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gao_GAO-02-16 | gao_GAO-02-16_0 | Facilities and Financial Arrangements of Interconnection Among Backbone Providers Vary
Two types of facilities are used for the exchange of data traffic by interconnected Internet backbone providers. The first type of facility, known as a “network access point” (NAP), enables numerous backbone providers to interconnect with each other at a common facility for the exchange of data traffic. Internet data traffic is also exchanged by backbone providers at “private” interconnections. Internet Data Are Exchanged Among Backbone Networks at Two Types of Interconnection Facilities: NAPs and Private Interconnection Points
A NAP facilitates the interconnection of multiple backbone providers. The Introduction of New Services Over the Internet May Be Constrained by Limits in Capacity
New Internet services, such as video streaming and voice telephone calls over the Internet, are expected to become increasingly common in the coming years. At present, however, many backbone networks are not well designed to provision such “time-sensitive” services. Also, more broadband content is expected to be transmitted over the Internet. Scope and Methodology
To obtain information about the characteristics and competitiveness of the Internet backbone market, the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, asked us to report on (1) the physical structure and financial arrangements among Internet backbone providers, (2) the nature of competition in the Internet backbone market, and (3) how this market is likely to develop in the future. | What GAO Found
Although most Americans are familiar with Internet service providers that give consumers a pathway, or "on-ramp," to the Internet, few are familiar with Internet backbone providers and backbone networks. At the Internet's core are many high-capacity, long-haul "backbone" networks that route data traffic over long distances using high-speed fiber lines. Internet backbone providers compete in the marketplace and cooperate in the exchange of data traffic. The cooperative exchange of traffic among backbone providers is essential if the Internet is to remain a seamless and widely accessible public medium. Interconnection among Internet backbone providers varies both in terms of the physical structure and financial agreements of data traffic exchange. The physical structure of interconnection takes two forms: (1) the exchange of traffic among many backbone providers at a "network access point"--a common facility--and (2) the exchange of traffic between two or more backbone providers at "private" interconnection points. No publicly available data exist with which to evaluate competitiveness in the Internet backbone market. Evolution of this market is likely to be largely affected by two types of emerging services. First, demand is likely to rise for time-sensitive applications, such as Internet voice systems. Second, more "broadband"--bandwidth-sensitive--content, such as video, will likely flow over the Internet in the coming years. |
gao_GAO-05-910T | gao_GAO-05-910T_0 | Schedule Milestones and Management
AOC and its major construction contractors have moved the CVC project forward since the Subcommittee’s June 14 hearing, although the majority of the selected milestones scheduled for completion by today’s hearing have not been completed on time. AOC and its construction management contractor are assessing the situation and expect to have more information on this problem within the next month. According to AOC’s construction management contractor, both the project’s May and June 2005 master schedules (1) reflect significant improvement in the linkage of interrelated tasks, although the contractor recognizes that more work needs to be done in this area and (2) generally provide sufficient information to manage the project’s resources. However, we still have concerns about the extent to which the schedule links related activities, which the construction management contractor has agreed to address, and about whether AOC’s September 15, 2006, target date for opening the facility to the public is realistic. For the following reasons, we continue to believe that the project is more likely to be substantially completed in the December 2006 to March 2007 time frame than by September 2006: Because of unforeseen site conditions and other problems, AOC’s construction contractors have had difficulty meeting a number of milestones. Last week, we began to update our risk assessment of the project’s schedule and plan to have this update completed in September. While monitoring the CVC project, we have identified a number of risks and uncertainties that could have significant adverse effects on the project’s schedule and costs. Although AOC has started to plan and prepare for CVC operations, as we indicated in our May 17 and June 14 testimonies, it has not yet developed a schedule that integrates the construction activities with the activities that are necessary to prepare for operations. First, the operations planning contractor’s scope of work includes both the design of certain space within the CVC project and the wayfinding signs that are to be used within the project, and the timing and content of this work needs to be coordinated with CVC construction work. Second, about $7.8 million is available for either CVC construction or operations, and it will be important for AOC to balance the need for both types of funding to ensure optimal use of the funds. Project Costs and Funding
As we said during the Subcommittee’s May 17 and June 14 hearings, we estimate that the cost to complete the construction of the CVC project, including proposed revisions to its scope, will range from about $522 million without provision for risks and uncertainties to about $559 million with provision for risks and uncertainties. For several reasons, we believe that AOC may need additional funds for CVC construction in the next several months. Thus, while AOC may not need all of the $37 million we have suggested be allowed for risks and uncertainties, we believe that, to complete the construction of CVC’s currently approved scope, AOC is likely to need more funds in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 than it has already received and has requested. Although the exact amount and timing of AOC’s needs are not clear, we believe that between $5 million and $15 million of this $37 million may be required in fiscal year 2006. First, coordination within the CVC project team and between the team and AOC’s Fire Marshal Division has been an issue, especially with respect to the project’s fire protection systems. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that (1) Congress has sufficient information for deciding when to open CVC to the public and (2) planning and budgeting for CVC construction and operations are appropriately integrated, we recommend that the Architect of the Capitol take the following two actions: In consultation with other appropriate congressional organizations, provide Congress with an estimate of the additional costs that it expects will be incurred to open CVC to the public by September 15, 2006, rather than later, such as after the completion of the House and Senate expansion spaces. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) progress in achieving selected project milestones and in managing the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project's schedule since Congress's June 14 hearing on the project. We will also discuss the project's costs and funding, including the potential cost impact of schedule-related issues. Our observations today are based on our review of schedules and financial reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; our observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and our discussions with AOC's Chief Fire Marshal and CVC project staff, including AOC, its major CVC contractors, and representatives of an AOC schedule consultant, McDonough Bolyard Peck (MBP). We did not perform an audit; rather, we performed our work to assist Congress in conducting its oversight activities.
What GAO Found
AOC and its major construction contractors have made progress on the project since Congress's June 14 hearing, but work on some of the selected milestones scheduled for completion by today's hearing is incomplete; some work has been postponed; and some new issues have arisen that could affect the project's progress. Largely because of past problems, remaining risks and uncertainties, and the number of activities that are not being completed on time, we continue to believe that the project is more likely to be completed in the December 2006 to March 2007 time frame than in September 2006. AOC and its construction management contractor have continued their efforts to respond to two recommendations we made to improve the project's management--having a realistic, acceptable schedule and aggressively monitoring and managing adherence to that schedule. However, we still have some concerns about the amount of time scheduled for some activities, the extent to which resources can be applied to meet dates in the schedule, the linkage of related activities in the schedule, and the integration of planning for completing construction and starting operations. Since Congress's last CVC hearing, AOC has engaged contractors to help it respond to two other recommendations we made--developing risk mitigation plans and preparing a master schedule that integrates the major steps needed to complete construction with the steps needed to prepare for operations. AOC has also been taking a number of actions to improve coordination between the CVC project team and AOC's Fire Marshal Division. Insufficient coordination in this area has already affected the project's schedule and cost, and could do so again if further improvements are not made. We continue to believe that the project's estimated cost at completion will be between $522 million and $559 million, and that, as we have previously indicated, AOC will likely need as much as $37 million more than it has requested to cover risks and uncertainties to complete the project. At this time, we believe that roughly $5 million to $15 million of this $37 million is likely to be needed in fiscal year 2006, and the remainder in fiscal year 2007. In the next 2 to 3 months, AOC plans to update its estimate of the project's remaining costs. We will review this estimate and provide Congress with our estimate together with information on when any additional funding is likely to be needed. During the next several months, AOC is likely to face competing demands for funds that can be used for either CVC construction or operations, and it will be important for AOC to ensure that the available funds are optimally used. Finally, we are concerned that AOC may incur costs to open the facility to the public in September 2006 that it would not incur if it postponed the opening until after the remaining construction work is more or fully complete--that is, in March 2007, according to AOC's estimates. |
gao_GAO-15-307 | gao_GAO-15-307_0 | GSA Worked to Select Green Projects and New Courthouses That Reflected Recovery Act Priorities
GSA Selected Green Projects to Achieve Environmental Goals and Obligate Funds Quickly
According to GSA officials, the agency obligated its $4.5 billion in Recovery Act funds to green projects that would help convert federal buildings and courthouses into green buildings and that could be obligated quickly. In total, GSA used about $800 million of its $4.5 billion green building funds toward 15 full or partial courthouse modernization projects (an average of about $53 million each). Courthouse in San Antonio, Texas, GSA installed solar panels and a solar water heater on the roof (fig. Table 3 shows simple payback period estimates for selected energy- and water-saving technologies installed at the Hipolito F. Garcia Federal Building and U.S. GSA Generally Selected New Construction Projects That Helped It Build or Acquire New Courthouses
In addition to $4.5 billion in green funds, the Recovery Act provided GSA with $750 million for federal buildings and U.S. courthouses. As of May 2014, GSA had used $257 million of its $750 million-general- purpose funds for seven courthouses and the remainder on federal buildings that did not have a judiciary presence. GSA’s Project Management Has Not Always Aligned with Successful Practices and Had Mixed Effects on Judicial Operations
GSA’s Project Management Did Not Always Align with Successful Practices
We found that GSA management incorporated the seven successful practices for managing large-scale investments to varying degrees at 10 courthouse projects that we reviewed in greater detail. Courthouse in San Juan, Puerto Rico, judiciary tenants said that GSA limited their involvement during construction, and as a result, their input was not obtained on the project’s phased schedule approach that required the closure of all public restrooms in the operating courthouse for a year, except for one restroom on the seventh floor of the adjoining federal building. For example, judiciary officials at Federico Degetau Federal Building and Clemente Ruiz Nazario U.S. Costs or Schedules Changed for a Majority of Courthouse Construction and Modernizations
According to GSA cost and schedule data for new construction and full or partial modernization courthouse projects, GSA completed 8 of the 22 Recovery Act projects on time and on budget. Most Judiciary Tenants Were Satisfied with Completed Recovery Act Projects, but Some Reported Disruptions and Coordination Challenges
Judiciary tenants at 6 of 10 of the courthouses we studied said that Recovery Act projects did not disrupt court operations. For example, although the MPC directed GSA project managers to include on-site renewable energy systems—including solar panels, solar water heaters, or both—when scoping projects, project managers did not incorporate this MPC at 4 of the 10 courthouses in our review. GSA has not yet evaluated the environmental performance of its Recovery Act projects against the MPC. Without evaluating building performance against the MPC, GSA is limited in its knowledge of whether projects have achieved expected outcomes. Some Projects Are Contributing to Federal Environmental Goals but It Remains Unclear If They Meet the MPC
Since GSA has not measured the progress of its Recovery Act projects toward meeting the MPC, we analyzed GSA’s energy and water usage data for the full or partial courthouse- modernization projects we reviewed against federal portfolio-wide goals upon which some of the MPC were based. We evaluated whether the five courthouses were contributing toward the federal goal by either meeting or exceeding the 27 percent reduction that was expected by fiscal year 2014. GSA should examine incorporating successful management practices—such as consistently involving tenants at various stages of the project—into its capital investment process to ensure that projects are managed efficiently and that tenant disruptions are minimized. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines how the General Services Administration (GSA) used funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) in buildings that included a judicial presence. This report examines (1) how GSA determined which courthouse projects to fund under the Recovery Act; (2) how GSA’s management of selected Recovery Act courthouse projects aligned with successful practices and whether these projects disrupted judiciary operations, and (3) how, if at all, GSA established environmental performance goals for courthouses funded by the Recovery Act and whether the selected projects met those goals. To identify how GSA determined which courthouses would receive Recovery Act funds, we reviewed GSA’s Recovery Act-planning documents; project selection criteria; prior GAO reports; and relevant legislation and guidance, including the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), related federal statutes, and executive orders related to GSA’s $4.5 billion in high-performance green (green) Recovery Act funds and its $750 million in funds for federal buildings and U.S. courthouses. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Recovery Act provided GSA with $5.55 billion—over three times the agency's 2009 funding for new construction and renovations—to invest in federal buildings and U.S. courthouses. This amount included $4.5 billion to convert federal buildings and U.S. courthouses into green buildings that would reduce energy and water use, among other goals.
GAO was asked to review GSA's use of Recovery Act funds as they related to courthouses. This report examines (1) how GSA determined which courthouse projects to fund under the Recovery Act, (2) how GSA's management of selected Recovery Act projects aligned with successful practices and whether these projects disrupted judiciary operations, and (3) how GSA set environmental goals for courthouses and whether selected projects met those goals. GAO reviewed relevant laws and agency documents, collected cost and schedule data on courthouse projects, and analyzed environmental outcomes for 10 projects. GAO selected these 10 Recovery Act courthouse projects, based on project size, type, and location, and interviewed GSA officials and judiciary tenants about GSA's management and coordination.
What GAO Found
The General Services Administration (GSA) developed eight selection criteria for utilizing its $4.5 billion in high-performing green (green) building funds—or more than 80 percent of its total $5.5-billion budget—under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). GSA used almost $800 million of its $4.5-billion green building funds on 15 full or partial modernization projects and the remaining funds were used on federal buildings or limited scope projects. For example, at the Hipolito F. Garcia Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in San Antonio, Texas, GSA installed solar panels and a solar water heater on the roof, installed a green roof on the interior courtyard, and replaced the building's lighting. In addition, as of May 2014, GSA used $257 million of the $750 million in Recovery Act funds dedicated to federal buildings and U.S. courthouses to construct or acquire seven courthouses.
GSA management of selected Recovery Act courthouse projects did not always align with seven successful practices that GAO developed for managing large-scale investments. GAO's more in-depth review of 10 courthouses showed that while GSA generally provided top leadership support and sufficient funding, its management of these Recovery Act projects did not always align with the remaining five practices. For example, judiciary tenants at 3 of the 10 courthouses said that GSA management did not actively engage with judiciary stakeholders during construction. In one case, judiciary officials at the Federico Degetau Federal Building and Clemente Ruiz Nazario Courthouse in Puerto Rico said they were not consulted on the project's phased schedule approach that required the closure of all public restrooms in the operating courthouse for a year, except for one restroom on the seventh floor of the adjoining federal building. For the projects GAO reviewed, when GSA did not incorporate the successful practices, GAO found that projects were more likely to experience schedule delays, cost increases, or lack of tenant support. GAO found that most judiciary tenants were satisfied with the completed projects, although tenants at 4 courthouses said the projects disrupted court operations.
GSA set environmental goals by establishing minimum performance criteria (MPC) to guide how it designed green courthouse Recovery Act projects; however, environmental outcomes are not yet known. The MPC included dozens of environmental requirements for projects in areas such as energy, water, and material use. While some Recovery Act projects have been completed for several years and GSA has the necessary data to evaluate projects, GSA officials have not developed a schedule for analyzing building performance against the MPC. GAO evaluated the extent to which the selected courthouses with a year or more of operational data contributed toward the energy and water- reduction goals that GSA used to develop the MPC. GAO found that as of fiscal year 2014, 2 of the 5 courthouses with available data are contributing toward energy reduction goals, and all 4 courthouses with available data are contributing toward water reduction goals. Without evaluating the performance of courthouse projects against the MPC, GSA lacks important information that could guide the agency's future investments in green infrastructure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA (1) examine incorporating successful management practices into its capital investment process and (2) analyze and apply environmental outcomes for green Recovery Act projects. GSA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-38 | gao_GAO-07-38_0 | Agencies Provide Most of the Required SBIR-Award Data Elements to SBA, but Some Data Submitted are Incomplete
While federal agencies participating in the SBIR program submit a wide range of descriptive award information to SBA annually, these agencies are not consistently providing all of the required information. Specifically, participating agencies are required to provide over 40 data elements for each SBIR award they make. As a result, SBA does not have information on the number of employees at SBIR awardee firms for about one-third of all the awards reported by these agencies in 2004 and 2005. Agencies Generally Comply with SBA’s Formatting Guidance, but Key Data on SBIR Award Recipients May Be Inconsistent or Inaccurate
Participating agencies are providing some data that do not comply with SBA’s formatting guidance, and while some of these inconsistencies are corrected by SBA’s quality assurance processes, others are not. Because the data contained in the public-use section of Tech-Net will be incorporated into the government-use section of the database, inaccurate data in one section of the database will be replicated in the other, and these inaccurate data will limit evaluations of the SBIR program. Instead, SBA relies on the agencies to fully report all the required application information on the awards they make. The formatting inconsistencies that we identified arise primarily because the SBA reporting template used by agencies to submit required data can be edited. SBA Is Five Years Behind Schedule in Meeting its Obligation to Implement a Government-Use SBIR Database
SBA has not met its obligation to implement a restricted government-use database that would allow SBIR program evaluation as directed by the 2000 SBIR reauthorization act. SBA planned to meet this requirement by expanding the existing Tech-Net database to include a restricted government-use section that would be accessible only to government agencies and other authorized users. However, according to SBA officials, the agency has been unable to meet this requirement, primarily because of increased security and other information technology project requirements, agency management changes, and budgetary constraints. While SBA officials expect the government-use section of the database to be operational by October 1, 2006, they also recognize that additional enhancements, such as improving the user-friendliness of the interface for online submission of SBIR data by participating agencies and recipients, will be needed after the system is made operational. Regardless of how they track commercialization success, both SBA and agency officials generally agree that several factors complicate their efforts to obtain this information. Agencies’ Efforts to Track SBIR Commercialization Success Vary
Of the eight agencies we reviewed, five systematically and periodically survey SBIR recipients to gather a variety of data on program participation, including the recipients’ commercialization experiences. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methods
Our objectives for this review were to identify (1) the types of data that participating Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program agencies are reporting to the Small Business Administration (SBA) for inclusion in the Tech-Net database, (2) the extent to which agencies provide data for the Tech-Net database in a standard format to enable program evaluation, (3) the extent to which SBA has met the mandate to establish by early 2001 a government-use database that can be used for program evaluation, and (4) the extent to which participating SBIR agencies have developed and implemented techniques to track the commercialization success of SBIR projects. To determine the extent to which data for the Tech-Net database are provided in a standard format, enabling program evaluation, we compared data provided to SBA by the eight participating agencies with data in SBA’s Tech-Net database for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the 2 most recent years for which data were available. The agency data included information about the award itself, such as the award amount, a descriptive abstract of the project, and a unique tracking number; information about the award recipient, such as gender and socio-economic status; and information about the type of firm that received the award, such as number of employees and geographic location. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program was created to increase the use of small businesses to meet federal research needs and commercialize the results of this research. To monitor the program, the Small Business Administration (SBA) requires participating agencies to provide, in a standard format, specific data on all SBIR awards they make. SBA then compiles these data into a database known as Tech-Net. Congress also required SBA to create, by 2001, a restricted and more comprehensive database that would provide information for government agencies to use in evaluating the program. GAO was asked to identify the (1) types of data that agencies report to SBA for inclusion in the Tech-Net database, (2) extent to which these data are provided in a standard format, (3) extent to which SBA has established the government-use database, and (4) extent to which SBIR agencies have developed and implemented techniques to track commercialization of SBIR projects. GAO reviewed 8 of the 11 agencies participating in SBIR.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies participating in the SBIR program annually submit over 40 data elements to SBA for each award they make. These data include information on the award, such as value and a descriptive abstract; information on the recipient, such as name and gender; and information about the firm receiving the award, such as number of employees and location. Participating agencies submit most of the information required by SBA, but they are not consistently providing all required data elements, including the number of employees in the firm, and the gender and socio-economic status of the award recipient, resulting in incomplete sections of the database. Agencies stated that this happens because they do not collect all of the information that SBA wants and because SBA's requirements change regularly. Some participating agencies are not submitting SBIR award data in the standard format required by SBA, and although SBA's quality assurance processes correct most of these problems, they do not correct all of them. In 2004 and 2005, about 25 percent of the data provided by five participating agencies did not comply with SBA's format. Formatting inconsistencies occur because the template SBA has provided agencies for reporting data can be edited. According to SBA, identifying and correcting inconsistently formatted data involves considerable resources, therefore the agency has focused its quality assurance efforts only on key data elements needed to track awards; other fields, such as those containing demographic data, are generally not corrected. As a result, comprehensive program evaluations may be limited by the quality of the data in these fields. SBA officials expect this problem to be resolved by fiscal year 2007, when all data will be submitted via an Internet interface that will not allow changes in the format. SBA is 5 years behind schedule in meeting the congressional mandate to implement a restricted government-use database for the SBIR program. SBA had planned to meet this requirement by expanding its Tech-Net database to include a restricted government-use section. SBA officials attributed the delay in meeting the 2001 deadline primarily to increased security requirements needed for the database, agency management changes, and budgetary constraints. SBA officials expect the government-use section of Tech-Net to be operational by October 1, 2006, when safeguards to protect the proprietary commercialization information in the database are in place. Most agencies GAO reviewed systematically gather data on the commercialization success of SBIR-funded projects. Five of these eight agencies regularly survey all awardees to gather information on program participation, including commercial success, and one agency is about to start a similar survey. In contrast, two agencies only gather anecdotal success stories from a small sample of SBIR awardees. SBA and agency officials generally agree that despite their best efforts, obtaining commercialization information from awardees remains a major challenge. |
gao_GAO-15-103 | gao_GAO-15-103_0 | Background
DOD and the military services invest in ground radars and air-to-ground precision guided munitions. Air-to-ground precision guided munitions are weapons launched from Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft that are intended to accurately engage and destroy enemy targets on the ground. DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) approves study guidance, which provides direction on what the AOA must include, for acquisition category I programs. Overlapping Performance Requirements and Potential Duplication Exist across Ground Radar Programs, but DOD Has Determined Any Redundancy Is Necessary
Our analysis of DOD’s active ground radar programs found evidence of overlapping performance requirements and potential duplication in certain mission areas. The military services pursued separate ground radar acquisition programs for several reasons: other programs did not fully meet their performance requirements; the timelines for other programs did not align with their needs; and they made different decisions on whether to pursue multi-role or single role radars. However, while many of the requirements overlap, the AN/TPQ-53 does not meet the G/ATOR Block II detection range requirements for multiple target types. In addition to some unique requirements, urgent operational needs and different acquisition approaches led the Army and Marine Corps to establish separate acquisition programs for counterfire target acquisition radars. The JROC did not validate the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 performance requirements because it was initially an urgent wartime need and did not meet acquisition category I dollar thresholds. However, at the point the JROC could have reviewed the AN/TPQ-53 requirements, the program had transitioned to the more traditional acquisition process. Air-To-Ground Precision Guided Munitions Programs Are Not Duplicative, but Potential for Duplication in the Future Exists
Our analysis of DOD’s active air-to-ground precision guided munitions found some munitions shared some capabilities, but after taking into consideration characteristics such as the aircraft that can launch them, we found the systems were not duplicative. To the extent overlapping capabilities exist, DOD officials said these capabilities provided needed flexibility for different military operations. Both the Army and the Navy plan to buy APKWS through fiscal year 2015 to meet their guided rocket needs, but starting in fiscal year 2016, they may pursue separate, potentially duplicative, efforts to meet their requirements. There are costs and benefits associated with both the Army and Navy’s acquisition approaches; however, if the Army and Navy fulfill their guided rocket needs separately instead of through a single solution with a cooperative contracting strategy, it could result in the inefficient use of weapon system investment dollars and a loss of buying power. We found these programs to be potentially duplicative. For example, DOD may have missed an opportunity to review whether the capabilities of the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire Radar and the Marine Corps’ G/ATOR Block II were unnecessarily redundant or duplicative because the requirements document for the AN/TPQ-53 was validated by the Army, rather than the JROC, which has a broader perspective on DOD’s capability needs. This cooperation has helped DOD leverage its buying power. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that DOD take the following two actions:
To provide the JROC the opportunity to review all ground radar programs for potential duplication and CAPE with the opportunity to develop broad analysis of alternative guidance, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should direct the Joint Staff to assign all new ground radar capability requirement documents with a Joint Staff designation of “JROC Interest.”
To address potential overlap or duplication in the acquisition of Hydra- 70 rocket guidance kits, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should require the Army and Navy to assess whether a single solution and cooperative, preferably competitive, contracting strategy offers the most cost effective way to meet both services’ needs. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent of potential overlap or duplication across (1) ground radar and (2) air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs, we reviewed acquisition programs currently in development or production, which does not include systems only being developed or produced for foreign military sales. Our scope included two air surveillance and air defense ground radar systems—the Air Force’s Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DELRR) and the Marine Corps’ AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) Block I Radar—and two counterfire target acquisition ground radar programs—the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire Radar and the Marine Corps’ AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR Block II. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past five years, GAO has found potential overlap or duplication in DOD weapon system investments. Overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs are engaged in similar activities. Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities. Senate Report 113-44 accompanying the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO examine the military services' ground radar and air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs for potential duplication. Ground radars are sensors used to detect and track targets, and precision guided munitions are weapons intended to accurately engage and destroy enemy targets.
This report examines the extent to which potential overlap or duplication exists across the military services' (1) ground radar and (2) air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs. GAO analyzed program documentation on system performance requirements and capabilities and interviewed DOD officials about potential duplication.
What GAO Found
Several of the Department of Defense's (DOD) active ground radar programs have overlapping performance requirements and two are potentially duplicative. In these instances, the military service pursued separate acquisition programs because other programs did not fully meet their performance requirements, among other reasons. Specifically, GAO found:
The Marine Corps' Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) Block I and the Air Force's Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DELRR) have some overlapping key requirements, such as range, and are potentially duplicative. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which validates requirements for DOD's largest acquisition programs, did not find unnecessary redundancy, and Air Force officials stated that G/ATOR could not meet all of the 3DELRR's requirements.
The Army's AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire Radar and the Marine Corps' G/ATOR Block II have some overlapping requirements, but the AN/TPQ-53 does not meet certain key G/ATOR Block II requirements, therefore reducing the risk that the programs are duplicative. In this case, urgent operational needs and different acquisition approaches also led the Army and Marine Corps to establish separate acquisition programs.
As a result of reviews conducted by the JROC and DOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), which develops guidance for analyzing alternative ways to fulfill capability needs, the Air Force made positive changes to the 3DELRR program, such as reducing some requirements to improve program affordability. CAPE also expanded the alternatives considered on acquisition programs to minimize potential duplication. DOD missed an opportunity to assess whether the capabilities of the AN/TPQ-53 and G/ATOR Block II were unnecessarily redundant. The JROC did not review the AN/TPQ-53 requirements because it was initially fielded to meet an urgent need and did not meet the dollar threshold to automatically trigger a review. However, the AN/TPQ-53 transitioned to the traditional, non-urgent needs acquisition process at which point the JROC could have reviewed it. Ensuring that the JROC and CAPE review new ground radar acquisitions could help DOD avoid duplication.
DOD's active air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs are not duplicative, but potential for duplication exists in the future. The active programs share some capabilities, but characteristics such as the aircraft that can launch them distinguish them from one another. To the extent that overlapping capabilities exist, DOD officials said these capabilities provided needed flexibility for military operations. Cooperation among the military services contributed to the current lack of duplication. GAO found one example of potential future duplication. Both the Army and the Navy plan to buy the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System through fiscal year 2015 to meet their guided rocket needs, but starting in fiscal year 2016, they may pursue separate, potentially duplicative, efforts. There are costs and benefits associated with both the Army and Navy's acquisition approaches; however, if the Army and Navy fulfill their guided rocket needs separately instead of cooperatively, it could result in the inefficient use of weapon system investment dollars and a loss of buying power.
What GAO Recommends
To address potential duplication, GAO recommends that DOD ensure that new ground radar acquisitions are reviewed by the JROC and CAPE and require the Army and Navy to jointly assess the possibility of using a single solution and a cooperative, preferably competitive, contracting strategy to meet their guided rocket needs. DOD partially agreed with GAO's first recommendation, but stated it should not be mandatory. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid as discussed in its report. DOD agreed with the second recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-258 | gao_GAO-03-258_0 | NRC also charged the OCFO and the former Executive Council with developing a new planning, budgeting, and performance management process. This section describes how components of the process were designed to operate, while the next section (“Planning and Performance Information Influences Resource Allocation Decisions in Various Ways”) explains how performance information informs resource decisions in those offices that have implemented PBPM and its techniques. Four Components of PBPM
Component 1: Setting the Strategic Direction
In Component 1, NRC establishes agencywide strategic direction by formulating the strategic plan and by issuing Commission guidance throughout the year. In addition, the Commission provides direction to its managers on programs and operations through various written directives. Component 2: Determining Planned Accomplishments and Resources
In Component 2, managers in offices using PBPM employ a set of interrelated tools to translate agency goals and strategies into individual office work activities, performance targets, and resource needs. (A later section of this report, “Challenges to Improving the NRC Budget and Planning Process,” more fully discusses challenges to improving the assessment component). NRC informs its resource allocation decisions by providing strategic direction to operating units prior to budget formulation and by monitoring actual performance against performance targets during budget execution. PBPM also promotes agencywide coordination of budget formulation and execution decisions by providing a common language and common goals. Operating plans are also used to monitor performance and make necessary adjustments. Our report on federal agency efforts in linking performance plans with budgets found that NRC’s budget presentation linked its program activities to performance goals, which showed funding needed to achieve goals. Agency officials noted challenges in (1) creating performance measures that balance competing goals and keep performance measures current, (2) associating resource requests with outcomes, (3) standardizing PBPM practices and techniques but still allowing individual offices to tailor the process to their needs, (4) developing the assessment component, and (5) committing significant effort to maintaining PBPM. In addition, NRC must continue developing a cost accounting system to support PBPM. First, the budget process focuses on performance targets and budget decisions for the short term while achieving some outcomes may take many years. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Encouraging a clearer and closer link between budgeting and planning is essential to improving federal management and instilling a greater focus on results. Through work at various levels within the organization, this report on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)--and its two companion studies on the Administration for Children and Families (GAO-03-09) and the Veterans Health Administration (GAO-03-10)--documents (1) what managers considered successful efforts at creating linkages between planning and performance information to influence resource choices and (2) the challenges managers face in creating these linkages.
What GAO Found
Although in differing stages of implementation throughout NRC, NRC designed the Planning, Budgeting, and Performance Management Process (PBPM) to better integrate its strategic planning, budgeting, and performance management processes. PBPM links four individual components: (1) setting the agency's strategic direction, (2) determining activities and performance targets of component offices and related resources, (3) executing the budget and monitoring performance targets and taking corrective actions, if needed, to achieve those targets, and (4) assessing agency progress toward achieving its goals. GAO's report provides examples of how the PBPM framework can influence budget formulation and execution decisions. These examples show (1) how NRC informs its resource allocation decisions by providing strategic direction to operating units prior to budget formulation, (2) how operating units that have implemented these processes link strategic direction to budgets through tools that set priorities and assign resources to office activities to accomplish these priorities, and (3) how operating units monitor performance targets and make adjustments as necessary during budget execution. In addition, agency managers have told GAO that PBPM also promotes agencywide coordination of budget formulation and execution decisions by providing a common language and common goals. Integrating budget and planning processes and improving performance management in NRC is an ongoing effort that includes addressing a series of challenges. They are (1) creating performance measures that balance competing goals and keep performance measures current, (2) associating resource requests with outcomes, (3) standardizing PBPM practices and techniques but still allowing some flexibility among offices to tailor the process to their needs, (4) developing the assessment component, and (5) committing significant effort to maintain PBPM. In addition, NRC must continue developing a cost accounting system to support PBPM. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-10 | gao_T-AIMD-96-10_0 | As we testified last month, given the serious and pervasive nature of DOD’s financial management problems, and the need for more immediate progress, the Department needs to consider additional steps to (1) establish a skilled financial management workforce, (2) ensure that financial management systems are capable of producing accurate data, and (3) build an effective financial management organization structure with clear accountability. CFO Act agencies, however, need to ensure that CFOs possess all the necessary authorities within their agencies to achieve change. Moreover, implementing the CFO Act’s objective of upgrading financial operations, such as developing performance measurement systems and integrating budget and accounting data, will require significantly enhanced staff skills. The first important step was taken with the CFO Act requirement for the preparation and audit of financial reports to achieve basic data reliability. Recent GAO Testimony on the Benefits on Preparing and Auditing Agencywide Financial Statements
Financial Management: Momentum Must Be Sustained to Achieve the Reform Goals of the Chief Financial Officers Act (GAO/T-AIMD-95-204, July 25, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the progress being made to implement financial management reforms through the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that improving financial management through implementation of the CFO Act requires: (1) implementing expanded requirements for financial statement audits to improve the reliability of data for decisionmaking; (2) strengthening the efficiency of revenue collection operations and controls; (3) building stronger financial management organizations by upgrading skill levels, enhancing training, and ensuring that CFO possess the necessary authority to achieve change; (4) better solutions to address problems with agencies' underlying financial systems; and (5) designing accountability reports to allow more thorough and objective assessments of agencies' performance and financial conditions and to enhance the budget preparation and deliberation process. |
gao_GAO-16-106 | gao_GAO-16-106_0 | 1.) Cost Sharing Sponsors
Sponsors share in the costs of dam safety repairs based on original congressional authorizations for dam construction or subsequent sponsors’ agreements with the Corps. Cost sharing percentages can range from under 1 percent, such as for small water supply users, to over 50 percent, such as for hydropower users, depending on a sponsor’s agreement with the Corps. The Corps Has Determined Cost Sharing Based on Ways in Which a Dam May Fail, but Has Not Applied One Provision That Reduces Sponsors’ Cost Share
A Dam’s Potential Failure Mode Drives the Corps’ Decision on Cost Sharing
According to the Corps’ Safety of Dams regulation, during a dam safety modification study, Corps district officials are to identify and analyze all the potential ways that a dam could fail. The potential failure mode is the primary factor in determining the applicable authority, in addition to consideration of policy and statutory requirements: Major Rehabilitation: According to Corps officials, this authority applies to dam safety repairs associated with typical degradation of dams over time. Under this authority, sponsors are to pay their full cost share. The total estimated cost for these repairs is $5.8 billion. For 11 of the 16 dams the Corps applied its Major Rehabilitation authority. Sponsors for these dams are to pay their full cost share, estimated at $574 million of the total $4.2 billion in repairs. The Corps Did Not Apply One Provision of Its Dam Safety Assurance Authority That Reduces Sponsors’ Cost Share
While the Corps applied the Dam Safety Assurance authority to 5 of 16 dams in our review based on the availability of new hydrologic or seismic data, it did not apply the Dam Safety Assurance authority’s state-of-the- art provision to any of these dam safety repair projects. Specifically, the 2014 regulation notes the difficulty of defining the state- of-the-art provision and states that because the state-of-the-art “terminology makes it difficult to define the kinds of repairs that would be applicable, it is not used.” The same 2014 regulation states that use of the state-of-the-art provision must be decided on a case-by-case basis by the ASA(CW). Without clarifying the circumstances under which the state-of-the-art provision applies and implementing the policy consistently, the Corps is at risk of not applying the full range of statutory authorities provided to it, thereby raising questions about the appropriate allocation of federal and non-federal funding for dam safety repairs. Some Corps Districts Did Not Communicate with Sponsors or Engage Them Effectively, Potentially Reducing Payments Received from Sponsors
The Corps Did Not Effectively Communicate Its Cost Sharing Determination, Contributing to Uncertainty Regarding Sponsor Payment
The Corps’ lack of clarity and a consistent policy position regarding the state-of-the-art provision under the Dam Safety Assurance authority has contributed to disagreements with a major sponsor and uncertainty regarding sponsor payment. 2.) For example, the Corps determined that repairs to mitigate the effects of seepage were needed at 9 of the 16 dams we reviewed, with a total estimated cost of about $4 billion. Of the 16 dam safety repair projects we reviewed, 9 had sponsors, and—as discussed below—at 3 of the 9 dams the Corps did not communicate with the sponsors in a manner that would ensure their meaningful involvement and willingness to be cost sharing partners, as required by its regulation. Because the Corps does not have clear guidance to ensure effective communications with sponsors, it did not adequately communicate or reach agreements on cost sharing responsibilities with these sponsors. As a result, these sponsors’ plans for paying their cost shares are uncertain, leaving the recovery of federal outlays from these sponsors similarly uncertain. Because the Corps has not always effectively communicated with or engaged sponsors, some are deriving benefits from dams absent an agreement with the Corps while other sponsors that have agreements either have not been notified by the Corps of their final cost share responsibility or dispute the Corps’ cost sharing determination and may raise a legal challenge. Recommendations
To improve cost sharing for dam safety repairs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to clarify policy guidance: on the types of circumstances under which the state-of-the-art provision of the Dam Safety Assurance authority might apply to dam safety repair projects. for district offices to effectively communicate with sponsors to establish and implement cost sharing agreements during dam safety repair projects. For all dams, including the three dams named in the report, this would involve communicating estimated and final cost sharing amounts, executing agreements, and engaging sponsors to ensure cost share payment. Not all sponsors for the dams included in our review were available for interview. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Corps operates over 700 dams, which are aging and may require major repairs to assure safe operation. At some dams, sponsors that benefit from dam operations share in the cost of operating and repairing these dams based on original congressional authorizations for dam construction or subsequent agreements with the Corps. Since 2005, the Corps initiated an estimated $5.8 billion in repairs at 16 dams with urgent repair needs; sponsors are to share repair costs at 9 of these dams.
GAO was asked to examine cost sharing for Corps dam safety repairs. This report examines how, over the last 10 years, the Corps (1) determined cost sharing and (2) communicated with sponsors regarding cost sharing. GAO reviewed relevant laws and Corps regulations; analyzed dam safety projects' documentation for the 16 dams the Corps selected for repairs since 2005; conducted site visits to a non-generalizable sample of three dams based on cost share determinations and range of sponsors; and interviewed Corps officials and sponsors.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) determined sponsors' (such as water utilities and hydropower users) share of costs for dam safety repairs pursuant to regulations, but did not apply a provision in a statutory authority that reduces sponsors' share. The Corps determined these cost shares based on analyses of the potential ways each dam could fail, and in consideration of statutory requirements regarding which type of cost sharing arrangement, or authority, would apply given these possible failure scenarios.
The Corps applied its Major Rehabilitation authority at 11 of the 16 dam safety repair projects GAO reviewed for repairs associated with typical degradation of dams, such as embankment or foundation erosion through seepage. Under this authority, sponsors are to pay their full agreed-upon cost share of the repair.
The Corps applied its Dam Safety Assurance authority at 5 of the 16 dam safety repair projects GAO reviewed for repairs that resulted from the availability of new hydrologic or seismic data. Under this authority, sponsors' agreed-upon cost share is reduced by 85 percent.
The Corps did not apply one provision of its Dam Safety Assurance authority—related to repairs needed due to changes in state-of-the-art design or construction criteria (state-of-the-art provision)—since the enactment of the enabling legislation in 1986. Since that time, the Corps has not provided guidance on the types of circumstances under which the state-of-the-art provision applies and has not had a consistent policy position regarding the provision. For example, the Corps' latest regulation states in one section that the state-of-the-art provision will not be applied because of the difficulty in defining terminology, while another section allows for consideration on a case-by-case basis. Without clarifying the circumstances under which the state-of-the-art provision applies, and implementing the policy consistently, the Corps is at risk of not applying the full range of statutory authorities provided to it, contributing to conditions under which, as discussed below, sponsors have taken actions opposing the Corps.
In GAO's review of 9 dams with sponsors, the Corps did not communicate with or effectively engage all sponsors. For example, a federal sponsor that markets hydropower generated at two dams disagreed with the Corps' decision to not apply the state-of-the-art provision of its Dam Safety Assurance authority, which, if used, would reduce this sponsor's cost share by about $410 million. This sponsor has proceeded to set its power rates in anticipation of paying the reduced cost share, creating uncertainty for the recovery of federal outlays for repairs. In addition, GAO found the Corps was not effective in reaching agreement with other sponsors on cost-sharing responsibilities at three dams because it did not have clear guidance for effectively communicating with sponsors. For example, the Corps did not engage a sponsor to ensure cost share payment at one dam and, at another dam, delayed executing agreements that would ensure sponsors' cost shares. Because the Corps did not effectively engage these sponsors, some are deriving benefits absent agreements with the Corps, while others that have agreements have not been notified of their final cost-sharing responsibility. As a result, these sponsors' cost share payments (about $3.1 million) are uncertain.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Corps clarify policy guidance on (1) usage of the state-of-the-art provision and (2) effective communication with sponsors to establish and implement cost sharing agreements for all dams, including the three named in this report. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-185 | gao_GAO-10-185_0 | Medicare Cost Plans
CMS pays cost plans the reasonable cost of the Medicare-covered services they furnish directly to, or arrange for, Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in their plan, less the value of the deductible and coinsurance. Beneficiaries in Cost Plans Had Multiple MA Options
All beneficiaries enrolled in cost plans had multiple MA options available to them. Nearly 100 percent of beneficiaries enrolled in cost plans had at least 5 MA plans serving their county in June 2009, and more than 57 percent had a choice of 15 or more MA plans (see fig. Cost Plan Quality Scores Higher Than MA Plans While Estimated Out-of- Pocket Costs Vary by Health Status
Some of the differences between cost plans and MA plans that affect beneficiaries involve out-of-network coverage, enrollment periods, and prescription drug coverage. Cost Plan Quality Scores Generally Higher Than Competitor MA Plans
Our analysis of CMS quality scores found that cost plans’ quality scores, on average, were higher than the average of competing MA plans. In general, beneficiaries 80 to 84 years old reporting poor health had lower estimated average out-of-pocket costs in cost plans compared to competitor MA plans and Medicare FFS, while beneficiaries in the same age group in cost plans reporting good or excellent health had higher estimated average out- of-pocket costs. Half of Organizations Offering Cost Plans Also Offered MA Plans
In June 2009, 9 of the 18 organizations offering cost plans also offered MA plans in some or all of their cost plans’ service area, which demonstrates that these organizations were capable of bearing financial risk. These 9 organizations operated a total of 12 cost plans. All eight organizations offering both cost plans and MA plans that were not special needs plans operated at least one MA plan in some or all of their cost plan’s service area. CMS requires that organizations that offer an MA plan in the same service area as their cost plan close the cost plan to new enrollment. Another organization’s Medicare managed care enrollment was fairly evenly split between its MA plan and cost plan. Financial and Beneficiary Transition Issues Cited as Concerns Regarding Conversion to MA Plans
Officials from organizations that offered cost plans cited potential future changes to MA payments and difficulty assuming financial risk as concerns about converting cost plans to MA plans. Officials from 13 of the 18 organizations that offered cost plans identified past payment changes in the Medicare risk programs and the potential for future payment changes in the MA program as making the decision to convert difficult, though 6 of these organizations offered an MA plan in some or all of their cost plan’s service area in 2009. Officials from some organizations said that the size of their enrollment was insufficient to manage the financial risk associated with the MA program. Cost Plans Cited Concerns about Transitioning Beneficiaries
Officials from more than half of the 18 organizations with cost plans stated they were concerned about the potential disruption to beneficiaries if they were required to convert to a MA plan. CMS stated that they would strongly suggest that the cost plans adhere to the more stringent MA requirements regarding plan closures, which require the organization offering the plan to notify each Medicare beneficiary enrolled in the plan at least 90 days before it stops operating by sending a CMS-approved notice to beneficiaries describing available alternatives for obtaining Medicare services within the service area, including MA plans and Medicare FFS. Agency and Other External Comments
We provided a draft of this report to CMS and the Medicare Cost Contractors Alliance. In addition, the Medicare Cost Contractors Alliance officials provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Of the 22 cost plans, 15 were open to enrollment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare cost plans--managed care plans paid based on the reasonable costs of delivering Medicare-covered services--enroll a small number of beneficiaries compared to Medicare Advantage (MA), Medicare's managed care program in which the plans accept financial risk if their costs exceed fixed payments received for each enrolled beneficiary. Despite the small enrollment, industry representatives stated that cost plans provide a managed care option in areas that traditionally had few or no MA plans. Current law allows existing cost plans to continue operating unless specific MA plans of sufficient enrollment serve the same area. In such cases, the cost plan must discontinue serving that area beginning in 2011. The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine issues related to the conversion of Medicare cost plans to MA plans. In response, GAO (1) determined the MA options available to beneficiaries in cost plans, (2) described key differences for beneficiaries between cost plans, MA plans, and Medicare fee-for-service (FFS); (3) determined the extent to which organizations offering cost plans also offer MA plans; and (4) described concerns cost plans have about converting to MA plans. GAO analyzed data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that administers Medicare. GAO also reviewed requirements for Medicare managed care plans and interviewed officials from all Medicare cost plans and CMS.
What GAO Found
All Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in the 22 cost plans had multiple MA options available to them. Nearly all beneficiaries enrolled in cost plans had at least 5 MA plans serving their county in June 2009, and more than 57 percent had a choice of 15 or more MA plans. Some of the differences between cost plans and MA plans that affect beneficiaries are out-of-network coverage, enrollment periods, and prescription drug coverage. Cost plans' quality scores, on average, were higher than the average of competing MA plans' scores in the county with the cost plan's highest enrollment. Estimated out-of-pocket costs varied between cost plans and other options depending on the self-reported health status of the beneficiary. In general, beneficiaries reporting poor health had lower estimated average out-of-pocket costs in most cost plans compared to competitor MA plans and FFS, while beneficiaries reporting good or excellent health had relatively higher estimated costs in most cost plans compared to MA plans and FFS. Half of the 18 organizations offering cost plans also offered at least one MA plan in some or all of their cost plans' service area. These 9 organizations operated a total of 12 cost plans. In general, organizations that offer cost plans and MA plans in the same service area must close their cost plan to enrollment. Officials from organizations that offered cost plans cited potential future changes to MA payments and difficulty assuming financial risk as concerns about converting cost plans to MA plans. Unlike cost plans, MA plans assume financial risk if payments from CMS do not cover their costs. Officials from 13 of the 18 organizations offering cost plans identified past and the potential for future payment changes in the MA program as reasons the decision to convert was difficult, though 6 of these organizations offered an MA plan in some or all of their cost plan's service area in 2009. Additionally, officials from 5 organizations said that their enrollment was insufficient to manage the financial risk plans would need to accept in the MA program. Officials from more than half of the organizations that offered cost plans also expressed concerns about the potential disruption to beneficiaries caused by transferring beneficiaries from cost plans to MA plans. GAO provided a draft of this report to CMS. CMS provided GAO with technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_AIMD-97-5 | gao_AIMD-97-5_0 | The primary focus of this report is on the capital planning and budgeting experiences of five case study organizations represented by four agencies: the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Guard, the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Interagency Fleet Management System (IFMS) and the Public Buildings Service (PBS), and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Instead, agencies must budget for the full cost of contracts up-front. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to examine (1) how case study organizations perceive the budget process and structure affects their ability to acquire capital assets, (2) whether there are financing mechanisms currently used or proposed by our case studies that could be helpful in improving budgeting for capital assets within the current unified budget structure, and (3) the results of OMB’s Bulletin 94-08 on “Planning and Budgeting for the Acquisition of Fixed Assets.”
To identify aspects of the budget process that affected case studies’ capital spending decisions and the financing mechanisms they used and proposed, we interviewed officials from our case studies as well as OMB and congressional staff responsible for reviewing the budgets of these organizations. The up-front funding requirement advances both. In the fiscal year 1997 President’s budget, OMB requested $1.4 billion in budget authority to fully fund selected ongoing projects in DOE and NASA that otherwise would have been incrementally funded. Several of these approaches to financing capital may be worthwhile for other agencies to consider to help accommodate the up-front funding requirement. The review found that some agencies lacked an integrated planning and budgeting process for fixed assets. Although most agencies were requesting full funding for capital projects, the review identified some large capital projects that were not fully funded and prompted OMB officials to encourage full up-front funding when discussing budget requests with agencies. In addition, it requires agencies to request full up-front funding for stand-alone stages of all ongoing and new fixed-asset acquisitions and outlines broad principles for planning and monitoring such acquisitions. Some have recommended that the government adopt a full-scale capital budget, but this raises major budget control issues and may not be necessary to address agency-identified impediments to capital spending. In addition to using revolving funds or an investment component, some case studies budget for stand-alone stages of capital acquisitions and use reprogramming authority. Recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget
GAO recommends that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget continue OMB’s top-level focus on fixed-asset acquisitions to include working with agencies and the Congress to promote flexible budgetary mechanisms that help agencies accommodate the consistent application of up-front funding requirements while maintaining opportunities for appropriate congressional oversight and control. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Although requiring that budget authority for the full cost of acquisitions be provided before an acquisition is made allows the Congress to control capital spending at the time a commitment is made, it also presents challenges. Because the entire cost for these relatively expensive acquisitions must be absorbed in the annual budget of an agency or program, fixed assets may seem prohibitively expensive despite their long-term benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Guard, the General Services Administration's Interagency Fleet Management System and Public Building Service, and the U.S. Geological Survey plan and budget for fixed assets, focusing on: (1) these agencies' perception of how the budget process affects their capital acquisitions; (2) whether there are funding mechanisms that might be helpful in planning and budgeting for fixed assets; and (3) the responses to the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Bulletin 94-08 on planning and budgeting for the acquisition of fixed assets.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the up-front funding requirement for the full cost of acquisitions allows Congress to control capital spending at the time a commitment is made and to better understand the future economic impact of its decisions; (2) officials at most of the agencies reviewed see up-front funding as problematic, since it requires the full cost of an asset to be absorbed in an agency's or program's annual budget, despite the fact that benefits may accrue over many years; (3) when combined with discretionary spending caps on agency and program budgets, the up-front funding requirement can make capital acquisitions seem prohibitively expensive; (4) a full-scale capital budget would raise major budget control issues and may not be necessary to address agency-identified impediments to capital spending; (5) several strategies can reduce the impact of the full funding requirement on agency budgets and help agencies accommodate the consistent application of up-front funding within the existing budget structure; (6) these strategies include budgeting for stand-alone stages of capital acquisitions, and using a revolving fund or an investment component in a working capital fund; (7) Congress has authorized agencies to accumulate budget authority for capital purchases over time; (8) some agencies have sought accounts dedicated to capital acquisitions, while others have sought additional authority to retain proceeds from capital asset sales; (9) some of these same problems and strategies surfaced as a result of an OMB effort to improve agencies' planning and budgeting for fixed assets; (10) the OMB review identified the full extent to which capital projects were not fully funded up front and led to OMB requesting $1.4 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1997 to fully fund some of these capital projects; and (11) new budget preparation instructions for FY 1998 require agencies to request full up-front funding for stand-alone stages of all ongoing and new fixed-asset acquisitions. |
gao_GAO-01-273 | gao_GAO-01-273_0 | Subsequently, the federal government established a program to certify SDBs as eligible for preferences when being considered for federal prime and subcontracting opportunities. More Than 9,000 Firms Certified, More Than Two-Thirds From Existing 8(A) Certifications
As of August 24, 2000, according to SBA officials, 9,034 small business firms were certified as SDBs. The remaining 2,629, or 29 percent, were small business firms that applied to the program and were certified by SBA. Table 1 shows the composition of the SDB certifications. Table 2 shows the status of the applications submitted to SBA by small business concerns for SDB certification. Officials Identify Uncertainty About the Program, Costs, Benefits, and Qualifications as Factors for Low Number of Applications
The number of SDBs that have been certified through the SDBC program is significantly lower than the 30,000 projected by SBA, based on the number of firms that had self-certified as SDBs. Officials gave different reasons for this view. Finally, an SBA official we interviewed pointed out that, in some cases, firms that had previously self-certified as SDBs might not currently qualify for SDB status. Scope and Methodology
To determine the number of businesses that SBA had certified as socially and economically disadvantaged since the implementation of the SDBC program, we met with and obtained information from SBA and reviewed data contained in the SBA Pro-Net database. Also, we sent letters to 30 representatives from federal agencies' Office of Small Disadvantaged Business Utilization requesting their view on reason for the lower-than- expected SDB certifications. | What GAO Found
The federal government has an annual, governmentwide procurement goal of at least five percent for small disadvantaged businesses (SDB). SDBs are eligible for various price and evaluation benefits when being considered for federal contract awards. SDB firms must have their SDB status certified by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Because of concerns over reports that fewer businesses were receiving SDB certification than expected, GAO examined the SBA certification processes to (1) determine the number of businesses that SBA had certified as socially and economically disadvantaged since the implementation of the Small Disadvantaged Business Certification program and (2) obtain views on reasons for the current difference in the number of SDB certifications from the number that had previously self-certified as SDBs. SBA records show that 9,034 small business firms were certified as SDBs as of August 24, 2000. According to SDB officials, 6,405 of these were automatically certified because of their 8(a) certification. The number of SDBs that have been certified by SBA is significantly lower than the 30,000 projected by SBA based on the number of firms that had self-certified as SDBs. Possible reasons for this discrepancy include (1) company reluctance to participate because of their uncertainty as to when or how the program would be implemented, (2) the perception by businesses that the application process is burdensome, and (3) the belief by some companies that the benefits do not justify the effort. |
gao_RCED-99-141 | gao_RCED-99-141_0 | Performance-Based Contracting at the National Laboratories Is an Evolving Process
DOE’s implementation of performance-based contracting for its laboratories is in a state of transition. The number of performance measures . Types of Fees Paid to Contractors Vary Widely
Although performance fees are a major feature of performance-based contracting, only 9 of the Department’s 18 laboratory contracts have them. Nine of the remaining laboratory contracts operate under DOE’s traditional fixed-fee arrangement, and one laboratory contract has no fee. DOE has not analyzed the impact of performance-based contracting on its laboratory contractors. As a result, it has not determined whether performance-based contracting is achieving the intended objectives of reducing costs and improving performance. Without such an overall analysis, however, it is difficult to determine the value to the government of the over $100 million spent on contractor fees for fiscal year 1998. DOE’s laboratories were not the focus of this review, however. However, since DOE has not evaluated the impact of performance-based contracting on its laboratories—owing in part to the wide variance in fee arrangements—there is limited evidence on how performance fees ensure a high level of performance by contractors at lower cost. Recommendation
Because DOE does not know whether performance-based contracting is improving performance at lower cost at its national laboratories and because our previous recommendation to develop criteria for measuring the costs and benefits of paying fees to contractors for incurring increased financial risk was not implemented, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy evaluate the costs and benefits from using performance-based contracting at the national laboratories. We also agree that DOE’s use of performance-based contracting is evolving and that the variability we found in laboratory contracts (principally in performance measures and fee arrangements) is in part due to an ongoing learning process associated with the transition to performance-based contracting. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. DOE field officials told us that performance fees are used to encourage superior performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in implementing performance-based contracting at its national laboratories, focusing on: (1) the status of performance-based contracting in DOE's national laboratory contracts; and (2) DOE's efforts to determine the impact of performance-based contracting.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOE's use of performance-based contracting for its laboratories is in a state of transition; (2) while all laboratory contracts GAO examined had some performance-based features, GAO found wide variance in the number of performance measures and the types of fees negotiated; (3) about half of the 18 laboratory contracts have performance fees to encourage superior performance--a major goal of performance-based contracting; (4) most of the remaining laboratory contracts are still based on DOE's traditional fixed-fee arrangement in which the fees are paid regardless of performance; (5) DOE has not evaluated the impact of performance-based contracting on its laboratory contractors and, as a result, does not know if this new form of contracting is achieving the intended results of improved performance and lower costs; (6) specifically, DOE has not determined whether giving higher fees to encourage superior performance by its laboratory contractors is advantageous to the government, although GAO recommended in 1994 that DOE develop criteria for measuring the costs and benefits to the government of using higher fees; (7) fees for the laboratories totalled over $100 million for fiscal year 1998; (8) while the contractors were unable to cite measurable benefits achieved by switching to performance-based contracting, they support its goals; and (9) the main benefits from performance-based contracting cited by laboratory contractors was that it has helped DOE clarify what it expects from the contractors and that it has improved communication. |
gao_GAO-10-1068T | gao_GAO-10-1068T_0 | GSA and the judiciary plan new federal courthouses based on the judiciary’s estimated 10-year judge and space requirements. Extra Space in Courthouses Cost an Estimated $835 Million in Constant 2010 Dollars to Construct and $51 Million Annually to Rent, Operate, and Maintain
Thirty-two of the 33 federal courthouses completed since 2000 include extra square feet of space, totaling 3.56 million square feet—overall, this space represents about 9 average-sized courthouses. The estimated cost to construct this extra space, when adjusted to 2010 dollars, is $835 million, and the annual cost to rent, operate, and maintain it is $51 million. The extra space and its causes are as follows: 1.7 million square feet caused by construction in excess of congressional 887,000 extra square feet caused by the judiciary overestimating the number of judges the courthouses would have in 10 years; and 946,000 extra square feet caused by district and magistrate judges not sharing courtrooms. Most Courthouses Exceed the Congressionally Authorized Size Due to a Lack of Oversight by GSA
Twenty-seven of the 33 federal courthouses constructed since 2000 exceed their congressionally authorized size, resulting in about 1.7 million more square feet than authorized. Twelve of the 15 courthouses that exceeded the congressionally authorized gross square footage by 10 percent or more also had total project costs that exceeded the total project cost estimate provided to congressional authorizing committees. However, there is no statutory requirement for GSA to notify congressional authorizing or appropriations committees if the size exceeds the congressionally authorized square footage. GSA established a policy for measuring gross square footage by 2000, but has not ensured that this space measurement policy was understood and followed. For these 28 courthouses, the judiciary has 119, or approximately 26 percent, fewer judges than the 461 it estimated it would have, resulting in approximately 887,000 extra square feet. We identified a variety of factors that led the judiciary to overestimate the number of judges it would have after 10 years, which include: Inaccurate caseload growth projections: In a 1993 report, we questioned the reliability of the caseload projection process the judiciary used. For this report, we were not able to determine the degree to which inaccurate caseload projections contributed to inaccurate judge estimates because the judiciary did not retain the historic caseload projections used in planning the courthouses. Low Levels of Use Show That Judges Could Share Courtrooms, Reducing the Need for Future Courtrooms by More than One-Third
Our analysis indicates that courtroom sharing could have reduced the number of courtrooms needed in 27 of the 33 district courthouses built since 2000 by a total of 126 courtrooms—about 40 percent of the total number of district and magistrate courtrooms constructed since 2000. The model shows the following courtroom sharing possibilities: 3 district judges could share 2 courtrooms, 3 senior judges could share 1 courtroom, and 2 magistrate judges could share 1 courtroom with time to spare. During our interviews and convening of an expert panel on courtroom sharing, some judges remained skeptical of sharing and raised potential challenges to courtroom sharing, but other judges with sharing experience said they have overcome those challenges when necessary without postponing trials. Our model’s application of the judiciary’s data shows that more sharing opportunities are available. Our congressional requesters specifically asked that we consider how a courtroom sharing policy could have changed the amount of space needed in these courthouses. Our model provides one option for developing a sharing policy based on actual time during which courtrooms are scheduled and used. This extra space exists because the courthouses, as built, are larger than those congressionally authorized; contain space for more judges than are in the courthouses at least 10 years after the space was planned, and, for the most part, were not planned with a view toward judges sharing courtrooms. GSA and the judiciary agreed with most of the recommendations, but expressed concerns with GAO’s methodology and key findings. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal judiciary (judiciary) and the General Services Administration (GSA) are in the midst of a multi-billion dollar courthouse construction initiative, which has faced rising construction costs. For 33 federal courthouses completed since 2000, GAO examined (1) whether they contained extra space and any costs related to it; (2) how their actual size compares with the congressionally authorized size; (3) how their space based on the judiciary's 10-year estimates of judges compares with the actual number of judges; and (4) whether the level of courtroom sharing supported by the judiciary's data could have changed the amount of space needed in these courthouses. This testimony is based on GAO's June 2010 report; for that report, GAO analyzed courthouse planning and use data, visited courthouses, modeled courtroom sharing scenarios, and interviewed judges, GSA officials, and others.
What GAO Found
The 33 federal courthouses completed since 2000 include 3.56 million square feet of extra space consisting of space that was constructed (1) above the congressionally authorized size, (2) due to overestimating the number of judges the courthouses would have, and (3) without planning for courtroom sharing among judges. Overall, this space represents about 9 average-sized courthouses. The estimated cost to construct this extra space, when adjusted to 2010 dollars, is $835 million, and the annual cost to rent, operate and maintain it is $51 million. Twenty seven of the 33 courthouses completed since 2000 exceed their congressionally authorized size by a total of 1.7 million square feet. Fifteen exceed their congressionally authorized size by more than 10 percent, and 12 of these 15 also had total project costs that exceeded the estimates provided to congressional committees. However, there is no requirement to notify congressional committees about size overages. A lack of oversight by GSA, including not ensuring its space measurement policies were followed and a lack of focus on building courthouses within the congressionally authorized size, contributed to these size overages. For 23 of 28 courthouses whose space planning occurred at least 10 years ago, the judiciary overestimated the number of judges that would be located in them, causing them to be larger and costlier than necessary. Overall, the judiciary has 119, or approximately 26 percent, fewer judges than the 461 it estimated it would have. This leaves the 23 courthouses with extra courtrooms and chamber suites that, together, total approximately 887,000 square feet of extra space. A variety of factors contributed to the judiciary's overestimates, including inaccurate caseload projections, difficulties in projecting when judges would take senior status, and long-standing difficulties in obtaining new authorizations. However, the degree to which inaccurate caseload projections contributed to inaccurate judge estimates cannot be measured because the judiciary did not retain the historic caseload projections used in planning the courthouses. Using the judiciary's data, GAO designed a model for courtroom sharing, which shows that there is enough unscheduled courtroom time for substantial courtroom sharing. Sharing could have reduced the number of courtrooms needed in courthouses built since 2000 by 126 courtrooms--about 40 percent of the total number--covering about 946,000 square feet of extra space. Judges raised potential challenges to courtroom sharing, such as uncertainty about courtroom availability, but those with courtroom sharing experience overcame those challenges when necessary, and no trials were postponed. The judiciary has adopted policies for future sharing for senior and magistrate judges, but GAO's analysis shows that additional sharing opportunities are available. For example, GAO's courtroom sharing model shows that there is sufficient unscheduled time for 3 district judges to share 2 courtrooms and 3 senior judges to share 1 courtroom. The recommendations in GAO's related report include: GSA should (1) ensure courthouses are within their authorized size or provide notification when designed spaced exceeds authorized space (2) retain caseload projections to improve the accuracy of 10-year judge planning; and (3) establish and use courtroom sharing policies based on scheduling and use data. GSA and the judiciary agreed with most recommendations, but expressed concerns with GAO's methodology and key findings. GAO believes these to be sound, as explained in the report. |
gao_GAO-16-406 | gao_GAO-16-406_0 | To distinguish between the two statutory authorities that may use O&M funding, for the purposes of this review we refer to O&M-funded projects undertaken using section 2805 of Title 10, U.S. Code (Unspecified Minor Military Construction authority) in support of contingency operations as “O&M- funded unspecified minor military construction projects” and to O&M- funded projects using Contingency Construction Authority as “Contingency Construction Authority projects.”
Roles and Responsibilities Related to Contingency Construction
CENTCOM and its component commands have key roles and responsibilities for contingency construction within CENTCOM’s geographic area of responsibility. DOD Has Not Tracked the Universe and Cost of All Contingency Construction Projects in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility That Support Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Since contingency operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has not tracked the universe and cost of all CENTCOM contingency construction projects supporting operations there. According to senior DOD officials, DOD is not required to track the universe and cost of those projects. DOD has routinely used O&M funding for these projects to more quickly meet requirements because the MILCON review process can take up to 2 years. However, in some instances, DOD's use of O&M funding has posed financial, operational, and duplication risks. Senior DOD officials stated that they were unaware of the magnitude of their use of O&M funds for unspecified minor military construction projects in the CENTCOM area of responsibility because DOD did not track the O&M-funded contingency construction projects using that authority. This use of O&M funding appears significant when compared with the $3.9 billion DOD reported as enacted for other construction projects in Afghanistan over the same period using MILCON funding. CENTCOM officials noted that a construction project can use either MILCON or O&M funding, and should be designed to address a single construction requirement. Nonetheless, subsequent to the completion of the concrete shelters the department reported in September 2015 that it should have used MILCON funds to construct the shelters and determined that the obligations incurred for the projects had exceeded the statutory limit for O&M-funded unspecified minor military construction projects, thus resulting in a violation of the Antideficiency Act. DOD Has Guidance Used for Determining the Appropriate Level of Construction for MILCON-Funded Contingency Construction Projects in CENTCOM’s Area of Responsibility, but Has Not Documented the Rationale for All Such Determinations
DOD Has Guidance Used for Determining the Appropriate Level of Construction for MILCON- Funded Contingency Construction Projects
DOD has guidance that is used for determining the appropriate level of construction for MILCON-funded projects. Specifically, as of July 2015, the Army Corps of Engineers was unable to provide us with documentation regarding the service components’ rationale for the respective level-of-construction determinations for 11 of 39 MILCON-funded construction projects in its database that cost over $40 million each during fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Additionally, absent a requirement for a formal process to reevaluate contingency construction projects when missions change, DOD risks constructing facilities that may not be essential to support existing missions or may not be sufficient for revised missions in the CENTCOM area of responsibility and in future contingencies worldwide. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has tracked the universe and cost of all contingency construction projects in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility that support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan separately from all other construction projects undertaken by DOD, we reviewed and analyzed available DOD contingency construction project data from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2016 maintained by the Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Army, the Air Force, and the Army Corps of Engineers to determine the extent to which DOD identifies and records construction projects undertaken in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To determine the extent to which DOD has developed a process for reevaluating ongoing contingency construction projects when missions change, we collected and reviewed supporting documentation for reviews that the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan conducted beginning in November 2011 of planned or ongoing contingency construction projects in Afghanistan— including CENTCOM data on construction project reevaluation reviews for fiscal years 2011-15. | Why GAO Did This Study
For about 15 years, DOD has funded “contingency construction” projects to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The range, complexity, and cost of construction vary (e.g., from concrete pads for tents to brick-and-mortar barracks). DOD funds the projects through MILCON or O&M appropriations. Base commanders can use O&M to fund lower cost projects.
Senate Report 113-174 includes a provision for GAO to review issues related to military construction in the CENTCOM area of responsibility in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO evaluated, among other things, the extent to which DOD has (1) tracked the universe and cost of all contingency construction projects in support of contingency operations there, (2) developed a process to determine the appropriate level of construction for MILCON-funded contingency construction projects, and (3) developed a process for reevaluating contingency construction projects when missions change. GAO reviewed relevant guidance and project data.
What GAO Found
Since contingency operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not tracked the universe and cost of all U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) contingency construction projects supporting operations there. According to senior DOD officials DOD is not required to track all contingency construction projects separately from all other DOD projects, but DOD has been able to generate specific data on MILCON-funded contingency construction projects when requested. Senior DOD officials stated that they were unaware of the magnitude of their use of O&M funds because DOD has not tracked the universe and cost of O&M-funded unspecified minor military construction projects in support of contingency operations. GAO identified O&M-funded construction costs for fiscal years 2009-12 of at least $944 million for 2,202 of these projects in Afghanistan, costs that are significant compared with the $3.9 billion DOD reported as enacted for MILCON-funded projects there in the same period. DOD has routinely used O&M funding to more quickly meet requirements because the MILCON review process can take up to 2 years. However, DOD's use of O&M funding has posed risks. For example:
Financial risk: In 2010, DOD identified needed concrete shelters at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, staying below the O&M maximum by dividing a single requirement into separate projects. DOD reported in 2015 that it should have used MILCON funds for the shelters, determining that the obligations incurred had exceeded the statutory maximum for O&M-funded unspecified minor military construction projects, resulting in an Antideficiency Act violation.
Duplication risk : In 2015, officials at a base in the CENTCOM area of responsibility decided to use O&M funding for temporary facilities for a squadron while in the same year requesting MILCON funding for a permanent facility for the same squadron, which could result in providing the same service to the same beneficiaries.
For MILCON-funded contingency construction projects, DOD has guidance used for determining the appropriate level of construction, or building standard, based on the facility's life expectancy requirements, but as of July 2015 had not documented the rationale for such determinations for 11 of the 39 projects in fiscal years 2011-15 that cost over $40 million each. Further, for 8 of the 11 projects, senior DOD officials could not confirm what level of construction the projects represented based on DOD standards aimed at helping to match investments with requirements. Senior DOD officials acknowledged that an absence of such documentation could lead to DOD constructing facilities in excess of requirements because of the resulting lack of communication with those who design and construct the facilities.
DOD has not developed a formal process for reevaluating ongoing contingency construction projects when missions change. According to CENTCOM documentation, beginning in November 2011 DOD undertook five rounds of reviews of planned and ongoing projects in Afghanistan anticipating a change in the mission. However, without a requirement for such reviews, DOD risks constructing facilities that may be unneeded to support U.S. forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility and in future contingencies worldwide.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made six recommendations including that DOD track the universe and cost of O&M-funded projects (DOD did not concur), review construction projects to ensure funds were properly used (DOD did not concur), examine approaches to shorten project approval times (DOD partially concurred), document level-of-construction determinations (DOD partially concurred), and require project reviews when missions change (DOD partially concurred). GAO maintains that its recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-03-1022T | gao_GAO-03-1022T_0 | A supermajority of the Panel agreed on a package of additional recommendations. As I noted previously, the new Circular A-76 is generally consistent with the Commercial Activities Panel’s sourcing principles and recommendations and, as such, provides an improved foundation for competitive sourcing decisions in the federal government. In particular, the new Circular permits: greater reliance on procedures contained in the FAR, which should result in a more transparent, simpler, and consistently applied competitive process, and source selection decisions based on trade-offs between technical factors and cost. The new Circular also suggests the potential use of alternatives to the competitive sourcing process, such as public-private and public-public partnerships and high-performing organizations. Challenges in Implementing Competitive Sourcing
Implementing the new Circular A-76 will likely be challenging for many agencies. Foremost among the challenges that agencies face is setting and meeting appropriate goals that are integrated with other priorities. Although the revised Circular also provides for a streamlined process at comparable FTE levels, the revised streamlined process lacks a number of key features designed to ensure that agencies’ sourcing decisions are sound. Finally, the revised Circular has created an accountability gap by prohibiting all challenges to streamlined cost comparisons. Protest Rights
Another accountability issue relates to the right of in-house competitors to challenge sourcing decisions in favor of the private sector—an issue that the Commercial Activities Panel addressed in its report. While both the public and the private sectors could file appeals to the ad hoc agency appeal boards under the prior Circular, only the private sector had the right, if dissatisfied with the ruling of the agency appeal board, to file a bid protest at GAO or in court. Effective Human Capital Practices Will Be Key to Successful Implementation of Competitive Sourcing
For many agencies, effective implementation of the new Circular will depend on their ability to understand that their workforce is their most important organizational asset. Agencies will need to build and maintain capacity to manage competitions, to prepare the in-house MEO, and to oversee the work—regardless of whether the private sector or MEO is selected. With a likely increase in the number of public-private competitions and the requirement to hold accountable whichever sector wins, agencies will need to ensure that they have an acquisition workforce sufficient in numbers and abilities to manage the cost, quality, and performance of the service provider. Agencies can aid their workforce in transitioning to a competitive sourcing environment if they: ensure employee involvement in the transition process; for example, by clearly communicating to employees what is going to happen and when it is going to happen; provide skills training for either competing against the private sector or create a safety net for displaced employees to bolster their support for the changes as well as to aid in the transition to a competitive environment, such as offering workers early retirement, severance pay, or a buyout; facilitate the transition of staff to the private sector or reimbursable provider when that is their choice and assist employees who do not want to transfer to find other federal jobs; and develop employee retention programs and offer bonuses to keep people where appropriate. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In May 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released a revised Circular A-76, which represents a comprehensive set of changes to the rules governing competitive sourcing--one of five governmentwide items in the President's Management Agenda. Determining whether to obtain services in-house or through commercial contracts is an important economic and strategic decision for agencies, and the use of Circular A-76 is expected to grow throughout the federal government. In the past, however, the A-76 process has been difficult to implement, and the impact on the morale of the federal workforce has been profound. Concerns in the public and private sectors were also raised about the timeliness and fairness of the process for public-private competitions. It was against this backdrop that the Congress enacted legislation mandating a study of the A-76 process, which was carried out by the Commercial Activities Panel, chaired by the Comptroller General of the United States. This testimony focuses on how the new Circular addresses the Panel's recommendations reported in April 2002, the challenges agencies may face in implementing the new Circular A-76, and the need for effective workforce practices to help ensure the successful implementation of competitive sourcing in the federal government.
What GAO Found
The revised Circular A-76 is generally consistent with the Commercial Activities Panel's principles and recommendations, and should provide an improved foundation for competitive sourcing decisions in the federal government. In particular, the new Circular permits greater reliance on procedures in the Federal Acquisition Regulation--which should result in a more transparent and consistently applied competitive process--as well as source selection decisions based on trade-offs between technical factors and cost. The new Circular also suggests the potential use of alternatives to the competitive sourcing process, such as public-private and public-public partnerships. However, implementing the new Circular will likely be challenging for many agencies. Foremost among the challenges that agencies face is setting and meeting appropriate goals integrated with other priorities, as opposed to arbitrary quotas. Additionally, there are potential issues with the streamlined cost comparison process and protest rights. The revised streamlined process lacks a number of key features designed to ensure that agency sourcing decisions are sound, including the absence of an appeal process. Finally, the right of in-house competitors to file a bid protest at GAO challenging the sourcing decisions in favor of the private sector remains an open question. For many agencies, effective implementation will depend on their ability to understand that their workforce is their most important organizational asset. Agencies will need to aid their workforce in transitioning to a competitive sourcing environment. For example, agencies will need a skilled workforce and adequate infrastructure and funding to manage competitions; to prepare the in-house offer; and to oversee the cost, quality, and performance of whichever service provider is selected. |
gao_GAO-09-193 | gao_GAO-09-193_0 | Federal Funding Mechanisms
The federal government uses a variety of funding mechanisms to achieve national priorities through partnerships with nonfederal parties such as nonprofit organizations. Grants and Contracts Provide Both Direct and Indirect Funds to Nonprofit Organizations
Nonprofit organizations sometimes work directly with federal agencies as grantees and contractors, in a relatively straightforward relationship. Nonprofit Organizations Provided Access to Additional Funds through Federal Loans and Loan Guarantees
Nonprofit organizations are involved in credit relationships with the federal government, in some cases as the recipient of funds loaned or guaranteed by federal agencies, and in some cases as the guaranty agency. Finally, some federal programs use loans and loan guarantees to encourage activities that indirectly result in increased revenues to nonprofit organizations. Type of Funding Mechanism Generally Determines the Level of Oversight and Influence That Federal Agencies Have over Nonprofit Organizations
The amount of federal involvement in selecting and overseeing nonprofit performance varies across funding mechanisms. While the federal agency does not monitor the performance of individual nonprofit and other recipients receiving this grant funding, states are required to monitor the performance of nonprofit recipients. With fee-for-service programs such as Medicare, states determine service provider eligibility, but individuals choose their providers. Data Limitations Leave Decision Makers without Complete Information on Funding to Nonprofit Organizations, Although Data Suggest That Significant Federal Funds Reached Nonprofit Organizations in 2006
The federal government tracks and provides information on funding in order to provide decision makers and the public with accurate information on the sources and uses of federal funds, among other reasons. Data Limitations and Reliability Concerns Contribute to an Incomplete and Unreliable Picture of Federal Funding
The data presently collected provide an incomplete and, for portions, unreliable picture of federal funding to nonprofit organizations. Other fee-for-service or voucher programs, such as federal Pell Grants and the Federal Work-Study program, obligated about $10 billion to nonprofit organizations in 2006. There are a number of other programs for which federal funds flow through states to nonprofit organizations but we did not attempt to estimate that funding. Credit—Available data from FAADS indicates that about $450 million in direct loans and $2.5 billion in loan guarantees were issued directly to nonprofit organizations in 2006, though OMB has raised concerns with how some of these data are reported. Tax Policies and Tax Expenditures—Though more difficult to assess and not directly comparable to funding through other mechanisms, federal tax policies provide significant financial benefits to nonprofit organizations. Although available data indicate that significant federal funding reaches the nonprofit sector, the precise extent of that funding is not known because of data limitations. It prevents the federal government from accurately assessing the extent to which it uses this sector and the potential effect of the sector’s strength as a key partner in delivering federal services. However, we identified significant reliability concerns regarding data from two systems, Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS-NG) and Federal Awards and Assistance Data System (FAADS), which we highlight in the body of the report and in appendix II. We used the following data sources to estimate federal funding to nonprofit organizations: FPDS-NG—We assessed federal contract funding to nonprofit organizations by summing the funding for all contract actions involving vendors identified as nonprofits in the FPDS-NG in fiscal year 2006. Direct payments for specified use include payments under Medicare, and we consider these to be fee-for-service or voucher programs. In several cases, estimates of the cost of tax expenditures include tax expenditures involving nonprofit and other entities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasingly, the federal government relies on networks and partnerships to achieve its goals, and many of these involve nonprofit organizations. GAO was asked to assess (1) the mechanisms through which federal dollars flow to nonprofits and (2) what is known about federal dollars flowing through them to nonprofit organizations in fiscal year 2006. To address these objectives, GAO conducted a literature review of funding; analyzed data from several sources, including the Federal Procurement Data System--Next Generation (FPDS-NG) and the Federal Awards and Assistance Data System (FAADS); and analyzed nonprofit organizations' roles in 19 federal programs.
What GAO Found
The federal government uses a variety of funding mechanisms to achieve national priorities through partnerships with nonprofit organizations, and the relationships are sometimes complex and multidirectional. Nonprofit organizations receive federal grant and contract funds both directly and through other entities, such as states, for performing activities or providing services to particular beneficiaries. Federal funds paid to nonprofit organizations as fees for services follow a somewhat more complex path. Credit through loan and loan guarantee mechanisms facilitate nonprofit organizations' access to capital. Similarly, some tax policies result in benefits to nonprofit organizations by either reducing their costs or increasing their revenues. With direct federal grants and contracts, and with some loans and loan guarantees, federal agencies generally select the nonprofit participant, directly control the amount of funding provided, and monitor nonprofit performance. With other mechanisms, such as tax expenditures and fee-for-service programs, the federal government sets criteria for acceptable recipients but does not directly select or monitor nonprofit performance. Due to limitations and reliability concerns with tracking systems' data, the data presently collected provide an incomplete, unreliable picture of the federal government's funds reaching the nonprofit sector through various mechanisms, although they suggest these funds were significant. No central source tracks federal funds passed through an initial recipient, such as a state, and the nonprofit status of recipients was not reliably identified in FPDS-NG or FAADS. Factors contributing to data limitations include the nonprofit status of recipients being self-reported and no consistent definition of nonprofit across data systems. The development of a system to report funding through subawards, currently underway, may enable more complete estimates of funding to the sector in the future. However, until the accuracy of nonprofit status is improved, accurately determining the extent of federal funds reaching the sector is not possible, leaving policy makers without a clear understanding of the extent of funding to, and importance of, key partners in delivering federal programs and services. Funding data sources identified the following as the approximate amounts of federal funds flowing to nonprofits in 2006 under different mechanisms, although most sources did not reliably classify nonprofit status of recipients: (1) $135 billion in fee-for-service payments under Medicare; (2) $10 billion in other types of fee-for-service payments; (3) $25 billion in grants paid directly to nonprofits; (4) $10 billion paid directly to nonprofits for contracts; and (5) $55 billion in federal funds paid to nonprofits by states from two grant programs, including Medicaid. (GAO could not assess other programs.) In addition, approximately $2.5 billion in loan guarantees and $450 million in loans were issued to nonprofits, and approximately $50 billion in federal tax revenues were foregone due to tax expenditures related to nonprofits. |
gao_GAO-17-29 | gao_GAO-17-29_0 | DOD Organizations Involved in the JIAC Consolidation Process and Related Efforts
A number of DOD organizations have been involved in the JIAC consolidation process. DOD did not agree with our recommendation, stating that the best practices do not wholly apply to decision-making processes for military construction projects. Credibility (Minimally Met). Without a sensitivity analysis that reveals how a cost estimate is affected by a change in a single assumption, the cost estimator will not fully understand which variable most affects the cost estimate. DOD Conducted Multiple Reviews of Lajes Field as a Possible JIAC Location
After its 2013 decision to consolidate the JIAC at RAF Croughton, DOD conducted multiple reviews to provide information on Lajes Field as a potential alternative location for the JIAC, in response to congressional interest and inquiries. DOD officials told us that the reviews of 2015 and 2016 were not conducted with the same level of rigor as a formal cost estimate, because DOD had already completed its analysis of alternatives, and the decision to consolidate JIAC at RAF Croughton had already been made. DOD officials also told us that no credible new evidence had been produced to indicate the department should revisit its initial decision. EUCOM developed an analysis comparing RAF Croughton with Lajes Field as potential locations for the JIAC. CAPE’s April 2016 cost verification for the JIAC. CAPE conducted an independent review of the cost estimates presented in EUCOM’s September 2015 review and those developed by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for its July 2015 review. DISA’s May 2016 review on the JIAC communications infrastructure requirements. In this update to its July 2015 review, DISA assessed and compared the communications infrastructures at RAF Croughton and Lajes Field with the intelligence mission support requirements, including the communications and technical requirements for the JIAC. DOD’s Multiple Reviews of Lajes Field Produced Different Cost Estimates Because They Were Based on Different Assumptions
DOD’s multiple reviews of Lajes Field as an alternative location for the JIAC produced different cost estimates, because these reviews relied on different assumptions in developing the cost estimates for communications infrastructure and housing. Conclusions
To address costly sustainment challenges and instances of degraded theater intelligence capabilities associated with the current JIAC facilities at RAF Molesworth, DOD plans to spend almost $240 million for the Air Force to consolidate and relocate the JIAC’s facilities at RAF Croughton. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better enable DOD to provide congressional decision makers with complete and reliable information on the total anticipated costs for the JIAC consolidation efforts, we recommend that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment’s Basing Office—in coordination with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Installations, Environment and Energy—update future construction cost estimates for consolidating the JIAC at RAF Croughton using best practices for cost estimating as identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Specifically, cost estimates for the JIAC consolidation should fully incorporate all four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable estimate. A cost estimate is considered comprehensive when it accounts for all possible costs associated with a project, details all cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions, is technically reasonable, is structured in sufficient detail to ensure that costs are neither omitted nor double-counted, and the estimating teams’ composition is commensurate with the assignment; well documented when supporting documentation for the estimate is accompanied by a narrative explaining the process, sources, and methods used to create the estimate and contains the underlying data used to develop the estimate; accurate when the estimate is neither overly conservative nor too optimistic and is based on an assessment of the costs most likely to be incurred; and credible when the estimate has been cross-checked with independent cost estimates, the level of confidence associated with the point estimate—the best guess at the cost estimate given the underlying data—has been identified, and a sensitivity analysis has been conducted. Our analysis of the Air Force’s February 2015 cost estimate for the Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex (JIAC) showed that, when compared with best practices, it minimally met one and partially met three of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate (see table 1). The September 2015 review by U.S. European Command (EUCOM) also references standards; however, it did not discuss these standards in detail. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's JIAC, which provides critical intelligence support for the U.S. European and Africa Commands and U.S. allies, is currently located in what DOD has described as inadequate and inefficient facilities at RAF Molesworth in the United Kingdom. To address costly sustainment challenges and instances of degraded theater intelligence capabilities associated with the current JIAC facilities, the Air Force plans to spend almost $240 million to consolidate and relocate the JIAC at RAF Croughton in the United Kingdom.
GAO was asked to review analysis associated with consolidating and relocating the JIAC. This report (1) assesses the extent to which DOD's cost estimate for the JIAC consolidation at RAF Croughton aligns with best practices and (2) describes key reviews DOD has conducted since spring of 2013 related to an alternative location for JIAC consolidation. GAO compared the Air Force's February 2015 JIAC cost estimate with GAO best practices for developing federal cost estimates, reviewed key DOD analysis of Lajes Field as a potential alternative location for the JIAC, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
GAO assessed the cost estimate for the military construction project to consolidate and relocate the Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex (JIAC) at Royal Air Force (RAF) base Croughton and found that it partially met three and minimally met one of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate defined by GAO best practices, as shown in the table below. For example, it minimally met the credibility standard because it did not contain a sensitivity analysis; such analyses reveal how the cost estimate is affected by a change in a single assumption, without which the estimator will not fully understand which variable most affects the estimate. Unless the Department of Defense's (DOD) methodology incorporates all four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable estimate in preparing future cost estimates for the JIAC construction project, it will not be providing decision makers with reliable information.
After DOD's 2013 decision to consolidate the JIAC at RAF Croughton, DOD organizations conducted multiple reviews in response to congressional interest in Lajes Field, Azores (Portugal) as a potential alternative location for the JIAC, including
U.S. European Command (EUCOM) September 2015 review , a cost comparison and location analysis of RAF Croughton and Lajes Field;
Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation April 2016 cost verification for JIAC , an independent review of EUCOM's September 2015 cost estimates and those developed by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in July 2015; and
Defense Information Systems Agency May 2016 review on JIAC communications infrastructure requirements , an assessment and comparison of the communications infrastructures at Lajes Field and RAF Croughton with the intelligence mission support requirements, including the communications and technical requirements, for the JIAC.
These reviews produced different cost estimates, in particular for housing and communications infrastructure, because the DOD organizations that developed them relied on different assumptions. DOD officials said that these reviews were not conducted with the same level of rigor as formal cost estimates, because DOD had concluded its analysis of alternatives and no credible new evidence had been produced to indicate the department should revisit its initial decision to consolidate the JIAC at RAF Croughton.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD update its future construction cost estimates for consolidating the JIAC at RAF Croughton to comply with best practices for cost estimating identified by GAO. DOD did not agree, stating it would waste resources to continue to generate cost estimates once DOD transitions to managing the project with actual cost data. GAO continues to believe that its recommendation is valid, as discussed in this report. |
gao_HEHS-95-111 | gao_HEHS-95-111_0 | These questionnaires gathered information on (1) the methods states use to identify and collect overpayments, (2) how recovery efforts are coordinated among the three programs, (3) the level of overpayments established and collected in fiscal year 1992, and (4) what factors hinder or help states’ abilities to recover overpayments. Successful Practices for Establishing Claims and Recovering Overpayments
States that had the most success in establishing claims and recovering overpayments used a much higher number of certain recovery practices and tools than other states. The practices and tools used for recovering overpayments were lower average caseloads for eligibility staff, greater portion of a state’s total staff working to recover overpayments, use of state income tax refund intercept, use of multiple approaches to collect overpayments, automated tracking and billing system with a full range of functions, and more of a state’s overpayment records in automated tracking and billing system. Potential for States to Improve Recovery Efforts
If all states had performed as high-performing states did in recovering AFDC, Food Stamp, and Medicaid overpayments in 1992, we estimate that an additional $262 million could have potentially been recovered. In contrast, the AFDC and Medicaid programs provide little guidance on best recovery practices to the states. Currently, only the Food Stamp Program allows states to intercept a federal income tax refund to recover overpayments from a former program client who is delinquent in repayment. USDA Comments and Our Evaluation
USDA concurred with our conclusion that more can be done to recover overpayments from current and former welfare clients. It agreed that, because some states establish claims for a greater percentage of their overpayments than others, they recover more overpayments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed states' efforts to recover benefit overpayments in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Food Stamp, and Medicaid programs, focusing on: (1) overpayments collected from current and former welfare clients in 1992; (2) factors that help or hinder effective state recovery practices; and (3) how the federal government can help states recover more overpayments.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the states with the highest recovery rates in fiscal year 1992 established claims for a greater portion of their overpayments; (2) successful practices to establish overpayments included using computer matching to identify potential overpayments, more timely efforts to verify overpayments and establish claims, and establishing overpayment claims on the more difficult collection cases; (3) states that used a broader array of recovery tools had greater collection rates than other states; (4) successful practices to recover overpayments included using lower average caseloads for eligibility staff, detailing more staff to recovery efforts, intercepting state income tax refunds, and using automated tracking and billing systems to recover overpayments; and (5) an additional $262 million could have been recovered in 1992 if all states had been as successful as the top performing states. GAO also found that: (1) two of the three federal agencies responsible for overseeing the programs do not help states identify the best recovery practices; and (2) eliminating client consent for temporary reductions in benefits due to administrative errors in the Food Stamp Program and intercepting federal income tax refunds to recover AFDC and Medicaid overpayments could increase overpayment recoveries by millions of dollars annually. |
gao_GAO-02-694T | gao_GAO-02-694T_0 | The Service’s Current Financial Situation
Overall, the Service’s financial condition has continued to decline. The Service’s Transformation Plan identified numerous short-term steps the Service plans to take under its existing authority to cut costs and improve productivity. In the long term, the Service’s Transformation Plan recognizes that the Service’s basic business model is not sustainable and that much larger declines in mail volume may be in the offing if mailers increasingly shift to various electronic and other alternatives. However, the Service’s transformation plan had little to say on these matters other than proposing that the Service be transformed into a Commercial Government Enterprise that would act much more like a business, and, as part of that proposal, its board of governors would be “refocused on fiduciary duties.” Under its current framework, the Service is intended to function in a businesslike manner, which raises the following questions related to its governance structure: What type of governing board would be most appropriate considering the Service’s size, importance, and challenges? It will also be important to have greater clarity about the time frames and financial impact associated with the actions outlined in the Transformation Plan that the Service plans to take immediately. Cost-cutting/productivity: Costs are increasing faster than revenues and are hard to cut. The Service’s business model, which relies on rising mail volumes to cover rising costs, is not sustainable and needs a comprehensive transformation. 11. Appendix II: Postal Service Mail Volume and Revenue Information | What GAO Found
The U.S. Postal Service continues to face financial and transformation challenges. Since GAO placed the Service's long-term outlook and transformation efforts on its high-risk list, the Service's financial situation has continued to decline, and its operational challenges have increased. The Service took a good first step when it issued its Transformation Plan. The plan provides information about the Service's challenges, identifies many actions the Service plans to take under its existing authority, and outlines steps that would require congressional action. The plan does not, however, adequately address some key issues or include an action plan with key milestones. The catastrophic events of September 11 and subsequent anthrax scares, coupled with the recent economic slowdown, have decreased mail volumes and revenues. However, the Service's financial difficulties are not just a cyclical phenomenon that will fade as the economy recovers. The Service's basic business model, which assumes that rising mail volume will cover rising costs and mitigate rate increases, is questionable as mail volumes stagnate or deteriorate in an increasingly competitive environment. The Service's Transformation Plan recognizes that postal costs are rising faster than revenues and identifies many actions that the Service plans to take under its existing authority, notably through cutting costs and improving productivity. |
gao_GAO-16-319 | gao_GAO-16-319_0 | As a result of these challenges and others, drug sponsors may be hesitant to attempt to develop drugs to treat rare pediatric diseases. FDA and the Pediatric Voucher Program
FDA, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for overseeing the safety and efficacy of drugs sold in the United States. In making this decision, FDA determines whether the drug sponsor has met all of the eligibility criteria for a pediatric voucher, which includes determining that the drug is for a rare pediatric disease as well as reviewing the clinical data examining the drug’s use in a pediatric population included in the drug application. Once a drug sponsor is awarded a voucher, it can later be redeemed by that sponsor with the submission of another new drug application for a drug to treat any disease or condition in adults or children, making the sponsor automatically eligible for a 6-month priority review. If a rare pediatric disease designation is not requested prior to a drug sponsor submitting its new drug application, FDA officials may determine through their reviews of a new drug application and discussions with a drug sponsor that a certain drug may be eligible for a voucher. Too Early to Gauge if Pediatric Voucher Program Stimulates Drug Development
Drugs for Which Vouchers Were Awarded Were in Development Prior to the Program’s Implementation, though They Helped Fulfill Unmet Medical Need
Given that the typical drug development process often exceeds a decade, insufficient time has elapsed to gauge whether the 3-year-old pediatric voucher program has been effective at encouraging the development of drugs for rare pediatric diseases. As of December 31, 2015, there have been 11 requests for a pediatric voucher. Of these, 6 have been awarded, 2 denied, and 3 are still under review. Specifically, these six drugs were the first drugs approved by FDA to treat the seven rare pediatric diseases for which they are indicated. No other drugs had been previously approved for these diseases. As of December 31, 2015, four of the six pediatric vouchers—for Vimizim, Unituxin, Cholbam, and Xuriden—have been sold or transferred to other drug sponsors. Sale prices of the pediatric vouchers have ranged from $67.5 million to $350 million. It was used to expedite the review of Praluent, a new drug to treat adults with high cholesterol. In written responses to our questions, FDA officials reported that they have seen no evidence that the program has encouraged increased development of drugs for rare pediatric diseases. The agency also indicated that while it strongly supports the goal of the program—incentivizing the development of drugs for rare pediatric diseases—it has not seen evidence that the program has yet been effective in achieving this goal. According to FDA, the program interferes with its ability to set priorities on the basis of public health needs by requiring FDA to provide priority reviews of new drug applications that would not otherwise qualify, based on the merits of those applications. The agency noted that an application for a drug will receive priority review designation if it is for a drug that treats a serious condition and, if approved, would provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness. Four of five sponsors that were awarded or transferred and later sold vouchers told us that they plan to reinvest a portion of the proceeds they received into additional research and development of drugs to treat other rare pediatric diseases. Although sponsors and patient advocacy groups were generally positive about the voucher program, some also expressed concerns related to the uncertain future of the program and FDA’s interpretation of what diseases are considered rare pediatric diseases, concerns also expressed by organizations representing physicians and the health insurance industry. For example, some of the sponsors, patient advocacy groups, and other organizations that we contacted said that the FDASIA provision providing for termination of FDA’s authority to award pediatric vouchers one year after the award of the third voucher under the program (March 2016) created ambiguity for industry that therefore diminishes the program’s appeal. He indicated, similar to FDA’s concern, that the program could instead lead to unintended consequences. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for comment to HHS. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Children's Hospital Association 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Almost 7,000 rare diseases, most of which are serious or life-threatening, affect more than 25 million Americans. About half of all rare diseases affect children, and few of these diseases have viable treatments. To encourage the development of drugs to treat or prevent rare pediatric diseases, the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) of 2012 authorized FDA to award a priority review voucher to a drug sponsor upon approval of that sponsor's drug to treat a rare pediatric disease. A drug sponsor can later redeem the voucher when submitting another new drug application to treat any disease or condition in adults or children, or sell or transfer the voucher to another sponsor. A voucher entitles a sponsor to a 6-month priority review by FDA rather than the 10-month standard review.
FDASIA included a provision for GAO to study the pediatric voucher program. GAO examined what is known about the effectiveness of the program in encouraging the development of drugs to prevent or treat certain rare pediatric diseases. GAO reviewed relevant laws and documentation related to the program and its management, and identified drug sponsors who were awarded vouchers, the diseases their drugs were approved to treat, and whether the vouchers were redeemed, sold, or transferred. GAO also interviewed FDA officials, drug sponsors, patient advocacy groups, and organizations representing physicians and children's hospitals, among others.
What GAO Found
It is too early to gauge whether the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) pediatric voucher program has stimulated the development of drugs to treat or prevent rare pediatric diseases. Given that the typical drug development process often exceeds a decade, insufficient time has elapsed to determine whether the 3 year-old program has been effective. Any drug sponsors motivated by the program to attempt to develop a drug for a rare pediatric disease may be many years from submitting new drug applications—which contain scientific and clinical data about safety and effectiveness—to FDA for review.
As of December 31, 2015, there have been 11 requests for a pediatric voucher. Of these, six have been awarded, two denied, and three remain under review. The six drugs for which vouchers were awarded were in development prior to the program's implementation and these drugs helped fulfill unmet medical needs. One drug is indicated to treat a rare pediatric cancer, and the other five drugs treat rare metabolic diseases affecting children. No other drugs had been previously approved by FDA for these conditions. Four of the six awarded pediatric vouchers have been sold to other drug sponsors for prices ranging from $67.5 million to $350 million. One of the six vouchers awarded has been redeemed and was used to obtain a priority review of a new drug application for a drug to treat adults with high cholesterol. FDA approved this new drug application in July 2015.
FDA officials stated that, while they strongly support the goal of incentivizing drug development for rare pediatric diseases, they have seen no evidence that the program is effective. The program's authorization, as amended, is set to terminate October 1, 2016, and FDA officials said they do not support the program's continuation. They expressed concern that the program adversely affects the agency's ability to set its public health priorities by requiring FDA to provide priority reviews of new drug applications that would not otherwise qualify if they do not treat a serious condition or provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness. Additionally, FDA officials said that the additional workload from the program strains the agency's resources. However, other stakeholders provided generally positive feedback on the program. For example, drug sponsors that sold these vouchers said they plan to reinvest portions of the proceeds they received into additional research on rare pediatric diseases, although there is no requirement to do so. Patient advocacy groups told GAO that the program could lead to the development of needed drugs.
We provided a draft of this report for comment to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-723 | gao_GAO-03-723_0 | In other cases, DOD has publicly sold its unneeded property. Infrastructure Needs of Many Enclaves Not Identified Until after BRAC Decision Making
Many of DOD’s specific enclave infrastructure needs were not identified until after the commission for a BRAC round held its deliberations and had rendered its recommendations. In addition, DOD’s enclave-planning processes generally did not include a cross-service analysis of the needs of military activities or activities in the vicinity of a realigning or closing base with a proposed enclave. Army officials told us that it was recognized early in the process that the Army wanted to retain the majority of existing training land at some of its bases slated for closure or realignment that also served as reserve component maneuver training locations, but time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying specific enclave needs before the commission completed decision-making. The Air Force’s enclave infrastructure needs were reportedly more defined than those of the Army at the time of commission deliberation and decision making. Air Force officials told us that the base evaluation process for the 1991 and 1993 rounds—the rounds when the Air Force’s major reserve enclaves were created—included a detailed analysis of the infrastructure needed for the enclaves, including enclave size, identification of required facilities, and expected costs to operate and maintain its proposed enclaves prior to commission consideration of its proposals. The Army subsequently updated its savings estimates in its succeeding annual budget submissions to reflect estimated costs to operate and maintain many of its enclaves. As a result, the previous estimated cost omissions have not materially affected the department’s estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings across all previous round BRAC actions due to the fact that the savings estimates for these locations have been updated to reflect many enclave costs in subsequent annual budget submissions. Recommendations for Executive Action
As part of the new base realignment and closure round scheduled for 2005, we recommend that you establish provisions to ensure that data provided to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission clearly specify the (1) infrastructure (e.g., acreage and total square footage of facilities) needed for any proposed reserve enclaves and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain such enclaves. We also contacted select officials who had participated in the 1995 BRAC round decision-making process to discuss their views on establishing enclaves on closed or realigned bases. To determine whether projected costs to operate and maintain reserve enclaves were considered in deriving estimated savings during the BRAC decision-making process, we reviewed available cost and savings estimation documentation derived from DOD’s COBRA model to ascertain if estimated savings were offset by projected enclave costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
While four previous base closure rounds have afforded the Department of Defense (DOD) the opportunity to divest itself of unneeded property, it has, at the same time, retained more than 350,000 acres and nearly 20 million square feet of facilities on enclaves at closed or realigned bases for use by the reserve components. In view of the upcoming 2005 base closure round, GAO undertook this review to ascertain if opportunities exist to improve the decision-making processes used to establish reserve enclaves. Specifically, GAO determined to what extent (1)specific infrastructure needs for reserve enclaves were identified as part of base realignment and closure decision making and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain enclaves were considered in deriving net estimated savings for realigning or closing bases.
What GAO Found
The specific infrastructure needed for many DOD reserve enclaves created under the previous base realignment and closure process was generally not identified until after a defense base closure commission had rendered its recommendations. While the Army generally decided it wanted much of the available training land for its enclaves before the time of the commission's decision making during the 1995 closure round, time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying specific training acreages and facilities until later. Subsequently, in some instances the Army created enclaves that were nearly as large as the bases that were being closed. In contrast, the infrastructure needed for Air Force reserve enclaves was more defined during the decision-making process. Moreover, DOD's enclave-planning processes generally did not include a cross-service analysis of military activities that may have benefited by their inclusion in a nearby enclave. The Army did not include estimated costs to operate and maintain its reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated base realignment or closure savings during the decision-making process, but the Air Force apparently did so in forming its enclaves. GAO's analysis showed that the Army overestimated savings and underestimated the time required to recoup initial investment costs to either realign or close those bases with proposed enclaves. However, these original cost omissions have not materially affected DOD's recent estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings from the previous closure rounds because the Army subsequently updated its estimates in its budget submissions to reflect expected enclave costs. |
gao_GAO-12-525T | gao_GAO-12-525T_0 | Restructuring Reduces Near Term Risk, but Long Term Affordability Is Challenging
JSF restructuring continued throughout 2011 and into 2012 with additional costs and extended schedules incurred for key activities and decisions. The Department is expected to soon approve a new acquisition program baseline that will likely make further changes in cost and schedule. The interim total program cost estimate increased about $15 billion since the June 2010 estimate included in the Nunn-McCurdy certification, about $5 billion for development and $10 billion for procurement. Compared to the current approved baseline set in 2007, total costs have increased about $119 billion, unit procurement costs have risen more than 40 percent, and the start of full-rate production has been delayed 5 years. Initial operational capability dates for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps—the critical dates when the warfighter expects the capability promised by the acquisition program to be available—have been delayed over time and are now unsettled. With the latest reduction, the program now plans to procure a total of 365 aircraft through 2017, about one-fourth of the 1,591 aircraft expected in the 2002 plan. As shown in figure 2, the JSF annual funding requirements average more than $13 billion through 2035, and approach $16 billion annually for an extended period. Mixed Performance in 2011 Affected by Concurrency and Technical Risks
Much of the instability in the JSF program has been and continues to be the result of highly concurrent development, testing, and production activities. During 2011, overall performance was mixed as the program achieved 6 of 11 primary objectives for the year. Initial development flight tests of a fully integrated, capable JSF aircraft to demonstrate full mission systems capabilities, weapons delivery, and autonomic logistics is now expected in 2015 at the earliest. With most development flight testing still to go, the program can expect more changes to aircraft design and continued alterations of manufacturing processes. Late releases of software have delayed testing and training, and added costs. Only 4 percent of mission systems requirements have been verified and significant learning and development remains before the program can demonstrate mature software and hardware. Problems with the helmet mounted display may pose the greatest risk. DOD is pursuing a dual path by funding a less-capable alternate helmet as a back-up; this development effort will cost more than $80 million. The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) is a ground system essential to managing and streamlining logistics and maintenance functions and for controlling life-cycle operating and support costs. Engineering changes are persisting at relatively high rates and additional changes will be needed as testing continues. Until manufacturing processes are in control and engineering design changes resulting from information gained during developmental testing are reduced, there is risk of more cost growth. Even with the substantial reductions in near-term procurement quantities, DOD is still investing billions of dollars on hundreds of aircraft while flight testing has years to go. Cost overruns on each of the first four annual procurement contracts are projected to total about $1 billion (see table 2). According to program documentation, through the cost sharing provisions in these contracts, the government’s share of the total overrun is about $672 million. On average, the government is paying an additional $11 million for the 63 aircraft on under contract (58 are U.S. aircraft and 5 are for international partners). Defense officials reduced the buy quantity in the fifth annual procurement contract to help fund these cost overruns and additional retrofit costs to fix deficiencies discovered in testing. Each was delivered more than 1 year late. This will make it vital that the contractor achieve an efficient manufacturing process. Testing and Production Overlap Increases Engineering Changes and Concurrency Costs
We and several defense offices cautioned the Department years ago about the risks posed by the extremely high degree of concurrency, or overlap, among the JSF development, testing, and production activities.To date, the Government has incurred an estimated $373 million in retrofit costs on already-built aircraft to correct deficiencies discovered in development testing. While the JSF program’s engineering change traffic– the monthly volume of changes made to engineering drawings–is declining, it is still higher than expected for a program entering its sixth year of production. DOD’s November 2011 report concluded that the “team assesses the current confidence in the design maturity of the F-35 to be lower than one would expect given the quantity of LRIP aircraft procurements planned and the potential cost of reworking these aircraft as new test discoveries are made. The JSF remains the critical centerpiece of DOD’s long-term tactical aircraft portfolio. System development of the aircraft and engine ongoing for over a decade, continue to experience significant challenges. Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the JSF, is DODs most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical to DODs long-term recapitalization plans as it is intended to replace hundreds of legacy aircraft. Total U.S. investment in the JSF is nearing $400 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft over several decades and will require a long-term, sustained funding commitment. In 2010, DOD began to extensively restructure the program to address relatively poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes.
This testimony draws on GAOs extensive body of work on the JSF, including preliminary results from the current annual review mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This testimony discusses (1) program costs, schedule changes, and affordability issues, (2) performance testing results, software, and technical risks, and (3) procurement contract cost performance, concurrency impacts, manufacturing results, and design changes. GAOs work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) restructuring continues into a third year, adding to cost and schedule. Since June 2010, the total cost estimate increased about $15 billion, $5 billion for development and $10 billion for procurement. There will likely be additional changes when the Department of Defense (DOD) approves a new program baseline, expected soon. Compared to the current approved baseline from 2007, total costs have increased about $119 billion, full-rate production has been delayed 5 years, and initial operational capability dates are now unsettled because of program uncertainties. While the total number of aircraft the U. S. plans to buy has not changed, DOD has for 3 straight years reduced near-term procurement quantities, deferring aircraft and costs to future years. Since 2002, the program has reduced aircraft procurement quantities through 2017 by three-fourths, from 1,591 to 365. As the program continues to experience cost growth and delays, projected annual funding needs are unprecedented, averaging more than $13 billion a year through 2035.
Most of the instability in the program has been and continues to be the result of highly concurrent development, testing, and production. Overall performance in 2011 was mixed as the program achieved 6 of 11 primary objectives. Developmental flight testing gained momentum and is about one-fifth complete with the most challenging tasks still ahead. The program can expect more changes to aircraft design and manufacturing processes. Performance of the short takeoff and vertical landing variant improved this year and its probation period to fix deficiencies was ended early, even though several fixes are temporary and untested. Management and development of the more than 24 million lines of software code continue to be of concern and late software releases have delayed testing and training. Development of the critical mission systems that give the JSF its core combat capabilities remains behind schedule and risky. To date, only 4 percent of the mission system requirements for full capability has been verified. Testing of a fully integrated JSF aircraft is now expected in 2015 at the earliest. Deficiencies with the helmet mounted display, integral to mission systems functionality and concepts of operation, are most problematic. DOD is funding a less-capable alternate helmet as a back-up. The autonomic logistics information system, a key ground system for improving aircraft availability and lowering support costs, is not yet fully developed.
Cost overruns on the first four annual procurement contracts total more than $1 billion and aircraft deliveries are on average more than one year late. Officials said the governments share of the cost growth is $672 million; this adds about $11 million on average to the price of each of the 63 aircraft under those contracts. In addition to the overruns, the government also incurred an estimated $373 million in retrofit costs on produced aircraft to correct deficiencies discovered in testing. The manufacturing process is still absorbing a higher than expected number of engineering changes resulting from flight testing, which makes it difficult to achieve efficient production rates. Until engineering changes are reduced, there are risks of additional cost overruns and retrofit costs. The program now estimates that the number of changes will persist at elevated levels through 2019. Even with the substantial reductions in near-term procurement quantities, DOD is still investing billions of dollars on hundreds of aircraft while flight testing has years to go.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made prior recommendations to help reduce risk and improve outcomes, which DOD has implemented to varying degrees. GAOs forthcoming report will address these in detail along with potential new recommendations. |
gao_RCED-97-18 | gao_RCED-97-18_0 | Specifically, we (1) determined the status of the Contract Reform Team’s recommendations; (2) evaluated the effect of the initiatives on competition for M&O contracts, which are used to manage and operate DOE’s facilities; (3) evaluated DOE’s initial efforts at inserting performance goals in its M&O contracts; and (4) evaluated DOE’s early use of incentive contracts to control the costs of its M&O contracts. Together, these reform actions, among others, should serve as the framework for contract reform. DOE Has Acted on 47 Recommendations but Some Actions Did Not Comply With Contract Reform Team’s Requirements
DOE states that it has completed action on 47 recommendations. We reviewed the documentation for each of DOE’s completed actions performed in response to the Reform Team’s recommendations and found that nine actions did not meet the specific requirements of the Reform Team’s recommendations. However, even the extended deadlines have been exceeded as well. Conclusions
Although, DOE has made significant progress in setting a framework for contract reform through the issuance of new policies, guidance, and plans, the real test of contract reform will be in the implementation of these reforms in contracts. DOE has (1) changed its policy and adopted competitive awards as its new contracting standard, (2) included performance goals in its contacts, and (3) moved quickly to implement the use of incentive contracts to control costs. As a result, we could not link the contract goals to those of the strategic plan. As DOE begins to use incentive contracts to control costs, its M&O procurement regulations are not providing the necessary direction for the placement of these incentives in contracts by DOE’s contracting officers. In addition, the contracting officer may have the proposal reviewed by an auditor. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed certain aspects of the Department of Energy's (DOE) contract reform initiative.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOE has completed action on 47 of the 48 contract reform recommendations, but 9 of the completed actions did not meet the requirements of the Contract Reform Team; (2) DOE also missed its deadlines for completing the required new policies, guidance, and plans that serve as the framework for contract reform by an average of 11 months; (3) the missed deadlines have added to the time needed to implement contract reform; (4) while DOE has changed its policy and adopted competitive contract awards as the new standard for management and operating (M&O) contracts, in practice, DOE continues to make noncompetitive awards for these contracts; (5) DOE's contracting offices are including performance goals in their M&O contracts, but the contract goals are not always clearly linked to those of the Department; (6) DOE's contracting offices have moved quickly to implement another important reform by using incentive contracts, but the negotiation of these incentives did not always prove effective; and (7) since DOE is authorized to use its own procurement regulation for M&O contracts, the contracting officers have been left to use their own judgment and have achieved different results with the use of these incentives. |
gao_GAO-08-254T | gao_GAO-08-254T_0 | Background
The overall process used to implement USERRA is as follows. DOD and DOL share responsibility for outreach—the education of servicemembers and employers about their respective responsibilities under USERRA. The Secretary of Labor in consultation with the U.S. Attorney General and the Special Counsel prepares and transmits a USERRA annual report to Congress on, among other matters, the number of USERRA claims reviewed by DOL, and during the current demonstration project by OSC, along with the number of claims referred to DOJ or OSC. No Single Agency Is Accountable for Maintaining Visibility over the Entire Complaint Resolution Process
Although USERRA defines individual agency roles and responsibilities, it does not make any single individual or office accountable for maintaining visibility over the entire complaint resolution process. Moreover, from the time informal complaints are filed with DOD’s ESGR through final resolution of formal complaints at DOL, DOJ, or OSC, no one entity has visibility over the entire process. Agencies Have Taken Action to Improve Information on Employers and Assistance to Servicemembers Under USERRA
Outreach
Integral to getting servicemembers the help they need is educating them and their employers on their respective responsibilities under USERRA. To improve the reporting of National Guard and Reserve employment information, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to establish specific time frames for reservists to report their employment data, set specific time frames for reserve components to achieve the established compliance reporting goals, and direct the service components to take action to ensure reporting compliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) has mobilized more than 500,000 National Guard and Reserve members. As reservists return to civilian life, concerns exist about difficulties with their civilian employment. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) of 1994 protects the employment rights of individuals, largely National Guard and Reserve members, as they transition back to their civilian employment. GAO has issued a number of reports on agency efforts to carry out their USERRA responsibilities. DOD, the Department of Labor (DOL), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) have key responsibilities under the act. GAO was asked to discuss the overall process that the agencies use to implement USERRA. Specifically, this testimony addresses (1) organizational accountability in the implementation of USERRA and (2) actions that the agencies have taken to improve their processes to implement USERRA. For this testimony, GAO drew from its most recent reports on USERRA.
What GAO Found
USERRA defines individual agency roles and responsibilities; however, it does not designate any single individual or office as accountable for maintaining visibility over the entire complaint resolution process. From the time informal complaints are filed with DOD's Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve through final resolution of formal complaints at DOL, DOJ, or OSC, no one entity has visibility over the entire process. The four agencies have generally been responsive to GAO's recommendations to improve the implementation of USERRA--on outreach to employers, data sharing and trend information, reporting to Congress, and the internal review of DOL's investigators' determinations of USERRA claims. |
gao_GAO-04-751T | gao_GAO-04-751T_0 | Medicare Spending for Physician Services Grew Rapidly in 1980s, Slowed After Implementation of Spending Targets
In 1980, Medicare spending for physician services totaled $7.5 billion. Total Medicare spending for physician services depends on the fee paid for each service, the number of beneficiaries served, the number of services provided to each beneficiary (volume), and the mix of those services—that is, the combination of more and less expensive services (intensity). An expenditure target…sets an acceptable level of growth in the volume and intensity of physician services.”
In 1990s, Growth in Spending on Physician Services Slowed Under Spending Target Systems
Annual spending growth during the 1990s was far lower than in the preceding 10 years. In 2000s, Spending Growth for Physician Services Rose but Remained Lower than Rates in the 1980s
Beginning in 2000, the growth in volume and intensity of services per Medicare beneficiary began to rise, although the average annual rate of growth remained substantially below that experienced before spending targets were introduced. Total spending on physician services is projected to grow by an average of 8 percent a year from 2000 through 2005. Under SGR and Prior System, Physician Fee Updates Are Mechanism To Bring Actual Spending in Line with Spending Targets
A target for spending on physician services serves as a budgetary control by automatically lowering fee updates in response to excess volume and intensity growth. Projected increases in volume and intensity, beyond what the current SGR targets allow, are expected to contribute to annual fee reductions for several years as the system tries to align spending with targets. SGR System Evolved from Spending Target System Introduced with Physician Fee Schedule in 1992
The SGR system evolved from the MVPS system of spending targets, which was introduced with the physician fee schedule in 1992. Concerns about the MVPS spending target prompted the Congress to create SGR’s system of spending targets. Under the SGR system, if spending exceeds the target, future fee updates are reduced. Specifically, the SGR formula establishes expenditure targets as follows: from a base year—1996—the targets are updated each year to account for four factors: (1) changes in the number of Medicare beneficiaries in traditional fee-for-service; (2) growth in the costs of providing physician services, laboratory tests, and Medicare-covered outpatient prescription drugs; (3) growth in the overall economy, as measured by changes in real per capita gross domestic product (GDP); and (4) changes in expenditures that result from changes in laws or regulations. Conversely, if volume and intensity grow more slowly than 2 percent annually, the SGR system permits physicians to benefit from fee increases that exceed the increased cost of providing services. Legislative Action Temporarily Avoided Fee Declines; Fees Projected to Decline Beginning in 2006
Since the introduction of the fee schedule in 1992 through 2001, physicians generally experienced real increases in their fees—that is, fees increased more than the increase in the cost of providing physician services, as measured by MEI. 4.) Based on the new higher spending estimates and lower targets, CMS determined that fees had been too high in 2000 and 2001. In setting the 2002 physician fees, the SGR system reduced fees to recoup previous excess spending. As a result, physician fee cuts were postponed, not avoided. If the growth in real spending per beneficiary is not lowered through other means, SGR will mechanically reduce fee updates in an attempt to impose fiscal discipline and moderate total spending increases. Although this mechanical response may be desirable from a budgetary perspective, any consequences for physicians and their patients are uncertain. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) system, implemented in 1998 and subsequently revised, is used to update Medicare's physician fees and moderate the growth in Medicare spending for physician services. SGR, and a predecessor system implemented in 1992, were designed to reduce physician fee updates if spending growth exceeded a specified target. Although spending growth slowed substantially under both systems, concerns about SGR arose when the system caused fees to decline by 5.4 percent in 2002. GAO was asked to discuss (1) Medicare physician spending trends both before and after the implementation of spending targets and (2) the evolution and mechanics of the SGR system. This statement is largely based on GAO's previous work on Medicare spending trends and the SGR system.
What GAO Found
Medicare spending on physician services grew rapidly through the 1980s, at an average annual rate of 13.4 percent, even though physician fee increases were subject to some limits. The spending growth was driven by increases in the number of services provided to each beneficiary--referred to as volume--and an increase in the average complexity and costliness of those services--referred to as intensity. Recognizing that expenditure growth of this magnitude was not sustainable, the Congress attempted to impose fiscal discipline by establishing a system of spending targets for Medicare physician services along with a fee schedule beginning in 1992. Following the introduction of spending targets, volume and intensity growth slowed substantially during the 1990s. In recent years, under the SGR system, volume and intensity growth has increased, but not by the rates experienced during the 1980s before spending targets were in place. SGR, the current system of spending targets, evolved from the target system that went into effect in 1992. Under the SGR system, physician fees are adjusted up or down, depending on whether actual spending has fallen below or has exceeded the target. Fees increase at least as fast as the costs of providing physician services as long as volume and intensity growth remains below a specified rate--currently, a little more than 2 percent a year. If volume and intensity grows faster than the specified rate, SGR lowers fee increases or causes fees to fall. Physicians raised concerns about SGR when fees dropped significantly in 2002, a decline that was, in part, a correction for fees that had been set too high in prior years because of errors in forecast estimates and other data. Congressional action averted fee reductions, and projected fee reductions, for 2003 through 2005. However, beginning in 2006, fees are projected to resume falling for several years, partly to recoup the excess spending accumulated from averted cuts in previous years and partly because real per beneficiary spending on physician services is projected to grow faster than allowed under SGR. A dilemma for policymakers posed by projected fee reductions is that while SGR's automatic responses work as intended from a budgetary perspective, the consequences for physicians and their patients are uncertain. |
gao_GAO-04-380 | gao_GAO-04-380_0 | The acquisition is scheduled to occur over a 30-year period at a projected cost of $17 billion. In June 2002, the Coast Guard awarded a contract to ICGS as the system integrator for Deepwater. However, a year and a half into the program, the key management and oversight components needed to make the program effective have not been effectively implemented. Integrated product teams (IPT) are the Coast Guard’s primary tool for managing the program and overseeing the contractor, but these teams have struggled to collaborate effectively and accomplish their missions. Further, while it is still early in the program, the transition from existing Coast Guard assets to the new Deepwater assets has not been effectively communicated, a particular concern in light of schedule delays for some of the first assets to be delivered. IPTs Have Had Difficulty Fulfilling Their Critical Management Function
IPTs are the Coast Guard’s primary tool for managing the Deepwater program and overseeing the system integrator. Inadequate communication among members. High turnover of IPT membership and understaffing. Insufficient training. In addition, the Coast Guard has not adequately addressed the imminent departure of Coast Guard officials from the Deepwater program. The Coast Guard’s process and procedures for evaluating the system integrator’s performance during the first year of the contract lacked rigor in terms of applying quantifiable metrics to assess performance, gathering input from government performance monitors, and communicating with and documenting information for the decision makers. Input from the COTR responsible for gauging the system integrator’s performance for all efforts related to the design and delivery of ships was not included in the calculation at all. Ultimately, the program executive officer awarded the system integrator a rating of 87 percent, resulting in an award fee of $4.0 million of the maximum $4.6 million annual award fee. In 2001, the Coast Guard set a goal of developing measures, within a year after contract award, to conduct annual assessments of the system integrator’s progress toward achieving the three overarching goals of the Deepwater program: increased operational effectiveness, lower TOC, and customer satisfaction. However, the Coast Guard’s time frame for implementing metrics to gauge progress against these goals has slipped. Control of Future Costs through Competition Remains a Risk because of Weak Oversight of Subcontractor Decisions
Competition is a key component for controlling costs in the Deepwater program and a guiding principle for DHS’s major acquisitions. However, beyond the first 5-year term, the Coast Guard has no way to ensure competition is occurring because it does not have mechanisms in place to measure the extent of competition or to hold the system integrator accountable for steps taken to achieve competition. The acquisition structure of the Deepwater program is such that the two first-tier subcontractors, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman—the companies that formed ICGS and that developed the Deepwater solution—have sole responsibility for determining whether to hold competitions for Deepwater assets or to provide these assets themselves. The lack of transparency into competition and the government’s lack of a mechanism to hold the contractor accountable raise questions about whether the Coast Guard will be able to control costs. As a result of the evaluation, Lockheed Martin identified an alternative CASA aircraft to meet the Coast Guard’s maritime patrol aircraft mission. The concerns we raised in 2001 about the Coast Guard’s ability to control costs in future years remain valid today. Appendix I: Comments from the Coast Guard
Appendix II: Status of Selected Deepwater Contract Management and Oversight Plans
Establishes criteria and procedures used to evaluate Integrated Coast Guard Systems’ (ICGS) management performance, and to determine the amount of award fee earned
Details responsibilities and processes to implement the contract Describes activities and processes to ensure funding is available to execute the program Establishes structure and method for identifying and managing risks, and developing and selecting options to mitigate risks “Soon after contract award”
Outlines the processes and procedures used to implement the program’s quality assurance process 90 days after contract award (September 2002) | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard's Deepwater program, the largest acquisition program in its history, involves modernizing or replacing ships, aircraft, and communications equipment. The Coast Guard awarded the Deepwater contract to Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) in June 2002. The Coast Guard estimates the program will cost $17 billion over a 30-year period. ICGS is a system integrator, with responsibility for identifying and delivering an integrated system of assets to meet the Coast Guard's missions. GAO was asked to assess whether the Coast Guard is effectively managing the Deepwater program and overseeing the contractor and to assess the implications of using the Deepwater contracting model on opportunities for competition.
What GAO Found
Over a year and a half into the Deepwater contract, the key components needed to manage the program and oversee the system integrator's performance have not been effectively implemented. Integrated product teams, the Coast Guard's primary tool for overseeing the system integrator, have struggled to effectively collaborate and accomplish their missions. They have been hampered by changing membership, understaffing, insufficient training, and inadequate communication among members. In addition, the Coast Guard has not adequately addressed the frequent turnover of personnel in the program and the transition from existing to Deepwater assets. The Coast Guard's assessment of the system integrator's performance in the first year of the contract lacked rigor. For example, comments from the technical specialist responsible for monitoring the design and delivery of ships were not included in the evaluation scores. Further, the factors that formed the basis for the award fee determination were unsupported by quantifiable metrics. Despite documented problems in schedule, performance, cost control, and contract administration, ICGS received a rating of 87 percent, resulting in an award fee of $4.0 million of the maximum $4.6 million annual award fee. Further, the Coast Guard has not yet begun to measure the system integrator's performance on the three overarching goals of the Deepwater program--operational effectiveness, total ownership cost, and customer satisfaction. Its original plan of measuring progress on an annual basis has slipped, and Coast Guard officials have not projected a time frame for when they will be able to hold the contractor accountable for progress against these goals. This information will be essential to the Coast Guard's decision about whether to extend ICGS's contract after the first 5 years. Competition is critical to controlling costs in the Deepwater program and a guiding principle of Department of Homeland Security acquisitions. Concerns about the Coast Guard's ability to rely on competition as a means to control future costs contributed to GAO's description of the Deepwater program in 2001 as "risky." Three years later, the Coast Guard has neither measured the extent of competition among suppliers of Deepwater assets nor held the system integrator accountable for taking steps to achieve competition. Deepwater's acquisition structure is such that the two first-tier subcontractors have sole responsibility for determining whether to hold competitions for assets or to provide these assets themselves. The Coast Guard has taken a hands-off approach to "make or buy" decisions made at the subcontractor level. As a result, questions remain about whether the government will be able to control costs. |
gao_GAO-10-792 | gao_GAO-10-792_0 | As described in this report, single-family mortgages and other forms of traditional collateral generally are perceived as representing less risk than alternative forms of collateral, such as agricultural and small business loans. FHLBank and CFI Officials Cited Several Factors, Including Lack of Interest and Risk-Management Policies, to Explain Minimal Use of Alternative Collateral
Officials from the 12 FHLBanks cited several factors to help explain the minimal use of alternative collateral to secure advances in the FHLBank System. Officials from these three FHLBanks said that their memberships had not expressed an interest in pledging alternative collateral. FHLBank Policies That Focus On Potential Risks May Also Limit the Use of Alternative Collateral
FHFA and some FHLBank officials said that alternative collateral generally has been viewed as representing greater risks than single-family mortgages and investment-grade securities. For example, FHFA officials said that it could be difficult to establish a value for agricultural and small business loans because they generally have not been actively traded in secondary markets. These FHLBanks generally apply higher haircuts to alternative collateral than to any other type of collateral that may be used to secure advances. CFIs Generally Valued Their Relations With FHLBanks, but Half Raised Concerns about Haircuts on Alternative Collateral or Other FHLBank Risk- Management Policies
While many CFIs may have significant traditional collateral resources to pledge to secure advances, we conducted interviews with 30 CFIs that could be constrained in their ability to obtain FHLBank advances due to their significant involvement in agricultural or small business lending. Moreover, a majority of the FHLBanks have not established quantitative performance goals for products, related to agricultural and small business lending in their strategic business plans, which could include alternative collateral, as required by agency regulations. But, without more proactive oversight by FHFA from a mission standpoint, the appropriateness of FHLBank alternative collateral policies may not be clear. In the Absence of FHFA Examination Oversight, FHLBanks Have Wide Discretion to Establish Haircuts and Other Policies for Alternative Collateral, but Documentation to Support These Policies Is Limited
While FHFA may prioritize FHLBank safety and soundness concerns and the structure of the AHP and CIP programs may facilitate their oversight from a mission standpoint, FHFA’s, as well as FHFB’s, limited oversight of alternative collateral may have limited its appeal within the FHLBank System. Further, of the 10 FHLBanks that accept alternative collateral, 3 provided documentation of the basis of the haircuts that they applied to such collateral. In many cases the FHLBanks have not substantiated and documented their reasons for not accepting alternative collateral or applying relatively high haircuts to it. Specifically, FHFA stated that the agency would (1) review each FHLBank’s policies and practices, starting with the 2011 annual supervisory examination cycle, to assure that they can substantiate their collateral practices and are meeting their CFI members’ liquidity needs; (2) issue an Advisory Bulletin to the FHLBanks that provides supervisory guidance on how to include goals for alternative collateral in the preparation of FHLBank strategic business plans beginning in 2011, and review those plans to ensure they include such goals; and (3) direct the FHLBanks to document their outreach and alternative collateral needs assessment efforts in their strategic business plans, and instruct examiners to monitor the FHLBanks’ efforts in these areas as part of the agency’s ongoing supervisory review. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) discuss factors that may limit the use of alternative collateral to secure Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) advances; and (2) assess selected aspects of the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) oversight of the FHLBanks’ alternative collateral policies and practices. We also conducted interviews with representatives from FHFA, the regulator of the FHLBank System; the 12 FHLBanks; the Council of Federal Home Loan Banks; the Independent Community Bankers of America; and obtained information from a nongeneralizable, random sample of 30 Community Financial Institutions (CFI). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Home Loan Bank System is a government-sponsored enterprise comprising 12 regionally-based Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBank), the primary mission of which is to support housing finance and community and economic development. Each FHLBank makes loans (advances) to member financial institutions in its district, such as banks, which traditionally are secured by single-family mortgages. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) authorized FHLBanks to accept alternative forms of collateral, such as agricultural and small business loans, from small members. GAO was asked to assess (1) factors that may limit the use of alternative collateral; and (2) selected aspects of the Federal Housing Finance Agency's, (FHFA) related regulatory oversight practices. GAO reviewed FHLBank policies and FHFA documentation; and interviewed FHLBank and FHFA officials, and a nongeneralizable random sample of 30 small lenders likely to have significant levels of agricultural or small business loans in their portfolios.
What GAO Found
FHLBank and FHFA officials cited several factors to help explain why alternative collateral represents about 1 percent of all collateral that is used to secure advances. These factors include a potential lack of interest by small lenders in pledging such collateral to secure advances or the view that many such lenders have sufficient levels of single-family mortgage collateral. Officials from two FHLBanks said their institutions do not accept alternative collateral at all, at least in part for these reasons. Further, FHLBank officials said alternative collateral can be more difficult to evaluate than single-family mortgages and, therefore, may present greater financial risks. To mitigate these risks, the 10 FHLBanks that accept alternative collateral generally apply higher discounts, or haircuts, to it than any other form of collateral, which may limit its use. For example, an FHLBank with a haircut of 80 percent on alternative collateral generally would allow a member to obtain an advance worth 20 percent of the collateral's value. While GAO's interviews with 30 small lenders likely to have significant alternative collateral on their books found that they generally valued their relationships with their local FHLBanks, officials from half said the large haircuts on alternative collateral or other policies limited the collateral's appeal. FHFA's oversight of FHLBank alternative collateral policies and practices has been limited. For example, FHFA guidance does not direct its examiners to assess the FHLBanks' alternative collateral policies. As a result, the FHLBanks have wide discretion to either not accept alternative collateral or apply relatively large haircuts to it. While the FHLBanks may view these policies as necessary to mitigate potential risks, 9 of the 12 FHLBanks did not provide documentation to GAO to substantiate such policies. Further, the documentation provided by three FHLBanks suggests that, in some cases, haircuts applied to alternative collateral may be too large. Also, the majority of the FHLBanks have not developed quantitative goals for products related to agricultural and small business lending, such as alternative collateral, as required by FHFA regulations. FHFA officials said that alternative collateral has not been a focus of the agency's oversight efforts because it does not represent a significant safety and soundness concern. However, in the absence of more proactive FHFA oversight from a mission standpoint, the appropriateness of FHLBank alternative collateral policies is not clear. FHFA should revise its examination guidelines to include periodic analysis of alternative collateral, and enforce its regulation pertaining to quantitative goals for products related to agricultural and small business lending. FHFA agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-639 | gao_GAO-06-639_0 | There are many potential pathways for spill notification in the corridor. Many spills go unreported because responsible parties may not understand or comply with reporting requirements. EPA Region 5 does not remove all duplicate spill reports from their database, or update its data after investigating spills. In contrast, Coast Guard officials in District 9 document their investigations and use the information to update their spill data, but they do not update spill volume estimates because of automated system limitations. Other events, including CSOs and industrial permit violations, are reported more frequently in the corridor. The NRC received 991 reports of spills in the corridor from 1994 to 2004, but these may include multiple reports of the same spills. These data might be subject to the same limitations as the spill data because industrial permit violations and CSOs are self-reported and facilities may not report all of these events. Spill Notification Occurs between and among Many Different Parties and Agreements Outlining U.S.–Canadian Notification Processes Are Not Explicit about Time and Magnitude
Spill notification may involve the following: (1) spill occurrence and reporting by a responsible party or observer to a designated reporting center or a response agency; (2) spill notification from response agencies to one another; and (3) spill notification by response agencies to drinking water facilities and other stakeholders. Spill notification between the United States and Canada is outlined in two agreements. The coast guards of each country and officials from the Michigan State Police and Ontario SAC have agreed to notify one another of spills; however, these two agreements are not explicit about which spills warrant notification or how quickly notification should occur. Drinking water facility operators on the U.S. side of the corridor had differing perspectives on current notification processes, but the majority expressed concern that their facilities could be contaminated by spills due to untimely notification. Finally, efforts have been made to develop informal notification processes between individual industries or trade associations and drinking water facilities. We selected six spill cases to illustrate the various ways that spill notification can occur. EPA’s Spill Prevention and Enforcement Efforts Are Limited and the Coast Guard Addresses Spill Prevention as Part of Other Compliance Efforts
EPA’s spill prevention program addresses only oil spills, and EPA is uncertain as to which facilities are governed by its spill prevention requirements. EPA Region 5 conducted varying numbers of spill prevention-related inspections per year in the corridor for the time frame we reviewed, and their inspections uncovered significant spill prevention deficiencies. It also regulates the transfer of oil and hazardous substances. EPA and the Coast Guard Issued a Total of 16 Penalties during the Period Reviewed
EPA and the Coast Guard issued 16 penalties in response to spills, noncompliance with spill prevention programs, or for failure to report spills during the period we reviewed. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We were asked to examine (1) how many oil and hazardous substance spills of more than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) were reported in the St. Clair–Detroit River corridor from 1994 to 2004, and how accurately reported spills reflect the extent of actual spills; (2) what processes are used to notify parties of spills, and whether they contain explicit requirements for reporting times and spill magnitude; and (3) the extent of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Coast Guard’s spill prevention efforts and enforcement activities in the St. Clair–Detroit River corridor from 1994 through 2004. These data are likely subject to the same limitations as the spill data, in that industrial permit violations and CSOs are self-reported and facilities may be reluctant to report these events; however, spills may be particularly subject to underreporting because they are not part of a structured program as are CSOs and industrial permit violations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Spills of oil and hazardous substances in the St. Clair-Detroit River corridor have degraded this border area between the United States and Canada and are a potential threat to local drinking water supplies. Within the United States such spills are reported to the National Response Center (NRC), and in Canada to the Ontario Spills Action Centre. This report discusses (1) how many oil and hazardous substance spills greater than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) were reported in the corridor from 1994 to 2004, and how accurately reported spills reflect the extent of actual spills; (2) what processes are used to notify parties of spills, and if they contain explicit requirements for reporting times and spill magnitude; and (3) the extent of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Coast Guard's spill prevention efforts and enforcement activities in the corridor from 1994 to 2004.
What GAO Found
The NRC received 991 spill reports and the Ontario Spills Action Centre received 157 reports of spills in the corridor from 1994 through 2004, but these reports do not accurately portray the actual number or volume of spills. Many spills go unreported by responsible parties because they do not understand or fail to comply with reporting requirements. Further, multiple reports for the same spill are often recorded by NRC and provided to EPA and the Coast Guard for investigation. EPA does not remove all duplicate spill reports or update its data after investigating spills. Coast Guard officials update their spill data after investigations but they are unable to update spill volume estimates due to automated system limitations. GAO also found that, according to agency data sets, other events--combined sewer overflows (CSOs) and industrial permit violations--occurred more frequently than spills in the corridor. While data on industrial permit violations and CSOs might be subject to the same limitations as the spill data because the data are self reported and facilities may not report all of these events, spills may be particularly subject to underreporting because they are not part of a structured program as CSOs and industrial permit violations are. There are multiple parties involved in spill notification in the corridor and agreements outlining U.S.-Canadian notification processes are not explicit about reporting times or the magnitude of spills that warrant notification. The coast guards of each country have agreed to notify one another of spills primarily when a joint response may be needed. Another agreement between Michigan and Ontario officials calls for notifying each other of spills that may have a joint impact. We reviewed six selected spill incidents that illustrate the various ways that notification can occur. The drinking water facility operators we contacted on the U.S. side of the corridor had differing perspectives on current notification processes, and the majority expressed concern that their facilities could be contaminated by spills if they are not notified in a timely manner. Finally, efforts have been made to develop informal notification processes between individual industries or trade associations and drinking water facilities. EPA's spill prevention program is limited and the Coast Guard addresses spill prevention as part of other compliance efforts. EPA's prevention program addresses only oil spills. Further, EPA is uncertain of which specific facilities are subject to regulation under its spill prevention program, and conducts varying numbers of inspections per year. EPA inspections uncovered significant spill prevention deficiencies, whereas the Coast Guard's inspections revealed minor issues. The agencies issued a total of 16 penalties for spills and program noncompliance during the period we reviewed. |
gao_GAO-16-612 | gao_GAO-16-612_0 | The first version of the SLS that NASA is developing is a 70-metric ton (mt) launch vehicle known as Block I. SLS Has Resolved Some Technical Issues and Matured Its Design, but Pressure Remains on Reduced Cost and Schedule Reserves
The SLS program has made solid progress in resolving some technical issues and maturing the SLS design, but the program’s management of known risks as well as the program’s upcoming integration and test phase puts pressure on the program’s reduced cost and schedule reserves. This pressure threatens the program’s committed November 2018 launch readiness goal. Such risks are not unusual for large-scale programs, especially human exploration programs, but the program’s management of these risks may increase pressure on reduced cost and schedule reserves. For example, the SLS program has not positioned itself well to provide accurate assessments of progress with the core stage—including forecasting impending schedule delays, cost overruns, and estimates of anticipated costs at completion—because, at the time of our review, NASA did not have a performance measurement baseline necessary to support full earned value management reporting on the core stage contract. Finally, unforeseen technical challenges are likely to arise once the program reaches its next phase, final integration for SLS and integration of SLS with its related Orion and EGS human spaceflight programs that will likely place further pressure on cost and schedule reserves. Examples of this development progress— and the unexpected difficulties encountered achieving that progress— include the following:
Core stage. NASA’s Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, which oversees development of the SLS, EGS, and Orion programs, plans to conduct a “build-to-synchronization” review in summer 2016 to demonstrate that the integrated launch vehicle, crew vehicle, and ground systems will perform as expected to meet EM-1 objectives. According to NASA program management requirements, a critical design review for a NASA program would not only evaluate the integrated design, but also evaluate whether it meets mission requirements with appropriate margins and acceptable risk within cost and schedule constraints. The EGS Program Is Making Progress Completing Modifications, but Technical Challenges Are Consuming Cost and Schedule Reserves
The EGS program is maturing selected systems, but the program is encountering technical challenges that require both time and money to fix. This pressure threatens the program’s committed November 2018 launch readiness goal. For example, based on the program’s February 2016 risk assessment, the EGS program could see maximum cost increases of $10 million for the Mobile Launcher and $11 million for the Vehicle Assembly Building, which is almost double the program’s fiscal year 2016 reserve. Recommendation for Executive Action
In order to ensure available cost and schedule margins are sufficient to meet the synchronized goals for launch readiness and related activities, we recommend the NASA administrator direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate as it finalizes its schedule and plans for EM-1 during the planned build-to-synchronization review to re-evaluate SLS and EGS cost and schedule reserves based on results of the integrated design review in order take advantage of all available time resources and maximize the benefit of available cost reserves, and to verify that the November 2018 launch readiness date remains feasible. NASA stated that the results of its build-to-synchronization review will be reported to the NASA Program Management Council by November 30, 2016. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Exploration Ground Systems Components beyond the Space Launch System and Orion
According to Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) officials, the program does not track how EGS investments could benefit users beyond the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion, but we found that the majority of EGS funds are being used to develop major components that will be exclusively used by SLS and Orion or require some modification to be used by another user. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Space Launch System (SLS) program made progress in meeting cost and schedule commitments, we compared current program status with National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) cost and schedule baselines for executing Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) in 2018. | Why GAO Did This Study
NASA is in the midst of developing systems needed to support deep-space exploration by humans. SLS will be NASA's first exploration-class launch vehicle in over 40 years to propel astronauts and cargo beyond low-Earth orbit. The EGS program is developing systems and infrastructure to support both SLS and the crew capsule, known as Orion. Together, the first planned SLS flight, the ground systems for that effort, and the first two Orion flights are estimated to cost almost $23 billion. In July 2015, GAO found that SLS's limited cost and schedule reserves were placing the program at increased risk of being unable to deliver the launch vehicle on time and within budget.
The House Committee on Appropriations report accompanying H.R. 2578 included a provision for GAO to assess the acquisition progress of the SLS, EGS, and Orion programs. This report assesses the extent to which (1) SLS has made progress meeting cost and schedule commitments, and (2) EGS has made progress in completing modifications to key facilities and equipment. To do this work, GAO examined the results of design reviews, contractor data, and other relevant program documentation, and interviewed relevant officials. GAO plans to report separately on the Orion program in July 2016.
What GAO Found
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new launch vehicle, the Space Launch System (SLS), has resolved some technical issues and matured its design since GAO's July 2015 report, but pressure remains on the program's limited cost and schedule reserves. This pressure, in turn, threatens its committed November 2018 launch readiness goal. The program has made progress in resolving some technical issues—for example, a major alignment problem with the welding tool for the core stage (SLS's structural backbone and fuel tank) was corrected. Nonetheless, SLS development faces known risks moving forward. While such risks are not unusual for large-scale programs, the program's approach to managing them may increase pressure on the limited reserves. For example, the SLS program has not positioned itself well to provide accurate assessments of core stage progress—including forecasting impending schedule delays, cost overruns, and anticipated costs at completion—because at the time of our review it did not anticipate having the baseline to support full reporting on the core stage contract until summer 2016—some 4.5 years after NASA awarded the contract. Further, unforeseen technical challenges are likely to arise once the program reaches its next phase, final integration for SLS and integration of SLS with its related Orion and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) human spaceflight programs. Any such unexpected challenges are likely to place further pressure on SLS cost and schedule reserves. The figure below shows key events in SLS and EGS launch readiness schedules.
The EGS program is making progress in modifying selected facilities and equipment to support SLS and Orion, but is encountering technical challenges that require time and money to address. Like SLS, the program has reduced cost and schedule reserves, which threatens its committed November 2018 launch readiness goal. Modifications to two main components—the Vehicle Assembly Building, where the SLS is assembled, and the Mobile Launcher, the vehicle used to bring SLS to the launch pad—have already cost more and taken longer than expected as has development of EGS software. In June 2016, after all the systems necessary to support the first flight test are expected to have a stable design, NASA plans to start an integrated design review to demonstrate that the integrated systems will perform as expected. NASA guidance indicates that this type of review should also evaluate whether mission requirements are being met with acceptable risk within cost and schedule constraints. NASA officials stated that this review will have limited discussion of cost and schedule. Proceeding ahead without reassessing resources, however, could result in the EGS or SLS program exhausting limited resources to maintain pace toward an optimistic November 2018 launch readiness date.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NASA should reevaluate cost and schedule reserves as part of its integrated design review for the first flight test in order to maximize all remaining cost and schedule reserves. NASA concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_NSIAD-98-2 | gao_NSIAD-98-2_0 | Background
SOCOM and the Army are purchasing two separate active infrared countermeasure systems to protect U.S. aircraft. To meet its urgent need, SOCOM plans to exercise its first production option for 15 DIRCM systems in July 1998 and procure 45 additional systems during fiscal years 1998 and 1999. DIRCM and ATIRCM Will Eventually Have the Same Technology
The ATIRCM and DIRCM systems will initially have one key difference in technological capability. However, DOD has not yet taken advantage of the schedule changes to determine if one system will be more cost-effective than the other and if it can achieve significant savings by procuring only one system to protect all its aircraft. Conclusions and Recommendations
DOD’s plans to acquire infrared countermeasure capability may not represent the most cost-effective approach. We, therefore, recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) direct that the appropriate tests and analyses be conducted to determine whether DIRCM or ATIRCM will provide the most cost-effective means to protect U.S. aircraft and (2) procure that system for U.S. aircraft that have a requirement for similar Infrared Countermeasure capabilities. DOD has never planned for DIRCM or ATIRCM to be the only means of protection for its aircraft from infrared guided missiles. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Army's Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure system (ATIRCM) and the U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) Directional Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM) system to determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is justified in acquiring both systems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD may be able to achieve sizable savings by procuring, supporting, and maintaining only one active infrared countermeasure system to protect its aircraft from infrared guided missiles; (2) despite congressional emphasis on, and DOD's stated commitment to, commonality, SOCOM and the Army are acquiring two separate countermeasure systems that eventually will have the same laser effect technology; (3) DOD should determine which system is more cost-effective and procure that one to protect its aircraft; (4) if DIRCM is determined to be more cost-effective, the ATIRCM program should be terminated; and (5) if ATIRCM is determined to be more cost-effective, no additional DIRCM systems should be procured beyond those planned to be procured in July 1998 to meet SOCOM's urgent need. |
gao_GGD-96-28 | gao_GGD-96-28_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our initial objectives were to determine (1) the extent of legalized gaming in the United States, (2) the currency transaction reporting requirements for casinos, (3) the currency transaction reporting requirements for tribal casinos, and (4) the level of enforcement efforts to ensure that casinos are complying with currency transaction reporting requirements. Indian gaming may generate large amounts of revenue for some of the tribes that own these operations. According to International Gaming and Wagering Business (various issues 1988 through 1995), wagering in nontribal casinos increased from about $117 billion in 1984 to about $368 billion in 1994. On the other hand, under BSA regulations, casinos are required to report all cash transactions over $10,000, including gaming winnings. Casinos must also obtain and verify additional identifying information about customers who wish to deposit funds, open an account, or establish a line of credit. Tribal casinos report such cash receipts over $10,000 on a Report of Cash Payments Over $10,000 Received in a Trade or Business, IRS Form 8300. Certain Tribal Casinos Are to Be Subject to BSA Currency Transaction Reporting Requirements
The Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 expanded the definition of a “financial institution” subject to BSA reporting requirements to include certain tribal casinos. IRS Examination Division and Criminal Investigation Division officials in New Orleans stated that they work together to ensure that casinos comply with BSA requirements, and that any potential money laundering would be investigated. (Both are prohibited transactions in amounts over $2,500.) The new BSA regulations that require casinos to take a more active role in ensuring their own compliance with BSA, as well as other money laundering prevention strategies such as Nevada’s prohibited transactions, could be positive steps toward compliance given the limited IRS resources for compliance reviews. 1. Casino gaming includes riverboats. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined: (1) the extent of legalized gaming in the United States; (2) currency transaction reporting requirements for casinos; (3) whether the same transaction reporting requirements apply to tribal casinos; and (4) the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to ensure that casinos are complying with currency transaction reporting requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 48 states permit some form of legalized gaming, including riverboat casino gaming and Indian gaming; (2) the amount of cash wagered annually in casinos has grown from $117 billion in 1984 to $407 billion in 1994; (3) the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requires casinos to report currency transactions over $10,000, obtain additional identifying information about customers opening a line of credit, and develop BSA compliance programs that meet certain requirements; (4) although Nevada casinos report customers that purchase chips in cash amounts over $10,000, they do not report customer identification information on verified winnings over $10,000 or cash exchanges involving small denomination bills over $2,500; (5) tribal casinos are not subject to BSA, but they must report currency transactions in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provision regarding cash received in a trade or business; (6) IRS has made efforts to educate tribal casino officials on IRC reporting requirements to ensure that they are complying with federal regulations; (7) IRS needs to use its enforcement resources to complete compliance reviews of other nonbank financial institutions and to ensure that individuals and businesses are complying with tax laws; and (8) new BSA regulations will relieve some of the pressure on IRS by requiring casinos to take a more active role in ensuring their own compliance with BSA. |
gao_GAO-11-624 | gao_GAO-11-624_0 | Medicaid is a federal-state program for certain categories of low-income children, families, and individuals. Most Physicians Are Enrolled and Serving Children in Medicaid and CHIP, but Are Generally More Willing to Accept Privately Insured Children as New Patients
On the basis of our survey of physicians, we estimate that nationally more than three-quarters of primary and specialty care physicians are enrolled as Medicaid and CHIP providers and serving children covered by these programs. A larger share of primary care physicians than specialty care physicians are participating in Medicaid and CHIP—that is, enrolled and serving children in Medicaid and CHIP. Physicians Participating in Medicaid and CHIP Are Generally More Willing to Accept Privately Insured Children as New Patients Than Children in Medicaid and CHIP
Although most participating physicians are accepting children in Medicaid and CHIP as new patients, they are generally more willing to accept privately insured children as new patients. Nonparticipating Physicians Largely Cited Administrative Issues as Limiting Their Own Willingness to Serve Children in Medicaid and CHIP
Physicians not participating in the programs—that is, those not enrolled or not serving children in Medicaid and CHIP—often cited certain administrative issues related to reimbursement and enrolling as a provider as factors that limit their own willingness to serve children enrolled in these programs. More Than Three Times as Many Participating Physicians Have Difficulty Referring Children in Medicaid and CHIP to Specialty Care as Have Difficulty Referring Privately Insured Children
On the basis of our national survey, most physicians participating in Medicaid and CHIP experience difficulty referring children in these programs to specialty care, but relatively few have difficulty referring privately insured children to specialty care. Of further note, 34 percent of the physicians experience great difficulty for children in Medicaid and CHIP, compared to 1 percent for privately insured. The study found that 66 percent of the calls for children covered by Medicaid and CHIP were denied an appointment compared to 11 percent for children with private insurance. The most frequently cited specialties for children enrolled in Medicaid and CHIP and privately insured children were mental health specialties (such as psychiatry and psychology), dermatology, and neurology. Concluding Observations
Medicaid and CHIP have a significant role in addressing the preventive and specialty health care needs of tens of millions of children in the United States. HHS commented that CMS is committed to improving physician participation rates and that our report will be of significant value to CMS as it works with states and providers to ensure that beneficiaries have access to covered health care services. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology for GAO Survey of Primary Care and Specialty Care Physicians
We conducted a mixed-mode survey (mail and Web-based) of primary care and specialty care physicians to determine the extent to which nonfederal primary care and specialty care physicians are enrolled as Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) providers and serve children in these programs; the extent to which they are accepting new Medicaid and CHIP patients; factors that may affect physicians’ own willingness to participate in Medicaid and CHIP; and the extent to which participating physicians experience difficulty referring children in Medicaid and CHIP for specialty care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)--two joint federal-state health care programs for certain low-income individuals--play a critical role in addressing the health care needs of children. The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 required GAO to study children's access to care under Medicaid and CHIP, including information on physicians' willingness to serve children covered by Medicaid and CHIP. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which physicians are enrolled and serving children in Medicaid and CHIP and accepting these and other children as new patients, and (2) the extent to which physicians experience difficulty referring children in Medicaid and CHIP for specialty care, as compared to privately insured children. GAO conducted a national survey of nonfederal primary and specialty care physicians who serve children, and asked about their enrollment in state Medicaid and CHIP programs, whether they served and accepted Medicaid and CHIP and privately insured children, and the extent to which they experienced difficulty referring children in Medicaid and CHIP and privately insured children to specialty care. GAO also interviewed officials with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that oversees Medicaid and CHIP.
What GAO Found
Most physicians are enrolled in Medicaid and CHIP and serving children covered by these programs. On the basis of its 2010 national survey of physicians, GAO estimates that more than three-quarters of primary and specialty care physicians are enrolled as Medicaid and CHIP providers and serving children in those programs. A larger share of primary care physicians (83 percent) are participating in the programs--enrolled as a provider and serving Medicaid and CHIP children--than specialty physicians (71 percent). Further, a larger share of rural primary care physicians (94 percent) is participating in the programs than urban primary care physicians (81 percent). Nationwide, physicians participating in Medicaid and CHIP are generally more willing to accept privately insured children as new patients than Medicaid and CHIP children. For example, about 79 percent are accepting all privately insured children as new patients, compared to about 47 percent for children in Medicaid and CHIP. Nonparticipating physicians--those not enrolled or not serving Medicaid and CHIP children--most commonly cite administrative issues such as low and delayed reimbursement and provider enrollment requirements as limiting their willingness to serve children in these programs. Physicians experience much greater difficulty referring children in Medicaid and CHIP to specialty care, compared to privately insured children. On the basis of the physician survey, more than three times as many participating physicians--84 percent--experience difficulty referring Medicaid and CHIP children to specialty care as experience difficulty referring privately insured children--26 percent. For all children, physicians most frequently cited difficulty with specialty referrals for mental health, dermatology, and neurology. In its comments on a draft of this report, HHS stated that CMS is committed to improving physician participation and that this report will be of value as CMS works with the states to ensure beneficiary access to care. |
gao_GAO-07-900 | gao_GAO-07-900_0 | The plan is composed of four recurring reviews: self-assessment, operational status, on-site, and acquisition planning. The CPO has issued an acquisition oversight program guidebook, provided training on self-assessment and operational status reviews, and began implementation of the four reviews in the plan (see table 1). The acquisition oversight plan generally incorporates basic principles of an effective and accountable acquisition function and includes mechanisms to monitor acquisition performance. However, the acquisition planning reviews are not sufficient to determine if components’ adequately plan their acquisitions. Several recent reviews have identified problems in DHS’s acquisition planning. The CPO Faces Challenges in Implementing Reviews and Corrective Actions
DHS faces two challenges in achieving the goals of its acquisition oversight plan. First, the CPO has had limited resources to implement the plan reviews. In turn, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security provide the CPO with sufficient enforcement authority to effectively oversee the Department’s acquisitions—a recommendation that has yet to be implemented. An independent evaluation of DHS’s acquisition oversight program by the Inspector General or an external auditor could help strengthen the oversight conducted through the plan and better ensure that the program is fully implemented and maintaining its effectiveness over time. The CPO has been assigned responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the oversight process—in part by providing lessons learned for acquisition program management and execution. In addition to the Web site, other opportunities may exist for sharing knowledge. Additional actions are needed to achieve the plan’s objectives and opportunities exist to strengthen oversight through enhanced internal controls. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve oversight of component acquisition planning processes and the overall effectiveness of the acquisition oversight plan, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Chief Procurement Officer to take the following three actions: Reevaluate the approach to oversight of acquisition planning reviews and determine whether the mechanisms under the plan are sufficient to monitor component actions and improve component acquisition planning efforts. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine actions taken by DHS to implement the acquisition oversight plan and challenges DHS faces, we reviewed prior GAO and DHS Office of the Inspector General reports pertaining to acquisition oversight as well as relevant DHS documents, such as the oversight plan, documents of completed reviews and guidance to components, including training materials. We interviewed officials in the CPO’s office and the nine DHS components with acquisition offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the third largest department in federal procurement spending in fiscal year 2006, has faced ongoing cost, schedule, and performance problems with major acquisitions and procurement of services. In December 2005, DHS established an acquisition oversight program to provide insight into and improve components' acquisition programs. In 2006, GAO reported that DHS faced challenges in implementing its program. Congress mandated that DHS develop an oversight plan and tasked GAO with analyzing the plan. GAO (1) evaluated actions DHS and its components have taken to implement the acquisition oversight plan and (2) identified implementation challenges. GAO also identified opportunities for strengthening oversight conducted through the plan. GAO reviewed relevant DHS documents and GAO and DHS Inspector General reports and interviewed officials in the office of the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) and nine DHS components.
What GAO Found
The CPO has taken several actions to implement DHS's acquisition oversight plan--which generally incorporates basic principles of an effective and accountable acquisition function. The plan monitors acquisition performance through four recurring reviews: self-assessment, operational status, on-site, and acquisition planning. Each component has completed the first self-assessment, which has helped components identify and prioritize acquisition weaknesses. In addition, each component has submitted an initial operational status report to the CPO and on-site reviews are being conducted. Despite this progress, the acquisition planning reviews are not sufficient to determine if components adequately plan their acquisitions--in part because a required review has not been implemented and the CPO lacks visibility into components' planning activities. DHS faces two key challenges in implementing its acquisition oversight plan. First, the CPO has had limited oversight resources to implement plan reviews. However, recent increases in staff have begun to address this challenge. Second, the CPO lacks sufficient authority to ensure components comply with the plan--despite being held accountable for departmentwide management and oversight of the acquisition function. GAO has previously recommended that DHS provide the CPO with sufficient enforcement authority to enable effective acquisition oversight. In addition to these challenges, GAO identified two opportunities to strengthen internal controls for overseeing the plan's implementation and for increasing knowledge sharing. Specifically, independent evaluations of DHS's oversight program could help ensure that the plan maintains its effectiveness over time. Sharing knowledge and lessons learned could provide DHS's acquisition workforce with the information needed to improve their acquisition processes and better achieve DHS's mission. |
gao_GAO-10-349 | gao_GAO-10-349_0 | Taxpayers are generally not required to repay the credit unless the home ceases to be the taxpayer’s principal residence within 3 years of purchase. IRS Moved Quickly to Address the Recovery Act’s Significant Implementation Challenges
While IRS has implemented major pieces of legislation in the past, the Recovery Act posed significant implementation challenges because it was a large piece of legislation and many provisions were immediately or retroactively effective and had to be implemented during the tax filing season—IRS’s busiest time of year. Some provisions affected the 2009 filing season (for tax year 2008), while others mainly will affect the 2010 and 2011 filing seasons. For example, as shown in table 2, of the 54 provisions that IRS has a role in implementing, IRS had detailed data- collection plans for 17, or about 31 percent. Very little of the data that IRS has collected on the tax provisions has been released publicly. Initial Data Collection Did Not Fully or Accurately Capture the Use of Some Recovery Act Provisions
During much of our review, IRS focused on collecting and internally reporting data on four provisions—BABs, COBRA, the FTHBC, and the HCTC. The Economic Stimulus Effect of the Tax Provisions Cannot Be Precisely Isolated
The data IRS has collected about the tax provisions it is administering are not designed to isolate or differentiate the stimulus effect of these provisions from that of other Recovery Act provisions. To assess the effects of stimulus policies such as tax incentives, economists use evidence from macroeconometric forecasting models and models that extrapolate from historical data. Although the economic effect of each of the Recovery Act tax provisions cannot be precisely estimated, the effect of some provisions on specific aspects of the economy may be described in general terms. In addition, their analysis suggests that, in addition to other policy actions affecting residential real estate, the Recovery Act’s FTHBC may have moderated job losses in the construction industry. As a result of its prerefund checks, as of February 1, 2010, IRS had frozen about 140,000 refunds pending civil or criminal examination, and, as of December 2, 2009, had identified 175 criminal schemes and had 123 criminal investigations open. An IRS form already exists that could help resolve this compliance issue, but whether IRS is authorized to use it for this purpose would have to be determined. If Form 1099-S information reporting could be required for all home sales or for those taxpayers who do not certify that they had not claimed the FTHBC, IRS might be better able to identify the taxpayers who need to repay part or all of the credit. This alternative involves acquiring access to third-party data in the form of publicly available real estate information from local governments. Documenting IRS’s Recovery Act Lessons Learned and Expanding Its Authority, with Appropriate Controls, Could Improve Future Tax Administration
IRS plans to do a “lessons learned” review of its Recovery Act experiences and implementation, most likely after the 2010 filing season, but it had not yet developed detailed plans during our review. One hundred percent of the proceeds from BABs must be used for capital expenditures. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the status of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) implementation of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) tax provisions; (2) analyze IRS plans to collect data on the provisions, examine whether and how IRS captured data on the use of selected provisions, and discuss the provisions’ overall effect; (3) assess IRS’s efforts to determine potential abuse of the provisions and IRS’s steps for minimizing it; and (4) discuss possible lessons learned for future tax administration. To further address this objective as well as others, we selected five Recovery Act tax provisions to review in detail—Build America Bonds (BAB), Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) premium subsidies, the First-Time Homebuyer Credit (FTHBC), the Making Work Pay Credit (MWPC), and net operating loss (NOL) carrybacks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), was enacted to bolster the struggling U.S. economy at an estimated cost of $787 billion, of which more than a third was in the form of tax relief to the public. This report (1) describes the status of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) implementation of Recovery Act tax provisions; (2) examines whether IRS captured or planned to capture data on the use of the provisions; (3) assesses IRS's efforts to determine potential abuse of the provisions; and (4) discusses possible lessons learned for future tax administration. GAO analyzed IRS's implementation and data-collection plans for each provision; reviewed IRS and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) risk-management documents; interviewed federal and industry officials; and focused on five provisions implemented in 2009: Build America Bonds (BAB), Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), First-Time Homebuyer Credit (FTHBC), Making Work Pay Credit, and Net Operating Loss carrybacks.
What GAO Found
The Recovery Act posed significant implementation challenges for IRS because it had more than 50 provisions, many of which were immediately or retroactively available and had to be implemented during the tax filing season--IRS's busiest time. Some provisions affected the 2009 filing season (2008 tax year), while others mainly will affect the 2010 and 2011 filing seasons. IRS responded quickly to its challenges. IRS went beyond its typical data-collection efforts and plans to collect some data to track many Recovery Act provisions. Specifically, IRS currently has detailed data-collection plans for 17 or about 31 percent of the provisions and 63 percent of the total estimated cost of the tax provisions. Initial collections did not fully or accurately capture the use of some provisions. In addition, very little of the data that IRS has collected on the tax provisions has been released publicly. Similar to what GAO has found about the act's spending projects, the tax provisions' economic stimulus effect cannot be precisely isolated. Economists use evidence from macroeconomic forecasting models and models that extrapolate from historical data to assess stimulus effects. These approaches, however, are imprecise because historical experience may not apply well given the magnitude of the Recovery Act. The effect of some provisions on specific aspects of the economy may be described in general terms. For example, the Council of Economic Advisers noted that in addition to other policy actions affecting residential real estate, the FTHBC may have moderated construction-industry job losses. As a result of IRS's FTHBC prerefund compliance reviews, as of February 1, 2010, IRS had frozen about 140,000 refunds pending civil or criminal examination, and, as of December 2, 2009, had identified 175 criminal schemes and had 123 criminal investigations open. Although IRS addressed some challenges with the FTHBC in these ways, it still needs to finalize a way to identify individuals who fail to report home sales and might be required to repay part of the credit because their homes ceased to be their principal places of residence within 3 years of purchase. A form already exists that could be used for this purpose--Form 1099-S, "Proceeds from Real Estate Transactions," but it is not clear IRS could use the form for this purpose under current legislative authority. As GAO's review ended, IRS identified third-party data that it expected to use and then evaluate the results. Issues IRS encountered in its Recovery Act experience could provide useful guidance for the future. Officials intend to do a lessons-learned study after the 2010 filing season but have yet to develop plans for doing so. |
gao_GAO-12-352 | gao_GAO-12-352_0 | In February 2011, the Corps submitted its initial report to Congress summarizing its experiences implementing the peer review process in response to the requirement in section 2034 of WRDA 2007. It Is Unclear How Many Peer Reviews Have Been Completed in Response to Section 2034 Requirements
Since enactment of WRDA 2007, 49 Corps civil works project studies have undergone peer review as of January 2012, but it is unclear how many of these reviews were performed in response to the requirements in section 2034. This is because the Corps does not make specific determinations or track whether a peer review is being conducted in response to the requirements of section 2034. Nevertheless, because the Corps did not distinguish which studies had been selected for peer review in accordance with section 2034, we believe that it did not provide Congress with the type of information required by section 2034 that would help congressional decision makers evaluate the trial program. Completed Peer Reviews Have Cost Millions of Dollars in Direct and Indirect Costs
The 49 peer reviews conducted by the Corps since November 2007 resulted in direct costs of about $9 million in contract costs and contract administration fees. Furthermore, the addition of peer review to the Corps study process has resulted in indirect costs by altering project study schedules because of the additional time required to complete the peer review. In some cases where a peer review was not planned for during the early stages of the study process, significant delays in the project studies have resulted from the addition of the peer review. In addition, Corps staff resources were also used to manage the peer reviews, but these costs are not fully quantifiable. In contrast, according to some Corps division and planning- center-of-expertise officials, when the project manager had built in time for the peer review and had identified funding for it early, the peer review process had much less of an impact on the overall project study schedule. The Corps’ Process for Initiating Peer Review Is More Expansive and Less Flexible Than Section 2034 Requirements
The Corps’ process for determining whether a project study is subject to peer review is more expansive than section 2034 requirements because it uses broader criteria; this has resulted in peer reviews of studies that are outside the scope of section 2034. In addition, the process the Corps uses does not include the flexibility provided in section 2034 to exclude certain project studies from peer review. Moreover, some studies are undergoing peer review that do not warrant it, according to some Corps officials we spoke with. Gaps Exist in the Corps’ Process for Screening Its Contractors Who Are Responsible for Selecting Experts for Peer Review Panels
The Corps has a process to review general information on contractors’ conflicts of interest and independence during its contractor selection process, but it does not have a process for reviewing project-specific information provided by contractors to determine if conflicts of interest and independence exist at the project level. The Corps’ contractors, however, have a process for reviewing the appropriate information related to the conflicts of interest and independence of the experts selected for peer review panels at the project level. The Corps Has Adopted Most Peer Review Recommendations, Resulting in Technical Improvements but Generally No Changes in Project Decisions
The Corps has adopted and incorporated most of the peer review recommendations it has received. Adoption of these recommendations has resulted in some technical improvements to project study reports but generally has not changed the Corps’ decisions in selecting preferred project designs. According to some Corps officials we spoke with, this is the result of the review occurring too late in the process to effect a change in decision making. As a result, some recommendations about alternatives may not have been implemented because the decision on the preferred design had already been made. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this work were to examine (1) the number of Corps project studies that have undergone independent peer review in response to section 2034 of the Water Resources and Development Act (WRDA) of 2007, (2) the cost of these peer reviews, (3) the extent to which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Corps) process for determining if a project study is subject to peer review is consistent with section 2034, (4) the process the Corps uses to ensure that the contractors it hires and the experts the contractors select to review project studies are independent and free from conflicts of interest, and (5) the extent to which recommendations from peer reviews have been incorporated into project studies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 2034 of the Water Resources Development Act of 2007 requires that certain U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) civil works project studies undergo independent external peer review to assess the adequacy and acceptability of the methods, models, and analyses used. In the act, Congress established a 7-year trial period for this requirement and also required the Corps to submit two reports on its experiences with the peer review process.
GAO was asked to examine (1) the number of Corps project studies that have undergone independent peer review in response to section 2034, (2) the cost of these peer reviews, (3) the extent to which the Corps process for determining if a project study is subject to peer review is consistent with section 2034, (4) the process the Corps uses to ensure that the contractors it hires and the experts the contractors select to review project studies are independent and free from conflicts of interest, and (5) the extent to which peer review recommendations have been incorporated into project studies. GAO reviewed relevant laws, agency guidance, and documents and interviewed Corps officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
Since enactment of the Water Resources Development Act of 2007, 49 project studies have undergone peer review but it is unclear how many were performed in response to section 2034 requirements because the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) does not make specific determinations or track if a peer review is being conducted under section 2034. In February 2011, in response to section 2034, the Corps submitted its initial report to Congress summarizing its implementation of the peer review process. In its report, however, the Corps did not distinguish which studies had been selected for peer review in accordance with section 2034 and therefore, did not provide Congress information that would help decision makers evaluate the requirements of section 2034 at the end of the trial period.
The 49 peer reviews resulted in both direct and indirect costs. Specifically, these peer reviews resulted in direct costs of over $9 million in contract costs and fees. In addition, Corps staff resources were used to manage the reviews, although these costs are not fully quantifiable. Furthermore, the addition of peer review to the Corps study process has resulted in indirect costs by altering project study schedules to allow for time needed to complete peer reviews. In some cases where a peer review was not planned during the early stages of the study process, significant delays to project studies occurred while funds were sought to pay for the peer review. In contrast, according to some Corps officials, when project managers have built in time and identified funding for peer reviews early, the process has had less of an impact on project study schedules.
The Corps process for determining whether a project study is subject to peer review is more expansive than section 2034 requirements because it uses broader criteria, resulting in peer reviews of studies outside the scope of section 2034. In addition, the process the Corps uses does not include the flexibility provided in section 2034, which allows for the exclusion of certain project studies from peer review. Moreover, some studies are undergoing peer reviews that do not warrant it, according to some Corps officials GAO spoke with.
The Corps has a process to review general information on contractors conflicts of interest and independence when selecting them to establish peer review panels, but it does not have a process for reviewing project-level information on conflicts of interest and independence. As a result, it cannot be assured that contractors do not have conflicts at the project-level. In contrast, the Corps contractors do have a process for reviewing information related to conflicts of interest and the independence of experts selected for each peer review panel.
The Corps has adopted and incorporated into its project study reports most of the peer review recommendations it has received. Doing so has resulted in some technical improvements to study reports but generally has not changed the Corps decisions about project alternatives, in part because the peer review process occurs too late in the project study process to affect decision making, according to some Corps officials GAO spoke with. As a result, some recommendations about alternatives may not have been implemented because the decision on the preferred design had already been made.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of Defense direct the Corps to, among other actions, better track peer review studies, revise the criteria for determining which studies undergo peer review and the timing of these reviews, and improve its process for ensuring contractor independence. The department generally concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-99-41 | gao_NSIAD-99-41_0 | Program Transition Met Statutory Requirements
The transition of the CMP from the Army to the Corporation was completed on September 30, 1996, in accordance with the Corporation for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and Firearms Safety Act. The Secretary of the Army transferred (1) all property under the control of the Director of Civilian Marksmanship, the Civilian Marksmanship Support Detachment, and the National Match Fund, including office equipment, targets and frames, vehicles, supplies, and appliances; (2) control of the leased property that had been occupied by the Civilian Marksmanship Support Detachment in Port Clinton, Ohio; and (3) all funds available from sales programs and fees to the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and all funds in a nonappropriated fund account known as the National Match Fund. Corporation Policies Inadequate, and Procedures to Ensure Firearms Sales Comply With the Act Not Followed
The Corporation has not routinely ensured that its sales of firearms to individuals complied with the requirements of the 1996 act. The Corporation obtained background investigations from the Defense Security Service (DSS). Most of the support provided (more than $9.9 million) was specifically authorized by the 1996 act to be provided on a nonreimbursable basis. In addition, according to Corporation officials, as of September 30, 1998, DOD had provided more than $1 million in support for which it was reimbursed. The 1996 act does not specifically refer to other DOD support that is being provided without reimbursement. The Secretary of the Army did not issue regulations relating to the logistical support to be provided to the Corporation and reimbursement for that support as required by the act. Some Army officials responsible for providing support told us they were unsure of what support they should be providing to the Corporation and how to arrange for reimbursement of expenses. Army Transferred Firearms to the Corporation and Holds More for Potential Future Transfer
As of September 30, 1998, the Army transferred more than 56,000 firearms to the Corporation. At transition, the Army transferred to the Corporation all of the required firearms except those at Anniston. As of September 30, 1998, the Army was storing more than 230,000 M1 Garands, over 35,000 .22 caliber rifles, and over 4,000 other firearms at Anniston for potential transfer to the Corporation. At that time, the Army and the Corporation were negotiating a new memorandum of understanding that could make these firearms available to the Corporation. However, Army officials told us that some of these firearms were not at Anniston under CMP control on February 9, 1996. Should the Army decide to transfer firearms from Anniston that were not under CMP control on February 9, 1996, legislative authority other than section 1615 of the act will be needed. Our randomly selected sample of Corporation sales records for three types of firearms sold to individuals showed that the Corporation sold firearms without adhering to its procedures designed to ensure that purchasers had not been convicted of felonies, were U.S. citizens, and were members of a CMP-affiliated club. To determine the types and number of firearms the Army transferred to the Corporation and has stored for potential transfer, we reviewed the supporting workpapers to the Army report on the assets held by the CMP before the program’s transition, Army records of transfers, and Army and Defense Logistics Agency inventory records. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Corporation for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and Firearms Safety's administration of the Civilian Marksmanship Program (CMP), focusing on: (1) whether CMP's conversion to a private corporation and the Corporation's subsequent firearms sales were conducted in accordance with the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act; (2) the types and value of federal support provided to the Corporation; and (3) the types and number of firearms the Army transferred to the Corporation and was storing for potential transfer.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Army and the Corporation completed the transition of the CMP to the Corporation on September 30, 1996, in accordance with the 1996 act; (2) the Corporation has not routinely ensured that it complied with the requirements of the 1996 act in its firearms sales to individuals; (3) GAO estimates that the Corporation sold between 1,200 and 2,200 M1 Garand rifles without adhering to its own procedures that were designed to ensure that the purchasers were not convicted of felonies, were U.S. citizens, and were members of a Corporation-affiliated club; (4) the Army and other defense agencies had provided more than $19 million in support to the Corporation as of September 30, 1998; (5) for support provided on a reimbursable basis, Corporation officials told GAO the Corporation reimbursed the Army and other defense organizations more than $1 million; (6) additional support, including obtaining background investigations of prospective gun buyers, was provided to the Corporation at a cost of more than $440,000 but was not specifically referred to in the act and was not reimbursed by the Corporation; (7) the Secretary of the Army has not prescribed regulations relating to the logistical support to be provided to the Corporation and reimbursement for that support, even though the 1996 act required the Secretary to do so; (8) several Army officials told GAO they were uncertain as to what support they should be providing and how to arrange for reimbursement from the Corporation for expenses incurred by the Army; (9) as of September 30, 1998, the Army had transferred more than 56,000 firearms to the Corporation; (10) at transition, the Army transferred to the Corporation all of the required firearms except those at Anniston Army Depot; (11) as of September 30, 1998, the Army was storing more than 230,000 M1 Garands, over 35,000 .22 caliber rifles, and more than 4,000 other firearms at Anniston for potential transfer to the Corporation; (12) at that time, the Army and the Corporation were negotiating a new memorandum of understanding that would make any of these firearms that were surplus to Army requirements available for transfer to the Corporation; (13) Army officials told GAO that some of these firearms were not at Anniston under CMP control on February 9,1996; and (14) should the Army decide to transfer firearms that were not under CMP control on February 9, 1996, legislative authority other than section 1615 of the act would be needed. |
gao_GAO-06-1129T | gao_GAO-06-1129T_0 | Background
Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental satellites have been used by the United States to provide meteorological data for weather observation, research, and forecasting. 1). NOAA is also planning a future generation of satellites, known as the GOES-R series, which are planned for launch beginning in 2012. Table 2 highlights key system-related improvements GOES-R is expected to make to the geostationary satellite program. Satellite Programs Often Experience Technical Problems, Cost Overruns, and Schedule Delays
Satellite programs are often technically complex and risky undertakings, and as a result, they often experience technical problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays. Table 4 lists key problems experienced with these programs. GOES-R Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System Requirements and Cost Estimates Are Changing
At the time of our review, NOAA was nearing the end of the preliminary design phase on its GOES-R program and planned to award a contract for the system’s development in August 2007. In May 2006, program officials estimated that the life cycle cost could reach $11.4 billion. The agency then requested that the program identify options for reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum number of satellites to two. The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Past Lessons Learned, but Significant Actions Remain
NOAA has taken steps to apply lessons learned from problems encountered on other satellite programs to the GOES-R procurement. Key lessons include (1) establishing realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensuring sufficient technical readiness of the system’s components prior to key decisions, (3) providing sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and (4) performing adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has established plans designed to mitigate the problems faced in past acquisitions; however, many activities remain to fully address these lessons. Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements. Additionally, the delivery of the first satellite was delayed by 5 years. In summary, the procurement of the next series of geostationary environmental satellites—called the GOES-R series—is at a critical juncture. Recent concerns about the potential for cost growth on the GOES-R procurement have led the agency to reduce the scope of requirements for the satellite series. While NOAA is positioning itself to improve the acquisition of this system by incorporating the lessons learned from other satellite procurements including the need to establish realistic cost estimates, ensure sufficient government and contractor management, and obtain effective executive oversight, further steps remain to fully address selected lessons and thereby mitigate program risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) plans to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series (GOES-R). This new series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to summarize and update its report previously issued to the Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards--Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-993 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). This report (1) determines the status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, and (2) identifies and evaluates the actions that the program management team is taking to ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite programs are not repeated.
What GAO Found
At the time of our review, NOAA was nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R system--which was estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. It expected to award a contract in August 2007 to develop this system. However, recent analyses of the GOES-R program cost--which in May 2006 the program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion--have led the agency to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. Since our report was issued, NOAA officials told GAO that the agency has made a decision to reduce the scope of the program to a minimum of two satellites and to reduce the complexity of the program by canceling a technically complex instrument. NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite programs, but more remains to be done. Prior satellite programs--including a prior GOES series, a polar-orbiting environmental satellite series, and various military satellite programs--often experienced technical challenges, cost overruns, and schedule delays. Key lessons from these programs include the need to (1) establish realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical readiness of the system's components prior to key decisions, (3) provide sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and (4) perform adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has established plans to address these lessons by conducting independent cost estimates, performing preliminary studies of key technologies, placing resident government offices at key contractor locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight committee. However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons. Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements. |
gao_GAO-10-49 | gao_GAO-10-49_0 | Multiple Measures Are Available for Consumers, Industry, Government, and Others to Assess Broadband Performance
Consumers Can Generally Access Measures of Availability, Price, Advertised Speed, and Actual Delivered Speed from Broadband Providers and Third Parties
Although there are limitations that we discuss later, consumers interested in broadband service can generally contact providers or search provider Web sites to determine the availability of service, advertised price, and advertised speed of broadband service in their area. According to the study, to establish broadband leadership, countries must focus on broadband availability, penetration, and quality. Broadband Subscribers per 100 Inhabitants. Eight of the 10 performance measures listed above are “composite indexes,” i.e., combinations of measures that are generally used to try to account for and normalize a variety of factors such as demographic, economic, and geographic differences among countries, which according to many of the stakeholders we spoke with can affect broadband deployment and penetration. For example, officials from the Consumer Federation of America and Pew Internet & American Life Project told us the lack of a comprehensive and consistent measure from the government for consumers to compare prices from providers was a limitation. FCC has open proceedings on requiring providers to report actual delivered speeds on the broadband reporting form, but it currently does not collect this information. Thus, while stakeholders identified multiple alternatives, they differed on the need for FCC to develop additional reporting requirements to measure price, average actual delivered speed, and service reliability as follows: Consumer advocacy groups and academicians and representatives from think tanks generally believed there was a need for improved information on price and actual delivered speeds to make comparisons and good decisions about service. Current Data Sources for Industry and Government to Compare Broadband across Various Segments of the United States Have Limitations, and Stakeholders Generally Support Ongoing Efforts for Improvement
Despite FCC’s efforts to improve the data collected through its broadband reporting form, comparisons of broadband service across various segments of the country still have the following limitations that diminish their usefulness in informing policy and investment decisions: While FCC requires most broadband providers to report broadband subscribership on the broadband reporting form, it does not have a reporting requirement for these providers to report broadband availability. Stakeholders generally agreed that the national broadband inventory map would help supplement gaps in FCC’s broadband data by providing detailed data on availability and subscribership across the country. International Broadband Comparisons Have Limitations for a Variety of Reasons, but Stakeholders Generally Support FCC’s Efforts to Develop Additional International Comparisons
As previously discussed, stakeholders reported that socioeconomic differences among countries can limit the efficacy of international comparisons. Despite the concerns raised about the limitations of the measures used for international comparisons, several stakeholders found the comparisons useful. Conclusions
A wide range of measures to assess broadband performance is generally available to consumers, industry, and government. Nevertheless, all stakeholders are generally supportive of NTIA’s State Broadband Data and Development Grant Program and its effort to create a national broadband inventory map, which could help fill some current gaps in data. However, NTIA lacks specific guidance for grantees on calculating actual delivered speeds. Without such guidance, it will be difficult to ensure the consistency, and therefore the quality, of the data, limiting the effectiveness of the mapping effort in making comparisons across the country. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Commerce and FCC for their review and comment. We also conducted a literature review to identify broadband performance measures, including international broadband comparisons. Table 4 contains a detailed list of the stakeholders included in our study: To evaluate the limitations, if any, of the measures, and how the measures could be supplemented or improved, we interviewed and reviewed related documentation from the stakeholders previously mentioned to obtain their opinions and analysis on the strengths and limitations of the measures and any potential options identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Broadband Data Improvement Act, enacted in 2008, established a variety of initiatives intended to improve the quality of state and federal data on broadband (i.e., high-speed Internet) services and promote the deployment (the building of infrastructure over which broadband services can be provided) of affordable broadband services to all parts of the nation. The act required GAO to conduct a study to consider and evaluate additional broadband metrics or standards. This mandated report addresses (1) the measures generally available to consumers, industry, government and others, and (2) the limitations, if any, of the measures and how they could be supplemented or improved. To identify and evaluate the measures, GAO conducted a review of literature and related laws and interviewed and reviewed related documentation from stakeholder groups.
What GAO Found
Multiple measures are generally available to consumers, industry, and government to assess broadband performance. Consumers can generally access measures of availability, price, advertised speed, and actual delivered speed from providers and third parties to compare services. Industry and government also have access to some measures that enable comparisons across segments of the United States to inform policy and guide investment. For example, the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) data from its semiannual reporting requirement for providers are the primary source for comparing the availability of and subscribers to broadband. Through a literature review and interviews with stakeholders, GAO focused on 10 measures that can be used to make international comparisons of broadband service to inform policy. Eight were composite indexes that are generally used to account for factors such as demographic and economic differences among countries, which, according to stakeholders, can affect broadband deployment and penetration (the number or percentage of subscribers per capita or per household). Through available documentation and discussions with stakeholders, GAO found that current measures have limitations, views were mixed on potential alternatives, and ongoing efforts need improvement: (1) According to some stakeholders, the lack of comprehensive measures from the government to compare price, actual delivered speeds, and service reliability data from providers is a limitation for consumers. FCC has open proceedings on requiring providers to report such information, but there was no consensus among stakeholders on the need for additional reporting requirements and measures. (2) Stakeholders told GAO that FCC's semiannual data collection from providers does not include information on availability, price, or actual delivered speeds, which limits the ability to make comparisons across the country and inform policy or investment decisions. Stakeholders generally agreed that the Department of Commerce's effort to develop a national broadband inventory map through its State Broadband Data and Development Grant Program would address some gaps and provide detailed data on availability, subscribership, and actual delivered speeds, but the department did not provide guidance to grantees on calculating actual delivered speeds or specific standards to verify the data collected. This could result in inconsistent data and limit the effectiveness of the effort. GAO has previously reported that consistency and data verification are important for reducing the risk of producing inaccurate data. (3) Finally, the measures used for international broadband comparisons have limitations for a variety of reasons, including socioeconomic differences that make the comparisons difficult. Despite the concerns, stakeholders found the measures useful to help inform policy. Stakeholders generally supported FCC's efforts to develop international comparisons because the comparisons will be at a local level within each country, and could provide more relevant information. |
gao_GAO-09-808T | gao_GAO-09-808T_0 | Background
Biennially, the Judicial Conference, the federal judiciary’s principal policymaking body, assesses the judiciary’s needs for additional judgeships. The demands upon judges’ time are largely a function of both the number and complexity of the cases on their dockets. Some types of cases may demand relatively little time, and others may require many hours of work. The federal judiciary has developed workload measures for bankruptcy judges to estimate the national average amount of a judge’s time that different types of cases may require. In assessing the need for additional bankruptcy judgeships in a bankruptcy court, the Judicial Conference first considers the court’s weighted case filings. The Judicial Conference has established 1,500 annual weighted case filings per authorized judgeship as an indicator of a bankruptcy court’s potential need for additional judgeships. However, our analysis focused solely on the weighted case filings workload measure. Each case filed in a bankruptcy court is assigned a case weight. Total annual weighted case filings for any specific bankruptcy court is the sum of the weights associated with each of the cases filed in the court in a year. Total annual weighted case filings per judgeship represent the estimated average amount of judge time that would be required to complete the cases filed in a specific bankruptcy court in a year. Weighted case filings per judgeship is the total weighted filings divided by the number of authorized judgeships. How the Case Weights Were Developed
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) developed the weights, adopted by the Judicial Conference in 1991, based on a 1988-1989 time study in which 272 bankruptcy judges (97 percent of all bankruptcy judges in those years) recorded the time they spent on specific cases for a 10-week period. Once the case weights had been created, total weighted case filings were calculated for each bankruptcy court. Of course, the actual time that individual judges spend on case-related and non case-related work will vary. Assessment of Case Weight Methodology
Overall, the methodology used to develop the bankruptcy case weights appears to be reasonable. FJC researchers systematically used the reported time data to develop the case weights and made an effort to address all known limitations in the data. It is important to note that the case weights were designed to estimate the impact of case filings on the workload of bankruptcy judges. 2002 and 2008 Research Designs for Updating the Bankruptcy Case Weights
In June 2002, the Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System decided to begin a study to create new bankruptcy case weights. Future updating of the weights could include revision of case weight values and/or developing case weights for new case categories. The data from the time study could be used to validate the feasibility of the new approach.The preliminary design for this study appeared to be reasonable. The extent to which new provisions in the Bankruptcy Reform Act affect bankruptcy judges workload depends, of course, on the frequency with which they are invoked and the time it takes to address them. The FJC has again initiated a new case weight study that includes data collected over 5 10-week reporting periods from May 2008 through May 2009. Each active and recalled bankruptcy judge is to participate during one of the 5 reporting periods. Appendix I: Quality Assurance Steps the Judiciary Takes to Ensure the Accuracy Of Case Filing Data for Weighted Filings
All current records related to bankruptcy filings that are reported to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and used for the bankruptcy court case weights are generated by the automated case management systems in the bankruptcy courts. Time studies, in general, have the substantial benefit of providing quantitative information that can be used to create objective and defensible measures of judicial workload, along with the capability to provide estimates of the uncertainty in the measures. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Judicial Conference of the United States, the federal judiciary's principal policymaking body, uses 1,500 annual weighted case filings per authorized judgeship (judgeship position) in a bankruptcy court as an indicator of the need for additional bankruptcy judgeships for that court. Total annual weighted case filings for any specific bankruptcy court is the sum of the weights associated with each of the cases filed in the court in a year. Total annual weighted case filings per judgeship represent the estimated average amount of judge time that would be required to complete the cases filed in a specific bankruptcy court in a year. In May 2003 GAO testified on whether weighted case filings were a reasonably accurate measure of the case-related workload of bankruptcy judges. The accuracy of weighted case filings rests in turn on the soundness of the methodology used to develop them. GAO's work focused on whether the methodologies used to develop the current case weights and to revise and update those weights were likely to result in reasonably accurate measures of bankruptcy judges' case-related workload. This statement is based on GAO's May 2003 testimony on weighted case filings as a measure of bankruptcy judges' case-related workload and documentation provided by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) in June 2009 on subsequent efforts to update the current weighted filings measure.
What GAO Found
In May 2003 GAO reported that the methodology used to develop the case-related workload measure for federal bankruptcy judges--weighted case filings--were likely to result in reasonably accurate workload measures. The current study to revise those weights, begun in 2008, uses the same methodology as the study used to develop the current case weights and, as designed, is also likely to result in reasonably accurate workload measures. (1) The time demands on bankruptcy judges are largely a function of the number and complexity of the cases on their dockets, with some cases taking more time than others. To measure these differences, the Judicial Conference uses weighted case filings, which are a statistical measure of the average estimated judge time that specific types of bankruptcy cases are expected to take. Each case filed is assigned a weight, and the total weight of all cases filed in a bankruptcy court divided by the number of judgeships for that court provides a measure of the total average case-related workload per judgeship. (2) In assessing the need for new bankruptcy judgeships, the Judicial Conference relies on the weighted case filings to be a reasonably accurate measure of case-related bankruptcy judge workload. Whether the weighted filings are reasonably accurate depends in turn upon the soundness of the methodology used to develop the case weights. (3) On the basis of the documentation provided for our review and discussions with FJC and Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts officials, GAO concluded in 2003 that the case weights, as approved by the Judicial Conference in 1991 and 1996, were likely to be reasonably accurate. (4) The original case weights are now 18 years old. Changes in the intervening years in case characteristics, case management practices, and the implementation of new statutory or procedural requirements, such as the many changes in 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, may have affected the continued accuracy of the current case weights. (5) To the extent that the case weights now understate or overstate the total time demands on bankruptcy judges, use of the weights could potentially result in the Judicial Conference understating or overstating the need for additional bankruptcy judgeships. (6) In 2008, the Federal Judicial Center began a study to revise the current case weights that is designed to collect data on the time bankruptcy judges spend on cases filed during 5, 10-week data collection periods from May 2008 through May 2009. Each active and recalled bankruptcy judge is to participate during one of the five reporting periods. This study design permits the development of new case weights based on the same type of objective time data as the current weights, which we found to be reasonable. |
gao_NSIAD-95-52 | gao_NSIAD-95-52_0 | 1.) DOD started the program by procuring two candidate systems for competitive testing. 2.) As of December 1994, the contractor had not delivered adequate logistic support information. The contracting officer identified logistic support information as the primary area of deficiency. Hunter’s Performance Problems Have Not Been Resolved
DOD policy requires that operational test and evaluation be structured to determine (1) the operational effectiveness and suitability of a system under realistic combat conditions and (2) whether the minimum acceptable operational performance requirements have been satisfied. Goal of Joint-Service System Is at Risk
DOD currently plans to begin full-rate production of the Hunter system for the Army and the Marine Corps before verifying that the system will meet the Navy’s needs. As a result, the congressional call for DOD to develop a joint-service system is at risk. Recommendation
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense prohibit award of a second low-rate production contract until the Hunter system satisfactorily demonstrates that it is operationally effective and operationally suitable and will satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Navy. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition of the Hunter Short-Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), focusing on whether: (1) the system is logistically supportable; (2) previously identified performance deficiencies have been corrected; and (3) the system represents a valid joint-service effort.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Hunter UAV system is not logistically supportable and has serious unresolved performance deficiencies; (2) the contractor had not delivered required logistical support information as of December 1994; (3) the system may be unsuitable for theater operations and may require costly contractor maintenance and support; (4) the vehicle is grounded because of a number of crashes during testing; (5) DOD plans to go into full production before determining whether the land-based vehicle is suitable for naval operations, which jeopardizes the joint-service system; (6) although DOD recently restructured the Hunter program, the program faces further delays and curtailment of critical testing while allowing for the procurement of defective systems; and (7) the planned award of a second low-rate production contract will have a minimal effect on preserving the contractor's skilled labor pool. |
gao_GAO-01-1053 | gao_GAO-01-1053_0 | Transition to Quieter Aircraft Was Expected to Benefit Communities, Airports, and Airlines
The mandated transition to quieter aircraft was expected to reduce the number of people exposed to noise levels that FAA considers incompatible with residential living, to facilitate needed airport expansion, and to enable airlines to embark on long-term planning for investing in and operating their fleets. Less noise from airport operations was expected to reduce community opposition to airport expansion. Expectations Were Partially Realized
The results anticipated from the transition to meet Stage 3 noise standards were partially realized. Also, FAA estimates that the transition to aircraft compliant with Stage 3 noise standards considerably reduced the population exposed to levels of noise from airport operations that FAA considers incompatible with residential living. Despite the significant decrease in the population exposed to incompatible noise, the demand continues for federally authorized support for noise mitigation efforts that are provided through a federal grant program and a federally authorized passenger boarding fee. Our review of the results of the transition, however, especially compared with the expectations, raises two key issues: (1) Why does concern about noise continue to generate substantial opposition to airport operations and expansion after such a major decline in the number of people living in areas exposed to incompatible levels of noise? | What GAO Found
The transition to quieter aircraft required by the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 was expected to benefit communities, airports, and airlines. In turn, the transition was expected to reduce community opposition to airport operations and expansion and to reduce the demand for funds provided for noise abatement through federal grants and user charges. The results expected from the transition to quieter aircraft were partially realized. The transition occurred as planned and considerably reduced the population exposed to noise levels incompatible with residential living. Nevertheless, noise concerns remain a barrier to airport expansion, and the demand for federally authorized support for noise abatement efforts has continued. GAO identified two key issues for review by the aviation community. First, even though fewer people are exposed to aircraft noise, according to a survey in 1999-2000, more than half of the noise complaints came from people living in areas exposed to noise levels that FAA considers compatible with residential living. Second, if people are allowed to move to areas close to an airport, they may later find themselves exposed to noise levels that FAA considers incompatible with residential living as the airport's operations grow to meet rising demands. Furthermore, residential development in such areas could generate new opposition to airports operations and future expansion plans. |
gao_GAO-05-25 | gao_GAO-05-25_0 | In most cases, states received an increase of funds. Some states were unable to spend all of their federal allocations in the first 2 years of increased funding under the program. A number of factors may have contributed to these differences, including gaps in the availability of critical services, such as mental health services, mentoring, and housing, as well as challenges in engaging youth and foster parents to participate in the program. FCIA Allowed States to Serve Younger and Emancipated Youth and to Improve Services for All Youth in Independent Living Programs
After the passage of FCIA, 40 states reported in our survey expanding services to youth younger than they had previously served, and 36 states reported serving older youth, and the states we visited reported improving service quality. States Reported Barriers to Establishing Linkages between the Independent Living Programs and Other Youth-Serving Programs
While table 3 shows that states are using a wide variety of programs to provide independent living services, officials in the 4 states we visited reported several barriers that hinder their ability to establish linkages with other agencies and programs, including the lack of information on the array of programs available in each state or local area and differences in program priorities. States’ and HHS’s Actions in Response to FCIA Requirements Have Not Yet Established Accountability for Independent Living Programs
All states developed multiyear plans as required under FCIA and submitted annual progress reports to ACF for their independent living programs, but the absence of standard comprehensive information within and across state plans and reports precludes using them at the state and federal level to monitor how well the programs are working to serve foster youth. HHS reported that it expects to issue guidance in the form of a proposed regulation in 2005. Oversight is similarly hindered by a lack of standard monitoring practices across ACF regional offices. While ACF is developing an information system that may address some of these limitations, it may be unavailable for several years. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how states’ funding allocations changed to serve youth after the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 (FCIA), we analyzed federal funding to the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico for independent living programs before and after the passage of FCIA. To perform this comparison, we used data reported by states to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) on the numbers of eligible youth in foster care within each state in federal fiscal year 2002. To determine the extent to which states expanded independent living services and age groups of foster youth served since the passage of FCIA, as well as what challenges remain, we surveyed all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico through a Web-based questionnaire. To determine to what extent states used other federal and state programs to coordinate the delivery of independent living services to foster youth, we surveyed states using the above-mentioned survey instrument. Assessing the Effects of Foster Care: Early Results from the Casey National Alumni Study. | Why GAO Did This Study
To improve outcomes for youth leaving foster care, Congress passed the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 (FCIA), which increased the allocation of federal funds for independent living programs from $70 million to $140 million. This report reviews (1) how states' funding allocations changed to serve youth after FCIA, (2) the extent to which states have expanded services and age groups of foster youth served since the passage of FCIA and what challenges remain, (3) the extent to which states have used other federal and state programs to coordinate the delivery of services to foster youth, and (4) how the states and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have fulfilled the program accountability provisions of the law and assessed the effectiveness of independent living services.
What GAO Found
The doubling of federal funding for independent living programs has resulted in most states receiving an increase in funds. Although some states had difficulty expanding their program infrastructure in the first 2 years of increased funding, the amount of funds states returned to HHS declined the second year. Differences in funding also appeared in the amounts available per eligible foster care youth. Following the passage of FCIA, 40 states reported in our survey expanding independent living services to younger youth, and 36 states expanded services to older youth, but gaps remain in providing some key services to youth. State differences in serving youth may have been caused by gaps in the availability of critical services, such as mental health services, mentoring, and housing, as well as challenges engaging youth and foster parents to participate in the program. Almost all states that we surveyed reported increased levels of coordination under FCIA, but linkages with other federal and state youth-serving programs were not always in place to increase services available across local areas. Despite some coordination efforts, states may not make full use of available resources. One of the barriers in linking program services reported by the 4 states we visited included the inconsistent availability of information on the array of programs that were operating in each state and local area. States and HHS have taken action to fulfill the accountability provisions of FCIA, but little information is available to assess the effectiveness of independent living services. All states submitted required plans and reports, but the absence of a uniform reporting format and lack of standard monitoring practices among HHS regional offices hindered assessments of state performance. HHS is developing an information system that may improve program accountability and reported that it expects to issue a proposed regulation in 2005. |
gao_GAO-17-365 | gao_GAO-17-365_0 | While telehealth visits with providers are conducted from a separate site, Medicare requires that the patient be physically present at a medical facility such as a hospital, rural health clinic, or skilled nursing facility— referred to as the originating site—during the telehealth service. Selected Associations Report Telehealth and Remote Patient Monitoring May Improve Care for Medicare Beneficiaries, but Cited Coverage and Payment Restrictions as Barriers
Officials from selected associations representing providers and patients rated the significance of certain factors that encourage the use of telehealth and remote patient monitoring in Medicare as well as factors that create barriers to their use. Officials with a payer association we selected generally agreed with the assessments of the selected provider and patient associations. Selected Associations Cited the Potential to Improve or Maintain Quality of Care as a Significant Factor Encouraging the Use of Telehealth and Remote Patient Monitoring in Medicare
Among the factors presented as potentially encouraging both telehealth and remote patient monitoring use in Medicare, officials from selected provider and patient associations most often rated the potential to improve or maintain quality of care as very or somewhat significant. Officials from a provider association told us that telehealth can improve patient outcomes by facilitating follow-up to care. Additionally, an official from a patient association stated that remote patient monitoring is a helpful tool for treating patients with chronic disease. Selected Associations Cited Payment and Coverage Restrictions as Barriers to the Use of Telehealth and Remote Patient Monitoring in Medicare
Among the factors presented as potential barriers to the use of both telehealth and remote patient monitoring in Medicare, selected patient and provider associations most often rated cost increases or inadequate payment and coverage restrictions as very significant or somewhat significant. For example, officials from a provider association reported that Medicare’s telehealth policies for payment and coverage lag behind other payers due to the program’s statutory and regulatory restrictions. In particular, these restrictions limit the geographic and practice settings in which beneficiaries may receive services, as well as the types of services that may be provided via telehealth and the types of technology that may be used. Second, CMS’s new Medicare payment program allows participating clinicians to use telehealth, and to some extent remote patient monitoring, to help them achieve some of the goals of the payment program. See table 2 for more information on the Medicare telehealth requirements waived for these models and demonstrations. For example, clinicians could use telehealth to coordinate care and, in some cases, to reach patients in remote locations. Additionally, there are some instances when clinicians can use remote patient monitoring to meet Merit-based Incentive Payment System goals—for example, using home monitoring to remotely gather information to determine a patient’s proper dose of blood thinning medication. Agency and Third- Party Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS, DOD, and VA for review and comment. These departments provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology for Identifying Factors Affecting the Use of Telehealth and Remote Patient Monitoring
We administered a data collection instrument to selected associations representing providers, patients, and payers to obtain information on the factors that encourage the use of telehealth and remote patient monitoring in Medicare or are barriers to their use. Appendix VII: Examples of Telehealth and Remote Patient Monitoring in Medicare Models and Demonstrations
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act created the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (Innovation Center) within the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce Medicare, Medicaid, and state Children’s Health Insurance Program expenditures while preserving or enhancing the quality of care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Telehealth and remote patient monitoring can provide alternatives to health care provided in person at a physician's office, particularly for patients who cannot easily travel long distances for care. Medicare pays for some telehealth services that are subject to statutory and regulatory requirements, such as requiring the patient be present at an originating site like a rural health clinic.
The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 includes a provision for GAO to study telehealth and remote patient monitoring. Among other reporting objectives, this report reviews (1) the factors that associations identified as affecting the use of telehealth and remote patient monitoring in Medicare and (2) emerging payment and delivery models that could affect the potential use of telehealth and remote patient monitoring in Medicare.
GAO reviewed agency documents and regulations and interviewed agency officials. GAO also selected nine general and medical specialty associations with expertise and interest in telehealth or remote patient monitoring—six provider, two patient, and one payer association—based on a review of relevant documents and literature and through background interviews. GAO interviewed representatives from each of the associations and collected information from the provider and patient associations through a data collection instrument.
GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS. In response, HHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Selected associations representing providers and patients most often cited the potential to improve or maintain quality of care as a significant factor that encourages the use of telehealth (providing clinical care remotely by two-way video) and remote patient monitoring (monitoring of patients outside of conventional settings) in Medicare. For example, according to officials from a provider association, telehealth can improve patient outcomes by facilitating follow-up care, while remote patient monitoring is helpful for treating patients with chronic diseases. With regard to factors that create barriers, the selected associations most often cited concerns over payment and coverage restrictions. For example, officials from a provider association noted that Medicare telehealth coverage restrictions limit the geographic and practice settings in which beneficiaries may receive services. While not indicating how significant these factors are to Medicare, officials with a payer association told GAO that they considered these factors—also identified by the provider and patient associations—as either encouraging use or creating barriers to the use of telehealth and remote patient monitoring.
Medicare models, demonstrations, and a new payment program have the potential to expand the use of telehealth and remote patient monitoring. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), supports eight models and demonstrations in which certain Medicare telehealth requirements have been waived, such as requirements for the locations and facility types where beneficiaries can receive telehealth services. For example, the waivers allow beneficiaries to access telehealth in urban areas, or from their homes. Additionally, the use of telehealth and remote patient monitoring in Medicare may change depending on how many clinicians use them as a way to achieve the goals of the new Merit-based Incentive Payment System, which—starting in 2017—will pay clinicians based on quality and resource use, among other things. Under this payment program, clinicians can use telehealth and, in some instances, remote patient monitoring, to help meet the payment program's performance criteria. For example, clinicians could use telehealth to coordinate care or use remote patient monitoring to remotely gather information to determine a patient's proper dose of medication. |
gao_GAO-17-684 | gao_GAO-17-684_0 | Within the United States, the BSA and related AML regulations provide the legal and regulatory framework for preventing, detecting, and deterring money laundering. The BSA and its implementing regulations generally require banks and other financial institutions, such as securities broker-dealers and certain types of insurance companies, among others, to collect and retain various records of customer transactions, verify customers’ identities in certain situations, maintain AML programs, and report suspicious and large cash transactions. In addition, the United States has put in place a variety of AML measures intended to mitigate risks, including the following: promulgation of regulations requiring reporting by financial institutions to promote transparency with regard to the origin of funds; providing oversight to financial institutions in the United States by federal financial regulators to assess the effectiveness of BSA/AML compliance programs and take consequent appropriate legal action, if necessary; and forming partnerships with other countries through multilateral and bilateral treaties and arrangements to promote global AML policies and standards and facilitate the exchange of information on suspected money laundering activities. FinCEN relies on financial regulators and other entities to conduct examinations of U.S. financial institutions across a variety of financial sectors to determine compliance with the BSA and its implementing regulations. State and Treasury Support Capacity- Building Efforts and Collaborate to Combat Money Laundering in Western Hemisphere Countries
INL and OTA work with other U.S. agencies, primarily components within DHS, Justice, and Treasury, as well as with financial regulators, to provide capacity-building, training, and technical assistance on money laundering countermeasures and financial investigations to their counterparts in the Western Hemisphere and around the globe. From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, INL, in collaboration with U.S. law enforcement agencies, supported AML capacity-building and technical assistance for foreign partners in the law enforcement, prosecutorial, and judicial sectors in several other Western Hemisphere countries, as the following examples illustrate: INL funded training, provided by ICE, and the acquisition of equipment for the Jamaican Constabulary Force’s Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Unit to enhance intelligence gathering and analysis capacity for financial crime investigations. INL funded training provided at the Judicial Studies Institute in Puerto Rico where OPDAT trained judges from the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Colombia, and Uruguay. Specifically, this report describes (1) U.S. financial regulators oversight and monitoring of compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and related AML requirements and efforts to collaborate with counterparts in other Western Hemisphere countries, and (2) the activities that the Departments of State (State) and Treasury (Treasury) support to build capacity in other Western Hemisphere countries to combat money laundering and how State and Treasury collaborate on those efforts. Each of these 3 countries was designated a Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Country from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. To describe how U.S. agencies are helping to build capacity in other Western Hemisphere countries to combat narcotics-related money laundering and how State and Treasury coordinate these activities, we reviewed budget data provided by INL and OTA for fiscal years 2011 through 2015. We also interviewed officials from State’s INL and offices within Treasury and officials from the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security. Appendix IV: Department of State’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Allocations for Anti-Money Laundering
The Department of State’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau allocated funding for anti-money laundering (AML) capacity-building and technical assistance to a variety of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Table 6 below shows the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance allocations by country or region for Western Hemisphere AML programs in this time period. | Why GAO Did This Study
Proceeds from narcotics-related illicit activities are one of the most common sources of money laundering in the United States. Though difficult to accurately determine, in 2015, Treasury estimated that drug trafficking generated about $64 billion annually from U.S. sales. Moreover, the Western Hemisphere accounts for about a third of the jurisdictions designated by State as of primary concern for money laundering.
GAO was asked to provide information on U.S. efforts to impede illicit proceeds from drug trafficking from entering the financial systems of the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries. This report describes (1) U.S. agency oversight and monitoring of compliance with the BSA, including collaboration with counterparts in other Western Hemisphere countries, and (2) State's and Treasury's efforts to build capacity in other Western Hemisphere countries to combat narcotics-related money laundering.
GAO reviewed laws and regulations; interviewed experts and U.S. officials; reviewed documents and examined State's and Treasury's budget data for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the most recent at the time of the review, for anti-money laundering activities. GAO selected Colombia, Mexico, and Panama—three principal recipients of AML support—for site visits, in part, because each country was designated a major drug transit or illicit drug-producing country from fiscal years 2014 through 2016.
What GAO Found
U.S. financial regulators oversee and monitor compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) to prevent, detect, and deter the laundering of proceeds from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities using a risk-based examination approach. The Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) administers the BSA and related AML regulations, which provides the legal framework for combating money laundering. The BSA includes requirements for financial institutions to retain various records of customer transactions, verify customers' identity, maintain effective AML programs, and report suspicious transactions. FinCEN relies on a variety of U.S. financial regulators and agencies to help FinCEN oversee and monitor financial institutions' compliance with the BSA. U.S. financial regulators and FinCEN also collaborate directly with counterparts in other Western Hemisphere countries and through international working groups to identify and reduce risks to the financial sector by sharing information and analysis on financial crimes.
The Departments of State (State) and Treasury support AML capacity-building and technical assistance efforts in other Western Hemisphere countries in collaboration with the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security and other federal agencies. For example, Treasury provides training to support the development of legal and regulatory frameworks in partner countries consistent with international standards to prevent money laundering. Similarly, State funds such training and provides equipment to financial intelligence units in these countries to help them detect illicit financial transactions. In fiscal years 2011 through 2015, State and Treasury allocated about $63 million to support AML-related capacity-building and technical assistance in the region, of which $52 million was from State (see figure).
Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Allocations by Country for Western Hemisphere Anti-Money Laundering Programs, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2015
a Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) funding included regional programming for Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.
b Other includes funding for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, Jamaica,
Honduras, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador, Haiti, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Brazil. |
gao_RCED-99-59 | gao_RCED-99-59_0 | Barley is economically important to North Dakota agriculture. These two reference methods are generally not used by commercial testing facilities and grain dealers because they are more costly, time-consuming, and complex to operate. North Dakota Barley Farmers Have Experienced Large Revenue, Yield, and Acreage Losses Because of Scab and Vomitoxin
From 1993 through 1997, we estimate that North Dakota barley farmers suffered cumulative revenue losses from scab and vomitoxin of about $200 million (in 1997 dollars) —equal to almost 17 percent of the $1.2 billion in total barley revenues farmers received during this period.The losses from these diseases varied significantly, both over the years and across the regions of the state, with the Red River Valley suffering the greatest losses. U.S. maltsters and brewers, the traditional buyers of North Dakota’s malting barley, have reacted to scab and vomitoxin by expanding their imports of malting barley from Canada by about 380 percent. Veratox Test Results Have Increased Variabilty at Levels Critical to Pricing Decisions
According to testing experts, while the Veratox test kit serves the market’s need for a relatively fast and cost-effective method for measuring vomitoxin in barley, it can produce test results that vary, particularly at concentrations critical to pricing decisions. Finally, testing experts said that the training of the technicians who conduct the tests is critical for obtaining optimal test results. Neogen, the Veratox kit’s manufacturer, also provides training to new customers. While these reference methods have less variability than Veratox, they are not practical for use at commercial testing facilities and grain elevators for several reasons, according to experts we spoke with. Under Conditions of Light Infestation, Short- and Longer-Term Actions May Reduce the Impact of Scab and Vomitoxin
In barley, scab, and the vomitoxin resulting from scab, can be reduced somewhat through the use of fungicides and certain farming practices, such as crop rotation and deeper tillage of the soil. However, even if rotation initially helps reduce scab levels, infestation could occur from airborne spores from other locations. Thus, they believe that these short-term actions will be effective only in years of light infestation. However, these experts state that a more resistant barley variety will not completely eliminate the incidence of scab and vomitoxin, particularly during periods of moderate or severe infestation. Scope and Methodology
You asked us to (1) determine the financial impact of scab and vomitoxin on North Dakota barley farmers, (2) assess the performance of vomitoxin test methods, and (3) identify short- and long-term actions that could help reduce the impact of scab and vomitoxin on North Dakota barley farmers. Estimation of Revenue Losses to North Dakota Barley Farmers as a Result of Scab and Vomitoxin
This appendix explains the methods and data we used to estimate the revenue losses for North Dakota barley as a result of the scab and vomitoxin epidemic for 1993 through 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effect of scab and vomitoxin on North Dakota barley crops, focusing on: (1) the financial impact from scab and vomitoxin on barley farmers; (2) the performance of vomitoxin test methods; and (3) short- and long-term actions that could help reduce the impact of scab and vomitoxin on North Dakota barley farmers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) North Dakota barley farmers have experienced extensive revenue losses from scab and vomitoxin damage; (2) from 1993 through 1997, these farmers suffered estimated cumulative losses of about $200 million from scab and vomitoxin--equal to about 17 percent of the $1.2 billion in total barley revenues they received during this period; (3) while most of the revenue losses resulted from decreases in barley production, losses also resulted from severe price discounts; (4) maltsters and brewers, the traditional buyers of North Dakota's malting barley, have reacted to the scab and vomitoxin damage by purchasing less barley from North Dakota farmers and more from Canadian and other western U.S. sources; (5) three tests are generally used to measure vomitoxin concentrations in barley produced in North Dakota; (6) one is a field kit, called Veratox, which is commonly used by grain elevators and commercial testing facilities and is the test that most directly affects the prices farmers receive for their barley; (7) the Veratox test can produce results that vary at concentrations critical to pricing decisions; (8) testing experts attribute variations in test results to several sources, including the skill of the technician conducting the test; (9) they stress the importance of quality assurance measures and training to help reduce this variation; (10) the other two tests--high-pressure liquid chromatography and gas chromatography--are reference methods that are used primarily in research laboratories for such purposes as checking the performance of the Veratox kit; (11) according to analytical chemists and other testing experts, these tests provide accurate and consistent test results; (12) however, because of the complexity and the cost of the equipment for these two tests, they are not practical for use at commercial testing facilities and other locations that serve barley farmers; (13) short-term actions, such as rotating crops and spraying with fungicides, may help reduce scab and vomitoxin's impact under conditions of light infestation; (14) however, according to North Dakota agriculture experts, the benefits of these actions are negligible during periods of moderate to severe infestation; (15) from 1993 through 1997, several counties in the Red River Valley of North Dakota experienced moderate or severe scab and vomitoxin infestation; and (16) the longer-term action of developing more scab-resistant barley may also help reduce the disease's impact under conditions of light infestation. |
gao_GGD-96-48 | gao_GGD-96-48_0 | According to IRS data, for example, (1) IRS’ telephone assistors answered 11 percent more calls than IRS anticipated and provided accurate answers to 91 percent of taxpayers’ tax law questions; (2) 97 percent of taxpayers’ orders for tax forms and publications were filled accurately; (3) on average, refunds on paper returns were processed and issued within 36 days; and (4) service centers met deadlines for processing tax payments submitted with returns. What IRS’ indicators do not reveal are the difficulties IRS experienced in the 1995 filing season. IRS delayed refunds for up to 8 weeks on other returns (both paper and electronic), even if the returns had no missing or invalid SSNs, to allow staff time to identify duplicate uses of the same SSN and fraud schemes. Because IRS’ indicator is based on the number of calls IRS expects to answer rather than the number it expects to receive, the indicator masks the serious problems taxpayers have encountered in the past and encountered again in 1995 in trying to reach IRS by telephone. The exception was a new document imaging system that IRS used in 1995 to process several forms, including individual income tax returns filed on Form 1040EZ. But, extensive downtime and slower-than-expected processing rates during the filing season limited the effectiveness of SCRIPS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) performance during the 1995 tax filing season, focusing on the: (1) processing of individual income tax returns and refunds; (2) ability of taxpayers to reach IRS by telephone; and (3) new IRS computer system for processing returns.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS delayed about 7 million refunds for up to 8 weeks because of systematic checks for questionable refund claims; (2) IRS delayed refunds on returns with missing or invalid social security numbers (SSN) to identify duplicate uses of the same SSN and fraud schemes; (3) IRS could have alleviated negative publicity about the delays had it better forewarned taxpayers about the potential for delays; (4) although IRS answered 11 percent more calls from taxpayers in the 1995 filing season, the chance of reaching an IRS assistor was not very good; (5) various IRS processing and accessibility goals mask problems in its actual performance; and (6) IRS experienced numerous problems with its electronic image computer system, including extensive downtime and slow processing rates. |
gao_GAO-01-374 | gao_GAO-01-374_0 | Some other employers have reduced benefits or simply ceased to sponsor coverage. For retirees 65 years or older, Medicare is typically the primary source of health insurance coverage. Concluding Observations
Premium increases and forecasts for a potential economic slowdown could pose concerns for many employers and may make employer- sponsored benefits vulnerable to further erosion. In the longer term, these factors, coupled with the potential for Medicare reforms and an increasing number of aging baby boomers, may produce even more uncertainty and cost pressures for employers. Consequently, as the number of retirees without employer-based coverage increases, retirees, particularly those in poorer health, may encounter difficulty finding affordable alternative health coverage. | What GAO Found
In 1999, nearly 10 million retired people aged 55 or older relied on employer-sponsored health insurance as either their primary source of coverage or as a supplement to their Medicare coverage. Some of these persons are concerned about the continued availability of employer-sponsored coverage. Premium increases and forecasts for a potential economic slowdown could further erode employer-sponsored benefits. In the long term, these factors, coupled with the potential for Medicare reforms and the rising number of aging baby boomers, may produce even more uncertainty and cost pressures for employers. Consequently, as an increasing number of retirees lack employer-based coverage, those in poorer health may have difficulty finding affordable alternative health coverage. |
gao_GAO-08-689 | gao_GAO-08-689_0 | International Donor Funding for Afghan Highways
The United States and other international donors have committed over $2.2 billion for reconstruction of the regional and national highways identified in the Afghan government’s Road Sector Master Plan. Donors Have Made Progress in Building Highways, but Status of Other Roads Is Uncertain and Challenges Have Delayed Road Construction
The United States and other donors have completed construction of about 2,700 kilometers of regional and national highways in Afghanistan since 2002, but limited information is available on the status of provincial and rural roads and various challenges have delayed road construction. The Afghan government and international donors established the goal to complete Afghanistan’s regional highway network by the end of 2008, and as of February 2008, about 60 percent of the network was complete. Although Defense reported completing construction of 155 out of about 1,600 kilometers of CERP-funded civilian roads, project data are incomplete, and according to officials, they cannot identify the location of some CERP-funded roads. 5). U.S. agencies and other donors have faced several challenges in implementing road projects, such as poor security conditions, limitations of project implementers, and starting construction with limited planning. These factors have contributed to project delays and cost increases. Little Is Known about the Impact of Road Projects in Afghanistan
U.S. agencies involved in road reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan know little about the impact of road projects, since they have not conducted assessments to determine the degree to which the projects have achieved economic development and humanitarian assistance goals. 9). Defense Has Not Assessed the Impact of and Lacks Clear Guidance for CERP Projects
Defense has not conducted any impact assessment of its civilian road projects. A Fiscally Sustainable Road Maintenance Program for Afghan Roads Has Not Been Established
A fiscally sustainable program for road maintenance has not been established, although the Afghan government and international donors set a goal to do so by the end of 2007. Several factors have contributed to the Afghan government’s maintenance shortfall, including (1) its lack of human and financial resources, (2) a fragmented institutional organization, and (3) the lack of a comprehensive legal framework and means to enforce fee collection for the transportation sector in Afghanistan. However, USAID did not meet its 2007 target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads. Therefore, it is not clear whether or to what extent the Afghan government has increased its support for road maintenance. Furthermore, there is a lack of comprehensive data on U.S.-funded road projects, as agencies are not reporting information for all their civilian road projects to a USAID database. We limited our review of results frameworks to USAID’s overall Performance Management Plan, and its REFS and IRP programs. No. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Afghan government, the United States, and other donors consider road reconstruction a top development priority for Afghanistan. Almost 20 percent of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) $5.9 billion in assistance to Afghanistan has been for roads. The Department of Defense (Defense) has committed about $560 million for roads, of which Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds account for over half. GAO examined (1) the status of road reconstruction and challenges affecting project implementation, (2) U.S. agencies' efforts to evaluate the impact of road projects, and (3) efforts to develop a sustainable road maintenance program. GAO reviewed U.S. and Afghan governments' planning, evaluation, and funding documents and interviewed relevant stakeholders in Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
The United States and other donors have completed construction of several regional and national highways since 2002, but the status of other roads is uncertain and various challenges have delayed construction. The Afghan government and international donors planned to complete the high-priority regional highways by the end of 2008, and as of February 2008, about 60 percent of these roads were built. USAID has completed its portion, but completion of other portions is not expected until late 2009. Donors have committed to construct over 30 percent of national highways, which connect provincial capitals to the regional highways, and only USAID has completed portions of these highways. Detailed information on the status of provincial and rural roads is lacking. Although Defense reported committing CERP funds for 1,600 kilometers of roads, data on the roads were incomplete and Defense has not reported information on these roads to USAID, as required. Poor security, project implementer limitations, and starting construction with limited planning have contributed to project delays and cost increases. U.S. agencies have not conducted sound impact evaluations to determine the degree to which projects achieved the objective of economic development. Limitations of USAID's funding, data collection, and frameworks to assess results have impeded its ability to evaluate project impact. Defense has not conducted any impact evaluations and lacks clear guidance on project evaluation. However, agency officials have noted some anecdotal examples of road construction impact, such as reduced travel times and increased commerce. Moreover, no other donor has performed impact evaluations. A sustainable road maintenance program has not been established, although it is a goal of the Afghan government and international donors. The Afghan government's support of this goal has been limited due to factors such as a lack of resources and a fragmented institutional organization. As a result, international donors have agreed to temporarily fund road maintenance to protect their investments. While USAID plans to maintain about 1,500 kilometers of roads it built, it did not meet its 2007 target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads. |
gao_GAO-16-513 | gao_GAO-16-513_0 | The information handled by these systems includes sensitive or confidential business information on drug submissions and adverse event reports, among other types of information. Both logical and physical access controls are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities. As shown in table 2, weaknesses existed in each of these areas for the systems we reviewed. FDA did not always adequately ensure that its network boundaries were sufficiently segregated. FDA conducted background investigations for the employees and contractors we reviewed. Media can include magnetic tapes, optical disks (such as compact disks), and hard drives. Agencies safeguard used media to ensure that the information they contain is appropriately controlled or disposed of. FDA Did Not Fully Implement Its Information Security Program, Limiting the Effectiveness of Information Security Controls
A key reason for the weaknesses in controls over FDA’s information and information systems is that it has not yet fully implemented its agency- wide information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes a periodic assessment of risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or a group of information systems, as appropriate; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address any deficiencies in information security policies, procedures, or practices; and procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. FDA Has Taken Steps to Assess Risks, but Some Practices Have Not Been Fully Implemented. However, the agency did not always ensure that the plans were complete, or that plans were reviewed. 5. 15. We are also making 166 technical recommendations in a separate report with limited distribution. In the comments (reprinted in appendix II), the department stated that FDA concurred with our recommendations, has begun implementing several of them, and is actively working to address all the recommendations as quickly and completely as possible. The department emphasized its commitment to protecting the public health and proprietary business information at FDA, including by implementing layered defenses and other compensating controls. As stated in the report, we identified a significant number of weaknesses in technical controls—including access controls, change controls, and patch management—that jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the seven moderate- and high-impact systems we reviewed. As previously mentioned, these weaknesses place the seven FDA systems, including those that receive, process, and maintain sensitive industry and public health data, at increased and unnecessary risk of unauthorized access, use, or modification. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to evaluate the extent to which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has implemented information security controls to effectively protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information on selected information systems. Using the requirements identified by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), which establishes key elements for an effective agency-wide information security program, and associated NIST guidelines, Department of Health and Human Services and Food and Drug Administration Requirements, we evaluated FDA’s information security program by reviewing assessments of risk for six FDA systems to determine whether threats and vulnerabilities were being identified; analyzing FDA policies, procedures, and practices to determine their effectiveness in providing guidance to personnel responsible for securing information and information systems; analyzing security plans for six systems to determine if those plans had been documented and updated according to federal guidance; examining the security awareness training for employees and contractors to determine whether they had received training according to federal requirements; examining training records for personnel who have significant responsibilities to determine whether they had received training commensurate with those responsibilities; analyzing FDA’s procedures and results for testing and evaluating security controls to determine whether management, operational, and technical controls for seven systems had been sufficiently tested at least annually and based on risk; reviewing FDA’s implementation of continuous monitoring practices to determine whether the agency had developed and implemented an information system continuous monitoring strategy to manage its IT assets and monitor the security configurations and vulnerabilities for those assets; examining FDA’s process to correct weaknesses and to determine whether remedial action plans complied with federal guidance; and reviewing FDA’s implementation of incident response practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
FDA has a demanding responsibility of ensuring the safety, effectiveness, and quality of food, drugs, and other consumer products. In carrying out its mission, FDA relies extensively on information technology systems to receive, process, and maintain sensitive industry and public health data, including proprietary business information such as industry drug submissions and reports of adverse reactions. Accordingly, effective information security controls are essential to ensure that the agency's systems and information are adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper modification, unauthorized disclosure, or destruction.
GAO was asked to examine security controls over key FDA information systems. GAO assessed the extent to which FDA had effectively implemented information security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information on seven information systems selected for review. To do this, GAO reviewed security policies, procedures, reports, and other documents; examined the agency's network infrastructure; tested controls for the seven systems; and interviewed FDA personnel.
What GAO Found
Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has taken steps to safeguard the seven systems GAO reviewed, a significant number of security control weaknesses jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and systems. The agency did not fully or consistently implement access controls, which are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources. Specifically, FDA did not always (1) adequately protect the boundaries of its network, (2) consistently identify and authenticate system users, (3) limit users' access to only what was required to perform their duties, (4) encrypt sensitive data, (5) consistently audit and monitor system activity, and (6) conduct physical security reviews of its facilities. FDA conducted background investigations for personnel in sensitive positions, but weaknesses existed in other controls, such as those intended to manage the configurations of security features on and control changes to hardware and software; plan for contingencies, including systems disruptions and their recovery; and protect media such as tapes, disks, and hard drives to ensure information on them was “sanitized” and could not be retrieved after they are disposed of. The table below shows the number of GAO-identified weaknesses and associated recommendations, by control area.
These control weaknesses existed, in part, because FDA had not fully implemented an agency-wide information security program, as required under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. For example, FDA did not
ensure risk assessments for reviewed systems were comprehensive and addressed system threats,
review or update security policies and procedures in a timely manner,
complete system security plans for all reviewed systems or review them to ensure that the appropriate controls were selected,
ensure that personnel with significant security responsibilities received training or that such training was effectively tracked,
always test security controls effectively and at least annually,
always ensure that identified security weaknesses were addressed in a timely manner, and
fully implement procedures for responding to security incidents.
Until FDA rectifies these weaknesses, the public health and proprietary business information it maintains in these seven systems will remain at an elevated and unnecessary risk of unauthorized access, use, disclosure, alteration, and loss.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 15 recommendations to FDA to fully implement its agency-wide information security program. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is recommending that FDA take 166 specific actions to resolve weaknesses in information security controls. HHS stated in comments on a draft of this report that FDA concurred with GAO's recommendations and has begun implementing several of them. |
gao_GAO-07-6 | gao_GAO-07-6_0 | The profitability of African-American banks has generally been below that of their peers in all size categories (fig. 3). As figure 5 indicates, many minority banks with less than $100 million in assets had higher operating expenses than their peers in 2005. Regulators Adopted Differing Approaches to Supporting Minority Banks, but Assessment Efforts Were Limited
FDIC has established the most comprehensive efforts among the bank regulators to support minority banks and also leads interagency efforts to coordinate agencies’ activities. While not required to do so by Section 308 of FIRREA, OCC and the Federal Reserve have taken some steps to support minority banks, such as holding occasional conferences for Native American banks, and are planning additional efforts. Regulators Do Not Assess Efforts through Comprehensive Surveys or Outcome-Oriented Performance Measures
While FDIC has recently been proactive in assessing its support efforts for minority banks, none of the regulators have routinely and comprehensively surveyed their minority banks on all issues affecting the institutions, nor have the regulators established outcome-oriented performance measures. Survey of Minority Banks Identified Potential Limitations in Regulators’ Support Efforts and Other Regulatory Issues
Minority bank survey respondents identified potential limitations in the regulators’ efforts to support them and related regulatory issues, such as examiners’ understanding of issues affecting minority banks, which would likely be of significance to agency managers and warrant follow-up analysis. Minority banks regulated by FDIC were generally more positive about the agency’s efforts than other banks were about their regulators’ efforts. Some 36 percent of survey respondents described the efforts as very good or good, 26 percent described them as fair, and 13 percent described the efforts as poor or very poor (fig. However, more than half of FDIC-regulated banks and about three-quarters of the other minority banks responded that their regulator’s efforts were fair, poor, or very poor or responded with a “don’t know.” In particular, banks regulated by OTS gave the highest percentage of poor or very poor marks, while banks regulated by the Federal Reserve most often provided fair marks. For example, only about half of minority banks regulated by FDIC and only about a quarter regulated by the other agencies view their regulator’s support efforts as very good or good. First, although regulators emphasize the provision of technical assistance services to minority banks, less than 30 percent of such banks have recently used such services. As part of these regular program assessments, the regulators may wish to focus on such areas as minority banks’ overall views on support efforts, the usage and effectiveness of technical assistance services (particularly technical assistance provided to small minority banks and African- American banks), and the level of training provided to agency examiners regarding minority banks and their operating environments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) review the profitability of minority banks over time, (2) identify the federal banking regulators’ efforts to support minority banks and determine whether the regulators were evaluating the effectiveness of these efforts, and (3) obtain the views of minority banks on the federal regulators’ minority banking support efforts and related regulatory issues. We created a list of the population of minority banks by asking FDIC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Reserve, and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) for the names of all such institutions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Minority banks can play an important role in serving the financial needs of historically underserved communities and growing populations of minorities. For this reason, the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) established goals that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) must work toward to preserve and promote such institutions (support efforts). To evaluate their efforts, as well as those of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Reserve, GAO (1) reviewed the profitability of minority banks, (2) identified the regulators' support and assessment efforts, and (3) obtained the views of minority banks on the regulators' efforts. GAO reviewed financial data from FDIC, interviewed regulators, and surveyed all minority banks.
What GAO Found
The profitability of most large minority banks (assets greater than $100 million) was nearly equal to that of their peers (similarly sized banks) in 2005 and earlier years. However, many small minority banks and African-American banks of all sizes were less profitable than their peers. GAO's analysis and other studies identified some possible explanations for these differences, including relatively higher loan loss reserves and operating expenses and competition from larger banks. Bank regulators have adopted differing approaches to supporting minority banks, but no agency has regularly and comprehensively assessed the effectiveness of its efforts. FDIC--which supervises over half of all minority banks--has the most comprehensive support efforts and leads interagency efforts. OTS focuses on providing technical assistance to minority banks. While not required to do so by Section 308 of FIRREA, OCC and the Federal Reserve have taken some steps to support minority banks and are planning others. Although FDIC has recently sought to assess the effectiveness of its support efforts through various methods, none of the regulators comprehensively surveys minority banks to obtain their views or has developed outcome-oriented performance measures. Consequently, the regulators are not well positioned to assess their support efforts. GAO's survey of minority banks identified potential limitations in the regulators' support efforts that would likely be of significance to agency managers and warrant follow-up analysis. Only about one-third of survey respondents rated their regulators' efforts for minority banks as very good or good, while 26 percent rated the efforts as fair, 13 percent as poor or very poor, and 25 percent responded "don't know." Banks regulated by FDIC were more positive about their agency's efforts than banks regulated by other agencies. However, only about half of the FDIC-regulated banks and about a quarter of the banks regulated by other agencies rated their agency's efforts as very good or good. Although regulators may emphasize the provision of technical assistance to minority banks, less than 30 percent of such institutions have used such agency services within the last 3 years and therefore may be missing opportunities to address problems that limit their operations or financial performance. |
gao_T-RCED-98-215 | gao_T-RCED-98-215_0 | Table 1 summarizes the size and characteristics of the proposed alliances. Airline officials also note that additional routing options can create some better on-line connections by substituting one airline’s connection for its partner’s when the partner has closer connection times for the customer. In addition to the anticipated benefits of code-sharing, all three of the proposed alliances would offer their passengers reciprocal frequent flier benefits—that is, earning and using frequent flier points on either alliance partner—and the reciprocal use of club facilities. Airline officials believe that these reciprocal benefits would increase the value of frequent flier programs by allowing consumers to pool their points and choose from more destinations and frequencies. Alliances May Reduce Competition, Which Would Harm Consumers
While the proposed domestic alliances may benefit consumers, they also have the potential to decrease competition in dozens of nonstop markets and hundreds more one-and multiple-stop markets because, even though the alliances are not mergers, they may reduce the incentive for alliance partners to compete with each other. We analyzed 1997 data on the 5,000 busiest domestic airport-pair origin and destination markets—markets for air travel between two airports—to determine how these markets could be affected by the proposed alliances. If the airlines do not continue to compete on prices, we found that the number of independent airlines could decline in 1,836 of these 5,000 markets, possibly affecting the fares paid by nearly 101 million passengers out of a total of 396 million passengers. In a typical international alliance, a domestic airline with a domestic route network will form an alliance with a foreign airline that has a route network in its home territory. Decisionmakers Need to Consider a Number of Complex Issues in Evaluating the Alliances
Many dimensions of each of the proposed alliances deserve close scrutiny so that decisionmakers can assess whether the potential benefits of each particular alliance outweigh its potential harmful effects. These key issues are how substantial the benefits to consumers may be, whether incentives to compete are retained, what the potential impact of the proposed alliances on certain classes of consumers and certain communities are, how international travel may be affected, and what the overall implications of the proposed alliances for competition may be. Some of the estimated increases for the growth in traffic may depend on questionable assumptions about how much new traffic can be generated by marginal additions in the frequency of flights and the number of destinations or about how many additional travelers will choose to fly to destinations through a code-sharing arrangement that is currently available through an interline connection. On the other hand, if the alliances reduce incentives to compete on prices, then DOJ and DOT will need to carefully examine the overlap in the alliance partners’ route structures and assess whether an alliance would create a significant number of routes with less, or no, competition. The potential sources of new competition if any combination, or all, of the alliances move forward. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the potential impact of the alliances proposed by the nation's six largest airlines, focusing on the competitive implications of the proposed alliances, including: (1) their potential benefits to consumers; (2) their potential harm to consumers; and (3) the issues that policymakers need to consider in evaluating the net effects of the proposed alliances.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the primary potential benefits of the proposed alliances for consumers, according to airline officials, are the additional destinations and frequencies that occur when alliance partners join route networks by code-sharing; (2) with code-sharing, an airline can market its alliance partner's flights as its own and, without adding any planes, increase the number of destinations and the frequency of the flights it can offer; (3) airline officials also predict that increased frequencies and connection opportunities will spur additional demand, allowing for even more frequent flights and additional destinations; (4) the primary source of potential harm to consumers from the proposed alliances is the possibility that they will reduce competition on hundreds of domestic routes if the alliance partners do not compete with each other or compete less vigorously than they did when they were unaffiliated; (5) GAO analyzed 1997 data on the 5,000 busiest domestic airport-pair origin and destination markets--markets for air travel between two airports--to determine how these markets could be affected by the proposed alliances; (6) if all three alliances occur, GAO found that the number of independent airlines could decline on 1,836 of the 5,000 most frequently traveled domestic airline routes and potentially reduce competition for about 100 million of the 396 million domestic passengers per year; (7) in weighing the net effects of the proposed alliances, policymakers in the Department of Justice and the Department of Transportation have a difficult task because each alliance varies in its level of integration and in the scope and breadth of the combined networks; (8) however, GAO believes that if several key issues are addressed, policymakers will be better able to determine whether an alliance benefits consumers overall; (9) the first issue is whether airline partners' assumptions concerning the additional traffic and other benefits generated by the alliance are realistic; (10) second, it will be critical to determine if an alliance retains or reduces incentives for alliance partners to compete on price; and (11) if an alliance agreement reduces the incentives for partners to compete with fares in markets they both serve, then policymakers may want to examine the overlap in the alliance partners' route structures to determine whether that alliance would lead to a significant number of routes with fewer independent airlines. |
gao_RCED-98-221 | gao_RCED-98-221_0 | The relative share of spending for other Superfund cost categories remained about the same between fiscal years 1996 and 1997. EPA stated that the increase in spending for administration and support between fiscal years 1996 and 1997 can be attributed to normal spending fluctuations for items such as rental payments and other infrastructure needs, and to possible accounting changes. As figure 2 shows, the Corps managed the largest portion of this spending during fiscal years 1996-97 (about 65 percent of the spending during the 2-year period). EPA managed about 13 percent of contractor spending during the 2 fiscal years. The Department of the Interior managed a small portion of contractor spending (about 5 percent), primarily for mining cleanups. Contractor Costs for Remedial Actions Managed by EPA or the Corps
Nationwide, about 71 percent of contractor spending for remedial actions managed by EPA during fiscal years 1996-97 went to the physical implementation of the cleanups. The remaining 29 percent was for prime contractor expenses related to managing and overseeing the cleanups. For the two remedial action projects where information was available from the Corps, about 69 percent of contractor spending during fiscal years 1996-97 went to the physical implementation of the cleanups. We could not determine if these results are typical of the Corps’ projects, however, because these two projects accounted for only 16 percent of the Corps’ spending for contractors during fiscal years 1996-97. Contractor Spending Managed by EPA
For the remedial action projects performed by EPA’s contractors, we found that, nationwide, about 71 percent of contractor spending during 1996-97 went to the subcontractors who physically perform the cleanup work. 3.) Travel associated with the professional labor (1 percent). General and administrative expenses, such as salaries for upper management and corporate office costs (3 percent). Contractor Spending Managed by the Corps
During fiscal years 1996-97, only 2 of the about 70 remedial actions with significant charges by the Corps’ contractors ($10,000 or more in spending during either year) were billed on a cost-reimbursement basis, thus allowing us to analyze the share of contractor spending for physical cleanups. EPA said that the report’s analysis is sound. 6.) Scope and Methodology
To update the share of annual Superfund spending that went to contractor cleanup work to include fiscal year 1997, we obtained information from EPA’s Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS). To determine the share of contractor spending for remedial actions administered by EPA, the Corps, the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation, and the states, we also obtained information from IFMS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) updated the share of annual Superfund spending that went for contractor cleanup work to include fiscal year (FY) 1997; (2) determined the share of contractor spending for remedial actions that were managed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), other federal agencies, and the states during FY 1996 and FY 1997; and (3) for the contractor spending for remedial actions that was managed by EPA or the Army Corps of Engineers, analyzed the share that contractors charged for the physical implementation of cleanup actions, as opposed to other contractor charges.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in FY 1997, about 46 percent of total Superfund spending went to the contractors who study, design, and implement cleanups, compared with 49 percent that was spent on these functions during FY 1996; (2) a corresponding 3-percent increase occurred in EPA's administrative and support costs for the program between FY 1996 and FY 1997; (3) EPA said that this increase can be attributed to normal outlay fluctuations; (4) the share of spending for other Superfund cost categories remained about the same between the 2 fiscal years; (5) contractor spending for remedial actions is managed by several different entities, including EPA, the Corps, the Department of the Interior, and about half of the states; (6) among these, the Corps manages the largest portion of this spending--accounting for 65 percent during FY 1996 through FY 1997; (7) the states collectively managed about 17 percent of such spending during the past 2 fiscal years; (8) EPA managed about 13 percent of such spending during this period; (9) the Department of the Interior also managed a small portion of such spending--accounting for 5 percent over the 2 fiscal years; (10) for the spending managed by EPA nationwide, about 71 percent of the costs charged by contractors for remedial action work during FY 1996 through FY 1997 was for the subcontractors who physically performed the cleanups, such as earthmoving and constructing treatment facilities; (11) the remaining 29 percent went to the prime contractors for professional work, such as construction management and engineering services, and the associated travel, overhead, and administrative costs and fees; (12) for the two projects where detailed information on contractor charges was available from the Corps, the share of spending for the physical implementation of cleanups was about 69 percent; and (13) because these two projects accounted for only 16 percent of contractor spending managed by the Corps during FY 1996 through FY 1997, GAO could not determine whether these results generally represent the Corps' contractor spending. |
gao_GAO-02-676T | gao_GAO-02-676T_0 | IGs at the Departments of Agriculture, the Interior, and Transportation also identified weaknesses in the review and approval processes at these agencies. Lack of Training
Another common internal control weakness we identified was lack of or inadequate training related to the use of purchase cards. Navy’s policies required that all cardholders and approving officials must receive initial purchase card training and refresher training every 2 years. Poor Controls Resulted in Fraudulent, Improper, Abusive, and Questionable Purchases
In a number of cases, the significant control weaknesses that we and the IGs identified resulted in or contributed to fraudulent, improper, abusive, and questionable purchases. For example, one cardholder from Education purchased two computers from the same vendor at essentially the same time. Agencies have taken actions to respond to the recommendations made. | What GAO Found
The use of government purchase cards has increased in recent years as agencies have sought to eliminate the bureaucracy and paperwork long associated with small purchases. At the same time, agencies need to have adequate internal controls in place to protect the government from waste, fraud, and abuse. GAO found significant internal control weaknesses in agency purchase card programs, including inadequate review and approval processes, a lack of training for both cardholders and approving officials, and poor monitoring. This lax environment allowed cardholders to make fraudulent, improper, abusive, and questionable purchases. Weak controls also resulted in lost, missing, or misused government property. |
gao_GAO-07-774 | gao_GAO-07-774_0 | DOD Initiatives Assist UOCAVA Voters, but Certain Weaknesses May Limit Their Effectiveness
Since the 2000 federal election, DOD has established several initiatives as alternatives to the by-mail process to facilitate voter registration and ballot request, receipt of a ballot, and submission of a voted ballot by electronic means—such as fax and e-mail—for UOCAVA voters. These include the Electronic Transmission Service’s fax to e-mail and e-mail to fax conversion enhancement (hereafter referred to as the e-mail to fax conversion feature); the 2004 Interim Voting Assistance System (IVAS); the 2006 Integrated Voting Alternative Site (also called IVAS); DOD’s online voting assistance guidance; and online forms to register, request, receive, or submit ballots. The e-mail to fax conversion feature allows UOCAVA voters who do not have access to a facsimile machine to send ballot requests, via e-mail, to DOD’s Electronic Transmission Service, which converts e-mail attachments to faxes and sends them to local election officials. This 2006 IVAS expanded on the 2004 effort, by providing information on electronic ballot request and receipt options for all UOCAVA citizens in all 55 states and territories. Officials within Congress, and others, have expressed concerns that voters could be exposed to a heightened risk of identity theft if they used Tool 1 to send voting materials that contain personally identifiable information (including Social Security number, date of birth, and address), by unsecured e-mail. Online Voting Guidance Is Useful but Some Inconsistencies Exist in the Links
In addition to these initiatives, DOD also has established the FVAP Web site, which contains information on FVAP programs and links to assist UOCAVA voters in the voting process. Absence of Internet Absentee Voting Guidelines Has Hindered Development of the Mandated Internet- Based Absentee Voting Demonstration Project
The Election Assistance Commission has not yet developed the Internet absentee voting guidelines, and because it is required by law to develop them for DOD’s use in the secure, Internet-based, absentee voting demonstration project, DOD has not moved ahead with the project. Commission officials told us that they have not yet developed the required Internet absentee voting guidelines because the Commission has been working on other priorities—including standards for electronic voting machines, challenges associated with these electronic voting machines, and a process for certification and accreditation—and it lacks the resources to work on the Internet absentee voting guidelines or the mandated study of the issues and challenges for Internet technology at the same time. Regarding the demonstration project, DOD officials stated that they had not taken action to develop this project because the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 requires the Commission to develop the guidelines first. DOD Was Developing Plans to Expand the Use of Electronic Voting Technology in the Future, but Sound Management Practices Are Key
We observed that DOD was developing, but had not yet completed, plans to expand the use of electronic voting technology for UOCAVA voters use in federal elections through November 2010, as required by the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. DOD officials noted that both the 2004 and 2006 IVAS initiatives were planned, designed, advertised, and implemented just months before those two elections. Without a proactive, integrated, long-term, results-oriented plan that involves all major stakeholders; includes goals, interim tasks—such as identifying security risks and addressing privacy concerns—milestones, time frames, and contingency plans; and follows the sound management practices used by leading organizations, DOD is not in a position to address congressional expectations to establish secure and private electronic and Internet-based voting initiatives. Recommendations for the Election Assistance Commission
To improve the Election Assistance Commission’s efforts to comply with the direction from Congress to develop the Internet absentee voting guidelines, we recommend that the Commission take the following two actions: Determine, in conjunction with major stakeholders like DOD, whether the Commission’s 2007 Internet voting study and any other Commission efforts related to Internet or electronic voting are applicable to DOD’s plans for Internet-based voting, and incorporate them where appropriate. We also reviewed and analyzed various DOD requirements documents, GAO reports, internal DOD reports, and other reports related to DOD’s prior Internet-based absentee voting initiatives—Voting Over the Internet and SERVE—to ascertain, among other things, challenges and benefits associated with Internet voting efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) protects the rights of military personnel, their dependents, and overseas citizens to vote by absentee ballot. The Department of Defense (DOD) and others have reported that absentee voting, which relies primarily on mail, can be slow and may, in certain circumstances, serve to disenfranchise these voters. In 2004, Congress required DOD to develop an Internet-based absentee voting demonstration project and required the Election Assistance Commission--which reviews election procedures--to develop guidelines for DOD's project. In 2006, Congress required DOD to report, by May 15, 2007, on plans for expanding its use of electronic voting technologies and required GAO to assess efforts by (1) DOD to facilitate electronic absentee voting and (2) the Commission to develop Internet voting guidelines and DOD to develop an Internet-based demonstration project. GAO also assessed DOD's efforts to develop plans to expand its use of electronic voting technologies. GAO interviewed officials and reviewed and analyzed documents related to these efforts.
What GAO Found
Since 2000, DOD has developed several initiatives to facilitate absentee voting by electronic means such as fax or e-mail; however, some of these initiatives exhibited weaknesses or had low participation rates that might hinder their effectiveness. For example, the 2003 Electronic Transmission Service's fax to e-mail conversion feature allows UOCAVA voters who do not have access to a fax machine to request ballots by e-mail and then converts the e-mails to faxes to send to local election officials. DOD officials told us, however, they have not performed, among other things, certification tests and thus are not in compliance with information security requirements. The 2004 Interim Voting Assistance System (IVAS)--which, DOD reported, enabled UOCAVA voters to request and receive ballots securely--cost $576,000, and 17 citizens received ballots through it. The 2006 Integrated Voting Alternative Site (also called IVAS)--which enabled voters to request ballots using one tool, by mail, fax, or unsecured e-mail--raised concerns, from Congress and others, that using unsecured e-mail could expose voters to identity theft if they transmit personal data. While this IVAS displayed a warning that voters had to read to proceed, it did not advise them to delete personal voting information from the computers they used. DOD spent $1.1 million, and at least eight voted ballots were linked to this 2006 IVAS. Both the 2004 and 2006 IVAS were each implemented just 2 months before an election. DOD also has a Web site with links to guidance on electronic transmission options, but some of this guidance was inconsistent and could be misleading. DOD officials acknowledged the discrepancies and addressed them during GAO's review. The Election Assistance Commission has not developed the Internet absentee voting guidelines for DOD's use, and thus DOD has not proceeded with its Internet-based absentee voting demonstration project. Commission officials told GAO that they had not developed the guidelines because they had been devoting constrained resources to other priorities, including challenges associated with electronic voting machines. Furthermore, they have not established--in conjunction with major stakeholders like DOD--tasks, milestones, and time frames for completing the guidelines. The absence of such guidelines has hindered DOD's development of its Internet-based demonstration project. To assist the Commission, however, DOD has shared information on the challenges it faced in implementing prior Internet projects--including security threats. GAO observed that DOD was developing, but had not yet completed, plans for expanding the future use of electronic voting technologies. Because electronic voting in federal elections involves numerous federal, state, and local-level stakeholders; emerging technology; and time to establish the initiatives, developing results-oriented plans that identify goals, time frames, and tasks--including addressing security issues--is key. Without such plans, DOD is not in a position to address congressional expectations to establish secure and private electronic and Internet-based voting initiatives. |
gao_GAO-08-962T | gao_GAO-08-962T_0 | In 2007, about 2 million workers were earning at or below the federal minimum wage. The Number of Enforcement Actions Has Decreased, although Enforcement Remained WHD’s Major Compliance Activity
From 1997 to 2007, the number of WHD’s enforcement actions decreased by more than a third, from approximately 47,000 actions in 1997 to just under 30,000 in 2007. According to WHD, although enforcement actions have comprised the majority of its compliance activities, the total number of actions decreased over this period because of three factors: the increased use of more time-consuming comprehensive investigations, a decrease in the number of investigators, and improved screening of complaints to eliminate those that may not result in violations. Most of these enforcement actions conducted from 1997 to 20007 were initiated by complaints from workers. WHD’s partnerships and outreach activities constituted about 19 percent of its total staff time. The majority (72 percent) of WHD’s enforcement actions were initiated in response to complaints from workers. From 2000 to 2007, in planning and conducting WHD-initiated enforcement actions, the agency primarily targeted four industry groups: agriculture, accommodation and food services, manufacturing, and health care and social services. WHD Does Not Effectively Use Available Information and Tools in Planning and Conducting Its Compliance Activities
In planning and conducting its compliance activities, WHD does not effectively use available information and tools. Finally, the agency may not sufficiently leverage existing tools such as hotlines and partnerships to improve compliance with FLSA. WHD Did Not Change How It Targets Its WHD- Initiated Investigations, despite Information from Its Studies of Low Wage Industries
From 1997 to 2007, in targeting employers for investigation, WHD focused on employers in the same industries despite obtaining information from its commissioned studies on low wage industries in which FLSA violations are likely to occur. Therefore, the investigations initiated by WHD may not have addressed the needs of low wage workers most vulnerable to FLSA violations. The Extent to Which WHD’s Activities Have Improved FLSA Compliance Is Unknown
The extent to which WHD’s activities have improved FLSA compliance is unknown, because WHD frequently changes both how it measures and how it reports on its performance. When agencies provide trend data in their performance reports, decision makers can compare current and past progress in meeting long-term goals. While WHD’s long-term goals and strategies have generally remained the same since 1997, WHD often changes how it measures its progress, keeping about 90 percent of its measures for 2 years or less. Moreover, although WHD established a total of 131 performance measures throughout the period from 1997 to 2007, it reported on 6 of them for more than 1 year. This lack of consistent information on WHD’s progress in meeting its goals makes it difficult to assess how well WHD’s efforts are improving compliance with FLSA. Recommendations for Executive Action
To more effectively plan and conduct its compliance activities, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Administrator of WHD to enter all complaints and actions taken in response to complaints in its WHISARD database, and use this information as part of its resource allocation process; establish a process to help ensure that input from external stakeholders, such as employer associations and worker advocacy groups, is obtained and incorporated as appropriate into its planning process; incorporate information from its commissioned studies in its strategic planning process to improve targeting of employers for investigation; and identify ways to leverage its existing tools by improving services provided through hotlines, office phone lines, and partnerships, and improving its tracking of whether penalties are assessed when repeat or willful violations are found and whether back wages and penalties assessed are collected. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 130 million workers are protected from substandard wages and working conditions by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). This act contains specific provisions to ensure that workers are paid the federal minimum wage and for overtime, and that youth are protected from working too many hours and from hazardous conditions. The Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) is responsible for enforcing employer compliance with FLSA. To secure compliance, WHD uses enforcement actions, partnerships with external groups, and outreach activities. In response to a congressional request, we examined (1) the trends in FLSA compliance activities from fiscal years 1997 to 2007, (2) the effectiveness of WHD's efforts to plan and conduct these activities, and (3) the extent to which these activities have improved FLSA compliance.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 1997 to 2007, the number of WHD's enforcement actions decreased by more than a third, from approximately 47,000 in 1997 to just under 30,000 in 2007. According to WHD, the total number of actions decreased over this period because of three factors: the increased use of more time-consuming comprehensive investigations, a decrease in the number of investigators, and screening of complaints to eliminate those that may not result in violations. Most of these actions (72 percent) were initiated from 1997 to 2007 in response to complaints from workers. The remaining enforcement actions, which were initiated by WHD, were concentrated in four industry groups: agriculture, accommodation and food services, manufacturing, and health care and social services. WHD's other two types of compliance activities--partnerships and outreach--constituted about 19 percent of WHD's staff time based on available data from 2000 to 2007. WHD did not effectively take advantage of available information and tools in planning and conducting its compliance activities. In planning these activities, WHD did not use available information, including key data on complaints and input from external groups such as employer and worker advocacy organizations, to inform its planning process. Also, in targeting businesses for investigation, WHD focused on the same industries from 1997 to 2007 despite information from its commissioned studies on low wage industries in which FLSA violations are likely to occur. As a result, WHD may not be addressing the needs of workers most vulnerable to FLSA violations. Finally, the agency does not sufficiently leverage its existing tools, such as tracking the use and collection of penalties and back wages, or using its hotlines and partnerships, to encourage employers to comply with FLSA and reach potential complainants. The extent to which WHD's activities have improved FLSA compliance is unknown because WHD frequently changes both how it measures and how it reports on its performance. When agencies provide trend data in their performance reports, decision makers can compare current and past progress in meeting long-term goals. While WHD's long-term goals and strategies generally remained the same from 1997 to 2007, WHD often changed how it measured its progress, keeping about 90 percent of its measures for 2 years or less. Moreover, WHD established a total of 131 performance measures throughout this period, but reported on 6 of these measures for more than 1 year. This lack of consistent information on WHD's progress in meeting its goals makes it difficult to assess how well WHD's efforts are improving compliance with FLSA. |
gao_NSIAD-98-87 | gao_NSIAD-98-87_0 | The objectives of this report are to (1) identify best commercial practices for establishing, managing, and sustaining excellent supplier relationships and (2) compare these practices with those of DOD, selected prime contractors, and the supplier teams on two weapon system programs. Our case studies were performed on two munitions programs: the Brilliant Anti-armor Submunition, referred to as BAT, which is the older and more traditional of the two programs; and the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) program, which is piloting several acquisition reforms and has applied innovative supplier management techniques. Mutually rewarding environment: The firms created an environment whereby the suppliers also benefited from superior performance. However, on the basis of our meetings with prime contractors, we found that it can be difficult to translate the desire for better supplier relations into tangible differences in the actual relationships among suppliers, prime contractors, and DOD. The practices within this trait created the “quid pro quo,” that is, the realization by the key team members that they were all benefiting from the relationship and that more significant contributions were matched with significant rewards. In a more traditional program, like BAT, the four traits do not comprise as powerful a system as is formed by the best commercial practices. Consequently, their performance was limited to compliance with contract requirements, impairing the program’s ability to take full advantage of the suppliers’ intellectual capital, such as design or product ideas. Supplier Relationships Must Have Central Support
Best Commercial Practices
The leading commercial firms embraced effective supplier relationships as a core business strategy and built organizational structures with skilled people to carry out the strategy. While the role played by DOD through the Army program office on the BAT program was traditional regarding supplier relationships, a very different role was played by the JDAM program office. In the acquisition of weapon systems, DOD is the customer on the one hand and on the other it shares responsibility for managing and directing the program with the prime contractor. Rigorous Supplier Selection Creates Strong Supplier Base
Best Commercial Practices
Leading companies used a rigorous supplier selection process to create a strong supplier base. DOD offered its advice but did not mandate changes in the choice of suppliers. An Effective Communication and Feedback System Must Exist
Best Commercial Practices
Leading commercial companies established effective communications and feedback systems with their suppliers to continually assess and improve both their own and supplier performance. Some suppliers had more positive experiences on the program. The ultimate success of this approach in producing a weapon that will perform as required remains to be seen. However, the approach did receive praise from key suppliers for the types of relationships it fostered. Best commercial supplier practices, when analyzed in the aggregate, can be seen as four traits that operate in a system that is self-sustaining because it provides mutual benefits to both suppliers and the product developer. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reported on whether best supplier practices can benefit Department of Defense (DOD) weapons systems programs, focusing on: (1) best commercial practices for establishing, managing, and sustaining excellent supplier relationships; and (2) a comparison of these practices with those of DOD, selected prime contractors, and the supplier teams on two weapon system programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) best commercial practices, when analyzed in the aggregate, can be seen as the four traits that operate in a system that is self-sustaining because it provides mutual benefits to both the firm responsible for the final product and its suppliers: (a) the leading commercial firms embrace effective supplier relationships as a core business strategy and build organizational structures with skilled people to carry out the strategy; (b) leading companies use a rigorous supplier selection process to create a strong supplier base that they could more effectively manage; (c) they establish effective communications and feedback systems with their suppliers to continually assess and improve both their own and supplier performance; and (d) the firms foster an environment in which suppliers realized that more significant contributions were matched with significant rewards; (2) DOD and prime contractors were aware of such benefits and were implementing some of these practices; (3) however, experience on the Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunition program showed that it could be difficult to translate the desire for better supplier relations into tangible differences in the actual relationships among suppliers, prime contractors, and DOD; (4) in the program, the four traits did not comprise as powerful a system as was formed by the best commercial practices; (5) consequently, their performance was strictly limited to compliance with contract requirements; (6) in the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) program, a more rewarding environment was created for suppliers even though improved supplier relations was not an explicit program objective; (7) nonetheless, the action taken by DOD on the program bolstered the support for supplier relationships and encouraged the suppliers to play a greater role; (8) DOD shares responsibility with the prime contractors for shaping the suppliers' environment; (9) thus, the role it plays on individual programs has a direct bearing on the sophistication of supplier relationships and the success of best supplier practices; (10) the supplier relationships on the Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunition program reflect DOD's traditional role of distancing itself from suppliers; (11) on the JDAM program, DOD was much more proactive and involved with the suppliers; (12) its pilot program mandate supported the program office's involvement in seeing that best supplier practices were used; (13) the ultimate success of this approach in producing a weapon that will perform as required remains to be seen; and (14) suppliers praised the approach for the relationships it fostered. |
gao_GAO-17-546 | gao_GAO-17-546_0 | Selected Agencies Generally Used Advice from Scientific Advisory Bodies to Develop and Apply Radiation-Protection Requirements and Guidance
EPA, NRC, DOE, and FDA have generally used the advice of scientific advisory bodies to develop and apply radiation protection requirements and guidance for workers and the public for the four radiation settings in our review. This advice includes the use of the “linear no-threshold model,” which assumes that the risk of cancer increases with every incremental increase in radiation exposure. Agencies’ Radiation Protection Requirements and Guidance Vary Depending on the Four Settings Reviewed in Which Exposure Can Occur
The limits and guidance the four agencies have developed and applied vary depending on the settings in which exposure can occur, as described below. This result is in part because the scientific advisory bodies on which the agencies relied have developed recommendations specific to the four settings we reviewed: (1) operation and decommissioning of nuclear plants; (2) cleanup of sites with radiological contamination; (3) use of medical imaging equipment that produces radiation; and (4) accidental or terrorism-related exposure to radiation. Officials at the plant told us that they have been able to keep exposures below the plant’s own limit by continuously seeking opportunities to reduce unnecessary worker exposure to radiation, such as using robots to perform maintenance work in radiation areas. Seven Federal Agencies Obligated about $210 Million for Fiscal Years 2012 to 2016 for Research on Low-Dose Radiation’s Health Effects, but Annual Funding Decreased
From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, seven federal agencies obligated $209.6 million for research on the health effects of low-dose radiation. These estimates, according to EPA, can be used by federal and state agencies to develop and implement radiation protection regulations and standards. Agencies Collaborated on Individual Projects on Radiation’s Health Effects but Not on Overall Research Priorities
The seven agencies that funded research on health effects of low-dose radiation for fiscal years 2012 through 2016 collaborated on particular research projects through the use of several mechanisms, including the following:
Joint funding of individual research projects: For example, as previously mentioned, DOE’s Office of Science, EPA, NASA, and NRC jointly funded the Million Person Study, and CDC and DOE’s Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security helped fund the International Nuclear Workers Study. Until recently, DOE’s Low Dose Radiation Research Program provided a stable source of funding for such research and according to DOE’s website, DOE took a leading role in advocating for greater communication and coordination between the fields of radiation biology and epidemiology. DOE’s reduced role has created a void in federal efforts to maintain a collaborative mechanism for low-dose radiation research, and no other agency has stepped forward to fill this void. DOE is well positioned to lead an effort to ensure that federal agencies have a mechanism for interagency collaboration to address overall research priorities related to low-dose radiation health effects because of the agency’s past experience as a leader in this area of research. Conclusions
DOE and other federal agencies have invested millions of dollars in low- dose radiation research, and this research has led to a better understanding of the health effects of radiation exposure, thereby helping federal agencies develop and implement radiation protection requirements and guidance for workers and the public. Given the reduction in funding for low-dose radiation research, federal agencies can benefit from greater collaboration on addressing their research priorities in this area. DOE, consistent with its past experience as a leader in this area of research and its research responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, could assist agencies in developing an interagency collaborative mechanism for the future. Table 2 shows examples of federal agencies’ dose limits, guidance levels, and other radiation protection measures. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to EPA, exposure to low doses of radiation does not cause immediate health effects but may increase a person's cancer risk. Federal agencies fund research on cancer risk, but uncertainties remain about risk assessments that federal agencies use to develop radiation protection regulations and guidance.
GAO was asked to examine federal agencies' radiation protection requirements and guidance and related research. This report (1) describes how selected federal agencies have developed and applied radiation protection requirements and guidance and (2) examines the extent to which federal agencies have funded and collaborated on research on low-dose radiation's health effects for fiscal years 2012 to 2016.
GAO selected four federal agencies, based on their development of requirements or guidance for settings in which radiation exposure to workers and the public can occur. GAO reviewed agency documentation and interviewed agency officials on the development of the requirements and guidance. GAO also collected and examined federal-funding data for low-dose radiation research from seven agencies that fund this research.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Food and Drug Administration generally used the advice of scientific advisory bodies to develop and apply radiation protection requirements and guidance for workers and the public in the radiation exposure settings that GAO reviewed. These settings were: (1) the operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants; (2) the cleanup of sites with radiological contamination; (3) the use of medical equipment that produces radiation; and (4) accidental or terrorism-related exposure to radiation. Specifically, the agencies relied on the advice of three scientific advisory bodies that supported the use of a model that assumes the risk of cancer increases with every incremental radiation exposure. Accordingly, the agencies have set regulatory dose limits and issued guidance to confine exposure to levels that reduce the risk of cancer, while recognizing that scientific uncertainties occur in estimating cancer risks from low-dose radiation. For example, NRC requires nuclear power plants to consider measures for limiting workers' exposure below NRC's regulatory dose limit, such as by using robots for maintenance work in radiation areas.
GAO identified seven federal agencies that funded research on low-dose radiation's health effects. In fiscal years 2012 to 2016, DOE, NRC, EPA, and four other federal agencies obligated about $210 million for such research (see table). Although the agencies have collaborated on individual projects on radiation's health effects, they have not established a collaborative mechanism to set research priorities. GAO's previous work has shown that federal agencies can use such mechanisms to implement interagency collaboration to develop and coordinate sound science policies. In the past, DOE took a leading role in this area because DOE provided stable funding and advocated for greater coordination on research on low-dose radiation's health effects. However, since fiscal year 2012, DOE has phased out funding for one of its main research programs in this area. This has created a void in coordination efforts among federal agencies, and no other agency has stepped forward to fill this void. Because of DOE's prior experience as a leader in this area of research and its research responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it could play an important role in helping federal agencies establish a coordinating mechanism for low-dose radiation research.
Dollars are in millions and have not been adjusted for inflation
Source: GAO analysis of agency data. | GAO-17-546
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOE lead development of a mechanism for interagency collaboration on research on low-dose radiation's health effects. DOE disagreed, stating that agencies set their own research priorities. GAO continues to believe that DOE is in the best position to lead such an effort, as discussed in the report. |
gao_AIMD-00-304 | gao_AIMD-00-304_0 | These firms generally focus on overpayment identification but will also collect identified overpayments. These activities are described below: Postpayment medical review. HCFA and its contractors use a variety of techniques to find MSP cases. HCFA Lacks Information to Measure Effectiveness of Overpayment Identification Activities
HCFA currently has limited information available to measure how effective the contractors are in identifying Medicare overpayments. Overpayment Identification Efforts Used by Recovery Auditors Mirror HCFA’s Current Efforts
We found that the techniques used by recovery auditors were similar to those already employed by HCFA’s contractors in their postpayment review, MSP, and other program safeguard activities. While the techniques are similar, the specific application—such as what factors trigger a more affect how well overpayments are identified. While it is difficult to isolate the dollar savings attributable to a single year’s funding, based on HCFA estimates for fiscal year 1999, MIP saved the Medicare program more than $17 for each dollar spent—about 55 percent from prepayment activities and the rest from postpayment activities. Because of problems like these, HCFA does not have reliable data on how well it collects debt transferred to it by contractors. To assist them, both the Program Support Center and Treasury contract with private collection agencies that are paid contingency fees for their collection efforts. For providers still in the Medicare program, claims administration contractors can simply withhold funds from future payments. However, there is evidence that HCFA could do more—either in-house, or through its contractors—to identify overpayments, if it had additional resources. Administrative Burden Associated With Recovery Auditors
The potential administrative burden that recovery auditors would place on current claims administration contractors and providers has also been raised as a concern similar to the situation HCFA faces as it integrates the PSCs into Medicare’s integrity activities. In an effort to tackle its outstanding overpayment problem, some have suggested that HCFA use the services of recovery auditors to supplement its program integrity activities. That is not to say that Medicare could not benefit from a stronger focus on postpayment activities to identify additional overpayments. Since its enactment, HIPAA has provided HCFA with increased and assured funding for program safeguards, but funding is still less than what was available in 1989 on a per-claim basis. While this funding is due to increase in the next several years, it will only keep pace with expected growth in program expenditures and amounts to little more than one-quarter of 1 percent of program expenditures. Under its two pilot projects, HCFA is focusing on transferring some Part A debt of significant value that may be as old as 6 years; its plans to expand the pilots to all contractors will still exclude debt that falls below HCFA’s minimum thresholds. Matters for Congressional Consideration
The Congress should consider increasing HCFA’s MIP funds to allow an expansion of postpayment and other effective program safeguard activities, and require HCFA to report on the financial returns from these and other program safeguard investments. Recommendations
To improve overpayment identification and collection, we recommend that the Administrator of HCFA require that the effectiveness of prepayment and postpayment activities be evaluated to determine the relative benefits of various prepayment and postpayment safeguards. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on efforts to recover Medicare's overpayments, focusing on: (1) how the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and its contractors identify potential overpayments, and whether techniques used by recovery auditors would improve overpayment identification; (2) how well HCFA and its contractors collect overpayments once they are identified, and whether the services of recovery auditors would improve HCFA collection efforts; and (3) what challenges HCFA would face if it were required to hire recovery auditors to augment its overpayment identification and collection activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) despite HCFA's efforts to pay claims correctly in its $167 billion fee-for-service Medicare program, several billions of dollars in Medicare overpayments occur each year; (2) it is therefore critical that HCFA undertake effective postpayment activities to identify overpayments expeditiously; (3) HCFA's claims administration contractors use several postpayment techniques to identify overpayments; (4) these include medical review to ensure reports for providers that are paid on the basis of their costs, and reviews to determine if another entity besides Medicare has primary payment responsibility; (5) the contractors identify and collect billions of dollars through these activities, but how well each contractor performs them is not clear because HCFA lacks the information it needs to measure the effectiveness of contractors' overpayment identification activities; (6) while recovery auditors may also save money for clients, such as state Medicaid agencies, by identifying overpayments, the identification techniques they use are generally similar to those already used by HCFA and its contractors; (7) this does not mean that HCFA could not benefit from a stronger focus on specific postpayment activities; (8) however, doing so may require additional program safeguard funding so as not to shift funds away from HCFA's other efforts, such as prepayment review to prevent overpayments; (9) Congress has given HCFA assured funding for program safeguard activities; (10) however, the funding level is about one-third less than it was in 1989 and, although it will increase until 2003, it will only keep pace with expected growth in Medicare expenditures; (11) for fiscal year 1999, based on HCFA estimates, the Medicare Integrity Program saved the Medicare program more than $17 for each dollar spent--about 55 percent from prepayment activities and the rest from postpayment activities; (12) because these activities can bring a positive return, GAO suggests that Congress consider increasing HCFA's funding to bolster its postpayment review program; (13) HCFA plans to expand its pilot projects from some to all of its claims administration contractors; and (14) however, it has established minimum thresholds for referrals for collection that are higher than the Department of the Treasury and debt collection center will accept because HCFA says that it does not have the resources needed to pursue collection on the large volume of debt below its thresholds. |
gao_GAO-12-941T | gao_GAO-12-941T_0 | DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at Land Borders and Major Seaports, but Challenges Remain
Over the past decade, DHS has made significant progress in deploying radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials, but it has made less progress with other pathways. In 2010, we reported that DHS initially planned to deploy more than 2,100 portal monitors to U.S. ports of entry. However, as we reported in 2010 and 2011, DHS has made less progress scanning: (1) railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico and (2) international air cargo and commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, and baggage. According to DHS officials, the department scans nearly all containerized cargo entering U.S. seaports for nuclear and radiological materials. As we reported over the last 2 years, DHS has made limited progress with regard to radiation scanning of the roughly 4,800 loaded railcars in approximately 120 trains entering the United States each day from Although, most Canada and Mexico through 31 rail ports of entry.international rail crossings have radiography systems to scan the majority of cargo, much of the scanning for nuclear and radiological materials that takes place at these ports of entry is conducted with portable, handheld radioactive isotope identification devices. Observations from Our Past Work for DHS to Consider When Replacing Portal Monitors
As deployed portal monitors reach the end of their expected service lives, observations from our past work may help DHS as it considers options for deploying new technologies as to whether to refurbish or replace them. Ports and border crossings have received most of the investment of radiation detection technologies because these are the areas through which a significant amount of cargo must pass, and federal law requires certain scanning at seaports. As we reported in 2011, any additional investment in radiation detection equipment needs to be consistent with the highest priority needs of the domestic side of the GNDA, including examining and balancing the needs and risks of all smuggling pathways into the United States. Testing new equipment rigorously prior to acquisition and deployment. Obtaining full concurrence of the end user––CBP––to ensure that any new equipment meets CBP’s operational needs. Our past work on the advanced spectroscopic portal and DNDO efforts to develop a system to use radiography to scan cargo for nuclear materials found that DNDO did not fully understand (1) how CBP used existing radiation detection equipment in a port environment or (2) the extent of the space limitations in port environments. Conducting a cost-benefit analysis to inform acquisition decisions. A key part of deciding whether to refurbish or replace currently deployed portal monitors is conducting a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that can be used to compare the relative costs and expected benefits of existing versus new equipment. DHS’s GNDA Strategic and Implementation Plans Address Our Past Recommendations but Do Not Yet Clearly Define Priorities
In our past work on the GNDA, we made recommendations about the need for a strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA. Among other things, in July 2008, we recommended that DHS develop an overarching strategic plan for the GNDA that (1) clearly defines the objectives to be accomplished, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities for meeting each objective, (3) identifies the funding necessary to achieve those objectives, and (4) employs monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. DHS agreed with our recommendation. In January 2009, we recommended that DHS develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy and that this plan focus on establishing time frames and costs for addressing previously identified pathways within the architecture—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small maritime vessels. DHS did not comment on this recommendation but noted that it aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions. DHS has taken action on these recommendations. In December 2010, DHS issued the interagency GNDA strategic plan and in April 2012, it issued its GNDA implementation plan for domestic aspects of the GNDA. As we reported in July 2011, the 2010 GNDA strategic plan addresses several aspects of our prior recommendations—including defining program objectives and assigning roles and responsibilities. Our review of the April 2012 GNDA implementation plan found that DHS had made progress in both identifying funding dedicated to plan objectives and in employing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress in meeting plan objectives. While these pathways remain an area of concern, the strategies discussed in the plan address our 2009 recommendations and lay out an approach to making nuclear smuggling through these pathways more difficult and thus less likely to succeed. However, in both the GNDA strategic plan and the implementation plan, it remains difficult to identify priorities from among various components of the domestic part of the GNDA. Identifying priorities would help inform DHS’s decisions to refurbish or replace portal monitors or invest in radiation detection equipment for other potential pathways. DHS has done a comprehensive analysis of GNDA capabilities and compared its capabilities with the expected capabilities of adversaries who may wish to smuggle nuclear material into the United States. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the efforts of the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to develop and deploy a global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA)an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United Statesand to provide an update on the deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders. Preventing terrorists from using nuclear or radiological material to carry out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. DNDO is charged with, among other things, enhancing and coordinating the nuclear detection efforts of federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector to ensure a managed, coordinated response. Among other things, DNDO is required to coordinate with other federal agencies to develop an enhanced GNDA. It is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. While federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other potential pathways in the architecture, including (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, (2) international general aviation, and (3) small maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels.
Even before DNDOs inception in 2005, we were highlighting the need for a more comprehensive strategy for nuclear detection. In 2002, we reported on the need for a comprehensive plan for installing radiation detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, at all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry. In July 2008, we testified that DNDO had not developed an overarching strategic plan to guide the development of a more comprehensive GNDA, and we recommended that DHS coordinate with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State to develop one. DHS agreed with our recommendation. In January 2009, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy to help ensure the success of initiatives aimed at closing vulnerabilities in the United States. We stated that this plan should focus on, among other things, establishing time frames and costs for the areas DNDO had identifiedland border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small maritime craft. DHS did not comment on this recommendation but noted that it aligned with DNDOs past, present, and future actions. The status of these recommendations is discussed later in this testimony.
DHS has made meaningful progress in deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. border crossings and seaports; however, as deployed portal monitors begin to reach the end of their expected service lives, DHS will soon need to make decisions about whether to refurbish or replace them. DHS has also made progress in developing key planning documents to guide the GNDA. This testimony discusses: (1) DHSs efforts to complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, (2) observations from our past work that may help DHS as it considers options for deploying new technologies to refurbish or replace existing portal monitors when they reach the end of their expected service lives, and (3) our assessment of the extent to which DHS has addressed our prior recommendations.
This testimony is primarily based on our prior work on federal efforts to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, issued from October 2002 through July 2011. We have updated our prior work in this testimony to reflect DHSs continuing efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment.
What GAO Found
Over the past 10 years, DHS has made significant progress in deploying radiation detection equipment to scan for nuclear or radiological materials in nearly all trucks and containerized cargo coming into the United Stated through seaports and border crossings. However, challenges remain for the agency in developing a similar scanning capability for railcars entering this country from Canada and Mexico, as well as for international air cargo and international commercial aviation. As portal monitors approach the end of their expected service lives, observations from our past work may help DHS as it considers options to refurbish or replace such monitors. Among other things, we have previously reported that DHS should (1) test new equipment rigorously prior to acquisition and deployment, (2) obtain the full concurrence of the end user to ensure that new equipment meets operational needs, and (3) conduct a cost-benefit analysis to inform any acquisition decisions. In our past work on the GNDA, we recommended that DHS develop an overarching strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA, as well as a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy. DHS took action on these recommendations and, in December 2010, it issued the interagency GNDA strategic plan. We reported, in July 2011, that the GNDA strategic plan addressed several of the aspects of our prior recommendations but did not (1) identify funding necessary to achieve plan objectives or (2) employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed improvements. In April 2012, DHS issued its GNDA implementation plan, which addresses the remaining aspects of our recommendations by identifying funding dedicated to plan objectives and employing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress in meeting those objectives. However, in both the GNDA strategic plan and the implementation plan, it remains difficult to identify priorities from among various components of the domestic part of the GNDA. |
gao_GAO-03-691 | gao_GAO-03-691_0 | Background
NCLBA provides for increased accountability by requiring states and school districts to improve student achievement. To support the new accountability requirements, NCLBA established several options that permit states and school districts to redirect specified NCLBA program funds. First, NCLBA established two flexibility demonstration programs—State- and Local-Flex. State- and Local-Flex provide various mechanisms to assist states and school districts in their efforts to improve student achievement. Commitment of Leadership and Capacity Influenced Decisions to Apply While Conflicting Deadlines, Few Perceived Benefits, and Limited Awareness Influenced Decisions Not to Apply
Officials in the 1 state and 3 school districts that applied for the flexibility demonstration programs did so because of the commitment of leadership to make full use of federal flexibility provisions as soon as possible, and the ability and willingness to develop goals and strategies demonstrating how additional flexibility would be used to improve student achievement even though it was possible they would have to revise these plans later. State and district officials we spoke with said that a second factor influencing their decision to apply was that the added flexibility afforded through the demonstration programs would allow them to better coordinate federal funds to fit with their strategies to improve student achievement and narrow achievement gaps. Conflicting Deadlines, Few Perceived Benefits, and Limited Awareness of Flexibility Demonstrations Were Cited as Key Factors in Decisions Not to Apply
For the State-Flex program, officials in 8 states said they did not apply for State-Flex because they were busy completing accountability plans and that they needed the information in these plans in order to complete the program application. The key reason why school districts did not apply for Local-Flex was a lack of awareness about the program, while districts that were aware of the program cited various other reasons for not applying. Finally, while Education has developed criteria and procedures for reviewing and awarding flexibility, it is too early to comment on its processes because it has yet to award flexibility to any state or district. As part of the application process for these two programs, Education publicized and sought feedback through the Federal Register. While these 17 states technically did not have approved accountability plans at the time State- Flex applications were due, these states and their school districts were in a better position to develop and use data on student achievement needed for State- and Local-Flex applications. Education has acknowledged that its communications were not targeted at those states and districts in the best position to apply. For applicants, we reviewed copies of the four applications submitted for the programs and conducted site visits to two applicants— Florida and Seattle. To review the extent to which the Department of Education publicized, provided guidance to interested applicants on, and established a process to review and award flexibility demonstration programs, we conducted structured interviews with Education officials and reviewed Education’s documentation. We also discussed Education’s guidance with states and school district officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) has focused national attention on increasing accountability for states and school districts to improve student achievement. While increasing accountability, NCLBA also provided states and school districts with additional flexibility. The act established two flexibility demonstration programs--State- and Local-Flex--which allow up to 7 states and 80 school districts to redirect up to 100 percent of certain NCLBA program funds. GAO was asked to determine factors that affect states' and districts' decisions whether or not to apply for the demonstration programs and to determine the extent to which the U.S. Department of Education publicized, provided guidance, and established a process to review and award flexibility demonstration programs. To address these questions, GAO conducted a study, using telephone interviews with officials in 22 states and 37 school districts, and site visits to 2 of the four applicants.
What GAO Found
The one applicant for State-Flex and the three applicants for Local-Flex cited two main reasons why they applied--the commitment of leadership and the ability to develop goals and strategies to improve student achievement. In contrast, states did not apply primarily due to few perceived benefits, as well as conflicting deadlines with other NCLBA requirements, while school districts did not apply primarily due to a lack of awareness about the program. In particular, state officials said they were busy completing mandatory draft plans for measuring student achievement. Additionally, these state officials indicated that they needed student achievement data based on these plans in order to apply for State-Flex. Officials in other states said that less time-consuming options to transfer funds were preferable to State-Flex due to the time and effort required to complete the State-Flex application and develop agreements with school districts. Finally, most school district officials GAO spoke with did not apply for Local-Flex because they were not aware of the program. Education publicized the flexibility demonstration programs in routine channels, such as the Federal Register, at conferences informing states and school districts about NCLBA, and in letters to nearly 200 of the largest districts. However, Education's communication strategy did not target those potential applicants in the best position to apply--states and districts that had developed goals and strategies to improve student achievement and narrow achievement gaps. Additionally, Education provided guidance on the application process and assisted interested applicants. However, the two applicants GAO visited said that more guidance was needed in some areas, such as how to demonstrate that funds would be used for allowable purposes. Finally, while Education has developed criteria and procedures for reviewing and awarding flexibility, it is too early to comment on its processes because it has not made awards under these two flexibility programs to any state or district. |
gao_GAO-03-851T | gao_GAO-03-851T_0 | Based on our experience, while DOD’s leadership has the intent and the ability to transform DOD, the needed institutional infrastructure is not in place within a vast majority of DOD organizations. The following provides some observations on key provisions of the proposed National Security Personnel System Act in relation to the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. Specifically, the new personnel authorities could be implemented for a maximum of 120,000 of DOD’s civilian employees in fiscal year 2004, up to 240,000 employees in fiscal year 2005, and more than 240,000 employees in a fiscal year after fiscal year 2005, if the Secretary of Defense determines that, in accordance with the bill’s requirement that the Secretary and the Director of OPM jointly develop regulations for DOD’s new human resources management system, the Department has in place a performance management system and pay formula that meets criteria specified in the bill. We strongly support a phased approach to implementing major management reforms, whether with the human capital reforms at DOD or with change management initiatives at other agencies or across the government. We are pleased that both the House version of DOD’s fiscal year 2004 authorization bill and the proposed National Security Personnel System Act contain statutory safeguards and standards along the lines that we have been suggesting to help ensure that DOD’s pay for performance efforts are fair to employees and improve both individual and organizational performance. In our reviews of agencies’ performance management systems—as in our own experience with designing and implementing performance-based pay reform for ourselves at GAO—we have found that these safeguards are key to maximizing the chances of success and minimizing the risk of failure and abuse. Congress has an important and continuing role to play in the design and implementation of the federal government’s personnel policies and procedures. Governmentwide Human Capital Reforms
As I mentioned at the outset of my statement today, the consideration of human capital reforms for DOD naturally suggests opportunities for governmentwide reform as well. Many of the provisions in the proposed Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2003 and the governmentwide human capital provisions of the House version of DOD’s fiscal year 2004 authorization bill fall into this category. Summary Observations
Since we designated strategic human capital management as a governmentwide high-risk area in January 2001, the Congress, the administration, and agencies have taken steps to address the federal government’s human capital shortfalls. Significant progress has been—and is being—made in addressing the federal government’s pressing human capital challenges. DOD and other agency-specific human capital reforms should be enacted to the extent that the problems being addressed and the solutions offered are specific to particular agencies. A governmentwide approach should be used to address certain flexibilities that have broad-based application and serious potential implications for the civil service system, in general, and OPM, in particular. This approach will help to accelerate needed human capital reform in DOD and throughout the rest of the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
People are at the heart of an organization's ability to perform its mission. Yet a key challenge for the Department of Defense (DOD), as for many federal agencies, is to strategically manage its human capital. DOD's proposed National Security Personnel System would provide for wide-ranging changes in DOD's civilian personnel pay and performance management and other human capital areas. Given the massive size of DOD, the proposal has important precedent-setting implications for federal human capital management. This testimony provides GAO's observations on DOD human capital reform proposals and the need for governmentwide reform.
What GAO Found
GAO strongly supports the need for government transformation and the concept of modernizing federal human capital policies both within DOD and for the federal government at large. The federal personnel system is clearly broken in critical respects--designed for a time and workforce of an earlier era and not able to meet the needs and challenges of today's rapidly changing and knowledge-based environment. The human capital authorities being considered for DOD have far-reaching implications for the way DOD is managed as well as significant precedent-setting implications for the rest of the federal government. GAO is pleased that as the Congress has reviewed DOD's legislative proposal it has added a number of important safeguards, including many along the lines GAO has been suggesting, that will help DOD maximize its chances of success in addressing its human capital challenges and minimize the risk of failure. More generally, GAO believes that agency-specific human capital reforms should be enacted to the extent that the problems being addressed and the solutions offered are specific to a particular agency (e.g., military personnel reforms for DOD). Several of the proposed DOD reforms meet this test. In GAO's view, the relevant sections of the House's version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 and the proposal that is being considered as part of this hearing contain a number of important improvements over the initial DOD legislative proposal. Moving forward, GAO believes it would be preferable to employ a governmentwide approach to address human capital issues and the need for certain flexibilities that have broad-based application and serious potential implications for the civil service system, in general, and the Office of Personnel Management, in particular. GAO believes that several of the reforms that DOD is proposing fall into this category (e.g., broad banding, pay for performance, re-employment and pension offset waivers). In these situations, GAO believes it would be both prudent and preferable for the Congress to provide such authorities governmentwide and ensure that appropriate performance management systems and safeguards are in place before the new authorities are implemented by the respective agency. Importantly, employing this approach is not intended to delay action on DOD's or any other individual agency's efforts, but rather to accelerate needed human capital reform throughout the federal government in a manner that ensures reasonable consistency on key principles within the overall civilian workforce. This approach also would help to maintain a level playing field among federal agencies in competing for talent and would help avoid further fragmentation within the civil service. |
gao_GAO-04-1003 | gao_GAO-04-1003_0 | A legislative framework has evolved that shapes the careers of general and flag officers and the management of these officers. The act codified in Title 10 many of the legislative provisions DOD is seeking to change. The retirees spent an average of 3-1/2 years in their last pay grade. At this promotion point, they averaged 26 years of active commissioned service. General and flag officers who retired during this time period served an average of 6 years as a general or flag officer, with individuals in higher pay grades serving longer. Additional career data for general and flag officers is provided in appendix I.
DOD Did Not Provide Evidence That the Current Legislative Framework Hinders General and Flag Officer Management or Agency Performance
Although DOD provided various rationales for its fiscal year 2005 legislative proposals and sponsored a study on issues related to general and flag officer management, DOD did not provide evidence showing that the current legislative framework has hindered DOD’s management of general and flag officers or degraded the department’s performance. In addition, the fiscal year 2005 legislative proposals (1) would reduce congressional oversight and provide broad latitude to the Executive Branch in managing general and flag officers, (2) could impede the upward flow of officers, and (3) would likely increase federal retirement outlays. The career profile data we developed show that large numbers of general and flag officers are retiring several years before the statutory retirement limits on age and years of active commissioned service. DOD did not develop a cost estimate for its general and flag officer proposals. Executive Branch Has Not Made Frequent Use of Existing Legislative Authority to Extend General and Flag Officer Careers
The Executive Branch currently has legislative authority to extend the careers of general and flag officers on a case-by-case basis without congressional approval. This evaluation should include an assessment of (1) factors that contribute to the retirement of senior general and flag officers prior to the statutory retirement limits, (2) the need for changes in DOD policy or procedure to make greater use of existing authority to extend general and flag officers careers on a case-by-case basis beyond the statutory retirement limits, and (3) the long-term cost implications of proposals to change retirement compensation. As our report states, many general and flag officers are retiring several years before reaching their statutory limits on age and years of commissioned service. For example, more than three-fourths of general and flag officers who retired in grades O-9 and O-10 between fiscal years 1997 and 2002 could have served 3 or more years before reaching the current statutory retirement limits. Factors other than the statutory limits, such as personal considerations and military service culture, may account for early retirements of general and flag officers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress has established a legislative framework that shapes the careers and the management of general and flag officers. The Department of Defense (DOD) has proposed eliminating or amending a number of legislative provisions, such as revising existing statutory retirement limits based on age and years of service, to provide greater flexibility in managing its senior officers in order to retain experienced leaders. GAO is issuing this report in response to a mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. GAO's objectives were to (1) develop a profile of general and flag officer careers and (2) assess DOD's justification for its general and flag officer legislative proposals.
What GAO Found
General and flag officers who have retired over the past several years typically retired at age 56 after having served an average of 33 years of active commissioned service and 3-1/2 years in their last pay grade. On average, retired general and flag officers were first promoted to general and flag officer at age 49, upon reaching 26 years of active commissioned service, and served 6 years as a general or flag officer before retiring. DOD did not present evidence that the legislative provisions it seeks to change hinder the management of general and flag officers or the agency's ability to perform its mission. DOD presented various rationales for its proposals and sponsored a study of general and flag officer management but did not provide data to support the need for these proposals. GAO found that DOD can achieve its goal of extending some general and flag officers' careers and assignments within the parameters of the current legislative framework since many general and flag officers retire several years before reaching the statutory retirement limits. More specifically, the career profile data show that more than three-fourths of general and flag officers who retired in grades O-9 and O-10 between fiscal years 1997 and 2002 could have served at least 3 more years before reaching the current statutory retirement limits. Existing legislative authority provides some flexibility in managing general and flag officers, but the Executive Branch has not made frequent use of this authority. In particular, the Executive Branch has rarely used its existing authority to defer the retirement of general and flag officers on a case-by-case basis beyond the statutory limits on age and years of service. Additionally, factors other than the statutory limits, such as personal considerations and military service culture, may account for early retirements of general and flag officers. GAO also found that the proposals (1) would reduce congressional oversight and provide broad latitude to the Executive Branch in managing general and flag officers, (2) could impede the upward flow of officers by limiting promotion opportunities due to the extension of general and flag officer careers, and (3) would likely increase federal retirement outlays for retirement compensation, based on a cost estimate developed by GAO. |
gao_GAO-12-335 | gao_GAO-12-335_0 | Moreover, land use activities can also produce toxic pollution. Regional offices are to review and discuss with states the projects states select for section 319 funding to ensure the plans’ effective implementation. According to our survey results, project managers for 28 percent of all projects that involved implementing conservation practices or pollution remediation techniques reported that their projects were unable to accomplish all objectives originally identified in the project proposal.These projects were generally unable to implement the desired number or type of conservation practices or to implement them in the originally proposed locations. Many of the challenges that project staff reported facing resulted from bad weather, staff turnover, or other factors outside their control. In West Virginia, Department of Environmental Protection officials selected a project that was to subsidize the cost to homeowners of pumping and replacing damaged septic systems in rural areas, among other practices. Environmental Protection Agency, A National Evaluation of the Clean Water Act Section 319 Program (Washington, D.C.: November 2011). EPA’s Oversight and Measures of Effectiveness of States’ Programs Have Not Consistently Ensured Projects Likely to Yield Measurable Water Quality Outcomes
EPA regional offices have varied widely in the extent of their oversight and the amount of influence they have exerted over state nonpoint source management programs. This variability is seen most notably in regional offices’ reviews of states’ annual work plans and project selection criteria, which are to describe the activities that states’ nonpoint source management programs plan to undertake in the upcoming year and the parameters for which projects are eligible to receive section 319 funds from the state. Officials from three regional offices told us that they reviewed annual work plans in depth and played an active role in influencing the types of projects selected. EPA’s Primary Measures of Effectiveness May Not Fully Demonstrate Program Goal Achievements
In addition to requiring states to report on their progress in meeting milestones for their nonpoint source management programs, section 319 requires states to annually report to EPA on two measures of effectiveness resulting from implementation of their management programs: (1) reductions in loadings of specific nonpoint source pollutants and (2) improvement in water quality of water bodies identified on states’ lists of impaired waters as requiring nonpoint source controls to meet water quality standards. Section 319 does not limit EPA to these two measures of effectiveness, but the agency has chosen to use these two reporting requirements as barometers of success for the section 319 program. Since 2000, states have removed more than 350 water bodies from their lists of impaired waters. According to the Department’s Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), which manages the program, it has resulted in substantial pollutant reductions in key watersheds across the country.program could adversely affect water quality if installed without the proper suite of companion practices to mitigate these adverse effects. To determine whether the instances we observed when meeting with state officials were isolated examples or indicative of a more prevalent problem, we examined EQIP data on three key parameters: (1) the universe of conservation practices funded by NRCS field units that could have negative water quality effects in watersheds in which Section 319 projects were funded; (2) for that universe of practices, the extent to which nutrient management plans were in place to mitigate unintended adverse effects on water quality; and (3) where nutrient management plans were not in place, the extent to which alternative mitigation practices were in place that could reliably serve that same purpose. While NRCS procedures strive to minimize such problems, state environmental officials identified instances where these procedures may not always have their intended effect. To strengthen EPA’s implementation of its responsibilities under the Clean Water Act’s section 319 nonpoint source pollution control program, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA take the following two actions: provide specific guidance to EPA’s 10 regional offices on how they are to fulfill their oversight responsibilities, such as how to review states’ plans for project feasibility and criteria to ensure that funded projects have characteristics that reflect the greatest likelihood of effective implementation and tangible water quality results, and in revising section 319 guidelines to states, and in addition to existing statutorily required reporting measures, emphasize measures that (1) more accurately reflect the overall health of targeted water bodies (e.g., the number, kind, and condition of living organisms) and (2) demonstrate states’ focus on protecting high-quality water bodies, where appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our work were to examine (1) states’ experiences in funding projects that effectively address nonpoint source pollution problems, (2) the extent to which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversees the section 319 program and measures program effectiveness in reducing the adverse impacts of nonpoint source pollution on water quality, and (3) the extent to which key agricultural conservation programs complement EPA’s efforts to reduce nonpoint source pollution. To examine the extent to which key agricultural conservation programs complement EPA’s efforts to reduce nonpoint source pollution, we analyzed data on USDA’s conservation practices funded under the Environmental Quality Incentives Program that have been implemented in watersheds where states have allocated section 319 funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pollution from nonpoint sourcessuch as runoff from farms or construction sitesremains the leading cause of impairment to the nations waters. Under section 319 of the Clean Water Act, each year EPA provides grants to states to implement programs and fund projects that address nonpoint source pollution; the program received $165 million in fiscal year 2012. Section 319 includes minimum conditions that states must meet to receive grants. By regulation, EPAs 10 regional offices oversee state programs and are to ensure that states projects can be feasibly implemented. USDA also has programs to protect water resources.
GAO examined (1) states experiences in funding projects that address nonpoint source pollution, (2) the extent to which EPA oversees the section 319 program and measures its effectiveness, and (3) the extent to which key agricultural programs complement EPA efforts to control such pollution. GAO surveyed project managers, reviewed information from EPAs 10 regional offices on oversight of state programs, and analyzed USDA data.
What GAO Found
Under section 319 of the Clean Water Act, state-selected projects to reduce nonpoint source pollution have helped restore more than 350 impaired water bodies since 2000, but other projects have encountered significant challenges. According to GAO survey results, 28 percent of projects did not achieve all objectives originally identified in the project proposal (e.g., implementing the desired number of pollution reduction practices), while many that did so still faced considerable challenges. About half such challenges were beyond staff control (e.g., bad weather or staff turnover), but the other half were challenges that generally could have been identified and mitigated before projects were proposed and selected for funding, such as gaining access to desired properties. In one state, for example, $285,000 in section 319 funds was to subsidize the cost to homeowners of repairing damaged septic systems. Once the grant was awarded, however, one homeowner signed up to participate.
The Environmental Protection Agencys (EPA) oversight and measures of effectiveness of states programs have not consistently ensured the selection of projects likely to yield measurable water quality outcomes. EPAs 10 regional offices varied widely in their review of states work plans, which describe projects states plan to undertake in the upcoming year, and project selection criteria, which identify eligibility parameters for receiving section 319 funds. For example, three regional offices reported reviewing annual work plans in depth and actively influencing the types of projects selected, while three others reported limited to no involvement in such reviews, instead deferring to states judgment on project feasibility and selection. EPA, however, has not provided its 10 regions with guidance on how to oversee the state programs. Also, EPAs primary measures of program effectiveness may not fully demonstrate program achievements. Section 319 requires states to report to EPA on two measures, including reductions in key pollutants. It does not limit EPA to these two measures, but the agency has chosen to use them as barometers of success for the section 319 program. States can demonstrate their achievements in additional waysways that may provide a more accurate picture of the overall health of targeted water bodies, such as the number and kind of living organisms in the water.
USDAs Environmental Quality Incentives Program is the key agricultural conservation program that can complement EPA efforts to reduce nonpoint source pollution, and its conservation practices have significantly reduced pollutants coming from agricultural land across the country. Notwithstanding its achievements, certain conservation practices can adversely affect water quality if not properly implementedfor example, by transporting polluted runoff from nutrient-laden fields into nearby water bodies. The agencys Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) has procedures in place intended to ensure that its practices do not inadvertently harm water quality. During its field work, GAO identified a few instances where these procedures may not have been followed (including in watersheds where EPAs section 319 funds had been used), and therefore sought NRCS data to determine if they were isolated instances or indicative of a more prevalent issue. NRCS national level data, however, are not sufficiently detailed to identify whether appropriate measures are always in place to mitigate potential water quality impacts. According to NRCS, such data are instead located in its field offices and are not analyzed by the agency.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that EPA provide section 319 oversight guidance to its regional offices and that USDA analyze data to determine if measures were taken to mitigate water quality impacts in section 319 project areas. EPA agreed with the recommendations, while USDA was silent on them. Both agencies commented on specific findings, which are addressed within the report. |
gao_T-RCED-98-222 | gao_T-RCED-98-222_0 | While HUD has been downsizing, its annual obligations for headquarters contracts have steadily increased. According to HUD’s data systems, the annual contract obligations at HUD’s headquarters grew from $213 million in fiscal year 1991 to $376 million in fiscal year 1996 (in constant 1996 dollars). HUD’s 2020 Management Reform Plan and supporting documents indicate that the Department’s reliance on contractors to help carry out its responsibilities will remain significant. For instance, the plan calls for HUD to contract with private firms for a number of functions, including physical building inspections of public housing and multifamily insured projects; legal, investigative, audit, and engineering services; and activities to clean up the backlog of troubled assisted multifamily properties. Previously, physical inspections of multifamily projects were carried out by HUD personnel, mortgagees, and regional contractors. Such conditions can decrease the marketability of HUD’s properties, decrease the value of surrounding homes, increase HUD’s holding costs and, in some cases, threaten the health and safety of neighbors and potential buyers. If contractors do not accurately report on the condition of properties, HUD may lack vital information on which to make disposition decisions and to address safety hazards. We recognize, however, that the condition of the properties is not totally attributable to HUD’s oversight of the contractors. Other Weaknesses Exist in HUD’s Contracting
We, the Inspector General, and the National Academy of Public Administration have identified other weaknesses in HUD’s contracting with respect to the Department’s procurement systems, needs assessment and planning functions, and oversight of contractors’ performance. HUD Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Contracting Operations
HUD has recognized the need to improve its contracting processes and has begun taking actions to address weaknesses that we and the Inspector General have identified. HUD is also establishing a contract review board, composed of the chief procurement officer and other senior HUD officials, that will be responsible for reviewing and approving each HUD program office’s strategic procurement plan and reviewing the offices’ progress in implementing the plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed issues related to contracting activities at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), focusing on the: (1) extent of HUD's reliance on contractors to carry out the Department's responsibilities; (2) weaknesses in HUD's current contracting practices, particularly with respect to the oversight of property management contractors; and (3) HUD's actions to address its contracting weaknesses.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HUD's annual obligations for headquarters contracts have steadily increased in recent years, growing from $213 million in fiscal year (FY) 1991 to $376 million in FY 1996, according to HUD's data systems; (2) furthermore, the Department will continue to rely heavily on contractors to help carry out its responsibilities under its 2020 Management Reform Plan; (3) for instance, the plan calls for HUD to contract with private firms for a number of functions, including physical building inspections of public housing and multi-family insured projects; legal, investigative, audit, and engineering services; and activities to clean up the backlog of troubled assisted multi-family properties; (4) GAO, HUD's Inspector General, and the National Academy of Public Administration have identified weaknesses in HUD's contract administration and monitoring of contractors' performance; (5) the three HUD field offices GAO visited varied greatly in their efforts to monitor real estate asset management contractors' performance, and none of the offices adequately performed all of the functions needed to ensure that the contractors meet their contractual obligations to maintain and protect HUD-owned properties; (6) GAO's physical inspection of the properties for which the contractors in each location were responsible identified problems at the properties, including vandalism, maintenance problems, and safety hazards, which may decrease the marketability of HUD's properties, decrease the value of surrounding homes, increase HUD's holding costs, and in some cases, threaten the health and safety of neighbors and potential buyers; (7) HUD has recognized the need to improve its contracting processes and has begun taking actions to address the weaknesses that GAO and the Inspector General have identified; (8) HUD has recently appointed a chief procurement officer and is also establishing a contract review board; and (9) HUD is taking steps to revise its property disposition activities which could reduce its reliance on asset management contractors. |
gao_RCED-98-75 | gao_RCED-98-75_0 | The conceptual design for the Tritium Extraction Facility was reviewed by three teams—the “Red Team,” the “Independent Review Team,” and the “Formal Design Review Team.” Although there is no requirement for such reviews, they were requested by DOE headquarters’ Office of Commercial Light Water Reactor Production and the Project Office at Savannah River to increase their confidence in the conceptual design of the facility before proceeding to the preliminary design phase. In addition to the overall comments made by two of the review teams, all three teams made a number of specific comments. Comments that the review teams considered to be significant and that we believe cover issues that could affect the success of the project related to the design of the remote handling and tritium extraction processes, the need to include contingencies in the schedule, and the level of detail in the conceptual design report. DOE’s Process for Handling Review Teams’ Comments
Although one of the review teams was chartered by DOE headquarters and two were chartered by the Savannah River Project Office, the purpose of obtaining the independent reviews of the conceptual design was similar in all three cases—to provide confidence in the adequacy of the Tritium Extraction Facility’s conceptual design. The Project Office prepared a list of the actions taken, and the three members of the Red Team concluded that, overall, the Project Office had been responsive to the comments. The Project Office handled the Independent Review Team’s comments differently. The original intention was for the Formal Design Review Team to review the Project Office’s responses and for the chairman of the team to issue a “closure” memo (1) stating that the team had reviewed and agreed with the Project Office’s responses to its comments and (2) endorsing the conceptual design. DOE had two specific comments. As a result, the comment has not been resolved. To obtain information on the process DOE used to respond to the comments raised by the review teams, we reviewed the review teams’ charters; correspondence between the review teams, the Project Office, and DOE; and the teams’ reports and related documents. Each represents significant uncertainties, in terms of scope, cost, and schedule. A section devoted to the project’s schedule should be added to the conceptual design report. The team’s chairman no longer considers this a major comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) plans to build a Tritium Extraction Facility at its Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the reports of three different teams responsible for reviewing the project's conceptual design and related products, focusing on: (1) the major comments raised by the three reviews; and (2) the process used by DOE to respond to those comments.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) two of the teams that reviewed the Tritium Extraction Facility's conceptual design found the project's scope, cost, and schedule to be appropriate and found no issues that would necessitate reevaluating the project; (2) the third team made no overall comments on the project; (3) the three teams also had nearly 800 specific comments; (4) comments that the review teams considered to be significant related to: (a) the design of the remote handling and tritium extraction processes; (b) the need for the project's schedule to allow for contingencies that could occur in the process and equipment development; and (c) the adequacy of the level of detail in the conceptual design report; (5) DOE handled each review team's specific comments differently; (6) for one team, the Savannah River Project Office prepared a response to each comment, and DOE headquarters had three members of the original review team comment on the adequacy of the responses; (7) for comments made by the second team, the Project Office responded to all comments, but did not seek the team's review of the responses; (8) for the third review team's comments, DOE responded to each comment, but the design team has not yet reviewed the responses; (9) overall, DOE made many changes to the conceptual design because of the review teams' comments and appears to have been generally responsive to the comments; (10) however, some comments--such as the one related to a need to include contingencies in the projects' schedule--have not been resolved to the satisfaction of the review teams; and (11) nonetheless, DOE approved the conceptual design report and the project entered the preliminary design phase in October 1997. |
gao_GAO-12-346 | gao_GAO-12-346_0 | FDA Lacks a Comprehensive List of Its IT Systems
Federal guidance calls for agencies to prepare and maintain a comprehensive list of their IT systems. Although FDA reported spending approximately $439 million for IT investments in fiscal year 2011, the agency does not have a comprehensive list of IT systems identifying and providing key information about the systems that it currently uses or is developing. IV for a list of the 44 IT investments.) In addition to the OMB budget documents, the agency’s list of 21 mission- critical systems and modernization initiatives did not fully identify FDA’s IT systems. Until the agency has a comprehensive inventory of its IT assets, it will lack the information needed to ensure that it is identifying the appropriate mix of investments that best meet its needs and priorities. Nevertheless, much work remains on FDA’s largest mission-critical system modernization project, MARCS, and a lack of adequate planning, among other things, makes it uncertain when or if it will meet its goals of replacing eight key legacy systems and providing needed functionality. In addition, FDA has not yet fully implemented key IT management capabilities to guide and support its modernization effort, such as IT strategic planning, enterprise architecture development and implementation, and IT human capital planning. By enhancing existing applications and developing new systems, it is to provide information to headquarters and field users to perform inspections, compliance activities, and laboratory operations. However, despite its importance to FDA’s overall modernization efforts, much of the planned functionality has not been delivered, and FDA has yet to retire the legacy systems MARCS was intended to replace. While the Program Manger provided a fiscal year 2011 schedule and multiple 2012 subproject schedules, these documents lacked key information that is required in an IMS. Until FDA establishes these capabilities, successful completion of its modernization efforts is in jeopardy. Since 2008, the agency has had five CIOs, potentially hampering its ability to plan and effectively implement a long- range IT strategy. FDA Has Made Mixed Progress in More Effectively Sharing and Integrating Data
Data sharing is critical for FDA to effectively carry out its mission. As previously noted, the agency needs timely access to data to be able to support its product review and approval process, its inspection of imports and manufacturing facilities, and its postmarket surveillance activities. Specifically, the agency has several initiatives under way to more effectively share its data, including adopting an enterprisewide standard for formatting data, and several projects aimed at enhancing its ability to share data, both internally and with external partners. However, these projects have made mixed progress, and more significant work remains for FDA to fully implement standardized data sharing across the agency. FDA Has Not Adequately Assessed Data-Sharing Opportunities within the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
OMB and the Federal CIO Council guidance state that agencies should analyze their business and information environments to determine information-sharing requirements and identify improvement opportunities.information sharing within the agency and other government agencies. Nonetheless, the center has not comprehensively assessed its information-sharing needs and capabilities to identify further opportunities for data sharing and system integration. Conclusions
While FDA has taken several important steps toward modernizing its IT environment, much remains to be done, and these efforts have not been guided by key foundational IT management practices, which expose them to significant risk. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure the success of FDA’s modernization efforts, we are recommending that the Commissioner of FDA direct the CIO to take the following four actions:
Take immediate steps to identify all of FDA’s IT systems and develop an inventory that includes information describing each system, such as costs, system function or purpose, and status information, and incorporate use of the system portfolio into the agency’s IT investment management process. In its comments, the department neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations but stated that FDA has taken actions to address many of the issues in our report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) current portfolio of information technology (IT) systems, including the number of systems in use and under development, and their purpose and costs; (2) assess the status and effectiveness of FDA’s efforts to modernize the mission-critical systems that support its regulatory programs; and (3) examine the agency’s progress in effectively integrating and sharing data among key systems. We supplemented our analysis with interviews of the agency’s CIO, Chief Technology Officer, Chief Enterprise Architect, Senior Technical Advisor, and other relevant IT managers regarding management of FDA’s IT portfolio, the status of and plans to modernize key systems such as MARCS, shortfalls in mission-related systems, IT strategic and human capital planning, status of enterprise architecture development, and efforts to improve interoperability of systems that support FDA’s regulatory mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), relies heavily on information technology (IT) to carry out its mission of ensuring the safety and effectiveness of regulated consumer products. Specifically, IT systems are critical to FDAs product review, adverse event reporting, and compliance activities. Recognizing limitations in its IT capabilities, the agency has undertaken various initiatives to modernize its systems. GAO was asked to (1) assess FDAs current portfolio of IT systems, including the number of systems in use and under development, and their purpose and costs; (2) assess the status and effectiveness of FDA's efforts to modernize the mission-critical systems that support its regulatory programs; and (3) examine the agency's progress in effectively integrating and sharing data among key systems. To do this, GAO reviewed information on key FDA systems and interviewed agency officials to determine the status of systems and the effectiveness of key IT management practices, as well as data sharing among key systems.
What GAO Found
While FDA has taken several important steps toward modernizing its IT environment, much remains to be done. FDA reported spending about $400 million for IT investments in fiscal year 2011; however, the agency currently lacks a comprehensive IT inventory that identifies and provides key information about the systems it uses and is developing. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and GAO guidance call for federal agencies to maintain such an inventory in order to monitor and manage their IT investments. This inventory should include information on each system, such as costs, functionality or purpose, and status. However, FDA does not have such a comprehensive list of its systems. Instead, the agency points to budget documents required by OMB, which included information on 44 IT investments for fiscal year 2011. The agency also provided a partial list of 21 mission-critical systems and modernization initiatives. Nonetheless, agency officials acknowledged that these documents do not identify all FDAs systems or the complete costs, purpose, or status of each system. Until the agency has a complete and comprehensive inventory, it will lack critical information needed to effectively assess its IT portfolio.
Much work remains on FDAs largest and costliest system modernization effortthe Mission Accomplishments and Regulatory Compliance Services program. This program is estimated to cost about $280 million and is intended to enhance existing applications and develop new systems that provide information for inspections, compliance activities, and laboratory operations. However, much of the planned functionality has not been delivered and its completion is uncertain. Moreover, the program lacks an integrated master schedule identifying all the work activities that need to be performed and their interdependencies. FDAs Chief Information Officer (CIO) stated that the agency is reevaluating the scope of the initiative. As a result, it is uncertain when or if FDA will meet its goals of replacing key legacy systems and providing modernized functionality to support its mission. In addition, FDA has not yet fully implemented key IT management capabilities essential for successful modernization, as previously recommended by GAO. These include developing an actionable IT strategic plan, developing an enterprise architecture to guide its modernization effort, and assessing its IT human capital needs. This is due in part to the fact that FDAs IT management structure has been in flux. Since 2008, the agency has had five CIOs, hampering its ability to plan and effectively implement a long-range IT strategy. While the agency recently hired a CIO, without stable leadership and capabilities, the success of FDAs modernization efforts is in jeopardy.
The agency currently has initiatives under way to improve its data sharing with internal and external partners, including adoption of an enterprisewide standard for formatting data and several projects aimed at enhancing its ability to share data. Effective data sharing is essential to its review and approval process, inspection of imports and manufacturing facilities, and tracking of contaminated products. However, these projects have made mixed progress, and significant work remains for FDA to fully implement standardized data sharing. Further, FDAs Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition has not comprehensively assessed information-sharing needs to ensure that its systems and databases are organized for effective information sharing. This is needed to help ensure more efficient access to and sharing of key information supporting its mission.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that FDA develop a comprehensive inventory of its IT systems, develop an integrated master schedule for a major modernization effort, and assess information needs to identify opportunities for greater sharing. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations but stated that FDA has taken actions to address many of the issues in the report. |
gao_RCED-98-65 | gao_RCED-98-65_0 | In addition, in September 1996, HUD entered into pilot contracts with one corporation to test the approach of contracting out all management and marketing functions associated with HUD’s inventory of acquired single-family properties at three field offices—the Maryland and Louisiana state offices and the Sacramento Area Office—that, according to HUD’s Single-Family Property Disposition Director, were already understaffed in relation to the sizes of their inventories. Weaknesses Exist in HUD’s Oversight of REAM Contracts
We found that HUD does not have a system in place for monitoring its field offices’ administration of REAM contracts. As a result, the government may sell properties for less than they are worth or incur unnecessary holding and maintenance costs because the properties are not marketable. These changes are motivated primarily by HUD’s larger effort to downsize the agency and to substantially reform management practices agencywide. HUD envisions that these changes, when implemented, will limit the need for REAM contractors’ services. Nevertheless, it appears that HUD’s property disposition operations will continue to rely on contractors’ services to some extent for the foreseeable future. Many of these staff reductions will come from single-family housing operations, including Real Estate Owned functions. Specifically, according to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Single-Family Housing, the Department plans to sell the rights to properties before they enter inventory, thus enabling them to be quickly disposed of once they become available. Specifically, these controls should require that (1) field locations complete performance evaluations of contractors (using the standard monitoring guide in HUD’s Property Disposition Handbook) prior to renewing contracts and communicate the results of these evaluations to the contractors in writing in a timely manner; (2) field location program offices maintain files on contractors’ performance; (3) HUD staff or contractors hired to perform monitoring duties conduct monthly on-site inspections of a sample of properties in inventory; (4) contracts contain clear and consistent requirements on when contractors’ routine inspection reports must be submitted to HUD for review; (5) HUD staff ensure that real estate asset management contractors notify HUD of deteriorated or hazardous conditions at custodial properties; and (6) HUD headquarters obtain sufficient information to monitor homeownership centers’ and field offices’ administration of the contracts. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested by the Chairman, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, House Committee on Banking and Financial Services; the Chairman, Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies, Senate Committee on Appropriations; and the Chairman, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Regulatory Relief, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,we evaluated (1) whether the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is ensuring that real estate asset management (REAM) contractors meet their contractual obligations and (2) what actions HUD has planned or under way to change its handling and disposition of the single-family properties in its inventory. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) whether the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is ensuring that real estate asset management contractors meet their contractual obligations; and (2) what actions HUD has planned or under way to change its handling and disposition of the single-family properties in inventory.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HUD does not have an adequate system in place to assess oversight of real estate asset management contractors, and the three HUD field offices that GAO visited varied greatly in their efforts to monitor these contractors' performance; (2) none of the offices adequately performed all of the functions needed to ensure that the contractors meet their contractual obligations to maintain and protect HUD-owned properties; (3) GAO's physical inspection of properties for which the contractors in each location were responsible identified serious problems, including vandalism, maintenance problems, and safety hazards; (4) these included such things as broken windows, graffiti, leaking roofs, and broken steps; (5) these conditions may decrease the marketability of HUD's properties; decrease the value of surrounding homes; increase HUD's holding costs; and, in some cases, threaten the health and safety of neighbors and potential buyers; (6) in connection with HUD's plans to reduce staff by about 29 percent by the year 2002, HUD's single-family property disposition operations, including the real estate asset management function, are in a period of transition; (7) these changes are closely linked to HUD's agencywide 2020 Management Reform Plan; (8) they include: (a) a reduction in property disposition staff and the consolidation of all field offices' single-family housing operations into four homeownership centers; (b) plans to sell the rights to properties before they are assigned to HUD's property disposition inventory so that they can be quickly disposed of once they become available; and (c) to some degree, the use of contracts similar to a pilot program started in September 1996 to test the approach of contracting out all marketing and management functions associated with acquired properties; and (9) while HUD envisions that these changes will eventually limit the need for real estate asset management contractors' services, there will continue to be properties in need of such services for the foreseeable future, even if on a smaller scale. |
gao_GAO-02-972 | gao_GAO-02-972_0 | Such technologies could be used by countries of concern to upgrade their military capabilities. Export Licensing and Visa Regulations Impose Requirements on Foreign Nationals Working in the United States
To work with controlled dual-use technology in the United States, foreign nationals and the firms that employ or sponsor them must comply with U.S. export control and visa regulations. Commerce, in consultation with other departments, is responsible for issuing deemed export licenses to firms that employ or host foreign nationals. Deemed export licenses are generally valid for 2 years. Almost 10 percent of all export licenses approved by Commerce authorize deemed exports. Commerce Approves Most Deemed Export License Applications
In fiscal year 2001, Commerce approved 822 deemed export license applications and rejected 3. About 90 percent of the licenses approved in fiscal year 2001 authorized foreign nationals to work with advanced electronics, computer, or telecommunications and information security technologies (see fig. Not all domestic transfers of technology to foreign nationals require a deemed export license. Commerce’s Efforts to Detect Unlicensed Deemed Exports Do Not Use All Available Sources of Data
To better direct its efforts to detect possible unlicensed deemed exports, Commerce screens applications for H-1B and other types of visas submitted overseas and develops potential cases for enforcement staff in the field. However, it does not screen H-1B change-of-status applications submitted domestically to INS for foreign nationals already in the United States. Also, Commerce cannot readily track the disposition of potential cases referred to the field. According to DOD officials, these conditions are needed to mitigate the risk to U.S. national security posed by providing controlled dual-use technology to a foreign national. Commerce uses several of these conditions to limit the level of technology to which foreign nationals may be exposed. The licensing conditions were first formulated in 1997 by an interagency group that included representatives of the departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and Energy. A firm may also be required to monitor the immigration status of the foreign employee and to document whether the foreign national leaves the firm before becoming a permanent resident of the United States. | What GAO Found
To protect its national security and foreign policy interests, the United States controls exports of civilian technologies that have military uses. U.S. firms may be required to obtain a license from the Department of Commerce before exporting these "dual-use" technologies from the United States to many other countries, including countries of concern. Since Commerce regulations also deem domestic transfers of controlled dual-use technologies to citizens of these countries to be exports, Commerce may require firms that employ foreign nationals working with these technologies in this country to obtain "deemed" export licenses. The firms should, in many cases, hold a deemed export license, and the foreign nationals should have an appropriate visa classification, such as an H-1B specialized employment classification. Commerce issues deemed export licenses to firms that employ or sponsor foreign nationals after consulting the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy. Deemed export licenses are generally valid for 2 years and comprise almost 10 percent of all export licenses approved by Commerce. In fiscal year 2001, Commerce approved 822 deemed export license applications and rejected 3. Most of the approved licenses allowed foreign nationals from countries of concern to work with advanced computer, electronic, or telecommunication and information security technologies in the United States. To better direct its efforts to detect possible unlicensed deemed exports, in fiscal year 2001 Commerce screened thousands of applications for H-1B and other types of visas submitted by foreign nationals overseas. From these applications, it developed 160 potential cases for follow-up by enforcement staff in the field. However, Commerce did not screen thousands of H-1B change-of-status applications submitted domestically to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for foreign nationals already in the United States. In addition, Commerce could not readily track the disposition of the 160 cases referred to field offices for follow-up because it lacks a system for doing so. Commerce attaches security conditions to almost all licenses to mitigate the risk of providing foreign nationals with controlled dual-use technologies. However, according to senior Commerce officials, Commerce staff do not regularly visit forms to determine whether these conditions are being implemented because of competing priorities, resource constraints, and inherent difficulties in enforcing several conditions. |
gao_GAO-15-638T | gao_GAO-15-638T_0 | FCC Has Made Progress Implementing Lifeline Reforms, but Some Reform Efforts Remain Incomplete
Our March 2015 report found that FCC has made progress implementing reform efforts contained in the Order. In May 2015, FCC reported the results of the broadband pilot program. In addition, to reduce the burden on consumers and Lifeline providers, the Order called for an automated means for determining Lifeline eligibility by the end of 2013. Performance goals and measures: FCC established three outcome- based goals: (1) to ensure the availability of voice service for low- income Americans, (2) to ensure the availability of broadband for low- income Americans, and (3) to minimize the Universal Service Fund contribution burden on consumers and businesses. FCC identified performance measures it will use to evaluate progress towards these goals, but it has not yet fully defined these measures. FCC Has not Evaluated the Extent to which Lifeline is Efficiently and Effectively Reaching its Performance Goals
In our March 2015 report, we found that FCC has not evaluated the effectiveness of the Lifeline program, which could hinder its ability to efficiently achieve program goals. Although FCC attributes the penetration rate improvement to Lifeline, several factors could play a role. For example, changes to income levels and prices have increased the affordability of telephone service, and technological improvements, such as mobility of service, have increased the value of telephone service to households. FCC officials stated that the structure of the program has made it difficult for the commission to determine causal connections between the program and the penetration rate. However, FCC officials noted that two academic studies have assessed the program. These studies suggest that household demand for telephone service—even among low-income households—is relatively insensitive to changes in the price of the service and household income. As a result, we concluded that the Lifeline program, as currently structured, may be a rather inefficient and costly mechanism to increase telephone subscribership among low-income households, because several households receive the subsidy for every additional household that subscribes to telephone service due to the subsidy. In our March 2015 report, we recommended that FCC conduct a program evaluation to determine the extent to which the Lifeline program is efficiently and effectively reaching its performance goals of ensuring the availability of voice service for low-income Americans while minimizing program costs. The results of an evaluation could be used to clarify FCC’s and others’ understanding of how the Lifeline program does or does not address the problem of interest—subscription to telephone service among low-income households—and to assist FCC in making changes to improve program design or management. FCC agreed that it should evaluate the extent to which the Lifeline program is efficiently and effectively reaching its performance goals and said that it would address our recommendation. Usefulness of Broadband Pilot Program May Be Limited by FCC’s Lack of Evaluation Plan and Other Challenges
In our March 2015 report we also found that FCC’s broadband pilot program includes 14 projects that test an array of options and will generate information that FCC intends to use to decide whether and how to incorporate broadband into Lifeline. FCC officials said they aimed to test and reveal “causal effects” of variables. We found that FCC did not conduct a needs assessment or develop implementation and evaluation plans for the broadband pilot program, as we had previously recommended in October 2010. We noted that a needs assessment could provide information on the telecommunications needs of low-income households and the most cost-effective means to meet those needs. FCC officials noted that the pilot program is one of many factors it will consider when deciding whether and how to incorporate broadband into Lifeline, and to the extent the pilot program had flaws, those flaws will be taken into consideration. Since our report was issued, FCC released a report on the broadband pilot program, which discusses data collected from the 14 projects. The pilot projects enrolled approximately 12 percent of the 74,000 low-income consumers that FCC indicated would receive broadband through the pilot projects. FCC officials told us they do not view the pilot’s low enrollment as a problem, as the program sought variation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through FCC's Lifeline program, companies provide discounts to eligible low-income households for telephone service. Lifeline supports these companies through the Universal Service Fund (USF); in 2014, Lifeline’s disbursements totaled approximately $1.7 billion. Companies generally pass their USF contribution obligation on to their customers, typically in the form of a line item on their telephone bills. In 2012, FCC adopted reforms to improve the program’s internal controls and to explore adding broadband through a pilot program. This testimony summarizes the findings from GAO’s March 2015 report (GAO-15-335) and provides information on (1) the status of Lifeline reform efforts, (2) the extent to which FCC has evaluated the effectiveness of the program, and (3) how FCC plans to evaluate the broadband pilot program. GAO reviewed FCC orders and other relevant documentation; analyzed 2008-2012 Census Bureau data; and interviewed FCC officials, officials at four pilot projects selected based on features such as technology, and officials from 12 Lifeline providers and four states selected based on factors such as disbursements and participation.
What GAO Found
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has made progress implementing reforms to the Lifeline Program (Lifeline), which reduces the cost of telephone service for eligible low-income households. In 2012, FCC adopted a Reform Order with 11 key reforms that aimed to increase accountability and strengthen internal controls, among other things. FCC has made progress implementing eight of the reforms, including the National Lifeline Accountability Database, which provides a mechanism to verify an applicant’s identify and whether the applicant already receives Lifeline service. FCC has partially implemented three of the reforms. For example, FCC established performance goals for the program, but it has not fully defined performance measures.
FCC has not evaluated the extent to which Lifeline is efficiently and effectively reaching its performance goals—to ensure the availability of voice service for low-income Americans and minimize the burden on consumers and businesses that fund the program. FCC attributes improvements in the level of low-income households' subscribing to telephone service over the past 30 years to Lifeline, but other factors, such as lower prices, may play a role. FCC officials stated that Lifeline's structure makes evaluation difficult, but referred GAO to two academic studies that have evaluated the program. These studies suggest that household demand for telephone service—even among low-income households—is relatively insensitive to changes in the price of service and household income; therefore, several households may receive the Lifeline subsidy for every additional household that subscribes to telephone service due to the subsidy. GAO has found that program evaluation can help agencies understand whether a program is addressing an intended problem. Without a program evaluation, FCC does not know whether Lifeline is effectively ensuring the availability of telephone service for low-income households while minimizing program costs.
The usefulness of the broadband pilot program may be limited by FCC’s lack of an evaluation plan and other challenges. The pilot program included 14 projects to test an array of options and provide data on how Lifeline could be structured to promote broadband. Although GAO recommended in 2010 that FCC develop a needs assessment and implementation and evaluation plans for the pilot, FCC did not do so. A needs assessment, for example, could provide information on the telecommunications needs of low-income households and the most cost-effective means to meet those needs. In addition, the 14 projects enrolled about 12 percent of the 74,000 customers anticipated. FCC officials said they do not view the pilot’s low enrollment as a problem, as the program sought variation. FCC officials noted that the pilot program is one of many factors it will consider when deciding whether and how to incorporate broadband into Lifeline, and to the extent the pilot program had flaws, those flaws will be taken into consideration. In May 2015, FCC released a report which discusses data collected from the pilots.
What GAO Recommends
In its March 2015 report, GAO recommended that FCC conduct a program evaluation to determine the extent to which the Lifeline program is efficiently and effectively reaching its performance goals. FCC agreed that it should evaluate the extent to which the program is efficiently and effectively reaching its performance goals and said that it will address GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-958 | gao_GAO-03-958_0 | For example, studies show that immunizations against influenza can prevent thousands of hospitalizations and deaths each year among those age 65 and older. Many Medicare beneficiaries did not receive recommended preventive services, such as influenza and pneumonia immunizations. 1). In CMS’s Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey of 2000, however, about 30 percent of Medicare beneficiaries did not receive an influenza vaccination, and 37 percent had never had a pneumonia vaccination. Many Beneficiaries May Be Unaware of Their Risk for Health Conditions That Preventive Care Is Meant to Detect
Many Medicare beneficiaries may not know that they are at risk for health conditions that preventive care could detect—strong evidence that they may not be receiving the full range of recommended preventive services.For example, data from CDC’s NHANES for 1999–2000 show that, of beneficiaries participating in this nationally representative survey who had a physical examination and were found to have elevated blood pressure readings at the time of the examination, 32 percent reported that no physician or other health professional had ever told them about the condition. Projected nationally, this percentage translates into 2.1 million Medicare beneficiaries (see fig. Medicare + Choice Plans Reviewed Assess Health Risks Using Varying Approaches
The Medicare + Choice plans we reviewed vary in their specific strategies for delivering preventive services, but several common themes emerge from their efforts. New Ways to Improve the Provision of Preventive Services within Medicare’s Fee-for-Service Program Are Promising but Untested
Several options have been suggested for improving the provision of preventive services within Medicare’s fee-for-service program. Following up on the study’s findings, CMS has begun designing a fee-for- service-focused demonstration project, called the Medicare Senior Risk Reduction Program, to identify health risks and follow up with preventive services provided by means other than physician visits. Perhaps of most concern, nearly one-third of beneficiaries who were screened and identified as having elevated blood pressure or high cholesterol measures in a nationally representative survey had not previously been told by their physicians or other health providers that they had these conditions. All plans we contacted had a means to identify health risks, to provide feedback on risks to patients or their physicians, and to follow up with interventions to reduce those risks. But the follow-up programs, approaches, and priorities differed among the plans we contacted, and few had evaluated their approaches in a manner that would indicate whether these programs could, without significantly increasing costs, improve health outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Because no single source contained all the information we needed to assess the extent to which Medicare beneficiaries receive preventive services through existing physician visits, we used data from four national health surveys: three conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and one conducted by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) (see table 2). To describe the preventive care approaches of Medicare + Choice plans, we consulted with national experts and officials from the American Association of Health Plans and chose five plans considered to have innovative preventive care programs. We also interviewed Department of Health and Human Services and CMS officials and reviewed documents on planned and present CMS demonstrations related to preventive services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare, the federal health program insuring almost 35 million beneficiaries age 65 and older, covers certain preventive services, such as flu shots and mammograms. Most beneficiaries receive care through Medicare's fee-for-service program, under which they generally receive these services as part of visits to the doctor for specific illnesses or conditions. Other beneficiaries receive services under Medicare's managed care program, called Medicare + Choice. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which beneficiaries received recommended preventive services through existing visits, (2) whether approaches used by Medicare + Choice plans provide insight for improving delivery of preventive care services for fee-for-service beneficiaries, and (3) what the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is doing to explore suggested options for delivering preventive care to fee-for-service beneficiaries. GAO's work included analyzing data from four national health surveys and reviewing five Medicare + Choice plans considered to have innovative approaches to delivering preventive services. GAO also interviewed Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and CMS officials and reviewed documents on CMS demonstrations related to preventive services.
What GAO Found
Most Medicare beneficiaries receive some preventive services through their visits to physicians, but relatively few receive the full range of preventive services available. Survey data showed, for example, that in 2000 about 30 percent of beneficiaries did not receive a flu shot, and 37 percent had never been vaccinated against pneumonia. Moreover, many Medicare beneficiaries are apparently unaware that they may have conditions that preventive services are meant to detect. For example, in a 1999-2000 nationally representative survey during which people received physical examinations, nearly one-third of those age 65 and older who were found to have high cholesterol measurements said they had not previously been told by a physician or other health professional that they had high cholesterol. Projected nationally, this percentage could represent 2.1 million people. No clear "best practice" approach to delivering preventive care stands out among the innovative Medicare + Choice plans GAO studied. All five plans identify health risks, provide feedback on risks to patients or their physicians, and follow up to reduce those risks. But their follow-up programs, approaches, and priorities differ, and little is known about the effectiveness of these efforts for the Medicare-age population. CMS has begun the development work to design a project evaluating the use of individual assessments of health risks, followed by counseling and other services, as a way to improve preventive care delivery. Another suggested approach--adding a routine physical examination benefit to Medicare's fee-for-service program--could provide more opportunities, but at increased cost and without guarantee that preventive services would actually be provided to Medicare beneficiaries. |
gao_GAO-09-501T | gao_GAO-09-501T_0 | In addition to monitoring these high-risk areas, we also monitor actions that DOD has taken in response to our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Over the next 5 years, DOD plans to spend more than $357 billion on the development and procurement of major defense acquisition programs. We will continue to seek to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s weapon system investments through our work on individual programs and crosscutting areas that affect acquisition outcomes. Failure to Match Requirements with Technology and Other Resources Underlie Poor Weapon Program Outcomes and Undermine Accountability
Over the past several years our work has highlighted a number of underlying systemic causes for cost growth and schedule delays at both the strategic and program levels. At the strategic level, DOD’s processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems—which together define DOD’s overall weapon system investment strategy—are fragmented. As a result, DOD fails to effectively address joint warfighting needs and commits to more programs than it has resources for, thus creating unhealthy competition for funding. Furthermore, DOD officials are rarely held accountable for poor decisions or poor program outcomes. We recently reviewed the effect of the PPBE process on major defense acquisition programs and found that the process does not produce an accurate picture of the department’s resource needs for weapon system programs. Initiating Programs with Inadequate Knowledge of Requirements and Resources Often Results in Poor Outcomes
At the program level, the key cause of poor outcomes is the approval of programs with business cases that contain inadequate knowledge about requirements and the resources—funding, time, technologies, and people—needed to execute them. Not only does DOD not conduct disciplined systems engineering prior to the beginning of system development, it has allowed new requirements to be added well into the acquisition cycle. In some of the programs we reviewed, cost estimates have been off by billions of dollars. Recent DOD Policy Changes Could Improve Future Performance of Weapon System Programs
DOD understands many of the problems that affect acquisition programs and has recently taken steps to remedy them. Concluding Observations on What Remains to Be Done
A broad consensus exists that weapon system problems are serious and that their resolution is overdue. Acquisition problems are likely to persist until DOD’s approach to managing its weapon system portfolio (1) prioritizes needs with available resources, thus eliminating unhealthy competition for funding and the incentives for making programs look affordable when they are not; (2) ensures that programs that are started can be executed by matching requirements with resources; and (3) balances the near-term needs of the joint warfighter with the long-term need to modernize the force. However, DOD could do more in this regard too by requiring new programs to have manageable development cycles, requiring programs to establish knowledge-based cost and schedule estimates, and requiring contractors to perform detailed systems engineering analysis before proceeding to system development. Recently proposed acquisition reform legislation addresses some of these areas. However, while legislation and policy revisions may lead to improvements, they will not be effective without changes to the overall acquisition environment. The department has tough decisions to make about its weapon systems and portfolio, and stakeholders, including the DOD Comptroller, military services, industry, and Congress, have to play a constructive role in the process toward change. Defense Acquisitions: Perspectives on Potential Changes to DOD’s Acquisition Management Framework. Status of Recommendations to the Department of Defense (Fiscal Years 2001-2007). Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since fiscal year 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) has significantly increased the number of major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. However, acquisition outcomes have not improved. Over the next 5 years, DOD expects to invest $357 billion on the development and procurement of major defense acquisition programs and billions more on their operation and maintenance. Last year, we reported that the total acquisition cost of DOD's portfolio of major defense programs under development or in production has grown by $295 billion (in fiscal year 2008 dollars). In most cases, the programs we assessed failed to deliver capabilities when promised--often forcing warfighters to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. Continued cost growth results in less funding being available for other DOD priorities and programs, while continued failure to deliver weapon systems on time delays providing critical capabilities to the warfighter. This testimony describes the systemic problems that have contributed to poor cost and schedule outcomes in DOD's acquisition of major weapon systems; recent actions DOD has taken to address these problems; and steps that Congress and DOD need to take to improve the future performance of DOD's major weapon programs. The testimony is drawn from GAO's body of work on DOD's acquisition, requirements, and funding processes.
What GAO Found
Since 1990, GAO has consistently designated DOD's management of its major weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area. A broad consensus exists that weapon system problems are serious, but efforts at reform have had limited effect. For several years, GAO's work has highlighted a number of strategic- and program-level causes for cost, schedule, and performance problems in DOD's weapon system programs. At the strategic level, DOD's processes for identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems, which together define the department's overall weapon system investment strategy, are fragmented. As a result, DOD fails to balance the competing needs of the services with those of the joint warfighter and commits to more programs than resources can support. At the program level, DOD allows programs to begin development without a full understanding of requirements and the resources needed to execute them. The lack of early systems engineering, acceptance of unreliable cost estimates based on overly optimistic assumptions, failure to commit full funding, and the addition of new requirements well into the acquisition cycle all contribute to poor outcomes. Moreover, DOD officials are rarely held accountable for poor decisions or poor program outcomes. Recent changes to the DOD acquisition system could begin to improve weapon program outcomes. However, DOD must take additional actions to reinforce the initiatives in practice including (1) making better decisions about which programs should be pursued or not pursued given existing and expected funding; (2) developing an analytical approach to better prioritize capability needs; (3) requiring new programs to have manageable development cycles; (4) requiring programs to establish knowledge-based cost and schedule estimates; and (5) requiring contractors to perform detailed systems engineering analysis before proceeding to system development. Recently proposed acquisition reform legislation addresses some of these areas. However, while legislation and policy revisions may lead to improvements, they will not be effective without changes to the overall acquisition environment. DOD has tough decisions to make about its weapon systems portfolio, and stakeholders, including the DOD Comptroller, the military services, industry, and Congress, have to play a constructive role in the process of bringing balance to it. |
gao_GAO-04-729T | gao_GAO-04-729T_0 | This reduction in demand has resulted in GPO’s procured printing business, which was once financially self- sustaining, experiencing losses in 3 of the past 5 years, with a net loss of $15.8 million over that period. Ongoing technological changes are also creating challenges for GPO’s longstanding structure for centralized printing and dissemination. GPO Is Making Progress in Its Transformation
The Public Printer and his leadership team recognize the challenges that they face in this changing environment and have embarked upon an ambitious effort to transform the agency. To assist in that process, our panel of printing and dissemination experts developed a series of options for GPO to consider in its planning. GPO officials responded positively to these results, commenting that that the panel’s suggestions dovetail well with their own assessments. In addition, these officials stated that they are using the results of the panel as a key part of the agency’s ongoing strategic planning process. ● Regarding GPO’s mission to disseminate information, GPO officials stated that its Office of Innovation and New Technology, established in early 2003, is leading an effort to transform GPO into an agency “at the cutting edge of multichannel information dissemination.” A major goal in this effort is to disseminate information while still addressing the need “to electronically preserve, authenticate, and version the documents of our democracy.” In addition, the Public Printer has been added to the oversight committee of the National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program, a national cooperative effort to archive and preserve digital information, led by the Library of Congress. In our October 2003 report, we stated that under the Public Printer’s direction, GPO also had taken several steps that recognize the important role strategic human capital management plays in its transformation. For example, GPO established and filled the position of Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO), shifted the focus of existing training, expanded opportunities for more staff to attend needed training, and enhanced recruitment strategies. We also made numerous recommendations to GPO on the steps it should take to strengthen its human capital management in support of its transformation. In addition, according to the CHCO, the human resources office has been reorganized into teams responsible for a particular GPO division, serving as a “one-stop shop” for all of the divisions’ human resource needs. As a first step in GPO’s strategic workforce plan, GPO’s CHCO plans to conduct a skills assessment of its workforce within the next 6 months. Finally, GPO’s CHCO is initiating a pay for performance pilot program. Specifically, we suggested that the agency consider ● working with executive branch agencies to examine the nature of their in-house printing and determine whether it could provide these services more economically; ● addressing the few areas in which executive branch agencies rated its products, services, and performance as below average, ● re-examining its marketing of electronic services to ensure that agencies are aware of them; and ● using the results of the surveys to work with agencies to establish processes that will ensure that eligible documents (whether printed or electronic) are forwarded to GPO for dissemination to the public, as required by law. In summary, the new printing and dissemination environment at the beginning of the 21st century has created significant challenges for GPO. Agency leadership recognizes these challenges and has made a commitment to transform the agency to function effectively within this changed environment. To help explore GPO’s options for the future, we contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a panel of experts to discuss (1) trends in printing, publishing, and dissemination and (2) the future role of GPO. The National Academy assembled a panel of experts on printing and publishing technologies, information dissemination technologies, the printing industry, and trends in printing and dissemination. | Why GAO Did This Study
Advances in technology have led to more organizations making information available over the Internet and the World Wide Web rather than through print, significantly changing the nature of printing and information dissemination. Government Printing Office (GPO) management recognizes that the new environment in which it operates requires that the agency modernize and transform itself and the way it does business. To assist in this transformation, GAO has been performing a comprehensive review of government printing and information dissemination and of GPO's operations. In this testimony, GAO summarizes the result of its work to date, for which GAO convened a panel of experts on printing and dissemination (assembled with the help of the National Academy of Sciences) to develop options for GPO to consider in its transformation, and surveyed executive branch customers regarding their practices and preferences for printing and dissemination, as well as on their interactions with GPO. The testimony reports on how changes in the technological environment are presenting challenges to GPO and on its progress in addressing actions that GAO's work indicates could advance its transformation effort.
What GAO Found
The changing technological environment is creating challenges for GPO. Specifically, the agency has seen declines in its printing volumes, printing revenues, and document sales. At the same time, more and more government documents are being created and downloaded electronically, many from its Web site (GPO Access). The agency's procured printing business, once selfsustaining, has experienced losses in 3 of the past 5 years, showing a net loss of $15.8 million. The sales program lost $77.1 million over the same period. In addition, these changes are creating challenges for GPO's longstanding structure for centralized printing and dissemination and its interactions with customer agencies. The Public Printer recognizes these challenges and in response has embarked upon an ambitious transformation effort. To assist in this effort, the panel of printing and dissemination experts GAO convened suggested that in its planning, GPO should focus on dissemination, rather than printing. The panel also provided specific options for it to consider as it transforms itself. GPO officials welcomed the options presented, commenting that the panel's suggestions dovetail well with their own assessments. In addition, these officials stated that they are using the results of the panel as a key part of the agency's ongoing strategic planning process. In addition, in October 2003, we reported that under the Public Printer's direction, GPO had taken several steps that recognize the important role that strategic human capital management plays in its transformation, including establishing and filling the position of Chief Human Capital Officer. At that time, we made numerous recommendations on the further actions it could take to strengthen its human capital management. In response, GPO is beginning to address these recommendations. For example, it has reorganized its human resources office into teams responsible for each of its divisions, serving as a "one-stop shop" for all of a division's human resource needs. It also plans to conduct a skills assessment of its workforce and is initiating a pay for performance pilot. |
gao_GAO-06-100 | gao_GAO-06-100_0 | USCIS also obtains information from third parties, not including IRS, to verify applicants’ self-reported data. As of December 2003, business sponsors from our nationwide selection who were not in installment agreements with the IRS or otherwise making payments to IRS, for taxes due, had unpaid assessments totaling $3.7 billion. If businesses were required to meet their tax obligations, to the extent that future business sponsors owe taxes, they would need to pay their tax bill or make payment arrangements with the IRS to come into compliance before becoming eligible to sponsor immigrant workers to enter the country. USCIS officials said a statutory change would be preferable to a regulatory change because, although they acknowledge no explicit prohibition exists in immigration laws against conditioning approval of employer petitions on their tax compliance, they have serious legal concerns about USCIS’s authority to issue such a regulation absent specific statutory authority. USCIS Can Benefit from Data Sharing with IRS in Making Immigration Eligibility Decisions
More Accurate Immigration Eligibility Decisions
IRS data can enable USCIS adjudicators to make more accurate eligibility decisions by better identifying businesses that may not have met immigration eligibility criteria. Sixteen percent of businesses from our nationwide selection (67,949 of 413,723 businesses) applying to sponsor immigrant workers did not file one or more tax returns at the time of their application to sponsor an immigrant worker between 1997 and 2004 (app. IRS and USCIS Have Data-Sharing Options but Each Presents Challenges
A variety of options is available to IRS and USCIS for establishing and implementing data sharing. An applicant-initiated data-sharing relationship could be implemented under existing IRC authority through a taxpayer consent, whereby a taxpayer authorizes IRS to disclose his or her information to other agencies. However, achieving such efficient data sharing may take time due to various legal, technological, and cost challenges that must be overcome. States are the biggest users of taxpayer information. This data-sharing relationship’s annual savings are estimated at $463 million. Further, because collecting the unpaid assessments of business sponsors would displace other tax collections work, absent funding to cover its costs of bringing the business sponsors into compliance, IRS might not realize a net increase in overall tax collections. Short of this change, either an applicant-initiated or an agency-initiated data-sharing arrangement could help improve benefit decisions. In order to develop a better understanding of the implementation challenges and costs, to explore the most practical options for full scale implementation of data sharing, and to more completely assess benefits to IRS and USCIS from data sharing, USCIS should undertake a pilot test of data sharing under existing authority to use taxpayer consents to obtain tax data. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To improve taxpayer compliance and USCIS’s immigration benefit decisions, Congress should consider (1) changing immigration eligibility to require businesses applying to sponsor immigrant workers to meet tax filing and payment obligations to sponsor immigrant workers and (2) authorizing a user fee to be collected and retained by IRS to cover the costs of bringing non-compliant taxpayers into compliance. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the (1) potential benefits of data matching and the (2) options for establishing and maintaining a data- sharing relationship between the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), including any challenges associated with those options. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2000, federal agencies estimated they saved at least $900 million annually through data sharing initiatives. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can use data from taxpayers and third parties to better ensure taxpayers meet their obligations. Likewise, Congress has authorized certain agencies access to taxpayer information collected by IRS to better determine benefit eligibility. In July 2004, we reported that data sharing between IRS and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has the potential to improve tax compliance as well as immigration eligibility decisions (GAO-04-972T). For this report, GAO determined (1) the potential benefits of data matching, and (2) the options and associated challenges.
What GAO Found
Data sharing can help improve (1) tax compliance if businesses applying to sponsor immigrant workers are required to meet tax filing and payment requirements, and (2) the accuracy and timeliness of USCIS's immigration eligibility decisions if it obtained tax data from IRS to help ensure business sponsors meet eligibility criteria. As of December 2003, IRS databases showed 18,942 businesses (5 percent) applying to sponsor immigrant workers had $5.6 billion in unpaid assessments. Of this amount, businesses were not in installment agreements with IRS or otherwise making payments on $3.7 billion. If future business sponsors owe taxes and are required to meet their tax obligations, they would need to make arrangements with the IRS to come into compliance. Although USCIS officials acknowledge that no explicit prohibition exists in immigration laws against conditioning approval of employer applications on their tax compliance, USCIS officials said a statutory change is preferable because they have legal concerns about USCIS's authority to issue such a regulation absent specific authority. IRS data can help USCIS make more accurate eligibility decisions by better identifying businesses that may not have met eligibility criteria due to having unpaid assessments or not filing returns. In our nationwide selection, 67,949 of 413,723 (16 percent) business sponsors were in IRS's nonfiler database at the time of their application. A variety of options is available to IRS and USCIS for establishing and implementing data sharing. An applicant-initiated data-sharing arrangement could be implemented under existing Internal Revenue Code authority through taxpayer consent, whereby taxpayers authorize IRS to disclose their information. USCIS then could verify applicant-provided data by obtaining tax returns or tax transcripts. Treasury guidance suggests a small-scale pilot using consents as a way to make the business case for continued access to taxpayer information. In general, the more that data sharing could be done electronically, the more efficient the data sharing could be. However, achieving electronic data sharing may take longer than paper-based processes due to legal, technological, and cost challenges. Further, if business sponsors need to come into compliance, net tax collections might not increase if collecting their taxes displaces other IRS work. Establishing user fees to cover data-sharing costs could be a way to fund data sharing, but IRS lacks the authority to collect and retain a user fee to cover compliance-related costs associated with data sharing. |
gao_GAO-14-424 | gao_GAO-14-424_0 | State Uses a Multistage Process to Respond to Congressional Correspondence
State uses a multistage process to respond to both constituent-related and substantive correspondence. Specifically, they said that they use the database to track the status of State’s response letters as they move through the following stages of State’s process:
Congressional Correspondence Unit initiates case in database: When State receives a piece of congressional correspondence, the Congressional Correspondence Unit scans a copy of the correspondence and records information about it—such as the date received, the member’s name, and subject—into the database. For all other cases, the process includes the following stages. Bureau of Legislative Affairs reviews draft response letter: The tasked bureau or office transmits its draft response letter to the Congressional Correspondence Unit, which conducts an initial review of the draft response letter. State Did Not Track the Timeliness of Nearly Half of Its Responses to Congressional Correspondence
We found that State did not track key information about the timeliness of nearly half of its responses to congressional correspondence. We reviewed data concerning 4,804 pieces of correspondence and identified 2,524 (53 percent) cases in which State tracked the time it took to respond and also met its timeliness goal of responding to congressional correspondence within 21 days. However, we found that the Bureau of Legislative Affairs did not track the time State took to respond to 1,544 (32 percent) of the 4,804 cases that we reviewed because the Bureau of Consular Affairs— which was tasked with drafting and mailing these responses directly to constituents and members—did not notify the Bureau of Legislative Affairs when it did so, as required by State policy. Therefore, we could not determine whether State had actually sent such acknowledgments in the 736 cases where the response time exceeded 21 days, which constituted 15 percent of the 4,804 cases we reviewed. According to State policy, within 21 business days of receiving congressional correspondence, State must provide the member with either (1) a response letter or (2) an interim acknowledgment informing the member that State’s response will take more than 21 days and explaining why. We reviewed data concerning the 4,804 pieces of correspondence that State’s database indicated had been received and responded to between April 2011 and June 2013. State Did Not Track the Timeliness of Response Letters Tasked to the Bureau of Consular Affairs for Direct Reply to Constituents and Members
We found that State did not track if and when the Bureau of Consular Affairs replied directly to constituents and sent copies of the replies to members of Congress because the Bureau of Consular Affairs did not notify the Bureau of Legislative Affairs when sending those response letters, as required by State policy. Because State’s database lacks accurate data for almost a third of the cases we reviewed and does not have complete data on interim acknowledgments for the 15 percent of cases where the response time exceeded 21 business days, State cannot readily determine the extent to which it is meeting its timeliness goal for these cases (see fig. 1). In 2011, State took an important step toward ensuring that it is doing so by employing a database to help track and manage the process of drafting and mailing its response letters. Without accurate and complete data, State is not in a position to identify elements of the process that may be most prone to delays and develop strategies to improve the timeliness of its response letters. Ensure that State tracks if and when it provides interim acknowledgments to members of Congress. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix II, State agreed with our recommendations and said it would begin to implement them immediately. | Why GAO Did This Study
State receives about 2,200 pieces of correspondence each year from members of Congress seeking information. GAO was asked to review State's procedures for responding to requests for information.
GAO examined (1) State's process for responding to congressional correspondence and (2) the extent to which State tracks the timeliness of its responses to congressional correspondence. To do so, GAO reviewed information on 4,804 pieces of correspondence that State indicated it had received and responded to between April 2011—when State said it began using a database to track its response letters—and June 2013. GAO also interviewed cognizant State officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) uses a multistage process to respond to congressional correspondence. In April 2011, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs (the Bureau), which is responsible for tracking State's response letters, began using a database to track State's responses as they move through the stages of the process. The process includes the Bureau entering key information into a database, tasking other State bureaus or offices with subject matter expertise to draft response letters, and conducting reviews of draft response letters prior to mailing them. In some cases, the Bureau tasks other bureaus with drafting, reviewing, and mailing the letters themselves.
State did not track key information on the timeliness of nearly half of its responses to congressional correspondence. State's timeliness goal is to provide the member, within 21 business days of receiving his or her correspondence, with either a response letter or an interim acknowledgment informing the member of the delay. State tracked the time it took to respond and also met its timeliness goal in 2,524 (53 percent) of the 4,804 cases that GAO reviewed. However, State did not track the timeliness of its responses in 1,544 (32 percent) of the cases GAO reviewed because the bureau tasked with mailing the response directly to constituents and members did not notify the Bureau when it did so, as required by State policy. In those cases, the Bureau recorded the date it tasked the other bureau as the date State sent its response letter, although it had no information as to if or when this actually occurred. In addition, because the Bureau did not systematically track State's interim acknowledgments in cases that took more than 21 days, GAO could not determine whether State actually sent such acknowledgments in 736 (15 percent) of the cases GAO reviewed where the response time exceeded 21 days (see figure). Because its database lacks accurate and complete data, State is not in a position to identify elements of the process that may be most prone to delays and therefore cannot develop strategies to improve the timeliness of its response letters.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State (1) take steps to ensure that all response letters, including those tasked to bureaus to reply directly to constituents and members, are tracked; and (2) ensure that if and when interim acknowledgments to members of Congress are provided, they are tracked. State agreed with GAO's recommendations and said it would begin to implement them immediately. |
gao_GAO-11-727 | gao_GAO-11-727_0 | USAID and State Conduct TCB Activities Aligned with Their Primary Goals; TCB Is Secondary to Goals of Other Agencies
Of the four agencies we reviewed that fund and implement TCB activities, only USAID and State have strategic plans that include TCB-focused goals. In conjunction with objectives other than TCB, USAID conducts TCB- related activities that indirectly support TCB by helping countries take advantage of trade-related economic opportunities. TCB Is Secondary to the Goals of MCC and the Army
Other agencies we reviewed do not have TCB-focused strategic goals, but conduct activities that have trade-related effects and that are considered TCB to fulfill their broader mission goals. MCC operates differently than USAID and other U.S. agencies in that it only provides assistance to developing countries based on criteria involving governance and economic reform measures. However, the Army funds trade-related physical infrastructure projects considered TCB as part of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan and in support of its infrastructure development efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the database, from 2005 to 2010, overall annual funding increased 25 percent, from $1.35 billion to $1.69 billion. The Inclusion of MCC and the Army Has Significantly Increased the Reported Levels of and Changed the Composition of Total TCB Funding
Since our previous review of TCB assistance in 2005, there have been significant changes in the level and composition of total TCB funding as reported by the U.S. TCB database. Annual TCB funding in the category of physical infrastructure has grown from $346 million in 2005 to $787 million in 2010, a 127 percent increase. The TCB Database Does Not Adequately Explain Significant Factors Driving Changes in the Composition of TCB Funding
The Database Does Not Fully Explain Limitations That May Cause Prior Years’ Reporting to be Understated
Difficulties reporting previous years’ data for newly identified sources of TCB funding may mean that funding levels for those years are understated in certain cases. USAID officials explained that the TCB survey is designed to solicit such a determination because it surveys those officials responsible for managing the projects “on the ground.”
Although the TCB survey attempts to identify and quantify just the trade- related components of a physical infrastructure project, we found examples where the application of this distinction was challenging. USAID Has Improved Its Assessment of TCB, but Has Not Made Plans to Make Use of Insights from a Recent Multicountry Evaluation, or to Conduct Additional Evaluations
USAID has made improvements in assessing the results of its TCB assistance, including developing indicators and taking the positive step of commissioning its first independent agencywide multicountry evaluation of TCB activities, as we recommended in our 2005 report. In addition, it has commissioned a limited number of evaluations of specific TCB programs to assess longer-term results. Although the agency is developing training based on the results of the evaluation, it has not developed plans for disseminating best practices to missions nor has it made plans for conducting such evaluations on an ongoing basis. Activities in the trade and investment program area relate to TCB, and USAID uses 20 trade and investment standard indicators to measure the immediate results of its TCB activities. USAID Has Yet to Take Action on the Evaluation’s Results or Plan for Additional Evaluations
Although the evaluation examined the results of USAID’s TCB activities for the purpose of learning from experiences, improving the design and implementation of TCB assistance, and informing efforts to systematically monitor and evaluate results, it has yet to take action to incorporate the results of the evaluation into its management of TCB activities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the management and evaluation of TCB activities, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID take the following two actions: Explicitly and publicly report the identified limitations associated with the methodology used to collect and report data in the U.S. government TCB database, including MCC and the Army’s data issues, and consider ways to differentiate between categories of assistance that directly and indirectly relate to TCB. USAID stated that it has already taken steps consistent with our recommendations. Clear reporting and transparency in methodology and collection are essential for users of the TCB database; the actions USAID has already taken, as well as those they state they intend to take, should facilitate the ability of users to understand changes in the nature of TCB over time. We are suggesting that USAID document its specific plans for conducting TCB evaluations on an ongoing basis. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) how agencies’ trade capacity building (TCB) activities are aligned with the agencies’ goals, (2) the extent to which the U.S. TCB database provides sufficient information on key trends and funding, and (3) the extent to which U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of its TCB activities. These include the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Departments of the Army (Army) and State (State), and USAID. In addition, we included the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in our review due to its role in trade policy coordination. To understand how agencies’ TCB activities are aligned with the agencies’ goals, we analyzed strategic, budget, and programmatic documents describing these agencies’ TCB funding and activities. U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 2005 to 2010, 24 U.S. agencies provided more than $9 billion in trade capacity building (TCB) assistance to help more than 100 countries reduce poverty, increase economic growth, and achieve stability through trade. To report on TCB funding, the U.S. government conducts an annual survey of agencies and publicly reports the data in a TCB database administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO examined (1) how agencies' TCB activities are aligned with the agencies' goals, (2) the extent to which the TCB database provides sufficient information on key trends and funding, and (3) the extent to which USAID monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of its TCB activities. GAO focused on the agencies that reported the most funding for TCB activities since 2005--the Departments of the Army and State, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and USAID--and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). GAO analyzed U.S. government data; reviewed agencies' strategic, budget, and program documents; and met with U.S. and foreign government officials in select countries.
What GAO Found
USAID and State conduct TCB activities that are aligned with their primary goals, but TCB is secondary to the goals of other agencies. USAID and State have developed strategic plans that include TCB-focused goals. Aligned with these goals, USAID and State assist countries in negotiating and implementing trade agreements. In addition, USAID assists countries in taking advantage of economic growth opportunities stemming from trade, often in conjunction with other agency goals. TCB is not a primary focus of MCC and the Army, however, they conduct activities to meet their broader agency goals that have trade-related effects. MCC identifies trade-related assistance it considers TCB as part of its programs' poverty reduction goals. The Army implements TCB-related physical infrastructure projects as part of its disaster response objectives and in support of its reconstruction and economic development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. government TCB database has reported that annual TCB funding has increased from $1.35 billion in 2005 to $1.69 billion in 2010, but the database does not adequately describe certain factors underlying this growth and other significant changes in the composition of TCB funding. From 2005 to 2010, two agencies--MCC and the Army--began reporting significant TCB funding, primarily for physical infrastructure projects. Their funding comprised 54 percent of total TCB, and physical infrastructure projects comprised 45 percent of total TCB. However, the TCB database does not adequately explain significant factors driving changes in the composition of TCB funding. In particular, the annual TCB survey methodology attempts to identify and quantify just the trade-related components of projects, but this can be difficult in practice, particularly for physical infrastructure projects. Although GAO found the survey data to be generally reliable, these factors can lead to limitations in the data that are not described for its users. Clear reporting and transparent methodology and data collection are essential to understanding levels of funding and changes in the nature of TCB over time. USAID has improved its assessment of TCB activities, including developing performance indicators and taking the positive step of commissioning a multicountry evaluation of the effects of TCB, but it has yet to develop plans to make use of the evaluation's valuable insights. USAID uses trade and investment indicators to assess the immediate results of its TCB activities. However, officials explained that it is difficult to attribute trade-related trends revealed by the indicators to the effects of TCB assistance and collect valid and reliable data to measure progress. To assess longer-term results, USAID has commissioned evaluations of TCB programs in specific countries, but these are limited in number. It recently commissioned a multicountry evaluation of the long-term effectiveness of its TCB activities agencywide. While USAID is beginning to incorporate the evaluation's results in its training, it has yet to develop plans for disseminating best practices to missions and offices on the methods they may use to better manage and assess their activities. Furthermore, it has not made plans for conducting evaluations on an ongoing basis.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Administrator of USAID publicly report identified limitations and key distinctions in the categories of TCB assistance in the database. GAO also recommends that USAID develop a written plan for using its recent TCB evaluation and for conducting evaluations on an ongoing basis. USAID stated that it has already taken steps consistent with the GAO recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-543 | gao_GAO-13-543_0 | Health Insurance Exchanges and Related Grants
PPACA mandated the establishment of exchanges—new health insurance marketplaces in each state through which qualified individuals and small businesses can compare, select, and purchase standardized health coverage from among participating issuers of health coverage. To assist states in developing exchanges, PPACA authorized HHS to award grants to states for the planning and establishment of insurance exchanges. Oversight of premium rates charged by insurance issuers historically has been primarily a state responsibility; however, PPACA established a role for HHS by requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to work with states to establish a process for the annual review of unreasonable premium increases in the individual and small group insurance markets. The regulations also establish criteria and a process by which HHS will determine whether a state has an effective rate review program and thus meets HHS’s standards for conducting the rate reviews. PPACA appropriated $250 million for HHS to award grants to states from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. This includes reviewing grant applications and evaluating whether the projects funded by the grants are on schedule and meeting goals. HHS Follows a Multistep Process to Award PPACA Exchange and Rate Review Grants to States
HHS’s process to award PPACA exchange and rate review grants to states involves soliciting, screening, and evaluating applications and making official grant awards. These include the program eligibility criteria, the amount of funding available for award, the types of activities that may be funded under the grants, the instructions for completing applications, and the process and criteria for evaluating applications. Internal Reviews and Budget Negotiations
Questions or concerns flagged during this review, as well as those identified during the objective review, can also help inform HHS officials’ future oversight of states’ use of grant funds. HHS Has Awarded about $3.8 Billion in PPACA Exchange and Rate Review Grants, Which States Are Using for Activities Related to Exchanges and to Enhance Rate Review Capabilities
As of March 27, 2013, HHS had awarded nearly $3.7 billion in exchange grants to states, much of which will be used to fund activities related to developing IT systems for states’ exchanges. HHS also awarded about $159 million in rate review grants to states, which to date has been used for five key activities related to enhancing states’ rate review processes, including enhancing the transparency of issuers’ rate review filings. HHS Awarded nearly $3.7 Billion in Exchange Grants to States, Much of Which Will Fund Activities Related to Developing Information Technology Systems
Between September 2010, when exchange grants were first awarded, and March 27, 2013, HHS awarded 132 exchange grants totaling nearly These awards included Exchange Planning, $3.7 billion to 50 states.Early Innovator, and Level 1 and 2 Establishment grants. HHS’s Process for Overseeing PPACA Exchange and Rate Review Grants Consists of Several Key Mechanisms
HHS oversees states’ use of grant funds by reviewing and analyzing state-reported information and conducting some limited verification of state data. Regular Oversight of Exchange and Rate Review Grants to Date Is Primarily Based on Review of State- Reported Information and Some Limited Independent Verification
CCIIO’s regular oversight process for exchange and rate review grants consists of a variety of mechanisms through which project officers regularly review information reported by grantees as well as communicate with grantees. As part of this progress report, CCIIO requires exchange program grantees to provide information on the amount of grant funds spent over the life of the grant across key budget categories. CCIIO officials indicated that exchange grant site visits are in their early stages and have been utilized to provide technical assistance to help grantees establish their exchanges. Further, OAGM officials said that so far they had not identified any misuse of grant funds on the basis of established program criteria. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for its review and comment. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Award amount $0-1 million; depends on states’ proposed activities and budget (along with the Department of Health and Human Services’ assessment of the proposal). States preparing to support federally facilitated exchanges are eligible to use grant funding for a subset of these activities, as outlined in the funding opportunity announcement. Funding is awarded to help states undertake all exchange activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA required the establishment of health insurance exchanges and a process for the annual review of unreasonable increases in insurance premiums charged by issuers of health coverage in each state. To assist states in establishing exchanges and in enhancing their ability to review issuers premium rate increases, the law established new grant programs under which HHS is authorized to award grants to states through 2014. The law appropriated an unspecified amount of funds for exchange grants, and appropriated $250 million to HHS for rate review grants. GAO was asked to provide information on HHSs processes to award and oversee these grants. In this report, GAO describes (1) the process HHS uses to award exchange and rate review grants to states; (2) the amounts of grants and key activities states funded through the grants; and (3) HHSs process for overseeing states use of the grants.
GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and HHSs procedures that established the processes for awarding the grants. GAO obtained and analyzed data on all exchange and rate review grants awarded from August 2010 through March 2013. GAO also reviewed HHSs procedures for overseeing the grants, and interviewed officials responsible for grants oversight. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has a structured process for awarding Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) exchange and rate review grants to states. These grants are designed to help states establish exchanges--new health insurance marketplaces through which individuals and small businesses can obtain insurance--and review issuers' proposed rate increases. The grant award process consists of a series of steps during which the agency solicits, screens, and evaluates grant applications, and then makes funding awards. Once HHS deems that applications meet program eligibility criteria, applications go through various reviews, including a review by independent experts and HHS officials. On the basis of these reviews, HHS determines whether states' proposed activities are allowable, and if so, whether the associated requests for grant funding are reasonable. Based on recommendations from the reviews, HHS determines whether to award grants to states, and if so, the amounts of any grants to be awarded.
As of March 27, 2013, HHS had awarded about $3.8 billion in PPACA exchange and rate review grants that states have used or plan to use to develop exchanges and enhance rate review capabilities. This includes nearly $3.7 billion in exchange grants awarded to 49 states and the District of Columbia. Among states that have received exchange grants, the amount of funding provided to states ranges from $0.8 million (Wyoming) to about $911 million (California). Approximately half the states were awarded under $30 million in exchange grant funding, while 10 states were awarded over $100 million. As of February 2013, states had drawn down approximately $380 million of their exchange grant funds. GAO's review of a subset of exchange grantee financial reports indicated that nearly 80 percent of expenditures have been for contracts and consulting services, much of which states spent on key activities for developing exchange information technology systems. HHS also awarded about $159 million in rate review grants to 46 states and the District of Columbia, much of which has funded five key activities, including expanding the scope of rate review programs and enhancing the transparency of the rate review process.
HHS's process for overseeing states' use of PPACA grant funds consists of several mechanisms. The agency regularly monitors states' grant activities though its review of program and financial information reported by states, as well as ongoing communication with grantees. HHS's process also includes mechanisms to periodically verify state-reported information, including its analysis of states' withdrawal of grant funds and site visits. To date, however, use of site visits has been limited. HHS has a number of mechanisms it can utilize, such as restricting a grantee's access to funds, if its monitoring identifies concerns or compliance issues, but agency officials indicated they have not identified any misuse of grant funds or compliance issues to date. |
gao_GAO-05-784T | gao_GAO-05-784T_0 | Background
Three agencies share responsibility for enforcing ERISA: the Department of Labor (EBSA), the Department of the Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). EBSA enforces fiduciary standards for plan fiduciaries of privately sponsored employee benefit plans to ensure that plans are operated in the best interests of plan participants. About one-fifth of Americans’ retirement wealth is invested in mutual funds, which are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), primarily under the Investment Company Act of 1940. EBSA Uses a Multifaceted Enforcement Strategy
EBSA’s enforcement strategy is a multifaceted approach of targeted plan investigations supplemented by providing education to plan participants and plan sponsors. EBSA allows its regions the flexibility to tailor their investigations to address the unique issues in their regions, within a framework established by EBSA’s Office of Enforcement. The regional offices then have a significant degree of autonomy in developing and carrying out investigations using a mixture of approaches and techniques they deem most appropriate. Participant leads are still the major source of investigations. To supplement their investigations, the regions conduct outreach activities to educate both plan participants and sponsors. The purpose of these efforts is to gain participants’ help in identifying potential violations and to educate sponsors in properly managing their plans and avoiding violations. The regions also process applications for the Voluntary Fiduciary Correction Program (VFCP) through which plan officials can voluntarily report and correct some violations without penalty. EBSA officials told us that they open about 4,000 investigations into actual and potential violations of ERISA annually. EBSA Has Taken Steps to Address Weaknesses in Its Enforcement Program, but Significant Challenges Remain
EBSA has taken steps to address many of the recommendations we have made over a number of years to improve its enforcement program, including assessing the level and types of noncompliance with ERISA, improving sharing of best investigative practices, and developing a human capital strategy to better respond changes in its workforce. EBSA reported a significant increase in enforcement results for fiscal year 2004, including $3.1 billion in total monetary results and closing nearly 4,400 investigations, with nearly 70 percent of those cases resulting in corrections of ERISA violations. Despite this progress, EBSA continues to face a number of significant challenges to its enforcement program, including the lack of timely and reliable plan information, restrictive statutory requirements that limit its ability to assess certain penalties, and the need to better coordinate enforcement strategies with the SEC. As a result, EBSA officials told us that they are currently using plan year 2002 and 2003 Form 5500 information for computer targeting. Recent Scandals Highlight the Need for Better Coordination with SEC
Recent events such as the abusive trading practices of late trading and market timing in mutual funds and new revelations of conflicts of interest by pension consultants highlight the need for EBSA to better coordinate enforcement strategies with SEC. Given these concerns, it is important that employees’ benefits are adequately protected. Over the years, EBSA has taken steps to strengthen its enforcement program and leverage its limited resources. Congress may want to amend ERISA to address such limits on EBSA’s enforcement authority. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to address public concerns over the mismanagement and abuse of private sector employee benefit plans by some plan sponsors and administrators. The Department of Labor's Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) shares responsibility with the Internal Revenue Service and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for enforcing ERISA. EBSA works to safeguard the economic interest of more than 150 million people who participate in an estimated 6 million employee benefit plans with assets in excess of $4.4 trillion. EBSA plays a primary role in ensuring that employee benefit plans operate in the interests of plan participants, and the effective management of its enforcement program is pivotal to ensuring the economic security of workers and retirees. Recent scandals involving abuses by pension plan fiduciaries and service providers, as well as trading scandals in mutual funds that affected plan participants and other investors, highlight the importance of ensuring that EBSA has an effective and efficient enforcement program. Accordingly, this testimony focuses on describing EBSA's enforcement strategy, EBSA's efforts to address weaknesses in its enforcement program along with the challenges that remain.
What GAO Found
EBSA's enforcement strategy is a multifaceted approach of targeted plan investigations. To leverage its enforcement resources, EBSA provides education to plan participants and plan sponsors. EBSA allows its regional offices the flexibility to tailor their investigations to address the unique issues in the regions, within a framework established by EBSA's Office of Enforcement. The regional offices then have a significant degree of autonomy in developing and carrying out investigations using a mixture of approaches and techniques they deem most appropriate. Participant leads are still the major source of investigations. EBSA officials told us that they open about 4,000 investigations into actual and potential violations of ERISA annually. To supplement their investigations, the regions conduct outreach activities to educate both plan participants and sponsors. The purpose of these efforts is to gain participants' help in identifying potential violations and to educate sponsors in properly managing their plans and avoiding violations. Finally, EBSA maintains a Voluntary Fiduciary Correction Program through which plan officials can voluntarily report and correct some violations without penalty. EBSA has taken steps to address many of the recommendations we have made over the years to improve its enforcement program, including assessing the level and types of noncompliance with ERISA, improving sharing of best investigative practices, and developing a human capital strategy to better respond changes in its workforce. EBSA reported a significant increase in enforcement results for fiscal year 2004, including $3.1 billion in total monetary results and closing about 4,400 investigations, with nearly 70 percent of those cases resulting in corrections of ERISA violations. Despite this progress, EBSA continues to face a number of significant challenges to its enforcement program, including (1) the lack of timely and reliable plan information, which is highlighted by the fact that EBSA is currently using plan year 2002 and 2003 plan information for its computer targeting, (2) restrictive statutory requirements that limit its ability to assess certain penalties, and (3) the need to better coordinate enforcement strategies with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is highlighted by recent scandals involving the trading practices and market timing in mutual funds and conflicts of interest by pension consultants. |
gao_GAO-08-618 | gao_GAO-08-618_0 | Magnitude of Unpaid Taxes of Medicare Providers
Our analysis found that over 27,000 Medicare providers had over $2 billion in unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2006. This represented over 6 percent of the approximately 436,000 Medicare providers paid during calendar year 2006. The amount of unpaid federal taxes we identified among Medicare providers was substantially understated because (1) we intentionally limited our scope to providers with agreed-to federal tax debt for tax periods prior to 2006; (2) the IRS taxpayer data reflected only the amount of unpaid taxes either reported by the taxpayer on a tax return or assessed by IRS through its various enforcement programs and thus the unpaid tax debt amount did not include entities that did not file tax returns or underreported their income; and (3) our analysis does not include Medicare providers that owed taxes under separate TINs from those that received the Medicare payments. Examples of Medicare Providers Involved in Abusive and Potentially Criminal Activity Related to the Federal Tax System
For all 25 cases involving Medicare providers with outstanding tax debt that we audited and investigated, we found abusive activity, potentially criminal activity, or both related to the federal tax system. Rather than fulfill their role as “trustees” of this money and forward it to IRS as required by law, these Medicare providers diverted the money for other purposes. In addition, as discussed previously, willful failure to remit payroll taxes is a criminal felony offense punishable by imprisonment up to 5 years. As a result, many of the Medicare providers in our case studies continued to receive Medicare payments while failing to pay their federal taxes. In addition to failure to pay taxes, our investigations also revealed that certain Medicare providers had significant quality-of-care and other problems. For example, several cases involved quality-of-care problems, including patient neglect, for example, losing track of a patient in the provider’s care who has not been found and not taking appropriate actions to prevent a patient’s suicide. Even if such requirements did exist, absent taxpayer consent, federal law generally prohibits IRS from disclosing taxpayer data, and consequently, CMS and its contractors have no access to tax data directly from IRS. In addition, CMS has not fully participated in the continuous levy program. As a result, the federal government potentially lost opportunities to collect over $140 million in unpaid taxes during calendar year 2006. Further, CMS has not implemented a process for continuously levying payments made by Medicare contractors. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following two actions: To enhance program integrity, consider (1) issuing guidance requiring Medicare contractors to determine to the extent feasible if prospective Medicare providers (including any Medicare providers that reenroll into Medicare) have delinquent federal taxes, including obtaining applicant consent to inquire as to tax debt status from IRS, and (2) using the results of those inquiries in determining whether to enroll such providers into the Medicare program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify the magnitude of unpaid federal taxes owed by Medicare providers, we obtained and analyzed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax debt data as of September 30, 2006. We also obtained and analyzed calendar year 2006 Medicare payments to providers from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). To identify indications of abuse or potentially criminal activity, we selected 25 Medicare providers for a detailed audit and investigation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Medicare program, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and its contractors paid over $400 billion in Medicare benefits in calendar year 2006. GAO was asked to determine if Medicare providers have unpaid federal taxes and, if so, to (1) determine the magnitude of such debts, (2) identify examples of Medicare providers that have engaged in abusive or potentially criminal activities, and (3) determine whether CMS prevents delinquent taxpayers from enrolling in Medicare or levies payments to pay taxes. To determine amount of unpaid taxes owed by Medicare providers, GAO compared claim payment data from CMS and tax debt data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In addition, GAO reviewed policies, procedures, and regulations related to Medicare. GAO also performed additional investigative activities.
What GAO Found
Our analysis of data provided by CMS and IRS indicates that over 27,000 health care providers (i.e., about 6 percent of all such providers) paid under Medicare during calendar year 2006 had payroll and other agreed-to federal tax debts totaling over $2 billion. The $2 billion in unpaid tax debts only includes those debts reported on a tax return or assessed by IRS through its enforcement programs. This $2 billion figure is understated because some of these Medicare providers owed taxes under separate tax identification numbers (TIN) from the TINs that received the Medicare payments or they did not file their tax returns. We selected 25 Medicare providers with significant tax debt for more in-depth investigation of the extent and nature of any abusive or potentially criminal activity. Our investigation found abusive and potentially criminal activity, including failure to remit to IRS payroll taxes withheld from their employees. Rather than fulfill their role as "trustees" of this money and forward it to IRS as required by law, these Medicare providers diverted the money for other purposes. Willful failure to remit payroll taxes is a felony under U.S. law. Furthermore, individuals associated with some of these providers at the same time used payroll taxes withheld from employees for personal gain. Some of these individuals accumulated substantial wealth and assets, including million-dollar houses and luxury vehicles, while failing to pay their federal taxes. In addition, some providers received Medicare payments even though they had quality-of-care issues, such as losing track of a patient in their care who has not been found. CMS has not developed a policy to require contractors (1) to obtain consent for IRS disclosure of federal tax debts and (2) to screen providers for unpaid taxes. Further complicating this issue, absent consent by the taxpayer, which CMS does not require, federal law generally prohibits the disclosure of taxpayer data to CMS or its contractors. IRS can continuously levy up to 15 percent of each payment made to a federal payee--for example, a Medicare hospital--until that tax debt is paid. However, CMS has not incorporated most of its Medicare payments into the continuous levy program. As a result, for calendar year 2006, the government lost opportunities to potentially collect over $140 million in unpaid taxes. |
gao_GAO-15-339 | gao_GAO-15-339_0 | Directive Established Federal Records Management Requirements
In response to the November 2011 presidential memorandum to begin an executive branch-wide effort to reform records management policies and develop a framework for the management of electronic government records, the Director of OMB and the Archivist of the United States jointly issued a directive to heads of federal departments and agencies. However, certain requirements were not fully met by 5 of the agencies because these agencies were either still working on addressing the requirement, or did not view the requirement as being mandatory. Until agencies fully implement the directive’s requirements, the federal government may be hindered in its efforts to improve performance and promote openness and accountability through the reform of records management. All Agencies Designated a Senior Agency Official to Oversee Records Management Activities, but Not All Designated the Official at the Appropriate Level
According to the directive, by November 15, 2012, and every year thereafter, each agency is required to name or reaffirm the Senior Agency Official who is responsible for coordinating with the agency records officer and other appropriate officials to ensure the agency’s compliance with records management statutes and regulations. In those cases, it agreed to grant the officer an exemption from obtaining the certificate of Federal Records Management Training. OPM, OMB, and NARA Took Actions to Oversee Agencies’ Implementation of the Directive, but Not All Specified Actions Were Completed
OPM, OMB, and NARA had taken steps toward implementing the 11 of 13 actions specified in the directive as their responsibility, but selected requirements had not been fully addressed by the specified deadlines. For example, OPM had finalized an occupational series to elevate records management roles, responsibilities, and skill sets for agency records professionals. In addition, according to an official in OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, that agency was still in the process of updating its Circular A-130 to include records management requirements for agencies that are moving to cloud-based services or storage solutions, with the updated circular expected to be released by the end of calendar year 2015. Further, NARA had met with Senior Agency Officials and produced a plan to move agencies toward greater automation of records management. However, it had not included metadata requirements in its guidance, as required. Also in December 2012, NARA completed a review of its records management reporting requirements. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the 24 major agencies included in our study and from OMB and NARA. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the extent to which federal agencies have taken the actions called for in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Managing Government Records Directive, and (2) determine the extent to which the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), OMB, and NARA have taken actions called for in the directive, including overseeing agencies’ compliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government collects large amounts of information, increasingly in electronic form, to accomplish its missions. This greater reliance on electronic communication and information technology systems has, as a result, radically increased the information that agencies must manage. In 2012, NARA and OMB issued a directive to reform federal records management in response to a 2011 presidential memorandum on managing government records. The directive requires federal agencies, NARA, OMB, and OPM to take actions toward reforming records management policies and practices.
GAO was requested to evaluate federal agencies' implementation of the directive. GAO's objectives were to (1) assess the extent to which federal agencies have taken the actions called for in the directive and (2) determine the extent to which OPM, OMB, and NARA have taken actions called for in the directive. To do this, GAO reviewed policies, guidance, and other documentation of actions taken through December 31, 2014, by 24 selected federal agencies, NARA, and OMB, and interviewed the agencies' records management officials.
What GAO Found
The 24 federal agencies took actions toward implementing each of the seven requirements set forth in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directive on managing government records (see table).
However, certain requirements were not fully met by 5 of the agencies because these agencies were either still working on addressing the requirement, or did not view the requirement as mandatory. For example, while all 24 agencies designated a senior official to oversee records management, 2 did not designate the official at the assistant secretary level, and 1 did not reaffirm the official by the specified deadline. Further, at 2 agencies, records management officers did not obtain the NARA training certificate or had not been granted an exemption. These agencies expect to complete their training by the end of fiscal year 2015.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), OMB, and NARA took steps to implement 11 required oversight actions, although not all actions had been completed. For example, OPM finalized an occupational series to elevate records management roles, responsibilities, and skill sets for agency records professionals. In addition, OMB was in the process of updating its Circular A-130 to include records management requirements for agencies when moving to cloud-based services or storage solutions. The agency expects to release the updated circular by December 2015. Lastly, NARA, in consultation with other stakeholders, produced a plan to move agencies toward greater automation of records management. However, it did not include metadata requirements in its guidance, as required. Until agencies, OMB, and NARA fully implement the directive's requirements, the federal government may be hindered in its efforts to improve performance and promote openness and accountability through the reform of records management.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 10 recommendations to 5 federal agencies and NARA to ensure records management directive requirements on designating senior officials and identifying, reporting, and managing records are met. In commenting on a draft of this report, the agencies and NARA generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-836T | gao_GAO-02-836T_0 | Background
During World War I, at a portion of American University and in other areas that became the Spring Valley neighborhood in Washington, D.C., the U.S. Army operated a large research facility to develop and test chemical weapons and explosives. In 1993, buried ordnance was discovered in Spring Valley, leading to its designation by the Department of Defense (Defense) as a FUDS currently comprising 661 acres. Hazards Identified and Removed from Spring Valley
Although the U.S. Army twice concluded that it had not found any evidence of large-scale burials of hazards remaining at Spring Valley, an accidental discovery of buried ordnance and subsequent investigations have led to the discovery of additional munitions and chemical contamination. As of April 2002, the Corps had removed about 1,063 cubic yards of contaminated soil from American University. Despite the large increases in the scope and cost of the remaining cleanup work, in April 2002, the Corps shortened its estimate of the time to complete the cleanup by 5 years, projecting completion in fiscal year 2007. | What GAO Found
During World War I, the U.S. Army operated a large research facility to develop and test chemical weapons and explosives in the area that became the Spring Valley neighborhood in Washington, D.C. Buried ordnance, discovered there in 1993, led to the designation by the Department of Defense (DOD) of 61 acres as a formerly used defense site. Through fiscal year 2001, DOD had spent over $50 million to identify and remove hazards at the site. The government entities involved have identified and removed a large number of hazards, but the number remaining is unknown. The health risks influencing cleanup activities at Spring Valley are the possibility of injury or death from exploding or leaking ordnance and containers of chemical warfare agents and potential long-term health problems from exposure to arsenic-contaminated soil. As of April 2002, the U.S. Army estimated that the remaining cleanup activities would cost $7.1 million and take 5 years, but these estimates are unreliable. This testimony summarized a June report (See GAO-02-556). |
gao_GAO-08-763T | gao_GAO-08-763T_0 | The nation’s infrastructure is vast and affects the daily lives of virtually all Americans. Collectively, this infrastructure connects communities, facilitates trade, provides clean drinking water, and protects public health, among other things. Funding for the nation’s infrastructure comes from a variety of federal, state, local, and private sources. Increasing congestion has strained the capacity of our nation’s surface transportation and aviation systems, decreasing their overall performance in meeting the nation’s mobility needs. Aging and Deteriorating Water Infrastructure Presents Challenges
Water utilities nationwide are under increasing pressure to make significant investments to upgrade aging and deteriorating infrastructures, improve security, serve a growing population, and meet new regulatory requirements.Water infrastructure needs across the country are estimated to range from $485 billion to nearly $1.2 trillion over the next 20 years. GAO Principles Could Guide Efforts to Reexamine Federal Programs in Light of Challenges
Given the nation’s infrastructure challenges and the federal government’s fiscal outlook, we have called for a fundamental reexamination of government programs. These principles include creating well-defined goals based on identified areas of national interest, which involves examining the relevance and relative priority of existing programs in light of 21st century challenges and identifying emerging areas of national importance; establishing and clearly defining the federal role in achieving each goal in relation to the roles of state and local governments, regional entities, and the private sector; incorporating performance and accountability into funding decisions to ensure resources are targeted to programs that best achieve intended outcomes and national priorities; employing the best tools, such as benefit-cost analysis, and approaches to emphasize return on investment at a time of constrained federal resources; and ensuring fiscal sustainability through targeted investments of federal, state, local, and private resources. Various Options Are Available or Have Been Proposed to Fund Investments in the Nation’s Infrastructure
Various options exist or have been proposed to fund investments in the nation’s infrastructure. These options include altering existing or introducing new funding approaches and employing various financing mechanisms. In addition, some have suggested including an infrastructure component in a future economic stimulus bill, which could provide a one- time infusion of funds for infrastructure. Each of these options has different merits and challenges, and the selection of any of them will likely involve trade-offs among different policy goals. Furthermore, the suitability of any of these options depends on the level of federal involvement or control that policymakers desire for a given area of policy. However, as we have reported, when infrastructure investment decisions are made based on sound evaluations, these options can lead to an appropriate blend of public and private funds to match public and private costs and benefits. To help policymakers make explicit decisions about how much overall federal spending should be devoted to infrastructure investment, we have previously proposed establishing an investment component within the unified budget. Aviation user fees. Tolling. The federal government currently offers several programs to provide state and local governments with incentives such as bonds, loans, and credit assistance to help finance infrastructure. A number of available mechanisms can be used to help finance infrastructure projects. To date, $5.3 billion has been allocated for six projects. For example, although the federal government invests in surface transportation, aviation, water, and dam infrastructure, a significant portion of this infrastructure is owned by state and local governments. Performance and Accountability: Transportation Challenges Facing Congress and the Department of Transportation. Highway Trust Fund: Overview of Highway Trust Fund Estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
Physical infrastructure is critical to the nation's economy and affects the daily life of virtually all Americans--from facilitating the movement of goods and people within and beyond U.S. borders to providing clean drinking water. However, this infrastructure--including aviation, highway, transit, rail, water, and dam infrastructure--is under strain. Estimates to repair, replace, or upgrade aging infrastructure as well as expand capacity to meet increased demand top hundreds of billions of dollars. Calls for increased investment in infrastructure come at a time when traditional funding for infrastructure projects is increasingly strained, and the federal government's fiscal outlook is worse than many may understand. This testimony discusses (1) challenges associated with the nation's surface transportation, aviation, water, and dam infrastructure, and the principles GAO has identified to help guide efforts to address these challenges and (2) existing and proposed options to fund investments in the nation's infrastructure. This statement is primarily based on a body of work GAO has completed for the Congress over the last several years. To supplement this existing work, GAO also interviewed Department of Transportation officials to obtain up-to-date information on the status of the Highway Trust Fund and various funding and financing options and reviewed published literature to obtain information on dam infrastructure issues.
What GAO Found
The nation faces a host of serious infrastructure challenges. Demand has outpaced the capacity of our nation's surface transportation and aviation systems, resulting in decreased performance and reliability. In addition, water utilities are facing pressure to upgrade the nation's aging and deteriorating water infrastructure to improve security, serve growing demands, and meet new regulatory requirements. Given these types of challenges and the federal government's fiscal outlook, it is clear that the federal government cannot continue with business as usual. Rather, a fundamental reexamination of government programs, policies, and activities is needed. Through prior analyses of existing programs, GAO identified a number of principles that could guide a reexamination of federal infrastructure programs. These principles include: (1) creating well-defined goals based on identified areas of national interest, (2) establishing and clearly defining the federal role in achieving each goal, (3) incorporating performance and accountability into funding decisions, (4) employing the best tools and approaches to emphasize return on investment, and (5) ensuring fiscal sustainability. Various options are available to fund infrastructure investments. These options include altering existing or introducing new funding approaches and employing various financing mechanisms, such as bonds and loans. For example, a variety of taxes and user fees, such as tolling, can be used to help fund infrastructure projects. In addition, some have suggested including an infrastructure component in a future economic stimulus bill, which could provide a one-time infusion of funds for infrastructure projects. Each of these options has different merits and challenges, and choosing among them will likely involve trade-offs among different policy goals. Furthermore, the suitability of the various options depends on the level of federal involvement or control that policymakers desire. However, as GAO has reported, when infrastructure investment decisions are made based on sound evaluations, these options can lead to an appropriate blend of public and private funds to match public and private costs and benefits. To help policymakers make explicit decisions about how much overall federal spending should be devoted to investment, GAO has previously proposed establishing an investment component within the unified budget. |
gao_GAO-16-80 | gao_GAO-16-80_0 | For example, 6 of DOD’s 13 acquisition career fields, including 3 priority career fields— contracting, engineering, and business—did not meet growth goals. Overall Acquisition Workforce Growth Goals Have Been Met
DOD increased the size of its military and civilian acquisition workforce by 21 percent, from about 126,000 to about 153,000, between September 2008 and March 2015. DOD originally planned to insource 10,000 contractor positions for the acquisition workforce by fiscal year 2015. All but One Career Field Completed Required Competency Assessment
In October 2009, section 1108 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required DOD to include certain information as a part of its acquisition workforce plan, including an assessment of (1) the critical skills and competencies needed by the future DOD workforce for the 7-year period following the submission of the report, (2) the critical competencies of the existing workforce and projected trends in that workforce based on expected losses due to retirement and other attrition, and (3) gaps in DOD’s existing or projected workforce that should be addressed to ensure that DOD has continued access to critical skills and competencies. Without establishing appropriate time frames to conduct follow-up assessments and completing those assessments, acquisition workforce leaders will not have the data needed to track improvement in the capability of the workforce and focus future training efforts, as called for by Office of Personnel Management standards. Budget documents also indicate, however, that many career fields are projected to continue to be significantly over or under their original growth targets identified in DOD’s April 2010 acquisition workforce plan (see figure 6). In the past, some hiring decisions made by DOD components using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund exceeded initial 2010 career field targets. In addition, over the past 7 years, about 2,700 personnel, or 26 percent of those hired with these funds, were in career fields that were not considered high priority in the 2010 acquisition workforce plan. An updated plan that includes revised career field goals, coupled with guidance on how to use the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, could help DOD components focus future hiring efforts on priority career fields. Without an integrated approach, the department is at risk of using the funds to hire personnel in career fields that currently exceed their targets or are not considered a priority. Office of Personnel Management standards state that identifying skill gaps and monitoring progress towards addressing gaps are essential steps for effective human capital management. Specifically, to ensure that DOD has the right people with the right skills to meet future needs, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics direct the Director, Human Capital Initiatives to: Issue an updated acquisition workforce plan in fiscal year 2016 that includes revised career field goals; Issue guidance to focus component hiring efforts using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund on priority career fields;
Ensure the functional leader for the production, quality, and manufacturing career field completes an initial competency assessment; and
Establish time frames, in collaboration with functional leaders, to complete future career field competency assessments. GAO-13-638. GAO-12-83. Acquisition Workforce: Department of Defense’s Plans to Address Workforce Size and Structure Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO and others have found that DOD needs to take steps to ensure DOD has an adequately sized and capable acquisition workforce to acquire about $300 billion in goods and services annually. DOD is required by statute to develop an acquisition workforce plan every 2 years. DOD issued a plan in 2010, in which it called for the department to increase the size of the acquisition workforce by 20,000 positions by fiscal year 2015, but has not yet updated the plan.
Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review DOD's acquisition workforce plans. In the absence of an updated plan, this report examines DOD's efforts to (1) increase the size of its acquisition workforce, (2) identify workforce competencies and mitigate any skill gaps, and (3) plan for future workforce needs. GAO analyzed current and projected DOD workforce, budget, and career field data; reviewed completed competency assessments; and obtained insights on workforce challenges from the largest acquisition commands within the Army, Navy and Air Force.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has increased the size of its acquisition workforce from about 126,000 in September 2008 to about 153,000 in March 2015. The growth was accomplished by hiring additional civilian personnel, insourcing work previously performed by contractors, adding more military personnel, and re-categorizing existing positions. However, 6 of the 13 acquisition career fields, including 3 priority career fields—contracting, business and engineering—did not meet growth goals.
DOD has completed workforce competency assessments for 12 of the 13 acquisition career fields and added training classes to address some skill gaps. It is unclear the extent to which skill gaps remain, in part because 10 of the career fields have not conducted follow-up competency assessments to gauge progress. DOD has not established time frames for doing so. Office of Personnel Management standards state that identifying skill gaps and monitoring progress towards addressing gaps are essential steps for effective human capital management.
DOD has not updated its acquisition workforce plan, which would allow it to be better positioned to meet future needs. GAO's analysis of DOD budget information indicates that many career fields will continue to be significantly over or under the growth goals DOD established in 2010, especially in priority career fields such as contracting and engineering. In the past, some hiring decisions made by DOD components using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund exceeded initial 2010 career field targets. In addition, over the past 7 years, about 2,700 personnel, or 26 percent of those hired with these funds, were in career fields that were not considered high priority in the 2010 acquisition workforce plan. An updated plan that includes revised career field goals, coupled with guidance on how to use the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, could help DOD components focus future hiring efforts on priority career fields. Without an integrated approach, the department is at risk of using the funds to hire personnel in career fields that currently exceed their targets or are not considered a priority.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD complete the remaining competency assessment, establish time frames for conducting follow-up assessments, issue an updated acquisition workforce plan, and issue guidance to prioritize the use of funding. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-94 | gao_GAO-04-94_0 | 1.) Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project Has Not Achieved Trip-Time Goal
Amtrak has not met the goal of 3-hour rail service between Boston and New York City, although it has reduced the scheduled trip time from about 4 hours in 1994 to 3 hours 24 minutes in 2003. To do this, it completed the first milestone in FRA’s 1994 master plan—initiate electrified train service between Boston and New York City—in January 2000, and it acquired enough high-speed trains to begin limited high-speed rail service in December 2000. In total, as of March 2003, Amtrak, commuter rail authorities, and other stakeholders had completed 21 of the project’s 72 work elements—51 were either incomplete or their status was unknown. As of March 2003, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and other stakeholders had spent about $3.2 billion on the project. Under the master plan, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and state departments of transportation shared responsibility for implementing the work elements. Furthermore, Amtrak said that to achieve a reliable 3-hour schedule it was not depending on improvements to the non-Amtrak-owned sections of track (such as those owned by commuter rail authorities) that FRA had identified as essential to achieve the 3-hour trip-time goal. 2.) Amtrak Did Not Exercise Effective Management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project
Amtrak could have exercised more effective management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project had its management of the project been more comprehensive and had it focused greater attention on critical infrastructure issues needed to attain the 3-hour trip-time goal. Financial Management of the Project Was Also Not Comprehensive and Was Largely Focused on the Short Term
Amtrak’s financial management of the project was also not comprehensive, and it also focused primarily on the short term. Yet other commuter rail and state officials believed that Amtrak did not fully integrate their interests into the project’s goals. Best Practices Framework Would Support Effective Management of Large- Scale Intercity Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects
Through our work on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project and our analyses of reports and guidance published by our office, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), FTA, and FHWA, we have identified key components of a best practices framework for effectively managing large infrastructure projects, including future intercity passenger rail projects. Some large-scale infrastructure projects are already funded in phases. In our view, these projects would benefit from a project management framework that is rooted in best practices, including comprehensive planning and financial management, risk assessment and mitigation, clear accountability and oversight, and incorporation of diverse stakeholders’ interests. Specify the Federal Railroad Administration’s responsibilities for the oversight of federal expenditures on major intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects and permit as necessary, to oversee such projects, the establishment and implementation of a project management oversight-like program at the Federal Railroad Administration similar to that authorized by the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Act of 1987. 3. These efforts culminated in the 1992 Amtrak Authorization and Development Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 1990s, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) undertook the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project to make infrastructure improvements that would enable Amtrak to meet a statutory goal of providing 3-hour intercity passenger rail service between Boston and New York City. Amtrak shared responsibility for implementing the project with commuter rail authorities and state governments, and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) developed a master plan for the project and provided federal funds to Amtrak. GAO reviewed (1) the status of the project, (2) Amtrak's management of the project, (3) FRA's oversight of the project, and (4) best practices for managing future large-scale rail infrastructure projects.
What GAO Found
Amtrak has not yet met the 3-hour trip-time goal established by the 1992 Amtrak Authorization and Development Act although electrified service between Boston and New York City was initiated in January 2000 and Amtrak began limited high-speed rail service in December 2000. Currently, this trip is scheduled to take 3 hours 24 minutes. Furthermore, 51 of 72 work elements that FRA identified in its 1994 master plan as necessary to reduce trip times (e.g., electrify tracks and acquire high-speed trains), enhance capacity (e.g., construct sidings), rebuild or extend the life of physical assets (e.g., replace bridges), or make other improvements are incomplete or their status is unknown. Fifteen of these work elements are on non-Amtrak owned sections of track and are important for achieving and maintaining 3- hour service as rail traffic increases over time. Through March 2003, Amtrak and others had spent about $3.2 billion on the project. Neither Amtrak nor FRA exercised effective management or oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Amtrak's management was not comprehensive, and it was focused primarily on the short term. Amtrak focused on managing the electrification and acquisition of new high-speed trains, and did not sufficiently address major infrastructure improvements needed to attain the trip-time goal. In addition, Amtrak did not fully integrate the interests of stakeholders (commuter rail authorities and state governments) into the project, even though work that involved them was critical to achieving 3-hour service. FRA served as a conduit for federal appropriations to the project but did not have the resources or the authority to oversee Amtrak's management of the project. Best practices--including comprehensive planning, risk assessment and mitigation, comprehensive financial management, accountability and oversight, and incorporation of diverse stakeholders' interests--provide a framework for effectively managing future large-scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects. These best practices have proved effective in managing large-scale infrastructure projects and could assist in managing future projects like the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. |
gao_GAO-10-544 | gao_GAO-10-544_0 | GDL systems typically consist of three stages: learner’s permit, which allows driving only under supervision; intermediate licensure, which allows unsupervised driving under certain restrictions; and full licensure. While states are responsible for implementing teen driver safety programs, NHTSA focuses its efforts on three priorities: (1) limiting teen access to alcohol, (2) promoting seat belt use, and (3) supporting state implementation of GDL systems. U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Most State GDL Systems Include Key Requirements, but Specific Provisions Vary By State and Research on These Provisions Is Limited
States Generally Include Requirements That Safety Experts Considered Key, but Specific Provisions Vary Among States
According to NHTSA officials, state officials, and other transportation safety experts, key requirements of a GDL system include a minimum entry age, a learner’s permit stage that includes supervised driving, and restrictions on nighttime driving and driving with teen passengers. Additional key requirements for teen drivers sometimes addressed as part of a GDL system include seat belt laws, bans on electronic devices, driver education, and parental involvement. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have a three-stage GDL system and, as shown in table 1, most states include the key requirements identified by officials. For example, all states have a minimum entry age and a learner’s permit stage, 49 states have nighttime driving restrictions, 43 states have passenger restrictions, 50 states have seat belt laws, 33 states have bans on electronic devices, and 34 states require completion of driver education before obtaining a driver’s license. Nighttime driving restrictions. This study did not show a significant change in the proportion of teen drivers using cell phones after implementing a cell phone ban for teens. Parental involvement. States Face Research, Legislative, and Other Challenges to Improve Teen Driver Safety and Have Developed Strategies to Address Them
Officials from 77 federal, state, and national organizations we interviewed highlighted several challenges to improving state teen driver safety programs, including research limitations discussed previously and barriers to enhancing teen driver legislation, among others. These officials also highlighted a variety of strategies to address the challenges. Limited research identifying effective approaches for improving teen driver safety. In addition, NHTSA provides information on teen driver safety through the Countermeasures That Work guide—which is updated annually and outlines a number of science-based strategies for major highway safety problem areas, including a section on young drivers. Enacting state teen driver legislation. Many officials stated that groups, including some legislators, oppose new teen driver safety laws because the laws infringe on an individual’s personal freedom and may restrict teens from driving themselves and others to and from activities such as school and work. Enforcing teen driver safety laws. Limited resources. Limited access to standardized driver education for teens. Other challenges. Challenges with the judicial system. Recommendation for Executive Action
To assist states in understanding and implementing key requirements of a teen driver safety program and to help identify the optimum provisions of GDL systems, we recommend that NHTSA conduct additional research on specific GDL provisions, including minimum entry age, nighttime and passenger restrictions, the effect of bans on electronic devices, driver education, and parental involvement. Specifically, this report (1) identifies the key requirements of a Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) system and describes the extent to which state programs include these requirements, and (2) describes challenges that states have faced in improving teen driver safety and how NHTSA and the states have addressed these challenges. Appendix II: Recommended GDL Requirements
Appendix III: Requirements of a GDL System and State Driver Safety Provisions
Midnight – 6 a.m. restriction from age 16 to 17 (1 year)
No more than 3 passengers from age 16 to 17 (1 year)
Beginning July 1, 2010: No more than 1 passenger from age 16 to 17 (1 year)
Program includes 30 hours of classroom instruction, 12 hours in a simulator, and 3 hours in a car 6 month holding period and 40 supervised driving hours, 10 of which must be at night or in inclement weather 1 a.m. – 5 a.m. restriction from age 16 to 16, 6 months (6 months)
Midnight – 5 a.m. restriction from age 16 to 16, 6 months (6 months)
Unknown if required for licensing Students that have taken driver education are not required to undergo supervised driving hours Program includes 30 hours of classroom instruction, and 6 hours of behind-the- wheel training or equivalent 6 month holding period and zero supervised driving hours 11 p.m. – 4 a.m. restriction from age 16 to 18 (2 years)
No more than 1 passenger from age 16 to 18 (2 years)
Program includes 30 hours of classroom instruction (must not be completed in less than 15 days), 6 hours of behind-the- wheel training, and 6 hours of observation 6 month holding period and 50 supervised driving hours, 10 of which must be at night 11 p.m. – 5 a.m. restriction from age 16 to 17 (1 year)
Midnight – 5 a.m. restriction from age 16 to 17 (1 year)
No passengers for the first 6 months of intermediate licensure and no more than 1 passenger for the second 6 months of intermediate licensure (1 year)
Program includes a 4-hour awareness course, 30 hours of classroom instruction, and 6 hours of behind-the- wheel training 6 month holding period and 40 supervised driving hours 11 p.m. – 5 a.m. restriction from age 16, 4 months to 18 (1 year, 8 months)
No passengers other than parents or driving instructor for the first 6 months of intermediate licensure and no passengers other than parents, driving instructor, or members of the immediate family for the second 6 months of intermediate licensure (1 year)
Required for licensing (if under 18)
Students that have taken driver education reduce their learner’s permit holding period from 6 months to 4 months Program includes 30 hours of classroom instruction (if taken in a commercial or secondary school), and 8 hours of behind-the-wheel training 6 month holding period and 50 supervised driving hours, 10 of which must be at night 10 p.m. – 6 a.m. restriction from age 16, 6 months to 17 (6 months)
No more than 1 passenger from age 16, 6 months to 17 (6 months)
September to June: 11 p.m. – 6 a.m. Sun. | Why GAO Did This Study
Teen drivers ages 16 to 20 have the highest fatality rate of any age group in the United States. As a result, states have increasingly adopted laws to limit teen driving exposure, such as Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) systems, which consist of three stages: a learner's permit allowing driving only under supervision; intermediate licensure allowing unsupervised driving with restrictions; and full licensure. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), within the Department of Transportation (DOT), supports state teen driver safety programs by researching teen driver safety issues, working to limit teens' access to alcohol, promoting seat belt use, and encouraging states to implement GDL systems. This requested report identifies (1) key GDL system requirements and the extent to which state programs include these requirements, and (2) challenges states face to improve teen driver safety and how states and NHTSA have addressed the challenges. GAO examined state GDL systems, visited six states, and interviewed federal and state traffic safety officials and other experts.
What GAO Found
Key requirements of a GDL system, according to traffic safety experts GAO interviewed, include a minimum entry age, a learner's permit phase that includes supervised driving, and restrictions on nighttime driving and driving with teen passengers. Additional key requirements sometimes addressed as part of a GDL system include seat belt use, bans on using electronic devices such as using cell phones while driving, driver education, and parental involvement. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have a three-stage GDL system and most state systems include key requirements. For example, all states, including the District of Columbia, have a minimum entry age and learner's permit stage, 49 have nighttime driving restrictions, and 43 have passenger restrictions. However, specific provisions vary. For example, nighttime driving restrictions vary from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. in certain states to 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. in others. While research shows that GDL systems are associated with improved teen driver safety, additional research on specific requirements, such as minimum entry age, the learner's permit phase, nighttime driving and passenger restrictions, bans on electronic devices, drivers' education, and parental involvement could help state officials determine optimum provisions to strengthen their GDL systems. For example, limited research is available to indicate optimal times to limit teen driving at night or the effect of electronic device bans on teen drivers. In addition to limited research, officials identified several challenges to improving state teen driver safety programs, such as difficulty in enacting and enforcing teen driver safety laws, limited resources to implement a teen driver safety program, limited access to standardized driver education, and difficulties involving parents as their teens learn to drive, among others. For example, enacting teen driver laws can be challenging because some groups, including legislators, believe these laws infringe on an individual's personal freedom. Officials have identified a number of strategies to address these challenges. For example, several states created a commission or task force to rally public support for new teen driver laws. Strategies to address other challenges included implementing enforcement checkpoints targeting teen drivers, seeking funding from private companies, developing driver education standards, and encouraging parent participation in teen driver programs. NHTSA also helps states address these challenges in several ways, including providing information on its Web site, publishing an annual guidebook on effective traffic safety countermeasures for major highway safety problem areas, including young drivers, and regular contact with state officials. |
gao_GAO-07-1126 | gao_GAO-07-1126_0 | We will discuss them in more detail later in this report, but their general roles and responsibilities are as follows: The Access Board is an independent federal agency devoted to accessibility for people with disabilities. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) informs commercial bus companies of their ADA responsibilities and collects data on ADA compliance. However, disability advocates have said (and many federal agencies and industry associations agree) that there are still problems. Much of the data for other modes, however, are either unreliable or still being developed. Third, DOT officials indicate their enforcement options are of limited use, which suggests a need for additional options. In a number of instances, compliance has not come through federal agency enforcement but through private citizens filing lawsuits and negotiating settlements. Although some agencies have a framework in place that allows comprehensive oversight, the lack of such a framework in other agencies and the manner in which responsibility is shared results in gaps in oversight and enforcement for intercity passenger rail and commercial bus and to possible duplication of effort for public rights-of-way. The general lack of data about ADA compliance at FMCSA, FRA, and FHWA is in marked contrast to those agencies’ use of data to target oversight activities in other areas. For example, the ADA does not provide for punitive damages. However, gaps exist in the current federal regulations and guidance because they do not specify how to include that information in the plans and, if a jurisdiction has a plan, when it should update the plan. To increase coordination and communication among DOT’s modal administrations and with DOJ, thereby improving DOT’s ability to oversee and enforce the ADA, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrators of FHWA, FMCSA, and FRA to enter into formal agreements with DOJ to clearly delineate responsibility for enforcing the provisions of the ADA pertaining to surface transportation and public rights-of-way. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following three objectives: (1) what is known about the extent of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) compliance for surface transportation and public rights-of-way, (2) what difficulties, if any, the federal government faces in overseeing and enforcing compliance with the ADA, and (3) the sources of federal technical assistance that are available to help public transportation providers, businesses, and state and local governments comply with ADA requirements and what gaps, if any, exist. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board); the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Rights Division; and the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Office of Civil Rights and modal administrations, including the Federal Highway Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, and Federal Transit Administration. To identify any difficulties the federal government faces in overseeing and enforcing compliance with the ADA, we interviewed Access Board, DOJ, and DOT officials (including officials from one of the Federal Transit Administration’s regional offices) and analyzed documentation regarding oversight requirements and activities, including information on the type and frequency of activity, processes by which entities are selected for review or investigation, and resulting enforcement activities, if applicable, as well as the processes for receiving, processing, and responding to complaints. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) provides people with disabilities the legal right to access transportation and public rights-of-way, including sidewalks and street crossings. The Department of Transportation (DOT) and Department of Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for overseeing ADA compliance. GAO was asked to review federal oversight and enforcement of ADA compliance, including (1) what is known about compliance, (2) difficulties the federal government faces in overseeing and enforcing compliance, and (3) the sources of federal help and any gaps in that help. GAO's work encompassed a wide range of federal agencies and other entities, such as industry associations, transportation providers, and disability advocacy groups, as well as detailed reviews in eight cities across the country.
What GAO Found
While data indicate accessibility is improving for public transit, the extent of ADA compliance for other modes of transportation and public rights-of-way is unknown due to the lack of reliable data. For example, there are no national data on compliance with requirements for ADA paratransit--transit service that complements bus or rail transit. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) solicits compliance data from registered commercial bus companies, but the response rate is low (13 percent in 2006), and the agency has not verified or analyzed the data. In other instances, such as the accessibility of Amtrak's train stations, data are still being developed. Federal agencies face three main difficulties overseeing and enforcing compliance. First, they differ greatly in the degree to which they have an oversight framework in place. For example, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has a memorandum of understanding in place with DOJ specifying each agency's responsibilities for public transit, while the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration have no formal mechanism for coordinating with DOJ. Second, federal agencies' lack of data about compliance limits DOT's ability to target its oversight and enforcement efforts. Only the Federal Transit Administration uses data in this manner. Third, DOT officials regard their enforcement options, such as withholding grant money, as lengthy and complex processes that would not be undertaken lightly. DOT officials said the authority to impose fines--an option they lack--would be more useful. Federal agencies provide a variety of technical assistance to help entities comply with the ADA, but gaps in regulations and guidance exist. For example, one gap involves a requirement for local governments to develop plans for identifying and correcting accessibility problems with public rights-of-way. As a result, GAO found confusion about which entities needed to develop the plans and how to use and update plans once they were developed. DOJ officials said most localities had not developed such plans, leaving themselves open to private lawsuits and federal enforcement action. |
gao_RCED-98-141 | gao_RCED-98-141_0 | Outstanding and Delinquent Loans Have Declined in Recent Years
Table 1 shows that as of September 30, 1997, about 110,000 borrowers owed FSA about $9.7 billion on active direct farm loans; these figures represent 9.5 percent fewer borrowers and 14.8 percent less debt compared with those of September 1995. About 18,600 borrowers were delinquent at the end of September 1997; these borrowers owed about $2.7 billion, or 28.2 percent of the total outstanding principal. This delinquency rate is an improvement from the delinquency rates in September 1996 and 1995, which were 34.2 percent and 40.7 percent, respectively. Large Amounts of Debt Written Off Through Debt Settlements
FSA incurs losses when it writes off the direct farm loans of delinquent borrowers through its debt settlement process, which essentially represents the agency’s final resolution of unpaid loans and generally occurs after loan-security property has been liquidated. In fiscal year 1997, FSA wrote off about $380 million through debt settlements, which is down from the more than $860 million written off in fiscal year 1996 and $780 million written off in fiscal year 1995. Appendix II provides information on the five states with the most write-offs during each of these 3 fiscal years. FSA has made little use of these authorities: It has contracted with private attorneys in only two states; it has not contracted with private lenders or with private collection agencies and is not actively considering doing so. To date, FSA has contracted with private attorneys to obtain assistance in resolving delinquent farm loan accounts in only two states—Louisiana and New Jersey—and has no plans to expand its use in other states. According to FSA’s state officials, the agency canceled one contract at the law firm’s request and the other because of noncompliance with the terms of the contract. FSA’s officials acknowledged that the agency has a problem with loan servicing. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested, our objectives were to assess (1) the levels of outstanding principal on active direct farm loans at the end of fiscal years 1995 through 1997, including the amounts owed by delinquent borrowers; (2) the amount of debt written off by FSA through the debt settlement process in fiscal years 1995 through 1997; and (3) FSA’s use of three statutory provisions enacted in the mid-1990s that authorize FSA to contract with private attorneys for legal assistance in resolving delinquent farm loan accounts, private lenders for assistance in servicing farm loan borrowers’ accounts, and private collection agencies for assistance in collecting delinquent farm loans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the levels of outstanding principal on active direct farm loans at the end of fiscal years (FY) 1995 through 1997, including the amounts owed by delinquent borrowers and the amount of debt written off by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) through the debt settlement process in each of these fiscal years; and (2) FSA's use of three statutory provisions enacted in the mid-1990s that authorize FSA to contract with the private sector to resolve delinquent loans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the size of the Farm Service Agency's direct farm loan portfolio has decreased in recent years; (2) the outstanding principal on active farm loans totalled about $11.4 billion in September 1995, $10.5 billion in September 1996, and $9.7 billion in September 1997; (3) the percentage of the portfolio held by delinquent borrowers--those who were at least 30 days past due on loan repayment--also decreased; (4) in September 1995, delinquent borrowers held 40.7 percent of the outstanding principal on direct farm loans; the delinquency rates for 1996 and 1997 were 34.2 percent and 28.2 percent, respectively; (5) FSA wrote off about $380 million for almost 2,000 borrowers in fiscal year (FY) 1997 through its debt settlement process, which essentially represents the agency's final resolution of unpaid loans and generally occurs after loan-security property has been liquidated; (6) previously, the agency has written off about $860 million and $780 million in (FY) 1996 and 1995, respectively; (7) of the more than $2 billion that was written off during the 1995-1997 period, most--81.5 percent--was written off with no payments to the agency by the borrowers at the time of debt settlement; (8) the extent of these write-offs underscores the high risks associated with the agency's farm loans; (9) to date, FSA has made only limited use of one of the three new loan-servicing authorities it was given in the mid-1990s; (10) specifically, it has contracted with private attorneys to obtain legal assistance in resolving delinquent farm loan accounts in two states and has no plans to expand its use in other states; (11) in regard to the other two authorities, FSA has not contracted with private lenders or with private collection agencies and is not actively considering such contracting; and (12) agency officials said they have not used these new contracting authorities more extensively because, among other things, they can obtain assistance from the Department of Justice and the Department of the Treasury or they can perform the servicing functions with their own personnel. |
gao_GAO-09-717 | gao_GAO-09-717_0 | Misclassification itself is not a violation of any federal labor law, but it can result in violations of federal and state laws. The Current Extent of Misclassification Is Unknown, but Misclassification Can Be a Significant Problem with Adverse Consequences
Although the national extent of employee misclassification is unknown, earlier national studies and more recent, though not comprehensive, studies suggest that employee misclassification could be a significant problem with adverse consequences. In its last comprehensive estimate of misclassification, for tax year 1984, IRS estimated that nationally about 15 percent of employers misclassified a total of 3.4 million employees as independent contractors, resulting in an estimated revenue loss of $1.6 billion (in 1984 dollars). A study commissioned by DOL in 2000 found that from 10 percent to 30 percent of firms audited in nine selected states had misclassified employees as independent contractors. DOL Has Taken Limited Steps to Detect and Address Misclassification
DOL’s detection of employee misclassification is generally the indirect result of its investigations of alleged FLSA violations, particularly complaints involving nonpayment of overtime or minimum wages. DOL Makes Only Limited Use of Education or Penalties to Deter Misclassification
Although education and outreach to workers could help reduce the incidence of misclassification, DOL’s work in this area is limited. The Questionable Employment Tax Practices (QETP) program, through which IRS and states share information on worker classification-related examinations and other questionable employment tax issues. Through CSP, which IRS initiated in 1996, employers under examination that meet certain criteria can lower their misclassification-related assessments if they agree to correctly classify their workers in the future and pay proper employment taxes. Collaboration among Federal Agencies Is Limited, but States Report Successful Collaboration to Address Misclassification among Their Agencies and with IRS
DOL and IRS typically do not exchange the information they collect on misclassification, and DOL does not share information internally. However, many of these agencies did not have information sharing relationships with IRS. Some state workforce agencies surveyed noted that IRS’s QETP information sharing and communication practices could be improved. Some states have passed legislation related to misclassification. , While these task forces are relatively recent innovations, state officials told us that they have already been effective in uncovering misclassification. No Option Had Unanimous Support or Opposition
Stakeholders did not unanimously support or oppose any of the 19 options. As a result, employers may continue to misclassify employees without consequences and workers may remain unprotected by labor laws and not receive benefits to which they are entitled. To enhance efforts to protect workers and make the most effective use of their resources, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the WHD Administrator and the Assistant Secretary for OSHA to ensure that information on cases involving the misclassification of employees as independent contractors is shared between the two entities and that cases outside their jurisdiction are referred to states and other relevant agencies, as required. To identify promising practices in addressing misclassification and use agency resources most effectively, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue establish a joint interagency effort with other federal and state agencies to address the misclassification of employees as independent contractors. In addition, DOL and IRS agreed to explore opportunities to collaborate to offer education and outreach to workers on the topic of worker classification, including developing a standardized document that DOL would require employers to provide to new workers. We also obtained data from IRS’s Classification Settlement Program. To obtain information on IRS’s education and outreach activities that address misclassification, we interviewed officials from the employment tax group within SB/SE, interviewed independent contractor and labor advocates, and reviewed educational materials on classification IRS makes available on its Web site. To understand how DOL and IRS cooperate with each other and with states and other relevant agencies, we examined agency policies and procedures for sharing information on misclassification and referring cases involving misclassification, and interviewed agency and state officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
When employers improperly classify workers as independent contractors instead of employees, those workers do not receive protections and benefits to which they are entitled, and the employers may fail to pay some taxes they would otherwise be required to pay. The Department of Labor (DOL) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are to ensure that employers comply with several labor and tax laws related to worker classification. GAO was asked to examine the extent of misclassification; actions DOL and IRS have taken to address misclassification, including the extent to which they collaborate with each other, states, and other agencies; and options that could help address misclassification. To meet its objectives, GAO reviewed DOL, IRS, and other studies on misclassification and DOL and IRS policies and activities related to classification; interviewed officials from these agencies as well as other stakeholders; analyzed data from DOL investigations involving misclassification; and surveyed states.
What GAO Found
The national extent of employee misclassification is unknown; however, earlier and more recent, though not as comprehensive, studies suggest that it could be a significant problem with adverse consequences. For example, for tax year 1984, IRS estimated that U.S. employers misclassified a total of 3.4 million employees, resulting in an estimated revenue loss of $1.6 billion (in 1984 dollars). DOL commissioned a study in 2000 that found that 10 percent to 30 percent of firms audited in 9 states misclassified at least some employees. Although employee misclassification itself is not a violation of law, it is often associated with labor and tax law violations. DOL's detection of misclassification generally results from its investigations of alleged violations of federal labor law, particularly complaints involving nonpayment of overtime or minimum wages. Although outreach to workers could help reduce the incidence of misclassification, DOL's work in this area is limited, and the agency rarely uses penalties in cases of misclassification. IRS enforces worker classification compliance primarily through examinations of employers but also offers settlements through which eligible employers under examination can reduce taxes they might owe if they maintain proper classification of their workers in the future. IRS provides general information on classification through its publications and fact sheets available on its Web site and targets outreach efforts to tax and payroll professionals, but generally not to workers. IRS faces challenges with these compliance efforts because of resource constraints and limits that the tax law places on IRS's classification enforcement and education activities. DOL and IRS typically do not exchange the information they collect on misclassification, in part because of certain restrictions in the tax code on IRS's ability to share tax information with federal agencies. Also, DOL agencies do not share information internally on misclassification. Few states collaborate with DOL to address misclassification, however, IRS and 34 states share information on misclassification-related audits, as permitted under the tax code. Generally, IRS and states have found collaboration to be helpful, although some states believe information sharing practices could be improved. Some states have reported successful collaboration among their own agencies, including through task forces or joint interagency initiatives to detect misclassification. Although these initiatives are relatively recent, state officials told us that they have been effective in uncovering misclassification. GAO identified various options that could help address the misclassification of employees as independent contractors. Stakeholders GAO surveyed, including labor and employer groups, did not unanimously support or oppose any of these options. However, some options received more support, including enhancing coordination between federal and state agencies, expanding outreach to workers on classification, and allowing employers to voluntarily enter IRS's settlement program. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-85 | gao_T-HEHS-97-85_0 | Labor’s workforce development responsibilities are housed in the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) and the Veterans’ Employment and Training Service. Together, they have a fiscal year 1997 budget of about $6.5 billion and 1,595 FTEs. Workforce Development Mission Is Challenged by Multiple Programs
uncertain how this fragmented system will be able to meet the employment demands of those affected by the recent welfare reform legislation. Multiple Employment Programs With Limited Information
A major challenge for Labor is to facilitate workforce development within the context of a conglomeration of programs operated by Labor and 14 other federal departments and agencies. Welfare Act Work Requirements Pose Challenges for Workforce Development Programs
The passage of the recent welfare reform legislation is likely to have an impact on the structure and delivery of employment training programs at the state and local levels. Opportunities Exist to Improve Labor’s Worker Protection Efforts
When we testified before this Subcommittee almost 2 years ago about the overall federal role in worker protection, we stressed the need for Labor to change its approach to one that was more service oriented and made more efficient use of agency resources. But this change has not been without controversy, and further opportunities exist to develop alternative regulatory approaches. In addition to the overall need to consider alternatives to current regulatory approaches, Labor faces regulatory challenges in two specific areas: (1) redesigning the wage determination process under the Davis-Bacon Act and (2) as a result of recent legislative action, developing and enforcing regulations regarding portability of employer-provided health insurance. Changes in OSHA’s regulatory approach illustrate Labor’s action in this direction. Over the next few months, Labor officials will continue discussions with OMB as well as consultations with the Congress and the stakeholders. It has developed a draft strategic plan that identifies its performance goals and measures, and it has been working to develop a comprehensive performance measurement system that will focus on outcomes to measure its own effectiveness. By meeting these requirements, Labor has been instilling accountability and oversight into its financial activities. Labor has made some efforts to improve its information management systems; for example, it has appointed a chief information officer. Labor’s mission is an urgent one. We are hopeful that the changes Labor is making in its approach to management will help it better address the two challenges we have identified: developing employment skills through programs that meet the needs of a diverse workforce in the most cost-effective way and effectively ensuring the well-being of the nations’ workers while reducing the burden of providing that protection. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the major challenges Department of Labor faces in achieving its mission, focusing on: (1) Labor's efforts to provide effective employment and training programs that meet the diverse needs of its target populations in a cost-efficient manner; (2) Labor's efforts to ensure worker protection within a flexible regulatory structure; and (3) how Labor's ability to meet these challenges would be enhanced by the improved management envisioned by recent legislation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although Labor has historically been the focal point for workforce development activities, it faces the challenge of meeting those goals within the context of an uncoordinated system of multiple employment and training programs operated by numerous departments and agencies; (2) in fiscal year 1995, 163 federal employment training programs were spread across 15 departments and agencies (37 programs were in Labor), with a total budget of over $20.4 billion; (3) although GAO has not recounted the programs and appropriations, GAO is confident that the same problem exists; (4) rather than a coherent workforce development system, there is a patchwork of federal programs with similar goals, conflicting requirements, overlapping target populations, and questionable outcomes; (5) comprehensive legislation that would have addressed this fragmentation was considered but not passed by the 104th Congress; (6) in the absence of consolidation legislation, Labor has gone ahead with some reforms, such as planning grants for one-stop career centers, but the actions it has taken have not been enough to fix the problems; (7) passage of the recent welfare reform puts even greater demands on an employment training system that appears unprepared to respond; (8) a second major challenge for Labor is to develop regulatory strategies that ensure the well-being of the nations' workers in a less burdensome, more effective manner; (9) Labor has made some changes since GAO last testified, which are perhaps best illustrated by actions at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), such as its partnership initiatives with companies, but OSHA's actions have not been without controversy, and substantial challenges remain there and at other Labor components with worker protection responsibilities; (10) congressional action poses new challenges in the worker protection area as well; (11) Labor has committed to redesigning its Davis-Bacon wage determination process with additional funds appropriated by the Congress; (12) Labor also must issue and enforce regulations to implement the new health care portability law; and (13) in meeting these mission challenges, Labor will need to become more effective at managing its organization. |
gao_GAO-14-425 | gao_GAO-14-425_0 | Increment 3.2B was designated as a major defense acquisition program with an approved cost, schedule, and performance baseline in June 2013. This incremental approach is consistent with the approach we recommended in May 2012 and Congress mandated in the 2013 NDAA, and should provide greater transparency into cost, schedule, and performance progress. In February 2013, the Air Force awarded an ID/IQ contract with a The Air Force plans to use individual contractual agreements, known as delivery orders, which are issued under the ID/IQ contract, for each modernization effort. Issuing delivery orders for each modernization effort should support informed management and oversight of each increment by increasing visibility into funds obligated to individual efforts. Air Force’s Approach to Managing Reliability Improvement Efforts Limits Transparency of Cost and Schedule Progress
The larger of the Air Force’s two primary F-22 improvement efforts— RAMMP—is not managed with its own cost and schedule baseline. The 2013 NDAA directed the Secretary of the Air Force to submit an annual report to the congressional defense committees on the cost, schedule, and performance of RAMMP and SRP. The Air Force submitted its first report in April 2013, but did not explicitly identify baseline cost and schedule estimates for RAMMP or SRP. However, the report lacked information for RAMMP needed to serve as baseline cost and schedule estimates going forward. Without a comprehensive baseline cost and schedule estimate for reliability efforts that encompasses the life of the aircraft across all types of funding, it is difficult to consistently track cost and schedule progress on projects that to date have cost almost $1 billion. F-22 Modernization and Improvement Efforts Will Continue to Face Schedule and Performance Challenges
The Air Force faces schedule and performance challenges in its management of F-22 modernization and improvement efforts as a result of continuing maintenance issues. Delays in completing depot-level maintenance have translated into delays in fielding modernization increments, which could also affect future increments. Despite Efforts to Improve Reliability and Maintainability, the F-22 Fleet Will Not Meet Its Availability Requirement
The F-22 fleet will not achieve its availability requirement as scheduled despite substantial investments in RAMMP projects. RAMMP is intended to increase the availability of the F-22 to perform its missions, primarily through improving reliability—the likelihood that the aircraft will operate without failure—and reducing the time required to maintain the aircraft. Officials from Air Combat Command, which is involved in developing requirements for the F-22, said that the current materiel availability requirement is based on assumptions that may no longer be applicable. Command officials noted that they expect to revisit this requirement at some future point with the DOD office that approves F-22 operational requirements to discuss changing the requirement to reflect operational realities, but they did not tell us specifically when they plan to do such a reassessment.projects aimed at achieving the current requirement may be unnecessary Continued investment in some RAMMP if it is no longer considered valid. Moreover, any delay in revisiting this requirement could limit funding that DOD might be able to make available for other high priority activities in a time of austere federal budgets. Recommendations for Executive Action
To support program oversight and ensure efficient use of future funding, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to take the following two actions: Incorporate into the Air Force’s annual report to Congress on F-22 improvement projects a comprehensive cost and schedule baseline estimate for RAMMP that includes development, procurement, and operations and maintenance costs through the expected life cycle of the fleet. In its written comments, reprinted in appendix II, DOD disagreed with one recommendation and agreed with the other. DOD’s response stated that reliability and maintainability programs cannot be baselined like major defense acquisition programs because of cost fluctuations based on life cycle issues that arise as the weapon system ages. Therefore, we continue to believe the recommendation is valid. This report assesses: (1) the Air Force’s new approach to structuring its F-22 modernization efforts, (2) the Air Force’s management of its F-22 reliability and structural improvement efforts, and (3) challenges facing efforts to modernize the F-22 and address reliability and structural problems moving forward. To assess challenges facing efforts to modernize the F-22 and address reliability and structural problems moving forward, we analyzed program schedules and actual and projected aircraft availability data for fiscal years 2011 to 2018, current as of August 2013, and reviewed program documents discussing maintenance issues affecting the aircraft. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Air Force's cost estimate for modernizing the F-22 aircraft's capabilities and making improvements that address the aircraft's reliability and structural problems is $11.3 billion, as of January 2014. In February 2013, the Air Force awarded a multibillion dollar contract for F-22 modernization efforts from 2013 through 2023. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directed the Air Force to report annually on improvement efforts.
GAO was asked to review F-22 modernization and improvement efforts. This report assesses (1) the Air Force's new approach to structuring its F-22 modernization efforts, (2) the Air Force's management of its F-22 reliability and structural improvement efforts, and (3) challenges facing efforts to modernize the F-22 and address reliability and structural problems moving forward. GAO analyzed program management, contracting, and other relevant documents; analyzed aircraft availability information; and spoke with Air Force officials.
What GAO Found
After a decade of managing its efforts to modernize the F-22 as part of the original F-22 program, the Air Force has now begun structuring these efforts as distinct incremental programs, and plans to continue doing so moving forward. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) recently designated F-22 modernization Increment 3.2B—intended to integrate two types of missiles onto the F-22 and upgrade other subsystems—as a major defense acquisition program with its own baseline cost and schedule estimate. This approach is consistent with the approach mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 and recommended in a May 2012 GAO report, and should allow decision makers to see a more precise view of cost and schedule changes. Furthermore, the Air Force plans to use individual contractual agreements for each modernization effort, a contracting approach that should support informed management and oversight of each increment by increasing visibility into funds obligated to individual efforts.
In contrast to modernization, the larger of the Air Force's two primary F-22 improvement efforts—the Reliability and Maintainability Maturation Program (RAMMP)—is not managed with its own cost and schedule baseline. This approach limits transparency of cost and schedule progress. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directed the Air Force to submit an annual report to the congressional defense committees on RAMMP and on F-22 structural repair efforts, to include baseline cost and schedule estimates. While the first report submitted under this requirement in April 2013 provided some cost and schedule information on the structural repair efforts, which could be used as a baseline estimate going forward, it did not include such information for RAMMP. Without a comprehensive baseline cost and schedule estimate for reliability efforts that encompasses the life of the aircraft across all types of funding, it is difficult to consistently track cost and schedule progress on projects that, to date, have cost almost $1 billion.
The Air Force faces schedule and performance challenges in its management of F-22 modernization and improvement efforts as a result of continuing maintenance issues. Delays in completing depot-level maintenance have translated into delays in fielding modernization increments, which could also affect future increments. Further, the F-22 fleet will not achieve its availability requirement as scheduled, despite substantial investment in RAMMP projects. RAMMP is intended to increase the availability of the F-22 to perform its missions, primarily through improving reliability—the likelihood that the aircraft will operate without failure—and reducing the time required to maintain the aircraft. Air Combat Command officials stated that the current requirement is based on assumptions that may no longer be applicable, and that they expect to revisit this requirement at some future point, although they did not specify when that reassessment would occur. Thus, continued investment in some projects aimed at achieving a requirement that may no longer be valid may be unwarranted. Any delay in revisiting this requirement could limit funding DOD might be able to make available for other high priority activities in a time of austere federal budgets.
What GAO Recommends
To support program oversight and ensure efficient use of future funding, GAO recommends that the Air Force include comprehensive cost and schedule baselines for reliability projects in its annual report to Congress and expedite reassessment of the F-22 availability requirement. DOD disagreed with the first recommendation, stating that reliability programs cannot be baselined like major defense acquisition programs, and agreed with the second. GAO continues to believe the first recommendation is valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_AIMD-97-117 | gao_AIMD-97-117_0 | Due to DFAS’ reliance on computer systems to carry out its operations, the Year 2000 issue has the potential to impact virtually every aspect of the DFAS accounting and finance mission. Although DFAS is responsible for the majority of DOD’s finance and accounting systems, DFAS is not responsible for all the systems that produce financial data. During the awareness phase, DFAS developed a Year 2000 strategy that adopts the five-phased approach of awareness, assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation. As of April 1997, DFAS had taken the following actions as part of its efforts to address the Year 2000 problem: established a Year 2000 systems inventory, prepared cost estimates for systems to be renovated, instituted a quarterly Year 2000 status reporting process, appointed a project manager to provide Year 2000 guidance and track Year established a Year 2000 certification program that defines the conditions that must be met for automated systems to be considered as Year 2000 compliant. Specifically, DFAS has not identified, in its Year 2000 plan, all critical tasks for achieving its objectives or established milestones for completing all tasks, performed formal risk assessments of all systems to be renovated and ensured that contingency plans are in place in the event that renovations are not completed in time or if systems fail to operate properly, identified all systems interfaces and only a fraction of written interface agreements have been finalized with interface partners, and adequately planned to ensure that testing resources are available when needed. DFAS’ risk in these areas is increased due to its dependence on the military services and other Defense agencies, such as DISA, to ensure that their systems and related operating environments are Year 2000 compliant. No Process for Ensuring COTS Compliance
DFAS has not defined a validation process for ensuring that its COTS applications are Year 2000 compliant. Conclusions
While initial progress has been made, there are several critical issues facing DFAS, that if left unaddressed, may well result in the failure of its systems to operate at the year 2000. Although DFAS managers have recognized the importance of solving Year 2000 problems in their systems, to reduce the risk of failure with its own Year 2000 effort, it is critically important that DFAS take every measure possible to ensure that it is well-positioned to deal with unexpected problems and delays. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) program for solving the year 2000 computer systems problem, focusing on the: (1) status of DFAS' efforts to identify and correct its year 2000 systems problems; and (2) appropriateness of DFAS' strategy and actions for ensuring that problems will be successfully addressed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DFAS managers have recognized the importance of solving the year 2000 problem; (2) if not successfully addressed it could potentially impact DFAS' mission; (3) to help ensure that services are not disrupted, DFAS has developed a year 2000 strategy which is based on the generally accepted five-phased government methodology for addressing the year 2000 problem; (4) this approach is also consistent with GAO's guidelines for planning, managing, and evaluating year 2000 programs; (5) in carrying out its year 2000 strategy, DFAS has assigned accountability for ensuring that year 2000 efforts are completed, established a year 2000 systems inventory, implemented a quarterly tracking process to report the status of individual systems, estimated the cost of renovating systems, begun assessing its systems to determine the extent of the problems, and started to renovate and test some applications; (6) DFAS also established a year 2000 certification program that defines the conditions that must be met for automated systems to be considered year 2000 compliant; (7) while initial progress has been made, there are several critical issues facing DFAS, that if left unaddressed, may well result in the failure of its systems to successfully operate in 2000: (a) DFAS has not identified in its year 2000 plan all critical tasks for achieving its objectives or established milestones for completing all tasks; (b) DFAS has not performed formal risk assessments of all systems to be renovated or ensured that contingency plans are in place; (c) DFAS has not identified all system interfaces and has completed written interface agreements with only 230 of 904 interface partners; and (d) DFAS has not adequately ensured that testing resources will be available when needed to determine if all operational systems are compliant before the year 2000; (8) DFAS' risk of failure in these areas is increased due to its reliance on other DOD components; (9) DFAS is also dependent on military services and DOD components to ensure that their systems are Year 2000 compliant; and (10) it is essential that DFAS take every possible measure to ensure that it is well-positioned as it approaches 2000 to mitigate these risks and ensure that defense finance and accounting operations are not disrupted. |
gao_AIMD-98-46 | gao_AIMD-98-46_0 | We reviewed financial and operational regulations and documentation related to managing and reporting on the ship maintenance process. Implementing Guidance Needed to Ensure Consistent and Timely Reporting of Deferred Maintenance
Neither DOD nor the Navy has developed implementing guidance for determining and disclosing deferred maintenance on financial statements. Navy officials said that they are reluctant to develop their procedures until DOD issues its guidance. As we reported to DOD in our September 30, 1997, letter, DOD guidance is important to ensure consistency among the military services and to facilitate the preparation of DOD-wide financial statements. The views on how to apply the deferred maintenance standard to the ship maintenance process ranged from including only unfunded ship overhauls to estimating the cost of repairing all problems identified in each ship’s maintenance log. As a result of the variations in the way the deferred maintenance standard can be applied to ships (including submarines), DOD and the Navy need to consider a number of issues, including the following. 6 allows agencies to decide what “acceptable condition” means and what maintenance needs to be done to keep assets in that condition. The determination may also be influenced by whether the ship is currently deployed or scheduled to be deployed in the near future. Also, if DOD chooses to disclose deferred maintenance for all reported assets, including maintenance on assets not needed for current requirements, identifying the types of assets included in the deferred maintenance disclosure may be another way to differentiate between critical and noncritical. Agency Comments
In comments on a draft of this report (see appendix I), the Department of Defense agreed that it must consider the key issues identified in this report as it implements deferred maintenance reporting requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) implementation of the requirement for valuable information related to deferred maintenance on mission assets, focusing on Navy ships, including submarines.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the development of DOD and Navy policy and implementing guidance for deferred maintenance is essential to ensure consistent reporting among the military services and to facilitate the preparation of accurate DOD-wide financial statements, particularly since the new accounting standard provides extensive management flexibility in implementing the disclosure requirement; (2) Navy officials stated that they were reluctant to develop procedures to implement the required accounting standard until DOD issues overall policy guidance; (3) DOD and Navy officials have expressed numerous views as to how to apply the deferred maintenance standard to ships; (4) this makes it even more important for clear guidance to be developed; (5) the opinions ranged from including only unfunded ship overhauls to including cost estimates of repairing all problems identified in each ship's maintenance log; (6) in formulating the DOD and Navy guidance, key issues need to be resolved to allow for meaningful and consistent reporting within the Navy and from year to year including: (a) what maintenance is required to keep the ships in an acceptable operating condition; and (b) when to recognize as deferred needed maintenance which has not been done on a ship; and (7) in addition, DOD needs to address in its implementing guidance whether the: (a) deferred maintenance standard should be applied to all or only certain groups of assets, such as ships being deactivated in the near future; and (b) reported deferred maintenance should differentiate between critical and noncritical and, if so, what constitutes control. |
gao_GAO-10-333 | gao_GAO-10-333_0 | Tuna cannery officials said that minimum wage increases were a significant contributing factor in the closure of one cannery, in addition to other factors. Workers participating in discussion groups said that their support for the minimum wage increases had dwindled because of the closure of one cannery and uncertainty about the future of the remaining cannery, as well as concern about job security and reductions in benefits related to the wage increases. Small employers and other private sector officials expressed mixed views about the future minimum wage increases, including concern that they would make it more difficult to attract new industries to the CNMI; however, many expressed greater concerns about changes to immigration law. CNMI employers responding to our questionnaire reported having taken cost-cutting actions, such as freezing hiring, since the minimum wage increases began. In addition, participants expressed concern about the implementation of U.S. immigration law. In preparing this report, we interviewed officials from the U.S. We also collected detailed data from large employers in each area including through a questionnaire, as described below. Later, the Northern Mariana Islands sought self-government and permanent ties with the United States. By the end of the first quarter of 2009, the last garment factory in the CNMI had closed. As of July 2009, the federal minimum wage was set at $7.25 per hour. Appendix III: American Samoa Wages, Employment, Employer Actions, Inflation- Adjusted Earnings, and Worker Views
In American Samoa, the first minimum wage increase raised the wages of about three-quarters of workers of large private sector employers that responded to GAO’s questionnaire. Based on June 2009 wage data from our questionnaire, the future minimum wage increases would affect the wages of 95 percent of those private sector workers by 2016. Federal data show that employment grew from 2006 to 2008, while questionnaire responses show that employment dropped from 2008 to 2009. Since the September 2009 closure of one tuna cannery, employment has continued to drop. Private sector employers also reported planning actions such as leaving American Samoa or closing by the end of 2010. In discussion groups, workers generally said that their support for the wage increases had dwindled because of concerns such as the cannery closure, job insecurity, and loss of benefits. Minimum Wage Increases through 2016 Would Affect Wages of Almost All American Samoa Private Sector Workers Employed in 2009, Particularly in Canning Industry
Wages of Most Private Sector Workers Were Low Enough to Be Raised By Minimum Wage Increases in 2007-2009
According to wage data provided in large private sector employers’ responses to our questionnaire, before the first minimum wage increase in July 2007 about 74 percent of those employers’ workers earned wages close enough to the minimum to be affected by that first increase (see fig. Selected planned employer action and attribution to minimum wae increaClose or relocate (private sector)
Lay off hourly workers (public and private sectors)
Fewer Employers Attributed Their Actions to Factors Other Than the Minimum Wage Increases Than Attributed Actions to the Increases
Employers also reported that, in addition to the minimum wage increases, factors such as rising costs of utilities and of transportation and shipping contributed to their decisions and plans to cut costs and raise prices. The tariff on cleaned loins is $11 per metric ton under model B.
American Samoa Median Annual Inflation-Adjusted Earnings Declined, but Estimated Earnings for Minimum Wage Workers Who Remained Employed Increased
Median Inflation-Adjusted Earnings Declined from 2006 to 2008
Although data show that median annual earnings of workers employed in American Samoa rose from 2006 to 2008, inflation eroded these income gains; as a result, median inflation-adjusted annual earnings in American Samoa declined by about 6 percent from 2006 to 2008. CNMI government data show that following the 2007 wage increase, employment continued an existing downward trend largely reflecting the garment factory closures. In questionnaire responses, employers reported having taken cost-cutting actions, such as freezing hiring, since the increases began. Employers attributed their actions both to the minimum wage increases and to other factors. Based on an analysis of responses from CNMI employers in the hotel industry, we found that raising room rates to cover higher wage costs may cause a 2.6 to 13.7 percent decline in visits to the CNMI. CNMI government tax data show that average annual inflation- adjusted earnings declined by about 6 percent from 2006 to 2008. Although earnings data do not allow for a direct comparison of average and minimum wage annual earnings or for tracking the earnings of workers who lost their jobs, GAO estimated that annual inflation-adjusted earnings for minimum wage full-time workers who retained their jobs and hours rose by about 12 percent. In discussion groups, CNMI workers generally expressed support for the minimum wage increases and cited other factors affecting living standards. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 requires that GAO report annually on the impact of past and future minimum wage increases in American Samoa and the CNMI, and the reports are due between March 15 and April 15 of each year. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2007, the United States enacted a law incrementally raising the minimum wages in American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). The law applied the first $.50 per hour increase in July 2007 and mandated additional increases in each subsequent year until the minimum wages reach the level of the U.S. minimum wage--currently $7.25 per hour. American Samoa's lowest paid will reach that wage in 2016, and the CNMI in 2015. In American Samoa, one of two tuna canneries employing almost a third of workers closed in September 2009. In the CNMI, where the garment industry was one of two major employers, the last garment factory closed in early 2009. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act requires GAO to report annually on the impact of the minimum wage increases in American Samoa and the CNMI. In this report GAO describes, since the increases began, wages, employment, employer actions, inflation-adjusted earnings, and worker views. GAO reviewed existing information from federal and local sources. GAO also collected data from large employers (at least 50 employees) through a questionnaire and from small employers and workers through discussion groups, in addition to conducting interviews during visits to each area. GAO shared the report with relevant federal agencies and the governments of American Samoa and the CNMI and incorporated their comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
In American Samoa, the first minimum wage increase raised the wages of about three-quarters of workers at private sector employers that responded to GAO's questionnaire. June 2009 wage data from GAO's questionnaire indicate that by 2016, the minimum wage increases would affect the wages of close to 95 percent of those employers' private sector workers. Earnings data show that employment grew from 2006 to 2008, while questionnaire responses show that employment dropped from 2008 to 2009; since the September 2009 closure of one tuna cannery, employment has very likely continued to drop. Cannery officials said that minimum wage increases were a significant contributing factor in the closure of one cannery, in addition to other factors. Public and private sector officials expressed concern about the significant impact on employment if future minimum wage increases lead the remaining cannery to close or make attracting new industries more difficult. Many employers reported having taken cost-cutting actions, such as freezing hiring and cutting worker benefits, since the increases began. Employers also reported planning actions such as leaving American Samoa or closing by the end of 2010. More employers attributed their actions to the minimum wage increases than to other factors. Federal data show that median annual inflation-adjusted earnings in American Samoa declined by about 6 percent from 2006 to 2008. GAO estimated that inflation-adjusted earnings for full-time minimum wage workers who retained their jobs and hours rose by about 14 percent. In discussion groups, workers generally said that their support for the wage increases had dwindled because of concerns about issues such as the cannery closure, job insecurity, and loss of benefits. In the CNMI, the first minimum wage increase raised wages for about a third of workers at private sector employers that responded to GAO's questionnaire. June 2009 wage data from GAO's questionnaire indicate that the future increases will affect the wages of more than 80 percent of those employers' workers by 2015. CNMI government data show that following the 2007 wage increase, employment continued an existing downward trend largely reflecting the garment factory closures. Small employers and other private sector officials expressed mixed views about the future increases, and many expressed greater concern about immigration changes. In questionnaire responses, employers reported having taken cost-cutting actions, such as freezing hiring, since the increases began and also reported planning such actions by the end of 2010. Employers attributed their actions both to the minimum wage increases and to other factors. Based on an analysis of responses from CNMI employers in the hotel industry, GAO found that raising room rates to cover higher wage costs may cause a 2.6 to 13.7 percent decline in visits to the CNMI. CNMI government tax data show that average annual inflation-adjusted earnings declined by about 6 percent from 2006 to 2008. GAO estimated that annual inflation-adjusted earnings for minimum wage full-time workers who retained their jobs and hours rose by about 12 percent. In discussion groups, CNMI workers generally expressed support for the minimum wage increases and cited other factors affecting living standards. |
gao_GGD-98-108 | gao_GGD-98-108_0 | The Problem of Lengthy Processing Times for Civil Penalty Cases Is Growing Worse
In the past, civil penalty cases have not been processed in a timely manner. 1). 2). 3). Processing Times Slower in Recent Years
For 1985 through 1991, Treasury’s data show that the average processing time to close a case was 1.77 years. 4). Specifically, the average processing time to close a case was 3.02 years. “Perhaps the most serious result of civil penalty cases remaining inactive for lengthy periods of time can be the expiration of the statute of limitations....”
According to FinCEN’s data for the period January 1, 1992, through March 27, 1998, a total of 16 cases had one or more BSA violations that could not be pursued because the statute of limitations had expired. In addition, we believe that insufficient management attention has been a significant cause of the lengthy processing times for civil penalty cases. FinCEN officials told us that the agency has never set timeliness goals for civil penalty processing. For example, FinCEN’s data for the 16 cases show the following. FinCEN Has Not Issued a Regulation to Delegate Civil Penalty Authority
Section 406 of the MLSA directed the Secretary of the Treasury to delegate to appropriate federal banking regulatory agencies the authority to assess civil penalties for BSA violations. FinCEN’s current strategic plan indicates that delegation of civil penalty authority to the banking regulatory agencies may not occur before 2002. Conclusions
Except for the delegation of civil penalty authority to FinCEN in 1994, Treasury’s policies and procedures for processing civil penalty referrals for BSA violations generally have not changed since our 1992 report. Also, the number of staff processing civil penalty referrals has remained fairly constant, at about six, before and after the May 1994 delegation to FinCEN. Pending such delegation, FinCEN is still responsible for processing civil penalties. The second was to determine the status of FinCEN’s efforts regarding a provision of the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 (MLSA). More specifically, as agreed with the Chairman’s office, we focused our work on the following questions:
How, if at all, has Treasury changed its policies and procedures for processing civil penalty cases since 1992? Based upon workload and related statistics, what was Treasury’s performance in processing civil penalty cases during calendar years 1992 through 1997? What is the status of FinCEN’s efforts to develop and issue a final regulation delegating the authority to assess civil penalties for BSA violations to the federal banking regulatory agencies, as required by the MLSA? Cases closed as a percentage of annual workload 648 Average time to close case (in years)
Table III.3: Processing Times (by Time Period) for the 648 Civil Penalty Cases That Were Closed During Calendar Years 1985 Through 1997 Table III.4: Average and Range of Processing Times by Type of Action Taken for the 648 Civil Penalty Cases That Were Closed During Calendar Years 1985 Through 1997 Average (in years)
Average (in years)
Average (in years)
Comments From the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
Major Contributors to This Report
General Government Division, Washington, D.C.
Office of the General Counsel, Washington, D.C.
Geoffrey R. Hamilton, Senior Attorney The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's (FinCEN) efforts to process civil penalty referrals for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), focusing on: (1) whether Treasury has changed its policies and procedures for processing civil penalty cases since 1992; (2) Treasury's performance in processing civil penalty cases during calender years 1992 through 1997; and (3) the status of FinCEN's efforts to develop and issue a final regulation delegating the authority to assess civil penalties for BSA violations to the federal banking regulatory agencies, as required by the Money Laundering Suppression Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) except for the May 1994 delegation to FinCEN, Treasury's policies and procedures for processing civil penalty cases generally have not changed since 1992; (2) also, the number of staff processing civil penalty cases has remained fairly constant, at about six, before and after the May 1994 delegation to FinCEN; (3) the problem of lengthy processing times for civil penalty cases is growing worse; (4) for example, according to FinCEN's data for cases closed in calendar years 1985 through 1991, the average processing time to close a case was 1.77 years, and the most lengthy time was 6.44 years; (5) in comparison, FinCEN's data for calendar years 1992 through 1997 indicate an average processing time was 3.02 years, and the most lengthy time was 10.14 years; (6) for cases closed in the 2 most recent years, 1996 and 1997, the average processing times were 3.57 years and 4.23 years, respectively; (7) lengthy processing can negatively affect the public's perception of the government's efforts to enforce the BSA, thereby lessening the credibility and deterrent effects of the act's provisions; (8) another result is that the 6-year statute of limitations for BSA civil penalties could expire; (9) according to FinCEN's data, for the period January 1, 1992, through March 27, 1998, a total of 16 cases had one or more BSA violations that could not be pursued because the statute of limitations had expired; (10) insufficient management attention is a significant cause of the lengthy processing times for civil penalty cases; (11) FinCEN officials told GAO, for example, that the agency has never set timeliness goals for processing civil penalty cases; (12) FinCEN has issued neither a notice of proposed rulemaking nor a final regulation to delegate civil penalty assessment authority to the banking regulatory agencies; (13) FinCEN officials told GAO they have been working with the federal banking regulatory agencies for some time to devise an appropriate plan for delegating civil penalty assessment authority, but some issues still required resolution; (14) FinCEN's current strategic plan indicates that such delegation may not occur before 2002; and (15) for several more years, FinCEN could still be responsible for processing civil penalty referrals. |
gao_GAO-05-363 | gao_GAO-05-363_0 | Since we reported on the FBI’s lack of an architecture, others have similarly reported on this gap in the bureau’s ability to effectively modernize its systems and transform its operations. While the bureau’s EA efforts to date represent important progress from where it was in 2003, when we last assessed its efforts, much remains to be accomplished before the FBI will have an effective EA program. According to these plans, the architecture is to describe the “as is” and “to be” environments, as well as a sequencing plan. For example, the EA program office does not yet have adequate resources. Further, the program office reports that it is in the process of developing its “as is” architecture. Despite this progress, much remains to be accomplished before the FBI will have an effective EA program. Bureau Is Not Effectively Managing Its EA Contractor
Federal acquisition regulations and relevant IT acquisition management guidance recognize the importance of effectively managing contractor activities. The FBI’s approach to managing its EA contract does not include most of the performance-based contracting features described in the FAR. In tracking and overseeing its contractor, the FBI also has not employed the kind of effective practices specified in relevant acquisition management guidance. For example, the bureau does not have a written policy to govern its tracking and oversight activities, has not designated responsibility or established a group for performing contract tracking and oversight activities, and has not developed an approved contractor monitoring plan. In particular, these policies and procedures are to include an FBI-wide standard life-cycle management directive that is to define procedures for the use of performance-based contracting methods and the establishment of tracking and oversight structures, policies, and processes. Conclusions
Having a well-defined and enforced architecture is critical to the FBI’s ability to effectively and efficiently modernize its mission operations and supporting IT environment. Moreover, given that the FBI’s program is heavily relying on contractor support, it is also important for the bureau to ensure that it employs effective contract management controls that will enable it to, among other things, define contractor work to be performed in measurable, results-oriented terms; establish positive and negative contractor performance incentives; and define and implement contractor tracking and oversight processes consistent with acquisition management guidance. GAO contacts and staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As specified in the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, our objectives were to determine (1) whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is managing its enterprise architecture (EA) program in accordance with established best practices and (2) what approach the bureau is following to track and oversee its EA contractor, including the use of effective contractual controls. Detailed Descriptions of Elements in GAO’s EA Management Maturity Framework
Because the task of developing, maintaining, and implementing an EA is an important, complex, and difficult endeavor, doing so effectively and efficiently requires that rigorous, disciplined management practices be adopted. Establish a program office that is responsible for EA development and maintenance. Use a framework, methodology, and automated tool to develop the architecture. Develop an architecture program management plan. Consistent with the EA program plans discussed in Stage 2, an organization should ensure that the EA products completely and correctly describe both the “as is” and the “to be” environments of the enterprise and include a sequencing plan for migrating the organization between the two environments. According to FBI officials, these versions are not yet complete. The FBI is in the process of completing its EA, and thus, it is not yet an integral part of the bureau’s IT investment process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is currently modernizing its information technology (IT) systems to support its efforts to adopt a more bureauwide, integrated approach to performing its mission. A key element of such systems modernization programs is the use of an enterprise architecture (EA), which is a blueprint of an agency's current and planned operating and systems environment, as well as an IT investment plan for transitioning between the two. The conference report accompanying FBI's fiscal year 2005 appropriations directed GAO to determine (1) whether the FBI is managing its EA program in accordance with established best practices and (2) what approach the bureau is following to track and oversee its EA contractor, including the use of effective contractual controls.
What GAO Found
The FBI is managing its EA program in accordance with many best practices, but other such practices have yet to be adopted. These best practices, which are described in GAO's EA management maturity framework, are those necessary for an organization to have an effective architecture program. Examples of practices that the bureau has implemented include establishing a program office that is responsible for developing the architecture, having a written and approved policy governing architecture development, and continuing efforts to develop descriptions of the FBI's "as is" and "to be" environments and sequencing plan. The establishment of these and other practices represents important progress from the bureau's status 2 years ago, when GAO reported that the FBI lacked both an EA and the means to develop and enforce one. Notwithstanding this progress, much remains to be accomplished before the FBI will have an effective EA program. For example, the EA program office does not yet have adequate resources, and the architecture products needed to adequately describe either the current or the future architectural environments have not been completed. Until the bureau has a complete and enforceable EA, it remains at risk of developing systems that do not effectively and efficiently support mission operations and performance. The FBI is relying heavily on contractor support to develop its EA; however, it has not employed effective contract management controls in doing so. Specifically, the bureau has not used performance-based contracting, an approach that is required by federal acquisition regulations whenever practicable. Further, the bureau is not employing the kind of effective contractor tracking and oversight practices specified in relevant acquisition management guidance. According to FBI officials, the agency's approach to managing its EA contractor is based on its long-standing approach to managing IT contractors: that is, working with the contractor on iterations of each deliverable until the bureau deems it acceptable. This approach, in GAO's view, is not effective and efficient. According to FBI officials, as soon as the bureau completes an ongoing effort to redefine its policies and procedures for managing IT programs (including, for example, the use of performance-based contracting methods and the tracking and oversight of contractor performance), it will adopt these new policies and procedures. Until effective contractor management policies and procedures are defined and implemented on the EA program, the likelihood of the FBI effectively and efficiently producing a complete and enforceable architecture is diminished. |
gao_NSIAD-96-224 | gao_NSIAD-96-224_0 | In response to these problems, DOD and the services embarked on initiatives to correct shortfalls in wartime medical capabilities and improve medical readiness. Lack of funding may also hamper implementation of MRSP. Marine Corps
In late 1993, the Marine Corps began to reassess the reconfiguration of its medical battalions, which are part of its combat units. The project is designed to identify 25-year trends and breakthroughs in both clinical and nonclinical technologies; determine how to apply these technologies across DOD health care responsibilities, which range from personal fitness to treatment of war zone casualties; and identify how the military health services system should be funded and staffed to transition to the year 2020. The MHSS 2020 project could serve as the mechanism for identifying future medical system requirements against which MRSP and the services’ reengineering programs should be focused. However, the extent to which MRSP and these reengineering programs will be compatible with future medical system requirements will not be known until the MHSS 2020 project is completed. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to (1) assess the extent to which actions taken in response to MRSP have corrected medical capability problems, (2) take steps to resolve other unsettled problems, and (3) use the results of the MHSS 2020 project to guide the focus of MRSP and service reengineering initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to reassess and improve its medical capabilities, focusing on: (1) DOD implementation of its Medical Readiness Strategic Plan (MRSP); (2) the services' medical reengineering efforts; and (3) the Military Health Services System (MHSS) 2020 project to identify future wartime medical system requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD and the services are making progress to correct the medical capability problems that have hampered recent military operations; (2) MRSP appropriately focuses on problems that GAO and DOD have identified; (3) DOD is placing increased emphasis on implementing MRSP, after a slow start; (4) many key MRSP tasks are unfunded or partially funded; (5) the services are reconfiguring their combat hospitals into smaller components and undertaking efforts to significantly enhance their current medical system capabilities; (6) the MHSS 2020 Project has not yet identified how military health capabilities should be funded and staffed in the future; and (7) until MHSS 2020 is completed, DOD cannot determine how compatible MRSP and service reengineering programs will be with future requirements. |
gao_GAO-04-376 | gao_GAO-04-376_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to your request, our objectives were to identify existing governmentwide requirements and guidelines for certifying and accrediting federal information systems, determine the extent to which federal agencies have reported that their information systems are certified and accredited, and assess whether agencies’ certification and accreditation processes provide (1) consistent and comparable results, and (2) adequate information for authorizing officials to understand risks and make informed decisions. Elements of the certification and accreditation process described by this guidance include the following: Roles and responsibilities. FISMA-Required Standards Are Incorporated
FISMA-required standards issued by NIST are incorporated as an integral part of the new certification and accreditation process. Reported Percentages of Systems Certified and Accredited Vary Widely
For the 24 agencies we surveyed, the average percentage of systems authorized after certification and accreditation was 63 percent for the first half of fiscal year 2004. However, the status at individual agencies was mixed, with six reporting that they have certified and accredited less than half of their systems. Further, there are other factors that lessen the usefulness of these and other FISMA performance data, including the limited assurance of data reliability and quality and the need to refine reporting requirements to provide better information on the status of agencies’ information security efforts. Processes at Selected Agencies Do Not Ensure Consistent or Adequate Information
Although agencies responding to our survey indicated that their certification and accreditation processes required that specific criteria identified in federal guidance be met, our review of certification and accreditation documentation for selected systems at four agencies, as well as IG FISMA evaluations for fiscal year 2003, noted instances in which agencies do not consistently meet such criteria as a current risk assessment and security control evaluation. Funding and staffing issues were most commonly indicated, including those associated with implementing the new NIST guidance. Unless such criteria are met, agencies cannot ensure that accrediting officials are receiving consistent information on which to base their decisions, and the value of this process as a management control for ensuring information system security is limited. Further, to improve the consistency and reliability of agency FISMA reporting for administration and congressional oversight, we recommend that the OMB Director consider changes to OMB’s FISMA reporting guidance that would provide additional clarification that national security systems are to be reflected in reporting performance measurement data and that only systems granted full authorization to operate should be considered in reporting the number of systems certified and accredited; require reporting on key aspects of agencies’ certification and accreditation processes and efforts, such as how agencies ensure the quality and consistency of their certifications and accreditations and the status of their efforts according to levels of risk or impact established for their systems; and encourage the IGs to assess agency FISMA reporting processes and test agency-reported performance data as part of their FISMA-mandated independent evaluations; for example, the IGs could review the quality of agency certifications and accreditations for the subset of systems they evaluate to determine whether they meet appropriate criteria and determine whether such information is accurately reflected in the agencies’ compilation of related performance measures. Comments from all these agencies have been incorporated into the report, as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires agencies to certify the security controls of their information systems and to formally authorize and accept the risk associated with their operation (a process known as accreditation). These processes support requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA). Further, OMB requires agencies to report the number of systems authorized following certification and accreditation as one of the key FISMA performance measures. In response to the Congressional request, GAO (1) identified existing governmentwide requirements and guidelines for certifying and accrediting information systems, (2) determined the extent to which agencies have reported their systems as certified and accredited, and (3) assessed whether their processes provide consistent, comparable results and adequate information for authorizing officials.
What GAO Found
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and other agencies, including the Department of Defense, have provided guidance for the certification and accreditation of federal information systems. This guidance includes new guidelines just issued by NIST, which emphasize a model of continuous monitoring, as well as compliance with FISMA-required standards for minimum-security controls. Many agencies report that they have begun to use the new guidance in their certification and accreditation processes. The reported percentage of systems certified and accredited for operation as of the first half of 2004 was 63 percent for 24 major federal agencies. However, the picture is not uniform across the government, with 7 of the agencies reporting greater than 90 percent of their systems certified and accredited but 6 reporting fewer than half. GAO's analyses also highlighted instances in which agencies do not consistently report FISMA performance measurement data, as well as other factors that lessen the usefulness of these data, such as the limited assurance of data reliability and quality. All the agencies GAO surveyed reported that their certification and accreditation processes met criteria consistent with those identified in federal guidance, such as a current risk assessment and security control evaluation. However, our review of documentation for the certification and accreditation of 32 selected systems at four of these agencies showed that these criteria were not always met--results similar to those found by agency inspectors general. Further, three of these four agencies did not have routine quality review processes to determine whether such criteria are met--processes that could help agency accrediting officials receive consistent information on which to base their decisions. Several agencies cited obstacles in implementing their certification and accreditation processes, including resource and staffing limitations. Some agencies have taken actions to improve their processes, such as redefining system boundaries to better manage systems. |
gao_GAO-14-260 | gao_GAO-14-260_0 | Matchmaking: Activity (generally government contracting or financing initiatives) that brings together government and private-sector resources and small business owners. Recognition: Activity that celebrates the contributions of small business, small business owners, or small business advocates. Determining type and subject of activity. SBA field or program offices that originate cosponsored activities are responsible for vetting nonprofit and governmental entities; SBA’s Office of Strategic Alliances is responsible for vetting for-profit entities and upon request may assist originating offices in vetting nonprofit and government entities. After SBA’s General Counsel or their designee determines that no conflicts of interest exist with potential cosponsors and reviews the draft cosponsorship agreement for legal sufficiency, SBA field and program offices— with assistance from cosponsors—will work to finalize the agreement and develop a proposed budget for the activity that lists the sources of income, such as cash and in-kind contributions from cosponsors, in-kind contributions from SBA, and fees paid by participants, and the estimated cost of conducting the cosponsored activity. Table 1 provides information on the budgets for cosponsorship agreements SBA executed in fiscal year 2012. SBA officials and cosponsors also said that cosponsored activities provided participants with convenient access to services and resources from multiple organizations in a single location and often included counseling and training. Focus Group Participants, SBA, and Cosponsors Generally Reported That Cosponsored Activities Benefited Small Businesses
Our focus groups participants identified benefits they received from attending cosponsored activities and also noted that they obtained information on topics useful to their small business (see fig. Both SBA officials and cosponsors told us that the activities provided attendees with “one-stop shopping,” including access to services and resources from multiple organizations, counseling, and referrals. Some SBA District Offices Informally Collect Participant Feedback on Cosponsored Activities
Although the act specifies that SBA cosponsored activities provide benefits to small businesses, it does not specify how SBA should identify and measure benefits. However, SBA officials told us that the agency did not have a formal policy requiring the collection and use of participant feedback on cosponsored activities. SBA officials told us that obtaining participant feedback was not a responsibility that cosponsorship agreements were required to include. Although not required by the cosponsorship agreements, obtaining periodic participant feedback is an integral part of the Emerging Leaders Initiative course. Cosponsors we met with noted the importance of obtaining participant feedback. Further, small businesses attending focus groups that we held provided us with feedback on ways in which the cosponsored activity could have been improved. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that federal agencies should have appropriate policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms for each of their activities, including those to ensure compliance with key requirements. Obtaining feedback on cosponsored events would provide SBA with direct information from small business participants that could be used to help ensure that events are providing benefits to small businesses. Such information could also provide another way for SBA to evaluate the use of its cosponsorship authority. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that SBA most effectively implements the statutory authority to conduct cosponsored events for the benefit of small businesses and to enhance SBA’s ability to evaluate the use of its cosponsorship authority, the Administrator of the SBA should develop a mechanism to consistently obtain participant feedback on cosponsored activities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to (1) describe the roles and responsibilities of SBA and cosponsors in planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities; and (2) examine the benefits cosponsored activities provide to small businesses. To describe the roles and responsibilities of SBA and cosponsors in planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities, we reviewed Section 4(h) of the Small Business Act, implementing regulations, and SBA’s standard operating procedures and guidance related to the use of cosponsorship authority. To examine the benefits cosponsored activities provide to small businesses, we conducted eight focus groups in three cities (Atlanta, GA; Detroit, MI; and Kalamazoo, MI) with 48 entrepreneurs that had attended one of three SBA cosponsored activities conducted in 2012 and 2013— the Emerging Leaders Initiative, Doing Business with Federal Procuring Agencies series, and Small Business Talk Series. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 4(h) of the Small Business Act authorizes SBA to provide assistance for the benefit of small businesses through activities the agency cosponsors with eligible for-profit and nonprofit entities, as well as federal, state, and local government entities. Cosponsored activities can provide information on SBA programs and services or on subjects of interest to small businesses, bring together government and private sector resources and small business owners (generally for government contracting or financing initiatives), or celebrate the contributions of small business owners. GAO was asked to study SBA's use of its cosponsorship authority.
This report (1) describes the roles and responsibilities of SBA and cosponsors in planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities, and (2) examines the benefits cosponsored activities provide to small businesses. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and SBA procedures, guidance, and official cosponsorship files. GAO conducted eight focus groups with a total of 48 small business entrepreneurs in three cities to obtain feedback on their experiences with cosponsored activities. GAO also interviewed cosponsors and SBA officials.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Administration (SBA) and cosponsors share responsibilities for planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities. Before cosponsored activities take place, SBA field and program offices decide on the type and subject of the activity, solicit potential cosponsors, draft an agreement, agenda and budget, and designate a cosponsor as fiscal agent to collect, manage, and disburse any funds received. SBA's General Counsel or designee is responsible for reviewing draft cosponsorship agreements for legal sufficiency and determining whether any conflicts of interest exist with potential cosponsors. GAO's analysis of the official files for 132 cosponsored agreements SBA executed in fiscal year 2012 and other related materials showed that the activities were intended to provide training on a variety of topics, such as business planning and marketing, social media, and government contracting. SBA and cosponsors are both responsible for conducting the activity in accordance with the agreement. Following cosponsored activities, SBA field and program offices must submit a final cosponsorship report to SBA's Office of Strategic Alliances, which is responsible for maintaining the official files on these activities.
SBA does not consistently collect feedback related to the benefits that cosponsored activities provide to small businesses. Participants in focus groups that GAO held commented positively on the quality of the presentations and opportunities to network, among other things, offered by cosponsored activities. Participants also noted that they obtained information on topics useful to their small businesses, including financial management and the federal contracting process. SBA officials and representatives of cosponsors told GAO that the events provided attendees with access to services and resources from multiple organizations in a single venue and often included counseling and referrals to other resources. Although the Small Business Act specifies that SBA cosponsored activities provide benefits to small businesses, it does not specify how SBA should identify and measure benefits. Some SBA district office staff told GAO that they solicited participant feedback on cosponsored events through a survey, evaluation, or questionnaire. GAO also found that obtaining periodic participant feedback is an integral part of a 7-month training initiative, called the Emerging Leaders Initiative, conducted using cosponsorship authority. However, SBA officials told us that obtaining formal feedback was not required and that the agency did not have a policy on soliciting and using it. Cosponsors GAO met with noted the importance of obtaining participant feedback and entrepreneurs GAO spoke to also identified ways in which the cosponsored activities could have been improved. Federal internal control standards state that federal agencies should have appropriate policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms for each of their activities, including those to ensure compliance with key requirements. Obtaining feedback on cosponsored events would provide SBA with direct information from small business participants that could be used to help ensure that events are providing benefits to small businesses. Such information could also provide another way for SBA to evaluate the use of its cosponsorship authority.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SBA develop a mechanism to consistently obtain participant feedback on cosponsored activities. SBA generally agreed with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-16 | gao_GAO-12-16_0 | The RRG must (1) provide a copy of the plan or study to the insurance regulator in the nondomiciliary states in which the RRG intends to conduct business before it can write any insurance coverage in that state; (2) provide a copy of the group’s annual financial statement (certified by an independent public accountant) to the insurance commissioner of each state in which it is doing business (the financial statement should include a statement of opinion on loss and loss adjustment expense reserves by a qualified loss reserve specialist or actuary); and (3) submit to an examination by a nondomiciliary state regulator to determine the RRG’s financial condition, if the domiciliary state regulator has not begun or refuses to begin an examination. RRGs Generally Reported Increased Profitability and Continue to Write the Majority of Their Business in Nondomiciliary States
Premiums Written by RRGs Generally Increased, Particularly in Health Care- Related Lines
Based on data reported by RRGs to NAIC since 2004, RRGs in aggregate have shown an increase in premiums written and in their share of the broader commercial liability market. In 2005, we reported that RRGs wrote about $1.8 billion of commercial liability coverage, which constituted about 1.17 percent of the overall market in 2003. According to NAIC data, in 2010 RRGs wrote about $2.5 billion in premiums, which was about 3 percent of the total $92 billion of commercial liability insurance coverage written industrywide. Although Most RRGs Are Domiciled in One of a Few States, They Wrote the Majority of Business Outside Their State of Domicile
Although they conducted business nationwide, similar to what we reported in 2005 more than 80 percent of active RRGs in 2010 were domiciled in five states and the District of Columbia. Nondomiciliary state insurance regulators we interviewed expressed concerns about the amount of RRG business in their states and their limited authority to regulate RRGs providing coverage to their state’s insureds. RRG representatives with whom we spoke generally believed that RRGs have increased the availability of such insurance. Representatives from the RRG industry maintain that state regulatory practices such as registration requirements beyond what is specified in LRRA “encroached” on LRRA’s partial preemption of state insurance laws. RRGs have challenged requirements established by nondomiciliary states that RRGs believe are preempted, and therefore not permitted, by LRRA. States and federal courts also have differed in their interpretations. Two nondomiciliary state insurance regulators with whom we spoke indicated concerns about the capitalization and solvency of RRGs operating in their states, and two regulators support increasing the minimum capital requirement. The revised accreditation standards also require all RRGs to have risk- focused examinations in an effort to implement more uniform baseline standards for RRG regulation, applicable to all financial examinations of RRGs commencing on or after January 1, 2011. One proposed change would expand the type of insurance RRGs may provide to include commercial property coverage. RRG representatives with whom we spoke generally favored amending LRRA to allow RRGs to provide commercial property insurance coverage. For example, the office would resolve disagreements about whether LRRA preempts any regulatory actions by a state. Conclusions
In establishing the Liability Risk Retention Act, Congress allowed RRGs to provide commercial liability insurance to RRG members and established a lead-state regulatory framework. However, states have interpreted these provisions differently, due in part to LRRA’s silence on certain issues such as registration requirements, fees, and the types of insurance coverage RRGs can write, sometimes resulting in litigation between state insurance regulators and RRGs. In addition, some federal courts to which these disputes have been brought also have interpreted LRRA differently. NAIC has made progress addressing these concerns, including requiring accredited states to implement risk-focused examinations and risk-based capital analyses, as well as developing corporate governance standards for the RRG industry. Further, NAIC has made efforts to more closely align the accreditation standards for RRGs with those of traditional insurance companies. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To reduce the varying interpretations of LRRA, which have led to uncertainty and disagreements among RRGs and state insurance regulators, and at the same time continue to facilitate the formation and efficient operation of RRGs, Congress should consider clarifying certain LRRA provisions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe changes in the financial condition of the risk retention group (RRG) industry from 2004–2010; (2) examine the regulatory treatment of RRGs across domiciliary and nondomiciliary states; and (3) examine changes to federal and state regulatory practices regarding RRGs since 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress authorized the creation of risk retention groups (RRG)--a group of similar businesses that creates its own insurance company to insure its risk--to increase the affordability and availability of commercial liability insurance. Through the Liability Risk Retention Act (LRRA), Congress partially preempted state insurance laws to allow RRGs licensed in one state (the domiciliary state) to operate in all other states (nondomiciliary states) with minimal additional regulation. In a 2005 report (GAO-05-536), GAO noted concerns with the adequacy of RRG regulation. This report (1) describes changes in the financial condition of the RRG industry from 2004 to 2010; (2) examines the regulatory treatment of RRGs across domiciliary and nondomiciliary states; and (3) examines changes to federal and state regulatory practices regarding RRGs since 2004. GAO analyzed RRG financial data, surveyed state insurance regulators (96 percent response rate), and interviewed RRG industry representatives.
What GAO Found
Certain indicators suggest that the financial condition of the RRG industry in aggregate generally has remained profitable. In 2003, RRGs wrote about $1.8 billion, or 1.17 percent of commercial liability insurance. In 2010, RRGs continued to comprise a small percentage of the total market, writing about $2.5 billion--or about 3 percent of commercial liability coverage. Other financial indicators, such as ratios of RRG premiums earned compared to claims paid--also suggest profitability. In addition, the number of RRGs has increased since 2004, with the most growth occurring in health care-related lines. In 2010, more than 80 percent of RRGs were domiciled in Vermont, South Carolina, the District of Columbia, Nevada, Hawaii, and Arizona, but RRGs wrote about 95 percent of their premiums outside their state of domicile. Evidence suggests that RRGs may choose to domicile in a particular state, partly due to some financial and regulatory advantages such as lower minimum capitalization requirements. RRG representatives opined that RRGs have expanded the availability of commercial liability insurance--particularly in niche markets--but differed in their opinions of whether RRGs have improved its affordability. Different interpretations of LRRA have led to varying state regulatory practices and requirements in nondomiciliary states and disputes between state regulators and RRGs in areas such as registration requirements, fees, and types of coverage RRGs may write. For example, while some states have interpreted LRRA to permit RRGs to write contractual liability coverage, others have not, and therefore may not allow RRGs to write this coverage in their state. RRGs have challenged requirements established by nondomiciliary states that RRGs assert are not permitted by LRRA. However courts also have differed in their interpretations of LRRA. Some regulators with whom GAO spoke indicated that their actions toward nondomiciled RRGs reflect an effort to use their limited regulatory authority to protect insureds in their states as well as address concerns about RRG solvency. Some state regulatory practices for RRGs have changed since 2004, and federal legislation has been proposed. In 2005, GAO recommended implementation of more uniform, baseline state regulatory standards, including corporate governance standards to better protect RRG insureds. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has since revised its accreditation standards to more closely align with those for traditional insurers which are subject to oversight in each state in which they operate. For example, all financial examinations of RRGs that have commenced during or after 2011 should use the risk-focused examination process. NAIC also has begun developing corporate governance standards that it plans to implement in the next few years. Proposed legislation would amend LRRA to allow RRGs to provide commercial property insurance and also include a federal arbitrator to resolve disputes between RRGs and state insurance regulators. While some RRG representatives and state regulators supported this legislation, others expressed concerns about whether RRGs would be adequately capitalized to write commercial property insurance and about federal involvement in state regulation.
What GAO Recommends
To further facilitate states' implementation and help reduce the varying interpretations of LRRA, Congress should consider the merits of clarifying certain LRRA provisions regarding registration requirements, fees, and coverage. NAIC concurred with this matter for congressional consideration. |
gao_GAO-17-750 | gao_GAO-17-750_0 | According to an EPA official, the agency has addressed noncompliance with stormwater and wastewater requirements of the Clean Water Act by entering into consent decrees with over 50 municipalities from 1998 through 2016. Surveyed Municipalities Use of Green Infrastructure to Manage Stormwater Is Limited and Funded through General Revenues and Fees Charged to Utility Customers
Most of the 31 municipalities we surveyed use green infrastructure to comply with NPDES permits or CSO consent decrees, but almost half said that less than 5 percent of the area covered by their permits or consent decrees drains into green infrastructure. Of the 30 municipalities that reported using green infrastructure to help meet the provisions of their permits or CSO consent decrees, many of them also reported on the percentages of the areas subject to permits or consent decrees that drain into green infrastructure, with the remaining areas draining into gray infrastructure or directly into creeks, lakes, or rivers. Of the 30 municipalities that reported using green infrastructure, 22 reported that developing an operation and maintenance cost estimate was usually more challenging than doing so for gray infrastructure, while none said that it was usually less challenging. In describing instances where they used green infrastructure even though it was more challenging, some municipalities reported that they continued to use green infrastructure to help comply with their permits or CSO consent decrees for three primary reasons: they saw using green infrastructure as a learning opportunity, they believed that green infrastructure would perform better or provide additional benefits compared to gray infrastructure, or the community wanted to use green infrastructure. Several municipalities also reported that they were discouraged from using green infrastructure because it was more expensive than using gray infrastructure. EPA Helped to Facilitate Municipalities’ Use of Green Infrastructure, but in Launching a New Pilot Project Has Not Yet Developed Collaboration Agreements with Municipalities
Over the last 10 years since EPA began encouraging the use of green infrastructure to manage stormwater, the agency’s efforts have provided information, technical assistance, and funding to help municipalities use green infrastructure. According to the document, it is for use by EPA, states, and local governments to develop and implement integrated plans under the Clean Water Act. EPA’s pilot project with five municipalities is a good way to focus on developing long-term stormwater plans. When working with the municipal departments and other stakeholders, such as those in each of the five groups in the pilot project, EPA could have a better assurance that the groups will successfully develop long-term stormwater plans if they document their agreement on how they will collaborate, such as in a memorandum of understanding, aligned with our key considerations for implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms. EPA stated that it is in the early stages of the pilot project to assist municipalities in developing long-term stormwater plans and will utilize the collaborative practices recommended by GAO as it implements the project over the next 12 to 18 months. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we (1) describe to what extent selected municipalities are incorporating green infrastructure into their efforts to comply with National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits and consent decrees that address combined sewer overflows (CSO), and what is known about funding for such efforts; (2) describe what challenges, if any, these municipalities reported facing to incorporate green infrastructure into their efforts to comply with those permits and consent decrees; and (3) examine efforts the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is taking to help municipalities use green infrastructure. We selected 20 municipalities that had NPDES permits required of municipalities to discharge stormwater into nearby water bodies, such as creeks, lakes, and rivers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Urban stormwater runoff is a major contributor to pollution in U.S. waters. Municipalities historically managed stormwater with gray infrastructure. In 2007, EPA began encouraging the use of green infrastructure to manage stormwater and reduce the need for gray infrastructure.
GAO was asked to examine the use of green infrastructure by municipalities to meet EPA's stormwater requirements. This report (1) describes the extent to which selected municipalities are incorporating, and funding, green infrastructure in stormwater management efforts; (2) describes what challenges, if any, municipalities reported facing in incorporating green infrastructure into stormwater management efforts; and (3) examines efforts EPA is taking to help municipalities use green infrastructure.
GAO surveyed two nongeneralizable samples totaling 31 municipalities with stormwater permits or consent decrees for CSOs and interviewed EPA officials to examine EPA efforts to help municipalities use green infrastructure. The municipalities were randomly selected from lists of municipalities that are required to have permits and have consent decrees.
What GAO Found
Almost all 31 municipalities GAO surveyed reported using green infrastructure to comply with their Clean Water Act permits or combined sewer overflow (CSO) consent decrees. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates stormwater pollution under the Clean Water Act, which requires municipalities to obtain permits to discharge stormwater into waterbodies. EPA has also entered into consent decrees with municipalities that have CSOs—events where raw sewage is discharged into waterbodies. Green infrastructure uses natural processes to manage stormwater, such as capturing stormwater so it can seep into soil (see figure). However, of 27 municipalities responding, 15 reported that less than 5 percent of the area subject to their permit or consent decree drained into green infrastructure, with the remaining area draining into gray infrastructure, such as concrete sewers, or directly to waterbodies. Most of the municipalities reported funding green infrastructure with fees and general revenues.
Of the 31 municipalities GAO surveyed, 26 reported that green infrastructure was more challenging than gray infrastructure in aspects of infrastructure development, such as developing project operation and maintenance cost estimates. Nevertheless, 25 of these municipalities reported instances where they used green infrastructure even though it was more challenging. Some municipalities reported that they were less familiar with green infrastructure but used it anyway because it performed better or it provided additional benefits, the community wanted to use it, and the municipality saw an opportunity to learn about green infrastructure.
EPA provides multiple resources to educate and assist municipalities on the use of green infrastructure. In 2016, the agency launched a pilot project with five municipalities to encourage states, communities, and municipalities to develop long-term stormwater plans to increase their use of green infrastructure. Key to the success of the pilot project is collaboration among many stakeholders from across each community, such as members of the local utility, transportation, and recreation departments, as well as local organizations. GAO has previously identified key considerations, such as documenting agreements on how to collaborate that can benefit collaborative efforts. However, EPA has not yet documented collaborative agreements with pilot stakeholders. EPA could better assure that the stakeholders will successfully develop long-term stormwater plans if it documents how the stakeholders will collaborate.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA document agreements, when working with municipalities and other stakeholders, on how they will collaborate when developing long-term stormwater plans. EPA generally agreed with GAO's recommendation and plans to implement it over the next 12 to 18 months. |
gao_GAO-05-720 | gao_GAO-05-720_0 | Specifically, of the activities planned for completion by December 2004, the agency has fully or partially implemented all 23 of the initiatives related to its capability theme to improve the skills of employees, enhance quality assurance, and alter the patent process through legislative and rule changes. With passage of the legislation in December 2004 to restructure and increase the fees available to USPTO, the agency is re-evaluating the feasibility of many initiatives that it had deferred or suspended. For more details on USPTO’s progress in implementing the 38 initiatives in the Strategic Plan, see appendix III. USPTO Has Made Less Progress Implementing Its Productivity and Agility Initiatives
As shown in table 5, USPTO has not implemented 3 of the 4 initiatives that focus on accelerating the time to process patent applications and expand public input and has partially implemented only 1 of the productivity initiatives that allow the agency to increase fees and retain the funds. USPTO Has Taken Steps to Help Attract and Retain a Qualified Patent Examiner Workforce, but Long- Term Success Is Uncertain
Since 2000, USPTO has taken steps intended to help attract and retain a qualified patent examination workforce. However, during the past 5 years, the agency’s recruiting efforts and use of benefits have not been consistently sustained, and officials and examiners at all levels in the agency told us that the economy has more of an impact on USPTO’s ability to attract and retain examiners than any actions taken by the agency. While USPTO has been able to meet its hiring goals, attrition has recently increased. USPTO Faces Long- standing Human Capital Challenges That Could Undermine Its Recruiting and Retention Efforts
Although USPTO has taken a number of steps to attract and retain a qualified patent examiner workforce, the agency continues to face three human capital challenges of a long-standing nature that could also undermine its efforts in the future if not addressed. However, USPTO lacks a collaborative culture, has an awards system that is based on outdated information, and requires little ongoing technical training for patent examiners. USPTO management and examiners do not agree on the need to address these issues. In February 2004, this issue was presented for arbitration to determine the validity of the agreement. It is so different than when they were examining.” Examiners in our focus groups said that the lack of communication and involvement has created an atmosphere of distrust in management officials by examiners and has lowered examiners’ morale. According to agency officials, the primary method for examiners to keep current in their technical fields is by processing patent applications. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to take the following two actions: develop formal strategies to (1) improve communication between management and patent examiners and between management and union officials, and (2) foster greater collaboration among all levels of the organization to resolve key issues discussed in this report, such as the assumptions underlying the quota system and the need for required technical training. Scope and Methodology
We were asked to report on various efforts being undertaken by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) about its (1) overall progress in implementing the initiatives in the 21st Century Strategic Plan related to the patent organization; (2) efforts to attract and retain a qualified patent workforce; and (3) remaining challenges, if any, in attracting and retaining a qualified patent workforce. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is responsible for issuing U.S. patents that protect new ideas and investments in innovation and creativity. Recent increases in both the complexity and volume of patent applications have increased the time it takes to process patents and have raised concerns about the validity of the patents USPTO issues. Adding to these challenges is the difficulty that USPTO has had attracting and retaining qualified staff. In this context, GAO was asked to obtain information about USPTO's patent organization. Specifically GAO reviewed (1) overall progress in implementing the initiatives in its strategic plan; (2) efforts to attract and retain a qualified patent workforce; and (3) remaining challenges, if any, in attracting and retaining a qualified patent workforce.
What GAO Found
USPTO has made more progress in implementing its strategic plan initiatives to increase the agency's capability than initiatives aimed at decreasing patent pendency. USPTO has fully or partially implemented all 23 capability initiatives that focus on improving the skills of employees, enhancing quality assurance, and altering the patent system through changes in existing laws or regulations. In contrast, the agency has partially or fully implemented only 8 of the 15 initiatives aimed at reducing pendency. Lack of funding was cited as the primary reason for not implementing these initiatives. With passage of legislation in December 2004 to increase fees available to USPTO for the next two years, the agency is re-evaluating the feasibility of implementing some of these initiatives. Since 2000, USPTO has taken steps intended to help attract and retain a qualified patent examination workforce, such as enhancing its recruiting efforts and using many of the human capital benefits available under federal personnel regulations. However, it is too soon to determine the long-term success of the agency's recruiting efforts because they have been in place only a short time and have not been consistently sustained due to budgetary constraints. Long-term uncertainty about USPTO's hiring and retention success is also due to the unknown impact of the economy. In the past, when the economy was doing well, the agency had more difficulty in recruiting and retaining the staff it needed. USPTO faces three long-standing challenges that could also undermine its efforts to retain a qualified workforce: the lack of an effective strategy to communicate and collaborate with examiners; outdated assumptions in the production quotas it uses to reward examiners; and the lack of required ongoing technical training for examiners. According to patent examiners, the lack of communication and a collaborative work environment has resulted in low morale and an atmosphere of distrust that is exacerbated by the contentious relationship between management and union officials. Also, managers and examiners have differing opinions on the need to update the monetary award system that is based on assumptions that were established in 1976. As a result, examiners told us they have to contend with a highly stressful work environment and work voluntary overtime to meet their assigned quotas. Similarly, managers and examiners disagree on the need for required ongoing technical training. Examiners said they need this training to keep current in their technical fields, while managers believe that reviewing patent applications is the best way for examiners to remain current. |
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