerprints submitted electronically by state repositories to the FBI increased from 45 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 2003. Also, for the recent 8-month period GAO reviewed, the overall average submission time for criminal fingerprints was 40 days (an average that encompasses both paper and electronic submissions)--whereas, before IAFIS, average submission times were much higher (e.g., 118 days in 1997). Although much progress has been made, many jurisdictions lack automation and have backlogs of paper fingerprint cards to be processed, in part because of competing priorities and resource constraints. Numerous efforts have been made to help improve the timeliness of criminal fingerprint submissions to IAFIS. To facilitate electronic processing, federal technical and financial assistance has encouraged law enforcement agencies to purchase optical scanning (Livescan) equipment for taking fingerprints and to establish automated systems compatible with FBI standards. GAO noted that the need for quick, fingerprint-based identifications--positively linking individuals to relevant criminal history records--is becoming increasingly important. Reasons for such importance are the mobility of criminals (many of whom have multistate records), the growing incidence of identity theft or identity fraud, the significance of homeland security concerns, and increasing demands stemming from background checksrequired for employment or other noncriminal justice purposes. |
gao_GAO-16-351 | gao_GAO-16-351_0 | Congress also provided Treasury with the authority to extend its authority under EESA with respect to the Housing Finance Agency Innovation Fund for the Hardest Hit Housing Markets (Hardest Hit Fund) to December 31, 2017 for current program participants and to obligate up to $2 billion of TARP funds to that program. Treasury officials previously indicated that they cannot reliably estimate future borrower participation and likely program expenditures due to inherent limitations of the available data. While no estimate of future participation and expenditures can be made with complete certainty, our own analysis of data from Treasury and a private vendor resulted in estimates of borrower participation and cost projections that ranged from Treasury using all available MHA funds to an estimated surplus of $2.5 billion. Without Periodic Reviews of Unexpended Balances, Treasury May Miss Opportunities to Achieve Budgetary Benefits
Agencies Can Identify Opportunities for Budgetary Benefits by Reviewing Unexpended Balances
Prior GAO work has concluded that conducting reviews of unexpended balances can help agencies identify opportunities to achieve budgetary benefits. In our July 2009 report, which reviewed these estimates, we found that Treasury’s estimate may have been overstated, reflecting uncertainty resulting from data gaps and the numerous assumptions that had to be made. Treasury officials previously told us that Treasury’s mandate is to help as many struggling homeowners as possible. The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget submission indicates that Treasury is now estimating a $4.7 billion reduction in total outlays for the MHA program. We compared these estimates of future cost with available, but unused, funds as of October 16, 2015, to produce estimates of potential excess funds. Additionally, if Treasury were to deobligate MHA funds that it determines were likely to not be expended, this may provide Congress with the opportunity to use those funds for other priorities. Congress recently enacted legislation that effectively terminates entry into the MHA programs after December 31, 2016, and authorized Treasury to move up to $2 billion in TARP funds to the Hardest Hit Fund. In February 2016, Treasury deobligated $2 billion and announced plans to move these funds to the Hardest Hit Fund. By taking action to estimate likely MHA expenditures and potential excess funds, Treasury could identify additional opportunities to deobligate those funds. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To better ensure that taxpayer funds are being used effectively, Congress should consider permanently rescinding any Treasury-deobligated excess MHA balances that Treasury does not move into the Hardest Hit Fund. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide Congress and others with accurate assessments of the funding that has been and will likely be used to help troubled borrowers and to identify any potential obligations not likely to be used, the Secretary of the Treasury should (1) review potential unexpended balances by estimating future expenditures of the MHA program; and (2) deobligate funds that its review shows will likely not be expended and obligate up to $2 billion of such funds to the TARP-funded Hardest Hit Fund as authorized by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. In its comment letter, Treasury agreed with our recommendations and stated that it had updated its cost estimates for MHA and planned to deobligate $2 billion from the program, which it did on February 25, 2016. Specifically, Treasury noted that its updated cost estimates had identified an additional $2.7 billion in potential excess MHA funds but that deobligating all MHA funds in excess of the current cost estimate would unduly increase the risk of insufficient funding for future program expenditures. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to a provision in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 that requires GAO to issue a report on TARP every 60 days, this report examines to what extent the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) is reviewing unexpended balances and cost projections for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)-funded Making Home Affordable (MHA) program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2009 Treasury has obligated $27.8 billion in TARP funds through its MHA program to help struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 includes a provision for GAO to report every 60 days on TARP activities. This report examines the extent to which Treasury is reviewing unexpended balances and cost projections for the MHA programs. To do this work, GAO used 2015 mortgage and other data from a private vendor and Treasury to help illustrate potential future costs of MHA/HAMP, reviewed internal Treasury documents, and interviewed relevant federal agency officials.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) monitors activity and aggregate expenditures under its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)-funded Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, but it has not instituted a system to review the extent that it will use the full available program balance ($7.7 billion as of October 16, 2015). In a July 2009 report, GAO found that Treasury's estimates of program participation may have been overstated, reflecting uncertainty caused by data gaps and assumptions that had to be made, and recommended that Treasury periodically review and update its estimates.
In response, Treasury started performing periodic estimates of the eligible HAMP population. Treasury officials previously told GAO that they could not reliably estimate future participation levels due to data limitations and that they assumed that all available MHA funds would be spent. GAO recognizes that no estimate of future participation and expenditures can be made with certainty. But prior GAO work has concluded that reviewing unexpended balances, including those that have been obligated, can help agencies identify possible budgetary savings. Moreover, Congress's recent action to limit entry into the MHA programs after December 31, 2016, and to allow Treasury to obligate up to $2 billion in TARP funds, including MHA funds, to the Housing Finance Agency Innovation Fund for the Hardest Hit Housing Markets (Hardest Hit Fund), provides Treasury with greater certainty and opportunity with respect to estimating and reprogramming excess MHA fund balances. Since then, the President's 2017 Budget identified $4.7 billion in potential excess funds, and Treasury has announced its intention to transfer $2 billion of these funds to the Hardest Hit Fund. Officials said that deobligating additional amounts would present undue risk of having insufficient funds, and that further estimates of excess funds should await the completion of all new activity.
GAO performed its own analysis of September 2015 mortgage data to estimate potential future HAMP participation and costs. This analysis resulted in estimates of MHA program balances as of October 16, 2015, that ranged from using all available funds to a surplus of $2.5 billion. In preparing these estimates, GAO attempted to provide a wide range of possible outcomes and generally used inclusive assumptions. Thus the actual number of eligible loans is likely to be lower and the unexpended balances higher than GAO's estimates. Taking action to estimate likely MHA expenditures allows Treasury to deobligate excess funds and, as appropriate, move funds to the Hardest Hit Fund. To the extent that additional funds may be deobligated, Congress may then have the opportunity to use those funds on other priorities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making two recommendations to Treasury and has one matter for congressional consideration. Treasury should (1) estimate future expenditures for the MHA program and any unexpended balances and (2) deobligate funds that its review shows will likely not be expended and move up to $2 billion of such funds to the TARP-funded Hardest Hit Fund as authorized. Congress should consider permanently rescinding any deobligated MHA funds that are not moved to the Hardest Hit Fund and make them available for other priorities. Treasury agreed with our recommendations and indicated that it has updated its cost estimates and subsequently deobligated $2 billion of MHA funds on February 25, 2016. |
gao_GAO-07-356 | gao_GAO-07-356_0 | In 1982, Congress enacted the Coastal Barrier Resources Act to minimize (1) the loss of human life; (2) wasteful expenditures of federal revenue; and (3) damage to fish, wildlife, and other natural resources associated with coastal barriers along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts by restricting future federal expenditures and financial assistance, which have the effect of encouraging development of coastal barriers. CBRA has no provisions prohibiting the administration of federal regulatory activities, such as issuing certain permits, within the CBRS. Three federal agencies—the Corps, EPA, and the U.S. Coast Guard—issue permits that regulate, among other things, the discharge of dredged or fill material into federally regulated waters, including wetlands; the discharge of wastes into navigable waters; and the construction of bridges over navigable waters. We found that factors such as the lack of suitably developable land in the unit and state laws discouraging development were responsible for inhibiting development. We also determined that an estimated 13 percent of CBRS units experienced minimal levels of development—consisting of less than 20 additional structures per unit since becoming part of the CBRS—while 3 percent of CBRS units experienced significant development—100 or more additional structures per unit. According to local officials, commercial interest and public desire to build in some units and local government support for development were some of the key factors contributing to the development in the CBRS units we reviewed. Lack of Accessibility to the Unit. A number of CBRS units include land owned by entities seeking to preserve the area in its natural state. A Small Percentage of Units Have Experienced Some Level of Development, but Significant Development Has Been Concentrated in a Few Units
Although the majority of CBRS units remain undeveloped, 16 percent have experienced some level of development. Availability of Affordable Private Flood Insurance. The Extent to Which Federal Agencies Have Provided Financial Assistance and Permits to Entities in CBRS Units Varies
We found that federal agencies have provided some financial assistance prohibited by CBRA, some assistance allowed by CBRA, and hundreds of permits for federally regulated construction projects to entities within the CBRS units included in our review. Four agencies provided financial assistance expressly prohibited by CBRA to property owners in CBRS units. As a result, we were unable to determine the total extent of such assistance. 2. 3. 4. Federal Agencies Have Provided Assistance That Is Allowable under CBRA, but the Extent of Such Assistance Is Unknown
We found that three federal agencies had provided financial assistance allowable under CBRA to entities within the CBRS. All of the permits were associated with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), primarily to allow storm water discharges from construction sites or for discharges from water or wastewater treatment systems. Conclusions
Although CBRA has limited the amount of federal financial assistance provided to some CBRS units, it does not appear to have been a major factor in discouraging development in those CBRS units that have developable land, local government and public support for development, and access to affordable private flood insurance. Recommendations for Executive Action
In light of the federal financial assistance that was provided in violation of CBRA, we are recommending that the Secretaries of DHS, HUD, and VA, and the Administrator of SBA direct their agencies to (1) obtain official determinations from the FWS on whether the properties we identified as receiving federal assistance in violation of CBRA are in fact located within a CBRS unit and if they are, cancel all inappropriate loan guarantees and insurance policies that have been made to the owners of these properties and (2) examine their policies and procedures to ensure that they are adequate to prevent federal assistance that is prohibited by CBRA from being provided to entities in CBRS units. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to address issues related to the Coastal Barrier Resources Act, as amended, (CBRA) by reviewing development that has occurred and federal funding that has been provided within the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources System (CBRS). It is within this area that new development—three single-family homes—has occurred since the unit’s inclusion in the CBRS. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1982, Congress enacted the Coastal Barrier Resources Act. The Coastal Barrier Resources Act, as amended (CBRA), designates 585 units of undeveloped coastal lands and aquatic habitat as the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources System (CBRS). CBRA prohibits most federal expenditures and assistance within the system that could encourage development, but it allows federal agencies to provide some types of assistance and issue certain regulatory permits. In 1992, GAO reported that development was occurring in the CBRS despite restrictions on federal assistance. GAO updated its 1992 report and reviewed the extent to which (1) development has occurred in CBRS units since their inclusion in the system and (2) federal financial assistance and permits have been provided to entities in CBRS units. GAO electronically mapped address data for structures within 91 randomly selected CBRS units and collected information on federal financial assistance and permits for eight federal agencies.
What GAO Found
An estimated 84 percent of CBRS units remain undeveloped, while 16 percent have experienced some level of development. About 13 percent of the developed units experienced minimal levels of development--typically consisting of less than 20 additional structures per unit since becoming part of the CBRS, and about 3 percent experienced significant development--consisting of 100 or more structures per unit--since becoming part of the CBRS. According to federal and local officials, CBRA has played little role in the extent of development within the CBRS units that we reviewed because they believe that other factors have been more important in inhibiting development. These include (1) the lack of suitably developable land in the unit; (2) the lack of accessibility to the unit; (3) state laws discouraging development within coastal areas; and (4) ownership of land within the unit by groups, such as the National Audubon Society, who are seeking to preserve its natural state. In units that GAO reviewed where development had occurred, federal and local officials also identified a number of factors that have contributed to development despite the unit's inclusion in the CBRS. These include (1) a combination of commercial interest and public desire to build in the unit, (2) local government support for development, and (3) the availability of affordable private flood insurance. Multiple federal agencies have provided some financial assistance to property owners in CBRS units that is expressly prohibited by CBRA; some assistance allowed under CBRA; and hundreds of permits for federally regulated development activities within the unit. Specifically, four agencies--the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Small Business Administration--provided financial assistance, such as flood insurance and loan guarantees, totaling about $21 million that is prohibited by CBRA to property owners in CBRS units. Although most of these agencies had processes in place to prevent such assistance from being provided, they cited problems with inaccurate maps as being a key factor leading to these errors. With regard to financial assistance allowed by CBRA, GAO found that three federal agencies have provided such assistance but did not track how much assistance they provided, so the total extent of this assistance is unknown. With regard to permits issued in CBRS units for federally regulated activities, GAO identified hundreds of permits issued by the Army Corps of Engineers and state agencies authorized to issue permits on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency. These permits covered various activities such as the construction of piers, the discharge of dredged or fill material into federally regulated waters, and permits associated with water discharges from construction sites or wastewater treatment systems. |
gao_GAO-08-529 | gao_GAO-08-529_0 | All States Whose Officials We Interviewed Include Death as a Critical Incident
All 14 states whose officials we interviewed included death among individuals with developmental disabilities as a critical incident in their waiver programs. Consistent with CMS’s expectation that states review critical incidents, the developmental disabilities agencies in 13 of the 14 states we interviewed had processes in place to review deaths. Six Basic Mortality Review Components Identified as Important by Experts Are Used by Most States Whose Officials We Interviewed
All but 1 of the 14 states whose officials we interviewed included most of the six basic mortality review components experts identified as important when reviewing deaths among individuals with developmental disabilities; however, states varied somewhat in how they implemented these components. For example, some states’ officials said they reviewed unexpected deaths only, whereas others reviewed deaths of all developmentally disabled individuals receiving state-funded services. Screening and reviews in most states were typically conducted at a local level, such as a county or region, and review findings led to local actions, such as tailored training with individual providers, to address quality of care. The woman died of pancreatitis while living in a community group home and receiving Medicaid HCBS waiver services. This region increased its educational outreach to families on the topic of choking prevention. Combined, 13 of 50 states did not aggregate mortality data, and 37 did. Officials in Several States in Which We Conducted Interviews Believed Mortality Reviews Reduce Risk of Death and Improve Quality of Care
Officials in several states in which we conducted interviews said they believed that their mortality review processes had reduced the risk of death and served as one means for improving the quality of services provided in their HCBS waiver programs. In general, these additional components—using state-level interdisciplinary mortality review committees, involvement of external stakeholders, taking statewide actions based on mortality information to improve care, and public reporting—gave the mortality reviews in these states greater accountability and transparency. Eleven of the 14 states had adopted at least one of the additional components. For example, 6 of the 14 states had interdisciplinary mortality review committees that provided additional oversight and added value to local mortality review efforts. The developmental disabilities agency publicly reports mortality information, such as posting on its Web site aggregated data about the number and causes of deaths among individuals who received care by the agency. Combined, 24 of 50 states reported having a state-level review committee, and 26 did not. In 6 of the 14 states in which protection and advocacy officials were not notified of deaths among individuals with developmental disabilities, protection and advocacy agency officials told us that state developmental disabilities agencies should be required to notify their protection and advocacy agencies of these deaths. Mortality Reviews Result in Statewide Actions to Address Similar Care Concerns and to Help Prevent Deaths in Most of the 14 States
In 11 of the 14 states, mortality reviews resulted in statewide actions to address similar quality-of-care concerns and to help prevent avoidable deaths among individuals with developmental disabilities. Nearly all of the 14 states had some processes in place for conducting mortality reviews of individuals with developmental disabilities, even though CMS does not have an expectation for states to review deaths as critical incidents under the waiver program. However, based on information provided by all states nationwide, (1) 13 states did not aggregate mortality data (a basic component for mortality reviews), (2) 26 states did not utilize an interdisciplinary mortality review committee to review deaths among individuals with developmental disabilities (an additional component), and (3) 20 states had not taken a statewide action to improve care based on mortality review information (an additional component). Moreover, the extent to which states other than the 14 whose officials we interviewed identified death as a critical incident has not been established. | Why GAO Did This Study
Deaths of individuals with developmental disabilities due to poor quality of care have been highlighted in the media. Prior GAO work has raised concerns about inadequate safeguards for such individuals receiving care through state Medicaid home and community-based services (HCBS) waivers. CMS approves and oversees these waivers. Safeguards include the review of, and follow-up action to, critical incidents--events that harm or have the potential to harm waiver beneficiaries. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which states (1) include, as a critical incident, deaths among individuals with developmental disabilities in waiver programs; (2) have basic components in place to review such deaths; and (3) have adopted additional components to review deaths. GAO interviewed state developmental disabilities agency officials and external stakeholders in 14 states, e-mailed a survey to 35 states and D.C., interviewed experts, and reviewed documents.
What GAO Found
All 14 states whose officials GAO interviewed included death among individuals with developmental disabilities as a critical incident in their waiver programs. The developmental disabilities agencies in all 14 states required waiver service providers to report such deaths to the agencies. Consistent with CMS's expectation that states review critical incidents, nearly all states had processes in place to review these deaths. The extent to which states other than these 14 identified death as a critical incident has not been established. All but 1 of the 14 states included most of the six basic mortality review components identified as important by experts when reviewing deaths among individuals with developmental disabilities, but states varied somewhat in how they implemented components. For example, some states reviewed unexpected deaths only, while other states reviewed all deaths of individuals receiving Medicaid HCBS services. Mortality reviews were typically conducted at a local level, such as a county or region. Review findings led to local actions, such as tailored training with individual providers, to address quality of care. Officials in 13 of the 14 states reported that they aggregated mortality data, for example, by cause of death and age, whereas nationwide, 37 of 50 states aggregated mortality data and 13 states did not. For example, one California region observed an increase in choking deaths among individuals with developmental disabilities in 2007 and increased its educational outreach to families about choking prevention. Officials in several states said they believed their mortality reviews had reduced the risk of death and led to improvements in the quality of their HCBS waiver services. Four of the 14 states incorporated all additional components for more comprehensive mortality reviews. In general, these four additional components--state-level interdisciplinary mortality review committees, involvement of external stakeholders, statewide actions to address problems, and public reporting--gave the mortality reviews in these states greater accountability and transparency. Eleven of the 14 states had adopted at least one of these additional components. For example, 6 of the 14 states had interdisciplinary mortality review committees that reviewed deaths and that provided additional oversight to local review efforts, whereas nationwide, 24 of 50 states had review committees, and 26 states did not. In 6 of the 14 states, developmental disabilities agencies were not required to report deaths to the state protection and advocacy agencies, a key external stakeholder with authority to investigate deaths involving suspected abuse and neglect. Mortality reviews in 11 of the 14 states resulted in statewide actions, such as the issuance of safety alerts or new risk-prevention practices, to address quality-of-care concerns. Nationwide, 30 of 50 states took a statewide action to improve care, while 20 states did not. Four of the 14 states publicly reported mortality review information, such as posting annual mortality reports on their agency Web sites. |
gao_RCED-96-113 | gao_RCED-96-113_0 | Assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may be provided if the President, at a state governor’s request, declares that an emergency or disaster exists and that federal resources are required to supplement state and local resources. These included changes in (1) the building codes applicable to the repair and restoration of damaged buildings and (2) the damage threshold governing the decision on whether to repair or replace a damaged facility. To determine how FEMA ensures that funds are expended only for eligible items, we reviewed FEMA’s written guidance and procedures for disbursing funds to public assistance grantees. Criteria for Determining Eligibility of Certain Private Nonprofit Applicants Are Unclear
Before 1970, private nonprofits were not eligible for public assistance. Under the uniform requirements, it is the states’ responsibility, rather than FEMA’s, to ensure that all costs applied against FEMA funding are eligible. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Director of FEMA stated that FEMA conducts final inspections and project reviews to verify the actual eligible costs for large projects “in which the grantee is required to make an accounting to FEMA of eligible costs.”
FEMA public assistance program officials generally believe that the states’ reviews are adequate to ensure that disbursements are made only for eligible items; conversely, FEMA’s Deputy Inspector General advised us that the quality of the states’ closeout reviews varies considerably from state to state and that he does not rely on the closeout reviews as adequate assurance that all costs charged against the DSR were proper, especially when many states’ disaster recovery personnel view themselves as advocates for the subgrantees. Following are the options that the FEMA respondents rated most highlywhen considering changes to the eligibility criteria that could reduce the public assistance program’s costs. Restrict eligibility of public facilities to those being actively used for public purposes at the time of the disaster. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) public assistance program, focusing on: (1) its procedures for determining eligibility for public assistance; (2) its efforts to ensure that funds are spent in accordance with authorized work; and (3) options to modify FEMA eligibility criteria.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) while FEMA must fund the restoration of eligible facilities in accordance with applicable building codes, it is unclear whether the building codes that existed before the disaster or at the time of restoration should apply; (2) the eligibility of certain private, nonprofit facilities that provide essential governmental services to the general public is unclear; (3) without clear eligibility criteria, FEMA cannot control program costs or ensure consistent eligibility determinations; (4) eligibility determinations were not systematically codified and disseminated to FEMA personnel; (5) FEMA relies on states, independent audits, and its inspector general to ensure that federal funds are only spent on eligible restorations; and (6) changing various eligibility requirements in accordance with FEMA program officials' recommendations could reduce FEMA public assistance program costs. |
gao_GAO-05-813 | gao_GAO-05-813_0 | The Basic Pilot Program, as a voluntary, automated verification program, offers a mechanism with potential to enhance the employment verification process by reducing document fraud. However, existing weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of the program to detect identity fraud, delays in entering data into DHS databases, and some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements, could become more significant and additional resources could be needed if employer participation in the program greatly increased or was made mandatory. Current Employment Verification Process Based on Employers’ Review of Documents
In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on employers’ review of documents presented by employees to prove identity and work eligibility. Employers must then certify that they have reviewed the documents presented by their employees to establish identity and work eligibility and that the documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. Document and Identity Fraud Have Undermined the Form I-9 Process
Since the passage of IRCA in 1986, document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with IRCA to ensure that they employ only authorized workers through the current verification and reverification processes. In 1998, INS proposed a further reduction in the number of acceptable work eligibility documents to 14 but did not finalize the proposed rule. Additionally, some of the employers, employer associations, and immigration experts we interviewed for this review told us that the large number of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility and the fact that the Form I-9 has not been updated have impeded employer efforts to verify employment eligibility. Current Program May Not Complete Timely Verifications if Use Greatly Increased
According to USCIS officials, due to the growth in other USCIS verification programs, current USCIS staff may not be able to complete timely verifications if the number of employers using the Basic Pilot Program were to significantly increase. Since fiscal year 1999, the number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers for violations of IRCA and the number of administrative worksite arrests have declined, which, according to ICE, are due to various factors, such as the widespread use of counterfeit documents that make it difficult for ICE agents to prove employer violations. Worksite Enforcement Has Been a Relatively Low Priority for ICE, but ICE Has Proposed Additional Resources for the Program
Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs formerly managed by INS and now managed by ICE, and competes for resources with these other program areas, such as alien smuggling and fraud. Various studies have shown that the availability and use of fraudulent documents have made it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers knowingly hire unauthorized workers. After September 11, 2001, INS and ICE focused investigative resources on national security cases and, in particular, focused worksite enforcement efforts on critical infrastructure protection, which is consistent with DHS’s primary mission to combat terrorism. To assist Congress and ICE in determining the resources needed for the worksite enforcement program and to help ensure the efficient and effective use of program resources, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for ICE to take the following two actions: establish additional output goals and measures for the worksite enforcement program to clearly indicate the target level of ICE worksite enforcement activity and the resources needed to implement the program, and set a specific time frame for completing the assessment and development of outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement program to provide a target level of performance for worksite enforcement efforts and measures to assess the extent to which program results have met program goals. We analyzed former INS plans for addressing Form I-9 challenges, including its plans to modify the list of acceptable work eligibility documents. We also examined U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) interim guidelines on the electronic Forms I-9 to determine what guidance, if any, they provide to employers using the electronic form. | Why GAO Did This Study
The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets attracting illegal immigrants to the United States. Immigration experts state that strategies to deter illegal immigration require both a reliable employment eligibility verification process and a worksite enforcement capacity to ensure that employers comply with immigration-related employment laws. This report examines (1) the current employment verification (Form I-9) process and challenges, if any, facing verification; and (2) the priorities and resources of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) worksite enforcement program and any challenges in implementing the program.
What GAO Found
The current employment verification process is based on employers' review of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have reviewed employees' documents and that the documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. However, various studies have shown that document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with the employment verification process to hire only authorized workers and easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility have also hindered verification efforts. In 1997, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued an interim rule on a reduction in the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 1998, proposed a further reduction, but this proposal has not yet been finalized. DHS is currently reviewing the list of acceptable work eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame for completing this review. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which participating employers electronically verify employees' work eligibility, has potential to help enhance the verification process and substantially reduce document fraud. Yet, current weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of the program to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its databases, and some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements could, if not addressed, have a significant impact on the program's success. Furthermore, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officials stated that the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete timely verifications if the number of employers using the program significantly increased. Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE, worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent with DHS's mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites to help address those sites' vulnerabilities. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of employer notices of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests have generally declined, according to ICE, due to various factors such as document fraud, which makes it difficult to prove employer violations. ICE has not yet developed outcome goals and measures for its worksite enforcement program, which, given limited resources and competing priorities for those resources, may hinder ICE's efforts to determine resources needed for the program. |
gao_GAO-04-357 | gao_GAO-04-357_0 | Commerce may conduct a PSV check on any controlled item it licenses that is exported from the United States. During fiscal years 2000 to 2002, Commerce approved 70 percent of the license applications it received for exports of dual-use items to countries of concern. Commerce Approves Most Dual-Use Export Licenses to Countries of Concern
Between 2000 and 2002, Commerce approved 70 percent of dual-use export licenses to countries of concern—a total of 7,680 licenses for exports to China, India, Israel, Russia, and others. First, PSVs do not confirm compliance with license conditions because U.S. officials frequently do not check license conditions; they often lack the technical training to assess compliance; and end users may not be aware of the license conditions by which they are to abide. Second, some countries of concern, most notably China, limit the U.S. government’s access to facilities where dual-use items are shipped, making it difficult to verify whether exported items are being used as intended. Third, PSV results have only a limited impact on future licensing decisions. Companies receiving an unfavorable PSV will be subject to greater scrutiny in the future but can still obtain an export license. Additionally, according to Commerce officials, past PSV results play only a minor role in future enforcement actions. The agents rated 57 (55 percent) of these checks favorable; that is, the item had arrived at its intended destination and was being used for the purposes stated in the license, although the agents did not visit the end user. However, during fiscal years 2000 to 2002, Commerce only checked 6 percent of dual-use licenses for countries of concern. Scope and Methodology
We were asked to (1) assess the number of dual-use export licenses approved and subject to post-shipment verification (PSV), and (2) evaluate how the PSV process ensures that sensitive exports are used as intended. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States controls certain dual-use technologies that could be used to enhance the military capabilities of countries of concern. The Department of Commerce (Commerce) conducts post-shipment verification (PSV) checks to ensure that these technologies arrive at their intended destination and are used for the purposes stated in the export license. GAO was asked to (1) assess the number of dual-use export licenses approved and subject to postshipment verification and (2) evaluate how the PSV process ensures that sensitive exports are used as intended.
What GAO Found
The Department of Commerce approved 26,340 licenses for the export of dual-use items during fiscal years 2000 to 2002. Twenty-eight percent of these licenses involved dual-use exports to countries of concern such as China, India, and Russia. However, Commerce conducted PVC checks on few of these licenses. We found that, during fiscal years 2000 to 2002, Commerce completed PSV checks on 428, or about 6 percent, of the dual-use licenses it approved for countries of concern. Commerce and other departments attached conditions to nearly all (99 percent) of the licenses for countries of concern to alleviate concerns about potential diversion or misuse. We identified three key weaknesses in the PSV process that reduce the effectiveness of this important activity. First, PSVs do not confirm compliance with license conditions because U.S. officials frequently do not check license conditions, they often lack the technical training to assess compliance, and end users may not be aware of the license conditions by which they are to abide. Second, some countries of concern, most notably China, limit the U.S. government's access to facilities where dual-use items are shipped, making it difficult to conduct a PSV. Third, PSV results have only a limited impact on future licensing decisions. Companies receiving an unfavorable PSV may receive greater scrutiny in future license applications, but they can still receive an export license. In addition, according to Commerce officials, past PSV results play only a minor role in future Enforcement actions. |
gao_GAO-03-296 | gao_GAO-03-296_0 | While most companies that lease federal lands pay their royalties in cash, the federal government can instead take a portion of the oil and gas that these companies produce—known as “taking royalties in kind.” The Congress authorized royalties in kind under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953. Standard leases for the exploration of oil and gas on federal properties reserve the right for the federal government to take its royalties in kind. MMS Has Taken Increasing Amounts of Royalties in Kind Since 1995 to Meet Several Objectives
From January 1995 through September 2001, MMS took 178 million barrels of oil and 213 billion cubic feet of gas in kind primarily for three purposes: (1) to provide small refiners with a stable source of crude oil, (2) to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), and (3) to study alternatives to the traditional system of cash royalty payments. MMS Takes Oil in Kind and Sells It to Small Refiners
From January 1995 through September 2001, MMS sold to small refiners about 143 million barrels of oil, or about 25 percent of the federal government’s royalty share of all oil produced on federal lands during this time period. This amount represented about 17 percent of the federal government’s royalty share of all oil produced on federal lands in each of these 2 years, as shown in figure 1. However, MMS has yet to develop several key management control activities and does not plan to develop them until 2004, when it will consider the RIK Program to have changed from a pilot status to a fully operational status. MMS Has Begun to Establish Management Control
MMS has begun to establish management control over its RIK Program by addressing the risk that oil and gas sales will be unsuccessful, addressing inherent risks associated with the sale of oil and gas, and developing written procedures for various activities within the Royalty-in-Kind Program. MMS also has made progress in documenting the results of its RIK sales. However, MMS has not established clear objectives for the program that are linked to statutory requirements. In addition to the lack of objectives linked to statutory requirements, MMS is not systematically collecting the necessary information to monitor and evaluate the RIK program. Without clear objectives and the systematic collection of evaluative information, MMS cannot assess and ultimately determine whether it should expand or contract the use of royalty in kind sales. Recommendations for Executive Action
To continue the further development of management control for the Minerals Management Service’s Royalty-in-Kind Program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior instruct the appropriate managers within the Minerals Management Service to do the following: Clarify the Royalty-in-Kind Program’s strategic objectives to explicitly state that goals of the Royalty-in-Kind pilots include obtaining fair market value and collecting at least as much revenue as MMS would have collected in cash royalty payments. 5. 6. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2001, the federal government collected $7.5 billion in royalties from the sale of oil and gas produced on federal lands. Although most oil and gas companies pay royalties in cash, the Department of the Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS) has the option to take a percentage of the oil and gas produced and either transfer this percentage to other federal agencies or to sell this percentage itself--known as "taking royalties in kind." GAO reviewed the extent to which MMS has taken royalties in kind since 1995, the reasons for taking royalties in kind, and MMS's progress in implementing management control over its Royalty-in-Kind Program.
What GAO Found
From January 1995 through September 2001, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) took, in kind, 178 million barrels of oil and 213 billion cubic feet of gas, or 32 percent of the federal government's royalty share of all oil and 3 percent of the federal government's royalty share of all gas produced on federal lands. MMS sold the majority of this oil--143 million barrels--to small refiners in accordance with long-standing legislation. MMS also took 29 million barrels of federal royalty oil to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. MMS took the remaining 6 million barrels of oil in kind and all the gas in kind under a series of pilot projects to evaluate whether there are additional circumstances under which taking royalties in kind is in the best interest of the federal government. MMS personnel have made progress in implementing some components of management control for its Royalty-in-Kind Program, such as addressing the risks associated with oil and gas sales and developing written procedures. However, MMS does not plan to complete and implement all management controls until 2004, when it will consider the Royalty-in-Kind pilots to have changed from a pilot stage to a fully operational stage and when it will have acquired additional systems support. To date, MMS has not developed clear strategic objectives linked to statutory requirements nor collected the necessary information to effectively monitor and evaluate the Royalty-in-Kind Program. Without clear objectives linked to statutory requirements and the collection of necessary information, MMS cannot systematically assess whether Royalty-in-Kind sales are administratively less costly, whether they generate fair market value or at least as much revenue as traditional cash royalty, payments, and thus whether MMS should expand or contract the Royalty-in-Kind Program. |
gao_GAO-15-624 | gao_GAO-15-624_0 | IRS requests funding by appropriation accounts, which align broadly with its strategic goals, which are to (1) deliver high quality and timely service to reduce taxpayer burden and encourage voluntary compliance; and (2) effectively enforce the law to ensure compliance with tax responsibilities and combat fraud. The President’s fiscal year 2016 budget request includes $3.24 billion for IRS IT investments. Funding Declined for Most IRS Business Units and Tradeoffs to Manage Reductions May Affect Some Programs’ Effectiveness and Increase Risk
Fifteen of Eighteen Business Units Decreased Spending
IRS’s total appropriations declined from a high of $12.1 billion in fiscal year 2010 to $11.3 billion in fiscal year 2014, a reduction of about 7 percent. For example, SB/SE, which was the largest business unit in fiscal year 2010, experienced a 14 percent decrease in obligations—from $2.6 billion to $2.3 billion—from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014. Selected Business Units Scaled Back Activities, Potentially Reducing Program Effectiveness or Increasing Risk to IRS and the Federal Government
Each business unit we examined—HCO, Office of Chief Counsel, and SB/SE—took actions to absorb budget reductions. According to IRS officials, statutorily mandated activities—such as tax litigation in the Office of Chief Counsel—remained a priority. Examples of Programs and Services Reduced or Eliminated
Non-filer investigations. Examples of Deferred Programs or Acquisitions
Software acquisitions. Background reinvestigations. For fiscal year 2016, the President’s Budget requests $3.5 million and 11 FTEs for IRS to implement federal investigative standards, which includes reinvestigations of employees. IRS Is Using Its Budgeting Flexibility and Taking Steps to Improve Agency-Wide Coordination of Budget Decisions
IRS Has Flexibility in Spending User Fee Revenue
In fiscal year 2015, IRS plans to allocate less user fee revenue to the taxpayer services account than in previous years ($49 million, compared to around $180 million in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014). IRS transferred $416 million of that money to its appropriation accounts which accounted for 3.4 percent of IRS’s total available resources. Ultimately, IRS’s budget decreased $346 million from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2015, a 3.1 percent decline. IRS Is Working to Increase Agency-Wide Coordination in Budget Decisions in Response to Constrained Budget Environment
Recently, IRS launched two efforts to increase management coordination in budget formulation and execution decisions. IRS Reported on Major IT Investments in Its Fiscal Year 2016 Congressional Justification, but Some Information Was Inaccurate or Unclear
IRS Provided Inaccurate Data to the Congress
In its fiscal year 2016 CJ, IRS provided detailed information about its major IT investments, as it did in the 2014 and 2015 CJs; however, the information provided on actual obligations to date was inaccurate, due to potential deficiencies in some internal controls over the preparation of the CJ. Because the CJ reports inaccurate information about amounts obligated to date for most of the 20 listed major IT investments, Congress does not have accurate, reliable, and current data to inform its budget decisions or aid in its oversight. Some IT Investment Information Was Unclear Because IRS Did Not Use Standard Definitions
IRS reported information on “life-cycle cost” and “projected useful life of the current asset” for each major IT investment in the fiscal year 2016 CJ, but did not use standard definitions for these terms or define or explain the terms in such a way that they could be understood and used. IRS Is Taking Steps to Implement GAO Recommendations, Including Those Related to Greater Use of Return on Investment Data and Improvements in the PPACA Cost Estimate
As of February 2015, we have 88 open recommendations and 8 matters for congressional consideration that could have financial implications if implemented. IRS has made progress in response to this recommendation. We also recommended that IRS calculate actual ROI for implemented initiatives. Updated PPACA Cost Estimate Showed Improvement and Met or Substantially Met Criteria in Three of Four Overall Categories, but Is Still Not Considered Reliable
IRS’s PPACA cost estimate identifies the costs of planning, developing and implementing the IT systems needed to support its role in implementing PPACA. Encompasses the planning, development, and implementation of IT systems needed to support IRS’s tax administration responsibilities associated with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Status IRS’s Research, Analysis, and Statistics Division has begun to estimate marginal direct revenues and marginal costs attributable to specific compliance projects within its correspondence exam program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The financing of the federal government depends largely upon IRS's ability to collect taxes, including providing taxpayer services that make voluntary compliance easier and enforcing tax laws to ensure compliance with tax responsibilities. For fiscal year 2016, the President requested $12.9 billion in appropriations for IRS; the request is almost $2 billion (18 percent) more than IRS's fiscal year 2015 appropriation.
Because of the size of IRS's budget and the importance of its service and compliance programs for all taxpayers, GAO was asked to review the fiscal year 2016 budget request for IRS and the effects of recent budget constraints. In February 2015, GAO reported interim information on IRS's budget. This report (1) analyzes select IRS business units' budget and staffing; (2) describes how IRS is managing in a constrained budget environment; (3) assesses key data for IT investments; and (4) describes IRS progress in implementing selected GAO open recommendations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2016 CJ, IRS and Office of Management and Budget guidance, and IRS data from fiscal years 2010 to 2014, and interviewed IRS officials.
What GAO Found
Business unit trends. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) total appropriations declined from a high of $12.1 billion in fiscal year 2010 to $11.3 billion in fiscal year 2014, a reduction of about 7 percent. GAO selected business units with large declines in obligations—both dollar amount and percent—from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014, the most current spending data available. To absorb budget cuts, the business units GAO reviewed—Human Capital Office, Office of Chief Counsel, and Small Business/Self-Employed Division—each reduced staff (full-time equivalents or FTEs) by 16 to 30 percent. According to officials, they also prioritized legally required programs, such as tax litigation, and reduced some programs or services, such as limiting non-filer investigations, postponing software acquisitions, and delaying approximately 24,000 employee background reinvestigations. Such scaled back activities potentially reduce program effectiveness or increase risk to IRS and the federal government.
Budget environment. IRS's budget decreased by an additional $346 million from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2015. IRS used its flexibility to absorb this reduction by allocating user fee revenue, which comprised 3.4 percent of its budget, or $416 million, in fiscal year 2014. Additionally, to increase agency-wide coordination of budget decisions, IRS formed a new office and committee to inform budget formulation and execution decisions.
Information technology data. IRS requested $3.2 billion for information technology (IT) investments. This accounted for 23 percent of IRS's budget request for fiscal year 2016. However, IRS provided inaccurate data on actual obligations to date for major IT investments in its congressional justification (CJ) for fiscal year 2016. As a result, Congress does not have accurate, reliable, and complete data on IT investments to inform its budget decisions or aid in its oversight. Additionally, IRS did not use standard definitions for “life-cycle cost” and “projected useful life of the current asset” or explain the terms in a way that could be understood and used.
Open GAO recommendations. Eighty-eight recommendations and eight matters for congressional consideration could have financial implications if implemented. IRS made progress implementing many recommendations, including two particularly important ones. First, IRS has begun to estimate return on investment for specific compliance projects within its correspondence exam program. Second, IRS's updated cost estimate for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act improved from previous versions and met or substantially met the criteria in three of four overall categories, but is still not reliable because it only partially met the criteria in the overall credibility category.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS implement controls to ensure that information reported on major IT investments is accurate, define key terms in the CJ, and continue implementing previous recommendations. IRS agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-436 | gao_GAO-03-436_0 | Background
Since the 1970s, progress has been made in reducing the number of fatalities and injuries on our nation’s roads, but the numbers are still significant. From 1975 through 2001, annual fatalities decreased from 44,525 to 42,116, or about 5 percent. Figure 1 shows the yearly number of fatalities and the rate of fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled. One of the most significant studies to date on the factors that contribute to motor vehicle crashes was the Tri-Level Study of the Causes of Traffic Accidents, conducted in the 1970s by the Indiana University at Bloomington Institute for Research in Public Safety. In examining the causes of motor vehicle crashes, a number of experts and studies identified three categories of factors that contribute to crashes— human, roadway environment, and vehicle factors. Human factors involve the actions taken by or the condition of the driver of the automobile, including speeding and other traffic violations, as well as the effects of alcohol or drugs, inattention, decision errors, and age. Vehicle factors include vehicle-related failures and vehicle design issues that contribute to a crash. In general, human factors are considered to be the most prevalent factor contributing to crashes, followed by roadway environment and vehicle factors. Roadway Environment Contributes to Motor Vehicle Crashes
The roadway environment is generally cited as the second most prevalent factor contributing to crashes by data, experts, and studies. Federal Research Directed at Better Understanding of Factors That Contribute to Crashes
Various modal agencies within the Department of Transportation have research projects underway and planned that address aspects of crash causes. For example, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and NHTSA are conducting a study on the causes and contributing factors to large truck crashes. NHTSA is also funding the 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study, which involves collecting data about crashes and near misses from 100 vehicles equipped with sensors. In addition to possible follow-on research on the above projects, planned research includes a Transportation Research Board proposal for a 6-year program that would, among other things, involve installing sensors and other data collection devices on over 5,000 vehicles. This 1-year, $3 million driving research study involves collecting data from 100 vehicles equipped with various sensors and cameras. Drive Atlanta Study
Later this year, NHTSA will begin a 2-year, $3.1 million Drive Atlanta Study, which involves installing data recorders in 1,100 vehicles to develop information on situations and circumstances where excessive speed contributes to crashes. Within DOT, we interviewed officials from the Volpe Center, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the Federal Highway Administration. In general, the officials and experts provided information about major factors that contribute to motor vehicle crashes and research on these factors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nearly 6.3 million motor vehicle crashes occurred in the United States in 2001, or one crash every 5 seconds. On average, a person was injured in these crashes every 10 seconds, and someone was killed every 12 minutes. Since the 1970s, progress has been made in reducing the number of fatalities and injuries on our nation's roads. From 1975 through 2001, fatalities decreased from 44,525 to 42,116, while the rate of fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled decreased from 3.35 to 1.51. However, the decline in fatalities has leveled off in recent years. In the 1970s, Indiana University conducted one of the most significant studies to date on the factors that contribute to motor vehicle crashes. This study examined human, environmental, and vehicle factors that contribute to crashes. As requested, this report provides more recent information from data, experts, and studies about the factors that contribute to motor vehicle crashes and information about major ongoing and planned Department of Transportation research into factors that contribute to crashes.
What GAO Found
Many factors combine to produce circumstances that may lead to a motor vehicle crash--there is rarely a single cause of such an event. Three categories of factors contribute to crashes: human factors, roadway environment factors, and vehicle factors. Human factors involve the actions taken by or the condition of the driver of the automobile, including speeding and violating traffic laws, as well as being affected by alcohol or drugs, inattention, decision errors, and age. Roadway environment factors include the design of the roadway, roadside hazards, and roadway conditions. Vehicle factors include any failures that may exist in the automobile or design of the vehicle. Human factors are seen as the most prevalent, according to data, experts, and studies, in contributing to crashes, followed by roadway environment and vehicle factors. Agencies within the Department of Transportation have research projects underway or planned that address the factors that contribute to crashes. For example, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration are conducting a study on the causes and contributing factors to large truck crashes. In addition, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is conducting a 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study and the Drive Atlanta Study. The 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study involves collecting data from vehicles equipped with sensors and cameras to obtain better information on crashes and near misses. The Drive Atlanta Study involves collecting data from 1,100 vehicles equipped with data recorders to develop information about how excessive speed contributes to crashes. In addition, the Transportation Research Board has proposed a broad, 6-year, $180 million research program focused on making significant improvements in highway safety. This study, among other things, would involve installing sensors and other data collection devices on over 5,000 vehicles. |
gao_GAO-08-206 | gao_GAO-08-206_0 | Figure 1 show reported in the federal government’s financial statements. when cash payments are made. Although two countries—the Netherlands and Canada—have considered broader expansions of accrual budgeting since 2000, thus far they have made only limited changes. Iceland and Canada generally have taken this approach. Iceland also uses accrual budgeting for loan programs. Cash Information Remains Important, Particularly for Monitoring a Country’s Fiscal Position
Regardless of the approach taken in use of accrual budgeting, all of the countries consider cash information to be important, particularly for monitoring the country’s fiscal position even where fiscal indicators are accrual based. Accrual budgeting can also lead to improvements in financial information. Accrual Cost Information Helped Inform Some Debates That Led to Improvements in Fiscal Condition
Despite the inherent challenges, our six case study countries have continued to use accrual budgeting and additional countries have adopted accrual budgeting since 2000. The full costs of these agreements were not fully realized by the public until the adoption of accrual budgeting. Countries Use Other Methods to Increase Awareness of Greatest Long-Term Fiscal Challenges
Accrual budgeting was not used to increase awareness of long-term fiscal challenges that are primarily driven by old-age public pensions and healthcare programs. Instead, in recent years, several countries have begun reporting on the sustainability of the government’s overall finances over longer-term horizons, given demographic and fiscal trends. Unlike accrual or cash budgeting, which are intended to provide annual cost information, fiscal sustainability reporting provides a framework for understanding the government’s long-term fiscal condition, including the interaction of federal programs, and whether the government’s current programs and policies are sustainable. Therefore, most countries use more than one measure to assess fiscal sustainability. The sooner countries act to put their governments on a more sustainable footing, the better. As we stated in 2000 and in other GAO reports, increased accrual information in certain areas of the budget—insurance, environmental liabilities, and federal employee pensions and retiree health—can help the Congress and the President better recognize the long-term budgetary consequences of today’s operations and help prevent these areas from becoming long- term issues. Failure to pay attention to programs that require future cash resources can further mortgage our children’s future. Such reports would help increase awareness of the longer-term fiscal challenges facing the nation in light of our aging population and rising health care costs as well as the range of federal responsibilities, programs, and activities that may explicitly or implicitly commit the government to future spending. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To update the findings of our 2000 report, we examined (1) where, how, and why accrual budgeting is used in select Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and how it has changed since 2000; (2) what challenges and limitations were discovered and how select OECD countries responded to them; (3) what select OECD countries perceived the effect to have been on policy debates, program management, and the allocation of resources; (4) whether accrual budgeting has been used to increase awareness of long-term fiscal challenges and, if not, what is used instead; and (5) what the experience of select OECD countries and other GAO work tell us about where and how the increased use of accrual concepts in the budget would be useful and ways to increase the recognition of long-term budgetary implications of policy decisions. To address these objectives, we primarily focused on the six countries in the 2000 GAO report: Australia, Canada, Iceland, the United Kingdom. Since these countries may not provide a complete picture of the potential limitations or the use of alternative ways to increase the focus on long-term fiscal challenges, we also looked at two countries— Norway and Sweden—that considered expanding the use of accrual measurement in the budget but decided against it, to understand why. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government's financial condition and fiscal outlook have deteriorated dramatically since 2000. The federal budget has gone from surplus to deficit and the nation's major reported long-term fiscal exposures--a wide range of programs, responsibilities, and activities that either explicitly or implicitly commit the government to future spending--have more than doubled. Current budget processes and measurements do not fully recognize these fiscal exposures until payments are made. Increased information and better incentives to address the long-term consequences of today's policy decisions can help put our nation on a more sound fiscal footing. Given its interest in accurate and timely information on the U.S. fiscal condition, the Senate Committee on the Budget asked us to update our study of other nations' experiences with accrual budgeting and look at other ways countries have increased attention to their long-term fiscal challenges.
What GAO Found
In 2000, GAO reviewed the use of accrual budgeting--or the recording of budgetary costs based on financial accounting concepts--in Australia, Canada, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. These countries had adopted accrual budgeting more to increase transparency and improve government performance than to increase awareness of long-term fiscal challenges. Accrual budgeting continues to be used in all six countries; Canada and the Netherlands, which use accrual information selectively, considered expanding the use of accruals but thus far have made only limited changes. Since 2000, other countries have considered using accrual budgeting. For example, Denmark and Switzerland began using accrual budgeting on a selective basis. Norway and Sweden, however, rejected accrual budgeting primarily because they believed cash budgeting enables better control over resources. Countries have taken different approaches in the design of their accrual budgets. Regardless of the approach taken, cash information remains important in all the countries for evaluating the government's finances. Other countries' experiences show that accrual budgeting can be useful for recognizing the full costs of certain programs, such as public employee pensions and retiree health, insurance, veterans benefits, and environmental liabilities, that will require future cash resources. However, these other countries do not use accrual budgeting to recognize their long-term fiscal challenges that are primarily driven by public health care and pension programs. Instead, many countries in GAO's study have begun preparing fiscal sustainability reports to help assess these programs in the context of overall sustainability of government finances. European Union members also annually report on longer-term fiscal sustainability. Although no change in measurement or reporting can replace substantive action to meet our longer-term fiscal challenge, GAO believes that better and more complete information on both the full-cost implications of individual decisions and on fiscal sustainability of the government's finances can help. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-212 | gao_T-AIMD-98-212_0 | Major disruption in the service provided by the public telecommunications network can affect millions of users and cause massive financial losses. The consequences of not resolving Year 2000 problems in the telecommunications infrastructure are broad-based and potentially disastrous. Telecommunications problems can affect virtually all network components—switches, routers, PBXs, and Internet servers—all of which must be assessed and tested. Compounding the risk is the global nature of today’s telecommunications, which rely on seamless connections among widely scattered and widely diverse networks. Federal Activity Related to the Year 2000 Readiness of the Telecommunications Sector
In light of the potential risks involved, the federal government has recently begun to address the Year 2000 readiness of the telecommunications sector. The government is undertaking telecommunications initiatives from three perspectives: national, international, and governmental. Issues Surrounding Year 2000 Telecommunications Readiness
Key federal initiatives are in their early stages on a national, international, and governmental level, and critical issues remain to be addressed. Given the inarguably critical nature of telecommunications services to the functioning of our nation, coordinated oversight is essential. In order to gain confidence that our telecommunications infrastructure will be ready for the next century, accountability must be established; this includes a broad strategy as well as specific milestones and defined accountability. We see several major areas that must be addressed: (1) obtaining information on the current readiness status of various segments of the telecommunications industry for the next century, (2) establishing a mechanism for obtaining such readiness information on a regular basis, (3) setting milestones for achieving Year 2000 compliance, (4) disseminating readiness status information to the public and the Congress, and (5) developing—in conjunction with the private sector—contingency plans to ensure business continuity, albeit at reduced levels, in the event that not all telecommunications systems are fully operational on January 1, 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed: (1) the nation's telecommunications infrastructure; (2) the risks facing the nation if critical components of that infrastructure are not year 2000 compliant by the turn of the century; (3) federal government actions relating to national, international, and governmental telecommunications infrastructure; and (4) present issues that must be addressed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) major disruption in the service provided by the public telecommunications network can affect millions of users and cause massive financial losses; (2) the consequences of not resolving year 2000 problems in the telecommunications infrastructure are broad-based and potentially disastrous; (3) telecommunications problems can affect virtually all network components--switches, routers, private branch exchanges, and Internet servers--all of which must be assessed and tested; (4) compounding the risk is the global nature of today's telecommunications, which rely on seamless connections among widely scattered and widely diverse networks; (5) in light of the potential risks involved, the federal government has recently begun to address the year 2000 readiness of the telecommunications sector; (6) the government is undertaking telecommunications initiatives from three perspectives: national, international, and governmental; (7) key federal initiatives are in their early stages on a national, international, and governmental level, and critical issues remain to be addressed; (8) given the inarguably critical nature of the telecommunications services to the functioning of the nation, coordinated oversight is essential; (9) in order to gain confidence that the telecommunications infrastructure will be ready for the next century, accountability must be established; this includes a broad strategy as well as specific milestones and defined accountability; and (10) several major issues must be addressed: (a) obtaining information on the readiness status of various segments of the telecommunications industry for the next century; (b) establishing a mechanism for obtaining such readiness information on a regular basis; (c) setting milestones for achieving year 2000 compliance; (d) disseminating readiness status information to the public and Congress; and (e) developing--in conjunction with the private sector--contingency plans to ensure business continuity, albeit at reduced levels, in the event that not all telecommunications systems are fully operational on January 1, 2000. |
gao_GAO-08-996 | gao_GAO-08-996_0 | Key Features of USPS’s PFP Program Include Quantitative Performance Indicators and Individual Performance Elements
The PFP program includes quantitative corporate and unit indicators of performance and individual performance elements, both of which are used to rate PFP participants. In fiscal year 2008, 12 corporate indicators apply to all PFP participants, including measures of timely mail delivery, productivity, revenue, and net income, among other things. A total of 53 unit indicators apply to selected groups of participants, such as groups of postmasters and managers at various mail processing facilities, depending on their responsibilities and spans of control. Some individual performance elements have target levels of performance defined by narrative standards that are centrally established by USPS. USPS then calculates the overall PFP rating for each participant based on the results of corporate and unit indicators and ratings for individual performance elements; this rating is used to determine adjustments to the participant’s salary and any lump sum award. For PCES executives, PFP awards take the form of salary increases and lump sum awards. Overall PFP Ratings Primarily Depend on Results for Indicators Related to Efficiency, Service, and Revenues
Overall PFP ratings primarily depend on results for corporate and unit indicators related to USPS’s strategic goals of increasing efficiency, improving service, and generating revenue. The Weight of PFP Indicators Varies Considerably by Participant Group
The weight of PFP indicators varies considerably by participant group, based on the responsibilities and spans of control of various managerial and executive positions. Opportunities to Incorporate New Delivery Performance Indicators into USPS’s PFP Program Will Follow Implementation of Delivery Measurement Systems
As USPS implements the postal reform law’s requirements for measuring and reporting its delivery performance for all market-dominant products, which collectively make up nearly 99 percent of mail volume, USPS will have opportunities to incorporate new indicators into its PFP program, notably for Standard Mail and bulk First-Class Mail. Once such systems are fully implemented and mailers’ participation is sufficient to generate representative data, USPS will have the opportunity to incorporate new delivery performance indicators into its PFP program. To put these developments into context, in 2006, USPS said that its goal of improving service—which continues to be one of its primary goals—is supported by a “balanced scorecard” that uses service performance metrics for the mail that is measured to support personal and unit accountability. Postal Service’s (USPS) pay for performance (PFP) program, (2) provide information on the weight of the PFP program’s performance indicators in determining participants’ ratings, and (3) assess opportunities for USPS to incorporate new indicators of delivery performance into its PFP program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) pay for performance (PFP) program for managers includes quantitative performance indicators. PFP ratings are the basis for salary increases and lump sum awards for nearly 750 Postal Career Executive Service (PCES) executives and about 71,700 other participants, mostly Executive and Administrative Schedule (EAS) employees. GAO was requested to provide information about USPS's PFP system. This report (1) describes the key features of USPS's PFP system, (2) provides information on the weight of its performance indicators in determining PFP ratings, and (3) identifies opportunities for USPS to incorporate delivery performance indicators into its PFP system. GAO obtained USPS documents and data, interviewed USPS officials, and primarily based its assessment on laws related to timely delivery and interviews with senior USPS officials.
What GAO Found
Key features of the PFP program are quantitative corporate and unit indicators of performance and individual performance elements that are used to rate participants and provide the basis for awards. Quantitative performance targets are established for corporate and unit indicators. Corporate indicators apply to all participants and include measures of timely delivery, productivity, revenue, and net income, among others. Unit indicators apply to selected groups of participants and vary according to the groups' responsibilities and span of control. Individual performance elements are tailored to the participant group and, within some groups, to individuals. Individual performance elements may be defined by narrative standards or may be quantitative indicators defined with specific target performance levels. The overall PFP rating is based on results of corporate and unit indicators and individual performance elements and is used to determine the salary adjustment and any lump sum award. PFP indicators related to three USPS strategic goals--increasing efficiency, improving service, and generating revenues--collectively account for two-thirds of the average participant's rating (see fig.). However, indicator weights vary considerably by participant group, based on the responsibilities and span of control of various positions. As USPS implements requirements of the postal reform law for measuring delivery performance, it will have opportunities to incorporate new indicators into its PFP program, notably for timely delivery of Standard Mail (49 percent of mail volume in fiscal year 2007) and bulk First-Class Mail (25 percent of volume). Once new delivery performance measurement systems are fully implemented and mailers' participation is sufficient to generate representative data, USPS will be able to incorporate new delivery performance indicators into its PFP program. These new indicators would create a more "balanced scorecard" that uses service performance metrics for the mail that is measured to support personal and unit accountability. |
gao_GAO-01-868 | gao_GAO-01-868_0 | Scientific Knowledge of the Earth System
The performance report indicated that NASA made progress toward achieving its key outcome of expanding the scientific knowledge of the Earth system. NASA provided clear and reasonable explanations for targets that were not met. International Space Station Deployment, Operation, and Cost
The performance report indicated that NASA’s progress toward achieving the key outcome of deploying and operating the space station safely and cost-effectively was limited with respect to achievement of the agency’s planned performance targets. NASA’s strategies and time frames for achieving the unmet targets were reasonable. Comparison of NASA’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report With the Prior Year Report
For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements or remaining weaknesses in NASA’s fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report. Newly developed targets that have no corresponding fiscal year 1999 target to facilitate an assessment are characterized as “new target.”
NASA’s Efforts to Address its Major Management Challenges Identified by GAO
GAO has identified two governmentwide high-risk areas: strategic human capital management and information security. In addition, we have identified three major management challenges facing NASA: (1) correcting contract management weaknesses, (2) controlling International Space Station costs, and (3) effectively implementing the faster-better-cheaper approach to space exploration projects. As we discussed under outcomes, NASA did not address the challenge of controlling space station costs. Appendix II: Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) fiscal year 2000 performance report to assess the agency's progress in achieving selected key outcomes important to NASA's mission.
What GAO Found
The selected key outcomes are to (1) expand scientific knowledge of the Earth system, (2) expand the commercial development of space, and (3) deploy and operate the International Space Station safely and cost effectively. NASA reported mixed progress in achieving these key outcomes. In general, NASA's strategies for achieving unmet performance targets for theses outcomes are clear and reasonable. NASA achieved most targets related to expanding knowledge of the Earth system. However, its progress in other areas was more limited. NASA has made improvements in its fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison to its fiscal year 1999 performance report. Specifically, NASA describes its verification and validation efforts and discloses its data sources for each performance target. NASA's report partially addressed the governmentwide high-risk area of strategic human capital management but not the area of information security. GAO has previously found that NASA lacks an effective agencywide security program. NASA's report only addressed two of the three critical management challenges: (1) correcting weaknesses in contract management and (2) effectively implementing the faster, better, cheaper approach to space exploration projects. It did not address the challenge of controlling space station costs. |
gao_RCED-98-103 | gao_RCED-98-103_0 | Ensuring food safety therefore cannot be achieved by focusing on domestic products exclusively. FDA’s System for Allowing the Entry of Imported Foods
To ensure that FDA is notified of all imported food products under its jurisdiction, an importer must file both an import notice and certain shipping information and, for shipments valued over $1,250, a bond to cover the goods for release with Customs within 5 days of the shipment’s arrival at a U.S. port of entry. FDA does not visually check or inspect these released shipments. If the imported products do not meet U.S. requirements, they are stamped “U.S. Specifically, this report discusses (1) the differences in the agencies’ authorities and approaches for ensuring the safety of imported foods and (2) the agencies’ efforts to target their resources. Our work focused on the two principal federal agencies with responsibility for ensuring the safety of imported foods—FDA and FSIS. FDA’s Lack of Authority for Equivalent Inspection Systems in Exporting Countries Diminishes Its Ability to Protect Consumers From Unsafe Foods
FSIS shares the burden of ensuring the safety of the imported foods it regulates with the exporting country, while FDA primarily relies on inspections at the U.S. ports of entry to determine the safety of the imported foods under its jurisdiction. Because FDA is currently able to inspect less than 2 percent of the foods imported under its jurisdiction there is reason to question whether this approach adequately protects U.S. consumers. In contrast, FDA relies on port-of-entry inspections to ensure that imported foods are safe. For example, both visual inspections and laboratory tests are inadequate to detect Cyclospora, according to CDC. Agencies Have Not Effectively Targeted Their Resources on Imported Foods Posing Greater Risks
FSIS and FDA are not deploying their inspection resources to maximum advantage. As a result, FSIS’ resources are not being focused on imported foods posing the greater safety risk. With respect to FDA, its system for identifying shipments for inspection is hampered by work plans that do not set clear priorities for inspectors in making selection decisions, a failure to make relevant health risk data readily available to its inspectors to help them select shipments to inspect, and a failure to ensure that importer-provided information on incoming shipments is accurate. However, the system does not use this information to identify patterns of violations, such as firms or countries with repeated problems, that are directly related to food safety. Furthermore, FDA inspectors do not have ready access to some useful data in OASIS when deciding which products to inspect. To provide more accurate and accessible information to FDA and thus minimize inconsistencies in inspectors’ subjective decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Commissioner, FDA, to clarify and emphasize the guidance inspectors should use when making decisions on which shipments to inspect and test; modify the Operational and Administrative System for Import Support system so that (1) it automatically reviews the Import Alert and Low-Acid Canned Food databases and recommends appropriate actions to inspectors and (2) inspectors can consider previous laboratory test results, which are stored in the Laboratory Management System database, in choosing shipments for inspections and tests; and ensure that the field offices are taking appropriate corrective action, when warranted, against importers that repeatedly enter incorrect shipping information into the Operational and Administrative System for Import Support database. 3. 4. Comments From the Food Safety and Inspection Service
The following is GAO’s comment on the Food Safety and Inspection Service’s letter dated April 7, 1998. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed efforts of federal programs to ensure the safety of food imports, focusing on the: (1) differences in the agencies' authorities and approaches for ensuring the safety of imported foods; (2) agencies' efforts to target their resources on foods posing risks; and (3) weaknesses in the controls over imported foods.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal agencies cannot ensure that the growing volume of imported foods is safe for consumers; (2) although the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) require imported foods to meet the same standards as domestic foods, their approaches to enforcing these requirements differ; (3) by law, FSIS places the principal burden for safety on the exporting countries by allowing imports only from those countries with food safety systems it deems to be equivalent to the U.S. system; (4) FDA, lacking such legal authority, allows food imports from almost any country and takes on the burden of ensuring the safety of imported foods as they arrive at U.S. ports of entry; (5) relying on port-of-entry inspections to detect and prevent unsafe foods is ineffective, given that: (a) this approach does not ensure that foods are produced under adequately controlled conditions; (b) FDA currently inspects less than 2 percent of all foreign shipments; and (c) inspection will not detect some organisms, such as Cyclospora, for which visual inspections and laboratory tests are inadequate; (6) FSIS and FDA are not deploying their inspection resources to maximum advantage; (7) FSIS focuses its inspection and testing resources on shipments from exporting firms with a history of violations; (8) however, many of the violations may bear little relationship to food safety; (9) using available data on health-related risks from shipments that do not meet U.S. standards could help FSIS focus more closely on the imports posing the greater risks; (10) FDA's annual work plan does not set achievable targets for inspection activities; (11) as a result, inspectors do not have clear guidance for conducting inspections; (12) FDA does not make health risk data readily available to guide inspectors' selections; (13) when making decisions on which shipments to inspect, FDA relies on importers' descriptions of shipments' contents, which are often incorrect; (14) FDA's procedures for ensuring that unsafe imported foods do not reach U.S. consumers are vulnerable to abuse by unscrupulous importers; (15) in some cases, when FDA decides to inspect shipments, the importers have already marketed the goods; (16) in other cases, when FDA finds contamination and calls for importers to return shipments to the Customs Service for destruction or reexport, importers ignore this requirement or substitute other goods for the original shipment; and (17) such cases of noncompliance seldom result in a significant penalty. |
gao_GAO-17-741 | gao_GAO-17-741_0 | VA Reports Some Health Care Quality Measures on Hospital Compare and a Broader Range of Measures on Its Website
On Hospital Compare, VA Reports 35 of the 79 Health Care Quality Measures That Non-VA Hospitals Report
In implementing a requirement under the Choice Act, VA reports some of the 79 possible health care quality measures reported by non-VA hospitals on HHS’s Hospital Compare website. VA Reports 110 Health Care Quality Measures on Its Website, Including Some Categories of Measures Not Available on Hospital Compare
As of June 2017, VA reported on its own website 110 health care quality measures for its VAMCs. For example, the additional measures include measures of how long veterans must wait to obtain care at VAMCs and measures of the quality of care related to ambulatory care, such as colorectal cancer screening rates. This is the same February 2015 notice VA provided on the Hospital Compare website. VA Reports Health Care Quality Measures on Two Separate Webpages, and Its Primary Webpage Is Accessible and Understandable but Lacks Certain Relevant Information
VA Reports Health Care Quality Measures on Two Separate Webpages of Its Website, Considering One of Them as VA’s Primary Source of Information on Care Quality for Veterans
VA publicly reports 110 health care quality measures on two separate webpages on its website—the “Access and Quality” webpage, launched in April 2017, and the “Quality of Care” webpage, which VA has used since 2008. However, until VA’s website provides information on a broader range of health care services, highlights key differences in clinical quality of care, and reports this information in a manner that is easily accessible and understandable, VA is missing an opportunity to provide veterans with relevant quality information that it has already collected to help veterans make informed decisions about their care. VA Central Office Has Not Systematically Assessed the Completeness and Accuracy of the Clinical Information Used to Calculate Health Care Quality Measures
Studies and other evidence we reviewed indicate potential problems with the completeness and accuracy of the clinical information in patient records that is used to calculate VA’s publicly reported health care quality measures on Hospital Compare and its own website. However, according to an independent assessment of VA’s clinical documentation procedures conducted by McKinsey & Company in 2015, VA as a whole is below industry standards. However, the assessment found that only 62 of 134 VAMCs examined had a CDI program as of 2014. VA Central Office Has Not Systematically Assessed the Completeness and Accuracy of Clinical Information in Patient Records and How this Affects Accuracy of Health Care Quality Measures
Within VA, VA Central Office is responsible for calculating and reporting the health care quality measures that VA publicly reports for each of its VAMCs and ensuring that these measures provide accurate information on the quality of care at these facilities. However, while studies and other evidence we reviewed indicate potential problems with the clinical information recorded at some VAMCs, VA Central Office has not determined the extent to which these problems exist across VAMCs and adversely affect the accuracy of the quality measures VA publicly reports on Hospital Compare and its own website. When asked why they have not conducted such an assessment, VA Central Office officials told us that they have focused instead on improving the accuracy of medical coding and on specific clinical quality issues identified at individual VAMCs. VA Central Office’s lack of a systematic assessment of the completeness and accuracy of clinical information recorded in patient medical records and the extent to which this affects the accuracy of its quality measures is inconsistent with federal standards for internal controls related to information and monitoring. Without a systematic assessment of the completeness and accuracy of the clinical information recorded in VAMC patient medical records and their potential effects on the health care quality measures VA reports, VA Central Office does not have reasonable assurance that differences in VAMCs’ performance on VA’s quality measures reflect true differences in the quality of care and not differences in the accuracy and completeness of the underlying clinical information. Until VA can provide information on a broader range of health care measures and services, highlight key differences in the quality of clinical care at VAMCs, and present this information in a way that is easily accessible and understandable, VA cannot ensure that its website is functioning as intended in helping veterans make informed choices about their care. Therefore, VA lacks reasonable assurance that the quality measures reported on Hospital Compare and its own website provide accurate information to veterans so they can make informed choices about their care. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making two recommendations to the Department of Veterans Affairs. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help veterans make informed choices about their care, the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 (Choice Act) directs VA to publicly report applicable health care quality measures for its medical facilities on HHS's Hospital Compare website and on VA's own website.
The Choice Act also contains provisions for GAO to review the health care quality measures VA publicly reports. In this report, GAO 1) describes the quality measures VA reports on Hospital Compare and its own website; 2) evaluates VA's reporting of quality measures on its website; and 3) examines the extent to which VA has assessed the accuracy of the quality measures it publicly reports. GAO reviewed the quality measures VA publicly reports, reviewed studies and interviewed VA officials about the accuracy and completeness of the clinical information used to calculate the measures, and assessed the presentation and relevance of VA's information on quality of care using criteria identified in previous GAO work to evaluate health care websites.
What GAO Found
As of June 2017, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) publicly reported 35 health care quality measures on the Hospital Compare website, which is maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services. Veterans can use information on this website to compare the performance of VA medical centers (VAMC) and non-VA hospitals on a common set of quality measures. Those measures include patient reports of their experience of care, such as how well doctors and nurses communicated with them, and actual outcomes of care, such as readmissions to the hospital. On its own website, VA reported 110 quality measures, including some of the same measures reported on Hospital Compare . VA also reports quality measures not found on Hospital Compare , such as measures of how long veterans must wait to access care at VAMCs.
VA reports health care quality measures on two separate webpages of its website. VA launched the Access and Quality webpage in April 2017, which according to VA officials is the primary source of information for veterans on the quality of care at VAMCs. GAO found that this information is generally presented in a way that is accessible and easy to understand. However, GAO also found that the primary webpage provides information from a small subset—15—of the 110 measures VA reports on its website as of June 2017. Most of the other measures are available on a second, older webpage that resides elsewhere on VA's website and is generally not easily accessible and understandable. Until VA can provide information on a broader range of health care measures and services and present this information in a way that is easily accessible and understandable, VA cannot ensure that its website is functioning as intended in helping veterans make informed choices about their care.
Within VA, VA Central Office is responsible for calculating the health care quality measures that VA publicly reports for each of its VAMCs and ensuring that these measures provide accurate information on the VAMCs' quality of care. However, GAO found that VA Central Office has not systematically assessed the completeness and accuracy of the underlying clinical information that is used to calculate these measures. This clinical information is recorded in veterans' medical records and includes diagnoses given and treatments provided. Several studies have found potential problems with the accuracy and completeness of this clinical information at some VAMCs. For example, a 2015 independent assessment conducted by McKinsey & Company found that VA's clinical documentation procedures are below industry standards and that many VAMCs do not have programs in place to improve clinical documentation practices. VA Central Office officials told GAO that they have not systematically assessed the completeness and accuracy of the clinical information across VAMCs and the extent to which this affects the accuracy of its quality measures because they have focused on other priorities. However, the lack of such an assessment is inconsistent with federal standards for internal controls related to information and monitoring. As a result, VA does not have assurance that the quality measures it publicly reports on Hospital Compare and its own website accurately reflect the performance of its VAMCs and provide veterans with the information they need to make informed choices about their care.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA 1) report a broader range of health care quality measures in an accessible and understandable way on its website and 2) conduct a systematic assessment of the patient clinical information across VAMCs to ensure its accuracy and completeness. VA concurred with GAO's first recommendation and concurred in principle with the second recommendation, and described steps to implement the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-52 | gao_GAO-04-52_0 | For decades, the federal wildland fire community pursued a policy of suppressing all fires as soon as possible. Over the years, suppressing fire in areas where it naturally occurred has caused an increase in the volume of brush, small trees, and other vegetation. The increase in such “forest fuels,” combined with a severe drought in much of the nation over the past few years, has increased the severity of wildland fires. The Forest Service is responsible for managing over 192 million acres of public lands—nearly 9 percent of the nation’s total surface area and about 30 percent of all federal lands in the United States. However, because the Forest Service does not have a national database to track both its decisions involving forest fuels reduction activities and the extent to which they were appealed or litigated, we were asked to develop this information. The Number of Decisions Involving Forest Fuels Reduction Activities and the Number of Acres Affected
For fiscal years 2001 and 2002, the national forest managers reported that there were 818 decisions involving forest fuels reduction activities. These decisions affected almost 4.8 million acres of national forest land. Number of Decisions
Of the 818 decisions involving forest fuels reduction activities, the forest managers reported that 52 of the decisions (about 6 percent) were expected to have significant environmental impacts, thus requiring the preparation of environmental impact statements. The Number of Decisions Involving Forest Fuels Reduction Activities Appealed and Litigated and the Amount of Acreage Affected
Of the 818 decisions involving forest fuels reduction activities, 24 percent were appealed. In addition, 25 decisions (about 3 percent of all decisions) were litigated. Of the 332 appealable decisions, 194 were appealed affecting over 950,000 acres. There is no limit to the number of appeals that can be filed on an individual decision. These litigated decisions affected about 111,000 acres (about 2 percent). Outcomes of Appealed and Litigated Decisions and the Identities of Appellants and Plaintiffs
Of the 197 appealed decisions the Forest Service reviewed, 144 (about 73 percent) were allowed to be implemented without any changes. However, the Forest Service did not allow 38 decisions (about 19 percent) to be implemented. Of the 25 litigated decisions, 19 have been resolved and 6 were still ongoing at the time of our review. The Number of Decisions That Were Processed Within Prescribed Time Frames
Most of the appeals that occurred in fiscal years 2001 and 2002 were processed within the prescribed time frames. For those appeals that were not processed within the 90- day limit, the appeal processing times ranged from 91 to 240 days, with a median processing time of 119 days. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Forest Service for review and comment. The agency generally agreed with the information presented in the report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal fire community's decades old policy of suppressing wildland fires as soon as possible has caused a dangerous increase in vegetation density in our nation's forests. This density increase combined with severe drought over much of the United States has created a significant threat of catastrophic wildfires. In response to this threat, the Forest Service performs activities to reduce the buildup of brush, small trees, and other vegetation on national forest land. With the increased threat of catastrophic wildland fires, there have been concerns about delays in implementing activities to reduce these "forest fuels." Essentially, these concerns focus on the extent to which public appeals and litigation of Forest Service decisions to implement forest fuels reduction activities unnecessarily delay efforts to reduce fuels. The Forest Service does not keep a national database on the number of forest fuels reduction activities that are appealed or litigated. Accordingly, GAO was asked to develop this information for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. Among other things, GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of decisions involving fuels reduction activities and the number of acres affected, (2) the number of decisions that were appealed and/or litigated and the number of acres affected, (3) the outcomes of appealed and/or litigated decisions, and (4) the number of appeals that were processed within prescribed time frames.
What GAO Found
In a GAO survey of all national forests, forest managers reported that in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, 818 decisions involved fuels reduction activities covering 4.8 million acres. Of the 818 decisions involving fuels reduction activities, about 24 percent were appealed--affecting 954,000 acres. However, of the 818 decisions, more than half, 486 decisions, could not be appealed because they involved activities with little or no environmental impact. Of the 332 appealable decisions, 194 (about 58 percent) were appealed. There can be multiple appeals per decision. In addition, 25 decisions (3 percent) affecting about 111,000 acres were litigated. For 73 percent of the appealed decisions, the Forest Service allowed the fuels reduction activities to be implemented without changes; 8 percent required some changes before being implemented; and about 19 percent could not be implemented. Of the 25 litigated decisions, 19 have been resolved. About 79 percent of appeals were processed within the prescribed 90-day time frame. Of the remaining 21 percent, the processing times ranged from 91 days to 240 days. The Forest Service, in commenting on a draft of this report, generally agreed with the report's contents. Their specific comments and our evaluation of them are provided in the report. |
gao_HEHS-98-16 | gao_HEHS-98-16_0 | Estimated Number of People With AD
The results of our meta-analysis, based on the pooling of the data of individuals from each of the studies, were used to project the numbers of Americans, in 1995, with (1) AD of any level of severity (mild, moderate, or severe) and (2) moderate or severe AD (see table 1). The AD prevalence estimates are generated by multiplying prevalence rates (discussed in the section below called “Estimated Prevalence Rates”) by the corresponding age- and gender-specific 1995 estimates from the Bureau of the Census.When these results are summed over the several age intervals and both genders, the overall estimate for Americans 65 years of age or older with any AD is 1.9 million. When adjusted for the cases of mixed dementia and missed cases not included in some of the studies, these percentages become 6.3 and 4.1, respectively. Projections for Numbers of People With AD
We also developed projections into the next century of the number of AD cases and the number of AD cases requiring assistance. These rates are each increased by 10 percent when all mixed cases and missed cases are included. These results demonstrate that the AD prevalence rate increases sharply with age, doubling about every 5 years at least until about the age of 85, as expected from previous reports of this relationship. In addition, the rate is greater for women than for men. NIA’s Ongoing Studies
NIA is currently supporting a number of studies of AD prevalence in the United States. Many of these studies include minority groups in addition to whites. The results of these studies are expected to be published within the next several years. The number of people with AD is at least 1.9 million now and can, with relatively conservative assumptions about population growth, be expected to grow to at least 2.9 million by 2015. Depending on severity, these cases will need some kind of long-term care. 2. 7. 8. “Prevalence of Alzheimer’s Disease and Other Dementing Disorders in Pamplona, Spain.” Neuroepidemiology, Vol. 11. (Relevant to study 7.) When this factor is applied to the estimates given above, the findings for 1995 are 2 million people with AD of any kind and 1.3 million cases of moderate or severe AD, rather than the 1.9 million and 1.1 million, respectively, that were originally reported. Comments From the National Institute on Aging
The following are GAO’s comments on NIA’s June 4, 1997, letter. 2. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided estimates of the prevalence of Alzheimer's Disease (AD) in the United States, including projections for prevalence in the near future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on the basis of existing studies, it is estimated that at least 1.9 million Americans 65 years of age or older suffered from any level of AD--mild, moderate, or severe--in 1995; (2) this number would be closer to 2.1 million if adjusted for the omissions, in many of these studies, of cases with mixed dementia and cases missed by the screening instruments used; (3) when only people likely to need at least some active assistance with personal care are considered, the results of GAO's meta-analysis show slightly more than 1 million people with AD over the age of 64; (4) the result would be higher--closer to 1.4 million people with AD--if all mixed cases and missed cases were included in all studies; (5) consistent with all earlier research, the results for both any AD and moderate or severe AD demonstrate that the prevalence rates increase sharply with age, doubling about every 5 years, at least until the age of 85, when the increase begins to slow; (6) also consistent with some earlier research, the estimated rates for women are higher than for men; (7) projecting the number of people with AD into the future gives some indication of the long-term care and research challenges that will face the nation as people grow older; (8) GAO's meta-analysis, when combined with Bureau of the Census projections, shows that more than 2.9 million people would have at least a mild case of AD in 2015; of these, over 1.7 million would need active assistance in personal care; (9) these figures jump to 3.2 million and 2.1 million, respectively, when mixed cases and missed cases are included; (10) given the uncertainty surrounding existing estimates of AD, a number of studies are now under way, supported by the National Institute on Aging, that should yield better prevalence estimates of African-Americans, Hispanics, and other nonwhite subpopulations; and (11) the results of these studies, expected to be published over the next several years, should improve GAO's picture of AD prevalence for the United States as a whole, as well as for the specific population segments studied. |
gao_GAO-05-223 | gao_GAO-05-223_0 | To extend the expiring FCRA preemption provisions and address continuing concerns about inaccuracies in reports, identity theft, and other matters, Congress passed the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (the FACT Act), which amended FCRA. Finally, as we have noted, the FACT Act created FLEC to improve financial literacy and education and, among other things, required FLEC to increase consumers’ awareness and understanding of credit reports and scores. But many consumers did not know other important information, such as how long information remained on their report and the impact their credit history could have on insurance and employment. Most Consumers Knew Some of the Possible Impacts of Credit Reports and Some Rules Governing Access
We found that most consumers understood some of the ways their credit history—as contained in their credit reports—could affect their lives, but around one-third were not aware of several potential uses of their reports. 1). Consumers’ Knowledge of the Dispute Process Was Limited, and Few Consumers Had Disputed Information
Consumers knew that they could dispute inaccurate information on their credit reports, but fewer than half were able to answer specific questions about the dispute process and their rights. For example: 72 percent did not know that CRAs investigate incorrect information for 60 percent did not know that resolving a dispute with one CRA did not mean that the other CRAs would automatically correct the information; 59 percent did not know that they had the right to add an explanatory statement to their credit reports if they were unable to resolve a dispute; and 62 percent did not know which agency to contact if they were not satisfied with a CRA’s work—for instance, if a dispute was not resolved—and few (6 percent) named FTC as the government agency they would contact. Certain Demographics and Credit Experiences Are Associated with Consumers’ Understanding of Credit Reporting Issues
We found that education, income, race/ethnicity, employment status, and age, as well as having had an automobile or mortgage loan and experience with the credit reporting process, all had a statistically significant effect on consumers’ knowledge of credit reporting. We found that most consumers understood the basics of credit reporting but were less aware of other important information, including: The impact of information contained in credit reports, how long information remains on reports, some types of information reported, and the possible impact of credit history on insurance coverage and premiums and employment; How various behaviors impact credit scores—for example, that using all available credit and frequently applying for new credit can lower a score; The dispute process and federal protections under FCRA, as amended by the FACT Act—for example, that CRAs investigate erroneous information for free, that the FACT Act allows consumers a free credit report each year, and FTC is the federal agency charged with enforcing consumer protections for credit reporting by CRAs. In addition, we recommend that the Chairman of FTC, through ongoing educational initiatives, materials, and public announcements, and in light of FTC’s responsibility to protect consumers and enforce consumer rights: Improve consumers understanding of how credit reports and scores are Encourage consumers to obtain their credit reports and credit scores and if necessary, dispute inaccurate information on their reports; and Educate consumers about FTC’s role in enforcing consumers’ rights in credit reporting. In addition, this report discusses some of the factors that are associated with consumers’ understanding of these issues. a) a potential employer? Further, we found few specific areas in which knowledge differed between genders. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report responds to a mandate in the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACT Act) of 2003 requiring GAO to assess consumers' understanding of credit reporting. The FACT Act, among other things, extended provisions governing the credit reporting system and addressed ongoing concerns about inaccuracies in credit reports. For example, the act expanded access to credit information by entitling consumers to one free credit report each year. It also established the Financial Literacy and Education Commission (FLEC) to improve consumers' understanding of credit issues. This report examines consumers' understanding and use of credit reports and scores and the dispute process and looks at factors that may influence their understanding of credit reporting.
What GAO Found
Based on survey responses for a national sample of 1,578 consumers, GAO found that consumers understood the basics of credit reporting and the dispute process. For example, many consumers understood what a credit report contained and the sources of this information, and about 60 percent had seen their credit reports. However, many consumers did not know more detailed information, such as how long items remained on their credit reports or the impact their credit history could have on insurance rates and potential employment. Further, most consumers knew what a credit score was, and approximately one-third had obtained their credit scores, but many did not know that some behaviors--such as using all their available credit--could negatively affect their scores. Similarly, GAO found that most consumers knew they had the right to dispute information on their credit reports, and a small percentage (18 percent) had disputed inaccuracies. But most consumers did not fully understand their rights in the dispute process--for example, that there is no cost to dispute inaccurate information or that they could contact the Federal Trade Commission, the federal agency primarily responsible for enforcing consumers' rights with respect to credit reporting agencies (CRAs), if they could not resolve a dispute with the CRAs. GAO also found that several factors were associated with consumers' knowledge. For instance, having less education, lower incomes, and less experience obtaining credit were associated with lower survey scores, while having certain types of credit experiences--such as an automobile loan or a mortgage--were associated with higher scores. Other factors, such as gender and living in a state where credit reports were free prior to the FACT Act, did not have a significant effect on consumers' knowledge. Educational efforts could potentially increase consumers' understanding of the credit reporting process. These efforts should target those areas in which consumers' knowledge was weakest and those subpopulations that did not score as well on GAO's survey. |
gao_GAO-09-887T | gao_GAO-09-887T_0 | Three of these en route centers also control air traffic over the oceans. 2). In 2005, the agency requested that NWS restructure its aviation weather services by consolidating its center weather service units to a smaller number of sites, reducing personnel costs, and providing products and services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Proposal to Consolidate Center Weather Service Units Is Under Consideration
NWS and FAA are considering plans to restructure the way aviation weather services are provided at en route centers. While NWS subsequently identified eight additional performance measures in its proposal, FAA has not yet approved these measures. However, the agencies have not established a baseline of performance for the 9 other performance measures. NWS officials reported that they are not collecting baseline information for a variety of reasons, including that the measures have not yet been approved by FAA, and that selected measures involve products that have not yet been developed. While 4 of the potential measures are tied to new products or services under the restructuring, the other 5 could be measured using current products and services. It is important to obtain an understanding of the current level of performance in these measures before beginning any efforts to restructure aviation weather services. Without an understanding of the current level of performance, NWS and FAA will not be able to measure the success or failure of any changes they make to the center weather service unit operations. As a result, any changes to the current structure could degrade aviation operations and safety—and the agencies may not know it. NWS and FAA Face Challenges in Efforts to Modify the Current Aviation Weather Structure
NWS and FAA face challenges in their efforts to modify the current aviation weather structure. These include challenges associated with (1) interagency collaboration, (2) defining requirements, and (3) aligning any changes with the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)— a long-term initiative to increase the efficiency of the national airspace system. Unless and until these challenges are addressed, the proposed restructuring of aviation weather services at en route centers has a reduced chance of success. Further, after requesting extensions twice, NWS provided its proposal to FAA in June 2009. However, FAA rejected all three of NWS’s proposals in September 2008 on the basis that the costs of the proposals were too high, even though cost was not specified in FAA’s requirements. Additionally, NWS will need to develop continuous two-way communications in lieu of having staff onsite at each en route center. Specifically, we are recommending that the Secretaries direct the NWS and FAA administrators, respectively, to improve their ability to measure improvements in the center weather service units by establishing and approving a set of performance measures for the center weather service units, and by immediately identifying the current level of performance for the five potential measures that could be identified under current operations (forecast accuracy, customer satisfaction, service delivery conformity, timeliness of on-demand services, and training completion) so that there will be a baseline from which to measure the impact of any proposed operational changes. In addition, we are recommending that the Secretaries direct the NWS and FAA administrators to address specific challenges by improving interagency collaboration by defining a common outcome, establishing joint strategies to achieve the outcome, and agreeing upon each agency’s responsibilities; establishing and finalizing requirements for aviation weather services at en ensuring that any proposed organizational changes are aligned with NextGen initiatives by seeking a review by the Joint Program Development Office responsible for developing the NextGen vision; and before moving forward with any proposed operational changes, address implementation challenges by developing a feasible schedule that includes adequate time for stakeholder involvement; undertaking a comprehensive demonstration to ensure no services are degraded; and effectively transitioning the infrastructure and technologies to the new consolidated structure. We also interviewed NWS and FAA officials involved in establishing a baseline of current performance provided by center weather service units. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Weather Service's (NWS) weather products are a vital component of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic control system. In addition to providing aviation weather products developed at its own facilities, NWS also provides staff onsite at each of FAA's en route centers--the facilities that control high-altitude flight outside the airport tower and terminal areas. Over the last few years, FAA and NWS have been exploring options for enhancing the efficiency of the aviation weather services provided at en route centers. GAO was asked to summarize its draft report that (1) determines the status and plans of efforts to restructure the center weather service units, (2) evaluates efforts to establish a baseline of the current performance provided by these units, and (3) evaluates challenges to restructuring them.
What GAO Found
NWS and FAA are considering plans to restructure the way aviation weather services are provided at en route centers, but it is not yet clear whether and how these changes will be implemented. In 2005, FAA requested that NWS restructure its services by consolidating operations to a smaller number of sites, reducing personnel costs, and providing services 24 hours a day, seven days a week. NWS developed two successive proposals, both of which were rejected by FAA--most recently because the costs were too high. FAA subsequently requested that NWS develop another proposal by late December 2008. In response, NWS developed a third proposal that involves consolidating 20 of 21 existing center weather service units into 2 locations. NWS sent this proposal to FAA in early June 2009. FAA officials stated that they plan to respond to NWS's proposal in early August 2009. In response to GAO's prior concerns that NWS and FAA lacked performance measures and a baseline of current performance, the agencies have agreed on five measures and NWS has proposed eight others. In addition, the agencies initiated efforts to establish a performance baseline for 4 of 13 potential performance measures. However, the agencies have not established baseline performance for the other 9 measures. NWS officials stated that they are not collecting baseline information on the 9 measures for a variety of reasons, including that some of the measures have not yet been approved by FAA, and that selected measures involve products that have not yet been developed. While 4 of the 9 measures are tied to new products or services that are to be developed if NWS's latest restructuring proposal is accepted, the other 5 could be measured in the current operational environment. For example, both forecast accuracy and customer satisfaction measures are applicable to current operations. It is important to obtain an understanding of the current level of performance in these measures before beginning any efforts to restructure aviation weather services. Without an understanding of the current level of performance, NWS and FAA may not be able to measure the success of any changes they make to the center weather service unit operations. As a result, any changes to the current structure could degrade aviation operations and safety--and the agencies may not know it. NWS and FAA face challenges in their efforts to improve the current aviation weather structure. These include challenges associated with (1) interagency collaboration, (2) defining FAA's requirements, and (3) aligning any changes with the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)--a long-term initiative to increase the efficiency of the national airspace system. If the restructuring proposal is accepted, the agencies face three additional challenges in implementing it: (1) developing a feasible schedule that includes adequate time for stakeholder involvement, (2) undertaking a comprehensive demonstration to ensure no services are degraded, and (3) effectively reconfiguring the infrastructure and technologies to the new structure. Unless and until these challenges are addressed, the proposed restructuring of aviation weather services at en route centers has a reducedchance of success. |
gao_GAO-01-1166T | gao_GAO-01-1166T_0 | Yet the task of providing security to the nation’s aviation system is unquestionably daunting, and we must reluctantly acknowledge that any form of travel can never be made totally secure. Safeguarding airplanes and passengers requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators are kept from breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to secure airport areas or to aircraft. Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated that significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation’s aviation security. Potential for Unauthorized Access to Aviation Computer Systems
Our work has identified numerous problems with aspects of aviation security in recent years. One such problems is FAA’s computer-based air traffic control system. FAA had not (1) completed background checks on thousands of contractor employees, (2) assessed and accredited as secure many of its ATC facilities, (3) performed appropriate risk assessments to determine the vulnerability of the majority of its ATC systems, (4) established a comprehensive security program, (5) developed service continuity controls to ensure that critical operations continue without undue interruption when unexpected events occur, and (6) fully implemented an intrusion detection capability to detect and respond to malicious intrusions. In May 2000, we reported that our special agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained access to secure areas of two airports by using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and badges. FAA monitors the performance of screeners by periodically testing their ability to detect potentially dangerous objects carried by FAA special agents posing as passengers. Differences in the Screening Practices of Five Other Countries and the United States
We visited five countries—Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—viewed by FAA and the civil aviation industry as having effective screening operations to identify screening practices that differ from those in the United States. We found that some significant differences exist in four areas: screening operations, screener qualifications, screener pay and benefits, and institutional responsibility for screening. Second, screeners’ qualifications are usually more extensive. | What GAO Found
A safe and secure civil aviation system is critical to the nation's security, physical infrastructure, and economy. Billions of dollars and myriad programs and policies have been devoted to achieving such a system. Although it is not fully known at this time what actually occurred or what all the weaknesses in the nation's aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the horrendous events on September 11, 2001, it is clear that serious weaknesses exist in our aviation security system and that their impact can be far more devastating than previously imagined. As reported last year, GAO's review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) oversight of air traffic control (ATC) computer systems showed that FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its own security requirements. Specifically, FAA had not ensured that ATC buildings and facilities were secure, that the systems themselves were protected, and that the contractors who use these systems had undergone background checks. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. GAO's special agents used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas, bypass security checkpoints at two airports, and walk unescorted to aircraft departure gates. Tests of screeners revealed significant weaknesses in their ability to detect threat objects on passengers or in their carry-on luggage. Screening operations in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--countries whose systems GAO has examined--differ from this country's in some significant ways. Their screening operations require more extensive qualifications and training for screeners; include higher pay and better benefits; and often include different screening techniques, such as "pat-downs" of some passengers. |
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