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gao_T-OCG-99-23 | gao_T-OCG-99-23_0 | Improving Performance and Accountability Across Government
My testimony today focuses on the major challenges faced by government in improving its performance and strengthening accountability. They are
Adopting an effective results orientation. Improving the use of information technology to achieve results. Strengthening financial management for decision-making and accountability. Building, maintaining, and marshaling the human capital needed to achieve results. Many agencies continue to struggle to implement basic tenets of performance-based management called for by the Government Performance and Results Act. The uneven pace of progress across government is not surprising; agencies are in the early years of undertaking the changes that performance-based management entails. (GAO/OCG-99-14)
Aligning Activities to Meet Demands
Ineffective and outmoded organizational and program structures frequently have undermined agencies’ effectiveness. Challenges agencies confront range from the need for clearer lines of accountability to streamlining organizations in response to changing circumstances. Addressing the Urgent Year 2000 Computing Challenge
Resolving the Year 2000 computing problem is the most pervasive, time-critical risk facing government today. Over the past 2 years, preparedness has improved markedly, but significant challenges remain and time is running out. Resolving Serious Information Security Weaknesses
Continuing computer security weaknesses put critical federal operations and assets at great risk. Much more needs to be done to ensure that systems and data supporting essential federal operations are adequately protected. Widespread financial system weaknesses, problems with fundamental recordkeeping, incomplete documentation, and weak internal controls—including computer controls—prevented the government from accurately reporting a large portion of its assets, liabilities, and costs. These deficiencies undermine agencies’ ability to accurately measure costs and effectively safeguard federal assets and manage operations. Providing cost information also remains a key challenge. New standards require agencies to develop measures of the full costs of carrying out a mission, producing products, or delivering services to promote comparison of the costs of various programs and results. (GAO/OCG-99-8)
Developing Staff to Meet Critical Needs
The rapid pace of social and technological change and shifts in agency strategies to achieve their missions pose continuing challenges to attract and develop skilled staff. Skills gaps in critical areas undermine agencies’ effectiveness and efforts to address high-risk areas. (GAO/OCG-99-19)
Overall, human capital must become a more prominent issue for the government as agencies become more performance-based. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the major challenges faced by the government in improving its performance and strengthening accountability, focusing on agencies' need to: (1) adopt an effective results orientation; (2) improve the use of information technology to achieve results; (3) strengthen financial management decision-making and accountability; and (4) build, maintain, and marshal the human capital needed to achieve results.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) many agencies continue to struggle to implement basic tenets of performance-based management called for by the Government Performance and Results Act; (2) the uneven pace of progress across government is not surprising; agencies are in the early years of undertaking the changes that performance-based management entails; (3) ineffective and outmoded organizational and program structures frequently have undermined agencies' effectiveness; (4) challenges agencies confront range from the need for clearer lines of accountability to streamlining organizations in response to changing circumstances; (5) resolving the year 2000 computing problem is the most pervasive, time-critical risk facing the government; (6) over the past 2 years, preparedness has improved markedly, but significant challenges remain and time is running out; (7) continuing computer security weaknesses put critical federal operations at great risk; (8) much more needs to be done to ensure that systems and data supporting essential federal operations are adequately protected; (9) widespread financial system weaknesses, problems with fundamental recordkeeping, incomplete documentation, and weak internal controls prevented the government from accurately reporting a large portion of its assets, liabilities, and costs; (10) these deficiencies undermine agencies' ability to accurately measure costs and effectively safeguard federal assets and manage operations; (11) providing cost information also remains a key challenge; (12) new standards require agencies to develop measures of the full costs of carrying out a mission, producing products, or delivering services to promote comparison of the costs of various programs and results; (13) the rapid pace of social and technological change and shifts in agency strategies to achieve their missions pose continuing challenges to attract and develop skilled staff; (14) skills gaps in critical areas undermine agencies' effectiveness and efforts to address high-risk areas; and (15) overall, human capital must become a more prominent issue for the government as agencies become more performance-based. |
gao_GAO-07-70 | gao_GAO-07-70_0 | 1). The regimes require export licensing for defense-related items and information, including data, except where exclusions apply. The U.S. export control system places the onus on universities and other exporters to understand and comply with the export control regulations. State issues export licenses based on the U.S. The U.S. Munitions List contains 21 categories, covering items such as weapons, chemical and biological agents, missiles, and both commercial and military satellites. Universities Focus on Conducting Fundamental Research
According to most university officials, their institutions conduct basic and applied science and engineering research in a wide variety of areas, producing findings that are conducted, shared, and published openly within a broad community that includes international students and scholars. Several universities we interviewed stated that if they are unsuccessful in negotiating the restrictive language out of those research contracts they consider to be fundamental, they sometimes reject the opportunity to participate in the research. In other cases, university officials stated they move export-controlled work to off-campus facilities and laboratories administered by the universities or the entity sponsoring the contract, where such research can be better segregated and controlled. Efforts Undertaken by Universities to Understand and Comply with Export Control Regulations
According to a State official, U.S. export control regulations are designed for “self-compliance.” For the academic community specifically, State officials said that it is the universities’ responsibility to conduct due diligence to determine whether their research activities are subject to export laws, and to identify whether an export license is required for foreign nationals within their purview. Officials confirmed that most of these applications are received from industry. In addition to conferences and agency-provided training, both State and Commerce maintain telephone help desks and Web sites for exporters to obtain guidance on export controls. However, State and Commerce have taken few actions to coordinate their outreach efforts to universities. Commerce and State Have Not Conducted Analysis to Identify whether Any Risk Exists to Export- Controlled Information at Universities
State and Commerce officials expressed concerns that despite the export control exclusions for university research, the potential may exist for foreign nationals to access controlled defense and dual-use technologies and information on U.S. campuses. Given that much of the research conducted at U.S. universities is federally funded, data from other government agencies on the subjects of research conducted at academic institutions could supplement data from Commerce and State. Since government agencies place the responsibility for complying with export control regulations on universities and other exporting entities, it is essential that Commerce and State, the two agencies primarily charged with administering export regulations, understand whether universities correctly interpret and apply relevant export control policies and regulations when deciding whether their research is subject to export controls. Recommendations for Executive Actions
To improve the Department of Commerce’s oversight of export-controlled information under its jurisdiction at universities, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of the Bureau of Industry and Security to strategically assess potential vulnerabilities in the conduct and publication of academic research by becoming more knowledgeable about research being conducted on university campuses and, in consultation with other agencies, make use of available information on technology development and foreign student populations at universities to assess the extent to which research at universities may be subject to export controls and on the basis of this assessment of university research and foreign student populations, improve interagency coordination, conduct additional outreach, and improve guidance to ensure that universities understand when to apply export controls. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the nature of the research conducted at universities and identify the steps they have taken to comply with government export control regulations, we interviewed and obtained documentation from officials at 13 universities in positions such as vice chancellor for research, director of compliance, and general counsel. | Why GAO Did This Study
Foreign students and scholars have made substantial contributions to U.S. research efforts and technology development. However, according to a federal government intelligence assessment, foreign access to sensitive U.S. technology has imposed a significant but unquantifiable cost to the United States. Given this risk, GAO was asked to (1) describe the nature of the research at universities and identify steps they take to comply with export controls and (2) assess efforts by the Departments of Commerce and State--the key export control agencies--to determine the risk of export violations in university research. GAO reviewed Commerce and State export control programs and met with officials from 13 universities, selected based on their foreign student populations, applications for export licenses, and federal grants and contracts.
What GAO Found
The U.S. export control system requires export licensing for defense items and items that have both commercial and military applications, except where exclusions apply, such as those applicable to universities in some circumstances. The U.S. export control agencies place the onus on universities to understand and comply with the regulations. According to university officials we interviewed, their institutions focus almost exclusively on fundamental research--defined as basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community. Such research is generally not subject to export controls. Universities we visited conduct research in such areas as nanotechnologies, computer security, and chemical engineering. To ensure their research remains in the public domain, university officials said they negotiate contract language to remove publication or other dissemination restrictions for research they consider to be fundamental. If export controls apply, university officials stated they sometimes involve only those students eligible to conduct the research under a license exclusion, to avoid the lengthy license application process. In other cases, they refer such work to off-campus associated facilities that can better regulate and control foreign national access to the research. Universities we visited indicated that government-provided training and guidance on export control regulations is limited in informing their efforts to manage and protect export-controlled information in the university environment. State and Commerce officials expressed concerns that universities may not correctly interpret and apply export regulations, given the large number of foreign students participating in research at universities and the relative lack of license applications from universities. Although federal internal control standards contain guidelines for agencies to conduct risk assessments, State and Commerce have not conducted an overall assessment of available trend data on technology development research and foreign participation in such research at U.S. universities to identify potential vulnerabilities. For example, U.S. government agencies collect data on foreign student nationality, school enrollment, and types of research conducted at universities for federal agencies, which could supplement information that State and Commerce receive from visa application processes and other sources. Although State and Commerce provide guidance through training seminars, agency Web sites, and telephone help desks to assist exporters in understanding and complying with regulations, officials stated that their focus is on processing export license applications--primarily from industry. Recently, Commerce established an advisory committee composed of industry and university representatives who are expected to discuss issues such as the nature of university research and its relation to export controls. |
gao_GAO-12-881 | gao_GAO-12-881_0 | Community Banks and Credit Unions Have Declined in Number but Remain Important for Small Businesses and Agriculture
The number of community banks and credit unions has declined in recent decades, as smaller institutions have expanded, merged with, or been purchased by larger institutions. However, community banks and credit unions still play an important role in the economy. Community banks and credit unions allocate more of their lending to small businesses and rural areas than large banks, which research suggests is due to their focus on relationship-based lending. Another factor that may have contributed to consolidation is economies of scale, which refer to how a bank’s or credit union’s scale of operations, or size, is related to its costs. Importantly, the existence of economies of scale in banking has been subject to debate. Many Dodd-Frank Act Provisions May Affect Community Banks and Credit Unions, but the Full Extent of Their Impact Is Uncertain
The Dodd-Frank Act’s reforms are directed primarily at large, complex U.S. financial institutions, and the act exempts small institutions, including community banks and credit unions, from several of its provisions. However, federal regulators, state regulatory associations, and industry associations collectively identified provisions within 7 of the act’s 16 titles that they expect to impact community banks and credit unions. We analyzed the impact of a number of these Dodd-Frank Act provisions and, in brief, found that: some provisions, including the depository insurance reforms and CFPB supervision of nonbank providers of financial services and products, have benefited or may benefit community banks and credit unions; certain of the act’s mortgage reforms are expected to impose additional costs on community banks and credit unions, but their impact depends on future rule makings; the act’s risk retention provision for securitizations is expected to initially have a limited impact on community banks and credit unions; and other provisions, including those covering proprietary trading, remittance transfers, and executive compensation, are expected to impose additional requirements on community banks and credit unions, but their impact depends partly on future rule makings. Industry officials told us that determining which provisions will affect small institutions is difficult, because the impact may depend on how agencies implement certain provisions through their rules, and many of the rules needed to implement the act have not been finalized.reason, regulators and industry officials have noted that the full impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on community banks and credit unions is uncertain. Nonetheless, regulators and industry officials have noted that they expect that some of the act’s regulations will increase regulatory requirements on community banks and credit unions and disproportionately affect them For the same relative to larger banks because of their size. As recognized by federal regulators, industry officials, and others, the Dodd-Frank Act contains several provisions to help minimize certain regulatory requirements on small institutions. Officials from industry associations told us that they viewed this change as positive for community banks overall. Section 989G of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to exempt non-accelerated filers from section 404(b). The Dodd-Frank Act established CFPB and authorized it to supervise certain nonbank financial companies and large banks and credit unions with over $10 billion in assets and their affiliates for consumer protection purposes. Industry officials also have noted that it generally is too soon to determine the act’s overall impact on community banks’ and credit unions’ ability to lend to small businesses. Although any provision in the Dodd-Frank Act that affects these institutions could impact their customers (including small businesses), officials from federal agencies, state regulatory associations, and industry associations we interviewed identified only one provision in the Dodd-Frank Act (discussed below) that may directly impact community banks’ and credit unions’ ability to lend to small businesses. The provision serves, among other purposes, to facilitate the enforcement of fair lending laws. CFPB and NCUA generally agreed with our report. In addition, CFPB, FDIC, OCC, and SEC staff provided technical comments, which we have incorporated, as appropriate. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to examine (1) significant changes that community banks and credit unions have undergone in the past decade, including the factors that have contributed to such changes, and (2) the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- Frank Act) provisions that regulators, industry associations, and others expect to impact community banks and credit unions, including their small business lending. We also analyzed a number of the Dodd-Frank Act provisions that regulators, industry officials, and others expect to impact community banks and credit unions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Dodd-Frank Act includes numerous reforms to strengthen oversight of financial services firms and consolidate certain consumer protection responsibilities within CFPB. To help minimize its regulatory burden on small institutions, including community banks and credit unions, the act exempts such institutions from several of its provisions. However, the act also contains provisions that impose additional requirements on small institutions. Although no commonly accepted definition of a community bank exists, the term often is associated with smaller banks. Historically, community banks and credit unions have played an important role in providing credit to small businesses and other local customers.
This report examines (1) the significant changes community banks and credit unions have undergone in the past decade and the factors that have contributed to such changes, and (2) Dodd-Frank Act provisions that regulators, industry associations, and others expect to impact community banks and credit unions, including their small business lending. GAO analyzed regulatory and other data on community banks and credit unions; reviewed academic and other relevant studies; and interviewed federal regulators, community banks, credit unions, state regulatory and industry associations, academics, and others. CFPB, federal banking regulators, and the Securities and Exchange Commission provided technical comments on this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. CFPB and the National Credit Union Administration generally agreed with the report.
What GAO Found
While the number of community banks and credit unions has declined in recent years, they have remained important lenders to small businesses and other local customers. From 1985 through 2010, the number of banks under $10 billion in assets and credit unions declined by over 50 percent to 7,551 and 7,339, respectively. The decline resulted largely from consolidations, which were facilitated by changes in federal law that made it easier for banks and credit unions to expand geographically. Another factor that may have contributed to consolidations is economies of scale, which refer to how an institution's size is related to its costs. Although the existence of economies of scale in banking has been subject to debate, some recent research suggests that banks can save costs by expanding. Despite the decline in their number, community banks and credit unions have maintained their relationship-banking model, relying on their relationships with customers and local knowledge to make loans. Such institutions can use their relationship-based information to make loans to small businesses and other borrowers that larger banks may not make because of their general reliance on more automated processes. About 20 percent of lending by community banks can be categorized as small business lending (based on a commonly used proxy), compared to about 5 percent by larger banks. Community banks and credit unions also play an important role in rural areas, using relationship-based lending to serve customers with limited credit histories.
Although the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act's (Dodd-Frank Act) reforms are directed primarily at large, complex U.S. financial institutions, regulators, industry officials, and others collectively identified provisions within 7 of the act's 16 titles that they expect to have positive and negative impacts on community banks and credit unions. Industry officials told us that it is difficult to know for sure which provisions will impact community banks and credit unions, because the outcome largely depends on how agencies implement certain provisions through their rules, and many of the rules implementing the act have not been finalized. Thus, regulators and industry officials also have noted that the full impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on these institutions is uncertain. Nonetheless, some regulators and industry officials expect some of the act's provisions to benefit community banks and credit unions and other provisions to impose additional requirements on community banks and credit unions that could affect them disproportionately relative to larger banks. GAO analyzed a number of the Dodd-Frank Act provisions that regulators, industry officials, and others expect to impact community banks and credit unions. Several of the act's provisions, including its deposit insurance reforms, exemption from Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection's (CFPB) supervision of certain nonbanks, could reduce costs and/or help level the playing field for community banks and credit unions. Other provisions, such as the act's mortgage reforms, may impose additional requirements and, thus, costs on generally all banks and credit unions, but their impact will depend on, among other things, how the provisions are implemented. Finally, industry officials generally told us that it is too soon to determine the Dodd-Frank Act's overall impact on small business lending and identified only one provision that contains a data collection and reporting requirement as potentially having a direct impact on such lending. |
gao_GAO-07-28 | gao_GAO-07-28_0 | States and Localities Used Eminent Domain for Various Purposes and to Varying Degrees, but the Extent of Eminent Domain Use Is Unknown Due to Limited Data
Officials from national organizations, states, and cities with whom we spoke cited various common public purposes for which eminent domain can be or has been used, but the lack of data precludes a determination of the extent to which eminent domain has been used across the nation. Purposes for which we received examples include the building or expansion of roads and other transportation-related projects; construction of state and municipal facilities; and the elimination and prevention of blight. In addition, officials from some of the national organizations we contacted, which represent state and local governments, property rights groups, urban planning, and home builders, also cited remediation of environmental contamination and economic development. No Aggregate Data Exist on the Number of Instances and Purposes for which Eminent Domain Was Used
The lack of state or national data precluded objective statewide or national assessments on the use of eminent domain, including (1) how frequently eminent domain is used, (2) how often private-to-public or private-to-private transfer of property occurs, or (3) the purposes for which eminent domain has been used by state and local governments. Federal and State Governments Set Compensation and Relocation Benefits, but Concerns Exist That Some Payment Limits Are Too Low
Land acquisition laws generally require compensation be paid to the owner of a property that a public authority has acquired, including acquisitions by eminent domain. The land acquisition process often includes relocation of either the property owner or residents and businesses located in the property acquired by the authority; federal and state laws also address the costs involved in relocation. The project planning stage may begin by identifying the need for a project. This planning process often ends with the approval of a project plan by a public body. If the owner does not agree with an authority’s initial offer, then some authorities may provide additional offers above the appraised value. Property rights groups told us about the negative effects that the use of eminent domain could have on property owners, community residents, and businesses, such as the loss of small businesses or the dispersal of residents who relied upon each other in informal networks. However, in some cases that we reviewed, authorities acquired occupied residences and operating businesses to redevelop an area. Authorities counter that, under certain circumstances, there is money available to owners to fight eminent domain. Slightly More Than Half of All State Legislatures Modified Their Eminent Domain Laws
After the Supreme Court’s Kelo decision, 29 states enacted at least one of three general types of changes to their eminent domain laws from June 23, 2005, through July 31, 2006. The Department of Transportation provided technical comments, which have been incorporated where appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Congress, in the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, mandated that we conduct a nationwide study on the use of eminent domain. Our objectives were to provide information on (1) the purposes and extent for which eminent domain can be and has been used; (2) the process states and select localities across the country use to acquire land, including by eminent domain; (3) how the use of eminent domain has affected individuals and communities in select localities; and (4) the changes state legislatures made to laws governing the use of eminent domain from June 2005 through July 2006. In addition, we interviewed multiple national associations of local and state government officials and planning professionals, national public interest groups, national property rights groups, and the National Academy of Public Administration to gain their perspective on past, current, and potential uses of eminent domain. The three categories were: (1) states that placed restrictions on the use of eminent domain, such as prohibiting its use to increase property tax revenues, transfer condemned property to a private entity, or to assemble land for projects that are solely for economic development; (2) states that established additional procedural requirements, such as providing further public notice prior to condemnation; and (3) states that modified definitions for terms related to eminent domain use, such as blight or blighted property, public use, and economic development. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Congress mandated that GAO conduct a nationwide study on the use of eminent domain by state and local governments. This report provides information on (1) the purposes for and extent to which eminent domain can be and has been used; (2) the process states and select localities across the country use to acquire land, including by eminent domain; (3) how the use of eminent domain has affected individuals and communities in select localities; and (4) the changes state legislatures made to laws governing the use of eminent domain from June 2005 through July 2006. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant provisions in federal, state, and local laws; conducted site visits to various redevelopment projects where eminent domain was used; and interviewed multiple national associations of local and state government officials and planning professionals, national public interest groups, and national property rights groups to gain their perspectives on the use of eminent domain and its effect on communities and property owners. The Department of Transportation provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which have been incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found
Officials from national organizations and state and local governments cited various purposes for which eminent domain can be or has been used, including the building or expansion of transportation-related projects; the elimination and prevention of conditions that are detrimental to the physical, social, and economic well-being of an area; remediation of environmental contamination; and economic development. However, no centralized or aggregate national or state data exist on the use of eminent domain, thereby precluding GAO from any national or statewide assessments of, among other things, how frequently eminent domain is used for private-to-public or private-to-private transfer of property and purposes of these transfers. Multiple laws promulgated from federal, state, and local governments set forth how authorities can acquire land--including by eminent domain--and how compensation for property owners is determined. Some believe payment limits are too low. The initial step in a project that involves land acquisition is the public review and approval by a public body of a project plan, which is followed by a land valuation process during which title studies and appraisals are completed. During the land acquisition stage, authorities often make a formal offer to the owner and attempt to negotiate the purchase of the property. If the authority cannot locate the owner or the parties cannot agree to a price, among other circumstances, the authorities then begin the formal legal proceedings to acquire the property by eminent domain. Finally, once the property is acquired, authorities may provide relocation assistance that may include monetary payments to cover moving expenses. Redevelopment projects for which eminent domain is used affect individuals and communities in a range of ways that cannot be quantified due to a lack of measures and aggregate data. According to authorities, areas selected for redevelopment could have been vacant and abandoned land or those that included residents and operating businesses. Local officials both described and showed us community benefits resulting from redevelopment projects, including additional employment opportunities and housing in an area. Also, property rights groups told us some of the negative effects of eminent domain, such as the dispersal of long-standing communities. Finally, these groups expressed concerns about how authorities implement procedures for using eminent domain, particularly the provision of public notice to owners about the risk of condemnation, and the process for designating an area as blighted. From June 23, 2005, through July 31, 2006, 29 states enacted at least one of the following three general types of changes to their eminent domain laws: (1) restrictions on the use of eminent domain under certain circumstances, (2) additional procedural requirements, and (3) changes that defined or redefined key terms related to eminent domain including public use. |
gao_GAO-08-506T | gao_GAO-08-506T_0 | Background
Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion annually, MDA’s BMDS is the largest research development program in the Department of Defense’s budget. To develop a system capable of carrying out its mission, MDA, until December 2007, executed an acquisition strategy in which the development of missile defense capabilities was organized in 2-year increments known as blocks. In addition, we reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code to compare MDA’s current level of accountability with federal acquisition laws. Fielded Capability Increased, but Less than Planned at Higher Cost
MDA made progress in developing and fielding the BMDS during 2007. On the other hand, fewer assets were fielded than originally planned, some tests were delayed, and the cost of the block increased by approximately $1 billion. An evaluation of aggregate performance would also have to consider that (1) some parts in fielded interceptors identified as potentially problematic have not been replaced yet, and (2) tests done to date have been developmental in nature and do not provide sufficient realism for DOD to determine if the BMDS is suitable and effective for battle. Fielding of Assets and Cost
During Block 2006, MDA increased its inventory of BMDS assets while enhancing the system’s performance. When work is deferred, its costs are no longer accounted for in the original block. Because MDA did not track the cost of the deferred work, the agency could not make an adjustment that would have matched the cost with the correct block. Another reason why it is difficult to determine the actual cost of Block 2006 is a planning methodology employed by MDA prime contractors that can obscure the full cost of work. Earned value management does not recognize such variances in completing scheduled work and to the extent more work has to be done to complete the product, additional costs could be incurred that are not yet recognized. Testing and Performance of Fielded Capability
Most test objectives were achieved during 2007, although several BMDS programs experienced setbacks in their test schedules. As we reported in March 2007, MDA altered its original Block 2006 performance goals commensurate with the agency’s reductions in the delivery of fielded assets. For several reasons, information is not sufficient to assess whether MDA achieved its revised performance goals. First, MDA uses a combination of simulations and flight tests to determine whether performance goals are met. However, too few flight tests have been completed to ensure the accuracy of the models and simulations predictions. Key Steps Taken to Enhance BMDS Oversight, But More Can Be Done
Since its initiation in 2002, MDA has been given a significant amount of flexibility. In the past year, MDA has begun implementing two initiatives—a new block construct and a new executive board—to improve transparency, accountability, and oversight. In addition, Congress has directed that MDA begin buying certain assets with procurement funds like other programs, which should promote accountability for and transparency of the BMDS. These changes should improve the transparency of the BMDS program and make MDA more accountable for the investment being made in missile defense. For example, the actual cost of each block can be tracked because MDA will no longer defer work planned for one block, along with its cost, to a future block. For example, MDA officials told us that the agency does not plan to estimate the full cost of a block. Independent life-cycle cost estimates provide confidence that a program is executable within estimated cost. Although MDA plans to develop unit cost for selected block assets and to request that DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group verify the unit costs, the agency does not yet plan to do so for a block cost estimate. Although the charter of the MDEB includes the mission to make recommendations to MDA and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on investment options, program priorities, and MDA’s strategy for developing and fielding an operational missile defense capability, the MDEB will not necessarily have the opportunity to review and recommend changes to BMDS blocks. Using procurement funds will mean that MDA will be required to ensure that assets are fully funded in the year of their purchase, rather than incrementally funded over several years. Upcoming Report
Our annual report on missile defense is in draft and with DOD for comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Funded at $8 billion to $10 billion per year, the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) effort to develop and field a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is the largest research and development program in the Department of Defense (DOD). The program has been managed in 2-year increments, known as blocks. Block 2006, the second BMDS block, was completed in December 2007. By law, GAO annually assesses MDA's progress. This testimony is based on GAO's assessment of MDA's progress in (1) meeting Block 2006 goals for fielding assets, completing work within estimated cost, conducting tests, and demonstrating the performance of the overall system in the field, and (2) making managerial improvements to transparency, accountability, and oversight. In conducting the assessment, GAO reviewed the assets fielded; contractor cost, schedule, and performance; and tests completed during 2007. GAO also reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. code, acquisition policy, and the charter of a new missile defense board. We have previously made recommendations to improve oversight in the areas that MDA has recently taken action. We also have a draft report that is currently with DOD for comment that includes additional recommendations.
What GAO Found
In the past year, MDA has fielded additional and new assets, enhanced the capability of some existing assets, and achieved most test objectives. However, MDA did not meet the goals it originally set for the block. Ultimately, MDA fielded fewer assets, increased costs by about $1 billion and conducted fewer tests. Even with the cost increase, MDA deferred work to keep costs from increasing further, as some contractors overran their fiscal year 2007 budgets. Deferring work obscures the cost of the block because such work is no longer counted as part of Block 2006. The cost of the block may have been further obscured by a way of planning work used by several contractors that could underestimate the actual work completed. If more work has to be done, MDA could incur additional costs that are not yet recognized. MDA also sets goals for determining the overall performance of the BMDS. Similar to other DOD programs, MDA uses models and simulations to predict BMDS performance. We were unable to assess whether MDA met its overall performance goal because there have not been enough flight tests to provide a high confidence that the models and simulations accurately predict BMDS performance. Moreover, the tests done to date have been developmental in nature, and do not provide sufficient realism for DOD's test and evaluation Director to determine whether BMDS is suitable and effective for battle. GAO has previously reported that MDA has been given unprecedented funding and decision-making flexibility. While this flexibility has expedited BMDS fielding, it has also made MDA less accountable and transparent in its decisions than other major programs, making oversight more challenging. MDA, with some direction from Congress, has taken significant steps to address these concerns. MDA implemented a new way of defining blocks--its construct for developing and fielding BMDS increments--that should make costs more transparent. For example, under the newly-defined blocks, MDA will no longer defer work from one block to another. Accountability should also be improved as MDA will for the first time estimate unit costs for selected assets and report variances from those estimates. DOD also chartered a new executive board with more BMDS oversight responsibility than its predecessor. Finally, MDA will begin buying certain assets with procurement funds like other programs. This will benefit transparency and accountability, because to use procurement funding generally means that assets must be fully paid for in the year they are bought. Previously, MDA has been able to pay for assets incrementally using research and development funds. Some oversight concerns remain, however. For example, MDA does not plan to estimate the total cost of a block, nor to have a block's costs independently verified--actions required of other programs to inform decisions about affordability and investment choices. Also, the executive board faces a challenge in overseeing MDA's large technology development efforts and does not have approval authority for some key decisions made by MDA. |
gao_GAO-13-342T | gao_GAO-13-342T_0 | Background
BIE, formerly known as the Office of Indian Education Programs when it was part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), was renamed and established as a separate bureau in 2006. Organizationally, BIE is under the Office of the Assistant Secretary- Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs), and its director reports to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs. The director is responsible for the direction and management of all education functions, including the formation of policies and procedures, supervision of all program activities, and approval of the expenditure of funds for education functions. Similar to public schools, BIE schools receive formula grants from Education. Currently, BIE’s administrative functions—human resources, budget management, information technology, and acquisitions—are managed by Indian Affairs’ Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management (DAS-M). However, in 2004, in response to the NAPA study, its administrative functions were centralized under the DAS-M.
More recently, in 2011, Indian Affairs commissioned another study— known as the Bronner report—to evaluate the administrative support structure for BIE and BIA. The report, issued in March 2012, found that organizations within Indian Affairs, including DAS-M, BIA, and BIE, do not coordinate effectively and communication among them is poor. Likewise, delays in contracting have occasionally affected BIE’s ability to provide timely services for students with disabilities. Communication is especially difficult because of Indian Affairs’ fragmented administrative structure. Further, DAS-M staff may not have the requisite expertise needed for working on BIE-related tasks. 2.) Preliminary results from our work also suggest that lack of consistent leadership within DAS-M and BIE hinders collaboration between the two offices. BIE’S Limited Governance of Schools Affects Reform Efforts
Although BIE’s responsibilities to operate Indian schools are in some respects similar to those of state educational agencies (SEA), BIE’s influence is limited because most schools are tribally operated. Like an SEA, BIE administers, oversees, and provides technical support for a number of programs funded by Education. Yet, in contrast to states that can impose a range of reforms on schools, in tribally operated schools, which form the majority of BIE schools, tribes retain authority over key policies. For example, BIE cannot require tribally-operated schools to adopt or develop their own teacher and principal evaluation systems. Consequently, this has affected BIE’s ability to calculate proficiency for its schools in a timely manner. According to BIE and Education officials, many of these individual schools are small in size and lack the organizational capacity to function as a school district. We have previously reported that smaller school districts face challenges acquiring special education services or providers because they lack the same capacity, resources, knowledge, or experience necessary to provide those services as larger-sized school districts. While BIE confronts several limitations in its ability to govern schools, its mission remains to provide students quality education opportunities. To this end, officials’ roles and responsibilities must be clear, and sustained leadership is key. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2011, the federal government provided over $800 million to BIE schools that serve about 41,000 Indian students living on or near reservations. Within the Department of Interior, BIE is part of Indian Affairs, and BIEs director is responsible for the management of all education functions. BIEs mission is to provide quality education opportunities to Indian students. However, poor student outcomes raise questions about how well BIE is achieving its mission.
This testimony reports on ongoing GAO work about the Department of Interiors management of BIE schools. A full report will be issued later this year. Based on preliminary findings, todays testimony will focus on: (1) the key management challenges affecting BIE and (2) BIEs governance of schools.
For this work, GAO reviewed agency documents and relevant federal laws and regulations; interviewed agency officials; and conducted site visits to public and BIE schools.
What GAO Found
Management challenges within the Department of Interior's Office of the Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs), such as fragmented administrative structures and frequent turnover in leadership, continue to hamper efforts to improve Indian education. For example, incompatible procedures and lack of clear roles for the Bureau of Indian Education and the Indian Affairs' Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management (DAS-M), which provides administrative functions to BIE, such as human resources and acquisitions, contribute to delays in schools acquiring needed materials and resources. According to BIE officials, some DAS-M staff are not aware of the necessary procedures and timelines to meet schools' needs. For instance, delays in contracting have occasionally affected BIE's ability to provide services for students with disabilities in a timely manner. A study commissioned by Indian Affairs to evaluate the administrative support structure for BIE and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)--also under Indian Affairs--concluded that organizations within Indian Affairs, including DAS-M, BIA, and BIE, do not coordinate effectively and communication among them is poor. Similarly, preliminary results from GAO's work suggest that lack of consistent leadership within DAS-M and BIE hinders collaboration between the two offices.
Although BIE's responsibilities to operate Indian schools are in some respects similar to those of state educational agencies (SEAs), BIE's influence is limited because most schools are tribally-operated. Like an SEA, BIE administers, monitors, and provides technical support for a number of programs funded by the Department of Education. Yet, in contrast to states that can impose a range of reforms on schools, in most BIE schools tribes retain authority over key policies. For example, BIE cannot require most schools to adopt or develop their own teacher and principal evaluation systems. Further complicating reform efforts, many small individual BIE schools function as their own school districts. We have previously reported that smaller school districts may face challenges acquiring special education services or providers because they lack the same capacity, resources, knowledge, or experience necessary to provide those services as larger-sized school districts. |
gao_GAO-11-920 | gao_GAO-11-920_0 | 3. DOE, NRC, and State Are Not Able to Fully Account for U.S. Nuclear Material Located at Foreign Facilities
DOE, NRC, and State are not able to fully account for U.S. nuclear material overseas that is subject to nuclear cooperation agreement terms because the agreements do not stipulate systematic reporting of such information, and there is no U.S. policy to pursue or obtain such information. U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Generally Require That Partners Report Inventory Information upon Request, but DOE and NRC Have Not Systematically Sought Such Data
Section 123 of the AEA, as amended, does not require nuclear cooperation agreements to contain provisions stipulating that partners report information on the amount, status, or location (facility) of special nuclear material subject to the agreement terms. NRC and DOE could not fully account for U.S. exports of HEU in response to a congressional mandate that the agencies report on the current location and disposition of U.S. HEU overseas. DOE, NRC, and State Do Not Have Access Rights to Monitor and Evaluate That U.S. Nuclear Material Located at Foreign Facilities Is Adequately Protected
Nuclear cooperation agreements do not contain specific access rights that enable DOE, NRC, or State to monitor and evaluate the physical security of U.S. nuclear material overseas, and the United States relies on partners to maintain adequate security. However, the interagency physical protection teams have neither systematically visited countries believed to be holding Category I quantities of U.S. nuclear material, nor have they systematically revisited facilities determined to not be meeting IAEA security guidelines in a timely manner. In addition, we reviewed U.S. agencies’ records of these and other physical protection visits and found that, over the 17-year period from 1994 through 2010, U.S. interagency physical protection teams made 55 visits. DOE Seeks to Increase Security or Remove Vulnerable U.S. Nuclear Material at Partner Facilities but Faces Challenges
DOE has taken steps to improve security at a number of facilities overseas that hold U.S. nuclear material. Specifically, GTRI can only bring certain types of nuclear material back to the United States that have an approved disposition pathway and meet the program’s eligibility criteria. GTRI officials told us that, of the approximately 17,500 kilograms of HEU it estimates was exported from the United States, the majority—12,400 kilograms—is currently not eligible for return to the United States. GTRI officials stated that these reactors are in Germany, France, and Japan, and that the material has been deemed to be adequately protected. GTRI reported that the other approximately 2,000 kilograms of transferred U.S. nuclear material is located primarily in EURATOM member countries and is either currently in use or adequately protected. Currently, annual reconciliations with five partners are undertaken. To help federal agencies better understand where U.S. nuclear material is currently located overseas, we recommend that the Secretary of State, working with the Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, take the following four actions to strengthen controls over U.S. nuclear material subject to these agreements: determine, for those partners with which the United States has transferred material but does not have annual inventory reconciliation, a baseline inventory of weapon-usable U.S. nuclear material, and establish a process for conducting annual reconciliations of inventories of nuclear material on a facility-by-facility basis; establish for those partners with which the United States has an annual inventory reconciliation, reporting on a facility-by-facility basis for weapon-usable material where possible; facilitate visits to sites that U.S. physical protection teams have not visited that are believed to be holding U.S. Category I nuclear material; and seek to include measures that provide for physical protection access rights in new or renewed nuclear cooperation agreements so that U.S. interagency physical protection teams may in the future obtain access when necessary to verify that U.S. nuclear materials are adequately protected. DOE, NRC, and State disagreed with GAO in three general areas of the report. We are particularly concerned that NRC and DOE, in response to a 1992 mandate by Congress, could only account for the location and disposition of about 1,160 kilograms out of an estimated 17,500 kilograms of U.S.-exported HEU. To assess DOE’s and other U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor and evaluate the physical security conditions of U.S. nuclear material overseas subject to nuclear cooperation agreement terms and describe DOE’s activities to secure or remove potentially vulnerable U.S. nuclear material at partner facilities, we reviewed all U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements in force, as well as other U.S. statutes, and IAEA’s security guidelines, “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,” INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, and other relevant international conventions to determine the extent to which such laws and international conventions provide for DOE and U.S. agencies to monitor and evaluate the physical security of transferred U.S. nuclear material subject to U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement terms. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has exported special nuclear material, including enriched uranium, and source material such as natural uranium under nuclear cooperation agreements. The United States has 27 nuclear cooperation agreements for peaceful civilian cooperation. Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, partners are required to guarantee the physical protection of U.S. nuclear material. GAO was asked to (1) assess U.S. agency efforts to account for U.S. nuclear material overseas, (2) assess the Department of Energy's (DOE) and U.S. agencies' efforts to evaluate the security of U.S. material overseas, and (3) describe DOE's activities to secure or remove potentially vulnerable U.S. nuclear material at partner facilities. GAO analyzed agency records and interviewed DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of State (State), and partner country officials. This report summarizes GAO's classified report issued in June 2011.
What GAO Found
DOE, NRC, and State are not able to fully account for U.S. nuclear material overseas that is subject to nuclear cooperation agreement terms because the agreements do not stipulate systematic reporting of such information, and there is no U.S. policy to pursue or obtain such information. U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements generally require that partners report inventory information upon request, however, DOE and NRC have not systematically sought such data. DOE and NRC do not have a comprehensive, detailed, current inventory of U.S. nuclear material--including weapon-usable material such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium--overseas that includes the country, facility, and quantity of material. In addition, NRC and DOE could not fully account for the current location and disposition of U.S. HEU overseas in response to a 1992 congressional mandate. U.S. agencies, in a 1993 report produced in response to the mandate, were able to verify the location of 1,160 kilograms out of 17,500 kilograms of U.S. HEU estimated to have been exported. DOE, NRC, and State have established annual inventory reconciliations with five U.S. partners, but not the others it has transferred material to or trades with. Nuclear cooperation agreements do not contain specific access rights that enable DOE, NRC, or State to monitor and evaluate the physical security of U.S. nuclear material overseas, and the United States relies on its partners to maintain adequate security. In the absence of access rights, DOE's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, NRC, and State have conducted physical protection visits to monitor and evaluate the physical security of U.S. nuclear material at facilities overseas when permitted. However, the agencies have not systematically visited countries believed to be holding the highest proliferation risk quantities of U.S. nuclear material, or systematically revisited facilities not meeting international physical security guidelines in a timely manner. Of the 55 visits made from 1994 through 2010, U.S. teams found that countries met international security guidelines approximately 50 percent of the time. DOE has taken steps to improve security at a number of facilities overseas that hold U.S. nuclear material but faces constraints. DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) removes U.S. nuclear material from vulnerable facilities overseas but can only bring back materials that have an approved disposition pathway and meet the program's eligibility criteria. GTRI officials told GAO that, of the approximately 17,500 kilograms of HEU exported from the United States, 12,400 kilograms are currently not eligible for return to the United States. Specifically, GTRI reported that over 10,000 kilograms of U.S. HEU are believed to be in fuels from reactors in Germany, France, and Japan that have no disposition pathways in the United States and are adequately protected. In addition, according to GTRI, 2,000 kilograms of transferred U.S. HEU are located primarily in European Atomic Energy Community countries and are currently in use or adequately protected. GAO suggests, among other things, that Congress consider directing DOE and NRC to compile an inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas. DOE, NRC, and State generally disagreed with GAO's recommendations, including that they conduct annual inventory reconciliations with all partners, stating they were unnecessary. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations could help improve the accountability of U.S. nuclear material in foreign countries. |
gao_GAO-02-919T | gao_GAO-02-919T_0 | Recent Advances and Changes in Science, Work, and Society Have Enhanced Potential among People with Disabilities
Scientific advances, changes in the nature of work, and social changes have generally enhanced the potential for people with disabilities to work. Medical advancements and assistive technologies have given more independence to some individuals. Moreover, the economy has become more service- and knowledge-based, presenting both opportunities and some new challenges for people with disabilities. For instance, the Americans with Disabilities Act fosters the expectation that people with disabilities can work and have the right to work. As with treatment, the benefits of innovations in assistive technologies— such as advanced prosthetics and wheelchair designs—have not been fully incorporated into DI and SSI disability criteria because the design of these programs does not recognize these advances in disability decision making. Incorporating Advances and Changes into the Disability Criteria Could Have Profound Implications
In order to incorporate the medical, economic, and social advances and changes into the programs’ disability criteria, some steps can be taken within the existing program design, while others would require more fundamental changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs began, much has changed and continues to change in medicine, technology, the economy, and societal views and expectations of people with disabilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that scientific advances, changes in the nature of work, and social changes have generally enhanced the potential for people with disabilities to work. Medical advances, such as organ transplantation, and assistive technologies, such as advances in wheelchair design, have given more independence to some individuals. At the same time, a service- and knowledge-based economy has opened new opportunities for people with disabilities, and societal changes have fostered the expectation that people with disabilities can work and have the right to work. GAO further found that DI and SSI disability criteria have not kept pace with these advances and changes. Depending on the claimant's impairment, decisions about eligibility benefits can be based on both medical and labor market criteria. Finally, some steps to incorporate these advances and changes can be taken within the existing programs' design, but some would require more fundamental changes. |
gao_GAO-12-644T | gao_GAO-12-644T_0 | Another layer of security is checked-baggage screening, which uses technology referred to as explosive detection systems (EDS) and explosives trace detection (ETD). DHS and TSA Have Experienced Challenges in Developing and Meeting Key Performance Requirements for Various Screening Technologies
Our past work has found that technology program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the program start. For example, in June 2010, we reported that more than half of 15 DHS programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, or establishing acquisition program baselines.currently have ongoing work related to this area and we plan to report the results later this year. For example:
We reported in January 2012 that TSA did not fully follow DHS acquisition policies when acquiring AIT, which resulted in DHS approving full AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSA’s revised specifications. In July 2011, we reported that TSA revised its EDS requirements to better address current threats, and plans to implement these requirements in a phased approach. However, we reported that some number of EDS machines in TSA’s checked baggage screening fleet are configured to detect explosives at the levels established in the 2005 requirements. The remaining EDS machines are configured to detect explosives at 1998 levels. When TSA established the 2005 requirements, it did not have a plan with the appropriate time frames needed to deploy EDSs to meet the requirements. DHS and TSA Have Encountered Challenges in Overseeing and Testing New Screening Technologies
Our prior work has also shown that not resolving problems discovered during testing can sometimes lead to costly redesign and rework at a later date. Specifically: In January 2012, we reported that TSA began deploying AIT before it received approval for how it would test AIT. As a result, we reported that TSA procured AIT without DHS’s full oversight and approval or knowledge of how TSA would test and evaluate AIT. We also reported that TSA made additional revisions to the EDS requirements in January 2010 but experienced challenges in collecting explosives data on the physical and chemical properties of certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS detection software to meet the 2010 requirements.also needed by TSA for testing the machines to determine whether they meet established requirements prior to their procurement and deployment to airports. TSA and S&T have experienced these challenges because of problems associated with safely handling and consistently formulating some explosives, which have also resulted in problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned. DHS concurred and reported actions underway to address them. DHS and TSA Have Experienced Challenges Identifying Acquisition Program Baselines, Program Schedules, and Costs
We have found that realistic acquisition program baselines with stable requirements for cost, schedule, and performance are among the factors that are important to successful acquisitions delivering capabilities within cost and schedule. Our prior work has found that program performance metrics for cost and schedule can provide useful indicators of the health of acquisition programs and, when assessed regularly for changes and the reasons that cause changes, such indicators can be valuable tools for improving insight and oversight of individual programs as well as the total portfolio of major acquisitions.be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established Importantly, program performance cannot at the program start, particularly those that establish the minimum acceptable threshold required to satisfy user needs. In April 2012, we reported that TSA’s methods for developing life cycle cost estimates for the EBSP did not fully adhere to best practices for developing these estimates. DHS Has Efforts Underway to Strengthen Oversight of Technology Acquisitions
In part due to the problems we have highlighted in DHS’s acquisition process, the implementation and transformation of DHS remains on our high-risk list. Specifically, DHS has faced challenges overseeing the management, testing, acquisition, and deployment of various technology programs including AIT and EDS. Transportation Security Administration: Progress and Challenges Faced in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs. Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development of New Technologies. Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions. Aviation Security: TSA Is Increasing Procurement and Deployment of Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to This Effort and Other Areas of Aviation Security Remain. Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within DHS, TSA is responsible for developing and acquiring new technologies to address transportation-related homeland security needs. TSAs acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life-cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation security missions and investments, including technologies used to screen passengers and checked baggage such as AIT and EDS, among others. GAOs testimony addresses three key DHS and TSA challenges identified in past work: (1) developing and meeting technology program requirements, (2) overseeing and conducting testing of new screening technologies, and (3) identifying acquisition program baselines (or starting points), program schedules, and costs. This statement will also discuss recent DHS and TSA efforts to strengthen TSAs investment and acquisition processes. This statement is based on reports and testimonies GAO issued from October 2009 through April 2012 related to TSAs efforts to manage, test, and deploy various technology programs.
What GAO Found
GAOs past work has found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have faced challenges in developing and meeting program requirements when acquiring screening technologies. GAOs past work has demonstrated that program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the program start. In June 2010, GAO reported that more than half of the 15 DHS programs GAO reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, or establishing acquisition program baselines. At the program level, in January 2012, GAO reported that TSA did not fully follow DHS acquisition policies when acquiring advanced imaging technology (AIT)commonly referred to as a full body scanner that identifies objects or anomalies on the outside of the bodywhich resulted in DHS approving full AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSAs revised specifications. In July 2011, GAO reported that in 2010 TSA revised its explosive detection systems (EDS) requirements to better address current threats and planned to implement these requirements in a phased approach; however, GAO reported that some number of the EDSs in TSAs fleet were configured to detect explosives at the levels established in 2005 while the remaining ones were configured to detect explosives at 1998 levels and TSA did not have a plan with time frames needed to deploy EDSs to meet the current requirements.
GAO also reported DHS and TSA challenges in overseeing and testing new technologies. For example, in January 2012, GAO reported that TSA began deploying AIT before it received approval for how it would test AIT. Contrary to DHSs acquisition guidance, TSA approved AIT for deployment prior to DHSs approval of the AIT testing and evaluation plan. In July 2011, GAO also reported that TSA experienced challenges collecting data on the properties of certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS detection software and needed by TSA before testing EDS prior to procurement and deployment to airports. TSA and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate experienced these challenges because of problems safely handling and consistently formulating some explosives. The challenges related to data collection for certain explosives resulted in problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned.
DHS and TSA have experienced challenges identifying acquisition program baselines, program schedules, and costs. GAOs prior work has found that realistic acquisition program baselines with stable requirements for cost, schedule, and performance are among the factors that are important to successful acquisitions delivering capabilities within cost and schedule. GAO also found that program performance metrics for cost and schedule can provide useful indicators of the health of acquisition programs. In April 2012 GAO reported that TSAs methods for developing life-cycle cost estimates for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program did not fully adhere to best practices for developing these estimates.
DHS has efforts underway to strengthen oversight of technology acquisitions. In part due to the problems GAO highlighted in DHSs acquisition process, the implementation and transformation of DHS remains on GAOs high-risk list.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations. In prior work, GAO made recommendations to address challenges related to deploying AIT, EDS, and other screening technology to meet requirements; overseeing and conducting testing of AIT and EDS technologies; and incorporating information on costs and schedules, among other things, in making technology acquisition decisions. DHS and TSA concurred and have actions underway to address these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-97 | gao_GAO-11-97_0 | We conducted interviews with federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian officials relevant to these Border Patrol sectors. DHS Vision for Integrated Homeland Security
Federal legislation and DHS policy have stressed the need for coordination between DHS components and across other federal agencies and partners to most efficiently and effectively secure the homeland and its borders. DHS Used Interagency Forums and Joint Operations to Improve Border Security Coordination, but DHS Oversight Could Address Emerging Challenges
DHS used interagency forums and joint operations to improve federal coordination of northern border security efforts with law enforcement partners from state, local, and tribal governments, and Canada according to officials we interviewed across four northern border sectors. However, numerous partners cited challenges related to the inability to resource the increasing number of interagency forums in their area and raised concerns that some efforts were overlapping. Ongoing DHS oversight of the mission and location of interagency forums established by its components could help prevent duplication of efforts, and help ensure that DHS is a mindful steward in conserving the scarce resources of northern border partners. Additional DHS Action Could Help Address Challenges Hindering Northern Border Coordination among Its Components and with Other Federal Agencies
Federal agency coordination to secure the northern border was reported to have improved by some Border Patrol, ICE, Forest Service, and DEA officials operating within the four sectors we visited; however, in all sectors officials cited problems with others in sharing information and resources for daily operations. DHS headquarters officials from several offices agreed, stating that many DHS components do not consistently enforce information-sharing practices contained in interagency agreements, and that field agents are left to resolve coordination challenges without adequate headquarters guidance. Although DHS has relied on component-level management to ensure that components coordinate information and operations in the field, the long- standing and continuing coordination challenges between ICE and Border Patrol highlight the importance of developing a permanent solution to oversee and address these challenges. DHS Reported Limited Progress in Securing the Northern Border, but Assessing Partner Contributions Could Inform Decisions in Addressing Remaining Vulnerabilities
DHS reported limited progress in securing the northern border, but processes Border Patrol used to assess border security and resource requirements did not include the extent that northern border partnerships and resources were available or used to address border security vulnerabilities. DHS action to develop guidance and policy for including partner contributions in these processes could provide the agency and Congress with more complete information in making funding and resource allocation decisions. Our review of these reports for 2010 showed that for the northern border overall, 32 of the nearly 4,000 border miles had reached an acceptable level of control, with 9 of these miles included in the four sectors we visited. These border miles are defined as vulnerable to exploitation due to issues related to accessibility and resource availability and, as a result, there is a high degree of reliance on law enforcement support from outside the border zone. As such, the processes in place reflect the extent that Border Patrol, exclusive of its partners, had sufficient resources to detect, apprehend, and achieve an effective law enforcement resolution. Additionally, we previously reported that DHS has not fully responded to a legislative reporting requirement to link its initiatives— including partnerships—to existing vulnerabilities to inform decisions on federal resource allocations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure DHS is maximizing the benefits of its coordination efforts with northern border partners through interagency forums, documented agreements, and its resource planning process, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following three actions: Provide DHS-level guidance and oversight for interagency forums established or sponsored by its components to ensure that the missions and locations are not duplicative and to consider the downstream burden on northern border partners. Direct CBP to develop policy and guidance necessary to identify, assess, and integrate the available partner resources in northern border sector security assessments and resource planning documents. Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The challenges of securing the U.S.-Canadian border involve the coordination of multiple partners. The results of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to integrate border security among its components and across federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners are unclear. GAO was asked to address the extent to which DHS has (1) improved coordination with state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners; (2) progressed in addressing past federal coordination challenges; and (3) progressed in securing the northern border and used coordination efforts to address existing vulnerabilities. GAO reviewed interagency agreements, strategies, and operational documents that address DHS's reported northern border vulnerabilities such as terrorism. GAO visited four Border Patrol sectors, selected based on threat, and interviewed officials from federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian agencies operating within these sectors. While these results cannot be generalized, they provided insights on border security coordination.
What GAO Found
According to a majority of selected northern border security partners GAO interviewed, DHS improved northern border security coordination through interagency forums and joint operations. Specifically, interagency forums were beneficial in establishing a common understanding of security, while joint operations helped to achieve an integrated and effective law enforcement response. However, numerous partners cited challenges related to the inability to resource the increasing number of interagency forums and raised concerns that some efforts may be overlapping. While guidance issued by GAO stresses the need for a process to ensure that resources are used effectively and efficiently, DHS does not oversee the interagency forums established by its components. DHS oversight could help prevent possible duplication of efforts and conserve resources. DHS component officials reported that federal agency coordination to secure the northern border was improved, but partners in all four sectors GAO visited cited ongoing challenges sharing information and resources for daily border security related to operations and investigations. DHS has established and updated interagency agreements, but oversight by management at the component and local level has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of these agreements, such as those related to information sharing, in areas GAO visited. As a result, according to DHS officials, field agents have been left to resolve coordination challenges. Ongoing DHS-level oversight and attention to enforcing accountability of established agreements could help address long-standing coordination challenges between DHS components, and further the DHS strategic vision for a coordinated homeland security enterprise. Border Patrol--a component of DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection--reported that 32 of the nearly 4,000 northern border miles in fiscal year 2010 had reached an acceptable level of security and that there is a high reliance on law enforcement support from outside the border zone. However, the extent of partner law enforcement resources available to address border security vulnerabilities is not reflected in Border Patrol's processes for assessing border security and resource requirements. GAO previously reported that federal agencies should identify resources among collaborating agencies to deliver results more efficiently and that DHS had not fully responded to a legislative requirement to link initiatives--including partnerships--to existing border vulnerabilities to inform federal resource allocation decisions. Development of policy and guidance to integrate available partner resources in northern border security assessments and resource planning documents could provide the agency and Congress with more complete information necessary to make resource allocation decisions in mitigating existing border vulnerabilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DHS enhance oversight to ensure efficient use of interagency forums and compliance with interagency agreements; and develop guidance to integrate partner resources to mitigate northern border vulnerabilities. DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-204 | gao_GAO-10-204_0 | Moreover, federal agencies have conducted few exercises to test recovery plans for these incidents. FEMA Has Not Developed a National Disaster Recovery Strategy to Help Guide RDD or IND Recovery Planning
FEMA has not developed a national disaster recovery strategy, as required by law and directed by executive guidance, or issued specific guidance to coordinate federal, state, and local government recovery planning for RDD or IND incidents. Specifically, emergency management officials from almost all 13 cities and most of their 10 states indicated in our survey that they believe they would need to rely heavily on the federal government to conduct and fund all or almost all analysis and environmental cleanup activities associated with recovering from an RDD or IND incidents of the magnitude described in the national planning scenarios. Uncertainty about Federal Capability to Effectively Clean up Areas Contaminated with Radioactive Materials from RDD or IND Incidents
It is uncertain whether federal capability is sufficient to effectively clean up from RDD or IND incidents because federal agencies have only carried out environmental cleanup of localized areas of radioactive materials, and some limitations exist in federal capabilities to help address the magnitude of the cleanup that would follow these incidents. According to a decontamination expert at DOE’s Idaho National Laboratory, experience has shown that without guidance and discussion early in the response phase, a contractor might use a decontamination technology during this phase for no other reason than it was used before in an unrelated situation. The expert told us that this situation might lead to selecting environmental cleanup technologies that generate waste types that are more difficult to remove than the original material and that create more debris requiring disposal—leading to increased costs. Respondents from nearly all the cities and states expressed the need for a national disaster recovery strategy to address gaps and overlaps in current federal guidance in the context of RDD and IND incidents. For example, respondents from some of the cities sought better guidance on monitoring radioactivity levels, acceptable cleanup standards, and management of radioactive waste. Most respondents from cities expressed the need for greater planning interactions with the federal government and more exercises to test recovery plans. Developed online national recovery guidance in 2007. Updated the recovery handbooks for radiation incidents in 2008 and 2009. Conducted a full-scale RDD recovery exercise in 2008. As the United States moves forward in recovery preparation, some insights might be gained from the actions already taken by the United Kingdom to increase its preparedness to recover from acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism, many of which are similar to those suggested by the city, state, and federal emergency management officials we surveyed for improving federal preparedness to recover from RDD and IND incidents. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better prepare federal agencies to coordinate with state and local governments on the analysis and environmental cleanup of areas contaminated with radioactive materials following RDD or IND incidents, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator to prepare a national disaster recovery strategy that would clarify federal responsibilities for assisting state and local governments with the analysis and environmental cleanup of areas contaminated with radioactive materials in the event of RDD or IND incidents; issue guidance that describes how federal capabilities would be integrated into and support state and local plans for recovery from RDD and IND incidents; and schedule additional recovery exercises, in partnership with other federal, state, and local governments that would, among other things, specifically assess the preparedness of federal agencies and their contractors to conduct effective and efficient analysis and environmental cleanup activities associated with RDD and IND incidents. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In our review, we examined (1) the extent to which federal agencies are planning to fulfill their responsibilities to help cities and states clean up areas contaminated with radiation materials from radiological dispersal device (RDD) and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents, (2) what is known about the federal government’s capability to effectively clean up areas contaminated with radioactive materials from RDD and IND incidents, and (3) suggestions from government emergency management officials for improving federal preparedness to help cities and states recover from RDD and IND incidents. To determine the extent to which federal agencies are planning to fulfill their responsibilities to help cities and states clean up areas contaminated with radioactive materials from RDD and IND incidents, we reviewed pertinent federal law, presidential directives, and other executive guidance; interviewed cognizant officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); conducted a survey of 13 cities considered to be at high or medium risk to such attacks and their states, and all federal FEMA and EPA regional offices; and reviewed information on the number and type of RDD and IND response and recovery exercises that have been conducted from May 2003 through September 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
A terrorist's use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND) to release radioactive materials into the environment could have devastating consequences. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which the federal government is planning to fulfill its responsibilities to help cities and their states clean up contaminated areas from RDD and IND incidents, (2) what is known about the federal government's capability to effectively clean up these contaminated areas, and (3) suggestions for improving federal preparedness to help cities and states recover from these incidents. The report also discusses recovery activities in the United Kingdom. GAO reviewed federal laws and guidance; interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Energy (DOE), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and surveyed emergency management officials from 13 cities at high risk of attack, their 10 states, and FEMA and EPA regional offices.
What GAO Found
FEMA, the DHS agency responsible for developing a comprehensive emergency management system, has not developed a national disaster recovery strategy, as required by law, or issued specific guidance to coordinate federal, state, and local government recovery planning for RDD and IND incidents, as directed by executive guidance. To date, most federal attention has been given to developing a response framework, with less attention to recovery. Responding to an attack would involve evacuations and providing treatment to those injured; recovering from an attack would include cleaning up the radioactive contamination to permit people to return to their homes and businesses. Existing federal guidance provides limited direction for federal, state, and local agencies to develop recovery plans and to conduct exercises to test recovery preparedness. Of the over 90 RDD and IND exercises to test response capabilities in the last 6 years, only 3 included a recovery component. GAO's survey found that almost all 13 cities and most states believe they would need to rely heavily on the federal government to conduct and fund analysis and environmental cleanup activities. However, city and state officials were inconsistent in views on which federal agencies to turn to for help, which could hamper the recovery effort. Although DOE and EPA have experience cleaning up localized radiation-contaminated areas, it is unclear whether this federal capability is sufficient to effectively direct the clean up after RDD or IND incidents, and to efficiently address the magnitude of cleanup that would follow these incidents. According to an expert at DOE's Idaho National Laboratory, experience has shown that not selecting the appropriate decontamination technology can generate waste types that are more difficult to remove than the original material and can create more debris requiring disposal--leading to increased costs. Limitations in laboratory capacity to rapidly test potentially millions of material samples during cleanup, and uncertainty regarding where to dispose of radioactive debris could also slow the recovery process. At least two-thirds of the city, state, and federal respondents expressed concern about federal capability to provide the necessary cleanup actions after these incidents. Nearly all survey respondents had suggestions to improve federal recovery preparedness for RDD and IND incidents. For example, almost all the cities and states identified the need for a national disaster recovery strategy to address gaps and overlaps in federal guidance. All but three cities wanted additional guidance, for example, on monitoring radioactivity levels, cleanup standards, and management of radioactive waste. Most cities wanted more interaction with federal agencies and joint exercising to test recovery preparedness. Finally, GAO's review of the United Kingdom's preparedness to recover from radiological terrorism showed that it has already taken actions similar to those suggested by GAO's survey respondents, such as issuing national recovery guidance, conducting a full-scale recovery exercise, and publishing national recovery handbooks for radiation incidents. |
gao_GAO-03-56 | gao_GAO-03-56_0 | GSA administers the purchase card program governmentwide. An estimated 4 million U.S. merchants accept MasterCard, Visa, or both, and at least 2.1 million of these merchants did business with the government in fiscal year 2001.Because the banks that issue purchase cards do not have access to data on all of the merchants accepting the cards, MasterCard and Visa collected this information on the banks’ behalf, contracting in one case with Austin- Tetra, a private firm, to assist in the task. However, this information is not useful because the data collected were inconsistent and incomplete, making them unreliable. Therefore, at this time, no meaningful conclusions can be drawn about where purchase card dollars are spent or the effect on small businesses of the government use of purchase cards. Drawing on lessons learned in its first attempt at a governmentwide socioeconomic data report, GSA is continuing to work with SBA, DOD, and the private sector to improve the reliability of the data for subsequent reports. However, in its initial data collection effort, GSA did not precisely define the information it was requesting or clearly specify the criteria to be used by the banks and associations as they categorized merchants. Therefore, businesses requiring certification, such as HUBZone and small disadvantaged businesses, are easier to categorize than businesses for which registration is voluntary, such as woman-owned small businesses. The data exchanged during transactions generally focus on information needed to ensure that the merchant is paid and the cardholder’s account is charged. Conclusions
Although the government likely will never be able to capture complete socioeconomic information on 100 percent of purchase card merchants, the available data can be strengthened to provide more accurate and consistent information that would provide decisionmakers a clearer picture of the extent to which small businesses are receiving federal money through the purchase card program. Identify the information that federal agencies, especially the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of Defense (DOD), have collected for fiscal year 2001 on the socioeconomic status of purchase card merchants and the sources of such information. To assess GSA’s governmentwide efforts to collect data on the socioeconomic status of merchants, we reviewed (1) data reported to GSA by the banks and payment card associations for fiscal year 2001, (2) data provided to GSA for their internal purchase card program from Visa, and (3) MasterCard’s merchant file. To identify the challenges to the collection and reporting of socioeconomic data on merchants, we interviewed government officials from GSA’s purchase card program, SBA, DOD, and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Government purchase cards have streamlined the process of acquiring goods and services by allowing employees to purchase directly from merchants rather than going through the regular procurement process. The government spent $13.8 billion using purchase cards in fiscal year 2001. However, the government does not know how purchase card spending impacts small businesses and other socioeconomic categories, such as woman-owned small businesses, and small disadvantaged businesses. Because of these uncertainties, the General Services Administration (GSA), which administers the purchase card program, has begun to collect socioeconomic data on merchants doing business with the federal government through purchase cards. This report assesses GSA's efforts and identifies the challenges to collecting and reporting this data.
What GAO Found
GSA's effort to collect socioeconomic data in fiscal year 2001 was ineffective because of incomplete, inconsistent, and, therefore, unreliable data gathered by banks and payment card associations on behalf of GSA. The data were inconsistent primarily because GSA did not precisely define criteria for the information it was seeking from the banks. Therefore, no meaningful conclusions can be drawn at this time about where agencies spend purchase card dollars or the effect of purchase cards on small businesses. Nevertheless, GSA has been working with the Small Business Administration, the Department of Defense, and the private sector to develop strategies to improve the data's reliability. By building on the lessons learned in its initial attempt to collect the data, GSA hopes to produce more reliable socioeconomic data for future fiscal years. We identified several challenges that prevent GSA from gathering data on 100 percent of the merchants doing business with the federal government. These challenges stem from the nature of the purchase card transaction processing system, which focuses on the data needed to ensure that the merchant is paid and the cardholder's account is charged. It is not designed to collect socioeconomic data for the government. Despite the challenges that prevent the collection of socioeconomic data on all purchase card merchants, well-defined criteria and consistent use of available data sources would provide decisionmakers with a clearer picture of the extent to which small businesses are receiving federal dollars through purchase cards. |
gao_GAO-11-107 | gao_GAO-11-107_0 | NASA Is Taking Steps to Address Risk and Ensure Success of Remaining Delta II Missions
NASA’s LSP is taking steps to address risk and ensure the success of the last planned Delta II launched missions. LSP exercises oversight of United Launch Alliance through a combination of specific government approvals and targeted government insight into contractor activities and designs. According to LSP officials, having government systems engineers with the technical expertise to review or repeat the contractors’ engineering analyses is a key factor in high launch success rates. LSP is taking some additional actions to mitigate risk associated with the remaining Delta II flights. LSP has also identified several specific areas of concern with the remaining Delta II flights—including contractor workforce expertise, postproduction subcontractor support, spare parts, and launch pads—that must be mitigated where possible to ensure the success of the remaining missions. LSP has been coordinating with NASA and contractor officials responsible for these efforts. Due to an active small class launch vehicle market and NASA’s relative low need for vehicles in this class, the agency has no immediate plans to develop additional small class launch vehicles. Rather, the agency will acquire small class launch services using the NASA Launch Services II contract. NASA Plans to Leverage Falcon 9 and Taurus II Investments to Fill Medium Class Capability Gap
NASA’s plan to transition from Delta II to other medium class launch providers is to eventually certify the vehicles being developed for space station resupply for use by NASA science missions. NASA Plan to Acquire Future Medium Class Launch Vehicles Includes Inherent Risk
NASA has a reasonable plan for addressing the medium launch capability gap, but its approach has inherent risks that need to be mitigated. First, NASA has not developed detailed estimates of the time and money required to resolve technical issues likely to arise during the launch vehicle certification process. Second, both Taurus II and Falcon 9 have already experienced delays and history indicates more delays are likely as launch vehicle development is an inherently risky endeavor. Finally, neither potential provider currently has the proper facilities, such as a West Coast launch site, needed to launch the majority of NASA earth science missions requiring a medium capability. As additional costs are currently unknown, according to Science Mission Directorate officials, NASA has yet to budget for them. Science Missions in Development Face Uncertainties Related to Committing to Launch Vehicles before They Are Certified and Proven
NASA science missions requiring a medium class launch vehicle that are approaching their preliminary design review face uncertainties related to committing to as-yet uncertified and unproven launch vehicles. Therefore, NASA’s intention is to select a launch vehicle and accept any delays and residual cost increases to the science mission associated with delays in the certification process. According to NASA officials, changing the planned launch vehicle of a science mission after its preliminary design review is a fundamental change to the mission design and would lead to significant cost growth and schedule delays. NASA officials indicated that science missions within the next few years might be asked to design to accommodate multiple launch vehicle possibilities if the availability of future vehicles is delayed or until the task order is issued for the particular mission. Recommendations for Executive Action
Given the likelihood of delays and additional costs associated with developing and fielding a medium class launch vehicle fully certified for science missions and the implications to funding available to support science missions, we recommend that as LSP gains a more complete understanding of the detailed designs and actual performance of the Falcon 9 and Taurus II, the NASA Administrator require, NASA’s Science Mission Directorate—in conjunction with NASA’s Space Operations Mission Directorate—to perform a detailed cost estimate to determine the likely costs of certification and the trade-offs required to fund these costs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the National Space and Aeronautics Administration’s (NASA) and United Launch Alliance’s steps to ensure resources (budget, workforce, and facilities) are available to support safe Delta II operations through the last planned NASA flight, we interviewed NASA Launch Services Program (LSP) program officials and United Launch Alliance program officials and reviewed their launch vehicle transition plans. To examine technical and programmatic implications to science missions if NASA commits to new launch vehicles before they are certified and proven, we reviewed NASA’s systems engineering policy and interviewed officials with NASA’s Science Mission Directorate, NASA science mission project managers, and the Launch Services Program and discussed potential cost and schedule effects of committing to unproven launch vehicles. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has long relied on the Delta II medium class launch vehicle to launch science missions. Delta II, however, is no longer in production, and no other vehicle in the relative cost and performance range is currently certified for NASA use. Thus, NASA faces a potential gap in the availability of medium class launch vehicles that could cause design challenges, delays, or funding issues. GAO was asked to assess (1) NASA's and the Delta II contractor's, steps to ensure resources (budget, workforce, and facilities) are available to support safe Delta II operations through the last planned NASA flight in 2011; (2) NASA's plans and contingencies for ensuring a smooth transition from current small and medium class launch vehicles to other launch vehicles for future science missions; (3) the risks associated with NASA's planned approach to fill the medium launch capability gap; and (4) technical and programmatic implications to science missions if NASA commits to new launch vehicles before they are certified and proven. GAO identified and assessed transition plans and mitigation activities and interviewed responsible NASA and government officials.
What GAO Found
NASA's Launch Services Program (LSP) is taking steps to address risks and ensure the success of the last planned Delta II launched missions through a combination of specific government approvals and targeted government insight into contractor activities and designs. For example, LSP uses government systems engineers with technical expertise to review or repeat the contractors' engineering analyses. This is a key factor in high launch success rates. From 1990 through 2009, LSP has achieved a 98 percent launch success rate. LSP is conducting additional reviews of launch vehicle processing to mitigate risk associated with the remaining Delta II flights. LSP has also identified several specific areas of concern with the remaining Delta II flights--including contractor workforce expertise, postproduction subcontractor support, spare parts, and launch pads--and is taking steps where possible to mitigate risks and ensure the success of the remaining missions. NASA plans to leverage ongoing investments to acquire a new medium launch capability for science missions in the relative cost and performance range of the Delta II. The agency expects to eventually certify the vehicles being developed for space station resupply for use by NASA science missions. NASA has been in coordination with agency and contractor officials responsible for these efforts. Further, the agency revised its policy to allow for faster certification of new providers. Due to an active small class launch vehicle market and NASA's relative low need for vehicles in this class, the agency has no plans to develop additional small class launch vehicles. Rather, the agency will acquire these services through the NASA Launch Services II Contract. NASA's plan has inherent risks that need to be mitigated. NASA has not developed detailed estimates of the time and money required to resolve technical issues likely to arise during the launch vehicle certification process. As these costs are currently unknown, according to Science Mission Directorate officials, NASA has not yet budgeted for them. Further, both space station resupply vehicles have experienced delays and more delays are likely as launch vehicle development is an inherently risky endeavor. Neither potential provider currently has the facilities needed to launch the majority of NASA earth science missions requiring a medium capability. NASA medium class science missions that are approaching their preliminary design review face uncertainties related to committing to as yet uncertified and unproven launch vehicles. Launch vehicle decisions for these missions will be made before new vehicles are certified. Because changing the launch vehicle of a science mission after its preliminary design review is likely to lead to significant cost growth and schedule delays, NASA's intention is to select a launch vehicle and accept the impacts that any delays in the certification process could have to the cost and schedule of the science mission. NASA officials also indicated that future science missions might be asked to accommodate multiple launch vehicle possibilities if the availability of future vehicles is delayed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NASA perform a detailed cost estimate based on knowledge gained during launch vehicle certification and adequately budget for potential additional costs. NASA concurred. |
gao_GGD-99-11 | gao_GGD-99-11_0 | To help ensure compliance, the law also required each district director to certify each quarter whether violations had occurred and the corrective action taken, if needed. IRS’ Certification Process Identified Few Violations but Had Systemic Weaknesses
Our review of quarterly certifications for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 found that directors reported 11 potential violations in 368 quarterly certifications (see app. Also, we identified several systemic weaknesses that affected the reliability of the certification process. First, our analysis of the potential violations that were reported indicated that there was confusion among IRS officials about what constituted a violation. We estimated that, overall, about 75 percent of front-line employees (i.e., revenue agents and tax auditors in the examination function and revenue officers in the collection function) and 81 percent of examination and collection group managers believe that one or more enforcement measures were considered to some extent by their managers when preparing their most recent performance evaluation. We estimated that about 70 percent of front-line employees, who believed that tax enforcement results affected their evaluations, based their perceptions on verbal communication with their managers during group meetings and performance feedback sessions. Appendix IV contains detailed information on the basis for front-line employee and group manager perceptions. Our analysis of employee evaluations found that an estimated 69 percent of the evaluations contained two types of narrative that employees could have interpreted as inappropriate references to tax enforcement results but which did not violate IRS guidance. The second type of narrative that could create misperceptions about the use of tax enforcement results was the use of the terms “overage” (the age of the cases in the employee’s workload inventory) and “cycle time” (the number of cases worked within the established guidelines for closing cases). IRS’ Proposed Revisions to the Certification Process Address Some Weaknesses
Because of Internal Audit reports, IRS has undertaken several steps to strengthen the certification process, including expanding the number of employees covered, instituting an independent review process of the certifications, revising guidance, and training managers. IRS has not informed managers about what specific sanctions can be imposed for misusing tax enforcement results or submitting misleading certifications. In addition to these possible sources of confusion, IRS’ independent review process is to focus on reviewing documents and records to identify written violations. Nonetheless, our survey of IRS employees indicated a widespread perception that managers consider tax enforcement results when preparing performance evaluations. IRS’ revised guidance has few examples of the appropriate and inappropriate use of tax enforcement results in written evaluations. Recommendations to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
To better ensure managerial accountability for the proper use of tax enforcement results, we recommend that the Commissioner expand the guidance to include additional examples of the appropriate and inappropriate use of records of tax enforcement results in written evaluations, revise the quarterly certification form to specifically state that tax enforcement results were not used in any written employee evaluation prepared or reviewed, including appraisals, awards, or promotion justifications, and that the manager did not verbally communicate to employees that tax enforcement results affected their evaluations or were used to set individual production goals or quotas, revise the penalty guide to specifically list the disciplinary actions that can be taken for violations, and survey employees periodically to determine whether they perceive that tax enforcement results were used in written evaluations or verbally communicated by their supervisors and use the results to assess whether IRS needs to further clarify the guidance, provide additional training, or take any other appropriate action. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) managers' compliance with legislative and policy prohibitions against using enforcement statistics in employee evaluations and the requirement that managers certify each quarter whether violations had occurred, focusing on: (1) the extent to which IRS' certification process identified violations of law and policy; (2) IRS employees' perceptions of the use of tax enforcement results in their annual performance evaluations; (3) supervisors' use of tax enforcement results in written employee performance evaluations; and (4) IRS' efforts to revise the certification process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, district and service center directors submitted 368 quarterly certifications that reported 11 potential violations; (2) GAO identified several systemic weaknesses that affected the reliability of the certifications; (3) specifically, GAO found: (a) some confusion among IRS officials about what constituted a violation; (b) inadequate guidance about specific actions directors should take to identify violations; (c) a failure to integrate performance evaluations and the certification process; and (d) unclear guidance on sanctions that could be applied against managers for misusing tax enforcement results or submitting false certifications; (4) GAO's survey of a statistically representative sample of examination and collection employees showed a widespread perception that managers considered enforcement results when preparing annual performance evaluations; (5) GAO estimated that 75 percent of front-line employees and 81 percent of group managers perceived that tax enforcement results affected their most recent performance evaluation; (6) about 70 percent of front-line employees said they based their perception in part on information communicated to them verbally in staff meetings or performance feedback sessions with their managers; (7) and about 36 percent of front-line employees indicated tax enforcement results were used in their written performance evaluations; (8) 9 percent of employees received a written evaluation that contained a tax enforcement result and an estimated 69 percent contained narrative that employees could have interpreted as inappropriate references to tax enforcement results but which did not violate IRS guidance; (9) about 41 percent of the evaluations in GAO's sample mentioned process measures dealing with the age of the cases in the employee's workload inventory and the number of cases worked within guidelines established for closing cases; (10) IRS has undertaken several steps to strengthen the certification process; (11) although these actions address some of the weaknesses of the current system, IRS' revised guidance has few examples of the appropriate and inappropriate use of tax enforcement results in written evaluations; (12) the revised guidance does not clearly inform managers about potential sanctions for inappropriate use of tax enforcement results; and (13) IRS' new independent review process is geared toward identifying written violations and not violations communicated verbally. |
gao_T-RCED-98-219 | gao_T-RCED-98-219_0 | The Administration Has Several Broad Goals and a Broad Plan for Stage 1
The administration has several broad goals for what it wants to accomplish in stage 1 and a broad plan for accomplishing those goals. However, the administration has not established a quantitative goal for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by the end of stage 1—a primary focus of its initiative. The administration’s goals and plan for accomplishing its goals are contained in the President’s October 1997 speech, according to OMB’s Office of Natural Resources, Energy and Science. While OMB officials acknowledge that the existing stage 1 plan is broad, they have no specific time frame for preparing a more detailed plan that would include overall performance goals and measures to meet the spirit of the Government Performance and Results Act. Extent to Which Stage 1 Will Meet Kyoto Target Is Unclear
The extent to which the $6.3 billion stage 1 proposal will help the United States meet the protocol’s target for reduced emissions is unclear. The largest investment under the proposal, tax credits, with an estimated cost of about $3.6 billion, has no estimate of the expected benefits and thus is not tied to the protocol’s emissions reduction target. The administration has set performance goals for most of the $2.7 billion proposed for research and development and the increased use of energy-efficient products and has estimated potential emissions reductions. However, DOE only recently provided its estimates, while commenting on a draft of this testimony, and we have not analyzed the method or assumptions used to support them. In addition, EPA’s estimates may be overstated. Therefore, it is uncertain how much these activities will help the United States meet the target specified by the protocol. Results of Research and Development Are Uncertain
DOE is responsible for implementing most of the research and development activities under the administration’s climate change proposal. Lack of Key Information on Stage 1 Has Implications for the Future
Because stage 1 lacks a quantitative goal for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, does not have a specific performance plan, and contains incomplete information on expected outcomes and links to the protocol’s target, stage 1 may not provide a firm foundation for stages 2 and 3. There may be penalties for noncompliance if the United States ratifies the protocol but does not reach the target, although the specific penalties have not been agreed upon. First, the United States would be required by the protocol to meet the emissions target during the 5-year period, 2008 through 2012. Finally, according to the Department of State, the protocol’s targets are binding on nations that enter into the accord, and noncompliance could eventually carry penalties. The parties are to begin discussing procedures for eventually establishing penalties for noncompliance in Buenos Aires in November 1998. 2. 3. 6. 7. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed: (1) the potential impact of efforts to comply with the Kyoto Protocol; (2) whether the administration has an overall goal for stage 1 and a plan for accomplishing that goal; (2) if funded, to what extent will the $6.3-billion stage 1 climate change proposal help the United States meet the protocol's emissions target; and (3) what the current implications are for the United States if the Senate ratifies the protocol, given the current status of the administration's efforts to implement the climate change proposal.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the administration has several broad goals for what it wants to accomplish in stage 1 and a broad plan for accomplishing them; (2) both the broad goals and plan are contained in the President's October 1997 speech; (3) the administration has not established a quantitative goal for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by the end of stage 1--a primary focus of its initiative; (4) while Office of Management and Budget officials acknowledge that the plan is broad, they have no specific timeframe for preparing a more detailed plan that would include overall performance goals and measures to meet the spirit of the Government Performance and Results Act; (5) the extent to which the $6.3-billion stage 1 proposal will help the United States meet the protocol's target for emission reductions is unclear; (6) the largest investment under the proposal, tax credits, with an estimated cost of about $3.6 billion, has no estimate of the expected benefits and thus is not explicitly tied to the protocol's target for emission reductions; (7) the administration has set performance goals for most of the $2.7 billion proposed for research and development and the increased use of energy-efficient products and has estimated potential emissions reductions; (8) the Department of Energy only recently provided its estimates, while commenting on a draft of this testimony, and GAO has not analyzed them; (9) in addition, the Environmental Protection Agency's estimates may be overstated; (10) therefore, it is uncertain how much these activities will help the United States meet the target specified by the protocol; (11) without an overall goal and plan for stage 1 and complete information on expected outcomes and links to the protocol's emission reduction target, it is uncertain whether stage 1 will effectively lay the foundation for the 31-percent emissions reduction required by the protocol; and (12) although the administration's response to the protocol is relatively recent, a firm foundation in stage 1 is important because the protocol's targets for emission reductions are binding on the nations that agree to the protocol, and penalties for noncompliance with the targets are to be discussed by the parties to the protocol in November 1998. |
gao_GAO-01-513 | gao_GAO-01-513_0 | Under TRICARE, DOD provides health care to its eligible beneficiaries through military-operated hospitals and clinics worldwide and supplements this care with civilian providers. Conclusions
As of June 30, 2000, the number of change orders issued had almost tripled, while the number of unsettled change orders had more than doubled since our last report. Although we recommended in that report that DOD devote high-level attention to managing improvements to the change order process, this was not consistently done. As a result, until recently, none of TMA’s numerous initiatives effected much improvement to the process or reduced the backlog. The current small backlog is the result of a recent concerted effort, not better management over time. TMA’s new Change Management Process appears to address many of TMA’s problems with change orders by controlling the volume of issuance, using a more collaborative negotiation process, and settling costs before implementation. However, past initiatives that appeared promising ultimately delivered little in terms of preventing or reducing the backlog. The high volume of change orders soon to enter the new Change Management Process makes it imperative that TMA management closely monitor the process to prevent future backlogs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to update the 1997 report and provide information on (1) the status of the change order backlog and whether DOD reduced it, (2) factors that contributed to the growth of the backlog, and (3) DOD’s new change order process. To provide information on factors that contributed to the previous growth of the backlog, we used the January 8, 2001, COTS database to calculate the average amount of time needed to finalize all change orders settled by June 30, 2000; average age of unsettled change orders as of June 30, 2000; number of change orders issued each month between May 1, 1997, and June 30, 2000; number of proposals that had been submitted as of June 30, 2000; average amount of time from change order issuance to proposal submission; average number of days between proposal submission and change order settlement as of June 30, 2000; and number of change orders issued since May 1997 that had an IGCE. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under TRICARE, the Department of Defense's (DOD) managed care program, military-operated hospitals and clinics are supplemented by contracted civilian services. Since the inception of TRICARE, DOD has made many changes to these contracts via contract change orders. Since July 1997, when GAO reported that DOD was trying to improve its change order process, the backlog of change orders has continued to grow. This report evaluates (1) the status of the change order backlog and how DOD addressed it, (2) factors that contributed to the growth of the backlog, and (3) DOD's new initiative to improve the change order process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that as of June, 2000, the number of change orders issued had almost tripled, while the number of unsettled change orders had more than doubled since July 1997. Despite recommendations to devote high-level attention to managing improvements to the change order process, this was not done. Until recently, none of TRICARE Management Activity's (TMA) many initiatives significantly improved the process or reduced the backlog. The current small backlog is the result of recent concerted effort, not better management over time. TMA's new Change Management Process (CMP) appears to address many of TMA's problems with change orders. However, past initiatives have made similar promises and delivered little when they were abandoned or eclipsed by higher priorities. The high volume of change orders now or soon to enter the new CMP makes it imperative that TMA management closely monitor the process to prevent future backlogs. |
gao_GAO-08-936 | gao_GAO-08-936_0 | For the 2008 Dress Rehearsal and the 2010 Census, the Bureau awarded the development of the hardware and software for a HHC to a contractor. The help desk call log revealed that listers most frequently reported issues with transmission, the device freezing, mapspotting, and large assignment areas. After address canvassing, the Bureau established a review board and worked with its contractor to create task teams to address FDCA performance issues such as (1) transmission problems relating to the mobile computing environment, (2) the amount of data transmitted for large assignment areas, and (3) options for improving HHC performance. For example, the Bureau has not developed an acceptable level of performance for total number of failed transmissions or average connection speed. Additionally, the contractor and the Bureau did not use the dashboard specified in the contract for dress rehearsal activities. However, the “control panel/dashboard” application was not used during the dress rehearsal. The plan calls for using data such as the number of HHCs shipped to local census offices, the number of defective HHCs, the number of HHCs broken during the dress rehearsal address canvassing operation, the number checked in at the end of the operation, whether deployment affected the ability of staff to complete assignments, software/hardware problems reported through the help desk, the amount of time listers lost due to hardware or software malfunctions, and problems with transmissions. This testing plan includes a limited operational field test of address canvassing; however, the plan does not specify that the dashboard described earlier will be used in this test. Field staff told us that help desk resources were unavailable on the weekends and that they had difficulty getting help. Lower than expected productivity has cost implications. Specifically, we revised our recommendation that the Bureau “Specify the basis for acceptance of the FDCA solution for address canvassing and when that acceptance will occur—when the Bureau would say it meets its operational needs and accepts it from the contractor” to “Specify the basis for determining the readiness of the FDCA solution for address canvassing and when and how this determination will occur—when the Bureau would say that the contractor’s solution meets its operational needs.” Also, after further discussion with Bureau officials, we provided more specific measures of address and map information successfully collected. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to analyze U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) and contractor data showing how handheld computers (HHC) operated and its implications on operations, and examine implications the redesign may have on plans for address canvassing in the 2010 Census. To determine how well the HHC worked in collecting and transmitting address and mapping data, and what data the Bureau and contractor used in assessing HHC performance during address canvassing, we examined Bureau documents, observed HHCs in use, and interviewed Bureau and contractor officials. We reviewed the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) contract, focusing specifically on what performance specifications and requirements were included in the contract. The Bureau acknowledged that data for all address field staff were not included in its analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) had planned to rely heavily on automation in conducting the 2010 Census, including using handheld computers (HHC) to verify addresses. Citing concerns about escalating costs, in March 2008 the Secretary of Commerce announced a redesign of the key automation effort. GAO was asked to (1) analyze Bureau and contractor data showing how HHCs operated and their impact on operations, and (2) examine implications the redesign may have on plans for address canvassing in the 2010 Census. GAO reviewed Bureau and contractor data, evaluations, and other documents on HHC performance and staff productivity; interviewed Bureau and contractor officials; and visited the two dress rehearsal sites to observe and document the use of the HHCs in the field.
What GAO Found
Census and contractor data highlight problems field staff (listers) experienced using HHCs during the address canvassing dress rehearsal operation in 2007. Help desk logs, for example, revealed that listers most frequently reported issues with transmission, the device freezing, mapspotting (collecting mapping coordinates), and difficulties working with large blocks. When problems were identified, the contractor downloaded corrected software to the HHCs. Nonetheless, help desk resources were inadequate. The Bureau acknowledged that issues with the use of technology affected field staff productivity. After address canvassing, the Bureau established a review board and worked with its contractor to create task teams to analyze and address Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) performance issues. Although the Bureau recognized that technology issues affected operations, and the contractor produced data on average transmission times, the Bureau and its contractor did not fully assess the magnitude of key measures of HHC performance. GAO previously recommended the Bureau establish specific quantifiable measures in such areas as productivity and performance. Also, the FDCA contract calls for the contractor to provide near real-time monitoring of performance metrics through a "dashboard" application. This application was not used during the census dress rehearsal. The Bureau has developed a preliminary list of metrics to be included in the dashboard such as daily measures on average transmission duration and number of failed transmissions, but has few benchmarks for expected performance. For example, the Bureau has not developed an acceptable level of performance on total number of failed transmissions or average connection speed. Technology issues and the Bureau's efforts to redesign FDCA have significant implications for address canvassing. Among these are ensuring that FDCA solutions for technical issues identified in the dress rehearsal are tested, the help desk adequately supports field staff, and a solution for conducting address canvassing in large blocks is tested. In June 2008, the Bureau developed a testing plan that includes a limited operational field test, but the plan does not specify the basis for determining the readiness of the FDCA solution for address canvassing and when and how this determination will occur. |
gao_GAO-11-226 | gao_GAO-11-226_0 | M&A Services for NOAA Are Funded in a Variety of Ways
Commerce, NOAA’s headquarters, line offices, and FMCs use a variety of mechanisms to fund M&A services. NOAA’s Headquarters Funds the M&A Services It Provides to the Agency through Funds Appropriated for M&A Services and through Direct Billings
According to NOAA officials, NOAA’s appropriation for corporate administrative services funds the following four types of M&A services that NOAA’s headquarters provides to the agency: services provided by NOAA’s Undersecretary and related staff offices, including executive management policy formulation and direction; NOAA-wide corporate services and agency management, including activities such as financial, procurement, and human resource services; information services provided by the Office of the Chief Information Officer; and facilities management services, such as repairs, restoration, construction, and environmental compliance and safety for NOAA-owned buildings. Additional services requested by line offices. Some FMCs Fund M&A Services through Assessments and Other FMCs Do Not Track or Separately Define Their M&A Costs
FMCs at two of NOAA’s line offices use assessments to fund the M&A services they provide, and some or all the FMCs at the other three line offices do not track their costs for M&A services. NOAA’s Documentation of Its Policies and Procedures for M&A Services Does Not Always Conform to Applicable Federal Standards
NOAA’s headquarters, line offices, and FMCs have documented some aspects of their policies and procedures for M&A services, but not to the full extent called for by applicable federal cost accounting and internal control standards. For example, NOAA’s headquarters has documented some of its policies and procedures for M&A services, but it has not done so in a handbook or manual as called for by applicable federal standards. In addition, the five line offices and the FMCs have no or limited documentation of their policies and procedures for the M&A services they provide. FMCs’ Documentation of Their Policies and Procedures for M&A Services Generally Do Not Adhere to Applicable Federal Standards
According to line office officials at NESDIS, NOS and NWS, FMCs within their line offices do not document (1) their policies regarding the types of M&A services they provide; (2) the procedures they use each year to determine the budget for their M&A services; (3) their policies and procedures for assigning the costs of their M&A services to specific programs, activities, or outputs that benefit from the services and the results of that cost assignment; and (4) the justification for why those assignments are appropriate. Estimated Salaries and Expenses For NOAA Were About $3.8 Billion for Fiscal Year 2009
Using object class data provided by NOAA officials, we estimated that NOAA’s salaries and expenses were about $3.8 billion for fiscal year 2009. These estimates are approximate because salaries and expenses could be higher if they were accounted for in object classes that we did not include in our estimate. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the management and oversight of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s management and administration services and related costs, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of NOAA to require that NOAA’s headquarters, line offices, and FMCs document in a manual or handbook their policies and procedures for the M&A services they provide in line with internal control and federal cost accounting standards. In response to this comment, we incorporated information on these accounts into the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) examined how management and administration (M&A) services at the Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are funded, (2) assessed the extent to which NOAA’s policies and procedures for accounting for M&A services conform to applicable standards, and (3) estimated salaries and expenses for NOAA’s budget for fiscal year 2009. We interviewed officials and gathered and reviewed cost data on M&A services from NOAA at each of four levels—Commerce, NOAA’s headquarters, line offices, and a subset of FMCs. We used object class data to estimate NOAA’s salaries and expenses because NOAA does not separately report salaries and expenses. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is a bureau within the Department of Commerce (Commerce). To help achieve NOAA's program goals, it relies on management and administration (M&A) services, such as legal support and information technology. In response to the fiscal year 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act Conference Report, GAO (1) examined how NOAA's M&A services are funded, (2) assessed the extent to which NOAA's policies and procedures for M&A services conform to applicable standards, and (3) estimated salaries and expenses for NOAA's budget for fiscal year 2009. Among other things, GAO reviewed documents on M&A services and data on M&A costs from NOAA officials for its headquarters; line offices, which are responsible for executing NOAA's programs; and a subset of financial management centers (FMC) within the line offices, which manage specific programs and projects.
What GAO Found
M&A services at NOAA are provided at four levels--Commerce, NOAA's headquarters, line offices, and FMCs--and each level funds its services in different ways. First, Commerce uses NOAA payments to the department's Working Capital Fund to support M&A services, such as legal services, that can be more efficiently provided centrally. It also uses payments to its Advances and Reimbursements Account for, among other things, payments to external parties for M&A services provided to the department as a whole. Commerce uses funds appropriated for departmental management to provide leadership services for the whole department, including NOAA. Second, NOAA's headquarters funds most of its M&A services using its corporate administrative services appropriation. NOAA's headquarters also uses a direct billing process to provide some unplanned services, such as issuing new identification cards, as well as pooled and additional services requested by line offices. Third, line offices fund the M&A services they provide by assessing their programs, projects, and activities in various ways. Finally, some FMCs fund M&A services through assessments of their subunits, while others do not track or separately define their M&A costs. NOAA's headquarters, line offices, and FMCs have documented some of their policies and procedures for M&A services, but they have not done so to the full extent required by applicable internal control and federal cost accounting standards. Taken together, these standards require agencies to document in a manual or handbook (1) their policies regarding the types of M&A services they provide; (2) the procedures they use each year to determine the budgets for their M&A services; (3) their policies and procedures for assigning the costs of their M&A services to specific programs, activities, or outputs that benefit from the services, and the results of that assignment; and (4) the justification for why those assignments are appropriate. NOAA's headquarters has documented some of its policies and procedures for its M&A services in written yearly operating and spending plans, but has not done so in a manual or handbook. In addition, the line offices and FMCs have no or limited documentation of their policies and procedures for the M&A services they provide. This lack of documentation limits the availability of information on M&A services for agency officials and congressional decision makers and may hamper financial management and management decision making. Estimated salaries and expenses for NOAA were about $3.8 billion for fiscal year 2009, with approximately $1.38 billion in estimated salaries and $2.46 billion in estimated expenses. NOAA does not separately report salaries and expenses for each line of its budget. Therefore, GAO estimated salaries and expenses based on budget object class data. These estimates are approximate because salaries and expenses could be higher if they were accounted for in object classes that GAO did not include in its estimates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NOAA require its headquarters, line offices, and FMCs to document in a manual or handbook their policies and procedures for the M&A services they provide in line with federal cost accounting and internal control standards. NOAA reviewed a draft of this report and concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-1137T | gao_GAO-03-1137T_0 | Biometric Technologies for Personal Identification
When used for personal identification, biometric technologies measure and analyze human physiological and behavioral characteristics. The corresponding biometric technologies are fingerprint recognition, hand geometry, and facial, retina, and iris recognition. Depending on the application, biometric systems can be used in one of two modes: verification or identification. Leading Biometric Technologies
Facial Recognition
Retina Recognition Signature Recognition Speaker Recognition Facial recognition technology identifies people by analyzing features of the face not easily altered—the upper outlines of the eye sockets, the areas around the cheekbones, and the sides of the mouth. Speaker recognition can be used to verify a person’s claimed identity or to identify a particular person. Federal Applications of Biometric Technologies
Biometrics have been used in several federal applications including access control to facilities and computers, criminal identification, and border security. In the last 2 years, laws have been passed that will require a more extensive use of biometric technologies in the federal government. Laws passed in the last 2 years require a more extensive use of biometrics for border control. Weaknesses in the security process or failures by people to operate the technology or implement the security process can diminish the effectiveness of technology. As we described, not all people can enroll in a biometrics system. Similarly, false matches and false nonmatches will also sometimes occur. Procedures need to be developed to handle these situations. Exception processing that is not as good as biometric-based primary processing could be exploited as a security hole. In conclusion, biometric technologies are available today that can be used in security systems to help protect assets. However, it is important to bear in mind that effective security cannot be achieved by relying on technology alone. Technology and people must work together as part of an overall security process. As we have pointed out, weaknesses in any of these areas diminishes the effectiveness of the security process. We have found that three key considerations need to be addressed before a decision is made to design, develop, and implement biometrics into a security system: 1. Decisions must be made on how the technology will be used. A detailed cost-benefit analysis must be conducted to determine that the benefits gained from a system outweigh the costs. 3. A trade-off analysis must be conducted between the increased security, which the use of biometrics would provide, and the effect on areas such as privacy and convenience. Security concerns need to be balanced with practical cost and operational considerations as well as political and economic interests. A risk management approach can help federal agencies identify and address security concerns. As federal agencies consider the development of security systems with biometrics, they need to define what the high-level goals of this system would be and develop the concept of operations that will embody the people, process, and technologies required to achieve these goals. With these answers, the proper role of biometric technologies in security can be determined. If these details are not resolved, the estimated cost and performance of the resulting system will be at risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
One of the primary functions of any security system is the control of people into or out of protected areas, such as physical buildings, information systems, and our national border. Technologies called biometrics can automate the identification of people by one or more of their distinct physical or behavioral characteristics. The term biometrics covers a wide range of technologies that can be used to verify identity by measuring and analyzing human characteristics--relying on attributes of the individual instead of things the individual may have or know. In the last 2 years, laws have been passed that will require a more extensive use of biometric technologies in the federal government. Last year, GAO conducted a technology assessment on the use of biometrics for border security. GAO was asked to testify about the issues that it raised in the report, the use of biometrics in the federal government, and the current state of the technology.
What GAO Found
Biometric technologies are available today that can be used in security systems to help protect assets. Biometric technologies vary in complexity, capabilities, and performance and can be used to verify or establish a person's identity. Leading biometric technologies include facial recognition, fingerprint recognition, hand geometry, iris recognition, retina recognition, signature recognition, and speaker recognition. Biometric technologies have been used in federal applications such as access control, criminal identification, and border security. However, it is important to bear in mind that effective security cannot be achieved by relying on technology alone. Technology and people must work together as part of an overall security process. Weaknesses in any of these areas diminishes the effectiveness of the security process. The security process needs to account for limitations in biometric technology. For example, some people cannot enroll in a biometrics system. Similarly, errors sometimes occur during matching operations. Procedures need to be developed to handle these situations. Exception processing that is not as good as biometric-based primary processing could also be exploited as a security hole. We have found that three key considerations need to be addressed before a decision is made to design, develop, and implement biometrics into a security system: (1) decisions must be made on how the technology will be used; (2) a detailed cost-benefit analysis must be conducted to determine that the benefits gained from a system outweigh the costs; and (3) a trade-off analysis must be conducted between the increased security, which the use of biometrics would provide, and the effect on areas such as privacy and convenience. Security concerns need to be balanced with practical cost and operational considerations as well as political and economic interests. A risk management approach can help federal agencies identify and address security concerns. As federal agencies consider the development of security systems with biometrics, they need to define what the high-level goals of this system will be and develop the concept of operations that will embody the people, process, and technologies required to achieve these goals. With these answers, the proper role of biometric technologies in security can be determined. If these details are not resolved, the estimated cost and performance of the resulting system will be at risk. |
gao_GAO-05-401T | gao_GAO-05-401T_0 | This means that appropriations bills are not automatically subject to CBO review under UMRA. Once the provision is identified as a mandate under UMRA, CBO determines whether the cost estimate, if feasible, exceeds the applicable threshold ($50 million for intergovernmental and $100 million for private sector mandates, in any of the first 5 fiscal years during which the mandate would be effective). However, UMRA does not provide for a point of order for private sector mandates. Of 377 laws enacted in 2001 and 2002, CBO identified at least 44 containing a federal mandate under UMRA. Of these 44, CBO identified 5 containing mandates at or above the cost thresholds, and all were private sector mandates. Nonfederal Parties Perceived Some Enacted Provisions to Be Unfunded Mandates
Although CBO’s annual reports for 2001 and 2002 showed that most proposed legislation did not contain federal mandates as defined by UMRA, we asked CBO to compile a list of examples from among those laws enacted in 2001 and 2002 that had potential impacts on nonfederal parties but were not identified as containing federal mandates meeting or exceeding UMRA’s cost thresholds. We then analyzed these 43 examples to illustrate the application of UMRA’s procedures, definitions, and exclusions on legislation that was not identified as containing mandates at or above UMRA’s threshold, but might be perceived to be unfunded mandates. Out of the remaining 31 laws that did undergo a cost estimate, 24 were found to contain mandates with costs below applicable thresholds, 3 contained provisions that were excluded from UMRA coverage, 2 contained provisions with direct costs that were not feasible to estimate, 1 contained a provision that did not meet UMRA’s definition of a mandate, and 1 was reviewed by the Joint Committee on Taxation and found not to contain any federal mandates. Preparation of an UMRA statement, and related estimate or analysis of the costs and benefits of the rule, is not required if the agency is “otherwise prohibited by law” from considering such an estimate or analysis in adopting the rule. Within the OMB, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is responsible for reviewing compliance with UMRA as part of its centralized review of significant regulatory actions published by federal agencies, other than certain independent regulatory agencies. Of the 113 major and/or economically significant rules in 2001 and 2002 not identified as including federal mandates under UMRA, we reported that 48 contained no new requirements that would impose costs or have a negative financial effect on state, local, and tribal governments or the private sector. There were 26 rules for which the agencies stated that the rule would not compel expenditures at or above the UMRA threshold and 10 rules for which the agencies stated that rules imposed no enforceable duty. However, UMRA’s many definitions, exclusions, and exceptions result in many statutes and rules never triggering UMRA’s thresholds, which means they are not identified as federal mandates. As we reported last year, in 2001 and 2002 many statutes and final rules with potentially significant financial effects on nonfederal parties were enacted or published without being identified as federal mandates at or above UMRA’s thresholds. Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) was enacted to address concerns expressed by state and local governments about federal statutes and regulations that require nonfederal parties to expend resources to achieve legislative goals without being provided funding to cover the costs. Over the past 10 years, Congress has at various times considered legislation that would amend various aspects of UMRA. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Unfunded Mandates: Analysis of Reform Act Coverage ( GAO-04-637 , May 12, 2004). Specifically, this testimony addresses (1) the process used to identify federal mandates and what are federal agencies' roles, (2) statutes and rules that contained federal mandates under UMRA, and (3) statutes and rules that were not considered mandates under UMRA but may be perceived to be "unfunded mandates" by certain affected parties.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the identification and analysis of intergovernmental and private sector mandates is a complex process under UMRA. Proposed legislation and regulations are subject to various definitions, exclusions and exceptions before being identified as containing mandates at or above UMRA's cost thresholds. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is required to prepare statements identifying and estimating, if feasible, the costs of mandates in legislation. While a point of order can be raised on the floor of the House or Senate against consideration of any UMRA-covered intergovernmental mandate that lacks a CBO estimate or exceeds the cost thresholds, it contains no similar enforcement for private sector mandates. Conversely, federal agencies are required to prepare mandate statements for regulations containing intergovernmental or private sector mandates that would result in expenditures at or above the UMRA threshold. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, within the Office of Management and Budget, is responsible reviewing compliance with UMRA as part of the rule making process. In 2001 and 2002, 5 of 377 statutes enacted and 9 of 122 major or economically significant rules issued were identified as containing federal mandates at or above UMRA's thresholds. All 5 statutes and 9 rules contained private sector mandates as defined by UMRA. One final rule also contained an intergovernmental mandate. Despite the determinations under UMRA, at least 43 statutes and 65 rules issued in 2001 and 2002 resulted in new costs or negative financial consequences on nonfederal parties. These parties may perceive such statutes and rules as unfunded or underfunded mandates even though they did not meet UMRA's definition of a federal mandate at or above UMRA's thresholds. For 24 of the statutes and 26 of the rules, CBO or the agencies estimated that the direct costs or expenditures, as defined by UMRA, would not meet or exceed the applicable thresholds. The others were excluded for a variety of reasons stemming from exclusions or exceptions specified by UMRA. |
gao_NSIAD-99-35 | gao_NSIAD-99-35_0 | Offset agreements ordinarily specify the level of offset required, normally expressed as a percentage of the sales contract, and the types of activities that are eligible for offset credits. For example, coproduction activity may also include the transfer of technology needed to improve production processes. Procurements of goods and services not related to the weapon system sales—indirect offset activities—were also frequently used. Placing contracts overseas has resulted in additional contractors who are qualified to participate in weapon system development and production. However, the long-term supplier relationships that develop may result in reduced business opportunities for some U.S. firms. U.S. contractors have established longer term relationships covering foreign firm participation in future sales of the weapon system and beyond their commitment in the purchasing country. In most cases, the value of the technology transfer is negotiated between the U.S. contractor and the foreign government. To satisfy this desire, a U.S. contractor provided an Asian commercial company with technology and training in the area of commercial component manufacture. In addition to the U.S. contractors making purchases, they also employ other parties such as major subcontractors, suppliers, and foreign entities to help meet their offset obligations. In a few cases, U.S. contractors advocated a foreign firm’s product to DOD or suppliers. Offset Transactions Include Business Development Activities
U.S. contractors also undertook a wide variety of activities that could be labeled business development and are similar to those performed by an economic development ministry. Marketing Assistance
Marketing assistance is defined as a U.S. contractor helping foreign companies penetrate and develop U.S. and/or non-U.S. markets by analyzing the market for the exporter’s product or assisting the exporter in responding to a request for proposals. Financial assistance is defined as providing funds to a foreign company in the country where the offset obligation exists to facilitate an export. Scope and Methodology
To assess the activities undertaken by U.S. contractors to satisfy offset obligations, we analyzed over 100 transactions contained in 19 ongoing or recently completed offset programs by 6 major U.S. defense companies with 12 purchasing countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the types of activities undertaken by U.S. contractors to meet offset obligations associated with the sale of defense equipment to various foreign governments.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) companies undertake a broad array of activities to satisfy offset requirements; (2) under offset programs, U.S. contractors commonly award subcontracts for components and subsystems to firms in purchasing countries, and in a few cases, have made longer-term commitments covering foreign firm participation in the event of future sales of weapon systems; (3) this activity has been accompanied by technology transfers, for example, providing manufacturing technology needed to produce a component; (4) placing contracts overseas has resulted in the emergence of additional contractors that are qualified to participate in weapon system development and production; (5) the long-term supplier relationships that develop may result in reduced business opportunities for some U.S. firms; (6) nonetheless, the value of the export sale, in the transactions examined, greatly exceeded the amount of work placed overseas; (7) for procurements not directly related to weapon systems, U.S. prime contractors enlisted their major subcontractors, their suppliers, and other foreign entities to help meet offset obligations; (8) U.S. contractors also undertook a wide variety of activities that could be labelled business development; (9) contractors provided technical assistance to foreign firms across a wide range of technologies and industries and assisted foreign firms in marketing their products in export markets using the expertise of the contractors' own organizations or consultants; (10) in a few cases, U.S. contractors advocated a foreign firm's product to the Department of Defense or suppliers; (11) in isolated cases, offset transactions involved financial assistance to subsidize particular export sales; (12) these transactions were limited to foreign markets and therefore did not involve improper incentive payments under U.S. law; (13) U.S. contractors also facilitated or established joint ventures with firms in the offset country; and (14) while a country's economic development ministry might perform similar activities, the offset program allowed the country, or firms in the country, to leverage the expertise and know-how of major U.S. multinational firms. |
gao_GAO-11-674T | gao_GAO-11-674T_0 | Refund Fraud Delays Innocent Taxpayers’ Refunds
Refund fraud can stem from identity theft when an identity thief uses a legitimate taxpayer’s name and Social Security Number (SSN) to file a fraudulent tax return seeking a refund. Employment Fraud Exposes Innocent Taxpayers to Enforcement Actions for Unreported Income
Employment fraud occurs when an identity thief uses a taxpayer’s name and SSN to obtain a job. After the victim files his or her tax return, IRS matches income reported by the victim’s employer and the thief’s employer to the tax return filed by the legitimate taxpayer, as shown in figure 2. IRS agreed with our recommendations to address these and other issues. IRS Has Taken Multiple Steps to Resolve, Detect, and Prevent Employment and Refund Fraud
In 2004, IRS developed a strategy to address the problem of identity theft– related tax administration issues. According to IRS, the strategy has evolved and continues to serve as the foundation for all of IRS’s efforts to provide services to victims of identity theft and to reduce the effects of identity theft on tax administration. Identity theft indicators speed resolution by making a taxpayer’s identity theft problems visible to all IRS personnel with account access. Indicators also alert IRS personnel that a future account problem may be related to identity theft and help speed up the resolution of any such problems. Detection. IRS also uses its identity theft indicators to screen tax returns filed in the names of known refund and employment fraud victims. Prevention. IRS’s Ability to Address Identity Theft Issues Is Constrained by Law, Timing, and Resources
Privacy and Other Laws Limit IRS’s Coordination with Other Agencies and Taxpayers
IRS’s initiatives to address identity theft are limited in part because tax returns and other information submitted to and, in some cases generated by, IRS are confidential and protected from disclosure, except as specifically authorized by statute. Additionally, IRS has limited authorities to share identity theft information with other federal agencies. By the time both the victim and IRS determine that an identity theft incident occurred, well over a year may have passed since the employment fraud. IRS Does Not Pursue Criminal Investigations in Every Case of Potential Refund and Employment Fraud because of Resource Priorities
IRS officials told us that IRS pursues criminal investigations of suspected identity thieves in only a small number of cases. However, more restrictive screening will likely increase the number of legitimate returns that fail the screenings (false positives). IRS provides taxpayers with targeted information to increase their awareness of identity theft, tips and suggestions for safeguarding taxpayers’ personal information, and information to help them better understand tax administration issues related to identity theft. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Identity theft is a serious and growing problem in the United States. Taxpayers are harmed when identity thieves file fraudulent tax documents using stolen names and Social Security numbers. In 2010 alone, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) identified over 245,000 identity theft incidents that affected the tax system. The hundreds of thousands of taxpayers with tax problems caused by identity theft represent a small percentage of the expected 140 million individual returns filed, but for those affected, the problems can be quite serious. GAO was asked to describe, among other things, (1) when IRS detects identity theft based refund and employment fraud, (2) the steps IRS has taken to resolve, detect, and prevent innocent taxpayers' identity theft related problems, and (3) constraints that hinder IRS's ability to address these issues. GAO's testimony is based on its previous work on identity theft. GAO updated its analysis by examining data on identity theft cases and interviewing IRS officials. GAO makes no new recommendations but reports on IRS's efforts to address GAO's earlier recommendation that IRS develop performance measures and collect data suitable for assessing the effectiveness of its identity theft initiatives. IRS agreed with and implemented GAO's earlier recommendation.
What GAO Found
Identity theft harms innocent taxpayers through employment and refund fraud. In refund fraud, an identity thief uses a taxpayer's name and Social Security Number (SSN) to file for a tax refund, which IRS discovers after the legitimate taxpayer files. In employment fraud, an identity thief uses a taxpayer's name and SSN to obtain a job. When the thief's employer reports income to IRS, the taxpayer appears to have unreported income on his or her return, leading to enforcement action. IRS has taken multiple steps to resolve, detect, and prevent employment and refund fraud: Resolve--IRS marks taxpayer accounts to alert its personnel of a taxpayer's identity theft. The purpose is to expedite resolution of existing problems and alert personnel to potential future account problems. Detect--IRS screens tax returns filed in the names of known refund and employment fraud victims. Prevent--IRS provides taxpayers with information to increase their awareness of identity theft, including tips for safeguarding personal information. IRS has also started providing identity theft victims with a personal identification number to help identify legitimate returns. IRS's ability to address identity theft issues is constrained by (1) privacy laws that limit IRS's ability to share identity theft information with other agencies; (2) the timing of fraud detection--more than a year may have passed since the original fraud occurred; (3) the resources necessary to pursue the large volume of potential criminal refund and employment fraud cases; and (4) the burden that stricter screening would likely cause taxpayers and employers since more legitimate returns would fail such screening. |
gao_GAO-07-82 | gao_GAO-07-82_0 | 1). 3). Finally, citing resource constraints, HUD has conducted limited on-site oversight of grantees. As a result of a lack of verified and aggregated data or analysis and limited oversight, HUD largely was unable to tell how well the individual Youthbuild grantees performed. HUD Has Not Collected or Analyzed Data That Could Help It Assess Grantees
HUD requires grantees to submit performance reports, including closeout reports, but HUD has not developed or fully utilized information— particularly from the closeout reports—that could help it assess Youthbuild grantee programs and has lacked resources to conduct comprehensive oversight of grantees. Furthermore, while closeout reports require that some performance outputs be collected, including the number of participants receiving GEDs or high-school diplomas, placed in jobs, or entering higher education programs, the reports do not collect other output information such as how many participants were placed in construction-related employment. HUD officials cited a lack of resources as the primary reason for not requiring the monitoring of a larger percentage of grantees. To augment limited existing data, we analyzed information in 245 closeout reports, but the results cannot be generalized to the entire program. Moreover, while closeout reports include impediments to success and “best practices,” HUD did not systematically review this information or share it with YouthBuild USA. As a result, the lack of follow-up data and programwide evaluations make it very difficult to determine which programs and strategies have worked best and assess the performance of Youthbuild over time. Several officials further noted that it was difficult to locate many participants after they had left the program. YouthBuild USA’s President told us that she not only agreed that reviewing the closeout reports for problems and “best practices” would be beneficial, but that she believes the closeout reports needed to “be analyzed to get to the bottom line because the total impact (outcomes) of a grant could not be determined from data provided on a rolling quarterly basis.” As a result of not sharing the closeout reports with YouthBuild USA, HUD may have missed opportunities to improve the program as a whole and help grantees improve performance. Youthbuild Grantees Have Experienced Varied Success in Obtaining Outside Funding Sources, and Many Cited Continued HUD Funding as Crucial
Our analysis of available closeout reports showed that the grantees have had varying success in obtaining additional funding sources. However, success in obtaining additional funds varied widely, from 21 grants reporting no additional funding sources to 40 reporting more than $1 million (see fig. Overall, YouthBuild USA found that 60 percent of programs that HUD did not fund for 2 consecutive years ceased operations, and 90 percent of programs not funded for 3 consecutive years ceased operations. YouthBuild USA, also found that grantees with continuous HUD funding achieved higher outputs, such as GED attainments and job placements, than the ones that did not receive one or more follow-on grants. Labor has experience in managing youth training and education programs and collecting performance information, and Congress transferred Youthbuild to Labor in part to better align the program with existing federal workforce development and youth training programs. According to YouthBuild USA officials, their data indicate that grantees with repeat awards also produced better outcomes such as a higher level of job placements. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the reporting and assessment of performance for Youthbuild grantee programs and develop the bases for an overall assessment of the program, we are making the following three recommendations: that the Secretary of HUD analyze closeout reports by grant and share information on identified problems and “best practices” with its technical services contractor and Labor; that the Secretary of Labor develop and monitor post-program performance outcome measures for the YouthBuild program, such as the types of employment graduates attained and retained, wage rates, and degrees or certifications received, and share the data with the grantees; and that the Secretary of Labor consider whether multiyear funding could be useful in helping YouthBuild grantees attract additional outside funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1993, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has provided funding for Youthbuild, a competitive grant program that trains and educates disadvantaged youth and helps build low-income housing. In 2006, Youthbuild was transferred to the Department of Labor (Labor) to better align the Youthbuild program with existing youth workforce and training programs. In response to concerns about the overall quality of Youthbuild, a Senate report directed GAO to assess the program. GAO's objectives included (1) evaluating how HUD assessed and oversaw the program, (2) determining what results the program achieved, and (3) assessing how successful grantees were in obtaining outside funding. GAO analyzed Youthbuild performance data, visited Youthbuild sites, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
While HUD requires grantees to report basic performance data, such as the number of program participants and graduates and job placements, HUD has not aggregated or analyzed the data and conducted limited oversight of grantees. According to HUD officials, they did not have staff available to analyze the closeout reports that grantees must submit, and a lack of resources also limited oversight of grantees. The monitoring HUD did primarily focused on compliance with program requirements such as documentation rather than on performance. As a result, HUD largely was unable to tell how the individual Youthbuild grantee programs performed. Limited outcome data preclude any overall assessment of the performance of the Youthbuild program; further, the few other analyses available such as the one GAO did in this study to augment limited existing data cannot be generalized programwide. GAO analyzed 245 closeout reports, representing 46 percent of the grantees or 12,863 participants. While GAO could determine percentages of participants who received high school diplomas or were placed in jobs, GAO could not determine outcomes over time, partly because the reports lacked baseline information and grantees were not required to and generally did not follow participants after graduation. Further, while closeout reports include information about impediments to program success and "best practices," HUD did not systematically review this information or share it with its primary technical assistance contractor. Consequently, the lack of programwide evaluations, follow-up data, and dissemination of best practices make it very difficult to assess the performance of Youthbuild over time and determine which programs and strategies have worked best. Reporting on post-program performance outcomes, such as the number of participants placed and retained in construction-related employment, could increase the value of the closeout reports and better measure program results. Labor officials indicated that they would consider including such measures for program reporting. Grantees had varying success in obtaining funds from outside sources, but YouthBuild USA data suggest that continued (multiyear) HUD funding was critical to sustaining grantee operations and attracting leveraged funds. Grantees' success in obtaining additional funds varied widely, from 21 grants reporting no additional funding sources to 40 reporting more than $1 million. While most grantees have generated outside funding, YouthBuild USA reported that most grantees have had difficulty continuing operations without continued HUD funding. Their data show that 90 percent of grantees ceased operations if not funded for 3 consecutive years by HUD. Further, YouthBuild USA also noted that grantees with follow-on HUD funding achieved better performance outcomes, such as higher rates of job placements, than grantees that did not receive subsequent HUD funding. |
gao_GAO-13-868T | gao_GAO-13-868T_0 | The U.S. Government Auditing Standards which govern our work describe performance audits as providing objective analysis so that management and those charged with governance and oversight can use the information to improve program performance and operations, reduce costs, facilitate decision making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action, and contribute to public accountability. Each year, we present our findings, conclusions, and recommendations in reports and testimony before Congress. For example, in fiscal year 2012, we issued more than 650 reports and testified 159 times before various congressional committees. Last fiscal year, financial benefits from our work totaled $55.8 billion U.S. dollars. That is a $105 return on every dollar invested in GAO. We also documented 1,440 other benefits that shaped legislation, improved services to the public, and strengthened government operations. Making the transition to include performance audits as well as traditional financial and compliance audits expands the range of tools that national audit offices have to help their respective governments identify and address challenging domestic and global problems. Increasingly Complex Issues Are Expanding the Perspective of Performance Auditing
The issues, risks, and problems that governments around the world confront are growing increasingly complex and boundary-spanning. That is, those issues, risks, and problems cut across geographic boundaries, government programs, levels of government, and sectors. As government agencies increasingly rely on collaboration with private and nongovernmental entities and delegate responsibilities for implementing public policy initiatives to these entities, the line between the governmental and the nongovernmental sectors continues to blur. In order to contribute actively to prevent the risk of political and regulatory fragmentation, the European Parliament has to prepare itself for this upcoming complexity.”
Performance auditing has a vital role in providing decision makers and citizens with the information, analysis, and recommendations they need to respond to this increasingly complex and interconnected environment. To most effectively contribute to fundamental improvements in the performance of 21st century government, we are finding that auditors need to be more and more focused on governance—that is, assessing and improving connections across organizations, levels of government, sectors, and policy tools. While many of our individual engagements examine the challenges a specific agency or program faces, three GAO-wide initiatives—our High Risk program; our annual reports on overlap, duplication, and fragmentation; and our reviews of the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010—offer government-wide perspectives on the progress needed to respond effectively to 21st century governance challenges. Performance audits, in addition to financial and compliance audits, have allowed us to meet our mission to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's mission is to support the U.S. Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. Each year, GAO presents its findings, conclusions, and recommendations in reports and testimony before Congress. In fiscal year 2012, GAO issued more than 650 reports and testified 159 times before various congressional committees. Last fiscal year, financial benefits from GAO's work totaled $55.8 billion U.S. dollars, a $105 return on every dollar invested in GAO. In addition to financial benefits, GAO also documented 1,440 other benefits that shaped legislation, improved services to the public and strengthened government operations.
GAO and its counterparts, such as the European Court of Auditors, have unprecedented opportunities to help our respective governments plan ahead and address increasingly complex issues in meeting the challenges posed by global interconnections and worldwide fiscal difficulties. The experiences of GAO with respect to performance auditing illustrate how audit organizations can help decision makers address these challenges.
What GAO Found
Performance audits as well as traditional financial and compliance audits are essential tools that national audit offices have to help their respective governments identify and address challenging national and global problems. Performance auditing provides objective analysis so that management and those charged with governance and oversight can use the information to improve program performance and operations, reduce costs, facilitate decision making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action, and contribute to public accountability.
Increasingly complex issues, risks and problems that governments around the world confront are expanding the perspective of performance auditing. These issues, risks and problems such as modernizing outdated financial regulatory systems and protecting public safety, cut across geographic boundaries, government programs, levels of government and sectors. As government agencies increasingly rely on collaboration with private and nongovernmental entities and delegate responsibilities for implementing public policy initiatives to these entities, the line between the governmental and the nongovernmental sectors continues to blur.
From GAO's experience, performance auditing has a vital role in providing decision makers and citizens with the information, analysis, and recommendations they need to respond to this increasingly complex and interconnected environment.
To most effectively contribute to fundamental improvements in the performance of 21st century government, GAO has found that auditors need to be more and more focused on governance, including assessing and recommending how to improve connections across organizations, levels of government, sectors, and policy tools. While many of GAO's individual engagements examine the challenges a specific agency or program faces, three GAO-wide initiatives--the High Risk program; the annual reports on overlap, duplication, and fragmentation; and the reviews of the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010--offer government-wide perspectives on the progress needed to respond effectively to 21st century governance challenges. |
gao_GAO-02-23 | gao_GAO-02-23_0 | Its mission is to provide national leadership, coordination, and resources to prevent and respond appropriately to juvenile delinquency and juvenile victimization. They further explained that guidance needs to be somewhat general given the variation that can occur among projects as grantees tailor them to meet local needs and circumstances. In Some Programs, All Grantees Report the Number of Juveniles They Directly Serve
We identified eight programs in which grantees directly serve juveniles and in which all grantees report the number of juveniles served to either OJJDP or an outside evaluator. First and foremost, many of OJJDP’s programs are not intended to serve juveniles directly. Our in-depth review of these 10 evaluations shows that although several are well-designed and use, or plan to use, sophisticated data analysis methods, others raise concerns as to whether the evaluations will produce definitive results. Many of the training and technical assistance providers are required to report information on their projects’ activities and accomplishments semiannually using OJP’s Categorical Assistance Progress Report form, as do all OJJDP grantees.OJP provides standard guidance on information to be reported, such as information on the status of each of the grantees’ project goals and quantitative results of their projects. II for a description of OJJDP’s product dissemination process). Appendix VIII: Twenty-Four Other Evaluations Funded by OJJDP
This appendix contains summaries of the 24 evaluations the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) has funded since 1995 (excluding the 11 impact evaluations it has funded of its own programs discussed in app. The five project sites are implementing different projects and have not yet completed their evaluation designs. Youth Gang Programs and Strategies. | What GAO Found
Although national rates of violent juvenile crime and youth victimization have declined during the past five years, critical problems affecting juveniles, such as drug dependency, the spread of gangs, and child abuse and neglect, persist. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) has funded various demonstration, replication, research and evaluation, and training and technical assistance programs to prevent and respond to juvenile delinquency and juvenile victimization. GAO's review of 16 of OJJDP's major programs found that, although virtually all grantees must report on their progress twice a year, the information they reported varied. Grantees receive standard, general guidance for reporting on their projects and providing OJJDP information to monitor grantee's projects and accomplishments. According to OJJDP officials, such guidance needs to be general because of differences among individual projects and local needs and circumstances. GAO identified eight programs in which all grantees reported the number of juveniles they directly served. OJJDP does not require grantees in all its programs to report directly on the number of juveniles served directly because many of its programs are not intended to serve juveniles directly. GAO's in-depth review of OJJDP's 10 impact evaluations undertaken since 1995 raises concerns about whether the evaluations will produce definitive results. In some of these evaluations, variations in how the programs are implemented across sites make it difficult to interpret evaluation results. |
gao_GAO-05-442T | gao_GAO-05-442T_0 | The Army has determined that it needs more agile forces. To be successful, therefore, the transformation must include more than new weapons. FCS is a family of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions that will be linked by an information network. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To develop the information on whether the FCS program was following a knowledge-based acquisition strategy and the current status of that strategy, we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; the Program Manager for the Unit of Action (previously known as Future Combat Systems); the Future Combat Systems Lead Systems Integrator; and LSI One Team contractors. The FCS Program Is An Unprecedented Challenge
The FCS program faces significant challenges in setting requirements, developing systems, financing development, and managing the effort. The Requirements Challenge
The Army wants the FCS-equipped unit of action to be as lethal and survivable as the current heavy force, but to be significantly more responsive and sustainable. For example: A first-of-a-kind network will have to be developed that will entail development of unprecedented capabilities—on-the-move communications, high-speed data transmission, dramatically increased bandwidth, and simultaneous voice, data and video; The design and integration of 18 major weapon systems or platforms has to be done simultaneously and within strict size and weight limitations; At least 53 technologies that are considered critical to achieving FCS’ critical performance capabilities will need to be matured and integrated into the system-of-systems; Synchronizing the development, demonstration, and production of as many as 157 complementary systems with the FCS content and schedule. Yet even with these improvements, the FCS is still at significant risk for not delivering planned capability within budgeted resources. This risk stems from the scope of the program’s technical challenges and the low level of knowledge demonstrated thus far. Key decisions, such as its planned 2007 production decision, are expected to occur before critical knowledge is captured. It may be several years before the program reaches the level of knowledge it should have had at program start. The Army employed lower standards than recommended by best practices or DOD policy in determining technologies acceptable for the FCS program. While DOD has found it acceptable to accommodate such problems over the years, this will be a difficult proposition for the FCS, given the magnitude of its cost in an increasingly competitive environment for investment funds. They are separate programs from the FCS, and their costs are not included in the costs of the FCS. Manned Ground Vehicles
FCS includes eight manned ground vehicles, that require critical individual and common technologies to meet required capabilities. In 2004, GAO reported a similar situation with the Stryker vehicles. Although the program restructuring provides more time to resolve risk and to demonstrate progress, the knowledge base for making a confident estimate is still low. For example, a one-year delay late in FCS development, not an uncommon occurrence for other DOD programs, could cost over $3 billion. Such a spiral should meet the standards of providing a worthwhile military capability, having mature technology, and having firm requirements. Other capabilities currently in the FCS program could be moved out of system development and demonstration and instead be bundled into advanced technology demonstrations that could develop and experiment with advanced technologies in the more conducive environment of “pre- acquisition” until they are ready to be put into a future spiral. Advancing technologies in this way will enable knowledge to guide decisions on requirements, lower the cost of development, and make for more reasonable cost and schedule estimates for future spirals. | Why GAO Did This Study
FCS is the core of Army efforts to create a lighter, more agile, capable force: a $108 billion investment to provide a new generation of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions linked by an information network. Although system development and demonstration began in May 2003, the program was restructured in July 2004, including processes to make FCS capabilities available to current forces. GAO has been asked to assess (1) FCS technical and managerial challenges; (2) prospects for delivering FCS within cost and scheduled objectives; and (3) options for proceeding.
What GAO Found
In its unprecedented complexity, FCS confronts the Army with significant technical and managerial challenges in its requirements, development, finance, and management. Technical challenges include the need for FCS vehicles to be smaller, weigh less, and be as lethal and survivable as current vehicles, which requires (1) a network to collect and deliver vast amounts of intelligence and communications information and (2) individual systems, such as manned ground vehicles, that are as complex as fighter aircraft. Its cost will be very high: its first increment--enough to equip about 1/3 of the force--will cost over $108 billion, with annual funding requests running from $3 billion to $9 billion per year. The program's pace and complexity also pose significant management challenges. The Army is using a Lead System Integrator to manage FCS and is using a contracting instrument--Other Transaction Agreement--that allows for more flexible negotiation of roles, responsibilities, and rights with the integrator. The FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability within budgeted resources. Currently, about 9 1/2 years is allowed from development start to production decision. DOD typically needs this period of time to develop a single advanced system, yet FCS is far greater in scope. The program's level of knowledge is far below that suggested by best practices or DOD policy: Nearly 2 years after program launch and with $4.6 billion invested, requirements are not firm and only 1 of over 50 technologies are mature. As planned, the program will attain the level of knowledge in 2008 that it should have had in 2003, but things are not going as planned. Progress in critical areas--such as the network, software, and requirements--has in fact been slower, and FCS is therefore likely to encounter problems late in development, when they are very costly to correct. Given the scope of the program, the impact of cost growth could be dire. To make FCS an effective acquisition program different approaches must be considered, including (1) setting the first stage of the program to demonstrate a worthwhile military capability, mature technology, and firm requirements; and (2) bundling its other capabilities into advanced technology demonstrators until they can be put in a future stage, which will provide guidance for decisions on requirements, lower the cost of development, and make for more reasonable cost and schedule estimates for future stages. |
gao_GAO-15-366 | gao_GAO-15-366_0 | The GEO satellite constellation provides midlatitude coverage and the hosted HEO sensors provide polar coverage for missile warning and defense and other missions. Air Force Assessed the Feasibility of GEO Satellites 5 and 6 Technology Insertion, but Earlier Assessment and Investment in Technology Development and Planning Could Have Improved the Effort
The Air Force assessed the feasibility and cost of incorporating a newer infrared focal plane into the SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6 and found that inserting a new focal plane would incur significant cost and schedule increases. The assessment came too late to be useful to GEO satellites 5 and 6, but that might not have been the case if the Air Force had invested in technology development and insertion planning earlier in the program to provide more options for consideration. The Air Force Met Congressional Requirements to Assess New Focal Plane Technology for GEO Satellites 5 and 6
As directed in the Senate report, the Air Force assessed the feasibility and costs of inserting newer infrared focal plane technologies—sensors that can detect heat from missile launches, for example—into GEO satellites 5 and 6. It identified two plausible options for insertion, and though technically feasible, neither was deemed affordable or deliverable within the replenishment need dates of 2020 and 2021. Limited Prior Investment in Technology Development and Planning Efforts Reduced Technology Insertion Options
Because of limited prior investment in research and development and technology insertion planning leading up to the acquisition of GEO satellites 5 and 6, there was only one viable alternative focal plane to be considered. As a result, the Air Force was limited in the number of feasible options for adding new technology to GEO satellites 5 and 6. DOD policy and guidance indicate that planning for technology insertion and refresh is also important throughout a system’s life cycle. In addition, DOD’s Defense Acquisition Guidebook advises the use of trade studies to inform system modifications, such as technology insertion or refresh, and the development and implementation of technology refresh schedules. Beyond assessing the two options—of replacing the current analog focal plane with a more modern digital focal plane, either with or without changes to the electronic interfaces—the Air Force was not in a position to incorporate changes and still maintain the efficiencies planned by buying GEO satellites 5 and 6 together. Limited Planning May Hinder the Air Force’s Ability to Fully Address Technology Insertion Risks in Future Systems
The current approach to technology insertion for SBIRS is not consistent with the best practice of establishing a plan prior to the start of a program that identifies specific technologies to be developed and inserted to achieve a desired end state. While the Air Force is working to develop a technology road map for the next system, the effort is still hampered by the lack of a clear vision for the path forward, requiring the Air Force to plan for multiple potential systems. In its Systems Engineering Guide, the MITRE Corporation—a not-for-profit research and development company—highlights the importance of technology planning to provide guidance for evolving and maturing technologies to address future mission needs. As mentioned above, we have also found that leading commercial companies conduct strategic planning before technology development and plan for technology insertion before a program begins. Currently, technology insertion for SBIRS is largely driven by the need to replace obsolescent parts, that is, parts that are no longer available and need to be rebuilt or redesigned and qualified for the space environment. One of the areas under the SMI plan, Evolved SBIRS, focuses on reducing cost and technical risk for replenishments of the current SBIRS satellites and future SBIRS systems, including addressing obsolescence. Although Air Force Space Command’s (AFSPC) annual integrated planning process identifies technology concepts that could be a part of a future system, it is the program’s responsibility to decide which concepts to Program managers generally pursue further, according to officials.initiate technology development ideas and propose them to AFSPC as they arise, at which point they develop into science and technology projects. Given the short history of SMI, which started in fiscal year 2013, the SBIRS program has had limited time to develop and demonstrate new technologies that could be inserted into a follow-on. It is too early to determine how successful the road map will be in providing a timely plan for inserting technology into the next system. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve technology planning and ensure planning efforts are clearly aligned with the SBIRS follow-on, we recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force establish a technology insertion plan as part of the SBIRS follow-on acquisition strategy that identifies obsolescence needs as well as specific potential technologies and insertion points. | Why GAO Did This Study
SBIRS is a key part of DOD's missile warning and defense systems. To replace the first two satellites currently on orbit, the Air Force plans to build two more with the same design as previous satellites. The basic SBIRS design is years old and some of its technology has become obsolete. To address obsolescence issues in the next satellites, the program must replace old technologies with new ones, a process that may be referred to as technology insertion or refresh. A Senate Armed Services Committee report included a provision for GAO to review an Air Force assessment of the feasibility of inserting newer technologies into the planned replacement satellites, SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6, and how it intends to address technology insertion issues for future satellite systems.
This report examines (1) the extent to which the Air Force assessed the feasibility of inserting newer technologies into SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6 and (2) plans to address obsolescence issues and risk associated with technology insertion for future satellites or systems. GAO identified technology insertion planning guidance and practices, reviewed the Air Force's assessment and plans, and met with DOD and contractor offices.
What GAO Found
The Air Force assessed options for replacing older technologies with newer ones—called technology insertion—in the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites 5 and 6. However, the assessment was limited in the number of options it could practically consider because of timing and minimal early investment in technology planning. The Air Force assessed the feasibility and cost of inserting new digital infrared focal plane technology—used to provide surveillance, tracking, and targeting information for national missile defense and other missions—in place of the current analog focal plane, either with or without changing the related electronics. While technically feasible, neither option was deemed affordable or deliverable when needed. The Air Force estimated that inserting new focal plane technology would result in cost increases and schedule delays ranging from $424 million and 23 months to $859 million and 44 months. The assessment came too late to be useful for SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6. It occurred after the Air Force had approved the acquisition strategy and while negotiations were ongoing to procure production of the two satellites. According to the Air Force, implementing changes at that stage would require contract modifications and renegotiations and incur additional cost and schedule growth. Limited prior investment in technology development and planning for insertion also limited the number of feasible options for adding new technology into SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6. Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition policy and guidance indicate that such planning is important throughout a system's life cycle, and GAO has reported on leading commercial companies' practice of planning for technology insertion prior to the start of a program. Air Force officials said early technology insertion planning was hampered in part by development challenges, test failures, and technical issues with the satellites, which took priority over research and development efforts.
The current approach to technology insertion for the system or satellites after SBIRS GEO satellites 5 and 6 could leave the program with similar challenges in the future. GAO's work on best practices has found that leading companies conduct strategic planning before technology development begins to help identify needs and technologies. Similarly, the MITRE Corporation—a not-for-profit research and development organization—has highlighted the importance of technology planning to provide guidance for evolving and maturing technologies to address future mission needs. Technology insertion decisions for the future system or satellites are not guided by such planning. Instead, decisions are largely driven by the need to replace obsolete parts as issues arise. Current efforts—such as individual science and technology projects, including those in the Space Modernization Initiative—are limited by lack of direction, focusing on isolated technologies, and therefore are not set up to identify specific insertion points for a desired future system. In addition, the SBIRS program has had little time to develop and demonstrate new technologies that could be inserted into a SBIRS follow-on system. The Air Force is working to develop a technology road map for the next system, according to officials. Given the lack of a clear vision for the path forward and the road map's early development status, it is too soon to determine whether it will be able to identify specific technology and obsolescence needs and insertion points in time for the next system.
What GAO Recommends
To improve technology planning, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force establish a plan as part of the SBIRS follow-on acquisition strategy that identifies obsolescence needs, specific potential technologies, and insertion points. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-01-559 | gao_GAO-01-559_0 | DOD Does Not Have a Sound Analytical Basis for Its 3-Month Carryover Standard
DOD has a 3-month carryover standard for all but one working capital fund activity group, but Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and military service officials could not provide, and we could not identify, any analytical basis for this standard. They informed us that the 3-month standard (1) was based on management judgment and that 3 months (one-fourth of the fiscal year) should be enough time to ensure a smooth flow of work during the transition from one fiscal year to the next, (2) had been in effect for many years, and (3) was reviewed during a 1996 DOD carryover study when DOD representatives visited various working capital fund activities to solicit the opinions of managers regarding the carryover standard and reviewed data substantiating those opinions. Because the Army and Navy are reducing the amount of carryover but not the amount of revenue, the number of months of carryover they are reporting is understated. Inaccurate Budget Estimates Further Complicate Review of Carryover Levels
Further complicating the congressional budget review of carryover is that some activity groups have underestimated their budgeted year-end carryover year after year, thereby providing decisionmakers misleading carryover information and resulting in more funding being provided than was intended. If the standard had been reduced to 60 days or 75 days, projected customer order levels would have been about $1.6 billion or $1.0 billion less, respectively, than the amount budgeted. To determine whether applying the carryover authority to not more than a 30-day quantity of work would be sufficient to ensure uninterrupted operations at the working capital fund activities early in a fiscal year and what the impact on these activities would be if the carryover policy were reduced from 3 months to 30 days, we calculated what the potential financial impact on customer orders would have been if a 30, 60, 75, or 90- day carryover standard had been in effect for fiscal year 2001. This appendix discusses the different methods the services used to determine compliance with DOD’s 3-month carryover standard. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report examines the working capital fund activities for the Department of Defense (DOD). GAO (1) identifies potential changes in current management processes or policies that, if made, would result in a more efficient operation and (2) evaluates various aspects of the DOD policy that allow Defense Working Capital Fund activities to carry over a 3-month level of work from one fiscal year to the next.
What GAO Found
GAO found that DOD lacks a sound analytical basis for its current 3-month carryover standard. DOD established a 3-month carryover standard for most working capital fund activity groups, although it has not done the analysis necessary to support the 3-month standard. Without a validation process, neither DOD nor congressional decisionmakers can be sure that the 3-month standard is providing activity groups with reasonable amounts of carryover to ensure a smooth transition from one fiscal year to the next or whether the carryover is excessive. In addition, carryover information currently reported under the 3-month standard is not comparable between services and is misleading to DOD and congressional decisionmakers. Specifically, results can differ markedly because the military services use different methods to calculate the number of months of carryover. Further complicating the congressional budget review of carryovers is that some activity groups have underestimated their budgeted carryover year after year, thereby providing decisionmakers with misleading year-end carryover information and resulting in more funding being provided than was intended. GAO also reviewed the potential financial impact of reducing the amount of fiscal year-end carryover permitted by DOD policy. GAO's analysis showed that if a 30-day, 60-day or 75-day carryover policy had been in effect during the fiscal year 2001 budget review process, the amount of budgeted customer orders could have been reduced by about $2.9 billion, $1.6 billion, or $1.0 billion, respectively. |
gao_GAO-07-785T | gao_GAO-07-785T_0 | GAO’s High-Risk Series Raises the Priority and Visibility of the Need to Transform Federal Oversight of Food Safety
We designated the federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area to raise the priority and visibility of the need to transform this system. Fragmented Federal Oversight of Food Safety Led to High- Risk Designation
The fragmented nature of the federal food oversight system calls into question whether the government can plan more strategically to inspect food production processes, identify and react more quickly to outbreaks of contaminated food, and focus on promoting the safety and integrity of the nation’s food supply. While 15 agencies collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety, two agencies have primary responsibility–– USDA, which is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and processed egg products, and FDA, which is responsible for virtually all other foods. We have identified examples where the federal government’s resources and enforcement activities can better align with the risks of food contamination. For example, the majority of federal expenditures for food safety inspection have been directed toward USDA’s programs for ensuring the safety of meat, poultry, and egg products; however, USDA is responsible for regulating only about 20 percent of the food supply. In contrast, FDA, which is responsible for regulating about 80 percent of the food supply, accounted for only about 24 percent of expenditures. Limitations in Federal Agencies’ Recall Programs Heighten the Risk that Unsafe Food Will Reach Consumers
Among the reasons we designated federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area is that limitations in the federal government’s food recalls heighten the risk that unsafe food will remain in the food supply and ultimately be consumed. Food recalls are largely voluntary, and federal agencies responsible for food safety have no authority to compel companies to carry out recalls in these cases, with the exception of FDA’s authority to require a recall for infant formula. Even in the context of their limited recall authority, we reported in October 2004 that USDA and FDA could do a better job in carrying out their food recall programs so they could quickly remove potentially unsafe food from the marketplace. Specifically: USDA and FDA did not know how promptly and completely companies were carrying out recalls. USDA and FDA did not promptly verify that recalls had reached all segments of the distribution chain, yet monitoring the effectiveness of a company’s recall actions is the agencies’ primary role in a food recall. The procedures USDA and FDA used to alert consumers to a recall— press releases and Web postings—may not have been effective. The recent outbreaks of E. coli in spinach and Salmonella in peanut butter, along with outbreaks of contaminated pet food, underscore the need of a broad-based transformation of the federal oversight of food safety to achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and sustainability. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, about 76 million people contract a foodborne illness in the United States; about 325,000 require hospitalization; and about 5,000 die. The outbreaks of E. coli in spinach and Salmonella in peanut butter, along with contamination in pet food, have highlighted the risks posed by accidental food contamination. The attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened awareness that the food supply could also be vulnerable to deliberate contamination. This testimony focuses on the (1) role that GAO's high-risk series can play in raising the priority and visibility of the need to transform federal oversight of food safety, (2) fragmented nature of federal oversight of food safety, and (3) limitations in federal food recall programs.
What GAO Found
GAO's High-Risk Series is intended to raise the priority and visibility of government programs that are in need of broad-based transformation to achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and sustainability. These reports also help Congress and the executive branch carry out their responsibilities while improving the government's performance and enhancing its accountability for the benefit of the American people. In January 2007, as part of our regular update of this series for each new Congress, GAO designated the federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area for the first time. We designated federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area because of the need to transform this system to reduce risks to public health as well as the economy. While this nation enjoys a plentiful and varied food supply that is generally considered to be safe, the federal oversight of food safety is fragmented, with 15 agencies collectively administering at least 30 laws related to food safety. The two primary agencies are the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and processed egg products, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible for virtually all other food. We have identified examples where the federal government's resources and enforcement activities can better align with the risks of food contamination. For example, the majority of federal expenditures for food safety inspection were directed toward USDA's programs for ensuring the safety of meat, poultry, and egg products; however, USDA is responsible for regulating only about 20 percent of the food supply. In contrast, FDA, which is responsible for regulating about 80 percent of the food supply, accounted for only about 24 percent of expenditures. Among the reasons we designated federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area is that limitations in the federal government's food recalls heighten the risk that unsafe food will remain in the food supply and ultimately be consumed. Food recalls are voluntary, and federal agencies responsible for food safety have no authority to compel companies to carry out recalls--with the exception of FDA's authority to require a recall for infant formula. USDA and FDA provided guidance for companies to carry out voluntary recalls. We have reported that USDA and FDA could do a better job carrying out their food recall programs so they can quickly remove potentially unsafe food from the marketplace. At the time of our review, these agencies did not know how promptly and completely companies were carrying out recalls, did not promptly verify that recalls had reached all segments of the distribution chain, and used procedures that may not have been effective to alert consumers to a recall. |
gao_GAO-11-465 | gao_GAO-11-465_0 | The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics oversees the space and unmanned aircraft systems acquisition programs. The Complexity of DOD’s ISR Enterprise Funding Presents Challenges for Managing and Overseeing the Scope and Cost
The USD(I) has the authority to exercise oversight responsibility over DOD’s ISR’s enterprise; however the broad scope and complex funding arrangements of DOD’s ISR enterprise make it difficult to manage and oversee. The scope of the ISR enterprise and capabilities include many different kinds of activities—from collection of information through dissemination of analysis compiled from multiple sources—conducted by multiple agencies. As a result, ISR activities may be funded through any of several sources, including the Military Intelligence Program, the National Intelligence Program, overseas contingency operations funding, and service appropriations, or by a combination of these sources. To manage DOD’s large ISR enterprise, the USD(I) serves as DOD’s senior intelligence official, responsible for providing strategic, budget, and policy oversight over DOD’s ISR enterprise. However, the USD(I) does not have full visibility into several budget sources that fund DOD’s ISR enterprise, such as national intelligence capabilities, capabilities used for ISR and non-ISR purposes, urgent operational needs, and military personnel expenses related to ISR. The USD(I)’s inability to gain full visibility into all of DOD’s ISR financial resources may hinder efforts to develop an investment strategy for ISR, to consider tradeoffs across military services and programs, and to address potential duplication, fragmentation, and overlap. DOD Has Established Initiatives and Processes to Achieve Efficiencies, but Additional Steps Could Improve Accountability
DOD has developed general guidance in directives, a manual, and memorandums emphasizing the need to identify and eliminate duplication or redundancies in its capabilities, which provides a foundation for further action. However, current ISR efficiency studies have limited scope, initiatives are in the early stages of development, and implementation plans, including resource requirements, have not been fully developed. In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed that the department begin a series of efficiency initiatives to reduce duplication, overhead, and excess. However, the scope of the review was limited to ISR analysis activities and excluded ISR activities associated with collecting ISR data, which represents one of the largest areas of growth in ISR spending. The absence of implementation goals and timelines will make it difficult to determine whether this initiative will make progress in achieving efficiencies. DOD Has Developed an ISR Integration Roadmap but Has Only Partially Addressed Management Elements Required by Legislation or Identified by Congressional Committees
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required DOD to develop an ISR Integration Roadmap to guide the development and integration of DOD ISR capabilities over a 15-year period, and to report to Congress on the content of the roadmap, including specific management elements that DOD should address. In response to both of these requirements, DOD issued an ISR Integration Roadmap. Our review of DOD’s 2007 and 2010 ISR roadmaps found that DOD has made progress in addressing the issues that Congress directed to be included, but neither roadmap included all the specified elements or addressed the important issue of how to invest future resources among competing priorities. Additionally, the roadmap does not provide estimated costs associated with these capability needs and does not prioritize ISR capabilities. Furthermore, until DOD develops an integrated ISR investment strategy, the defense and intelligence communities may continue to use resources that are not necessarily based on strategic priorities, which could lead to gaps in some areas of intelligence operations and redundancies in others. For example, more work remains for DOD to identify efficiencies across the entire ISR enterprise, such as exploring efficiencies in ISR collection activities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve management of DOD’s ISR enterprise and increase its ability to achieve efficiencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the USD(I) to take the following three actions: Collect and aggregate complete financial data—including information on dual-use assets, urgent operational needs, capability funding from multiple sources, and military personnel funding—to inform resource and investment decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The success of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems in collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence information has fueled demand for ISR support, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has significantly increased its investments in ISR capabilities since combat operations began in 2001. In fiscal year 2010, intelligence community spending --including for ISR--exceeded $80 billion. Section 21 of Public Law 111-139 mandated that GAO identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities. This report examines the extent to which: (1) DOD manages and oversees the full scope and cost of the ISR enterprise; (2) DOD has sought to identify and minimize the potential for any unnecessary duplication in program, planning, and operations for ISR; and (3) DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap addresses key congressionally directed management elements and guidance.
What GAO Found
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) has the authority to oversee DOD's ISR enterprise; however, the broad scope and complex funding arrangements of DOD's ISR enterprise make it difficult to manage and oversee. The scope of the ISR enterprise and capabilities include many different kinds of activities conducted by multiple agencies. As a result, ISR activities may be funded through any of several sources, including the Military Intelligence Program, the National Intelligence Program, overseas contingency operations funding, and military service funds. To manage DOD's large ISR enterprise, the USD(I) serves as DOD's senior intelligence official, responsible for providing strategic, budget, and policy oversight over DOD's ISR enterprise. However, the USD(I) does not have full visibility into several budget sources that fund DOD's ISR enterprise, such as national intelligence capabilities, dual use assets, urgent operational needs, and military personnel expenses related to ISR. The USD(I)'s inability to gain full visibility and clarity into all of DOD's ISR financial resources hinders efforts to develop an investment strategy for ISR and to achieve efficiencies. DOD has developed general guidance in directives and other documents emphasizing the need to identify efficiencies and eliminate duplication or redundancies in its capabilities, which provides a foundation for further action. In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed that the department begin a series of efficiency initiatives to reduce duplication, overhead, and excess. However, the scope of the review pertaining to ISR was limited to analysis activities and excluded activities associated with collecting ISR data--one of the largest areas of growth in ISR spending. Additionally, two ISR efficiency initiatives are in the early stages of development and do not have implementation goals and timelines. Without goals and timelines, it will be difficult to determine whether these initiatives will make progress in achieving efficiencies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required DOD to develop a roadmap to guide the development and integration of DOD ISR capabilities over a 15-year period and report to Congress on the contents of the roadmap, such as goals and an investment strategy to prioritize resources. DOD responded to both of these requirements by issuing an ISR roadmap. GAO's review of DOD's 2007 and 2010 ISR roadmaps found that DOD has made progress in addressing the issues that Congress directed to be included, but the 2007 and 2010 roadmaps did not address certain management elements identified by Congress. In 2008, Congress restated the 2004 requirements and provided additional guidance to the USD(I). However, the 2010 roadmap still does not represent an integrated investment strategy across the department because it does not clearly address capability gaps or priorities across the enterprise and still lacks investment information. Until DOD develops an integrated ISR investment strategy, the defense and intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions and use resources that are not necessarily based on strategic priorities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD compile and aggregate complete ISR funding data, establish implementation goals and timelines for its efficiency efforts, and give priority to examining efficiency in ISR collection activities. DOD agreed or partially agreed with these GAO recommendations. GAO also suggests that Congress consider holding DOD accountable to address required elements of the ISR roadmap. |
gao_GAO-06-983T | gao_GAO-06-983T_0 | Background
For 16 years, DOD’s supply chain management processes, previously identified as DOD inventory management, have been on our list of high- risk areas needing urgent attention because of long-standing systemic weaknesses that we have identified in our reports. DOD Continues to Implement Its Supply Chain Management Improvement Plan, but Full Implementation Will Take Several Years
Since October 2005, DOD has continued to make progress implementing the initiatives in its supply chain management improvement plan, but it will be several years before the plan can be fully implemented. DOD has sought to demonstrate significant improvement in supply chain management within 2 years of the plan’s inception in 2005; however, the department may have difficulty meeting its July 2007 goal. While DOD has generally stayed on track, DOD has reported some slippage in meeting scheduled milestones for certain initiatives. Given the long-standing nature of the problems being addressed, the complexities of the initiatives, and the involvement of multiple organizations within DOD, we would expect to see further milestone slippage in the future. Supply Chain Improvement Plan Lacks Outcome- focused Performance Measures for Many of the Initiatives
While DOD has incorporated several broad performance measures in its supply chain management improvement plan, the department continues to lack outcome-focused performance measures for many of the initiatives. Therefore, it is difficult to track and demonstrate DOD’s progress toward improving its performance in the three focus areas of requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution. For example, DOD could show near-term progress by adding intermediate measures for the DOD supply chain management improvement plan, such as outcome-focused performance measures for the initiatives or for the three focus areas. DOD’s supply chain management improvement plan includes four high- level performance measures that are being tracked across the department, but these measures do not necessarily reflect the performance of the initiatives or explicitly relate to the three focus areas. In addition, while not required by the regulation, the performance measures DOD has included in the plan are not explicitly linked to the three focus areas, and it has not included overall cost metrics that might show efficiencies gained through supply chain improvement efforts. Additionally, we observed that DOD’s plan does not identify departmentwide performance measures in the focus areas of requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution. DOD Has Multiple Plans Addressing Supply Chain Management, but Alignment Among Them Is Unclear
DOD has multiple plans aimed at improving aspects of logistics, including supply chain management, but it is unclear how all these plans are aligned with one another. In September 2005, DOD issued its Focused Logistics Roadmap, also referred to as the “As Is” roadmap. It is intended to provide a baseline of programs and initiatives for future capability analysis and investment. These plans were developed at different points of time, for different purposes, and in different formats. Therefore, it is difficult to determine how all the ongoing efforts link together to sufficiently cover requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution and whether they will result in significant progress toward resolving this high-risk area. Until DOD clearly aligns the supply chain management improvement plan with other department plans and ongoing initiatives, supply chain stakeholders will not have a comprehensive picture of DOD’s ongoing efforts to resolve problems in the supply chain. Although we are encouraged by DOD’s planning efforts, DOD lacks a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide strategy to guide logistics programs and initiatives. To address this concern and guide future logistics programs and initiatives, DOD is in the process of developing a new strategic plan—the “To Be” roadmap. This plan is intended to portray where the department is headed in the logistics area, how it will get there, and monitor progress toward achieving its objectives, as well as institutionalize a continuous assessment process that links ongoing capability development, program reviews, and budgeting. However, until it is completed, we will not be able to assess how the roadmap addresses the challenges and risks DOD faces in its supply chain improvement efforts. These measures could include outcome-focused measures for each of the initiatives or for the three focus areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains a military force with unparalleled logistics capabilities, but it continues to confront decades-old supply chain management problems. The supply chain can be the critical link in determining whether our frontline military forces win or lose on the battlefield, and the investment of resources in the supply chain is substantial. Because of weaknesses in DOD's supply chain management, this program has been on GAO's list of high-risk areas needing urgent attention and transformation since 1990. Last year, DOD developed a plan to resolve its long-term supply chain problems in three focus areas: requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution. In October 2005, GAO testified that the plan was a good first step. GAO was asked to provide its views on DOD's progress toward (1) implementing the supply chain management improvement plan and (2) incorporating performance measures for tracking and demonstrating improvement, as well as to comment on the alignment of DOD's supply chain management improvement plan with other department logistics plans. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports and ongoing work in this area. It contains GAO's views on opportunities to improve DOD's ability to achieve and demonstrate progress in supply chain management.
What GAO Found
Since October 2005, DOD has continued to make progress implementing the 10 initiatives in its supply chain management improvement plan, but it will take several years to fully implement these initiatives. DOD's stated goal for implementing its plan is to demonstrate significant improvement in supply chain management within 2 years of the plan's inception in 2005, but the time frames for substantially implementing some initiatives are currently 2008 or later. While DOD has generally stayed on track, it has reported some slippage in the implementation of certain initiatives. Factors such as the long-standing nature of the problems, the complexities of the initiatives, and the involvement of multiple organizations within DOD could cause the implementation dates of some initiatives to slip farther. DOD has incorporated several broad performance measures in its supply chain management improvement plan, but it continues to lack outcome-focused performance measures for many of the initiatives. Therefore, it is difficult to track and demonstrate progress toward improving the three focus areas of requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution. Although DOD's plan includes four high-level performance measures that are being tracked across the department, these measures do not necessarily reflect the performance of the initiatives and do not relate explicitly to the three focus areas. Further, DOD's plan does not include cost metrics that might show efficiencies gained through supply chain improvement efforts. In their effort to develop performance measures for use across the department, DOD officials have encountered challenges such as a lack of standardized, reliable data. Nevertheless, DOD could show near-term progress by adding intermediate measures. These measures could include outcome-focused measures for each of the initiatives or for the three focus areas. DOD has multiple plans aimed at improving aspects of logistics, including supply chain management, but it is unclear how these plans are aligned with one another. The plans were developed at different points of time, for different purposes, and in different formats, so it is difficult to determine how all the ongoing efforts link together to sufficiently cover requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution and whether they will result in significant progress toward resolving this high-risk area. Also, DOD's supply chain management improvement plan does not account for initiatives outside the direct oversight of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and DOD lacks a comprehensive strategy to guide logistics programs and initiatives. DOD is in the process of developing a new plan, referred to as the "To Be" roadmap, for future logistics programs and initiatives. The roadmap is intended to portray where the department is headed in the logistics area, how it will get there, and what progress is being made toward achieving its objectives, as well as to link ongoing capability development, program reviews, and budgeting. However, until it is completed, GAO will not be able to assess how the roadmap addresses the challenges and risks DOD faces in its supply chain improvement efforts. |
gao_GAO-10-44 | gao_GAO-10-44_0 | Since August 2008, the IMF has dramatically increased its commitment to lend to member countries in response to the global economic crisis, as shown in table 1. Designing an IMF- Supported Program Is a Complex Process That Allows for Negotiated Trade-offs Among Objectives and Policies
The IMF-supported program is intended to help countries achieve macroeconomic stability and contains objectives, targets, macroeconomic policies, and conditions. The design of an IMF-supported program involves a complex process, which includes the use of a macroeconomic framework, economic judgment, and discussions between the IMF staff and country officials regarding trade-offs among different objectives and policies. IMF-Supported Programs Are Intended to Help Countries Achieve Their Objectives in the Context of Macroeconomic Stability
An IMF-supported program is defined by its objectives and the link between those objectives and the macroeconomic policies used to achieve them, with the specific content of a country’s program reflecting the country’s characteristics and circumstances. For example, IMF-supported program objectives in low-income countries are broadly geared toward the long-term goals of increasing economic growth and reducing poverty. In middle- and high- income countries, an IMF-supported program may include targets to stabilize the exchange rate, raise interest rates, and tighten credit conditions to stem the outflow of capital and restore investor confidence. Four IMF-Supported Programs Were Negotiated Based on Countries’ Circumstances
IMF-supported programs in each of the four countries we reviewed contain different sets of objectives, targets, and conditions that reflect each country’s individual circumstances, trade-offs, and negotiations with IMF staff. The program in postconflict Liberia focuses on rebuilding capacity, whereas the program in Zambia, a country with significant natural resources, but substantial poverty, centers on increasing economic growth. Hungary, a middle-income country, faced a risking risk of debt default; thus, the program concentrates on restoring investor confidence and reducing debt and expenditures. A banking and currency collapse precipitated Iceland’s request for a program, which focuses on recapitalizing the banks and stabilizing the currency. While IMF staff and country officials in all four countries generally agreed with the programs and have made progress in implementing the programs, each country has encountered some challenges in implementing conditions or achieving targets. Figures 2, 4, 6, and 8 show country background information for Liberia, Zambia, Hungary, and Iceland. Macroeconomic Policies in IMF- Supported Programs Are Broadly Consistent with Findings of Academic Literature
For low-income countries, empirical evidence suggests inflation is detrimental to economic growth after it exceeds a critical threshold, which is broadly consistent with the inflation targets included in the IMF- supported programs we reviewed. Similarly, for middle- and high-income countries, the academic literature identifies weaknesses in macroeconomic policies that often precede economic crises that are consistent with the policies in the IMF-supported programs we reviewed. Empirical Evidence Evaluating the Complex Relationship between Inflation and Growth Is Broadly Consistent with IMF-Supported Programs in Low-Income Countries
Empirical Research Suggests a Complex Relationship between Inflation and Growth; Inflation Harms Growth above a Critical Threshold
Inflation targets are a prominent feature of IMF-supported programs in low-income countries, but there has been considerable debate about appropriate targets for these countries. These variables suggest a number of specific policy weaknesses that make countries more vulnerable to crises, especially high inflation, high public indebtedness, and an overvalued currency. Agency Comments
The Department of the Treasury provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix III. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the process for designing an International Monetary Fund (IMF)-supported program, we reviewed and analyzed IMF’s public documents and data. To examine the extent to which the findings of empirical economic studies are consistent with the IMF’s macroeconomic policies, we reviewed IMF documents and empirical studies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has significantly increased its total committed lending to countries from about $3.5 billion in August 2008 to about $170.4 billion in August 2009, as countries have been severely affected by the global economic crisis. IMF-supported programs are intended to help countries overcome balance-of-payments problems, stabilize their economies, and restore sustainable economic growth. Critics have long-standing concerns that the IMF has an overly austere approach to macroeconomic policy that does not sufficiently heed country viewpoints. To help address these concerns, the IMF recently stated that it has changed its policies, including by increasing its flexibility. GAO was asked to examine (1) the process for designing an IMF-supported program, (2) the IMF-supported programs in four recipient countries, and (3) the extent to which the findings of empirical economic studies are consistent with the IMF's macroeconomic policies. GAO analyzed IMF and recipient country documents; interviewed U.S., IMF, and foreign government officials, conducting fieldwork in four relatively large recipient countries; and analyzed published or widely cited empirical studies. GAO received written comments from the Department of the Treasury, noting its concurrence with the report's conclusions.
What GAO Found
Designing an IMF-supported lending program involves a complex, iterative process based on projections for key macroeconomic variables; discussions between IMF staff and country officials regarding program goals, policies, and trade-offs; use of economic judgment; and IMF Executive Board approval. An IMF-supported program is intended to help countries achieve their objectives in the context of macroeconomic stability. Programs in low-income countries are broadly geared toward increasing economic growth and reducing poverty, and generally strive for low inflation and sustainable levels of debt. In middle- and high-income countries, programs generally aim to stem capital outflows, restore confidence, and stabilize the exchange rate by, for example, setting targets for budget deficits and international reserves. Trade-offs among the different combinations of objectives and policies allow for negotiations between the IMF staff and country officials, reflecting what is technically feasible and politically acceptable. IMF-supported programs in the four countries GAO reviewed--Liberia, Zambia, Hungary, and Iceland--include different sets of objectives, targets, and conditions that reflect country circumstances, based on negotiations between the IMF staff and country officials. In postconflict Liberia, the program focuses on rebuilding capacity and contains a target for maintaining a balanced budget with no borrowing. In Zambia--a country negatively affected by the recent economic crisis--the IMF-supported program is designed to increase economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve governance. Hungary, which faced a rising risk of default, has a program that focuses on restoring investor confidence while reducing debt and expenditures. A banking and currency collapse in Iceland precipitated the IMF-supported program, which contains some controversial approaches to monetary policy and banking reform. All four countries are making progress but face challenges in implementing conditions or achieving targets in their IMF-supported programs. The macroeconomic policies in IMF-supported programs are broadly consistent with the findings of the empirical literature GAO reviewed, although this literature lacks precise guidance for setting policy targets. For low-income countries, empirical evidence generally suggests inflation is detrimental to economic growth after it exceeds a critical threshold, which is broadly consistent with the inflation targets included in the IMF-supported programs we reviewed. For middle- and high-income countries, the literature identified specific policy weaknesses in advance of crises, including high inflation, high public indebtedness, and low international reserves. These weaknesses are consistent with the policies upon which the IMF focuses in the 13 programs in middle- to high-income countries GAO reviewed. |
gao_GAO-05-666 | gao_GAO-05-666_0 | Over the last 10 years, DOD has invested approximately $20 billion for the environmental restoration of contaminated sites, including remediation of contaminated groundwater on and around active, closing, and formerly used defense facilities. DOD Has Implemented or Field-tested a Wide Range of Technologies to Remediate Sites Contaminated with Groundwater
DOD has implemented or field-tested all of the 15 types of generally accepted technologies currently available to remediate groundwater. DOD guidance directs department officials to consider cost-effectiveness and performance when selecting technologies for cleanup. According to department officials, DOD selects the most suitable technology to clean up a contaminated site based on a number of factors, including the type of contaminant, its location and concentration at different levels in the subsurface, and its chemical and physical composition. See table 2 for information on which of the 15 technologies can potentially treat each of DOD’s contaminants of concern. Most of these new approaches are being used or field-tested by DOD and involve novel materials that are applied to contaminated sites using existing technologies. DOD Supports the Development of New Technologies with the Commercial Sector through Several Programs
We found that DOD is actively involved in researching and testing new approaches to groundwater remediation, largely through its efforts to develop and promote the acceptance of innovative groundwater remediation technologies. In particular, the DOD-funded Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) supports public and private research on contaminants of concern to DOD and innovative methods for their treatment, among other activities. Agency Comments
DOD generally agreed with the content of the report, stating that the report is an accurate summary of DOD’s use and field tests of remedial technologies; DOD also provided technical clarifications that we have incorporated, as appropriate. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the groundwater remediation technologies that the Department of Defense (DOD) is currently using or field-testing and (2) examines whether any new groundwater remediation technologies are being used outside the department or are being developed by commercial vendors that may have potential for DOD’s use, and the extent to which DOD is researching and developing new approaches to groundwater remediation. We did not consider any modifications or enhancements to a technology, such as variations in the material or equipment used during treatment, to be a separate technology. The contaminated water flows into the wetland and is processed by wetland plants and microorganisms to break down and remove the contaminants. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
To date, the Department of Defense (DOD) has identified nearly 6,000 sites at its facilities that require groundwater remediation and has invested $20 billion over the past 10 years to clean up these sites. In the past, DOD primarily used "pump-and-treat" technologies to contain or eliminate hazardous contaminants in groundwater. However, the long cleanup times and high costs of using pump-and-treat technologies often make them expensive and ineffective for groundwater remediation. As directed by Public Law 108-375 and as agreed, GAO (1) described current DOD groundwater remediation technologies and (2) examined whether any new technologies are being used or developed outside the department that may have potential for DOD's use and the extent to which DOD is researching and developing new approaches to groundwater remediation. GAO provided the Department of Defense with a draft copy of the report for its review and comment. DOD generally agreed with the contents stating that the report is an accurate summary of DOD's use and field tests of remedial technologies. DOD also provided technical clarifications that have been incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
DOD has implemented or field-tested all of the 15 types of generally accepted technologies currently available to remediate contaminated groundwater, including several alternatives to pump-and-treat technologies. Some of these technologies, such as bioremediation, introduce nutrients or other materials into the subsurface to stimulate microorganisms in the soil; these microorganisms consume the contaminant or produce byproducts that help break down contaminants into nontoxic or less-hazardous materials. DOD selects the most suitable technology for a given site on the basis of several factors, such as the type of contaminant and location in the subsurface, and the relative cost-effectiveness of a technology for a given site. DOD has identified a number of contaminants of concern at its facilities, each of which varies in its susceptibility to treatment. GAO did not identify any alternative groundwater remediation technologies being used or developed outside DOD that the department has not considered or used. Most of the new approaches developed by commercial vendors and available to DOD generally use novel materials applied to contaminated sites with existing technologies. DOD actively researches and tests new approaches to groundwater remediation largely by developing and promoting the acceptance of innovative remediation technologies. For example, DOD's Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program supports public and private research on contaminants of concern to DOD and innovative methods for their treatment. |
gao_GAO-09-20 | gao_GAO-09-20_0 | On average, the premium for a subsidized policy in a high-risk flood zone is higher than the premium on a full-risk policy in the same zone because properties with full-risk rates have either been built to newer flood-resistant building codes or have been mitigated to reduce flood risks and thus are generally less flood prone than properties that are eligible for subsidized rates. While the percentage of policies receiving subsidies has dropped since 1978 to 23 percent of all policies as of December 2007, the number of subsidized properties has continued to increase. Further, because of current low NFIP participation rates, there appears to be room for substantial growth in the number of NFIP policies, many of which are likely to receive subsidized premium rates. The properties receiving subsidized rates have been a financial burden on the program because of their relatively high loss experience and subsidized rates that do not reflect the actual risk of flooding. 1). FEMA officials also told us that since the 1973 act, the increase in the number of mortgages subject to the flood insurance requirement, coupled with greater enforcement of this requirement by financial regulators in recent years, had resulted in an increased number of flood insurance policies, including policies with subsidized rates. Approximately 70 percent (3.69 million) of the total policies were concentrated in five states: California, Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Texas. Subsidized Properties Have Contributed to NFIP’s Historical Operating Deficits and Account for the Majority of Repetitive Loss Properties
The large number of subsidized properties has contributed to NFIP’s historical operating losses through its relatively high loss experience and rates that do not reflect the actual risk of flooding. Several Options Exist for Addressing the Financial Impact of Subsidized Properties on NFIP, but Each Option Involves Trade-offs
Because of the financial condition of NFIP and mounting losses, the negative financial impact that subsidized premium rates have on the program continues to be an area warranting ongoing attention, as we pointed out when placing NFIP on the high-risk list in 2006. Options Exist That Could Help Reduce the Number of Subsidized Properties and Their Financial Impact on NFIP
Reducing the financial impact of subsidized properties on NFIP would generally involve either reducing the number of properties receiving subsidized premium rates, reducing the losses associated with these properties, reducing the amount of the subsidy, or some combination of these approaches. Whether maintaining the current program or making changes to NFIP subsidies, Congress will be faced with balancing often- competing public policy goals, which include charging premium rates that more fully reflect actual flood risks and help better ensure NFIP solvency, encouraging broad participation in natural catastrophe insurance programs by offering affordable rates, and limiting taxpayer costs before and after a disaster. First, it could reduce flood losses by ensuring that more homes were better protected from flooding through mitigation, whether it was through elevation, relocation, or demolition. And as we have seen, participation from local communities is critical for successful mitigation efforts. Second, substantially increasing mitigation efforts would be costly and would require increased funding for FEMA’s mitigation programs. Depending on how the option was implemented, a potential advantage to this option would be that more policyholders would have to pay the full- risk rate and that those eligible for the subsidy would be made aware of the full-risk rate before applying for the subsidy. However, this option has several disadvantages. This option also would involve certain implementation challenges in the midst of other ongoing management challenges for NFIP. As we have seen in 2008, flood losses are volatile and highly unpredictable, and estimating future losses and determining premium rates adequate to cover those losses is an inherently difficult process. In addition, even if subsidized rates were eliminated, the potential for catastrophic losses could still result in NFIP needing to borrow from the Treasury to pay losses. Absent a change in the NFIP’s use of subsidized premium rates, however, the subsidies will continue to hinder the financial stability of the program, and the potential further increases in the number of properties receiving subsidies could make the situation worse. Therefore, implementing any or a combination of these options could significantly reduce the adverse financial impact of subsidies on NFIP. Agency Comment and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for comment. In its written comments, DHS expounded upon several topics discussed in the report. We also reviewed relevant FEMA reports and analysis on these factors. To evaluate NFIP’s existing structure and identify and evaluate options for reducing or eliminating the costs of properties insured at subsidized premium rates and the advantages and disadvantages of these options, we analyzed NFIP’s legislative history, which described the objectives of NFIP overall and NFIP subsidies in particular, and original expectations about the subsidized inventory. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agency that administers the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), estimates that subsidized properties--those that receive discounted premium rates that do not fully reflect the properties' actual flood risk--experience as much as five times the flood damage as properties that do not qualify for subsidized rates. Almost one in every four residential policies has subsidized rates that are on average 35-40 percent of the full-risk rate. Unprecedented losses from the 2005 hurricane season and NFIP's periodic need to borrow from the Department of the Treasury to pay flood insurance claims has raised concerns about the impact that subsidized premium rates have on the longterm financial solvency of NFIP. GAO designated NFIP as high-risk in March 2006; as of June 2008, NFIP's debt stood at $17.4 billion. This report (1) provides information on NFIP's inventory of subsidized properties and (2) examines NFIP's current approach to subsidized properties and the advantages and disadvantages of options for reducing the costs associated with these properties. To do this work, GAO analyzed data on policies and claims and collected available data about subsidized properties. GAO also reviewed applicable reports and interviewed relevant agency, state, and private sector officials. In its written comments, DHS expounded upon several topics discussed in this report.
What GAO Found
While it constitutes a declining percentage of all NFIP policies, the number of properties receiving subsidized premium rates has grown since 1985; by 2007 it was at its highest point in almost 30 years. According to FEMA, this growth resulted from several factors, including a growing number of mortgages with mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements and greater enforcement of these requirements, the longer-than-expected life of the structures that are eligible for subsidies, and increased awareness of the dangers of floods from several major recent disasters and increased NFIP marketing efforts. To date, more than half of the subsidized policies are concentrated in five states with relatively high flood risk--California, Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Texas. Current low participation rates--around 50 percent of single-family homes in high-risk areas--leave room for substantial growth in the number of NFIP policies, many of which would be likely to receive subsidized rates. Because of their relatively high loss experience and lower premium rates, the policies receiving subsidized rates have been a financial burden on the program, with total claims exceeding premiums by $962 million over the period from 1986 through 2004, before the large losses from the 2005 hurricanes. Without changes to the program, the number of subsidized properties will likely continue to grow, increasing the potential for future NFIP operating deficits. As Congress evaluates the impact of subsidized premium rates, it is faced with balancing the public policy goals of charging premium rates that fully reflect actual risks, encouraging broad program participation through affordable rates, and limiting costs to taxpayers. While the current program of propertybased subsidies and voluntary mitigation efforts--steps taken to reduce a property's flood risk such as relocation or elevation--encourages broad program participation, it is unlikely to substantially reduce the adverse financial impact of subsidized properties. GAO identified three options for addressing the financial impact of subsidized properties on the NFIP, each with advantages and disadvantages. One option would be to increase mitigation efforts, including making mitigation mandatory. Mitigation could help reduce flood losses, but the increased funding for such efforts could be high. A second option, eliminating or reducing subsidies, could improve NFIP's financial stability by increasing the number of policies that more accurately reflect the risk of flooding. However, the resulting higher premium rates could reduce NFIP participation and could meet resistance from local communities. A third option would be to target subsidies based on financial need, which could help ensure that only those in need receive subsidies, with the rest paying full-risk rates. However, it could be challenging for FEMA to develop and administer such a program in the midst of ongoing management challenges. While the inherent difficulty in determining premium rates adequate to cover potentially volatile and at times catastrophic flood losses means that the potential for the program to incur future operating deficits will always exist, implementing any or a combination of these options could significantly reduce the adverse financial impact of subsidies on NFIP. |
gao_GAO-03-734 | gao_GAO-03-734_0 | It is too early to tell whether this new framework will successfully anticipate future crises. The new framework uses the Fund’s major forecasting tools, the WEO and the EWS, which have not performed well in anticipating prior crises. Forecasting Crises Has Been Historically Difficult for All Parties
Financial crises have been historically difficult to anticipate because of a number of complex underlying factors. Some Progress in Implementing Crisis Prevention Initiatives, but Challenges Remain
In the late 1990s, the Fund and the World Bank began implementing two crisis prevention initiatives designed to assist four parties: IMF staff, World Bank staff, member country governments, and private sector participants. Parties’ use of the information provided by these two initiatives has been mixed, and several significant challenges remain. Fund staff frequently incorporate information from the assessments into their policy advice when assessments are available; however, assessments have not been completed in some important emerging market countries primarily because participation is voluntary. Finally, some private sector participants find assessments of limited use because they are untimely, outdated, and dense. In 2001, the Fund began considering the SDRM, an international legal framework that would allow a majority of a country’s external creditors to approve a restructuring of most private sector loans. In response to these concerns, the Fund has clarified and strengthened its policy of lending into crisis situations. The Fund’s new vulnerability assessment process is more comprehensive than its previous crisis anticipation efforts, but it is too soon to judge its effectiveness. The Fund and the Bank have made progress in their crisis prevention efforts by performing assessments of member countries’ financial sectors and adherence to standards. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen the Fund’s crisis prevention initiatives we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury instruct the U.S. Executive Director of the Fund to work with other Executive Board members to encourage the Fund to improve the timeliness of publication of Financial System Stability Assessments and Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes; expand the coverage, frequency, and publication of reports on member countries’ progress on implementing assessment recommendations; improve the assessment reports’ readability, for example, by creating a standardized format in which to present executive summaries and key findings; and pursue strategies for increasing participation in the Financial Sector Assessment Program and all modules of the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes, including the possibility of making participation mandatory for all members of the IMF. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the House Financial Services and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee requested that we assess (1) the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s or the Fund’s) framework for anticipating financial crises, (2) the status of key IMF initiatives to prevent financial crises, and (3) new IMF proposals to resolve future financial crises. | Why GAO Did This Study
Building on reform initiatives instituted after the Mexican financial crisis, the IMF implemented new initiatives in the mid-1990s to better anticipate, prevent, and resolve sovereign financial crises. GAO was asked to assess (1) the IMF's framework for anticipating financial crises, (2) the status of key IMF reform initiatives to prevent financial crises, and (3) new IMF proposals to resolve future financial crises.
What GAO Found
While the Fund's new vulnerability framework is more comprehensive than its previous efforts, it is too early to assess whether it will improve Fund efforts to anticipate crises. The new framework uses the Fund's major forecasting tools, the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Early Warning System (EWS), which have not performed well in anticipating prior crises. The forecasting of crises has been historically difficult for all forecasters. The Fund, with the World Bank, has made progress in implementing initiatives to prevent crises, but several challenges remain. To obtain better information about country financial sector weaknesses, the Fund and Bank introduced the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) to report on member countries' financial sectors and the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) to assess member countries' adherence to 12 standards. Assessments have not been completed in some major emerging market countries primarily because participation is voluntary, and use of this information has been mixed. For example, some private sector market participants have found the reports untimely, outdated, and dense. The Fund is considering two approaches to restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt; however, there are significant challenges to implementing them. One approach involves creating an international legal framework that would allow a specified majority of a country's external creditors to restructure most private sector loans. Under the second approach, the Fund is encouraging members to include renegotiation clauses in individual bonds. Many private sector representatives wish to maintain the existing process in which the Fund assists resolution by providing loans to some eligible members. In response to concerns that its resources may have unintended negative impacts during a crisis, the Fund has clarified and strengthened its criteria for lending to members experiencing crises. |
gao_GAO-16-360 | gao_GAO-16-360_0 | Specifically, allocating agencies must allocate at least 10 percent of the state housing credit ceiling to projects involving qualified nonprofit organizations; execute an extended low-income housing commitment of at least 30 years (of which the first 15 years is the compliance period) before a building can receive credits; require developers to hire an agency-approved third party to conduct a comprehensive market study of the housing needs of low-income individuals in the area to be served by the project before the credit allocation is made; provide a written explanation to the general public if the agency makes an allocation that is not in accordance with established priorities and selection criteria; and notify the chief executive officer (or the equivalent) of the local jurisdiction where the building is located, and provide the official a reasonable opportunity to comment on the project. Agencies Implemented Requirements for Allocation Plans and Award Credits in Varied Ways; IRS Has Not Reviewed the Plans or Agency Criteria
Most Agencies Did Not Explicitly Cite All Required Preferences and Selection Criteria in Qualified Allocation Plans
Based on our review of 58 QAPs and our site visits, we found the QAPs did not consistently contain, address, or mention preferences and selection criteria required in Section 42, but we found that some allocating agencies incorporated the information into other LIHTC program documents, or implemented the requirements in practice. As a result of IRS’s lack of regular oversight of the allocating agencies, we concluded in July 2015 that IRS is not well positioned to provide this type of oversight because of its tax compliance mission and recommended that Congress consider designating HUD as a joint administrator of the program to better align program responsibilities with each agency’s mission and more efficiently address existing oversight challenges, including a lack of regular review of QAPs. Additionally, over one-third of the QAPs reviewed cited letters of support from local governments. In Texas, concerns also have been raised about the requirement, but its allocating agency continues to require letters of support. Selected Agencies Have Procedures to Assess Reasonableness of Development Costs, but IRS Is Not Well Positioned to Examine How Agencies Award Credit Boosts
Selected Agencies Determine Award Amounts for Projects Differently and Use Various Cost Limits and Benchmarks to Determine Reasonableness of Costs
Section 42 states that allocating agencies must consider the reasonableness of costs and their uses for proposed LIHTC projects, allows for agency discretion in making this determination, and also states that credits allocated to a project may not exceed the amount necessary to assure its feasibility and its viability as a low-income housing project. IRS also does not review forms with certain noncompliance issues for audit potential. HUD, through the Rental Policy Working Group, has started to collect physical inspection results of LIHTC properties electronically, but the division within IRS responsible for the LIHTC program was unaware of this effort. HUD officials noted that they use these analyses to provide feedback to states about the condition of their properties. IRS oversight of allocating agencies continues to be minimal, particularly in reviewing QAPs and allocating agencies’ practices for awarding discretionary basis boosts. Recommendations for Executive Action
GAO is making the following three recommendations: To receive more consistent information on LIHTC noncompliance, the IRS Commissioner should collaborate with the allocating agencies to clarify when allocating agencies should report such information on the Form 8823 (report of noncompliance or building disposition). IRS agreed that it should improve noncompliance reporting and data collection, but added that it would have to consider whether it has the resources to implement the recommendations. IRS noted that the working group was established to address fair housing concerns and cannot address tax matters. As we state in the report, IRS could have a better understanding of the prevalence of noncompliance by using REAC’s computerized data on and analysis of the physical condition of properties—a capability that IRS does not currently have. While we understand that IRS has limited resources, leveraging HUD’s work with the Rental Policy Working Group pilot and accessing REAC’s computerized system could result in cost savings. For example, this report shows that HUD could apply its experience in administering affordable housing programs—including collecting physical inspection data, analyzing noncompliance trends, and reviewing fair housing issues—that could result in guidance to support the work done at the allocating agencies. IRS would still retain all responsibilities related to tax law enforcement. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses how state and local allocating agencies administer the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program and any oversight issues the allocating agencies or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) face in implementing the program. The QAPs we reviewed were from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the cities of Chicago and New York City, for a total of 58 QAPs. In addition, we visited nine allocating agencies to observe the processes used to award tax credits, assess the reasonableness of development costs, and monitor compliance of properties. To describe how allocating agencies award LIHTCs, we reviewed the Code, Treasury regulations, and guidance. We interviewed officials from IRS and Treasury about agencies’ practices for submitting Form 8823 and how IRS records information in its Low-Income Housing Credit database. | Why GAO Did This Study
LIHTC encourages private-equity investment in low-income housing through tax credits. The program is administered by IRS and allocating agencies, which are typically state or local housing finance agencies established to meet affordable housing needs of their jurisdictions. Allocating agency responsibilities (in Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code and regulations of the Department of the Treasury) encompass awarding credits, assessing reasonableness of project costs, and monitoring projects. GAO was asked to review allocating agencies' oversight of LIHTC. This report reviews how allocating agencies administer the LIHTC program and identifies any oversight issues. GAO reviewed regulations and guidance for allocating agencies; analyzed 58 allocation plans (from 50 states, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories, New York City, and Chicago); performed site visits and file reviews at nine selected allocating agencies; and interviewed IRS and HUD officials.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2016 and does not include details that IRS deemed tax law enforcement sensitive.
What GAO Found
Allocating agencies that administer the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program have certain flexibilities for implementing program requirements and the agencies have done so in various ways. Although GAO found that allocating agencies generally have processes to meet requirements for allocating credits, reviewing costs, and monitoring projects, some of these practices raised concerns:
More than half of the qualified allocation plans (developed by 58 allocating agencies) that GAO analyzed did not explicitly mention all selection criteria and preferences that Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code requires.
Allocating agencies notified local governments about proposed projects as required, but some also required letters of support from local governments. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has raised fair housing concerns about this practice, saying that local support requirements (such as letters) could have a discriminatory influence on the location of affordable housing.
Allocating agencies can increase (boost) the eligible basis used to determine allocation amounts for certain buildings at their discretion. However, they are not required to document the justification for the increases. The criteria used to award boosts varied, with some allocating agencies allowing boosts for specific types of projects and one allowing boosts for all projects in its state.
In a July 2015 report, GAO found that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) oversight of allocating agencies was minimal and recommended joint administration with HUD to more efficiently address oversight challenges. GAO's work for this review continues to show that IRS oversight remains minimal (particularly in reviewing allocation plans and practices for awarding discretionary basis boosts) and that action is still warranted to address GAO's prior recommendation. In this report, GAO also identified the following issues related to managing noncompliance information from allocating agencies:
IRS provides discretion to allocating agencies for reporting noncompliance data, and has not provided feedback about data submissions. Consequently, allocating agencies have been inconsistently reporting these data to IRS.
IRS has not used the information that it receives from allocating agencies to identify trends in noncompliance. GAO's analysis shows that IRS had recorded only about 2 percent of the noncompliance information it received since 2009 in its database.
IRS has not used key information when determining whether to initiate an audit, potentially missing opportunities to initiate LIHTC-related audits.
In contrast, HUD collects and analyzes housing data, and through a Rental Policy Working Group initiative, now adds LIHTC inspection results to its database. The IRS division responsible for LIHTC was unaware of this effort and is not involved with the working group. By participating in the working group, IRS could leverage HUD data to better understand the prevalence of noncompliance in LIHTC properties and determine whether to initiate audits.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS clarify when agencies should report noncompliance and participate in the Rental Policy Working Group to assess the use of HUD's database to strengthen IRS oversight. IRS agreed it should improve its noncompliance data, but also stated that it had to consider resource constraints. HUD supported using its expertise and experience administering housing programs to improve LIHTC. |
gao_GAO-06-537 | gao_GAO-06-537_0 | DOD Not Meeting Original TSAT Goals
DOD is not meeting its original cost, schedule, and performance goals for the TSAT program. TSAT’s cost has increased by over $420 million, the planned launch date for the first satellite has slipped more than 3 years, and the satellites will be less capable than originally planned. Initial Goals for TSAT Were Based on Limited Knowledge
When DOD started the TSAT program in January 2004, it estimated the total acquisition cost to be about $15.5 billion. In addition, DOD recently changed its TSAT acquisition strategy to an incremental approach by deciding to build the first two satellites with fewer capabilities and delaying the more advanced capabilities for the later satellites in the program. However, as of April 2006, DOD had yet to develop this new estimate. When DOD established initial goals for the TSAT program, it lacked sufficient knowledge about key critical technologies. The results of the tests are to be assessed at the second interim program review before DOD makes a decision to enter the product development phase of the program. Importantly, this review will include an assessment of the maturity levels of the critical technologies. Remaining Gaps in Knowledge Could Hamper Successful Outcomes
Despite these positive steps to lower program risks, DOD faces gaps in knowledge, as it begins to implement its new development approach, that could impede TSAT’s success. Notwithstanding the approval for the revised TSAT program from senior DOD officials, DOD has yet to justify the TSAT investment in light of other DOD investments using the knowledge it has now gained on cost, schedule, and initial capabilities to be delivered. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s transition to transformational communications by gaining the additional knowledge it needs before TSAT enters product development, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force to take the following four actions:
Reassess the value of TSAT in the broader context of other DOD investments, using updated knowledge on likely cost, schedule, technology, and initial capability;
Update requirements in coordination with the TSAT user community;
Prove that all critical technologies will work as intended; and
Establish new cost, schedule, and performance goals for the program once the above knowledge has been gained. To determine if the TSAT program is using an acquisition approach that will provide the knowledge it needs to proceed to product development, we collected and reviewed documents that described the TSAT program’s plans to build knowledge and to mitigate risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) wants to create a networked force where soldiers and systems are able to operate together seamlessly. To help facilitate this transformation, DOD began the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) program in January 2004. We reported in 2003 that TSAT was about to begin without sufficiently mature technology. In this report, at your request, we followed up with an assessment of (1) how the TSAT program is progressing, and (2) whether the program is using an acquisition approach that will provide the knowledge needed to enter product development.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense is not meeting original cost, schedule, and performance goals established for the TSAT program. When the program was initiated in 2004, DOD estimated TSAT's total acquisition cost to be $15.5 billion and that it would launch the first satellite in April 2011. TSAT's current formal cost estimate is nearly $16 billion and the initial launch date has slipped to September 2014--a delay of over three years. Furthermore, while the performance goal of the full five-satellite constellation has not changed, the initial delivery of capability will be less than what DOD originally planned. After DOD established initial goals for TSAT, Congress twice reduced the program's funding due to concerns about technology maturity and the aggressiveness of the acquisition schedule. DOD developed the initial goals before it had sufficient knowledge about critical TSAT technologies. DOD is taking positive steps to lower risk in the TSAT program so it can enter the product development phase with greater chance of success. However, as DOD prepares to implement a new incremental development approach for the program, it faces gaps in knowledge that could hamper its success. An incremental development will mean reduced capabilities in the initial satellites and more advanced capabilities in the remaining satellites. Given this change, it will be important for DOD to update requirements in coordination with the TSAT user community. While senior DOD officials have agreed to these reduced capabilities to get the first satellite launched in 2014, DOD has yet to reevaluate its investment in TSAT in light of other DOD investments using the knowledge it has now gained. Using this new knowledge, DOD could be in a better position to set more realistic goals, before entering product development. |
gao_GAO-14-419 | gao_GAO-14-419_0 | Information Security Weaknesses Placed SEC Financial Data at Risk
Although SEC had implemented and made progress in strengthening information security controls, weaknesses limited their effectiveness in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a key financial system. SEC did not consistently control access to this financial system’s network, servers, applications, and databases; manage its configuration; segregate duties; and plan for contingencies and disasters. Consequently, SEC’s financial information and systems were exposed to increased risk of unauthorized access, disclosure, modification, and disruption. Although SEC had issued policies and implemented controls based on those policies, it did not consistently protect its network boundary from possible intrusions; identify and authenticate users; authorize access to resources; ensure that sensitive data are encrypted; audit and monitor actions taken on the commission’s systems and network; and restrict physical access to sensitive assets. During fiscal year 2013, SEC implemented segregation of duties controls for key information technology processes. However, production servers for the key financial system had active development user accounts. Although SEC had developed contingency and disaster recovery plans and implemented controls for this planning, it did not (1) update its contingency and disaster recovery plans to reflect its computing environment, (2) test disaster recovery procedures to ascertain recovery after the move to its newly built data center, and (3) ensure redundancy of a critical server for the key financial system. SEC Did Not Effectively Oversee and Manage the Implementation of Information Security Controls during Migration of a Key Financial System
The information security weaknesses existed in the key financial system, in part, because SEC did not effectively oversee and manage the implementation of information security controls during the migration of the system to a new production environment. Specifically, (1) SEC’s Information Security Risk Committee did not identify and convey risks related to the data center move (and to the system) to the agency’s Operational Risk Management Program Office, which is responsible for developing and overseeing SEC’s operational risk management and internal control program and evaluating the results of internal control reviews and information technology system reviews performed by the internal control divisions and offices; (2) SEC did not perform a security impact analysis after the system servers were rebuilt and major changes were made to the systems; and (3) SEC did not act to mitigate security- related risks identified and communicated in the system’s weekly status reports by the contractor prior to the go-live date. Until SEC mitigates its control deficiencies and strengthens oversight of contractors performing security-related tasks as part of its information security program, it will continue to be at risk of ongoing deficiencies in the security controls over its financial and support systems and the information they contain. II), SEC generally agreed with our recommendations. This report contains recommendations to you. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
As part of our audit of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) fiscal years 2012 and 2013 financial statements, we assessed the commission’s information security controls. The objective was to determine the effectiveness of SEC’s information security controls for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its key financial systems and information. | Why GAO Did This Study
SEC is responsible for enforcing securities laws, issuing rules and regulations that protect investors, and helping to ensure that securities markets are fair and honest. In carrying out its mission, the commission relies extensively on computerized systems that collect and process financial and sensitive information. Accordingly, it is essential that SEC have effective information security controls in place to protect this information from misuse, fraudulent use, improper disclosure, manipulation, or destruction.
As part of its audit of SEC's fiscal years 2013 and 2012 financial statements, GAO assessed the commission's information security controls. The objective was to determine the effectiveness of information security controls for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SEC's key financial systems and information. To do this, GAO assessed security controls in key areas by reviewing SEC documents, testing selected systems, and interviewing relevant officials.
What GAO Found
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had implemented and made progress in strengthening information security controls, weaknesses limited their effectiveness in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a key financial system. For this system's network, servers, applications, and databases, weaknesses in several controls were found, as the following examples illustrate:
Access controls: SEC did not consistently protect its system boundary from possible intrusions; identify and authenticate users; authorize access to resources; encrypt sensitive data; audit and monitor actions taken on the commission's networks, systems, and databases; and restrict physical access to sensitive assets.
Configuration and patch management: SEC did not securely configure the system at its new data center according to its configuration baseline requirements. In addition, it did not consistently apply software patches intended to fix vulnerabilities to servers and databases in a timely manner.
Segregation of duties: SEC did not adequately segregate its development and production computing environments. For example, development user accounts were active on the system's production servers.
Contingency and disaster recovery planning: Although SEC had developed contingency and disaster recovery plans, it did not ensure redundancy of a critical server.
The information security weaknesses existed, in part, because SEC did not effectively oversee and manage the implementation of information security controls during the migration of this key financial system to a new location. Specifically, during the migration, SEC did not (1) consistently oversee the information security-related work performed by the contractor and (2) effectively manage risk.
Until SEC mitigates control deficiencies and strengthens the implementation of its security program, its financial information and systems may be exposed to unauthorized disclosure, modification, use, and disruption. These weaknesses, considered collectively, contributed to GAO's determination that SEC had a significant deficiency in internal control over financial reporting for fiscal year 2013.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that SEC take two actions to (1) more effectively oversee contractors performing security-related tasks and (2) improve risk management. In a separate report for limited distribution, GAO is recommending that SEC take 49 specific actions to address weaknesses in security controls. In commenting on a draft of this report, SEC generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and described steps it is taking to address them. |
gao_NSIAD-96-108 | gao_NSIAD-96-108_0 | DOD has also supported efforts to foster greater cooperation and interservicing among the services on regional and local levels. At the same time, DOD is advocating greater reliance on outsourcing (contracting out) base support functions. Having one service provide large-scale base support to another service also raised concern about the receiving base losing its identity and appearing to be subsumed by the base providing support. Some service officials suggested that these impediments could be overcome either through greater reliance on civilian management of base operations and/or basing a portion of an installation commander’s proficiency assessment on his or her efforts to foster greater efficiencies in base operations. Finally, interservicing agreements reached in advance of outsourcing could enhance the potential for greater efficiencies and cost savings; however, a proposed change in Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) guidance for contracting out could reduce the potential for interservicing. Recommendations
Given the potential for significant savings in base support costs through interservicing type arrangements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) identify options and take steps to minimize the impediments to interservicing and (2) emphasize interservicing as part of contracting out deliberations to maximize potential savings and efficiencies. We were unable to determine the extent of savings realized from this consolidation. Base Support Functions Having the Potential for Interservicing
Military personnel at the collocated military bases we visited cited a range of base support functions being performed at their collocated bases—ones where at least one of the services had identified at least portions of those functions as having the potential for consolidation and interservicing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to promote interservicing, which includes one service's reliance on another for base support and greater reliance on intraservice consolidated support; and (2) opportunities that exist for military bases to save on installation support costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although DOD is aware of the potential for reducing base support costs through interservicing, it is difficult to determine the amount of the potential savings, since interservicing has never been fully or correctly implemented; (2) the services have not taken sufficient advantage of the potential savings in base support costs from interservicing; (3) the services have been considering a broad array of initiatives, including regionalizing and privatizing some base support functions; (4) consolidating these functions through advanced interservicing agreements could enhance the potential for greater efficiencies and cost savings; (5) many commanders resist interservicing because they fear losing control of their assets and service standards; and (6) an even greater impediment to interservicing on a large scale is the possibility of one base commander having to provide base support for several services. |
gao_GAO-05-979 | gao_GAO-05-979_0 | Congress noted in its accompanying findings that “continued dumping and subsidization . CBP Faces Three Key Problems Implementing CDSOA
CBP faces three key problems in implementing CDSOA. First, despite some recent improvements, CBP’s processing of CDSOA claims and disbursements is labor intensive, and the agency is facing a dramatic increase in its 2005 workload. Third, CBP disbursed only about half the funds that should have been available in fiscal year 2004 because of ongoing problems collecting AD/CV duties. Companies are not held accountable for the claims they file because CBP does not require them to provide any supporting documentation for their claims and does not systematically verify company claims. CBP has only verified the claims of a handful of claimants. CDSOA Payments Largely Concentrated on a Few Companies and Industries, with Mixed Effects Reported
Most CDSOA payments went to a small number of U.S. producers and industries, with mixed effects reported. In four of these industries—bearings, candles, crawfish, and pasta— recipients we contacted reported benefits, but some non-recipients said that CDSOA payments were having adverse effects on their ability to compete in the U.S. market. Retaliation Against U.S. Producers Underway for U.S. Failure to Comply with WTO Ruling on CDSOA
After finding the CDSOA inconsistent with WTO agreements and after the United States’ failure to bring the act in compliance with the agreements, in 2004 the WTO gave 8 of the 11 members that complained about CDSOA authorization to suspend concessions or other WTO obligations owed to the United States. The total suspension authorized for 2005 could be up to $134 million based on the fiscal year 2004 CDSOA disbursements. On May 1, 2005, Canada and the European Communities began the imposition of additional duties on various U.S. exports. For instance, while trade remedies such as AD/CV duties generally provide relief to all producers in a particular market, the eligibility requirements of CDSOA limit relief to only a subset of domestic producers—only those that petitioned for relief or that publicly supported the petition by sending a letter to the ITC or filling an ITC questionnaire while the agency was conducting its original investigation and remain in operation. The CDSOA program’s time frame for processing payments is already too tight to perform desired quality controls. Specifically, we assessed (1) what key legal requirements guide and have affected agency implementation of CDSOA; (2) what problems, if any, U.S. agencies have faced in implementing CDSOA; and (3) which U.S. companies and industries have received payments under CDSOA and what effects these payments have had for recipient and non-recipient companies; and described (4) the status of the World Trade Organization (WTO) decisions on CDSOA. To determine which U.S. companies and industries have received payments under CDSOA and what effects these payments have had for recipient and non-recipient companies, we obtained and analyzed CBP’s annual disbursement data for fiscal years 2001 to 2004 and collected information from top CDSOA recipients and from recipients and non-recipients in seven industries. Their views are not necessarily representative of all CDSOA recipients. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between fiscal years 2001 and 2004, the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA) provided over $1 billion funded from import duties to U.S. companies deemed injured by unfair trade. Some supporters state CDSOA helps U.S. companies compete in the face of continuing unfair trade. Some opponents believe CDSOA recipients receive a large, unjustified windfall from the U.S. treasury. Also, 11 World Trade Organization (WTO) members lodged a complaint over the law at the WTO. This report assesses (1) key legal requirements guiding and affecting agency implementation of CDSOA; (2) problems, if any, U.S. agencies have faced in implementing CDSOA; and (3) which companies have received CDSOA payments and their effects for recipients and non-recipients; and describes (4) the status of WTO decisions on CDSOA.
What GAO Found
Congress enacted CDSOA to strengthen relief to injured U.S. producers. The law's key eligibility requirements limit benefits to producers that filed a petition for relief or that publicly supported the petition during a government investigation to determine whether injury had occurred. This law differs from trade remedy laws, which generally provide relief to all producers in an industry. Another key CDSOA feature requires that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) disburse payments within 60 days after the beginning of a fiscal year, giving CBP limited time to process payments and perform desired quality controls. This time frame, combined with a dramatic growth in the program workload, presents implementation risks for CBP. CBP faces three key implementation problems. First, processing of company claims and CDSOA payments is problematic because CBP's procedures are labor intensive and do not include standardized forms or electronic filing. Second, most companies are not accountable for the claims they file because they do not have to support their claims and CBP does not systematically verify the claims. Third, CBP's problems in collecting duties that fund CDSOA have worsened. About half of the funds that should have been available for disbursement remained uncollected in fiscal year 2004. Most of the CDSOA payments went to a few companies with mixed effects. About half of these payments went to five companies. Top recipients we surveyed said that CDSOA had beneficial effects, but the degree varied. In four of seven industries we examined, recipients reported benefits, but some non-recipients noted CDSOA payments gave their competitors an unfair advantage. These views are not necessarily representative of the views of all recipients and non-recipients. Because the United States has not brought CDSOA into compliance with its WTO obligations, it faces additional tariffs on U.S. exports covering a trade value of up to $134 million based on 2004 CDSOA disbursements. Recently, Canada, the European Union, Mexico, and Japan imposed additional duties on various U.S. exports. Four other WTO members may follow suit. |
gao_GAO-09-387 | gao_GAO-09-387_0 | Scope and Methodology
As part of our audit of the fiscal years 2008 and 2007 CFS, we evaluated the federal government’s financial reporting procedures and related internal control. These material weaknesses contributed to our disclaimer of opinion on the accrual basis consolidated financial statements and also contributed to our adverse opinion on internal control. This report provides the details of the material weaknesses identified during the fiscal year 2008 audit that relate to the processes used to prepare the CFS and our recommendations to correct these weaknesses, as well as the status of corrective actions by Treasury and OMB to address recommendations from previous reports. Therefore, when preparing the CFS, Treasury should ensure that intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies are eliminated. Without adequate policies and procedures to accurately identify and eliminate intragovernmental payroll tax amounts in the process used to prepare the CFS, the federal government’s ability to determine the impact of these amounts on the CFS is impaired and, consequently, the CFS may be misstated. However, these procedures were not effective in helping assure that (1) information was consistently reported in the CFS and these related sections of the Financial Report and (2) information reported in the MD&A and Citizen’s Guide was consistent, complete, and accurate. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Controller of OMB, to (1) establish and document criteria to be used in identifying federal entities as significant to the CFS for purposes of obtaining assurance over the information being submitted by those entities for the CFS and (2) develop and implement policies and procedures for assessing and documenting, on an annual basis, which entities met such criteria. Appendix I: Status of Treasury’s and OMB’s Progress in Addressing GAO’s Prior Year Recommendations for Preparing the CFS
This appendix includes the status of recommendations from the following six reports that were open at the beginning of our fiscal year 2008 audit: Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Needs Improvement, GAO-04-45 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2003); Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Needs Further Improvement, GAO-04-866 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2004); Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Continues to Need Improvement, GAO-05-407 (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2005); Financial Audit: Significant Internal Control Weaknesses Remain in Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government, GAO-06-415 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. We will continue to monitor Treasury’s and OMB’s progress in addressing GAO’s recommendations. Of the 56 recommendations relating to the processes used to prepare the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS) that are listed in this appendix, 16 were closed and 40 remained open as of December 9, 2008, the date of our report on the audit of the fiscal year 2008 CFS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since GAO's first audit of the fiscal year 1997 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), material weaknesses in internal control and other limitations on the scope of our work have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the accrual basis CFS. Certain of those material weaknesses relate to inadequate systems, controls, and procedures to properly prepare the CFS. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide details of the continuing material weaknesses related to the preparation of the CFS, (2) recommend improvements, and (3) provide the status of corrective actions taken to address the 56 open recommendations GAO reported for this area in June 2008.
What GAO Found
During its audit of the fiscal year 2008 CFS, GAO identified continuing and new control deficiencies in the federal government's processes used to prepare the CFS. These control deficiencies contribute to material weaknesses in internal control over the federal government's ability to (1) adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies; (2) ensure that the CFS was consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, properly balanced, and in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and (3) identify and either resolve or explain material differences between components of the budget deficit reported in the Department of the Treasury's records, used to prepare the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit and Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities, and related amounts reported in federal agencies' financial statements and underlying financial information and records. The control deficiencies GAO identified involved: (1) establishing and documenting policies and procedures for identifying and eliminating federal agencies' intragovernmental payroll tax amounts when compiling the CFS, (2) establishing and documenting policies and procedures for preparing and reviewing information included in key sections of the Financial Report of the U.S. Government, (3) establishing criteria for identifying federal entities' significance to the CFS and annually assessing which entities meet such criteria, (4) enhancing procedures for analyzing and reviewing data used when compiling the Statements of Net Cost, and (5) various other control deficiencies identified in previous years' audits. Of the 56 open recommendations GAO reported in June 2008, 16 were closed and 40 remained open as of December 9, 2008, the date of GAO's report on its audit of the fiscal year 2008 CFS. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions taken to address the 4 new recommendations as well as the 40 open recommendations from prior years. |
gao_GAO-06-707T | gao_GAO-06-707T_0 | According to the department’s performance plan, its investment in public diplomacy continues to increase, particularly for efforts targeting audiences in the Middle East. Public Diplomacy Resources Have Shifted to the Muslim World, but Staffing Numbers Have Leveled Off
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on countries in the Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. Much of this increase has gone to regions with significant Muslim populations, including South Asia (39 percent), East Asia and the Pacific (28 percent), and the Near East (25 percent). State officials said that the department will initially reposition approximately 75 Foreign Service officers this year from posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to India, China, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world. Strategy, Planning, and Coordination Efforts Are Inadequate
Since 2003, we have reported on the lack of strategic elements to guide U.S. public diplomacy efforts. While State has recently developed a strategic framework for its public diplomacy efforts, it has not issued guidance on how this framework is to be implemented in the field. Government Lacks an Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy
In 2003, we reported that the United States lacked a governmentwide, interagency public diplomacy strategy, defining the messages and means for communication efforts abroad. This committee, to be led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, is intended to coordinate interagency activities to ensure that: all agencies work together to disseminate the President’s themes and all public diplomacy and strategic communications resources, programs, and activities are effectively coordinated to support those messages; and every agency gives public diplomacy and strategic communications the same level of priority that the President does. However, the department has not yet developed written guidance that provides details on how the Under Secretary’s new strategic framework should be implemented in the field. In 2005, we noted that State’s efforts to engage the private sector in pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives had met with mixed success and recommended that the Secretary develop a strategy to guide these efforts. Posts Lack a Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy
GAO and others have suggested that State adopt a strategic approach to public diplomacy by modeling and adapting private sector communication practices to suit its purposes (see fig. 1). Recently, State has begun to help posts improve their strategic communications planning. In addition to this guidance, the department is currently developing a sample country-level communication plan and has asked 15 pilot posts to develop specific plans for their host countries. Staffing Challenges and Security Concerns Limit U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities
Public diplomacy efforts in the field face several other challenges, many of which are heightened in the Muslim world. Insufficient Staff and Lack of Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy Activities
While several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy officials stated that, with current staffing levels, they do not have the capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. To address these challenges, we recommended in 2003 that the Secretary of State designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden. Language Deficiencies Pronounced, Especially in the Muslim World
In 2005, 24 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions were filled by officers without the requisite language proficiency, similar to our findings in 2003. Embassies Must Balance Security and Public Outreach
Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public access, forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between safety and mission. 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward the United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy activities--led by the State Department (State)--are designed to counter such sentiments by explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation, and advancing mutual understanding between nations. Since 2003, we have issued three reports on U.S. public diplomacy efforts that examined (1) changes in public diplomacy resources since September 11, 2001; (2) strategic planning and coordination of public diplomacy efforts; and (3) the challenges facing these efforts. We have made several recommendations in the last 3 years to the Secretary of State to address strategic planning issues, private sector engagement, and staffing challenges related to public diplomacy. For example, today's report recommends that the Secretary develop written guidance detailing how the department intends to implement its public diplomacy goals as they apply to the Muslim world. State has consistently concurred with our findings and recommendations for improving public diplomacy, and the department, in several cases, is taking appropriate actions. However, the department has not established a timetable for many of these actions.
What GAO Found
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on countries in the Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. Since 2001, State has increased its public diplomacy resources, particularly in regions with significant Muslim populations. That funding trend has continued more recently, with increases of 25 percent for the Near East and 39 percent for South Asia from 2004 to 2006, though public diplomacy staffing levels have remained largely the same during that period. The Secretary of State recently announced plans to reposition some staff to better reflect the department's strategic priorities, including plans to shift 28 public diplomacy officers from posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to China, India, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world. In 2003 and again in 2005, we reported that the government lacked an interagency communication strategy to guide governmentwide public diplomacy activities, and it continues to lack this strategy. We also noted that State did not have a strategy to integrate its diverse public diplomacy activities and that efforts to effectively engage the private sector had met with mixed success. Today, although State has developed a strategic framework to focus its public diplomacy efforts and related tactics to achieve these goals, the department has not issued guidance on how to implement these strategies and tactics. In addition, posts' public diplomacy efforts generally lack important strategic communication elements found in the private sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to better communicate with target audiences. These elements include having core messages, segmented target audiences, in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate results, and an integrated communication plan to bring all these elements together. State officials indicate that the department has begun to develop communication plans for 15 pilot posts, but it remains to be seen whether these communication plans will contain all of these strategic elements. Posts throughout the world, and particularly in the Muslim world, face several challenges in implementing their public diplomacy programs, including concerns related to staff numbers and language capabilities and the need to balance security with public outreach. For example, we found that 24 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions worldwide were filled by officers without the requisite language skills. Furthermore, security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public access. State has begun to address many of these challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of many of these efforts. |
gao_GAO-03-699 | gao_GAO-03-699_0 | Selected Boxing Commissions’ Documentation of Compliance Varied
The 8 state and 2 tribal boxing commissions that we reviewed varied in the extent to which they had documentation indicating compliance with the 10 provisions of the act related to the fundamental elements we identified. All 10 commissions had documentation indicating compliance at least 75 percent of the time for three provisions—those that require prefight medical examinations, disclosure of amounts paid to promoters, and registration of boxers—but only 2 commissions had documentation at least 75 percent of the time for the provision prohibiting conflicts of interest. The number of such provisions enacted by an individual Commission ranges from 10 (California) to 4 (Missouri). All 10 states and tribes have provisions fully covering the additional element that requires uniform boxing and scoring rules, and eight states or tribes have provisions fully covering the additional element that requires the filing of postfight medical reports. Federal Action under the Act Has Been Limited
Actions taken by the Department of Justice under the act have been limited. Justice officials said the department does not prosecute cases unless they are referred to it by federal law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, the officials said, violations of the act are misdemeanors, and U.S. FTC officials said they periodically check the sanctioning organizations’ Web sites to assess whether the required information has been made available to the public and has found the Web sites to be adequate. In February 2003, legislation was introduced in the Senate that would amend the act by, among other things, creating a new organization within the Department of Labor to provide oversight and enforcement of the federal boxing laws. The purpose of this new federal organization is to facilitate more uniform enforcement of federal requirements designed to enhance boxers’ health, safety, and economic interests as well as the integrity of the sport. The Department of Justice’s GAO liaison and the Federal Trade Commission’s GAO liaison and Office of General Counsel provided only oral technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. According to the president, ABC is frustrated with the lack of enforcement of the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996. Establish Uniform Contractual Terms
There are frequent reports of boxers’ economic exploitation. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In analyzing the adequacy of efforts to protect the health, safety, and economic well-being of professional boxers and to enhance the integrity of the sport, our objectives were to (1) identify fundamental elements considered important to address the major health and safety, economic, and integrity problems facing professional boxing; (2) assess the extent to which the act’s provisions cover these elements and whether selected state and tribal boxing commissions have documentation indicating compliance with the act’s provisions; (3) assess the extent to which selected states and tribes have adopted provisions that cover fundamental elements in addition to those covered in the act; and (4) determine what actions the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have taken under the act. To identify fundamental elements that are considered important to address the major health and safety, economic, and integrity problems facing professional boxing, we reviewed recent congressional testimony and studies conducted by a task force of the National Association of Attorneys General, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Labor. To assess the extent to which selected state and tribal boxing commissions have documented their compliance with the act’s provisions, we identified 8 of the 46 state boxing commissions and 2 of the 8 tribal boxing commissions for review. The state and tribal commission we selected accounted for 49 percent of all professional boxing events held in the United States during calendar year 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 established minimum health and safety standards for professional boxing and provided for limited federal oversight by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. In 2000, the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act amended the act to better protect boxers' economic well-being and enhance the integrity of the sport. However, reports of problems continue, including permanent and sometimes fatal injuries, economic exploitation, and corruption. GAO was asked to (1) identify fundamental elements considered important to protect professional boxers and enhance the integrity of the sport; (2) assess the extent to which provisions of the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, as amended (the act), cover these elements and determine whether selected state and tribal boxing commissions have documentation indicating compliance with the act's provisions; (3) determine whether selected states and tribes have provisions that cover additional elements; and (4) identify federal actions taken under the act.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO's review of congressional testimonies and national studies dating from 1994 through 2002, GAO identified 15 fundamental elements that are considered important to protect boxers' health, safety, and economic well-being and to enhance the integrity of the sport. The act addresses 10 of the 15 fundamental elements that GAO identified. The 8 (of 46) state and 2 (of 8) tribal boxing commissions that GAO selected for review accounted for 49 percent of the fights in 2001 and varied in the extent to which they had documentation indicating compliance with the 10 provisions of the act related to the fundamental elements. For example, all 10 commissions had documentation indicating compliance at least 75 percent of the time for 3 provisions--requiring prefight medical exams, disclosure of purses and payments, and registration of boxers--but only 2 commissions had documentation indicating compliance at least 75 percent of the time for a provision prohibiting conflicts of interest. Commissions either gave no reason for the lack of documentation, cited privacy or liability concerns, or said they were unaware of the federal provision. The eight states and two tribes that GAO reviewed vary in the extent to which they adopted additional provisions that cover elements not covered by the act's provisions. The number of such provisions ranges from 10 (California) to 4 (Missouri). For example, the states have provisions requiring the filing of postfight medical reports, uniform boxing and scoring rules, and boxing commission officials' knowledge of the sport. Federal actions taken under the act have been limited. The Department of Justice said it has not exercised its authority to prosecute cases because none have been referred to it by federal law enforcement authorities. Furthermore it noted that violations under the act are misdemeanors, and it generally applies its resources to prosecuting felonies. The Federal Trade Commission periodically checks the Web sites of the organizations that sanction professional boxing events to see whether they have posted the information that they are required to make available to the public and has found them to be adequate. Legislation was recently introduced to significantly amend the act by, among other things, creating a new organization within the Department of Labor that would provide oversight and enforcement of boxing laws. This new federal organization is intended to facilitate more uniform enforcement of federal requirements aimed at enhancing boxers' health, safety, and general interests as well as the integrity of the sport. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission provided only technical comments on our report. The Association of Boxing Commissions and five state and tribal commissions had concerns about the lack of existing federal enforcement and the economic impact of any additional federal requirements. |
gao_GAO-13-630 | gao_GAO-13-630_0 | Treasury ultimately disbursed about $205 billion to 707 financial institutions through December 2009. Under this option, Treasury’s ability to exit the program largely depends on the ability of institutions to repay their investments. As of May 31, 2013, Treasury had received $222.6 billion in repayments and income, exceeding the $204.9 billion originally disbursed by almost $18 billion (see fig. Further, 556 institutions had exited CPP as of May 31, 2013, including 212 institutions that exited by fully repaying their CPP investments, 128 that participated in auctions, and 165 that refinanced their investments through other federal programs. Treasury Has Increasingly Used Auctions to Wind Down CPP
Treasury has increasingly used the auction option after the first sale of CPP securities in March 2012 received investor interest. Each auction involved the sale of an institution’s outstanding CPP investment, also known as the par amount. In most cases, the final sales price for an institution’s shares was below the par amount. In particular, the $2.4 billion in total proceeds from the 16 auctions to date—from March 2012 through April 2013— represents 84 percent of the $2.9 billion principal investment in the institutions. Treasury Structured Auctions to Maximize Taxpayer Return, but Some Auction Participants Have Raised Concerns about the Process
Treasury began planning its auctions in November 2011 by hiring a contractor to help assess its exit strategy for CPP. After selecting the institutions, Treasury notified them that they would be part of an upcoming auction, and the institutions then had to assemble and submit documentation to Treasury. Documentation requirements were based on the nature of the offering. Representatives from many of the 13 financial institutions with whom we spoke—particularly those that had participated in some of the earlier auctions—thought that the process of preparing for the auction was rushed, was not well organized, and did not have clear instructions. According to some of these representatives, this amount of time was not sufficient to get regulatory approval to bid on their own shares. In contrast, while representatives from a few institutions that participated in later auctions felt the process was rushed, others told us that they had much more time to prepare for their auctions—up to 10 months in some cases. Although Treasury did not begin discussing specific documentation requirements until it notified a financial institution that it was scheduled for a particular upcoming auction, Treasury officials said that they would have been willing to move an institution that need more time to prepare to a later. Finally, Treasury officials said that any changes to the process that benefit the financial institution would make the process less competitive for other bidders at the expense of taxpayers. A number of financial institutions told us that they would have preferred the option of matching the winning bid to be able to retain ownership of their shares. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to assess (1) the extent to which Treasury had sold Capital Purchase Program (CPP) investments through auctions and the returns on those investments; and (2) the CPP auction process and institutions’ views on the process. We also interviewed individuals knowledgeable about the CPP auction process, representatives from trade associations for financial institutions, and officials from the Securities and Exchange Commission. | Why GAO Did This Study
CPP was established as the primary means of restoring stability to the financial system under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under CPP, Treasury invested almost $205 billion in 707 eligible financial institutions between October 2008 and December 2009. As of May 31, 2013, 151 institutions remained in the program with under $6 billion in outstanding investments. TARP's authorizing legislation requires GAO to report every 60 days on TARP activities. This report examines (1) the extent to which Treasury has sold CPP investments through auctions and the returns on those investments and (2) the CPP auction process and institutions' views on the process.
To conduct its work, GAO reviewed Treasury documents and financial data on auction participants. GAO also interviewed officials from Treasury and the Securities and Exchange Commission, representatives from auction participants, and others.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has increasingly used auctions to sell its Capital Purchase Program (CPP) investments. Initially, Treasury relied primarily on financial institutions redeeming their shares to wind down the program. However, in March 2012 Treasury began using auctions to exit CPP, and more institutions have exited the program through auctions than through any other method since then. As of May 2013, Treasury has held 16 auctions, selling 128 investments for total proceeds of about $2.4 billion. Each auction has involved the sale of an institution's outstanding investment, also known as the par amount. In most cases, the final sales price was below the par amount, and in total Treasury received 84 percent of par in the first 16 auctions. Through these auctions, repurchases, and other mechanisms, 556 institutions had exited CPP as of May 31, 2013, accounting for almost $223 billion in repayments and income and exceeding the original investment amount by about $18 billion.
Treasury has structured the auctions to maximize taxpayer returns, but representatives from some of the 13 financial institutions that participated in the auctions told GAO that they had concerns about the process. Treasury selected institutions for auctions based on, among other things, the size of the institution's CPP investment and its dividend payment record. Treasury then notified the institutions that their securities were going to be auctioned, and the institutions were required to submit certain documentation to Treasury. Representatives of some institutions, mostly from earlier auctions, told GAO that the process was rushed and left them with limited notice to prepare the required documentation and insufficient time to obtain regulatory approval to bid on their own shares. Treasury officials said they would have been willing to move an institution to a later auction if it needed more time to prepare, and while representatives of a few institutions that participated in later auctions felt the process was rushed, other institutions said they had more time to prepare. Representatives of some institutions expressed frustration that they did not have the option to match the winning bid to retain ownership of their shares. Treasury officials said that any changes to the process that benefitted the financial institution would make the process less competitive for other bidders at the expense of taxpayers and would contradict Treasury's goal of structuring the process to increase competition and maximize returns for taxpayers. |
gao_GAO-17-228 | gao_GAO-17-228_0 | Background
SSA provides benefits to individuals with disabilities through two main programs: DI and SSI. Prompted by OIG requests and at the direction of SSA’s Operations component, they review claims to help detect patterns of disability fraud perpetrated by third parties such as physicians, attorneys, or claimant representatives. SSA’s National Anti-Fraud Committee (NAFC) provides a forum for agency executives to collaborate on antifraud strategies and serves as an advisory board for the OAFP in determining what initiatives to monitor, among other things. The Fraud Risk Framework provides a comprehensive set of leading practices that serves as a guide for agency managers to use when developing efforts to combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based way. Commit—Commit to combating fraud by creating an organizational culture and structure conducive to fraud risk management; 2. SSA Has Demonstrated an Organizational Commitment to Combating Fraud, but Its New Antifraud Office Is Still Evolving
SSA has taken steps to establish an organizational culture and structure that are conducive to managing fraud risks in its disability programs. SSA further demonstrated a commitment to antifraud efforts by conducting a study to evaluate its fraud risk management approach and shortly thereafter establishing a dedicated antifraud office within the agency. For example, the OAFP has taken steps to coordinate antifraud initiatives across SSA by gathering information about progress on the initiatives, and has helped create antifraud training materials for the agency. Although these steps are generally consistent with leading practices in fraud risk management, the OAFP faced challenges during its first 2 years to fully establish itself within the agency. However, recent actions may help to address these challenges:
Lack of consistent leadership: Until recently, the OAFP had not had a permanent leader who provided accountability for the agency’s antifraud initiatives. SSA Has Taken Steps to Identify and Address Disability Fraud Risks but Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive Fraud Risk Assessment or Developed an Antifraud Strategy
Steps Taken to Identify Fraud Risks in Disability Programs but Not to Conduct a Comprehensive Fraud Risk Assessment
SSA has undertaken efforts over the last year to identify fraud risks in its disability programs but has not comprehensively assessed the fraud risks identified through those efforts. SSA’s antifraud activities include the following, among others:
Cooperative Disability Investigation (CDI) units: SSA and the OIG established CDI units in fiscal year 1997 to help prevent and detect potential disability fraud and have increased the number and coverage of the units in recent years. Fraud examination units: SSA established fraud examination units in 2014. Without developing and documenting an antifraud strategy that considers the likelihood and impact of fraud risks along with its tolerance for these risks and its existing activities to mitigate them, as called for in leading practices, SSA cannot ensure that it has a coordinated approach to address the range of fraud risks in its disability programs and appropriately target the most significant risks. SSA Does Not Have Effective Metrics to Monitor and Evaluate Its Antifraud Activities
SSA monitors its antifraud activities—including those to protect its disability programs—through the OAFP and NAFC, but the metrics SSA uses do not enable effective monitoring and evaluation. According to SSA documents, the OAFP is responsible for monitoring SSA’s antifraud activities and establishing performance and outcome-oriented goals for them. Leading practices identified in the Fraud Risk Framework call for managers to develop outcome-oriented measures to monitor and evaluate fraud risk management activities and to adapt activities based on the results. Of the 17 ongoing initiatives listed in SSA’s 2015 antifraud initiatives report, we found that 10 had metrics that were not outcome-oriented, and 4 did not have any metrics. SSA’s antifraud strategic plan for 2016 to 2018 includes an objective to “adapt fraud risk management activities and communicate the results of monitoring and evaluations to management.” Although the plan highlights the importance of monitoring to help strengthen fraud risk management activities, it does not include specific steps for monitoring its antifraud initiatives. Without this information, the OAFP and NAFC may not be able to determine whether SSA’s antifraud activities are operating effectively or determine whether changes are necessary. However, gaps exist in the agency’s fraud risk assessment, corresponding strategy design, and monitoring of antifraud activities. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Commissioner (or Acting Commissioner) of SSA direct the OAFP to take the following four actions for its disability programs: lead a comprehensive fraud risk assessment that is consistent with leading practices, and develop a plan for regularly updating the assessment; develop, document, and implement an antifraud strategy that is aligned to its assessed fraud risks; work with components responsible for implementing antifraud initiatives to develop outcome-oriented metrics, including baselines and goals, where appropriate for antifraud activities; and review progress toward meeting goals on a regular basis, and recommend that the NAFC make changes to control activities or take other corrective actions on any initiatives that are not meeting goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA's Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs provide cash benefits to millions of Americans with disabilities who are unable to work. Collectively, payments from DI and SSI were about $200 billion in fiscal year 2015. Although the extent of fraud in these programs is unknown, recent high-profile cases have highlighted instances in which individuals fraudulently obtained millions of dollars in benefits. GAO was asked to review SSA's fraud risk management.
This report examines SSA's actions to manage fraud risks and the extent to which these actions align with leading practices for (1) establishing an organizational culture and structure conducive to fraud risk management, (2) identifying, assessing, and addressing fraud risks, and (3) monitoring and evaluating its antifraud activities. GAO reviewed SSA documents, such as training materials and operational guidance; and interviewed SSA officials at the agency's headquarters, its three fraud examination units, and selected state disability determination offices chosen for their proximity to antifraud initiatives. GAO assessed those actions against leading practices identified in its Fraud Risk Framework.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has taken steps to establish an organizational culture and structure conducive to fraud risk management in its disability programs, but its new antifraud office is still evolving. In recent years, SSA instituted mandatory antifraud training, established a centralized antifraud office to coordinate and oversee the agency's fraud risk management activities, and communicated the importance of antifraud efforts. These actions are generally consistent with GAO's Fraud Risk Framework, a set of leading practices that can serve as a guide for program managers to use when developing antifraud efforts in a strategic way. However, SSA's new antifraud office, the Office of Anti-Fraud Programs (OAFP), faced challenges establishing itself as the coordinating body for the agency's antifraud initiatives. For example, the OAFP has had multiple acting leaders, but SSA recently appointed a permanent leader of OAFP to provide accountability for the agency's antifraud activities.
SSA has taken steps to identify and address fraud risks in its disability programs, but it has not yet comprehensively assessed these fraud risks or developed a strategic approach to help ensure its antifraud activities effectively mitigate those risks. Over the last year, SSA gathered information about fraud risks, but these efforts generally have not been systematic and did not assess the likelihood, impact, or significance of all risks that were identified. SSA also has several prevention and detection activities in place to address known fraud risks in its disability programs such as fraud examination units, which review disability claims to help detect fraud perpetrated by third parties. However, SSA has not developed and documented an overall antifraud strategy that aligns its antifraud activities to its fraud risks. Leading practices call for federal program managers to conduct a fraud risk assessment and develop a strategy to address identified fraud risks. Without conducting a fraud risk assessment that aligns with leading practices and developing an antifraud strategy, SSA's disability programs may remain vulnerable to new fraud schemes, and SSA will not be able to effectively prioritize its antifraud activities.
SSA monitors its antifraud activities through the OAFP and its National Anti-Fraud Committee (NAFC), which serves as an advisory board to the OAFP, but the agency does not have effective performance metrics to evaluate the effect of such activities. The OAFP has responsibility for monitoring SSA's antifraud activities and establishing performance and outcome-oriented goals for them. It collects metrics to inform reports about its antifraud initiatives, and the NAFC receives regular updates about antifraud initiatives. However, the quality of the metrics varies across initiatives and some initiatives do not have metrics. Of the 17 initiatives listed in SSA's 2015 report on antifraud initiatives, 10 had metrics that did not focus on outcomes, and 4 did not have any metrics. For example, SSA lacks a metric to help monitor the effectiveness of its fraud examination units. Leading practices in fraud risk management call for managers to monitor and evaluate antifraud initiatives with a focus on measuring outcomes. Without outcome-oriented performance metrics, SSA may not be able to evaluate its antifraud activities, review progress, and determine whether changes are necessary.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends SSA (1) conduct a comprehensive fraud risk assessment for its disability programs, (2) develop a corresponding antifraud strategy, (3) develop outcome-oriented metrics for antifraud activities, and (4) review progress and change activities as necessary. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-595 | gao_GAO-16-595_0 | Background
FDA’s Oversight of Drugs
FDA’s approval is required before brand-name drugs and generic drugs can be marketed for sale in the United States. DSS also analyzes market research data from IMS Health to compare current supply of the drug with historical demand. Meanwhile, since 2012, the number of ongoing shortages (shortages that began in prior years) has remained high with over 250 ongoing shortages each year from 2012 through 2015. Although the timing of FDA’s approvals of submissions does not establish a causal link, it could indicate that prioritizing reviews may be a useful strategy in addressing some drug shortages. FDA Prioritized Review of Both Drug Applications and Supplements to Address Shortages and the Majority Were for Generic Sterile Injectable Drugs
From January 2010 through July 2014, FDA prioritized its review of 383 submissions—applications and supplements to change approved drug applications—to address drug shortages. Number of Warning Letters FDA Issued to Sterile Injectable Drug Establishments Increased, Including Letters to Establishments Linked to Widespread Shortages
Number of Warning Letters FDA Issued to Sterile Injectable Drug Manufacturers Increased, but the Percentage of Inspections Resulting in Letters Was Relatively Small
The number of warning letters FDA issued annually to sterile injectable drug manufacturing establishments found to be out of compliance with manufacturing standards generally increased from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2013. Seven Sterile Injectable Drug Establishments Linked to Widespread Shortages Received Warning Letters and All Had Previous Indications of Difficulty Meeting Manufacturing Standards
From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2012, seven sterile injectable drug manufacturing establishments that received warning letters for noncompliance with manufacturing standards slowed or shut down production. Shortages of Sterile Injectable Anti- infective and Cardiovascular Drugs Were Strongly Associated with Certain Factors
Shortages of sterile injectable anti-infective and cardiovascular drugs during 2012, 2013, and 2014 were strongly associated with certain factors we examined. We estimated a regression model to examine the relationship between drug shortages and four factors: (1) a decrease in the number of suppliers, (2) sales of a generic version, (3) the failure of an establishment making the drug to comply with manufacturing standards resulting in a warning letter, and (4) price decline. The strong association between shortages and both (1) a decrease in the number of suppliers and (2) the failure of an establishment making the drug to comply with manufacturing standards resulting in a warning letter suggests that shortages may be triggered by supply disruptions. Relatively low profit margins may cause suppliers to exit the market for less profitable drugs in favor of more profitable ones or may make it unprofitable to increase supply, which could make the market vulnerable to shortages. Agency and Third- Party Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report for comment to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Appendix I: Comparison of Drug Shortage Data Collected by the Food and Drug Administration and the University of Utah Drug Information Service
Throughout our work we have received questions from members of Congress about the similarities and differences between the drug shortage data collected by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the University of Utah Drug Information Service (UUDIS). Many of the shortages that FDA identified during this time period were also identified by UUDIS during this same time period. Both anti-infective and cardiovascular drugs continue to be subject to multiple and prolonged shortages. FDA classifies establishment inspections as official action indicated when serious deficiencies are found that warrant regulatory action. Drug Shortages: Public Health Threat Continues, Despite Efforts to Help Ensure Product Availability. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drug shortages are a serious public health concern. GAO previously found that many shortages were of sterile injectable drugs and could generally be traced to supply disruptions caused by manufacturers slowing or halting production to address quality issues.
Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review several aspects of drug shortages. This report examines (1) trends in drug shortages, (2) FDA's efforts to prioritize reviews of drug submissions to address shortages, (3) trends in FDA warning letters issued to sterile injectable manufacturing establishments for noncompliance with manufacturing standards, and (4) the relationship between certain factors and shortages of sterile injectable drugs. GAO analyzed—using various methods including regression analyses—drug shortage data from the University of Utah Drug Information Service from 2010 through 2015; drug sales data from IMS Health from 2010 through 2014 for sterile injectable anti-infective and cardiovascular drugs (which have been subject to multiple and prolonged shortages); and FDA data, including data on warning letters related to inspections conducted from October 2006 through September 2013 and data on prioritized reviews from January 2010 through July 2014, which were generally the latest available data at the time GAO began its analysis. GAO also interviewed FDA officials and reviewed agency documents, including documents related to the issuance of warning letters to seven establishments FDA and others said were linked to widespread shortages.
What GAO Found
When available supplies of prescription drugs are insufficient, patient care may be adversely affected. The number of new shortages has generally decreased since 2011, while the number of ongoing shortages remained high.
To help address shortages, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prioritized the review of—more quickly reviewed—383 drug applications and supplements during the time period GAO examined. Most were for generic sterile injectable drugs. FDA's approval of some of these submissions occurred before the shortage was resolved. Although the timing of FDA's approval does not establish a causal link, it could indicate that FDA's action helped address some shortages.
GAO found that, as part of FDA's oversight of drug safety and quality, it generally issued an increasing number of warning letters to sterile injectable drug establishments during the time period GAO reviewed for noncompliance with manufacturing standards outlined in federal regulations. However, the percentage of inspections resulting in warning letters remained relatively small as the number of inspections also increased. Moreover, seven establishments that were linked to widespread shortages and received warning letters all had previous indications of difficulty complying with manufacturing standards.
Shortages of sterile injectable anti-infective and cardiovascular drugs in 2012, 2013, and 2014 were strongly associated with certain factors GAO examined. Two factors—a decline in the number of suppliers and failure of at least one establishment making a drug to comply with manufacturing standards resulting in a warning letter—suggest that shortages may be triggered by supply disruptions. A third factor—drugs with sales of a generic version—suggests that due to relatively low profit margins for generic drugs, manufacturers are less likely to increase production, making the market vulnerable to shortages. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reviewed a draft of this report and reiterated its commitment to addressing drug shortages. GAO incorporated HHS's technical comments as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-881T | gao_GAO-08-881T_0 | Background
All full-power television broadcasters are required by law to cease broadcasting their analog signal by February 17, 2009. Low-power broadcast stations are not required to cease broadcasting in analog as of February 2009 and most will continue to broadcast in analog after the conclusion of the full-power transition. The Vast Majority of Broadcasters are Transmitting a Digital Signal, but Some Broadcast Stations Face a Range of Technical, Coordination, or Other Issues in Completing Their DTV Transition
Most broadcasters have made significant progress in preparing their stations for the transition to digital, with approximately 91 percent of broadcasters responding to our survey reporting that they were already transmitting a digital signal. A small number of stations responding to our survey (9 percent) had yet to begin broadcasting a digital signal, but almost all of those stations expected to be broadcasting digitally by February 17, 2009. Before the transition to digital can be finalized, some stations still have to resolve (1) technical issues, such as the relocation of their digital or analog antenna; (2) coordination issues, such as the U.S. government reaching agreements with the Canadian and Mexican governments and coordinating with cable providers and satellite companies; or (3) other issues, such as the construction of broadcast towers or financial constraints that might hinder their ability to complete the steps necessary for the transition. Viewers Have Options to Prevent Loss of Service from Low- Power Analog Broadcasts, but Concerns Remain About the Clarity of Information Pertaining to this Issue
Potentially millions of viewers can receive low-power analog transmissions, including programming from the major networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox), Spanish language broadcasting, and public television. Since most low-power stations will not transition to digital in February 2009, it is possible for viewers to receive programming in analog (from low-power stations) and digital (from full-power stations) after the transition date. To have access to both analog and digital television signals after the DTV transition, viewers could use a special kind of converter box that passes through an analog signal and a digital signal, often referred to as analog pass through. Public and private stakeholders have taken steps to educate the public about the low-power issue and the options available to consumers. While public and private efforts are ongoing to inform the public about low-power stations not transitioning to digital, some have expressed concerns that the messages intended to explain this issue are instead confusing the public. Further complicating matters, many consumers do not know the difference between full-power and low-power stations or whether the signals they receive are full or low power. Most People are Aware of the DTV Transition, but Many are Unprepared or Have Inadequate Plans
Most households will be unaffected by the DTV transition and a vast majority have heard of the transition. Those at higher risk of being affected by the transition—households viewing over-the-air television signals—have higher levels of awareness than those who will be unaffected. Over half of the population has heard of the converter box subsidy program and those in households at risk of losing television service who plan to take action are likely to utilize the program. However, only a third of those indicating plans to purchase boxes and utilize the coupons know how to obtain coupons. While general awareness of the DTV transition is high, there are indications that some consumers are confused or unknowledgeable about the transition, as 45 percent of those households who are at risk plan no action or inadequate action to prepare for the transition. Households Planning to Take Action for the DTV Transition are Likely to Utilize the Converter Box Subsidy Program, but Many Household Plan to Take No Action to Prepare for the Transition
Greater than half of the population is aware of the NTIA converter box subsidy program, but more detailed knowledge of the program is much weaker. Amongst low risk households, 30 percent indicated they have plans to ready themselves for the transition—despite the fact that no action is required to maintain television service. To obtain information on issues pertaining to low-power television stations and how they affect consumers, we reviewed data from the Federal Communications Commission and interviewed a wide variety of industry and other private stakeholders, such as national retailers, industry associations, and consumer advocacy groups. Digital Television Transition: Issues Related to an Information Campaign Regarding the Transition. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Digital Television (DTV) Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005, requires all full-power television station in the United States to cease analog broadcasting by February 17, 2009. Low-power stations are not required to cease analog transmissions and most will continue broadcasting in analog. Federal law also requires the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to subsidize consumers' purchases of digital-to-analog converter boxes. After the transition, households with analog sets that rely on over-the-air broadcasts must take action or they will lose television service, but some households might not be aware of this potential disruption. This testimony provides information on (1) technical and coordination issues facing full-power broadcast stations as they transition to digital, (2) issues pertaining to low-power broadcasting and how they affect consumers, and (3) the extent to which American households are aware of the DTV transition and likely to utilize the converter box subsidy program. GAO interviewed officials with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and NTIA and met with a wide variety of industry participants and other stakeholders. GAO conducted a Web-based survey of broadcasters to determine their status in transitioning to digital and issues they were encountering and commissioned a survey of the U.S. population on consumer awareness. This statement is based on GAO's body of work on the DTV transition.
What GAO Found
Broadcasters have made significant progress in preparing for the DTV transition. In fact, many stations are already broadcasting their full digital signal with the only remaining step being to turn off their analog signal. As of February 2008, 91 percent of broadcasters responding to our survey reported that they were already transmitting a digital signal. Nine percent of stations in our survey had yet to begin broadcasting a digital signal, but almost all of those stations expected to be broadcasting digitally by the transition date. In finalizing the transition to digital, some stations still must resolve technical, coordination, and construction issues. Technical issues include relocating either digital or analog antennas and, in some cases, constructing new broadcast towers. Some stations are bound by financial constraints related to the costs of resolving these issues. In addition, some stations have outstanding coordination issues, such as the U.S. government reaching agreements with the Canadian and Mexican governments regarding signal interference issues and coordinating with cable and satellite providers. Since most low-power stations will not transition to digital by February 2009, it is possible for viewers to receive programming in analog and digital after the transition. Potentially millions of viewers can receive low-power analog transmissions, including programming from the major networks, Spanish language broadcasting, and public television. To have access to both analog and digital television signals after the DTV transition, viewers could purchase a special kind of converter box that passes through an analog signal and a digital signal, or purchase other equipment. Public and private stakeholders have taken steps to educate the public about the low-power broadcasts potentially remaining in analog but some advocacy groups and others have expressed concerns that the messages intending to explain the low-power issue are instead confusing the public. Further complicating matters, many consumers do not know the difference between full-power and low-power stations or whether the signals they receive are full or low power. Most households will be unaffected by the DTV transition and a vast majority have heard of the transition. About 84 percent of people have heard of the transition, but fewer have more specific knowledge about the transition. Those at higher risk of being affected by the transition--households viewing over-the-air television signals--have higher levels of awareness than those who will be unaffected. Over half of the population has heard of the converter box subsidy program and those households at risk of losing television service who plan to take action are likely to utilize the program. However, only a third of those indicating plans to purchase boxes and utilize the coupons know how to obtain coupons. In addition, there are indications that some consumers are confused about the transition, as 45 percent of those households who are at risk plan inadequate or no action to prepare for the transition. Conversely, amongst those unaffected by the transition, 30 percent indicated they have plans to ready themselves for the transition--despite the fact that no action will be required to maintain television service. |
gao_GAO-07-1244T | gao_GAO-07-1244T_0 | In the Women’s Business Centers Sustainability Act of 1999, Congress established the sustainability pilot program because of concerns that WBCs could not become self-sustaining in 5 years and needed continued SBA funding. In addition to the WBC program, SBA’s SBDC and SCORE programs also provide training and counseling services to small business clients. Under the Small Business Act, as amended, SCORE is sponsored by and may receive appropriations through SBA. However, in 1991, Congress authorized SBA to make awards for 3- year projects, and in 1997 Congress authorized SBA to make awards to WBCs for 5-year projects. Several WBCs that we spoke with expressed concern about the funding term limits and pointed out that the SBDC and SCORE programs do not have the same limits, even though SBA also administers those programs. WBCs are not guaranteed funding each year because SBA makes awards each year at its discretion. Current program participants and those that have successfully graduated will be eligible to apply for continuous funding through these awards. The award process will remain competitive and the number of organizations competing could increase while SBA’s annual budget for the WBC program may not increase beyond the approximate $12 million provided in the last 5 years. Prior to the new program changes, SBA officials emphasized that the WBC program is the agency’s only performance based program and said that they believed this provided an incentive for WBCs to continuously improve. SBA just completed making WBC awards for fiscal year 2007 to fund activities in fiscal year 2008, and SBA officials told us that they plan to begin providing the 3-year renewable awards in fiscal year 2008. Imbalances in SBA’s Staff Resources and Ineffective Communication with WBCs Could Reduce the Effectiveness of Oversight Procedures
Our preliminary review found that SBA had developed written procedures for monitoring the performance and financial management activities of WBCs and has taken steps to measure the WBC program’s effectiveness. SBA relies heavily on District Office Technical Representatives (DOTRs) to carry out oversight responsibilities, but our preliminary review suggests that the downsizing of SBA’s staffing may have created challenges for DOTRs in fulfilling their assigned responsibilities. Our preliminary review found that SBA had taken some steps to adapt program oversight procedures to staffing changes in district offices. These and other revisions that SBA has made to date appear to have been made on an as-needed basis and were not part of a strategic process or plan to revise its oversight activities. WBCs also cited concerns about communication with SBA. One study that we reviewed reported that 54 percent of 52 WBCs surveyed said that SBA could improve its communication with them. WBCs Make Some Efforts to Coordinate with SBDCs and SCORE but Appear to Lack the Guidance Needed to Improve These Efforts
Based on our preliminary review, we found that the WBCs we spoke with focused on a different type of client than the SBDCs and SCORE chapters in their areas, and several WBCs actively coordinated with the other programs to avoid duplicating services. Most WBCs told us that they referred clients to the SBDCs and SCORE when appropriate, and several coordinated services with the other programs to leverage resources and avoid duplication. SBA officials told us that they expected district offices to ensure that the programs did not duplicate each other, and the program requirement suggests that WBCs can promote coordination through co-sponsorship arrangements or memorandums of understanding. Some WBCs told us that coordinating services could be difficult. These concerns and uncertainties thwart coordination efforts and could increase the risk of service duplication in some geographic areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration (SBA) provides training and counseling services to women entrepreneurs through the Women's Business Center (WBC) program. With approximately $12 million in fiscal year 2007, SBA funded awards to 99 WBCs. However, Congress and WBCs have expressed concerns about the uncertain nature of the program's funding structure. Concerns have also been raised about the possibility that the WBC and two other SBA programs, the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) and SCORE programs, are duplicating each other's efforts. This testimony discusses preliminary views on (1) uncertainties associated with the funding process for WBCs; (2) SBA's oversight of the WBC program; and (3) actions that SBA and WBCs have taken to avoid duplication among the WBC, SBDC, and SCORE programs. GAO reviewed policies, procedures, examinations, and studies related to the funding, oversight, and services of WBCs and interviewed SBA, WBC, SBDC, and SCORE officials.
What GAO Found
Until 2007, WBCs were funded on a temporary basis for up to 10 years, at which time it was expected that the centers would become self-sustaining. Beginning in 1997, SBA made annual awards to WBCs for up to 5 years. Because of concerns that WBCs could not sustain their operations without continued SBA funding, in 1999, Congress created a pilot program to extend funding an additional 5 years. Due to continued uncertainty about WBCs' ability to sustain operations without SBA funding, in May 2007, Congress passed legislation authorizing renewable 3-year awards to WBCs that "graduated" from the program after 10 years, as well as to current program participants. Like the current awards, the 3-year awards are competitive, and more centers may be applying for limited dollars. SBA is currently revising its award process to incorporate the new program changes. Though SBA has oversight procedures in place to monitor WBCs' performance and use of federal funds, staff shortages from the agency's downsizing and limited communication may hinder SBA's oversight efforts. SBA relies extensively on district office technical representatives (DOTRs) to oversee WBCs, but these staff members also have other job responsibilities and may not have the needed expertise to conduct some oversight procedures. SBA provides annual training and has taken steps to adjust its oversight procedures to adapt to staffing changes, but concerns remain. Some WBCs also cited communication problems, and one study reported that 54 percent of 52 WBCs responding to the study's survey said that SBA could improve its communication with the centers. For example, some WBCs told us that SBA did not provide sufficient feedback on their performance. Under the terms of the WBC award, the centers are required to coordinate with local SBDCs and SCORE chapters. SBA officials told us that they expected district offices to ensure that the programs did not duplicate each other. However, based on our preliminary review, we found that SBA provided limited guidance on how to successfully carry out coordination efforts. Most of the WBCs that we spoke with explained that in some situations they referred clients to an SBDC or SCORE counselor, and some WBCs also took steps to more actively coordinate with local SBDCs and SCORE chapters to avoid duplication and leverage resources. However, some WBCs told us that coordinating services was difficult, as the programs were each measured by the number of clients served and could end up competing for clients. Such concerns thwart coordination efforts and could increase the risk of duplication in some geographic areas. |
gao_GAO-02-687T | gao_GAO-02-687T_0 | Security Issues Have Been Reported at Federal Buildings
The 1995 domestic terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, aroused governmentwide concern about the physical security of federal buildings. Protection, Detection, and Reaction are Integral Security Concepts
Countermeasures identified through the risk management process support the three integral concepts of a holistic security program: protection, detection, and reaction. Table 1 provides a high-level description of access control technologies that can be deployed to protect federal facilities. Many of these technologies are mature and have already been deployed in various federal facilities, where their capabilities and effectiveness have been demonstrated. The price for the smart card itself can range from about $3 to $30 each. | What GAO Found
The terrorist attacks of September 11 have heightened concerns about the physical security of federal buildings and the need to protect those who work in and visit these facilities. These concerns have been underscored by reports of long-standing vulnerabilities, including weak controls over building access. There are several commercially available security technologies that can be deployed, ranging from turnstiles, to smart cards, to biometric systems. Although many of these technologies can provide highly effective technical controls, the overall security of a federal building will depend on robust risk management processes and implementing the three integral concepts of a holistic security process: protection, detection, and reaction. |
gao_GAO-13-351T | gao_GAO-13-351T_0 | The federal government has a reserve of crude The federal government has been extensively involved in the production, storage, and use of helium since the early part of the twentieth century. Furthermore, when the debt is fully paid off, the revolving Helium Fund shall be terminated (50 U.S.C. § 167b(a)); and established a modified “in-kind” program to meet federal needs for helium. As directed by Congress, the National Academies’ National Research Council reviewed the helium program and released a report in 2000 that evaluated the changes made in the program, the effects of these changes on the program, and several scenarios for managing the federal government’s reserve of helium in the future.changes in price and availability of helium, in 2008, the National Research Council convened a committee to determine if the current implementation of the helium program was having an adverse effect on U.S. scientific, technical, biomedical, and national security users of helium. The Helium Privatization Act of 1996 Addressed or Altered Our Prior Concerns
Since our reports in the early 1990s, the Helium Privatization Act of 1996 has caused considerable changes to the helium program and addressed or altered our prior concerns. In October 1992, we reported on various aspects of the federal helium program including the helium debt, pricing, and alternatives for meeting federal helium needs. Helium Debt
In October 1992, we recommended that Congress cancel the helium program’s debt. As of September 1991, the debt had grown to about $1.3 billion, over $1 billion of which was interest that had accrued on the original debt principal of about $290 million. We recommended that Congress cancel the debt in the Helium Fund because it was no longer realistic to expect the debt to be repaid by the statutory deadline of 1995, and because canceling the debt would not adversely affect the federal budget as the debt consisted of outlays that had already been appropriated and interest that was a paper transaction. 1). The helium debt was also a factor in setting the price of federal helium. In 1992, GAO recognized that if the helium debt was cancelled, Congress may wish to propose a new pricing scheme. The 1996 act did not cancel the debt, as we had recommended, but it did require a specific method for pricing crude helium. 2). In 1992, GAO recommended that Congress reassess the conservation objectives of the helium program and consider other alternatives to meet federal helium needs. As part of the resetting of the helium program’s objectives, the 1996 act established a revised approach for meeting federal needs for helium. Three Urgent Issues Facing the Helium Program
As we testified in 2010, changes in helium prices, production, and demand have generated concerns about the future availability of helium for the federal government and other critical purposes. The Helium Privatization Act of 1996 does not provide a specific direction for the helium program past 2015. Specifically, the three urgent issues are as follows:
How will the helium program be funded after 2013? If the helium program’s debt is paid off this year, as expected, and the revolving helium fund is terminated, it is not clear how the operations of the helium program will be paid for. When we last testified on this issue, the estimated payoff date was 5 years away in 2015, and it was more closely aligned with the 1996 act’s requirement to sell down the helium reserve by January 1, 2015. The debt payoff schedule has accelerated primarily because of improved sales of the crude helium offered for sale. At what price should BLM sell its crude helium? When BLM first set its price after the 1996 act, its price was estimated to be significantly higher than the market price, but now the reverse is true—BLM’s price for crude helium is estimated to be at or below the market price for refined helium. How should the helium remaining in storage after 2015 be used? As of September 30, 2012, there were 11.44 billion cubic feet of conservation helium in storage. According to the 2010 report by the National Academies’ National Research Council, the United States could become a net importer of helium within the next 7 to 12 years, and the principal new sources of helium will be in the Middle East and Russia. As the deadline for the required actions to be taken under this act approaches, Congress may need to address some unresolved issues such as how the helium program will operate once the Helium Fund expires at the end of this year, how to set the price for the helium owned by the federal government, and how to use the remaining helium in storage. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has been extensively involved in the production, storage, and use of helium since the early part of the twentieth century. The federal helium program is currently managed by the Department of the Interior's BLM. During the 1960s and early 1970s, Interior purchased about 34 billion cubic feet of crude helium for conservation purposes and to meet federal helium needs, such as for the space program and scientific research. Crude helium is a gas of 50 to 85 percent helium. While some of this helium was used to meet federal needs, most of it was retained in storage. The funds used to purchase this helium became a debt owed by the program. BLM now sells crude helium from the reserve, and the proceeds go into the revolving Helium Fund, which is used to finance the program and payoff the program's debt.
GAO reported on the management of the helium program in the 1990s (GAO/RCED-92-44 and GAO/RCED-93-1).
Since GAO's reviews of the program in the 1990s, key changes have affected the program, and a 2010 report by the National Academies' National Research Council concluded that it is time to reassess the program. GAO testified on the helium program in May 2010 (GAO-10-700T). This testimony is an update of GAO's May 2010 testimony and discusses (1) how the Helium Privatization Act of 1996 addressed issues raised by GAO in the 1990s and (2) three urgent issues facing the helium program in the near future.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's reports in the early 1990s, the Helium Privatization Act of 1996 has caused considerable changes to the helium program and addressed or altered GAO's prior concerns. In 1992, GAO reported on various aspects of the federal helium program including the helium debt, pricing, and alternatives for meeting federal helium needs.
Helium debt. In 1992, GAO recommended that Congress cancel the helium program's debt since doing so would not adversely affect the federal budget, as the debt consisted of outlays that had already been appropriated and interest that was a paper transaction. As of September 1991, this debt had grown to about $1.3 billion, over $1 billion of which was interest that had accrued on the original debt principal of about $290 million. The 1996 act did not cancel the debt as GAO had recommended, but it did freeze the growth of the program's debt and, as a result, the debt should be paid off this year.
Helium pricing. The helium debt was also a factor in setting the price of federal helium. In 1992, GAO recognized that, if the helium debt was cancelled, Congress might need to propose a new pricing scheme. The 1996 act requires a specific method for pricing helium. This, along with other changes in the supply and demand for helium, has resulted in the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) price to be at or below the market price.
Alternatives for meeting federal helium needs. In 1992, GAO recommended that Congress reassess the conservation objectives of the helium program and consider other alternatives to meet federal helium needs. In resetting the program's objectives, the 1996 act directed Interior to stop refining helium and established a modified in-kind approach for meeting federal helium needs. Agencies must purchase helium from refiners that then purchase an equivalent amount of crude helium from BLM.
Changes in the helium market have generated concerns about the future availability of helium for federal and other needs. The Helium Privatization Act of 1996 did not provide a specific direction for the federal helium program past 2015. Three urgent issues facing the program are as follows:
How will the helium program be funded after 2013? If the helium program's debt is paid off this year, as expected, the revolving Helium Fund will be terminated as required by the 1996 act. When GAO last testified on this issue, the estimated payoff date was 5 years away in 2015. The schedule has accelerated primarily because of improved crude helium sales.
At what price should BLM sell its helium? In the past, the debt has been a factor in the price, and the price has been above the market price. After 2013, the debt will be paid off, and the current price is at or below market.
How should the helium owned by the federal government be used? BLM's effort to sell off the excess helium in storage will not be completed by January 1, 2015, as required by the 1996 act. As of September 30, 2012, there were 11.44 billion cubic feet of conservation helium in storage. After BLM is finished drawing down the reserve, some believe that the United States could become a net importer of helium. |
gao_GAO-17-638 | gao_GAO-17-638_0 | MAP-21 addresses several of our past recommendations—by articulating national goals and adopting a performance-based approach to funding surface transportation projects. FHWA Recently Completed the Rulemaking Stage, Establishing a National Approach to Transportation Performance Management
FHWA has recently completed the first of the three-stage TPM implementation process—rulemaking, setting and tracking performance targets, and evaluating performance—issuing all six interrelated rules that establish both the performance measures focused on the national transportation goals and the overarching performance-management framework (see fig.1). The agency issued the first of the six rules in March 2016. In January 2017, the last two rules were issued and became effective in May 2017, with part of one rule delayed indefinitely. The 17 performance measures focus on key indicators of (1) safety, (2) pavement and bridge condition, and (3) performance of the surface transportation system (reliability, congestion, freight movement, and air quality). DOT Has Taken Steps to Guide the Transition to TPM but Does Not Have a Comprehensive Implementation Plan
To guide the transition to national transportation performance management, FHWA has engaged in extensive outreach with states and MPOs throughout the initial, rulemaking stage of TPM implementation and continues to develop a range of tools, trainings, and workshops to help prepare states and MPOs for key activities related to the second stage—setting and tracking performance targets. However, the agency has: not clearly defined its overarching goals for the transition, not developed an implementation plan showing how the various efforts underway relate to each other and when they will be completed, nor clearly communicated its approach to states and MPOs. DOT Has Not Developed a Comprehensive Plan to Guide Implementation Efforts
The new performance-based approach to transportation is a transformational shift, impacting billions of dollars in federal transportation funds, including almost $40 billion in FHWA grant funding to states and holding states and grantees accountable for results, many for the first time. For example, the agency has not identified strategic implementation goals describing what the transformation is intended to accomplish and how the various efforts the agency has underway will help accomplish those goals. However, FHWA has not identified specific processes or essential activities that will be used to achieve these results. An implementation plan could also help the agency make the best use of the performance information states will begin reporting to improve transportation decision-making, communicate a national performance story, and assess the impacts of federal funding. With the issuance of the interrelated final rules and of states’ beginning the target-setting process, there is an opportunity for FHWA at this critical junction to articulate an overarching approach to TPM, including specific steps the agency plans to take to operationalize the transformation, time frames for key activities and efforts, and specific actions the agency will take to help states and other grantees address anticipated challenges. Publicly communicate this plan and approach to build a shared understanding of the goals and purpose of the transformation with its grantees. DOT also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration. These rules were created in response to the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), which required the Secretary of Transportation to establish measures states could use to assess their performance in the 12 areas listed in this table. Part of the System Performance final rule pertaining to the greenhouse gas measure was delayed indefinitely. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2008, GAO has highlighted the need to demonstrate the outcomes of the billions of dollars the Department of Transportation (DOT) provides to states and other grantees for surface transportation programs. MAP-21 included provisions for DOT and its grantees to move toward a performance-based approach, transforming federal surface transportation programs by holding states and other grantees accountable for results, in many cases for the first time.
GAO was asked to review DOT's implementation of TPM. This report focuses on FHWA, which administers the largest grant program of the three DOT agencies involved, and (1) examines the progress made in developing rules to establish a national performance-based approach and (2) evaluates how FHWA is guiding the transition to TPM, among other objectives. GAO reviewed proposed and final rules and information on rulemaking activities and interviewed FHWA officials, national transportation organizations, and a non-generalizable sample of 10 state departments of transportation, among others. States were selected based on factors such as geographic distribution, population, and urban and rural characteristics.
What GAO Found
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) recently issued the last of six interrelated rules to implement a new performance-based approach to federal surface transportation grant programs. Three of the six rules establish 17 total performance measures in the areas of safety, pavement and bridge conditions, and performance of the surface transportation system (congestion, freight movement, reliability, and air quality). Rulemaking was the first of three stages to implement the transportation performance management (TPM) approach, which was required by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) in 2012 (see fig.). The agency issued the first of the six rules in March 2016. In January 2017, the last two final rules were issued and became effective in May 2017, with part of one rule related to greenhouse gas emissions delayed indefinitely.
FHWA is developing tools and training to help implement TPM but has not yet developed a comprehensive plan to guide implementation. The agency has begun to help states and regional metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) prepare to set targets and begin tracking performance as part of the second implementation stage. However, the agency has not clearly articulated strategic goals for the TPM transition, developed an implementation plan showing how the various efforts under way relate to each other and when they will be completed, or clearly communicated the approach to states and MPOs. For example, the agency has not identified strategic goals describing what each stage of the transformation is intended to accomplish and how the various efforts under way will help accomplish those goals. While FHWA has stated in its rulemaking that it wants to “communicate a national performance story,” it has not identified specific processes or activities that will be essential to achieving these results. Developing, communicating, and reinforcing the goals of a transformation, as well as specific activities and timelines for achieving those goals, are among the key practices that GAO has identified for major organizational transformations. An implementation plan could help the agency better articulate the goals of the transformation, make the best use of the performance information states will begin reporting, and help assess the effects of federal funding to improve investment decision-making.
What GAO Recommends
FHWA should develop a TPM implementation plan that includes goals and specific actions and timelines, and publicly communicate that plan. DOT concurred with the recommendation. The agency also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-148 | gao_GAO-06-148_0 | EPA noted that lead in drinking water occurs primarily as a byproduct of the corrosion of materials in the water distribution system or household plumbing, some of which is outside the control of the water systems. EPA’s activities included a series of expert workshops on key aspects of the rule (monitoring protocols, simultaneous compliance, lead service line replacement, public education, and lead in plumbing fittings and fixtures), a review of state policies and practices for implementing the lead rule, data verification audits that covered the collection and reporting of compliance data for the lead rule in 10 states, and an expert workshop and a review of state efforts to monitor for lead in drinking water at schools and child care facilities. EPA’s most recent data indicate that the number of water systems that exceed the lead action level has declined by nearly 75 percent since the early 1990s. According to EPA’s data, nearly 90 percent of all water systems have qualified for reduced monitoring. However, we also analyzed data on the results of lead testing and found that EPA’s database does not contain current information for a much larger percentage of large and medium water systems. EPA Does Not Have Complete Information on the Status of Water Systems’ Efforts to Implement Lead Rule
As part of EPA’s efforts to improve its indicators of lead rule implementation, the agency restructured its reporting requirements and reduced the number of “milestones” that states are required to report from 11 to 3. Specifically, their experiences indicate that (1) the sampling sites used for lead testing may no longer reflect areas of highest risk, (2) reduced monitoring may not be appropriate in some instances, (3) the homeowners who participate in tap monitoring may not be informed of the test results, (4) controls over when and how treatment changes are implemented may not be adequate, (5) data on the effectiveness of lead service line replacement programs are limited, and (6) states vary in how they apply the lead rule when water systems sell drinking water to other systems. Given the circumstances in which lead contamination became a problem in the District of Columbia, when a change in the system’s disinfection treatment impaired the effectiveness of corrosion control, such decisions can be critical. Treatment requirements. In addition, no clear focal point exists at the federal or state level to collect and analyze the results of testing and remediation efforts. The Extent to Which Drinking Water at Schools and Child Care Facilities Is Contaminated by Lead Is Uncertain, in Part, Because No Clear Focal Point Exists to Collect Available Data
While a number of cities have detected elevated lead levels in school drinking water, and a few states are beginning to collect information on the status of local testing efforts, little information exists on the extent to which drinking water at schools and child care facilities nationwide may contain unacceptable levels of lead. For information on experiences in implementing the lead rule and the need for changes to the regulatory framework, we interviewed EPA, state, and local officials; analyzed states’ responses to an EPA information request regarding their policies and practices in implementing the rule; and reviewed other relevant studies and documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Elevated lead levels in the District of Columbia's tap water in 2003 prompted questions about how well consumers are protected nationwide. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), states, and local water systems share responsibility for providing safe drinking water. Lead typically enters tap water as a result of the corrosion of lead in the water lines or household plumbing. EPA's lead rule establishes testing and treatment requirements. This report discusses (1) EPA's data on the rule's implementation; (2) what implementation of the rule suggests about the need for changes to the regulatory framework; and (3) the extent to which drinking water at schools and child care facilities is tested for lead.
What GAO Found
EPA's data suggest that the number of drinking water systems with elevated lead levels has dropped significantly since testing began in the early 1990s. However, EPA's database does not contain recent test results for over 30 percent of large and medium-sized community water systems and lacks data on the status of water systems' efforts to implement the lead rule for over 70 percent of all community systems, apparently because states have not met reporting requirements. In addition, EPA's data on water systems' violations of testing and treatment requirements are questionable because some states have reported few or no violations. As a result, EPA does not have sufficient data to gauge the rule's effectiveness. Implementation experiences to date have revealed weaknesses in the regulatory framework for the lead rule. For example, most states do not require their water systems to notify homeowners that volunteer for periodic lead monitoring of the test results. In addition, corrosion control can be impaired by changes to other treatment processes, and controls that would help avoid such impacts may not be adequate. Finally, because testing indicates that some "lead-free" products leach high levels of lead into drinking water, existing standards for plumbing materials may not be sufficiently protective. According to EPA officials, the agency is considering some changes to the lead rule. On the basis of the limited data available, it appears that few schools and child care facilities have tested their water for lead, either in response to the Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988 or as part of their current operating practices. In addition, no focal point exists at either the national or state level to collect and analyze test results. Thus, the pervasiveness of lead contamination in the drinking water at schools and child care facilities--and the need for more concerted action--is unclear. |
gao_GAO-06-99 | gao_GAO-06-99_0 | EPA maintains the data in its RCRAInfo database. According to RCRAInfo data, in 2003, mercury-contaminated debris constituted about 12,000 metric tons of the mercury-containing waste; about 0.4 percent of all mercury-containing waste and about 0.03 percent of all hazardous waste in 2003. RCRAInfo data on mercury-contaminated debris may be incomplete. Businesses that did not submit optional information may have managed a portion of the waste as debris or they may have managed none of this waste as debris. In 2001, the first year businesses reported on debris, RCRAInfo data showed that businesses did not submit the optional information on the physical form of a waste (including debris) in about 14 percent of instances when they treated and disposed of mercury-containing waste. In response to our survey, officials in 21 states and 6 hazardous waste landfill operators identified one or more items as debris that do not typically meet EPA’s debris definition. The landfill operators responded correctly about particle size requirements for debris. Programs Are in Place to Monitor All Types of Hazardous Waste, Including Mercury-Contaminated Debris
EPA and the states oversee compliance with treatment and disposal requirements for mercury-contaminated debris as part of their efforts to monitor multiple types of hazardous waste. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that the businesses that generate, treat, and dispose of hazardous waste are properly managing and reducing the risk of their mercury-containing waste, we are making the following two recommendations to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency: clarify and better describe the types of waste that can and cannot be reported under the “debris” reporting category and include the definition of debris in the instructions for the Hazardous Waste Report and conduct further outreach to communicate to states and hazardous waste landfills the types of mercury-containing wastes that can be treated and disposed of according to the alternative treatment standards for debris. GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the mechanisms that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses to track the treatment and disposal of mercury-contaminated debris and the quantity of mercury- contaminated debris that is disposed of, (2) the extent to which EPA, states, and industry share a common understanding of the types of mercury-containing wastes that can be treated and disposed of as debris, and (3) EPA and state controls that are in place to monitor compliance with EPA’s treatment and disposal requirements for mercury-contaminated debris. For the state survey, we received responses from 48 states and the District of Columbia. Landfill does not accept metallic mercury. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for regulating hazardous wastes (such as mercury) under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Under RCRA, mercury-containing hazardous waste must meet specific treatment standards before land disposal. But, certain difficult to manage waste due, in part, to its large particle size, can follow alternate "debris" standards that provide diverse treatment options. This report examines (1) the mechanisms that EPA uses to track the treatment and disposal of mercury-contaminated debris and the quantity of this waste, (2) the extent to which EPA, states, and industry share a common understanding of the types of mercury-containing wastes that can be treated and disposed of as debris, and (3) EPA and state controls that are in place to monitor compliance with EPA's treatment and disposal requirements for mercury-contaminated debris.
What GAO Found
EPA uses its RCRAInfo database to maintain information on all hazardous waste, including mercury-contaminated debris. EPA reported that in 2003, mercury-contaminated debris constituted about 12,000 metric tons--or about 0.4 percent of all mercury-containing waste and about 0.03 percent of all hazardous waste. However, EPA's data on mercury-contaminated debris may be incomplete. Reporting on the physical form of the waste (debris is one of many physical forms) is optional, and businesses did not submit this optional information in about 9 percent of instances when they reported treating and disposing of mercury-containing waste in 2003. In addition, EPA's reporting category for debris does not provide a complete list of items that EPA considers to be debris, and debris can be reported in other categories. The 48 states and the District of Columbia and the 14 commercial hazardous waste landfill operators that responded to our survey do not share a common understanding of the types of mercury-containing waste that EPA allows to be treated and disposed of as debris. For example, in their responses, officials in 21 states and operators of 6 commercial hazardous waste landfills identified as debris waste that is explicitly not debris, such as intact devices containing mercury, and may have used the debris regulations for such waste. Consequently, EPA cannot be certain that businesses are appropriately managing their mercury-containing waste as debris. EPA's mandatory waste tracking and documentation requirements serve as controls to monitor compliance with EPA's treatment and disposal requirements for mercury-contaminated debris. EPA and state oversight inspections and enforcement programs provide additional compliance monitoring with the alternative treatment standards for debris. |
gao_GAO-02-1126T | gao_GAO-02-1126T_0 | These mechanisms have given states additional options to accelerate the construction of projects and leverage federal assistance. It has also provided them with greater flexibility and more funding techniques. To date, most federal funding for highways and transit projects has come through the federal-aid highway grants—appropriated by Congress from the Highway Trust Fund. Grants are the next most costly alternative for the federal government. Our work raises a number of issues concerning the potential costs and benefits of expanding alternative financing mechanisms to meet our nation’s surface transportation needs. Congress likely will weigh these potential costs and benefits as it considers reauthorizing TEA-21. Expanding the use of alternative financing mechanisms has the potential to stimulate additional investment and private participation. But expanding investment in our nation’s highways and transit systems raises basic questions of who pays, how much, and when. In 1995, the federally capitalized transportation revolving loan fund concept took shape as the State Infrastructure Bank (SIB) pilot program, authorized under Section 350 of the NHS Act. Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) credit assistance
As part of TEA-21, Congress authorized the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998 (TIFIA) to provide credit assistance, in the form of direct loans, loan guarantees, and standby lines of credit to projects of national significance. | What GAO Found
As Congress considers reauthorizing the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) in 2003, it does so in the face of a continuing need for the nation to invest in its surface transportation infrastructure at a time when both the federal and state governments are experiencing severe financial constraints. As transportation needs have grown, Congress provided states--in the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 and TEA-21--additional means to make highway investments through alternative financing mechanisms. A number of states are using existing alternative financing tools such as State Infrastructure Banks, Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicles bonds, and loans under the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act. These tools can provide states with additional options to accelerate projects and leverage federal assistance--they can also provide greater flexibility and more funding techniques. Federal funding of surface transportation investments includes federal-aid highway program grant funding appropriated by Congress out of the Highway Trust Fund, loans and loan guarantees, and bonds that are issued by states that are exempt from federal taxation. Expanding the use of alternative financing mechanisms has the potential to stimulate additional investment and private participation. However, expanding investment in the nation's highways and transit systems raises basic questions of who pays, how much, and when. |
gao_GAO-01-144 | gao_GAO-01-144_0 | IRS Plans to Base Staffing on Strategic Goals Rather Than Annual Funding
IRS faces an annual challenge in determining the staffing level for its toll- free telephone customer service operations. IRS has not established a long-term, desired level-of-telephone-service goal based on the needs of taxpayers and the costs and benefits of meeting them, and then determined what staffing level is needed to achieve that service level. Rather, IRS annually determines the level of funding it will seek for its customer service workforce, based on its judgment of how to best balance its efforts to assist taxpayers and to ensure their compliance with tax laws, and then calculates the expected level of service that funding level will provide. In an effort to improve its recruiting for customer service representatives, IRS is in the early stages of developing a national recruiting strategy. As the Government Performance and Results Act and SSA experience suggest, IRS will also need support for its long- and short-term goals from congressional stakeholders. Customer Service: Human Capital Management at Selected Public and Private Call Centers (GAO/GGD-00-161, Aug. 22, 2000). | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determines the staffing level for its toll-free telephone customer service operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that IRS lacks a long-term telephone customer service goal that reflects the needs of taxpayers and the costs and benefits of meeting that goal. Rather, IRS annually determines the level of funding it will seek for its customer service workforce, using its judgment of how to best balance service and compliance activities. IRS then calculates the level of service that funding levels will provide. This approach is inconsistent with the Government Performance and Results Act and the practice of selected public and private call centers that field questions. IRS recognizes the shortcomings of its personnel management and will include performance measures and goals in its 2002 strategic plan. According to IRS officials, the agency also faces challenges in recruiting, training, retaining, and scheduling customer service representatives. IRS is developing a strategy to address each of these issues. |
gao_GAO-08-126T | gao_GAO-08-126T_0 | Prior Actions Have Improved Port Security, but Issues Remain
Port security overall has improved because of the development of organizations and programs such as AMSCs, Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSPs), maritime security exercises, and the International Port Security Program, but challenges to successful implementation of these efforts remain. Area Maritime Security Committees Share Information and Coast Guard Plans to Expand Interagency Operational Centers
Two main types of forums have developed for agencies to coordinate and share information about port security: area committees and Coast Guard sector command centers. Some examples of security activities include conducting waterborne security patrols, boarding high-interest vessels, escorting vessels into ports, and enforcing fixed security zones. The SAFE Port Act included several new requirements related to security exercises, such as establishing a Port Security Exercise Program to test and evaluate the capabilities of governments and port stakeholders to prevent, prepare for, mitigate against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies at facilities that MTSA regulates. The Coast Guard Is Evaluating the Security of Foreign Ports, but Faces Resource Challenges
The security of domestic ports also depends upon security at foreign ports where cargoes bound for the United States originate. The Coast Guard is required to conduct assessments of security plans and facility compliance inspections, but faces challenges in staffing and training to meet the SAFE Port Act’s additional requirements such as the sufficiency of trained personnel and guidance to conduct facility inspections. The report, expected later this year, will cover, among other things, the extent to which the Coast Guard has met its inspection requirements and found facilities to be in compliance with its security plans, the sufficiency of trained inspectors and guidance to conduct facility inspections, and aspects of the Coast Guard’s overall management of its MTSA facility oversight program, particularly documenting compliance activities. In this memo, DHS indicated that (1) programs requiring the collection and use of fingerprints to vet individuals will use the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT); (2) these programs are to reuse existing or currently planned and funded infrastructure for the intake of identity information to the greatest extent possible; (3) its CIO is to establish a procurement plan to ensure that the department can handle a large volume of automated vetting from programs currently in the planning phase; and (4) to support the sharing of databases and potential consolidation of duplicative applications, the Enterprise Data Management Office is currently developing an inventory of biographic data assets that DHS maintains to support identity management and screening processes. DNDO Faces Challenges Testing Radiation Detection Equipment
DHS also has container security programs to develop and test equipment to scan containers for radiation. According to CBP, containers from these ports will be scanned for radiation and other risk factors before they are allowed to depart for the United States. Furthermore, many U.S. and international customs officials we have spoken to, including officials from the World Customs Organization, have stated that the 100 percent scanning requirement is contrary to the SAFE Framework developed and implemented by the international customs community, including CBP. However, the SAFE Port Act specifies that scanning equipment outputs from SFI will be available for review by U.S. government officials either at the foreign seaport or in the United States. Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation’s Seaports. Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve Workforce Planning and Accountability. Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because the safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part on the security of its 361 seaports, the United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act), modified existing legislation and created and codified new programs related to maritime security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have key maritime security responsibilities. This testimony synthesizes the results of GAO's completed work and preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work related to the SAFE Port Act pertaining to (1) overall port security, (2) security at individual facilities, and (3) cargo container security. To perform this work GAO visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security plans, and post-exercise reports; and interviewed officials from the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have improved overall port security efforts by establishing committees to share information with local port stakeholders, taking steps to establish interagency operations centers to monitor port activities, conducting operations such as harbor patrols and vessel escorts, writing port-level plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, testing such plans through exercises, and assessing the security at foreign ports. However, these agencies face resource constraints and other challenges trying to meet the SAFE Port Act's requirements to expand these activities. For example, the Coast Guard faces budget constraints in trying to expand its current command centers and include other agencies at the centers. Similarly, private facilities and federal agencies have taken action to improve security at about 3,000 individual facilities by writing facility-specific security plans, inspecting facilities to determine compliance with their plans, and developing special identification cards for workers to help prevent terrorists from getting access to secure areas. Federal agencies face challenges trying to meet the act's requirements to expand the scope or speed the implementation of such activities. For example, the Transportation Security Administration missed the act's deadline to implement the identification card program at 10 selected ports because of delays in testing equipment and procedures. Federal programs related to the security of cargo containers have also improved as agencies are enhancing systems to identify high-risk cargo, expanding partnerships with other countries to screen containers before they depart for the United States, and working with international organizations to develop a global framework for container security. Federal agencies face challenges implementing container security aspects of the SAFE Port Act and other legislation. For example, Customs and Border Protection must test and implement a new program to scan 100 percent of all incoming containers overseas--a departure from its existing risk-based programs. |
gao_GAO-12-180 | gao_GAO-12-180_0 | Therefore, as more navigable ocean water emerges in the Arctic and human activity increases, the Coast Guard will face expanding responsibilities in the region. Specifically, our analysis showed that, of the five reporting elements, DOD addressed three and partially addressed two. However, it has not yet developed a comprehensive approach to addressing Arctic capabilities that would include steps such as developing a risk-based investment strategy and timeline to address near-term needs and establishing a collaborative forum with the Coast Guard to identify long-term Arctic investments. DOD and DHS Have Established a Collaborative Forum to Identify Potential Near- term Investments but Not Long-term Needs
While DOD and DHS have established the working group to identify shared near-term Arctic capability gaps, this collaborative forum is not intended to address long-term Arctic capability gaps or identify opportunities for joint investments over the longer-term. According to DOD and Coast Guard officials, although the working group is primarily focused on near-term investments, it has discussed some mid- to long-term capability needs. Addressing near-term gaps is essential for DOD to have the key enabling capabilities it needs to communicate, navigate, and maintain awareness of activity in the region. Recommendations for Executive Action
To more effectively leverage federal investments in Arctic capabilities in a resource-constrained environment and ensure needed capabilities are developed in a timely way, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, take the following two actions: develop a risk-based investment strategy that: 1) identifies and prioritizes near-term Arctic capability needs, 2) develops a timeline for addressing them, and 3) is updated as appropriate; and establish a collaborative forum with the Coast Guard to fully leverage federal investments and help avoid overlap and redundancies in addressing long-term Arctic capability needs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our work were to determine the extent to which (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) report on the Arctic addresses the reporting elements specified in House Report 111-491 and (2) DOD has efforts under way to identify and prioritize the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic. To address the extent to which DOD’s report on the Arctic addresses the reporting elements specified in House Report 111-491, we evaluated the DOD Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage (Arctic Report) issued in May 2011. In addition, we interviewed DOD officials involved in preparing the Arctic Report to discuss their interpretation of the direction in the House Report and the DOD report’s findings. To address the extent to which DOD has efforts under way to identify and prioritize the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic, we reviewed documentation related to DOD’s Arctic operations, such as the U.S. Navy’s November 2009 Arctic Roadmap, the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. European Command’s April 2011 Arctic Strategic Assessment, the U.S. Coast Guard’s July 2011 High Latitude Study, and the Navy’s September 2011 Arctic Capabilities Based Assessment. 5136), directed DOD to submit a report on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage. Climate Change Adaptation: Federal Efforts to Provide Information Could Help Government Decision Making. | Why GAO Did This Study
The gradual retreat of polar sea ice, combined with an expected increase in human activityshipping traffic, oil and gas exploration, and tourism in the Arctic regioncould eventually increase the need for a U.S. military and homeland security presence in the Arctic. As a result, the Department of Defense (DOD) must begin preparing to access, operate, and protect national interests there. House Report 111-491 directed DOD to prepare a report on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, and specified five reporting elements that should be addressed. House Report 112-78 directed GAO to review DODs report. GAO assessed the extent to which 1) DODs Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage (Arctic Report) addressed the specified reporting elements and 2) DOD has efforts under way to identify and prioritize the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic. GAO analyzed DODs Arctic Report and related documents and interviewed DOD and U.S. Coast Guard officials.
What GAO Found
DODs Arctic Report, submitted May 31, 2011, addressed three and partially addressed two of the elements specified in the House Report.
While DOD has undertaken some efforts to assess the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic, it is unclear whether DOD will be in a position to provide needed capabilities in a timely and efficient manner because it lacks a risk-based investment strategy for addressing near-term needs and a collaborative forum with the Coast Guard for addressing long-term capability needs. DODs Arctic Report acknowledges that it has some near-term gaps in key capabilities needed to communicate, navigate, and maintain awareness of activity in the region. However, DOD has not yet evaluated, selected, or implemented alternatives for prioritizing and addressing near-term Arctic capability needs. In addition, DOD and the Coast Guard have established a working group to identify potential collaborative efforts to enhance U.S. Arctic capabilities. This working group is focused on identifying potential near-term investments but not longer-term needs, and it is currently expected to be dissolved in January 2012. Uncertainty involving the rate of Arctic climate change necessitates careful planning to ensure efficient use of resources in developing Arctic needs such as basing infrastructure and icebreakers, which require long lead times to develop and are expensive to build and maintain. Without taking steps to meet near- and long-term Arctic capability needs, DOD risks making premature Arctic investments, being late in obtaining needed capabilities, or missing opportunities to minimize costs by collaborating on investments with the Coast Guard.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop a risk-based investment strategy and timeline for developing Arctic capabilities needed in the near-term; and establish a forum with the Coast Guard to identify collaborative Arctic capability investments over the long-term. DOD and the Department of Homeland Security generally agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-755 | gao_GAO-01-755_0 | CDC and NIH Programs Continue to Broaden Understanding of Lyme Disease
CDC and NIH have conducted a broad range of research and educational activities related to Lyme disease. NIH has funded research on the basic nature of Lyme disease and on its diagnosis, treatment, and prevention, and initiated most related expert and congressional recommendations. CDC’s laboratories have conducted basic research on diagnostic test development. To educate the medical and patient communities, CDC has funded activities by professional groups and associations to develop diagnosis and treatment recommendations for both physicians and nurses; maintains an informational Web site for patients and health professionals and provides the public with educational materials; has provided training and funds to state and local health departments to improve surveillance and educational activities, including sponsoring conferences and workgroup meetings in 1993, 1994, 1998, and 1999 to update the Lyme disease community and help guide the future of CDC Lyme disease programs; and has disseminated the results of its Lyme disease research in hundreds of articles in peer-reviewed journals. Funding for Lyme Disease Has Increased Slightly at CDC and Significantly at NIH
Funding related to Lyme disease has increased at both CDC and NIH from fiscal years 1991 through 2000. The CDC increase in allocations was about 7 percent during that period, from $6.9 million to $7.4 million in inflation- adjusted dollars. In contrast, the NIH increase in obligations has been steady and relatively large, at 99 percent. Appendix IV: Recommendations Made to CDC and NIH Lyme Disease Programs
The following tables provide expert recommendations and congressional appropriations committees’ recommendations made to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Lyme disease programs. | What GAO Found
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have conducted an increasingly broad range of research and educational activities related to Lyme disease. CDC has instituted a system for the surveillance of Lyme disease, helped to standardize diagnostic testing, conducted and funded basic research on Lyme disease and on its prevention, and developed patient and practitioner educational materials. CDC has initiated most activities recommended by external reviewers and congressional appropriations committees regarding changes to its programs. NIH has conducted and funded basic research on Lyme disease and on its etiology, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention. In addition, NIH research is addressing two topics of particular interest to patient advocates--chronic Lyme disease and the occurrence of other tick-borne infections in Lyme disease patients. NIH has also responded to most expert recommendations and congressional recommendations. During the last 10 years, allocations for Lyme disease have increased slightly at CDC, and obligations for Lyme disease have increased significantly at NIH. CDC allocations for Lyme disease research and education have increased seven percent, from $6.9 million to $7.4 million in inflation-adjusted dollars from fiscal years 1991 through 2000. In contrast, the NIH increase in obligations for Lyme disease has been steady and relatively large, at 99 percent. |
gao_GAO-17-652 | gao_GAO-17-652_0 | Background
CMS and states jointly finance and administer the Medicaid program, which finances health care, including behavioral health services, for low- income individuals and families. Since 2010, Facility Capacity Nationwide Has Increased for Mental Health Treatment and Remained Constant for Substance Use Treatment, with Variation Across States
The Capacity of Mental Health Treatment Facilities Increased Nationally from 2010 to 2014, although There Was Significant Variation Across States
Capacity for inpatient or residential mental health services for the adult population increased from 2010 to 2014, as measured by numbers of facilities providing services, the number of beds designated for these services, and the number of beds per 100,000 adults, according to N- MHSS data from those years. The number of beds designated for inpatient or residential substance use services per 100,000 adults increased slightly, from 57 to 58.4 between 2010 and 2015. Based on size and type of facility, we estimated that nearly half of the inpatient and residential substance use treatment facilities in 2010 and 2015 may have been IMDs, and thus federal Medicaid funding would be unavailable for adult Medicaid beneficiaries due to the IMD exclusion. CMS’s IMD Policies Have Changed Over Time to Allow Payments in Certain Circumstances
Over time, CMS policies have changed to allow some states to finance the provision of care for adult Medicaid beneficiaries in IMDs, in certain circumstances. V for a timeline of changes related to the Medicaid IMD exclusion.) According to CMS officials, beginning with Tennessee in 1993, HHS approved section 1115 demonstrations in 9 states that allowed states to pay for behavioral health services in IMDs. By 2009, CMS officials said that the authority to pay for IMD costs in all of the states was phased out, except in Massachusetts. In addition to Massachusetts’s demonstration, CMS has recently approved applications from some, but not all states, for section 1115 demonstrations that allow states to pay for substance use or mental health services provided in IMDs. For example, although Maryland was approved to provide substance use treatment services in IMDs under the substance use demonstration guidance issued in July 2015, the state had applied at the same time to provide mental health services in IMDs. Historically, Medicaid managed care plans had the flexibility to provide covered services in alternate settings under certain conditions, such as behavioral health services in IMDs. In May 2016, CMS issued a final rule designed to modernize its Medicaid managed care regulations. The rule codified this policy, known as the “in lieu of” policy, under which managed care plans may provide alternative services or services in alternative settings, such as IMDs, in lieu of covered services or settings if they are medically appropriate and a cost- effective substitute for covered services or settings. CMS set a 15-day per month limit on the number of days a beneficiary may receive behavioral health services in an IMD for which managed care plans will receive payment. Selected States Use Multiple Approaches to Provide Inpatient and Residential Behavioral Health Services to Adult Medicaid Beneficiaries, and Reported Some Access Challenges
Selected States Use a Variety of Options to Provide Inpatient and Residential Behavioral Health Services to Adult Medicaid Beneficiaries, Including Medicaid and State Funds
While there are no national data on how states finance services provided to adult Medicaid beneficiaries in IMDs, officials in our six selected states told us they used or reported using between 2 to 4 approaches to provide inpatient and residential behavioral health services to adult Medicaid beneficiaries from 2012 to 2016 (see table 1). Most of these state Medicaid officials said that when their states were unable to use Medicaid funds to finance services in IMDs, they relied on other funding sources, including state-only funding, or facility officials said they provided uncompensated care. Selected States Reported Access Challenges, but Lacked Data on Extent of Problem
The six states we selected generally did not have data to document access challenges for adult Medicaid beneficiaries seeking IMD-type services, but state or facility officials from each of these selected states shared examples of access problems. Although state officials often did not characterize the prevalence of the problems, some facility officials we spoke with said they regularly turned away patients, maintained waitlists, and that enough demand existed to warrant expanding capacity. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid is the largest source of national funding for behavioral health services—mental health and substance use services—with nearly $71 billion in projected 2017 spending. However, Medicaid excludes payments for beneficiaries aged 21-64 who are residents of IMDs. As a result, questions have been raised about adult Medicaid beneficiaries' access to services typically provided in IMDs—namely inpatient or residential behavioral health treatments.
GAO was asked to examine questions related to any potential effects of the IMD exclusion on adult beneficiaries. Among other things, this report describes (1) recent trends in the capacity of facilities that provide inpatient and residential behavioral health services; (2) how CMS policies related to the IMD exclusion have changed over time; and (3) how selected states finance IMD services for adult Medicaid beneficiaries. GAO examined federal laws, regulations, and guidance, interviewed officials in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the department that includes CMS, and analyzed the most current data from three national HHS surveys. GAO also interviewed Medicaid officials in six states selected based on geography and use of options to provide care in IMDs for adult Medicaid beneficiaries. Additionally, GAO interviewed representatives of nine behavioral health facilities in the six states referred to GAO by state Medicaid officials and a hospital association. Selected states' and facilities' experiences are not generalizable. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Between 2010 and 2015, inpatient and residential behavioral health services capacity has gone up for adult mental health treatment and stayed about the same for substance use treatment. GAO found that for adult mental health treatment, inpatient and residential capacity increased from about 61 to 69 beds per 100,000 adults between 2010 and 2014. For adult substance use treatment, inpatient and residential capacity remained fairly constant between 2010 and 2015, increasing from 57 to about 58 beds per 100,000 adults. In both types of behavioral health services there was significant variation across states.
GAO also found that over time, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS)—the agency that oversees state Medicaid programs—changed policies to allow some states to finance care for adult Medicaid beneficiaries in institutions for mental disease (IMD), in certain circumstances. IMDs are generally facilities larger than 16 beds that primarily provide inpatient, residential, or other services to individuals with behavioral health conditions. These policy changes included the following:
Medicaid demonstrations. Beginning in 1993, CMS officials said they approved demonstrations in nine states, allowing federal funds to cover behavioral health services in IMDs; these demonstrations were largely phased out by 2009. In July 2015, CMS announced a demonstration that would allow states to use Medicaid funds to cover substance use services in IMDs. As of May 2017, CMS had approved these demonstrations in four states. CMS has also approved applications from some, but not all, states for demonstrations that allow states to pay for substance use or mental health services in IMDs.
Medicaid managed care. In May 2016, CMS issued a final rule that codified a policy, known as the “in lieu of” policy, under which managed care plans may provide alternative services or services in alternative settings, such as IMDs, under certain circumstances. In the rule, CMS set a 15-day per month limit on the number of days an adult beneficiary may receive behavioral health services in an IMD for which managed care plans will receive payment. According to CMS estimates, at least 17 states had likely been allowing such coverage before the rule was issued.
Even with multiple funding sources, selected states reported some problems with adult access to IMD services. While CMS does not collect national data on how states finance services for adults in IMDs, officials in six selected states GAO interviewed stated they used between two to four strategies to fund services for adults in IMDs in recent years, including under Medicaid managed care and demonstrations. State officials said that when their states were unable to use Medicaid funds to finance IMD services, they relied on other options, such as state-only funding, or providing services in smaller non-IMD facilities. Officials from each of the six states shared examples of access problems; for instance, one state reported long waits for inpatient mental health services. In addition, some facility officials said they regularly turned away patients and maintained waitlists. |
gao_T-RCED-98-122 | gao_T-RCED-98-122_0 | Concessions Operations in the Federal Government
Our work has shown that concession activities on federal lands are a large industry that generates billions of dollars. Concessioners operating under these agreements generated about $2.2 billion in revenues, and paid the government about $65 million in fees and about $23 million in other forms of compensation. We found that for concession agreements that were either initiated or extended during fiscal year 1994, the average return to the government from concessions in the land management agencies was about 3 percent—in the case of the Park Service it was about 3.5 percent. Factors Affecting the Rate of Return
Our analysis of rates of return throughout the federal government indicated that there are three key factors that affect the rate of return to the government. These are (1) whether the return from a concession agreement was established through a competitive bidding process, (2) whether the incumbent concessioner had a preferential right of renewal in the award of a follow-on concession agreement, and (3) whether the agency had the authority to retain a majority of the fees generated from the concession agreement. These rights primarily affect concessioners in the Park Service. In addition, five nonland management agencies that had authority to retain most of their fees managed 5 percent of the concession agreements throughout the government. In contrast, the six land management agencies, which have not had authority to retain concession fees, have over 90 percent of the total concession agreements and concession revenues, but generate only 73 percent of the total concession fees. Based on this body of work, it is our view that any efforts at reforming concessions should consider (1) encouraging greater competition in the awarding of concession agreements, including eliminating preferential rights of renewal, and (2) under what circumstances it would be appropriate to provide opportunities for the land management agencies to retain at least a portion of their concession fees. In addition, some concession reform proposals have suggested removing possessory interest—the right of concessioners in the Park Service to be compensated for facilities constructed or acquired on federal lands. At issue are the costs of acquiring concessioner-owned facilities relative to the benefits realized by having greater control through government ownership of facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the need for concessions reform in the National Park Service as well as in other land management agencies, focusing on a comparison of the Park Service's concessions programs with those of other federal agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) concession activities on federal lands is a large industry that generates billions of dollars; (2) GAO's most recent work showed that over 11,000 concession agreements were managed by civilian agencies throughout the federal government; (3) concessioners operating under these agreements generated about $2.2 billion in gross revenues; (4) over 90 percent of concession agreements and the concession gross revenues were from concessioners in the six land management agencies--with many of the largest concessioners operating in the Park Service; (5) for agreements that were either initiated or extended during fiscal year 1994, concessioners in all of the land management agencies paid the government an average of about 3 percent of their gross revenues; (6) in the case of the Park Service, the average return was about 3.5 percent; (7) in contrast, concessioners in nonland management agencies paid fees of about 9 percent of their gross revenues; (8) the key factors affecting rate of return to the government were: (a) whether the fee was established through competition; (b) whether the agency was permitted to retain most of the concessions fees it generated; and (c) whether an incumbent concessioner had a preferential right in renewing its concession agreement with the government; (9) throughout the federal government, rates of return from concessioners were higher when established through competition; (10) in addition, agencies which had authority to retain fees and which did not grant preferential rights of renewal generally obtained higher rates of return to the government from concessioners; (11) in previous reports, GAO noted that as Congress considers reforming concessions in the Park Service, it may want to consider: (a) encouraging greater competition by eliminating preferential rights of renewal; and (b) providing opportunities for the Park Service to retain at least a portion of concession fees; (12) in addition, some concession reform proposals have suggested removing possessory interest--the concessioners right to be compensated for facilities constructed or acquired on federal lands; and (13) at issue are the long-term costs of acquiring concessioner-owned facilities relative to the benefits realized by having greater control through government ownership of facilities. |
gao_T-NSIAD-97-147 | gao_T-NSIAD-97-147_0 | Rationales Regarding Eximbank Programs
I would first like to discuss the various rationales that have been advanced for and against government involvement in export finance and GAO’s position on this matter. The arguments for and against the programs focus on three issues: (1) trade policy leverage, (2) industry effects, and (3) employment and trade effects. Supporters of the Eximbank export finance programs say that this assistance provides leverage in trade policy negotiations, helps to “level the international playing field” for U.S. business, corrects “market failures,” and helps to increase exports and employment. Trade Policy Leverage
Supporters believe that the Eximbank’s programs (1) help assist U.S. companies to compete against foreign companies that receive similar types of government support and (2) provide leverage in trade policy negotiations. As already noted, the Eximbank is required to seek international agreements to reduce government-subsidized export financing. Others have supported export promotion programs as a way to substantially reduce the U.S. trade deficit. Distribution of Eximbank Financing
During fiscal years 1994 to 1996, the Eximbank provided an annual average of $12.8 billion in export financing commitments (loans, guarantees, and insurance) at an annual average program cost of $877 million. Relative to total U.S. goods exported to these markets, the Eximbank supported about 11 percent of U.S. exports to China, about 22 percent of U.S. exports to Indonesia, about 1 percent of U.S. exports to Mexico, about 93 percent of U.S. exports to Trinidad and Tobago, and about 4 percent of U.S. exports to Brazil. During fiscal years 1994 through 1996, the 15 largest users (lead U.S. exporters or contractors) of Eximbank financing accounted for about $14.4 billion, or about 38 percent, of the Eximbank’s total export-financing commitments made during that period. About 20 percent ($7.5 billion) of the Eximbank’s financing commitments—about 79 percent of its total transactions—went to small business, primarily through its insurance programs. The Eximbank has participated in international (OECD) negotiations to limit the use of tied aid and has used its tied aid capital projects fund to counter foreign countries’ use of tied aid. In sum, the Congress may wish to assess Eximbank’s reauthorization within the context of the international competition. The costs of these programs need to be weighed against their benefits to exporters and the leverage they provide in international negotiations to reduce government support for these types of programs. Total costs are defined as the Eximbank’s program costs and administrative costs. —Aims to be financially self-sustaining. —Hermes and C&L exercise a dual role by operating the government’s export finance programs and offering export finance assistance privately. EDC conducts a significant (42 percent) level of business with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations, which influences its profitability. Export Finance: The Role of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (GAO/GGD-93-39, Dec. 23, 1992). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed issues concerning the reauthorization of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), focusing on: (1) the rationale for and against the Eximbank's programs; (2) the ways in which its assistance is distributed; and (3) foreign competitors' export finance programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in reviewing the Eximbank's export finance programs, the Congress needs to weigh the benefits to the U.S. economy of the Eximbank's programs against their costs; (2) while there are numerous arguments for and against government export financing programs, the most compelling case for these programs appears to be in helping to "level the international playing field" for U.S. exporters and providing leverage in trade policy negotiations to induce foreign governments to reduce and ultimately eliminate such subsidies; (3) during fiscal years (FY) 1994 to 1996, the top 15 users (lead U.S. exporters or contractors) of Eximbank financing accounted for about 38 percent of the value of Eximbank's financing commitments; (4) during the same period, the Eximbank also reported that 20 percent of its assistance went to support small business; (5) the Eximbank believes that these small business transactions would not otherwise have been financed by private lenders; (6) in geographical terms, China, Indonesia, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Brazil were Eximbank's top markets in FY 1996; (7) the six major industrialized countries GAO reviewed all maintain various types of export finance assistance programs; (8) although considerable differences exist among these programs, they all help exporters in competing for market share in developing markets by providing varying types of financial assistance (loans, guarantees, and insurance); (9) the Eximbank provides similar types of assistance and also administers a tied aid capital projects fund (also known as the "war chest") as part of its programs; (10) tied aid is concessionary (low interest rate) financing that is linked to the procurement of goods and services from the donor country: (11) the war chest is designed to counter other countries' trade-distorting tied aid practices; (11) Eximbank's assistance programs have cost the U.S. taxpayers about $4 billion over the last 5 years; (12) the Eximbank's programs require substantial levels of taxpayer support and the U.S. government's ultimate objectives continue to be aimed at reducing and eliminating such export financing subsidies and allowing exporters to compete on the basis of price, quality, and service, not subsidized financing; (13) the U.S. government needs to make renewed efforts to use international forums such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to reduce and eventually eliminate such subsidized export finance programs; and (14) given the growing importance of exports to national economic performance, achieving the objective of eliminating all financial subsidies may prove difficult. |
gao_GAO-13-615 | gao_GAO-13-615_0 | MCC Has Established a Records and Information Management Program but Has Not Reviewed Its Inventory of Compact Management Records
Beginning in 2006, MCC established a records and information management program and subsequently established guidelines for handling compact management records and other compact-related information. The policy also includes a list specifying the types of documents that MCC classifies as compact management records. Documents that may be needed to support future audits or analysis of MCC assistance. The policy also states that MCC is responsible for ensuring that the partners understand (1) what is covered by both compact management records and other compact-related information and (2) that MCC or a U.S. government audit, legal, or oversight entity may need to have access to such information for at least 5 years after the compact end date. Partner Countries’ Implementation of MCC Document Retention Requirements and Their Ability to Provide Requested Documents Vary
For the five closed compacts that we reviewed—MCC’s compacts with Armenia, Benin, El Salvador, Ghana, and Mali—the MCAs provided varying levels of detail about their plans for retaining compact-related information to address MCC requirements. MCC’s compact closure guidelines do not provide a sample document retention schedule specifying standard types of compact-related information that most compacts would need to retain or provide. All five program closure plans that we reviewed contained some discussion of filing and storing documents, but each MCA addressed the guidelines’ three requirements differently. Such variation in approaches to scheduling and storing compact documentation will make it more difficult for MCC to verify that standard compact information is being retained in all partner countries after the compacts have closed. According to the plans:
Armenia will store the documents at three different government agencies: the state archives, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and the Foreign Financing Projects Management Center (a foreign donor coordination unit);
Benin will store the documents at its national archives;
El Salvador has made a contractor responsible for the safekeeping of compact-related files and documents;
Ghana’s MCA will continue as a foreign donor coordination unit after compact closure and will retain all MCC documents; and
Mali will store compact-related information at the Office of the Secretary General of the President (the “Office of the Segal”), which was the office of the principal government representative under the compact. Four of the governments provided all or most of the documents we requested. MCC has previously noted that political turmoil in Madagascar, whose government was overthrown in 2009, impeded MCC’s ability to access documents. However, because its policies do not call for, and it does not conduct, systematic reviews of the records it receives, MCC cannot be sure that it is meeting the Federal Records Act’s requirement that it preserve all records documenting its functions, activities, decisions, and other important transactions. Recommendations
We recommend that MCC’s Chief Executive Officer take the following three actions to strengthen MCC’s records and information management program: 1. Develop a policy requiring—and conduct—periodic reviews of each set of compact management records that MCC receives from partner governments, to ensure that the records are complete. Revise program closure guidelines to include a sample document retention schedule, specifying standard types of compact-related information that most compacts would need to retain. 3. Review MCC’s policy of delegating the storage of compact-related information to partner governments, weighing the costs and benefits of storing more of this information at MCC headquarters. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) examine the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) records and information management program and practices and (2) assess partner-country governments’ implementation of MCC guidelines for retention and storage of compact-related information. In addition, we interviewed officials at MCC and NARA. To assess partner governments’ implementation of MCC’s guidelines for retention and storage of compact-related information, we selected five closed compacts—Armenia’s, Benin’s, El Salvador’s, Ghana’s, and Mali’s—to use as case studies. We chose these compacts because they closed after May 2011 and therefore were subject to MCC’s Program Closure Guidelines, which were finalized that month. We also conducted a test of MCC’s ability to retrieve compact-related information from partner governments after compact closure. | Why GAO Did This Study
MCC has approved 26 bilateral compact agreements, providing a total of about $9.3 billion to help eligible developing countries reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth. MCC is subject to the Federal Records Act, which requires that agencies preserve all records documenting its functions and other important transactions.
GAO was asked to review MCC's management of records and information. This report (1) examines MCC's records and information management program and practices and (2) assesses partner governments' implementation of MCC's information retention guidelines. GAO analyzed MCC documents, interviewed MCC officials, and tested MCC's ability to retrieve compact-related information from five closed compacts. GAO selected these compacts because they closed after May 2011, when MCC's Program Closure Guidelines went into effect.
What GAO Found
In 2006, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) established a records and information management program to maintain and preserve its federal records. The program includes policies related to compact management records--a subset of MCC's federal records. These policies also address the handling of other compact-related information generated by MCC partner governments' accountable entities, which typically manage compact implementation until the 5-year compacts close. MCC's policies require that the entities transfer their compact management records to MCC for storage before compact closure. MCC also requires that partner governments retain compact-related information not classified as records, such as survey data and data quality reviews, for at least 5 years after their compacts close, to facilitate audits and analysis of MCC assistance. However, MCC does not require, and has not conducted, periodic reviews to determine whether it has received all compact-management records from the accountable entities consistent with federal internal control standards. As a result, MCC cannot be sure that it is meeting the federal requirement that it preserve all records documenting its functions, activities, and other transactions.
In reviews of five closed compacts--Armenia's, Benin's, El Salvador's, Ghana's, and Mali's--GAO found variation in the accountable entities' implementation of MCC document retention requirements and the partner governments' ability to retrieve requested compact-related information after the compacts closed. As required by MCC's compact closure guidelines, all five program closure plans that we reviewed contained some discussion of retaining and storing documents, but each accountable entity addressed the guidelines' requirements differently. MCC's guidelines do not provide a list specifying standard types of compact-related information that most compacts should retain. Such variation in approaches to retaining and storing compact-related information will make it more difficult for MCC to verify that standard compact information is retained in all partner countries after the compacts close. In addition, in a test of MCC's ability to retrieve documents from the partner governments after compact closure, GAO found that four of the five governments provided all or most requested documents within 30 days, but Mali's, which is involved in political turmoil, provided no documents. Political turmoil in Madagascar, another compact-recipient country, has also impeded MCC's ability to obtain compact information that may be needed to conduct future audits, evaluate project impact, or inform future compact designs.
What GAO Recommends
To strengthen MCC's records and information management program, MCC's Chief Executive Officer should (1) develop a policy requiring--and conduct--periodic reviews of MCC's compact-management records to ensure they are complete, (2) revise guidelines to include a sample document retention schedule specifying standard types of compact-related information compacts should retain, and (3) review MCC's policy of delegating storage of most compact-related information to partner governments. MCC agreed with all three recommendations and stated that they have already taken steps to implement them. |
gao_GAO-15-529T | gao_GAO-15-529T_0 | Similarly, a number of studies of private- and public-sector organizations have found that increased levels of engagement result in improved individual and organizational performance. Most Agencies Defied Government-wide Downward Trend and Maintained or Improved Engagement Levels
Our ongoing work indicates that the recent government-wide average decline in the EEI masks the fact that the majority of federal agencies either sustained or increased employee engagement levels during the same period. From 2006 through 2014, government-wide employee engagement levels initially increased—reaching a high of 67 percent in 2011—and then declined to 63 percent in 2014, as shown in figure 1. However, the decline in engagement is the result of several large agencies bringing down the government-wide average. Specifically, our preliminary work indicates that 13 out of 47 agencies saw a statistically significant decline in their EEI from 2013 to 2014; while this is only 28 percent of agencies, nearly 69 percent of federal employees are at one of those agencies, including the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Veterans Affairs.majority of agencies sustained or improved engagement, as shown in figure 2. Key Practices Found to Strengthen Employee Engagement
Performance Conversations Are the Strongest Driver of Employee Engagement Levels
For our ongoing work we used regression analysis to test which selected FEVS questions best predicted levels of employee engagement as measured by our index, after controlling for other factors such as demographic characteristics and agency. Of the various topics covered by the FEVS that we analyzed, we identified six that had the strongest association with higher EEI levels compared to others, including (1) having constructive performance conversations, (2) career development and training, (3) work-life balance, (4) inclusive work environment, (5) employee involvement, and (6) communication from management (see table 1). Importantly, our ongoing work suggests that these six practices were generally the consistent drivers of higher EEI levels when we analyzed them government-wide, by agency, and by selected demographic groups (such as agency tenure and supervisory status).practices are the strongest predictors of engagement, this suggests they could be key starting points for all agencies embarking on efforts to improve engagement. Agencies Are Taking Specific Steps to Strengthen Engagement
During our ongoing work, we have found that agencies that have improved employee engagement, or that already have high levels of engagement, apply the drivers noted above. Agencies Need to be Sensitive to Limitations with EEI Data and Use Supplemental Information to Identify and Address Engagement Issues
OPM provides a range of different tools and resources to help agencies use EEI data to strengthen employee engagement. They include, for example, an online mechanism to share OPM-generated survey reports (at government-wide, agency specific, and sub-agency levels) to facilitate data analysis. Our ongoing work indicates that these resources could provide agencies with needed support. OPM does not report whether changes to an agency’s EEI are statistically significant—that is, whether an up or down change is not due to random chance. As a result, agency officials may be misinterpreting changes to the EEI and acting on data that may not be meaningful. Our preliminary analysis of the FEVS showed that 34 percent (16 of 47) of the absolute changes in agency EEI scores from 2013 to 2014 were actually statistically significant. In smaller agencies and at component or lower levels within larger agencies, large absolute differences are less likely to be significant. The EEI Calculation Does Not Allow for Analysis of Engagement Drivers. Agencies need to understand and address these limitations so that they properly interpret the information and target corrective actions accordingly. | Why GAO Did This Study
A growing body of research on both private- and public-sector organizations has found that increased levels of engagement—generally defined as the sense of purpose and commitment employees feel towards their employer and its mission—can lead to better organizational performance.
This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work examining the federal government's efforts to improve employee engagement, including (1) trends in employee engagement from 2006 through 2014; (2) practices that could strengthen engagement levels based on the EEI results and the experiences of selected agencies and GAO; and (3) certain limitations of the EEI that will be important for agency managers and leaders to consider as they use this metric to assess and improve engagement within their own organizations.
To identify engagement trends, GAO analyzed responses to FEVS questions from 2006 through 2014 from which the EEI is derived. To identify drivers of the EEI in 2014, GAO conducted a regression analysis. To identify practices that could strengthen engagement, GAO interviewed officials at OPM and three case study agencies (selected for sustained or increased EEI levels) that were responsible for engagement efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO's ongoing work indicates that the recent government-wide decline in engagement, as measured by the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Employee Engagement Index (EEI) masks the fact that the majority of federal agencies either sustained or increased employee engagement levels during the same period. Government-wide, engagement has declined 4 percentage points from an estimated 67 percent in 2011 to an estimated 63 percent in 2014. This decline is attributable to several large agencies—like the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security—bringing down the government-wide average. Specifically, 13 out of 47 agencies saw a statistically significant decline in their EEI from 2013 to 2014. While this is 28 percent of agencies, they represent nearly 69 percent of federal workforce. However, the majority of federal agencies either sustained or increased engagement levels during this period. Specifically, from 2013 to 2014, 31 agencies sustained and 3 agencies increased their engagement level.
GAO's preliminary analysis of selected Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) questions indicates that six practices were key drivers of the EEI:
constructive performance conversations,
career development and training opportunities,
work-life balance,
inclusive work environment,
employee involvement, and
communication from management.
Importantly, these practices were generally the consistent drivers of higher EEI levels government-wide, by agency, and by selected employee characteristics (such as federal agency tenure) and therefore could be key starting points for agency efforts to improve engagement. Some agencies that have improved employee engagement, or that already have high levels of engagement, apply these practices.
OPM provides a range of tools and resources to help agencies use EEI data to strengthen employee engagement. They include, for example, an online tool to share OPM-generated survey reports to facilitate agency data analysis. GAO's ongoing work indicates that these resources could provide agencies with needed support. However, OPM does not report whether changes to an agency's EEI are statistically significant—that is, whether an up or down change is not due to random chance. As a result, agency officials may be misinterpreting changes to the EEI and acting on data that may not be meaningful. GAO's preliminary analysis of the FEVS shows that 34 percent of the absolute changes in agency EEI scores from 2013 to 2014 were statistically significant. In smaller agencies and at component or lower levels within larger agencies, large absolute differences are not always significant. GAO's ongoing work has noted that agency officials need to understand and take this (and other limitations) into account so that they properly interpret the information and target corrective actions accordingly.
What GAO Recommends
Because this statement is based on ongoing work, GAO is not making any recommendations at this time. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-114 | gao_T-HEHS-97-114_0 | As a result, the program is vulnerable to exploitation. It should be noted that neither HCFA nor its contractors could accurately tell us what Medicare actually paid the providers in response to these claims. During that same period, the number of Medicare claims climbed 70 percent to 822 million. Several of these initiatives, however, are in their early stages, and it is too soon to assess whether they will, in fact, prevent fraud and abuse in the nursing facilities environment. Conclusion
The multiple ways that providers and suppliers can bill for services to nursing home patients and the lax oversight of this process contribute to the vulnerability of payments for the health care of this population. 4, 1997). Fraud and Abuse: Providers Target Medicare Patients in Nursing Facilities (GAO/HEHS-96-18, Jan. 24, 1996). Fraud and Abuse: Medicare Continues to Be Vulnerable to Exploitation by Unscrupulous Providers (GAO/T-HEHS-96-7, Nov. 2, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the challenges that exist in combatting fraud and abuse in the nursing facility environment.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while most providers abide by the rules, some unscrupulous providers of supplies and services have used the nursing facility setting as a target of opportunity; (2) this has occurred for several reasons: (a) the complexities of the reimbursement process invite exploitation; and (b) insufficient control over Medicare claims has reduced the likelihood that inappropriate claims will be denied; (3) GAO is encouraged by a number of recent efforts to combat fraud and abuse, the pending implementation of provisions in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) and a legislative proposal made by the administration; and (4) while these efforts should make a difference in controlling fraud and abuse in nursing homes, it is too early to tell whether these efforts will be sufficient. |
gao_GAO-09-109 | gao_GAO-09-109_0 | ICE Has Not Documented the 287(g) Program Objective in Program- Related Documents
According to ICE senior program officials, the main objective of the 287(g) program is to enhance the safety and security of communities by addressing serious criminal activity such as violent crimes, human smuggling, gang/organized crime activity, sexual-related offenses, narcotics smuggling and money laundering committed by removable aliens. Program-Related Documents Lack Detail Regarding Program Implementation and ICE Supervision Activities
ICE has not consistently articulated in program-related documents, such as MOAs, brochures and training materials, how participating agencies are to use their 287(g) authority, nor has it described the nature and extent of ICE supervision over these agencies’ implementation of the program. The MOA is designed to help ensure that management’s directives for the program are carried out by program participants. Internal control standards state that a good internal control environment requires that an agency’s organizational structure define key areas of authority and responsibility. In response to our inquiry, ICE officials did not provide a clear definition of the nature and extent of ICE supervision to be provided to participating agencies. There was wide variation in the perceptions of what supervisory activities are to be performed. ICE Has Not Ensured Information Regarding the 287(g) Program Is Obtained and Communicated
Collection and Reporting Requirements Are Not Defined
While ICE states in its MOAs that participating agencies are responsible for tracking and reporting data, the MOA did not provide details as to what data needs to be collected or in what manner data should be collected and reported. Without clearly communicating to participating agencies guidance on what data is to be collected and how it should be gathered and reported, ICE management may not have the information it needs to ensure the program is achieving its objective. From fiscal years 2006 through 2008, ICE received approximately $60 million to provide 287(g) resources for 67 participating agencies nationwide as follows: Training. As of October 2008, ICE had trained and certified 951 state or local officers in the 287(g) program. Equipment. Supervision. Program Activities Are Reported by ICE and Participating Agencies Reported Benefits and Concerns
Both ICE and state and local law enforcement agencies participating in the 287(g) program have reported activities, benefits, and concerns associated with the program. Of those 43,000 aliens arrested by program participants pursuant to the 287(g) authority, ICE detained about 34,000 and placed about 14,000 (41 percent) of those detained in removal proceedings, and arranged for about 15,000 (44 percent) to be voluntarily removed. The remaining 5,000 (15 percent) arrested aliens detained by ICE were either given a humanitarian release, sent to a federal or state prison to serve a sentence for a felony offense, or not taken into ICE custody given the minor nature of the underlying offense and limited availability of detention space. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the ICE 287(g) program achieves the results intended, we are recommending that the Assistant Secretary for ICE take the following five actions: Document the objective of the 287(g) program for participants, Clarify how and under what circumstances 287(g) authority is to be used by state and local law enforcement officers in participating agencies, Document in MOAs the nature and extent of supervisory activities ICE officers are expected to carry out as part of their responsibilities in overseeing the implementation of the 287(g) program and communicate that information to both ICE officers and state and local participating agencies, Specify the program information or data that each agency is expected to collect regarding their implementation of the 287(g) program and how this information is to be reported, and Establish a plan, including a time frame, for the development of performance measures for the 287(g) program. Appendix II: Structured Interview Questions for All 29 Participants of the 287(g) Program
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
This report addresses (1) the extent to which ICE has designed controls to govern 287(g) program implementation and (2) how program resources are being used and the program activities, benefits, and concerns reported by participating agencies. Officials from all 29 state and local law enforcement agencies that had entered into agreements with ICE as of September 1, 2007, listed below. We also compared controls ICE told us they designed to govern implementation of the 287(g) program, including conducting background checks, providing formal training with qualifying exams for the applicants’ officers, and agreeing with state and local agencies to MOAs, with criteria in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and standard practices for program management. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, authorizes the federal government to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies to train officers to assist in identifying those individuals who are in the country illegally. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for supervising state and local officers under this program. GAO was asked to review this program. This report reviews (1) the extent to which ICE has designed controls to govern 287(g) program implementation; and (2) how program resources are being used and the activities, benefits, and concerns reported by participating agencies. GAO reviewed memorandums of agreement (MOA) between ICE and the 29 program participants as of September 1, 2007. GAO compared controls ICE designed to govern the 287(g) program with criteria in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. GAO interviewed officials from both ICE and participating agencies on program implementation, resources, and results.
What GAO Found
ICE has designed some management controls to govern 287(g) program implementation, such as MOAs and background checks of state and local officers, but the program lacks other controls, which makes it difficult for ICE to ensure that the program is operating as intended. First, the program lacks documented program objectives to help ensure that participants work toward a consistent purpose. ICE officials stated that the objective of the program is to address serious crime, such as narcotics smuggling committed by removable aliens; however, ICE has not documented this objective in program materials. As a result, of 29 program participants reviewed by GAO, 4 used 287(g) authority to process individuals for minor crimes, such as speeding, contrary to the objective of the program. Second, ICE has not described the nature and extent of its supervision over participating agencies' implementation of the program, which has led to wide variation in the perception of the nature and extent of supervisory responsibility among ICE field officials and officials from the participating agencies. ICE is statutorily required to supervise agencies participating in the 287(g) program, and internal control standards require an agency's organizational structure to clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility. Defining the nature and extent of the agency's supervision over this large and growing program would strengthen ICE's assurance that management's directives are being carried out. Finally, while ICE states in its MOAs that participating agencies are responsible for tracking and reporting data to ICE, in 20 of 29 MOAs GAO reviewed, ICE did not define what data should be tracked or how it should be collected and reported. Communicating to participating agencies what data is to be collected and how it should be gathered and reported would help ensure that ICE management has the information needed to determine whether the program is achieving its objective. ICE and program participants use resources for personnel, training, and equipment, and participants report activities, benefits, and concerns regarding the program. In fiscal years 2006-2008, ICE received about $60 million to train, supervise, and equip program participants. As of October 2008, ICE reported enrolling 67 agencies and training 951 state and local law enforcement officers. According to data provided by ICE for 25 of the 29 program participants reviewed by GAO, during fiscal year 2008, about 43,000 aliens had been arrested pursuant to the program, and of those, ICE detained about 34,000. About 41 percent of those detained were placed in removal proceedings, and an additional 44 percent agreed to be voluntarily removed. The remaining 15 percent of those detained by ICE were given a humanitarian release, sent to federal or state prison, or released due to the minor nature of their crime and federal detention space limitations. Program participants report a reduction in crime, the removal of repeat offenders, and other public safety benefits. However, over half of the 29 agencies GAO contacted reported concerns from community members that use of program authority would lead to racial profiling and intimidation by law enforcement officials. |
gao_GAO-11-893 | gao_GAO-11-893_0 | The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 and BOP’s Process for Addressing Cell Phone Possession
In August 2010, the Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 was passed and amended 18 U.S.C. BOP Telephone Rates Typically Are Less Than Other Correctional Systems’ Rates and Fund Inmate Wages and Recreation; Lowering Rates Would Decrease Costs for Inmate Calls but Could Reduce Revenue
BOP’s rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected states’ and military branch systems that also use inmate telephone revenue to support inmate amenities, and lowering rates would have several implications. If BOP reduced inmate telephone rates, inmates would benefit from the ability to make less expensive phone calls. However, lower rates also could result in less revenue, lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages and other amenities, unless BOP recovers these funds through other sources. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. BOP and Selected States Confiscated Thousands of Cell Phones in 2010 and Believe That Rising Inmate Cell Phone Usage Threatens Institutional Safety and Expands Criminal Activity
BOP and officials from most of the selected states we contacted reported increases in the numbers of cell phones confiscated at prisons over the last 3 to 4 years and cite cell phone use as a security concern. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the states’ DOCs with whom we spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. BOP and Selected States Have Implemented Cell Phone Search and Detection Technologies, but BOP Could Evaluate Technologies Better and Increase Coordination
BOP and the eight selected states we contacted have taken steps to address growing contraband cell phone smuggling and use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could evaluate existing technologies better to maximize its investment decisions. BOP has tested multiple cell phone detection technologies; however, it has not developed evaluation plans to measure the effectiveness of these tests. Moreover, BOP has shared information with state agencies to some extent on strategies for combating contraband cell phones, but BOP’s regional offices could pursue more direct connections with states in accordance with relevant BOP policy that encourages them to do so. Additional information on cell phone detection strategies tested or deployed by BOP and selected state DOCs—as well as these officials’ perspectives on their utility—is deemed law enforcement sensitive and not included in this report. At the regional level, we found that BOP’s regional offices had limited coordination with states regarding contraband cell phone issues. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DOJ, and also requested comments from the Department of Commerce, FCC, and Department of Defense on nonsensitive draft excerpts related to these agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The rates Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmates pay to make phone calls generate revenue that funds inmate wages and other amenities; however, inmates' contraband cell phone use is growing. The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 criminalized cell phone possession in federal prisons and mandated that GAO study related issues. In response to the mandate, this report addresses (1) how telephone rates for BOP inmates compare with other correctional systems and the implications of lowering rates; (2) the number of cell phones confiscated in BOP and selected states, and any reported impact; and (3) the extent to which BOP and selected states have taken actions to minimize cell phone smuggling, these actions' effectiveness, and how BOP has coordinated internal and state information sharing. GAO reviewed BOP's policies, procedures, and cell phone confiscation data (2008-2010). GAO also interviewed BOP officials within BOP's 6 regions and 4 of its 116 institutions--as well as officials from 8 state correctional departments--selected for their cell phone detection efforts or challenges faced. The results are not generalizable, but provide insights.
What GAO Found
BOP's rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected state and military branch systems that also use telephone revenues to support inmate activities; lowering rates would have several implications. Inmates would benefit from the ability to make cheaper phone calls, but lower rates could result in less revenue and lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages and recreational activities. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases, and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. BOP and selected states confiscated thousands of cell phones in 2010, and these entities believe that rising inmate cell phone use threatens institutional safety and expands criminal activity. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the state departments of correction with whom GAO spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. BOP and selected states have taken actions to address contraband cell phone use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could better evaluate existing technologies to maximize its investment decisions. BOP screens visitors and staff to detect contraband and has also tested multiple cell-phone detection technologies. However, BOP has not developed evaluation plans for institutional use to measure the effectiveness of these tests, which could help ensure that such tests generate information needed to make effective policy decisions. Moreover, while BOP has shared detection strategies with state agencies to some extent, BOP's regional offices have only had limited interaction with states, and could increase coordination and knowledge sharing to better identify and benefit from other strategies being used. This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011. Information that the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been omitted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BOP's Director formulate evaluation plans for cell phone detection technology to aid decision making, require use of these plans, and enhance regional collaboration with states. The Department of Justice concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GGD-97-14 | gao_GGD-97-14_0 | In our report, Child Support Enforcement: Families Could Benefit From Stronger Enforcement Program (GAO/HEHS-95-24, Dec. 27, 1994), we found that the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) lacked essential management tools, such as programwide planning and goal-setting, to assess and improve program performance. Federal responsibility for the program lies within the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF). These recommendations address four key program areas for which OCSE has responsibility: (1) strengthening its partnership with state child support programs, (2) developing its own management strategies for how it will contribute to improved program results, (3) reorienting its audit processes to assess state results, and (4) realigning federal incentive funding with state performance. Traditionally, federal agencies have used factors such as the amount of program funds, the level of staff deployed, or the number of tasks completed as measures of performance. OMB based its selection of OCSE, in part, on OCSE’s previous efforts to develop a 5-year strategic plan; its ability to quantify program goals, such as child support collections; and the involvement of state and local governments as key program administrators. 1.2). Federal/State Partnership Strengthened; OCSE Needs Its Own Strategies to Manage for Results
OCSE has made progress in reorienting its management toward program results by working with the states to develop national goals and objectives for increasing the number of paternities established, support orders obtained, and collections received. At the time of our review, OCSE and the states also were developing performance measures, such as the percentage of children in the child support enforcement caseload with paternity resolved, as statistical tools for identifying state progress toward achieving these goals. However, the current incentive funding structure has two major limitations. The incentive funding structure remains weakly linked with state performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Office of Child Support Enforcement's (OCSE) management of the child support enforcement program, focusing on OCSE progress in: (1) strengthening its partnership with state and local child support enforcement programs; (2) achieving national program goals; (3) improving assessment of state program results; and (4) redesigning the federal incentive funding structure for improved state performance.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) OCSE is making progress in reorienting its management of the child support enforcement program toward program results; (2) OCSE and the states have approved 5-year national goals and objectives for increasing the number of paternities established, the number of support orders obtained, and the amount of collections received; (3) OCSE has also negotiated voluntary performance agreements with states specifying intended program results; (4) OCSE audits continue to focus on state compliance rather than on state progress in achieving program goals because of a lack of performance measures, the absence of penalties for poor-performing states, and limited staff resources; (5) the OCSE federal incentive funding structure, which is based on maximizing child support collections relative to administrative costs rather than on all program goals, limits its use as an incentive for improved results; and (6) welfare reform legislation enacted in August 1996 presents the Department of Health and Human Services an opportunity to more strongly link incentive funding with demonstrated state performance. |
gao_GAO-12-681 | gao_GAO-12-681_0 | In response, we have testified and reported on lengthy federal IT projects that too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission- related outcomes. Agile software development supports the practice of shorter software delivery. Effective Practices for Applying Agile
We identified 32 practices and approaches as effective for applying Agile to software development projects, based on an analysis of practices identified by experienced Agile users. Our analysis also found that the identified practices generally align with five key project management activities outlined in widely-accepted software development guidance: strategic planning, organizational commitment and collaboration, preparation, execution, and evaluation. Start with Agile guidance and an Agile adoption strategy. Empower small, cross-functional teams. Enhance migration to Agile concepts using Agile terms and examples. Provide examples, such as one illustrating the small scope of a user story to teams writing these stories. Include requirements related to security and progress monitoring in your queue of unfinished work (backlog). Continuously improve Agile adoption at both the project level and organization level. Seek to identify and address impediments at the organization and project levels. Gain trust by demonstrating value at the end of each iteration. Track progress using tools and metrics. Track progress daily and visibly. Federal Use of Effective Practices
Officials who have used Agile on federal projects at five agencies generally agreed that the practices identified by the experienced users are effective in a federal setting. Specifically, each practice was used and found effective by officials from at least one agency. Federal Challenges in Applying Agile
We identified 14 challenges with adapting to and applying Agile in the federal environment based on an analysis of experiences collected from five federal agencies that had applied Agile to a development effort. Teams had difficulty transitioning to self-directed work: Officials at two agencies reported that staff had challenges in transitioning to self-directed teams. Staff had difficulty committing to more timely and frequent input: While Agile advocates frequent input and feedback from all stakeholders, four agency officials noted challenges to commit to meeting such input expectations. Timely adoption of new tools was difficult: As identified in the effective practices, automated tools may be used to support project planning and reporting. Compliance reviews were difficult to execute within an iteration time frame: Iterations may incorporate compliance reviews to ensure, for example, that agency legal and policy requirements are being met within the iteration. Traditional artifact reviews do not align with Agile: Traditional oversight requires detailed artifacts in the beginning of a project, such as cost estimates and strategic plans, while Agile advocates incremental analysis. Traditional status tracking does not align with Agile: Officials from three agencies noted that project status tracking in Agile does not align with traditional status tracking methods, creating challenges. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that the experiences of those who have used Agile development are shared broadly, we recommend that the Federal CIO Council, working with its chair, the Office of Management and Budget’s Deputy Director for Management, include practices such as those discussed in this report in the Council’s ongoing effort to promote modular development in the federal government. In oral comments on the draft, OMB’s E- government program manager said that the draft recommendation was better addressed to the Federal CIO Council than to the OMB official who is the chair of the Council. Accordingly, we revised the recommendation to address it to the Council, working with its chair, the OMB Deputy Director for Management. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify (1) effective practices in applying Agile for software development solutions and (2) federal challenges in implementing Agile development techniques. The questionnaire asked whether these practices were used and found effective. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies depend on IT to support their missions and spent at least $76 billion on IT in fiscal year 2011. However, long-standing congressional interest has contributed to the identification of numerous examples of lengthy IT projects that incurred cost overruns and schedule delays while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. To reduce the risk of such problems, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recommends modular software delivery consistent with an approach known as Agile, which calls for producing software in small, short increments. Recently, several agencies have applied Agile practices to their software projects.
Accordingly, GAO was asked to identify (1) effective practices in applying Agile for software development solutions and (2) federal challenges in implementing Agile development techniques. To do so, GAO identified and interviewed ten experienced users and officials from five federal projects that used Agile methods and analyzed and categorized their responses.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 32 practices and approaches as effective for applying Agile software development methods to IT projects. The practices generally align with five key software development project management activities: strategic planning, organizational commitment and collaboration, preparation, execution, and evaluation. Officials who have used Agile methods on federal projects generally agreed that these practices are effective. Specifically, each practice was used and found effective by officials from at least one agency, and ten practices were used and found effective by officials from all five agencies. The ten practices are:
Start with Agile guidance and an Agile adoption strategy.
Enhance migration to Agile concepts using Agile terms, such as user stories (used to convey requirements), and Agile examples, such as demonstrating how to write a user story.
Continuously improve Agile adoption at both the project level and organization level.
Seek to identify and address impediments at the organization and project levels.
Obtain stakeholder/customer feedback frequently.
Empower small, cross-functional teams.
Include requirements related to security and progress monitoring in your queue of unfinished work (the backlog).
Gain trust by demonstrating value at the end of each iteration.
Track progress using tools and metrics.
Track progress daily and visibly.
GAO identified 14 challenges with adapting and applying Agile in the federal environment:
Teams had difficulty collaborating closely.
Procurement practices may not support Agile projects.
Teams had difficulty transitioning to self-directed work.
Customers did not trust iterative solutions.
Staff had difficulty committing to more timely and frequent input.
Teams had difficulty managing iterative requirements.
Agencies had trouble committing staff.
Compliance reviews were difficult to execute within an iteration time frame.
Timely adoption of new tools was difficult.
Federal reporting practices do not align with Agile.
Technical environments were difficult to establish and maintain.
Traditional artifact reviews do not align with Agile.
Agile guidance was not clear.
Traditional status tracking does not align with Agile.
Finally, officials described efforts to address challenges by clarifying previously unclear guidance on using Agile. In a related effort, the Federal Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council is developing guidance on modular development in the federal government, but it does not specifically address effective practices for Agile.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Federal CIO Council, working with its chair, OMBs Deputy Director for Management, include practices such as those discussed in this report in the Councils ongoing effort to promote modular development. After reviewing a draft of this report, OMB commented that the recommendation was better addressed to the Council than to its chair. GAO revised the recommendation to address it to the Council working with its chair. |
gao_OIMC-95-7 | gao_OIMC-95-7_0 | They record this information and include it in their workpapers for subsequent analysis and product development. MSP’s key objectives were to (1) work with users to develop a mission-critical application—the Data Collection and Analysis (DCA) application—that streamlined their work and improved performance; (2) pilot-test the DCA in an operational setting; (3) evaluate benefits—time and quality improvements—provided by the application and the network; and (4) determine the best system configuration for GAO-wide implementation. DCA Application Developed to Address User Requirements
The DCA is a suite of commercial software packages linked to standardize and manage GAO-created documents. The on-line capability allows staff to quickly and easily communicate and share information with other team members at dispersed locations throughout the assignment, providing a means to analyze information more thoroughly. Over 85 percent of the staff said that the Windows version of electronic mail was faster and easier for sending and receiving automated files, compared with the previous method of using dial-up communications software in a stand-alone setting. The DCA streamlined typical assignment tasks, and the easy and immediate access to assignment information improved communication and work group collaboration. Conclusions
Several best practices were developed from the pilot experience, which GAO used in preparing a detailed plan for GAO-wide implementation of the computer network and the DCA. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on its pilot test of and plans to implement the Mission Support Project computer network's data collection and analysis (DCA) application, a suite of commercial software packages linked to standardize and manage GAO-created documents.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that personnel participating in the pilot test reported that: (1) the network and application improved communications, kept them informed of work-related matters, and were faster and easier to use for sending and receiving automated files than the previous dial-up communications software; (2) the windows-based software was easier for switching software applications; (3) DCA software streamlined and simplified typical assignment tasks and processes, enabling users to quickly track the history and status of workpapers and products, facilitating supervisory review; and (4) DCA software allowed staff to quickly and easily locate, share, and reuse information. GAO also noted that its comprehensive plan for GAO-wide implementation of DCA: (1) addresses all implementation aspects, including communications, facilities, preparation, cable installation, workstation testing, employee training, and installation; (2) identifies the tasks, resources, and necessary sequence of actions; and (3) provides for effective oversight to ensure a coordinated team approach to implementation. |
gao_GAO-09-498 | gao_GAO-09-498_0 | The literature we reviewed also mentions other potential benefits to improving aviation safety in Africa, including the following: Improved safety of the global aviation system. Efforts have been made to improve connectivity as a means of creating economic benefits for both the United States and African countries, as well as for pursuing strategic and foreign policy interests. However, according to U.S. government and African officials, many political leaders in African countries have not prioritized aviation safety, in part because of more pressing priorities, such as poverty, health care, and basic nutrition. The lack of priority for improving safety may create or exacerbate other challenges frequently identified in the literature we reviewed and by officials we interviewed, including weak aviation regulatory systems, a lack of resources, inadequate infrastructure, a lack of human capital expertise, and a lack of training capacity. Improving aviation safety in Africa has been hindered by the lack of training capacity in some African countries. U.S. Assistance Has Helped Address Some Challenges but Could Benefit from Better Coordination
DOT Provides Assistance to African Countries Primarily through the SSFA Program
DOT’s SSFA program has been the principal U.S. aviation safety assistance program for African countries since its inception in 1998 as a presidential initiative. The State Department provides funding for the program from one of its appropriations—the Economic Support Fund Account—and funding for the program has ranged from $8.5 million from the appropriation for fiscal year 2003 to zero from the appropriations for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 (see table 2). However, to stretch the resources through this date, DOT officials said they have limited SSFA activities, focusing only on countries that are making tangible progress in improving safety and regional initiatives. Currently, multiple federal agencies are working to improve aviation safety or are funding aviation-related projects in Africa. These agencies have distinct missions and, consequently, their efforts on the continent have different purposes, but their efforts nonetheless intersect. The International Community Has Taken Steps to Address the Challenges
The international community also has taken steps to improve aviation safety in Africa. The first major initiative, the Comprehensive Regional Implementation Plan for Aviation Safety in Africa (AFI Plan), was developed in 2007 to address aviation safety concerns and support African countries in meeting their international obligations for safety oversight. The purpose of this database is to facilitate the coordination of assistance in order to better leverage limited resources. However, funding for the program has been inconsistent, and the future of the SSFA program is uncertain because of resource constraints. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address our objectives, we reviewed and synthesized reports and studies on U.S. efforts to improve aviation safety in Africa, the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Safe Skies for Africa (SSFA) program, and Africa’s aviation markets and safety records. A list of these agencies and organizations follows: Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Department of Defense Department of State Millennium Challenge Corporation National Transportation Safety Board U.S. Agency for International Development U.S. Trade and Development Agency U.S. Trade Representative for Africa International Civil Aviation Organization World Bank European Commission European Aviation Safety Agency MacArthur Foundation Air Transport Association American Association of Airport Executives Flight Safety Foundation International Air Transport Association International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Association Airbus Boeing Continental Airlines Delta Airlines Honeywell International, Inc.
To obtain additional information on aviation safety efforts in Africa, we conducted site visits to four selected African countries. To identify the African countries to visit, we reviewed published research on U.S. efforts to improve aviation safety in Africa, comparable international efforts, Africa’s aviation markets and safety record, and DOT and FAA documentation on the SSFA program. We used the following criteria to ensure variation in the countries chosen for site visits: (1) countries’ participation in the SSFA program; (2) countries that have an FAA Category 1 rating, currently have direct flights to the United States, and are not currently participating in the SSFA program; (3) countries that have achieved an FAA Category 1 rating as a result of the SSFA program; (4) countries that are not involved with the SSFA program or do not have an FAA Category 1 rating, and have major challenges and a poor safety record for aviation safety, with consideration to geographic dispersion; and (5) countries that are involved in positive efforts to meet international aviation safety standards and improve aviation safety as a result of the SSFA program, such as countries that have been involved in regional aviation safety oversight organizations to improve air transport and aviation safety. | Why GAO Did This Study
The African continent is important to U.S. economic, strategic, and foreign policy interests, and efforts have been made to improve commerce and connectivity to benefit the two regions. However, the continent has the highest aviation accident rate in the world, which has hindered progress. Recognizing the importance of improving aviation safety in Africa, the United States and the international aviation community have worked to improve aviation safety in Africa. This congressionally requested report discusses (1) challenges in improving aviation safety in Africa, (2) key U.S. efforts to improve aviation safety in Africa and the extent to which they address the identified challenges, and (3) international efforts to improve aviation safety in Africa. To address these issues, GAO synthesized literature and aviation safety data, interviewed federal officials, and visited four African countries.
What GAO Found
Improving aviation safety in Africa is an important goal for the United States and the international aviation community. However, achieving that goal presents several challenges. The major challenge is the relatively low priority that political leaders in many African countries have accorded aviation safety, in part because of more pressing concerns such as widespread poverty, national health care issues, and a lack of awareness about the potential benefits of an improved aviation system. This relatively low priority placed on improving safety is reflected in the other challenges that were frequently identified in the literature GAO reviewed and by the officials GAO interviewed. These challenges include weak regulatory systems, inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of technical expertise and training capacity. U.S. assistance to improve aviation safety in Africa has helped to address some challenges. For instance, the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Safe Skies for Africa (SSFA) program--created in 1998 as a presidential initiative--is the principal U.S. effort to improve aviation safety. One of the primary goals of the SSFA program is to increase the number of African countries that meet international aviation safety standards. Through memorandums of agreement, the State Department provides funding for the program and DOT manages the program. DOT and the Federal Aviation Administration work to help African countries meet international aviation safety standards by providing technical assistance and training. However, funding for the program has been inconsistent since its inception, with funding levels ranging from a high of $8.5 million from the Department of State's fiscal year 2003 appropriation to zero from its appropriations in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. DOT officials stated that current budgetary and personnel limitations hamper their ability to effectively implement the program. For example, DOT has currently limited SSFA activities to countries making tangible progress in improving safety, rather than directing activities to all participating countries. Given the potential benefits associated with improved aviation systems, two agencies that focus on economic development--the U.S. Trade and Development Agency and the Millennium Challenge Corporation--have also provided funding for aviation safety-related projects in Africa. However, coordination of U.S. efforts on the continent has not been consistent, because of differences in agency missions and program processes, resulting in potential duplication of effort and missed opportunities to leverage limited resources. Several international efforts have been implemented to assist and encourage African countries in improving their civil aviation systems. For example, in response to widespread concerns about the adequacy of aviation safety oversight on the continent, the International Civil Aviation Organization developed the Comprehensive Regional Implementation Plan for Aviation Safety in Africa to help African countries meet their international obligations for safety oversight. The World Bank also provides funding for African countries to address aviation needs and deficiencies. |
gao_GAO-04-78T | gao_GAO-04-78T_0 | The growth of distance education has added a new dimension to evaluating the quality of postsecondary education programs. Distance Education Use Varies between Minority Serving Institutions and Other Schools, with Some Minority Serving Institutions Choosing Not to Offer Any Distance Education
There are some variations in the use of distance education at Minority Serving Institutions and other schools. While it is difficult to generalize across the Minority Serving Institutions, the available data indicate that Minority Serving Institutions tend to offer at least one distance education course at the same rate as other schools, but they differ in how many courses are offered and which students take the courses. We found that Minority Serving Institutions offered distance education courses for two main reasons: (1) they improve access to courses for some students who live away from campus and (2) they provide convenience to older, working, or married students. It offers distance education by videoconference equipment or correspondence. School officials believe that classroom education best meets the needs of its students because of the personal interaction that occurs in a classroom setting. Minority Serving Institutions Face Sizable Challenges in Using Technology, Including Distance Education, and Education’s Efforts to Monitor Technology Could Be Improved
Minority Serving Institutions, like other schools, face stiff challenges in keeping pace with the rapid changes and opportunities presented by information technology and Education could improve how technological progress is monitored. Minority Serving Institutions view the use of technology as a critical tool in educating their students. With respect to their overall technology goals, Minority Serving Institutions viewed using technology in the classroom as a higher priority than offering distance education. 1.) Accrediting Agencies Have Made Progress in Ensuring the Quality of Distance Education Programs; However, Two Areas May Merit Attention
Accrediting agencies have made progress in ensuring the quality of distance education programs. While accrediting agencies have made progress in reviewing the quality of distance education programs, there is no agreed upon set of standards for holding schools accountable for student outcomes. Certain Statutory Requirements Limiting Federal Aid to Students Involved in Distance Education May Cause Some Students to Lose Eligibility for Such Aid
Finally, we found that if some statutory requirements—requirements that were designed to prevent fraud and abuse in distance education—remain as they are, increasing numbers of students will lose eligibility for the federal student aid programs. While the number of schools currently affected is small in comparison to the over 6,000 postsecondary schools in the country, this is an important issue for more than 200,000 students who attend these schools. In deciding whether to eliminate or modify these rules, the Congress and the Administration will need to ensure that changes to federal student aid statutes and regulations do not increase the chances of fraud, waste, and abuse to federal student financial aid programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Higher Education Act of 1965 gives special recognition to some postsecondary schools--called Minority Serving Institutions--that serve a high percentage of minority students. These and other schools face stiff challenges in keeping pace with technology. One rapidly growing area, distance education, has commanded particular attention and an estimated 1.5 million students have enrolled in at least one distance education course. In light of this, GAO was asked to provide information on: (1) the use of distance education by Minority Serving Institutions; (2) the challenges Minority Serving Institutions face in obtaining and using technology; (3) GAO's preliminary finding on the role that accrediting agencies play in ensuring the quality of distance education; and (4) GAO's preliminary findings on whether statutory requirements limit federal aid to students involved in distance education. GAO is currently finalizing the results of its work on (1) the role of accrediting agencies in reviewing distance education programs and (2) federal student financial aid issues related to distance education.
What GAO Found
There are some variations in the use of distance education at Minority Serving Institutions when compared to other schools. While it is difficult to generalize, Minority Serving Institutions offered at least one distance education course at the same rate as other schools. When Minority Serving Institutions offered distance education, they did so to improve access for students who live away from campus and provide convenience to older, working, or married students. Some Minority Serving Institutions do not offer distance education because classroom education best meets the needs of their students. Additionally, schools view the overall use of technology as a critical tool in educating their students and they generally indicated that offering more distance education was a lower priority than using technology to educate their classroom students. The two primary challenges in meeting technology goals cited by these institutions were limitations in funding and inadequate staffing to maintain and operate information technology. Accrediting agencies have taken steps to ensure the quality of distance education programs, such as developing supplemental guidelines for reviewing these programs. However, GAO found (1) no agreed upon set of standards for holding institutions accountable for student outcomes and (2) differences in how agencies review distance education programs. Finally, several statutory rules limit the amount of federal aid for distance education students. GAO estimates that at least 14 schools are not eligible or could lose their eligibility for federal student financial aid if their distance education programs continue to expand. While the number of schools potentially affected is relatively small in comparison to the more than 6,000 postsecondary institutions in the country, this is an important issue for the nearly 210,000 students who attend these schools. Several factors must be considered before deciding whether to eliminate or modify these rules. They include the cost of implementation, the extent to which the changes improve access, and the impact that changes would have on Education's ability to prevent schools from fraudulent or abusive practices. |
gao_GAO-06-309 | gao_GAO-06-309_0 | Background
Under VA’s Disability Compensation program, the agency can award total (100 percent) disability compensation to veterans who cannot work because of service-connected disabilities, even though their schedular rating is less than 100 percent. When the present value of IU benefits is considered over a veteran’s lifetime, the value of these added benefits depends upon the veteran’s schedular rating at the time he or she begins receiving IU benefits and the length of time these benefits are received. To illustrate the potential amount of added benefits that could be received due to IU, we estimated the lifetime present value of the increase in disability compensation benefits for veterans with schedular disability ratings between 60 and 90 percent who began receipt of IU benefits in 2005 at different ages. For example, for younger veterans, those at age 20 in 2005, the estimated lifetime present value of these benefits can range from almost $300,000 to over $460,000. For veterans awarded IU benefits at age 75 in 2005, the lifetime present value of these benefits can range from about $89,000 to about $142,000. When we analyzed VA data to determine the age at which veterans begin receiving IU benefits, we found that just under half of new IU beneficiaries were awarded IU benefits at the age of 60 or older. VA’s Decision-making Criteria, Guidance, and Procedures Do Not Ensure That IU Decisions Are Well Supported
VA’s regulations and guidelines for awarding IU benefits do not ensure that its decisions are well supported. In addition, VA guidelines do not give rating specialists the procedures to obtain the employment and earnings history, and vocational assessments needed to support IU decisions. As a result, VA rating specialists and some vocational rehabilitation staff told us that unemployability benefits have sometimes been granted to veterans who have employment potential. VA Lacks Key Criteria and Guidance Needed to Determine Unemployability
VA rating specialists making IU decisions are required to determine whether the claimant is capable of obtaining or retaining substantially gainful employment, which agency guidelines define as “that which is ordinarily followed by to earn their livelihood with earnings common to the particular occupation in the community where the veteran resides.” However, VA regulations and guidelines do not provide the criteria and guidance that are needed to determine whether a claimant has the ability to obtain or retain substantially gainful employment or is unemployable because of his or her service-connected disabilities. . . the veteran’s current . VA’s Earnings Enforcement Process is Inefficient and Ineffective
VA has an inefficient and ineffective process to enforce the earnings limit for ongoing eligibility for IU benefits. However, this process relies on old data, outdated and time-consuming procedures, insufficient guidance, and weak eligibility criteria. Moreover, the agency does not track and review its enforcement activities to better ensure their effectiveness. VA’s Practices to Manage Its Disability Benefits Lag Behind Other Disability Programs
Private-sector and SSA disability programs provide important features that VA’s IU benefits lack. Yet, VA is among the federal disability programs we have identified as high-risk, in part, because it is poorly positioned to provide meaningful and timely support to help veterans with disabilities return to work. VA’s management of IU benefits exemplifies these problems. Approaches from other disability programs demonstrate the importance of providing return-to-work services and using vocational expertise to assess the claimant’s condition and provide the appropriate services. Incorporating return-to-work practices in IU decision making could help VA modernize its disability program to enable veterans to realize their full productive potential without jeopardizing the availability of benefits for veterans who cannot work. 2. 3. Appendix I: IU Beneficiaries and Estimated Expenditures
We estimated the number of Individual Unemployability (IU) beneficiaries for 1996 to 2005 from monthly internal Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) reports on activity under the Disability Compensation program. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its Disability Compensation program, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides Individual Unemployability (IU) benefits to veterans of any age who are unemployable because of service-connected disabilities. Over the last decade, the number of IU beneficiaries and benefit costs have more than tripled. In 2005, about 220,000 veterans received an estimated $3.1 billion in IU benefits. In response to a congressional request, GAO assessed VA's management of IU benefits. This report (1) examines the added value of IU benefits for veterans of selected ages and disability ratings, (2) assesses the criteria, guidance, and procedures used for initial decision making, (3) assesses VA's ongoing eligibility enforcement procedures, and (4) compares VA's decision-making and enforcement procedures with those used by other disability programs.
What GAO Found
Under VA's disability compensation program, VA can award IU benefits (that is, total disability compensation) to veterans of any age who cannot work because of service-connected disabilities even though VA did not rate their impairments at the total disability level. The added value of IU benefits over a veteran's lifetime depends upon the veteran's level of impairment at the time he or she begins receiving IU benefits and the length of time these benefits are received. To illustrate the potential amount of IU benefits that could be received, GAO estimated the lifetime present value of the added benefits in disability compensation for veterans with different impairment levels who began receipt of IU benefits in 2005 at different ages. GAO found that the lifetime present value of these benefits can range from about $300,000 to over $460,000 for veterans age 20 in 2005, and about $89,000 to about $142,000 for veterans age 75 in 2005. GAO also found that just under half (45.6 percent) of new IU beneficiaries was awarded IU benefits at the age of 60 or older, and 19.2 percent were age 75 or older. VA's criteria, guidance, and procedures for awarding IU benefits do not ensure that its IU decisions are well supported. VA regulations and guidelines lack key criteria and guidance that are needed to determine unemployability. VA guidelines also do not give rating specialists the procedures to obtain the employment history and vocational assessments needed to support IU decisions. As a result, some VA staff told us that IU benefits have been granted to some veterans with employment potential. In addition, VA's process for ensuring the ongoing eligibility of IU beneficiaries is inefficient and ineffective. This enforcement process relies on old data, outdated, time-consuming manual procedures, insufficient guidance, and weak eligibility criteria. Moreover, the agency does not track and review its enforcement activities to better ensure their effectiveness. VA is among the federal disability programs GAO has identified as high risk and in need of modernization, in part, because it is poorly positioned to provide meaningful and timely support to help veterans with disabilities return to work. Specifically, VA's compensation program does not reflect the current state of science, technology, medicine, and the labor market. VA's management of IU benefits exemplifies these problems because its practices lag behind those of other disability programs. Approaches from other disability programs demonstrate the importance of providing return-to-work services and using vocational expertise to assess the claimant's condition and provide the appropriate services. Incorporating return-to-work practices in IU decision making could help VA modernize its disability program to enable veterans to realize their full potential without jeopardizing the availability of benefits for veterans who cannot work. |
gao_GAO-17-584T | gao_GAO-17-584T_0 | The 2020 Decennial Census is not the first decennial census to be on GAO’s High- Risk-List. Its plan for 2020 includes four broad innovation areas (re- engineered field operations, administrative records, verifying addresses in-office, and the Internet self-response option). The Bureau Needs to Manage Risks of Implementing Innovations
The Bureau Is Planning Many Previously Unused Innovations for the 2020 Census
The four innovation areas the Bureau plans for 2020 show promise for a more cost-effective head count (see table 1). However, they also introduce new risks, in part because they include new procedures and technology that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at all. As a result, it will be imperative that the Bureau conduct a robust testing program culminating in the 2018 End-to-End Test that is to demonstrate the systems and operations that will be used for 2020 under operational conditions. The Bureau Is Not Fully Prepared to Implement Key IT Capabilities
The Bureau Continues to Face Challenges in Managing and Overseeing IT Programs, Systems, and Contractors Supporting the Decennial
The Bureau is managing the acquisition and development of new and modified IT systems, which adds complexity to the design of the census. We have previously reported that the Bureau has faced challenges in managing internal coordination and governance, contracts, schedule, scope, and costs for its IT systems, and we have ongoing work reviewing each of these challenges: Internal coordination and governance. This delay reduces the time available for the integration and security testing activities leading up to the 2018 End-to-End test. The Bureau is still in the midst of determining the full complement of systems to be used for the 2018 End-to-End Test (beginning in August 2017) as well as the 2020 Census. For example, the scope of work for the integration contract has increased since the contract was awarded in August 2016, and the corresponding costs are likely to rise as well. Thus, it will be important that these security assessments are completed in a timely manner and that risks are at an acceptable level before the systems are deployed. The Bureau Needs to Improve the Reliability of Its 2020 Cost Estimate
Estimation Does Not Conform to Best Practices
In June 2016, we reported that the Bureau’s October 2015 update of the life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census did not conform to the four characteristics that constitute best practices, and, as a result, the estimate was unreliable. In 2016, we reported that although the Bureau had taken significant steps to improve its capacity to carry out an effective cost estimate, such as establishing an independent cost estimation office, its October 2015 version of the estimate for the 2020 Census only partially met the characteristics of two best practices (comprehensive and accurate) and minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). Several Events Indicate That the Cost of Some Elements of the 2020 Census Design Are Increasing
The Bureau has not published an update to its October 2015 cost estimate, yet several events since then suggest that the cost of the current design could be higher. In summary, while the Bureau has made substantial progress in revamping its approach to the census and testing the new design, considerable challenges and uncertainties remain in (1) implementing the cost-saving innovations; (2) managing key IT systems, including ensuring their security, to support the census; and (3) developing a quality cost estimate for the 2020 Census. For these reasons the 2020 Census is a GAO high-risk area. | Why GAO Did This Study
One of the most important functions of the Bureau is conducting a complete and accurate decennial census of the U.S. population, which is mandated by the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. A complete count of the nation's population is an enormous challenge as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census, implement operational innovations, and use new and modified IT systems. In recent years, GAO has identified challenges that raise serious concerns about the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective enumeration. For these reasons, GAO added the 2020 Census to the High-Risk List in February 2017.
In this statement, GAO discusses three challenges: (1) implementing new innovations, (2) implementing and securing critical IT systems (3) and ensuring the reliability of the Bureau's cost estimate for the 2020 Census.
The information in this testimony is based primarily on GAO's previous reports on the Bureau's planning efforts for 2020. GAO also collected and reviewed new information on the following Bureau activities: (1) recent decisions on preparations for the 2020 Census, (2) IT security testing leading up to the 2017 Census Test, (3) progress on key systems to be used for the 2018 Census Test, and (4) efforts to update its life-cycle cost estimate.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) is planning many innovations for the 2020 Census, including re-engineering field operations, using administrative records to supplement census data, verifying addresses in-office using on screen imagery, and allowing the public to respond using the Internet. These innovations show promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new risks, in part because they include new procedures and technologies that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at all. It will be important for the Bureau to fully test these activities under census-like conditions during the 2018 End-to-End Test scheduled to begin August 2017 and make appropriate modifications.
The Bureau continues to face challenges in managing and overseeing the information technology (IT) programs, systems, and contracts supporting the decennial census. These challenges include managing internal coordination and governance, contracts, schedule, scope, and IT costs. For example, GAO expects that the IT costs will rise due to increases in the scope of work for the integration contract. In addition, the Bureau needs to address several security risks and challenges to secure its systems and data, including ensuring that security assessments are completed in a timely manner. Given that the 2018 End-to-End test begins in August 2017, it will be important that the agency work to address these challenges quickly. GAO has ongoing work that is reviewing each of these challenges.
The Bureau's October 2015 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect characteristics of a high-quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable. Overall, GAO found that the cost estimate partially met the characteristics of two best practices (comprehensive and accurate) and minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). Additionally, the Bureau has not published an update to its October 2015 cost estimate, yet several events since then including changes to the census design suggest that the cost of the current design (around $12.5 billion in 2020 constant dollars) could be higher than planned.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has previously made a number of recommendations to address issues raised in this testimony, many of which have not yet been implemented. |
gao_GAO-10-790 | gao_GAO-10-790_0 | DHS and Coast Guard Acquisition Policies and Processes Continue to Evolve, Further Establishing the Coast Guard as Systems Integrator
DHS has revised its approach to managing and overseeing Deepwater by conforming the program to its recently finalized acquisition directive, Acquisition Management Directive 102-01, which establishes a number of review points for the department’s acquisitions to provide senior acquisition officials insight into such key documents as baselines and test reports. DHS has increased the number of reviews of individual Deepwater assets and plans to review up to six assets in fiscal year 2010. For its part, the Coast Guard’s MSAM is generally aligned with DHS directives although operational testing policies are still being revised, and the Coast Guard has developed additional guidance on completing key requirements documents. The Coast Guard is also decreasing its dependence on ICGS by planning for alternate vendors on some of the assets already in production, as well as awarding and managing work outside of the ICGS contract for those assets at earlier stages of the acquisition life cycle. However, Coast Guard and DHS approval of key documentation such as program baselines can take months. The new asset-specific baselines that have been developed—and approved by DHS for seven of nine assets—put the total cost of Deepwater at roughly $28 billion, or $3.8 billion over the $24.2 billion baseline. The revised baselines also present life-cycle costs, which encompass the acquisition cost as well as costs for operations and maintenance throughout the assets’ life cycle. While the revised baselines show a significant decrease in life-cycle costs compared to the 2007 baseline, the Coast Guard’s understanding of these costs continues to evolve as the agency revisits its assumptions and produces new cost estimates. These baselines also indicate that some schedules are expected to be delayed by several years. Further, as the Coast Guard develops more refined requirements, it has redefined or eliminated key performance indicators for many individual assets, while significant uncertainties surround other assets like C4ISR, the key to the system-of-systems as initially envisioned and approved. In the meantime, the Coast Guard and DHS are proceeding with acquisition decision events on individual assets. Further growth could occur, as four Deepwater assets currently lack revised cost baselines. Among them is the largest cost driver in the program, the 25 cutters of the Offshore Patrol Cutter class which, in the 2007 baseline, accounted for over 33 percent of the $24.2 billion total acquisition cost. System-level Performance Baselines Unlikely to be Met
In addition to establishing cost and schedule baselines, the 2007 Deepwater acquisition program baseline also established a baseline for system-of-systems level performance and the key performance parameters at the asset level that contribute to this performance. Coast Guard Has Not Yet Revalidated the Quantities or Mix of Assets Required to Meet Needs
While the Coast Guard has made progress in revising baselines for the cost, schedule, and capabilities of individual assets, it has not yet revalidated the quantities of those assets needed to meet operational needs—as it stated that it would in assuming the role of systems integrator. The results of the analysis have not been released. As the Coast Guard assumes the role of system integrator it is important that it understand its needs and builds an acquisition workforce to manage the Deepwater Program. This increase in number of positions has had an effect on the Coast Guard’s current vacancy rate. Recommendation for Executive Action
To capitalize on the increase in knowledge gained by creating new baselines for Deepwater assets, and to better manage acquisitions of further assets and capabilities, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard complete, and present to Congress, a comprehensive review of the Deepwater Program that clarifies the overall cost, schedule, quantities, and mix of assets that are needed to meet mission needs and what trade-offs need to be made considering fiscal constraints, given that the currently approved Deepwater baseline is no longer feasible. To assess the Coast Guard’s efforts to manage and build its acquisition workforce, we reviewed Coast Guard information on government, contractor, and vacant positions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Deepwater Program includes efforts to build or modernize ships and aircraft and to procure other capabilities. After a series of project failures, the Coast Guard announced in 2007 that it was taking over the systems integrator role from Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS). At the same time, a $24.2 billion program baseline was established which included schedule and performance parameters at an overall system level. GAO has previously reported on the Coast Guard's progress in establishing individual baselines for Deepwater assets and has made a number of recommendations, which have largely been addressed. In response to the conference report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2010, GAO assessed (1) DHS and Coast Guard acquisition policies and approach to managing the program, (2) whether the program is meeting the 2007 baseline, and (3) Coast Guard efforts to manage and build its acquisition workforce. GAO reviewed Coast Guard and DHS policies and program documents, and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
DHS has revised its approach to managing and overseeing Deepwater by making the program subject to its recently finalized acquisition directive, which establishes a number of review points to provide insight into such key documents as baselines and test reports. DHS has also increased the number of its reviews of individual Deepwater assets. The Coast Guard's own management policies are generally aligned with DHS directives, although operational testing policies are still being revised, and it has developed additional guidance on completion of key requirements documents. In taking on the systems integrator role, the Coast Guard is also decreasing its dependence on ICGS by planning for alternate vendors on some of the assets already in production, as well as awarding and managing work outside of the ICGS contract for other assets. Currently, the Deepwater Program exceeds the 2007 cost and schedule baselines, and given revisions to performance parameters for certain assets, it is unlikely to meet system-level performance baselines. The asset-specific baselines that have been approved to date, while providing greater insight into asset-level capabilities, place the total cost of Deepwater at roughly $28 billion, or $3.8 billion over the $24.2 billion 2007 baseline. The revised baselines also present life-cycle costs, which encompass the acquisition cost as well as costs for operations and maintenance. While the revised baselines show a significant decrease in life-cycle costs, due to changes to assumptions like shorter service lives for assets, the Coast Guard's understanding of them continues to evolve as the agency revisits its assumptions and produces new cost estimates. Costs could continue to grow as four assets currently lack revised cost baselines; among them is the largest cost driver in the Deepwater Program, the Offshore Patrol Cutter. The asset-level baselines also indicate that schedules for some assets are expected to be delayed by several years. Regarding system-level performance, the 2007 baseline may not be achievable, as the Coast Guard has redefined or eliminated key performance indicators for many individual assets, while significant uncertainties surround other assets. Further, a planned analysis to reassess the overall fleet mix for Deepwater was not completed as planned, and a new analysis will include surface assets only. In the meantime, the Coast Guard and DHS are proceeding with acquisition decisions on individual assets. The Coast Guard continues to take steps to address its acquisition workforce needs as it assumes the role of system integrator. For example, it is using a workforce planning model to estimate current and future needs for key acquisition personnel. The Coast Guard has also begun to implement initiatives such as promoting career growth for acquisition professionals. External limitations on the availability of acquisition personnel, coupled with 100 new positions authorized in fiscal year 2010, place the Coast Guard's acquisition directorate vacancy rate at about 20 percent. While it is using contractors in support roles, the Coast Guard has released guidance regarding the roles of government staff in overseeing contractors.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Coast Guard complete an overall assessment that clarifies the quantities, mix, and cost of assets needed to meet requirements, given that the current Deepwater baseline is no longer feasible, and that the results be reported to Congress. DHS concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-349 | gao_GAO-05-349_0 | Use of Consumer Loans That Are Considered Predatory Is Unknown, but Sources Say Predatory Lenders May Be Targeting Servicemembers
The extent to which active duty servicemembers use consumer loans considered to be predatory and the effects of such borrowing are unknown, but many sources suggest that predatory lenders may be targeting servicemembers. While DOD has some data on servicemembers’ use of four types of loans, DOD is unable to quantify the extent to which these types of loans have associated predatory practices, the frequency of borrowing, the amounts borrowed, or the effects of the loans. In the August 2004 DOD survey, 12 percent of servicemembers indicated that, during the last 12 months, they or their spouse had used at least one of the four specified types of financial loans that DOD says may have associated predatory practices. Although not generalizable to all active duty servicemembers and their spouses, some of the more than 400 participants in our 60 focus groups reported encountering problems when they used the short-term consumer loans; while other servicemembers said such loans have positive elements such as being quick, easy, and obtainable even if servicemembers had a bad credit history (see app. These included payday loans, rent-to-own transactions, and automobile title pawns. DOD’s Tools for Curbing the Use and Effects of Predatory Lending Underutilized
DOD and servicemembers are underutilizing the tools that DOD has for curbing predatory lending practices and the effects of such lending. While commanders at some installations we visited have changed the unfair practices of businesses by using recommendations from Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards to place or threaten to place businesses on off- limits lists to servicemembers, boards at other installations we visited rarely met or made such recommendations. Recently, DOD has sought to expand the tools available for curbing the use and effects of predatory lending practices by exploring additional on-installation alternatives to payday loans. The board at Fort Drum, New York, had not met in about 4 years because the board’s Director did not see a reason to convene. He was not aware of two recent, lending-related lawsuits filed by the New York Attorney General that had connections with Fort Drum servicemembers. Third, significant effort may be required to put businesses on off- limits lists. Advertising in Installation Newspapers Could Confuse Servicemembers about Whether the Military Endorses Payday Lenders
In some instances, DOD is not providing a clear message about whether it endorses advertisers in official installation newspapers. A DOD instruction requires installation publications to run disclaimers warning readers that advertisements do not constitute endorsement by the U.S. government. Among other things, the public affairs staff is to review advertisements and identify any that may be detrimental to DOD personnel or their family members. Servicemembers participating in our focus groups said they were confused because DOD officials and information provided during PFM training warned against using payday lenders but such lenders were allowed to advertise in installation newspapers. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following two recommendations to the Secretary of Defense: To improve DOD’s ability to curb the use and effects of predatory lending practices, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to amend existing regulations to require installation commanders to convene the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards at least semiannually to investigate and make recommendations to commanders on matters related to eliminating conditions which adversely affect the health, safety, morals, welfare, morale, and discipline of the Armed Forces, to include servicemembers’ use of lenders who may use predatory lending practices. To assess whether DOD was fully utilizing the tools that it has to curb the use and effects of predatory lending practices, we obtained information from the laws, policies, directives, and reports that were used to address servicemembers’ use of loans that DOD considered to be predatory in nature. Example: Some Marines feel that a business would not take advantage of them because they are in the military. Related GAO Products
Military Personnel: More DOD Actions Needed to Address Servicemembers’ Personal Financial Management Issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has expressed concerns about servicemembers' use of predatory consumer loans as well as their overall financial conditions. "Predatory lending" has no precise definition but describes cases where a lender takes unfair advantage of a borrower, sometimes through deception, fraud, or terms such as very high interest or fees. Serious financial problems can adversely affect unit morale and readiness as well as servicemembers' credit history and military career. DOD has tools such as off-limits lists to help curb the use and effects of predatory loans. GAO answered two questions: (1) To what extent do active duty servicemembers use consumer loans considered to be predatory in nature? and (2) Are DOD and active duty servicemembers fully utilizing the tools that DOD has to curb the use and effects of predatory lending practices?
What GAO Found
The extent to which active duty servicemembers use consumer loans considered to be predatory and the effects of that borrowing are unknown. The only DOD-wide data come from surveys. In a 2004 survey, 12 percent of servicemembers said they or their spouse had used, during the last 12 months, at least one of four types of loans: payday, rent-to-own, automobile title pawn, or tax refund, which DOD says can often be associated with predatory lending practices. DOD is unable to quantify the extent to which the loans have associated predatory practices, the frequency of such borrowing, the amounts borrowed, or the effects of the loans. Although not generalizable, participants in GAO's 60 focus groups at 13 bases in the United States and Germany identified problems resulting from the use of short-term consumer loans, but other participants described the loans as quick, easy, and obtainable by servicemembers with bad credit. Privacy concerns and the reluctance of servicemembers to reveal financial problems make it difficult to quantify the use and effects of predatory lending. DOD and active duty servicemembers are not fully utilizing DOD's tools for curbing the use and effects of predatory lending practices. At some of the installations that we visited, the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board--a panel that can recommend to an installation commander that a business be placed off-limits to servicemembers--had not met in over a year. Fort Drum's board, for example, had not met in about 4 years, even though the New York Attorney General had filed two lending-related lawsuits against businesses on behalf of servicemembers and some of their family members at Fort Drum. DOD officials told us the reasons for boards not meeting or making recommendations include high deployment levels and the effort required to place a business on an off-limits list. Other commanders effectively changed businesses' predatory practices by using their board's recommendations to place or threaten to place the businesses off-limits. In addition, DOD is not always providing a clear message regarding advertising in installation publications. Participants in GAO's focus groups said they were confused because DOD-provided financial management training (described in our 2005 report, Military Personnel: More DOD Actions Needed to Address Servicemembers' Personal Financial Management Issues) warned them against using payday lenders but some installation newspapers carried advertisements for such businesses. These problems occur even though a DOD instruction requires (1) a disclaimer indicating that the advertisement does not constitute endorsement by the U.S. government and (2) a review by public affairs staff to determine if the advertisement might be detrimental to servicemembers. Our review of some installation newspapers showed possible reasons for the confusion; the disclaimers were often not prominently displayed or were located away from the advertisements. DOD also offers servicemembers free legal review of contracts and other financial transactions, but servicemembers often do not use the reviews until problems result. Recently, DOD began exploring additional on-installation alternatives to payday loans. |
gao_GGD-97-23 | gao_GGD-97-23_0 | For example, as we mentioned above, holding companies may have subsidiary holding companies that have their own banking or nonbanking subsidiaries. Our objectives were to (1) discuss previously reported problems with the bank oversight structure in the United States, (2) summarize those characteristics of the five countries’ regulatory structures that might be useful for Congress to consider in any U.S. modernization efforts, and (3) identify potential avenues for modernizing the U.S. banking oversight structure. Other examiners from the same agency focus on consumer protection and community reinvestment performance of banking institutions. In all five countries we studied, banking organizations typically were subject to consolidated oversight, with one oversight entity being legally responsible and accountable for the entire banking organization, including its banking and nonbanking subsidiaries. In France, Germany, and Japan the central bank was one of two principal oversight agencies, but the countries had different structures for involving the central banks in bank oversight. We believe that the federal bank oversight structure should include: (1) clearly defined responsibility for consolidated and comprehensive oversight of entire banking organizations, with coordinated functional regulation and supervision of individual components; (2) independence from undue political pressure, balanced by appropriate accountability and adequate congressional oversight; (3) consistent rules, consistently applied for similar activities; and (4) enhanced efficiency and reduced regulatory burden, consistent with maintaining safety and soundness. In five recent reports, we reviewed the structure and operations of bank regulation and supervision activities in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K. Each of the oversight structures of these five countries reflects a unique history, culture, and banking industry, and, as a result, no two of the five oversight structures are identical. Nevertheless, certain aspects of these structures may be useful to consider in future efforts to modernize banking oversight in the United States, even though no structure as a whole likely would be appropriate to adopt in the United States. Some countries relied on the work of external auditors, at least in part, for purposes of efficiency. Recommendations
GAO’s work on the five foreign oversight systems showed that there are a number of different ways to simplify bank oversight in the United States in accordance with the four principles of consolidated oversight, independence, consistency, and enhanced efficiency and reduced burden. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed its previous work on the structure and operations of bank oversight in five countries, focusing on: (1) aspects of those systems that may be useful for Congress to consider in any future modernization efforts; (2) perceived problems with federal bank oversight in the United States; and (3) principles for modernizing the U.S. federal bank oversight structure.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the five foreign banking systems reviewed had less complex and more streamlined oversight structures than the United States; (2) in all five countries, fewer national agencies were involved with bank regulation and supervision than in the United States; (3) in all but one of these countries, both the central bank and the ministry of finance had some role in bank oversight, and several of these countries relied on the work of the banks' external auditors to perform certain oversight functions; (4) in all cases, there was one entity that was clearly responsible and accountable for consolidated oversight of banking organizations as a whole; (5) the bank oversight structure in the United States is relatively complex, with four different federal agencies having the same basic oversight responsibilities for those banks under their respective purview; (6) industry representatives and expert observers have contended that multiple examinations and reporting requirements resulting from the shared oversight responsibilities of four different regulators contribute to banks' regulatory burden, and that the federal oversight structure is inherently inefficient; (7) having one agency responsible for examining all U.S. bank holding companies, with a different agency or agencies responsible for examining the holding companies' principal banks, could result in overlap and a lack of clear responsibility and accountability for consolidated oversight of U.S. banking operations; and (8) any modernized banking structure should provide for clearly defined responsibility and accountability for consolidated and comprehensive oversight, independence from undue political pressure, consistent rules, consistently applied for similar activities, and enhanced efficiency and reduced regulatory burden. |
gao_GAO-06-755T | gao_GAO-06-755T_0 | More Than 1,280 CFC Charities Had Tax Debts Totaling $35.6 Million
Based on our analysis, more than 1,280 CFC charities had federal tax debts totaling $35.6 million as of September 30, 2005. This represented nearly 6 percent of the charities that participated in the OPM-administered 2005 campaign. $27.7 million of this debt represented payroll taxes, penalties, and interest dating as far back as 1988. The remaining $7.9 million includes annual reporting penalties, excise taxes, exempt organization business income, unemployment taxes, and other types of taxes and penalties. Generally, the IRS requires 501(c)(3) charities with more than $25,000 of income to file an annual return (i.e., Form 990). The majority of the approximately 1,280 delinquent charities, 78 percent, owed less than $10,000 in delinquent taxes. Some CFC Charities with Delinquent Tax Debt Also Received Substantial Federal Grants
In performing our analysis, we identified at least 170 of the CFC charities with delinquent tax debt that also received federal grants totaling about $1.6 billion from the Departments of Health and Human Services (excluding Medicaid), Education, and others in 2005. Willful failure to remit payroll taxes is a felony under U.S. law, and the IRS can assess a trust fund recovery penalty (TFRP) equal to the total amount of taxes not collected or not accounted for and paid against all individuals who are determined by the IRS to be “willful and responsible” for the nonpayment of withheld payroll taxes. During the time frames for which these charities were not paying their taxes, funds were available to cover other charity expenses, including officer salaries. We referred all 15 cases discussed in our report to the IRS so that it can determine whether additional collection action or criminal investigation is warranted. To demonstrate the vulnerability of OPM’s lack of validation of tax-exempt status, we applied to three of CFC’s largest local 2006 campaigns using a fictitious charity with entirely false documents and an erroneous IRS taxpayer identification number. OPM does not perform any independent verification of charity applicants’ tax-exempt status. Therefore, we referred these charities to OPM and IRS for further review and confirmation of their tax-exempt status. Concluding Observations
The success of the OPM’s CFC is predicated on each donor’s confidence in a system that ensures that their donations reach charitable organizations that have met the CFC’s specific eligibility requirements and are legitimate charities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to investigate and determine whether and to what extent (1) charities listed in the 2005 Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) have unpaid payroll and other federal taxes; (2) selected charities, their directors, or senior officers are abusing the federal tax system; and (3) the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) screens charities for federal tax problems before allowing them to be listed with the CFC. To determine whether any of the charities listed in the 2005 CFC have unpaid payroll and other federal taxes, we first identified charities that participated in the 2005 campaign. To determine whether selected charities, their directors, or senior officers are abusing the federal tax system, we selected 15 charities for a detailed audit and investigation. As with the 5 cases discussed in the body of this testimony, for all 10 of these case studies we found abuse or potentially criminal activity related to the federal tax system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) administers the annual Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), which gave more than 22,000 charities access to the federal workplace, helping those in need by collecting more than $250 million in donations during the 2005 campaign. The success of the campaign is predicated on each donor's confidence in a system that ensures donations reach charitable organizations that have met the CFC's specific eligibility requirements and are legitimate charities. For example, to be eligible, each charity must have formally received from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax-exemption designation under 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Subcommittee on Oversight is reviewing tax-exempt status entities and asked GAO to determine whether charitable organizations participating in the CFC were remitting their payroll and other taxes to the IRS as required by law. Specifically, GAO was asked to investigate and determine whether and to what extent (1) charities listed in the 2005 CFC have unpaid payroll and other taxes; (2) selected charities, their directors or senior officers are abusing the federal tax system; and (3) OPM screens charities for federal tax problems before allowing them to be listed with the CFC.
What GAO Found
More than 1,280 CFC charities, or about 6 percent of charities in the OPM- administered 2005 campaign, had tax debts totaling approximately $36 million as of September 30, 2005. The majority of delinquent charities owed less than $10,000. Approximately $28 million of this debt represented payroll taxes, penalties, and interest dating back as far as 1988. The remaining $8 million represented annual reporting penalties, excise taxes, exempt organization business income, unemployment taxes, and other types of taxes and penalties during this same period. Further, at least 170 of the charities with tax debt received about $1.6 billion in federal grants in 2005. GAO investigated 15 CFC charities, selected primarily for the amount and age of their outstanding tax debt. All 15 charities engaged in abusive and potentially criminal activity related to the federal tax system. Although exempt from certain taxes (e.g., federal income tax), these charities had not forwarded payroll taxes withheld from their employees along with other taxes to the IRS. Willful failure to remit payroll taxes is a felony under U.S. law. However, rather than fulfill their role as trustees of this money and forward it to the IRS, the directors and senior officers diverted the money for charity-related expenses, including their own salaries, some of which were in excess of $100,000. We referred all 15 of these charities to the IRS for consideration of additional collection or criminal investigation. OPM does not screen CFC charities for federal tax problems or independently validate with the IRS whether the charity is truly a tax-exempt organization. Federal law prevents OPM from accessing taxpayer information required to screen for tax delinquency, although information on exempt status is available to the public. Consequently, OPM was unaware of the charities that owed federal tax debt and cannot provide assurance that the more than 22,000 participating charities are tax-exempt organizations. To demonstrate the vulnerability of this process, GAO created a fictitious charity and successfully applied to three large local campaigns. |
gao_GAO-03-486 | gao_GAO-03-486_0 | According to IRS’s estimate, it revised about 450 tax forms and instructions in 2001 that affected individual and business tax returns. Benefits of Testing Forms and Instructions Can Far Exceed IRS’s Costs
The benefits of testing some changes to IRS’s forms and instructions can considerably exceed IRS’s costs to do tests, especially because so many taxpayers can be affected by improvements in clarity that may result from testing. Finally, to illustrate the potential benefits if testing EIC and Child Tax Credit forms and instructions made them clearer and thereby reduced taxpayers’ time needed to understand and complete the credit forms, we calculated the value of time saved by taxpayers (using minimum wage levels) in understanding and completing EIC and Child Tax Credit forms assuming the time saved was 1 minute. IRS Has Not Addressed Constraints to Increased Testing
Although IRS officials said that making greater use of testing to improve clarity of forms and instructions could be beneficial, officials have not addressed the two constraints—time and resources—that they state limit their ability to do more testing of changes to forms and instructions. IRS’s current procedures for developing and revising forms and instructions do not clearly specify which draft version of forms and instructions should be tested with taxpayers or when in the annual forms development cycle testing should occur. However, because IRS does not have a clear targeted time for testing, IRS’s ability to plan and conduct tests maybe constrained. Although they recognize that testing is beneficial, officials say time constraints and limited resources preclude more testing. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine how often IRS has used taxpayers to test the clarity of new or revised individual income tax forms and instructions, we interviewed officials in its W&I Division’s Tax Forms and Publications Division in Washington, D.C. We sought to obtain (a) an understanding of the process IRS used to develop and revise individual income tax forms and instructions and (b) gather information on the forms and instructions IRS tested using taxpayers for the 5-year period between July 1997 and June 2002. To determine whether any factors limited IRS’s ability to use individual taxpayers to test forms and instructions and, if so, how these factors can be addressed, we interviewed IRS’s Tax Forms and Publications Division’s officials and analyzed supporting data they provided us. Unlike IRS, described below, these agencies routinely test their forms, surveys, and questionnaires prior to distribution to the public. Appendix III: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service | Why GAO Did This Study
Taxpayers rated the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) ability to provide clear and easy-to-use forms and instructions among the lowest of 27 indicators of service in 1993. Due to continuing concerns about unclear forms and instructions, GAO was asked to determine (1) whether and how often IRS tests the clarity of new and revised individual income tax forms and instructions; (2) the benefits, if any, of testing forms and instructions for clarity prior to their use; and (3) whether any factors limit IRS's ability to do more tests and if so, how they can be addressed.
What GAO Found
IRS used taxpayers and its employees to test revisions to five individual income tax forms and instructions from July 1997 through June 2002. According to IRS officials, they revised about 450 tax forms and instructions in 2001, many of which were for individual income tax returns. Testing forms and instructions can help ensure their clarity and thereby benefit taxpayers and IRS by, for instance, reducing taxpayers' time to understand and complete tax forms, reducing calls to IRS for assistance, and reducing taxpayer errors. Due to similar benefits, federal agencies we contacted that routinely collect information from the public test their questionnaires. Quantifying benefits due to testing is difficult, but IRS's experience in revising and testing Earned Income Credit and Child Tax Credit forms and instructions suggests that benefits of testing in some cases can considerably exceed the cost of testing. If taxpayers who did their own tax returns needed 1 less minute to understand these two credits due to testing, their time saved, valued at the minimum wage, would be worth $1.2 million; IRS's contracting cost for the two tests was $56,000. Although IRS officials recognized that testing could be beneficial, they cited tight time frames and constrained resources as limiting their ability to do more tests. While IRS faces time constraints when making some changes to forms and instructions due to the passage of new laws, not all changes are time constrained. IRS does not have procedures specifying which versions of draft forms and instructions should be tested with taxpayers or when in its annual forms development process testing should occur. Resources currently available for testing are limited but the office responsible for testing has not developed data on missed testing opportunities and has limited data on the benefits that have been realized when testing occurred. IRS's planning and budgeting process uses such data to support resource allocation decisions. |
gao_GAO-17-8 | gao_GAO-17-8_0 | Recognizing IPTs’ potential to improve the federal government’s approach to managing IT investments, OMB has called for the development and use of IPTs for federal IT acquisitions. Three Characteristics Are Key to a Comprehensive Integrated Program Team; Shortfalls Have Contributed to Previous Acquisition Problems
Three key characteristics contribute to the creation and operation of comprehensive IT acquisition IPTs: (1) effective executive leadership through team support, empowerment, and oversight; (2) effective team composition; and (3) effective processes for team operations. Empower Team to Act
The people assigned to an IPT should have the appropriate authority to perform their assigned responsibilities. These three leadership stakeholders are involved in the gate review process and provide oversight. Projects are tracked using activity based costing. Shortfalls in team composition. Selected Departments Had Mixed Progress in Assessing Their IT Skill Gaps
One key element cuts across the characteristics and practices needed to build a strong IPT: IT workforce planning. Ensuring program staff have the necessary knowledge and skills is a factor commonly identified as critical to the success of major IT investments. Selected federal departments had mixed progress in assessing their IT skill gaps. While they have demonstrated important progress in either partially or fully implementing key IT workforce planning activities, each of the five departments had shortfalls. As shown in the figure, of the five departments, Defense had the most robust implementation with all eight activities fully or partially implemented. By not fully implementing key IT workforce planning activities, Defense runs the risk that it cannot adequately assess and address gaps in knowledge and skills that are critical to providing support for major acquisitions. For example, the department has only recently established policies to guide its workforce planning activities. While these are positive steps, these actions are not yet rooted in an IT workforce planning process that lays the foundation for how the department is to analyze its IT workforce skill gaps, develop and implement strategies to address gaps, and monitor and evaluate progress in addressing the gaps. The right mix of expertise to recognize problems early and the requisite authority to do something about them are contingent upon effective IT workforce planning. Recommendations for Executive Action
To facilitate the analysis of gaps between current skills and future needs, the development of strategies for filling the gaps, and succession planning, we are making a total of five recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and the Treasury. Of those five departments, four agreed with our recommendations and one, Defense, partially agreed. However, the department did not attach a copy of the workforce plan. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify key characteristics of a comprehensive integrated program team (IPT) responsible for managing a major federal information technology (IT) acquisition, and (2) evaluate whether selected federal agencies are adequately assessing and addressing gaps in knowledge and skills that are critical to the success of major IT acquisitions. To create the evaluation framework, we reviewed relevant laws and guidance to identify steps and activities for federal agencies to conduct IT workforce planning, including:
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996;
E-Government Act of 2002;
Legislation commonly referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act;
Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015;
OMB’s 25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information
OMB’s Guidance for Specialized Information Technology Cadres;
OMB’s Management and Oversight of Federal Information
OMB’s Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan for the
OMB’s Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Strategy;
OMB’s Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic
The Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Workforce Planning
OPM’s workforce planning guidance on key elements and suggested
OPM’s IT Program Management Career Path Guide; and
GAO guidance on federal internal control standards as well as key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2017, the federal government is expected to spend more than $89 billion on IT. In many instances, agencies have not consistently applied best practices that are critical to successfully acquiring IT investments, such as ensuring program staff have the necessary knowledge and skills. In an effort to aid agencies in successfully delivering projects, the Office of Management and Budget has called for the development and use of IPTs for federal IT acquisitions to ensure that projects consist of the appropriate mix of individuals. GAO was asked to review IPTs for federal IT acquisitions and the federal government's IT workforce planning.
GAO's objectives were to (1) identify key characteristics of comprehensive IPTs responsible for managing major federal IT acquisitions, and (2) evaluate whether selected federal agencies are adequately assessing and addressing gaps in knowledge and skills that are critical to the success of major IT acquisitions. To do so, GAO reviewed relevant literature; interviewed IPT experts; and evaluated IT workforce efforts at five departments: Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and the Treasury.
What GAO Found
Integrated program teams (IPT) are cross-functional or multidisciplinary groups of individuals that are organized and collectively responsible for delivering a product to an external or internal customer. GAO identified three characteristics that contribute to the creation and operation of a comprehensive IPT: (1) executive leadership through team support, empowerment, and oversight; (2) team composition; and (3) processes for team operations. GAO also identified 18 practices supporting these three characteristics (see figure). For example, executive leadership is effective when sufficient resources are provided and teams are empowered to act, team composition is more robust when the IPT has cross-functional and multidisciplinary skill sets, and team operations are streamlined when team guidelines are established and stakeholders are involved as active members. When implemented, these practices can increase the IPT's likelihood of success by having the right mix of expertise to recognize problems early and by having the requisite authority to do something about them.
While multiple factors contribute to a robust IPT, one aspect involves having a strong information technology (IT) workforce. To evaluate agencies' IT workforce planning efforts, GAO identified eight key workforce planning steps and activities based on relevant laws and guidance (see table).
Five federal departments had mixed progress in assessing their IT skill gaps. While all five departments had demonstrated important progress in either partially or fully implementing key IT workforce planning activities, each had shortfalls. For example, four departments had not demonstrated an established IT workforce planning process.
As shown in the figure, of the five departments, the Department of Defense had the most robust IT workforce planning process by fully or partially implementing all eight activities. However, the departments have not yet fully implemented all of the practices for various reasons. For example, policies were not comprehensive in requiring such activities or were not being applied to IT workforce planning at four departments, one department placed a greater emphasis on assessing its cybersecurity workforce, and two departments identified the need to perform more granular assessments of the workforce in order to identify skill gaps. Until the departments fully implement key workforce planning steps and activities, they risk not adequately assessing and addressing gaps in knowledge and skills that are critical to the success of major acquisitions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that selected departments implement IT workforce planning practices to facilitate more rigorous analyses of gaps between current skills and future needs, and the development of strategies for filling the gaps. Four departments agreed and one, Defense, partially agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-879 | gao_GAO-02-879_0 | Ultimately, at the fourth ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, WTO members were able to reach consensus on a new negotiating effort, officially called the Doha Development Agenda. Finally, the tragic events of September 11th helped galvanize WTO members to show their support for a strong and healthy worldwide trading system. U.S.-EU Relationship Was Critical
The strong support on the part of the United States and the European Union for the negotiations, bolstered by the positive relationship between the U.S. Trade Representative and the EU Commissioner for Trade, helped bring together other WTO members on specific issues and on the overall goal of launching a new set of global trade negotiations. Key Developments in Doha Won Developing Country Support
WTO officials and foreign representatives said that two developments at the Doha ministerial conference were crucial to gaining developing countries’ support to launch a new set of negotiations. Meeting Interim Deadline on Agricultural Trade Crucial but Difficult
According to several WTO member country representatives and senior WTO officials, whether WTO members meet the March 31, 2003, interim deadline for establishing the agricultural modalities (that is, numerical targets, timetables, and formulas for countries’ commitments) specified in the Doha Declaration will be a crucial indicator of the likelihood of success in the overall negotiations. For the European Union, the goals set out in the Doha Declaration for phasing out export subsidies present a serious challenge. A third aspect of the decision on modalities is to devise a formula for reducing tariffs on agricultural products. For example, the outcome of the ministerial conference in September 2003 in Cancun, Mexico, will be a critical indication of whether key decisions on agricultural trade and the Singapore issues can be made. The negotiations on market access for nonagricultural goods face several difficulties. They are also to liberalize trade in environmental goods and services. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance, the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, and the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade asked us to (1) analyze the factors that contributed to the Doha ministerial conference’s successful launch of new WTO negotiations, (2) analyze the key interim deadlines for the most sensitive issues, from the present time through the next ministerial conference in 2003, and (3) evaluate the most significant challenges facing the WTO in the overall negotiations. | What GAO Found
In November 2001, the World Trade Organization launched a new set of multilateral negotiations at its ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar. The ministerial conference was important because it laid out an ambitious agenda for a broad set of new multilateral trade negotiations, set forth in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. The declaration calls for a continuation of discussions on liberalizing trade in agriculture and services which began in 2000. In addition, it provides for new talks on market access for nonagricultural products, trade and the environment, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, and other issues. Four main factors led to the World Trade Organization's successful launch of new multilateral trade negotiations in Doha. First, the United States' and the European Union's clear support of the launch, bolstered by the strong personal relationship between the U.S. Trade Representative and the European Union Commissioner for Trade, facilitated agreement on the agenda for new negotiations. Second, World Trade Organization members applied an effective preparation strategy before the Doha ministerial conference. Third, some key developments at the Doha conference helped gain support from the developing countries for launching negotiations. Last, World Trade Organization officials and member country representatives said that the tragic events of September 11th galvanized Organization members to show their support for a strong and healthy worldwide trading system. The Doha Declaration requires negotiators to make early, crucial decisions because it mandates several important interim deadlines. One of these deadlines involves decisions on agricultural trade, where World Trade Organization members must agree on modalities, or methodologies, timetables, and desired targets, for reducing agricultural export subsidies, domestic support, and agricultural tariffs by March 31, 2003. The second interim deadline concerns the "Singapore issues," which Organization members must decide whether to include in the negotiations by the next ministerial conference in September 2003. The overriding challenge for the World Trade Organization in the negotiations will be to forge consensus within its large and diverse membership and to deal with several difficult organizational issues. In addition, the Organization will need to overcome the negative effects of outside events, such as disputes among its key members. |
gao_GAO-04-53 | gao_GAO-04-53_0 | This best practices model enables decision makers to be reasonably certain about their products at critical junctures during development and helps them make informed investment decisions. This knowledge-based process can be broken down into three cumulative knowledge points. While the user may not initially receive the ultimate capability under this approach, the initial product is available sooner and at a lower, more predictable cost. DOD’s Revised Policy Provides a Framework for Knowledge-Based, Evolutionary Acquisitions
DOD’s leaders have made significant improvements to DOD’s acquisition policy by adopting the knowledge-based, evolutionary approach used by leading commercial companies. In placing greater emphasis on evolutionary product development, the policy sets up a more manageable environment for achieving knowledge. Leading companies have used this approach to reduce risks and to make costs and delivery dates more predictable. Controls Are Needed to Ensure Knowledge-Based Approach Is Followed
While DOD has strengthened its acquisition policy with a knowledge- based, evolutionary framework, the policy does not include many of the same controls that leading companies rely on to attain a high level of knowledge before making additional significant investments. To determine if DOD has the necessary controls, we compared controls in DOD’s policy with those used in the best practices model at three critical junctures. DOD was responsive to all three requirements. Each report is required to (1) identify any major acquisition program that entered system development and demonstration during the preceding calendar year with immature key technology that was not demonstrated in, at minimum, a relevant environment, as required by the new policy; (2) justify the incorporation of any key technology on an acquisition program that does not meet that requirement; (3) identify any instances that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology did not concur with the technology assessment and explain how the issue has been or will be resolved; (4) identify each case in which a decision was made not to conduct an independent technology readiness assessment for a critical technology on a major defense acquisition; and (5) explain the reasons for the decision each year through 2006. Conclusions
DOD can maximize its $1 trillion investment in new weapons over the next 6 years by ensuring effective implementation of the new acquisition policy. DOD stated that it agrees in principle with the advantages of using knowledge-based controls at key points in the acquisition process to assess risk and ensure readiness to proceed into the next phase of the acquisition process. DOD’s policy does not include all the necessary controls to ensure a high level of product knowledge is attained and used for making decisions to move a program forward in the product development process. We reviewed the relevant sections of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 and the accompanying Senate Armed Services Committee report to identify the requirements applicable to DOD’s acquisition policy. We compared these requirements with DOD’s responses to determine whether they have been addressed. Appendix I: Section 802, Evolutionary Acquisition
Section 802 of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress explaining how the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to meet certain statutory and regulatory requirements for acquisition programs following an evolutionary approach. As shown in the table, DOD’s policy generally responded to the requirements in the act concerning guidance for implementation of spiral development programs. Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) investment in new weapon systems is expected to exceed $1 trillion from fiscal years 2003 to 2009. To reduce the risk of cost and schedule overruns, DOD revamped its acquisition policy in May 2003. The policy provides detailed guidance on how weapon systems acquisitions should be managed. The Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required GAO to determine whether DOD's policy supports knowledge-based, evolutionary acquisitions and whether the policy provides the necessary controls for DOD to ensure successful outcomes, such as meeting cost and schedule goals. The report also required GAO to assess whether the policy is responsive to certain requirements in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 concerning DOD's management of the acquisition process.
What GAO Found
DOD's new policy supports knowledge-based, evolutionary acquisitions by adopting lessons learned from successful commercial companies. One of those lessons is a knowledge-based approach, which requires program managers to attain the right knowledge at critical junctures--also known as knowledge points--so they can make informed investment decisions throughout the acquisition process. The policy also embraces an evolutionary or phased development approach, which sets up a more manageable environment for attaining knowledge. The customer may not get the ultimate capability right away, but the product is available sooner and at a lower cost. Leading firms have used these approaches--which form the backbone of what GAO calls the best practices model--to determine whether a project can be accomplished with the time and money available and to reduce risks before moving a product to the next stage of development. By adopting best practices in the acquisition policy, DOD's leadership has taken a significant step forward. The next step is to provide the necessary controls to ensure a knowledge-based, evolutionary approach. Implementing the necessary controls at all three knowledge points along the acquisition process helps decision makers ensure a knowledge-based approach is followed. Without controls in the form of measurable criteria that decision makers must consider, DOD runs the risk of making decisions based on overly optimistic assumptions. Each successive knowledge point builds on the preceding one, and having clearly established controls helps decision makers gauge progress in meeting goals and ensuring successful outcomes. DOD was responsive to the requirements in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. DOD's responses reflected the committee's specific concerns about the application of certain statutory and regulatory requirements to the new evolutionary acquisition process, for more guidance for implementing spiral development, and about technology readiness at program initiations. |
gao_GAO-15-133 | gao_GAO-15-133_0 | DOD Primarily Relies on Contractors to Determine Needs for Specialty Metals and Verify Compliance with Restrictions
The Department of Defense (DOD) monitors the availability of specialty metals and conducts periodic quality assurance reviews; but played a limited role in planning for the procurement of specialty metals and ensuring compliance with specialty metals’ restrictions for the five programs we reviewed. We reviewed selected prime contracts for these programs and found they contained clauses requiring prime contractors to procure specialty metals in compliance with domestic source restrictions, ensure that delivered items meet contract technical requirements as part of quality assurance, and maintain processes for meeting future material needs. In turn, these prime contractors told us that they flow down the contract requirements—including those pertaining to specialty metals—to their suppliers, and require them to follow industry standards for quality management. Further, prime contractors for these programs told us they use a risk-based approach to oversee subcontractors, including those at lower tiers. management guidance, and the prime contractor told us that this planning includes specialty metals. These prime contractors indicated they also require their subcontractors and suppliers to use these industry standards. DOD Has Defined Procedures for Requesting Specialty Metals Waivers, but Dissemination of Its Waiver Information is Limited
The specialty metals restrictions allow the Secretary of Defense or certain delegated officials to grant national security waivers, among other things, for the use of noncompliant specialty metals. During our review and, in part, in response to our discussions with USD AT&L officials, DOD developed written guidance for program offices to follow when requesting national security waivers. Since 2009, DOD granted six national security waivers for the use of noncompliant specialty metals on five different weapon system programs—five of which were granted after contractor disclosure that noncompliant specialty metals were, in some cases, contained in the end items delivered to DOD. Table 3 shows the six national security waivers approved for five weapon system programs since 2009 when the DFARS was revised to remove a previous exemption for high performing magnets, as provided by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Specifically, in 2009, DOD eliminated an exception in the DFARS that allowed electronic components containing noncompliant high performance (samarium-cobalt) magnets to be procured from non- domestic sources. However, we found that DOD’s process for granting national security waivers for specialty metals had some weaknesses. Further, DOD has been directed by a House report accompanying H.R. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for information and communications to be recorded and communicated to others, such as stakeholders who need it, to help the agency achieve its goals. Establishing a mechanism to disseminate non-sensitive information—including the names of programs that received waivers, sources of the noncompliant specialty metals, and corrective actions—to key stakeholders, such as DOD weapon system program offices and their defense suppliers—could help raise awareness of and greater compliance with the specialty metals restrictions. However, DOD’s lack of a mechanism to disseminate information to its key stakeholders within the department’s weapon system program offices and their supplier-base on national security waivers granted makes it difficult for others not directly involved with the waiver request to have awareness of the risks as well as the consequences. Further, greater awareness of supplier-base problems and broader dissemination of information could assist DOD in better discovering vulnerabilities, such as systemic supply chain risks that affect national security objectives. Specifically, we assessed (1) how DOD meets its needs for specialty metals parts and ensures compliance with the specialty metals restrictions, and (2) DOD’s process for providing national security waivers for specialty metal procurements and the extent to which it disseminates waiver information throughout the department. We selected a non- generalizable sample consisting of these five DOD weapon system programs, based on their greatest total acquisition cost estimates as of November 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
Specialty metals—such as titanium, certain steel alloys, and samarium-cobalt alloy magnets—are essential to DOD weapon systems due to their unique properties, such as being highly durable. Federal statute requires specialty metals used in weapon systems to be procured from domestic sources or qualifying countries. However, the law allows DOD to waive this requirement in the interest of national security. GAO was mandated by a House report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 to review DOD's compliance with specialty metals requirements.
This report assesses (1) how DOD meets its needs for specialty metals parts and ensures compliance with restrictions, and (2) DOD's process for providing national security waivers for specialty metal procurements and the extent to which it disseminates waiver information throughout the department. GAO reviewed contracts, laws, regulations and DOD guidance, and analyzed a non-generalizable sample of five weapon systems as case studies based on their total 2013 acquisition costs, among other things. GAO also reviewed national security waivers DOD granted since 2009 and interviewed DOD and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) typically relies on its prime contractors to plan for the procurement of specialty metals and ensure compliance with specialty metals' restrictions for the five weapon systems programs that GAO reviewed. For these programs, GAO found that DOD plays a limited role—primarily monitoring the availability of specialty metals and conducting periodic reviews of prime contractor quality assurance processes. GAO also reviewed contracts for these five programs and found they contained clauses that require prime contractors to procure specialty metals in compliance with domestic source restrictions, ensure that delivered items meet contract requirements as part of quality assurance, and maintain processes for future material needs. In turn, these prime contractors told GAO that they pass down the contract requirements—including those pertaining to specialty metals—to their subcontractors and defense suppliers, and require them to follow industry standards for quality management. These standards include, among other things, testing subcontractor processes to determine if they meet contractual specifications; reviewing required supplier certifications for items delivered under the contract to confirm compliance with all identified requirements; and rating subcontractors using performance metrics. Prime contractors for these programs also told GAO they use a risk-based approach to oversee subcontractors, including those suppliers at lower tiers.
DOD recently improved its national security waiver process; but its dissemination of information contained in those waivers is limited. Since 2009—when specialty metals restrictions were changed and the exception for national security was added—DOD has granted six national security waivers to five different weapon system programs known to have procured noncompliant specialty metals. Five of the six waivers were for samarium-cobalt magnets, which were noncompliant largely due to a change in a previously allowed exception for these magnets. During its review, GAO identified weaknesses in DOD's waiver process such as not having defined procedures for requesting waivers; and in June 2014, DOD developed written guidance for program offices to follow when requesting these waivers. However, GAO also found that DOD does not have a mechanism to share information on national security waivers granted for noncompliant specialty metals. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for information to be recorded and communicated to management and others, including external parties who need it, such as program offices and suppliers, to help the agency achieve its goals. Disseminating non-sensitive information—including the names of programs that received waivers, sources of the noncompliant specialty metals, and corrective actions—to key stakeholders, such as DOD weapon system program offices and their defense suppliers, could help raise awareness of and compliance with the specialty metals restrictions. Moreover, greater awareness of supplier-base problems and broader dissemination of national security waiver information could assist DOD in better discovering potential vulnerabilities, such as systemic supply chain risks that could impact national security objectives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD disseminate non-sensitive information within the department and its supplier-base on the waivers it has granted for specialty metals. DOD concurred with the recommendation and plans to publish non-sensitive information. |
gao_AIMD-98-119 | gao_AIMD-98-119_0 | Financial Data Reflect a Profitable Operation
The Concessions Committee does not receive appropriated funds. Independent Financial Statement Audits Performed
The Committee received unqualified opinions on its fiscal year 1997 and 1996 financial statements based on audits performed by the independent public accounting firm. The Committee does not engage in resale activities. Although the Committee’s operations are reviewed by a high level official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Committee is not subject to the reporting and oversight requirements of other nonappropriated fund instrumentalities. Operating Procedures Are Not Specified
The Committee’s current operating guidance does not specify the procedures by which the Committee is to exercise its authority or the types of goods and services that can be offered by concessionaires. In the absence of specific operating procedures, the Committee has elected to follow Army regulations applicable to nonappropriated fund instrumentalities. While the Committee has chosen to follow these regulations, it is not required to do so and therefore cannot be held accountable for deviations. If the Committee’s need for reserves are overstated, additional resources could be made available to MWR funds. At our suggestion, the business manager agreed to request its independent public accountant’s assistance in preparing a 5-year operating budget that would identify the minimum level of cash reserves needed to cover normal operations. Its financial operations have been audited, and our review disclosed no instances where the independent public accounting firm did not comply in all material respects with generally accepted government auditing standards. Although the amount available for MWR contributions is directly linked to the Committee’s decisions to retain earnings for reserves and equipment, there is no written policy to guide its members in making these decisions, and we could find no documentation supporting how the decisions were reached. Furthermore, the Committee does not have a long-term operating budget for use in making these decisions. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) require the Committee to comply with the same reporting requirements of other nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, thereby ensuring that the Congress has the opportunity to review the Committee’s activities; (2) specify operating regulations to be followed by the Committee in its day-to-day operations, including guidance on the types of goods and services that can be offered; and (3) require the Committee to develop a policy and a long-term operating budget to guide members in making MWR contributions and cash reserve decisions and to document in its minutes the rationale for those decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense (DOD) Concessions Committee's operations, focusing on the Committee's: (1) financial operations; (2) oversight and management; and (3) contributions to morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) funds.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Concessions Committee's financial statements are audited by an independent public accounting firm, and those financial statements have consistently received unqualified opinions; (2) as a result, GAO did not independently review the Committee's financial operations; (3) GAO reviewed an independent public accounting firm's work for the last 2 fiscal years; (4) GAO's review disclosed no instances where the firm did not comply in all material respects with generally accepted government auditing standards; (5) the Committee is not subject to the reporting and oversight requirements of other nonappropriated fund instrumentalities; (6) although the Committee's operations are reviewed by a senior official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Committee has not been required to submit financial information to Force Management and Policy; (7) therefore, Congress does not receive information on its activities; (8) also, the Committee's governing directive does not specify the procedures by which the Committee is to manage its day-to-day operations or criteria for determining the types of sales activities it may engage in; (9) in the absence of specific operating procedures, the Committee has followed Army regulations for nonappropriated fund instrumentalities; (10) while GAO did not find any instances where the Committee deviated from the Army regulations, the absence of mandatory operating regulations represents a weakness in management controls; (11) although the Committee has chosen to follow these regulations, it is not required to do so and therefore cannot be held accountable for deviations; (12) although the amount available for MWR contributions is directly linked to the Committee's decisions to retain earnings for reserves and equipment, there is no written policy to guide its members in making these decisions, and GAO could find no documentation supporting how the decisions were reached; (13) although the Committee has a capital expenditure budget, it does not have a long-term operating budget for use in making these decisions; (14) at GAO's suggestion, the Committee has indicated it will prepare a 5-year operating budget that will identify the minimum level of cash reserves that are needed to cover current operations; (15) the Committee also plans to review its long-term capital expenditure budget in light of the ongoing Pentagon renovations; and (16) these actions may result in identifying additional resources that could be made available to MWR funds. |
gao_RCED-95-144FS | gao_RCED-95-144FS_0 | Losses and Costs Associated With HUD’s Acquisition, Management, and Sale of Single-Family Properties
The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) single-family mortgage insurance programs are intended to protect lenders from financial losses resulting from defaults on mortgage loans to home buyers. It spent nearly $14 billion to acquire, manage, and sell these properties, and it sold these properties for about $9.2 billion. Breakdown of Costs
For the single-family properties sold during fiscal years 1992 through 1994, HUD incurred by far the largest proportion of its total costs—about 89 percent, or more than $12.4 billion—to acquire the properties. 1.3.) During the same period, HUD sold an average of nearly 66,000 properties each year. 2.5.) Length of Time That Single-Family Properties Remained in HUD’s Inventory
The median time required for HUD to sell an acquired single-family property was about 5 months for the properties sold during fiscal years 1992 through 1994. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) acquisition and disposition of single-family properties.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) HUD spent nearly $14 billion to acquire, manage, and dispose of nearly 200,000 single-family properties it sold during fiscal years 1992 through 1994, and it only received $9.2 billion from the sale of these properties; (2) the median loss per single-family property was around $22,500; (3) HUD acquisition costs represented about 89 percent of its total costs; (4) HUD acquired an average of more than 63,000 single-family properties per year and sold an average of nearly 66,000 such properties during fiscal years 1992 through 1994; and (5) these single-family properties remained in HUD inventory about 5 months before being sold. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-146 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-146_0 | Statutes and regulations influence the mix of maintenance work performed by the public and private sectors. Third, it is not consistent with congressional guidance in one key area—the use of public-private competitions. Policy Report Provides Depot Maintenance Framework
In response to the congressional requirement for a comprehensive statement of depot maintenance policy, DOD provided an overall framework for managing DOD depot maintenance activities. Section 311(d)(5) of the act provides that in cases of workload in excess of the workload to be performed by DOD depots, DOD’s policy should provide for competition “between public and private entities when there is sufficient potential for realizing cost savings based upon adequate private-sector competition and technical capabilities.” DOD’s report provides a policy that is inconsistent with this instruction. We have reported that public-private depot maintenance competitions can be a beneficial tool for determining the most optimum cost-effective source of repair for non-core workloads. In May 1995 the CORM concluded that 20 percent savings could be achieved by the privatization of various commercial activities and recommended that DOD transfer essentially all depot maintenance to the private sector. Privatization-In-Place Plans Do Not Appear to Optimize Savings
There have been a number of recent initiatives to privatize depots recommended for closure or realignment by BRAC. On the other hand, if the remaining centers do not receive additional workload, they will continue to operate with significant excess capacity, becoming more and more inefficient and more and more expensive as their workloads continue to dwindle due to downsizing and privatization initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the privatization of defense depot maintenance activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) evolving depot maintenance policy includes a public-private mix and shifts work to the private sector where feasible; (2) depot privatization could worsen excess maintenance capacity and inefficiencies if not carefully managed; (3) DOD's policy report provides an overall framework for managing depot maintenance activities and substantial implementation flexibility, but the policy is not consistent with congressional guidance providing for public-private competition for non-core workloads; (4) privatizing depot maintenance is not likely to achieve the 20-percent savings DOD projects, since the 20-percent savings were for commercial-type activities that more readily led to competition which produced the reported savings; (5) most non-ship depot maintenance private-public competitions have been won by the public sector and averaged fewer than two competitors; (6) DOD plans to privatize in place and delay downsizing and closure of two air logistics centers will probably cost more than closing them and relocating their workloads to underutilized defense or private facilities; and (7) statutes governing competition and base closures may have to be repealed or amended before DOD can proceed with its privatization efforts. |
gao_GAO-02-542 | gao_GAO-02-542_0 | Our analysis shows that dual-tasking could allow the Air Force to make more efficient use of fighter squadrons, resulting in tasking significantly fewer squadrons for more than one 90-day period to meet requirements. As a result, fewer squadrons would need to be tasked to meet requirements. Finally, our analysis showed that dual-tasking would result in more of a squadron’s aircraft being used to meet requirements. Significant Challenges Could Limit Realization of Benefits
Implementing dual-tasking under the 2010 Concept presents the Air Force with some significant challenges. Filling Maintenance Positions Is Critical
Our analysis showed that the Air Force would need to fill more of its authorized maintenance positions to support deploying a greater portion of a dual-tasked squadron’s aircraft. More than half of the maintenance specialties at both wings were undermanned, and many were assigned 60 percent or fewer of the people authorized. The problems posed by vacant maintenance positions would be even more pronounced under dual-tasking, since the wing would need to deploy more maintenance personnel to support the greater portion of a squadron’s aircraft that would be deployed. To do this, we compared how the Air Force met requirements in the most recent Expeditionary Aerospace Force 15-month cycle (Dec. 2000 to Feb. 2002)with how it would meet these same requirements under the 2010 dual- tasking concept. From this analysis we compared, for the most recent 15-month cycle and in 2010, the total number of squadrons used to meet requirements, the number of squadrons used for more than one 90-day period, the number of aircraft deployed to cover requirements from each squadron, and the number of aircraft that remained at their home station. Additionally, to assess whether dual-tasked squadrons would have enough pilots to meet the higher deployment requirements under dual- tasking, we compared the number of pilots in squadrons with the number that would be required if the squadrons were dual-tasked. | What GAO Found
The Air Force expeditionary aerospace force concept seeks to spread deployments more evenly across its forces and increase the predictability of deployments. By dual-tasking some fighter squadrons the Air Force could fulfill two requirements as the 2010 Concept envisions. Although significant challenges could impede the ability to maximize these benefits, the Air Force has not specifically analyzed what is needed to implement dual-tasking by 2010. Dual-tasking would result in more efficient use of squadrons and greatly reduce the need to use squadrons for more than one 90-day deployment every 15 months. Dual-tasking would provide theater commanders with the same number of aircraft to meet requirements as under current practice; however, the aircraft would come from fewer squadrons. Because a larger proportion of a squadron's aircraft would be used to meet requirements, and because dual-tasking uses fewer squadrons to meet requirements, the need to repeatedly use the same squadrons would be reduced. The number of squadrons needed for more than one 90-day period over a 15-month period would decline from 26 squadrons to five. More training would be required under dual-tasking. Yet, the Air Force has not quantified this increase, assessed how it would manage the increase, or projected how it would support such an increase either logistically or in its budget. To support deploying a greater portion of dual-tasked squadron's aircraft, more of the authorized maintenance positions would have to be filled. More than half of the maintenance specialties at the wings GAO analyzed were undermanned, and some were manned at less than 60 percent. Dual-tasking could cause maintenance personnel to be deployed more frequently than desired unless more of these vacant positions are filled. In addition, almost all of a squadron's pilots would be needed to meet dual-tasking requirements. This will pose challenges in managing pilot deployments. |
gao_GAO-05-456 | gao_GAO-05-456_0 | DOD contracting officers can place orders directly through many interagency contracts. Franchise Funds Did Not Always Ensure Fair and Reasonable Prices or Competitive Procedures
GovWorks and FedSource did not always obtain the full benefits of competitive procedures, did not otherwise ensure fair and reasonable prices, and may have missed opportunities to achieve savings on behalf of DOD customers for millions of dollars worth of goods and services. In 5 of the 10 cases, GovWorks sought, but did not receive, competing proposals as required for the types of contracts used. Our findings at GovWorks are consistent with our previous work on DOD’s use of other agencies’ contracts. In four of the five projects involving staffing support, FedSource paid contractors higher prices for services than were established in the contract. DOD customers chose to use franchise funds based on convenience, rather than as part of an acquisition plan. DOD conducted little analysis, if any, to determine whether using franchise funds’ contracting services was the best method for acquiring a particular good or service. For their part, although franchise funds’ business operating principles require that they maintain and evaluate cost and performance benchmarks against their competitors, they did not perform analyses that DOD could use to assess whether the franchise funds deliver good value. This focus on customer satisfaction and generating revenues provides an incentive to emphasize customer service rather than ensuring proper use of contracts and good value. Without this type of data, it is difficult to make informed decisions about the use of other agencies’ contracting services. For example, DOD customers sometimes paid a GovWorks fee, or service charge, on top of a fee to use another agency’s contract because GovWorks generally uses other agencies’ contracts to make purchases for DOD customers. However, the assignments did not contain criteria for evaluating the work performed by contract employees. Without this critical information, neither DOD nor the franchise funds could effectively measure contractor performance. We found that FedSource generally did not ensure that contractor oversight occurred. Oversight of Franchise Funds Has Been Limited
Aside from monitoring the contractors’ performance, we also found that the departments of the Interior and the Treasury, which operate GovWorks and FedSource, respectively, and the Office of Management and Budget have conducted infrequent reviews of franchise funds’ procurement activities. A GovWorks’ 2004 Management Review identified such issues as lack of acquisition planning for work added to existing awards, unanticipated increases in the amounts of orders, and inadequate documentation of many requirements such as competitive procedures, determinations that changes were within the scope of the contract, the basis of award decisions, and that prices were fair and reasonable. To ensure that DOD customers analyze alternatives when choosing franchise funds and to provide DOD with the measurable data it needs to assess the value of the franchise funds’ contracting services, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: Develop a methodology to help DOD customers determine whether use of franchise funds’ contracting services is in the best interest of the government. To ensure that GovWorks and FedSource adhere to sound contracting practices, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Interior and the Treasury take the following two actions: develop procedures and performance measures for franchise fund contracting operations to demonstrate compliance with federal procurement regulations and policies while maintaining focus on customer service and develop procedures for franchise fund contracting officers to work closely with DOD customers to define contract outcomes and effective oversight methods. We also reviewed information available from the franchise funds that would indicate whether the franchise funds provided a good value, and interviewed franchise fund officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest user of other federal agencies' contracting services. The availability of these contracting services has enabled DOD and other departments to save time by paying other agencies to award and administer contracts for goods and services on their behalf. DOD can access these contracting services a number of ways, such as ordering directly from interagency contracts for commonly needed items. DOD also can pay someone else to do the work. For example, DOD uses franchise funds, which are government-run, fee-for-service organizations that provide a portfolio of services, including contracting services. As part of a congressional mandate, GAO assessed whether franchise funds ensured fair and reasonable prices for goods and services, whether DOD analyzed purchasing alternatives, and whether DOD and franchise funds ensured value by defining contract outcomes and overseeing contractor performance.
What GAO Found
GovWorks and FedSource, two of the franchise funds that DOD has relied on for contracting services, have not always ensured fair and reasonable prices while purchasing goods and services. The franchise funds also may have missed opportunities to achieve savings from millions of dollars in purchases, including engineering, telecommunications, or construction services. In the course of its review, GAO examined $249 million worth of orders and work assignments from the contracts the franchise funds used to make purchases on DOD's behalf. In many cases, GovWorks sought but did not receive competing proposals. GovWorks added substantial work--as much as 20 times above the original value of a particular order--without determining that prices were fair and reasonable. FedSource generally did not ensure competition for work, did not conduct price analyses, and sometimes paid contractors higher prices for services than established in contracts with no justification provided in the contract files. For its part, DOD--in the absence of clear guidance on the proper use of other agencies' contracting services--chose to use franchise funds on the basis of convenience without analyzing whether using franchise funds' contracting services was the best method for meeting purchasing needs. DOD also lacks information about purchases made through other agencies contracts, including franchise funds, which makes it difficult to make informed decisions about the use of these types of contracts. The franchise funds' business-operating principles require that they maintain and evaluate cost and performance benchmarks against their competitors. However, the franchise funds did not perform analyses that DOD could have used to assess whether the funds deliver good value. The funds' performance measures generally focus on customer satisfaction and generating revenues. These measures create an incentive to increase sales volume and meet customer demands at the expense of ensuring proper use of contracts and good value. DOD and the franchise funds--which share responsibility for ensuring value through sound contracting practices such as defining contract outcomes and overseeing contractor performance--did not adequately define requirements. Without well-defined requirements, DOD and the franchise funds lacked criteria to measure contractor performance effectively. On a separate oversight-related issue, GAO found that the departments of the Interior and the Treasury--each of which has responsibility in the successful operation of the respective franchise funds--and the Office of Management of Budget have performed little oversight of GovWorks and FedSource. |
gao_GAO-13-560 | gao_GAO-13-560_0 | Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety, effectiveness, and quality of domestic and imported prescription drugs that are marketed to U.S. consumers. CBP is responsible for enforcing laws prohibiting the illegal importation of goods into the United States, including prescription drugs that have not been approved by the FDA for the U.S. market, as well as those that are counterfeit or misbranded. DOJ’s Civil and Criminal Divisions also prosecute such cases, coordinating closely with U.S. As a result, they may be reluctant to report health problems that they experience. Most Rogue Internet Pharmacies Operate from Abroad, and Many Illegally Ship Unapproved Drugs into the United States and Sell Drugs without Requiring Valid Prescriptions
Although the exact number of rogue Internet pharmacies is unknown, most operate from abroad. Rogue Internet pharmacies also often sell drugs to consumers without a prescription, in violation of FDCA and state requirements, or with a prescription that does not satisfy FDCA and state requirements. Rogue Internet Pharmacies Violate a Variety of Other Federal and State Laws and Industry Standards
Rogue Internet pharmacies violate a variety of federal laws, including those related to fraud, money laundering, and intellectual property rights, according to officials from several federal agencies and stakeholders we interviewed. According to officials from state boards of pharmacy we interviewed, brick-and-mortar pharmacies have fulfilled online prescription drug orders, including to residents of another state without obtaining a nonresident pharmacy license in the state where those customers reside or without ensuring the prescriptions are valid. The Complex and Global Nature of Rogue Internet Pharmacies Poses Substantial Challenges for Federal Investigators and Prosecutors
Rogue Internet pharmacies are often complex, global operations, and as a result, federal agencies face substantial challenges investigating and prosecuting their operators. Officials from federal agencies and stakeholders we interviewed told us that piecing together these operations can be difficult because rogue Internet pharmacies can be composed of thousands of related websites. 1.) Federal Agencies Have Investigated and Prosecuted Rogue Internet Pharmacy Operators and Prevented Some Illegal Shipments
Despite facing substantial challenges, several federal agencies— including FDA, ICE, and USPIS—have investigated and prosecuted rogue Internet pharmacy operators that have violated federal laws. Agency investigations have resulted in the conviction of operators, fines, and asset seizures. For example, FDA and other federal agencies have participated in Operation Pangea, an annual worldwide, week-long initiative in which regulatory and law enforcement agencies from around the world work together to combat rogue Internet pharmacies. Federal agencies responsible for preventing illegal prescription drug imports have also interdicted rogue Internet pharmacy shipments. State boards of pharmacy focus on regulating licensed brick-and-mortar pharmacies located within their state. CSIP has helped member companies that provide services to Internet businesses—such as Internet registrars, search engines, and payment processors—share information about rogue Internet pharmacies, and encourages its members to block services to them.CSIP contracts with a third-party company that proactively searches the Internet to identify rogue Internet pharmacies and disseminates this information to its members. 4.) FDA and Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Educate Consumers about the Risks of Purchasing Prescription Drugs from Internet Pharmacies, but Challenges Remain
FDA and stakeholders have taken steps to educate consumers about the dangers of buying prescription drugs from rogue Internet pharmacies and how to identify legitimate ones; however, these efforts face challenges. Some federal agencies and stakeholders have also taken steps to educate consumers about the risks of purchasing prescription drugs online and provide tools to help consumers identify legitimate and rogue Internet pharmacies. NABP also warns consumers not to buy from websites that are on its publicly available list of rogue Internet pharmacies, and posts information on its website to educate consumers about how to safely buy medicine online. Many rogue Internet pharmacies use sophisticated marketing methods to appear professional and legitimate, making it challenging for even well-informed consumers and health care professionals to differentiate between legal and illegal Internet pharmacies. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for comment to HHS, DOJ, and DHS, and we provided excerpts of this report for comment to USPIS and NSF. We received technical comments from HHS, DOJ, and DHS, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Department of Commerce, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, the Federal Trade Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, the National Science Foundation, the Office of Management and Budget, and the United States Postal Inspection Service, as well as other interested parties. National Association of Boards of Pharmacy 22. Establishing a Safe Harbor for Companies That Provide Services to Internet-Based Businesses. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internet offers consumers a convenient method for purchasing drugs that is sometimes cheaper than buying from traditional brick-and-mortar pharmacies. According to a recent FDA survey, nearly 1 in 4 adult U.S. Internet consumers have purchased prescription drugs online. However, many Internet pharmacies are fraudulent enterprises that offer prescription drugs without a prescription and are not appropriately licensed. These rogue Internet pharmacies may sell drugs that are expired, improperly labeled, or are counterfeits of other drugs. A number of federal and state agencies share responsibility for administering and enforcing laws related to Internet pharmacies, including state boards of pharmacy, FDA, DOJ, CBP, and ICE.
The Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act directed GAO to report on problems with Internet pharmacies. This report identifies (1) how rogue sites violate federal and state laws, (2) challenges federal agencies face in investigating and prosecuting operators, (3) efforts to combat rogue Internet pharmacies, and (4) efforts to educate consumers about the risks of purchasing prescription drugs online. To conduct this work, GAO interviewed officials from FDA, DOJ, CBP, ICE, and other federal agencies, reviewed federal laws and regulations, and examined agency data and documents. GAO also interviewed officials from five state boards of pharmacy with varied approaches to regulating Internet pharmacies, and stakeholders including NABP, drug manufacturers, and companies that provide services to Internet businesses, such as payment processors.
What GAO Found
Rogue Internet pharmacies violate a variety of federal and state laws. Most operate from abroad, and many illegally ship prescription drugs into the United States that have not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), that is responsible for ensuring the safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs. Many also illegally sell prescription drugs without a prescription that meets federal and state requirements. Rogue sites also often violate other laws, including those related to fraud, money laundering, and intellectual property rights.
Rogue Internet pharmacies are often complex, global operations, and federal agencies face substantial challenges investigating and prosecuting those involved. According to federal agency officials, piecing together rogue Internet pharmacy operations can be difficult because they may be composed of thousands of related websites, and operators take steps to disguise their identities. Officials also face challenges investigating and prosecuting operators because they are often located abroad. The Department of Justice (DOJ) may not prosecute such cases due to competing priorities, the complexity of these operations, and challenges related to bringing charges under some federal laws.
Despite these challenges, federal and state agencies as well as stakeholders have taken actions to combat rogue Internet pharmacies. Federal agencies have conducted investigations that have led to convictions, fines, and asset seizures from rogue Internet pharmacies as well as from companies that provide services to them. FDA and other federal agencies have also collaborated with law enforcement agencies around the world to disrupt rogue Internet pharmacy operations. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which are responsible for enforcing laws related to the importation of goods such as prescription drugs, have also worked with other agencies, including FDA, to interdict rogue Internet pharmacy shipments at the border. Given that most rogue Internet pharmacies operate from abroad, states have faced challenges combating them, and generally focus their oversight on licensed in-state entities that fulfill orders for rogue Internet pharmacies. Companies that provide services to Internet-based businesses, such as search engines and payment processors, have also taken action--primarily by blocking services to them.
FDA and others have taken steps to educate consumers about the dangers of buying prescription drugs from rogue Internet pharmacies. FDA recently launched a national campaign to raise public awareness about the risks of purchasing drugs online, and the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) posts information on its website about how to safely purchase drugs online. However, rogue Internet pharmacies use sophisticated marketing methods to appear legitimate, making it hard for consumers to differentiate between legitimate and rogue sites.
HHS, DOJ, and DHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-05-9 | gao_GAO-05-9_0 | Scope and Methodology
As agreed with your offices, our objectives for this report were to (1) assess the soundness of the Bureau’s design for the 2004 census test and whether the Bureau implemented the test consistent with its plans, (2) review the quality of the Bureau’s IT security practices, and (3) identify initial lessons learned from conducting the test and their implications for the 2010 Census. The Bureau Developed a Sound Test Design
The design of the 2004 census test contained many components of a sound study (see table 1). The Bureau also developed evaluation plans for each of the test’s 11 research questions, and explained how stakeholders were involved with the design, as well as how lessons learned from past studies were incorporated. The Bureau Needs to Implement Better IT Security Practices
The Bureau operated a number of IT systems in order to transmit, manage, and process data for the test. For example: IT inventory was not complete. The Bureau did not have a complete inventory that showed all applications and general support IT systems associated with the test. For example, the HHCs show promise in that enumerators were successful in using them to collect data from nonrespondents and remove late mail returns. The Bureau tested new group quarters procedures in 2004 that were designed to address the difficulties the Bureau had in trying to identify and count this population group during the 2000 Census. Thus, as the Bureau plans for the next field test in 2006 and the 2008 dress rehearsal, it will be important for the Bureau to ensure the various census operations are fully functional at the time of the test so they can be properly evaluated. Conclusions
The Bureau is well aware that a successful enumeration hinges on early research, development, testing, and evaluation of all aspects of the census design. However, looking toward the future, it will be critical for the Bureau to diagnose the source of these challenges, devise cost- effective solutions, and integrate refinements and fixes in time to be assessed during the next field test scheduled for 2006. Define specific, measurable performance requirements for the HHCs and other census-taking activities that address such important measures as productivity, cost savings, reliability, durability, and test their ability to meet those requirements in 2006.
Review and test the wording and formatting of the coverage and race/ethnicity questions to make them less confusing to respondents and thus help ensure the collection of better quality data, and ensure they are formatted the same way on both the HHC and paper versions of the census form. We will continue to monitor the Bureau’s progress in resolving these issues and update Congress on a regular basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
A rigorous testing and evaluation program is a critical component of the census planning process because it helps the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) assess activities that show promise for a more cost-effective head count. The Bureau conducted a field test in 2004, and we were asked to (1) assess the soundness of the test design and the extent to which the Bureau implemented it consistent with its plans, (2) review the quality of the Bureau's information technology (IT) security practices, and (3) identify initial lessons learned from conducting the test and their implications for future tests and the 2010 Census.
What GAO Found
The Bureau's design for the 2004 census test addressed important components of a sound study, and the Bureau generally implemented the test as planned. For example, the Bureau clearly identified its research objectives, developed research questions that supported those objectives, and developed evaluation plans for each of the test's 11 research questions. The initial results of the test suggest that while certain new procedures show promise for improving the cost-effectiveness of the census, the Bureau will have to first address a number of problems that could jeopardize a successful head count. For example, enumerators had little trouble using hand held computers (HHC) to collect household data and remove late mail returns. The computers could reduce the Bureau's reliance on paper questionnaires and maps and thus save money. The test results also suggest that certain refinements the Bureau made to its procedures for counting dormitories, nursing homes, and other "group quarters" could help prevent the miscounting of this population group. Other aspects of the test did not go as smoothly. For example, security practices for the Bureau's IT systems had weaknesses; the HHCs had problems transmitting data; questionnaire items designed to improve coverage and better capture race/ethnicity confused respondents; enumerators sometimes deviated from prescribed enumeration procedures; and certain features of the test were not fully operational at the time of the test, which hampered the Bureau from fully gauging their performance. With few testing opportunities remaining, it will be important for (1) the Bureau to find the source of these problems, devise cost-effective solutions, and integrate refinements before the next field test scheduled for 2006, and (2) Congress to monitor the Bureau's progress in resolving these issues. |
gao_GAO-14-612 | gao_GAO-14-612_0 | It requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that includes the following components: periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; policies and procedures that are (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or group of information systems, as appropriate; security awareness training to inform personnel, including contractors, of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures designed to reduce these risks, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. While the six agencies we reviewed generally established security and privacy requirements for contractors to follow and prepared for assessments to determine the effectiveness of contractor implementation of controls, five of the six were inconsistent in overseeing the execution and review of those assessments. Table 4 details the degree of implementation of oversight activities for the selected systems at each agency. Review the assessment results. Further, OMB has developed guidance over several years to assist agencies in assessing their contractors’ performance. OMB Guidance is Not Clear on When Systems Should Be Identified and Reported as Contractor- Operated
OMB guidance to agencies for categorizing and reporting contractor- operated systems does not clearly define what a contractor-operated system is and consequently, agencies are interpreting the guidance differently. Additionally, in their fiscal year 2012 annual FISMA reports, inspectors general from 9 of the 24 major agencies found data reliability issues with their agencies’ categorization of contractor-operated systems.example, DOT’s Inspector General reported that 24 of the Department’s 60 information systems were owned and operated by a contractor, but only 4 were categorized as being contractor-operated by the department. Conclusions
The six agencies reviewed made efforts to assess the implementation of security and privacy controls for selected contractor-operated systems. A contributing reason for these shortfalls is that agencies had not documented procedures for officials to follow in order to perform such oversight of contractors effectively. Until these agencies develop, document and implement specific procedures for overseeing contractors, they will have reduced assurance that the contractors are adequately securing and protecting agency information, including of the extent to which contractors have undergone background investigations. Without complete information, OMB and DHS assistance to agencies for improving their cybersecurity postures is limited and Congress will not have complete information on the implementation of FISMA. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency and the General Services Administration, the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management, the Secretaries of Energy, Homeland Security, State, and Transportation, and other interested parties. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess the extent to which (1) selected agencies oversee the security and privacy controls for systems that are operated by contractors on their behalf and (2) executive branch agencies with government wide guidance and oversight responsibilities have taken steps to assist agencies in ensuring implementation of information security and privacy controls by contractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies often rely on contractors to operate computer systems and process information on their behalf. Federal law and policy require that agencies ensure that contractors adequately protect these systems and information.
GAO was asked to evaluate how well agencies oversee contractor-operated systems. The objectives of this report were to assess the extent to which (1) selected agencies oversee the security and privacy controls for systems that are operated by contractors on their behalf and (2) executive branch agencies with government-wide guidance and oversight responsibilities have taken steps to assist agencies in ensuring implementation of information security and privacy controls by such contractors. To do this, GAO selected six agencies based on their reported number of contractor-operated systems and two systems at each agency using a non-generalizable random sample for review, analyzed agency policies and procedures, and examined security and privacy-related artifacts for selected systems. GAO also interviewed agency officials, and reviewed federal guidance and evaluated agency FISMA submissions.
What GAO Found
Although the six federal agencies that GAO reviewed (the Departments of Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), State, and Transportation (DOT), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)) generally established security and privacy requirements and planned for assessments to determine the effectiveness of contractor implementation of controls, five of the six agencies were inconsistent in overseeing the execution and review of those assessments, resulting in security lapses. For example, in one agency, testing did not discover that background checks of contractor employees were not conducted. The following table shows the degree of implementation of oversight activities at selected agencies.
A contributing reason for these shortfalls is that agencies had not documented procedures for officials to follow in order to effectively oversee contractor performance. Until these agencies develop, document, and implement specific procedures for overseeing contractors, they will have reduced assurance that the contractors are adequately securing and protecting agency information.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the General Services Administration have developed guidance to assist agencies in ensuring the implementation of security and privacy controls by their contractors. However, OMB guidance to agencies for categorizing and reporting on contractor-operated systems is not clear on when an agency should identify a system as contractor-operated and therefore agencies are interpreting the guidance differently. In fiscal year 2012, inspectors general from 9 of the 24 major agencies found data reliability issues with agencies' categorization of contractor-operated systems. Without accurate information on the number of contractor-operated systems, OMB assistance to agencies to help improve their cybersecurity posture will be limited and OMB's report to Congress on the implementation of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) is not complete.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that five of the six selected agencies develop procedures for the oversight of contractors and that OMB clarify reporting instructions to agencies. The five agencies generally agreed with the recommendations and OMB did not provide any comments. |
gao_GAO-11-197 | gao_GAO-11-197_0 | For example, VA recognized that the shift in veterans’ demand for services could be met at community based outpatient clinics that are more geographically accessible to veterans than its hospitals. The 5-year capital plan included in VA’s fiscal year 2011 budget submission document includes the following: capital planning linked to the agency mission, strategic goals, and objectives; baseline assessments and identification of performance gaps—such as underutilized or vacant property and the backlog of repairs needed at its facilities; an alternatives evaluation and resulting risk management plan for these performance gaps; a description of the agency’s planning and approvals process; and a long-term capital plan. VA Has Taken Steps to Realign Its Real Property Portfolio, but a Substantial Number of Costly Projects and Other Long-standing Challenges Remain
VA Has Taken Steps to Realign Its Real Property Portfolio
As a part of its shift from hospital based, inpatient care to outpatient care, VA has made changes to its real property portfolio on the basis of its May 2004 CARES Decision document and subsequent capital planning. In addition, VA has identified several other high-cost projects that have not yet been funded. For example, VA reported in its 5-year capital plan for fiscal years 2010-2015 that agencywide, it has a backlog of $9.4 billion of facility condition assessment deficiencies (repairs). Furthermore, due to incremental funding of projects, 24 of the 69 ongoing major construction projects listed in the plan needed an additional $4.4 billion to complete. Like other agencies across the government, VA has faced underlying obstacles that have exacerbated its real property management challenges and caused them to persist over time. Specifically, we have previously reported on such challenges, including competing stakeholder interests, legal and budgetary limitations, and the need for improved capital planning. These challenges can impact the agency’s ability to fully realign its real property portfolio. VA’s Capital Planning Efforts Generally Reflect Leading Practices, but Its Capital Plan Lacks Transparency about the Cost of Future Priorities That Could Better Inform Decision Making
Leading Practices in Capital Planning Have Been Established by OMB and GAO
Congress, OMB, and GAO have identified the need for effective capital planning. Specifically, SCIP extends the horizon of its 5-year capital plan to 10 years, providing VA with a longer range picture of the agency’s future real property priorities. VA’s 5-year Capital Plan Lacks Transparency about the Cost of Future Priorities That Could Better Inform Decision Making
Despite the positive aspects of VA’s capital planning efforts, VA’s resulting 5-year capital plan that it provides yearly to Congress lacks transparency about the cost of future priorities beyond the current budget year. However, the plan identifies other potential projects, not beginning in the current budget year, for which it lists project name but contains no information on what these projects might cost or the priority, as VA has not assigned one to them. Further, during our review, VA officials told us they are considering the release of future year capital cost estimates to Congress. Additionally, transparency regarding future capital costs puts VA’s priorities in context with the overall fiscal condition of the U.S. government. Providing cost estimates for future projects to Congress for capital programs is not without precedent in the federal government. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance transparency and allow for more informed decision making related to VA’s real property priorities, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs provide the full results of VA’s SCIP process and any subsequent capital planning efforts, including details on the estimated cost of all future projects, to Congress on a yearly basis. and (2) To what extent do VA’s capital planning efforts follow leading practices and provide the information needed for informed decision making? To determine the extent to which VA’s capital planning efforts, including the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES), have resulted in changes to its real property portfolio and to identify the agency’s remaining priorities, we interviewed VA officials located in the central office in Washington, D.C., and 6 Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) and observed VA facilities in 5 of these 6 VISNs. To compare VA’s efforts with the efforts of other federal agencies that have provided estimates to Congress regarding the magnitude of future real property priorities, we reviewed our previous reports on capital planning across the federal government, including the Department of Defense’s future years defense program and efforts by the judiciary in March 1996 to communicate its urgent housing needs to Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has undertaken various planning efforts to realign its real property portfolio, including the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES), creation of a 5-year capital plan, and its newest effort, the Strategic Capital Investment Planning process (SCIP). Through these efforts, VA has identified numerous real property priorities it believes should be completed if the agency's facilities are to meet veterans' needs for services now and in the future. This congressionally requested report addresses the extent to which VA's capital planning efforts (1) have resulted in changes to its real property portfolio and (2) follow leading practices and provide information for informed decision making. To perform this work, GAO reviewed leading capital planning practices and data on VA's real property portfolio and future priorities. GAO also interviewed VA officials and veterans service organizations, and visited sites in 5 of VA's 21 veterans integrated service networks.
What GAO Found
Through its capital planning efforts, VA has taken steps to realign its real property portfolio from hospital based, inpatient care to outpatient care, but a substantial number of costly projects and other long-standing challenges also remain. Several of VA's most recent capital projects--such as community based outpatient clinics, rehabilitation centers for blind veterans and spinal cord injury center--were based on its CARES efforts and subsequent capital planning. VA officials and veterans service organizations GAO contacted agreed that these facilities have had a positive effect on veterans' access to services. However, VA has identified several high-cost priorities such as facility repairs and projects that have not yet been funded. For example, VA reported in its 5-year capital plan for fiscal years 2010-2015 that it had a backlog of $9.4 billion of facility repairs. The 5-year plan further identified an additional $4.4 billion in funding to complete 24 of the 69 ongoing major construction projects. Besides substantial funding priorities, VA, like other agencies, has faced underlying obstacles that have exacerbated its real property management challenges and can also impact its ability to fully realign its real property portfolio. GAO has previously reported that such challenges include competing stakeholder interests, legal and budgetary limitations, and capital planning processes that did not always adequately address such issues as excess and underutilized property. VA's capital planning efforts generally reflect leading practices, but lack transparency about the cost of future priorities that could better inform decision making. For example, GAO found that VA's 5-year capital plan links its investments with its strategic goals, assesses the agency's capital priorities, and evaluates various alternatives. Also, SCIP strengthens VA's capital planning efforts by extending the horizon of its 5-year plan to 10 years, and providing VA with a longer range picture of the agency's future real property priorities. While these are positive steps, VA's planning efforts lack transparency regarding the magnitude of costs of the agency's future real property priorities, which may limit the ability of VA and Congress to make informed funding decisions among competing priorities. For instance, for potential future projects, VA's 5-year capital plan only lists project name and contains no information on what these projects are estimated to cost or the priority VA has assigned to them beyond the current budget year. VA officials said during the review that they are considering the release of future year capital cost estimates to Congress. Transparency about future requirements would benefit congressional decision makers by putting individual project decisions in a long-term, strategic context, and placing VA's fiscal situation within the context of the overall fiscal condition of the U.S. government. Providing future cost estimates to Congress for urgent, major capital programs is not without precedent in the federal government. Other federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense, have provided more transparent estimates to Congress regarding the magnitude of its future capital priorities beyond immediate budget priorities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA annually provide to Congress the full results of its SCIP process and any subsequent capital planning efforts, including details on estimated cost of future projects. VA concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-07-436T | gao_GAO-07-436T_0 | CNMI’s economy depends on two industries, garment manufacturing and tourism, for its employment, production, and exports. However, recent changes in trade laws have increased foreign competition for CNMI’s garment industry, while other external events have negatively impacted its tourism sector. U.S. Department of Commerce data show that the value of CNMI shipments of garments to the United States dropped by more than 16 percent between 2004 and 2005, from about $807 million to $677 million, and down from a peak of $1 billion in 1998--2000. In 2006, reported garment exports to the United States fell further, by an estimated 25 percent compared to 2005, with exports declining to an estimated $497 million. In December 2006, the largest and oldest garment factory closed. For example, tourism in CNMI experienced a sharp decline in the late 1990s with the Asian financial crisis and due to the cancellation of Korean Air service to CNMI following an airplane crash on Guam in August 1997. CNMI’s Reported Fiscal Condition Continues to Weaken
The fiscal condition of CNMI’s government has steadily weakened from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005, the most recent year for which audited financial statements for CNMI were available. In addition, several indicators point to a severe financial crisis in fiscal year 2006. As shown in figure 4, CNMI’s reported governmental fund balance declined from a positive $3.5 million at the beginning of fiscal year 2001 to a deficit of $84.1 million by the end of fiscal year 2005, as CNMI’s expenditures for its governmental activities consistently exceeded revenues in each year since fiscal year 2002. 15-24 to implement “austerity holidays” consisting of bi-weekly furloughs, during which government employees are not paid and many government operations are closed. CNMI’s Financial Accountability Remains Weak
CNMI has had long-standing financial accountability problems, including the late issuance of its single audit reports, the inability to achieve unqualified (“clean”) audit opinions on its financial statements, and numerous material weaknesses in internal controls over financial operations and compliance with laws and regulations governing federal grant awards. The auditors identified the following issues in fiscal year 2005 that resulted in the most recent qualified audit opinion: (1) inadequacies in the accounting records regarding taxes receivable, advances, accounts payable, tax rebates payable, other liabilities and accruals, and the reserve for continuing appropriations, (2) inadequacies in accounting records and internal controls regarding the capital assets of the Northern Marianas College, and (3) the lack of audited financial statements for the Commonwealth Utilities Corporation, which represents a significant component unit of CNMI. It is important to note however, that many of the auditors’ findings, particularly those categorized as material weaknesses, are longstanding findings going back in some cases to 1987. In our December 2006 report, we recommended that OIA develop a standardized framework for its site visits to improve the effectiveness of its monitoring. Conclusions
CNMI faces daunting economic, fiscal, and financial accountability challenges. CNMI’s economic and fiscal conditions are affected by its economy’s general dependence on two key industries. Federal agencies and CNMI have sponsored and participated in conferences, training sessions, and other programs to improve accountability, but knowing what has and has not been effective and drawing the right lessons from this experience is hampered by a lack of formal evaluation and data collection. During 2006, the CNMI government took dramatic steps to reverse prior patterns of deficit spending. The CNMI government will need to continue to work toward long-term sustainable solutions. Leadership on the part of the CNMI government and OIA is critical to addressing the challenges CNMI faces and to providing long-term stability and prosperity for this insular area. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. insular area of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) is a self-governing commonwealth of the United States that comprises 14 islands in the North Pacific. In a December 2006 report--U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability Challenges (GAO-07-119)--regarding four insular areas including CNMI, GAO identified and reported the following: (1) economic challenges, including the effect of changing tax and trade laws on their economies; (2) fiscal condition; and (3) financial accountability, including compliance with the Single Audit Act. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, which requested the December 2006 report, asked GAO to present and discuss the results as they pertain to CNMI. Our summary and conclusions are based on our work performed for our December 2006 report on U.S. insular areas. For this testimony we also had available CNMI's fiscal year 2005 audited financial statements, which we have included in our review, along with some recent developments in fiscal year 2006.
What GAO Found
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) faces serious economic, fiscal, and financial accountability challenges. CNMI's economy depends heavily on two industries, garment manufacturing and tourism. However, recent changes in U.S. trade law have increased foreign competition for CNMI's garment industry, while other external events have negatively affected its tourism sector. CNMI's garment industry has declined in recent years with factory closings and reduced production. The value of garment shipments to the United States dropped by more than 16 percent between 2004 and 2005 and by an estimated 25 percent in 2006. Tourism in CNMI declined sharply in the late 1990s as a result of a series of external events, including the Asian financial crisis; cancellation of Korean Air service; and fears of international crises such as the SARS epidemic, terrorism, and the Iraq war. In 2005, Japan Airlines withdrew direct flights to the capital. The fiscal condition of CNMI's government has steadily weakened from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005, as government spending has exceeded revenues each year since 2002. CNMI ended fiscal year 2005 with a deficit of $84.1 million in its governmental fund balance. CNMI's liabilities also exceed its assets for its primary government. Indicators point to a severe financial crisis in fiscal year 2006. In response, the CNMI government has implemented cost-cutting and restructuring measures, including "austerity holidays," consisting of biweekly furloughs during which government workers are not paid and many government operations are closed to reduce personnel and operating costs. CNMI's long-standing financial accountability problems include the late submission of financial audit reports, inability to achieve "clean" opinions in its financial statements by the independent financial auditors, and reports showing serious internal control weaknesses over financial reporting. Many of the auditors' findings are longstanding, going back in some cases to 1987. Federal agencies and CNMI have sponsored and participated in conferences, training sessions, technical assistance, and other programs to improve CNMI's economy, fiscal condition, and accountability. During 2006, the CNMI government took steps to reverse its prior patterns of deficit spending. It will need to continue to work toward long-term sustainable solutions, with concentrated attention on the challenges facing the islands and feedback mechanisms for continuing improvement. Leadership on the part of the CNMI government and the Department of the Interior's Office of Insular Affairs is critical to providing long-term stability and prosperity for this U.S. insular area. |
gao_GAO-08-674T | gao_GAO-08-674T_0 | While it is committing substantially more investment dollars to develop and procure new weapon systems, our analysis shows that the 2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs is experiencing greater cost growth and schedule delays than programs in fiscal years 2000 and 2005. In other words, every dollar spent on inefficiencies in acquiring one weapon system is less money available for other priorities and programs. The majority of programs in our assessment this year proceeded with lower levels of knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of product knowledge later in development than expected under best practices (see fig. Only a small portion of the programs in our assessment that have held a design review captured the necessary knowledge to ensure that they had mature technologies at system development start and a stable system design before entering the more costly system demonstration phase of development. In addition, we found that over 80 percent of the programs providing data did not or did not plan to demonstrate the successful integration of the key subsystems and components needed for the product through an integration laboratory, or better yet, through testing an early system prototype by the design review. Additional Factors Can Contribute to Poor Weapon Program Outcomes
This year, we gathered new data focused on other factors we believe could have a significant influence on DOD’s ability to improve cost and schedule outcomes. The Way Forward: Potential Solutions
Our work shows that acquisition problems will likely persist until DOD provides a better foundation for buying the right things, the right way. This involves (1) maintaining the right mix of programs to invest in by making better decisions as to which programs should be pursued given existing and expected funding and, more importantly, deciding which programs should not be pursued; (2) ensuring that programs that are started are executable by matching requirements with resources and locking in those requirements; and (3) making it clear that programs will then be executed based on knowledge and holding program managers responsible for that execution. We have made similar recommendations in past GAO reports. This includes changing the environment and incentives that lead DOD and the military services to overpromise on capability and underestimate costs in order to sell new programs and capture the funding needed to start and sustain them. Recent DOD Actions Provide Opportunities for Improvement
DOD has taken actions related to some of these steps. Based in part on GAO recommendations and congressional direction, DOD has recently begun to develop several initiatives that, if adopted and implemented properly, could provide a foundation for establishing sound, knowledge- based business cases for individual acquisition programs and improving program outcomes. GAO-08-294. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires Changes in DOD’s Environment. Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer Improvements for DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's investment in weapon systems represents one of the largest discretionary items in the budget. The department expects to invest about $900 billion (fiscal year 2008 dollars) over the next 5 years on development and procurement with more than $335 billion invested specifically in major defense acquisition programs. Every dollar spent inefficiently in acquiring weapon systems is less money available for other budget priorities--such as the global war on terror and growing entitlement programs. This testimony focuses on (1) the overall performance of DOD's weapon system investment portfolio; (2) our assessment of 72 weapon programs against best practices standards for successful product developments; and (3) potential solutions and recent DOD actions to improve weapon program outcomes. It is based on GAO-08-467SP , which included our analysis of broad trends in the performance of the programs in DOD's weapon acquisition portfolio and our assessment of 72 defense programs, and recommendations made in past GAO reports. DOD was provided a draft of GAO-08-467SP and had no comments on the overall report, but did provide technical comments on individual assessments. The comments, along with the agency comments received on the individual assessments, were included as appropriate.
What GAO Found
We recently released our sixth annual assessment of selected DOD weapon programs. The assessment indicates that cost and schedule outcomes for major weapon programs are not improving. Although well-conceived acquisition policy changes occurred in 2003 that reflect many best practices we have reported on in the past, these policy changes have not yet translated into practice at the program level. None of the weapon programs we assessed this year had proceeded through system development meeting the best practices standards for mature technologies, stable design, and mature production processes--all prerequisites for achieving planned cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. In addition, only a small percentage of programs used two key systems engineering tools--preliminary design reviews and prototypes to demonstrate the maturity of the product's design by critical junctures. This lack of disciplined systems engineering affects DOD's ability to develop sound, executable business cases for programs. Our work shows that acquisition problems will likely persist until DOD provides a better foundation for buying the right things, the right way. This involves making tough decisions as to which programs should be pursued, and more importantly, not pursued; making sure programs are executable; locking in requirements before programs are ever started; and making it clear who is responsible for what and holding people accountable when responsibilities are not fulfilled. Moreover, the environment and incentives that lead DOD and the military services to overpromise on capability and underestimate costs in order to sell new programs and capture funding will need to change. Based in part on GAO recommendations and congressional direction, DOD has begun several initiatives that, if adopted and implemented properly, could provide a foundation for establishing sound, knowledge-based business cases for individual acquisition programs and improving outcomes. |
gao_GAO-17-379 | gao_GAO-17-379_0 | Background
As of June 2017, BOP was responsible for approximately 188,000 inmates in federal custody. About 81 percent, or approximately 154,000 inmates, are housed in BOP-operated institutions. BOP provides most medical and dental care inside its institutions (inside care), usually with BOP-employed medical staff. BOP Obligated More Than $9 Billion for Inmate Health Care From Fiscal Years 2009 through 2016 and Several Factors Affected Costs
BOP’s Annual Health Care Obligations Have Increased Overall and on a Per Capita Basis
During the 8-year period starting in fiscal year 2009 and ending in fiscal year 2016, BOP obligated more than $9 billion for the provision of inmate health care. After adjusting for inflation, per capita health care obligations increased from $6,334 per inmate in fiscal year 2009 to $8,602 per inmate in fiscal year 2016, or an increase of about 36 percent during this time period. Officials frequently cited the following as major factors: inmates entering with relatively poorer health, aging inmates, rising pharmaceutical prices, and outside medical services. BOP Lacks or Does Not Analyze Certain Health Care Data Necessary to Understand and Control its Costs
BOP Lacks Health Care Utilization Data
BOP lacks data on the health care services it provides to inmates, which is otherwise known as health care utilization data. Specifically, BOP is planning to pilot a regional comprehensive medical services contract. By conducting a cost-effectiveness analysis of the potential ways to obtain health care utilization data, BOP will be better positioned to determine the most cost-effective way to collect such data and to start doing so in a timely manner. BOP Does Not Analyze Available Health Care Spending Data
BOP has not consistently collected and analyzed its institutions’ health care spending data to identify additional cost control opportunities, such as through strategic sourcing. BOP Has Initiatives Aimed to Control Health Care Costs but Has Not Assessed Their Effectiveness, Applied a Sound Planning Approach, or Documented its Analyses of Federal Medical Centers’ Missions
BOP Has Initiatives Intended to Control Health Care Costs but Has Not Evaluated Their Effectiveness
BOP has taken bureau-wide actions to help control health care costs through several initiatives, but has generally not evaluated the effectiveness of these initiatives. Conducting a comprehensive spend analysis could help BOP identify additional strategic sourcing opportunities to acquire medical goods and services more efficiently. By incorporating these sound planning elements, BOP could enhance its planning and implementation efforts before expending resources, better positioning itself for success as it aims to control health care costs. To better understand the available opportunities for collecting inmate health care utilization data, BOP should conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of potential solutions, and take steps toward implementation of the most effective solution. To enhance its strategic planning for and implementation of health care cost control efforts, BOP should incorporate elements of a sound planning approach and establish a means of measuring progress toward and effectiveness of its activities for its current strategic objectives and goals related to controlling health care costs; and identify the resources and investments necessary for implementation of its planned health care cost control initiatives. However, in an e-mail received on June 20, 2017, a DOJ official stated that BOP concurred with all five recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to examine: (1) how much the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has obligated for inmate health care from fiscal years 2009 through 2016 and the factors that affect BOP’s costs, (2) the extent to which BOP has data available to understand and help control its costs, and (3) the initiatives BOP has identified and implemented to help control health care costs and the extent to which BOP has effectively planned its health care cost control efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of June 2017, BOP was responsible for the custody and care—including health care—of about 154,000 inmates housed in BOP institutions. Health care includes medical, dental, and psychological treatment. BOP provides most care inside its institutions, but transports inmates outside when circumstances warrant. GAO was asked to review health care costs at BOP institutions.
This report addresses: (1) BOP's costs to provide health care services and factors that affect costs; (2) the extent to which BOP has data to help control health care costs; and (3) the extent to which BOP has planned and implemented cost control efforts.
GAO analyzed BOP health care obligations data for fiscal years 2009 through 2016, gathered information on BOP's health care cost control initiatives through a data collection instrument, and reviewed BOP's health care related strategic plans. GAO also interviewed BOP officials and visited 10 BOP institutions, selected in part, for total and per capita medical services costs.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2009 through 2016, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) obligated more than $9 billion for the provision of inmate health care and several factors affected these costs. Obligations for health care rose from $978 million in fiscal year 2009 to $1.34 billion in fiscal year 2016, an increase of about 37 percent. On a per capita basis, and adjusting for inflation, health care obligations rose from $6,334 in fiscal year 2009 to $8,602 in fiscal year 2016, an increase of about 36 percent. BOP cited an aging inmate population, rising pharmaceutical prices, and increasing costs of outside medical services as factors that accounted for its overall costs.
BOP lacks or does not analyze certain health care data necessary to understand and control its costs. For example, while BOP's data can show how much BOP is spending overall on health care provided inside and outside an institution, BOP lacks utilization data, which is data that shows how much it is spending on individual inmate's health care or how much it is expending on a particular health care service. BOP has identified potential solutions for gathering utilization data, but has not conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis of these solutions to identify the most effective solution. BOP also does not analyze health care spending data, i.e., what its institutions are buying, from whom, and how much they spend. BOP has pursued some opportunities to control its health care spending through interagency collaboration and national contracts, but it has not conducted a spend analysis to better understand trends. Doing so would provide BOP with better information to acquire goods and services more strategically.
BOP has initiatives aimed to control health care costs but could better assess effectiveness and apply a sound planning approach. Since 2009, BOP has implemented or planned a number of initiatives related to health care cost control, but has not evaluated their cost-effectiveness. Further, BOP has engaged in a strategic planning process to help control costs, but has not incorporated certain elements of a sound planning approach, such as developing a means to measure progress toward its objectives and identifying the resources and investments needed for its initiatives. By incorporating these elements, BOP could enhance its planning and implementation efforts before expending resources, better positioning itself for success as it aims to control health care costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations, including that BOP conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis to identify the most effective method to collect health care utilization data; conduct a spend analysis of health care spending data; evaluate cost control initiatives; and enhance its planning efforts by incorporating elements of a sound planning approach. BOP concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-36 | gao_GAO-13-36_0 | Included among these aircraft are airplanes, balloons, unmanned aircraft systems, gliders, and helicopters. As we reported about accidents occurring in 1998, personal operations accounted for more than 75 percent of fatal general aviation accidents. Some Industry Segments Experienced Fatal Accidents Disproportionately to Their Estimated Annual Flight Hours
To better understand the above observations about the airplanes involved in and the types of operations flown during general aviation accidents, we compared the proportions of fatal accidents by airplane category and operation type to their shares of FAA estimated flight hours for 1999 through 2010. Though the single-engine piston airplane is most often involved in fatal general aviation accidents, its share of fatal accidents (60 percent) was slightly less than its share of general aviation flight hours (65 percent). By comparison, E-ABs comprised 21 percent of fatal accidents, but only 4 percent of estimated flight hours. FAA and the industry recently completed a review of a subgroup of fatal loss of control accidents and will be developing detailed implementation plans for the intervention strategies. We discuss the implications of the lack of this and other data later in this section. Flight Activity Data Limitations Impede FAA’s Ability to Assess General Aviation Safety and Target Risk Mitigation Efforts
FAA estimates of general aviation annual flight hours—a measure key to NTSB’s calculation of general aviation accident and fatality rates and NTSB’s and FAA’s assessments of the safety of general aviation—may not be reliable because of methodological and conceptual limitations with the survey used to gather flight activity data. FAA’s Singular Goal to Reduce the Fatal Accident Rate May Mask Problems in Certain Segments of General Aviation
In 2008, FAA set a goal to reduce the fatal general aviation accident rate by 10 percent—from a baseline of 1.12 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours to 1 fatal accident per 100,000 flight hours—over 10 years, from 2009 to 2018. Although both initiatives work toward the overall goal of reducing general aviation fatalities, the GAJSC is using a data-driven approach to identify risks in general aviation operations and propose mitigations, while the 5- year strategy is composed of a wide variety of activities under four focus areas. The GAJSC consists of a steering committee that provides, among other things, strategic guidance and membership outreach. The 5-Year Strategy Has Significant Shortcomings
FAA’s 5-year strategy to improve general aviation safety suffers from several shortcomings that hinder its potential for success. Without performance goals or measures for the individual initiatives implemented under the 5-year strategy, FAA will not be able to evaluate the success or failure of those activities, regardless of whether the fatal accident rate is reduced. According to officials from the GAJSC and the general aviation industry groups we contacted, although they were briefed on the strategy, they were not consulted in its development and were surprised by the announcement of the strategy. Given the diversity of the general aviation community—illustrated, for example by the wide variety of aircraft in the fleet and the varying nonfatal and fatal accident rates among the general aviation segments, the adoption of a singular agency goal–-a 10 percent reduction in the general aviation fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours by 2018 is not the most effective risk-based tool for achieving general aviation safety gains. If the goal is reached, the overall success might mask ongoing safety issues in one or more segments of the community. For this reason, we think it is important for FAA to develop performance measures for the significant initiatives underlying the 5-year strategy. Improve measures of general aviation activity by requiring the collection of the number of hours that general aviation aircraft fly over a period of time (flight hours). DOT officials agreed to consider our recommendations and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. To do so, we addressed the following questions: (1) what are the characteristics and trends in general aviation accidents from 1999 to 2011 and (2) what actions have been taken by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve general aviation safety? To identify the characteristics of and trends in general aviation accidents, we conducted a data analysis using the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although the U.S. aviation system is one of the safest in the world, hundreds of fatalities occur each year in general aviationwhich includes all forms of aviation except commercial and military. The general aviation industry is composed of a diverse fleet of over 220,000 aircraft that conduct a wide variety of operationsfrom personal pleasure flights in small, piston aircraft to worldwide professionally piloted corporate flights in turbine-powered aircraft. According to 2011 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data, 92 percent of that years fatal accidents occurred in general aviation. The majority of general aviation accidents are attributed to pilot error. GAO was asked to examine the (1) characteristics of and trends in general 2011 and (2) recent actions taken by FAA to improve general aviation safety. GAO analyzed NTSB accident data, reviewed government and industry studies and other documents, and interviewed FAA and NTSB officials and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The number of nonfatal and fatal general aviation accidents decreased from 1999 through 2011; more than 200 fatal accidents occurred in each of those years. Airplanesparticularly single-engine piston airplanesflying personal operations were most often involved in accidents. Most general aviation accidents are attributed to pilot error and involved a loss of aircraft control. Some segments of the industry experienced accidents disproportionately to their total estimated annual flight hours. For example, among the airplane categories we reviewed, experimental amateur-built airplanes were involved in 21 percent of the fatal accidents but accounted for only 4 percent of the estimated annual flight hours. In another example, corporate operations were involved in about 1 percent of fatal accidents while accounting for 14 percent of estimated annual flight hours. We can draw some conclusions about general aviation accident characteristics, but limitations in flight activity and other data preclude a confident assessment of general aviation safety. The Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) survey of general aviation operators, on which the agency bases its annual flight-hour estimates, continues to suffer from methodological and conceptual limitations, even with FAAs efforts to improve it over the years. To obtain more reliable data, FAA has discussed requiring that flight-hour data be reported, such as during annual aircraft maintenance inspections. FAA has set a goal to reduce the fatal general aviation accident rate per 100,000 flight hours by 10 percent from 2009 to 2018. However, given the diversity of the industry and shortcomings in the flight activity data, this goal is not sufficient for achieving reductions in fatality rates among the riskier segments of general aviation. Further, achieving the goal could mask continuing safety issues in segments of the community.
FAA has embarked on several initiatives to meet its goal of reducing the fatal general aviation accident rate by 2018. These include the renewal of the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) with a data-driven approach and the implementation of the Flight Standards Services 5-year strategy. The GAJSC, a government-industry partnership, focuses on analyzing general aviation accident data to develop effective intervention strategies. The 5-year strategy involves numerous initiatives under four focus areas: (1) risk management, (2) outreach which is composed of FAA staff and industry volunteers, will be responsible for carrying out significant portions of the strategy. While the GAJSCs efforts are modeled on an approach deemed successful in contributing to a reduction in fatal jeopardize its potential for success. For example, the strategy lacks performance measures for the significant activities that comprise it. Without a strong performance management structure, FAA will not be able to determine the success or failure of the significant activities that underlie the 5-year strategy.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that FAA require the collection of general aviation aircraft flight-hour data in ways that minimize the impact on the general aviation community, set safety improvement goals for individual general aviation industry segments, and develop performance measures for the significant activities underlying the 5-year strategy. Department of Transportation officials agreed to consider GAOs recommendations and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-890T | gao_GAO-03-890T_0 | Background
In 1986, the United States and the FSM and the RMI entered into the Compact of Free Association. The second goal of the Compact – advancing economic development and self-sufficiency for both countries – was to be accomplished primarily through U.S. direct financial payments (to be disbursed and monitored by the U.S. Department of the Interior) to the FSM and the RMI. In addition, the Compact grants the United States a “defense veto” over actions by the FSM or the RMI governments that the United States determines are incompatible with its authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in these countries. Immigration issues were also addressed. According to the State Department, the aims of the amended Compacts are to (1) continue economic assistance to advance self-reliance, while improving accountability and effectiveness; (2) continue the defense relationship, including a 50-year lease extension (beyond 2016) of U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI; (3) strengthen immigration provisions; and (4) provide assistance to lessen the impact of Micronesian migration on Hawaii, Guam, and the CNMI. If the trust funds established in the amended Compacts earn a 6 percent rate of return, the FSM trust fund would be insufficient to replace expiring annual grants. Amended Compacts Could Cost the U.S. Government $6.6 Billion
Under the amended Compacts with the FSM and the RMI, new congressional authorizations of approximately $6.6 billion could be required for U.S. payments from fiscal years 2004 to 2086, of which $3.5 billion would be required for the first 20 years of the Compacts (see table 1). This new authorized funding would be provided to each country in the form of annual grant funds targeted to priority areas (such as health, education, and infrastructure), audit assistance, and disaster assistance; contributions to a trust fund for each country such that trust fund earnings would become available to the FSM and the RMI in fiscal year 2024 to replace expiring annual grants; payments the U.S. government makes to the RMI government that the RMI transfers to Kwajalein landowners to compensate them for the U.S. use of their lands for defense sites; and an extension of federal services that have been provided under the original Compact but are due to expire in fiscal year 2003. Nevertheless, the RMI trust fund would become insufficient for replacing grant funding by fiscal year 2040. The United States could withhold payments if either country fails to comply with grant terms and conditions. The successful implementation of the many new accountability provisions will require a sustained commitment by the three governments to fulfill their new roles and responsibility. Appropriate resources from the United States, the FSM, and the RMI represent one form of this commitment. While the U.S. government had already secured access to Kwajalein until 2016 through the 1986 MUORA, the newly revised MUORA would grant the United States access until 2066, with an option to extend for an additional 20 years to 2086. In addition, the ability of FSM and RMI citizens to volunteer to serve in the U.S. military would be extended. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1986, the United States entered into a Compact of Free Association with the Pacific Island nations of the Federated States of Micronesia, or FSM, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, or RMI. The Compact provided about $2.1 billion in U.S. funds, supplied by the Department of the Interior, over 17 years (1987-2003) to the FSM and the RMI. These funds were intended to advance economic development. In a past report, GAO found that this assistance did little to advance economic development in either country, and accountability over funding was limited. The Compact also established U.S. defense rights and obligations in the region and allowed for migration from both countries to the United States. The three parties recently renegotiated expiring economic assistance provisions of the Compact in order to provide an additional 20 years of assistance (2004-2023). In addition, the negotiations addressed defense and immigration issues. The House International Relations and Resources Committees requested that GAO report on Compact negotiations. This testimony discusses negotiated changes to the levels and structure of future assistance, including the potential cost to the U.S. government. Further, it reviews accountability, defense, and immigration changes brought about by the amended Compacts and related agreements.
What GAO Found
The amended Compacts of Free Association between the United States and the FSM and the RMI to renew expiring U.S. assistance could potentially cost the U.S. government about $6.6 billion in new authorizations from the Congress. Of this amount, $3.5 billion would cover payments over a 20-year period (2004-2023), while $3.1 billion represents payments for U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI for the years 2024 through 2086. While the level of annual grant assistance to both countries would decrease each year, contributions to trust funds--meant to eventually replace grant funding--would increase annually by a comparable amount. Nevertheless, at an assumed annual 6 percent rate of return, earnings from the FSM trust fund would be unable to replace expiring grant assistance in 2024, while earnings from the RMI trust fund would encounter the same problem by 2040. The amended Compacts strengthen reporting and monitoring measures that could improve accountability over assistance, if diligently implemented. These measures include the following: assistance grants would be targeted to priority areas such as health and education; annual reporting and consultation requirements would be expanded; and funds could be withheld for noncompliance with grant terms and conditions. The successful implementation of the many new accountability provisions will require appropriate resources and sustained commitment from the United States, the FSM, and the RMI. Regarding defense, U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI would be extended from 2016 through 2066, with an option to extend through 2086. Finally, Compact provisions addressing immigration have been strengthened. For example, FSM and RMI citizens entering the United States would need to carry a passport, and the U.S. Attorney General could, through regulations, specify the time and conditions of admission to the United States for these citizens. |
gao_GAO-10-665T | gao_GAO-10-665T_0 | Background
The Bureau takes extraordinary measures to produce a complete and accurate census. Importantly, nonresponse follow-up is the last opportunity for people to be directly counted in the census. First, for 2010, the mail-back response rate, used for determining the nonresponse follow-up workload, of 61.4 percent for the city of L.A. is lagging the national rate of 63.2 percent. The Bureau Is Positioned to Conduct Nonresponse Follow-up but Could Encounter Local and Other Challenges
Nationally, in terms of workload (as measured by the mail-back response rate) and staffing levels, the Bureau appears to be well positioned to implement nonresponse follow-up. On both counts, the Bureau’s performance is meeting its expected goals. With respect to the mail-back response rate, the Bureau expected a level of between 59 percent and 65 percent. The actual mail-back response rate when the Bureau determined the universe of houses to visit for nonresponse follow-up on April 19, was just over 63 percent, well within its estimates. This translates into a workload of around 48 million housing units. In terms of recruiting, the L.A. region has met its recruiting goals. Starting pay for enumerators, which is based on local labor markets, is $17 per hour in the L.A. area. Aside from workload and staffing, the reliability of the Bureau’s automated systems, and in particular an information technology (IT) system used for managing the Bureau’s field operations, is an open question. Further, census data are used to help ensure compliance with federal civil rights and other laws protecting our citizens. Census Data Are Used to Allocate Federal Aid to States and Localities
Many federal assistance programs are funded by formula grants that have historically relied, at least in part, on census and related population data to allocate funds. In our recent analysis, we found that the 10 largest federal assistance programs obligated an estimated $478 billion in fiscal year 2009 based, to some extent, on census and related population data. The grants included Medicaid, Highway Planning and Construction, Head Start, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program. Key Steps Could Help Ensure Timely and Accurate Follow-up Operations
Nationally, following up on nonresponding households is a daunting task, and L.A. presents its own challenges and opportunities. For example, data from a planning database the Bureau developed placed L.A. County first on a list of the top 50 U.S. counties with the highest number of people living in hard-to-count areas, based on data from the 2000 Census. Factors contributing to the area’s hard-to- count challenges include poverty, unemployment, and language barriers. At the same time, it will be important for the Bureau to fully leverage its partnership program—an effort where specially trained Bureau employees engage key government and community organizations to support the census—to help pave the way for nonresponse follow-up and improve cooperation with enumerators. Concluding Observations
As measured by workload and staffing levels, the Bureau is generally well- positioned to launch nonresponse follow-up. The operation starts tomorrow and will have more than 600,000 enumerators fan out across the country, collecting census information from those households that did not mail back their forms. With that in mind, the level of cooperation that occurs in the coming weeks on doorsteps across the country—as well as right here in downtown and South L.A.; Echo Park and Westlake; Wilshire and East Hollywood; and in neighborhoods all across L.A. City and County—will determine, to a large degree, the ultimate cost and quality of the decennial census. | Why GAO Did This Study
On May 1, 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) will launch its massive follow-up effort with the roughly 48 million households that did not mail back their census forms (130 million forms were delivered). As part of this nonresponse follow-up effort, over 600,000 enumerators will fan out across the country, personally contacting nonresponding housing units as many as six times in an effort to ensure everyone is counted. As requested, GAO's testimony in Los Angeles (L.A.) focuses on the importance of census participation, paying particular attention to (1) the Bureau's preparedness for nonresponse follow-up in terms of workload and staffing levels, (2) why it will be critical for Angelenos and others across the country to cooperate with enumerators during nonresponse follow-up, and (3) key steps the Bureau needs to take moving forward to ensure nonresponse follow-up is timely and accurate. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work.
What GAO Found
Nationally, based on workload and staffing levels, the Bureau appears to be well positioned to implement nonresponse follow-up. On both counts, the Bureau's performance is meeting its expected goals. With respect to the mail-back response rate, the Bureau expected a level of between 59 percent and 65 percent. The actual mail-back response rate when the Bureau determined the universe of houses to visit for nonresponse follow-up on April 19, was 63.2 percent, well within its estimates. The mail-back response rate for L.A. City was 61.4 percent, and L.A. County was 64.7 percent. In terms of staffing, the Bureau met its goals both nationally as well as for L.A. Still, the Bureau could encounter pockets of challenges at the local level where mail-back response rates are less than expected. Further, the reliability of a computer system needed to administer nonresponse follow-up is an open question. Participation in the census has decade-long implications for individuals, communities, and states. For example, census data are used to apportion House seats, redraw the boundaries of congressional and local election districts, and help ensure compliance with civil rights and other laws protecting our citizens. A complete count also helps ensure that L.A. and other areas obtain their fair share of federal assistance. Indeed, a number of formula grants allocate money based at least in part on census and related population data. GAO's recent analysis found that the 10 largest federal assistance programs obligated an estimated $478 billion in fiscal year 2009 based, to some extent, on census and related population data. The grants included Medicaid, Highway Planning and Construction, Head Start, and the Children's Health Insurance Program. Local governments as well as businesses use census data for planning and investment decisions, and to better tailor the services they provide. Nationally, following up on nonresponding households is a daunting task, and L.A. presents its own challenges and opportunities. For example, data from a planning database the Bureau developed placed L.A. County first on a list of the top 50 U.S. counties with the highest number of people living in hard-to-count areas, based on data from the 2000 Census. Factors contributing to the area's hard-to-count challenges include poverty, unemployment, and language barriers. Moving forward, among other activities, it will be important for the Bureau to track various production, quality, and other indicators as planned to help ensure nonresponse follow-up stays on track. In summary, participation in the census is a quick, easy, and confidential civic act that has a lasting impact on states, cities, neighborhoods, and even individuals. But the benefits that can accrue from a complete and accurate population tally can only occur if Angelenos cooperate with enumerators when they knock on nonrespondents' doors in the weeks ahead. |
gao_AIMD-99-22 | gao_AIMD-99-22_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) whether the Authority’s financial information was in the same amounts and consistently presented in the fiscal year 1996 and 1997 audited financial statements of the Authority and the District’s CAFR, (2) why the District’s internal control weakness concerning the Authority was not also included in the audit report on the Authority, (3) the Authority’s use of the escrow accounts’ interest income, (4) the Authority’s purpose for the “Taxable Equipment Lease/Purchase Agreement,” and (5) whether suggestions made to the Authority’s management in our prior letter were implemented. As a result of the widely different annual revenue amounts for the Authority ($8.6 million for fiscal year 1997) and the District ($5.2 billion in fiscal year 1997), the Authority’s account balances, which represent less than .2 percent of the District’s revenue, are summarized in the District’s CAFR instead of being reported in detail, as in the Authority’s financial statements. Reported Internal Control Weakness Concerning the Authority
In the District’s auditors’ Reports on Internal Controls and Compliance for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, an internal control weakness was identified concerning controls over financial reporting involving the Authority’s transactions that relate to the District. The District’s auditors recommended that the District and the Authority jointly develop procedures that would result in the Authority providing to the District the kind of monthly financial information needed for the District to perform a comprehensive reconciliation. They further stated that such information should include the monthly balances and the financial activity for each individual escrow account maintained by the Authority on behalf of the District. The Authority’s auditors stated, and we agree, that this material weakness did not affect the Authority’s internal controls related to preparation of its financial statements. In fiscal years 1997 and 1996, the escrow accounts earned interest of $9.8 million and $5.5 million, respectively. Authority officials stated that the purpose of the agreement was to obtain needed financing by recovering the net cost of assets acquired with fiscal year 1997 and 1996 funds and spreading the cost over a 3-year period and to free-up budget capacity (budget authority). Follow-Up on Prior GAO Letter
Our May 23, 1997, letter identified seven opportunities to improve the Authority’s future financial statements. The Authority implemented all of our prior report’s suggestions, except for the inclusion of an MD&A section as part of its audited financial statements (see appendix I). We continue to believe that our prior suggestion that the Authority include an MD&A section in its audited financial statements is needed and would enhance its financial statements. Authority’s Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of the report, the Authority disagreed with sections in our report concerning the lack of communication between the Authority and the District when transactions involve funds that are held by the Authority on behalf of the District, the Authority’s rights and economic benefits resulting from the agreement called “Taxable Equipment Lease/Purchase Agreement,” and our suggestions to enhance the Authority’s financial statements with an MD&A section. We are also sending a copy to the Chairperson, District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority. Status Of GAO’s Prior Year Suggestions
Include a Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section to enhance the annual report. GAO Comments
1. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO compared the audited financial statements and management letters of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority for fiscal years (FY) 1996 and 1997 to the District's Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) to determine: (1) whether there was agreement of amounts and consistency of presentation regarding the Authority's financial information; and (2) why the District's internal control weakness that relates to the Authority was not identified in the audit report on the Authority's financial statements. GAO also provided information on the: (1) Authority's use of interest income from escrow accounts established on behalf of the District; (2) Authority's purpose for the transaction entitled Taxable Equipment Lease/Purchase Agreement; and (3) status of the Authority's implementation of GAO's suggestions for its financial statements for fiscal years 1995 and 1996.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Authority's audited financial statements and the District's audited CAFR for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 revealed that the financial statements included the same amounts for Authority operations; (2) the presentation and categorization of the Authority's amounts were in accordance with the appropriate sections of the Government Accounting Standards Board accounting principles for both sets of financial statements; (3) in the District's auditors' report on internal controls and compliance for FY 1997, they identified a material weakness concerning financial reporting controls over transactions involving the Authority; (4) the District's auditors recommended that the Authority, along with the District, implement procedures to provide monthly balances and the related support for all financial activity each month on behalf of the District; (5) the Authority's auditors stated that this weakness did not affect the Authority's internal controls over financial reporting; (6) while Authority officials stated their belief that there was sufficient documentation available within the District to record financial activity on its books, the Authority's role in District operations and the District's dependence on the Authority for data on certain transactions and balances would necessitate effective communication of financial activity between the two entities; (7) since the Authority established the escrow accounts on behalf of the District, the accounts have earned interest income of $9.8 million and $5.5 million for fiscal years 1997 and 1996; (8) during FY 1997, $5 million was paid directly to vendors, transferred from an escrow account, or used to finance the Authority's operations; (9) the Authority entered into an agreement, entitled Taxable Equipment Lease/Purchase Agreement; (10) Authority officials stated that the purpose of the agreement was to obtain needed financing and to free-up budget capacity; (11) GAO identified seven opportunities for improving the Authority's future financial statements; (12) the Authority has implemented six of GAO's seven suggestions; (13) the one exception was the inclusion of a Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section as part of its audited financial statements; and (14) with the concept of MD&A expanding across all governmental entities and presently a requirement in the federal government and for publicly-traded private sector corporations, GAO believes that including a MD&A section in the Authority's audited financial statements is needed and would enhance its financial statements. |
gao_RCED-97-30 | gao_RCED-97-30_0 | Fiscal Year 1996 Adjustments to the Disposal Program
Following the appropriation for fiscal year 1996, DOE (1) curtailed most investigative activities at Yucca Mountain, (2) decided to revise its guidelines for determining if the site is suitable for a repository, and (3) announced that it would assess, in 1998, the “viability” of a repository at Yucca Mountain. 1.) 2.) According to the disposal program’s director, making a decision to develop a storage facility near Yucca Mountain after the viability assessment, although before DOE determines if the Yucca Mountain site is suitable for a repository, would provide for a more informed decision. Potential Impediments to Achieving the Objectives and Schedule for DOE’s Repository Project
Several uncertainties must be resolved in DOE’s favor if the Department is to achieve the project’s revised objectives and schedule. First, it is uncertain when EPA and NRC will issue the health standards and licensing regulations, respectively, that DOE will use to determine if Yucca Mountain is a suitable repository site. Also, the lack of applicable standards and regulations creates uncertainty about whether the scope of the Department’s site investigation has been adequate. Finally, limitations on the information that DOE is collecting in key areas and on NRC’s preparations to review a license application add more uncertainty to the repository project. DOE May Not Have Adequately Investigated Key Areas
Regardless of the timing and substance of the final repository regulations, limitations on the information that DOE is collecting and on NRC’s preparations to review a license application increase uncertainty about the sufficiency of the Department’s investigation of Yucca Mountain. Observations
DOE’s viability assessment may provide important insights into the expected design, performance, and cost of a repository at the Yucca Mountain site. DOE also said that we appear to be misinformed about its plans to continue addressing the uncertainties related to hydrology, the effects of heat from waste on the performance of the repository, and waste package materials. V for details of our scope and methodology.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) Yucca Mountain Project, focusing on: (1) adjustments DOE made to the disposal program due to reduced appropriations; and (2) potential impediments to achieving DOE's objectives and schedule for the repository project.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) because DOE did not receive the amount of appropriations requested for fiscal year 1996, it revised the scope and objectives of the repository project with the goal of applying for a construction license in March 2002, about 5 months later than had been planned; (2) specifically, DOE: (a) curtailed most investigative activities at Yucca Mountain in favor of analyzing the information already collected to focus the remaining investigative activities on key uncertainties; (b) decided to revise its guidelines for determining if the Yucca Mountain site is suitable for a repository by deleting those criteria that require compliance with specific technical conditions, such as those concerning the travel time for groundwater; and (c) will issue, in September 1998, an assessment of the expected design, performance, and cost of a repository at Yucca Mountain. This report is intended to support decisions on continuing the repository project and authorizing a waste storage facility near Yucca Mountain that may be made before DOE has determined if the site is suitable for a repository; (3) several impediments must be resolved in DOE's favor if it is to achieve the project's revised objectives and schedule; (4) it is uncertain when the Environmental Protection Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will issue the health standards and licensing regulations, respectively, that DOE needs to determine if Yucca Mountain is a suitable repository site; (5) the absence of applicable standards and regulations creates uncertainty about whether the scope of DOE's site investigation is adequate; and (6) limitations on information that DOE is collecting in key areas, such as hydrology and the effects of the heat generated by waste on the performance of the repository and NRC's preparations to review a license application, add more uncertainty to the repository project. |
gao_GAO-17-216 | gao_GAO-17-216_0 | CBP’s predeparture programs use the results of NTC’s efforts to identify and interdict high-risk individuals destined for the United States while they are still overseas. Specifically, CBP operates three air predeparture programs that are responsible for all U.S.-bound air travelers—Preclearance; the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program (JSP); and the regional carrier liaison groups (RCLG). As of April 2016, CBP operates 15 air Preclearance locations in six countries. According to CBP officials, under this program, unarmed, plain clothes CBP officers posted at foreign airports partner with air carriers and host country government officials to help prevent terrorists and other high-risk individuals from boarding U.S.-bound flights by vetting and interviewing them before travel. RCLGs are located and operate at domestic airports. CBP Analyzes Traveler Data and Threat Information to Identify High-Risk Travelers before They Board U.S.-Bound Flights
CBP Has Processes in Place to Identify High-Risk Travelers before They Board U.S.-Bound Flights
CBP electronically vets all travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights and continues to do so until they land at a U.S. port of entry. According to NTC officials responsible for the rules-based targeting program, unknown high-risk travelers pose the greatest threat to the United States because their information is not contained in lists of known high-risk individuals and are therefore more difficult to detect. Additionally, NTC coordinates its traveler data matching and rules-based targeting for international air travelers with TSA’s Secure Flight Program. CBP’s Air Predeparture Programs Interdict High-Risk Air Travelers, but CBP Has Not Fully Assessed the Programs’ Performance
CBP Identifies and Interdicts High-Risk Travelers before They Board U.S.-Bound Flights
Through its predeparture programs—Preclearance, IAP and JSP, and RCLGs—CBP identifies and interdicts high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. Specifically, CBP data indicate that CBP’s predeparture programs identified and ultimately interdicted approximately 22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year 2015. In fiscal year 2015, CBP officers at Preclearance locations determined that 10,648 air travelers were inadmissible out of the approximately 16 million air travelers seeking admission to the United States through a Preclearance location (see fig. CBP officers at IAP and JSP locations made 3,925 no- board recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 29 million air travelers bound for the United States from such locations (see fig. RCLG. According to senior CBP officials, some of the results of CBP’s predeparture programs are not easily measured. Developing and implementing a system of performance measures and baselines for each program would help ensure that these programs are achieving their intended goals. CBP Plans to Expand its Predeparture Programs, but Several Factors Limit Its Ability to Expand to All Priority Locations CBP Aims to Expand Its Predeparture Programs to Additional Overseas Locations
CBP has plans underway to expand its predeparture programs, particularly Preclearance operations. In May 2015, DHS announced plans to enter into formal negotiations to expand Preclearance to 10 airports in 9 countries. However, CBP did not select these two locations solely based on their score among the 10 priority locations that CBP selected for potential expansion. Although CBP prefers that the airport authority pay the majority of Preclearance costs, CBP officials stated that its expansion decisions are not solely driven by the costs CBP would have to incur to set up and maintain a Preclearance location. By developing and implementing a system of performance measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of its predeparture programs, CBP will be better positioned to measure predeparture program performance and to determine what these data indicate about whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better ensure the effectiveness of CBP’s predeparture programs, we recommend that the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection develop and implement a system of performance measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP’s predeparture programs and assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS seeks to identify and interdict international air travelers who are potential security threats to the United States, such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human traffickers, and otherwise inadmissible persons, at the earliest possible point in time. In fiscal year 2015, CBP processed more than 104 million U.S.-bound air travelers. CBP operates various predeparture programs domestically and overseas that are designed to identify and interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights.
GAO was asked to review CBP's predeparture programs. This report addresses (1) how CBP identifies high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights; (2) the results of CBP's predeparture programs and the extent to which CBP has measures to assess program performance; and (3) how CBP plans to expand its predeparture programs. GAO reviewed CBP policies and procedures and fiscal year 2015 data across these programs. GAO also visited nine foreign and one domestic airport, selected based on location and traveler volume, among other factors. Information from these visits was not generalizable but provided valuable insights into program operations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) analyzes traveler data and threat information to identify high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC), the primary entity responsible for these analyses, conducts traveler data matching which assesses whether travelers are high-risk by matching their information against U.S. government databases and lists, and rules-based targeting, which enables CBP to identify unknown high-risk individuals. CBP operates multiple predeparture programs that use the results of NTC's analyses to help identify and interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. CBP officers inspect all U.S. bound travelers on precleared flights at the 15 Preclearance locations and, if deemed inadmissible, a traveler will not be permitted to board the aircraft. CBP also operates nine Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and two Joint Security Program (JSP) locations as well as three Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG) that allow CBP to work with foreign government and air carrier officials to identify and interdict high-risk travelers. Through these programs, CBP may recommend that air carriers not permit such travelers to board U.S.-bound flights.
CBP data show that it identified and interdicted over 22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year 2015 through its predeparture programs. CBP officers at Preclearance locations determined that 10,648 of the approximately 16 million air travelers seeking admission to the United States through such locations were inadmissible. Similarly, CBP, through its IAP, JSP, and RCLG locations, made 11,589 no-board recommendations to air carriers for the approximately 88 million air travelers bound for the United States from such locations. While CBP's predeparture programs have helped identify and interdict high-risk travelers, CBP has not fully evaluated the overall effectiveness of these programs using performance measures and baselines. CBP tracks some data, such as the number of travelers deemed inadmissible, but has not set baselines to determine if predeparture programs are achieving goals, consistent with best practices for performance measurement. By developing and implementing a system of performance measures and baselines, CBP would be better positioned to assess if the programs are achieving their goals.
CBP plans to expand its predeparture programs where possible, though several factors limit its ability to expand to all priority locations. In May 2015—after soliciting interest among foreign airport authorities and scoring interested airports using risk and other factors—CBP stated it would begin Preclearance expansion negotiations with 10 priority airports in 9 countries. As of November 2016, CBP had not completed the process required to begin operations in any locations prioritized for expansion, but had reached agreement with one location at which Preclearance operations could begin as early as 2019. According to senior CBP officials, Preclearance expansions are lengthy and complex processes because host governments and airports must be willing to allow for a Preclearance location, and CBP's Preclearance expansion strategy relies on partnering with airports that are willing to pay for the majority of operational costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP develop and implement a system of performance measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of its predeparture programs and assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. CBP concurred with the recommendation and identified planned actions to address the recommendation. |
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