id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
gao_T-GGD-96-112 | gao_T-GGD-96-112_0 | Tax Administration: IRS Tax Debt Collection Practices
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to assist the Subcommittee in its review of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) tax debt collection practices. Every year IRS successfully collects over a trillion dollars in taxes owed the government, yet at the same time tens of billions more remain unpaid. It is this latter group whom IRS must deal with in its efforts to collect delinquent taxes. In doing so, IRS faces several significant challenges, including a lack of accurate and reliable information on either the makeup of its accounts receivable or the effectiveness of the collection tools it has at its disposal, as well as receivables that are often years old, out-of-date collection practices, and antiquated technology. It is these problems and challenges—and their results—that led us, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and IRS to recognize IRS’ accounts receivable as a high-risk area. Of the approximately $200 billion currently in the IRS accounts receivable inventory, IRS data shows that approximately $63 billion represents taxes that, although they have been assessed, may not be valid receivables, but rather are “place markers” for compliance actions. who have taxes withheld from their wages. Existing IRS computer systems do not provide ready access to needed information and, consequently, do not adequately support modern work processes. Potential Benefits of Using Private Debt Collectors
the use of private law firms and debt collection agencies to help collect delinquent tax debts. Private collectors, however, can perform collection-related activities, such as locating taxpayers and attempting to secure promises to pay. improve its collection programs. Currently, IRS is making some changes to its collection process as a part of its modernization effort. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) tax debt collection practices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) each year, billions of dollars in taxes remain unpaid; (2) impediments to improving tax debt collection include the lack of accurate and reliable accounts receivable data and effective collection tools and programs, a backlogged receivables inventory, outdated collection processes, and antiquated computer systems; (3) some accounts receivable may be overstated, not valid, or owed by deceased or unlocatable taxpayers and defunct businesses; (4) IRS is modernizing its information and processing systems, but these actions will not be completed for several years; (5) although IRS use of private debt collectors could increase tax collections by locating and encouraging taxpayers to pay their delinquent taxes, they cannot actually collect taxes; (6) some states have successfully used private debt collectors to increase their delinquent tax collections; (7) IRS accounts receivable have been designated a high-risk area, but IRS cannot make major changes in its business operations by itself; (8) IRS needs a comprehensive strategy to guide its efforts to improve tax debt collections, starting with having accurate and reliable information; and (9) IRS could adopt private industry practices and use private debt collectors in some collection-related activities. |
gao_GAO-08-756 | gao_GAO-08-756_0 | With an IT budget of $2.1 billion for fiscal year 2008, FAA accounts for about 83 percent of the Department of Transportation’s IT budget. The Air Traffic Organization is led by FAA’s Chief Operating Officer. FAA Has Established an EVM Policy for Major IT Investments, but Key Components Are Not Fully Consistent with Best Practices
In 2005, FAA established a policy requiring the use of EVM on its major IT investments; however, key components of this policy are not fully consistent with best practices. Without the level of detail provided by a product-oriented approach, program managers may not have the information they need to make decisions on specific program components. Until FAA establishes EVM training requirements for all relevant personnel (including executives with oversight responsibilities and program staff responsible for contract management) and verifies the completion of this training, it cannot effectively ensure that its program staff have the appropriate skills to validate and interpret EVM data, and that its executives fully understand the data they are given in order to ask the right questions and make informed decisions. Case studies of four programs demonstrated that all are using or planning to use EVM. Until these areas are fully addressed, FAA faces an increased risk that program managers are not adequately using earned value to manage their programs. Instead, the program estimates government costs. SWIM is not currently collecting EVM data. ERAM also partially implemented each of the three practices for ensuring that earned value data are reliable. For example: There were multiple cases in which the contractor reported that no work was planned or accomplished, yet funds were spent; in other cases, the contractor reported that work was planned and accomplished, but funds were credited to the government. FAA Has Taken Steps to Oversee EVM Compliance, but Its Oversight Process Lacks Sufficient Rigor
FAA has taken important steps to oversee compliance with EVM policies by establishing an oversight office, assessing major systems using defined evaluation criteria, and demonstrating improved capabilities on most programs. However, the oversight office’s assessments are not thorough enough to identify anomalies in contractor data, and its agencywide progress reports can be misleading, in that the agency’s evaluation process does not distinguish between systems that collect comprehensive data and those that do not. As a result, FAA executives do not always receive an accurate view of the quality of a program’s EVM data when making investment decisions on that program. The agency has established policies that require the use of EVM; system acquisition programs are using earned value data to manage their programs; an oversight office monitors system acquisition programs’ compliance with policy and standards; and earned value performance data are being used by multiple levels of management as they review and manage IT investment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) policies for implementing earned value management (EVM) on its information technology (IT) investments, (2) evaluate whether the agency is adequately using EVM techniques to manage key system acquisitions, (3) assess the agency’s efforts to oversee compliance with its EVM policies, and (4) evaluate whether the agency is using EVM data as part of its IT investment management. ASR-11 partially met the other practices because, while the program implemented many key components of an effective EVM system, ASR-11 is limited in what it can measure and validate. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plans to spend over $2 billion on information technology (IT) investments--many of which support FAA's air traffic control modernization. To more effectively manage such investments, in 2005 the Office of Management and Budget required agencies to use earned value management (EVM). EVM is a project management approach that, if implemented appropriately, provides objective reports of project status, produces early warning signs of impending schedule delays and cost overruns, and provides unbiased estimates of a program's total costs. Among other objectives, GAO was asked to assess FAA's policies for implementing EVM on its IT investments, evaluate whether the agency is adequately using these techniques to manage key IT acquisitions, and assess the agency's efforts to oversee EVM compliance. To do so, GAO compared agency policies with best practices, performed four case studies, and interviewed key FAA officials.
What GAO Found
FAA has established a policy requiring the use of EVM on its major IT acquisition programs, but key components of this policy are not fully consistent with best practices of leading organizations. Specifically, FAA fully met four and partially met three components of an effective EVM policy. For example, FAA requires its program managers to obtain EVM training, but it does not enforce completion of this training or require other relevant personnel to obtain this training. Until FAA expands and enforces its policy, it will be difficult for the agency to gain the full benefits of EVM. FAA is using EVM to manage IT acquisition programs, but not all programs are ensuring that their earned value data are reliable. Case studies of four programs demonstrated that all are using or planning to use EVM systems. However, of the three programs currently collecting EVM data, only one program is adequately ensuring that its earned value data are reliable. Another program is limited in its ability to ensure data reliability because it was initiated before earned value was required. The third program did not adequately validate contractor performance data. For example, GAO found anomalies in which the contractor reported spending funds without accomplishing work and others in which the contractor reported accomplishing work while crediting funds to the government. Until programs undertake a rigorous validation of their EVM data, FAA faces an increased risk that managers may not be getting the information they need to effectively manage the programs. FAA has taken important steps to oversee program compliance with EVM policies, but its oversight process lacks sufficient rigor. Through its recurring assessments, FAA has reported that most programs have improved their earned value capabilities over time, and that 74 percent of the programs were fully compliant with national standards. However, FAA's assessments are not thorough enough to identify anomalies in contractor data, and its progress reports do not distinguish between systems that collect comprehensive data and those that do not. As a result, FAA executives do not always receive an accurate view of the quality of a program's EVM data when making investment decisions on that program. |
gao_GAO-14-190 | gao_GAO-14-190_0 | The new KC-46 tanker is expected to be more capable than the KC-135 it replaces in several respects. Program Is Continuing to Meet Cost, Schedule, and Performance Estimates
KC-46 total program acquisition costs (development, production, and military construction costs) have remained relatively stable since program start, changing less than 1 percent since February 2011, and the program is meeting schedule and performance goals. Boeing set aside $354 million in contract funds to address identified, but unresolved development risks. As of December 2013, Boeing had about $75 million remaining to address these risks. However, there are indications that the start of initial operational test and evaluation, which is scheduled for May 2016, may slip. DOD’s Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, which is responsible for approving operational and live fire test and evaluation within each major defense acquisition program, recently issued its 2013 annual report and continued to recommend that the Air Force plan for a 6- to 12-month delay to the start of initial operational test and evaluation to allow more time to train aircrew and maintenance personnel and verify maintenance procedures. Program Stabilized the KC-46 Design and Is Now Focused on Software Development and Testing Challenges
The program office and Boeing held the program’s CDR in July 2013 and released over 90 percent of the total engineering design drawings, a key indicator that the design is stable. Overall, software development is progressing largely according to plan; however, software verification testing has not yet started and software problem reports are increasing. The program office is conducting a series of rehearsal test exercises and is working with Air Force officials to finalize agreements related to receiver aircraft availability to mitigate these risks. Notably, Boeing must verify the software code to determine if it works as intended. Boeing could have difficulty completing all testing if more retests are needed than expected. Pace of Flight Test Schedule Poses Future Risk
The program’s flight test schedule continues to be a concern due to the need for extensive coordination among government entities, the need for timely access to receiver aircraft, and its aggressive pace. Manufacturing Has Begun with Some Delays
The program has made progress in readying the KC-46 for low rate initial production in 2015. This includes identifying and assessing critical manufacturing processes to determine if they are capable of producing key military subsystems in a production representative environment. The program also established a reliability growth curve and Boeing will begin tracking its progress towards reaching reliability goals once testing begins. Development Aircraft Manufacturing Has Started
Boeing has started manufacturing all four development aircraft on schedule, but has experienced some delays with the first aircraft. Boeing officials attributed the schedule slip to late supplier deliveries. Program Is Capturing Manufacturing Knowledge
The program office and Boeing have taken several initial steps to help ensure that the KC-46 will be ready for low rate production in August 2015 and that the aircraft will be reliable. Conclusions
The KC-46 program has made good progress to date—acquisition costs have remained relatively stable, high-level schedule and performance goals have been met, the critical design review was successfully completed, and the contractor is building development aircraft. Parts delays on the first development aircraft and a critical aerial refueling subsystem are also causing increased schedule pressure. Recommendation for Executive Action
Due to existing schedule risks and the fact that the program is entering a challenging phase of testing, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to study the likelihood and potential effect of delays on total development costs, and develop mitigation plans, as needed, related to potential delays. Specifically, we examined (1) progress toward cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) development challenges, if any, and steps to address them; and (3) progress in manufacturing the aircraft. | Why GAO Did This Study
Aerial refueling allows U.S. military aircraft to fly farther, stay airborne longer, and transport more weapons, equipment, and supplies. Yet the mainstay of the U.S. tanker forces—the KC-135 Stratotanker—is over 50 years old. It is increasingly costly to support and its age-related problems could potentially ground the fleet. As a result, the Air Force initiated the $51 billion KC-46 program to replace the aerial refueling fleet. The program plans to produce 18 tankers by 2017 and 179 aircraft in total.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated GAO to annually review the KC-46 program through 2017. This report addresses (1) progress made in 2013 toward cost, schedule, and performance goals, (2) development challenges, if any, and steps to address them, and (3) progress made in manufacturing the aircraft. To do this, GAO reviewed key program documents and discussed development and production plans and results with officials from the KC-46 program office, other defense offices, and the prime contractor, Boeing.
What GAO Found
The KC-46 program has made good progress over the past year—acquisition costs have remained relatively stable, the critical design review was successfully completed, the program is on track to meet performance parameters, and the contractor started building development aircraft. As shown, total program acquisition costs—which include development, production, and military construction costs—and unit costs have changed less than 1 percent since February 2011.
As of December 2013, Boeing had about $75 million of its management reserves remaining to address identified, but unresolved development risks. There are indications that the start of initial operational test and evaluation, which is scheduled for May 2016, may slip 6 to 12 months. According to the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, more time may be needed to train aircrew and maintenance personnel and verify maintenance procedures.
The program released over 90 percent of the KC-46 design drawings at the critical design review, indicating that the design is stable. Overall, development of about 15.8 million lines of software code is progressing mostly according to plan. The next 12 months will be challenging as the program must complete software development, verify that the software works as intended, finalize developmental flight test planning, and begin developmental flight tests. Software problem reports are increasing and Boeing could have difficulty completing all testing if more retests are needed than expected. Developmental flight testing activities are also a concern due to the need for extensive coordination among government agencies, the need for timely access to receiver aircraft (aircraft the KC-46 will refuel while in flight), and the aggressive test pace. The program office is conducting test exercises to mitigate risks and working with Navy and United Kingdom officials to finalize agreements to have access to necessary receiver aircraft.
The program has also made progress in ensuring that the KC-46 is ready for low rate initial production in 2015. Boeing has started manufacturing all four development aircraft on schedule. The program office has identified its critical manufacturing processes and verified that the processes are capable of producing key military subsystems in a production representative environment. In addition, the program has established a reliability growth curve and will begin tracking its progress towards reaching reliability goals once testing begins. Boeing is experiencing some manufacturing delays due to late supplier deliveries on the first aircraft and parts delays for a test article of a critical aerial refueling subsystem, but the program has not missed any major milestones.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Air Force determine the likelihood and potential effect of delays on total development costs, and develop mitigation plans, as needed, related to potential delays. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-826T | gao_GAO-12-826T_0 | CAT/BPSS Is in the Operational Testing and Evaluation Phase, and the Life Cycle Cost Estimate Is Not Fully Consistent with Best Practices
CAT/BPSS, which is part of TSA’s Passenger Screening Program, has undergone initial testing and is in the operational testing and evaluation phase of acquisition, according to TSA. The goal of CAT/BPSS is to deploy a computerized system that will read and analyze data and embedded security features on every passenger’s identification and some boarding passes, and to identify fraudulent credentials and boarding passes. In 2011, TSA conducted qualification testing of this system at its System Integration Facility at Washington Reagan National Airport, including testing the systems against more than 530 genuine and fraudulent documents, such as state-issued driver’s licenses, passports, and military identification cards, according to TSA. This system is intended to help ensure that identity credentials and boarding passes presented at the checkpoint have not been tampered with or fraudulently produced, and that the information on the boarding pass matches that of the identity credential. In preparation for initial testing, TSA tested the performance of its current process for comparison purposes. Based on our assessment, the life cycle cost estimate is reasonably comprehensive and well documented. In addition, we cannot make a determination as to the credibility of the life cycle cost estimate as it does not include a risk and uncertainty analysis or an independent cost estimate. Previously Identified Challenges TSA Faces in Overseeing Acquisition of Screening Technologies
Our past work has identified three key challenges related to TSA’s efforts to acquire and deploy technologies to address homeland security needs: (1) developing and meeting technology program requirements, (2) overseeing and conducting testing of new screening technologies, and (3) developing acquisition program baselines to establish initial cost, schedule, and performance parameters. We have previously reported that DHS and TSA have faced challenges in developing and meeting program requirements when acquiring screening technologies, and that program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the program start. DHS agreed with our recommendation and has begun taking action to address it. We have also reported on DHS and TSA challenges in overseeing and testing new screening technologies, which can lead to costly redesign and rework at a later date. In our 2009 report, we recommended that, to the extent feasible, TSA ensure that tests are completed before deploying new checkpoint screening technologies to airports. In November 2011, because TSA did not have a fully developed life cycle cost estimate as part of its acquisition program baseline for the EBSP, DHS instructed TSA to revise the life cycle cost estimates as well as its procurement and deployment schedules to reflect budget constraints. Congressional Oversight Issues
This hearing provides an opportunity for congressional stakeholders to focus a dialogue on how to continue a sufficient level of oversight of the CAT/BPSS acquisition and implementation and other key components of the Passenger Screening Program. For example, relevant questions that could be raised include the following:
To what extent, if any, have key performance parameters changed during the course of the acquisition, and how will these changes affect security and efficiency at the checkpoint? In managing limited resources to mitigate a potentially unlimited range of security threats, how does CAT/BPSS fit into TSA’s broader aviation security strategy? Transportation Security Administration: Progress and Challenges Faced in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs. Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Acquisition and Development of New Technologies. Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress, but Additional Efforts Are Needed to Improve Security. Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11. Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our past work examining the Transportation Security Administrations (TSA) progress and challenges in developing and acquiring technologies to address aviation security needs. TSAs acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation security missions and investments. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA have responsibilities for researching, developing, and testing and evaluating new technologies, including airport checkpoint screening technologies. Specifically, S&T is responsible for the basic and applied research and advanced development of new technologies, while TSA, through its Passenger Screening Program, identifies the need for new checkpoint screening technologies and provides input to S&T during the research and development of new technologies, which TSA then procures and deploys.
TSA screens more than 600 million air passengers per year through approximately 2,300 security checkpoint lanes at about 450 airports nationwide, and must attempt to balance its aviation security mission with concerns about efficiency and the privacy of the traveling public. The agency relies upon multiple layers of security to deter, detect, and disrupt persons posing a potential risk to aviation security. Part of its checkpoint security controls include a manual review and comparison by a travel document checker of each persons boarding pass and identification, such as passports or state-issued drivers licenses. However, concerns have been raised about security vulnerabilities in this process. For example, in 2006, a university student created a website that enabled individuals to create fake boarding passes. In addition, in 2011, a man was convicted of stowing away aboard an aircraft after using an expired boarding pass with someone elses name on it to fly from New York to Los Angeles. Recent news reports have also highlighted the apparent ease of ordering high-quality counterfeit drivers licenses from China. We have previously reported on significant fraud vulnerabilities in thepassport issuance process and on difficulties in detecting fraudulent identity documentation, such as drivers licenses.
In response to these vulnerabilities, and as part of its broader effort to improve security and increase efficiency, TSA began developing technology designed to automatically verify boarding passes and to better identify altered or fraudulent passenger identification documents. TSA plans for this technology, known as Credential Authentication Technology/Boarding Pass Scanning Systems (CAT/BPSS), to eventually replace the current procedure used by travel document checkers to detect fraudulent or altered documents. However, we have previously reported that DHS and TSA have experienced challenges in managing their acquisition efforts, including implementing technologies that did not meet intended requirements and were not appropriately tested and evaluated, and have not consistently included completed analyses of costs and benefits before technologies were implemented.
This testimony focuses on (1) the status of TSAs CAT/BPSS acquisition and the extent to which the related life cycle cost estimate is consistent with best practices and (2) challenges we have previously identified in TSAs acquisition process to manage, test, acquire, and deploy screening technologies. This statement also provides information on issues for possible congressional oversight related to CAT/BPSS.
What GAO Found
In summary, TSA has completed its initial testing of the CAT/BPSS technology and has begun operational testing at three airports. We found the projects associated life cycle cost estimate to be reasonably comprehensive and well documented, although we are less confident in its accuracy due to questions about the assumed inflation rate. In addition, we could not evaluate its credibility because the current version does not include an independent cost estimate or an assessment of how changing key assumptions and other factors would affect the estimate. Our past work has identified three key challenges related to TSAs efforts to acquire and deploy technologies to address homeland security needs: (1) developing and meeting technology program requirements, (2) overseeing and conducting testing of new screening technologies, and (3) developing acquisition program baselines to establish initial cost, schedule, and performance parameters. |
gao_GAO-14-183T | gao_GAO-14-183T_0 | However, as we have described in numerous reports, although a variety of best practice documentation exists to guide their successful acquisition, federal IT projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission- related outcomes. IT Acquisition Best Practices Have Been Identified by Industry and Government and Promoted by Legislation
IT acquisition best practices have been developed by both industry and the federal government. For example, the Software Engineering Institute has developed highly regarded and widely used guidance on best practices, such as requirements development and management, risk management, configuration management, validation and verification, and project monitoring and control. In the federal government, GAO’s own research in IT management best practices led to the development of the Information Technology Investment Management Framework, which describes essential and complementary IT investment management disciplines, such as oversight of system development and acquisition management, and organizes them into a set of critical processes for successful investments. Critical Factors Underlying Successful Major Acquisitions
Subsequent to the launch of the Dashboard and the TechStat reviews, and to help the federal agencies address the well-documented acquisition challenges they face, in 2011, we reported on nine common factors critical to the success of IT investment acquisitions. Specifically, we reported that department officials from seven agencies each identified a successful investment acquisition, in that they best achieved their respective cost, schedule, scope, and performance goals. Among these seven IT investments, officials identified nine factors as critical to the success of three or more of the seven. Officials from all seven selected investments cited active engagement with program stakeholders—individuals or groups (including, in some cases, end users) with an interest in the success of the acquisition—as a critical factor to the success of those investments. Agency officials stated that stakeholders, among other things, reviewed contractor proposals during the procurement process, regularly attended program management office sponsored meetings, were working members of integrated project teams, and were notified of problems and concerns as soon as possible. Additionally, officials from six of the seven selected investments indicated that the knowledge and skills of the program staff were critical to the success of the program. Finally, officials from five of the seven selected investments identified having the end users test and validate the system components prior to formal end user acceptance testing for deployment as critical to the success of their program. Further, these factors support OMB’s objective of improving the management of large-scale IT acquisitions across the federal government, and wide dissemination of these factors could complement OMB’s efforts. Overall, the implementation of our numerous recommendations regarding key aspects of IT acquisition management can help OMB and federal agencies continue to improve the efficiency and transparency with which IT investments are managed, in order to ensure that the federal government’s substantial investment in IT is being wisely spent. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government reportedly plans to spend at least $82 billion on IT in fiscal year 2014. Given the scale of such planned outlays and the criticality of many of these systems to the health, economy, and security of the nation, it is important that federal agencies successfully acquire these systemsthat is, ensure that the systems are acquired on time and within budget and that they deliver the expected benefits and functionality.
However, GAO has previously reported and testified that federal IT projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. To help improve these efforts, OMB has launched several initiatives intended to improve the oversight and management of IT acquisitions. In addition, during the past several years GAO has issued multiple reports and testimonies on federal initiatives to acquire and improve the management of IT investments.
As discussed with committee staff, GAO is testifying today on IT best practices, with a focus on the results of its report issued on the critical success factors of major IT acquisitions. To prepare this statement, GAO drew on previously published work.
What GAO Found
Information technology (IT) acquisition best practices have been developed by both industry and the federal government. For example, the Software Engineering Institute has developed highly regarded and widely used guidance on best practices, such as requirements development and management, risk management, validation and verification, and project monitoring and control. GAO's own research in IT management best practices led to the development of the Information Technology Investment Management Framework, which describes essential and complementary IT investment management disciplines, such as oversight of system development and acquisition management, and organizes them into a set of critical processes for successful investments.
GAO also recently reported on the critical factors underlying successful IT acquisitions. Officials from federal agencies identified seven investments that were deemed successfully acquired in that they best achieved their respective cost, schedule, scope, and performance goals. Agency officials identified nine common factors that were critical to the success of three or more of the seven investments.
Officials from all seven investments cited active engagement with program stakeholders as a critical factor to the success of those investments. Agency officials stated that stakeholders regularly attended program management office sponsored meetings; were working members of integrated project teams; and were notified of problems and concerns as soon as possible.
Additionally, officials from six investments indicated that knowledge and skills of the program staff, and support from senior department and agency executives were critical to the success of their programs. Further, officials from five of the seven selected investments identified having the end users test and validate the system components prior to formal acceptance testing for deployment as critical to the success of their program. These critical factors support the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) objective of improving the management of large-scale IT acquisitions across the federal government; wide dissemination of these factors could complement OMB's efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous recommendations to OMB and agencies on key aspects of IT acquisition management, as well as the oversight and management of those investments. |
gao_AIMD-97-46 | gao_AIMD-97-46_0 | Each of these efforts established unique procedures for linking resources with results. Second, the concept of performance budgeting has and will likely continue to evolve. And, given the complexity and enormity of the federal budget process, performance budgeting at the federal level will need to encompass a variety of perspectives in its efforts to link resources with results. In performance budgeting terms, GPRA avoids the mechanistic approaches of previous efforts, notably PPBS and ZBB. Key Design Elements of GPRA Incorporate Lessons From the Past, but Implementation Challenges Remain
In its structure, focus, and approach, GPRA incorporates important lessons from past federal performance budgeting initiatives. For example, by requiring consultation between the executive and legislative branches on overall agency goals and missions, GPRA addresses past failures to link planning and goal setting processes with the congressional budget process; by requiring use of program activities in agency budget requests as the basis for performance planning and measurement, GPRA enhances prospects for effective links with the budget; and by emphasizing a range of performance measures that strive toward but do not initially demand outcomes, GPRA provides a realistic framework for the expectations and capabilities of performance measurement in the federal environment. This requirement is GPRA’s most fundamental change and perhaps its most significant challenge, because any effort to link resources and results must encompass some fundamental understanding of the goals of a particular program. Discussions with legislative and executive branch staff confirmed the above concerns and also suggested that these officials may be approaching strategic planning from fundamentally differing perspectives. GPRA Performance Planning and Measurement Requires Direct Linkage With the Budget
Where past initiatives tended to devise unique structures to capture performance information that ultimately proved difficult to link to congressional budget presentations, GPRA requires agencies to plan and measure performance using the same structures which form the basis for the agency’s budget request: program activities. Past initiatives struggled with performance reporting. As noted above past initiatives were generally attempted within a single annual budget cycle and tended to lack processes for addressing implementation problems. In contrast, GPRA defines a 7-year implementation time frame, from initial pilots to first governmentwide performance reports, and incorporates feedback mechanisms such as required evaluations of key concepts before governmentwide implementation. This constitutes a unique implementation environment when compared to past initiatives. Observations
While GPRA has incorporated critical lessons from the past, the Congress and the executive branch will face certain challenges in their efforts to connect resources to results in the federal government. The Congress and the executive branch must recognize the difficulties associated with devising a system that integrates performance and budget information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), focusing on key design elements and approaches of GPRA as compared with those of past initiatives which also sought to link resources with results, a concept generally termed performance budgeting.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in its overall structure, focus, and approach, GPRA incorporates critical lessons learned from previous efforts, but many of the same issues encountered in previous initiatives remain and will likely pose significant challenges if GPRA is to achieve its aim of better linking resource decisions to performance levels; (2) where past efforts failed to link executive branch performance planning and measurement with congressional resource allocation processes, GPRA requires explicit consultation between the executive and legislative branches on agency strategic plans; (3) past initiatives' experiences suggest that efforts to link resources with results must begin in the planning phase with some fundamental understanding about program goals; (4) where past initiatives devised unique performance information formats often unconnected to the structures used in congressional budget presentations, GPRA requires agencies to plan and measure performance using the "program activities" listed in their budget submissions; (5) where past initiatives were generally unprepared for the difficulties associated with measuring the outcomes of federal programs and often retreated to simple output or workload measures, GPRA states a preference for outcome measurement while recognizing the need to develop a range of measures; (6) GAO's discussions with selected legislative staff and agency officials revealed fundamental differences in perspectives and expectations that are often a necessary consequence of the system of separated powers; (7) past initiatives often foundered because no mechanism existed to reconcile or even to address these legitimate, but at times competing, views; (8) GPRA, through required consultations and formal, public documents, is intended to encourage an explicit and periodic exchange of views between the branches; (9) GPRA differs from prior initiatives in two important respects; (10) past performance budgeting initiatives were typically implemented governmentwide within a single annual budget cycle; (11) GPRA, in contrast, defines a multiyear and iterative governmentwide implementation process that incorporates pilot tests and formal evaluations of key concepts; (12) GPRA will face an operating environment unknown to its predecessors: persistent efforts to constrain spending; (13) past initiatives demonstrate that performance budgeting is an evolving concept that cannot be viewed in simple mechanistic terms; and (14) ultimately this goal of linking resources with results implies both risks and rewards. |
gao_GAO-15-445 | gao_GAO-15-445_0 | Federal employees may undergo different levels of security screening at a federal building depending on a variety of security-related factors unique to that building. FPS and USMS Face a Range of Challenges with Security Screening
FPS and USMS experience a range of challenges in their efforts to provide effective security screening. These challenges include: (1) building characteristics and location that may limit security options; (2) balancing security and public access; (3) operating with limited resources; (4) working with multiple federal tenants; and (5) effectively informing the public of prohibited items. Balancing Security and Public Access
Striking an appropriate balance between providing security at federal buildings, and facilitating the public’s access to government offices for services and other business transactions, continues to be a major challenge, as we have reported in the past. FPS and USMS Have Taken Steps to Assess Screening, but Each Lacks a Strategic Approach for Using the Data Collected to Improve Performance
Both FPS and USMS have taken steps to assess their security screening efforts such as conducting covert and intrusion tests and collecting data on prohibited items. However, in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, for example, USMS data showed that court security officers passed 92 percent of intrusion tests on security screening. Although USMS tests more frequently than FPS, it has been unable to meet its intrusion-test frequency requirement per building each year. Overall, FPS and USMS may use the results of covert and intrusion tests to address problems at the individual building or FPS region or USMS district level, to some degree, but they do not readily use the results to strategically assess performance nationwide. Without a more strategic approach to assessing performance, both FPS and USMS are not well-positioned to improve security screening, identify trends and lessons learned, and address the aforementioned challenges related to screening in a complex security environment. In addition to testing security-screening procedures, FPS and USMS also require protective security officers and court security officers to document prohibited items identified during the screening process. In addition, we found that in October 2012, FPS reduced the number of screening scenarios that can be used for covert testing. For example, USMS reported that the intrusion-test passage rate for security-screening tests improved from 83 percent in fiscal year 2010, to 91 percent in fiscal year 2011, and to 92 percent in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Data on Prohibited Items Show Wide Variations in the Number of Items Detected across Buildings
As discussed earlier, aside from their efforts to conduct covert and intrusion screening tests, FPS and USMS both collect data on prohibited items that are detected through the screening process. For example, FPS reported that in 2013, protective security officers detected approximately 700,000 prohibited items. The benefits of using performance data in this manner are reflected in ISC guidance, as well as key practices in security and internal control standards that GAO has developed. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making two recommendations—one to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and one to the Attorney General: We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct FPS to develop and implement a strategy for using covert- testing data and data on prohibited items to improve FPS’s security- screening efforts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report focuses on security screening at General Services Administration (GSA) buildings. To determine challenges federal entities face in their efforts to prevent prohibited items and individuals who may pose a security threat from entering GSA buildings, we interviewed GSA headquarters officials, FPS and USMS officials responsible for security issues at the headquarters level, FPS regional and USMS district level officials, and also officials at the building level for our 11 selected GSA buildings. To determine actions federal entities have taken to assess the effectiveness of their screening efforts and the results of these efforts, we compared FPS’s and USMS’s efforts to comply with the Interagency Security Committee’s (ISC) standards, including The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities and the Items Prohibited from Federal Facilities. For example, we reviewed FPS and USMS’s data on prohibited items from fiscal years 2004 through 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
FPS and USMS conduct building security screening at thousands of GSA buildings across the country. Given continued concerns related to the security of federal buildings, GAO was asked to examine the: (1) challenges federal entities face in their efforts to prevent prohibited items and individuals who may pose a security threat from entering GSA buildings and (2) actions federal entities have taken to assess the effectiveness of their screening efforts, and the results of those actions. GAO conducted site visits to 11 selected buildings in three metropolitan areas based on a variety of criteria, including security level, agency officials' recommendations, and for FPS, possible inconsistencies in its data on prohibited items, and other factors. GAO analyzed FPS's and USMS's data, reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed FPS and USMS officials in headquarters and the field.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) United States Marshals Service (USMS) experience a range of challenges in their efforts to provide effective security screening, including:
Building characteristics and location may limit security options : many General Services Administration (GSA) buildings were designed and constructed before security screening became a priority.
Balancing security and public access : striking an appropriate balance between facilitating the public's access to government services and providing adequate security can be difficult, for example, when there is a high volume of visitors.
Operating with limited resources : some FPS protective security officers are not fully trained to conduct security screening, and FPS and USMS may have limited funding for additional training or additional security officers.
Working with multiple federal tenants : many tenant stakeholders at multi-tenant GSA buildings have differing needs and priorities that may not always align when trying to build consensus for security-screening decisions.
To assess security-screening efforts, both FPS and USMS have taken steps such as conducting covert and intrusion tests and collecting data on prohibited items. From fiscal years 2011 to 2013, FPS data show that protective security officers passed covert tests on security-screening procedures at a low rate. In October 2012, FPS reduced the number of screening scenarios used for covert testing, but has since reinstated some of them. USMS data show that court security officers passed intrusion tests on security screening at a higher rate. For example, USMS reported that court security officers passed 83 percent of intrusion tests on security screening in fiscal year 2010, 91 percent in fiscal year 2011, and 92 percent in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Although USMS tests more frequently than FPS, it has not met its intrusion-test frequency requirement per building each year. In addition, FPS's and USMS's data on prohibited items show wide variations in the number of items identified across buildings. For example, FPS reported it had detected approximately 700,000 prohibited items in 2013; however, FPS data showed that there were 295 buildings with no reported data on prohibited items from fiscal years 2004 through 2013. While FPS and USMS may use the results of covert and intrusion tests to address problems at the individual building or FPS region or USMS district level, to some degree, they do not use the results to strategically assess performance nationwide. The benefits of using data in this manner are reflected in the Interagency Security Committee's (ISC) guidance, as well as key practices in security and internal control standards GAO has developed. Without a more strategic approach to assessing performance, both FPS and USMS are not well positioned to improve security screening nationwide, identify trends and lessons learned, and address the aforementioned challenges related to screening in a complex security environment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FPS and USMS each develop and implement a strategy for using covert and intrusion testing, and prohibited-items data to improve security-screening efforts. Specifically, for FPS, the strategy would, among other things, help determine which covert testing scenarios to use. For USMS, the strategy would, among other things, help determine the appropriate frequency of intrusion testing. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-919 | gao_GAO-12-919_0 | Most Selected Agencies Leveraged Only a Fraction of Their Buying Power and Achieved Limited Savings
The four agencies we reviewed—DOD, DHS, Energy, and VA—together accounted for 80 percent of the total $537 billion federal procurement spending in fiscal year 2011, but reported managing less than 5 percent, or $25.8 billion, through agencywide strategic sourcing contracts. While strategic sourcing may not be suitable for all procurement spending, this percentage of managed spending and savings is very low compared to leading companies which generally strategically manage about 90 percent of their procurement spending and achieve savings of 10 to 20 percent of total procurements annually. Further, most of the four agencies’ current and planned strategic sourcing efforts do not address their highest spending areas, the majority of which exceed $1 billion and most of which are services. Selected agencies’ reported savings added up to $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2011—less than one-half of one percent of total federal procurement spending. However, they did provide information on a limited number of ongoing departmentwide initiatives. According to VA officials, efforts were stymied by a lack of reliable data. Selected Agencies and the FSSI Program Continue to Face Challenges in Implementing Strategic Sourcing
Selected agencies and the FSSI program, which manages governmentwide strategic sourcing initiatives, continue to face common challenges which prevent them from fully adopting a strategic sourcing approach to procurement. VA and Energy also reported this challenge. Agencies are equally challenged to produce other metrics—such as spending through strategic sourcing contracts and savings—that can be used to monitor progress. Energy officials agreed with our recommendation and stated they have clarified their guidance on developing savings estimates. In addition, the FSSI program has not yet targeted any of the government’s 50 highest spend products and services for strategic sourcing, and therefore is missing the potential for more significant strategic sourcing savings and other benefits governmentwide. The FSSI Program Managed a Small Amount of Fiscal Year 2011 Spending through Several Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiatives and Reported Achieving Considerable Savings
In fiscal year 2011, the FSSI program managed $339 million through governmentwide initiatives and achieved approximately $60 million in savings, or almost 18 percent of the procurement spending it managed through these initiatives. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve departmentwide strategic sourcing efforts at DOD, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take the following five actions: sets goals for spending managed through strategic sourcing vehicles, establishes procedures for the identification and tracking of departmentwide and component strategic sourcing efforts through the PASS office, implements the PASS office strategic sourcing guidance, links strategic sourcing to its Better Buying Power memorandum, and establishes metrics, such as utilization rates, to track progress toward these goals. Accordingly, we assessed: (1) the extent to which selected agencies managed spending and achieved savings through strategic sourcing, and whether buying power could better be leveraged, (2) key challenges agency and Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI) officials face in strategically sourcing products and services, (3) the extent to which FSSIs managed spending and achieved savings through strategic sourcing, and whether governmentwide buying power could better be leveraged. To evaluate agency strategic sourcing efforts, we selected for review four agencies—Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and Department of Energy (Energy)—among the top ten in fiscal year 2011 procurement obligations that accounted for 80 percent of total federal procurement spending. GAO-10-367. GAO-07-20. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported that the government is not fully leveraging its aggregate buying power, and that strategic sourcing, a process that moves a company away from numerous individual procurements to a broader aggregate approach, allowed companies to achieve savings of 10 to 20 percent. A similar savings rate applied to the federal procurement budget would equal more than $50 billion dollars. In 2005, the Office of Management and Budget directed agencies to use strategic sourcing and established the FSSI program to manage governmentwide efforts. GAO was asked to assess (1) the extent to which selected agencies managed spending and achieved savings through strategic sourcing, (2) key challenges selected agency and FSSI officials face in strategically sourcing products and services, and (3) the extent to which the FSSI program managed spending and achieved savings through strategic sourcing. To do this, GAO selected four agencies that were among the highest in fiscal year 2011 procurement obligations--DOD, DHS, VA, and Energy--and reviewed governmentwide FSSI efforts. For each, GAO analyzed strategic sourcing data and policies, and interviewed responsible officials.
What GAO Found
Selected agencies leveraged only a fraction of their buying power through strategic sourcing and achieved limited savings. In fiscal year 2011, the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Energy, and Veterans Affairs (VA) accounted for 80 percent of the $537 billion in federal procurement spending, but reported managing about 5 percent or $25.8 billion through strategic sourcing efforts. These agencies reported savings of $1.8 billion--less than one-half of one percent of procurement spending. While strategic sourcing may not be suitable for all procurement spending, leading companies strategically manage about 90 percent of their procurements and report annual savings of 10 percent or more. Further, most agencies' efforts do not address their highest spending areas such as services, which may provide opportunities for additional savings.
Most selected agencies and the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI) program have not fully adopted a strategic sourcing approach. In prior work, GAO found that sustained leadership and effective metrics are important factors to implementing strategic sourcing. However, leaders at DOD have dedicated limited resources to strategic sourcing, and leaders at VA and Energy are just beginning to align resources for agencywide strategic sourcing efforts. A lack of clear guidance on metrics for measuring success has also impacted the management of ongoing FSSI efforts as well as most selected agencies' efforts. In contrast, DHS leaders stood up a centralized office and hold senior managers accountable to meet goals. DHS sets targets for use of strategic sourcing contracts, and reported that nearly 20 percent of its fiscal year 2011 procurement spending was directed through strategically sourced contracts.
The FSSI program managed little spending through strategic sourcing initiatives, but reported considerable savings. In fiscal year 2011, the program managed $339 million through several governmentwide initiatives and reported $60 million in savings. However, total spending through the program remains low, in part, because the FSSI contracts have low rates of use and the program has not yet targeted the products and services on which the government spends the most.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends a number of actions OMB, DOD, and VA can take to achieve more savings, such as applying strategic sourcing practices to their highest spending procurement categories, and setting targets for use of strategic sourcing contracts. All three agencies concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_RCED-97-225 | gao_RCED-97-225_0 | The states are also required by federal regulations to automatically certify as income eligible those individuals who document their participation in the Food Stamp Program, Medicaid, and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program. Efforts to Control Food Costs and Manage Vendors Have Reduced Costs, but the Program’s Structure May Discourage Wider Use
States’ initiatives to control food costs by limiting the types and package sizes of WIC foods and by more carefully selecting and regulating vendors have reduced the program’s costs by millions of dollars. These two practices include (1) contracting with manufacturers to obtain rebates on WIC foods in addition to infant formula and (2) limiting authorized food selections by, for example, requiring participants to select brands of foods that have the lowest cost. While all states have one or more food selection restrictions, 17 of the 48 WIC directors responding to our questionnaire reported that their states are considering the use of additional food selection limits to contain or reduce costs in the WIC program. According to Texas WIC officials, the state does not limit the number of vendors that can participate in the WIC program. Appendix II provides information on the states’ use of cost containment practices that affect the program’s costs. Thirty-two of the 48 WIC directors reported that their state agencies generally require documentation of income eligibility for these applicants. These states allow applicants to declare their income without providing supporting documentation. Finally, two directors reported that income documentation procedures are determined individually by the local WIC agencies. In addition, 20 state WIC directors reported that their states do not require applicants to provide proof of residency, and 12 reported that their states do not require applicants to provide proof of identity when they seek certification for program participation. Conclusions
A number of the states are making effective use of a variety of practices to contain the WIC program’s costs and to extend coverage to more women and children. Given such obstacles, and the states’ concern with how the program allocates the additional funds made available through cost containment initiatives, some states may be discouraged from adopting or expanding the use of cost containment practices. The states that base income-eligibility decisions on WIC applicants’ declarations of income without documentation may be allowing applicants who are not eligible to participate in the WIC program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed cost containment initiatives states are using to control the cost of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), focusing on the practices that the states use to: (1) contain costs by controlling the foods approved for use in the WIC program and by more closely selecting and regulating participating vendors; and (2) ensure that WIC applicants' incomes meet the program's eligibility requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the states are using a variety of cost containment initiatives to control the WIC program's costs; (2) for example, 10 states have contracted with manufacturers to obtain rebates on WIC foods in addition to infant formula, and some states have placed greater limits on WIC participants' food choices than other states; (3) separately, or in conjunction with efforts to contain food costs, 39 states use various practices to restrict the number of vendors or ensure that the prices vendors charge for WIC food items are competitive; (4) these and other practices to contain food costs have saved millions of dollars annually and enabled more individuals to enroll in the program, according to WIC directors; (5) while the use of cost containment practices could be expanded, certain obstacles, including the states' concern with how the program allocates the additional funds made available through cost containment initiatives, may discourage the states from adopting or expanding their use; (6) federal regulations provide that WIC program applicants who participate in the Food Stamp Program, Medicaid, and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program automatically meet the income eligibility requirements of the WIC program; (7) the states use a variety of procedures to certify the income eligibility of the applicants who do not participate in these programs; (8) thirty-two of the 48 state WIC directors responding to GAO's questionnaire reported that their states generally require these applicants to provide documents, such as pay stubs and letters, to verify their income; (9) of the remaining 16 WIC directors, 14 reported that their states do not require documentation; (10) these states allow applicants to declare their income without providing supporting documentation; and (11) the other two directors reported that income documentation procedures are determined individually by the local WIC agencies. |
gao_RCED-98-260 | gao_RCED-98-260_0 | EPACT’s Replacement Goal Is Not Likely to Be Achieved
The goal of EPACT to replace 10 percent of the conventional fuel consumed by light-duty vehicles by 2000 and 30 percent by 2010 with replacement fuels is unlikely to be achieved. On the basis of EIA’s modeling analysis, we estimate that alternative fuels will account for less than 1 percent of the total fuel to be consumed by light-duty vehicles in 2000 and about 3.4 percent in 2010, even after accounting for EPACT’s provisions mandating that fleets acquire AFVs. In addition, the lower price of gasoline discourages increased use of the higher priced alternative fuels. EPACT Will Lead to a Small Increase in the Use of Propane as a Transportation Fuel
EPACT is expected to lead to a small increase in the use of propane as a transportation fuel. As a result, consumption of propane as a transportation fuel will account for about 1.5 percent of the total propane used in the United States in 2000 and about 5.1 percent in 2010. The effects of EPACT specifically on the consumption of propane fuel by light-duty vehicles are summarized in table 2. EPACT Will Have Very Little Impact on the Supply and Price of Propane
Because EPACT is not expected to cause any significant increase in propane demand, it will have very little impact on the supply and price of propane. We estimate that the additional U.S. production of propane that will result from EPACT will be about 7,000 barrels per day in 2000 and 85,000 barrels per day in 2010. According to EIA’s modeling results, these levels of domestic production will satisfy most of the additional propane demand or consumption caused by EPACT, while imports will satisfy the rest. 2). We estimate, based on EIA’s modeling, that the effect of EPACT on the overall price of propane will be negligible: an increase of 0.17 cent per gallon in 2000 and 3.28 cents per gallon in 2010 (fig. The estimated price increase effects for residential consumers will be only 0.10 cent per gallon in 2000 and 1.50 cents per gallon in 2010; the increase for industrial consumers is estimated to be 0.10 cent per gallon in 2000 and 1.70 cents per gallon in 2010; and the increase for transportation consumers is estimated at 0.43 cent per gallon in 2000 and 2.33 cents in 2010. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether and how including propane as an alternative fuel under EPACT will affect the supply, price, and existing consumers of propane, we asked EIA to use its National Energy Modeling System to estimate the likelihood of achieving EPACT’s fuel replacement goal and to estimate the potential impact. In comparing the overall results of these two studies, the Oak Ridge authors noted that their results were “in marked contrast to DOE’s 1996 long-run analysis, which concluded that if the necessary infrastructure for a mature alternative fuel and vehicle industry were present, then alternative fuels, as a group, appear likely to sustain a 30-percent market share under equilibrium conditions.” The Oak Ridge report went on to state, “However, the modeling results here suggest that the necessary infrastructure may not evolve smoothly, and fuel and vehicle prices may not benefit from economies of scale in the absence of additional policies . . ..”
Estimating the Effect of EPACT’s Fleet Mandates
This appendix describes the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) methodology for estimating the effect of EPACT’s purchase mandates for alternative-fueled vehicles (AFV) on the replacement of petroleum fuels used by motor vehicles in the United States and on the demand, supply, price, and existing consumers of propane. We also asked EIA to use NEMS to model the effect of including propane as an alternative motor fuel under EPACT on the demand, supply, price, and existing users of propane. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined whether and how including propane as an alternative fuel under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) will affect existing propane consumers as well as the supply and price, focusing on: (1) whether EPACT's goal of replacing at least 10 percent of the conventional fuel used in light-duty vehicles by 2000 and at least 30 percent by 2010 with replacement fuels will be achieved; (2) the extent to which the use of propane as a motor fuel will increase as a result of EPACT; (3) the impact the use of propane as a motor fuel under EPACT will have on the supply and price of propane; and (4) the impact the use of propane as a motor fuel under EPACT will have on existing users of propane.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is unlikely that the goal of EPACT of replacing at least 10 percent of the conventional fuel used by light-duty vehicles in the United States by 2000 and at least 30 percent by 2010 with replacement fuels will be achieved; (2) GAO estimates, based on the Energy Information Administration's (EIA) modeling, that alternative fuels will account for less than 1 percent in 2000 and about 3.4 percent in 2010 of the total motor fuel projected to be consumed by light-duty vehicles; (3) the act's focus on the acquisition of alternative-fueled vehicles rather than on the use of alternative fuels, high alternative-fueled vehicle costs, low gasoline prices, and an inadequate refueling infrastructure for these vehicles are factors hindering the increased use of alternative fuels for transportation; (4) EPACT can be expected to lead to a small increase in the use of propane as an alternative fuel in the transportation sector; (5) GAO estimates that after the vehicle acquisition mandates in the act are factored in, consumption of propane as a motor fuel will account for about 1.5 percent of the total propane used in the United States in 2000 and about 5.1 percent in 2010; (6) the effects of EPACT on the supply and price of propane will be minimal; (7) incremental domestic production of propane as a result of the act will be about 7,000 barrels per day in 2000 and 85,000 in 2010; (8) according to the EIA, these levels of domestic production will satisfy most of the estimated additional propane demand caused by the act; (9) GAO estimates that the increase in the overall price of propane attributable to the act will be a negligible 0.17 cent per gallon in 2000 and 3.28 cents per gallon in 2010; (10) similarly, EPACT will have little impact on the existing consumers of propane because the price increases will be so small; (11) GAO estimates that propane prices paid by residential and industrial consumers will increase by an average of just 0.10 cent per gallon in 2000, while the prices paid by transportation consumers will increase by about 0.43 cent per gallon; and (12) GAO projects that in 2010, price increases due to the act will be, on average, 1.50 cents per gallon for the residential sector, 1.70 cents per gallon for the industrial sector, and 2.33 cents per gallon for the transportation sector. |
gao_GAO-10-759 | gao_GAO-10-759_0 | Background
The HUBZone program was established by the HUBZone Act of 1997 to stimulate economic development by providing federal contracting preferences to small businesses operating in economically distressed communities known as HUBZones. Moreover, certified HUBZone firms competing for government contracts must verify in the government’s Online Representations and Certifications Application (ORCA) that there have been “no material changes in ownership and control, principal office, or the percentage of employee’s living in a HUBZone since it was certified by the SBA.” Firms and individuals who misrepresent their eligibility during the application process or while participating in the program are subject to civil and criminal penalties; decertification from the HUBZone program; or debarment from all federal contracts. SBA’s HUBZone Certification Process Remains Vulnerable to Fraud and Abuse
The SBA continues to struggle with reducing fraud risks in its HUBZone certification process despite reportedly taking steps to bolster its controls. The SBA lost documentation for our fourth application on multiple occasions, forcing us to abandon our application. Our testing revealed that the SBA does not adequately authenticate self-reported information—especially as it pertains to information regarding whether a firm’s principal office location meets program requirements. For example, for our successful firms, we used the addresses of the Alamo, a public storage facility in Florida, and a city hall in Texas as our principal office locations—locations that a simple Internet search could have revealed as ineligible for the program. The SBA took at least 7 months to process each of the three applications from our bogus companies that it certified. SBA’s increased processing times failed to prevent our fraudulent firms from being certified. Specific details about each of our fraudulent applications are reported below. For the principal office location, we used the address of the Alamo, a National Historic Landmark in Texas. We fabricated these documents using publicly available materials and software and submitted them to the SBA. Fictitious Application 3: After 7 months of processing, SBA approved this bogus firm for HUBZone participation. Again, the agency told us that it did not receive the documentation and subsequently gave us one day to resubmit it. SBA Has Taken Some Actions on the 29 HUBZone Firms Previously Investigated by GAO
As of March 2010, the SBA has reviewed the status of all 29 firms we referred to it from our prior HUBZone investigations. Since our March 2009 report, these firms have received more than $66 million in federal obligations for new contracts. Of the 29 firms, 16 were decertified by the SBA, 8 voluntarily withdrew from the HUBZone program, and 5 were found by the agency to be in compliance with program requirements and remain certified. We did not attempt to verify SBA’s work. And although SBA indicated that firms sometimes come in and out of compliance while in the program, we maintain that the firms represented in the cases that the SBA reviewed and determined to meet HUBZone program requirements were out of compliance at the time of our review. Tables 1 and 2 below show the results of the SBA’s review of the 29 firms we referred from our July 2008 testimony and March 2009 report. Because the SBA did not promptly suspend or debar the firm, this firm was able to receive nearly $600,000 in additional noncompetitive 8(a) contracts since our last report. According to SBA officials, SBA has recently proposed debarment for this firm. In addition, this report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://gao.gov. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program provides federal contracting assistance to small firms located in economically distressed areas, with the intent of stimulating economic development. In July 2008 and March 2009, GAO reported on substantial vulnerabilities to fraud and abuse in the HUBZone application and monitoring process. GAO also found 10 HUBZone firms in the Washington, D.C., area and 19 firms in four other metropolitan areas in Alabama, California, and Texas that made fraudulent or inaccurate representations to get into or remain in the HUBZone program. Given the Committee's continued concern over fraud and abuse in the HUBZone program, GAO (1) performed additional proactive testing of SBA's HUBZone certification process, and (2) determined whether SBA has taken any actions against the 29 case study firms GAO identified in its prior work. Using publicly available resources to fabricate documents, GAO proactively tested SBA's application process by applying for HUBZone certification for four bogus businesses with fictitious owners and employees. GAO also interviewed SBA officials and reviewed SBA data about the 29 case study firms. GAO did not attempt to project the extent of fraud and abuse in the program nor systematically assess HUBZone program controls.
What GAO Found
The HUBZone program remains vulnerable to fraud and abuse. Using falsified documents and employee information, GAO obtained HUBZone certification for three bogus firms using the addresses of the Alamo in Texas, a public storage facility in Florida, and a city hall in Texas as principle office locations. A simple Internet search by SBA could have revealed these as phony applications. While the agency has required more documentation in its application process since GAO's July 2008 report, GAO's testing shows that SBA does not adequately authenticate self-reported information and, for these cases, did not perform site visits to validate the addresses. Further, the changes have significantly increased the time it takes SBA to process applications. Specifically, SBA took 7 or more months to process each of the bogus applications--at least 6 months longer than for GAO's previous investigations. SBA continually lost documentation for GAO's fourth application, and eventually withdrew it after GAO failed to resubmit the same materials for the fourth time. On its Web site, SBA reported that applicants are experiencing delays during the application process. SBA has taken some action on most of the 29 firms that GAO previously reported did not meet HUBZone program requirements. The SBA decertified 16 firms from the HUBZone program, and another 8 firms voluntarily withdrew. While GAO maintains all 29 firms did not meet requirements at the time of its review, SBA stated that the other 5 firms were in compliance at the time of its own review and so remain certified. Since GAO's March 2009 report, 17 of the 29 companies have received more than $66 million in federal obligations for new contracts. GAO recently reported that one firm has also defrauded the SBA 8(a) program. Because the SBA did not promptly debar the firm from federal contracts, it was able to fraudulently receive an additional $600,000 in noncompetitive 8(a) federal contracts since GAO's last report. SBA recently proposed debarring this firm. National Historic Landmark Address (The Alamo) Used by GAO as Principle |
gao_GAO-17-189 | gao_GAO-17-189_0 | FDA oversees the drug development process and the approval of new drugs for marketing in the United States. The GAIN provisions required FDA to take certain steps to encourage drug sponsors to develop antibiotics, particularly those that treat serious or life-threatening infections. Fast track designation may expedite FDA’s review of an application by allowing drug sponsors to have increased communication with FDA and by allowing FDA to review portions of the application as they come in rather than waiting for a complete application. FDA Created a Task Force to Coordinate the Release of Guidance and Used the QIDP Designation to Encourage the Development of New Antibiotics
FDA Created a Task Force to Coordinate the Release of Guidance Documents for Antibiotics
In 2012, FDA created an internal group called the Antibacterial Drug Development Task Force (Task Force) to coordinate the release of guidance documents for antibiotics as part of its role to promote the development of these types of drugs. As of August 2016, FDA and the Task Force had coordinated the release of 14 updated or new guidance documents related to the development of antibiotics, although half of these documents remain in draft form. FDA recently told us that the agency plans to release finalized guidance “soon.”
FDA Used the QIDP Designation and Its Associated Incentives to Encourage the Development of Antibiotics
Although it is too soon to determine if GAIN has actually stimulated the development of new antibiotics, FDA has taken steps to implement the GAIN provision related to the QIDP designation and the incentives associated with the approval of a QIDP drug. Since 2012, FDA has granted 101 requests for the designation. FDA data from July 9, 2012, (when the QIDP designation was created) through December 31, 2015, showed that FDA granted almost all of the requests that it received for the QIDP designation. Drug Sponsors in Our Study Said That GAIN Has Facilitated FDA’s Review of Their Antibiotic Applications, but Also Expressed Concern about Available Guidance
All Drug Sponsors in Our Study Told Us That Increased Communication with FDA or the Expedited Review of Their Applications Were Beneficial to Their Drug Development Processes
All 10 of the drug sponsors in our study said that increased communication with FDA or the expedited review of their QIDP- designated drug applications due to GAIN were beneficial to their drug development processes. Eight of the drug sponsors in our study attributed this increase in communication with FDA, typically associated with the fast track designation, to the agency’s implementation of the GAIN provisions and general commitment to supporting the development of new antibiotics. Several of the Drug Sponsors in Our Study Expressed Concern about Available FDA Guidance Documents
Several of the drug sponsors in our study expressed concern about how much they could rely on FDA’s draft guidance documents or the lack of guidance describing the QIDP designation and its requirements. However, the FDA draft guidance documents on developing antibiotics that we examined indicated on the title page and on subsequent pages that they were intended for comment purposes only, not for implementation, and would represent the agency’s current thinking “when finalized.” Thus, while these draft guidance documents can include updated information, it is unclear if the new information represents FDA’s current thinking on a topic or if the purpose of the draft guidance is limited to generating public comment. Three of the 10 drug sponsors expressed concern about the role of FDA’s draft guidance. Further, five sponsors in our study said that elements of the QIDP designation were unclear and that written guidance from FDA related to the QIDP designation and its incentives would help them to better understand the requirements and associated benefits. Federal internal control standards on information and communication state that sharing quality information with external parties is necessary to achieving an entity’s objectives. However, a lack of clarity on the role of draft guidance documents for and a lack of guidance on the QIDP designation could create uncertainty for drug sponsors about how much reliance they should place on these draft documents and could diminish the likelihood that some drug sponsors apply for the designation because they do not fully understand its requirements and benefits. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order for drug sponsors to benefit from FDA’s revised guidance on antibiotic development and take full advantage of the QIDP designation, we recommend that FDA clarify how drug sponsors should utilize draft guidance documents that were released in accordance with GAIN, and develop and make available written guidance on the QIDP designation that includes information about the process a drug sponsor must undertake to request the fast track designation and how the agency is applying the market exclusivity incentive. In its written comments, HHS agreed to consider our first recommendation and to implement our second recommendation. GAIN called for FDA to issue draft guidance documents and to review and revise them, as appropriate, to reflect scientific developments. Department of Health and Human Services. Food and Drug Administration. Food and Drug Administration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Antibiotics have long played a key role in treating infections, but this role is threatened by growing resistance to existing antibiotics and the decline in the development of new drugs. FDA oversees the approval of drugs for the U.S. market. The GAIN provisions created the QIDP designation and its associated incentives to encourage the development of new drugs to treat serious or life-threatening infections.
While it is too soon to tell if GAIN has stimulated the development of new drugs, GAO was asked to provide information on FDA's efforts to implement GAIN. This report examines (1) steps FDA has taken to encourage the development of antibiotics since GAIN, and (2) drug sponsors' perspectives on FDA's efforts. GAO analyzed FDA data on requests for the QIDP designation from July 2012 through December 2015 (the most recent data available at the time of GAO's review), and on drugs approved with this designation during the same time frame. GAO reviewed relevant FDA guidance documents and internal controls. GAO interviewed FDA officials and obtained information from a nongeneralizable selection of 10 drug sponsors about FDA efforts.
What GAO Found
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released updated or new guidance for antibiotic development, and used the qualified infectious disease products (QIDP) designation to encourage the development of new antibiotics. As of August 2016, FDA, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), had coordinated the release of 14 updated or new guidance documents on antibiotic development, in compliance with Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) provisions of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012. However, half of these guidance documents remain in draft form. The GAIN provisions required FDA to review and, as appropriate, revise guidance documents related to antibiotics, in part to ensure that they reflected scientific developments. FDA used the QIDP designation and its incentives, created under the GAIN provisions, to encourage drug sponsors to develop new antibiotics. Incentives available under the QIDP designation include eligibility for fast track designation—which allows drug sponsors to have increased interaction with FDA and allows FDA to review portions of sponsors' applications as they come in rather than waiting for a complete application. FDA granted 101 out of 109 requests for the QIDP designation from July 2012, when the designation was created, through December 2015. FDA also approved six drugs with the QIDP designation for market in the United States.
The 10 drug sponsors in GAO's study said that GAIN has facilitated FDA's review of their drug applications, and 8 said they experienced increased communication with FDA due to the agency's implementation of GAIN and general commitment to supporting the development of new antibiotics. However, several were uncertain whether they could rely on FDA's draft guidance or were concerned about the lack of guidance describing the QIDP designation and its requirements. For example, 2 drug sponsors expressed concern about the role of FDA's draft guidance. A third sponsor said it would be helpful if certain draft guidance was finalized. Five additional drug sponsors in GAO's study stated that written guidance from FDA related to the QIDP designation and its incentives, such as the process for obtaining fast track designation for a QIDP-designated application, would help them to better understand the requirements and its associated benefits. FDA released some of its updated guidance documents in draft form on its website, in response to GAIN, which indicated that they were intended for comment purposes only, not for implementation, and would represent the agency's current thinking “when finalized.” While these draft guidance documents can include updated information, it is unclear if the new information represents FDA's current thinking on a topic or if the purpose of the draft guidance is limited to generating public comment. Internal control standards for the federal government on information and communication state that sharing quality information with external parties is necessary to achieving an entity's objectives. The lack of clarity on the role of draft guidance for and the lack of written guidance on the QIDP designation create uncertainty for drug sponsors about how much reliance they should place on these draft documents and could diminish the likelihood that drug sponsors apply for the designation because they do not fully understand its requirements and benefits.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA clarify the role of draft guidance for and develop written guidance on the QIDP designation to help drug sponsors better understand the designation and its associated incentives. HHS said it would consider GAO's first recommendation and agreed with the second. GAO believes the first recommendation should also be adopted. |
gao_GAO-06-943 | gao_GAO-06-943_0 | These items included 3 ceramic body armor inserts identified as small arms protective inserts (SAPI), which are the ceramic inserts currently in demand by soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan; a time selector unit used to ensure the accuracy of computer-based equipment, such as global positioning systems and system-level clocks; 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft; guided missile radar test sets used to check the operation of the data link antenna on the Navy’s Walleye (AGM- 62) air-to-ground guided missile; and numerous other electronic items. Posing as DOD contractor employees, our investigators also entered DRMOs in two east coast states, and obtained about $1.1 million in excess military items that required demilitarization as well several other items that are currently in use by the military services. Sensitive Excess Military Items Purchased at DOD Excess Property Liquidation Sales
Using a fictitious identity as a private citizen, our undercover investigator applied for and received an account with DOD’s liquidation sales contractor. The undercover investigator was then able to purchase several sensitive excess military items that were being improperly sold to the public. The following discussion presents the case study details of our undercover purchases of sensitive excess military items that should have been destroyed when no longer needed by DOD and should not have been sold to the public. Universal frequency counter. These items included two guided missile launcher mounts for shoulder-fired missiles, several types of body armor, an all-band antenna used to track aircraft, six circuit card assemblies used in Navy computerized systems, a digital signal converter used in naval electronic surveillance, and two Palm V personal digital assistants (PDA) that were certified as having their hard drives removed. During our undercover security penetration at DRMO B in June 2006, our investigators noticed two Palm V Organizer PDAs and accessories. Waste Associated with Sales of A-Condition Excess Items that Military Services Are Continuing to Use in Operations
Because significant numbers of new, unused A-condition excess items still being purchased or in use by the military services are being disposed of through liquidation sales, it was easy for our undercover investigator to pose as a liquidation sales customer and purchase several of these items for a fraction of what the military services are paying to obtain these same items from DLA supply depots. Undercover Purchases of New, Unused Items that DOD Is Continuing to Buy or that Are in Demand by Military Units
Our undercover investigator used a fictitious identity to obtain a DOD liquidation sales customer account and purchase several new, unused excess DOD items that the military services are continuing to order from supply inventory or use in operations. Further, liquidation sales of items that military units are continuing to purchase at full cost from supply inventory demonstrates continuing waste and inefficiency in DOD’s excess property reutilization program. 1). The table below defines the DOD demilitarization codes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's previous work found problems in security controls over sensitive excess military equipment that resulted in lost and stolen items, some of which were sold to the public, and significant waste and inefficiency in the Department of Defense (DOD) excess property reutilization program. GAO was asked to perform follow-up investigations to determine whether (1) unauthorized parties could obtain sensitive excess military equipment that requires demilitarization (destruction) when no longer needed by DOD and (2) system and process improvements are adequate to prevent sales of new, unused excess items that DOD continues to buy or that are in demand by the military services.
What GAO Found
GAO investigators posing as private citizens to disguise their identity purchased several sensitive military equipment items from DOD's liquidation sales contractor, indicating that DOD has not enforced security controls for preventing sensitive excess military equipment from release to the public. GAO investigators at liquidation sales purchased ceramic body armor inserts currently used by deployed troops, a cesium technology timing unit with global positioning capabilities, a universal frequency counter, 2 guided missile radar test sets, 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 fighter aircraft, and numerous other items. GAO was able to purchase these items because controls broke down at virtually every step in the excess property turn-in and disposal process. GAO determined that thousands of military items that should have been demilitarized (destroyed) were sold to the public. Further, in June 2006, GAO undercover investigators posing as DOD contractor employees entered two excess property warehouses and obtained about $1.1 million in sensitive military equipment items, including 2 launcher mounts for shoulder-fired guided missiles, several types of body armor, a digital signal converter used in naval surveillance, an all-band antenna used to track aircraft, and 6 circuit cards used in computerized Navy systems. At no point during GAO's warehouse security penetration were its investigators challenged on their identity and authority to obtain DOD military property. The table below shows examples of sensitive military equipment obtained during GAO's undercover operations. GAO investigators posing as private citizens also bought several new, unused items currently being purchased or in demand by the military services from DOD's excess property liquidation sales contractor. Although military units paid full price for these items when they ordered them from supply inventory, GAO paid a fraction of this cost to purchase the same items, demonstrating continuing waste and inefficiency. |
gao_GAO-12-947 | gao_GAO-12-947_0 | DHS Has Improved Some Aspects of Its Procurement Oversight but Guidance Is Not Sufficiently Updated
OCPO’s oversight has helped ensure that components address constructive assessments of their compliance with procurement regulations and policies and has increased the Chief Procurement Officer’s visibility into components’ progress against procurement-related metrics. OCPO has been less consistent in—but continues to hone—its implementation of other aspects of the program, including self assessments and parts of its acquisition planning reviews. However, at the time of our review, DHS had not issued updated policy or guidance reflecting OCPO’s current approach to procurement oversight, which led to a lack of clarity for components regarding what the oversight efforts entail. Components Leverage Buying Power through DHS’s Strategic Sourcing Program
Components Actively Support DHS’s Strategic Sourcing Program
DHS component officials stated that most of their efforts to leverage buying power are through the department’s strategic sourcing program, which facilitates the development and award of contracts for the purchase of specific items or services across DHS. According to DHS data, DHS’s spending through strategic sourcing contract vehicles has increased steadily from $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2008, to almost $3 billion in fiscal year 2011, representing about 20 percent of DHS’s $14 billion in procurement spending for that year. The department also has several new initiatives under development. for goods and services ranging from ammunition to DHS policies encourage components to consider, but do not require, the use of departmentwide strategic sourcing contract vehicles. The Chief Procurement Officer has identified increasing strategic sourcing as a departmentwide priority and OCPO encourages the utilization and development of strategic sourcing vehicles in a variety of ways. OCPO officials explained that they host quarterly meetings and training sessions with the DHS Strategic Sourcing Working Group, meet with individual component programs and procurement offices, and post all contract information and ordering guides on the strategic sourcing web page. Components Have Leveraged Contracts with Other Agencies
Some components offered examples of contracts they leveraged with other agencies. However, most components found it more efficient to use DHS’s strategic sourcing vehicles than to leverage contracts with other agencies. Recommendation for Executive Action
In order to help ensure that DHS component officials understand what OCPO expects of them in its procurement oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Chief Procurement Officer to review and ensure consistency between Directive 143-05 and the Procurement Oversight Program Guidebook and with the department’s current procurement oversight efforts. The draft included a recommendation that DHS issue updated policy and guidance to reflect changes to the department’s procurement oversight efforts. In written comments, the department concurred with our findings and recommendation. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to (1) assess the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to implement procurement oversight, and (2) identify DHS components’ use of strategic sourcing to leverage their buying power. To assess DHS efforts to implement procurement oversight, we examined DHS’s procurement oversight policies and guidance; reviewed prior GAO reports on acquisition and procurement oversight; interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) and from DHS components; and examined OCPO and component documentation of oversight efforts, including OCPO’s review schedule, quarterly reports, goal letters, operational status reports, and documentation of on-site reviews from 2007 to the present. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS bought over $14 billion in goods and services in fiscal year 2011--over one quarter of its budget--and processed over 100,000 transactions to support its homeland security missions. In 2005, DHS established an oversight program to provide department-level insight into components' procurement of goods and services and to identify successful acquisition management approaches. DHS has also established specific initiatives, such as a strategic sourcing program in 2003 to reduce procurement costs and gain other efficiencies by consolidating requirements. GAO (1) assessed DHS's efforts to implement procurement oversight, and (2) identified DHS components' use of strategic sourcing to leverage their buying power. To do this, GAO reviewed procurement oversight policies and guidance, interviewed officials from OCPO and DHS components, reviewed prior GAO reports, reviewed on-site review findings and recommendations, and examined DHS and component documentation of oversight and strategic sourcing efforts.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) continues to implement and has improved some aspects of its procurement oversight but has not sufficiently updated its guidance. OCPO's oversight has helped ensure that DHS components receive and address constructive assessments of their compliance with procurement regulations and policies. The oversight also has increased the Chief Procurement Officer's visibility into components' progress against procurement-related metrics. For example, OCPO establishes annual procurement goals for the components and tracks their progress in quarterly reports. OCPO has been less consistent in--but continues to hone its implementation of--other aspects of the program, such as self assessments and parts of its acquisition planning reviews. However, until GAO sent DHS a draft of this report recommending that DHS issue updated policy and guidance to reflect changes to the department's procurement oversight efforts, the department did not issue updated policy or guidance. This has led to a lack of clarity among components regarding what the oversight efforts entail. For example, some components did not complete a required self assessment in 2011. GAO's review of the revised policy and guidance found inconsistencies between the two and with current oversight efforts.
DHS component officials stated that most of their efforts to leverage buying power are through the department's strategic sourcing program, which provides departmentwide contract vehicles for the purchase of specific items or services. According to DHS data, the department's spending through strategic sourcing contract vehicles has increased steadily from $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2008 to almost $3 billion in fiscal year 2011, representing about 20 percent of DHS's procurement spending for that year. The Office of Management and Budget has recognized some of DHS's strategic sourcing efforts as best practices. DHS policies encourage components to consider, but do not require, the use of strategic sourcing contract vehicles. The Chief Procurement Officer has identified increasing strategic sourcing as a departmentwide priority and OCPO encourages the utilization and development of strategic sourcing contract vehicles in a variety of ways, including hosting quarterly training sessions and posting contract information on the strategic sourcing web page. In addition, while components have leveraged contracts with other agencies, many found it more efficient to use DHS's strategic sourcing contract vehicles. DHS components generally do not use other components' contracts.
What GAO Recommends
Based on DHS's actions in response to the recommendation contained in the draft report, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Chief Procurement Officer to review and ensure consistency between the new procurement oversight directive and guidebook and with the department's current procurement oversight efforts. |
gao_GAO-06-88 | gao_GAO-06-88_0 | Background
In addition to the 50-50 requirement in 10 U.S.C. Management Control Weaknesses Prevent Determination of Military Departments’ Compliance with 50-50 Requirement for Fiscal Year 2004
As in previous years, management control weaknesses in DOD’s financial systems and persistent deficiencies in 50-50 data reporting processes continue to prevent us from determining whether the military departments complied with the 50-50 requirement for public- and private-sector depot maintenance funding allocations for fiscal year 2004. As a result, the data reported for the prior year cannot be relied on to provide an accurate measure of the balance of funding between the public and private sectors or to determine if the military departments complied with the statutory limitation set by Congress for private-sector depot-level maintenance funding allocations. Persistent Deficiencies Continue to Limit Accuracy of Reported Data
Systemic weakness in DOD’s financial systems and persistent deficiencies, such as inadequate management attention and review to ensure accurate and complete reporting, limited independent review and validation of 50-50 data by audit agencies or other third parties, and inadequate training for those responsible for data collection and reporting continue to limit the accuracy of the 50-50 data provided to Congress. Fiscal Year 2005 and 2006 Projections Do Not Represent Reasonable Estimates of Public- and Private- Sector Funding
DOD’s reported projections for fiscal years 2005 through 2006 do not represent reasonable estimates of public- and private-sector depot maintenance funding allocations. The usefulness of the reported projections to congressional and DOD decision makers is limited because errors, omissions, and inconsistencies in DOD’s reported prior-year data are carried into future years and because of the difficulty in projecting out- year data due to factors such as changing depot maintenance requirements, consolidating maintenance facilities, and the trend toward more contractor logistics support for new and existing weapon systems. DOD’s Current 50-50 Report Satisfies the Annual Mandate but Could Provide More Useful Data and Analysis
Although DOD’s current 50-50 report to Congress satisfies the annual mandate, it lacks additional detail that might be useful to Congress as it exercises its oversight role. Furthermore, the reported data are aggregated at the service level. The report also does not identify funding allocation variances from year to year, nor explain the reasons behind them. Finally, DOD’s 50-50 report to Congress does not contain information about the methodologies used to prepare the current and future year projections or the reasons for projected funding variances and changes in workload distribution. Explanation of the methodologies used to estimate workload allocation projections for the current and ensuing fiscal years. Neither DOD nor the military services have consistently implemented corrective actions sufficient to resolve the deficiencies. 2466. Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate over the Public-Private Mix. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under 10 U.S.C. 2466, the military departments and defense agencies can use no more than 50 percent of annual depot maintenance funding for work performed by private-sector contractors. The Department of Defense (DOD) must submit a report to Congress annually on the division of depot maintenance funding between the public and private sectors during the preceding fiscal year and projected distribution for the current and ensuing fiscal years. As required, GAO reviewed the report submitted in April 2005 and is, with this report, submitting its views to Congress on whether (1) the military departments complied with the "50-50 requirement" for fiscal year 2004 and (2) the projections for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 represent reasonable estimates. Additionally, GAO is assessing whether the data currently provided in DOD's annual 50-50 report are useful to Congress in exercising its oversight role.
What GAO Found
As in previous years, systemic weaknesses in DOD's financial systems and persistent deficiencies in 50-50 data reporting processes continue to prevent GAO from determining whether the military departments complied with the 50-50 requirement for public- and private-sector depot maintenance funding allocations for fiscal year 2004. Persistent deficiencies, such as inadequate management attention and review to ensure accurate and complete reporting, limited independent review and validation of data by audit services or other third parties, and inadequate training for those responsible for data gathering and reporting, continue to limit the quality of the 50-50 data submitted to Congress. GAO's previous reports over the last 7 years identified similar problems and recommended corrective actions, but DOD and the military services have failed to consistently implement corrective actions sufficient to resolve the deficiencies and alleviate data accuracy problems. The recurring nature of these problems indicates a management control weakness as defined under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act. Reported projections do not represent reasonable estimates of public- and private-sector depot maintenance funding allocations for fiscal years 2005 through 2006 because some data errors and omissions in DOD's prior-year report are carried into the projected years. It is difficult to project out-year data due to factors such as changing depot maintenance requirements, the ongoing consolidation of maintenance facilities, and the trend toward more contractor logistics support for new and existing weapon systems. Although DOD's current 50-50 report to Congress satisfies the annual mandate, it lacks additional detail that might be useful to Congress as it exercises its oversight role. The report currently submitted by DOD contains data that are aggregated at a high level and provides no analysis of changes from the prior years or long-term trends. The report also does not identify actual funding and workload distribution variances from year to year, nor explain the reasons behind them. Furthermore, it does not contain information as to the methodologies used to prepare the current and future year projections. |
gao_GAO-12-711 | gao_GAO-12-711_0 | The Cost Implications of Evolving Plans for Overseas Presence Are Uncertain
Although DOD has conducted some analysis to support recent global defense posture decisions, the cost implications of these decisions are unknown. In its 2011 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, DOD asserted that cost savings associated with permanently stationing forces in the United States rather than overseas are offset by other factors, such as increased costs to periodically rotate forces back to overseas locations. To support this assertion, OSD identified two posture initiatives: (1) the forward deployment and permanent stationing of U.S. Navy ships in Rota, Spain, in support of ballistic missile defense and (2) the reduction of U.S. Army force structure in Europe. The Navy considered and compared three options in order to determine the most appropriate way to address the operational requirements for ballistic missile defense in Europe: (1) deploying ships to the region from U.S. bases, (2) forward stationing ships and crews within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, and (3) deploying ships to the region and rotating crews from U.S. bases. The Navy concluded that forward stationing ships represented the most efficient and strategically beneficial of the three options. First, the Navy did not fully consider the rotational crewing option. GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a business case analysis or a cost-benefit analysis seeks to find the best value solution by linking each alternative to how it satisfies a strategic objective. This linkage is achieved by developing business cases that present facts and supporting details among competing alternatives, including the life cycle costs and quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits. DOD Will Likely Save Money by Reducing Army Forces and Headquarters in Europe, but Amount of Savings Depends on Future Decisions
The 10-year time period identified in the analysis is fiscal years 2012 through 2021. Until the decisions outlined above are made—especially regarding the plans to rotate forces back to Europe—the full extent of the savings that will be realized in light of the Secretary of Defense’s January 2012 decision to reduce the size of permanently stationed U.S. Army forces in Europe will remain uncertain. DOD Has Taken Steps to Align Posture Initiatives with Strategy and Cost but Continues to Lack Comprehensive and Consistent Cost Estimates of Initiatives
DOD’s Process to Prioritize Posture Initiatives Is Improving
In part to respond to previous GAO recommendations, DOD recognized the need to prioritize initiatives to reflect strategic goals, has taken steps to align posture initiatives with defense strategy, and has begun to gather cost information. Combatant Commands Reported Some Cost Data in Their 2011 Theater Posture Plans, but Gaps Remain
Although the geographic combatant commands are responsible for reporting cost data on existing global posture, we found that the combatant commands did not completely and consistently report cost data in their 2011 theater posture plans. Further, costs and cost savings associated with the decision to reduce Army forces in Europe and adjust the Army’s basing footprint in the region will remain unknown until options related to rotational forces and their associated costs are identified and assessed. Lacking this information, department and congressional decision makers will be unable to adequately assess the true cost of global posture initiatives in the future. In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive analysis for each course of action the Navy has considered to address mission requirements for ballistic missile defense in the Mediterranean, that compares all options the Navy considered and either applies consistent operational assumptions or controls for different operational assumptions and includes the long-term life cycle costs and annual operating costs associated with forward stationing, DOD partially concurred, but did not identify additional actions to address the recommendation. Additionally, we found that the Navy did not control for the different assumptions used to develop the ship number requirements associated with the forward stationing and U.S.-based deployment approaches, which could have altered the results of the analysis and could represent significant long-term costs. Based on our findings and our cost estimating guide that states that a credible business case analysis should include life cycle costs as well as quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits, we maintain that the Navy, DOD, and Congress would benefit from additional analysis in order to develop a more comprehensive cost estimate associated with the decision to forward station ships in Rota. To determine the extent to which DOD developed a process for making decisions about global posture initiatives that aligns with strategy and considers costs, as well as efforts made by combatant commands to compile and report comprehensive cost data on existing global posture and new posture initiatives in their theater posture plans, we evaluated core global posture strategy documents; current and draft DOD guidance; and other documentation we collected through interviewing with officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, U.S. European Command and its three service component commands, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Africa Command, the four military service headquarters, OSD, OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance on defense budget priorities, indicating that it must rebalance its overseas force postureincluding the forward stationing of Navy ships in Spain for ballistic missile defense and the reduction of U.S. Army forces in Europein the face of deficit reduction. Similarly, DOD reported in its 2011 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress that savings associated with permanently stationing forces in the United States rather than overseas are often offset by such factors as increased rotational costs. Based on direction from the Senate Armed Services Committee, GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD has (1) conducted analysis to support recent overseas posture decisions and (2) developed a process for making posture decisions that align with strategy and consider costs. GAO assessed two recent posture initiatives, DOD plans and guidance related to posture, and theater posture plans from each combatant command.
What GAO Found
Although the Department of Defense (DOD) has conducted some analysis to support two recent global posture decisions, the full cost implications of these decisions are unknown.
Forward deployment and permanent stationing of U.S. Navy ships in Rota . The Navy considered three options: (1) deploying ships to the region from U.S. bases, (2) forward stationing ships and crews overseas, and (3) deploying ships to the region and rotating crews from U.S. bases. The Navy concluded that forward stationing ships was the most efficient option, but GAO found that it did not fully consider the option to rotate crews from U.S. bases and, in a classified analysis, it used different assumptions for forward stationing versus deploying from the United States. These assumptions could affect the results of the analysis and have long-term cost implications. GAOs Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a business case or cost-benefit analysis finds the best value solution by presenting facts and supporting details among competing alternatives, including the life cycle costs and benefits, and sensitivity to changes in assumptions. Without an analysis that controls for differing assumptions or considers factors such as complete life cycle costs, the long-term costs associated with its decision to forward station ships will remain unknown.
Reduction of U.S. Army force structure in Europe . The planned reductions of U.S. Army forces in Europe will likely save money; however, decisions that could affect the extent of the savings are pending. For example, a 2010 Army analysis found $2 billion in savings over 10 years by returning forces from Germany, but assumed that new facilities estimated at $800 million would need to be built in the United States to house them. However, present planned reductions in overall Army end strength could eliminate the need for new construction. Further, DOD announced that it will rotate forces from the United States to Europe, but the nature of the rotationswhich could include significant costs depending on their size and frequencyhas not yet been defined. According to DOD officials, until such determinations are made, the savings to DOD will remain uncertain.
DOD has taken steps to align posture initiatives with strategy and cost, but continues to lack comprehensive and consistent cost estimates of initiatives. DODs evolving posture process links initiatives with defense goals. Stakeholders from key DOD entities prioritize the initiatives in a voting process based on strategic criteria; cost is discussed, but not voted on. Furthermore, combatant commands did not completely and consistently report cost data in their theater posture plans because of the lack of readily available cost information. GAO found two primary reasons for this: unclear roles and responsibilities of key DOD organizations that have access to the cost data needed to compile and report comprehensive cost estimates and lack of a standardized format to compile and report cost data from component commands. Until these cost data are comprehensively compiled and reported, DOD and congressional decision makers will be unable to assess the true cost of posture initiatives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD conduct a comprehensive cost analysis associated with the Navys decision to station ships in Rota, assess options and costs related to rotating forces in Europe, and clarify roles and responsibilities of key entities to collect cost data on initiatives. DOD generally agreed with GAOs recommendations and identified corrective actions, but additional steps are needed to fully address GAOs recommendation that the Navy further assess options and costs for ballistic missile defense. |
gao_GAO-04-584T | gao_GAO-04-584T_0 | State Authorities Were First to Uncover Mutual Fund Trading Abuses but SEC Has Since Acted Swiftly to Address Problems
State authorities uncovered various abusive practices in the mutual fund industry in 2003, but since then SEC has taken swift action designed to punish wrongdoers and better prevent or detect abusive practices in the future. SEC did not identify these abusive practices involving mutual funds for various reasons. Also, according to testimony by the head of the SEC office that conducts mutual fund examinations, SEC examiners did not reveal these practices because their examinations focused primarily on the operations of the mutual fund and trading of the fund’s portfolio securities practices with an acknowledged potential for abuse. However since these abuses have come to light, SEC and NASD, which oversees the broker-dealers that sell fund shares, have acted vigorously to address inappropriate practices in the mutual fund industry. SEC Has Increased Resource Allocations Without the Benefit of An Updated Strategic Plan
After experiencing an extended period in which increases in SEC’s workload grew faster than its staffing and other resources, SEC has received recent budget increases that have begun to allow it to increase its staffing, including positions in the divisions and offices with responsibilities for mutual fund regulation, oversight, and enforcement. As a result, it is difficult to determine whether SEC has optimally allocated its limited resources to achieve the greatest benefits. The rapid growth of the mutual fund industry during this time also posed challenges to SEC’s staff. To address the mutual fund scandals, SEC has plans to substantially increase the staffing in the units responsible for mutual fund oversight. SEC also has made progress in developing performance measures that are part of an overall strategic planning framework. SEC Faces Agencywide Challenges That Also Affect Mutual Fund Oversight
Although it has received additional resources in recent years, SEC still faces a number of agencywide challenges impacting its mission and its ability to oversee the mutual fund industry. These challenges include improving its ability to head off major problems before they occur by better anticipating and detecting abuses in the securities industry. SEC also faces challenges in hiring and retaining all the staff it needs to achieve its mission as demands on staff continue to grow. Moreover, SEC has experienced difficulties in obtaining the information technology it needs to effectively oversee the mutual funds industry. Finally, SEC faces challenges in overcoming impediments to its ability to gather information, cooperate with other law enforcement authorities, and collect monies owed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Having grown to over $7.5 trillion in assets, mutual funds have become vital components of the financial security of more than 95 million American investors. However, in 2003, various allegations of misconduct and abusive practices involving mutual funds came to light. Therefore, ensuring that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which has primary oversight of the mutual fund industry, has the necessary resources and strategic focus to adequately oversee fund practices has never been more important. To assess how SEC is positioned to oversee mutual funds, GAO reviewed (1) how the abusive mutual fund practices were identified and SEC's subsequent responses, (2) SEC's plans for increasing its staffing in the divisions and offices responsible for overseeing mutual funds and its progress in developing a new strategic plan to guide staff deployment, and (3) the challenges SEC faces in overseeing the mutual fund industry.
What GAO Found
In late 2003, state law enforcement authorities were the first to bring to light various abusive practices in the mutual fund industry. SEC did not identify these practices because detecting fraud in routine examinations is difficult and it has been challenged to keep pace with the rapid growth of the mutual fund industry using its existing resources. However, since the abuses were identified SEC has acted vigorously to address these inappropriate practices, including taking various enforcement actions to punish wrongdoers and issuing numerous rule proposals designed to better prevent or detect abusive practices in the future. After years during which its workload grew faster than its resources, SEC recently received budget increases that have allowed it to significantly increase its staffing. SEC also plans to significantly increase the numbers of staff that oversee mutual funds. However, SEC made these allocation decisions without the benefit of an updated and complete strategic plan, which it is preparing but has yet to finalize. As a result, GAO was unable to determine whether SEC has optimally allocated its limited resources to achieve the greatest benefits. Although it has received additional resources in recent years, SEC faces a number of agencywide challenges impacting its mission and ability to oversee the mutual fund industry. These include improving its ability to better anticipate and detect problems in the industry and identifying and obtaining all the staff it needs to achieve its mission. SEC has experienced difficulty in effectively implementing various agencywide information technology initiatives, such as an electronic document imaging system and projects needed by units responsible for mutual funds. SEC also has various gaps in its authority that impede its ability to gather information, cooperate with other law enforcement authorities, and collect monies owed by violators. |
gao_GAO-08-411T | gao_GAO-08-411T_0 | But this decline in the unified deficit is not an indicator that our challenge has eased. The retirement of the baby boom generation and the rising health care costs will soon place unprecedented and long-lasting stress on the federal budget, raising debt held by the public to unsustainable levels. Figure 1 shows GAO’s simulation of the deficit path based on recent trends and policy preferences. Rapidly rising health care costs are not simply a federal budget problem; they are our nation’s number one fiscal challenge. As is true for the federal budget, growth in health-related spending—Medicaid and health insurance for state and local employees and retirees—is the primary driver of the fiscal challenges facing the state and local governments. Our Long-Term Fiscal Outlook Is Driven by Health Care
Although Social Security is a major part of the fiscal challenge, it is far from our biggest challenge. Health care spending systemwide continues to grow at an unsustainable pace, eroding the ability of employers to provide coverage to their workers and undercutting their ability to compete internationally. Addressing the unsustainability of health care costs is a major competitiveness and societal challenge that calls for us as a nation to fundamentally rethink how we define, deliver, and finance health care in both the public and the private sectors. The Window of Opportunity Is Narrowing
As we enter 2008, what we call the long-term fiscal challenge is not in the distant future. In fact, the first baby boomers already have filed for early retirement benefits and will be eligible for Medicare benefits in less than 3 years. The longer we wait, the more painful and difficult the choices will become. Simply put, our nation is on an imprudent and unsustainable long-term fiscal path that is getting worse with the passage of time. As you are aware, during the past 3 years, I have traveled to 25 states as part of the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour. The passage of time is shrinking the window for action. It provides 13 potential tools for Congress and the administration to use to begin to confront our long-term fiscal and other challenges. We have an obligation, however, to look at both the short term and the long term. This long-term challenge increases the importance of careful design of any stimulus package—it should be timely, targeted, and temporary. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has for many years warned that our nation is on an imprudent and unsustainable fiscal path. During the past 3 years, the Comptroller General has traveled to 25 states as part of the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour. Members of this diverse group of policy experts agree that finding solutions to the nation's long-term fiscal challenge will require bipartisan cooperation, a willingness to discuss all options, and the courage to make tough choices. At the request of Chairman Conrad and Senator Gregg, the Comptroller General discussed the long-term fiscal outlook, our nation's huge health care challenge, and the shrinking window of opportunity for action.
What GAO Found
As we enter 2008, what we call the long-term fiscal challenge is not in the distant future. Already the first members of the baby boom generation have filed for early Social Security retirement benefits--and will be eligible for Medicare in only 3 years. Simulations by GAO, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and others all show that despite a 3-year decline in the budget deficit, we still face large and growing structural deficits driven primarily by rising health care costs and known demographic trends. Under any plausible scenario, the federal budget is on an imprudent and unsustainable path. Rapidly rising health care costs are not simply a federal budget problem; they are our nation's number one fiscal challenge. Growth in health-related spending is the primary driver of the fiscal challenges facing the state and local governments. Unsustainable growth in health care spending is a systemwide challenge that also threatens to erode the ability of employers to provide coverage to their workers and undercut our ability to compete in a global marketplace. Addressing the unsustainability of health care costs is a societal challenge that calls for us as a nation to fundamentally rethink how we define, deliver, and finance health care in both the public and the private sectors. The passage of time has only worsened the situation: the size of the challenge has grown and the time to address it has shrunk. The longer we wait the more painful and difficult the choices will become, and the greater the risk of a very serious economic disruption. It is understandable that the Congress and the administration are focused on the need for a short-term fiscal stimulus. However, our long-term challenge increases the importance of careful design of any stimulus package--it should be timely, targeted, and temporary. At the same time, creating a capable and credible commission to make recommendations to the next Congress and the next president for action on our longer-range and looming fiscal imbalance is called for. |
gao_HEHS-98-63 | gao_HEHS-98-63_0 | To provide a more complete picture, our report focuses on those students who borrow and those who work, showing the annual and cumulative amounts of their borrowing and the number of hours worked per week while they were enrolled. In general, this was true for both undergraduates and graduate and professional students. The average amount borrowed by undergraduates completing their program (excluding those who had not borrowed) rose from about $7,800 to about $9,700 over the 1992-93 to 1995-96 period, after adjusting for inflation. Among bachelor’s degree recipients, the portion of students who had borrowed $20,000 or more for the 1992-93 through 1995-96 time period rose from about 9 percent to about 19 percent of graduating seniors who had borrowed; see table 2. The most substantial increases in the number of graduating students who borrowed occurred at public schools. At 4-year public schools, the percentage of graduating seniors who borrowed in 1 or more years rose from 42 percent in 1992-93 to 60 percent in 1995-96 (see table 3.) This increase eliminated the earlier difference between public and private 4-year schools in the percentage of students borrowing in 1 or more years—public school students “caught up” to private school students in terms of the percentage of the group that borrowed. Students in professional programs were the most likely to borrow and had the highest levels of debt. Postsecondary Students Typically Worked While Enrolled
Changes in students’ employment have been less pronounced than changes in borrowing. Compared with 1992-93, the percentage of full-time undergraduate students who worked while attending school rose slightly, while the percentage of graduate and professional students who worked generally declined. The percentage of full-time students who worked rose in all three program categories—certificate or award, associate degree, and bachelor’s degree. Overall, during 1995-96 more than two-thirds of full-time undergraduates worked while enrolled. Many of these students held jobs in their field of study, such as teaching or research assistance. About 80 percent of full-time doctoral students who worked while enrolled said they held positions directly related to their studies, compared with about 63 percent of students in master’s programs and about two-thirds of students in professional programs. Work and Borrowing Patterns Varied Considerably for Some Groups
To gain a better understanding of student work and borrowing patterns during school year 1995-96, we analyzed amounts borrowed and hours worked by several factors, including type of school, cost of attendance, year in school, dependency status, gender, family income, race/ethnicity, cost of attendance, and expected family contribution. Little Information Available on Parental Debt for Children’s Education
In contrast with the substantial amount of information about students’ own borrowing experiences, little information is available about the amounts that parents borrow to pay for their children’s postsecondary education. Information From the Department of Education
The best available data are in the Department of Education’s NPSAS, which we used as the basis for information on student borrowing and work patterns. Degree or other credential received 1995-96 dollars) $5,171 $4,758 - $5,584 Percentage of graduates borrowing in 1 or more years a total of $20,000 or more 15.7 - 22.2 dollars)
Table II.5: Students in Graduate and Professional Programs Who Borrowed, Amount Borrowed, and Percentage With $50,000 or More Debt, School Years 1992-93 and 1995-96 undergraduate, graduate, or recipients who borrowed in 1 or a total of $50,000 or more for 1995-96 dollars)
Analyses of Undergraduate Work and Borrowing Patterns
Although our work focused primarily on the extent to which borrowing and working by undergraduates varied by each of several factors (type of school and year in school, for example), we sought more information about the extent to which these factors were predictive. However, the portion of dependent students who borrowed increased at all family income levels, and at the highest level ($100,000 and above), it nearly doubled from 16.3 percent to 32.6 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the changes that have occurred in recent years in the percentage of undergraduate and graduate/professional students who borrow and in the cumulative amount of their borrowing; (2) the changes that have occurred in the percentage of undergraduate and graduate/professional students who work and the number of hours they work; (3) how undergraduate borrowing and work patterns differ by type of school, year in school, dependency status, family income, and race/ ethnicity; and (4) information concerning the amounts of education debt parents incur. GAO based its review in large part on an analysis of data collected by the Department of Education as part of the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) over the past several years, students have turned increasingly to borrowing to cope with rising education costs; (2) at the undergraduate level, the percentage of postsecondary students who had borrowed by the time they completed their programs (received a bachelor's degree, associate degree, or award or certificate) increased from 41 percent in 1992-93 to 52 percent in 1995-96; (3) the average amount of debt per student increased from about $7,800 to about $9,700 in constant 1995-96 dollars; (4) for graduating seniors (recipients of bachelor's degrees) and who had borrowed, the average rose from about $10,100 to about $13,300; (5) the portion of these graduates with $20,000 or more of student debt grew from 9 percent to 19 percent during the period; (6) students attending 4-year public institutions showed the largest increase in the number of borrowers; (7) sixty percent of seniors graduating from these schools in 1995-96 borrowed at some point in their program, up from 42 percent in 1992-93 and about even with the percentage of borrowers at private 4-year schools; (8) students at 2-year public institutions borrowed least often and in lesser amounts; (9) at the graduate and professional levels, the percentage of borrowers and the level of debt generally increased; (10) higher borrowing levels were especially pronounced at professional schools, where average debt among borrowers completing their programs climbed from about $45,000 in 1992-93 to nearly $60,000 in 1995-96; (11) more full-time undergraduates worked while attending school in 1995-96 than in 1992-93; (12) more than two-thirds of full-time undergraduate students held jobs during 1995-96, working an average of 23 hours a week while enrolled; (13) at graduate and professional schools, the percentage of full-time students who worked changed little over the same period; (14) about two-thirds of master's and doctoral students worked, usually in part-time jobs directly related to their field of study; (15) at professional schools, less than half worked while enrolled; (16) some variations in borrowing and work patterns can also be seen on the basis of the cost of attendance, dependency status, family income, and gender; (17) however, most characteristics are not very strong predictors of how much undergraduates were likely to borrow or work; (18) little information is available about amounts of debt parents accumulate in order to pay for their children's postsecondary education; and (19) in general, household debt for education remains a small share of household debt. |
gao_GGD-98-16 | gao_GGD-98-16_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine the actions CID has taken since the early 1990s to increase the time spent on tax investigations relative to nontax investigations, we interviewed senior CID officials in IRS’ National Office, officials from both the Tax and Criminal Divisions in Justice, and officials from the Office of the Under Secretary for Enforcement in Treasury. We also reviewed CID’s annual goals and objectives and annual performance reports for fiscal years 1990 through 1996, as well as relevant documentation on the reorganization of its administrative functions and operations. To determine the types of investigations initiated and the results of referrals to U.S. Actions to Increase Direct Investigative Time Spent on Tax Investigations
In the early 1990s, concerns raised in IRS studies regarding CID’s investigative priorities spurred CID to take actions to increase the amount of time its agents spent on tax investigations. Another action CID took to better track the allocation of its resources to tax versus nontax investigations was to consolidate its major program areas and to establish a specific category for tax gap investigations. Since CID began taking these actions, DIT applied to tax gap investigations has increased. 1.) According to data provided by IRS, the percent of time applied to tax gap investigations for fiscal years 1993 through 1996 increased 13 percentage points. CIMIS data show that the percent of tax gap investigations initiated, the percent of tax gap cases referred to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution, and the percent of court sentences based on tax gap cases have all begun to increase since CID increased the time spent on tax gap investigations. However, as of fiscal year 1996, the increases have not been enough to match fiscal year 1990 levels for these indicators. 4.) Attorneys for prosecution, and court sentences by type of criminal investigation. Table II.1: Percent of Total DIT Applied to Tax Gap Investigations by Location in Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1996 Percent of DIT by fiscal years (continued)
Percent of DIT by fiscal years Table II.2: Percent of Total DIT Applied to Narcotics Investigations by Location in Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1996 Percent of DIT by fiscal years (continued)
Table II.3: Percent of Total DIT Applied to Other Fraud Investigations by Location in Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1996 Percent of DIT by fiscal years (continued)
The Number and Results of CID Investigations in Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1996
This appendix presents information on the number of CID investigations that were initiated, the number of investigations in which CID recommended prosecution, and the number of sentences resulting from prosecutions from fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 1996. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reported on the actions the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Criminal Investigation Division (CID) has taken since the early 1990s to increase the time spent on tax investigations versus nontax investigations, focusing on: (1) investigations initiated by CID; and (2) referrals to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution and court sentences based on these investigations, for fiscal year (FY) 1990 through FY 1996.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) between FY 1990 and FY 1992, IRS data show that the percent of time spent on tax gap investigations decreased by 10 percentage points, continuing a downward trend since the early 1980s; (2) on the basis of the recommendations of two IRS studies done in the early 1990s, CID began in October 1993 taking actions designed to increase the amount of time its agents spent conducting tax investigations: (3) specifically, CID reorganized its administrative functions and operations with the intent of better targeting resource allocations; (4) it also consolidated and recategorized its program areas with an objective of better targeting its investigations; (5) in addition, as of FY 1996, CID established goals for the percent of time to be spent on its investigations, particularly for tax gap investigations; (6) since these actions were initiated, the percent of time spent on tax gap investigations has increased by 13 percentage points from a low of 46 percent in 1992 to 59 percent in 1996; (7) overall, the 59 percent in FY 1996 represented a net increase of 3 percentage points over the FY 1990 level; (8) between FY 1992 and FY 1996, there was an increase in the percent of tax gap investigations that CID initiated and in the percent of referrals to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution based on tax gap cases; (9) since FY 1994, the percent of court sentences based on tax gap cases has also increased; (10) however, as of FY 1996 the increases in these indicators have not been enough to match FY 1990 levels. |
gao_GAO-02-479 | gao_GAO-02-479_0 | In some cases, the number of jobs at these facilities decreased over time. According to officials at these facilities, the salaries for the jobs provided varied from about $15,000 to $80,000 per year, depending on factors such as the type of work and the location of the facility. They also made infrastructure improvements, such as installing a new water drainage system. In addition, some of the facilities made or were planning to make financial contributions in the communities where they were located. These financial contributions would assist schools and universities as well as community groups and other organizations. Information on Property Values
Property values in a community are affected by many factors, including the condition of the land and houses; the proximity of the property to natural or manmade structures—such as the facilities covered by this study—that might be viewed as desirable or undesirable; and economic conditions in the surrounding or adjacent communities. In locations where property values were not available, community groups voiced concerns that the facilities would cause property values to decline. Incentives Received by the Facilities
Six of the 15 facilities we studied said they used incentives or subsidies that were available in a particular area. The incentives varied, depending on the type of facility and its location, but included tax exemptions, a local bond initiative, reductions in regulatory fees, and reduced utility rates. Most of these facilities have operated since the 1980s and 1990s. | Why GAO Did This Study
Industrial facilities that operate under permits regulating some emissions and discharges have been the subject of complaints from community groups and environmental activists who charge that the facilities expose the surrounding communities to greater environmental risk than the general population. In response, the facilities point out that they contribute to the economic growth of the surrounding communities by employing residents and supporting other community needs, such as schools and infrastructure.
What GAO Found
In a survey of selected facilities, GAO found that the number of jobs in some decreased over time. According to facility officials, these jobs included unskilled, trade, technical, administrative, and professional positions with salaries ranging from $15,000 to $80,000 per year. Most of the facilities identified other contributions that they had made or planned to make in the local communities. These included volunteer work such as organizing cleanups; infrastructure improvements such as installing a new water drainage system; and financial assistance to schools, universities, community groups, and other organizations. Property values in a community are affected by many factors, including the condition of the land and houses, the proximity of the property to natural or man-made structures--such as the facilities covered by this study--that might be viewed as desirable or undesirable, and economic conditions in the surrounding or adjacent communities. Information on property values was unavailable for most of the communities and facilities studied. In these locations, community groups voiced concerns that the facilities would cause property values to decline. Officials at 6 of the 15 facilities GAO studied said they had used available incentives or subsidies. The incentives varied, depending on the type of facility and its location, but included tax exemptions, a local bond initiative, reductions in regulatory fees, and reduced utility rates. |
gao_GAO-07-138 | gao_GAO-07-138_0 | To review the IG’s audit and inspection oversight coverage of the State Department, we compared the contents of the audits and inspections completed by the State IG in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 with the high-risk areas designated by GAO and with the management and performance challenges identified by the State IG. State IG Organization, Budgets, and Reported Accomplishments
The State IG currently provides oversight of the Department of State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the foreign affairs community through audits, inspections, and investigations. From fiscal year 2001 through 2005, the State IG’s overall budget authority went from $29 million to $32 million, which, when expressed in constant dollars, is an increase of approximately 1 percent. Also, while the State IG’s inspections obtain financial information at the department’s bureaus and posts, the high-risk areas and management challenges of financial management are covered almost exclusively by the State IG’s financial audits. Fundamental Differences between Audits and Inspections
There are fundamental differences between inspections and audits. Audits performed under Government Auditing Standards, by design, are subject to more depth in the requirements for levels of evidence and documentation supporting the findings than inspections performed under the inspection standards. State IG Quality Assurance Process, Including Assurance over Independence
The State IG has quality assurance processes that cover its three main lines of work: (1) audits, (2) investigations, and (3) inspections. Inspections. Two areas of continuing concern regarding independence are (1) the temporary appointment of management personnel with various titles such as Deputy IG, Acting IG, or Acting Deputy IG, to head the State IG office; and (2) the use of Foreign Service staff to lead State IG inspections. Both the State IG and DS pursue allegations of passport and visa fraud by State Department employees. Areas such as human resources, counterterrorism, public diplomacy, and information security, are almost exclusively covered through inspections. Due to the risk and significance of the high-risk areas being covered largely by inspections, the State IG would benefit from reassessing risk and its heavy reliance on inspections in those areas to determine whether the current mix of audits and inspections provides the amount and type of oversight coverage needed. Finally, there is a need for a formal agreement between the State IG and the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security to coordinate their investigative activities to help ensure the independence of investigations of the State Department’s management staff and to prevent duplication. To provide for more complete internal quality reviews of inspections we recommend that the State IG include inspections performed by the State IG’s Office of Information Technology in its internal quality review process. To help ensure the independence of the IG office, we recommend that the State IG work with the Secretary of State to take the following actions: Develop a succession planning policy for the appointment of individuals to head the State IG office in an acting IG capacity that is consistent with the IG Act regarding State IG appointment and provides for independent coverage in the event of delays between IG appointments. Such an agreement would, for example, address the coordination of investigative activities to help ensure the independence of internal departmental investigations and preclude the duplication of efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to review the Department of State Office of Inspector General (State IG) including its (1) organization, budget levels, and accomplishments; (2) audit and inspection coverage of the department; (3) role of inspections in the oversight of the department; (4) quality assurance process including assurance of independence; and (5) coordination of State IG investigations with the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. GAO obtained information from State IG reports, interviews, and documentation for a sample of inspections.
What GAO Found
The State IG provides oversight of the State Department, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the foreign affairs community, including the approximately 260 bureaus and posts around the world, through financial and performance audits, inspections, and investigations. Over fiscal years 2001 through 2005, in terms of constant dollars, the State IG's budget has increased by 1 percent while the State Department's overall budget has increased by 50 percent. This represents a relative decrease when comparing State IG with other agencies' ratios of IG budget to total agency budget. The State IG provides oversight coverage of the areas designated as high-risk by GAO and management challenges identified by the IG, with a heavy emphasis on inspections. The State IG covers the high-risk areas of human resources, counterterrorism, public diplomacy, and information security, almost exclusively through inspections. In fiscal year 2005, the State IG's ratio of inspections to audits was over two to one, while the federal statutory IGs had a combined ratio of one inspection to every ten audits. There are fundamental differences between inspections and audits. By design, audits performed under Government Auditing Standards are subject to more in-depth requirements for the levels of evidence and the documentation supporting the findings than are inspections performed under inspection standards. Due to the significance of the high-risk areas covered largely by inspections, the State IG would benefit by reassessing the mix of audit and inspection coverage of those areas. The State IG's audit and investigative functions both had recent peer reviews of quality assurance that resulted in "clean opinions." There is no requirement for a peer review of inspections; however, during our audit the State IG began an internal quality review process for inspections but did not include reviews of information technology inspections. Independence is critical to the quality and credibility of all the work of the State IG. Two areas of continuing concern that we have with the independence of the State IG involve (1) the temporary appointment of State Department management personnel to head the State IG office in an acting IG capacity and who subsequently return to management positions, and (2) the rotation of Foreign Service staff to lead IG inspections, including many who, along with other IG staff, move to positions in department management offices. Such staffing arrangements represent potential impairments to independence and the appearance of independence under professional standards applicable to the IGs. Both the State IG and the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security pursue allegations of fraud by department employees. There is no functional written agreement in place to help ensure the independence of internal departmental investigations and preclude the duplication of efforts. |
gao_GAO-03-138 | gao_GAO-03-138_0 | The Number of Restatements Has Grown Significantly and Trends Emerge
Although on a yearly basis the number of companies restating their financial statements due to accounting irregularities makes up only a small percentage of publicly listed companies, we found that the number of restatements has grown significantly since 1997. Finally, in reviewing these restatement announcements, we found that different parties can prompt a restatement, including the restating company’s management, an external auditor, or SEC. As figure 2 illustrates, for the announced restatements we identified, the percentage of all NYSE-, Nasdaq-, and Amex-listed companies that restated due to accounting irregularities increased between 1997 and June 2002. Revenue Recognition Is the Leading Reason for Restatements
Although public companies restate their financials for a variety of reasons, revenue recognition was the reason for 38 percent of the 919 announced restatements we identified (fig. Restating Publicly Traded Companies Lost Billions of Dollars in Market Capitalization in the Days and Months Surrounding a Restatement Announcement
In the 3 trading days surrounding the initial announcement of a restatement, the stock prices of most of the restating publicly traded companies that we analyzed decreased by almost 10 percent and, in total, these companies lost more than $100 billion in market capitalization. Restatements and Accounting Issues Appear to Have Negatively Impacted Investor Confidence
Not only do restatement announcements appear to affect company stock prices, but some evidence suggests that these announcements and the questions they raise about certain corporate accounting practices may negatively impact overall investor confidence. Investor confidence is difficult to quantify because it cannot be measured directly and because investors consider a variety of factors when making an investment decision. However, concerns about staff constraints have raised questions about Enforcement’s ability to effectively fulfill its mission. SEC has reported that the task force continues to focus on the professionals involved in these cases, especially the auditors, who “stand as the watchdogs of the reporting process.”
SEC’s Enforcement of Accounting-Related Violations Has Increased
Enforcement investigates possible violations of securities laws, including those related to accounting issues, which have increased from about 15 percent in fiscal 1996 to about 20 percent of SEC’s total enforcement activity in fiscal year 2001. Although the legislation authorized additional funding for SEC, it continues to face challenges in addressing its traditional and new more expansive roles. First, questions have been raised about the adequacy of the current system of corporate governance (including corporate management, boards of directors, audit committees, and auditors) and its ability to protect investors and ensure the integrity of public disclosures, as evidenced by recent accounting issues and corporate failures. Recent Accounting Cases Have Raised Questions About Other Players as Well
Stock exchanges or markets, credit rating agencies, and securities analysts also have roles in the corporate governance or corporate financial reporting process. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with your staff, our objectives were to (1) determine the number of, reasons for, and other trends in financial statement restatements since 1997; (2) analyze the impact of restatement announcements on the restating companies’ stock market capitalization; (3) research available data to determine the impact of financial statement restatements on investors’ confidence in the existing U.S. system of financial reporting and capital markets; (4) analyze the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) enforcement actions involving accounting and auditing irregularities; and (5) describe the major limitations of the existing oversight structure and steps that have been and are being taken to ensure the integrity of corporate financial disclosures and ongoing challenges. Although we identified 919 restatement announcements from January 1, 1997, to June 30, 2002, we excluded some restatements from our analysis for a number of reasons. Based on the cooperation extended to SEC, SEC deemed it appropriate to issue a cease-and-desist order. Side-by-Side of the Existing Corporate Governance and Oversight Structure and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) addresses many of the concerns about the existing corporate governance and financial reporting regulatory structure by enhancing the oversight of financial accounting. | What GAO Found
A number of well-publicized announcements about financial statement restatements by large, well-known public companies have erased billions of dollars of previously reported earnings and raised questions about the credibility of accounting practices and the quality of corporate financial disclosure and oversight in the United States. Industry officials and academics have speculated that several factors may have caused U.S. companies to use questionable accounting practices. Some officials have stated that increased focus and guidance by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on accounting issues in the late 1990s may have prompted more companies to restate previously reported financial statements. Although the number of restating companies continues to make up a small percentage of all publicly listed companies annually, the number of restatements due to accounting irregularities grew significantly--145 percent--from January 1997 through June 2002. The 845 restating companies GAO identified had restated their financial statements for many reasons--for example, to adjust revenue, costs or expenses, or to address securities-related issues. From January 1997 to June 2002, issues involving revenue recognition accounted for almost 38 percent of the 919 announced restatements. Finally, different parties can prompt a restatement, including the restating company, an external auditor, or SEC. The 689 publicly traded companies GAO identified that announced restatements between January 1997 and March 2002 lost billions of dollars in market capitalization in the days around the initial restatement announcement. However, these losses had potential ripple effects on overall investor confidence and market trends. The growing number of restatements and mounting questions about certain corporate accounting practices appear to have shaken investors' confidence in the nation's financial reporting system. Although determining the effect of the restatements and other accounting issues on overall investor confidence is difficult to measure, various attempts to measure investor confidence have been made. With the increase in the number of restatements due to accounting irregularities, 20 percent of SEC's enforcement cases since the late 1990s were for violations resulting from financial reporting and accounting practices. To address these, SEC has sought a variety of penalties, including levying monetary sanctions, issuing cease-and-desist orders, and barring individuals from appearing before SEC or serving as officers or directors in public companies. The recent increase in the number and size of restatements and disclosures of accounting issues and irregularities underlying them have raised significant questions about the adequacy of the current system of corporate governance and financial disclosure oversight. In addition to public companies, their auditors, and SEC, investors rely on a variety of parties for oversight and financial information, including stock markets, securities analysts, and credit rating agencies, all of which have roles in the corporate governance system or provide information to the investing public. However, recent events have raised concerns about the roles played by each of these parties. On July 30, 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted. The act addresses many of these concerns, including strengthening corporate governance and improving transparency and accountability to help ensure the accuracy and integrity of the financial reporting system. The act authorizes additional funding for SEC, which has faced staffing and workload imbalances that have challenged its ability to fulfill its mission. |
gao_GAO-12-524 | gao_GAO-12-524_0 | F-22 and Legacy Modernization Programs Took Different Approaches to Developing and Fielding Capabilities
The F-22A and legacy modernization programs we reviewed were rooted in very different development strategies, although they shared some similar characteristics. The F-22A began as a single-step program and did not anticipate the need for significant future modernization. The legacy programs, on the other hand, began with the expectation that their aircraft would be incrementally upgraded and modified over time. F-22A modernization began in reaction to a major shift in the aircraft’s basic mission, which required the development of robust ground attack capabilities that were not part of the initial development program. In contrast, the legacy modernization programs were primarily initiated to make incremental improvements to existing mission capabilities. The F-22A and legacy modernization programs all began at about the same time in development and procurement. The F-22A program is more complex and costly than the legacy programs, primarily because the new capabilities have to be retrofitted onto complex, stealth aircraft that have integrated avionics systems, which, according to program and contractor officials, adds labor hours and cost. The current total estimated cost of F-22A modernization is $9.7 billion. Because the legacy programs managed and funded modernization as a continuation of their baseline programs, it is difficult to isolate and compare the full costs of modernization. A comparison of data from F-22A, F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 selected acquisition reports at 5-year intervals over the first 20 years following the start of development for each program shows that the incremental development approaches of the legacy systems quickly produced large quantities of operational aircraft and introduced several new increments of aircraft over that time span (see table 2). All of the modernization programs also began around similar acquisition events. The total cost of F-22A modernization—through Increment 3.2B—is currently estimated to be $9.7 billion. Although the legacy and F-22A programs began modernizing at the same general points in time, the F-22A did not originally plan for a major modernization program, so when the aircraft’s mission changed in 2003, the resources—primarily technology and funding—needed to meet the new requirements had not been fully developed or identified. Agency Comments
DOD reviewed a draft of this report and had no formal written comments. In conducting our analysis, we identified relevant cost, schedule, and requirements information from selected acquisition reports, budget documents, program briefings, and official service histories. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Air Force expects to invest a total of $9.7 billion in F-22A modernization through 2023. The Air Force and Navy have modernized many of their fighter and attack aircraft over the past several decades. Given this historical experience and concerns about the mounting cost of F-22A modernization, GAO was asked to examine the history of the modernization programs of the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18, and compare those legacy programs with the F-22A modernization program.
To identify differences and similarities between the F-22A modernization program and those of the selected legacy programs, GAO reviewed official service history documents and current and historical program documents; analyzed program cost, schedule, performance, and quantity data; and spoke with current and former Air Force, Navy, and contractor officials.
DOD reviewed a draft of this report and had no formal written comments.
What GAO Found
The F-22A and legacy modernization programs GAO reviewed were rooted in different development strategies. The F-22A began as a single-step program and did not anticipate the need for future modernization, while the legacy programs each began with the expectation that their aircraft would be incrementally upgraded over time. F-22A modernization began in reaction to a major shift in the aircrafts basic mission, which required the development of new capabilities that had not been planned for as part of the initial development program. In contrast, the legacy modernization programs made planned incremental improvements to existing mission capabilities. All of the modernization programs began at about the same time in development and procurement. The F-22A program is developing and retrofitting new capabilities onto a complex stealth aircraft, which is costlycurrently estimated at $9.7 billion total. Legacy modernization programs were less complex, and thus less costly, and incorporated mature technologies onto new production aircraft. Accurately identifying and comparing the total cost of each modernization program is difficult. Each of the programs, including the F-22A, initially managed and funded modernization as a continuation of its baseline program, so modernization costs and funding were not clearly identified in selected acquisition reports or budget documents. |
gao_T-AIMD-99-177 | gao_T-AIMD-99-177_0 | Evolution of the 1996 Refinements
The concept of the single audit was created to replace multiple grant audits with one audit of an entity as a whole. The objectives of the Single Audit Act, as amended, are to promote sound financial management, including effective internal controls, with respect to federal awards administered by nonfederal entities; establish uniform requirements for audits of federal awards administered by nonfederal entities; promote the efficient and effective use of audit resources; reduce burdens on state and local governments, Indian tribes, and ensure that federal departments and agencies, to the maximum extent practicable, rely upon and use audit work done pursuant to the act. The 1996 amendments were effective for audits of recipients for fiscal years ending June 30, 1997, and after. The refinements cover a range of fundamental areas affecting the single audit process and single audit reporting, including provisions to extend the law to cover all recipients of federal financial assistance, ensure a more cost-beneficial threshold for requiring single audits, more broadly focus audit work on the programs that present the greatest financial risk to the federal government, provide for timely reporting of audit results, provide for summary reporting of audit results, promote better analyses of audit results through establishment of a federal clearinghouse and an automated database, and authorize pilot projects to further streamline the audit process and make it more useful. OMB’s Role
In June 1997, OMB issued Circular A-133, Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations. The Circular establishes policies to guide implementation of the Single Audit Act 1996 amendments and provides an administrative foundation for uniform audit requirements for nonfederal entities that administer federal awards. OMB also issued a revised OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Supplement. The Compliance Supplement identifies for single auditors the key program requirements that federal agencies believe should be tested in a single audit and provides the audit objective and suggested audit procedures for testing those requirements. We reported in our 1994 report that the Compliance Supplement had not kept pace with changes to program requirements, and had only been updated once since it was issued in 1985. We recommended that the Compliance Supplement be updated at least every 2 years. OMB is now updating this supplement on a more regular basis. The 1996 amendments expanded the scope of the act to include nonprofit organizations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the status of efforts to implement the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996, focusing on: (1) the importance of the 1996 amendments; (2) the actions taken to implement them; and (3) ways in which the refinements will continue to evolve and benefit future single audit efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the concept of the single audit was created to replace multiple grant audits with one audit of an entity as a whole; (2) the objectives of the Single Audit Act, as amended, are to: (a) promote sound financial management, including effective internal controls, with respect to federal awards administered by non-federal entities; (b) establish uniform requirements for audits of federal awards administered by non-federal entities; (c) promote the efficient and effective use of audit resources; (d) reduce burdens on state and local governments, Indian tribes, and nonprofit organizations; and (e) ensure that federal departments and agencies rely upon and use audit work done pursuant to the act; (3) the 1996 amendments were effective for audits of recipients' fiscal years ending June 30, 1997, and after; (4) the refinements cover a range of fundamental areas affecting the single audit process and single audit reporting, including provisions to: (a) extend the law to cover all recipients of federal financial assistance; (b) ensure a more cost-beneficial threshold for requiring single audits; (c) more broadly focus audit work on the programs that present the greatest financial risk to the federal government; (d) provide for timely and summary reporting of audit results; (e) promote better analyses of audit results through establishment of a federal clearinghouse and an automated database; and (f) authorize pilot projects to further streamline the audit process and make it more useful; (5) in June 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Circular A-133, Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations; (6) the Circular establishes policies to guide implementation of the Single Audit Act 1996 amendments and provides an administrative foundation for uniform audit requirements for nonfederal entities that administer federal awards; (7) OMB also issued a revised OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Supplement; (8) the Compliance Supplement identifies for single auditors the key program requirements that federal agencies believe should be tested in a single audit and provides the audit objective and suggested audit procedures for testing those requirements; (9) GAO reported in its 1994 report that the Compliance Supplement had not kept pace with changes to program requirements, and had only been updated once since it was issued in 1985; (10) GAO recommended that the Compliance Supplement be updated at least every 2 years; and (11) OMB is now updating this supplement on a more regular basis. |
gao_GAO-09-580 | gao_GAO-09-580_0 | The first phase—$32.6 billion—represents about two-thirds of the SFSF. Health, education, and transportation is estimated to account for approximately 90 percent of fiscal year 2009 Recovery Act funding for states and localities. States’ and Localities’ Use of and Plans for Recovery Act Funds Focus on Purposes of the Act and States’ Fiscal Stresses
Officials in the 16 selected states and the District indicated they have used certain Recovery Act funds and continue planning for the use of additional funds they have not yet received. States’ planning actions include appointing Recovery Czars; establishing task forces and other entities, and developing public web sites to solicit input and publicize selected projects. In our sample of 16 states and the District, officials from 15 states and the District indicated that they had drawn down increased FMAP grant awards, totaling $7.96 billion for the period of October 1, 2008 through April 1, 2009—47 percent of their increased FMAP grant awards. In our sample, individual states and the District reported that they would use the funds to maintain their current level of Medicaid eligibility and benefits, cover their increased Medicaid caseloads—which are primarily populations that are sensitive to economic downturns, including children and families, and to offset their state general fund deficits thereby avoiding layoffs and other measures detrimental to economic recovery. States are undertaking planning activities to identify projects, obtain approval at the state and federal level and move them to contracting and implementation. As of April 16, 2009, the U.S Department of Transportation reported that nationally $6.4 billion of the $26.6 billion in Recovery Act highway infrastructure investment funding provided to the states had been obligated – meaning Transportation and the states had reached agreements on projects worth this amount. In most states we visited, while they had not yet expended significant funds, they were planning to solicit bids in April or May. A few states had already executed contracts. State Fiscal Stabilization Fund
The states and D.C. must apply to the Department of Education for SFSF funds. Education will award funds once it determines that an application contains key assurances and information on how the state will use the funds. As of April 20, applications from three states had met that determination-South Dakota, and two of GAO’s sample states, California and Illinois. The applications from other states are being developed and submitted and have not yet been awarded. The states and the District report that SFSF funds will be used to hire and retain teachers, reduce the potential for layoffs, cover budget shortfalls, and restore funding cuts to programs. States have undertaken various other activities to monitor Recovery Act funds, including Arizona’s budget director meeting with the heads of programs potentially receiving Recovery Act funds to gauge each programs’ preparedness; Arizona’s Comptroller conducting a survey to inventory current internal controls at state agencies to help ensure controls are in place to limit the risk of fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement of Recovery Act funds; California’s Governor appointing the state’s first Inspector General specifically to oversee Recovery Act funds as they are disbursed in the state; Massachusetts’ legislature creating the Joint Committee on federal Recovery Act Oversight with the goals of ensuring compliance with federal regulations and reviewing current state laws, regulations and policies to ensure they allow access to Recovery Act funds and streamline the processes to quickly stimulate the economy; and Texas State Auditor’s Office plans to hire 10 additional staff. Officials in 9 of the 16 states and the District expressed concern about the definitions of jobs retained and jobs created under the Recovery Act, as well as methodologies that can be used for estimation of each. According to OMB, agencies must immediately post guidance to the Recovery Act web site and inform to the “maximum extent practical, a broad array of external stakeholders.” In addition, since nearly half of the estimated spending programs in the Recovery Act will be administered by non-federal entities, state officials have suggested opportunities to improve communication in several areas. As a result, our objectives for this report were to describe (1) selected states’ and localities’ uses of and planning for Recovery Act funds, (2) approaches taken by the selected states and localities to ensure accountability for Recovery Act funds, and (3) states’ plans to evaluate the impact of the Recovery Act funds they have received to date. These states and D.C. contain about 65 percent of the U.S. population and are estimated to receive about two-thirds of the intergovernmental grant funds available through the Recovery Act. The programs we selected were streams of Recovery Act funding flowing to states and localities through increased Medicaid Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) grant awards, funding for highway infrastructure investment, and the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF). For example, the Medicaid program is on the GAO high risk list. Bids will close on April 24, 2009. However, the receipt of this increased FMAP may reduce the funds that the state must use for their Medicaid programs, and states have reported using these available funds for a variety of purposes. 7). These projects include activities such as road construction and road maintenance. The increased FMAP available under theRecovery Act is for state expenditures for Medicaid services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) is estimated to cost about $787 billion over the next several years, of which about $280 billion will be administered through states and localities. The Recovery Act requires GAO to do bimonthly reviews of the use of funds by selected states and localities. In this first report, GAO describes selected states' and localities' (1) uses of and planning of Recovery Act funds, (2) accountability approaches, and (3) plans to evaluate the impact of funds received. GAO's work is focused on 16 states and the District of Columbia--representing about 65 percent of the U.S. population and two-thirds of the intergovernmental federal assistance available through the Recovery Act. GAO collected documents from and interviewed state and local officials, including Governors, "Recovery Czars," State Auditors, Controllers, and Treasurers. GAO also reviewed guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other federal agencies.
What GAO Found
About 90 percent of the estimated $49 billion in Recovery Act funding to be provided to states and localities in FY2009 will be through health, transportation and education programs. Within these categories, the three largest programs are increased Medicaid Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) grant awards, funds for highway infrastructure investment, and the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF). The funding notifications for Recovery Act funds for the 16 selected states and the District of Columbia (the District) have been approximately $24.2 billion for Medicaid FMAP on April 3, $26.7 billion for highways on March 2, and $32.6 billion for SFSF on April 2. Fifteen of the 16 states and the District have drawn down approximately $7.96 billion in increased FMAP grant awards for the period October 1, 2008 through April 1, 2009. The increased FMAP is for state expenditures for Medicaid services. The receipt of this increased FMAP may reduce the state share for their Medicaid programs. States have reported using funds made available as a result of the increased FMAP for a variety of purposes. For example, states and the District reported using these funds to maintain their current level of Medicaid eligibility and benefits, cover their increased Medicaid caseloads-which are primarily populations that are sensitive to economic downturns, including children and families, and to offset their state general fund deficits thereby avoiding layoffs and other measures detrimental to economic recovery. States are undertaking planning activities to identify projects, obtain approval at the state and federal level and move them to contracting and implementation. For the most part, states were focusing on construction and maintenance projects, such as road and bridge repairs. Before they can expend Recovery Act funds, states must reach agreement with the Department of Transportation on the specific projects; as of April 16, two of the 16 states had agreements covering more than 50 percent of their states' apportioned funds, and three states did not have agreement on any projects. While a few, including Mississippi and Iowa had already executed contracts, most of the 16 states were planning to solicit bids in April or May. Thus, states generally had not yet expended significant amounts of Recovery Act funds. The states and D.C. must apply to the Department of Education for SFSF funds. Education will award funds once it determines that an application contains key assurances and information on how the state will use the funds. As of April 20, applications from three states had met that determination- South Dakota, and two of GAO's sample states, California and Illinois. The applications from other states are being developed and submitted and have not yet been awarded. The states and the District report that SFSF funds will be used to hire and retain teachers, reduce the potential for layoffs, cover budget shortfalls, and restore funding cuts to programs. Planning continues for the use of Recovery Act funds. State activities indlude appointing Recovery Czars; establishing task forces and other entities, and developing public websites to solicit input and publicize selected projects. GAO found that the selected states and the District are taking various approaches to ensuring that internal controls manage risk up-front; they are assessing known risks and developing plans to address those risks. State auditors are also planning their work including conducting required single audits and testing compliance with federal requirements. Nearly half of the estimated spending programs in the Recovery Act will be administered by non-federal entities. State officials suggested opportunities to improve communication in several areas. Officials in nine of the 16 states and the District expressed concern about determining the jobs created and retained under the Recovery Act, as well as methodologies that can be used for estimation of each. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-216 | gao_T-HEHS-97-216_0 | State charter school laws and policies vary widely with respect to the degree of autonomy provided to the schools, the number of charter schools that may be established, the qualifications required for charter school applicants and teachers, and the accountability criteria that charter schools must meet. Title I Program
Title I is the largest federal elementary and secondary education aid program. Regardless of which of the three approaches states use, individual charter schools are generally allocated funds on the basis of whether they are treated as (1) an independent LEA, or school district (independent model), or as (2) a dependent of an LEA—that is, as a public school component of a preexisting school district (dependent model). Charter Schools’ LEA Status Dictates Minimum Criteria Used to Determine Funding Eligibility
Under title I and IDEA, the Department of Education is responsible for allocating funds to SEAs, which are required to allocate funds to LEAs. Schools within these areas generally receive special education services, rather than grant funds. Most Charter School Operators Surveyed Believed They Received an Equitable Share of Title I and IDEA Funds
Regardless of funding model, more than two-thirds of charter school operators expressing an opinion believed that they received an equitable share of both title I and IDEA funding. Charter School Officials Cited Several Barriers to Receiving Title I and IDEA Funds
On the basis of our preliminary work, charter schools do not appear to be at a disadvantage in terms of how federal funds are allocated. However, our survey has identified a variety of barriers that made it difficult for charter school operators to apply for and receive title I and IDEA funds. access these funds. In some cases, charter school officials noted that they did not receive funds because they failed to meet federal or district qualifying requirements. Outreach and Technical Assistance Most Frequently Cited as Facilitating Factors
Charter school officials most frequently cited receiving information about the availability of federal funds and how much their schools would be eligible for as facilitating factors in accessing title I and IDEA monies. In addition, charter school officials credited training and technical assistance provided by these sources with helping them to access federal funds. Finally, some respondents told us that their schools employed consultants to assist in applying for federal and state funds, which enabled them to focus their time and effort on other matters. Conclusion
In conclusion, our preliminary work suggests that the barriers that charter schools face in accessing federal funds appear to be unrelated to whether charter schools are treated as school districts or as members of school districts. These other barriers include state systems that base funding allocations on the prior year’s enrollment and student eligibility data, the costs of accessing funds relative to the amounts that schools would receive, and the significant time constraints that prevent charter school operators from pursuing funds. Charter School States and Number of Schools Operating in School Year 1996-97
States with charter legislation but no charter schools. States and the District of Columbia not included in our survey. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed charter schools' ability to access categorical education grant funds, focusing on: (1) how federal title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Individuals With Disabilities Education (IDEA) funds are distributed to charter schools, and the opinions of charter school operators on whether the distribution is equitable; and (2) what factors appear to be facilitating and impeding charter schools in accessing these funds.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) title I and IDEA funds are allocated to schools that meet established federal, state, and local demographic criteria; (2) these criteria relate to the number of enrolled children from low-income families and the number of enrolled children with disabilities that require special education services; (3) although most public schools receive funding under these programs, some public schools, including some charter schools, do not meet eligibility criteria and, as a result, do not receive funding; (4) GAO's preliminary work suggests that states are allocating federal funds to charter schools in much the same manner as they allocate funds to traditional public schools; (5) in general, states either treat charter schools as individual school districts or as components of existing districts; (6) although charter schools treated as school districts avoid having to meet additional criteria used to distribute funds beyond the district level, GAO's survey results thus far indicate that these schools were no more likely to have received title I and IDEA funds for the 1996-97 school year than were charter schools treated as components of existing school districts; (7) most charter school operators surveyed who expressed an opinion told GAO that they believe they received an equitable share of federal title I and IDEA funds; (8) while charter schools do not appear to be at a disadvantage in terms of how federal funds are allocated, GAO's survey has revealed a variety of barriers that have made it difficult for charter schools to access title I and IDEA funds; (9) these factors include a lack of enrollment and student eligibility data to submit to states before funding allocation decisions are made and the time required and the costs involved in applying for such funds, given the amount of funds available; (10) in addition, some charter schools have failed to meet statutory eligibility requirements for receiving federal funds; (11) charter school operators most often cited training and technical assistance as factors that facilitated their accessing title I and IDEA funds; (12) on the basis of survey responses, some states appear to be making a comprehensive effort to inform charter schools of the availability of federal funds and how to apply for them; and (13) charter school operators in other states told GAO that they received technical assistance from local school districts, while other charter school operators employed consultants to assist them. |
gao_GAO-07-988T | gao_GAO-07-988T_0 | HHS Has Initiated Actions to Identify Solutions for Protecting Personal Health Information but Has Not Defined an Overall Approach for Addressing Privacy
HHS and its Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT have initiated actions to identify solutions for protecting health information. Specifically, HHS awarded several health IT contracts that include requirements for developing solutions that comply with federal privacy and security requirements, consulted with the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) to develop recommendations regarding privacy and confidentiality in the Nationwide Health Information Network, and formed the American Health Information Community (AHIC) Confidentiality, Privacy, and Security Workgroup to frame privacy and security policy issues and identify viable options or processes to address these issues. The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT intends to use the results of these activities to identify technology and policy solutions for protecting personal health information as part of its continuing efforts to complete a national strategy to guide the nationwide implementation of health IT. However, HHS is in the early stages of identifying solutions for protecting personal health information and has not yet defined an overall approach for integrating its various privacy-related initiatives and for addressing key privacy principles. In summer 2006, the privacy and security solutions contractor selected 34 states and territories as locations in which to perform assessments of organization-level privacy- and security-related policies and practices that affect interoperable electronic health information exchange and their bases, including laws and regulations. The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics Made Recommendations for Addressing Privacy and Security within a Nationwide Health Information Network
In June 2006, NCVHS, a key national health information advisory committee, presented to the Secretary of HHS a report recommending actions regarding privacy and confidentiality in the Nationwide Health Information Network. The alliance plans to identify privacy practices and policies to help ensure the protection of personal health information exchanged within a nationwide health information network. In summary, concerns about the protection of personal health information exchanged electronically within a nationwide health information network have increased as the use of health IT and the exchange of electronic health information has also increased. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2004, President Bush called for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop and implement a strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of health information technology (IT). The plan is to recommend methods to ensure the privacy of electronic health information. GAO was asked to summarize its January 2007 report. The report describes the steps HHS is taking to ensure privacy protection as part of its national health IT strategy and identifies challenges associated with protecting electronic health information exchanged within a nationwide health information network.
What GAO Found
HHS and its Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT have initiated actions to identify solutions for protecting personal health information through several contracts and with two health information advisory committees. For example, in late 2005, HHS awarded several health IT contracts that include requirements for addressing the privacy of personal health information exchanged within a nationwide health information exchange network. HHS's privacy and security solutions contractor is to assess the organization-level privacy- and security-related policies, practices, laws, and regulations that affect interoperable health information exchange. In June 2006, the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics made recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on protecting the privacy of personal health information within a nationwide health information network and, in August 2006, the American Health Information Community convened a work group to address privacy and security policy issues for nationwide health information exchange. While its activities are intended to address aspects of key principles for protecting the privacy of health information, HHS is in the early stages of its efforts and has therefore not yet defined an overall approach for integrating its various privacy-related initiatives and addressing key privacy principles, nor has it defined milestones for integrating the results of these activities. GAO identified key challenges associated with protecting electronic personal health information in four areas. |
gao_GAO-02-802 | gao_GAO-02-802_0 | Benefits are paid from general revenues and, in general, most beneficiaries are eligible for the same benefit amount. There Are Over 1 Million Concurrent Beneficiaries and Few Work
Concurrent beneficiaries, who comprised about 14 percent of SSA’s disability population, were likely to have mental impairments and be female. About 11 percent of concurrent beneficiaries worked and had a median earned income of about $250 a month. More than One-half of Concurrent Beneficiaries Have Mental Impairments
Of the more than 6 million working-age adults receiving disability benefits under the DI program and the more than 3.5 million working-age adults receiving SSI, our analysis of the February 2002 SSA data indicates that, approximately 1.2 million—14 percent—received benefits from both programs. In addition, 53 percent were female. Little Coordination of DI and SSI Programs Exists for Concurrent Beneficiaries Who Work
There is little coordination between SSI and DI program rules, especially for concurrent beneficiaries who work and, as a result, SSA must apply the complex provisions of the two programs independently. Specialists in one program lack integrated guidance to readily determine the effect of work on the benefits in the other program. The Application of Both DI and SSI Rules Makes It Difficult for Concurrent Beneficiaries to Make Informed Decisions about Work Activity
Just as SSA has no special procedures for administering the rules for concurrent beneficiaries, it does not provide concurrent beneficiaries with any integrated explanation of the effects of work on both DI and SSI benefits through its public information materials. Concurrent beneficiaries who do not understand the programs’ provisions may make decisions about work that will make them worse off financially. For more detailed explanations, SSA could direct beneficiaries to contact an SSA representative knowledgeable of both programs. Appendix II: Comments from the Social Security Administration | What GAO Found
In calendar year 2001, the Social Security Administration (SSA) paid cash benefits of $60 billion to more than six million working-age adults with disabilities and eligible family members under its Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program, and $20 billion to more than 3.5 million working-age adults with disabilities under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. Some beneficiaries, known as concurrent beneficiaries, receive cash and medical benefits from both programs. Concurrent beneficiaries comprised about 14 percent of SSA's disability population; 58 percent have mental impairments, and about 53 percent are female. Eleven percent of concurrent beneficiaries worked and earned a median income of approximately $250 per month. There is little coordination between SSI and DI program rules for individuals who work and receive benefits from both programs concurrently. Because most field office staff specialize in one program, they may not be sufficiently knowledgeable of the procedures for the other program to ensure that concurrent beneficiaries who work are paid the appropriate benefit amount under both programs. Applying both SSI and DI program rules to concurrent beneficiaries may make it difficult for them to make informed decisions about attempting work and could result in an increase or decrease in overall income, depending on the amount of earnings. Concurrent beneficiaries may not receive adequate explanations from SSA staff or published materials about the complete effect work has on their disability benefits. However, because the rules are complex and may be difficult to understand even with a detailed explanation, beneficiaries who do not understand them could possibly make decisions about work that would not meet their needs or improve their situation. |
gao_NSIAD-96-43 | gao_NSIAD-96-43_0 | AMC officials believe this modernization effort is important to address concerns regarding the aging aircraft and improve the aircraft’s reliability and maintainability. AMC currently estimates that C-5 aircraft can attain a 14.6 million ton miles per day airlift capability, which would represent almost one-half of the Air Force’s total military aircraft airlift capacity. A Readiness Evaluation Could Lead to Higher C-5 Mission Capability Rates
The C-5’s mission capability rates could increase if the Air Force were to conduct a readiness evaluation similar to the operational readiness assessment conducted for B-1B bomber aircraft. For example, both aircraft have had historically low mission capable rates and poor spare parts support. Air Force airlift officials have stated that improvements to the spares process would have little impact on C-5 mission capability. DOD has not been providing adequate funding to meet the original schedule for proposed C-5 improvements. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to (1) conduct a readiness evaluation to determine how C-5 peacetime mission capability can be improved and the costs of such improvements and (2) assess the impact of proposed aircraft modifications on C-5 mission capability and then reprioritize the proposals according to the results of the assessment. To maximize potential C-5 cargo deliveries, DOD should consider using C-5 aircraft in the more unconstrained scenarios. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the reliability and mission capability of C-5 aircraft and the Department of Defense's (DOD) plan for modifying C-5 aircraft.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD is relying on C-5 aircraft to deliver about half of the wartime cargo carried by military aircraft, but C-5 mission-capable rates have fallen short of the Air Force's goal and those of other aircraft, because of a lack of spare parts and the complexity and poor reliability of the C-5; (2) the Air Force could improve the C-5 mission capable rate by conducting a readiness evaluation similar to the one it completed for B-1B aircraft and by giving a higher priority to certain C-5 modernization initiatives; (3) the Air Force has not prioritized proposed C-5 modifications and decisionmakers have not fully assessed the impact that these proposed improvements would have on overall aircraft mission capability; and (4) if peacetime C-5 mission capable rates were raised to the Air Force's goal, DOD could better meet its airlift requirements. |
gao_GAO-11-745T | gao_GAO-11-745T_0 | DOE Established Program Goals and Set Criteria for Applicant and Project Eligibility and Merit
DOE has taken several steps to implement the ATVM program. First, it set three goals for the program: increase the fuel economy of U.S. passenger vehicles as a whole, advance U.S. automotive technology, and protect taxpayers’ financial interests. In addition, DOE established criteria for ATVM staff, aided by experts from within and outside DOE, to judge and score the technical and financial merits of applicants and projects deemed eligible, along with policy factors to consider, such as a project’s potential for supporting jobs and whether a project is likely to advance automotive technology. Finally, the Credit Review Board, composed of senior DOE officials, uses the merit scores and other information, including Office of Management and Budget’s approved subsidy cost estimates for projects, to recommend loan decisions to the Secretary of Energy. The loans made to date represent about a third of the $25 billion authorized by law, but the program has used 44 percent of the $7.5 billion allocated to pay credit subsidy costs, which is more than was initially anticipated. However, the average credit subsidy rate for the $8.4 billion in loans awarded to date is 39 percent—a total of roughly $3.3 billion in credit subsidy costs. These higher credit subsidy costs were, in part, a reflection of the risky financial situation of the automotive industry at the time the loans were made. As a result, the program may be unable to loan the full $25 billion allowed by statute. The ATVM Program Has Begun Overseeing Loans to Ensure Borrowers Comply with Financial and Technical Requirements but Has Not Engaged Engineering Expertise that Would Help Ensure that Projects Are Delivered as Agreed
The ATVM program has set procedures for overseeing the financial and technical performance of borrowers and has begun oversight, but at the time of our February report the agency had not yet engaged engineering expertise for technical oversight as called for by the procedures. To oversee financial performance, staff are to review data submitted by borrowers on their financial health to identify challenges to repaying the loans. Staff also rely on outside auditors to confirm whether funds have been used for allowable expenses. To oversee technical performance, ATVM staff are to analyze information borrowers report on their technical progress and are to use outside engineering expertise to supplement their analysis once borrowers have begun constructing or retrofitting facilities or are performing engineering integration—that is, designing and building vehicle and component production lines. According to our review, several projects needing additional technical oversight are under way but the program, as of February of 2011, had not brought in additional technical oversight expertise to supplement program staffs’ oversight. DOE Lacks the Performance Measures to Enable It to Fully Assess the ATVM Program’s Progress Toward Achieving Its Goals
DOE has not developed sufficient performance measures that would enable it to fully assess whether the ATVM program is achieving its three goals. The measures stop short because they do not isolate the impact of the program on improving U.S. fuel economy from fuel economy improvements that might have occurred in the absence of the program—by consumers investing in more fuel efficient vehicles not covered by the program in response to high gasoline prices, for example. In addition, the ATVM program lacks performance measures that will enable DOE to assess the extent to which it has achieved the other two goals of the program—advancing automotive technology and protecting taxpayers’ financial interests. In our February 2011 report, to help ensure the effectiveness and accountability of the ATVM program, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy direct the ATVM program to (1) accelerate efforts to engage sufficient engineering expertise to verify that borrowers are delivering projects as agreed and to (2) develop sufficient and quantifiable performance measures for its three goals. DOE’s Loan Programs Executive Director disagreed with the first recommendation, saying that the projects were in the very early stages of engineering integration and such expertise had not yet been needed for monitoring. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Congress mandated higher vehicle fuel economy by model year 2020 and established the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program in the Department of Energy (DOE). ATVM is to provide up to $25 billion in loans for more fuel-efficient vehicles and components. Congress also provided $7.5 billion to pay the required credit subsidy costs--the government's estimated net long-term cost, in present value terms, of the loans. This testimony is based on GAO's February 2011 report on the ATVM loan program (GAO-11-145). It discusses (1) steps DOE has taken to implement the program, (2) progress in awarding loans, (3) how the program is overseeing the loans, and (4) the extent to which DOE can assess progress toward its goals.
What GAO Found
DOE has taken several steps to implement the ATVM program. First, it set three program goals: increase the fuel economy of U.S. passenger vehicles as a whole, advance U.S. automotive technology, and protect taxpayers' financial interests. DOE also set technical, financial, and environmental eligibility requirements for applicants. In addition, DOE established criteria for judging the technical and financial merits of applicants and projects deemed eligible, and policy factors to consider, such as a project's potential for supporting jobs. DOE established procedures for ATVM staff, aided by experts from within and outside DOE, to score applicants and projects. Finally, the Credit Review Board, composed of senior DOE officials, uses the scores and other information to recommend loan decisions to the Secretary of Energy. The ATVM program, as of May 2011, had made $8.4 billion in loans that DOE expects to yield fuel economy improvements in the near term along with greater advances, through newer technologies, in years to come. Although the loans represent about a third of the $25 billion authorized by law, the program has used 44 percent of the $7.5 billion allocated to pay credit subsidy costs, which is more than was initially anticipated. These higher credit subsidy costs were, in part, a reflection of the risky financial situation of the automotive industry at the time the loans were made. As a result of the higher credit subsidy costs, the program may be unable to loan the full $25 billion allowed by statute. The ATVM program has set procedures for overseeing the financial and technical performance of borrowers and has begun oversight, but at the time of our February report it had not yet engaged engineering expertise needed for technical oversight as called for by its procedures. To oversee financial performance, staff review data submitted by borrowers on their financial health to identify challenges to repaying the loans. Staff also rely on outside auditors to confirm whether funds have been used for allowable expenses. To oversee technical performance, ATVM staff are to analyze information borrowers report on their technical progress and are to use outside engineering expertise to supplement their analysis, as needed. According to our review, projects needing additional technical oversight are under way, and the ATVM staff lack the engineering expertise called for by the program's procedures for adequately overseeing technical aspects of the projects. However, the program had not yet engaged such expertise. As a result, DOE cannot be adequately assured that the projects will be delivered as agreed. DOE has not developed sufficient performance measures that would enable it to fully assess progress toward achieving its three program goals. For example, DOE has a measure for assessing the fuel economy gains for the vehicles produced under the program, but the measure falls short because it does not account for, among other things, the fuel economy improvements that would have occurred if consumers purchased more fuel-efficient vehicles not covered by the program. Principles of good governance call for performance measures tied to goals as a means of assessing the extent to which goals have been achieved.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations at this time. In the February report, GAO recommended that DOE (1) accelerate efforts to engage engineering expertise and (2) develop sufficient, quantifiable performance measures. DOE disagreed with the recommendations, stating that such expertise had not yet been needed and that performance measures would expand the scope of the program. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations are needed to help ensure that DOE is achieving its goals and is accountable to Congress. |
gao_GAO-05-200 | gao_GAO-05-200_0 | Congress authorizes annually the number of personnel that each service may have at the end of a given fiscal year. OSD Has Not Conducted A Comprehensive, Data-Driven Analysis to Assess Active Personnel Requirements to Implement the Defense Strategy
Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data about the number of employees an agency requires are critical in preventing shortfalls that threaten its ability to economically, efficiently, and effectively perform its missions. OSD has not placed an emphasis on reviewing active military personnel requirements, focusing instead on limiting personnel costs in order to fund competing priorities such as transformation. The quadrennial review of the defense program planned for 2005 represents an opportunity for a systematic analysis and reevaluation of personnel levels to ensure that they are consistent with the defense strategy. OSD provides policy and budget guidance to the services on balancing the costs of active personnel with other funding priorities, such as transformation. OSD coordinates with the services on active personnel levels throughout the department’s planning and budgeting cycle, but it has not established a process that would enable it to periodically examine the requirements for the active military personnel and ensure that decisions are driven by data that establish links between active military personnel levels and key missions required by the national defense strategy. Further, it cannot ensure that it has a sufficient basis for understanding the risks associated with different levels of active military personnel. OSD Does Not Have Comprehensive Plans to Manage Near- and Long-Term Initiatives to Increase the Proportion of Active Personnel in Warfighting Positions
OSD hopes to avert the need to increase active personnel levels by making more efficient use of the current active military personnel within each service, although it does not have a comprehensive plan for how it will accomplish this and progress in implementing initiatives designed to make more efficient use of active military is lagging behind goals. Sustained leadership and a plan for implementing initiatives and measuring progress can help decision makers determine if initiatives are achieving their desired results. However, without a comprehensive plan to manage implementation of its initiatives and assess their results, OSD may be unable to determine whether the initiatives have the desired effect of providing more military personnel for warfighting duties, thus averting the need for more active personnel. Military-to-Civilian Position Conversion and Active and Reserve Component Rebalancing Initiatives Are Not Meeting Expected Goals or Time Frames
While the services are in the process of implementing OSD’s initiatives to use active personnel more efficiently in the near term, such as converting military positions to civilian or contractor performance and rebalancing the active and reserve component skills, the initiatives are not meeting planned goals and time frames and are not having the desired results. Such a plan should establish implementation objectives and time frames, assign responsibility, identify resources, and develop performance measures to enable DOD to evaluate the results of the initiatives in allocating a greater proportion of the active force to warfighting positions. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has conducted a data-based analysis of active military personnel needed to implement the national defense strategy, we identified and examined relevant laws, presidential documents, and the Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, reports, and analyses related to active military personnel and the defense strategy. GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress recently increased active military personnel levels for the Army and the Marine Corps. The Secretary of Defense has undertaken initiatives to use military personnel more efficiently such as rebalancing high-demand skills between active and reserve components. In view of concerns about active personnel, GAO reviewed the ways in which the Department of Defense (DOD) determines personnel requirements and is managing initiatives to assign a greater proportion of active personnel to warfigthing duties. GAO assessed the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (1) has conducted a data-based analysis of active military personnel needed to implement the national defense strategy and (2) has a plan for making more efficient use of active military personnel and evaluating the plan's results.
What GAO Found
Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data about the number of employees required to meet an agency's needs are critical because human capital shortfalls can threaten the agency's ability to perform missions efficiently and effectively. OSD provides policy and budget guidance on active personnel levels and has taken some steps toward rebalancing skills between active and reserve components, but it has not conducted a comprehensive, data-driven analysis to assess the number of active personnel needed to implement the defense strategy. A key reason why it has not conducted such a comprehensive analysis is that OSD has focused on limiting personnel costs in order to fund competing priorities, such as transformation. OSD conducts some analyses of active personnel, such as monitoring actual personnel levels, and the services have processes for allocating the active personnel they are authorized to key missions. However, OSD does not systematically review the services' processes to ensure that decisions about active personnel levels are linked to the defense strategy and provide required capabilities within acceptable risk. If OSD conducted a data-driven analysis that linked active personnel levels to strategy, it could more effectively demonstrate to Congress a sound basis for the active personnel levels it requests. The quadrennial review of the defense program planned for 2005 represents an opportunity for a systematic reevaluation of personnel levels to ensure that they are consistent with the defense strategy. Although OSD has identified some near- and long-term initiatives for assigning a greater proportion of active personnel to warfighting positions, it has not developed a comprehensive plan to implement them that assigns responsibility for implementation, identifies resources, and provides for evaluation of progress toward objectives. OSD officials told us a key reason why OSD does not have a plan to oversee its initiatives is that they have had to respond to other higher priorities. Sustained leadership and a plan for implementing initiatives and measuring progress can help decision makers determine if initiatives are achieving their desired results. Without such a plan, OSD cannot be sure that initiatives are being implemented in a timely manner and having the intended results. For example, the initiative to convert military positions to civilian or contractor performance is behind schedule. Specifically, OSD's goal was to convert 10,000 positions by the end of fiscal year 2004; however, the services estimate that they had converted only about 34 percent of these positions. By establishing performance metrics and collecting data to evaluate the results of its initiatives, OSD could better determine its progress in providing more active personnel for warfighting duties and inform Congress of its results. |
gao_GAO-03-1071 | gao_GAO-03-1071_0 | The U.N. strategy consists of three elements: establishing the conditions for sustainable peace, including security, rule of law, and economic and social reform; coordinating and sustaining the efforts of international organizations and developing objectives and results-oriented measures of progress to manage the peace operation and make troop withdrawal decisions. The unit is also supposed to help develop guidelines and recommendations for the conduct, management, and support of these operations. United Nations Is Trying to Apply the Transition Strategy
The United Nations is trying to apply all the elements of the transition strategy to help move countries from conflict to sustainable peace. U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Seek to Establish Conditions for Sustainable Peace
In countries with complex emergencies, U.N. peacekeeping operations and other stakeholders seek to establish basic conditions for sustainable peace by (1) providing and maintaining security, (2) developing institutions that provide rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) creating conditions for social and economic reforms. In East Timor, attempts to coordinate efforts among donor countries and international organizations occurred before the peacekeeping operation deployed. Peace Operations Are Making Efforts to Specify Objectives and Measures
The U.N. operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have specified their objectives, based on mandates from the Security Council, and have developed measures of progress, some of which are results oriented. Nonetheless, the United Nations has to a limited extent used some measures to plan the withdrawal of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and East Timor. United Nations Confronts Significant Challenges to Implementing Transition Strategy
The United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each element of the transition strategy. DPKO acknowledges that it needs better measures by which to assess the progress that peacekeeping operations are making in attaining sustainable peace. Recent efforts have also taken longer than originally planned. The strategy takes a comprehensive and long- term view and focuses on addressing the causes of the conflict. However, the United Nations has not yet developed quantifiable results- oriented measures of progress to help the Security Council make peacekeeping transition decisions. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations has not yet developed results- oriented measures. The United Nations was concerned, however, that the report (1) did not fully recognize its efforts to apply results-oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did not acknowledge numerical measures of progress included in routine peacekeeping operations reports to headquarters, (3) did not fully explain the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo, and (4) did not reflect progress made in the Congo over the past year and a half. To assess the extent to which the United Nations is attempting to apply the strategy in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we obtained information from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the substance and status of initiatives to strengthen its operations in these countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United Nations responded to the failure of some past peacekeeping operations by developing a strategy to help peacekeeping operations move a country from conflict to sustainable peace. It has attempted to apply this strategy to the large and costly peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. As a contributor of over 25 percent of the cost of U.N. operations, the United States has a stake in the successful application of this strategy. The strategy also has implications for the conduct of international peace operations in other post-conflict countries. GAO was asked to (1) identify the elements of the U.N. transition strategy; (2) assess the extent to which the United Nations has applied the strategy to operations; and (3) assess the challenges to implementing the strategy in these three countries.
What GAO Found
The United Nations has developed a transition strategy for its peacekeeping operations that takes a comprehensive and long-term view and focuses on the causes of the conflict. The U.N. strategy for making effective peacekeeping transitions has three elements: (1) establishing conditions for sustainable peace, (2) coordinating efforts among the United Nations and other international organizations to establish these conditions and sustain assistance after peacekeepers withdraw, and (3) developing objectives and results-oriented measures of progress to help manage and decide when a country's conditions warrant the withdrawal of peacekeepers. The United Nations is attempting to apply the elements of this strategy to help Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo transition from conflict to sustainable peace, but it faces enormous challenges. Establishing security often takes longer and can be more expensive than originally planned in countries where rival factions may continue to fight. Developing participatory governance is also difficult in countries with little experience of accountable government. Coordinating with independent international organizations and donor nations with different priorities is also a challenge. The United Nations has not yet developed results-oriented measures of progress for the three peacekeeping operations. Although the United Nations uses some indicators to manage the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops, they did not have results-oriented measures to assess the security situations in Sierra Leone and East Timor and subsequent events in each country showed that the situation was not as secure as available measures indicated. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations acknowledges that it needs better indicators by which to measure the progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining sustainable peace. However, the department has not yet developed these indicators. |
gao_GAO-13-196 | gao_GAO-13-196_0 | The Act Established Two Separate Entities and Outlined Their Responsibilities
The Act Established State’s Office and Ambassador-at- Large for International Religious Freedom and Outlined State’s Responsibilities
In accordance with the Act, State created the Office of International Religious Freedom (the Office) in 1999, headed by the Ambassador-at- Large for International Religious Freedom (the Ambassador). USCIRF Is Implementing Its Primary Responsibilities as Outlined in the Act and Has Undertaken Other Activities
USCIRF is implementing its primary responsibilities as outlined in the Act by conducting an ongoing review of violations of religious freedom throughout the world and issuing policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress. According to USCIRF officials, the culmination of these activities is the release of its own annual report on international religious freedom, which the Act also requires.Based on USCIRF’s ongoing reviews, the report discusses the 20 to 30 countries that USCIRF considers the worst offenders of religious freedom and presents policy recommendations to the U.S. government. For example, in USCIRF’s 2012 annual report, a commissioner dissented from the CPC recommendation for Iraq, stating that USCIRF’s report, among other things, did “not establish either that the government engaged itself in severe violations or that it tolerated them.” Further, the commissioner stated that USCIRF’s report “only establishes the existence of such violations and the inability of the government to prevent them always (or prevent them often).”
USCIRF Has Provided Technical Assistance and Recommendations to Foreign Officials
In addition to carrying out the primary responsibilities laid out in the Act, USCIRF at times has provided technical assistance and recommendations to foreign officials through meetings, letters, press releases, and editorials. Meetings with foreign officials. For example, USCIRF recommended in its 2012 annual report that the Secretary of State designate Turkey as a CPC. The Ambassador was not regularly attending USCIRF meetings at the time, and State officials learned of USCIRF’s intent to recommend Turkey only shortly before USCIRF published its report in March 2012. Turkish officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a press release that USCIRF’s report directly contradicted State’s annual report on religious freedom, and called the USCIRF report “null and void.” State officials told us that they had to resolve the resulting tensions with the Turkish government. In addition, according to State officials, because the Ambassador and commissioners have not defined how they should interact, they have at times communicated conflicting information to foreign governments on behalf of the United States. NGOs Generally Rated Overall U.S. Government Efforts Positively While Raising Some Concerns and Suggesting Several Improvements
The NGOs—religious organizations and other civil society groups—that we surveyed, as well as NGO representatives whom we interviewed, generally rated overall U.S. government, State, and USCIRF efforts to promote international religious freedom positively. Likewise, NGOs that were familiar with State’s and USCIRF’s annual reports generally viewed both reports positively, although several raised concerns about a lack of objectivity in each report. Finally, NGOs generally viewed CPC designations positively, although some doubted the helpfulness of the designations to their own religious freedom work. In response to the mandate, this report assesses (1) the Department of State’s (State) implementation of its primary responsibilities established in the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (the Act); (2) the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF) implementation of its primary responsibilities established in the Act; (3) State’s and USCIRF’s interaction in their efforts to promote religious freedom; and (4) NGOs’ views on U.S. efforts to promote international religious freedom. Of the 131 NGOs, 84 responded to the survey. The survey addressed the Department of State’s (State) and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF) international religious freedom activities, including their respective annual reports; State’s designations, and USCIRF’s recommendations for designations, of Countries of Particular Concern (CPC); overall U.S. government progress on international religious freedom; and U.S. international religious freedom policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress passed the Act in 1998 to promote international religious freedom, among other purposes. The Act established within State the Office of International Religious Freedom, headed by an Ambassador-at-Large. The Act also established USCIRF, with the Ambassador-at-Large as an ex-officio member. In addition, the Act outlined primary responsibilities for both State and USCIRF.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2011required GAO to report on matters related to the U.S. promotion of international religious freedom. This report assesses (1) States implementation of its primary responsibilities established in the Act, (2) USCIRFs implementation of its primary responsibilities established in the Act, (3) States and USCIRFs interaction to promote religious freedom, and (4) NGOs views on U.S. efforts to promote religious freedom.
GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State, USCIRF, NGOs, and foreign governments. GAO conducted fieldwork in five countries, including CPCs, and surveyed 131 NGOs. The survey results reflect the views of survey respondents and cannot be generalized.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) is implementing the primary responsibilities outlined in the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (the Act) by undertaking numerous actions to promote religious freedom, engaging with foreign officials, and annually publishing its International Religious Freedom Report. The Ambassador-at-Large and the Office of International Religious Freedom assist the Secretary of State with certain responsibilities outlined in the Act, including the designation of Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) and the development of training.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is implementing its primary responsibilities outlined in the Act by conducting ongoing reviews of violations of religious freedom and issuing policy recommendations to the U.S. government. According to USCIRF officials, its primary responsibilities culminate in the release of its annual report. The report discusses the 20 to 30 countries that USCIRF considers the worst offenders against religious freedom, and it presents policy recommendations to the U.S. government. USCIRF has at times also provided technical assistance or recommendations to foreign officials.
Although the Act, as amended, directs State and USCIRF to cooperate, they have not defined how they should interact, which has at times created tensions with foreign-government officials. For example, in its 2012 report, USCIRF recommended that the Secretary of State designate Turkey as a CPC. Because the Ambassador-at-Large was not regularly attending USCIRF meetings at the time, State officials learned of the commissioners' intent shortly before USCIRF published its report. State officials explained that Turkey did not warrant CPC designation, as it had taken steps to improve religious freedom, but USCIRF proceeded with its recommendation. According to Turkish officials, USCIRF's report contradicted State's report and was therefore "null and void." State officials told GAO that they had to resolve the resulting tensions with the Turkish government.
Representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) whom GAO surveyed and interviewed generally viewed overall U.S. government efforts to promote international religious freedom positively, while raising some concerns and suggesting several improvements. To better promote international religious freedom, some NGOs suggested greater inclusion of civil society and other nonstate actors and further empowerment of U.S. government entities. Likewise, NGOs familiar with State's and USCIRF's annual reports generally viewed them positively, although several raised concerns that both reports lacked objectivity. Finally, NGOs generally viewed State's CPC designations positively, although some doubted how useful the designations or recommended designations were to their work. NGOs from GAO's five fieldwork countries provided similar opinions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and the Chair of USCIRF jointly define how State and USCIRF should interact in their efforts to promote international religious freedom. State and USCIRF concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_RCED-96-151 | gao_RCED-96-151_0 | However, FAA’s order does not prescribe the (1) methods for considering human factors, (2) minimal standards for incorporating human factors, or (3) requirements for seeking guidance on human factors from specialists that the administrators and directors are to follow. Incorporating the Consideration of Human Factors in Acquisitions and Operations
Recent legislative and organizational changes may affect how the formal consideration of human factors is incorporated in the acquisition process and may strengthen the application of human factors in operations, such as safety. However, on April 1, 1996, in response to new legislation exempting FAA from most federal procurement statutes, FAA implemented the Federal Aviation Administration Acquisition Management System, which superseded FAA’s 1993 acquisition policy. According to the initial guidance provided for this new system, human factors may be formally considered at an earlier stage in the acquisition process than previously, but this early consideration is not required. Identifying Research Issues
To identify aviation-related issues in research on human factors, the Human Factors Division consults with FAA units and other members of the aviation community. Allocating and Coordinating Resources for Research
Although the Human Factors Division is primarily responsible for allocating and coordinating FAA’s resources for internal and external research on human factors, FAA’s other units are not required to coordinate their research with the division, whether their research is performed internally, by the units themselves, or externally, through interagency agreements or through contractors. FAA also contracts with the Department of Defense to conduct research on human factors. Unless FAA ensures that research will be administered through the Human Factors Division or until the agency establishes a documented process for coordinating research, we continue to believe that the possibility of duplication exists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) organizational structure for incorporating human factors into aviation-related research.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FAA has incorporated a human factors policy order, a Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for human factors, and guidance for considering human factors in the acquisition process; (2) the order assigns responsibility for ensuring that human factors are considered in FAA research activities, but does not establish minimal standards for meeting this requirement; (3) recent legislative and organizational changes may affect the application of human factors research in FAA acquisitions and operations; (4) the FAA Acquisition Management System considers human factors at an earlier stage in the acquisition process, but there is no mention of the extent to which such factors should be considered; (5) the FAA Human Factors Division (HFD) consults with other members of the aviation community and participates in industry task forces and conferences to identify issues associated with human factors in aviation; (6) HFD solicits ideas for research from FAA acquisition and operating units and is responsible for internal and external coordination of FAA research; (7) HFD allocates most FAA funding for core research, and enters into interagency agreements with the National Space and Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Defense to coordinate the agencies' human factors research; and (8) the possibility of duplicating human factors research exists because FAA units are not required to coordinate their research activities. |
gao_GAO-12-626 | gao_GAO-12-626_0 | In addition, the Bureau has focused on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the transformation, by including in its change-strategy documents not only explicit reliance on the guiding principles for the 2020 Census, but specific principles to guide the transformation itself, such as “make data-driven decisions,” “be responsive and transparent to decennial staff and stakeholders,” and “focus on an efficient and resilient organization.” The Bureau has also created a high-level transformation timeline to build momentum and show progress that includes milestones such as staff workshops and deliverables such as multiyear roadmaps. Specifically, the amount of change- related activity being planned may not be aligned with the resources the Bureau has allocated to plan, coordinate, and carry them out. As shown in figure 3, the Bureau is taking steps to plan the 2020 Census generally consistent with two of the five key practices we identified and partially consistent with the other three. For example, early on, from June 2009 to November 2010, the Bureau began the practice to develop a project plan by issuing a series of eight 2020 planning memorandumsthat laid out a framework documenting goals, assumptions, and timing of the remaining four phases of 2020 Census. The Bureau also created a high-level schedule of program management activities for the remaining four phases, documented key elements such as the Bureau’s decennial mission, vision, and six guiding principles, and produced a business plan to support budget requests, which is being updated annually. But, current Bureau plans provide inadequate detail on when key decisions will need to be made to support transition between the planning phases. Regarding the involvement of stakeholders in 2020 Census planning, according to senior Bureau officials, there has been little effective outreach by the Bureau to inform congressional staff about the scope of topics the Bureau has planned as part of its approach to fundamentally reexamine how it conducts a census. Congressional support—regardless of the approach ultimately selected—is crucial for creating a stable environment in which to prepare for the census. For example, the Bureau has begun to identify current and future critical occupations by piloting a skills and competency assessment of selected IT 2020 Census positions, including those for 2020 Census research and testing. Still, the Bureau could do more to implement its strategic workforce planning consistent with key leading practices. The Bureau is generally or partially following most leading practices in the management areas of organizational transformation, long-term project planning, and strategic workforce planning—positioning itself well during this early phase of planning for the 2020 Census. Much of the Bureau’s early progress is visible in its plans for additional activity over the coming months; equally important will be the need to finalize these plans and execute these activities in a timely manner to maintain the Bureau’s early momentum toward a cost-effective 2020 Census. It will be important for the Bureau to take additional steps to further implement leading practices in each of the three management areas we reviewed. Finally, for strategic workforce planning, it will be important that the Bureau set agency workforce goals so that it can determine how to monitor, report, and evaluate its progress toward achieving those goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce require the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs who oversees the Economics and Statistics Administration, as well as the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau, to take the following six actions to improve the Bureau’s process of organizational transformation, long-term planning, and strategic workforce planning for the 2020 Census, and thus better position the Bureau to carry out a cost-effective decennial census: 1. 2. In order to ensure prioritization and timely completion of all necessary research and testing efforts, as well as timely transition to later 2020 Census phases, develop and implement a long-term planning schedule that includes key milestones and deadlines, including deadlines for decisions that directly affect activity in later 2020 a schedule for creating, revising, or updating governance, program management, and system engineering and architecture plans to be used in later 2020 Census phases beyond research and testing; and expected times of delivery for Bureau-wide enterprise tools, processes, and standards that 2020 Census planning would be expected to use. The Department of Commerce concurred with our findings and recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess the extent to which the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Bureau) 2020 Directorate and its Research and Planning Office are taking steps consistent with leading practices for organizational transformation, long-term project planning, and strategic workforce planning. Begin reporting on Bureau’s progress toward workforce goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAOs prior work has shown that it will be important for the Bureau to reexamine its management and culture as well as the fundamental design of the census in order to ensure a costeffective census. The Bureau recognizes this and has taken steps in at least three management areas toward achieving these goals. As requested, this report addresses the extent to which the Bureau is taking steps in accordance with selected leading practices that GAO identified for (1) organizational transformation, (2) long-term project planning, and (3) strategic workforce planning in preparing for the 2020 Census. To meet these objectives, GAO identified leading practices in these areas that are relevant to the Bureaus 2020 Census planning, reviewed Bureau documents, and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The Census Bureaus (Bureau) early planning and preparation efforts for the 2020 Census are consistent with most leading practices in each of the three management areas GAO reviewed. For example, with respect to its effort to transform its decennial organization, top Bureau leadership has been driving the transformation, and the agency has focused on a key set of principles as it begins to roll-out the strategy to staff. Furthermore, the Bureau has created a timeline to build momentum and show progress. At the same time, however, the amount of change-related activity the Bureau is considering as part of its reorganization of its decennial directorate may not be aligned with the resources the Bureau has allocated to plan, coordinate, and carry it out, and, as a result, the planned transformation efforts may not be sustainable or successful.
Similarly, the Bureau is taking steps consistent with many of the leading practices for long-term project planning, such as by, among other activities, issuing its series of 2020 planning memorandums in 2009 and 2010 that laid out a highlevel framework documenting goals, assumptions, and timing of the remaining four phases of the 2020 Census. The Bureau also created a high-level schedule of program management activities for the remaining phases, documented key elements such as the Bureaus decennial mission, vision, and guiding principles, and produced a business plan to support budget requests, which is being updated annually. Still, the Bureaus schedule does not include milestones or deadlines for key decisions needed to support transition between the planning phases, which could result in later downstream planning activity not being based on evidence from such sources as early research and testing. Furthermore, there has been little effective outreach to the Bureaus congressional stakeholders about its reexamination of census processes and design, which could result in a lack of support on potentially complex or sensitive topics that can be crucial for creating a stable environment in which to prepare for a census.
In the area of strategic workforce planning, the Bureau is taking steps consistent with leading practices such as by identifying current and future critical occupations with a pilot assessment of the skills and competencies of selected information technology 2020 Census positions. However, the Bureau has done little yet either to identify the goals that should guide workforce planning or to determine how to monitor, report, and evaluate its progress toward achieving them, which could help the Bureau identify and avoid possible barriers to implementing its workforce plans.
The steps the Bureau has taken and has planned are positioning it well during this early phase of planning for the 2020 Census. Since much of the Bureaus early progress is tied to additional planning and other activity needed over the coming months, equally important will be the need to execute these activities in a timely manner to maintain the Bureaus early momentum toward a cost-effective 2020 Census.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Census Director take a number of actions to make 2020 Census planning more consistent with key practices in the three management areas, such as examining planned transformation activity to ensure its alignment with resources, developing a more-detailed long-term schedule to smooth transition to later planning phases, implementing effective congressional outreach to ensure a stable planning environment, and setting workforce planning goals and monitor them to ensure their attainment.
The Department of Commerce concurred with GAOs findings and recommendations and provided minor clarifications, which were included in the final report. |
gao_GAO-14-133 | gao_GAO-14-133_0 | Background
IRS Processing and Taxpayer Services
Processing: IRS processes millions of paper and electronically-filed (e-filed) tax returns and validates key pieces of information during the tax filing season. Installment Agreements
Taxpayers can enter into IAs to pay their tax debts after filing their return with a balance due. IRS Achieved Processing Efficiency Gains, but Continues to Face Challenges in Providing Service to Taxpayers
Electronic Filing Continued to Grow
Despite late tax law changes which delayed the start of filing season and compressed the time that IRS had available to process tax returns, IRS officials and external stakeholders such as large tax preparation firms reported relatively smooth processing, with a few exceptions. See Appendix III for additional information on website use from 2008 through 2013. IRS Has Proposed Eliminating Some Services in 2014, but the Cuts May Not Stop the Deterioration in Performance or Address GAO’s Recommendation from Last Year
In 2012, we noted that IRS needs to dramatically revise its strategy for providing telephone and correspondence services and recommended that it define appropriate levels of telephone and correspondence services based on an assessment of demand and resources among other things.IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation, saying it already has an objective of providing taxpayers with access to accurate services while managing demand. We concluded that, with expected levels of resources, reversing the declines in telephone and correspondence services may require IRS to consider difficult tradeoffs such as limiting the types of phone calls that would be answered. IRS reported that it is working on final approval to implement the service options and bring about a better balance between demand for service and resources. However, the continued deterioration in taxpayer service in 2013, high cost of shifting staff from collections work to the telephones and correspondence, and anticipated level of telephone service for 2014 all highlight the importance of continuing to address the recommendation we made last year based on the need for a dramatic revision in IRS’s strategy. Until IRS develops a strategy, it risks not communicating expectations about the level of services it can provide based on the resources available. Table 4 shows that, in fiscal year 2012, IRS approved more than 3 million new IAs and collected $9.8 billion. IRS’s Identification of and Notification to Potential Non-Filers Takes Months after Filing Deadlines
Beginning in October, IRS uses prior year tax returns, third-party reports, such as W-2s and Forms 1099, and applications for automatic extensions of time to file to identify taxpayers who appear to have missed the mid- April tax return filing deadline. After the first match in October, IRS sends notices to non-filers in November and December requesting the return or a justification for not filing. Of these, IRS selected more than 3.2 million cases for review and sent notices to those non-filers requesting the return. As a result, taxpayer access to IRS’s telephone assistors remained at a low level and the percentage of overage correspondence grew. By eliminating or reducing some services IRS should be able to devote more resources to its continuing services. Fully addressing our recommendation would result in a strategy that could be used to facilitate a discussion with Congress and other stakeholders about the appropriate mix of service, level of performance, and resources. We identified opportunities in the processing of installment agreements where the existing process could be further streamlined to reduce resources by standardizing case notes and reducing unnecessarily redundant data entry. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue develop a set of standardized account entries and eliminate unnecessary redundancy when entering installment agreement data into accounts. IRS did not state whether it concurred with the recommendation. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid as discussed in the report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The tax filing season is when IRS processes most tax returns and provides services including telephone, correspondence, and website assistance for tens of millions of taxpayers. IRS budgeted more than $2 billion for these activities in 2013. The filing season is also when IRS begins collecting delinquent taxes by, for example, approving installment agreements and checking for non-filers. GAO was asked to review the 2013 tax filing season. This report (1) assesses IRS's performance in processing tax returns and providing services to taxpayers; (2) describes the installment agreement process and assesses its efficiency; and (3) describes the process for detecting and notifying non-filers. To conduct the analyses, GAO obtained and compared IRS data from 2007 through 2013, reviewed pertinent IRS documents, observed IRS operations, and interviewed IRS officials and experts in tax administration, including tax preparation firms.
What GAO Found
Despite efficiency gains from processing more tax returns electronically, adding website services, and shifting resources from enforcement, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was unable to keep up with demand for telephone and correspondence services. Access to IRS's telephone assistors remained at 68 percent from 2012. The percentage of overage paper correspondence (over 45 days old) increased to 47 percent from 40 percent in 2012. In the face of similar trends, last year GAO reported that a dramatic revision in IRS's taxpayer service strategy was needed and recommended IRS take steps to better balance demand for services with available resources. GAO acknowledged this may require IRS to consider difficult tradeoffs, such as limiting some services. In response, IRS has proposed eliminating or reducing some services for 2014 such as answering basic tax law questions only during the filing season. However, IRS officials told GAO the proposed cuts may not be sufficient to stop the deterioration in services. Until IRS develops a strategy, it risks not communicating expectations about the level of services it can provide based on the resources available. IRS could use the strategy to facilitate a discussion with Congress and other stakeholders about the appropriate mix of service, level of performance, and resources.
IRS offers options for installment agreements (IAs) to taxpayers who cannot fully pay their taxes when due. Taxpayers can enter into these agreements online, by phone, and by mail. In fiscal year 2012, IRS approved about 3.2 million new agreements and collected almost $10 billion. IRS devotes about 1,800 full-time equivalent staff to the program but it is not as efficient as it could be. GAO found opportunities to standardize account entries and reduce redundancy by eliminating dual entry of the same data on paper forms and into IRS's computers. IRS officials agreed that opportunities did exist to streamline the process. More standardized and less redundant data entry could reduce resource needs.
IRS detects non-filers by matching third party information (i.e., Form W-2s) with tax returns. The first match is done in October, well after the mid-April tax filing deadline from the previous year, because of the time it takes to receive the third party information and process it. IRS sends notices to non-filers in November and December.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS develop standardized account entries and eliminate unnecessary redundancy in the installment agreement process. IRS did not state whether it concurred with our recommendation. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid as discussed in this report. In addition, GAO continues to believe the prior recommendation that IRS develop a strategy that defines appropriate levels of telephone and correspondence services based on an assessment of demand and resources among other things remains valid and should be addressed. |
gao_AIMD-99-17 | gao_AIMD-99-17_0 | However, the majority of excise taxes are accounted for by IRS. Subsequent to this initial distribution, IRS certifies quarterly the amounts that should have been distributed to the excise tax-related trust funds based on the tax returns. Figure 2 shows IRS’ process for certifying the trust fund distributions. Excise Tax Section (Cincinnati Service Center)
Review Master File and AQETL data. This information is a basis for preparing the certifications. As a result, the certified amount for the Highway Trust Fund was understated by $67 million. The lack of IRS review of the distribution rates on this spreadsheet resulted in errors in the excise tax certifications for the Highway Trust Fund going undetected. Conclusions
The errors we found in the review of the fiscal year 1997 excise tax certification process are the direct result of weaknesses in fundamental internal controls, specifically the lack of appropriate verification and review procedures, at all critical points in the excise tax certification process. These weaknesses led to taxpayer, IRS, and OTA errors going undetected and directly resulted in inaccurate distributions of excise tax revenue to the trust funds in fiscal year 1997. Revise the Form 720 tax return to reflect a separate column adjacent to the column for entering the tax assessment, by abstract number, for the taxpayer to report on pages 1 and 2 of the tax return claims and adjustments, by abstract number, based on the information the taxpayer reports on Schedule C.
To strengthen internal controls over IRS’ process of certifying excise tax distributions to the general fund and federal trust funds, we recommend that IRS:
Develop, document, and implement review procedures over the adjustment and summarization of assessment data used in the certifications. The head of a federal agency is required by 31 U.S.C. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO conducted a follow-up review of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) controls over its process for certifying excise taxes for distribution to the federal trust funds.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS does not have adequate controls over its process for certifying excise taxes for distribution to the federal government trust funds; (2) the lack of fundamental internal controls resulted in errors in the certifications going undetected; (3) these errors ultimately affected the amounts distributed to the trust funds during fiscal year 1997; (4) IRS' ineffective controls over the certification process resulted in undetected: (a) mistakes by taxpayers in preparing excise tax returns; (b) input errors by IRS when entering excise tax return information in its master files; and (c) errors by IRS in preparing the excise tax certifications; (5) as a result of these errors, trust funds did not receive the appropriate amount of excise tax revenue; (6) these errors are particularly important to the Highway Trust Fund, which receives over half of the excise taxes that are accounted for by IRS; (7) these weaknesses were a contributing factor in the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Inspectors General's: (a) qualified opinion on the Highway Trust Fund financial statements; (b) disclaimer of opinion on the Federal Aviation Administration's financial statements; and (c) disclaimer of opinion on DOT's consolidated financial statements; (8) the errors GAO found relating to taxpayer mistakes, IRS data input, and certification preparation could have been detected or prevented by effective IRS procedures; and (9) IRS has taken some actions to improve certain controls over the excise tax certification process. |
gao_GAO-16-744 | gao_GAO-16-744_0 | The U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) is another component in FEMA. The grant review and award processes are represented in Figure 3. FEMA Changed Fire Grants Policies and Developed a Performance Assessment System in Response to FGRA Amendments
FEMA Changed Applications and Awards Policies Related to FGRA Amendments, and Grant Outcomes Generally Reflected These Changes
Our analysis of FGRA identified 26 amendments related to fire grant application and award policies. Specifically, FGRA included an amendment that established minimum award allocations for career, volunteer, and combination fire departments. In addition, these standards help fire departments minimize the possibility of fire-related injuries, property damage, and other effects, according to FEMA. Opportunities Exist to Further Enhance FEMA’s Management of Fire Grant Processes and Performance Assessment Efforts
Establishing Defined and Measurable Targets
While FEMA developed performance measures as part of its new performance assessment system for the AFG and SAFER programs, the agency did not include measurable performance targets linked to AFG and SAFER program goals that could help better assess the impact of the program and report program achievements. Thus, establishing measurable performance targets linked to AFG and SAFER program goals could enhance the quality and utility of the new performance assessment system by providing a yardstick against which the national investments in the programs can be evaluated. Enhancing Collaboration between GPD and USFA
The U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) plays an informal role as a consultant to GPD’s fire grant programs, but GPD could better leverage USFA’s expertise and resources to support programmatic management of the fire grant programs using collaborative mechanisms that our work across the federal government has identified. Despite the similarities in the goals and missions of the two organizations, key USFA and GPD policy documents do not describe how the two organizations’ programs could work together to achieve their common goals, and officials from both offices said there is no formalized relationship between them regarding program management. Officials from both GPD and USFA agreed that formalizing USFA’s role would benefit fire grant program management. Conclusions
FEMA has provided almost $5.8 billion since 2009 to fund fire grant programs that help firefighters and emergency medical service departments enhance their capabilities to respond to the needs of localities across the nation. To further leverage the expertise and resources in support of FEMA’s fire grants programs, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to define and document the roles and responsibilities of USFA in administering the fire grant programs. DHS concurred with all four recommendations and described planned actions to address them. DHS concurred with our last recommendation that FEMA define and document the roles and responsibilities of USFA in administering the fire grant programs. Appendix I: Fire Grants Funding and Awards by Grant Program, Eligible Activity
Funding Distribution of Assistance to Firefighters Grants (AFG), Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER), and Fire Prevention and Safety (FP&S) Awards Pre- and Post-Fire Grants Reauthorization Act of 2012, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2014
Table 2 shows the distribution of grants awards for the three grant programs fiscal years 2002 through 2014. For fiscal years 2009 through 2014, urban departments received a majority of the grant funding. Appendix IV: Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Performance Assessment System Measures for Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) and Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) programs
In 2014, FEMA created a performance assessment system for its fire grants programs in response to a Fire Grants Reauthorization Act of 2012 (FGRA) requirement that FEMA establish a system to track program progress and report to Congress on the effectiveness of these grants. | Why GAO Did This Study
Public fire departments in the U.S. responded to almost 1.3 million fires occurred in the United States in 2014, which resulted in more than 3,275 civilian deaths, 15,775 injuries, and $11.6 billion in property loss. To help support local firefighting efforts, FEMA, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), allocated almost $5.8 billion from 2009 to 2016 to award grants to fire departments and other organizations for equipment, staffing, research, and other needs.
The Fire Grants Reauthorization Act of 2012 (FGRA), which amended and reauthorized the three grant programs, includes a provision for GAO to review changes to the grant programs and FEMA's assessment of the fire grants' performance. This report examines (1) the extent to which the fire grants' policies and performance assessments changed as a result of FEMA's implementation of FGRA, and (2) what additional opportunities exist to enhance FEMA's management of fire grant processes and performance assessment efforts. GAO reviewed FGRA and FEMA grant policy documents, and interviewed FEMA officials and relevant stakeholders who provided insights on key actions taken.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) revised fire grant policies for the Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG), Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER), and Fire Prevention and Safety (FP&S) grant programs in response to the Fire Grants Reauthorization Act of 2012 (FGRA). GPD incorporated a majority of these changes into its existing application and award processes. For example, FGRA established minimum award allocations for three types of fire departments. In 2013 and 2014, each of these types of departments received more than the minimum of fire grant funds. FEMA also developed a performance assessment system for the AFG and SAFER programs in response to FGRA. The figure summarizes the types of uses for each fire grant program.
FEMA has several opportunities to enhance its administration of fire grants and how their contributions to national preparedness are assessed. For example, while FEMA developed performance measures for the AFG and SAFER programs, the agency did not include measurable performance targets linked to AFG and SAFER program goals that could help better assess the impact of the program and report program achievements. Establishing measurable performance targets linked to program goals could enhance the quality and utility of the new performance assessment system by providing a yardstick against which these investments can be evaluated. In addition, the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) provides firefighter training and education as well as fire-related research, data collection, and analysis, and acts as a consultant for GPD's fire grant programs, but FEMA has not defined and documented USFA's specific role or responsibilities with the fire grants program. As a result, there is no formalized relationship or policy regarding, for example, how the two organizations' programs could work together to achieve common goals. Using collaborative mechanisms GAO's work has identified across the federal government could help GPD better leverage USFA's expertise and resources to support programmatic management of the fire grants programs. Both GPD and USFA officials agreed that defining and documenting the roles and responsibilities of GPD and USFA would enhance the administration of the fire grants programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations, including that FEMA establish measurable performance targets, and define and document the roles and responsibilities of GPD and USFA in administering the fire grants. DHS concurred with all four recommendations, and described planned actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-03-350 | gao_GAO-03-350_0 | In program year 2000, older workers received employment and training services from various federal employment and training programs, including the Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP), the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), and Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs. For the dislocated worker program, participants’ earnings after completing the program are expressed as a percentage of their earnings before entering the program. Older People Enrolled in Federal Programs Generally Receive Subsidized Community Service Jobs and Job Search Assistance
Approximately 12 percent of all older people who were not working and wanted a job were enrolled in federal employment and training programs; most of these individuals received subsidized community service jobs or job search assistance, while a smaller number received training. Other older workers may receive job assistance services without being enrolled in a federal employment and training program, but these individuals are not counted in program statistics. 3). Within WIA, the adult program enrolled less than 1 percent of all people aged 55 and older who would have been eligible on the basis of age. For example, at least 14,000 older individuals— many of whom were also enrolled in the community service jobs program—participated in SCSEP training programs between July 2000 and June 2001 to prepare for private sector jobs. WIA Performance Measures May Affect Older Workers’ Access to Services
Employment and training providers report that, as a result of WIA’s performance measures, they are less likely to enroll some older workers in services such as training. Officials in six of the ten local workforce areas that we visited consider performance measures a barrier to enrolling older workers into WIA because their high prior wages and/or their tendency to work part time negatively impact the area’s performance. 6). Conclusions
According to some economists, the United States will face a significant labor shortage by 2030. Research findings have been inconsistent as to whether older workers need special services to help them find or retain employment and employment and training providers have taken different approaches to providing services to older workers. Consequently, some older workers, and any other workers who share similar employment characteristics with older workers, may not receive the more in-depth services that may be necessary to help ensure that these workers are provided adequate opportunities to fill the anticipated labor shortage and meet employer needs. Recommendation for Executive Action
In light of concerns that older workers have unique employment characteristics that could adversely affect certain program outcomes and that older workers who need in-depth job search assistance and job training to remain in, or re-enter, the workforce may not receive such services, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor assess WIA performance measures and make adjustments as necessary to eliminate the disincentive to enrolling older workers in WIA. Copies will be made available to others upon request. Workforce Investment Act: Coordination of TANF through One-Stops Has Increased Despite Challenges. Workforce Investment Act: New Requirements Create Need for More Guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Some economists predict that by 2030, the United States could experience a labor shortage of 35 million workers. As the shortage approaches, one option available is to encourage people to work beyond traditional retirement ages, especially because people who are age 55 or older will constitute nearly a third of the poppulation. Accordingly, increasing demands will be made on the workforce development system to help ensure that older workers are provided opportunities to help address the anticipated labor shortage. Concerned that the existing workforce development system may not meet the needs of older workers, the Subcommittee's Ranking Minority Member asked GAO to determine the extent that older workers are enrolled in federal employment and training programs, what services are provided, and how performance measures affect such services.
What GAO Found
About 12 percent of the 1.3 million older people who were not working and wanted a job were enrolled in these programs between July 2000 and June 2001. Some older workers received services without being enrolled in a program but these people were not counted in program statistics. The majority of older people enrolled received subsidized jobs through the Senior Community Service Employment Program. About one-third participated in programs funded by the Workforce Investment Act and Trade Adjustment Assistance. Most of the older workers enrolled in these programs received job search assistance, such as help in preparing for interviews and writing resumes, but some also received job training. Research findings have been inconsistent as to whether older workers have distinct learning needs, but Workforce Investment Act program providers are less likely now than in the past to have separate programs for older workers. The Workforce Investment Act requires program providers to report certain information so that Labor can determine how well programs are performing. These performance measures include how many participants find jobs and how much their earnings have increased. Program providers report that some performance measures provide a disincentive to enrolling older workers into the program because of employment characteristics that may negatively affect program performance. For example, in 6 of 10 the local areas we visited, officials said they considered performance measures a barrier to enrolling older workers seeking part-time jobs because they would have lower earnings and therefore reduce program performance. Consequently, some older workers may only receive job search assistance and not have access to in-depth services, such as computer training. |
gao_T-RCED-97-153 | gao_T-RCED-97-153_0 | Delays and Increased Costs in Revising the Tongass Plan Can Be Traced Primarily to Three Factors
Among its findings, our report notes that inefficiency in the Forest Service’s decision-making process can result when (1) the agency identifies issues but then conducts continual and/or multiple studies to address them without establishing any clear sequence for their timely resolution; (2) stakeholders, both inside and outside the agency, cannot agree on how the Forest Service is to resolve conflicts among competing uses on its lands and needed improvements are delayed; and (3) the Forest Service and federal regulatory agencies cannot agree on an acceptable level of risk to endangered and threatened species, water, air, and other individual natural resources. Agreement on Which Uses to Emphasize Has Been Difficult to Reach
The Forest Service also has had difficulty reconciling its older emphasis on producing timber with its more recent emphasis on sustaining wildlife and fish under its broad multiple-use and sustained-yield mandate. Underlying Issues Contribute to Inefficiency
In the end, the Forest Service hopes to approve a revised Tongass plan that is legally defensible, scientifically credible, and able to sustain the forest’s resources. However, as its experience in revising the Tongass forest plan has shown, developing a forest plan to avoid or prevail against legal challenges has become increasingly costly and time-consuming. On the Tongass, insufficient data and scientific uncertainty have hampered the development of a plan that can ensure the maintenance of viable populations of wildlife. However, the Forest Service has historically failed to live up to its own monitoring requirements, and federal regulatory agencies and other stakeholders continue to insist that the Forest Service front-load the process. This preparation of increasingly time-consuming and costly detailed environmental analyses and documentation before making a decision has helped perpetuate the cycle of inefficiency. The Forest Service Has Not Adequately Monitored the Effects of Its Decisions
An option to avoid the growing delays and increasing costs incurred in attempting to ensure that a decision is scientifically credible and legally defensible may be for the Forest Service to move forward with a decision using the best information available. Why does an agency study and restudy issues without reaching closure? Although the Forest Service is held accountable for developing forest plans that may be scientifically credible and legally defensible, it is not held accountable for developing them in a timely, orderly, and cost-effective manner. The American taxpayer bears the financial costs, while the costs associated with the uncertainty of not having an approved forest plan are borne by members of the public who are concerned about maintaining biological diversity but are precluded from forming reasonable expectations about the forest’s health over time as well as those who are economically dependent on the Tongass but are precluded from forming reasonable expectations about the future availability of the forest’s uses. Process Used to Revise the Tongass Forest Plan
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Forest Service has spent almost 10 years revising a land management plan, commonly called a forest plan, for the Tongass National Forest. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the decisionmaking process being used by the Forest Service to revise the land management plan for the Tongass National Forest in southeastern Alaska.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that its work on the Forest Service's process for revising the Tongass forest plan showed that: (1) the Service originally planned to spend 3 years revising the plan; (2) at the end of 3 years, the agency had spent about $4 million; however, it has spent another 7 years and $9 million studying and restudying issues without establishing a clear sequence or schedule for their timely resolution, attempting to reconcile its older emphasis on producing timber with its more recent emphasis on sustaining wildlife and fish, and attempting to reach agreement with federal regulatory agencies on an acceptable level of risk to individual natural resources; (3) GAO's work identified that these factors have contributed to inefficiency in decisionmaking throughout the agency; (4) in revising the Tongass forest plan, the Service has incurred unexpected delays and high costs to better ensure that the new plan is legally defensible, scientifically credible, and able to sustain the forest's resources;(5) developing a forest plan to avoid or prevail against legal challenges has become increasingly time-consuming and costly; (6) on the Tongass, insufficient data and scientific uncertainty have hindered the development of a plan that can ensure the maintenance of viable populations of animals; (7) as an option to further study and planning without resolution, the Service may be able to move forward with a decision conditioned on an adequate monitoring component and modify the decision when new information is uncovered or when preexisting monitoring thresholds are crossed; (8) however, the Service has historically failed to live up to its own monitoring requirements and, as a result, federal regulatory agencies and other stakeholders continue to insist that the Service prepare increasingly time-consuming and costly detailed environmental analyses and documentation before making a decision, effectively front-loading the process and perpetuating the cycle of inefficiency; (9) while the agency is being held accountable for developing a plan that may be legally defensible, scientifically credible, and able to sustain the forest's resources, it is not being held accountable for making a timely, orderly, and cost-effective decision; and (10) the costs of the Service's indecision in revising the Tongass plan are being borne by the American taxpayer and by the members of the public who are concerned about maintaining the forest's diverse species but are precluded from forming reasonable expectations about the forest's health over time and/or are economically dependent on the Tongass but are uncertain about the future availability of its uses. |
gao_GAO-10-833 | gao_GAO-10-833_0 | For the same 5-year period, the percentage of obligations reported for noncompetitive contracts decreased, from 35.6 percent to 31.2 percent of total obligations, while those reported under contracts that were competed with one offer received (noncompetitive procurements using competitive procedures) were steady, at about 13 percent of total obligations. Of the 10 contracts and orders that were incorrectly coded as competed with one offer received, 4 had not been competed at all. For services supporting DOD weapons programs, the government’s lack of access to proprietary technical data and a heavy reliance on specific contractors for expertise limit, or even preclude the possibility of, competition. Even for some procurements using competitive procedures, a strong incumbent coupled with overly restrictively written requirements can lead to only one offer—from the incumbent—being received. In other cases, groups of vendors have formed teams to compete for government requirements. Contracting officials and contractors told us that whereas previously several vendors might have submitted offers for more specific requirements, now only one offer—from the prime contractor on the team—is being received. Some Contracting Approaches Did Not Reflect Sound Procurement or Management Practices
In reviewing the contracts in our sample, we identified contracting approaches for nine contracts or orders that did not reflect sound procurement or management practices, in some cases not leveraging the effectiveness of the market place. These approaches included ambiguously written justifications for noncompetitive contracts, very limited documentation of the reasonableness of contractors’ proposed prices, instances where the contract’s cost grew significantly, and labor categories that were improperly authorized because they were not included in the contract. The advocates are to carry out a number of broad responsibilities, including promoting full and open competition and challenging barriers to competition, reporting to the agency’s senior procurement executive and chief acquisition officer on opportunities and actions taken to achieve competition, as well as conditions or actions that unnecessarily restrict it, such as unnecessarily detailed specifications or restrictive statements of work, and recommending to the senior procurement executive and chief acquisition officer a “system of personal and organizational accountability” for competition, which may include recognition and awards to program managers, contracting officers, or others. Apart from these duties, agencies are left with much discretion regarding where in the organization the competition advocates should be placed, who should be appointed to this position, and how they should carry out their responsibilities. Some agency officials we spoke with said that, because the FAR is vague in this regard, and especially given the current emphasis on competition, more guidance related to this position could be helpful. For the agencies in our review, we found a range of approaches to the competition advocate position and placement, skills and expertise, and methods of implementing their responsibilities. The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, stated that, in general, he agrees with our findings and recommendations concerning opportunities to increase competition in cases where only one offer is received (a situation DOD terms “ineffective competition”). Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to assess (1) the extent to which agencies are awarding noncompetitive contracts and contracts awarded competitively with only one offer received; (2) the exceptions to competition that agencies used when awarding noncompetitive contracts; (3) factors that affect competition in federal contracting; and (4) the extent to which the contracting approaches for the contracts in our sample reflected sound procurement or management practices. In addition, we identified the fiscal year 2008 obligations under contracts where only one offer had been received. As discussed in the first objective in this report, we found that about 18 percent of the contracts or orders had been miscoded as either competed or not competed. To determine how agencies are instituting the role of the competition advocate, we reviewed statutory and FAR provisions, Office of Management and Budget and Office of Federal Procurement Policy memorandums (such as the May 2007 memorandum on reinvigorating the role of the competition advocate), pertinent agency regulations and guidance, and the annual competition reports for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the agencies in our review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Competition is a critical tool for achieving the best return on the government's investment. While federal agencies are generally required to award contracts on the basis of full and open competition, they are permitted to award noncompetitive contracts in certain situations. Agencies are also required to establish competition advocates to promote competition. GAO assessed (1) trends in noncompetitive contracts and those receiving only one offer when competed; (2) exceptions to and factors affecting competition; (3) whether contracting approaches reflected sound procurement practices; and (4) how agencies are instituting the competition advocate role. GAO reviewed federal procurement data and 107 randomly selected contracts at the departments of Defense, Interior, and Homeland Security (which had among the highest noncompetitive obligations in fiscal year 2008) and interviewed contracting and program officials, competition advocates, and contractors.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2005 to 2009, reported obligations for noncompetitive contracts decreased from about 36 to 31 percent of total obligations, while obligations under contracts competed with only one offer received were steady, at about 13 percent of the total in each year. In comparing the data in the federal procurement data system to the information in contract files, we found that about 18 percent of the contracts sampled were coded incorrectly--as either not competed when they had been, or as competed with one offer received when they had not been competed at all. Agencies used a variety of exceptions to competition for the contracts and orders in our sample, with the two most common being "only one responsible source" and sole-source awards under the Small Business Administration's 8(a) business development program. For services supporting DOD weapons programs, the government's lack of access to proprietary technical data and decades-long reliance on specific contractors for expertise limit--or even preclude the possibility of--competition. In other cases, program offices may press for contracts to be awarded to the incumbent contractor without competition, largely due to their relationship and the contractor's understanding of program requirements. For competitive procurements where only one offer is received, factors include a strong incumbent, sometimes coupled with overly restrictive government requirements, or vendors forming large teams to submit one offer for broader government requirements, whereas previously several vendors may have competed. Contracting approaches for nine contracts reviewed did not reflect sound procurement practices and in some instances sound management practices, in some cases not leveraging the effectiveness of the market place. These approaches included ambiguously written justifications for noncompetitive contracts, very limited documentation of the reasonableness of contractors' proposed prices, instances where the contract's cost grew significantly or where labor categories were improperly authorized, and undefinitized contract actions that did not meet definitization requirements. Agencies have much discretion regarding where in the organization the competition advocates should be placed, who should be appointed to this position, and how they should carry out their responsibilities. As a result, agencies have taken a range of approaches regarding the placement of the competition advocates, their skills and expertise, and the methods they use to carry out their responsibilities. Some advocates cited their experience in program offices as helping them to question requirements that may be overly restrictive, while others had been contracting officers or procurement policy officials before assuming the position. Some agency officials said that regulations are vague regarding the role of the competition advocate, and that given the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's (OFPP) recent emphasis on competition, they would like to see more guidance on competition advocate roles and methods of implementing their duties.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OFPP take actions regarding assessment of the reasons only one offer is received and issue guidance on competition advocate roles, including their direct involvement with program offices to seek opportunities for competition. OFPP agreed with the recommendations, and DOD generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. Other agencies provided technical comments. |
gao_AIMD-96-59 | gao_AIMD-96-59_0 | Hundreds of Cases of Telephone Abuse Found at USDA
Our review of four monthly telephone bills for USDA agencies and offices in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area found that 652 collect calls, or about 50 percent of all collect calls accepted and paid for by USDA during this 4-month period, were from individuals at 18 correctional institutions. Additionally, our review of just a few calls from the thousands of long-distance calls made by USDA agencies and offices in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area each month found several other cases of telephone abuse involving personal long-distance calls outside the country to adult entertainment services and companies advertising jobs. However, as discussed later in this report, USDA generally does not review its telephone bills to make such determinations. However, because many of these collect calls could have been transferred to long-distance lines, thousands more could have been added to USDA’s telephone bills. However, the Department did not take adequate action to stop the problem. USDA received credit for some collect calls from Lorton. Consequently, agency managers lack the information they need to determine whether telephones and long-distance services are used properly in accordance with departmental policy. Since USDA has not yet established adequate and cost-effective controls for ensuring that its telephones are used properly, it is putting itself at continuing risk of telephone abuse and fraud. However, because these bills are generally not reviewed, USDA does not know whether these calls are authorized and it cannot detect instances where telephone fraud and abuse may have occurred. While the Assistant Secretary did not respond to our specific recommendations, it is important for the Department to address actions it plans to take on each recommendation as it moves ahead in preventing telephone fraud and abuse. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) use of its telecommunications resources, focusing on: (1) whether USDA ensures that the commercial telephone and long-distance services it pays for are used in accordance with federal regulations and departmental policy; and (2) USDA efforts to address recommendations from a previous GAO report.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) during the 4-month period reviewed, collect calls from federal, state, and county correctional institutions were accepted at 20 USDA offices in the District of Columbia area and may have been transferred to USDA long-distance lines; (2) these collect calls amounted to 50 percent of the collect calls accepted at these USDA offices and cost about $2,600; (3) despite the discovery of inappropriately accepted collect calls as early as 1993, USDA did not initiate adequate measures to stop the abuses; (4) USDA offices in the District area made unauthorized long-distance calls, including international calls to adult entertainment lines and companies advertising jobs; (5) such fraud and abuse exist because USDA does not review its commercial telephone bills; (6) despite some positive actions to control fraud and abuse, USDA has not responded to GAO recommendations concerning the inappropriate use of its telecommunications resources; and (7) USDA is vulnerable to more fraud, waste, and abuse because it does not review its telephone and telephone credit card bills. |
gao_GAO-15-627 | gao_GAO-15-627_0 | For fiscal year 2015, the department requested about $10 billion for its business system investments. DOD’s Approach to Business Systems Modernization
DOD’s approach to business systems modernization includes reviewing systems annually to ensure that they comply with the fiscal year 2005 NDAA’s business enterprise architecture and business process reengineering requirements. DOD Has Made Progress Strengthening Its Management of Business Systems, but Needs to Continue Implementing Recommended Improvements
The department has implemented 5 of the 16 recommendations that GAO has made since June 2011 to address each of the overarching provisions for improving business systems management in the fiscal year 2005 NDAA. For example, the department has implemented the recommendation to improve its reporting of business system data in its annual budget request. Appendix II provides additional information about the recommendations that DOD has fully and partially implemented. Implementing the remaining 11 recommendations will improve DOD’s modernization management controls and help fulfill the department’s execution of the requirements of the act. DOD Needs to Improve the Usefulness and Effectiveness of Its Business Enterprise Architecture and Business Process Reengineering Initiatives
DOD’s business enterprise architecture and process reengineering efforts are not fully achieving the intended outcomes described in statute. With respect to process reengineering, managers reported these efforts were moderately effective at streamlining business processes, but less so in limiting the need to tailor commercial off-the-shelf systems. Portfolio managers cited a number of challenges impeding the usefulness and effectiveness of these two initiatives, such as the availability of training, lack of skilled staff, parochialism, and cultural resistance to change. The department’s improvement efforts only address selected reported challenges. Addressing the challenges cited by the portfolio managers could help increase the utility and effectiveness of the department’s business enterprise architecture in driving greater operational efficiencies and cost savings. In particular, 70 percent reported that efforts have resulted in streamlined business processes. More fully addressing the challenges cited by the portfolio managers would help the department achieve better outcomes, including limiting the tailoring of commercial off-the-shelf systems. Among other things, portfolio managers reported that the architecture does not enable DOD to produce reliable and timely information for decision- making purposes. DOD has various improvement efforts under way; however, gaps exist and portfolio managers provided suggestions on how to close some of them. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that the department can better achieve business process reengineering and enterprise architecture outcomes and benefits, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense utilize the results of our portfolio manager survey to determine additional actions that can improve the department’s management of its business process reengineering and enterprise architecture activities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the actions by the Department of Defense to comply with section 332 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005, as amended and (2) determine the usefulness and effectiveness of DOD’s business enterprise architecture and business process reengineering processes. We obtained responses from all surveyed portfolio managers (24 in total). When data from the survey were analyzed, an independent analyst reviewed the computer program used for the analysis of the survey data. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO designated DOD's multibillion dollar business systems modernization program as high risk in 1995, and since then has provided a series of recommendations aimed at strengthening its institutional approach to modernizing its business systems investments. Section 332 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2005, as amended, requires the department to take specific actions consistent with GAO's prior recommendations and included a provision for GAO to review DOD's efforts. In addition, the Senate Armed Services Committee Report for the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 included a provision for GAO to evaluate the usefulness and effectiveness of DOD's business enterprise architecture and business process reengineering processes. This report addresses both of those provisions.
In evaluating the department's compliance, GAO analyzed DOD's efforts to address open recommendations made in previous reviews. To evaluate the usefulness and effectiveness of the department's business enterprise architecture and business process reengineering processes, GAO surveyed the military department portfolio managers (24 in total) and interviewed officials. The response rate for the survey was 100 percent, making the results of the survey generalizable.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented 5 of the 16 recommendations made by GAO since June 2011 to address each of the overarching provisions for improving business systems management in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 , as amended (NDAA) (10 U.S.C. § 2222) (see table). For example, it has implemented the recommendation to improve the data available for its business systems by making improvements to its repositories used for tracking information about the systems. Based on GAO's analysis, the department has partially implemented the remaining 11 recommendations. Implementing all recommended actions will improve DOD's modernization management controls and help fulfill the department's execution of the act's requirements.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation. | GAO-15-627 .
DOD's business enterprise architecture and process reengineering efforts are not fully achieving the intended outcomes described in statute. More specifically, portfolio managers reported through GAO's survey that the architecture was not effective in constraining system investments or enabling DOD to produce reliable and timely information for decision-making purposes, among other things. As a result, the architecture has produced limited value. Portfolio managers reported that the department's business process reengineering efforts were moderately effective in streamlining business processes, but much less so in limiting the tailoring of commercial off-the-shelf systems. They also reported that these efforts have been useful in realizing selected benefits, such as improved documentation of business needs.
Managers GAO surveyed reported various challenges that impede the department's ability to fully achieve intended outcomes, such as cultural resistance to change and the lack of skilled staff. The department has work under way to address some of these challenges; however, gaps exist and the portfolio managers provided suggestions on how to close some of them. More fully addressing the challenges cited by the portfolio managers would help the department achieve better outcomes, including greater operational efficiencies and cost savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD utilize the results of the survey to determine additional actions that can improve management of its business process reengineering and enterprise architecture activities. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-01-928 | gao_GAO-01-928_0 | WIA also requires the establishment of local workforce investment areas and boards to locally oversee the new one- stop center system. The data for these performance categories is collected by states for the programs administered by ETA. Veterans Receive Priority Service, but Effectiveness of Service Is Unknown
While veterans receive priority employment services at one-stop centers as required under the law, the effectiveness of the services, as indicated by the resulting employment, cannot be determined because VETS does not collect sufficient data to measure the outcomes veterans achieve from these services. Since veterans have these dedicated staff to serve them, they also received more intensive services, and received these services more readily, than nonveterans. However, the effectiveness of these services is unknown because VETS lacks adequate outcome data on job retention and wages. To show that states are providing priority service to veterans, VETS requires states to report data on the number and types of services provided to veterans and nonveterans as well as the percentage of each group served that enters employment. The agency does not have a comprehensive system in place to manage state performance in serving veterans. DVOP and LVER Programs Do Not Always Operate Well in One-Stop Centers
The DVOP and LVER grant programs do not always operate well in one- stop centers, according to the state and local officials we interviewed. Smaller employment services offices or one-stop centers may have a more difficult time meeting the employment needs of their veterans because of the restrictions in the law. The new one- stop center system, while giving veterans priority for employment services, gives states flexibility in planning and implementing employment and training systems and holds them accountable for performance. The Congress should consider revising title 38 to provide states and local offices more discretion to decide where to locate DVOP and LVER staff and provide states the discretion to have half-time DVOP positions; allow VETS and/or states the flexibility to better define the roles and responsibilities of staff serving veterans instead of including these duties in the law; combine the DVOP and LVER grant programs into one staffing grant to better meet states’ needs for serving veterans; provide VETS with the flexibility to consider alternative ways to improve administration and oversight of the staffing grants, for example, eliminating the prescriptive requirements for monitoring DVOP and LVER grants; eliminate the requirement that VETS report to the Congress a comparison of the job placement rate of veterans with that of nonveterans; and eliminate the requirement that VETS report on Federal Contractor Job Listings. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In designing our study, we obtained legislation, regulations, and Veterans Employment and Training Service (VETS) directives regarding the Disabled Veterans’ Outreach Program (DVOP) specialists and the Local Veterans’ Employment Representative (LVER) staffing grants to states. Veterans’ Employment and Training Service: Better Planning Needed to Address Future Needs (GAO/T-HEHS-00-206, Sept. 27, 2000). Veterans’ Employment and Training: Services Provided by Labor Department Programs (GAO/HEHS-98-7, Oct. 17, 1997). | What GAO Found
Recognizing that the country's fragmented employment and training programs were not serving job seekers or employers well, Congress enacted the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) in 1988. One of WIA's goals was to create a one-stop center system to help unify the services provided by many programs and give states the flexibility to design services better suited to local workforce needs. Veterans' employment and training programs, administered by the Department of Labor's Veterans' Employment and Training Service (VETS), are mandatory program partners in this new one-stop center system. VETS administers two grants programs--the Disabled Veterans' Outreach Program (DVOP) and the Local Veterans' Employment Representative (LVER) program--that fund staff offering services for veterans. Although veterans receive priority employment services at one-stop centers, VETS does not collect appropriate data for determining the effectiveness of these services, including subsequent job retention and wages. VETS requires states to collect information on the number and type of employment services provided to veterans relative to nonveterans. This information showed that veterans received more intensive services, and received these services more readily, than did nonveterans seeking services through states' employment service offices or one-stop centers--an elevated level of service principally provided by DVOP and LVER staff. VETS' oversight of the DVOP and LVER grants is inadequate. The agency lacks a comprehensive system in place to manage state performance in serving veterans. The two programs do not always operate well within the one-stop center environment because states do not have the flexibility to design their services for veterans in a way that best meets the needs of employers and veterans. The success of the one-stop system depends on providing services that meet the changing employment needs in local communities. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Veterans' Employment and Training Service: Greater Flexibility and Accountability Needed to Better Serve Veterans, by Sigurd R. Nilsen, Director of Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues, before the Subcommittee on Benefits, House Committee on Veterans' Affairs. GAO-02-192T , Oct. 30 (13 pages). |
gao_GAO-17-769 | gao_GAO-17-769_0 | Background
DOD has reported to Congress since fiscal year 2004 on several items related to its training ranges in response to section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The act as subsequently amended required annual progress reports to be submitted at the same time as the President submitted the administration’s annual budget for fiscal years 2005 through 2018. DOD’s 2017 Sustainable Ranges Report Met the Annual Reporting Requirements
DOD’s 2017 Sustainable Ranges Report met the annual statutory reporting requirements to describe DOD’s progress in implementing its sustainable ranges plan and any actions taken or to be taken in addressing constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace. In its 2017 report, DOD provided updates to the plan that were required by the act. These updates included: (1) proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls in current resources; (2) goals and milestones for tracking planned actions and measuring progress in the implementation of its training range sustainment plan; and (3) projected funding requirements for implementing its planned actions. In its 2017 report, DOD also reported on seven evolving activities and emerging issues, all of which were reported in its 2016 report. In an April 2016 report, we evaluated the extent to which DOD made progress in its efforts to assess the national security risks and effects of foreign encroachment. DOD Used Goals and Milestones to Describe Its Progress in Implementing Its Comprehensive Training Range Sustainment Plan
In its 2017 Sustainable Ranges Report, DOD used goals and milestones to address the statutory requirement to describe its progress in implementing its comprehensive training range sustainment plan. Using these goals as a common framework, each military service developed its own milestones and needed actions for reaching those milestones. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. Military Training: DOD’s Report on the Sustainability of Training Ranges Addresses Most of the Congressional Reporting Requirements and Continues to Improve with Each Annual Update. Military Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD relies on its training ranges within the United States and overseas to help prepare its forces for combat and complex missions around the globe.
Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required DOD to submit a comprehensive plan on its efforts to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, airspace, and marine areas in the United States and overseas for training. The act, as amended, further required DOD to provide annual progress reports on its efforts through 2018. The act also included a provision for GAO to submit annual evaluations of DOD's reports. This report assesses the extent to which DOD's 2017 Sustainable Ranges Report met statutory reporting requirements.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DOD's 2017 report and compared it with the statutory reporting requirements. GAO also interviewed cognizant DOD and military service officials regarding preparations made to complete the 2017 report.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) 2017 sustainable ranges report met the annual statutory reporting requirements to describe DOD's progress in implementing its plan to sustain training ranges and any additional actions taken or planned for addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace. DOD's 2017 report provides updates to the plan required by the act, specifically (1) proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls; (2) goals and milestones to describe DOD's progress in implementing its comprehensive training range sustainment plan; and (3) projected funding requirements for each of the military services to implement their planned actions. In the report, DOD used goals and milestones to address the statutory requirement to describe its progress in implementing its comprehensive training range sustainment plan. Using these goals as a common framework, each military service developed its own milestones and needed actions for reaching those milestones. The report also identifies evolving activities and emerging issues related to training range sustainability, and it includes actions taken to mitigate them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD agreed with GAO's findings without further comment. |
gao_GAO-04-9 | gao_GAO-04-9_0 | SBA’s Equations Were Reasonable and Estimated Default, and Recovery Rates Were in Line with Historical Experience
We found that the econometric equations that SBA used to estimate defaults, prepayments, and recoveries were reasonable, although other equations could also be reasonable. In addition, SBA did not include any economic variables in its equation for estimating recoveries. Current guidance is either silent or unclear about supporting documentation needed to explain the development of econometric models used to generate credit subsidy estimates for the budget and financial statements. Moreover, as a practical matter, this documentation would help facilitate SBA’s and other agencies’ annual financial statement audits. Documenting the basis for selecting and rejecting variables from an econometric model used to develop credit subsidy estimates is an important internal control that would also help to provide financial statement auditors reasonable assurance that a bias was not introduced into the credit subsidy estimates by systematically excluding variables to influence the subsidy rate in a particular direction. Although at the time of our review, some errors in its data existed in SBA’s databases, the nature and magnitude of these errors was unlikely to significantly alter the subsidy rate. SBA Had a Process to Identify and Correct Data Errors
The primary method that SBA used to help ensure the integrity of its loan data is its Form 1502 reconciliation process. However, from an audit perspective, SBA’s lack of adequate documentation of the model development process precluded us from (1) independently evaluating the model’s development; (2) determining whether SBA used a sound and consistently applied method to select and reject variables to be included in the model; and (3) determining whether a bias in selecting variables existed in the model. Without adequate documentation, SBA will be unable to transparently demonstrate the rationale and basis for key aspects of models that provide important cost information for budgets, financial statements, and congressional decision makers. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with your staff, we (1) assessed the reasonableness of the model’s econometric equations and evaluated the model’s estimated default, prepayment, and recovery rates based on the 7(a) program’s recent historical loan experience; (2) identified additional steps the SBA could take to further enhance the reliability of its subsidy estimate produced by the model; (3) reviewed SBA’s process for developing the subsidy model; (4) evaluated the model’s supporting documentation, including its discussion of what variables were tested and rejected; and (5) determined what steps SBA has taken to ensure the integrity of the data used in the model and determined whether these data are consistent with information in its databases. Assessing the Reasonableness of the Model’s Econometric Equations and Evaluating the Model’s Estimated Default, Prepayment, and Recovery Rates
To analyze the model, we obtained from SBA copies of the model as approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), along with the loan-level data that were used to develop the subsidy estimates. 8. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration (SBA) approved about $8.6 billion in loan guarantees through its 7(a) loan program in fiscal year 2003. SBA must estimate the subsidy cost of this program. Since fiscal year 2003, SBA has been using econometric modeling to estimate the subsidy. This report reviews SBA's estimation methodology and equations, assesses the default and recovery rates the model produced, identifies ways to enhance the estimates' reliability, describes the process for developing the model, and analyzes SBA's data.
What GAO Found
From an economics perspective, SBA's econometric equations were reasonable, and its model produced estimated default and recovery rates that were in line with historical experience. However, from an audit perspective, SBA's lack of documentation of the model development process precluded GAO, and others, from independently evaluating the model's development and determining if SBA used a sound and consistently applied method to select and reject model variables. Taking into account economic reasoning and research, SBA's econometric equations for estimating defaults, prepayments, and recoveries were reasonable. SBA's equations used a limited set of variables; equations using other variables could also be reasonable but would produce different estimates. Since an estimate is an approximation, no one estimate can be considered accurate, and reasonable estimates can fall within a range of values. The model's estimated default and recovery rates were in line with recent historical experience. SBA could improve its estimation methodology by periodically checking for and correcting errors and should consider adding more borrower information, such as credit scores. Some errors in the model resulted in understating the estimated program costs. SBA used the expertise of other agencies and a contractor to develop its model and worked closely with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which must approve the methodology agencies use to estimate subsidies. OMB officially approved the model in the fall of 2002. SBA did not adequately document its model development process, including alternative variables considered and rejected, to enable external reviewers to assess the process that was used. Further, GAO and two other independent reviewers could not determine whether a bias existed in the model by systematically excluding variables to influence the subsidy rate in a particular direction. Adequate documentation, a key internal control, would enable SBA and other agencies to demonstrate the rationale and basis for key aspects of the model that provide important cost information for budgets, financial statements, and congressional decision makers and facilitate SBA's annual financial statement audit. Current OMB and other guidance is either silent or unclear about the level of documentation necessary for credit subsidy model development. SBA had a process to help ensure data integrity and data consistency in the equations with the loan-level data in its databases. Although errors existed in SBA's data systems, the magnitude and nature of these errors were not likely to significantly affect the subsidy rate. |
gao_GAO-11-849 | gao_GAO-11-849_0 | More recently, manufacturers have extended the use of composites to airframe structures, such as the fuselage and wings. Boeing’s 787 will be the first mostly composite large transport airplane in commercial service. The 787 is the first large commercial transport category airplane to use composite materials for much of its fuselage and wings. As part of the type certification process, FAA evaluates the airplane’s design for novel features and the applicability of airworthiness standards to ensure that the novel airplane features comply with applicable performance standards or safety levels. FAA Followed Its Special Conditions Process in Requiring That Boeing Demonstrate That the 787’s Composite Structures Meet Existing Safety Levels
FAA Established Special Conditions for Boeing to Demonstrate That the 787’s Composite Airframe Meets Existing Safety Levels
FAA applied 5 special conditions where it determined the applicable airworthiness regulations did not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for design features related to the 787’s composite fuselage and wings. FAA Followed Its Processes for Developing and Monitoring Special Conditions
On the basis of our review of FAA’s documentation and discussions with FAA officials about its activities in developing the five special conditions, we found that FAA followed the special conditions process. In August 2011, FAA issued the type certificate for the Boeing 787. In some cases, FAA and Boeing negotiated certain aspects of the compliance approach. Some comments were technical corrections. We also found that FAA documented its determination to grant Boeing an equivalent level of safety finding, providing a description of the technical issues and Boeing’s plan to demonstrate the composite fuselage would meet the current level of safety in a manner similar to how it documented the special conditions determination, although it did not obtain public comments, which are not required for an equivalent level of safety finding. EASA Also Assessed the Use of Composite Materials in the Boeing 787
EASA’s Process Is Similar to FAA’s Special Conditions Process
EASA uses a validation process (a form of certification) to issue a type certificate indicating that U.S.-manufactured airplanes meet European airworthiness standards. The extent to which EASA relied on FAA to oversee and determine Boeing’s compliance with EASA’s composite-related review items varied. FAA and Industry Actions May Address Key Safety-Related Concerns, but It Is Too Early to Assess the Adequacy of These Actions
Key Safety-Related Concerns Identified in Areas Related to Composite Airframe Repair and Maintenance
Through a review of relevant literature and interviews with experts, we identified and categorized key safety-related concerns into four areas, namely (1) limited information on the behavior of composite airframe structures, (2) technical concerns related to the unique properties of composite materials, (3) limited standardization of composite materials and repair techniques, and (4) level of training and awareness on composite materials. None of the experts that we spoke with felt that the concerns they identified posed extraordinary safety risks or were insurmountable. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) and the European Aviation Safety Agency’s (EASA) certification of airplanes using composite materials, specifically the agencies’ processes for developing special requirements to ensure that Boeing demonstrates the 787 composite fuselage and wings meet current safety levels, and FAA’s actions to address safety-related concerns associated with repairing and maintaining composite airplanes identified by literature and stakeholders. We focused on FAA’s and EASA’s actions as they relate to the certification of the Boeing 787 because it is the first large transport category airplane for commercial use with a composite airframe structure to undergo the certification process. Identification of Repair and Maintenance Concerns
To identify the key safety concerns associated with the repair and maintenance of composite airframe structures in transport airplanes, we interviewed 11 aviation experts and conducted a literature search and reviewed 39 documents and FAA technical reports related to the repair and maintenance of composite airframe structures in transport category airplanes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Composite materials, made by combining materials such as carbon fibers with epoxy, have been used in airplane components for decades. Although composites are lighter and stronger than most metals, their increasing use in commercial airplane structures such as the fuselage and wings has raised safety concerns. Boeing's 787 is the first mostly composite large commercial transport airplane to undergo the certification process. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) certify new airplane designs and evaluate the airworthiness of novel features--like composite structures--against existing safety standards, which are often based on the performance of metallic airplanes. In August 2011, FAA and EASA certified the 787, which is expected to enter commercial service in the fall of 2011. GAO was asked to review FAA's and EASA's certification processes and FAA's oversight of the composite airplanes once they enter service. GAO examined how FAA and EASA assessed the use of composite materials in the Boeing 787 fuselage and wings, and the extent to which FAA has addressed safety-related concerns associated with the repair and maintenance of composite airplanes. GAO reviewed certification documentation, conducted a literature search, discussed repair and maintenance issues with experts, and interviewed FAA and EASA officials and Boeing representatives. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. FAA, EASA, Boeing, and others provided technical comments, which
What GAO Found
GAO found that FAA followed its certification process in assessing the Boeing 787 airplane's composite fuselage and wings against applicable FAA airworthiness standards. FAA applied five special conditions when it found that its airworthiness standards were not adequate to ensure that the composite structures would comply with existing safety levels. These special conditions require Boeing to take additional steps to demonstrate the 787's structures meet current performance standards. FAA also granted Boeing an equivalent level of safety finding when the manufacturer determined it could meet the standard but prove it differently from the method specified in that standard. On the basis of a review of FAA's special condition requirements, Boeing submissions, and discussions with FAA and Boeing officials, GAO found that FAA followed its process by documenting the technical issues related to the design of the composite fuselage and wings, determining the special conditions and equivalent level of safety finding, obtaining public comments on draft special conditions, and monitoring Boeing's compliance with those conditions. EASA also assessed the use of composite materials in the Boeing 787 and relied on FAA to oversee Boeing's compliance in some cases. EASA's process for determining whether its existing airworthiness standards were adequate to ensure the 787's composite fuselage and wings met current levels of safety was similar to FAA's special conditions process and resulted in some additional review items, partly because of differences in their respective standards. On the basis of expert interviews and a review of literature, GAO identified four key safety-related concerns with the repair and maintenance of composites in commercial airplanes--(1) limited information on the behavior of airplane composite structures, (2) technical issues related to the unique properties of composite materials, (3) standardization of repair materials and techniques, and (4) training and awareness. None of the experts believed these concerns posed extraordinary safety risks or were insurmountable. FAA is taking action to help address these concerns identified by GAO related to the repair and maintenance of composite airplane structures. However, until these composite airplanes enter service, it is unclear if these actions will be sufficient. |
gao_GAO-11-94 | gao_GAO-11-94_0 | A variety of factors can affect the demand for public transit services, including: Population and demographics. Federal, state, and local investment in transit has grown over the year resulting in the expansion of the nation’s public transit systems. Transit agencies also rely on a variety of other funding sources to help provide service, including assistance from state and local entities, and other sources such as passenger fares. By mode, light rail ridership grew at a faster rate than heavy rail or bus. For example, heavy rail experienced the greatest discrepancy in ridership and supply of services from 1998 through 2008 compared with light rail or bus. According to officials at the transit agencies we contacted, agencies experienced varying degrees of success in responding to ridership growth from 1998 through 2008. Transit Agencies’ Costs and Revenues Increased from 1998 through 2008, and the Share of Funding Sources Changed
While providing additional service, transit agency costs, including operating and capital expenses, increased from 1998 through 2008, as did transit agency revenues. However, while revenues increased overall, the share of funding sources changed; the share of federal funding remained steady while increases in state and local funding shares essentially offset declines in the share of funding from other sources, such as passenger fares. Agencies Faced Challenges and Responded by Adjusting Service, Making New System Investments, and Maintaining Their Existing Systems
Agencies Faced Capacity Constraints and Other Challenges Related to Their Vehicles and Infrastructure
From 1998 through 2008, transit agencies faced challenges when addressing increased ridership demand. More specifically, agencies faced capacity constraints related to limitations of their vehicles (e.g., too few rail cars and buses) and system infrastructure (e.g., platforms that were too short to accommodate longer trains). For example, transit officials at the MTA in New York City, New York, said the agency improved the heavy rail system’s signaling systems in order to sustain current levels of service and also enable the agency to increase frequency of service. Representatives of a local community group and intergovernmental agency added that the agency turned away riders during periods of high demand and service on many routes was too infrequent. Agencies’ Increased Costs and Fiscal Uncertainties May Limit Their Ability to Meet Future Increases in Ridership Demand
Transit agency officials expressed concern about their agencies’ abilities to meet future increases in ridership demand for two principal reasons: increased costs and various fiscal uncertainties. As previously discussed, from 1998 through 2008, while overall transit revenues (including operating and capital funding) increased, increases in the share of state and local government funding offset decreases in the share of other nonfederal funding sources, such as passenger fares. In addition, while in 1998 the federal government was the largest source of capital investment in transit, by 2008 this was no longer the case. Options Exist to More Effectively Deliver Federal Surface Transportation Programs and Help Transit Agencies Meet Increased Ridership Demand
We and others have reported on ways to more effectively deliver federal surface transportation programs that could help transit agencies address growing ridership demand amid fiscal uncertainties. Therefore, the challenge is to focus the resources that are available to effectively maximize the impact on transit agencies’ services. We and others have made recommendations to Congress and others about how to restructure federal programs to better assist transit agencies and the federal government in focusing scarce resources and addressing future ridership demand, including: focusing resources on maintaining the nation’s rail and bus systems in a state of good repair; streamlining the delivery of federal grant programs and projects; and incorporating performance accountability into federal programs. In commenting on the draft, DOT generally agreed with the information presented and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To address how transit agencies are responding to increased passenger demand, we reviewed (1) trends in transit ridership and services from 1998 through 2008; (2) challenges, if any, that transit agencies faced during this period to address increased ridership and actions they took in response; and (3) factors that might affect future ridership demand and the ability of transit agencies to meet that demand. | Why GAO Did This Study
Demand for public transportation in the United States reached record highs in 2008 and rose in the decade prior to 2008. Increased demand for public transportation can create opportunities and challenges for communities working to meet demand, improve service, and maintain transit systems, while operating within budgetary constraints. Transit agencies rely on a variety of funding sources, including federal, state, and local entities, and other sources, such as fares. The U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit Administration administers federal grant programs transit agencies can use to help meet ridership demand, such as for purchasing buses and modernizing rail systems. As requested, this report addresses (1) trends in transit ridership and services from 1998 through 2008, (2) challenges, if any, transit agencies faced during this period to address increased ridership and actions they took in response, and (3) factors that might affect future ridership demand and the ability of transit agencies to meet that demand. GAO analyzed data from the National Transit Database on transit ridership (i.e., passenger miles traveled), service (i.e., vehicle revenue miles), costs, and revenues; conducted interviews with 15 transit agencies operating heavy rail, light rail, and bus; interviewed federal officials and others; and reviewed prior GAO recommendations. DOT generally agreed with the report and provided technical comments.
What GAO Found
From 1998 through 2008, the most recent year for which complete data are available, transit ridership grew at a faster rate than transit service. Heavy rail experienced the greatest difference between growth in ridership and service compared with light rail or bus--heavy rail ridership outpaced the provision of service by about 18 percentage points during this period. Transit agency costs and revenues also increased overall from 1998 through 2008, but the relative shares of revenue sources changed. The share of federal funding remained steady while increases in state and local funding shares offset declines in the share of funding from other sources, such as passenger fares. In addition, in 1998 the federal government was the largest source of capital investment in transit; by 2008 local government provided the largest share. From 1998 through 2008, transit agencies faced challenges and took actions to address increased ridership demand. Specifically, agencies faced capacity constraints, including limitations of their vehicles (e.g., too few rail cars and buses) and their system infrastructure (e.g., platforms that were too short to accommodate longer trains). Transit agencies took steps to respond to increased demand, including: adjusting their service by modifying routes, fares, and hours of service; making new system investments, such as expanding fleets and extending platforms; and maintaining and updating existing infrastructure and vehicles. For example, New York City transit officials improved the signaling in their heavy rail system to increase frequency of service. Agencies experienced varying degrees of success in responding to increases in demand--some reported accommodating increases in ridership while others' success was limited. For example, a light rail agency reported that its service area did not keep pace with real estate development, and a bus agency turned away riders. Population growth and other factors are likely to increase future ridership demand, but cost increases and fiscal uncertainties could limit transit agencies' ability to meet this demand. Transit agency officials expressed concern about meeting future increases in ridership due to increased costs of expanding transit systems and maintaining aging infrastructure. Also, transit agencies' funding has been strained since 2008, as state and local funding has decreased with the economic downturn. This is significant because transit agencies previously relied on increases in state and local funding shares to offset decreases in other sources. Given this environment, along with fiscal difficulties facing the nation, it will be a challenge to effectively focus limited resources to maximize the positive effect on transit agencies' services. GAO and others have made recommendations to DOT, Congress, and others on options that could more effectively deliver federal surface transportation programs and help transit agencies address growing ridership. These options are under consideration and include: focusing resources on state of good repair, streamlining the delivery of federal grant programs, and incorporating performance accountability measures to maximize the impact of investments. |
gao_GAO-17-436 | gao_GAO-17-436_0 | FDIC Continues to Implement Controls, but Collective Weaknesses Require Management Attention
For calendar years 2016 and 2015, FDIC implemented numerous information security controls intended to protect its key financial systems. As we have previously reported, the collective effect of weaknesses in access and configuration management controls, both new and unresolved from previous audits, contributed to our determination that FDIC had a significant deficiency in internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2016. FDIC did not implement sufficient internal boundary protection controls on its network to isolate financial systems from other parts of its network. FDIC did not implement sufficient controls to ensure that users would be held accountable for the use of a key privileged account. For example, although the corporation used multiple tools to track and validate its IT assets, it had not established a single, authoritative, accurate listing of all IT assets in its environment. Agency programs are to include, among other things, the following elements: periodic assessments of risk, including the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the organization; plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; policies and procedures that are based on risk assessments, cost- effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each organizational information system; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, practices, and security controls to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the organization; and procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. For example, it had defined security categories for the general support systems we reviewed based on risk using NIST guidance, assessed the risk from control deficiencies identified during security control tests, and ensured that the general support systems we reviewed were authorized to operate; and conducted a disaster recovery test of its general support systems and mission-critical applications. However, FDIC had not fully or consistently implemented aspects of its information security program, which was an underlying reason for many of the information security weaknesses identified during our review. Specifically, FDIC had not included all necessary information in procedures for granting access to a key financial application; fully addressed the FDIC OIG’s finding that security control assessments of outsourced service providers had not been completed in a timely manner; fully addressed key previously identified weaknesses related to establishing agencywide configuration baselines and monitoring changes to critical server files; and completed actions to address the FDIC OIG’s finding that the corporation had not ensured that major security incidents are identified and reported in a timely manner. In addition, as of December 31, 2016, FDIC had addressed 15 of the 21 previously reported information system weaknesses that were unresolved at the end of our prior audit. However, management attention is needed to address new and previously identified deficiencies in access controls— including boundary protection, identification and authentication, authorization, cryptography, and audit and monitoring controls—and in configuration management controls. In a separate report with limited distribution, we are also making six recommendations to resolve shortcomings in FDIC’s internal control over financial reporting and help strengthen access and configuration management controls over key financial information, systems, and networks. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report (reprinted in appendix II), FDIC concurred with our recommendation to improve its implementation of its information security program and stated that corrective actions will be completed by July 2017. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this information security review was to determine the effectiveness of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. The review was conducted as part of our audit of the financial statements of the two funds administered by FDIC: the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund. | Why GAO Did This Study
FDIC has a demanding responsibility enforcing banking laws, regulating financial institutions, and protecting depositors. Because of FDIC's reliance on information systems, effective information security controls are essential to ensure that the corporation's systems and information are adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper modification, unauthorized disclosure, or destruction.
As part of its audit of the 2016 and 2015 financial statements of the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund, which are administered by FDIC, GAO assessed the effectiveness of the corporation's controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. To do so, GAO examined security policies, procedures, reports, and other documents; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed FDIC personnel.
What GAO Found
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) implemented numerous information security controls intended to protect its key financial systems. However, further actions are needed to address weaknesses in access controls—including boundary protection, identification and authentication, and authorization controls—and in configuration management controls. For example, the corporation did not sufficiently isolate financial systems from other parts of its network, ensure that users would be held accountable for the use of a key privileged account, or establish a single, accurate listing of all IT assets in its environment.
The corporation established a comprehensive framework for its information security program and implemented many aspects of its program. For example, FDIC (1) defined security categories for the general support systems we reviewed based on risk; (2) assessed the risk from control deficiencies identified during security control tests; and (3) conducted a disaster recovery test of its general support systems and mission-critical applications. In addition, FDIC addressed 15 of the 21 previously reported weaknesses that were unresolved as of December 31, 2015, as indicated in the following table.
However, an underlying reason for many of the information security weaknesses identified during GAO's review was that FDIC did not fully implement other aspects of its program. For example, the corporation did not (1) include necessary information in procedures for granting access to a key financial application and (2) fully address the FDIC Office of the Inspector General's finding that the corporation did not always identify and report major security incidents in a timely manner.
Until FDIC takes the necessary steps to address both new and previously reported control deficiencies, its sensitive financial information and resources will remain at increased risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper modification, unauthorized disclosure, or destruction. The combination of the continuing and new information security control deficiencies in access and configuration management controls, considered collectively, represent a significant deficiency in FDIC's internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2016.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that FDIC take one action to more fully implement its information security program. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO made six recommendations to FDIC to address newly identified weaknesses in access and configuration management controls. In commenting on a draft of this report, FDIC agreed with GAO’s recommendation and stated that corrective actions to implement the recommendation will be completed by July 2017. |
gao_GAO-02-499T | gao_GAO-02-499T_0 | Over the past decade, federal agencies have substantially increased their purchases of services, particularly for information technology and professional, administrative, and management support. In fiscal year 2001 alone, the federal government acquired about $109 billion in services. This money, however, is not always well-spent. In view of these problems, we examined how leading companies changed their approach to acquiring services. They were spending a substantial amount of money on services—ranging from routine maintenance, to advertising, to information management—but did not have a good grasp of how much was being spent and where these dollars were going. The companies we studied were able to turn this situation around by adopting a more strategic perspective to service spending; that is, each company focused more on what was good for the company as a whole rather than just individual business units, and each began making decisions based on enhanced knowledge about service spending. Specifically, the companies we visited analyzed their spending on services to answer basic questions about how much was being spent and where the dollars were going. In doing so, they realized that they were buying similar services from numerous providers, often at greatly varying prices. The companies used this data to rationalize their supplier base, or in other words, to determine the right number of suppliers that met their needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Service Acquisition Reform Act of 2002 seeks to strengthen the acquisition workforce by moving toward a performance-based contracting environment and improving service acquisitions management. During the past decade, federal agencies have substantially increased their purchases of services, particularly for information technology and professional, administrative, and management support. In fiscal year 2001 alone, the federal government acquired $109 billion in services. This money, however, is not always well-spent. GAO continues to find that defense and civilian acquisitions are poorly planned, not adequately completed, and poorly managed. Some leading companies have changed their approach to acquiring services after finding themselves spending a lot of money on services without knowing how much was being spent and where these dollars were going.
What GAO Found
GAO found that these companies were able to turn this situation around by adopting a more strategic perspective to service spending. Each company focused more on what was good for the company as a whole rather than just individual business units, and each began making decisions using enhanced knowledge about service spending. The companies analyzed their spending services to answer basic questions about how much was being spent and where the money was going. In doing so, they realized that they were buying similar services from many providers, often at different prices. The companies used this data to determine the right number of suppliers that met their needs. |
gao_GGD-96-20 | gao_GGD-96-20_0 | Our study was not designed to permit us to approximate the number of positions that appeared to be overgraded, undergraded, or aptly graded for the portion of the federal workforce to which the results of our study are generalizable; identify the causes of any overgrading or undergrading resulting from either (1) our use of the primary rather than the occupation-specific classification standards, (2) the agencies’ application of classification standards to individual positions, or (3) management decisions regarding the work incumbents were actually assigned versus their job descriptions; determine whether any difference on the basis of gender or minority status was inherent in the design of FES, as a product either of the factors that constitute FES or the allocation of weight or the point range assigned to each factor; or calculate what pay adjustments, if any, should be made. This study should not be referred to as a “pay equity” study because we examined only the relationship between job content and GS grades assigned through the use of FES and whether that relationship varied with the proportion of women or minorities in occupations. Furthermore, private sector wages may have resulted in overgrading positions in computer-related occupations. Explanations are somewhat less evident regarding occupations with high female representation, which appear more likely to be undergraded. OPM has also established a new oversight office, which, among other things, is planning various governmentwide policy studies. The odds ratios shown in table II.5 indicate pronounced differences in overgrading and undergrading between occupations with high minority representation and those with medium representation but only slight differences between those occupations with medium representation and those with low representation. D = Difference between actual GS grade and questionnaire grade (overgraded, aptly, or undergraded). F = Female representation (high, medium, or low). Also, the likelihood of a position being overgraded, rather than aptly graded increased as the incumbents’ GS grades increased. Independent of that, occupations with high minority representation were 2.18 times more likely to be overgraded than occupations with low or medium minority representation. Minorities, Gender, and Work. Development of a Framework for a Factor-ranking Benchmark System for Job Evaluation. Women and the Workplace. 7-97. U.S. Office of Personnel Management. 8-10. 4-9. The Factor Evaluation System of Position Classification Introduction. 6-13. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the relationship between job content and General Schedule (GS) grades assigned using the Factor Evaluation System (FES), focusing on whether the relationship varied on the basis of the proportion of women and minorities in various occupations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the difference between actual GS grades and the grades based on job content under FES was directly related to female and minority representation in nonsupervisory positions reviewed; (2) the likelihood of a position being overgraded increased as the incumbents' GS grades increased, but there was no correlation between undergrading and GS grades; (3) occupations with high female representation were more likely to be undergraded than those occupations with medium or low female representation; (4) occupations with high minority representation were more likely to be overgraded than those occupations with medium or low minority representation; (5) classification experts believed that FES did not place sufficient value on the physical demands and working conditions of certain specialist occupations with high minority representation, which caused them to be overgraded on a strict FES basis; (6) private sector wage levels may have resulted in overgraded positions in computer-related occupations; (7) the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) needs to monitor its development of a new federal job classification system to ensure that disparities are identified and addressed; and (8) OPM has established a new oversight office which will conduct a governmentwide classification study. |
gao_GAO-08-680 | gao_GAO-08-680_0 | Both of these goals apply not only globally but also at the country and regional levels. Food Insecurity Persists in Sub- Saharan Africa Due to Several Factors, Including Low Agricultural Productivity
Low agricultural productivity, limited rural development, government policy disincentives, and poor health are among the main factors contributing to persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. Additional factors, including rising global commodity prices and climate change, will likely further exacerbate food insecurity in the region (see fig. Overall, the gap between the average grain yield in sub-Saharan Africa compared with the rest of the world’s developing countries has widened over the years. Low agricultural productivity growth in sub-Saharan Africa is partially due to inadequate investment and the limited use of modern inputs and farming practice. Efforts of Host Governments and Donors, Including the United States, Toward Halving Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 Have Been Insufficient
Despite their commitment to halve hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015, efforts of host governments and donors, including the United States, to accelerate progress toward that goal have been insufficient. First, host governments have not prioritized food security as a development goal, and few have met their 2003 pledge to direct 10 percent of government spending to agriculture. Second, donors reduced the priority given to agriculture, and their efforts have been hampered by difficulties in coordination and deficiencies in estimates of undernourishment used to measure progress toward attaining the goals to halve hunger by 2015. Third, limited agricultural development resources, increased demand for emergency food aid, and a fragmented approach impair U.S. efforts to end hunger in sub-Saharan Africa. While emergency food aid has been crucial in helping to alleviate the growing number of food crises, it does not address the underlying factors that contributed to the recurrence and severity of these crises. Despite purporting to be a governmentwide presidential strategy, IEHA is limited to only some of USAID’s agricultural development activities and does not integrate with other agencies in terms of plans, programs, resources, and activities to address food insecurity in Africa. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance efforts to address global food insecurity and accelerate progress toward halving world hunger by 2015, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID take the following two actions: work in collaboration with the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, and the Treasury to develop an integrated governmentwide U.S. strategy that defines each agency’s actions and resource commitments toward achieving food security in sub-Saharan Africa, including improving collaboration with host governments and other donors and developing improved measures to monitor and evaluate progress toward the implementation of this strategy, and prepare and submit, as part of the annual U.S. International Food Assistance Report, an annual report to Congress on progress toward the implementation of the first recommendation. To examine factors that have contributed to continued food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa, we relied on the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) estimates on the number of undernourished people, and the prevalence of undernourishment, which is one of two progress indicators in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) target of halving hunger, to illustrate the lack of progress in reducing hunger in sub-Saharan Africa as compared with other parts of the developing world. The Impact of Climate Change on African Agriculture: A Ricardian Approach. Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
Following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. Agency for International Development letter dated May 16, 2008. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1996, the United States and more than 180 world leaders pledged to halve the number of undernourished people globally by 2015 from the 1990 level. The global number has not decreased significantly--remaining at about 850 million in 2001-2003--and the number in sub-Saharan Africa has increased from about 170 million in 1990-1992 to over 200 million in 2001-2003. On the basis of analyses of U.S. and international agency documents, structured panel discussions with experts and practitioners, and fieldwork in four African countries, GAO was asked to examine (1) factors that contribute to persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and (2) the extent to which host governments and donors, including the United States, are working toward halving hunger in the region by 2015.
What GAO Found
Chronic undernourishment (food insecurity) in sub-Saharan Africa persists primarily due to low agricultural productivity, limited rural development, government policy disincentives, and the impact of poor health on the agricultural workforce. Additional factors, including rising global commodity prices and climate change, will likely further exacerbate food insecurity in the region. Agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa, as measured by grain yield, is only about 40 percent of that of the rest of the world's developing countries, and the gap has widened over the years. Low agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa is due, in part, to the limited use of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer and improved seed varieties, and the lack of modern farming practices. The efforts of host governments and donors, including the United States, to achieve the goal of halving hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 have thus far been insufficient. First, some host governments have not prioritized food security as a development goal, and, according to a 2008 report of the International Food Policy Research Institute, as of 2005, only a few countries had fulfilled a 2003 pledge to direct 10 percent of government spending to agriculture. Second, donors have reduced the priority given to agriculture, and their efforts have been further hampered by difficulties in coordination and deficiencies in measuring and monitoring progress. Third, limited agricultural development resources and a fragmented approach have impaired U.S. efforts to reduce hunger in Africa. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding to address food insecurity in Africa has been primarily for emergency food aid, which has been crucial in helping to alleviate food crises but has not addressed the underlying factors that contributed to the recurrence and severity of these crises. Also, the United States' principal strategy for meeting its commitment to halve hunger in Africa is limited to some of USAID's agricultural development activities and does not integrate other U.S. agencies' agricultural development assistance to the region. |
gao_GAO-17-738 | gao_GAO-17-738_0 | See figure 1 for the contract closeout process. Effective Management of Contract Closeout Varied Across the Selected Agencies
Selected Agencies and Components Had Varying Levels of Contract Closeout Data and Some Established Related Goals and Performance Measures
The five agencies and selected components we reviewed varied widely in ensuring that contracts were closed within the time frames prescribed by federal acquisition regulations. DHS also had information on the number of contracts eligible or overdue for closeout and had initiatives underway to reduce the number of low-risk, firm-fixed-priced contracts but did not have initiatives for higher risk contracts, including those involving flexibly-priced contracts. Our review found that DHS management made a commitment to address contract closeout challenges, gained insight into the extent of its contract closeout backlog, and has initiatives underway to address at least a portion of its contract closeout backlog. Having such information could help the agency in its oversight of contract closeout by identifying and addressing the causes as to why contracts remain open. State acquisition officials stated that they are working to improve their ability to track when newly awarded contracts become eligible for closeout. These areas include: (1) assessing actions for reducing the amount of time it takes for DCAA to begin an incurred cost audit and establishing related performance measures to assess its progress and (2) evaluating the use of multi-year auditing and establishing related performance measures. DCAA did not, however, meet its original goal of having a 2-year inventory of audit proposals—eliminating its backlog of proposals older than 2 years—by fiscal year 2016 and acknowledged that meeting its revised goal to do so by the end fiscal year 2018 will be challenging. DCAA has reduced its inventory primarily through the use of a risk-based approach to conducting audits. DCAA Has Not Developed Certain Performance Measures for Its Incurred Cost Proposals
While DCAA has made progress in reducing its inventory of incurred cost proposals awaiting audit, our work identified two areas in which DCAA may be missing opportunities or lacking information to help identify additional ways to reduce its inventory. DCAA’s data for fiscal year 2016 indicate that once a contractor submits an adequate incurred cost proposal, it took DCAA on average 885 days— or nearly 2 and a half years—before DCAA completed the incurred cost proposal audit. Having centralized information on the number and type of contracts that need to be closed out and where the contracts are in the closeout process could help management address the causes as to why contracts remain open in order to reduce the contract closeout backlog. In this regard, DCAA has not assessed options and has not established performance measures for reducing the length of time to begin audit work on incurred cost proposals; the primary reason for the delay is due to the availability of DCAA staff to begin the audit work. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance management attention to closing out contracts, we are making the following seven recommendations, one to each of the five agencies in our review and two to DCAA to manage its incurred cost inventory. Additionally, DOD concurred with our recommendations that the Director, DCAA, assess and implement options for reducing the length of time to begin incurred cost audit work and to comprehensively assess the use and effect of multi-year audits. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
Appendix IV: Defense Contract Audit Agency’s (DCAA) Average Inventory Calculation
Congress enacted a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 which prohibited the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) from conducting audits for non-defense agencies unless the Secretary of Defense certified that DCAA’s backlog of incurred cost audits was less than 18 months of incurred cost inventory. | Why GAO Did This Study
Closing contracts is a key step in the contracting process. GAO and others have previously reported that large numbers of contracts were not closed within time frames set by federal regulations, which can expose the government to financial risk. DCAA's backlog of audits of contractors' incurred cost proposals contribute to the delays in closing out flexibly-priced contracts.
GAO was asked to review the extent of the contract closeout backlog at federal agencies. In addition, a House Armed Services Committee report included a provision for GAO to assess DCAA's incurred cost audit backlog. This report addresses the extent to which (1) selected federal agencies effectively manage contract closeout, and (2) DCAA effectively manages its incurred cost audit backlog.
GAO selected five agencies based on the number of contracts awarded and dollars obligated in fiscal year 2015. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed acquisition officials to assess how contract closeout is managed. GAO also analyzed data on DCAA's incurred cost audit backlog.
What GAO Found
The effectiveness of management efforts to reduce the number of contracts overdue for closeout varied across five agencies GAO reviewed—the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, and State. None of the agencies had critical elements agency-wide that would help track and oversee contract closeout processes—the number and type of contracts to be closed, where the contracts were in the process, and goals and performance measures. Having such information could help management address the causes as to why contracts remain open and reduce the contract closeout backlog.
Since 2011 the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) has reduced its inventory of contractors' incurred cost proposals awaiting audit by about half to 14,208, and DCAA has significantly reduced its backlog of older proposals—those for 2013 and prior—as of September 2016. To do so, DCAA used a risk-based approach to reduce the number of audits and began conducting multi-year audits, in which two or more incurred cost proposals are closed under a single audit. Nevertheless, DCAA did not meet its initial goal of eliminating its backlog by fiscal year 2016, and DCAA officials stated that they are unlikely to meet its revised goal by the end of fiscal year 2018. Further, GAO found that in fiscal year 2016, DCAA averaged 885 days from when a contractor submitted an adequate incurred cost proposal to when the audit was completed. The lag was due to limited availability of DCAA staff to begin audit work, as it took DCAA an average of 138 days to complete the actual audit work (see figure).
DCAA may be missing opportunities to help identify additional ways to reduce its inventory. For example, DCAA has not assessed options to reduce time to initiate audit work or comprehensively assessed how the use of multi-year audits could be improved and has not established related performance measures for both.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making seven recommendations, including to each of the five agencies to develop means to track critical elements on contract closeout efforts and to DCAA to assess its efforts to reduce its backlog and establish related performance measures. Four agencies concurred, and DHS identified planned actions that could address the intent of the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-14-231 | gao_GAO-14-231_0 | Key drivers NNSA identified for the cost increase for the MOX facility included the following:
DOE’s approval of the cost and schedule before design was complete. NNSA’s budget request for fiscal year 2014 stated that the cost of critical system components for the MOX facility averaged 60 percent higher than estimated as a result of approval of these estimates before design was complete. NNSA Has Not Analyzed Root Causes of the Cost Increases for the Plutonium Disposition Program’s Construction Projects
NNSA has not analyzed the underlying, or root, causes of the close to $3 billion in construction cost increases for the MOX facility and WSB. DOE’s project management order requires that lessons learned be captured throughout a project to allow for the exchange of information within DOE in the context of project management and to benefit future endeavors. Without a root cause analysis, it is uncertain whether NNSA will be able to accurately identify underlying causes of the cost increases for the MOX facility and WSB in order to identify and implement corrective measures and identify lessons learned to share with and apply to other DOE construction projects. NNSA Has Taken Steps to Hold Contractors Accountable for Cost Increases by Withholding Fees
After determining that the performance of the contractors for the MOX facility and WSB contributed to the projects’ construction cost increases, NNSA took steps to hold the contractors accountable for their performance by withholding fees specified under the contracts. In total, NNSA withheld $45.1 million or close to one-third of all fees the contractor could earn as of November 2013. Milestone fees. Specifically, (1) NNSA’s draft April 2013 life-cycle cost estimate for the overall program was partially comprehensive, partially well-documented, and partially accurate but did not meet any of the best practices for a credible estimate; (2) the MOX contractor’s September 2012 proposal for increasing the cost of the MOX facility was substantially comprehensive but partially well-documented and accurate and minimally credible; and (3) the WSB contractor’s February 2013 monthly update to its schedule estimate was minimally well-constructed and partially met the other three characteristics of a reliable schedule—comprehensive, credible, and controlled. The draft life-cycle cost estimate was not credible because NNSA did not conduct an independent cost estimate to provide an unbiased test of whether its estimate was reasonable, a formal sensitivity analysis to examine the effects of changing assumptions and ground rules, or a risk and uncertainty analysis to assess variability in point estimates due to factors such as errors and cost estimators’ inexperience or biases. Contractor’s Schedule Estimate for the WSB Did Not Meet Most Best Practices for Reliability
The WSB contractor’s February 2013 monthly update to its schedule estimate did not fully reflect the characteristics of a high-quality, reliable schedule estimate as established by best practices. Well-constructed. Conducting a root cause analysis of the cost increases for the MOX facility and WSB could help NNSA address its long-standing difficulties in completing projects within cost and on schedule, which has led to NNSA’s project management remaining on GAO’s list of areas at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. NNSA has drafted a life-cycle cost estimate of $24.2 billion for the Plutonium Disposition program—an important step toward presenting the full cost of NNSA’s current strategy to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium as MOX fuel. To identify lessons learned from and provide assurance of preventing recurrence of cost increases for the MOX facility and WSB, and to develop reliable cost estimates for the Plutonium Disposition program, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the DOE and NNSA Offices of Acquisition and Project Management and the NNSA office responsible for managing the Plutonium Disposition program, as appropriate, to take the following four actions:
Conduct an analysis of the root causes of the cost increases for the MOX facility and WSB, such as the causes of the design changes that led to cost increases, and identify and prioritize recommended solutions. However, as we stated in the report, DOE’s project management order does not include a requirement for a root cause analysis of projects experiencing significant cost increases or schedule delays, and NNSA officials said that they decide on a case-by-case basis whether to conduct a root cause analysis. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess drivers of the construction cost increases for the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and Waste Solidification Building (WSB) that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) identified, we reviewed the Department of Energy’s (DOE) budget request for NNSA for fiscal year 2014, which provided a summary of the cost drivers for both projects. To assess the extent to which NNSA’s most recent estimates of the Plutonium Disposition program’s life-cycle cost and of the cost and schedule for completing the program’s construction projects met best practices we have compiled in guides identifying the characteristics of high-quality, reliable cost and schedule estimates, we tailored our methodology to the differing stages of NNSA’s development and approval of each estimate:
NNSA’s life-cycle cost estimate for the Plutonium Disposition program. The schedule estimate sequenced activities in ways that decreased the probability of activities starting on time and contained activities that were not properly tied with the start or end date of other activities, potentially obscuring the critical path determining the project’s earliest completion date. | Why GAO Did This Study
NNSA, a separately organized agency within DOE, manages the Plutonium Disposition program to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium by burning it as MOX fuel—a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides—in specially modified commercial nuclear reactors. In 2012, DOE forecasted cost increases of close to $3 billion over the previous estimates for the program's two construction projects, the MOX facility and the WSB for disposing of waste from the MOX facility.
GAO was asked to review these cost increases and the life-cycle cost estimate. This report examines: (1) drivers NNSA identified for the cost increases; (2) the extent to which NNSA analyzed underlying causes of the cost increases; (3) steps NNSA took to hold construction contractors accountable for their role, if any, in the cost increases; and (4) the extent to which NNSA's most recent estimates met cost- and schedule-estimating best practices. GAO reviewed NNSA's draft life-cycle cost estimate and contractor estimates of the MOX project's cost and WSB schedule, compared the estimates with cost- and schedule-estimating best practices, and interviewed DOE and NNSA officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) identified various drivers for the close to $3 billion increase in the estimated cost of the Plutonium Disposition program's two construction projects—the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and the Waste Solidification Building (WSB). These drivers included DOE's approval of the MOX facility's cost and schedule estimates before design was complete and schedule delays in construction of the WSB. According to NNSA, the cost of critical system components for the MOX facility averaged 60 percent higher than estimated as a result of approval of estimates before design was complete.
NNSA has not analyzed the underlying, or root, causes of the Plutonium Disposition program construction cost increases to help identify lessons learned and help address the agency's difficulty in completing projects within cost and schedule, which has led to NNSA's management of major projects remaining on GAO's list of areas at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOE's project management order requires that lessons learned be captured throughout a project to, among other things, benefit future endeavors. NNSA officials said that, because the order does not require a root cause analysis of cost increases, NNSA decides on a case-by-case basis whether to conduct one. Unlike a root cause analysis, the cost drivers NNSA identified provided few details about why the drivers existed, such as DOE's reasons for approving the MOX facility's cost and schedule estimates before the design was complete. Without a root cause analysis, it is uncertain whether NNSA will be able to accurately identify underlying causes of the increases to identify and implement corrective measures and identify lessons learned to apply to other projects.
After determining that the performance of the contractors for the MOX facility and WSB contributed to cost increases, NNSA took steps to hold the contractors accountable by withholding fees specified under the contracts. In particular, as of November 2013, NNSA withheld $45.1 million or close to one-third of the MOX contractor's fees, including fees tied to meeting the MOX project's cost and schedule estimates. In addition, NNSA withheld $7.7 million or about 40 percent of the WSB contractor's fees tied to various performance measures for the WSB, such as completing construction milestones.
NNSA's most recent estimates for the Plutonium Disposition program did not fully reflect all the characteristics of reliable cost estimates (e.g., credible) and schedule estimates (e.g., well-constructed) as established by best practices for cost- and schedule-estimating, placing the program at risk of further cost increases. For example: (1) NNSA's draft April 2013 life-cycle cost estimate of $24.2 billion for the overall program was not credible because NNSA did not conduct an independent cost estimate to provide an unbiased test of whether the estimate was reasonable. (2) Because the MOX contractor's September 2012 proposal for increasing the cost of the MOX facility did not include a formal analysis to examine the effects of changing assumptions, it was minimally credible. (3) The WSB contractor's February 2013 monthly update to its schedule estimate was minimally well-constructed in that it contained activities that were not properly tied with the start or end date of other activities, which could potentially obscure the critical path determining the project's completion date.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending, among other things, that DOE conduct a root cause analysis of the Plutonium Disposition program's cost increases and ensure that future estimates of the program's life-cycle cost and cost and schedule for the program's construction projects meet all best practices for reliable estimates. DOE generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-22 | gao_GAO-14-22_0 | USAID manages its part of the procurement process using other systems not connected to WBSCM. USDA officials assert that, since March 2012, the agency has made significant improvements to WBSCM that would address many of the problems that led to USAID’s discontinued use of the system’s functions to procure bulk commodity ocean freight, manage commodity inventory, and track food aid shipments. USAID Has Not Used WBSCM as Intended Because It Had Significant Deficiencies at Implementation
WBSCM had deficiencies when it was implemented in April 2011, so USAID gradually discontinued using it to procure ocean freight for bulk commodities, manage commodities for prepositioned warehouses, and track food aid shipments between August 2011 and June 2012. In addition, USAID stated that the system’s process to procure international bulk ocean freight was not compatible with USAID’s process and recommended that neither agency use WBSCM to procure bulk ocean freight. Furthermore, in June 2012, USAID and USDA agreed that freight forwarders did not need to use WBSCM to update ocean freight contracts. USAID officials send USDA a consolidated spreadsheet, and USDA officials manually enter inventory data in WBSCM to provide food aid information for the Commodity Credit Corporation’s (CCC) quarterly financial statements. USAID’s Use of Other Systems Hinders USDA’s Ability to Prepare Accurate Reports and Efficiently File Claims Against Ocean Carriers to Recover Government Funds
Since USAID uses systems outside of WBSCM, USAID and USDA lack complete and accurate information on individual food aid shipments, which, in turn, hinders USDA’s ability to use WBSCM to prepare accurate financial reports and recover U.S. government funds. USAID’s data collection outside of WBSCM also makes it more difficult for USDA to efficiently file claims to recover U.S. government funds. USAID’s Systems Cannot Provide Information on Some Food Aid Shipments
In our work for a recent report on the impact of prepositioning on the timeliness of emergency food aid, we found that some information on emergency food aid shipments in WBSCM could not be used to assess their delivery timeframes. According to USDA officials, USDA filed 131 claims against vendors in fiscal year 2012, valued at $1.2 million. In prior work, we have identified practices that can enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies, thereby improving performance and results. Although USDA’s and USAID’s collaborative efforts have incorporated some of these elements to develop WBSCM, they have not incorporated others. Nevertheless, an upcoming functional upgrade of WBSCM offers the agencies an opportunity to make substantial, mutually agreeable changes to WBSCM. Specifically, USDA and USAID do not agree on the roles and responsibilities of key participants in the international food aid procurement process, do not share a defined outcome for their collaboration, and do not have a written agreement stating how the agencies will collaborate. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the efficiency and accountability of the emergency food aid procurement process, we recommend the Secretary of Agriculture and Administrator of USAID direct their staffs to work together to take steps to: improve USDA’s ability to account for U.S. government funds by ensuring that USAID provides USDA with accurate prepositioned commodity inventory data that USDA can independently verify; and assess WBSCM’s functionality by testing the international procurement functions that have been modified since April 2011 and documenting the results. USAID agreed to test WBSCM’s current functionality and to clarify the roles and responsibilities of participants in a written agreement with USDA. This report examines (1) the extent to which agencies agree to use WBSCM to manage the international emergency food aid procurement process; (2) how the agencies’ use of WBSCM and other systems affects USDA’s ability to have accurate information about emergency international food aid shipments; and (3) the extent to which the agencies are collaborating on how to use WBSCM. To examine the extent to which the two agencies use the Web Based Supply Chain Management system (WBSCM) to manage the international emergency process to procure commodities and ocean freight transportation, we interviewed USDA and USAID officials and reviewed documentation. These are contained in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
GAO Comment
USAID stated it is of the view that commodities move off USDA’s books and onto those of USAID when a USAID contractor takes possession of the commodities in question. | Why GAO Did This Study
USDA and USAID spent about $9.2 billion to provide international emergency food aid during fiscal years 2007-2012. USDA developed WBSCM with USAID's input to manage domestic and international food aid procurements. USDA spent about $187 million to develop and implement the system. GAO was asked to examine the international emergency food aid procurement process.
This report examines (1) the extent to which agencies agree to use WBSCM to manage the process, (2) how the agencies' use of WBSCM and other systems affects USDA's ability to have accurate information, and (3) the extent to which the agencies are collaborating on how to use WBSCM. GAO reviewed the procurement process and observed WBSCM in use. We analyzed inventory spreadsheets used to compile USDA's financial reports. We compared agencies' efforts to collaborate against key elements for effective interagency collaboration.
What GAO Found
Although the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) jointly manage international emergency food aid procurement, the agencies disagree about the usefulness of the Web Based Supply Chain Management system (WBSCM) to manage the entire process. WBSCM had significant deficiencies when it was implemented in April 2011, which led USAID to discontinue using it to procure ocean freight for bulk commodities, manage prepositioned or stockpiled commodity inventory, and track food aid shipments. For example, WBSCM was slow and time consuming to use and its process to procure ocean freight for bulk commodities was not compatible with USAID's process to negotiate contracts with ocean freight vendors. USDA currently uses WBSCM to procure food aid commodities, while USAID procures ocean freight using other systems not connected to WBSCM. Since March 2012, USDA has made changes to WBSCM, and USDA officials assert that these changes address some of the problems that led to USAID's decision to discontinue use of the system.
Since USAID uses systems outside of WBSCM, USAID and USDA lack information on individual food aid shipments, which, in turn, hinders USDA's ability to use WBSCM to prepare reports and efficiently file claims against ocean carriers to recover U.S. government funds. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that information should be accurately recorded and communicated to those who need it and in a form that enables them to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities. USAID relies on freight forwarders to track and periodically provide information on shipments. In GAO's work for a recent report, we found that freight forwarders did not collect complete or consistent information on emergency food aid shipments. Without accurate information from its freight forwarders, USAID is limited in its ability to generate accurate information on food aid shipments. In addition, GAO found that USAID and its warehouse contractors did not always accurately record all prepositioned commodity inventory transactions. USAID provides this potentially inaccurate information to USDA officials who enter this information into WBSCM to generate quarterly financial statements. Moreover, USAID's data collection outside WBSCM makes it more difficult for USDA to file claims efficiently against ocean freight vendors and recover U.S. funds because USDA officials must manually enter USAID information. According to USDA officials, USDA filed 131 such claims in fiscal year 2012 valued at $1.2 million.
USDA and USAID are not collaborating effectively to resolve their disagreement on the usefulness of WBSCM. In prior work, GAO identified key elements of effective collaboration that can enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies. Although USDA and USAID's collaborative efforts have incorporated some of these elements to develop WBSCM, they have not incorporated others. Specifically, USDA and USAID do not agree on the roles and responsibilities of key participants in the process, do not share a defined outcome for their collaboration, and do not have a written agreement stating how the agencies will collaborate. An upcoming functional upgrade of WBSCM offers an opportunity to make substantial changes that are mutually agreeable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended the agencies work together to ensure USDA receives accurate prepositioned inventory data, improve WBSCM's functionality by testing modified functions, and develop a written agreement that clearly outlines outcomes and roles and responsibilities for using WBSCM. USAID noted its view that prepositioned commodities move off USDA's books and onto those of USAID but agreed in general with our other two recommendations. USDA agreed with our recommendations and stated that the Commodity Credit Corporation retains ownership of prepositioned commodities. |
gao_GAO-08-517 | gao_GAO-08-517_0 | For example, an advantage of comparative surveys is that they are an independent evaluation of a nursing home recently surveyed by a state survey agency team. Substantial Proportion of Federal Comparative Surveys Identify Missed Deficiencies
A substantial proportion of federal comparative surveys identify missed deficiencies at the potential for more than minimal harm level or above. From fiscal year 2002 through 2007, about 15 percent of federal comparative surveys nationwide identified state surveys that failed to cite at least one deficiency at the most serious levels of noncompliance—the actual harm and immediate jeopardy levels (G through L). Federal surveyors identified no missed serious deficiencies in seven states (see app. Missed Deficiencies at the Potential for More Than Minimal Harm Level Were Widespread on Federal Comparative Surveys
In contrast to missed serious deficiencies, missed deficiencies at the potential for more than minimal harm level (D through F) were considerably more widespread on comparative surveys conducted during fiscal years 2002 through 2007. Approximately 70 percent of comparative surveys conducted nationwide identified state surveys that missed at least one deficiency at the potential for more than minimal harm level (D through F), with such missed deficiencies identified on greater than 40 percent of comparative surveys in all but five states—Alaska, Ohio, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Undetected care problems at the D through F level are of concern because they could become more serious over time if nursing homes are not required to take corrective actions. Federal Observational Surveys and Prior GAO Reports Identified Factors That May Contribute to Deficiency Understatement by State Survey Teams
Both federal observational surveys and our prior reports have identified factors that may contribute to the understatement of deficiencies by state survey teams. Together, these two areas directly affect the appropriate identification and citation of deficiencies. CMS Has Taken Steps to Improve the Federal Monitoring Survey Program, but Weaknesses in Management and Oversight Remain
CMS has taken steps to improve the federal monitoring survey program, but weaknesses remain in program management and oversight. For example, CMS has improved processes to ensure that comparative surveys more accurately reflect conditions at the time of the state survey, has switched control of the federal monitoring survey database to the office responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of state surveys, and has begun examining how to use monitoring survey data to improve oversight. Despite this progress, the management and oversight potential of the program has not been fully realized. In particular, CMS (1) has only begun exploring options for identifying understatement that occurs in cases where state surveys cite deficiencies at too low a level, for possible implementation in fiscal year 2009, and (2) is not effectively managing the federal monitoring survey database or using the database to oversee consistent implementation of the federal monitoring survey program by its regional offices. As a result, comparative surveys do not effectively capture the extent of the understatement of serious deficiencies by state surveyors. For example, CMS was not (1) examining comparative survey data to ensure that regional offices comply with CMS guidance intended to ensure that comparative surveys more accurately capture the conditions at the time of the state survey and (2) using the database to identify inconsistencies between comparative and observational survey results. Ensuring regional office compliance. These missed serious deficiencies most frequently involved Quality of Care, reflecting shortcomings in fundamental provider responsibilities such as ensuring proper nutrition and hydration, accident prevention, and preventing pressure sores. For example, we found that the database was missing a considerable number of comparative surveys. Nursing Home Care: Enhanced HCFA Oversight of State Programs Would Better Ensure Quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reports since 1998 have demonstrated that state surveyors, who evaluate the quality of nursing home care on behalf of CMS, sometimes understate the extent of serious care problems in homes because they miss deficiencies. CMS oversees the effectiveness of state surveys through the federal monitoring survey program. In this program, federal surveyors in CMS's regional offices either independently evaluate state surveys by resurveying a home (comparative surveys) or directly observe state surveyors during a routine nursing home survey (observational surveys). GAO was asked to evaluate the information federal monitoring surveys provide on understatement and the effectiveness of CMS management and oversight of the survey program. To do this, GAO analyzed the results of federal monitoring surveys for fiscal years 2002 through 2007, reviewed CMS guidance for the survey program, and interviewed headquarters and regional office officials.
What GAO Found
A substantial proportion of federal comparative surveys identify missed deficiencies at the potential for more than minimal harm level or above. During fiscal years 2002 through 2007, about 15 percent of federal comparative surveys nationwide identified state surveys that failed to cite at least one deficiency at the most serious levels of noncompliance--actual harm and immediate jeopardy. Overall, nine states missed serious deficiencies on 25 percent or more of comparative surveys; in seven states federal surveyors identified no such missed deficiencies. During the same period, missed deficiencies at the lowest level of noncompliance--the potential for more than minimal harm--were more widespread: nationwide, approximately 70 percent of federal comparative surveys identified state surveys missing at least one deficiency at the lowest level of noncompliance, and in all but five states the number of state surveys with such missed deficiencies was greater than 40 percent. Undetected care problems at this level are a concern because they could become more serious if nursing homes are not required to take corrective action. The most frequently missed type of deficiency on comparative surveys, at the potential for more than minimal harm level and above, was poor quality of care, such as ensuring proper nutrition and hydration and preventing pressure sores. Federal observational surveys highlighted two factors that may contribute to understatement of deficiencies: weaknesses in state surveyors' (1) investigative skills and (2) ability to integrate and analyze information collected to make an appropriate deficiency determination. These factors may contribute to understatement because they directly affect the appropriate identification and citation of deficiencies. CMS has taken steps to improve the federal monitoring survey program, but weaknesses remain in program management and oversight. For example, CMS has improved processes to ensure that comparative surveys more accurately reflect conditions at the time of the state survey, such as requiring that comparative surveys occur within 30 working days of the state survey rather than within the 2 months set in statute. Despite these improvements, the management and oversight potential of the program has not been fully realized. For example, CMS has only begun to explore options for identifying understatement that occurs in cases where state surveys cite deficiencies at too low a level, for possible implementation in fiscal year 2009. In addition, CMS is not effectively managing the federal monitoring survey database to ensure that the regional offices are entering data accurately and reliably--CMS was unaware, for example, that a considerable number of comparative surveys had not been entered. Furthermore, CMS is not using the database to oversee consistent implementation of the program by the regional offices--for example, the agency is not using the database to identify inconsistencies between comparative and observational survey results. |
gao_GAO-09-442 | gao_GAO-09-442_0 | In December 2007, we reported on DOD’s fiscal year 2006 travel program improper payment estimates. However, DOD did not estimate improper payments for commercial pay despite the large volume and high dollar amounts of the transactions. Inadequate Monitoring and Oversight of DOD’s Improper Payment Activities
The Office of the Comptroller’s monitoring and oversight of DOD’s improper payment activities were inadequate because they did not include verifying the accuracy and completeness of the information reported in DOD’s AFR as required by DOD guidance. In addition, we noted that DCMA’s and DCAA’s contract closeout processes were designed to ensure that applicable administrative actions had been completed during the course of a contract (e.g., all classified documents were disposed of) and not to specifically identify contract overpayments. Until the department establishes processes specifically designed to address recovery auditing and updates its internal guidance, it will be unable to determine the extent to which contract overpayments exist and are subsequently recovered to fulfill the Recovery Auditing Act requirements. DOD Reported Recovery Audit Information for Fiscal Year 2007 Was Incomplete
DOD did not fully address OMB recovery auditing reporting requirements in its AFR, such as disclosing the total costs associated with its recovery auditing activities and the associated recovered amounts related to overpayments made to vendors. Specifically, DOD excluded from its AFR $20.5 billion of its commercial payment universe for fiscal year 2007. Require DOD agencies and the military services to document the risk assessment methodology used, including the risk factors considered, and the rationale for assessing the risk level for the payment activity. However, we disagree because those actions are not sufficient to address IPIA. However, as we point out in this report, the majority of DOD’s processes aimed at identifying and recovering improper payments were inadequate because the primary purpose of these processes were not to identify commercial improper payments as required by the Recovery Auditing Act. As we stated in our report, the DOD Office of the Comptroller’s oversight and monitoring of improper payment and recovery auditing activities were inadequate as the office did not verify the accuracy and completeness of information received from DOD agencies and military service components and reported in its AFR. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) had adequate controls in place to address the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) and the Recovery Auditing Act requirements.To determine whether DOD adequately addressed IPIA requirements, we reviewed the applicable legislation and related OMB implementing guidance.We further reviewed DOD’s agency financial reports (AFR) for fiscal years 2004 through 2008, internal DOD improper payment guidance, and prior GAO and DOD Office of Inspector General (DOD OIG) reports on improper payments. Army Korea did not provide sampling results. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is required, as are other federal executive agencies, to report improper payment information under the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) and recovery auditing information under section 831 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, commonly known as the Recovery Auditing Act. The DOD Office of Inspector General has previously reported deficiencies at DOD related to these acts and GAO's prior work on DOD's reporting of its fiscal year 2006 travel improper payments estimate also identified shortcomings. Because of these and other long-standing weaknesses, the subcommittee asked GAO to examine DOD's fiscal year 2007 improper payment and recovery audit reporting to determine whether adequate processes existed to address both statutory requirements. To complete this work, GAO reviewed DOD's annual reports, conducted site visits, and met with cognizant DOD officials.
What GAO Found
DOD's process for addressing IPIA requirements had significant weaknesses. For example, as shown in the figure below, DOD did not conduct risk assessments for all of its payment activities as $322 billion in agency outlays were excluded from the amounts assessed. For those payment activities reviewed, DOD assessed the risk of improper payments occurring as low despite the department's long-standing financial management weaknesses and could not provide documentation supporting the methodologies used and the final risk level. GAO also found that DOD did not estimate improper payments for commercial pay under IPIA requirements, its largest payment activity. Further, the Office of the Comptroller's oversight and monitoring activities were inadequate because they did not include verifying the accuracy and completeness of the information in the agency's financial report (AFR). In addition to not estimating improper payments for commercial pay, DOD's processes for identifying and recovering commercial overpayments were inadequate, because they were not designed for this purpose as required by the Recovery Auditing Act. For example, GAO found that contract closeout processes were designed to ensure that applicable administrative actions had been completed (e.g., all classified documents were disposed of) and not to specifically identify contract overpayments. DOD also lacked detailed guidance on how to conduct a recovery audit program and did not fully address the recovery auditing reporting requirements in its AFR, such as disclosing the total cost associated with its recovery auditing activities. The Office of the Comptroller also did not verify the accuracy and completeness of the recovery audit information in the AFR, which resulted in $20.5 billion being excluded from its universe of commercial payments. DOD stated that its processes were sufficient to address the requirements of both acts, but since then has taken some actions, such as updating relevant guidance. Until these critical deficiencies are addressed, DOD will be unable to determine the extent to which improper payments exist and are subsequently recovered. |
gao_GAO-16-507T | gao_GAO-16-507T_0 | DHS Has Made Progress in Strengthening Its Management Functions, but Considerable Work Remains
DHS Progress in Meeting Criteria for Removal from the High-Risk List
DHS’s efforts to strengthen and integrate its management functions have resulted in progress addressing our criteria for removal from the high-risk list. DHS subsequently met an additional criterion—establishing a framework for monitoring progress—and therefore as of March 2016, has met three criteria and partially met the remaining two criteria, as shown in table 1. We found that DHS has established a plan for addressing this high-risk area. For example, the January 2016 strategy update includes an initiative focused on financial systems modernization and an initiative focused on IT human capital management. DHS Progress in Achieving Key High-Risk Actions and Outcomes
Key to addressing the department’s management challenges is DHS demonstrating the ability to achieve sustained progress across the 30 actions and outcomes we identified and DHS agreed were needed to address the high-risk area. We made 14 recommendations to DHS to, among other things, address HRIT’s poor progress and ineffective management. In doing so, it will be important for DHS to maintain its current level of top leadership support and sustained commitment to ensure continued progress in executing its corrective actions through completion; continue to implement its plan for addressing this high-risk area and periodically report its progress to us and Congress; identify and work to mitigate any resource gaps and prioritize initiatives as needed to ensure it can implement and sustain its corrective actions; closely track and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective actions and make midcourse adjustments as needed; and make continued progress in achieving the 20 actions and outcomes it has not fully addressed and demonstrate that systems, personnel, and policies are in place to ensure that results can be sustained over time. DHS Continues to Strengthen Acquisition Management, Though Key Efforts Need to Be Completed
Each year, DHS invests billions of dollars in its major acquisition programs to help execute its many critical missions. In fiscal year 2015 alone, DHS reported that it planned to spend approximately $7.2 billion on these acquisition programs, and the department expects it will ultimately invest more than $180 billion in them. 2012 to 2015: DHS Continued to Strengthen Acquisition Management, Which Highlighted Remaining Issues
DHS has concurred with and presented plans for addressing all of the acquisition management recommendations that we have addressed to the Secretary since September 2012, the implementation of which will enhance acquisition management. DHS has since implemented this recommendation. DHS concurred with these recommendations and is taking actions to implement them. To ensure that recent efforts are sustained, the department must continue to implement its sound acquisition policy consistently and effectively across all components. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed in each product. GAO-16-253. Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made; Significant Work Remains in Addressing High-Risk Areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk because the failure to address risks associated with transforming 22 agencies into one department could have serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. While challenges remain, DHS has made considerable progress. As a result, in 2013 GAO narrowed the scope of the high-risk area to focus on strengthening and integrating DHS management functions (human capital, acquisition, financial, and information technology). This statement discusses DHS's progress and actions remaining in addressing these functions with a focus on acquisition management. In fiscal year 2015 alone, DHS reported that it planned to spend approximately $7.2 billion on its major acquisition programs to help execute its many critical missions. This statement is based on GAO's 2015 high-risk update, GAO products from 2005 through 2016, and selected updates from ongoing work. To conduct past and ongoing work we reviewed key documents such as DHS strategies and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to strengthen and integrate its management functions have resulted in it meeting three and partially meeting two of GAO's criteria for removal from the high-risk list (see table).
For example, DHS has established a plan for addressing the high-risk area and a framework for monitoring its progress in implementing the plan. However, DHS needs to show additional results in other areas, including demonstrating the ability to achieve sustained progress across 30 outcomes that GAO identified and DHS agreed were needed to address the high-risk area. As of March 2016, DHS had fully addressed 10 of these outcomes but work remained in 20.
GAO has reported on DHS's acquisition management for over 10 years. The department has struggled to effectively manage its major programs, including ensuring that all major acquisitions had approved baselines and that they were affordable. GAO has noted significant progress in recent reviews (see table). This progress is largely attributable to sustained senior leadership attention.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS documents, interviews, and prior GAO reports. | GAO-16-507T
To ensure that recent efforts are sustained, the department must continue to implement its sound acquisition policy consistently and effectively across all components. GAO has made numerous recommendations in this regard, which DHS has concurred with and is taking actions to implement.
What GAO Recommends
This testimony contains no new recommendations. GAO has made about 2,400 recommendations to DHS since 2003 to strengthen management efforts, among other things. DHS has implemented more than 70 percent of these recommendations, including those related to acquisition management, and has actions under way to address others. |
gao_GAO-07-1110 | gao_GAO-07-1110_0 | AEITC Use Low and May Be Difficult to Increase
About 3 percent of the EITC recipients potentially eligible for the advance, about 514,000 individuals on average, elected it in each year, tax years 2002 through 2004, according to data employers reported on the Form W-2. As table 2 indicates, about half of all individuals who got AEITC received $100 or less each year and about 75 percent received $500 or less. There have been several federal efforts targeted to increase AEITC use over the last approximately 15 years, including both legislative and administrative changes. Interviews with IRS officials, other experts, and our prior AEITC work suggest that those eligible for the AEITC prefer receiving the EITC in a lump sum after they file their federal tax return instead of receiving relatively small portions spread throughout the year. High Noncompliance Exists with AEITC Requirements
Overall, as many as 80 percent of all AEITC recipients did not comply with or made errors involving one of the three AEITC requirements that we reviewed, and they received about $282 million when the 3 years, 2002 through 2004, are aggregated. Some taxpayers were noncompliant with more than one requirement. As table 4 illustrates, about 20 percent (more than 100,000) of AEITC recipients each year may not have been eligible for the advance because they did not have a valid SSN on their Form W-2. Collectively, these individuals received between $37 million and $39 million in AEITC each year. Some of these individuals were likely eligible for the AEITC. Collectively, these individuals received between $42 million and $50 million of AEITC benefits. Of the approximately 60 percent (about 300,000) AEITC recipients who filed a federal tax return, two-thirds misreported the amount they received in tax year 2002 through 2004, as shown in table 7. IRS’s Procedures to Verify SSNs Have Limited Effectiveness for AEITC Recipients Due to Taxpayer Noncompliance in Reporting and Filing
Submission Processing’s procedures have limited effectiveness in verifying that AEITC recipients have a valid SSN because, as previously noted, many individuals do not file the required tax return and, for those who do, most do not report receipt of the advance. AUR has the resources to only work on a fraction of these cases each year and uses criteria, such as revenue collection potential, for case selection. The program was therefore discontinued. Several advantages and disadvantages exist if IRS creates a Form W-5 database to use in monitoring AEITC noncompliance issues. If IRS were to test sending soft notices for AEITC and it cost IRS about the same amount to send notices to 300,000 noncompliant AEITC recipients, IRS would only need to reduce AEITC noncompliance by about 11 percent (about $10 million) to achieve a $19 to $1 return on investment. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To answer the first and second objectives: how many individuals received the Advance Earned Income Tax Credit (AEITC) compared with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and how much did they receive in tax years 2002 through 2004; what actions, if any, have been taken to increase use since 1992; and what is the potential for significant increases in the future; and what is the extent of noncompliance, if any, associated with the AEITC; we obtained a data file of all Forms W-2, “Wage and Tax Statement,” for tax years 1999-2004 indicating AEITC payments as shown by an amount greater than $0 in box 9 of the Form W-2 from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 3. This involved conducting literature searches and interviews with IRS and SSA officials. More than half of these individuals filed a tax return. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Advance Earned Income Tax Credit (AEITC) allows individuals to receive a portion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in their paychecks, instead of receiving all of it when filing their year-end tax return. Limited research has been conducted on the AEITC since GAO last examined it in the early 1990s. GAO was asked to determine (1) how many individuals received the AEITC compared with the EITC in tax years 2002 through 2004, what actions, if any, have been taken to increase use, and the potential for increases in use in the future; (2) the extent of noncompliance, if any, associated with the AEITC; and (3) how well the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) procedures address the areas of noncompliance. To address these questions, GAO analyzed Forms W-2 and tax return data and interviewed IRS and Social Security Administration (SSA) officials.
What GAO Found
AEITC use was low--only about 3 percent of EITC recipients potentially eligible for the advance received it in tax years 2002 through 2004, or about 514,000 of the 17 million potentially eligible individuals each year. About half of all recipients received $100 or less in AEITC and 75 percent received $500 or less for the year, with a total benefit paid of about $146 million each year. Several efforts have been aimed at increasing use over the last approximately 15 years, such as sending notices to individuals informing them that they were potentially eligible for the AEITC and making changes to IRS forms. Despite these efforts, use did not substantially increase and, for several reasons, it may be difficult to increase it in the future. For example, IRS officials, other experts, and prior GAO work suggests that individuals often do not elect the AEITC because they prefer receiving the entire EITC as a lump sum after filing their tax return. As many as 80 percent of AEITC recipients did not comply with at least one of the program requirements GAO reviewed, and some were noncompliant with more than one during the 3 years we reviewed. In tax years 2002 through 2004, about 20 percent, or more than 100,000 AEITC recipients, may not have been eligible for the AEITC because they had an invalid Social Security number (SSN). These individuals received a total of $37 million to $39 million each year. Almost 40 percent (about 200,000 recipients) did not file the required tax return; these individuals received $42 million to $50 million each year. Of the about 60 percent (more than 300,000) AEITC recipients who did file a return, about two-thirds misreported the amount received. IRS's procedures have limited effectiveness in addressing AEITC noncompliance. For example, Automated Underreporter (AUR) staff worked on only a fraction of AEITC cases because of resource constraints and criteria limiting case selection. IRS could address AEITC noncompliance by sending "soft notices" to recipients, requiring employers to verify employee SSNs before providing the AEITC, or creating a Forms W-5, "EITC Advance Payment Certificate," database. Each of these options have advantages, however, they also have potential disadvantages that could limit their effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-05-842T | gao_GAO-05-842T_0 | Progress and Continuing Challenges Found at Each Stage of DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Process
We found that DOD has taken steps to address challenges found at all three stages of its personnel security clearance process, but many of the steps have not yet resulted in implementations that fully address the challenges. In the preinvestigation stage, DOD has begun decreasing the uncertainty in its projections of how many and what levels of clearances are required by identifying the clearances needed for military and civilian positions and developing software that will result in electronic submissions of clearance investigation requests to OPM. Adding thousands of staff could, however, result in continued timeliness problems as well as quality concerns until the staff gain experience. Regarding the adjudication stage, DOD’s Joint Personnel Adjudication System consolidated the databases for 10 DOD adjudication facilities to enhance monitoring of adjudicative decisions and time frames for renewing clearances, but a new law requires a governmentwide clearance database. Preinvestigation Steps Being Taken to Help DOD Identify Requirements for Clearances and Address Submission of Requests for Clearance Investigations
At this time, DOD is uncertain about the number and level of clearances that it requires and has experienced problems submitting investigation requests, but the department has begun addressing these problems. Similarly, in response to our May 2004 recommendation to improve the projection of clearance requirements for industry personnel, DOD indicated that it is developing a plan and computer software to have the government’s contracting officers authorize the number of industry personnel investigations required to perform the classified work on a given contract and link the clearance investigations to the contract number. Despite having 2 years between the time when OPM and DOD announced an agreement for the transfer of DOD’s investigative functions and personnel to OPM and when the transfer actually occurred, DOD cannot make full use of OPM’s Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (eQIP), the system used to submit materials required to start a background investigation. For February 2005, OPM told us that it had more than 185,000 investigations governmentwide that had taken longer than its goals for closing cases: 120 days for initial investigations and 180 days for reinvestigations. Our prior review noted that delays in completing personnel security clearance investigations for DOD and other agencies have resulted, in part, from a shortage of investigative staff. In addition to correcting these problems, implementation of much of JPAS has eliminated the need for DOD’s 10 adjudication facilities to maintain their own databases of adjudicative information. OPM officials stated that JPAS and OPM’s Clearance Verification System account for over 90 percent of the government’s active security clearances and that the remaining clearances are primarily housed in classified record systems (e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency’s Scattered Castles) devoted to the intelligence community. In our February 2004 report, we noted that DOD had (1) as of September 30, 2003, a backlog of roughly 90,000 completed investigations that had not been adjudicated within prescribed time limits, (2) no DOD-wide standard for determining how quickly adjudications should be completed, and (3) inadequate adjudicator staffing. In summary, Mr. Chairman, we will continue to monitor this area as we do for all of the high-risk programs on our list. Much remains to be done to bring lasting solutions to this high-risk area. High-Risk Series: An Update. Washington, D.C.: January 2005. DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Personnel Security Investigations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Threats to national security--such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and high-profile espionage cases--underscore the need for timely, high-quality determinations of who is eligible for a personnel security clearance which allows an individual to access classified information. The Department of Defense (DOD) needs an effective and efficient clearance program because it is responsible for about 2 million active clearances and provides clearances to more than 20 other executive agencies as well as the legislative branch. Despite these imperatives, DOD has for more than a decade experienced delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance requests and impediments to accurately estimating and eliminating its clearance backlog. In January 2005, GAO designated DOD's personnel security clearance program as a high-risk area. In February 2005, DOD transferred its personnel security investigative functions and about 1,800 positions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), after 2 years of negotiation between the agencies. This testimony provides an update on the challenges that led to GAO's high-risk designation. It identifies both the positive steps that have been taken to address previously identified challenges and some of the remaining hurdles. GAO will continue to monitor this area.
What GAO Found
While DOD has taken steps to address the problems that led to designating its clearance program as high risk, continuing challenges are found in each of the three stages of DOD's personnel security clearance process. Preinvestigation: To address previously identified problems in projecting clearance workload, DOD is identifying the military and civilian positions that require clearances. Identifying clearance requirements for contractor personnel is still in the planning phase. Another problem is the efficient submission of investigation requests. In the 2 years since DOD and OPM announced the transfer of DOD's investigative functions and personnel to OPM, the two agencies did not ensure the seamless submission of DOD requests to OPM. DOD is developing software to remedy this problem. Investigation: Delays in completing investigations are continuing. For February 2005, OPM--which now supplies an estimated 90 percent of the government's clearance investigations--reported that over 185,000 of its clearance investigations had exceeded timeliness goals. OPM's effort to add investigative staff is a positive step, but adding thousands of staff could result in continued timeliness problems and quality concerns as the staff gain experience. OPM's workload should decrease because of two recent initiatives: (1) eliminating a few of the investigative requirements for some reinvestigations of personnel updating their clearances and (2) requiring the acceptance of clearances and access granted to personnel moving from one agency to another. Adjudication: In the past, DOD had difficulty monitoring who had been adjudicated for clearances and when the clearances needed to be renewed. While the Joint Personnel Adjudication System has combined databases from DOD's 10 adjudicative facilities to enhance monitoring, wider consolidation of government databases may be required. The Director of OPM will need to integrate all federal agencies into a single governmentwide database in order to meet a requirement established in a recent law. As of September 30, 2003, DOD had a backlog of roughly 90,000 adjudications. |
gao_GAO-17-188 | gao_GAO-17-188_0 | We recommended in our December 2011 report that federal financial regulators more fully incorporate OMB’s regulatory guidance into their rulemaking polices. In examining the regulatory analyses for the 12 rules, we found that the agencies reported conducting the regulatory analysis pursuant to PRA when required—that is, the agencies are required to minimize the paperwork burden of their rulemakings and evaluate whether a proposed collection is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency. In some cases, they determined that they were not required to conduct regulatory analyses pursuant to PRA because they determined no new collection of information would be required. Regulators Are Not Required to Follow OMB Guidance but Included Most Key Elements of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Independent federal financial regulators are not required to follow OMB’s Circular A-4 when developing regulations, but they told us that they try to follow this guidance in principle or spirit. To assess the extent to which the regulators follow Circular A-4, we examined 5 major rules (see table 3 for a description of these rules). As shown in the following examples, the regulators generally quantified some costs in all five of their respective rules and in four instances they discussed some costs qualitatively. The three remaining rules did not quantify benefits and noted data and other limitations to not doing so. Regulators Coordinated on Rulemakings as Required
The agencies reported coordinating as required or voluntarily on 19 of the 30 regulations that became effective between July 23, 2015, and July 22, 2016. According to regulators, most coordination for the rulemakings occurred throughout the rulemaking process. Coordination on the Integrated Mortgage Disclosure Rule Followed CFPB’s Internal Guidance for Agency Consultation
With respect to the integrated mortgage disclosure rule, CFPB followed its formal consultation process for working with agencies to develop Dodd-Frank Act rules. Indicators of the Impacts of the Dodd- Frank Act on SIFIs and Swaps
Financial regulators continue to implement reforms pursuant to the Dodd- Frank Act, but a number of factors make the full impact of the act uncertain. In particular, while many rules have been finalized, several rules have not been finalized or have not yet been started. As of December 2016, regulators had issued final rules for over 75 percent of the 236 provisions of the act that we are monitoring. Indicators Suggest Large Bank SIFIs Have Become Larger but Less Vulnerable to Financial Distress
According to the legislative history, the Dodd-Frank Act contains provisions intended to reduce the risk of failure of a large, complex financial institution and the damage that such a failure could do to the economy. Rather, the indicators track changes in the size, interconnectedness, leverage, and liquidity of designated nonbanks since the passage of the act to examine if the changes have been consistent with the goals of the act. This report discusses the regulatory analyses conducted by federal financial regulators (financial regulators) in their Dodd-Frank Act rulemakings, including their assessments of which rules they considered to be major rules; coordination between and among federal regulators on these indicators of the impact of selected Dodd-Frank Act provisions and their implementing regulations on financial market stability. In some instances, the regulators determined that the analysis was not required or not applicable and indicated this in their final rulemaking. Using GAO’s Federal Rules database, we found that 9 of the 30 rules were identified as major rules, per the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, under the Congressional Review Act because they resulted in or are likely to result in an annual impact on the economy of $100 million or more; a major increase in costs or prices; or significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of U.S.- based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets. For agencies subject to Executive Order (E.O.) We also selected three rules for in-depth review of interagency coordination: CFTC’s and the prudential regulators’ respective rules on margin requirements for uncleared swaps and CFPB’s rule on integrated mortgage disclosures. We selected these rules based on the opportunity for extensive interagency coordination. Appendix III: Coordination for Dodd-Frank Act Rules Effective as of July 22, 2016
The following table lists the 30 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) rules that we identified as having effective dates during the scope of our review (from July 23, 2015, through July 22, 2016), whether we found evidence of coordination during the rulemaking process, whether the Dodd-Frank Act required interagency or international coordination, and the nature of coordination, if any. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Dodd-Frank Act requires or authorizes various federal agencies to issue hundreds of rules to implement reforms intended to strengthen the financial services industry. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to study these financial services regulations annually. This sixth annual report discusses (1) the regulatory analyses federal agencies conducted for the 30 rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act that became effective between July 2015 and July 2016, (2) coordination among the regulators on these rules, and (3) indicators of the impact of select Dodd-Frank Act rules on financial market stability.
GAO assessed the extent to which regulators followed OMB's cost-benefit guidance for five major rules selected because they covered a variety of agencies and topics. GAO also examined coordination for three rules selected because they involved extensive interagency coordination and covered many regulators required to coordinate under the Dodd-Frank Act. GAO also reviewed documentation and interviewed regulatory staff.
What GAO Found
Federal financial regulators reported conducting the required regulatory analyses for rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) as part of the rulemaking process. For example, of the 30 rules GAO reviewed, which became effective between July 2015 and July 2016, the regulators analyzed the paperwork burden imposed for 12 rules for which they determined this analysis was required. For the remaining 18 rules, they determined that this analysis was not required or applicable. For instance, in some cases they determined that no new collection of information was required. As independent regulatory agencies, the federal financial regulators are not subject to executive orders requiring federal agencies to conduct detailed cost-benefit analysis in accordance with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, but regulators told GAO that they generally follow this guidance in spirit. GAO reviewed five of the nine rules considered major—that is, rules likely to result in an annual impact on the economy of $100 million or more, among other things—and found that regulators addressed most key elements of OMB guidance in their regulatory analyses. For instance, these agencies generally quantified some costs related to these rules. However, they did not quantify benefits in each rule and noted data and other limitations to doing so. In 2011, GAO recommended that the regulators more fully incorporate OMB's regulatory guidance into their written rulemaking policies, but not all regulators have implemented this recommendation.
Regulators reported coordinating, as required or voluntarily, on 19 of the 30 rules GAO reviewed. The Dodd-Frank Act and the rulemaking process did not require regulators to coordinate on the remaining 11 rules. GAO focused in particular on coordination efforts involving three rulemakings: the Commodity Futures and Trade Commission's and the prudential regulators' rules on margin requirements for over-the-counter swaps, and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection's (CFPB) rule on integrated mortgage disclosures. For the swaps rules, regulators coordinated domestically and internationally and, according to regulators, they largely harmonized their respective rules. For the integrated mortgage disclosure rule, CFPB followed its internal guidance for coordinating with relevant agencies throughout the rulemaking process.
The full impact of the Dodd-Frank Act remains uncertain because some of its rules have not been finalized and insufficient time has passed to evaluate others. As of December 2016, regulators had issued final rules for about 75 percent of the 236 provisions of the act that GAO is monitoring. Using recently released data, GAO updated indicators from its prior reports, including those that monitor systemic risk characteristics of large U.S. bank holding companies. These indicators track changes in characteristics of these companies such as size, interconnectedness, leverage, and liquidity since the passage of the act to examine if the changes have been consistent with the goals of the act. While changes in the indicators are not necessarily evidence of the impacts of the act's provisions, trends in indicators suggested large bank holding companies have become larger but less vulnerable to financial distress.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no new recommendations but continues to monitor the implementation of five prior recommendations intended to improve, among other things, financial regulators' cost-benefit analysis, interagency coordination, and impact analysis associated with Dodd-Frank regulations. Not all regulators have implemented these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-879 | gao_GAO-01-879_0 | Knowing the numbers and types of fires in workspace, as well as the causes of fires and any products involved, is critical for understanding the extent of the risk of fire and can lead to identification and implementation of steps to reduce this risk. Some private sector organizations—for example, a major hotel chain and some insurance organizations—track the number of fires in different types of facilities and their causes. Such information is used to manage this risk and reduce property damage, injuries, and the loss of life. Without more complete information on fires, the federal government—a key player in the standards- development process—cannot provide timely information on the causes of fires in federal facilities to standards-development organizations for their use in developing and revising standards, testing procedures, and certification decisions. Collecting and analyzing data on the risk of fire in its workspace could enable the government to better protect its employees and enhance its ability to participate in producing standards that would better protect the public at large from fire. | What GAO Found
Developing fire protection standards and testing products against them are critical to promoting fire safety. Business offices, including federal facilities, experience thousands of fires, more than $100 million in property losses, and dozens of casualties each year. Knowing the number and types of fires in the workplace, as well as their causes, is critical to understanding and reducing fire risks. Some private-sector groups track the number and causes of fires in different types of buildings. Such information is used to manage risk and reduce property damage, injuries, and deaths. However, the federal government collects little information on the fire risks in its facilities. As a result, the federal government cannot provide standards-development organizations with timely information that could be used to develop or revise fire safety standards, testing procedures, and certification decisions. Collecting and analyzing such data would help the government to better protect its employees and would contribute to the production of better standards to protect the public from fire. |
gao_GAO-15-418 | gao_GAO-15-418_0 | The USOC’s minimum standards policy for the program required each NGB to adopt an athlete safety program by December 31, 2013, that included the following minimum components: a policy that prohibits and defines six forms of misconduct: bullying, hazing, harassment (including sexual harassment), emotional misconduct, physical misconduct, and sexual misconduct (including child sexual abuse); criminal background checks for individuals who are in a position of authority over or have frequent contact with athletes; an education and training program covering key components of their athlete safety program by January 1, 2014; a procedure for reporting misconduct; and a grievance process to address allegations of misconduct following a report or complaint. 2.) Federal Efforts to Address Child Sexual Abuse in a Broader Context May Apply to Youth Athletes
Federal Agencies Engage in Some Activities to Prevent and Respond to Child Sexual Abuse that May Apply to Youth Athletes
Federal agencies engage in various efforts to prevent and respond to the sexual abuse of a broad population of youth, and these efforts may apply to youth athletes, depending on the circumstances. Specifically, Education and Justice oversee school compliance with Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination, including sexual harassment and abuse, in any education program or activity that receives federal funds. In addition, Education oversees compliance with the Clery Act, which requires schools that participate in federal student aid programs to annually disclose statistics on certain crimes, including sex offenses, that occur on or near their campuses. HHS and Justice Provide Resources and Justice Conducts Criminal Investigations to Address Child Sexual Abuse in a Variety of Settings, Including Youth Athletics
CDC and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), a nonprofit organization that receives Justice funding, each developed suggested practices for preventing and responding to sexual abuse within youth-serving organizations, which may include youth athletes in private athletic clubs and college and university sports camps. Federal Oversight and Enforcement Activities
Education conducts reviews of and investigations into schools’ compliance with Title IX and Clery Act requirements to ensure schools are meeting their obligations under these laws. Selected Athletic Programs Use Screening and Training of Staff, Among Other Actions, to Prevent and Address the Sexual Abuse of Youth Athletes
All Selected Athletic Programs Reported Using Name-Based Criminal Background Checks to Screen Staff, but Vary in Use of Other Screening Tools
Criminal Background Checks
Each of the 11 athletic programs we visited reported conducting some type of screening to determine if applicants are suitable to work with children. Officials at both private athletic clubs and university sports camps told us, however, that the cost of fingerprint-based background checks was a concern. Child sexual abuse prevention was a topic included in the required training for the selected athletic programs, and training generally covered topics such as how to identify the warning signs of, respond to, and report suspected abuse, including sexual abuse involving an athlete and athletic personnel. Reporting and Response Policies of Selected Athletic Programs Vary Based on the Type of Incident and Program
Reporting
In cases where the sexual abuse of a youth athlete is observed or suspected, all 11 athletic programs we visited have policies that require contacting the appropriate law enforcement or child protection officials. Policies also include conducting an internal investigation that could result in a range of sanctions, including bans from the athletic program if there are findings of wrongdoing. As with allegations of sexual abuse, in cases of inappropriate behavior that falls short of abuse, the policies of selected athletic programs we visited included a variety of disciplinary actions. Education, HHS, and Justice provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This appendix discusses in detail our methodology for addressing two research questions for athletic programs aimed at developing high performing athletes: (1) What role do federal agencies play in preventing and responding to the sexual abuse of youth participating in these programs? We conducted interviews with officials from the Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, and Justice, representatives of youth sports and education associations, and experts. We also conducted site visits to a nongeneralizable sample of youth sports camps on university campuses and private athletic programs in three states, which were selected based on the popularity of sports among youth, gender participation, college rankings in selected sports, and geographic diversity. Review of Federal Laws, Regulations and Guidance
To determine the federal role in preventing and responding to the sexual abuse of youth athletes in these programs, we reviewed relevant federal laws, including the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX); and the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act), among others. We also reviewed documents on suggested practices for preventing and responding to child sexual abuse in youth-serving organizations from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, an organization that receives grant funding from Justice. We did not assess the sufficiency of these policies or how selected athletic programs implemented these policies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Media reports of the sexual abuse of youth athletes by their coaches have raised questions about how athletic organizations protect against such abuse. Research shows that the power dynamic between coaches and athletes aiming for high performance makes those athletes uniquely vulnerable to abuse. Although states are primarily responsible for addressing abuse, federal laws may apply, such as those that prohibit sex discrimination, including sexual abuse, in federally-funded education programs, require reports of campus crimes, and set minimum standards for state child abuse reporting laws. GAO was asked to review efforts to prevent and respond to the sexual abuse of youth athletes under age 18.
GAO examined (1) the role of federal agencies in preventing and responding to sexual abuse of youth athletes, and (2) steps selected athletic programs aimed at high performance take to prevent and respond to such abuse. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, guidance, and literature; visited a nongeneralizable sample of 11 athletic programs in three states selected on factors including sport popularity, gender participation, and geographic diversity; and interviewed federal agencies, relevant associations, and experts.
What GAO Found
Several federal agencies have roles in preventing and responding to the sexual abuse of a broad population of youth under age 18, which may include youth athletes. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, a nonprofit organization that receives Department of Justice (Justice) funding, published suggested practices for preventing child sexual abuse in youth-serving organizations. These suggested practices include defining and prohibiting misconduct; screening staff using fingerprint-based criminal background checks and other tools; and training staff on how to recognize, report, and respond to abuse. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children also makes available information on child protection policies in youth sports settings, such as defining appropriate coach-athlete relationships. In addition, Justice may investigate alleged youth athlete abuse if there is a possibility the case constitutes a federal crime. These efforts may apply to youth in a range of settings. In addition, the Departments of Education (Education) and Justice oversee compliance with a civil rights law that protects individuals from sex discrimination, including sexual abuse, at schools that receive federal funding, which would generally include youth participating in sports camps on university campuses. Education also oversees postsecondary school compliance with a federal law requiring reporting of crimes, including sex offenses, that occur on or near campus. To ensure schools are meeting their obligations under these laws, Education and Justice conduct compliance reviews and investigations, and Justice participates in federal litigation involving claims of sex discrimination. Education also provides guidance and training to schools in areas such as developing codes of conduct, offering prevention and awareness training, and establishing reporting procedures.
The 11 athletic programs GAO reviewed all reported using methods, such as screening and training staff, to help prevent and respond to the sexual abuse of youth athletes. For example, the selected athletic programs, which included 8 private athletic clubs and 3 universities operating youth sports camps, all reported using name-based background checks to screen staff members for a criminal history. Two universities that operated sports camps reported they sometimes used fingerprint-based checks, while officials from other athletic programs cited the high cost of fingerprint checks as a barrier. Training for athletic staff in the programs GAO visited included how to identify signs of, respond to, and report suspected incidents of sexual abuse. Policies for all of these athletic programs also require staff to report suspected abuse to law enforcement. Further, the selected programs had response policies that generally included removing the suspected offender from the program and conducting their own investigations, which could result in lifetime bans from the program. Athletic programs' policies also included a variety of possible disciplinary actions, such as warning letters or required leave, for addressing inappropriate behavior that falls short of sexual abuse. Some of these policies have been created or revised in recent years, including the policies that private athletic clubs are implementing based on the United States Olympic Committee's athlete safety program, SafeSport, which prohibits various forms of misconduct, including child sexual abuse. GAO did not assess the effectiveness of any of the selected athletic programs' policies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. Education, HHS, and Justice provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-04-117T | gao_GAO-04-117T_0 | We now have both the need and the opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of federal oversight through more strategic and ongoing coordination of efforts between GAO and the IGs in the following areas: addressing major management challenges and program risks, monitoring the top challenges the government faces, such as implementation of the President’s Management Agenda, and conducting the audit of the government’s consolidated financial statements. With our respective areas of expertise in long-term challenges and agency- specific issues, GAO and the IGs can provide useful insights and constructive recommendations on programs that may warrant additional resources, consolidation, revision, or even elimination. Closer periodic strategic planning and ongoing engagement coordination between GAO and the IGs would help to ensure continued effective oversight of these key issues facing government. A practical issue that should also be dealt with is the adequacy of resources to provide for the agency financial statement audits. Over the years, a number of IGs have told us that the cost of agency financial audits has taken resources away from their traditional work. In the private sector, the cost of an annual financial audit is a routine business expense borne by the entity being audited, and the cost of the audit represents a very small percentage of total expenditures for the audited entity. We also considered the conversion of agency-appointed IGs to presidential appointment where their budgets were comparable to the presidentially appointed IG offices. We believe that if properly structured and implemented, the conversion or consolidation of IG offices could increase the overall independence, efficiency, and effectiveness of the IG community. These IG councils have been effective in coordinating the activities of the IGs in their efforts to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse throughout the federal government and in reporting these results to both the President and Congress. Matters for Congressional Consideration
As I stated at the beginning of my testimony, IGs have made a significant difference in federal performance and accountability during the last quarter century. | Why GAO Did This Study
On the 25th anniversary of passage of the Inspector General (IG) Act, Congress sought GAO's views on the role of the IGs in providing independent oversight within federal agencies and to discuss the new and continuing challenges faced by government performance and accountability professionals.
What GAO Found
The IGs have made a significant difference in federal performance and accountability during the past 25 years as indicated by their reports of billions of dollars in savings to the public and numerous civil and criminal referrals. They have earned a solid reputation for preventing and detecting fraud and abuse; promoting improvements in government operations; and providing helpful analyses on a host of governmentwide initiatives. Notwithstanding the accomplishments of the past, our nation now faces new challenges that demand even more from government performance and accountability professionals. For example, we are fighting international terrorism while facing a large and growing structural deficit. In addition, recent corporate failures have shaken public confidence in financial reporting and accountability in the private sector. Federal auditors can learn important lessons from the accountability breakdowns in the private sector and the resulting legislation passed by Congress. Closer strategic planning and ongoing coordination of audit efforts between GAO and the IGs would help to enhance the effectiveness and impact of work performed by federal auditors. Working together and in our respective areas of expertise in long-term challenges and agency-specific issues, GAO and the IGs can provide useful insights and constructive recommendations on a broad range of high-risk programs and significant management challenges across government. A practical issue that has arisen is who pays the cost of agency financial statement audits. Many IGs have told us that the cost of agency financial audits has taken resources away from their traditional work. In the private sector,the cost of financial audits is a routine business expense borne by the entity being audited and represents a small percentage of total expenditures for the audited entity. In a prior study, we considered the benefits of consolidating the smallest IG offices with those of presidentially appointed IGs and converting agency-appointed IGs to presidential appointment where their budgets were comparable. We believe that, if properly implemented, conversion or consolidation of IG offices could increase the overall independence, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of IGs. |
gao_GAO-06-661 | gao_GAO-06-661_0 | Status Models
States measure AYP using a status model that determines whether or not schools and students in designated groups meet proficiency targets on state tests 1 year at a time. To make AYP, schools must show that the percentage of students scoring at the proficient level or higher meets the state proficiency target for the school as a whole and for designated student groups, test 95 percent of all students and those in designated groups, and meet goals for an additional academic indicator (which can be chosen by each individual state for elementary and middle schools but must be the state-defined graduation rate in high schools). Using these initial percentages, states then set annual proficiency targets that increase up to 100 percent by 2014. Nearly All States Were Using or Considering Growth Models to Supplement Other Measures of Academic Performance
Nearly all states were using or considering growth models to track performance, as of March 2006. Half of the States Were Using Growth Models, and Most Remaining States Were Considering Them
Twenty-six states reported using growth models in addition to using their status models to track the performance of schools, designated student groups, or individual students, in our survey as of March 2006 (see figure 5). Additionally, nearly all states are considering the use of growth models: 20 of 26 states that used one growth model were also considering or in the process of implementing another growth model, and 22 of 25 states that did not use growth models were considering or in the process of implementing them to provide more detailed information about school, group, or student performance. These targets were based on combined test scores for reading/language arts, mathematics, and other subjects. While states developed growth models for purposes other than NCLBA, states such as Massachusetts and Tennessee have adjusted their state models to use them to meet NCLBA goals. Certain Growth Models Measure Progress in Achieving Key NCLBA Goals of Universal Proficiency by 2014 and Closing Achievement Gaps
Like status models, certain growth models can measure progress in achieving key NCLBA goals of reaching universal proficiency by 2014 and closing achievement gaps. Tennessee’s proposed model can also measure achievement gaps. While delaying these interventions may disadvantage students in some Title I schools, reducing the number of schools identified for improvement could allow for greater concentration of dollars in the lowest-performing schools. States Face Challenges In Measuring Year-to- Year Growth That Education’s Pilot Program and Data System Grants May Help Address
States face challenges in implementing growth models that Education’s initiatives may help address. Education Has Two Programs to Help States Develop Growth Models
In November 2005, Education announced a pilot project for states to submit proposals for using a growth model—one that meets criteria established by the department—along with their status model, to determine AYP. Through its approval of Massachusetts’ model and the growth model pilot program, Education is proceeding prudently in its effort to allow states to use growth models to meet NCLBA requirements. If schools are allowed to make AYP by getting credit for growth, some lower-performing schools will make AYP and the opportunity for school improvements the federal law prescribes to help students may be missed. Education commented that it appreciates our concluding observation that the department “is poised to gain valuable information on whether or not growth models are overstating progress or whether they appropriately give credit to fast-improving schools.” Education expressed concern that the definition of growth models used in the report may confuse readers because it is very broad and includes models that compare changes in scores or proficiency levels of schools or groups of students. While we acknowledge that some research exists to define growth models as tracking the same students over time, other research exists to show that there are different ways of classifying models that states use or could potentially use. As such, the definition used in this report reflects the variety of approaches states are taking to measure academic progress. GAO’s assessments also included reviews of documentation regarding the data systems. No Child Left Behind Act: Education Needs to Provide Additional Technical Assistance and Conduct Implementation Studies for School Choice Provision. GAO-05-7. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) requires that states improve academic performance so that all students reach proficiency in reading and math by 2014 and that achievement gaps close among student groups. States set annual proficiency targets using an approach known as a status model, which calculates test scores 1 year at a time. Some states have interest in using growth models that measure changes in test scores over time to determine if schools are meeting proficiency targets. To determine the extent that growth models were consistent with NCLBA's goals, GAO assessed (1) the extent that states have used growth models to measure academic achievement, (2) the extent that growth models can measure progress in achieving key NCLBA goals, and (3) the challenges states may face in using growth models to meet adequate yearly progress (AYP) requirements and how the Department of Education (Education) is assisting the states. To obtain this information, we conducted a national survey and site visits to 4 states. While growth models are typically defined as tracking the same students over time, GAO used a definition that also included tracking schools and groups of students. In comments, Education said that this definition could be confusing. GAO used this definition of growth to reflect the variety of approaches states were taking.
What GAO Found
Twenty-six states were using growth models, and another 22 were considering or in the process of implementing growth models, as of March 2006. States were using or considering growth models in addition to status models to measure academic performance and for other purposes. Seventeen states were using growth models prior to NCLBA. Most states using growth models measured progress for schools and for student groups, and 7 also measured growth for individual students. States used growth models to target resources for students that need extra help or award teachers bonuses based on their school's performance. Certain growth models can measure progress in achieving key NCLBA goals. If states were allowed to use these models to determine AYP, they might reduce the number of lower-performing schools identified for improvement while allowing states to concentrate federal dollars in the lowest-performing schools. Massachusetts sets growth targets for schools and their student groups and allows them to make AYP if they meet these targets, even if they do not achieve state-wide goals. Some lower-performing schools may meet early growth targets but not improve quickly enough for all students to be proficient by 2014. If these schools make AYP by showing growth, their students may not benefit from improvement actions provided for in the law. States face challenges measuring academic growth--such as creating data and assessment systems to support growth models--that Education's initiatives may help address. The ability of states to use growth models to make AYP determinations depends on the complexity of the model they choose and the extent that their existing data systems meet requirements of their model. Education initiated data grants to support state efforts to track individual test scores over time. Education also started a pilot project for up to 10 states to use growth models that met the department's specific criteria to determine AYP. Education chose North Carolina and Tennessee out of 20 states that applied. With its pilot project, Education may gain valuable information on whether growth models overstate progress or appropriately credit improving schools. |
gao_GAO-03-451 | gao_GAO-03-451_0 | This equipment is used to diagnose problems in aircraft avionics and weapon system components so that the component can be repaired and replaced on the aircraft or put into the supply system for future use. For example, testers may be used to diagnose problems with aircraft radars, guidance and control systems, or weapon systems. Over the years, various studies have criticized the continued proliferation of unique ATE and highlighted the need for the development and acquisition of testers that can be used to test more than one system or component. These problems include the high costs of maintaining and replacing ATE and the declining availability of spare parts for the aging testers. Readiness Could Be Adversely Affected
ATE is becoming increasingly out-of-date and more difficult to support. In addition, according to DOD readiness reports, only 28 percent of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps key aircraft models met their readiness goals in fiscal year 2002. Although the services have been making some progress, efforts to comply with these policies have been slow. In addition, strategic planning for the modernization of automatic test equipment at Navy depots has only recently been initiated. Since individual aircraft program offices have been doing their own planning for modernization, the Air Force has given little consideration to having common ATE or testers that are interoperable with those of other services. In the 1980s the Navy embarked upon an ATE standardization program to replace 25 of its testers with one standard ATE family, the Consolidated Automated Support System (CASS), to minimize unique types of testers. However, according to Navy officials, because of budget cuts that caused delays in developing the test program sets, only 4 of the 25 have been completely replaced by CASS, and 8 test sets have been partially replaced. Although the Air Force is developing plans to modernize its ATE, and although its policy is to consider developing common testers, it does not yet have an overall plan to guide its modernization efforts and has made limited progress in this area. In 1994, DOD appointed the Navy as its Executive Agent for ATE to oversee the implementation of this policy. Wherever the Executive Agent is placed organizationally, we recommend that the Secretary give it authority and resources to include representatives from all of the services, with a scope to include the oversight of ATE acquisition and modifications for all weapon systems; establish a mechanism to ensure that all ATE acquisitions and modernizations are identified in an early enough stage to be able to provide a comprehensive look at commonality and interoperability and to ensure a coordinated effort between service entities; direct the services to draw up modernization plans for its review so it can identify opportunities to maximize commonality and technology sharing between and within the services; and continue efforts to research technical issues dealing with tester commonality such as the development of open system architecture and other joint service applications. DOD concurred with our recommendations and agreed that it should reemphasize the policy that common automatic test equipment be developed to the maximum extent possible. We focused our work concerning this objective at the Navy office designated as DOD’s Executive Agent for Automatic Test Equipment—PMA-260 within the Naval Air Systems Command—and the Air Force’s Automatic Test System Division at Warner Robins Air Logistics Center. | Why GAO Did This Study
The services have billions of dollars worth of outdated and obsolete automatic test equipment (ATE) used to test components on military aircraft or weapon systems. Department of Defense (DOD) policy advocates the development and acquisition of test equipment that can be used on multiple types of weapon systems and aircraft and used interchangeably between the services. At the request of the Subcommittee's Chairman, GAO examined the problems that the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are facing with this aging equipment and their efforts to comply with DOD policy.
What GAO Found
DOD and the services face growing concerns regarding obsolete automatic test equipment, given the high costs of modernizing or replacing it and its potential effect on aircraft readiness. The Navy and Air Force, for example, estimate that they will spend billions of dollars to modernize or replace this equipment, much of which was acquired in the 1970s and 1980s. In the meantime, the aging testers are becoming increasingly out of date and more difficult to support. When the testers do not work properly, maintenance can suffer and readiness can be adversely affected. Since 1994, DOD policy has advocated the acquisition of test equipment that can be used on multiple weapon systems and aircraft and can be used interchangeably between the services; progress in this regard has been slow. For example, although the Navy set out in 1991 to replace 25 major tester types with one standard tester by 2000, budget cuts and delays in developing software have resulted in delays in completing the replacement of these obsolete testers until 2008. The Air Force has only recently initiated a test equipment modernization plan. However, little evidence suggests that consideration is being given to the acquisition of equipment that would have common utility for more than one weapon system as DOD policy advocates. For procurement of new weapon systems, the Air Force is giving little consideration to the use of a common tester, while a common tester is planned for use as the primary tester for the Joint Strike Fighter. Although DOD tasked the Navy as its Executive Agent for automatic test equipment in 1994, the agent has made only limited progress in achieving compliance across all the services with DOD policy advocating the development of common systems. While the Executive Agent can point to some successes in individual systems, its officials acknowledged that the organization does not have sufficient authority or resources to fully implement the policy and achieve the maximum commonality possible. |
gao_GAO-09-427T | gao_GAO-09-427T_0 | VA Has Been Working with DOD to Exchange Health Information for Over a Decade
VA and DOD have been working to exchange patient health data electronically since 1998. VA has one integrated medical information system—the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA)—which uses all electronic records and was developed in-house by VA clinicians and IT personnel. VA and DOD Have Increased Information Sharing, but Continue to Face Challenges in Developing and Implementing Interoperable Health Records
VA and DOD have increased their ability to share and use health information, sharing both computable and viewable data. This achievement has required years of effort by the two departments, involving, among other things, agreeing on standards and setting priorities for the kind of information to be shared and the appropriate level of interoperability to work toward. Interoperability—the ability to share data among health care providers—is key to sharing health care information electronically. Interoperability enables different information systems or components to exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged. At the highest level, electronic data are computable (that is, in a format that a computer can understand and act on to, for example, provide alerts to clinicians on drug allergies). As of January 31, 2009, the departments were exchanging computable outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy data through the CHDR interface on over 27,000 shared patients—an increase of about 9,000 patients since June 2008. However, the departments have more to do: not all electronic health information is yet shared. In addition, although VA’s health data are all captured electronically, information is still captured on paper at many DOD medical facilities. The involvement of the two departments in these initiatives is important both because of the experience that the departments can offer the national effort, and also because their involvement helps ensure that the standards they adopt are consistent with the emerging federal standards. VA and DOD Plans Lack Results-Oriented Performance Goals and Measures, and Interagency Program Office Is Not Fully Set Up
Using interoperable health IT to help improve the efficiency and quality of health care is a complex goal that requires the involvement of multiple stakeholders in both departments, as well as numerous activities taking place over an expanse of time. The departments’ efforts to meet the recent requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 provide additional examples of such challenges, raising concerns regarding their ability to most effectively meet the September 2009 deadline for developing and implementing interoperable electronic health record systems or capabilities. These plans identify various objectives and activities that, according to the departments, are aimed at increasing health information sharing and achieving full interoperability. However, of the 45 objectives and activities identified in their plans, we previously reported that only 4 were documented with results-oriented (i.e., objective, quantifiable, and measurable) performance goals and measures that are characteristic of effective planning. In neither case are tangible deliverables described that would permit the departments to determine progress in achieving these goals. Further, defining results-oriented performance goals and ensuring that these are met would be an important part of the task of the program office. Both departments agreed with our July 2008 recommendation that the departments give priority to fully establishing the interagency program office. Until the departments complete key activities to set up the program office, it will not be positioned to be fully functional, or accountable for fulfilling the departments’ interoperability plans. These include the need to continue to agree on standards for their own systems while ensuring that they maintain compliance with federal standards, which are still emerging as part of the effort to promote the nationwide adoption of health IT. Until these challenges are addressed, the risk is increased that the departments will not achieve the ability to share interoperable electronic health information to the extent and in the manner that most effectively serves military service members and veterans. | Why GAO Did This Study
For over a decade, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have been engaged in efforts to improve their ability to share electronic health information. These efforts are vital for making patient information readily available to health care providers in both departments, reducing medical errors, and streamlining administrative functions. In addition, Congress has mandated that VA and DOD jointly develop and implement, by September 30, 2009, electronic health record systems or capabilities that are fully interoperable and compliant with applicable federal interoperability standards. (Interoperability is the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged.) The experience of VA and DOD in this area is also relevant to broader efforts to advance the nationwide use of health information technology (IT) in both the public and private health care sectors--a goal of both current and past administrations. In this statement, GAO describes VA's and DOD's achievements and challenges in developing interoperable electronic health records, including brief comments on how these apply to the broader national health IT effort.
What GAO Found
Through their long-running electronic health information sharing initiatives, VA and DOD have succeeded in increasing their ability to share and use health information. In particular, they are sharing certain clinical information (pharmacy and drug allergy data) in computable form--that is, in a format that a computer can understand and act on. This permits health information systems to provide alerts to clinicians on drug allergies, an important feature that was given priority by the departments' clinicians. The departments are now exchanging this type of data on over 27,000 shared patients--an increase of about 9,000 patients between June 2008 and January 2009. Sharing computable data is considered the highest level of interoperability, but other levels also have value. That is, data that are only viewable still provide important information to clinicians, and much of the departments' shared information is of this type. However, the departments have more to do: not all electronic health information is yet shared, and although VA's health data are all captured electronically, information is still captured on paper at many DOD medical facilities. To share and use health data has required, among other things, that VA and DOD agree on standards. At the same time, they are participating in federal standards-related initiatives, which is important both because of the experience that the departments bring to the national effort, and also because their involvement helps ensure that their adopted standards are compliant with federal standards. However, these federal standards are still emerging, which could complicate the departments' efforts to maintain compliance. Finally, the departments' efforts face management challenges. Specifically, the effectiveness of the departments' planning for meeting the deadline for fully interoperable electronic health records is reduced because their plans did not consistently identify results-oriented performance goals (i.e., goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable) or measures that would permit progress toward the goals to be assessed. Further constraining VA's and DOD's planning effectiveness is their inability to complete all necessary activities to set up the interagency program office, which is intended to be accountable for fulfilling the departments' interoperability plans. Defining goals and ensuring that these are met would be an important part of the task of the program office. Without a fully established office that can manage the effort to meet these goals, the departments increase the risk that they will not be able to share interoperable electronic health information to the extent and in the manner that most effectively serves military service members and veterans. Accordingly, GAO has recommended that the departments give priority to fully establishing the interagency program office and develop results-oriented performance goals and measures to be used as the basis for reporting interoperability progress. The departments concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-818 | gao_GAO-04-818_0 | SEC Staffing and Workload Issues
In our previous reports on SEC, we found that SEC faced high staff turnover, ongoing vacancies, and increasing resource needs. Congress Takes Action to Address SEC’s Human Capital and Budget Challenges
SEC’s staff issues and a series of corporate failures and accounting scandals, including the bankruptcies of Enron in December 2001 and WorldCom in July 2002, caught Congress’s attention and raised significant concern about SEC’s ability to effectively carry out its mission. Budget Increases Have Funded New Staff Positions, but Many Remain Unfilled
SEC used much of its fiscal year 2003 increased appropriations to fund over 842 new staff positions. Officials say that while certain laws have helped speed up the hiring process, they are facing increased competition from the private sector. Budgetary Resources Were Focused on New Staff Positions for Financial Disclosure, Enforcement, and Examination Activities
SEC used its increased appropriations between 2002 and 2004 in its financial disclosure, enforcement, and examination areas primarily to fund new positions. In the fiscal year 2004 appropriations act, this unobligated balance was appropriated to SEC for use in 2004. SEC Continues to Allocate the Majority of Its Information Technology Budget to Hardware and Software Maintenance and Technology Infrastructure Needs
We reported in March 2002 that SEC’s IT systems and funding gaps were contributing to inefficiencies at the agency. As a result, SEC’s 2003 IT budget was increased by over 100 percent, to $100.9 million. In 2004, SEC’s IT budget was increased again to $120.5 million, or another 20 percent. OIG made a number of recommendations to address SEC’s IT investment decision-making governance issues, including (1) the development of a work plan for implementing the OIG’s recommendations; (2) formalizing charters, roles, and responsibilities for the Chief Information Officer (CIO), IOC, ITCPC, and other relevant IT governance bodies, including delegating to the CIO sufficient authority to effectively administer, control, implement, and enforce the IT capital planning responsibilities; (3) revising the project funding process and associated investment thresholds and criteria; (4) improving the strategic planning for IT investments, which includes finalizing an IT specific strategic plan that establishes the strategic direction for IT capital planning and tactical operations within SEC and establishing a single agencywide IT control process and structure for the entire IT budget to select, prioritize, and fund all IT investments to be managed by IOC and ITCPC; (5) linking IT project planning with SEC’s enterprise architecture; (6) improving the tracking of IT projects in progress; and (7) supporting IOC and ITCPC with adequate staff. Observations
Since Congress increased SEC’s budget to improve the agency’s oversight of financial markets in fiscal year 2003, SEC has made significant progress in hiring staff and is continuing its efforts to fill the remaining vacancies. Although SEC’s staff allocations appear to be consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley, these allocations were made without the benefit of a strategic plan. SEC commented that while more work remains, our review of SEC activities acknowledged the progress the agency has made within a constrained time frame. Appendix II: Comments from the Securities and Exchange Commission | Why GAO Did This Study
This report responds to a statement in the Conference Report on the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) fiscal year 2004 appropriations directing GAO to study SEC's allocation of its increased funding for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Historically, SEC has faced high staff turnover rates, long stretches of unfilled staff positions, and growing resource needs. Additionally, the agency has faced significant needs in its information technology area. In response to these trends and several high-profile corporate failures and financial scandals, Congress approved significant increases in SEC's appropriations to help improve oversight and increase public confidence in financial markets. This report builds on several reports GAO has issued on these issues. GAO was asked to review SEC's (1) allocation of its fiscal year 2003 and 2004 funds and (2) use of its information technology funding in fiscal year 2003 and its plan for 2004.
What GAO Found
Congress addressed SEC's human capital and workload challenges with a significant increase to SEC's appropriations for fiscal year 2003. SEC used over half of that increase to fund over 800 new positions primarily within its financial disclosure, enforcement, and examination areas. Although these allocations appear consistent with legislative directions, they were made without the benefit of an updated agencywide strategic plan, which was not approved until July 9, 2004. Although SEC received more flexible pay and hiring authority, SEC continues to face challenges filling critical vacancies, such as accountants. Officials cite competition from the private sector as a major factor. SEC's information technology (IT) budget increased from $46.6 million in fiscal year 2002 to over $100 million in fiscal year 2003. It increased another 20 percent to $120 million in fiscal year 2004. SEC used most of these large increases for maintenance and infrastructure needs, compared with new technology initiatives. Also, SEC's Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report detailing its concerns, which we share, about the decision-making process for IT capital investments. OIG made several recommendations to improve this process, and SEC staff have begun to take actions to address some of them. SEC commented that our review of its activities acknowledged the progress the agency has made and provided additional information about its activities since March. |
gao_GAO-02-466 | gao_GAO-02-466_0 | By May 1, 2003, all public stations are to be broadcasting a DTV signal as well. In particular, we discuss (1) the number of transitioning stations that reported they have had problems or expect problems that might keep them from meeting the deadline; (2) the lengths of extensions to the deadline that stations reported would be realistic for their situations; and (3) the dates when stations reported they would have built DTV stations if the transition were based on market forces rather than government mandate. Almost Three-Quarters of Transitioning Stations Reported They May Not Meet the May 2002 Deadline
Seventy-four percent of transitioning stations told us that they had problems or expected problems that might keep them from meeting the May 1, 2002, deadline for having a digital signal on the air. Few Transitioning Stations Would Broadcast Digitally This Year Without a Government Mandate
We asked broadcasters to estimate when they would likely have begun broadcasting a digital signal—assuming they had been given the spectrum but were not under any government deadline to transition to digital—on the basis of market forces such as competition, technology, and viewer demand. Because of the 85 percent rule (i.e., the requirement that 85 percent of households in a market be able to receive a digital signal before the analog signals are discontinued), much of the spectrum is likely to remain encumbered by analog broadcast stations until consumers adopt the necessary digital technologies. To develop our survey questions, we interviewed officials at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as well as officials of organizations representing industries affected by the transition to DTV. Thirty-eight percent of public stations said they would need an extension of 2 years or more, compared with 54 percent of commercial stations that said this. | What GAO Found
U. S. broadcast television stations are now switching from analog to digital television (DTV). The transition to digital technologies was sought by many broadcasters and was mandated by Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). FCC established 2006 as the target date for ending analog transmissions---a deadline later codified by Congress. At least 24 percent of all commercial television stations are now broadcasting a digital signal. However, these stations report little interest in receiving DTV. Transitioning stations reported that funding was one of the most prevalent problems. Seventy-four percent of transitioning stations indicated that the problems they are facing are so significant that they may not be able to begin broadcasting a DTV signal by May 2002, as required. Sixty-eight percent of transitioning stations said that a realistic extension for them would be one year or more. Thirty-one percent of the transitioning stations that said they might miss their May 2002 deadline reported that, if the transition were driven by market forces such as competition, technology, and consumer demand, they likely would not be on the air with a digital signal until after 2010. Another four percent of these stations reported that without a government mandate, they likely would never transition to digital. |
gao_GAO-08-211 | gao_GAO-08-211_0 | IRS has demanding responsibilities in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing the nation’s tax laws, and relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the status of IRS’s actions to correct or mitigate previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems were effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. IRS Has Made Limited Progress in Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses
IRS has made limited progress toward correcting previously reported information security weaknesses. It has corrected or mitigated 29 of the 98 information security weaknesses that we reported as unresolved at the time of our last review. For example, it has implemented controls for user IDs for certain critical servers by assigning each user a unique logon account and password and removing unneeded accounts (guest-level); improved physical protection for its procurement system by limiting computer room access to only those individuals needing it to perform their duties; developed a security plan for a key financial system; and updated servers that had been running unsupportable operating systems. IRS also has established six enterprisewide objectives for improving information security, including initiatives for protecting and encrypting data, securing information technology assets, and building security into new applications. For example, IRS continues to, among other things, use passwords that are not complex, grant excessive electronic access to individuals not warranting such allow sensitive data to cross its internal network unencrypted, allow changes to occur on the mainframe that are not properly monitored ineffectively remove physical access authorizations into sensitive areas, install patches in an untimely manner, and improperly segregate incompatible duties. Significant Weaknesses Continue to Place Financial and Taxpayer Information at Risk
In addition to this limited progress, other significant weaknesses in controls intended to restrict access to data and systems, as well as other information security controls continue to threaten the confidentiality and availability of its financial and tax processing systems and information, and limit assurance of the integrity and reliability of its financial and taxpayer information. IRS did not always enforce strong password management on systems at the three sites reviewed. As a result, IRS is at increased risk of unauthorized access to, and disclosure of, financial and taxpayer information, inadvertent or deliberate disruption of services, and destruction or loss of computer resources. IRS did not always effectively implement configuration management policies. IRS Has Not Fully Implemented Its Information Security Program
A key reason for the information security weaknesses in IRS’s financial and tax processing systems is that it has not yet fully implemented its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost- effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that include testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. These deficiencies represent a material weakness in IRS’s internal controls over its financial and tax processing systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relies extensively on computerized systems to carry out its demanding responsibilities to collect taxes (about $2.7 trillion in fiscal year 2007), process tax returns, and enforce the nation's tax laws. Effective information security controls are essential to ensuring that financial and taxpayer information is adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, improper disclosure, or destruction. As part of its audit of IRS's fiscal years 2007 and 2006 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) IRS's actions to correct previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) whether controls were effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. To do this, GAO examined IRS information security policies and procedures, guidance, security plans, reports, and other documents; tested controls over key financial applications at three IRS data centers; and interviewed key security representatives and management officials.
What GAO Found
IRS made limited progress toward correcting previously reported information security weaknesses. It has corrected or mitigated 29 of the 98 information security weaknesses that GAO reported as unresolved at the time of its last review. For example, IRS implemented controls for user IDs for certain critical servers, improved physical protection for its procurement system, developed a security plan for a key financial system, and upgraded servers that had been using obsolete operating systems. In addition, IRS established enterprisewide objectives for improving information security, including initiatives for protecting and encrypting data, securing information technology assets, and building security into new applications. However, about 70 percent of the previously identified information security weaknesses remain unresolved. For example, IRS continues to, among other things, use passwords that are not complex, grant excessive access to individuals who do not need it, and install patches in an untimely manner. In addition to this limited progress, other significant weaknesses in various controls continue to threaten the confidentiality and availability of IRS's financial processing systems and information, and limit assurance of the integrity and reliability of its financial and taxpayer information. IRS has not consistently implemented effective controls to prevent, limit, or detect unauthorized access to computing resources from within its internal network. For example, IRS did not always (1) enforce strong password management for properly identifying and authenticating users, (2) authorize user access to only permit access needed to perform job functions, (3) encrypt sensitive data, (4) effectively monitor changes on its mainframe, and (5) physically protect its computer resources. In addition, IRS faces risks to its financial and taxpayer information due to weaknesses in implementing its configuration management policies, as well as appropriately segregating incompatible job duties. Accordingly, GAO has reported a material weakness in IRS's internal controls over its financial and tax processing systems. A key reason for the weaknesses is that the agency has not yet fully implemented its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. As a result, IRS is at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction of financial and taxpayer information. |
gao_GAO-02-145T | gao_GAO-02-145T_0 | VA’s fourth mission—to serve as backup to the Department of Defense (DOD) health system in war or other emergencies and as support to communities following domestic terrorist incidents and other major disasters—has attracted greater congressional interest since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. In 1984, VA, DOD, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created a federal partnership to administer and oversee NDMS, which is a joint effort between the federal and private sectors to provide backup to civilian health care in the event of disasters producing mass casualties. VA also has its own medical emergency radiological response team of physicians and other health specialists. In addition to these functions, VA plays a key support role in the nation’s stockpiling of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies in the event of large- scale disasters caused by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Its direct emergency response activities include conducting and evaluating terrorist attack simulations to develop more effective response procedures and maintaining the inventories for stockpiled pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. The exercise had 500 participants and was designed to integrate the federal medical response into the state and local response, including local hospitals. How best to employ and enhance this potential will be determined as part of a larger effort currently underway to develop a national homeland security strategy. VA holds other substantial health system assets. The report outlined both strengths and weaknesses in regard to VA’s emergency response capabilities. | What GAO Found
In the event of a domestic terrorist attack or other major disasters, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is to provide backup medical resources to the military health system and local communities. VA now assists other federal agencies that have lead responsibility for responding to disasters, including terrorism. Its areas of responsibility include disaster simulation exercises and maintaining medical stockpiles. VA's efforts in these areas have enhanced national emergency preparedness by improving medical response procedures and by strengthening the security of federal pharmaceutical stockpiles to ensure rapid response to local authorities. VA also has resources that could play a role in future federal homeland security efforts. Its assets include the bricks, mortar, and human capital components of its health care system; graduate medical education programs; and expertise involving emergency backup and support activities. In managing large-scale medical emergencies arising from terrorist attacks, VA's emergency response capabilities have strengths and weaknesses. Determining how VA can best contribute to homeland security is especially timely given the extraordinary level of federal activity underway to manage large-scale disasters. |
gao_GAO-07-301 | gao_GAO-07-301_0 | Interoperability in the context of public safety communications systems refers to the ability of first responders to communicate with whomever they need to (including personnel from a variety of agencies and jurisdictions), when they need to, and when they are authorized to do so. DHS has taken steps to address these recommendations. DHS Assistance Has Helped on Specific Interoperability Projects, but a More Strategic Approach Is Needed
According to DHS, $2.15 billion in grant funding was awarded to states and localities from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005 for communications interoperability enhancements. This funding, along with technical assistance, has helped to make improvements on a variety of specific interoperability projects. Further, although DHS has required states to implement statewide plans by the end of 2007, no process has been established for ensuring that states’ grant requests are consistent with their statewide plans. Until DHS takes a more strategic approach to improving interoperable communications—such as including in its decision making an assessment of how grant requests align with statewide communications plans—and until more rigorous exercises are conducted, progress by states and localities in improving interoperability is likely to be impeded. Recent Progress Has Been Made in Developing Interoperability Standards, but Early Implementation Has Had Unsatisfactory Results
Until recently, little progress had been made in developing Project 25 standards—a suite of national standards that are intended to enable interoperability among the communications products of different vendors. Although one of the eight major subsets of standards was defined in the project’s first 4 years (from 1989 to 1993), from 1993 through 2005, no additional standards were completed that could be used by a vendor to develop elements of a Project 25 compliant system. To its credit, over the past 2 years, the private-sector coordinating body responsible for Project 25 has defined specifications for three additional subsets of standards. However, ambiguities in the published standards have led to incompatibilities among products made by different vendors, and no compliance testing has been conducted to ensure vendors’ products are interoperable. Nevertheless, DHS has strongly encouraged state and local agencies to use grant funding to purchase Project 25 radios, which are substantially more expensive than non-Project 25 radios. As a result, states and local agencies have purchased fewer, more expensive radios, which still may not be interoperable and thus may provide them with minimal additional benefits. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that progress is made in improving interoperable communications among federal, state, and local first responders, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following five actions: assess how states’ grant requests support their statewide communications plans and include the assessment as a factor in making DHS grant allocation decisions; plan for new full-scale exercises for UASI areas that provides local officials with sufficient time to develop and implement exercises to validate the robustness and effectiveness of their tactical interoperable communications plans; develop and implement a program plan for SAFECOM and other OEC interoperability programs that includes goals focused on improving interoperability among all levels of government; include in the program plan for SAFECOM and other OEC interoperability programs quantifiable performance measures that can be used to determine the extent to which each of the goals have been accomplished and that can be used to assess the effectiveness and usefulness of SAFECOM tools, assistance, and outreach, and make improvements based on the feedback; and modify grant guidance to provide more flexibility in purchasing communications equipment until standards for completed interfaces have been fully defined and products have been certified compliant. To determine the extent to which DHS funding and technical assistance helped to improve interoperable communication in these states, we reviewed documentation and interviewed state and local officials from selected states. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the first to respond to natural disasters, domestic terrorism, and other emergencies, public safety agencies rely on timely communications across multiple disciplines and jurisdictions. It is vital to the safety and effectiveness of first responders that their electronic communications systems enable them to communicate with whomever they need to, when they need to, and when they are authorized to do so. GAO was asked to determine, among other things, (1) the extent to which Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding and technical assistance has helped to improve interoperable communications in selected states and (2) the progress that has been made in the development and implementation of interoperable communications standards. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed grant information, documentation of selected states' and localities' interoperability projects, and standards documents.
What GAO Found
According to DHS, $2.15 billion in grant funding was awarded to states and localities from 2003 through 2005 for communications interoperability enhancements. This funding, along with technical assistance, has helped to make improvements on a variety of specific interoperability projects. However, states that GAO reviewed had generally not used strategic plans to guide investments toward broadly improving interoperability. Further, no national plan was in place to coordinate investments across states. To its credit, DHS has required states to implement a statewide plan by the end of 2007, and DHS has recently been required to implement a National Emergency Communications Plan. However, no process has been established for ensuring that states' grant requests are consistent with their statewide plans. Until DHS takes a more strategic approach to improving interoperable communications--such as including in its decision making an assessment of how grant requests align with statewide communications plans--progress by states and localities in improving interoperability is likely to be impeded. Until recently, the private-sector coordinating body responsible for developing Project 25 standards--a suite of national standards intended to enable interoperability among the communications products of different vendors--has made little progress. Although one of the eight major subsets of standards was defined in the project's first 4 years (from 1989 to 1993), from 1993 through 2005, no additional standards were completed that could be used to develop Project 25 products. Specifications for three additional subsets of standards were defined over the past 2 years. However, ambiguities in the published standards have led to incompatibilities among products made by different vendors, and no compliance testing has been conducted to determine if these products are interoperable. Nevertheless, DHS has strongly encouraged state and local agencies to use grant funding to purchase Project 25 radios, which are substantially more expensive than non-Project 25 radios. As a result, states and local agencies have purchased fewer, more expensive radios that still may not be interoperable and thus may provide few added benefits. Until DHS modifies its grant guidance to provide more flexibility in purchasing communications equipment, states and localities are likely to continue to purchase expensive equipment that provides them with minimal additional benefits. |
gao_GAO-06-431 | gao_GAO-06-431_0 | Since 2002, the Park Service has required park units to spend the majority of their visitor fees on deferred maintenance projects, such as road or building repair. Most of the Highly Visited Park Units Saw a Decline in Allocations for Daily Operations after Adjusting for Inflation
About seventy-four percent of the 83 most highly visited park units—over one million recreation visits per year—showed an average annual decline in inflation-adjusted terms in daily operations allocations from fiscal years 2001 through 2005. Increases in the Cyclic Maintenance and Repair and Rehabilitation programs reflect an emphasis on the effort for the Park Service to reduce its estimated $5 billion maintenance backlog. Increases in the Inventory and Monitoring Program reflect an emphasis on protecting natural resources primarily through an initiative called the Natural Resource Challenge. On an average annual basis, each unit experienced an increase in daily operations allocations, but most experienced a decline in inflation-adjusted terms. Increases in Operating Costs and New Park Service Management Requirements May Affect Daily Operations
Despite increases in inflation-adjusted allocations for daily operations at 4 of the 12 park units visited, officials at all 12 park units explained that this funding did not increase commensurately with increases in operating costs and new management requirements. While officials stated that these policies were important, implementing them without additional allocations reduced their management flexibility. While the Park Service may use visitor fees to pay salaries for permanent staff that manage and administer projects funded with visitor fees, it has a policy prohibiting such use. To alleviate the pressure on funds for daily operations, we believe it would be appropriate for the Park Service to follow through with revising this policy. Park Units Used Other Authorized Funding Sources to Support Park Service Operations
When funds allocated for daily operations were not sufficient to pay for activities that were previously paid with this source, the park units we visited reported that they deferred activities or relied on other authorized funding sources such as allocations for projects, visitor fees, donations from cooperating associations and friends groups, and concessions fees. The Park Service Has Undertaken Three Management Initiatives to Address Fiscal Performance and Accountability of Park Units
The Park Service identified three management initiatives that it has undertaken to address the fiscal performance and accountability of park units and to better manage within their available resources: the Business Plan Initiative (BPI), the Core Operations Analysis (COA), and the Park Scorecard. Since then, about 25 percent of all park units have participated in the process. Many officials—both at the unit level and headquarters—stated that business plans are, among other things, useful in helping them identify future budget needs. Recommendation for Executive Action
To reduce some of the pressure on funding for daily operations, we are recommending that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Park Service Director to follow through in revising Park Service policy to allow park units to use visitor fee revenues to pay the costs of permanent employees administering projects funded by visitor fees to the extent authorized by law. In addition to obtaining data on allocations for daily operations on a servicewide level, we also gathered data on the allocations for daily operations for individual park units to determine how many have received operating increases or decreases, and how many have remained relatively constant. To identify recent management initiatives the Park Service has under way to address fiscal performance and accountability for fiscal years 2001 to 2005, we gathered and reviewed documentation on several management initiatives including the Business Plan Initiative, the Core Operations Analysis, and the Park Scorecard. 2. National Park Service: Employee Housing Issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, some reports prepared by advocacy groups have raised issues concerning the adequacy of the Park Service's financial resources needed to effectively operate the park units. GAO was asked to identify (1) funding trends for Park Service operations and visitor fees for fiscal years 2001-2005; (2) specific funding trends for 12 selected high visitation park units and how, if at all, the funding trends have affected operations; and (3) recent management initiatives the Park Service has undertaken to address fiscal performance and accountability of park units.
What GAO Found
Overall, amounts appropriated to the National Park Service (Park Service) in the Operation of the National Park System account increased from 2001 to 2005. In inflation-adjusted terms, amounts allocated by the Park Service to park units from this appropriation for daily operations declined while project-related allocations increased. Project-related allocations increased primarily in (1) cyclic maintenance and repair and rehabilitation programs to reflect an emphasis on reducing the estimated $5 billion maintenance backlog and (2) the inventory and monitoring program to protect natural resources through the Natural Resource Challenge initiative. Also, on an average annual basis, visitor fees collected increased about 1 percent, a 2 percent decline when adjusted for inflation. All park units we visited received project-related allocations but most of the park units experienced declines in inflation-adjusted terms in their allocations for daily operations. Each of the 12 park units reported their daily operations allocations were not sufficient to address increases in operating costs, such as salaries and new Park Service requirements. In response, officials reported that they either eliminated or reduced services, or relied on other authorized sources to pay operating expenses that have historically been paid with allocations for daily operations. Also, implementing important Park Service policies, without additional allocations, has placed additional demands on the park units and reduced their flexibility. For example, the Park Service has directed its park units to spend most of their visitor fees on deferred maintenance projects. While the Park Service may use visitor fees to pay salaries for permanent staff that administer projects funded with these fees, it has a policy prohibiting such use. To alleviate the pressure on daily operations allocations, we believe it would be appropriate to use visitor fees to pay the salaries of employees working on visitor fee-funded projects. Interior believes that while employment levels at individual park units may have fluctuated for many reasons, employment servicewide was stable, including both seasonal and permanent employees. GAO identified three initiatives--Business Plan, Core Operations Analysis, and Park Scorecard--to address park units' fiscal performance and operational condition. Of the park units we visited with a business plan, officials stated that the plans, among other things, have helped them better identify future budget needs. Due to its early development stage, only a few park units have participated in the Core Operations Analysis; for those we visited who have, officials said that they are better able to determine where operational efficiencies might accrue. Park Service headquarters used the Scorecard to validate and approve increases in funding for daily operations for fiscal year 2005. |
gao_GAO-14-278T | gao_GAO-14-278T_0 | Our November 2012 report found similar funding trends. Specifically, local funding exceeded total federal funding for the 25 projects approved for federal New Starts grants—part of FTA’s Capital Investment Grant Program—from October 2004 through June 2012.important part of this picture, and according to FTA, MAP-21 authorized federal funding for public transit—$10.6 billion for fiscal year 2013 and $10.7 billion for fiscal year 2014. Federal funds available for the FTA’s transit programs come from two sources: (1) the general fund of the U.S. treasury and (2) the Mass Transit Account of the Highway Trust Fund. The primary mechanism for funding federal highway and transit for more than 50 years is the Highway Trust Fund, which is funded through motor fuel and other highway use taxes. For many years, user fees in the form of federal fuel taxes and taxes on commercial trucks provided sufficient revenues to the Highway Trust Fund; however, revenues into the fund have eroded over time, in part because federal fuel tax rates have not increased since 1993 and in part because of improvements in vehicle fuel efficiency. In May 2013, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that to maintain current spending levels plus inflation between 2015 and 2022, the Highway Trust Fund will require over $132 billion more than it is expected to take in over that period. This approach has effectively broken the link between taxes paid and benefits received by users and may not be sustainable given competing demands and the federal government’s growing fiscal challenge. For this and other reasons, and because MAP-21 did not address these issues, funding surface transportation remains on GAO’s High-Risk List. Effective Capital- Investment Decisions Help Transit Agencies Use Funds More Efficiently
Our recent work describes how sound capital-investment decisions can help transit agencies use federal and other transit funds more efficiently, and MAP-21’s new requirements for transit agencies to use asset management are consistent with our recent findings. Transit Asset Management
Improved transit asset management is important because of (1) the large backlog of transit assets—such as buses, rail cars, elevators, and escalators—that are already beyond their useful lives; (2) increasing demand for transit services; and (3) financial strains on transit providers due to rising fuel prices, decreased state and local funding, and likely limitations of federal funding going forward. According to FTA, roughly $78 billion (in 2009 dollars) would be necessary to cover the costs of rehabilitating or replacing the nation’s transit assets and bring them to a state of good repair. Sound asset-management practices can help agencies prioritize their capital investments to help optimize limited funding. However, of the nine transit agencies we visited, only two measured the effects of capital investments on the condition of certain transit assets and none of the agencies measured the effects on future ridership, in part because they lacked the tools to determine these effects. The FTA concurs with this recommendation, in part. However, according to FTA officials, given the agency’s current budget situation, it is difficult for it to commit to conduct additional research in the near future. Bus Rapid Transit
In addition to maintaining transit agencies’ existing assets in a state of good repair, some transit agencies also face a need to build and expand their systems to meet demand. As a result of the lower initial capital costs for BRT along with the benefits of improved service, transit agencies took advantage of federal New and Small Starts dollars to invest in a relatively large number of BRT projects, as compared to other modes of transit. Coordination Efforts for Transportation- Disadvantaged Populations Are Under Way
Effective federal coordination can help maximize limited resources, while still providing essential services—especially to transportation- disadvantaged populations, including those who cannot provide their own transportation or may face challenges in accessing public transportation due to age, disability, or income constraints. We have previously reported that transportation-disadvantaged populations often benefit from greater and higher quality services when transportation providers coordinate their operations. However, effective coordination can be challenging, as federal programs provide funding under a variety of services, including education, employment, and medical and other human services. Our June 2012 report also concluded that insufficient federal leadership and lack of guidance for furthering collaborative efforts might hinder the coordination of transportation services among state and local providers. Also, the Coordinating Council should report on the progress of its prior recommendations and develop a plan to address any outstanding recommendations. Public Transit: Funding for New Starts and Small Starts Projects, October 2004 through June 2012. Bus Rapid Transit: Projects Improve Transit Service and Can Contribute to Economic Development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of passengers use transit services on a daily basis, and many transit agencies that provide these services receive federal funding. To meet the needs of these passengers in a challenging economy, transit agencies must use federal and other resources wisely, while ensuring quality service.
The July 2012 surface transportation reauthorization act--MAP-21--has addressed a number of transit issues by strengthening federal authority to oversee transit safety and emphasizing the restoration and replacement of aging infrastructure, among other things. While it is too early to assess all of the impacts of MAP-21, the work GAO has done can help inform the next surface transportation reauthorization act.
This testimony covers GAO's recent work on: (1) funding transit; (2) improving capital decision making; and (3) coordinating services for transit-disadvantaged populations.
To address these objectives, GAO drew from its recent reports issued from March 2011 through November 2013. GAO has also analyzed MAP-21, recent rulemaking, and other reports.
What GAO Found
The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) authorized $10.6 and $10.7 billion for fiscal years 2013 and 2014, respectively, for public transit, but did not address long-term funding. Federal funds available for FTA's transit programs come from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury and the Mass Transit Account of the Highway Trust Fund. The Highway Trust Fund supports surface transportation programs, including highways and transit, and is funded through motor fuel and other highway use taxes; however, revenues have eroded over time because federal fuel tax rate stagnation, fuel efficiency improvements, and the use of alternative fuel vehicles. In May 2013, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that to maintain current spending levels plus inflation between 2015 and 2022, the Fund will require over $132 billion more than it is expected to take in over that period. GAO reported that while Congress transferred over $50 billion in general revenues to the Fund since fiscal year 2008, this approach may not be sustainable given competing demands for funding. For these reasons funding surface transportation remains on GAO's High-Risk List.
To address these funding challenges, sound capital-investment decisions can help transit agencies use their funds more efficiently. GAO's work on transit asset management and bus rapid transit has illustrated these benefits.
Transit asset management : According to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), it would cost roughly $78 billion (in 2009 dollars) to rehabilitate or replace the nation's aging transit assets--such as buses, rail cars, and escalators. GAO's 2013 report on asset management recognized that many of the nearly 700 public transit agencies struggle to maintain their bus and rail assets in a state of good repair. Sound management practices can help agencies prioritize investments to help optimize limited funding. However, of the nine transit agencies GAO visited, only two measured the effects of capital investments on asset condition and none measured the effects on future ridership. Thus, GAO recommended additional research to measure the effects of capital investments; FTA concurs in part with this recommendation. FTA agency officials recognize the importance of additional research; however, they are hesitant to commit additional resources given their current budget situation.
Bus rapid transit (BRT) : In addition to maintaining assets, transit agencies often need to build or expand systems to meet demand. Transit agencies can apply for federal capital-investment funding for new projects through New and Small Starts and Core Capacity Improvement grants. GAO's 2012 report found that many agencies had taken advantage of New and Small Starts funding to develop BRT projects, which generally require less capital investment compared to rail.
GAO's recent work also shows benefits from coordinating transit services for the transportation-disadvantaged--those who cannot provide their own transportation or face challenges accessing public transportation. GAO's 2012 report pointed out that coordination can be challenging, as federal programs provide funding for a variety of services. GAO also concluded that insufficient federal leadership and guidance on coordinating services for the disadvantaged may hinder coordination among state and local providers. The Coordinating Council--a group of federal agencies providing these services--has completed a strategic plan to strengthen interagency coordination, as GAO recommended.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made recommendations on these issues in previous reports. The Department of Transportation agreed to consider these recommendations and is in various stages of implementing them. |
gao_GAO-09-672T | gao_GAO-09-672T_0 | Our Reporting to Date under the Recovery Act
In order to meet our mandate to conduct bimonthly reviews and prepare reports on selected states’ and localities’ use of funds, we have selected 16 states and the District of Columbia to track over the next few years to provide an ongoing longitudinal analysis of the use of funds under the Recovery Act. These states contain about 65 percent of the U.S. population and are estimated to receive about two-thirds of the intergovernmental grant funds available through the Recovery Act. Our first bimonthly report, issued two weeks ago, covers the actions of selected states and localities under the Recovery Act as of April 20, 2009. The report also makes several recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed toward improving accountability and transparency requirements; clarifying the Recovery Act funds that can be used to support state efforts to ensure accountability and oversight; and improving communications with Recovery Act funds recipients about when funds become available for their use and when federal guidance is modified or newly released. GAO’s Coordination with the Accountability Community
Regular and frequent GAO coordination with federal IGs, the Board, and state and local government auditors is a critical component of our work to ensure effective and efficient oversight. It is also important for us to coordinate with OMB, especially in regard to the reporting requirements and other guidance to fund recipients and on what information is to be collected in order to adequately evaluate how well the Recovery Act achieves its objectives. We participate in weekly coordination conference calls with OMB, the Board, IGs, and state and local auditors. In addition to these regular calls, we are actively participating in discussions with state and local organizations to further foster coordination within the accountability community. For example, GAO’s western regional director recently made a presentation at the Pacific Northwest Audit Forum regarding GAO’s efforts to coordinate with state and local officials in conducting Recovery Act oversight. The work of our 16 state teams that resulted in our first bimonthly report on the actions of selected states and localities under the Recovery Act also exemplifies the level of coordination we are undertaking with the accountability community. During the conduct of our work, we collected documents from and interviewed State Auditors, Controllers, and Treasurers; state Inspectors General; and other key audit community stakeholders to determine how they planned to conduct oversight of Recovery Act funds. Our team working in North Carolina coordinated with the State Auditor regarding that state’s plans to ensure that Recovery Act funds are segregated from other federal funds coming through traditional funding streams to help ensure accountability and transparency. GAO’s Authorities to Assist Whistleblowers and Elicit Public Contributions
Provisions in GAO’s authorizing statute, the Whistleblower Protection Act, and the Recovery Act as well as a dedicated fraud reporting hotline facilitate our ability to evaluate allegations of waste, fraud and abuse in the federal government. Subject to certain limited exceptions, all agencies must provide the Comptroller General access to information he requires about the duties, powers, activities, organization, and financial transactions of that agency, including for the purpose of evaluating whistleblower complaints. Table 1 outlines the coverage of Whistleblower Act and Recovery Act provisions. As part of our normal operations, we maintain a fraud reporting service. Updated Information on the Recovery Act’s R&D Funding
On March 19, 2009, we testified before this Subcommittee on our role in helping to ensure accountability and transparency for Recovery Act science R&D funding. As initial implementation of the Recovery Act unfolds, we are tracking these agencies’ activities to plan for science R&D expenditures. OMB’s guidance requires that agencies’ submit program plans justifying Recovery Act expenditures that include a program’s objectives, funding, activities, types of financial awards to be used, schedule, environmental review compliance, performance measures, description of plans to ensure accountability and transparency, and a plan for monitoring and evaluation. As of April 28, 2009, only DOE’s Office of Science had obligated any funds for R&D project expenditures. We are currently examining the status of LGP’s efforts to solicit and review loan guarantee applications, including its efforts to use Recovery Act funds, and its progress in implementing the recommendations in our July 2008 report. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's efforts to coordinate with the accountability community--the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (the Board), the Inspectors General (IGs), and state and local government auditors--to help ensure effective and efficient oversight of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) funds. The Recovery Act assigns GAO a range of responsibilities including bimonthly reviews of the use of funds by selected states and localities. Because funding streams will flow from federal agencies to the states and localities, it is important for us to coordinate with the accountability community. Also, on March 19, 2009, GAO testified before this Subcommittee about the more than $21 billion in Recovery Act funds estimated to be spent for research and development (R&D) activities at four federal agencies. This statement discusses (1) GAO's efforts to fulfill its responsibilities under the Recovery Act; (2) GAO's coordination with others in the accountability community; (3) GAO's authorities to assist whistleblowers and elicit public concerns; and (4) updated information on the status of Recovery Act funds for R&D. It is based in part on GAO's first bimonthly Recovery Act report, Recovery Act: As Initial Implementation Unfolds in States and Localities, Continued Attention to Accountability Issues Is Essential (GAO-09-580), and GAO's March 5, 2009 testimony, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: GAO's Role in Helping to Ensure Accountability and Transparency (GAO-09-453T).
What GAO Found
GAO is carrying out its responsibilities to review the uses of Recovery Act funds and will also target certain areas for additional review using a risk-based approach. GAO's first bimonthly report examined the steps 16 states, the District of Columbia, and selected localities are taking to use and oversee Recovery Act funds. These states contain about 65 percent of the U.S. population and are estimated to receive about two-thirds of the intergovernmental grant funds available through the Recovery Act. GAO's report made several recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) toward improving accountability and transparency requirements; clarifying the Recovery Act funds that can be used to support state efforts to ensure accountability and oversight; and improving communications with Recovery Act funds recipients. Soon after the Recovery Act passed, GAO began to coordinate with the accountability community. By the end of February 2009, GAO conducted initial outreach to IGs, the Board, OMB, and state and local auditors. Now, GAO participates in regular coordination conference calls with representatives of these constituencies to discuss Recovery Act efforts and regularly coordinates with individual IGs. GAO also participates in discussions with state and local organizations to further foster coordination. The work of GAO's 16 state and District of Columbia teams that resulted in the first bimonthly report on the actions of selected states and localities under the Recovery Act also exemplifies the level of coordination we are undertaking with the accountability community. For example, teams working in the states collected documents from and interviewed State Auditors, Controllers, and Treasurers; state IGs; and other key audit community stakeholders to determine how they planned to conduct oversight of Recovery Act funds. Provisions in statute as well as a fraud reporting hotline facilitate GAO's ability to evaluate allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse in the federal government. Under GAO's authorizing statute, subject to certain limited exceptions, all agencies must provide the Comptroller General with access to information about the duties, powers, activities, organization and financial transactions of that agency, including for the purpose of evaluating whistleblower complaints. The Whistleblower Protection Act and the Recovery Act provide additional authority for GAO to assist whistleblowers. GAO also maintains a fraud reporting service, which has recently generated more than 25 allegations of misuse of Recovery and other federal funds. These allegations are currently under review by our forensic audit team. Since GAO first provided this Subcommittee with an estimate of the Recovery Act R&D funds to be spent, agencies have submitted program plans to OMB that include, among other things, programs' objectives, schedules, and the types of financial awards to be used. OMB expects to approve these plans by May 15, 2009. As of April 28, 2009, only the Department of Energy's Office of Science had obligated Recovery Act R&D funds for project expenditures. |
gao_RCED-96-191 | gao_RCED-96-191_0 | Figure 1 presents cafeteria managers’ perceptions of the extent to which plate waste was a problem in their school. 3.) Amount of Plate Waste by Food Type
Cafeteria managers reported large variations in the amount of waste from eight different types of food that may be included as part of the school lunch. 5.) 6.) Reasons for and Ways to Reduce Plate Waste
When responding to a list of possible reasons for plate waste at their school, the cafeteria managers most frequently selected a nonfood reason—“student attention is more on recess, free time or socializing than eating.” When responding to a list of possible ways to reduce plate waste, the managers most often viewed actions that would involve students, such as letting students select only what they want, as more likely to reduce plate waste than other actions. The managers believed that, overall, the minimum federal serving sizes provided about the right amount of food for the students at their school. Cafeteria Managers’ Level of Satisfaction With Federal Commodities
Most cafeteria managers reported satisfaction with various aspects of the federal commodities received at their school for use in school lunches. However, about 10 percent reported that they would prefer not to receive about half or more of the different commodities they were sent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on food waste from school lunches provided to school children under the National School Lunch Program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) school cafeteria managers had varying perceptions about the degree to which food waste was a problem; (2) elementary school cafeteria managers were more likely to perceive food waste as a more serious problem; (3) the amount of food wasted varied by the type of food, with cooked vegetables being wasted more often; (4) many cafeteria managers believed that students' attention on recess or free time, rather than lunch, contributed to waste; (5) many cafeteria managers believed that allowing students to select what they wanted to eat would reduce waste; and (6) most cafeteria managers were satisfied with the federal commodities they received for use in the School Lunch Program, but about 10 percent reported that they would rather not receive at least half of the different types of commodities they received under the program. |
gao_GAO-10-34 | gao_GAO-10-34_0 | For example, we estimate that 85 percent of wireless phone users are very or somewhat satisfied with call quality, while the percentages of those very or somewhat satisfied with billing, contract terms, carrier’s explanation of key aspects of service at the point of sale, and customer service range from about 70 to 76 percent. While we estimate that about three-fourths or more of wireless phone service users are satisfied with specific aspects of their service, the percentages of those very or somewhat dissatisfied range from about 9 to 14 percent, depending on the specific aspect of service. While the percentages of dissatisfied users appear to be small, they represent millions of people since, according to available estimates, the number of adult wireless phone service users is over 189 million. Specifically, our survey results indicate the following: Billing. Our analysis of FCC consumer complaint data also indicates that billing, terms of the service contract, and customer service are areas where wireless consumers have experienced problems in recent years. FCC Processes Wireless Consumer Complaints but Has Conducted Little Other Oversight of Services Provided by Wireless Phone Service Carriers
FCC processes tens of thousands of wireless consumer complaints each year but has conducted little additional oversight of services provided by wireless phone service carriers because the agency has focused on promoting competition. The agency receives informal consumer complaints and forwards them to carriers for response; however, our consumer survey results suggest that most wireless consumers with problems would not complain to FCC and many do not know where they could complain. FCC has also not articulated goals and measures that clearly identify the intended outcomes of its complaint-processing effort. We reported these survey results in June 2009. Consequently, consumers with wireless service problems may be confused about where to seek assistance and what kind of assistance to expect if they do know they can complain to FCC. FCC has taken a number of actions to enforce its rules that apply to wireless phone service carriers, but the agency has conducted no enforcement of its truth-in-billing rules as they apply to wireless service. Lacking in-depth analysis of its consumer complaints, FCC may not be aware of trends or emerging issues related to consumer problems, if specific rules—such as the truth-in-billing rules—are being violated, or if additional rules are needed to protect consumers. Representatives of state utility commissions and other stakeholders we interviewed told us that states’ authority under federal law to regulate wireless phone service is unclear, and this lack of clarity has, in some cases, led to costly legal proceedings and some states’ reluctance to provide oversight. According to our survey of state utility commissions, many state commissions do not have authority to regulate wireless phone service, and most that do have authority indicated that it is limited. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following five recommendations to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission: To improve the effectiveness and accountability of FCC’s efforts to oversee wireless phone service, direct the commission to 1. clearly inform consumers that they may complain to FCC about problems with wireless phone service and what they can expect as potential outcomes from this process, and expand FCC’s outreach to consumers about these efforts; 2. develop goals and related measures for FCC’s informal complaint- handing efforts that clearly articulate intended outcomes and address important dimensions of performance; and 3. develop and implement policies and procedures for conducting documented monitoring and analysis of consumer complaints in order to help the agency identify trends and emerging issues and determine whether carriers are complying with existing rules or whether new rules may be needed to protect consumers. To better ensure a systemwide focus in providing oversight of wireless phone service and improve FCC’s partnership with state agencies that also oversee this service, direct the commission to 4. develop and issue guidance delineating federal and state authority to regulate wireless phone service, including pulling together prior rulings on this issue; addressing the related open proceedings on truth- in-billing and early termination fees; and, if needed, seeking appropriate statutory authority from Congress; and 5. develop and implement policies and procedures for communicating with states about wireless phone service oversight. Additionally we interviewed individuals representing consumer organizations, state agencies, and the industry to obtain their views on wireless phone service consumer concerns and oversight efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Americans increasingly rely on wireless phones, with 35 percent of households now primarily or solely using them. Under federal law, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is responsible for fostering a competitive wireless marketplace while ensuring that consumers are protected from harm. States also have authority to oversee some aspects of service. As requested, this report discusses consumers' satisfaction and problems with wireless phone service and FCC's and state utility commissions' efforts to oversee this service. To conduct this work, Government Accountability Office (GAO) surveyed 1,143 adult wireless phone users from a nationally representative, randomly selected sample; surveyed all state utility commissions; and interviewed and analyzed documents obtained from FCC and stakeholders representing consumers, state agencies and officials, and the industry.
What GAO Found
Based on a GAO survey of adult wireless phone users, an estimated 84 percent of users are very or somewhat satisfied with their wireless phone service. Stakeholders GAO interviewed cited billing, terms of the service contract, carriers' explanation of their service at the point of sale, call quality, and customer service as key aspects of wireless phone service with which consumers have experienced problems in recent years. The survey results indicate that most users are very or somewhat satisfied with each of these key aspects of service, but that the percentages of those very or somewhat dissatisfied with these aspects range from about 9 to 14 percent. GAO's survey results and analysis of FCC complaint data also indicate that some wireless phone service consumers have experienced problems with billing, certain contract terms, and customer service. While the percentages of dissatisfied users appear small, given the widespread use of wireless phones, these percentages represent millions of consumers. FCC receives tens of thousands of wireless consumer complaints each year and forwards them to carriers for response, but has conducted little other oversight of services provided by wireless phone service carriers because the agency has focused on promoting competition. However, GAO's survey results suggest that most wireless consumers with problems would not complain to FCC and many do not know where they could complain. FCC also lacks goals and measures that clearly identify the intended outcomes of its complaint processing efforts. Consequently, FCC cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of its efforts to process complaints. Additionally, without knowing to complain to FCC or what outcome to expect if they do, consumers with problems may be confused about where to get help and about what kind of help is available. FCC monitors wireless consumer complaints, but such efforts are limited. Lacking in-depth analysis of its consumer complaints, FCC may not be aware of emerging trends in consumer problems, if specific rules are being violated, or if additional rules are needed to protect consumers. FCC has rules regarding billing, but has conducted no enforcement of these rules as they apply to wireless carriers. This August, FCC sought public comment about ways to better protect and inform wireless consumers. In response to GAO's survey, most state commissions reported receiving and processing wireless phone service consumer complaints; however, fewer than half reported having rules that apply to wireless phone service. Stakeholders said that states' authority to regulate wireless service under federal law is unclear, leading, in some cases, to costly legal proceedings and reluctance in some states to provide oversight. FCC has provided some guidance on this issue but has not fully resolved disagreement over states' authority to regulate billing line items and fees charged for terminating service early. State commissions surveyed indicated that communication with FCC about wireless phone service oversight is infrequent. As such, FCC is missing opportunities to partner with state agencies in providing effective oversight and to share information on wireless phone service consumer concerns. |
gao_GAO-08-226T | gao_GAO-08-226T_0 | In addition, lenders must certify that small businesses meet the “credit elsewhere” requirement. SBA describes the 7(a) program as contributing to an agencywide goal to “increase small business success by bridging competitive opportunity gaps facing entrepreneurs.” As reported annually in SBA’s Performance and Accountability Reports (PAR), the 7(a) program contributes to this strategic goal by fulfilling each of the following three long-term, agencywide objectives: increasing the positive impact of SBA assistance on the number and success of small business start-ups, maximizing the sustainability and growth of existing small businesses that receive SBA assistance, and significantly increasing successful small business ownership within segments of society that face special competitive opportunity gaps. In recognizing the difficulty of estimating credit subsidy costs and acknowledging that the eventual cost of the program may deviate from initial estimates, FCRA requires agencies to make annual revisions (reestimates) of credit subsidy costs for each cohort of loans made during a given fiscal year using new information about loan performance, revised expectations for future economic conditions and loan performance, and improvements in cash flow projection methods. The 7(a) Program’s Policy Objectives Reflect Legislative History, but Its Performance Measures Do Not Gauge the Program’s Impact on Participating Firms
The legislative basis for the 7(a) program recognizes that the conventional lending market is the principal source of financing for small businesses and that the loan assistance that SBA provides is intended to supplement rather than compete with that market. Outcome-based goals or measures showing a program’s impact on those it serves should be included in an agency’s performance plan whenever possible. However, all of the 7(a) program’s performance measures are primarily output measures. Limited Evidence Suggests That Certain Market Imperfections May Restrict Access to Credit for Some Small Businesses
We found limited information from economic studies that credit constraints such as credit rationing could have some effect on small businesses in the conventional lending market. This study’s results suggested that firms with longer relationships received more favorable terms—for instance, they were less likely to have to provide collateral. However, the studies we reviewed regarding credit rationing used data from the early 1970s through the early 1990s and thus did not account for several recent trends that may have impacted, either positively or negatively, the extent of credit rationing within the small business lending market. A Higher Percentage of 7(a) Loans Went to Certain Segments of the Small Business Lending Market, but Conventional Loans Were Widely Available
Certain segments of the small business lending market received a higher share of 7(a) loans than of conventional loans between 2001 to 2004, including minority-owned businesses and start-up firms. For example, 22 percent of all 7(a) loans went to small women-owned firms, compared with an estimated 16 percent of conventional loans that went to these firms. Also, similar proportions of 7(a) and conventional loans went to small businesses with different types of organizational structures and in different geographic locations. SBA officials said that based on analyses of these scores, the difference in the repayment risk of lending associated with 7(a) loans was higher than the risk posed by small firms able to access credit in the conventional lending market. Nearly 90 percent of 7(a) loans had variable rates compared with an estimated 43 percent of conventional loans, and almost 80 percent of 7(a) loans had maturities of more than 5 years, compared with an estimated 17 percent of conventional loans (fig. Loan guarantees can result in subsidy costs to the federal government, and the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA) requires, among other things, that agencies estimate the cost of the loan guarantees to the federal government and revise its estimates (reestimate) those costs annually as new information becomes available. As we have seen, the original credit subsidy cost that SBA estimated for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 was zero, making the 7(a) program a “zero credit subsidy” program—that is, the program no longer required annual appropriations of budget authority. Since the 7(a) program primarily provides variable rate loans, changes in the prevailing interest rates would result in higher or lower loan payments, affecting borrowers’ ability to pay and subsequently influencing default and prepayment rates. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration's (SBA) 7(a) program, initially established in 1953, provides loan guarantees to small businesses that cannot obtain credit in the conventional lending market. In fiscal year 2006, the program assisted more than 80,000 businesses with loan guarantees of nearly $14 billion. This testimony, based on a 2007 report, discusses (1) the 7(a) program's purpose and the performance measures SBA uses to assess the program's results; (2) evidence of any market constraints that may affect small businesses' access to credit in the conventional lending market; (3) the segments of the small business lending market that were served by 7(a) loans and the segments that were served by conventional loans; and (4) 7(a) program's credit subsidy costs and the factors that may cause uncertainty about these costs.
What GAO Found
As the 7(a) program's underlying statutes and legislative history suggest, the loan program's purpose is intended to help small businesses obtain credit. The 7(a) program's design reflects this legislative history, but the program's performance measures provide limited information about the impact of the loans on participating small businesses. As a result, the current performance measures do not indicate how well SBA is meeting its strategic goal of helping small businesses succeed. The agency is currently undertaking efforts to develop additional, outcome-based performance measures for the 7(a) program, but agency officials said that it was not clear when they might be introduced or what they might measure. Limited evidence from economic studies suggests that some small businesses may face constraints in accessing credit because of imperfections such as credit rationing, in the conventional lending market. Several studies GAO reviewed generally concluded that credit rationing was more likely to affect small businesses because lenders could face challenges in obtaining enough information on these businesses to assess their risk. However, the studies on credit rationing were limited, in part, because the literature relies on data from the early 1970s through the early 1990s, which do not account for recent trends in the small business lending market, such as the increasing use of credit scores. Though researchers have noted disparities in lending options among different races and genders, inconclusive evidence exists as to whether discrimination explains these differences. 7(a) loans went to certain segments of the small business lending market in higher proportions than conventional loans. For example, from 2001 to 2004 25 percent of 7(a) loans went to small business start-ups compared to an estimated 5 percent of conventional loan. More similar percentages of 7(a) and conventional loans went to other market segments; 22 percent of 7(a) loans went to women-owned firms in comparison to an estimated 16 percent of conventional loans. The characteristics of 7(a) and conventional loans differed in several key respects: 7(a) loans typically were larger and more likely to have variable rates, longer maturities, and higher interest rates. SBA's most recent reestimates of the credit subsidy costs for 7(a) loans made during fiscal years 1992 through 2004 indicate that, in general, the long-term costs of these loans would be lower than initially estimated. SBA makes its best initial estimate of the 7(a) program's credit subsidy costs and revises the estimate annually as new information becomes available. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, SBA estimated that the credit subsidy cost of the 7(a) program would be equal to zero--that is, the program would no longer require annual appropriations of budget authority--by, in part, adjusting fees paid by lenders. However, the most recent reestimates, including those made since 2005, may change because of the inherent uncertainties of forecasting subsidy costs and the influence of economic conditions such as interest rates on several factors, including loan defaults and prepayment rates. |
gao_T-GGD-98-76 | gao_T-GGD-98-76_0 | Personal Bankruptcy: the Credit Research Center and Ernst & Young Reports on Debtors’ Ability to Pay
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of our review of the Credit Research Center (the Center) report on personal bankruptcy debtors’ ability to pay their debts and share with you our observations on the February 1998 Ernst & Young report that also examines debtors’ ability to pay. Both studies share two fundamental assumptions: (1) that the information found on debtors’ initial schedules of estimated income, estimated expenses, and debts was accurate; and (2) that this information could be used to satisfactorily forecast debtors’ income and expenses for a 5-year period. These assumptions have been the subject of considerable debate, and the researchers did not test their validity. With regard to the first assumption, the accuracy of the data in bankruptcy petitioners’ initial schedules of estimated income, estimated expenses, and debts is unknown. However, both reports also stated that to the extent the data in the schedules were not accurate, the data would probably understate the income debtors have available for debt repayment. Neither report allowed for situations in which the debtor’s income decreases or expenses increase during the 5-year period. Differences Between the Two Reports
One difference between the two reports involves the calculation of debtor expenses. A third difference between the reports involves assumptions about repayment of secured, nonhousing debt. March 1998 Ernst & Young Report
On March 10, 1998 we received an Ernst & Young report that used a national sample of chapter 7 petitions from calendar year 1997 to estimate debtors’ ability to pay. Although we have not had an opportunity to examine this report in detail, the report appears to have addressed many of the sampling issues we raised regarding the Center report and February 1998 Ernst & Young report. However, the March 1998 Ernst & Young report shares the fundamental unvalidated assumptions of the Credit Center report and the February 1998 Ernst & Young report. These assumptions include (1) the data reported on debtors’ schedules of estimated income, estimated expenses, and debts are accurate; (2) the data in these schedules can be used to satisfactorily forecast debtors’ income and expenses for a 5-year period; (3) that 100 percent of debtors’ net income after expenses, as determined in the report, will be used for debt repayment over a 5-year repayment period; and (4) that all debtors will satisfactorily complete their 5-year repayment plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the results of its review of the Credit Research Center report on personal bankruptcy debtors' ability to pay their debts and observations on the February 1998 Ernst & Young report that also examines debtors' ability to pay.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) both studies share two fundamental assumptions that: (a) the information found in debtors' initial schedules of estimated income, estimated expenses, and debts is accurate; and (b) this information could be used to satisfactorily forecast debtors' income and expenses for a 5-year period; (2) these assumptions have been the subject of considerable debate, and the researchers did not test their validity; (3) with regard to the first assumption, the accuracy of the data in bankruptcy petitioners' initial schedules of estimated income, estimated expenses, and debt is unknown; (4) however, both reports also stated that to the extent the data in the schedules were not accurate, the data would probably understate the income debtors have available for debt repayment; (5) with regard to the second assumption, there is also no empirical basis for assuming that debtors' income and expenses, as stated in their initial schedules, would remain stable for a 5-year period following the filing of their bankruptcy petitions; (6) these two assumptions--debtors' income and expenses remain stable and all repayment plans would be successfully completed--could result in a somewhat optimistic estimate of debt repayment; (7) neither report allowed for situations in which the debtor's income decreases or expenses increase during the 5-year period; (8) one difference between the two reports involve the calculation of debtor expenses; (9) a second difference between the two reports involves the calculation of mortgage debt and family size; (10) a third difference between the reports involves assumptions about repayment of secured, nonhousing debt; (11) on March 10, 1998, GAO received an Ernst & Young report that used a national sample of Chapter 7 petitions from calendar year 1997 to estimate debtors' ability to pay; (12) the report appears to have addressed many of the sampling issues GAO raised regarding the Center report and February 1998 Ernst & Young report; and (13) however, the March 1998 Ernst & Young report shares the fundamental unvalidated assumptions of the Credit Center report and the February 1998 Ernst & Young report. |
gao_GAO-13-61 | gao_GAO-13-61_0 | OSHA Monitoring and Enforcement
OSHA uses directorates in its national office, as well as 10 regional offices and 87 area offices, to implement and oversee enforcement.national office includes the Directorate of Enforcement Programs, which provides guidance to OSHA inspectors on how to enforce safety and health standards and how employers are to comply with them; the Directorate of Evaluation and Analysis, which analyzes safety and health data; and the Directorate of Cooperative and State Programs, which develops policy and oversees the grants provided to state-run programs. OSHA’s Monitoring Is More Frequent and Its Guidance Is More Consistent for Federal than State Enforcement
OSHA Monitors Federal Efforts More Frequently than State Efforts
OSHA uses a variety of methods to monitor the progress of federal and state enforcement efforts, and monitors federal enforcement efforts more frequently than those of states. States are afforded flexibility in setting their own goals as long as they report their activities across a range of performance measures, such as the percentage of programmed inspections that find certain types of violations, and the average number of violations per inspection. Regional and area officials also meet quarterly with state managers to review states’ performance, whereas regional officials meet with area officials at least once every other week to review their performance. In addition, OSHA officials review aggregate data on inspections, violations, and penalties as a part of their annual audits of states. Guidance Is More Consistent for Audits of Federal Enforcement than State Enforcement
While the guidance OSHA provides for auditing its regional and area offices is fairly consistent, its guidance for auditing state-run programs has varied significantly each year since 2009. OSHA’s guidance for its fiscal year 2009 EFAME audits required that OSHA conduct site visits to states and inspect their case files. Not having consistent guidance on audits of state-run programs and no set schedule for when OSHA will conduct these more comprehensive audits can make it difficult for officials in state-run programs to prepare for these audits, and limits OSHA’s ability to identify problem areas and help states address them. OSHA Is Taking Steps to Better Assess Effectiveness but Does Not Focus on Outcomes
OSHA Has Several Initiatives to Assess Effectiveness, but Few Focus on Outcomes
OSHA recently developed several initiatives to better assess the effectiveness of state and federal enforcement efforts. However, the revised measures remain largely refinements of indicators previously used to track activities conducted (outputs), not effectiveness (outcomes). It is unclear how adding a 20 to 25 percent plus-or-minus range to targets for each of these enforcement activities will help OSHA officials determine whether a state’s program is at least as effective as the federal program because neither the state’s range nor the federal number is linked to effectiveness—improving employer compliance and reducing worker fatalities, injuries, and illnesses. OSHA’s difficulty in demonstrating the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts has affected its ability to convince states to implement enforcement changes OSHA believes will result in better outcomes. OSHA Does Not Use Existing Data to Assess Enforcement Effectiveness
OSHA is missing opportunities to use data already in hand to assess the effectiveness of federal and state enforcement efforts. For example, OSHA does not analyze data from its audits of its offices and of state-run programs, and information on its emphasis programs. OSHA does not analyze data from its MAP audits of regional and area offices or its FAME audits of state-run programs to inform its planning or to share information across regions. For fiscal year 2012, OSHA had approximately one dozen NEPs, including some that had been in effect for several years. directly responsible for desired outcomes, such as a reduction in worker injuries caused by lifting patients or falls. are most effective in ensuring employer compliance and reducing risks to workers. In addition, despite a 2010 directive calling for greater participation of the OSHA national office in regional office comprehensive audits, there is still minimal participation by the national office in these audits. Without the independent perspective of the national office, OSHA cannot assure that results of regional office audits of themselves are impartial and reasonable. Lack of such guidance may allow enforcement deficiencies to go undetected, increasing the risk of worker injuries, illnesses, and death. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve OSHA’s assessments of its effectiveness and its monitoring of federal and state enforcement efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health to: 1. consistently incorporate outcomes in its assessments of enforcement 2. annually analyze the results of its MAP and FAME audits to identify and address systemic problems and leading practices; 3. ensure that OSHA national staff participate in regional office comprehensive audits to enhance independence in accordance with OSHA’s MAP 2010 directive; and 4. provide consistent guidance for scheduling state EFAME audits to ensure that they are conducted on a regular basis and include mandatory on-site case file reviews. However, OSHA raised some concerns about them. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to examine 1) how the Department of Labor’s (Labor) Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) monitoring of its own and state enforcement efforts compares, and 2) recent steps OSHA has taken to evaluate the effectiveness of federal and state enforcement efforts. We also reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. | Why GAO Did This Study
OSHA is responsible for overseeing occupational safety and health for more than 130 million workers. In about half the states, OSHA sets and enforces compliance with safety and health standards. The remaining states set and enforce their own standards under OSHA-approved plans. In fiscal year 2010, OSHA strengthened its monitoring of staterun programs following a dozen worker deaths in one of those states. Questions have since been raised about how closely OSHA monitors its own enforcement efforts. GAO examined 1) how OSHA's monitoring of its own and state enforcement efforts compares, and 2) recent steps OSHA has taken to evaluate the effectiveness of federal and state enforcement efforts. GAO reviewed OSHA's monitoring policies and procedures and relevant federal laws and regulations; analyzed federal and state audits; visited three OSHA regional offices; and interviewed OSHA officials and other experts.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) provides more frequent monitoring and more consistent guidance for its federal enforcement activities than for state enforcement activities. More specifically, OSHA regional officials review performance reports on federal activities at least every other week but review reports on state-run program activities quarterly. In addition, OSHA's guidance for audits of its regional and area offices is more consistent than the guidance for its audits of state-run programs. Guidance for audits of its offices requires that regional offices conduct a comprehensive audit with on-site review of inspection case files at least once every 4 years and other audits focused on more specific activities in all other years. In contrast, guidance for regional office audits of state-run programs changes from year to year and does not include a regular schedule for comprehensive audits with on-site case file reviews. While the frequency of OSHA's monitoring of state-run programs is necessarily different because of the independent enforcement authority of participating states, OSHA's lack of consistent guidance for audits of these state-run programs may allow enforcement deficiencies to go undetected, increasing the risk of worker injuries, illnesses, or death. In addition, there is little participation by OSHA's national office in comprehensive audits of its regional offices despite a 2010 directive to do so. As a result, OSHA cannot ensure that the results of regional audits are impartial.
OSHA is taking steps to better assess the effectiveness of both its federal enforcement efforts and of state enforcement efforts, but it is often not clear how these steps will help OSHA demonstrate what efforts result in better outcomes for workers, such as reduced worker injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. For example, OSHA recently revised some of the measures it uses to assess staterun programs by adding acceptable ranges of performance. However, the revised measures still largely focus on outputs--such as the average number of violations per inspection--rather than outcomes. OSHA is also conducting studies to examine the results of specific enforcement activities, including one designed, in part, to evaluate the effect of OSHA providing additional educational support to employers. While tracking progress in meeting performance goals-- such as the annual number of conducted inspections--is useful, the lack of focus on outcomes makes it difficult for OSHA to determine which specific enforcement activities are most effective or to convince states to implement changes designed to improve outcomes. For example, only two state-run programs raised their penalty amounts in fiscal year 2011 as recommended by OSHA; state-run program representatives stated that OSHA lacked evidence to show that higher penalties are more effective in deterring future employer violations. OSHA also does not use data already in hand to assess the effectiveness of federal and state enforcement efforts. For example, OSHA does not use data from its annual audits of its regional and area offices or of state-run programs to inform its planning or share information across regions. Additionally, OSHA annually collects data on activities conducted under emphasis programs that focus on national safety and health issues, but it does not evaluate these data to determine whether these programs are responsible for desired outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OSHA standardize guidance for its audit practices, include outcomes in its assessments of its enforcement initiatives, better use data from its audits, and ensure national office participation in audits. OSHA generally agreed with the recommendations but expressed concern about overuse of outcomes to assess effectiveness. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid as discussed later in the report. |
gao_GAO-06-577 | gao_GAO-06-577_0 | The Peacekeeping Department employs about 270 field procurement staff at its field missions. UN Procurement Tripled Due to Growth in Peacekeeping Operations
UN procurement has more than tripled over the past decade as UN peacekeeping operations have grown. UN procurement grew from $430 million in 1997 to $1.6 billion in 2005. The Control Environment over UN Procurement Is Weak
UN funds are unnecessarily vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse because the UN lacks an effective organizational structure for managing procurement, has not demonstrated a commitment to improving its professional procurement workforce, and has failed to adopt specific ethics guidance for procurement officials. These conditions have weakened the UN control environment for procurement. The UN has not established a career path for professional advancement for Procurement Service and peacekeeping procurement staff. Because of the fiduciary responsibilities held by procurement staff, the lack of specific ethics guidance increases the risk of fraud, waste and abuse. Department of Management officials informed us in April 2006 that rules for governing the conduct of staff engaged in procurement activities, including a declaration of ethical responsibilities, would be promulgated “shortly.”
The UN Has Weaknesses in Key Procurement Control Activities
We found weaknesses in key procurement control activities that are intended to provide reasonable assurance that management’s directives are followed. As a result of recent findings of impropriety involving the Procurement Service, the United Nations hired a consultant to evaluate the internal controls of its procurement operations. The UN Has Not Updated the Procurement Manual Since 2004
The UN has not updated its procurement manual since January 2004 to reflect current UN procurement policy. Conclusions
Long-standing weaknesses in the UN’s internal controls over procurement have left UN procurement funds highly vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Many of these weaknesses have been known and documented by outside experts and the UN’s own auditors for more than a decade. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN work with other member states to encourage the Secretary-General to take the following eight actions: establish clear and effective lines of authority and responsibility between headquarters and the field for UN procurement; enhance the professionalism of the UN procurement workforce by establishing a comprehensive procurement training program and a formal career path; provide the Headquarters Committee on Contracts with an adequate structure and manageable workload for contract review needs; establish an independent bid protest process for UN vendors; take action to keep the UN procurement manual complete and updated on a timely basis and complete the ethics guidance; develop a consistent process for providing reasonable assurance that the UN is conducting business with only qualified vendors; develop a strategic risk assessment process that provides reasonable assurance of systematic and comprehensive examination of headquarters and field procurement; and standardize and strengthen monitoring of procurement activities by procurement managers, including actions aimed at helping to ensure that oversight agencies’ recommendations are implemented and that officials are held accountable for their actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than a decade, experts have called on the United Nations (UN) Secretariat to correct serious deficiencies in its procurement process. Recent evidence of corruption and mismanagement in procurement suggests that millions of dollars contributed to the UN by the United States and other member states are at risk of fraud, waste and abuse. During the last decade, UN procurement has more than tripled to more than $1.6 billion in 2005, largely due to expanding UN peacekeeping operations. More than a third of that amount is procured by UN peacekeeping field missions. To review the UN's internal controls over procurement, GAO assessed key control elements, including (1) the overall control environment and (2) specific control activities aimed at providing reasonable assurance that staff are complying with directives.
What GAO Found
Weak internal controls over UN headquarters and peacekeeping procurement operations expose UN resources to significant risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. The UN's overall control environment for procurement is weakened by the absence of (1) an effective organizational structure, (2) a commitment to a professional workforce, and (3) specific ethics guidance for procurement staff. GAO found that leadership responsibilities for UN procurement are highly diffused. While the UN Department of Management is responsible for UN procurement, field procurement staff are instead supervised by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which currently lacks the expertise and capacities needed to manage field procurement activities. Also, the UN has not demonstrated a commitment to maintaining a qualified, professional procurement workforce. It has not established training requirements or a procurement career path. In addition, the UN has yet to establish specific ethics guidance for procurement staff in response to long-standing mandates by the UN General Assembly, despite recent findings of unethical behavior. GAO also found weaknesses in key control activities. For example, the UN has not addressed workload and resource problems that are impeding the ability of a key committee to review high-value contracts. Also, the UN has yet to establish an independent process to review vendor complaints, despite long-standing recommendations that it do so. In addition, the UN has not updated its procurement manual since 2004. As a result of these and other weaknesses, many millions of dollars in U.S. and other member state contributions could be vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. |
gao_GAO-15-17 | gao_GAO-15-17_0 | CPSC has broad authority to identify, assess, and address hazards associated with consumer products under the following laws:
Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), which consolidated federal safety regulatory activity relating to consumer products within CPSC;
Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) of 2008, which amended CPSA to, among other things, expand CPSC’s authorities to address consumer product safety risks and direct the agency to develop a risk assessment methodology to identify hazardous imports;
Flammable Fabrics Act, which, among other things, authorizes CPSC to prescribe flammability standards for clothing, upholstery, and other fabrics; and
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, which establishes the framework for the regulation of substances that are toxic, corrosive, combustible, or otherwise hazardous. CPSC’s Authorities and Other Factors Affect How Quickly It Responds to New and Emerging Hazards
Certain aspects of CPSC’s authorities, as well as other factors, impact how quickly CPSC responds to new and emerging hazards, including (1) compliance actions involving litigation, (2) reliance on voluntary standards, (3) rulemaking procedures, and (4) information-sharing restrictions. Reliance on Voluntary Standards Can Prolong Response to Product Safety Hazards
As previously discussed, consumer product safety laws require CPSC to rely on voluntary standards if it determines that (1) compliance with a voluntary standard would eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of injury identified and (2) there is likely to be substantial compliance with the voluntary standard. CPSC does not control the voluntary standards development process, and the laws do not establish a time frame within which standard- development organizations must finalize a voluntary standard. For example, CPSC has worked with the window-covering industry since 1994 to develop voluntary standards to address strangulation hazards stemming from window blind cords, but conflicting consumer and industry goals have prolonged the process. Our report concluded that this restriction on sharing information may hinder CPSC’s ability to identify risks from new products in a timely manner, possibly leading to injury and death if unsafe products enter the U.S. market. As of September 2014, there have been no changes to section 29(f) of CPSA. These options and their trade-offs are summarized in figure 1. Representatives discussed various challenges the approach could present. Opinions vary among current and former commissioners about the extent to which expedited rulemaking authority should be used. Enhancing CPSC’s Authorities to Address Unsafe Imports
In September 2011, CPSC staff submitted a report to Congress that recommended several statutory changes designed to improve CPSC’s ability to identify hazardous products at the ports of entry and prevent them from entering the marketplace. In August 2014, CPSC officials confirmed that they continue to support all of the statutory changes recommended in the 2011 report. Almost half of the 23 consumer and industry representatives and commissioners we interviewed expressed an opinion about whether the proposed statutory changes would enable CPSC to respond more quickly to new and emerging risks. However, a commissioner and a consumer safety expert we interviewed did not support the proposed statutory changes and said that they would not help CPSC address new and emerging risks. Specifically, because the agency relies heavily upon analyses of scientific and technical data to assess potential hazards from a growing number of consumer products, these representatives said that additional resources to hire staff with expertise in technical areas, such as toxicology, public health, epidemiology, and engineering, could improve the timeliness of CPSC’s response to new or emerging product risks. For example, changes to expand CPSC’s use of preventive approaches to consumer product safety could give the agency greater ability to respond to risks by preventing hazardous products from entering the market, but also could inhibit market innovation and impose costs on manufacturers. This report discusses (1) how CPSC’s authorities and other factors may affect the time it takes CPSC to respond to new and emerging risks and (2) proposed options that may be available to improve CPSC’s ability to respond to new and emerging risks in a timely manner and trade-offs associated with those options. | Why GAO Did This Study
CPSC is responsible for ensuring the safety of thousands of consumer products, including imports, after they enter the U.S. market. Its jurisdiction covers a range of products–from children's toys to off-road recreational vehicles. Identifying and assessing new and emerging consumer product risks can present challenges. Questions have been raised in recent congressional hearings about the length of time CPSC takes to address a safety hazard, during which injuries and fatalities can continue to occur. Section 4 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 mandated that GAO review CPSC's ability to respond quickly to new and emerging risks.
This report discusses (1) how CPSC's authorities and other factors may affect its response time to new and emerging hazards and (2) options and their trade-offs that may be available to address CPSC's ability to respond to these hazards. GAO reviewed CPSC's laws and regulations, prior GAO reports, and other published studies. Additionally, GAO interviewed CPSC commissioners and staff, consumer safety experts, legal experts, and representatives from consumer and industry organizations.
What GAO Found
According to Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) officials, industry representatives, consumer groups, and subject-matter experts GAO interviewed, the timeliness of CPSC's responses may be affected by several factors, including (1) compliance actions that can involve litigation, (2) reliance on voluntary standards, (3) rulemaking procedures, (4) restrictions on sharing information with the public and international agencies, and (5) limited agency resources. For example, CPSC must defer to a voluntary standard if it determines that compliance with a voluntary standard would eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of injury and there is likely to be substantial compliance with the voluntary standard. However, because the laws do not establish a time frame for finalizing a voluntary standard, conflicting industry and consumer interests can delay its development, sometimes for years. CPSC has worked with the window covering industry since 1994 to develop a voluntary standard to address strangulation hazards stemming from window blind cords, but as of September 2014, no voluntary standard that addresses the ongoing safety concerns had been finalized. Further, new and emerging product safety risks present challenges because, statutorily, CPSC was established to respond to risks after products have been introduced into market.
Various options have been suggested for improving CPSC's ability to respond to new and emerging product safety risks, including the following examples:
Preventative regulatory approaches . Many representatives said that regulatory approaches designed to prevent hazardous products from entering the market—such as premarket approval—could reduce consumer injuries, but could also inhibit market innovation and impose burdensome costs on manufacturers and CPSC.
Expedited rulemaking authority . Some stakeholders proposed expanding CPSC's authority to use expedited rulemaking procedures similar to those authorized in 2008 in the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, which streamlined the rulemaking process for durable infant products. Most believed streamlined procedures would enable CPSC to promulgate rules in a more timely manner to address risks, but opinions differed on the extent to which the authority should be expanded.
Enhancing CPSC's authorities to address unsafe imports . CPSC has proposed several statutory changes to improve its ability to identify hazardous products at the ports of entry and prevent them from entering the marketplace. About half the representatives GAO talked to supported the proposed changes, with some exceptions where the changes would impose additional burdens on industry.
Enhanced data analysis capabilities . Most representatives agreed that CPSC could respond to new and emerging hazards more quickly if it had additional funding for technology and staff with technical expertise in the areas of engineering, toxicology, and public health to analyze product hazard data and conduct risk assessments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. In prior reports GAO has made a recommendation related to CPSC's participation in voluntary standards development and suggested that Congress address restrictions on how CPSC is able to share information with its international counterparts. |
gao_GAO-04-1036 | gao_GAO-04-1036_0 | White- collar crime ranked seventh in the priority list, and violent crime ranked eighth. About 550 of these positions (more than 80 percent of the permanently shifted positions) came from the FBI’s drug program, with substantially smaller reductions from the white-collar and violent crime programs. Additionally, the FBI has had a continuing need to temporarily redirect special agent resources from other criminal investigative programs to address counterterrorism and other higher-priority needs. The FBI continues to redirect agents from drug, white-collar, and violent crime programs to address the counterterrorism-related workload demands. Also, as expected with the significant shift in resources to address national security priorities, the FBI’s referrals of counterterrorism matters to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution have increased since September 11, while referrals of drug, white-collar, and violent crime matters have decreased. In fiscal year 2001, which ended just after September 11, 2001, the FBI referred 236 counterterrorism matters to U.S. The combined number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by about 10 percent since September 11. Attorneys from all federal sources decreased about 2 percent. Combined FBI and DEA Drug Program Agent Resources Have Decreased, but More DEA Positions Are Planned
As figure 4 shows, the combined number of FBI and DEA nonsupervisory field agent positions has decreased about 10 percent since the terrorist attacks, from about 4,500 nonsupervisory field agents at the end of fiscal year 2001 to about 4,000 field agent positions in the second quarter of fiscal year 2004. Law Enforcement Practitioners We Interviewed Valued the FBI’s Role but Had Mixed Views on the Effect of the FBI’s Shift in Resources on Drug Enforcement Efforts
Law enforcement practitioners we interviewed had mixed views about the impact of the FBI’s shift in resources on drug enforcement efforts. While many interviewees representing each of the locations and criminal justice organizations we visited generally described the FBI as a valuable law enforcement partner, some of them said that they did not think the FBI’s shift in resources had a significant impact on drug enforcement efforts in their communities. On the other hand, some law enforcement officials said that drug investigations have suffered as a result of the FBI shift in resources to new priority areas. Current Data Should Be Viewed as Short-Term Indicators with Limitations
Our analyses provide perspectives in the short term (less than 3 years) and are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. Our Analysis Did Not Identify Conclusive Effect on Federal White-Collar and Violent Crime Enforcement Resulting from FBI Priority Shifts
We did not conclusively identify an effect on federal white-collar and violent crime enforcement resulting from the FBI’s shift in priorities after September 11. Overall, all federal agencies referred about 6 percent fewer white-collar crime matters to U.S. Attorneys—-down from 12,792 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 matters in fiscal year 2003. However, violent crime referrals increased about 29 percent during this period, from 14,546 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 18,723 matters in fiscal year 2003. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the effect of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) post- September 11 priority shifts on federal efforts to combat domestic drug crime, we analyzed (1) the impact of resource shifts on the combined FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) nonsupervisory field special agent resources devoted to drug enforcement; (2) changes in the number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug crime matters; (3) changes in the number of drug crime matters referred from all federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution; and (4) impacts, if any, observed by headquarters and field law enforcement officials we interviewed. | Why GAO Did This Study
As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has committed to a transformation to increase its focus on national security. The FBI has shifted agent resources to its top priorities of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime. Some of these agent resources were shifted away from drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement programs. The FBI's drug program has sustained, by far, the largest reduction in FBI agent workforce--about 550 positions, or more than 80 percent of the nonsupervisory field agents who were permanently reprogrammed. In addition, the FBI has had a continuing need to temporarily redirect agents from drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement to address counterterrorism-related workload demands. While GAO and other organizations have focused considerable attention on the progress of the FBI's transformation, this report addresses questions about the extent to which the shift in resources has affected federal efforts to combat drug, white-collar, and violent crime and whether other agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the drug enforcement area, are filling gaps created by FBI resource shifts.
What GAO Found
The data GAO examined are inconclusive about the effect of the shifts in the FBI's priorities after September 11 on federal efforts to combat drug, white-collar, and violent crime. Indicators are mixed on the effect of the FBI shift on federal drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement. Further, GAO's analyses should be cautiously viewed as short-term indicators that are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. Data GAO examined on federal drug enforcement efforts did not show a conclusive effect of the FBI's shift in agent resources to priority areas. GAO found that combined FBI and DEA nonsupervisory field agent resources decreased by about 10 percent since September 11 but that DEA is expecting significant increases in positions over the next 2 fiscal years. The combined number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by about 10 percent since 2001, from 22,736 matters in fiscal year 2001, which ended just after September 11, to 20,387 matters in fiscal year 2003. This decline may be attributed, at least in part, to an increased emphasis on cases targeting major drug organizations rather than to fewer investigative resources. In addition, referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys from all federal sources decreased about 2 percent. Similarly, data do not show a conclusive impact on federal efforts to combat white-collar and violent crime resulting from the FBI's shift in priorities. For example, while the number of white-collar crime referrals from federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys declined by about 6 percent, from 12,792 in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 in fiscal year 2003, violent crime referrals from all federal sources have increased by about 29 percent, from 14,546 in fiscal year 2001 to 18,723 in fiscal year 2003. Views of law enforcement practitioners GAO interviewed were mixed on the effect of the FBI's shift in resources on drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement efforts. Although these views are not representative of all practitioners, some did not think the FBI's shift had a significant impact on these crime enforcement efforts in their communities, while others said that drug, white-collar and violent-crime investigations had suffered. |
gao_GAO-11-529 | gao_GAO-11-529_0 | Although Stand-Alone Proprietary Trading and Fund Investment Revenues Were Generally Small Relative to Total Revenues, Such Activities Caused Larger Losses during the Financial Crisis
Proprietary trading and hedge fund and private equity fund investments, like other banking and trading activities, provide revenue and create the potential for losses at banking entities. Financial institutions have conducted proprietary trading at stand-alone proprietary-trading desks and may have also conducted proprietary trading elsewhere in the firm. We analyzed data on activities of the stand-alone proprietary-trading desks of the six largest U.S. bank holding companies from June 2006 through December 2010, but determined through our work that collecting data on other proprietary trading was not feasible because the firms did not separately maintain records on such activities and because of the uncertainty over the types of activities that will be considered proprietary trading until the completion of the required regulatory rulemaking. The revenues from these firms’ stand-alone proprietary trading were generally small in most quarters relative to revenues from all trading and other activities. These activities also resulted in larger losses as a percent of total losses during the financial crisis. However, the likelihood of such potential outcomes was unclear. Although Stand-Alone Proprietary Trading Generally Produced Small Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenues, It Experienced Larger Losses during the Financial Crisis
According to regulators, researchers, and our analysis, most proprietary trading among banking entities has been conducted by the largest bank holding companies in the United States. To provide information about the extent to which proprietary trading posed risks to these firms, we attempted to gather information on stand-alone proprietary trading as well as other proprietary trading that may have been occurring within other trading activities of the firms. While the combined revenue over the period totaled $15.6 billion, the combined losses totaled $15.8 billion. One of the six bank holding companies was responsible for both the largest quarterly revenue at any single firm from stand-alone proprietary trading since 2006, which was $1.2 billion, and the two largest single-firm quarterly losses of $8.7 billion and $1.9 billion. To further examine the impact of stand-alone proprietary trading and hedge fund and private equity fund investment activities on their overall performance during this time period, we determined the change in each quarter from the previous quarter in the combined net income of the six firms—which would be negative when a firm experiences either less revenue or losses in particular business activities—and compared them to changes in revenues or losses from all trading activities, stand-alone proprietary trading, and private equity fund and hedge fund investments. During this 4.5-year period, the six firms usually experienced larger revenues and losses from activities other than stand-alone proprietary trading and investments in hedge and private equity funds, including writedowns on the values of these firms’ positions in CDOs and leveraged loans, and potentially including aspects of these and other activities that could be defined as prohibited proprietary trading as part of the rulemaking. Oversight Has Not Always Been Effective in Assessing the Adequacy of Risk Management at the Largest U.S. Financial Institutions
The Federal Reserve, OCC, and SEC share primary responsibility for overseeing risks associated with trading and investment activities by large U.S. bank holding companies, including proprietary trading and fund investment activities. Federal financial regulators have also taken steps to prevent what they consider conflicts of interest associated with trading and investment activities. However, implementing the act’s restrictions to fully ensure that such risks no longer exist at the firms raises new challenges for the regulators. While examiners have collected some information on certain trading and fund activities, they have yet to collect comprehensive information. While some market participants expressed concerns that the restrictions on proprietary trading activities could negatively affect U.S. financial institutions and the economy by reducing banks’ ability to diversify their income and compete with foreign institutions and reducing liquidity in asset markets, the actual potential for such effects remain unclear. Although we acknowledge the difficulties of identifying and collecting additional information, gathering more comprehensive information on the nature of and volume of trading at stand-alone proprietary-trading desks, as well as where the firms may be conducting prohibited proprietary trading at market-making desks or elsewhere in the firm, would assist the regulators in implementing the act’s restrictions in various ways. The bank holding companies also provided us with data on those hedge and private equity funds that they believed would be restricted by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the act). We also reviewed the comments submitted to the Financial Stability Oversight Council as part of its study required by Section 619 of the act. | Why GAO Did This Study
In addition to trading on behalf of customers, banks and their affiliates have conducted proprietary trading, using their own funds to profit from short-term price changes in asset markets. To restrain risk-taking and reduce the potential for federal support for banking entities, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the act) prohibits banking entities from engaging in certain proprietary trading. It also restricts investments in hedge funds, which actively trade in securities and other financial contracts, and private equity funds, which use debt financing to invest in companies or other lessliquid assets. Regulators must implement these restrictions by October 2011. As required by Section 989 of the act, GAO reviewed (1) what is known about the risks associated with such activities and the potential effects of the restrictions and (2) how regulators oversee such activities. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed the trading and fund investment activities of the largest U.S. bank holding companies and collected selected data on their profits, losses, and risk measures. GAO also reviewed regulators' examinations and other materials related to the oversight of the largest bank holding companies.
What GAO Found
Proprietary trading and investments in hedge funds and private equity funds, like other trading and investment activities, provide banking entities with revenue but also create the potential for losses. Banking entities have conducted proprietary trading at stand-alone proprietary-trading desks but also have conducted such trading elsewhere within their firms. GAO determined that collecting information on activities other than at stand-alone proprietary trading desks was not feasible because the firms did not separately maintain records on such activities. As a result, GAO did not analyze data on broader proprietary trading activity but analyzed data on stand-alone proprietary-trading desks at the six largest U.S. bank holding companies from June 2006 through December 2010. Compared to these firms' overall revenues, their stand-alone proprietary trading generally produced small revenues in most quarters and some larger losses during the financial crisis. In 13 quarters during this period, stand-alone proprietary trading produced revenues of $15.6 billion--3.1 percent or less of the firms' combined quarterly revenues from all activities. But in five quarters during the financial crisis, these firms lost a combined $15.8 billion from stand-alone proprietary trading--resulting in an overall loss from such activities over the 4.5 year period of about $221 million. However, one of the six firms was responsible for both the largest quarterly revenue at any single firm of $1.2 billion and two of the largest single-firm quarterly losses of $8.7 billion and $1.9 billion. These firms' hedge and private equity fund investments also experienced small revenues in most quarters but somewhat larger losses during the crisis compared to total firm revenues. Losses from these firms' other activities, which include lending activities and other activities that could potentially be defined as proprietary trading, affected their overall net incomes more during this period than stand-alone proprietary trading and fund investments. Some market participants and observers were concerned that the act's restrictions could negatively affect U.S. financial institutions by reducing their income diversification and ability to compete with foreign institutions and reducing liquidity in asset markets. However, with little evidence existing on these effects, the likelihood of these potential outcomes was unclear, and others argued that removing the risks of these activities benefits banking entities and the U.S. financial system. Financial regulators have struggled in the past to effectively oversee bank holding companies. While the act's restrictions reduce the scope of activities regulators must monitor, implementing them poses challenges, including how to best ensure that firms do not take prohibited proprietary positions while conducting their permitted customer-trading activities. Regulators have yet to gather comprehensive information on the extent, revenues, and risk levels associated with activities that will potentially be covered, which would help them assess whether expected changes in firms' revenues and risk levels have occurred. Without such data, regulators will not know the full scope of such activities outside of stand-alone proprietary trading desks and may be less able to ensure that the firms have taken sufficient steps to curtail restricted activity. As part of implementing the new restrictions, regulators should collect and review more comprehensive information on the nature and volume of activities potentially covered by the act. Treasury and the financial regulators agreed to consider this as part of their rulemaking. |
gao_GAO-14-532T | gao_GAO-14-532T_0 | High-Risk Areas for Which DHS Has Sole Responsibility Strengthening DHS Management Functions
DHS has made progress in addressing high-risk areas for which it has sole responsibility, but significant work remains. DHS has made important progress in implementing, transforming, strengthening, and integrating its management functions in human capital, acquisition, financial management, and IT. This has included taking numerous actions specifically designed to address our criteria for removing areas from the high-risk list. As shown in table 1, DHS has met two of our criteria for removal from the high-risk list (leadership commitment and a corrective action plan), and has partially met the remaining three criteria (a framework to monitor progress; capacity; and demonstrated, sustained progress). Capacity (partially met). is more than the government-wide decrease of 4 percentage points over the same time period. Accordingly, DHS has considerable work ahead to improve its employee morale. These assessments focus on occupations DHS identifies as critical to its mission, including emergency management specialists and cyber- focused IT management personnel. However, DHS needs to improve its acquisition management. DHS’s acquisition policy largely reflects key acquisition management practices, but the department has not implemented it consistently. In March 2014, we reported that the Transportation Security Administration does not collect or analyze available information that could be used to enhance the effectiveness of its advanced imaging technology. In March 2014, we also found that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not fully follow DHS policy regarding testing for the integrated fixed towers being deployed on the Arizona border. As a result, DHS does not have complete information on how the towers will operate once they are fully deployed. About half of major programs lack an approved baseline, and 77 percent lack approved life cycle cost estimates. However, a significant amount of work remains to be completed on the other seven outcomes related to DHS’s financial statements, internal control over financial reporting, and modernizing financial management systems. For example, one of the material weaknesses involves deficiencies in property, plant, and equipment. However, DHS needs to
DHS also needs to effectively manage the modernization of financial management systems at the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). IT Management. While important steps have been taken to define IT investment management processes generally consistent with best practices, work is needed to demonstrate progress in implementing these processes across DHS’s 13 IT investment portfolios. In July 2012, we recommended that DHS finalize the policies and procedures associated with its new tiered IT governance structure and continue to implement key processes supporting this structure. DHS agreed with these recommendations; however, as of April 2014, the department had not finalized the key IT governance directive, and the draft structure has been implemented across only 5 of the 13 investment portfolios. In addition, in April 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum committing to improving DHS’s planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes through strengthened departmental structures and increased capability.and most significant outcome—implement actions and outcomes in each management area to develop consistent or consolidated processes and systems within and across its management functional areas—DHS needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress integrating its management functions within and across the department and its components and take additional actions to further and more effectively integrate the department. As we reported in March 2013, to more fully address the Strengthening DHS Management Functions high-risk area, DHS needs to continue implementing its Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management and show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its key management initiatives and corrective actions and achieving outcomes. In doing so, it will be important for DHS to maintain its current level of top leadership support and sustained commitment to ensure continued progress in executing its corrective actions through completion; continue to implement its plan for addressing this high-risk area and periodically report its progress to Congress and GAO; monitor the effectiveness of its efforts to establish reliable resource estimates at the department and component levels, address and work to mitigate any resource gaps, and prioritize initiatives as needed to ensure it has the capacity to implement and sustain its corrective actions; closely track and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective actions and make midcourse adjustments, as needed; and make continued progress in addressing the 30 actions and outcomes—for the majority of which significant work remains—and demonstrate that systems, personnel, and policies are in place to ensure that progress can be sustained over time. National Flood Insurance Program
FEMA has made progress in all of the areas required for removal of the NFIP from the high-risk list, but needs to initiate or complete additional actions; also, recent legislation has created challenges for FEMA in addressing the financial exposure created by the program. For example, FEMA has not completed actions in certain areas, such as modernizing its claims and policy management system and overseeing compensation of insurers that sell NFIP policies. As of December 2013, FEMA owed the Treasury $24 billion—primarily to pay claims associated with Superstorm Sandy (2012) and Hurricane Katrina (2005)—and had not made a principal payment since 2010. Capacity (partially met). Government-wide High-Risk Areas in Which DHS Plays a Critical Role
Progress has been made in the government-wide high-risk areas in which DHS plays a critical role, but significant work remains. Information Security and Cyber Critical Infrastructure Protection
As we reported in our February 2013 high-risk update, the White House and federal agencies, including DHS, have taken a variety of actions that were intended to enhance federal and critical infrastructure cybersecurity. For example, H.R. Continue to develop continuous diagnostics and mitigation capabilities and assist agencies in developing and acquiring them. This effort is intended to protect networks and enhance an agency’s ability to see and counteract day-to-day cyber threats. Protecting Cyber Critical Infrastructure
DHS, in conjunction with other executive branch entities, has taken steps to enhance the protection of cyber critical infrastructure. Enhancing the Sharing of Terrorism-Related Information
DHS has made significant progress in enhancing the sharing of information on terrorist threats and in supporting government-wide efforts to improve such sharing. Overall, the federal government has made progress in addressing the terrorism-related information-sharing high-risk area. DHS is also taking steps to measure the extent to which fusion centers are coordinating and sharing information with other field-based task forces and centers—such as Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Forces—and assess In April 2013, we reported that opportunities to improve coordination. DHS information-sharing mission. Our report, expected to be issued later this month, will address (1) the extent to which the intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise are integrated to support departmental strategic intelligence priorities, and are unnecessarily overlapping or duplicative; (2) the extent to which Office of Intelligence and Analysis customers report that they find products and other analytic services to be useful, and what steps, if any, the office has taken to address any concerns customers report; and (3) challenges the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has faced in maintaining a skilled analytic workforce and steps it has taken to address these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has regularly reported on government operations identified as high risk because of their greater vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. DHS has sole or critical responsibility for four GAO high-risk areas—(1) strengthening its management functions, (2) NFIP, (3) information security and cyber critical infrastructure protection, and (4) terrorism-related information sharing. This statement addresses DHS's progress and work remaining in addressing high-risk areas for which (1) it has sole responsibility and (2) it has critical, but shared responsibility.
This statement is based on GAO's February 2013 high-risk update, reports and testimonies issued from March 2013 through April 2014, and analyses from GAO's ongoing assessment of DHS's efforts since February 2013 to address its high-risk designations. For these analyses, GAO examined DHS documents and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in addressing high-risk areas for which it has sole responsibility, but significant work remains.
Strengthening management functions. In this area, DHS has met two and partially met three of GAO's five criteria for removing areas from the high-risk list. Specifically, DHS has met the criteria for having (1) demonstrated leadership commitment, and (2) a corrective action plan for addressing its management risks. However, it has partially met GAO's criteria for (1) capacity (having sufficient resources); (2) having a framework to monitor progress; and (3) demonstrated, sustained progress. DHS has made important progress, but to more fully address GAO's high-risk designation, DHS needs to show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing key management initiatives. For example:
Human capital management. DHS has developed and demonstrated progress in implementing a strategic human capital plan. However, DHS needs to improve other aspects of its human capital management. As GAO reported in December 2013, the Office of Personnel Management's 2013 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey data showed that DHS ranked 36th of 37 federal agencies in a measure of employee job satisfaction. In addition, employee satisfaction had decreased 7 percentage points since 2011, which is more than the government-wide decrease. Accordingly, DHS has considerable work ahead to improve its employee morale. Further, DHS is finalizing its analysis of skill gaps in key portions of its workforce including emergency management specialists and cyber-focused IT management personnel.
Acquisition management. DHS has made progress in initiating efforts to validate required acquisition documents. However, about half of DHS major programs lack an approved baseline, 77 percent lack approved life cycle cost estimates, and the department has not implemented its acquisition policy consistently. In March 2014, GAO reported that the Transportation Security Administration does not collect or analyze available information that could be used to enhance the effectiveness of its advanced imaging technology. In March 2014, GAO also found that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not fully follow DHS policy regarding testing for the integrated fixed towers being deployed on the Arizona border. As a result, DHS does not have complete information on how the towers will operate once they are fully deployed.
Financial management. DHS has made progress toward improving its financial management, but a significant amount of work remains to be completed. For example, DHS needs to eliminate all material weaknesses at the department level in areas such as property, plant, and equipment before its financial auditor can assert that the controls are effective. DHS also needs to effectively manage the modernization of financial management systems at the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Information Technology (IT) Management. While important steps have been taken to define IT investment management processes, work is needed to demonstrate progress in implementing these processes across DHS's 13 IT investment portfolios. In July 2012, GAO recommended that DHS finalize the policies and procedures associated with its new tiered IT governance structure and continue to implement key processes supporting this structure. DHS agreed with these recommendations; however, as of April 2014, the department had not finalized the key IT governance directive, and the draft structure has been implemented across only 5 of the 13 investment portfolios.
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) . DHS's FEMA, which manages the NFIP, has partially met the five criteria for NFIP removal from the high-risk list, but needs to initiate or complete additional actions. For example, FEMA has not completed actions in certain areas, such as modernizing its claims and policy management system and overseeing compensation of insurers that sell NFIP policies. In addition, FEMA is unlikely to generate sufficient revenue to cover future catastrophic losses or repay billions of dollars borrowed from the Department of the Treasury. As of December 2013, FEMA owed the Treasury $24 billion—primarily to pay claims associated with Superstorm Sandy (2012) and Hurricane Katrina (2005)—and had not made a principal payment since 2010.
Progress has been made in the following government-wide high-risk areas in which DHS plays a critical role, but significant work remains.
Information security and cyber critical infrastructure protection. Federal agencies, including DHS, have taken a variety of actions that were intended to enhance federal and critical infrastructure cybersecurity, but more efforts are needed. DHS needs to take several actions to better oversee and assist agencies in improving information security practices. For instance, DHS should continue to assist agencies in developing and acquiring continuous diagnostic and mitigation capabilities to protect networks and counteract day-to-day cyber threats. In addition, DHS has taken steps to enhance the protection of cyber critical infrastructure but could do more to enhance coordination with the private sector.
Terrorism-related information sharing. The federal government faces significant challenges in sharing terrorism-related information. However, DHS has made significant progress in enhancing the sharing of this information. For example, DHS is taking steps to measure the extent to which fusion centers—collaborative efforts within states that investigate and respond to criminal and terrorist activity—are coordinating with other field-based task forces and centers to share terrorism-related information, and assessing opportunities to improve coordination and information sharing. The federal government has important work ahead to address the high risk issue, such as developing metrics that measure the homeland security results achieved from improved information sharing.
What GAO Recommends
This testimony contains no new recommendations. GAO has made over 2,100 recommendations to DHS since its establishment in 2003 to strengthen its management and integration efforts, among other things. DHS has implemented more than 65 percent of these recommendations and has actions under way to address others. |
gao_GAO-16-128 | gao_GAO-16-128_0 | ORAU groups its workforce development activities into the following three categories:
Research participation program: This program provides research experiences to students, postgraduates, faculty, and other participants. Agency Expenditures for the ORISE Program Increased from 2010 through 2014, with Stipends Making Up the Largest Portion of Expenses
From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014, DOE and other sponsoring agencies expended a total of $776.4 million for the ORISE program, with DOD, DOE, and HHS accounting for the majority of the expenditures. Over that period, annual program expenditures increased by 73 percent, and the number of annual appointments rose by 42 percent. DOD, HHS, and DOE collectively had the highest expenditures for the program (over 87 percent) over that period and had the highest number of appointments in fiscal year 2014 (over 88 percent). Methods of setting stipends. Responsibility for ensuring research participants do not perform inherently governmental functions is also dispersed among sponsoring agencies. Sponsoring agency components establish their own objectives for sponsoring research participants and decide whether and how to assess the extent to which the ORISE program meets those objectives, according to DOE officials. Some but not all DOE, DOD, and HHS components have used questionnaires, and some components have used other methods to assess how well the ORISE program is working in the short term, such as over the course of a research participant’s appointment. ORISE program coordinators and other officials at sponsoring agency components described other methods they use to assess the program, such as asking research participants about their experiences and monitoring the progress of research participants’ research projects, research participants’ publications and presentations related to their research, and the number of current agency employees who were past ORISE research participants. The official noted that, without such methods, they face challenges in assessing the long-term effectiveness of the ORISE program. For example, according to the official, such challenges include developing methods to track research participants over the course of their careers and determining the extent to which a participant’s degree of success in a STEM field is a result of the ORISE program as opposed to other educational experiences. Documents Used by DOE, DOD, and HHS for Research Participants and Mentors Provide Varying Levels of Detail on Inherently Governmental Functions
In 2011, OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued guidance to assist agency officers and employees in ensuring that only federal employees perform work that is inherently governmental or otherwise needs to be reserved to the public sector. Documents we reviewed that are issued by DOE, DOD, and HHS, regarding research participants at their agencies, and that are used by sponsoring agency components’ coordinators, mentors, and research participants varied in level of detail on activities considered inherently governmental functions. DOE and other sponsoring agency officials noted that ORISE research participants are assigned to research projects that generally do not involve inherently governmental functions. However, GAO found that some research participants’ projects involve activities that are closely associated with inherently governmental functions, such as participating in policy and strategic planning meetings, which may increase the risk of the participants performing inherently governmental functions. Development of detailed guidance could help sponsoring agencies fulfill their responsibilities as identified in OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy guidance on inherently governmental functions. However, the level of detail in documents currently used by DOE, DOD, and HHS varies, with some documents describing specific types of activities that are inherently governmental functions and others only providing general statements that research participants are not federal government employees. More detailed guidance can help ORISE coordinators, mentors, and research participants ensure that they are adhering to the prohibition on research participants as nonfederal government employees performing inherently government functions. In their written comments, DOE, DOD, and HHS described the measures they will take to implement our recommendation on inherently governmental functions. Appendix II: Federal Expenditures for and Appointments in the ORISE Research Participation Program
The following tables detail federal agencies’ expenditures for and research participant appointments they sponsored as part of the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) research participation program for fiscal years 2010 through 2014. In each table, the three agencies that account for the largest share of expenditures and appointments—the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Energy (DOE)—are broken out into component agencies that sponsored research participants. | Why GAO Did This Study
The ORISE research participation program seeks to enhance the future scientific and engineering workforce by providing students, postgraduates, and faculty with hands-on research experiences in federal agencies. The program is administered by a DOE contractor, and other agencies sponsor research participants via interagency agreements with DOE. Research participants engage in a variety of projects at DOE and other sponsoring agencies, but they are not considered federal government employees and thus are prohibited from performing inherently governmental functions.
GAO was asked to review the ORISE research participation program. This report examines (1) program expenditures by all sponsoring agencies and (2) selected agencies' assessments of program effectiveness and their guidance on inherently governmental functions.
GAO reviewed program data for fiscal years 2010-2014, the five most recent years for which data were available; examined program policies and guidance at DOE, DOD, and HHS, the three agencies that sponsored the most participants in fiscal year 2014; and interviewed officials at those three agencies.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the 11 departments and other federal agencies that sponsor research participants collectively expended $776.4 million for activities carried out through the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) research participation program (ORISE program). The three agencies with the highest expenditures for the program over the 5-year period were the Department of Energy (DOE), which oversees the contractor managing ORISE, and the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which both sponsor research participants via interagency agreements with DOE. Expenditures increased 73 percent over that period, and the number of appointments increased 42 percent. Stipends accounted for 82 percent of expenditures over that period, with the remainder going to other participant expenses, overhead and program support, and administrative and security charges. Agencies' expenditures per appointment varied for several reasons, such as differences in methods of setting stipends.
Components within DOE, DOD, and HHS that sponsor research participants have performed some assessments of the short-term effectiveness of the ORISE program, but provide varying levels of detail to agencies' employees and research participants about inherently governmental functions—those functions that are so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by federal government employees.
Program effectiveness. Sponsoring agency components establish their own objectives for research participants and can decide whether and how to assess the extent to which the ORISE program meets those objectives. DOE, DOD, and HHS components have used questionnaires and other methods to assess how well the ORISE program meets the short-term needs of research participants and of the agency staff who oversee their activities. Agencies also face challenges in assessing the program's long-term effectiveness; for example, they do not have methods to track research participants over their careers to determine the extent to which participants' success is a result of the program. DOE has worked with other agencies on developing ways to address such challenges.
Inherently governmental functions. Federal guidance directs agencies to develop internal procedures to ensure that only federal employees perform inherently governmental functions. DOE, DOD, and HHS sponsoring components' guidance for research participants that GAO reviewed had varying levels of detail on inherently governmental functions. Officials at these agencies said that research participants' projects generally do not involve inherently governmental functions, but GAO found that some research participants' projects involve activities that are closely associated with inherently governmental functions, such as participating in certain policy and strategic planning meetings, which may increase the risk of the participants performing inherently governmental functions. Development of detailed guidance could help sponsoring components reduce this risk and help officials better ensure adherence to the federal guidance on inherently governmental functions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE, DOD, and HHS develop detailed guidance to inform their employees and research participants about inherently governmental functions. DOE, DOD, and HHS concurred with the recommendation and said they will take additional measures to provide detailed guidance to relevant parties. |
gao_NSIAD-96-165 | gao_NSIAD-96-165_0 | Various statutes affect the mix of depot maintenance workload between the public and private sectors. The DOD report, Policy Regarding Performance of Depot-Level Maintenance and Repair, was submitted to your committees on April 4, 1996. The policy does not address how DOD intends to further downsize its depot maintenance capacity and improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of remaining DOD depot maintenance infrastructure. DOD Policy Is Inconsistent With Congressional Guidance With Respect to Competing Noncore Workloads Maintained in DOD Depots
Section 311(d)(5) of the act provides that for depot maintenance workloads in excess of that required to be performed by DOD depots, (i.e., noncore workloads), DOD’s policy should provide for competition “between public and private entities when there is sufficient potential for realizing cost savings based upon adequate private-sector competition and technical capabilities.” DOD’s policy is inconsistent with this instruction. Under this policy, DOD depots would be used sparingly for public-private competitions and DOD depots cannot compete for all noncore workloads where “adequate private sector competition” exists, even though they may offer the most cost-effective source of repair. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) policy regarding depot-level maintenance and repair, focusing on the: (1) future role of defense depots; and (2) inconsistency of DOD policy with current statutes and congressional directives.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the DOD depot maintenance policy calls for a greater mix of public and private-sector maintenance capabilities; (2) DOD will likely rely more on private-sector depots given the uncertainty of future workload assignments; (3) the policy is vague and offers no guidance as to how DOD should downsize its depot maintenance capacity; (4) the policy ignores congressional directives calling for competition between public and private-sector entities for non-core maintenance work; (5) under this policy, DOD depots would not be allowed to compete for non-core workloads even if they offer the most cost-effective source of repair; and (6) DOD needs to develop a system that allows excess capacity reduction and vigorous public-private competition between DOD depots and commercial firms. |
gao_GAO-06-948T | gao_GAO-06-948T_0 | To make AYP, schools generally must: show that the percentage of students scoring at the proficient level or higher meets the state proficiency target for the school as a whole and for designated student groups, test 95 percent of all students and those in designated groups, and meet goals for an additional academic indicator, such as the state’s graduation rate. States measure AYP using a status model that determines whether or not schools and students in designated groups meet proficiency targets on state tests 1 year at a time. From this point, they set annual proficiency targets that increase up to 100 percent by 2014. Nearly All States Reported Using or Considering Growth Models to Measure Academic Performance
Twenty-six states reported using growth models in addition to using their status models to track the performance of schools, designated student groups, or individual students, as reported in our March 2006 survey. For example, Massachusetts used a model that measures growth for the school as a whole and for designated student groups. Tennessee reported using a growth model that sets different goals for each individual student based on the students’ previous test scores. Certain Growth Models Can Measure Progress toward Key NCLBA Goals
Certain growth models can measure progress in achieving key NCLBA goals of reaching universal proficiency by 2014 and closing achievement gaps. Massachusetts designed a model that can measure progress toward the key goals of NCLBA by setting targets for the improvement of schools and their student groups that increase over time until all students are proficient in 2014. In order to make AYP under this proposal, a school could reach the state’s status model targets by counting as proficient in the current year those students who are predicted to be proficient in the future. States Face Challenges in Implementing Growth Models
States generally face challenges in collecting and analyzing the data required to implement growth models including models that would meet the law’s goals. Education has initiatives that may help states address these challenges. Using growth models can present risks for states if schools are designated as making AYP while still needing assistance to progress. In November 2005, Education announced a pilot project for states to submit proposals for using a growth model—one that meets criteria established by the department—along with their status model, to determine AYP. While NCLBA does not specify the use of growth models for making AYP determinations, the department started the pilot to evaluate how growth models might help schools meet NCLBA proficiency goals and close achievement gaps. Through its approval of Massachusetts’ model and the growth model pilot program, Education is proceeding prudently in its effort to allow states to use growth models to meet NCLBA requirements. While growth models may be defined as tracking the same students over time, GAO used a definition that also includes tracking the performance of schools and groups of students. GAO used this definition of growth to reflect the variety of approaches states are taking to measure academic progress. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) requires that states improve academic performance so that all students reach proficiency in reading and mathematics by 2014 and that achievement gaps close among student groups. States set annual proficiency targets using an approach known as a status model, which calculates test scores 1 year at a time. Some states have interest in using growth models that measure changes in test scores over time to determine if schools are meeting proficiency targets. The Chairman of the Committee on Education and the Workforce asked GAO to testify on its recent report on measuring academic growth. Specifically, this testimony discusses (1) how many states are using growth models and for what purposes, (2) how growth models can measure progress toward achieving key NCLBA goals, and (3) what challenges states face in using growth models especially to meet the law's key goals. While growth models may be defined as tracking the same students over time, GAO used a definition that also included tracking the performance of schools and groups of students. In comments on the report, Education said that this definition could be confusing. GAO used this definition of growth to reflect the variety of approaches states were taking.
What GAO Found
Nearly all states were using or considering growth models for a variety of purposes in addition to their status models as of March 2006. Twenty-six states were using growth models, and another 22 were either considering or in the process of implementing them. Most states using growth models measured progress for schools and for student groups, and 7 also measured growth for individual students. States used growth models to target resources for students that need extra help or award teachers bonuses based on their school's performance. Certain growth models are capable of tracking progress toward the goals of universal proficiency by 2014 and closing achievement gaps. For example, Massachusetts uses its model to set targets based on the growth that it expects from schools and their student groups. Schools can make adequate yearly progress (AYP) if they reach these targets, even if they fall short of reaching the statewide proficiency targets set with the state's status model. Tennessee designed a model that projects students' test scores and whether they will be proficient in the future. In this model, if 79 percent of a school's students are predicted to be proficient in 3 years, the school would reach the state's 79 percent proficiency target for the current school year (2005-2006). States face challenges measuring academic growth, such as creating data and assessment systems to support growth models and having personnel to analyze and communicate results. The use of growth models to determine AYP may also challenge states to make sure that students in low-performing schools receive needed assistance. U.S. Department of Education (Education) initiatives may help states address these challenges. Education started a pilot project for states to use growth models that meet the department's specific criteria, including models that track progress of individual students, to determine AYP. Education also provided grants to states to track individual test scores over time. |
gao_HEHS-98-153 | gao_HEHS-98-153_0 | Further, HCFA is responsible for monitoring HMOs to ensure that all Medicare requirements are met, including that HMOs’ reports of beneficiaries’ institutional status are accurate. 1.) HCFA based the higher payment rates for institutional status on historical evidence that beneficiaries living in these types of facilities had greater medical needs and higher medical costs than those who lived in the community. However, some facilities classified by HMOs as institutions clearly did not serve seniors with serious health problems. Facilities of this nature pose continued challenges in appropriately determining which beneficiaries should be classified as institutionalized for payment purposes. In a 1995 memorandum to HCFA headquarters, for example, the director of a HCFA region’s managed care operations noted that “the manual provides no guidance regarding the level of care provided to residents [needed to qualify for institutional status]” and that “HCFA has the obligation to provide better guidance to plans regarding the types of facilities which may be designated as ‘institutions.’”
On July 24, 1997, HCFA issued a policy letter that narrowed the definition of eligible institutions effective January 1, 1998. HCFA Allows HMOs a 3-Year Period to Adjust Payments for Institutional Enrollees
Verifying HMOs’ historical institutional status data is even more difficult than ensuring the accuracy of current data. The period of time being scrutinized is longer, and HCFA’s policy of allowing HMOs 3 years to correct institutional status data and adjust payments accordingly compounds the problem. HCFA’s Oversight Fails to Ensure Accurate Payments
Our review and the Inspector General audits underscore the need for HCFA to improve its oversight of the HMO data used in determining Medicare payments to HMOs. HCFA Lacks a Systematic Approach to Recovering Overpayments
HCFA’s procedures do not ensure that Medicare overpayments are recovered when HMO data reporting errors are found. However, beyond the limited number of beneficiary records reviewed during routine monitoring visits, HCFA does not attempt to verify HMO data or the results of HMOs’ self-audits. Variation in Expected Costs for Institutional Beneficiaries Provides Opportunities for Overpayment
Although HCFA uses the institutional risk adjuster to take into account the expected higher costs of health care for institutionalized beneficiaries, research on the risk adjuster indicates that institutional residence is actually only weakly related to a beneficiary’s expected health care costs. HCFA’s new definition of eligible institutions includes certified nursing facilities but generally excludes assisted living facilities. HCFA’s use of unaudited HMO data to determine payments to HMOs engenders little confidence in the accuracy of the data and resulting payments. Even when serious HMO reporting errors—resulting in substantial overpayments—have been discovered, HCFA may wait 2 years or more before checking to see if the HMO has implemented a revised data gathering and reporting system. Recommendations to the Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration
To better protect the integrity of Medicare capitation payments, we recommend that the HCFA Administrator take the following actions:
Establish a system to estimate and recover total overpayments when institutional status data errors are detected. Allow HMOs to revise records and claim retroactive payment adjustments for beneficiaries with institutional status only when HMO records have been verified by an independent third party. Conduct timely follow-up reviews of those HMOs found to have submitted inaccurate institutional status data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) oversight of Medicare payments to health maintenance organizations (HMO) for institutionalized beneficiaries, focusing on: (1) the criteria HCFA uses to determine a beneficiary's institutional status; (2) the methods HCFA employs to ensure that HMOs properly classify beneficiaries as institutionalized; and (3) whether the higher capitation rate for beneficiaries who live in institutions is justified by higher health care costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HCFA's broad definition of institution allowed HMOs to claim institutional status for individuals residing in facilities not likely to house sicker-than-average seniors; (2) some of the facilities GAO visited that HMOs had classified as institutional residences provided no medical care but rather offered a menu of recreational activities for seniors capable of living independently; (3) HCFA acted on GAO's findings and those of others by narrowing the definition of eligible institutions, effective January 1, 1998; (4) even with more stringent criteria, however, HCFA relies on the HMOs to determine which beneficiaries qualify for institutional status; and conducts only limited reviews to confirm the accuracy of HMO records; (5) studies by the Department of Health and Human Services Inspector General reviewing the accuracy of HMO institutional status data support GAO's finding that HCFA's reviews are not adequate to detect the extent of errors or overpayments resulting from HMOs' misclassification of beneficiaries; (6) the task of ensuring accurate data may be further complicated by HCFA's policy that allows HMOs 3 years to retroactively change institutional status data in beneficiary records; (7) the lack of a systematic approach for identifying errors limits HCFA's efforts to recover overpayments and ensure that appropriate payments are made to HMOs; (8) HCFA generally waits 2 years to verify that HMOs have corrected inaccurate recordkeeping systems, even when serious errors have been identified; (9) HCFA continues to use 20-year-old cost data in determining the payment rates for institutionalized enrollees and, as a result, HCFA overcompensates HMOs for their enrolled, institutionalized beneficiaries; (10) this overpayment problem may be corrected when HCFA implements a revised set of risk factors in 2000; (11) however, provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that use 1997 rates as the basis for 1998 and future rates effectively preclude a revision to the institutional risk factor at this time; (12) while HCFA has revised its definition of eligible institutions, concerns remain that HCFA's oversight of payments for institutional status is inadequate; (13) HCFA has no system to estimate and recover total overpayments when institutional status errors are detected or to verify HMOs' retroactive adjustment requests; and (14) further, HCFA does not ensure timely review of those HMOs found to have submitted inaccurate institutional status data, and its use of outdated cost data in determining payments continues to overcompensate HMOs for institutionalized enrollees. |
gao_GAO-11-794 | gao_GAO-11-794_0 | Of the 22 recommendations, 17 were focused on developing agencywide policies and procedures to address internal control weaknesses in the FBI’s procurement and contract administration processes. FBI’s Sentinel project was approved in July 2005 and was to succeed and expand on elements of the Trilogy project, namely to provide the FBI with a modern, automated investigative case-management system. FBI Developed Policies and Procedures and Took Other Specific Corrective Actions Sufficient to Address 26 of 27 Prior Recommendations
The corrective actions developed by the FBI were sufficient to address 21 of the 22 Trilogy recommendations and all 5 of the Sentinel recommendations we made in our prior reports. The FBI substantially addressed 17 Trilogy recommendations related to contract administration, invoice processing, and property accountability by establishing or revising policies and procedures, 4 by contracting for follow-up audits of the Trilogy costs, and the 5 Sentinel recommendations by revising Sentinel policies and procedures. The one recommendation that the FBI had not fully addressed from our Trilogy report recommended that the FBI investigate the 1,205 assets that we identified as missing, lost, or stolen and determine whether any confidential or sensitive information may be exposed to unauthorized users, and identify any patterns related to the equipment that could necessitate a change in FBI policies and procedures. In February 2011, FBI officials provided documentation accounting for the status of all but 134 assets, including desktop computers, laptops, and servers that could contain sensitive information. With regard to the 134 assets, the FBI stated that all of these assets had a useful life of 7 years or less and that if they were not already returned or destroyed, they are now obsolete and that spending more time or resources to search for the obsolete equipment would be wasteful. However, FBI officials also stated they would make the necessary entries to properly record any of the remaining 134 assets for which they subsequently determine the status. In our testing of the four recommendations dealing with interagency agreements and contracts, we found that they were effectively implemented, but we identified a new issue unrelated to our prior recommendations. The FBI’s monitoring of the interagency agreement process did not identify that the Determination and Findings forms were not properly prepared as required. As shown in table 2, our tests of non-statistically selected transactions identified implementation issues primarily in policies and procedures related to review of contractor invoices and accountability for purchased assets. Without verifying labor groups and labor rates billed on contractor invoices against the contractor’s proposal as required by FBI policy, the FBI is at increased risk that it will not identify erroneous or improper billings and will disburse government funds for unallowable contractor charges. As shown in table 2, we also found instances in which the FBI did not record accountable property items in its system in a timely manner and did not accurately record key accountability information such as location and serial numbers as required by the FBI’s policies and procedures. With an estimated 40 percent of its interagency agreements lacking a properly completed Determination and Findings form, the FBI increases the risk that it is obligating funds for supplies and/or services that are not in the best interest of the government or executing a contract that is inconsistent with federal laws or regulations. Additionally, our testing of selected accountable property items identified property items that were not timely or accurately recorded. In the area of contractor invoice review and approval, we recommend the Director of the FBI to direct the Chief Financial Officer to: review agencywide implementation of the new or revised policies and procedures related to our prior recommendations to verify that invoice costs are in accordance with contract terms to determine if the indications of issues we identified in this report represent systemic, agencywide implementation deficiencies, and take appropriate, cost-effective actions to better ensure agencywide compliance with the applicable policies and procedures. To address our second objective to determine whether there were any indications of implementation issues related to the policies and procedures that the FBI developed to address 17 of the 27 recommendations, we selected statistical samples of interagency agreements and contracts. According to the FBI’s listing, 20 of the 34 purchase orders included accountable property that had been recorded in the FBI’s PMA. Appendix II: Status of Trilogy and Sentinel Recommendations and Actions Taken by the FBI
Recommendation area/recommendations Trilogy recommendations
Interagency agreements and contract Administration 1. 2. 13. 27. lost, or stolen, reducing the number reported to 1,205. | Why GAO Did This Study
The FBI has spent over $900 million on the Trilogy and Sentinel information technology (IT) projects intended to provide FBI with an upgraded IT infrastructure and an automated case management system to support FBI agents and analysts. In February 2006 and July 2008, GAO reported on significant internal control weaknesses related to FBI's contract administration, processing of contractor invoices, and accountability for equipment acquired for these projects. GAO made 27 recommendations to the FBI to address these deficiencies. The FBI concurred with all 27 recommendations. This report provides an assessment of (1) the FBI's corrective actions to address GAO's 27 recommendations and (2) whether there were any indications of implementation issues related to the policies and procedures the FBI developed to address 17 of the 27 recommendations. GAO reviewed FBI policies and procedures, performed walk-throughs, and conducted detailed tests on statistically and nonstatistically selected samples of transactions.
What GAO Found
The corrective actions developed by FBI were sufficient to address 21 of the 22 Trilogy recommendations and all 5 Sentinel recommendations. The FBI substantially addressed: 17 Trilogy recommendations related to contract administration, invoice processing, and property accountability by establishing or revising policies and procedures; 4 by contracting for follow-up audits of the Trilogy costs; and the 5 Sentinel recommendations by revising Sentinel policies and procedures. The one Trilogy recommendation that FBI did not address completely was related to 1,205 missing, lost, or stolen Trilogy assets. As of February 2011, the FBI had researched and determined the status of all but 134 of these assets. FBI officials stated that almost all of these assets had a useful life of 7 years, and if they were not already returned or destroyed, they are now obsolete. There are diminishing returns to continue to pursue these assets, which included several information technology items that could potentially contain sensitive information. However, if the FBI is able to determine the status of any of these assets in the future, officials stated that they will make the entries to properly record them in FBI's property management application (PMA). In assessing implementation of the policies and procedures developed in response to GAO's 17 Trilogy recommendations related to contract administration, invoice processing, and property accountability, GAO found that policies and procedures related to the 4 recommendations dealing with contract administration, including interagency agreements, were effectively implemented but also identified a new issue. Specifically, GAO found that forms--required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation to support the use of interagency agreements to conveniently or economically obtain supplies and services--were not timely completed for 15 of 54 statistically selected interagency agreements tested, and found that FBI's monitoring did not identify this deficiency. GAO estimates that as much as 39.5 percent of FBI's fiscal year 2009 interagency agreements did not meet this requirement, increasing the risk that funds may have been disbursed for goods or services that were not in the best interest of the government. In addition, GAO's testing of FBI's implementation of polices and procedures for the remaining 13 recommendations that were related to invoice processing and property accountability found indications of implementation issues in 3 areas. (1) Regarding the review of contractors' invoices, 5 invoices (of the 37 tested) that had been reviewed and approved by FBI officials included labor rates that were not fully supported by the contract documentation. Without verifying labor charges against the contractor's proposal as required by FBI policy, there is an increased risk of disbursing funds for unallowable charges. (2) For property accountability, GAO found instances in which FBI (1) did not record accountable property items in its system in a timely manner and (2) did not accurately record key accountability information, such as location and serial numbers, as required by FBI's policies. These shortcomings increase the risk that assets could be lost or stolen and not be detected and investigated in a timely manner.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes three new recommendations to improve interagency agreement controls and determine if additional actions are necessary to improve controls for invoice processing and property accountability. The FBI concurred with all three recommendations and discussed actions it has initiated to address GAO's recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-97-19 | gao_HEHS-97-19_0 | Issuing the PEBES is a significant initiative for SSA. SSA chose this overall approach to calculating benefit estimates because it is consistent with approaches used by private and public pension plan sponsors to prepare benefit estimates, according to SSA officials. In addition, SSA has conducted a series of focus groups with the public and SSA employees to elicit their opinions of the statement and to determine what parts of it they did and did not understand. Clearly Communicating SSA Program and Benefit Information Could Further Enhance the PEBES’ Value
Although SSA has taken steps to improve the PEBES, we found that the current statement still provides too much information, which may overwhelm the reader, and it presents the information in a way that undermines its usefulness. When readers need explanations to understand complex information, the explanations should appear with the information. By focusing on reduced printing costs as the main reason for redesigning the PEBES, SSA is overlooking the hidden costs of the statement’s existing weaknesses. However, extensive revisions to the PEBES are needed to ensure that the statement communicates effectively. Recommendations to the Commissioner of Social Security
In order for the PEBES to better convey information to the public about SSA’s programs and benefits, we recommend that SSA revise the current statement to improve its layout and design and to simplify explanations. Personal Earnings and Benefit Estimate Statement
Comments From the Social Security Administration
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) overall progress in issuing the Personal Earnings and Benefits Estimate Statement (PEBES), focusing on: (1) whether the PEBES benefit estimates are reasonable; (2) what SSA has done to improve the statement; (3) the extent to which the statement communicates its goals and information clearly; (4) SSA plans to revise the statement further; and (5) actions that GAO believes will improve the statement.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the methods and assumptions used by SSA for estimating future retirement benefits are consistent with those used by private and public pension plan sponsors; (2) the public feels that the PEBES can be a valuable tool for retirement planning; (3) although SSA has taken steps to improve PEBES, it fails to communicate clearly the complex information readers need to understand SSA programs and benefits, partly because the design and organization of the statement make it difficult for the reader to locate and understand important information; (4) readers are confused by several important explanations, such as who in their family is eligible for benefits; (5) SSA is considering redesigning PEBES, but only if the redesign results in reduced printing costs; (6) this approach overlooks hidden costs, such as the workload generated by public inquiries when people do not understand the statement, and the possibility that a poorly designed statement will undermine, rather than improve, public confidence; and (7) active leadership from SSA senior managers will be needed to ensure the success of this important initiative. |
gao_GAO-10-842T | gao_GAO-10-842T_0 | Many DOD Organizations Are Involved in Distributing Supplies and Equipment by Various Routes and Methods into and around Afghanistan
Distribution of materiel, such as supplies and equipment, into and around Afghanistan is a complex process involving many DOD organizations and utilizing both surface and air modes of transportation over various routes. DOD’s ability to provide timely logistics support to units deploying to Afghanistan or already in theater depends on its ability to synchronize these activities into one seamless process. Army Central Command’s 1st Theater Sustainment Command provides command and control of logistics efforts within the U.S. Central Command area of operations by monitoring strategic movements of materiel and directly influencing movements into theater. The Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center bridges the gap between strategic and theater distribution by validating and directing air movements and monitoring and directing surface movements within theater. The main surface route uses commercial ships to transport cargo to the seaport of Karachi, Pakistan, from which it is trucked by contractors into Afghanistan. DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Improve the Distribution Process Based on Lessons Learned
DOD has taken some steps to improve its processes for distributing materiel to deployed forces based on lessons learned from prior operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. To address these issues, in January 2004, U.S. Transportation Command established the Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, in part to help coordinate the movement of materiel and forces into the theater of operations, including both Iraq and Afghanistan, by confirming the combatant commander’s deployment and distribution priorities and by synchronizing the forces, equipment, and supplies arriving in theater with critical theater lift and theater infrastructure limitations. DOD has also established policies and procedures to increase the use of RFID tags to improve in-transit visibility over cargo. In December 2003, we reported that DOD did not have adequate visibility over all supplies and equipment transported to, within, and from the theater of operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom, in part because RFID tags were not being used in a uniform and consistent manner. Several Challenges Hinder DOD’s Ability to Distribute Supplies and Equipment to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan
Based on our preliminary observations, we note several challenges that hinder DOD’s ability to distribute needed supplies and equipment to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan. These challenges include difficulties with transporting cargo through neighboring countries and around Afghanistan; limited airfield infrastructure within Afghanistan; lack of full visibility over supply and equipment movements into and around Afghanistan; limited storage capacity at logistics hubs in Afghanistan; difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment in Afghanistan; lack of coordination, as well as competing logistics priorities, in a coalition environment; and uncertain requirements and low transportation priority for contractors. DOD has ongoing or planned efforts to help mitigate some of these challenges. In addition, DOD is working to address these challenges through planning conferences to synchronize the flow of forces into Afghanistan. While some of DOD’s efforts will promptly improve its ability to efficiently distribute supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, other efforts involve long-term plans that will not be completed in time to support the ongoing troop increase that is scheduled to occur by August 2010. Limited Visibility over Surface Movements of Materiel May Hinder DOD’s Ability to Efficiently Manage the Flow of Materiel
DOD’s visibility over surface movements of supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan is limited, and this limitation may hinder its ability to effectively manage the flow of supplies and equipment into the logistics hubs and forward operating bases. Officials from key organizations across DOD, including U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, U.S. Forces-Iraq, and Army Central Command, attended both Throughout both conferences, DOD officials stressed the need to balance and closely coordinate multiple requirements in order to sustain current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, draw down forces and equipment f Iraq, and increase forces and equipment in Afghanistan. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that it spent $4 billion to move troops and materiel into Afghanistan, a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with few roads, no railway, and only four airports with paved runways over 3,000 meters. The terrain and weather in Afghanistan and surrounding countries pose further challenges to transporting supplies and equipment. In December 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be sent to Afghanistan by August 2010. Today's testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations drawn from ongoing work reviewing DOD's logistics efforts supporting operations in Afghanistan, including (1) the organizations involved and routes and methods used to transport supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan; (2) steps DOD has taken to improve its distribution process, based on lessons learned from prior operations; and (3) challenges affecting DOD's ability to distribute supplies and equipment within Afghanistan, and its efforts to mitigate them. In conducting its audit work, GAO examined DOD guidance and other documentation relating to the processes of transporting supplies and equipment to Afghanistan and met with various cognizant officials and commanders in the United States, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar.
What GAO Found
Movement of supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan is a complex process involving many DOD organizations and using air, sea, and ground modes of transportation. DOD's ability to provide timely logistics support to units deploying to Afghanistan or already in theater depends on its ability to synchronize all of these activities into one seamless process. For example, U.S. Transportation Command manages air and surface transportation from the United States to and around the U.S. Central Command area of operations; U.S. Central Command's Deployment and Distribution Operations Center validates and directs air movements and monitors and directs surface movements within theater; the Air Force's Air Mobility Division assigns and directs aircraft to carry materiel within the theater; and the Army's 1st Theater Sustainment Command monitors strategic movements of materiel and directly influences movements into theater. Most cargo in theater is transported commercially by ship to Pakistan and then by contractor-operated trucks to Afghanistan, but high-priority and sensitive items are transported by U.S. military and commercial aircraft directly from the United States and other countries to logistics hubs in Afghanistan. DOD has taken some steps to improve its processes for distributing materiel to deployed forces based on lessons learned from prior operations. For example, in response to lessons learned from problems with keeping commanders informed about incoming materiel in Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Transportation Command established the Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, which now helps coordinate the movement of materiel and forces into the theater of operations. Also, since GAO reported in 2003 that radio frequency identification tags were not being effectively used to track materiel in transit to, within, and from Iraq, DOD developed policies and procedures to increase tag use on cargo traveling through the U.S. Central Command theater of operations, including Afghanistan. Challenges hindering DOD's ability to distribute needed supplies and equipment to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan include difficulties with transporting cargo through neighboring countries and around Afghanistan, limited airfield infrastructure, lack of full visibility over cargo movements, limited storage capacity at logistics hubs, difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment, lack of coordination between U.S. and other coalition forces for delivery of supplies and equipment, and uncertain requirements and low transportation priority for contractors. DOD recognizes these challenges and has ongoing or planned efforts to mitigate some of them; however, some efforts involve long-term plans that will not be complete in time to support the ongoing troop increase. DOD is also working to address these challenges through planning conferences to synchronize the flow of forces into Afghanistan. At these conferences, DOD officials stressed the need to balance and coordinate multiple requirements in order to sustain current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, draw down forces and equipment in Iraq, and increase forces and equipment in Afghanistan. |
gao_AIMD-98-40 | gao_AIMD-98-40_0 | Although some of the initiatives include planned improvements to both contract and vendor payment processes, we focused on the contract payment process in this report. Background
The following sections describe DOD’s current contract payment process, the controls necessary to ensure accurate contract payment, and DOD’s long-standing problems with matching disbursements to corresponding obligations. As of September 30, 1997, DOD had at least $22.7 billion in problem disbursements. DOD has hundreds of efforts under way to help resolve disbursement and accounting problems, including the seven technology initiatives discussed in this report. However, as we have previously reported, DOD has not performed the in-depth analysis necessary to fully determine the underlying causes of its disbursement and accounting problems and therefore identify the most effective solutions and rank specific reforms. While these initiatives move DOD closer to a paper free environment, they will not allow DOD to meet the Secretary of Defense’s recently established goal of a paper-free contracting process by the year 2000, since three of the four long-term initiatives are not scheduled for completion until the end of fiscal year 2001. However, MOCAS is usually not provided with information that identifies the cost of the work accomplished with a specific funding source. Therefore, DOD is unable to ensure that payments are being made from the appropriate funding source. Accurate payments can only be made if accurate and complete data are available—regardless of which system is used. The system, as designed, will replace the contract payment functions currently in MOCAS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reported on seven technological initiatives that the Department of Defense (DOD) identified as key elements of its efforts to improve the contract payment process, focusing on DOD's goal of adopting the best business practices of the private sector.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the descriptive information presented in GAO's letter highlights several areas of concern that could prevent DOD from meeting its goal of a paperless contracting process by the year 2000; (2) for example, even if DOD successfully meets the current schedule, as of September 30, 1997, three of the four long-term initiatives are not scheduled for completion until the end of fiscal year 2001; (3) in addition, the initiatives may not eliminate the weaknesses in the contract payment processing; (4) as GAO previously reported, although DOD has numerous initiatives under way to help resolve its disbursement and accounting problems, it has not performed the in-depth analysis necessary to fully determine the underlying causes of these problems and therefore identify the most effective solutions and rank specific reforms; (5) as a result, as with its other initiatives, the extent to which these seven technology initiatives discussed in GAO's letter will resolve DOD's long-standing disbursement problems is unclear; (6) even in a highly automated and paperless environment, proper payments can only be made by ensuring that accurate and complete data are available in the systems; and (7) for example, for some types of payments, unless provided with information that identifies the cost of work accomplished with the appropriate funding source, the new systems and databases will not have the information necessary to ensure that proper payments are made. |
gao_GAO-04-702 | gao_GAO-04-702_0 | Not since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947 has the federal government undertaken a transformation of this magnitude. Other DHS entities also are responsible, or share responsibility, for critical information and technology management activities. DHS’s Progress in Dealing with Formidable Information and Technology Management Challenge Is Mixed
In the 18 months that it has been in operation, DHS has taken steps to institute key elements of an effective information and technology management structure. DHS’s mixed progress is not unexpected given the diversity of the inherited agencies and the size and complexity of the department and the daunting hurdles that it faces in integrating the systems and IT management approaches of its many organizational components. To address the risks associated with DHS’s departmental structures and specific IT investments, we have made recommendations to the DHS CIO and other responsible entities—such as the Coast Guard and TSA—to help the department successfully overcome its information and technology management challenge. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS did not address whether it would implement these recommendations. DHS has not established a process to ensure that control reviews of IT investments are performed in a timely manner. The DHS Secretary has recognized the criticality of information sharing in the department’s strategic plan. Conclusions
DHS faces the formidable challenge of defining and implementing an effective information and technology management structure at the same time that it is developing and acquiring major IT systems that are critical to meeting its mission needs. Although DHS has made progress in addressing this challenge, it does not yet have a fully institutionalized structure in place, which puts its pursuit of new and enhanced IT investments at risk of not optimally supporting corporate mission needs and not meeting cost, schedule, capability, and benefit commitments. In particular, still lacking in the department’s IT strategic planning process—which is critical because it defines what an agency seeks to accomplish and how that will be achieved—are goals, performance measures, and milestones for significant activities and whether DHS has appropriately skilled and deployed IT staff. Posthearing Questions Related to Proposed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Human Capital Regulations. Information Technology: OMB and Department of Homeland Security Investment Reviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003 GAO designated the merger of 22 separate federal entities into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a high risk area because of the criticality of the department's mission and the enormous transformation challenges that the department faced. Given that the effective use of information technology (IT) is a critical enabler of this merger, GAO has previously reported on a number of DHS efforts aimed at institutionalizing an effective information and technology governance structure and investing in new IT systems that are intended to better support mission operations. Now that DHS has been operating for over a year, GAO was asked to, based largely on its prior work, describe DHS's progress in meeting its information and technology management challenge.
What GAO Found
DHS's overall IT challenge is to standardize and integrate the legacy system environments and management approaches that it inherited from its predecessor agencies, while concurrently attempting to ensure that present levels of IT support for critical homeland security operations are not only maintained but improved in the near term. To accomplish this, the department is in the process of instituting seven information and technology management disciplines that are key elements of an effective information and technology management structure. DHS's progress in institutionalizing these key information and technology management elements has been mixed, and overall remains a work in progress. Such progress is not unexpected, given the diversity of the inherited agencies and the size and complexity of the department's mission operations. Nevertheless, because DHS has not yet fully institutionalized these governance elements, its pursuit of new and enhanced IT investments are at risk of not optimally supporting corporate mission needs and not meeting cost, schedule, capability, and benefit commitments. Accordingly, GAO has previously made recommendations relative to most of these areas to the department's chief information officer and other responsible DHS entities. Lastly, DHS has developed a draft IT strategic plan, which GAO finds lacking in explicit goals, performance measures, milestones, and knowledge of whether it has properly positioned IT staff with the right skills to accomplish these things. |
gao_T-GGD-96-141 | gao_T-GGD-96-141_0 | Both surveys indicated that many banks and thrifts still were not fully disclosing to their customers the risks associated with mutual fund investing. The survey’s findings on the physical location of the mutual fund sales area were nearly the same as ours, with about 37 percent of the institutions not clearly having separated the mutual fund sales area from the deposit-taking area. However, the interagency guidelines emphasize that bank customers should clearly and fully understand the risks of investing in mutual funds, and that these risks should be orally disclosed to the customer during any sales presentation. However, FDIC’s survey results indicated that many banks and thrifts still need to improve their compliance with the guidelines so that their customers are adequately informed of the risks associated with mutual fund investing. Other efforts are also being undertaken by all four bank and thrift regulators. These interagency efforts include efforts to adopt requirements that bank personnel engaged in the sale of nondeposit investment products take the securities industry’s standard qualifying examinations, better training for bank personnel selling uninsured investment products, reexamination of the interagency policy statement on mutual fund sales. Banking regulators and some banks and thrifts are taking steps to better ensure that the required disclosures are made. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) survey concerning the risks associated with mutual fund investing.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) sales of mutual funds through banks and thrifts have increased dramatically; (2) the value of assets managed by these institutions doubled from $219 billion in December 1993, to $420 billion in March 1996; (3) 2,800 banks sold over $40 billion in both proprietary and nonproprietary mutual fund shares during 1995; (4) in February 1994, FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of Thrift Supervision jointly issued guidelines on the policies and procedures for selling nondeposit investment products; (5) these interagency guidelines require that bank and thrift customers be fully informed of the risks of investing in mutual funds; (6) the guidelines also require that banks' mutual fund sales activities be physically separated from bank deposit activities; (7) the results of the FDIC survey indicate that many banks and thrifts are not disclosing the risks associated with mutual fund investing; and (8) all four bank and thrift regulators are making an effort to ensure that bank personnel pass qualifying examinations and receive better training in selling uninsured investment products, and reexamine the current interagency policy on mutual fund sales. |
gao_RCED-99-34 | gao_RCED-99-34_0 | USDA Has Reduced Administrative Positions Overall
From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 1998, USDA reduced its departmentwide administrative staff by 15 percent, from about 10,300 to an estimated 8,800, in four areas identified by the NPR—human resources, budgeting, accounting and auditing, and acquisition. USDA plans to have about 8,550 administrative staff supporting a departmentwide program staff of approximately 98,500 by the end of fiscal year 1999. Changes to Administrative Operations for Field-Based Agencies Will Not Be Fully Implemented Until 2002
As of November 1998, USDA had not consolidated administrative functions for its field-based agencies at the state office level. In addition, they said the plan will require up to 4 years to implement because the Department will need to complete a number of time-consuming and complex actions—relocating offices, developing common policies and procedures, and instituting common computing systems. USDA Has Not Yet Begun to Implement Its Administrative Convergence Plan at the State Level
USDA expects to begin consolidating administrative functions at the state level for its field-based agencies approximately 6 to 9 months following the Secretary’s approval of the proposed October 1998 convergence plan. 2.) The new state offices will receive policy guidance from the headquarters Support Services Bureau and will report to a board of directors composed of the state leaders of FSA, NRCS, and RD. Savings and Efficiencies Measures Lacking
USDA has not instituted, and has made no plans to develop, performance measures to determine the economies and efficiencies realized as a result of its departmentwide administrative streamlining. According to USDA officials, staff reductions should serve as a sufficient indicator of the Department’s savings and efficiencies because employees’ salary and benefit costs typically represent a majority—about 85 percent—of salary and administrative expenses. Without an assessment of the overall effects of its departmentwide streamlining efforts, USDA cannot know the extent to which its efforts have been successful in achieving all of the objectives mandated by the 1994 act. To determine USDA’s progress in measuring the savings and efficiencies realized as a result of its departmentwide reorganization and streamlining, we interviewed Department and agency officials involved in reorganization and streamlining and reviewed documents pertaining to their performance measures. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
USDA’s Staff by Mission Area, Agency and Office for Fiscal Years 1993 Through 1999
Farm Service Agency (FSA) (federal)
Farm Service Agency (nonfederal)
Alternative Agricultural Research and Commercialization Corporation Natural Resources and Environment Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS)
Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service Office of Chief Financial Officer Office of Chief Information Officer (continued)
Office of Budget and Program Analysis Office of the Chief Economist Office of the General Counsel 129,495 124,241 117,388 113,539 109,886 109,850 107,031 Offices included under the Assistant Secretary for Administration are the Office of Administrative Support, Board of Contract Appeals, Office of the Judicial Officer, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Office of Civil Rights, Office of Procurement and Property Management, Office of Operations, Office of Human Resources Management, Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, and Office of Outreach. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) progress in streamlining its administrative operations, focusing on USDA's efforts to: (1) reduce the number of administrative staff departmentwide; (2) consolidate and streamline administrative support structures for seven field-based agencies, particularly at the state office level; and (3) measure the savings and efficiencies realized as a result of its departmentwide reorganization and streamlining efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from fiscal year (FY) 1993 through FY 1998, USDA reduced its departmentwide administrative staff for four administrative functions--human resources, budgeting, accounting and auditing, and acquisition--from about 10,300 to an estimated 8,800, or by 15 percent; (2) USDA estimates that the number of administrative staff will decrease by an additional 250 by the end of FY 1999; (3) at that time, about 8,550 administrative staff will support approximately 98,500 program staff; (4) USDA has no estimates for further departmentwide reductions in administrative staffing beyond 1999; (5) as of November 1998, USDA had not begun to implement its plan to consolidate and streamline administrative functions at the state office level; (6) these new state offices will receive policy guidance from a newly created headquarters Support Service Bureau and report to a board of directors composed of the state leaders of the Farm Service Agency, Natural Resources Conservation Service, and Rural Development; (7) the plan, which is expected to be fully implemented by 2002, requires the completion of a number of time-consuming and potentially costly actions, including relocating offices, developing common policies and procedures, and instituting common computing systems; (8) furthermore, although it appears that administrative consolidation may provide long-term savings and efficiencies, USDA may incur additional costs to implement this consolidation in the short term; (9) USDA has no plans to develop performance measures to determine the economies and efficiencies realized as a result of its departmentwide streamlining actions; (10) USDA officials believe that a single measure--personnel reductions--serves as a sufficient indicator of the Department's overall performance; and (11) however, without additional performance measures, such as those that measure the quality of service delivery, USDA will not know the extent to which it has accomplished the 1994 act's overall objective of achieving greater efficiency, effectiveness, and economy in the organization and management of its programs and activities. |
gao_GAO-10-637T | gao_GAO-10-637T_0 | To address the extent to which CMS established a strong control environment for contract management, we obtained and reviewed documentation regarding contract closeout, acquisition planning, and other management information and interviewed officials in the Office of Acquisition and Grants Management (OAGM) about its contract management processes. Pervasive Deficiencies in Control Procedures at the Contract Level Increase the Risk of Improper Payments or Waste
Our October 2009 report identified pervasive deficiencies in internal control over contracting and payments to contractors. Specifically, as a result of our work, we estimated that at least 84.3 percent of FAR-based contract actions made by CMS in fiscal year 2008 contained at least one instance in which 1 of 11 key controls was not adequately implemented. The internal control deficiencies occurred throughout the contracting process and increased the risk of improper payments or waste. These deficiencies were due in part to a lack of agency-specific policies and procedures to ensure that FAR requirements and other control objectives were met. Further, CMS’s Contract Review Board process had not been properly or effectively implemented to help ensure proper contract award actions. We estimated that at least 46.0 percent of fiscal year 2008 CMS contract actions did not meet the FAR requirements applicable to the specific contract type awarded. For example, we found that CMS used cost reimbursement contracts without first ensuring that the contractor had an adequate accounting system. Weak Control Environment Hindered CMS’s Ability to Manage Its FAR-based Acquisition Process
The control deficiencies we identified in the statistical sample discussed in our October 2009 report stemmed from a weak overall control environment. CMS’s control environment was characterized by the lack of (1) strategic planning to identify necessary staffing and funding; (2) reliable data for effectively carrying out contract management responsibilities; and (3) follow-up to track, investigate, and resolve contract audit and evaluation findings for purposes of cost recovery and future award decisions. A positive control environment sets the tone for the overall quality of an entity’s internal control, and provides the foundation for an entity to effectively manage contracts and payments to contractors. Without a strong control environment, the control deficiencies we identified will likely persist. GAO Has Made Numerous Recommendations to Improve CMS’s Contract Management Controls
Seven of Nine GAO 2007 Recommendations Were Substantially Unresolved
As we reported in October 2009, CMS management had not taken substantial actions to address our 2007 recommendations to improve internal control in the contracting process. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2007, GAO reported significant deficiencies in internal control over certain contracts the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) awarded under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). This Subcommittee and others in Congress asked GAO to perform an in-depth review of CMS's contract management practices. This testimony is based on GAO's October 2009 report on these issues and summarizes GAO's findings on the extent to which CMS (1) implemented effective control procedures over contract actions, (2) established a strong contract management control environment, and (3) implemented GAO's 2007 recommendations. GAO used a statistical random sample of 2008 CMS contract actions to assess CMS internal control procedures. The results were projected to the population of 2008 CMS contract actions. GAO reviewed contract file documentation and interviewed senior acquisition management officials.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in October 2009 that pervasive deficiencies in CMS contract management internal control increased the risk of improper payments or waste. Specifically, based on a statistical random sample of 2008 CMS contract actions, GAO estimated that at least 84.3 percent of fiscal year 2008 contract actions contained at least one instance where a key control was not adequately implemented. For example, CMS used cost reimbursement contracts without first ensuring that the contractor had an adequate accounting system, as required by the FAR. These deficiencies were due in part to a lack of agency-specific policies and procedures to help ensure proper contracting expenditures. These control deficiencies stemmed from a weak overall control environment characterized primarily by inadequate strategic planning for staffing and funding resources. CMS also did not accurately capture data on the nature and extent of its contracting, hindering CMS's ability to manage its acquisition function by identifying areas of risk. Finally, CMS did not track, investigate, and resolve contract audit and evaluation findings for purposes of cost recovery and future award decisions. A positive control environment sets the tone for the overall quality of internal control and provides the foundation for effective contract management. Without a strong control environment, the specific control deficiencies GAO identified will likely persist. As of the date of GAO's October 2009 report, CMS had not substantially addressed seven of the nine recommendations made by GAO in 2007 to improve internal control over contracting and payments to contractors. To the extent that CMS has continuing weaknesses in contracting activities, it will continue to put billions of taxpayer dollars at risk of improper payments or waste. |
gao_GAO-12-738 | gao_GAO-12-738_0 | The 1996 Act also altered the federal mechanism for funding universal service by requiring telecommunications carriers and other entities providing interstate telecommunications service to contribute to USF, unless exempted by FCC. FCC Aims to Improve Efficiency and Provide Support for Broadband through Changes to the High- Cost Program
FCC Adopted New Rules to Support Broadband
FCC adopted new rules to fundamentally change the high-cost program by extending the program to support broadband capable networks. FCC also established an automatic review trigger if the program budget is threatened to be exceeded. Establishing public interest obligations for all eligible carriers. Under the USF Transformation Order, FCC requires all carriers to offer broadband services in their supported service areas, meet certain broadband performance requirements, and report regularly on associated broadband performance measures. FCC Is Implementing Changes to Its Funding Distribution to Improve Program Efficiency
In the USF Transformation Order, FCC changed its method for distributing funds to carriers to address some of the recognized program inefficiencies. According to FCC, these changes will allow it to reduce high-cost support for carriers providing only voice services and make funds available to carriers for the deployment of both voice and broadband-capable networks. FCC Has Taken Steps to Address Previously Identified Oversight and Management Challenges, but Issues Remain
FCC Steps to Address Management Challenges
We and OMB have each issued a report in the last 7 years critical of FCC’s management of the high-cost fund and in the USF Transformation Order, FCC has taken several steps to address these challenges. The management challenges we identified included a lack of performance goals and measures for the program and weak internal controls, resulting in FCC’s limited ability to oversee the actions of carriers or the data they provide. In 2005, OMB criticized FCC’s inability to measure the effect of the fund on subscribership in rural areas or to base funding decisions on any indication of measurable benefits. To address these challenges, FCC has (1) established performance goals and measures for the high- cost program, (2) improved its internal control mechanisms over the fund, and (3) directed USAC to undertake additional oversight and management actions. Gaps in FCC’s Oversight and Management of the High-Cost Program
While FCC has taken steps to address several shortcomings of the high- cost program, our review of the order has identified gaps in FCC’s plans to better oversee the program and make it more effective and efficient. Specifically, we determined that FCC lacks (1) a data-analysis plan for carrier data it will collect, and (2) a mechanism to link carrier rates and revenues with USF support payments. Furthermore, such analysis would enable FCC to adjust the size of the Connect America Fund based on sound evaluation and would allow Congress and FCC to make better informed decisions about the future of the program and how program efficiency could be improved. One of FCC’s performance goals (and a requirement in statute) is to ensure that rates for broadband and voice services are reasonably comparable in all regions of the country. However, in the USF Transformation Order, FCC reported that many rural carriers are offering basic local rates for telephone service that are lower than the average basic local rate paid by urban consumers. However, FCC has not stated what factors, such as carrier revenues, will be included in the model. FCC has stated that it is not equitable for all consumers to subsidize the cost of service for some consumers who pay local service rates that are significantly lower than the national average. Therefore, although FCC would like to prevent consumers from subsidizing carriers whose rates for basic local service are artificially low, its incentive mechanism to raise rural rates will not reduce the financial burden placed on all consumers as there is currently no connection between the amount of support payments a carrier receives and the revenue a carrier earns, through rates or any other source. As a way to control the size of the fund, the Joint Board recommended that FCC consider a carrier’s revenues when calculating its need for USF support but FCC declined to implement this recommendation. Recommendations for Executive Action
FCC should take the following two actions:
To determine the overall effectiveness of the Connect America Fund as well as improve the oversight and transparency of the high-cost program, establish a specific data-analysis plan for the carrier data and make the information publicly available. In particular, the report provides information on (1) FCC’s plans for repurposing the USF high-cost program for broadband services and (2) how FCC is planning to address previously identified oversight and management challenges as it broadens the scope of the program. The National Broadband Plan made 11 recommendations as it relates to universal service. | Why GAO Did This Study
The high-cost program within the Universal Service Fund (USF) provides subsidies to telecommunications carriers that serve rural and other remote areas with high costs of providing telephone service. The annual program cost has grown from $2.6 billion in 2001 to over $4 billion in 2011, primarily funded through fees added to consumers phone bills. The program is managed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which noted that providing universal access to broadband is the universal service challenge of our time. Accordingly, FCC made changes to the program to make funds available to support both telephone and broadband. GAO previously reported that using USF monies for broadband could cause the size of the fund to greatly expand unless FCC improved its management and oversight to ensure the programs cost-effectiveness. This requested report examines FCCs (1) plans for repurposing the high-cost program for broadband, and (2) plans to address previously identified management challenges as it broadens the programs scope. GAO reviewed and analyzed pertinent FCC orders, associated stakeholder comments, and reports related to USF and interviewed federal and industry stakeholders, as well as economists and experts.
What GAO Found
Under the USF Transformation Order, FCC adopted new rules to fundamentally change the high-cost program by extending the program to support broadband capable networks. For example, FCC established a $4.5-billion annual program budget for the next 6 years, created new fundscalled the Connect America Fund and the Mobility Fundthat will support broadband deployment, and established public interest obligations for the carriers as a condition of receiving funds. Specifically, FCC will require carriers to offer broadband services in their supported service areas, meet certain broadband performance requirements, and report regularly on associated broadband performance measures. FCC also changed its method for distributing funds to carriers to address some of the recognized inefficiencies with the program. According to FCC, these changes will allow it to reduce high-cost support for carriers providing only voice services and make funds available to carriers to offer both voice and broadband services.
FCC has taken several steps to address previously identified oversight and management challenges that GAO and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have raised in the last 7 years, but issues remain. Management challenges identified by GAO included a lack of performance goals and measures for the program and weak internal controls, while OMB criticized FCCs inability to base funding decisions on measurable benefits. In response, FCC established performance goals and measures for the high-cost program and improved internal control mechanisms over the fund. While these are noteworthy actions, GAO identified gaps in FCCs plans to better oversee the program and make it more effective and efficient. In particular, FCC has not addressed its inability to determine the effect of the fund and lacks a specific data-analysis plan for carrier data it will collect. Such analysis would enable FCC to adjust the size of the Connect America Fund based on data-driven evaluation and would allow Congress and FCC to make better informed decisions about the programs future and how program efficiency could be improved.
GAO also found that FCC lacks a mechanism to link carrier rates and revenues with support payments. A requirement in statute is for rates for telecommunications services to be reasonably comparable in rural and urban areas, but FCC has noted that some rural carriers are offering basic local rates for telephone services that are lower than the average basic rate paid by urban consumers. FCC has stated that it is not equitable for all consumers to subsidize the cost of service for some consumers who pay local service rates that are significantly lower than the national average and has therefore instituted an incentive mechanism for carriers to increase artificially low consumer rates. Although FCC would like to prevent consumers from subsidizing carriers that offer service at artificially low rates, its incentive mechanism to raise rural rates will not reduce the financial burden placed on all consumers as there is currently no connection between the support payments a carrier receives and the carriers rates and revenues. The Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service recommended that FCC consider a carriers revenues when calculating its need for support payments, but in the past, FCC declined to implement this recommendation. FCC is developing a new model to calculate carrier support, but has not stated what factors will be included.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should (1) establish a specific data-analysis plan for carrier data to determine program effectiveness, and (2) consult with the Joint Board as it examines the factors for calculating carrier support payments. FCC concurred with the recommendations and provided technical comments. |
gao_RCED-97-70 | gao_RCED-97-70_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about the cost-effective delivery of federal crop insurance and recognizing the important role the private insurance industry plays in delivering federal crop insurance, the Congress, in section 118 of the Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994, directed GAO and FCIC to jointly evaluate the financial arrangements between FCIC and participating insurance companies for delivering the crop insurance program to qualified producers and to address several specific issues. Not all participating companies reported these expenses to FCIC in a consistent format until 1994; furthermore, 1996 expenses for selling and servicing crop insurance were not complete at the time of our review. Administrative Expense Reimbursements Paid by the Government Exceed Private Companies’ Expenses
In 1994 and 1995, FCIC’s reimbursement payments to the nine participating companies in our review were higher than the expenses that can be reasonably associated with the sale and service of federal crop insurance. Collectively, reported expenses were $38 million less than the reimbursements the companies received. Some Reported Expenses Do Not Appear to Be Reasonably Associated With Crop Insurance Delivery
Our review of the nine companies’ reported expenses showed that about $43 million did not appear to be reasonably associated with the sale and service of federal crop insurance to farmers and thus should not be considered in determining an appropriate future reimbursement rate for administrative expenses. Other Reported Expenses Represent Opportunities to Lower Reimbursement Rates
We also found a number of expenses reported by the nine companies that, while in categories associated with the sale and service of crop insurance, seemed to be excessive in nature for a taxpayer-supported program and offer opportunities for FCIC to reduce future reimbursement rates. Each of these factors is discussed below. Recommendations to the Secretary of Agriculture
We recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of the Risk Management Agency to determine the administrative expense reimbursement rate that reflects the appropriate and reasonable costs of selling and servicing traditional buyup insurance and include this rate in the new agreement currently being developed with the companies; determine the compensation that reflects the appropriate and reasonable costs of selling and servicing catastrophic crop insurance and include it in the new agreement currently being developed with the companies; explicitly convey to participating insurance companies the type of expenses that the administrative reimbursement is intended to cover; and monitor companies’ expenses to ensure that the established rate is reasonable for the services provided. In 1995, it was more costly for the government to deliver catastrophic insurance through private companies than through USDA. Cost to the Government in 1995 for USDA Delivery Less Because of Underwriting Gain Paid to Companies
In 1995, the total cost to the government to deliver catastrophic insurance was less when provided through USDA than through private companies. In 1995, companies earned an underwriting gain of an estimated $45 million, or about a 37-percent return on the catastrophic premiums for which they retained risk. This underwriting gain increased the government’s delivery cost for company delivery by $127 per crop policy. Each has advantages and disadvantages. Industry leaders prefer FCIC’s current reimbursement method because it is relatively simple to administer and because they believe that most alternatives could reduce their reimbursements. Each alternative, however, has advantages and disadvantages compared with the current reimbursement arrangement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the financial arrangements between the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) and participating insurance companies for delivering crop insurance to qualified producers, focusing on the: (1) adequacy of the current administrative reimbursement rate for expenses of participating crop insurance companies; (2) comparative cost to the government in 1995 of private companies' and the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) delivery of catastrophic insurance; and (3) advantages and disadvantages of different expense reimbursement alternatives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1994 and 1995, the government's administrative expense reimbursement to insurance companies was greater than the companies' expenses to sell and service federal crop insurance; (2) for the 2-year period, companies reported expenses that were less than the reimbursements paid to them by FCIC; (3) furthermore, GAO found that some of these reported expenses did not appear to be reasonably associated with the sale and service of federal crop insurance and accordingly should not be considered in determining an appropriate future reimbursement rate for administrative expenses; (4) in addition, even within the expense categories reasonably associated with the sale and service of crop insurance, GAO found expenses that appeared excessive for reimbursement under a taxpayer-supported program suggesting an opportunity to further reduce future reimbursement rates; (5) these expenses included agents' commissions that exceeded the industry average, unnecessary travel-related expenses, and questionable entertainment activities; (6) finally, higher premiums in the crop insurance program have had the effect of increasing the government's reimbursement to companies for the time period GAO examined; (7) at the same time, companies' expenses associated with crop insurance sales and service could decrease as FCIC reduces the administrative requirements with which the companies must comply; (8) combined, all these factors indicate that FCIC could lower the reimbursement rate and still amply cover companies' reasonable expenses for selling and servicing federal crop insurance policies; (9) in 1995, the government's costs to deliver catastrophic insurance were higher through private companies than through USDA; (10) although the basic costs associated with selling and servicing catastrophic crop insurance through USDA and private companies were comparable, delivery through USDA avoids paying an underwriting gain to companies in years when there is a low incidence of catastrophic loss claims; (11) in 1995, the underwriting gain to participating companies for catastrophic insurance totalled about $45 million; (12) in 1996, the underwriting gains were even higher; (13) GAO identified a number of different approaches to reimbursing companies for their administrative expenses that offer the opportunity for cost savings; (14) each has advantages and disadvantages compared with the existing reimbursement arrangement; and (15) companies generally prefer the existing reimbursement method because it is relatively simple to administer. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.