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gao_NSIAD-95-76 | gao_NSIAD-95-76_0 | In response to our audit questions, the Army revised some of its estimates and, on the basis of these revisions, increased it to about $85 million. However, we found that the revised estimate excluded training costs that the Guard will likely incur and included savings in aircraft operating costs that resulted from another initiative. We could not estimate the agreement’s impact on readiness for 152 of the 182 units affected by the swap and migration. Thirteen units will be replaced by units with lower readiness ratings, while 17 units will be replaced by units having the same or higher readiness ratings. For example, we cannot identify the readiness impact for 20 of the 28 Reserve to Guard transfers involved in the swap because the Guard did not designate specific units that will assume the missions of the 20 Reserve units. The 107 new Reserve units have up to 1 year to organize and build up their readiness ratings before the Guard units are inactivated. For some units, this time could be very short. Because we cannot anticipate what future actions the reserve components will take to accommodate displaced personnel, we focused our attention in three primary areas affected in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 by the agreement—the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade, aviation units, and special operations units. Pennsylvania Army National Guard officials told us that, except for senior officers and enlisted persons, they would welcome the transfer of troops from the 157th. Aviation Units
Most Reserve helicopter pilots, technicians, and civilians associated with aviation units will have difficulty finding new units in the Guard. We found no evidence that the Guard’s status would hinder the Special Operations Command’s training responsibilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. As a combatant command, the U.S. Special Operations Command is responsible for preparing active and reserve component special operations forces to carry out assigned missions, including the training of assigned forces. We spoke with Department of the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officials to obtain documents and other information pertaining to the cost and readiness implications of the agreement, the reserve components’ efforts to absorb displaced personnel, and the agreement’s impact on control of special forces in the reserve components. GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Offsite Agreement, a major restructuring of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, focusing on the agreement's: (1) implementation costs; (2) impact on readiness; (3) efforts to absorb displaced personnel; (4) effect on the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; and (5) impact on the Special Operations Command's training of special Guard forces.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) implementation of the Offsite Agreement could cost over $180 million; (2) the Army's latest cost estimate is about $85 million; (3) GAO believes that the Army's estimate excludes training costs that the Guard will likely incur and includes savings in operating costs that would have resulted regardless of the agreement; (4) it is too early to tell how the agreement will affect readiness for most units; (5) the Guard did not identify specific units that will assume the missions of 20 inactivating Reserve units; another 107 Reserve units are new and have 1 year to establish their readiness ratings; (6) GAO estimated the readiness impact for some units; 13 units will be replaced by units with lower readiness ratings, while 18 units will be replaced by units having the same or higher readiness ratings; (7) the Guard and Reserve have primarily left it up to the reserve component commands and individual units to help affected persons find new units; (8) in three areas already affected by the agreement (the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade, aviation units, and special operations units) some of the commands' and units' initiatives appear to be working well; (9) others, however, appear to discourage the transfer of personnel, even if a transfer would result in a more effective use of their skills; (10) senior and experienced officers and enlisted persons in inactivating units appear to have the most difficulty obtaining positions in other units in the Reserve and the Guard; (11) reserve helicopter pilots and technicians are also experiencing difficulties; and (12) GAO found no evidence indicating that the Special Operations Command will have problems exercising control over the training of Guard special operations forces. |
gao_GAO-17-423 | gao_GAO-17-423_0 | Inaccuracies Limit the Usefulness of Some BIA Data on the Condition of Roads on Tribal Lands
Data fields pertaining to road inventory in BIA’s NTTFI and DMR databases are useful for the purpose of identifying roads eligible for federal tribal funding. Federal standards for internal control state that to achieve agency objectives, management should (1) design information systems and related control activities including continuing to evaluate those activities for continued relevance and effectiveness and (2) use quality information. We found the DMR data to be useful for identifying roads in the BIA inventory. In management of the RMP, BIA sets goals and reports on its performance; however, we found that some data in the DMR system— specifically, data on the current level of service (overall condition of the road), cost of needed maintenance, and amount of maintenance performed—may not be sufficiently accurate for BIA’s use in this reporting. Stakeholders Face Various Challenges to Improving Roads on Tribal Lands, Although Partnerships Have Helped to Mitigate
Based on our review of various planning and funding documents as well as interviews with selected stakeholders—including federal, state, local, and tribal officials—we identified funding constraints, overlapping jurisdictions, and adverse weather as some of the challenges faced in improving and maintaining roads on tribal lands. For example, two adjacent school districts within the Navajo Nation use many of the same roads for their school bus routes. In 2013, FHWA, BIA, Arizona Department of Transportation, and the Navajo Nation partnered on a $35 million emergency relief project to pave about 27 miles of BIA Route 20, which was an earth road, during the closure of a 23-mile stretch of U.S. Highway 89 after a landslide damaged a portion of the highway. Indian Students Have Higher Absence Rates, and Road Conditions Can Be a Barrier to School Attendance on Tribal Lands, Although Data Are Limited
Indian Students Nationwide Have Higher Absence Rates than Non- Indian Students, but Research about the Effect of Road Conditions Is Limited
Higher Absence Rates
Nationwide, Indian elementary and secondary school students are absent more than non-Indian students, according to our analysis of national data from two Department of Education (Education) surveys. Further, BIE has not provided guidance to its schools regarding capturing reasons for absences related to roads and weather. (See fig. In addition, DMR may contain inaccurate data on maintenance needs because BIA does not document how it develops maintenance cost estimates and tribes under-report maintenance performed. As a result, reports and budget submissions that rely on these data may not accurately reflect road conditions or maintenance needs and associated costs. Many factors affect student attendance, among them the condition of roads. To help ensure that NTTFI is able to provide quality information to support management and program oversight efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs to take the following three actions: coordinate with the FHWA and tribal stakeholders and reexamine the need for road-description and condition data currently collected in the NTTFI and eliminate fields that do not serve an identified purpose, for fields determined to have continued relevance for management and program oversight take steps to improve the quality of these data by clarifying guidance in the NTTFI coding guide that tribes use to collect data and by providing additional guidance on steps needed to ensure that data are consistently reported, and establish a process to monitor data to facilitate timely and targeted corrections to missing or erroneous data. Interior agreed with two of our recommendations for improving DMR and disagreed with one. We continue to believe that these recommendations are important for BIE to implement. (2) What challenges, if any, do stakeholders face in improving and maintaining roads on tribal lands? (3) What is known about the connection between road conditions on tribal lands and school attendance as well as other aspects of school transportation? To determine the extent to which the NTTFI and DMR systems provide useful data on road conditions on tribal lands, we reviewed federal regulations, strategic plans, performance reports, agency reports, industry practices, guidance, policies, and system documentation pertaining to the collection, coding, and use of both databases; conducted electronic data testing, such as for completeness, out-of-range values, and logical inconsistencies; attended a training workshop on NTTFI data entry; and interviewed Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and tribal officials about the systems. Appendix II: NTTFI Road Miles Data by BIA Region, Owner, and Road Surface Type
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) uses the National Tribal Transportation Facility Inventory (NTTFI) to document existing and proposed roads on tribal lands that are eligible for Tribal Transportation Program (TTP) funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
Roads on tribal lands are of particular importance for connecting people to essential services, such as schools, because of the remote location of some tribes. These roads are often unpaved and may not be well maintained. The federal government funds two programs to improve and maintain roads on tribal lands. BIA maintains the NTTFI and DMR databases to support these programs.
GAO was asked to review condition and school-access issues related to roads on tribal lands. This report examines: (1) the extent to which the NTTFI and DMR systems provide useful data on these roads; (2) any challenges to improving and maintaining these roads; and (3) what is known about the connection between road condition and school attendance as well as other aspects of school transportation. GAO reviewed documents and relevant literature; analyzed road-inventory and student- attendance data; and interviewed federal, state, local, and tribal transportation and education officials. GAO visited three selected tribes, based on road mileage and presence of BIE schools, among other factors.
What GAO Found
The two databases maintained by the Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) include some data fields useful for identifying tribal roads eligible for federal funding, but other fields may be too inaccurate to be useful for performance reporting and oversight. Specifically, the National Tribal Transportation Facility Inventory (NTTFI) provides useful data for identifying the roughly 161,000 miles of roads on tribal lands that are eligible for federal funding. However, the purpose for which these data are used has changed, and GAO found incomplete and inconsistent road-description and condition data, raising questions about the continued value of collecting these data. Similarly, BIA's Deferred Maintenance Reporting (DMR) system provides useful data on roughly 29,000 miles of BIA-owned roads eligible for federal funding, but GAO found inaccuracies in fields related to road-condition and road-maintenance needs. BIA does not document its road-maintenance cost estimates, and some tribes under-report performed maintenance. As a result, budget justification and performance reporting using these fields may not accurately reflect maintenance costs and needs. Federal standards for internal control suggest agencies design information systems and use quality information to achieve objectives.
Funding constraints, overlapping jurisdictions, and adverse weather make improving and maintaining roads on tribal lands challenging. However, intergovernmental partnerships have helped mitigate challenges in some cases. For example, in 2013, federal, state, and tribal agencies partnered on a $35- million project to pave a BIA earth road on the Navajo Nation when the main U.S. highway was closed due to a landslide. By partnering, the agencies completed the project in about 3 months and prior to the start of the school year, eliminating a 45-mile detour.
GAO's literature review and interviews with education officials indicate that road conditions can be a barrier to attendance, and Department of Education data show that Indian students have a higher chronic absence rate than other students (see fig.). At Interior, the Bureau of Indian Education's (BIE) schools generally do not collect data on transportation-related causes for absences, despite broader federal guidance that recommends doing so. BIE's attendance system lists causes, but transportation-related causes are currently not among them. Thus, BIE cannot quantify the effect of road conditions and target appropriate interventions. Rough road conditions in some areas also contribute to greater wear on school vehicles and associated higher maintenance costs.
School Bus on the Navajo Nation (Utah) and the National Rate of Students Chronically Absent, School Year 2013–14
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making eight recommendations including that BIA, in coordination with stakeholders, reexamine the need for NTTFI data and improve the quality of DMR data, and that BIE provide guidance to collect transportation-related absence data. Interior agreed with five of the recommendations, did not take a position on two, and disagreed with one. GAO continues to believe its recommendations are valid, as discussed further in this report. |
gao_NSIAD-98-152 | gao_NSIAD-98-152_0 | Deficiencies Must Be Corrected to Achieve Air Force Objectives
To test the operational performance of the B-2A, the Air Force measured B-2A performance against five broad operational objectives that were derived from documented Air Force operational requirements and concepts related to nuclear and conventional missions. As the B-2A matures, numerous minor problems identified in the test reports are scheduled to be corrected or improved based on their relative priorities. This will limit the Air Force’s ability to rapidly strike targets and sustain operations. The lack of an effective defensive avionics system could affect the B-2A’s survivability in selected situations because it is supposed to provide B-2A crews with information on the location of threats, both known and unknown that they may encounter during a mission. The Air Force’s cost estimate does not include the cost of correcting all deficiencies but does cover some improvements in the defensive system. These software changes are intended to provide capabilities that are useful but less than were expected in the original defensive system design. Inadequate Reliability and Maintainability of Low Observable Materials
Low observable materials and features on the B-2A frequently fail, requiring high amounts of maintenance. Lack of Environmental Shelters for Deployment
The operational test report states that the block 30 B-2A aircraft must be sheltered to protect it from weather and provide a suitable environment in which to maintain low observables. However, the Air Force will incur additional costs if it plans to correct the deficiencies identified during testing and achieve the full operational capability originally planned for the B-2A. At this time, there is no comprehensive plan that identifies the efforts required to achieve the full B-2A capability, the likely cost of these efforts, or a funding plan. Most B-2A Funds Have Been Appropriated
The fiscal year 1999 B-2A cost estimate indicates the cost to complete development, procurement, and modification of the B-2A program is $44.3 billion then-year dollars. In addition to the cost increases needed for defensive avionics, low observable materials, and support needed for deployment, the Air Force will also incur costs to procure spares to support the nuclear mission of the B-2A. As of April 1998, Northrop Grumman had delivered three modified aircraft later than, and one modified aircraft earlier than, the contract schedule. This change would be to accommodate the need to provide an aircraft for flight testing planned upgrades. DOD agreed there is a need to identify to Congress future efforts and funding requirements to upgrade current B-2As. To identify the status of the block 30 modification schedule, we reviewed the contract and planning schedules for the block 30 modification process, delivery documents identifying the delivery date and number of deficiencies on the delivered aircraft, and reports showing planned and actual manning at the contractor’s modification facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the total acquisition costs of the B-2A bomber, focusing on: (1) deficiencies that must be corrected to achieve Air Force objectives for the B-2A; (2) additional costs to correct the deficiencies; and (3) the B-2A modification schedule.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force evaluated the B-2A capability to meet several broad objectives--strike rapidly, sustaining operations, deploy to forward locations, survive in hostile environments, and accurately deliver weapons; (2) the November 1997 operational test reports concluded that B-2As, in the block 30 configuration, are operationally effective, but with several important deficiencies that limit the aircraft's ability to fully meet those objectives as planned; (3) the test reports identify four deficiencies: (a) incomplete development of the automated ground mission planning system, which is needed to rapidly plan and carry out B-2A strike missions; (b) unsatisfactory performance of the defensive avionics system, which is used to provide enemy threat information to the crews and increase their survivability in certain situations; (c) inadequate reliability and maintainability of low observable materials and structures, reducing the ability to sustain the defined pace of operations while maintaining a high degree of survivability for conventional B-2A missions; and (d) lack of environmental shelters to maintain low observable materials and to protect the aircraft from certain weather conditions during deployment; (4) the fiscal year 1999 B-2A cost estimate identifies the cost to complete the B-2A program for the block 30 configuration at $44.3 billion then-year dollars; (5) included in this figure is funding to correct or improve some, but not all, of the deficiencies listed above; (6) for example, the estimate does not include the additional costs that would be incurred if defensive avionics were to be required to achieve the originally planned capability, which Department of Defense officials said is no longer required at this time; (7) however, it does include funding for software upgrades to improve the system performance, which meets current operational objectives; (8) further, it does not include the cost to improve low observable materials, which are needed to sustain the pace of B-2A operations, and to provide for a sufficient number of deployment shelters to accommodate repairs to B-2As; (9) the estimate also excludes costs to buy spare parts that are being identified to support the B-2A's nuclear mission; (10) modifications of B-2As to the block 30 configuration have not been accomplished on schedule; (11) four modified aircraft were delivered as of April 1998--three later than scheduled and one ahead of schedule; and (12) according to the Air Force, the contractor has had difficulty hiring enough personnel to achieve the schedule. |
gao_NSIAD-98-196 | gao_NSIAD-98-196_0 | A dual-control system was established for tier 3 countries, such as Russia and China. The government has 10 days to assess and object to a proposed HPC sale. Key Study Used as Basis for Changing HPC Controls Had Limitations
The Stanford study, used as a key element by the executive branch in its decision to revise HPC export controls, had significant limitations. The Stanford Study Lacked Evidence of HPC Uncontrollability
The Stanford study accumulated information from computer companies on U.S. HPC market characteristics and concluded—without empirical evidence or analysis—that computers between 4,000 and 5,000 MTOPS were already available worldwide and uncontrollable and that computers at about 7,000 MTOPS would be widely available and uncontrollable by 1997.Using the findings from the Stanford study, executive branch officials set the computer performance control thresholds for each tier. The report recommended that such an analysis be done. Despite the study’s limitations and recommendations to gather better data in the future on other countries’ use of HPCs for military and other national security purposes, the executive branch raised the MTOPS thresholds for HPC export controls and established the four-tier export control structure. Licensing and Export Enforcement Since the Revision
The executive branch’s January 1996 export control revision (1) increased thresholds for requiring licenses, which resulted in a reduction in the numbers of licensed HPCs; (2) shifted some of the government’s end-use screening responsibility from the government to the computer industry, until this policy was revised in 1998; and (3) required HPC manufacturers to keep records of the end users of their HPC exports. Under current law, Commerce is required to conduct PSVs for all HPC exports over 2,000 MTOPS to tier 3 countries. U.S. government officials agreed that the way PSVs of computers have been traditionally conducted have reduced their value because such PSVs establish only the physical presence of an HPC. Using the EAA’s general description of foreign availability as our criteria, our analysis showed that subsidiaries of U.S. companies dominate the overseas sales of HPCs. In particular, the study used to justify the decision did not assemble empirical data or analysis to support the conclusion that HPCs below specific performance levels were uncontrollable and widely available worldwide. Defense said that our recommendation concerning the assessment of national security threats and proliferation impact of U.S. exports to countries of concern was done in connection with the 1995 decision to revise HPC export controls, and that it would consider additional options to safeguard exports of HPCs as part of its ongoing review of export controls. What our report actually states is that (1) the Stanford study did not assess the capabilities of countries of concern to use HPCs for military and other national security applications, as required by its tasking and (2) the executive branch did not undertake a threat analysis of providing HPCs to countries of concern. To identify similarities and differences between U.S. and foreign government HPC export controls, we discussed with officials of the U.S. embassies and host governments information on foreign government export controls for HPCs and the extent of cooperation between U.S. and host government authorities on investigations of export control violations and any HPC diversions of HPCs to sensitive end users. HPCs to China and India were exported with no individual licenses. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement and a congressional request, GAO reviewed concerns that U.S. national security interests may have been compromised by sales of unlicensed high performance computers (HPC) to China and Russia, focusing on: (1) the basis for the executive branch's revision of HPC export controls; (2) changes in licensing activities and the implementation of certain U.S. licensing and export enforcement requirements since the revision; and (3) the current foreign availability of HPCs, particularly for certain countries of national security concern.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a Stanford University study on foreign availability of HPCs was a key element in the decision to revise HPC export controls; (2) however, GAO's analysis of the study showed that it had 2 significant limitations; (3) first, the study lacked empirical evidence or analysis to support its conclusion that HPCs were uncontrollable based on worldwide availability and insufficient resources to control them; (4) second, the study did not assess the capabilities of countries of concern to use HPCs for military and other national security applications; (5) the study's principal author said that U.S. government data were insufficient to make such an assessment, and the study recommended that better data be gathered so that such an analysis could be done in the future; (6) the executive branch did not undertake a threat analysis of providing HPCs to countries of concern, but raised the computing power thresholds for HPC export controls and established a four-tier control structure; (7) the 1996 revision to HPC export controls had three key consequences; (8) the number of computer export licenses issued declined from 395 in fiscal year 1995 to 42 in 1997; (9) U.S. HPC exporters were charged with responsibilities previously conducted by the government, including screening and reporting on the end use and end user of HPCs; (10) the regulation required HPC manufacturers to keep records of the end users of all their HPC exports over 2,000 million theoretical operations per second (MTOPS); (11) to date, information on these exports reported to the government has been incomplete; (12) responsibility for postshipment verification (PSV) checks remained with the government; (13) however, because of how PSVs for computers are implemented, their value is reduced because they verify the physical location of a HPC, but not how it is used; (14) subsidiaries of U.S. computer manufacturers dominate the overseas HPC market, and they must comply with U.S. controls; (15) three Japanese companies are global competitors of U.S. manufacturers, two of which told GAO that they had no sales to tier 3 countries such as Russia and China; (16) Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom each have export controls on HPCs similar to those of the United States, according to foreign government officials; (17) Russia, China, and India have developed HPCs, but the capabilities of their computers are believed to be limited; and (18) thus, GAO's analysis suggests that HPCs over 2,000 MTOPS are not readily available to tier 3 countries from foreign sources without restrictions. |
gao_GGD-96-171 | gao_GGD-96-171_0 | The information disclosed by the program is derived from the Central Registration Depository (CRD). The staff are to send any disclosable information to the caller upon request. Scope and Methodology
To obtain information on the accessibility of the NASD Regulation hotline, we interviewed NASD Regulation officials; reviewed NASD Regulation Public Disclosure Program policies and procedures, and related documents; reviewed the results of calls to the hotline requesting disciplinary information; and conducted surveys of hotline callers and state securities regulators. However, these callers constituted less than 1 percent of the estimated 41 million U.S. investors who directly owned shares in a publicly traded company or a mutual fund as of 1992. NASD Regulation also does not inform hotline callers of the types of information that are not disclosed, unless the callers ask. Hotline Did Not Always Provide Callers With All Disclosable Information
NASD Regulation disclosed information in accordance with its current disclosure policies in 87 of the 100 cases we reviewed. The effectiveness of the NASD Regulation hotline greatly depends on NASD Regulation’s willingness to fully inform investors of their brokers’ disciplinary records. provide hotline callers with all the relevant disciplinary-related information available in CRD, such as whether a broker is the subject of a customer complaint, a settled arbitration, or a settled civil case; if NASD Regulation does not disclose this additional information, it should at least inform callers that the information is available from most state regulators. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. We have carefully reviewed every instance in which we use the term “broker” to refer to both broker-dealers and their individual associated persons. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effectiveness of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) hotline, focusing on: (1) investors' accessibility to the hotline; and (2) whether the information provided by the hotline meets NASD disclosure policies.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) over 300,000 investors have used the NASD Regulation hotline to obtain background information and disciplinary histories on their brokers; (2) less than 1 percent of the investors using the hotline own shares in publicly traded companies or a mutual fund; (3) most investors make investment-related decisions without using the NASD hotline; (4) the hotline does not disclose information related to a broker's involvement in civil cases, arbitration, or customer complaints; (5) these allegations are not disclosed until they are proven; (6) most state securities regulators disclose brokers' disciplinary histories to those investors that request background information; (7) the amount and type of information an investor receives depends on who the investor calls; (8) most of the disclosed information meets NASD disclosure policies; (9) NASD does not routinely verify whether an investor receives all of the information it requested; (10) NASD did not comply with disclosure polices in 13 cases; (11) there were 42 instances in which NASD failed to disclose complete background or all of the disclosable information, and 2 instances in which it disclosed more information than necessary; and (12) NASD Regulation is redesigning its central registration depository (CRD) to provide more accurate and timely disciplinary information. |
gao_GAO-09-454 | gao_GAO-09-454_0 | Background
The Arms Export Control Act authorizes the sale of defense articles and services to eligible foreign customers under the FMS program. Multiple organizations have a role in the FMS program, including DSCA and the military services, State, and CBP. Weaknesses in Shipment Verification Process Continue, and Expanded Monitoring Program Lacks Guidance for Country Visits
Agencies responsible for the FMS program have not taken the actions needed to correct previously identified weaknesses in the FMS shipment verification process, and DOD’s expanded end-use monitoring program lacks written guidance for selecting countries for compliance visits using a risk-based approach. First, agencies are not properly verifying FMS shipment documentation, in part because State has not finalized revisions to the ITAR to establish DOD’s role in the verification process. Second, DOD lacks mechanisms to fully ensure foreign governments receive their FMS shipments—in part because DOD does not track most FMS shipments and continues to rely on FMS customers to notify the department when a shipment has not been received. Finally, while DOD has visited an average of four countries each year since 2003 to assess compliance with FMS agreement requirements, it does not have written guidance using a risk-based approach to prioritize the countries it visits to monitor compliance and has not yet visited several countries with a high number of uninventoried defense articles. In one case, the DSP-94 listed seven ports. For example, in our 16 case studies, 188 supply discrepancy reports were filed. In addition, DOD officials identified another mechanism for tracking FMS shipments that is being used for countries within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, in particular Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD Lacks Information Needed to Effectively Administer and Oversee the FMS Program
While DOD has implemented initiatives aimed at improving the overall administration of the FMS program, it lacks the information needed to effectively administer and oversee the program. Specifically, DSCA has twice adjusted the surcharge rate—the rate charged to FMS customers to cover program administration costs. However, DSCA does not have sufficient information to determine the balance necessary to support the program in the future. DSCA Lacks Sufficient Information to Improve Metric Regarding FMS Agreement Development Time Frame
In an effort to ensure FMS sales agreements are developed and presented to customers in a timely manner, DSCA established a goal of developing and presenting 80 percent of agreements to its customers within 120 days of receiving a request to purchase a defense article through the FMS program. In 2008, DSCA began a study to determine if the 120-day goal was reasonable or if it needed to be revised. However, as the portal is based on information from 13 different systems, the data have the same limitations in providing DSCA with comparable data to oversee the FMS program. To ensure CBP port officials have the information needed to verify FMS shipments are authorized, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection to coordinate on establishing a process for: ensuring the value of individual shipments does not exceed the total value of the FMS agreement; designating a primary port for each new and existing FMS agreement; developing a centralized listing of these primary ports for use by CBP providing CBP officials with information on FMS agreements that were closed prior to fiscal year 2008. In its technical comments, DOD also stated that it has sufficient information and that it is not required to gather information on actual costs to administer the FMS program. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2008, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program sold over $36 billion dollars in defense articles and services to foreign governments. The Departments of State, Defense (DOD), and Homeland Security (DHS) all have a role in the FMS program. In 2003, GAO identified significant weaknesses in FMS control mechanisms for safeguarding defense articles transferred to foreign governments. In 2007, GAO designated the protection of technologies critical to U.S. national security a high-risk area. GAO was asked to (1) evaluate program changes State, DOD, and DHS have made since 2003 to ensure that unclassified defense articles transferred to foreign governments are authorized for shipment and monitored as required, and (2) determine what information DOD has to administer and oversee the FMS program. GAO conducted 16 case studies; analyzed U.S. port data and FMS agreements; reviewed program performance metrics; and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
Agencies involved in the FMS program have made some changes in the program but have not corrected the weaknesses GAO previously identified in the FMS program's shipment verification process, and the expanded monitoring program lacks written guidance to select countries to visit to ensure compliance with requirements. State--which is responsible for the program and approving FMS sales--has not finalized proposed regulatory revisions to establish DOD's role in the FMS shipment verification process, although the FMS agencies reached agreement on the proposed revisions about a year ago. DHS port officials, responsible for export enforcement, also continue to lack information needed to verify that FMS shipments are properly authorized. GAO found six FMS agreements that had unauthorized shipments, including missile components. In one case, 21 shipments were made after the agreement was closed. At the same time, DOD, which administers the FMS program and FMS agreements, lacks mechanisms to fully ensure that foreign governments receive their correct FMS shipments--in part because DOD does not track most FMS shipments once they leave its supply centers and continues to rely on FMS customers to notify the department when a shipment has not been received. With regard to monitoring defense articles once in country, DOD does not have written guidance to prioritize selecting countries for compliance visits using a risk management approach and has not yet visited several countries with a high number of uninventoried defense articles. DOD lacks information needed to effectively administer and oversee the FMS program. For example, within the last 10 years DOD has twice adjusted the surcharge rate--the rate charged to FMS customers to cover program administration costs--but it does not have information on program costs to determine the balance necessary to support the program in the future. Also, while DOD has a goal to release 80 percent of FMS agreements to a foreign government within 120 days of receiving its request to purchase defense articles, DOD officials stated they do not have the information needed to determine if the goal is reasonable. In addition, DOD lacks information to oversee the program, in large part due to the fact that FMS data reside in 13 different accounting, financial, and case implementation systems. DOD is in the process of defining its requirements for FMS program information before it moves forward with improving its data systems. In the meantime, DOD is relying on systems that do not provide it with sufficient, comparable data to oversee the program's performance. |
gao_GAO-01-861T | gao_GAO-01-861T_0 | GPEA makes OMB responsible for ensuring that federal agencies meet the act’s October 21, 2003, implementation deadline. In September 2000, we concluded that OMB’s GPEA guidance—as well as the guidance and supplementary efforts being undertaken by Treasury, the National Archives and Records Administration, the Departments of Justice and Commerce and others— provided a useful foundation of information to assist agencies with GPEA implementation and the transition to electronic government (e- government). This letter is the part of the plan that provides an agencywide perspective on GPEA compliance efforts. PRA information collections include such things as requests for forms and publications, tax-related forms, and business- production reports. Treasury’s plan provides the kind of information stipulated in OMB’s July 2000 guidance. The Office of the CIO did not review the data it received from the various DOD components for completeness or accuracy before reporting the information to OMB in October 2000. In reviewing the data, we found indications that some may be inaccurate, incomplete, or duplicative. First, all three agencies have determined that the security assurances provided through the use of PKI technology will be needed to enable many of their sensitive electronic transactions. OMB Will Be Challenged in Overseeing Agency Strategic GPEA- Related Activities
OMB will also be challenged in its oversight role of ensuring that agencies comply with GPEA. However, the GPEA implementation plans submitted by federal agencies do not provide sufficient information with which to assess whether agencies have been engaging in these processes. While OMB’s subsequent July reporting guidance called for a brief cover letter describing an agency’s overall strategy and actions to comply with the act, it did not stipulate a full report on the variety of strategic activities and other tasks that agencies were expected to perform, and their schedules for carrying them out. | What GAO Found
The Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA) requires that by 2003 federal agencies provide the public the option of submitting, maintaining, and disclosing required information--such as employment records, tax forms, and loan applications--electronically, instead of on paper. In October 2000, federal agencies submitted GPEA implementation plans to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is responsible for executive branch oversight of GPEA. The plans submitted by the the Department of the Treasury and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) generally provide the kind of information that was specified in OMB's July 2000 guidance. However, the Department of Defense's (DOD) plan did not describe the department's overall GPEA strategy and, in some cases, the data provided for specific information collections may be inaccurate, incomplete or duplicative. Officials at all three agencies said that they faced challenges in complying with GPEA, particularly with regard to implementing adequate security assurances for sensitive electronic transactions and in planning for and implementing computer network infrastructures. Furthermore, OMB will be challenged in providing oversight of agency GPEA activities because the plans submitted by the agencies go not document key strategic actions, nor do they specify when they will be undertaken. Taken in isolation, the plans do not provide enough information to assess agencies' progress in meeting the objectives of the act. OMB may wish to require agencies to report on major agencywide activities, including specific planned tasks and milestones and the rationale for adopting them. |
gao_GAO-03-705 | gao_GAO-03-705_0 | DOD is also concerned about the adverse impact that spare parts shortages have on the readiness of weapon systems. Strategic Plan Addresses Transformation, but Not Mitigation of Critical Spare Parts Shortages
The Army’s current strategic plan provides strategic goals, objectives, milestones, and performance measures for force transformation efforts. Armywide Initiatives Improve Logistics Business Processes, but Are Not Focused on Mitigating Critical Spare Parts Shortages
The Army’s key logistics initiatives were designed to improve internal business processes, but not specifically mitigate critical spare parts shortages. The initiative’s effectiveness may be limited because its efforts and results are not linked to or coordinated with the goals and metrics of the Army’s other initiatives as part of an overall approach to mitigating critical spare parts shortages in the future. Army Can Identify Readiness Impact of Additional Investment and Needs to Report This to Congress
While the Army has the means to link funding to a corresponding level of readiness and reports this information in budget justification documents (see app. II), it does not report how additional funding requests for spare parts might impact readiness to decisionmakers such as Congress. The Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity uses the Supply Performance Analyzer Model and the Selected Essential-Item Stockage for Availability Method Model to determine the investment needed to reach a weapon system’s desired supply availability rate. In addition, the Army used an outside consultant to analyze the impact additional investment in spare parts would have on readiness. For example, to support a briefing to the Army Vice Chief of Staff in March 2001, the Logistics Management Institute completed an analysis for the Army showing that an additional $331 million for spare parts would increase the mission-capable rate for the Apache and Blackhawk helicopters by 2.6 percent. Conclusions
The Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan serves as a mechanism to transform the Army’s forces from its present posture to a more strategically deployable and responsive force. The plan prescribes specific goals and milestones to support this transformation process, but it lacks specific focus on mitigating spare parts shortages. Furthermore, while some of the Army’s logistics initiatives might increase the availability of spare parts in general, the lack of specific and effective measures of performance will limit the Army’s ability to ascertain progress in mitigating spare parts shortages that are critical to equipment readiness. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to modify or supplement the Transformation Campaign Plan, or the Armywide logistics initiatives to include a focus on mitigating critical spare parts shortages with goals, objectives, milestones, and quantifiable performance measures, such as supply availability and readiness related outcomes and implement the Office of Secretary of Defense recommendation to report, as part of budget requests, the impact of additional spare parts funding on equipment readiness with specific milestones for completion. As our report clearly points out, without a focus on mitigating critical spare parts shortages with goals, objectives, and milestones included in the strategic plan or Armywide initiatives, we believe there is increased likelihood that the Army’s progress will be limited because it efforts may be ineffective or duplicative in mitigating spare parts shortages that are critical to equipment readiness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Prior reports and studies have identified major risks in the Department of Defense's (DOD) management, funding, and reporting of spare parts spending programs. Spare parts shortages adversely affect the U.S. Army's operations and can compromise the readiness of weapon systems. To address these issues, Congress has fully funded DOD's requests for spare parts spending and in some instances increased funding for additional spare parts. Yet, the Army continues to experience spare parts shortages. Congress requested that GAO evaluate (1) the Army's strategic plans for reducing spare parts shortages, (2) the likelihood that key initiatives will reduce such shortages, and (3) the Army's capability to identify the impact on readiness of increased investments for spare parts.
What GAO Found
The Army's logistics strategic plan provides strategic goals, objectives, and milestones for force transformation efforts, but does not specifically address the mitigation of critical spare parts shortages. The Army's Transformation Campaign Plan, published in April 2001, serves as a mechanism to move the Army from its present posture to a more strategically deployable and responsive force. The plan prescribes specific goals and milestones to support the transformation process. However, it lacks objectives and performance measures it could use to show progress in mitigating critical spare parts shortages. The Army's six servicewide logistics initiatives are aimed at enhancing readiness by improving internal business processes that would increase supply availability. However, they were not designed to mitigate spare parts shortages. These processes include those that acquire, repair, and distribute spare parts. Recognizing that the Armywide initiatives were not designed to specifically focus on mitigating critical shortages, the Army recently started a new initiative to address individual spare parts shortages that affect key weapon systems readiness. However, this initiative is not part of the Armywide logistics improvement efforts, and therefore it is not coordinated with other initiatives and its results are not linked with the overall goals and performance measures. Absent this coordination and linkage, any systemic problems that the initiatives identifies may not be elevated to the Armywide initiatives for resolution and its benefit may be limited to improving the availability of only a few parts. The Army has the means to link funding to weapon system readiness, and reports this in its budget justification documents, but it does not report to Congress how additional investments in spare parts would increase readiness. The Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity can use models to indicate the investment needed to reach a desired level of supply availability, along with the possible corresponding increase in readiness, and it has provided such information to Army units. Additionally, the Army has used consultants to project the impact of additional funding on the readiness of specific weapon systems and provided this to the Army Vice Chief of Staff. For example, the Logistics Management Institute projected that anadditional investment of $331 million for additional spare parts would increase the overall readiness of the Apache and Blackhawk helicopters by approximately 2.6 percent. |
gao_GAO-15-649 | gao_GAO-15-649_0 | DOD Reported Initiating 137 In-Kind Payment Projects in Fiscal Year 2013, and Cited Advantages and a Disadvantage from Receiving In-Kind Payment Projects versus Cash Payments
DOD Reported that the Military Services Initiated 137 In-Kind Construction and Renovation Payment Projects in Fiscal Year 2013 with an Estimated Value of at Least $1.8 Billion
DOD reported that the military services initiated 137 in-kind payment projects in Asia, Germany and the United States during fiscal year 2013 with an estimated value of at least $1.8 billion. Table 2 summarizes the number and value of in-kind payment projects by location and also highlights the most frequently reported purpose for which the projects were used. Military Services’ Real- Property Management Officials Reported Advantages and One Disadvantage in Accepting In-Kind Payment Projects in Exchange for Interests in Domestic Real-Property Transactions
The military services’ real-property management officials reported as many as four advantages to accepting in-kind payment projects rather than cash payments in domestic real-estate transactions, and officials from the three services reported one disadvantage. Reported Advantages
Installations can generally obtain facilities more quickly. The originating installation is more likely to receive100 percent of the negotiated payments for the real property interest. This policy negates the advantage in-kind payment projects have in assuring that the originating installation receives 100 percent of the negotiated value of the in-kind payment projects for the real-property interest since the originating installation receives the full amount of the cash payment up to $1 million. Military Services Have Issued Guidance Regarding the Receipt of Fair- Market Value and Follow Similar Procedures for Valuing Domestic In- Kind Payment Projects to Ensure Receipt of Fair- Market Value
Our review of various service policies governing real-estate transactions identified that all three services have issued guidance requiring that the cumulative value of in-kind payment projects reflect the fair-market value of the real-property interest in real-estate transactions and follow similar procedures to value domestic in-kind payment projects to ensure the receipt of fair- market value. If the developer and installation officials agree to the value of the work and that the value of the work is within the range of fair-market value of the real-estate interest, the parties execute the agreement to document the services to be performed as an in-kind payment project in lieu of cash. Agency Comments
We are not making any recommendations in this report. We provided DOD with a draft of this report for review. DOD provided technical comments on our findings, which we have incorporated where appropriate. However, numerous projects in Korea and Japan were executed under bilateral agreements or as part of voluntary host nation programs where the host nation manages the programming and execution processes and supporting documentation for these projects was not readily available in English or the specific project costs incurred by the Governments of Korea and Japan were, according to DOD officials, not required to be disclosed to the United States. To describe the potential advantages and disadvantages of accepting in- kind payments instead of cash for domestic real-estate transactions, we reviewed the services’ policies and procedures regarding the types of payments (cash or in-kind payment project) to be included in real-estate transactions and Army and Air Force guidance that informs when cash or in-kind payment projects are advantageous or not advisable. Appendix II: DOD Construction and Renovation Projects Initiated in Korea in Fiscal Year 2013 Using In-Kind Payments
DOD reported that the military services initiated 31 in-kind payment projects involving construction or renovation in Korea in fiscal year 2013 with a value of about $1.6 billion. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD uses in-kind payments domestically and overseas in its real-estate transactions as an alternative to appropriated funds to help manage a global real-property portfolio that includes more than 555,000 facilities worldwide. In-kind payments refer to DOD receiving construction and renovation services rather than cash as payment for DOD providing goods, services, real property, or an interest in real property.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 includes a provision for GAO to review the use of in-kind projects. This report identifies (1) the in-kind payment projects that DOD reported it initiated during fiscal year 2013, and discusses the potential advantages and disadvantages of accepting in-kind payments instead of cash for domestic real-estate transactions; and (2) the extent to which the military services have developed and implemented guidance and procedures to value domestic in-kind payments to ensure the receipt of fair-market value. The Act also provided for a listing of facilities constructed or renovated with the use of in-kind payments, and additional information, which GAO provides in appendixes to this report. To conduct this work, GAO collected in-kind project data from the military services, reviewed DOD and military service policy and project documentation, and interviewed military officials.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments on the findings, which GAO has incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) reported to GAO that 137 in-kind projects involving construction or renovation, valued at about $1.8 billion, were initiated in Korea, Japan, Germany and the United States during fiscal year 2013. In-kind payments involve non-cash options, such as renovating or constructing a facility. The table below summarizes the number and value (estimated costs to be incurred) of the projects by country and highlights the most frequently reported purpose for which the projects were used.
Number, Value, and Purpose of In-Kind Construction and Renovation Projects Initiated by DOD during Fiscal Year 2013
Source: GAO summary of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-15-649
a Subtotals for Korea and Japan and totals for DOD are of undetermined reliability because supporting documentation was not readily available in English, or, according to DOD officials, the costs incurred by the Governments of Korea and Japan were not required to be disclosed to the United States.
The military services' real-estate and real-property management officials discussed four potential advantages to accepting in-kind payments rather than cash payments in domestic real-estate transactions, and identified one potential disadvantage. The reported advantages included generally obtaining facilities more quickly than through the appropriations process and installations receiving 100 percent of the value of negotiated payments received from a real-property interest as opposed to cash payments where only 50 percent of the value is guaranteed to be provided back to the installation. However, some services have implemented policy changes such as returning 100 percent of the value of the real-property interest back to the installation—up to $1 million when accepting cash payments. One reported disadvantage was in-kind payments may require additional administrative work and oversight compared to cash payments.
GAO's review of service policies governing real-estate transactions identified that all services have issued guidance requiring that the cumulative value of in-kind projects reflect the fair-market value of the real-property interest in real-estate transactions. Each of the Services reported similar broad procedures for valuing in-kind payment projects and GAO's review of the documentation for the projects initiated in fiscal year 2013 confirmed that the installations were following the described procedures. |
gao_GAO-01-774 | gao_GAO-01-774_0 | EPA’s strategy for achieving its goal of improving air quality appears clear and reasonable. Safe Water for Drinking and Recreation
EPA reported that it is making strides in achieving its goal of safe and clean drinking water. Unsafe Pesticide Residues in Food Supplies
EPA reported making progress in ensuring that food is free from unsafe pesticide residues, especially where children are concerned. Comparison of EPA’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan With the Prior Year Report and Plan for Selected Key Outcomes
For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements or remaining weaknesses in EPA’s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report, and (2) fiscal year 2002 performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. In our report on EPA’s fiscal year 2001 performance plan, we concluded that the plan fell short on providing specifics on crosscutting goals and measures. EPA’s performance report discusses the agency’s progress in resolving all of these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to assess the agency's progress in achieving selected key outcomes that are important to EPA's mission.
What GAO Found
EPA reported reasonable progress in achieving its key outcomes. Specifically, EPA reported (1) attaining air quality standards in more areas of the country and reducing emissions of toxic pollutants, (2) making strides in achieving its goal of safe and clean drinking water, (3) making progress in cleaning up hazardous waste sites, and (4) making progress in ensuring that food is free from unsafe pesticide residues. Although EPA made several improvements to its fiscal year 2000 performance report, it still falls short in providing information on crosscutting goals and measures. EPA's 2002 performance plan's goals and performance measures address some, but not all, major management challenges. |
gao_GAO-12-529 | gao_GAO-12-529_0 | Scope and Methodology
As part of our audit of the fiscal years 2011 and 2010 CFS, we considered the federal government’s financial reporting procedures and related internal control. Also, we determined the status of corrective actions taken by Treasury and OMB to address open recommendations relating to the processes used to prepare the CFS detailed in our previous reports. We performed our audit of the fiscal years 2011 and 2010 CFS in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help to provide reasonable assurance that the information reported in the CFS is complete, accurate, and in conformity with GAAP, the Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary to (1) establish a mechanism to ensure that Treasury’s CFS disclosure checklist is reviewed and approved by the date in Treasury’s policies and procedures and (2) revise the SOP to include requirements for using the CFS disclosure checklist to prepare the format draft of the CFS and to update the CFS disclosure checklist as necessary when subsequent drafts of the CFS are prepared. Treasury developed the Intragovernmental Reporting and Analysis System (IRAS) to begin to address the long- standing weakness we reported regarding the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances. However, during our fiscal year 2011 audit, we found control deficiencies over the design and implementation of the IRAS data validation process. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help to provide reasonable assurance that Treasury timely receives the audited closing package from those federal entities that are newly identified as being significant to the Financial Report, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, working in coordination with the Controller of OMB, to enhance the SOP entitled “Significant Federal Entities Identification” to include procedures for (1) identifying any entities that become significant to the Financial Report during the fiscal year but were not identified as significant in the prior fiscal year and (2) obtaining audited closing packages from newly identified significant entities in the year they become significant, including timely written notification to newly identified significant entities. Status of Recommendations from Prior Reports
Of our 50 recommendations from our prior reports regarding control deficiencies in the CFS preparation process that were open at the end of the fiscal year 2010 audit, we were able to close 12 during our fiscal year 2011 audit, generally as a result of corrective actions taken by Treasury. The other 38 recommendations remained open as of December 12, 2011, the date of our report on the audit of the fiscal year 2011 CFS. We will continue to monitor Treasury’s and OMB’s progress in addressing our recommendations as part of our fiscal year 2012 CFS audit. Treasury’s process for compiling the CFS generally demonstrated that amounts in the Statement of Social Insurance and the Statement of Changes in Social Insurance Amounts were consistent with the underlying federal entities’ financial statements and that the Balance Sheet and the Statement of Net Cost were also consistent with the 35 significant federal entities’ financial statements prior to eliminating intragovernmental activity and balances. Count 39
Recommendation The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Controller of OMB, to develop, document, and implement processes and procedures for preparing and reviewing the Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and “The Federal Government’s Financial Health: A Citizen’s Guide to the Financial Report of the United States Government” sections of the Financial Report of the U.S. Government (Financial Report) to help assure that information reported in these sections is complete, accurate, and consistent with related information reported elsewhere in the Financial Report. To provide recommendations that are better aligned with the current status of remaining deficiencies related to this area, we have (1) closed this recommendation based on Treasury’s significant progress and (2) included in this report under “Review of Federal Entities’ Financial Information for Inclusion in the CFS” a new recommendation for corrective actions for the remaining deficiencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Treasury, in coordination with OMB, is primarily responsible for preparing the Financial Report , which contains the CFS. Since GAOs first audit of the fiscal year 1997 CFS, certain material weaknesses and other limitations on the scope of GAOs work have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the CFS, exclusive of the Statement of Social Insurance (SOSI). Also, GAO was unable to express opinions on the 2011 and 2010 SOSI and the 2011 Statement of Changes in Social Insurance Amounts because of significant uncertainties, primarily related to the achievement of projected reductions in Medicare cost growth, reflected in these statements.
As part of the fiscal year 2011 CFS audit, GAO identified material weaknesses and other control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide details on new control deficiencies GAO identified related to the preparation of the CFS, (2) recommend improvements, and (3) provide the status of corrective actions taken to address GAOs prior recommendations in this area that remained open at the end of the fiscal year 2010 audit.
What GAO Found
During its audit of the fiscal year 2011 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), GAO identified new and continuing control deficiencies in the Department of the Treasurys (Treasury) and the Office of Management and Budgets (OMB) processes used to prepare the CFS. These control deficiencies contributed to material weaknesses in internal control over the federal governments ability to
adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities;
ensure that the federal governments accrual-based consolidated financial statements were consistent with the underlying audited entities financial statements, properly balanced, and in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and
identify and either resolve or explain material differences between (1) components of the budget deficit that are used to prepare certain information in the CFS and (2) related amounts reported in federal entities financial statements and underlying financial information and records.
GAO identified new control deficiencies involving the need to
develop or revise and implement written procedures for appropriate Treasury and OMB officials to (1) review and approve the drafts of the Financial Report of the United States Government (Financial Report) before they are provided to GAO and (2) better ensure that key federal entity personnel are actively involved in the process for preparing and reviewing the Financial Report ;
enhance procedures for timely review, approval, and use of the CFS disclosure checklist;
develop procedures for pursuing indications that financial information provided by federal entities for inclusion in the CFS may not be in conformity with applicable accounting standards;
enhance Treasurys intragovernmental data validation process; and
enhance procedures for timely identifying, notifying, and obtaining closing packages from federal entities as they first become significant to the Financial Report .
In addition, GAO found that various other control deficiencies identified in previous years audits with respect to the CFS preparation continued to exist. Specifically, of the 50 open recommendations from GAOs prior reports regarding control deficiencies in the CFS preparation process,12 were closed and 38 remained open as of December 12, 2011, the date of GAOs report on its audit of the fiscal year 2011 CFS. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions taken to address the 10 new recommendations as well as the 38 open recommendations from prior years as part of its fiscal year 2012 CFS audit.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 10 recommendations 9 to Treasury and 1 to OMBto address new control deficiencies. In commenting on GAOs draft report, Treasury and OMB generally concurred with GAOs findings. |
gao_GAO-10-144T | gao_GAO-10-144T_0 | Enterprises Had a Mixed Record in Achieving Housing Mission Objectives, and Risk Management Deficiencies Compromised Their Safety and Soundness
It is generally accepted that the enterprises were successful in achieving key housing mission objectives to support the secondary mortgage market and facilitate the flow of mortgage credit: (1) We reported that the enterprises established a viable mortgage market for secondary loans that enabled capital to flow to areas with the greatest demand for mortgage credit. (2) The enterprises’ activities have been credited with lowering interest rates on qualifying mortgages below what they otherwise would have been, although estimates regarding the extent of this benefit vary. (3) Furthermore, the enterprises established underwriting practices and forms for conventional mortgages that became standard in the industry, increased the efficiency of underwriting, and helped develop the MBS market. However, it is not clear to what extent the enterprises have been able to support a stable and liquid secondary mortgage market during periods of economic stress, which is another key objective. Yet the enterprises have been able to provide this support to mortgage finance only with the substantial financial assistance from Treasury and the Federal Reserve discussed earlier. FHFA stated that the losses on these assets helped precipitate the enterprises’ financial deterioration and resulted in the decision to place them in conservatorship in September 2008. Options for Restructuring the Enterprises Aim to Achieve Housing Mission Objectives while Mitigating Safety and Soundness Risks
The enterprises’ mixed records in achieving their housing mission objectives and the losses and weaknesses that resulted in the conservatorships reinforce the need for Congress and the executive branch to fundamentally reevaluate the enterprises’ roles, structures, and business activities in mortgage finance. Researchers and others believe a range of options could better achieve housing mission objectives (in some cases through other federal entities such as FHA), help ensure safe and sound operations, and minimize risks to financial stability. These options generally fall along a continuum, with some overlap among key features, and advocate (1) establishing a government corporation or agency, (2) reconstituting the enterprises as for-profit GSEs in some form, or (3) privatizing or terminating them (see table 1). A Framework for Analyzing Trade-offs Associated with the Options and Potential Oversight and Regulatory Structures to Help Ensure Their Effective Implementation
We sought to assess each restructuring option in terms of its capacity to meet key housing objectives (providing liquidity and support to mortgage markets and facilitating housing opportunities for targeted groups) while also mitigating safety and soundness and financial stability risks. Our analysis indicates that each option involves important trade-offs, which are summarized in table 2. These initiatives could benefit housing markets and, in doing so, potentially improve the enterprises’ financial condition. Although it is not possible to predict what effects federal initiatives to respond to the housing crisis and the Treasury agreements with the enterprises could have on any transition, they could be substantial. For example, under the proposal to reconstitute the enterprises, potential investors might not be willing to invest in reconstituted GSEs that had a substantial volume of nonperforming mortgage assets or financial obligations to Treasury. To minimize this risk, the federal government could retain nonperforming assets in a “bad bank,” spin off the performing assets to a “good bank,” and devolve key functions, such as issuing MBS, to investors in a reconstituted GSE. Or, the federal government could use this process to terminate or privatize the enterprises. However, to the extent that the enterprises previously engaged in activities or incurred financial obligations inconsistent with maintaining long-term financial viability, the level of nonperforming assets and long-term costs to taxpayers may be higher than otherwise would be the case. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the results of our recently issued report on options for restructuring two government-sponsored enterprises (GSE): Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (enterprises). On September 6, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorship out of concern that their deteriorating financial condition and potential default on $5.4 trillion in financial obligations threatened the stability of financial markets. Since then, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has provided nearly $100 billion to the enterprises, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the total cost of Treasury financial assistance will be nearly $400 billion. Moreover, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) has committed to purchasing up to $1.45 trillion in the debt and securities of the enterprises (and other entities) to support housing finance, housing markets, and financial markets. While the conservatorships can remain in place as efforts are undertaken to stabilize the enterprises and restore confidence in financial markets, FHFA said that the conservatorships were not intended to be permanent. Over the longer term, Congress and the executive branch will face difficult decisions on how to restructure the enterprises and promote housing opportunities while limiting risks to taxpayers and the stability of financial markets. This testimony will will (1)summarize the enterprises' performance in achieving key housing mission objectives; (2) identify various options for revising the enterprises' long-term structures; (3) analyze these options in terms of their potential capacity to achieve key housing mission and safety and soundness objectives; and (4) discuss how the federal government's management of the conservatorships and response to the housing crisis could affect any transition.
What GAO Found
It is generally accepted that the enterprises were successful in achieving key housing mission objectives to support the secondary mortgage market and facilitate the flow of mortgage credit: (1) We reported that the enterprises established a viable mortgage market for secondary loans that enabled capital to flow to areas with the greatest demand for mortgage credit. (2) The enterprises' activities have been credited with lowering interest rates on qualifying mortgages below what they otherwise would have been, although estimates regarding the extent of this benefit vary.6 (3) Furthermore, the enterprises established underwriting practices and forms for conventional mortgages that became standard in the industry, increased the efficiency of underwriting, and helped develop the MBS market. However, it is not clear to what extent the enterprises have been able to support a stable and liquid secondary mortgage market during periods of economic stress, which is another key objective. The enterprises' mixed records in achieving their housing mission objectives and the losses and weaknesses that resulted in the conservatorships reinforce the need for Congress and the executive branch to fundamentally reevaluate the enterprises' roles, structures, and business activities in mortgage finance. Researchers and others believe a range of options could better achieve housing mission objectives (in some cases through other federal entities such as FHA), help ensure safe and sound operations, and minimize risks to financial stability. These options generally fall along a continuum, with some overlap among key features, and advocate (1) establishing a government corporation or agency, (2) reconstituting the enterprises as for-profit GSEs in some form, or (3) privatizing or terminating them. We sought to assess each restructuring option in terms of its capacity to meet key housing objectives (providing liquidity and support to mortgage markets and facilitating housing opportunities for targeted groups) while also mitigating safety and soundness and financial stability risks. Our analysis indicates that each option involves important trade-offs. Although it is not possible to predict what effects federal initiatives to respond to the housing crisis and the Treasury agreements with the enterprises could have on any transition, they could be substantial. For example, under the proposal to reconstitute the enterprises, potential investors might not be willing to invest in reconstituted GSEs that had a substantial volume of nonperforming mortgage assets or financial obligations to Treasury. To minimize this risk, the federal government could retain nonperforming assets in a "bad bank," spin off the performing assets to a "good bank," and devolve key functions, such as issuing MBS, to investors in a reconstituted GSE. Or, the federal government could use this process to terminate or privatize the enterprises. However, to the extent that the enterprises previously engaged in activities or incurred financial obligations inconsistent with maintaining long-term financial viability, the level of nonperforming assets and long-term costs to taxpayers may be higher than otherwise would be the case. |
gao_GAO-02-965 | gao_GAO-02-965_0 | Grant applications for clinical trials, clinical research centers, and clinical research training are typically reviewed by the sponsoring institute; however, the peer review of individual investigator grant applications usually takes place centrally, within CSR. However, there was concern that these awards were being directed toward basic research and were not sufficiently supporting the training and development of clinical investigators. Growth in NIH’s Spending on Clinical Research Has Kept Pace with Total Spending
NIH reports that it increased its funding of clinical research and expanded its clinical research activities in response to CREA. NIH Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Peer Review of Clinical Research
Since passage of CREA, NIH has acted to strengthen its peer review of clinical research applications. Although the two new clinical research study sections have been welcomed by the research community, some concerns remain among clinical investigators about the fairness of the review of clinical research by other study sections that have a mix of clinical and basic research. Funding, Number, and Activities of GCRCs Have Increased
NIH has increased funding for the GCRC program, although funding for the GCRCs has grown more slowly than NIH’s estimate of overall expenditures on clinical research. Three of these have been implemented, and the fourth is just beginning. NIH Has Established an Extramural Loan Repayment Program for Clinical Investigators
NIH has launched an extramural loan repayment program for clinical investigators as required by CREA, and most of NIH’s ICs participate in the program. NIH plans to fund 396 loan repayment contracts for a total of $20.2 million by the end of fiscal year 2002. It has increased its financial support of clinical research, expanded its clinical research activities, made improvements in its review of clinical research proposals, expanded its support of GCRCs, established new clinical research career development and training programs, and begun to implement a new extramural clinical research loan repayment program. Appendix I: NIH’s Estimated Expenditures for Extramural and Intramural Clinical Research, by IC, Fiscal Years 1997 - 2001
Dollars in millions
Appendix II: NIH’s Extramural Clinical Research Loan Repayment Contracts by IC, Fiscal Year 2002
Institutes and centers National Cancer Institute National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute National Institute of Mental Health National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases National Institute on Aging National Institute on Drug Abuse National Center for Research Resources National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases National Institute of Child Health and Human Development National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases National Eye Institute National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research National Human Genome Research Institute National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences National Institute of General Medical Sciences National Institute of Nursing Research National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine John E. Fogarty International Center Total
Appendix III: Comments from the National Institutes of Health | What GAO Found
Clinical research is critical for the development of strategies for the prevention, diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, and cure of diseases. Clinical research has been defined as patient-oriented research, epidemiologic and behavioral studies, and outcomes research and health services research. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the principal federal agency that funds clinical research supporting individual clinical investigators, clinical trials, general and specialized clinical research centers, and clinical research training. For many years, there have been concerns that clinical research proposals are viewed less favorably than basic research during the peer review process at NIH and that clinical research has not received its fair share of NIH funding. In November 2000, the Clinical Research Enhancement Act was enacted to address some of these concerns. NIH reports that it has increased its financial support of clinical research and that spending on clinical research has kept pace with total NIH research spending. NIH has taken some steps to improve its peer review of clinical research applications. The Center for Scientific Review recently added two new peer review study sections for the review of clinical research applications--one for clinical cardiovascular science and other for clinical oncology. NIH has increased its support of general clinical research centers, as required by the act, although the program has grown more slowly than NIH's overall estimated expenditures on clinical research. NIH has established the four clinical research career enhancement award programs mandated by the act. Three of these programs have been implemented, and they support new and midcareer clinical investigators and institutional clinical research teaching programs. The fourth program is designed to support graduate training in clinical investigation. NIH has initiated a new extramural loan repayment program specifically for clinical investigators as required by the act. This program was launched in December 2001. NIH received 456 applications by the February 2002 deadline. Twenty-one of NIH's institutes plan to fund 396 loan repayment contracts, for a total of $20.2 million, by the end of fiscal year 2002. |
gao_GGD-97-18 | gao_GGD-97-18_0 | The Prompt Regulatory Action provisions required federal regulators to institute a two-part system of regulatory actions that would be triggered when an institution fails to meet minimum capital levels or safety-and-soundness standards. Specifically, FDICIA requires a number of corporate governance and accounting reforms to (1) strengthen the corporate governance of depository institutions, (2) improve the financial reporting of depository institutions, and (3) help in the early identification of emerging safety-and-soundness problems in depository institutions. Other specific actions available to the regulators include imposing more stringent asset growth limitations than required for undercapitalized institutions or requiring the institution to reduce its total assets; requiring the institution, or its subsidiaries, to alter, reduce, or terminate an activity that the regulator determines poses excessive risk to the institution; improving management by (1) ordering a new election for the institution’s board of directors, (2) dismissing directors or senior executive officers, and/or (3) requiring an institution to employ qualified senior executive officers; prohibiting the acceptance, including renewal and rollover, of deposits requiring prior approval for capital distributions from holding companies having control of the institution; and requiring divestiture by (1) the institution of any subsidiary that the regulator determines poses a significant risk to the institution, (2) the parent company of any nondepository affiliate that regulators determine poses a significant risk to the institution, and/or (3) any controlling company of the institution if the regulator determines that divestiture would improve the institution’s financial condition and future prospects. To assess the impact of sections 38 and 39 on the regulatory oversight of banks and thrifts, we used the 61 banks that we determined were undercapitalized for section 38 purposes to evaluate OCC’s and FRS’ use of their section 38 authority (reclassification and directives) versus the use of traditional enforcement tools. We provided a draft of this report to the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision for their review and comment. Few Institutions Have Been Subject to Enforcement Actions Under Sections 38 and 39
Regulators have taken steps to implement FDICIA’s Prompt Regulatory Action provisions. The remaining two standards—asset quality and earnings—became effective on October 1, 1996, allowing for the full implementation of section 39. OCC used directives against a relatively small number of the banks in our sample. Regulators Had Not Used Their Section 39 Enforcement Authority
As of September 1996, regulators had not used their section 39 enforcement authority against an institution. Moreover, regulators have wide discretion governing the application of section 39 because the guidelines and regulations implementing section 39, as amended, do not (1) establish clear and specific definitions of unsound conditions and practices or (2) link such conditions or practices to specific mandatory regulatory actions. The success of these initiatives, coupled with the regulators’ willingness to use their various enforcement authorities, including sections 38 and 39, will be instrumental in determining whether losses to the insurance funds are prevented or minimized in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Federal Reserve System's (FRS) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's (OCC) efforts to implement the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) prompt regulatory action provisions and the impact of those provisions on federal oversight of depository institutions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) regulators have taken the required steps to implement FDICIA prompt regulatory action provisions, but have had to use the additional enforcement powers granted by the provisions against a relatively small number of depository institutions; (2) the improved financial condition of banks and thrifts has allowed them to build their capital levels to the point where only a few institutions were considered undercapitalized according to section 38 standards; (3) OCC and FRS generally took prescribed regulatory actions against the 61 undercapitalized banks reviewed; (4) as of September 1996, regulators had not used their section 39 authority; (5) the final two safety and soundness standards, asset quality and earnings, required to fully implement section 39 became effective on October 1, 1996; (6) the guidelines and regulations issued to date by regulators to implement section 39 do not establish clear, objective criteria for what would be considered unsafe and unsound practices or conditions or link the identification of such conditions to specific mandatory enforcement actions; (7) other FDICIA provisions and initiatives recently announced by regulators should help in the early identification of depository institutions with safety and soundness problems; and (8) the success of these provisions and initiatives will be determined by the regulators' willingness to use their enforcement powers early enough to prevent or minimize losses to the deposit insurance funds. |
gao_GAO-12-585 | gao_GAO-12-585_0 | A blowout is an uncontrolled release of oil or gas from a well. Surface Use of Dispersants Reflects a Significant Body of Research, but Gaps Remain
According to experts, agency officials, and specialists we spoke with, much is known about the use of dispersants on the surface of the water; however, they said that gaps remain in several research areas. For example, most experts told us that the use of chemical dispersants increases biodegradation rates, but many told us that more research was needed to quantify the actual rate at which biodegradation occurs. Experts Highlighted Two Emerging Areas in Need of Further Research
Although much is known about the use of dispersants on the surface of the water, experts highlighted two emerging areas in which additional research is needed—specifically, the subsurface application and effects of dispersants in deep water environments and the use of dispersants in Arctic conditions and other cold water environments. Previously discussed knowledge gaps about fate and transport of chemically dispersed oil also apply in the Arctic, with one expert noting that more research is needed on biodegradation rates in the Arctic because the cold temperatures may slow the process down. Specifically, six federal agencies have funded over $15.5 million of dispersant-related research projects since fiscal year 2000, with about half of this total federal funding—over $8 million—occurring since the Deepwater Horizon incident. One of these co-funded projects was the 2005 National Academy of Sciences report on dispersants. Over 40 Percent of Federally Funded Dispersant Research Has Focused on Effectiveness
Over 40 percent of the 106 federally funded research projects on dispersants have focused at least in part on effectiveness, with the remaining projects spread across a broad range of research areas, as noted in table 3. Specifically, BSEE has funded projects on the effectiveness of dispersants on different types of oil and under specific environmental conditions. General. Agency officials, experts, and specialists identified inconsistent and limited levels of funding as a challenge to developing research related to the use and effects of chemical dispersants. In addition, some industry representatives told us that maintaining a long-term focus for dispersant research can be a challenge for industry groups, as there are many different oil spill research priorities and responsibilities in addition to dispersants. Agency officials, experts, and specialists also identified scientific challenges, in particular, conducting research that replicates realistic oil spill conditions and obtaining oil and dispersants for testing. In the absence of an unexpected spill, another option to conduct dispersant-related research could come through the intentional discharge of oil for the express purpose of studying how the oil responds with or without the application of dispersants. Communication challenges. However, these reports are intended only to summarize federal research efforts and do not track or cross-reference related research that has been funded solely by industry or non-governmental sources. Some groups, including the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research, have developed lists of past or ongoing federal research projects related to dispersants, but there currently is no mechanism that tracks dispersant research across all sources and highlights key recent and ongoing research projects. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure existing and ongoing dispersant research is adequately captured and broadly available to different groups and generations of researchers, to ensure that new research undertaken by the federal government will not duplicate other research efforts, and to ensure that adequate attention is given to better understanding dispersant use in deep water and Arctic environments, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard direct the Chair of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research to take the following two actions, in coordination with member agencies: Ensure that in the course of revising the Interagency Committee’s research and technology plan, applications of dispersants subsurface and in Arctic conditions are among the areas prioritized for subsequent research. DHS concurred with all three recommendations made to it. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) what is known about the use of chemical dispersants and their effects, and knowledge gaps about or limitations to their use, if any; (2) the extent to which federal agencies and other entities have taken steps to enhance knowledge on chemical dispersant use and its effects; and (3) challenges, if any, that researchers and federal agencies face in their attempts to enhance knowledge on chemical dispersant use and its effects. To determine the extent to which federal agencies and other entities have taken steps to enhance knowledge on chemical dispersant use and its effects, and what challenges, if any, researchers have faced, we analyzed information on federal research efforts since fiscal year 2000 supplied by the key federal agencies conducting research on dispersant use and effects: the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), the Department of Homeland Security’s United States Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of Commerce’s NOAA, and the National Science Foundation (NSF). | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2010, an explosion onboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico led to a release of approximately 206 million gallons of oil. When an oil spill occurs, responders have several options for managing the environmental impacts, including using chemical dispersants to break the oil into smaller droplets, which can promote biodegradation and help prevent oil from coming on shore. GAO was asked to review (1) what is known about the use of chemical dispersants and their effects, and any knowledge gaps or limitations; (2) the extent to which federal agencies and other entities have taken steps to enhance knowledge on dispersant use and its effects; and (3) challenges, if any, that researchers and federal agencies face in their attempts to enhance knowledge. GAO collaborated with the National Academy of Sciences to identify and recruit experts on dispersant use and conducted interviews with these experts, agency officials, and other specialists, and reviewed key documents and reports.
What GAO Found
According to experts, agency officials, and specialists, much is known about the use of chemical dispersants on the surface of the water, but gaps remain in several research areas. For example, experts generally agreed that there is a basic understanding of the processes that influence where and how oil travels through the water, but that more research was needed to quantify the actual rate at which dispersants biodegrade. In addition, all the experts GAO spoke with said that little is known about the application and effects of dispersants applied subsurface, noting that specific environmental conditions, such as higher pressures, may influence dispersants effectiveness. Knowledge about the use and effectiveness of dispersants in the Arctic is also limited, with less research conducted on dispersant use there than in temperate or tropical climates. For example, one expert noted that more research is needed on biodegradation rates for oil in the Arctic because the cold temperature may slow the process down.
Federal agencies have funded over $15.5 million of dispersant-related research since fiscal year 2000, with more than half of the total funding occurring since the Deepwater Horizon incident. Most of these 106 projects were funded by the Department of the Interiors Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Over 40 percent of the research projects were focused at least in part on testing dispersant effectiveness. For example, BSEE funded 28 projects on the efficacy of dispersants on different types of oil and under different ocean conditions. In contrast, relatively few projects were focused on applying dispersants subsurface or in the Arctic. Specifically, NSF funded three projects looking at the use and effects of subsurface dispersant application, and BSEE and EPA funded the eight projects related to the use of chemical dispersants in Arctic or cold water environments.
Researchers face resource, scientific, and communication challenges related to dispersant research. Agency officials, experts, and specialists identified inconsistent and limited levels of funding as a challenge to developing research on the use and effects of chemical dispersants. For example, because support for dispersant research fluctuates, with temporary increases following a major spill, it is difficult for federal agencies to fund longer term studies, such as those needed to understand chronic toxicological effects of dispersants. In addition, researchers face scientific challenges with respect to dispersants, including being able to conduct research that replicates realistic oil spill conditions. Conducting research in the open ocean faces several logistical barriers, and laboratory experiments are unable to fully approximate the scale and complexity of ocean conditions. Lastly, agency officials, experts, and specialists told GAO that it can be a challenge to communicate and track research. Although some organizations have attempted to compile lists of dispersant-related research, currently there is no mechanism that tracks dispersant research across all sources and highlights past and ongoing research projects. For example, the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Researcha multi-agency committee chaired by the Coast Guardmaintains a list of federally sponsored oil spill related research, but does not track or cross-reference related research that has been funded solely by industry or nongovernmental sources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research periodically provide updated information on key dispersant research by nonfederal sources. Also, the Interagency Committee should ensure that subsurface and Arctic applications are among the future priority research areas. The Departments of the Interior, Commerce, and Homeland Security, and the EPA generally concurred with the recommendations made to them. |
gao_GAO-03-27 | gao_GAO-03-27_0 | Table 1 summarizes significant eligibility changes since September 11, 2001. FAA Is Awarding More AIP Grant Funds to Airports for Security Projects in Fiscal Year 2002 Than in Each Previous Year of the Program’s History
In fiscal year 2002, FAA awarded a total of $561 million in AIP grant funds for airport security projects, which represents about 17 percent of the $3.3 billion available for obligation. As illustrated in figure 1, the $561 million is the largest amount awarded for security projects in a single year and contrasts sharply with past funding trends. AIP Grants Awarded to Airports for Security Projects since September 11, 2001, Met Legislative and Program Eligibility Requirements
Based on data provided by FAA, all security projects awarded AIP grants since September 11, 2001, have met legislative and program eligibility requirements. Most of these projects would have qualified for AIP funding under eligibility requirements in place prior to September 11, 2001. Increase in AIP Funding for Security Projects Has Affected Funding for Some Airport Development Projects in Fiscal Year 2002 and Could Have a Greater Effect in Fiscal Year 2003
The unprecedented increase in AIP grant funds awarded to airports for security projects in fiscal year 2002 has affected the amount of funding available for some airport development projects, in comparison with fiscal year 2001. FAA Airport Planning and Programming officials stated that they were able to fully fund many program priorities, including: all set-aside requirements, such as the noise mitigation and reduction program and the military airport program; all safety projects, including those related to FAA’s initiatives to improve runway safety and reduce runway incursions; all phased projects that had been previously funded with AIP grant funds, including the 10 runway projects which are being built at primary airports. Most notable was the record level of carryover apportionments, which totaled $355 million, and the $84 million in grant funds that FAA recovered from prior-year projects. The airports are designated as a civil commercial service or reliever airport in the national airport system. | What GAO Found
The events of September 11, 2001 created several new challenges for the aviation industry in ensuring the safety and security of the national airport system. Chief among them is deciding to what extent Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grant funds should be used to finance the new security requirements at the nation's airports. Although many in the aviation industry believe that funding security projects has become even more important in the aftermath of September 11, they also recognize the need to continue funding other airport development projects, such as those designed to enhance capacity in the national airport system. During fiscal year 2002, the Federal Aviation Association (FAA) awarded a total of $561 million, 17 percent of the $3.3 billion available for grants, in AIP grant funds to airports for security projects related to the events of September 11, 2001. This amount is the largest amount awarded to airports for security projects in a single year since the program began in 1982. Based on data provided by FAA, all of the security projects funded with AIP grants since the events of September 11, 2001, met the legislative and program eligibility requirements. The projects, which range from access control systems to terminal modifications, qualified for AIP funding either under eligibility requirements in effect before September 11, 2001, or under subsequent statutory and administrative changes. Although FAA Airport Planning and Programming officials stated that they were able to comply with statutory requirements, set-asides, and other program priorities, the $504 million increase in AIP grand funds for new security projects in fiscal year 2002 has affected the amount of funds available for some airport development projects in comparison with the distribution of AIP grand funds awarded in fiscal year 2001. FAA was able to fully fund these projects, in part, because of a record level of carryover apportionments, which totaled $355 million, and the $84 million in grant funds that were recovered from prior-year projects. However, there were reductions in AIP funding awarded to nonsecurity projects in fiscal year 2002, as compared with fiscal year 2001. |
gao_GAO-17-152 | gao_GAO-17-152_0 | As of fiscal year 2016, there were a total of eight TARS sites along the southern U.S. border and in Puerto Rico. CBP Uses UAS and Aerostats for a Variety of Border Security Activities, but Could Benefit from Documented Procedures for Coordinating Predator B Operations with Other Government Agencies
CBP Uses Predator B UAS to Support a Variety of Activities and Government Agencies, but Could Benefit from Documenting Coordination Procedures
CBP uses Predator B aircraft to conduct various border security activities and to support a range of government agencies. CBP’s Predator B operations in support of other federal agencies accounted for 15 percent of Predator B flight hours from fiscal years 2013 through 2016, such as conducting aerial surveillance for investigations during controlled deliveries of illegal contraband by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Without documenting its procedures for coordination of Predator B operations with supported agencies, CBP does not have reasonable assurance that practices at NASOCs in Texas and North Dakota align with existing policies and procedures for joint operations with other government agencies. CBP Has Taken Actions to Assess Effectiveness of Its UAS and Aerostats, but Could Improve Data Collection
CBP Has Studied and Collects Various Data to Assess the Effectiveness of Its Predator B Program, but Could Strengthen Its Efforts through More Consistent Data Collection
CBP has initiated various studies and evaluations to help assess the effectiveness of its Predator B program, and also collects and tracks various data related to Predator B operations. Further, it does not include definitions and instructions for collecting and recording information on missions with multiple supported agencies and asset assists for seizures and apprehensions. Updated guidance and training for users for Predator B mission data collection would help CBP ensure consistent recording across all Predator B operating locations to support CBP’s efforts to assess the effectiveness of its Predator B program. The purpose of the second evaluation was to support Border Patrol’s continued use of tactical aerostats by examining operational effectiveness and comparison of capabilities and performance of tactical aerostats compared to other existing surveillance technology—for example, towers equipped with video surveillance cameras and ground sensors. Second, with regard to data, CBP collects and tracks data on its use of tactical aerostats to assess effectiveness, including data on (1) operational availability (i.e., percentage of time an aerostat is in flight providing surveillance data to CBP), (2) asset assists for apprehensions of individuals and seizures of narcotics, and (3) the number of detections of items of interest. In collecting and recording asset assist information, Border Patrol does not distinguish between tactical aerostats and TARS. Due to the constant change in cross-border illegal activity, costs associated with re-deployment of tactical aerostat sites (between $60,000 to over $100,000 per site), and time needed to locate and obtain access for land use for re-deployment, better data collection practices to distinguish between asset assists associated with tactical aerostats and TARS would help CBP to better ensure its data are complete to help guide resource allocation decisions. Conclusions
CBP uses a variety of technologies and assets to secure the border, including Predator B UAS. CBP’s Predator B aircraft are used as national assets and support numerous federal and non-federal government agencies. By documenting its procedures in all operating locations, CBP could better oversee coordination procedures as use changes based on needs and cross-border illegal activity. CBP uses tactical aerostats in south Texas to support Border Patrol’s ability to detect and interdict cross-border illegal activity. With regard to the second recommendation related to updating and maintaining guidance for recording Predator B mission information in its data collection system, DHS concurred and stated that CBP will take actions to update and maintain guidance for recording Predator B mission information, including incorporating a new functionality in its data collection system to include tips and guidance for recording Predator B mission information and updating its user manual for its data collection system by September 2019. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following questions:
How does U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) use unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and aerostats for border security activities, and to what extent has CBP developed and documented procedures for UAS coordination? To what extent has CBP taken actions to assess the effectiveness of its UAS and aerostats for border security activities? For the purposes of our report, UAS includes Predator B UAS and aerostats include tactical aerostats and the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) program. We also conducted site visits to observe CBP’s use of Predator B UAS and aerostats in Arizona, Texas, North Dakota, and California and interviewed CBP officials responsible for their operation. Appendix IV: Summary Statistics on the Reporting of Asset Assist Data for Apprehensions and Seizures for Aerostats, May 2014 through Fiscal Year 2016
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Enforcement Integrated Database includes a field that enables U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) agents to identify whether a technological or nontechnological asset assisted in the apprehension of illegal entrants or the seizure of drugs or other contraband. Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative Mechanisms along the Southwest Border. Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the lead federal agency charged with securing U.S. borders, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) CBP has employed a variety of technologies and assets to assist with its border security efforts. In support of its mission, CBP operates a fleet of remotely piloted Predator B UAS and uses aerostats, including tactical aerostats and TARS. GAO was asked to review CBP's use of UAS and aerostats for border security.
This report addresses the following questions: (1) How does CBP use UAS and aerostats for border security activities, and to what extent has CBP developed and documented procedures for UAS coordination? and (2) To what extent has CBP taken actions to assess the effectiveness of its UAS and aerostats for border security activities? GAO reviewed CBP documents; analyzed Predator B UAS, tactical aerostat, and TARS data on use and effectiveness from fiscal years 2013 through 2016; interviewed field and headquarters officials; and conducted site visits to observe CBP's use of UAS and aerostats along U.S. borders.
What GAO Found
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses Predator B unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for a variety of border security activities but could benefit from documented coordination procedures in all operating locations. CBP uses its Predator B UAS to support a variety of efforts, such as missions to support investigations in collaboration with other government agencies (e.g., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) and to locate individuals illegally crossing the border. GAO found that CBP established various mechanisms to coordinate with other agencies for Predator B missions but did not develop and document coordination procedures in two of its three operational centers. Without documented coordination procedures in all operating locations consistent with internal control standards, CBP does not have reasonable assurance that practices in all operating locations align with existing policies and procedures for joint operations with other federal and non-federal government agencies.
CBP uses aerostats—unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the ground and equipped with video surveillance cameras and radar technology—to support its border security activities along the southern U.S. border. In south Texas, the U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) uses relocatable tactical aerostats equipped with video surveillance technology to locate and support the interdiction of cross-border illegal activity. At eight fixed sites across the southern U.S. border and in Puerto Rico, CBP uses the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) program to support its efforts to detect occurrences of illegal aircraft and maritime vessel border incursions.
CBP has taken actions to assess the effectiveness of its UAS and aerostats for border security, but could improve its data collection. CBP collects a variety of data on its use of Predator B UAS, tactical aerostats, and TARS including data on their support for the apprehension of individuals, seizure of drugs, and other events (asset assists). For Predator B UAS, GAO found mission data—such as the names of supported agencies and asset assists for seizures of narcotics—was not recorded consistently across all operational centers, limiting CBP's ability to assess the effectiveness of the program. CBP has not updated its guidance for collecting and recording mission information in its data collection system to include new data elements added since 2014, and it does not have instructions for recording mission information such as asset assists. In addition, not all users of CBP's system have received training for recording mission information. Updating guidance and fully training users, consistent with internal control standards, would help CBP better ensure the quality of data it uses to assess effectiveness. For tactical aerostats, GAO found that Border Patrol collection of asset assist information for seizures and apprehensions does not distinguish between its tactical aerostats and TARS. Consistent with internal control standards, data that distinguishes between support provided by tactical aerostats and support provided by TARS would help CBP collect better and more complete information and guide resource allocation decisions, such as the re-deployment of tactical aerostat sites based on changes in cross-border illegal activity.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations, including that CBP document coordination procedures for Predator B operations in all operating locations, update guidance and implement training for collection of Predator B mission data, and update Border Patrol's data collection practices for aerostat asset assists. CBP concurred and identified planned actions to address the recommendations. |
gao_GGD-97-158 | gao_GGD-97-158_0 | IRS Used an Improved Methodology to Allocate Enforcement Revenues Between Base Programs and Initiatives, but Estimates Vary Depending on Assumptions
In reviews of past compliance initiatives, we identified several weaknesses in IRS’ methodology for computing and tracking initiative results. In preparing its fiscal year 1995 Compliance Initiatives Report, for example, IRS recognized the impact of opportunity costs, obtained revenue data from an automated system (ERIS) that was designed to track actual enforcement results, and improved the report’s usefulness to Congress by including not only the estimated results of the initiatives but also the estimated results of the base enforcement programs and explanations for variances between the results anticipated when the initiatives were approved and the estimated final results. Also, in computing the results of the fiscal year 1995 compliance initiatives, IRS adopted a rule that no FTEs, and thus no revenue, would be allocated to the initiatives until planned base staffing had been achieved. Although the methodology used for the fiscal year 1995 initiatives is an improvement over previous methodologies, the results of that methodology are estimates that are sensitive to various productivity assumptions. Because its systems do not distinguish between base and initiative activities, IRS, as part of its methodology, developed the formula we describe in appendix I to allocate the $31.4 billion in enforcement revenue between base and initiative activities. Before implementing its new methodology, IRS briefed us on the allocation formula. IRS did not clearly disclose that fact in the Compliance Initiatives Report. Caveats to Consider in Interpreting IRS’ Reported Results
In considering IRS’ estimates of the results of the fiscal year 1995 compliance initiatives, there are two other caveats that are relevant: (1) the fact that IRS collected a certain amount in fiscal year 1995 as a result of the initiatives does not necessarily mean that IRS collected more enforcement revenue in fiscal year 1995 than in fiscal year 1994 but only that IRS collected more in fiscal year 1995 than it estimated it would have without the initiatives and (2) the first year’s results from the fiscal year 1995 initiatives are not necessarily indicative of what other compliance initiatives would generate in their first year. Despite the estimated additional revenue from the initiatives, however, the amount of enforcement revenue collected in fiscal year 1995 was less than the amount collected in fiscal year 1994. If future initiatives require a greater proportion of new staff, the results could be different from those in fiscal year 1995 because new staff (1) require more training, which, under IRS’ current procedures for training new staff, increases the opportunity cost associated with moving experienced staff off-line to do the training and (2) generally can be expected to generate less revenue, at first, than experienced staff. Decisions on how to allocate staff among enforcement programs also affects initiative results. We do not have a basis for determining what the correct assumptions should be, but our sensitivity analyses showed that a change in the assumptions used could have a significant effect on the reported initiative results of $803.3 million. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 Compliance Initiatives Report, focusing on: (1) the methodology IRS used to allocate staff years and revenues between the base enforcement programs and the compliance initiatives; and (2) certain caveats to consider in interpreting IRS' reported results.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS could not compile actual revenue results from the FY 1995 compliance initiatives because the Enforcement Revenue Information System (ERIS) only provides information on the total amount of revenue collected as a result of enforcement activities and because other systems, such as those that track IRS staffing, also do not account separately for base enforcement activities and initiative activities; (2) therefore, IRS developed a new methodology to allocate FY 1995 enforcement revenues between base programs and the initiatives; (3) IRS' new methodology: (a) accounted for the opportunity costs associated with moving experienced staff off-line to train new staff; (b) provided that no staff or revenue would be allocated to the initiatives until planned staffing for base programs had been achieved; and (c) improved the Compliance Initiatives Report's usefulness to Congress by including total staffing and total revenue for the various enforcement programs, allocated between base and initiatives, along with explanations for variances between the results anticipated when the initiatives were approved and the estimated final results; (4) although the methodology used for the FY 1995 initiatives is an improvement over previous methodologies, the results of that methodology are estimates that are sensitive to assumptions embedded in the methodology about the productivity of new staff and more experienced staff; (5) those assumptions were based on the judgments of IRS managers rather than empirical data; (6) GAO does not know what the correct assumptions are, but GAO's sensitivity analyses showed that a change in productivity rates could have a significant effect on the reported results; (7) in considering IRS' estimates of the FY 1995 compliance initiatives, there are two other caveats that are relevant; (8) the fact that the initiatives generated a certain amount of revenue in FY 1995 does not necessarily mean that IRS collected more enforcement revenue in FY 1995 than it did in FY 1994 but only that IRS collected more enforcement revenue in FY 1995 than it had estimated it would collect without the initiatives; (9) in fact, the amount of enforcement revenue IRS reported collecting in FY 1995 was less than that reported for FY 1994; and (10) because, the estimates of revenue attributable to the compliance initiatives depended on various assumptions, including how IRS decided to allocate staff, the results in FY 1995 are not necessarily indicative of what other compliance initiatives would generate in their first year. |
gao_GAO-02-92 | gao_GAO-02-92_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine how long IRS takes to contact employers after an employment tax delinquency occurs, we analyzed the time between (1) the receipt of a quarterly Form 941 return and IRS’ mailing of an initial delinquency notice, (2) when a Form 941 was due and IRS’ mailing of a delinquency notice when the employer fails to file a Form 941, and (3) when the employers should have deposited employment taxes during a quarter and IRS’ mailing of an initial delinquency notice. In addition, the review covers IRS’ efforts to intervene with taxpayers in order to educate and inform them of their tax obligations and to expedite compliance. IRS Takes Several Weeks to Notify Employers of Employment Tax Delinquencies
Our analysis of IRS’ delinquent employment tax data indicates that once IRS receives Form 941 returns, it takes about 5 weeks to notify employers of employment tax delinquencies. During calendar years 1999 and 2000, IRS received and processed about 5.7 million Form 941 returns per quarter. In that regard, we found that IRS normally takes from 14 to 28 weeks after the due date to notify employers of their failure to file a Form 941 return. Employers owing smaller amounts of employment taxes are allowed to make less frequent deposits. Efforts to Evaluate IRS Programs to Prevent or Reduce Tax Delinquency Have Monitoring, (2) Federal Tax Deposit (FTD) Soft Letter, (3) ABC’s of FTDs, Experienced Problems
IRS has developed several specific programs designed to intervene with employers to help prevent employment tax delinquencies and reduce the pyramiding of additional tax, interest, and penalty charges. To evaluate the effectiveness of these programs, IRS planned to compare compliance rates of test and control groups and to use customer surveys and focus groups. IRS’ Ongoing Modernization Could Improve Intervention With Employers
IRS’ ongoing modernization efforts do not currently include any programs specifically designed to improve IRS’ notification to employers with tax delinquencies. However, sweeping organizational changes and information system improvements may in the future reduce taxpayer burden and improve compliance. It has also experienced delays in evaluating its efforts to improve its long- standing FTD Alert program. | What GAO Found
Employers are required to withhold amounts from their employees' salary to cover individual federal income tax, Social Security, and Medicare taxes; match the amounts for Social Security and Medicare taxes; and deposit these amounts with the U.S. Treasury. In fiscal year 2000, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) collected $1.3 trillion in this manner. Most employers withhold and deposit these taxes as required; however, the amount of unpaid employment taxes, penalty, and interest has grown significantly. IRS data show that in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, delinquent employers owed about $3.2, $3.5, $4.4, and $5 billion, respectively, in unpaid employment taxes, penalties, and interest. The time IRS takes to notify employers of delinquent payment of employment taxes varies. On average, IRS takes about five weeks to initially notify employers regarding employment tax delinquencies after the Form 941 return is received. When employers fail to file Form 941 returns, IRS normally takes from 14 to 28 weeks to notify them of this delinquency. Aside from its usual efforts to educate and inform taxpayers of their responsibilities, IRS has four programs to prevent or reduce employers' tax delinquencies. Two of these programs were designed to achieve early contact with employers, and two were designed to identify employers with existing, multiple employment tax delinquencies and help them to return to compliance. To evaluate the effectiveness of these programs and to support informed judgments about whether to adopt new ones, IRS planned to compare compliance rates of test and control groups and to use customer surveys and focus groups. IRS' efforts to evaluate these programs are being adversely affected by, among other things, delays in obtaining reliable data. IRS officials did not identify any specific programs to improve employment tax intervention under IRS' ongoing effort to modernize its organizational structure, management processes, and information technology systems. However, certain aspects of its modernization effort have some future potential to improve intervention. |
gao_GAO-15-218 | gao_GAO-15-218_0 | 6. 1). Agencies for TCB Assistance for AGOA Countries
Total U.S. government funding for TCB assistance for AGOA countries from 2001 to 2013 was approximately $5 billion. According to our analysis of the U.S. government’s TCB database, MCC and USAID are the agencies that reported providing the most funding for AGOA countries, and accounted for 90 percent of all TCB assistance to these countries from 2001 through 2013 (see fig. MCC’s and USAID’s TCB Assistance in Support of AGOA Has Primarily Focused on Barriers to Trade- Related Infrastructure and Agriculture, and Trade Facilitation
MCC Has Taken Steps to Support AGOA through TCB Assistance That Is Generally Focused on Trade-Related Infrastructure Needs, but Broader Infrastructure Challenges Remain
MCC’s TCB-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa are supportive of AGOA. From 2005 through 2013, MCC funded TCB activities in 15 of the 41 AGOA countries (see table 2). This compact included $176 million in trade-related infrastructure assistance for a roads project rehabilitating 491 kilometers of key segments of the country’s transportation network. USAID has funded TCB assistance activities in 39 of 41 AGOA countries; see table 3 for AGOA countries with the highest USAID TCB funding. USAID Has Worked with Some Host Governments on Strategic Approaches to AGOA Utilization, but Most Host Governments Have Not Established Such Approaches
USAID Has Worked with Some Host Governments to Develop Strategic Approaches to AGOA Utilization
USAID works with some host governments to develop strategic approaches to increasing AGOA utilization. AGOA legislation also directs the President, in part, to target assistance to sub-Saharan African governments. In the strategy documents, host governments may identify high-priority trade and investment sectors, constraints related to AGOA utilization, and specific steps to increase exports under AGOA. For example, the East Africa trade hub participated in a 2013 workshop with officials from the Mauritian government, and helped the host government develop and publish its AGOA-specific national strategy, which aims to support the ability of Mauritian firms to sell to the U.S. market and leverage opportunities that AGOA provides. USAID, through its trade hubs, has stated that identifying strategic needs and priorities through national strategies can bolster AGOA utilization. USAID officials also said that host governments must request and initiate the process of developing these strategies, and the lack of political will to motivate these efforts may be one reason some AGOA countries do not have such a strategic approach. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance eligible countries’ ability to utilize the AGOA program and ensure that TCB assistance is aligned with program objectives, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID work with more host governments to develop strategic approaches to promoting exports under AGOA. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) U.S. government trade capacity building (TCB) assistance in support of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and (2) the extent to which the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has made efforts to develop strategic approaches to AGOA utilization. In each country, we interviewed U.S. agency officials, host government officials, representatives from the private sector who had insights on U.S. TCB assistance, and contractors implementing TCB activities. To examine U.S. government TCB assistance in support of AGOA, we reviewed documents from relevant U.S. agencies, including program descriptions and evaluations, and analyzed data on U.S. TCB funding to AGOA countries. GAO-14-602. | Why GAO Did This Study
Signed in 2000, AGOA directs the President to provide TCB assistance to sub-Saharan African governments and firms to promote exports and develop infrastructure, among other things. AGOA provides duty-free access on qualifying U.S. imports from eligible sub-Saharan African countries, a total of 41 countries as of December 1, 2014. From 2001 through 2013, U.S. agencies funded about $5 billion in TCB assistance to AGOA countries. GAO was asked to review various issues related to the ability of AGOA countries to utilize AGOA prior to its expiration on September 30, 2015.
In this report, GAO examines (1) U.S. government TCB assistance in support of AGOA, and (2) the extent to which USAID has made efforts to develop strategic approaches to AGOA utilization. GAO focused on MCC and USAID because these two agencies accounted for nearly 90 percent of funding for TCB activities in AGOA countries from 2001 through 2013. GAO analyzed data on U.S. TCB assistance to AGOA countries in this period, reviewed agencies' funding and program documents, conducted interviews with officials who implement U.S. TCB assistance, and met with U.S. and foreign government officials and private sector representatives in Ethiopia and Ghana.
What GAO Found
Among U.S. agencies, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have funded the majority of trade capacity building (TCB) assistance in support of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (see figure). MCC obligated nearly $3 billion in funding for TCB activities in 15 of the 41 countries eligible for AGOA (AGOA countries), with the majority of funds provided for trade-related infrastructure projects. For example, MCC obligated $176 million for a roads project in Mozambique that aimed to improve the transportation network, including access to markets and reduction of transport costs. USAID obligated approximately $1.6 billion in funding for TCB activities in 39 of the 41 AGOA countries, with the majority of funds provided for trade-related agriculture and infrastructure, and trade facilitation. For example, USAID funded activities to help exporters in East Africa build business linkages with U.S. markets through trade shows.
Note: Funding amounts or percentages may not sum to totals because of rounding.
USAID has worked with some host governments to develop strategic approaches to AGOA utilization; however, most host governments have not established such approaches. USAID-funded regional trade hubs in sub-Saharan Africa have supported AGOA utilization by, among other things, collaborating with some host governments to develop AGOA-specific or broader national export strategies. Trade hub evaluations and statements from host government officials show that identifying strategic needs and priorities through strategic approaches can bolster AGOA utilization and help assess challenges to expanding exports. In strategy documents, host governments may identify high-priority trade and investment sectors, constraints related to AGOA utilization, and specific steps to increase exports under AGOA. Lack of a strategic approach has been identified as a significant reason for gaps in AGOA utilization. As of December 2014, 14 of the 41 AGOA countries had strategies reflecting AGOA priorities. According to USAID officials, host governments must initiate the process of developing a strategy, and a lack of political will may pose challenges to such efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Administrator of USAID work with more host governments to develop strategic approaches to promoting exports under AGOA. USAID agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-151 | gao_GAO-17-151_0 | DOD’s Latest Report to Congress Captures More-Comprehensive Environmental Cleanup Cost Information, but Omits Emerging Contaminants’ Cleanup Costs
DOD has captured and reported more-comprehensive cost information in its environmental cost reporting for installations closed under BRAC; however, DOD has not reported to Congress that the cleanup of emerging contaminants could significantly increase the total cost of environmental cleanup at installations closed by the BRAC process. For example, we reported in 2007 that the costs for environmental cleanup for installations closed under the 2005 BRAC round were not complete partly because DOD excluded the cleanup costs for contaminants released on DOD property after 1986 and munitions released on DOD property after 2002. In its annual report to Congress, DOD reported that it spent $609.6 million to clean up properties closed under BRAC in fiscal year 2015. DOD Has Made Progress in Transferring Excess Property, but Information on Successful Mitigation Strategies Is Not Widely Available
DOD has used a variety of methods since our 2007 report to continue to make progress in transfers of unneeded BRAC property. At the same time, installation officials stated that challenges remain, including unique situations that will require more time to overcome, and others that are more widespread, such as navigating multiple regulatory agencies or dealing with emerging contaminants. Regarding only the 2005 BRAC round, DOD reported that it had transferred about 66 percent (60,224 out of 90,914 acres) of its unneeded property as of September 30, 2015. When an installation is closed under BRAC, the unneeded property is reported as excess. Officials Identified Challenges That Impede Progress, but DOD Does Not Have a Method for Installation Officials to Share Lessons Learned on Successful Mitigation Strategies
Installation officials and local redevelopment authority representatives involved in the cleanup, transfer, and reuse of the property identified challenges that continue to impede the environmental cleanup and transfer process. Installation officials we spoke with stated that they periodically reach out to officials at other installations informally, even across services, for help in learning how to expedite or resolve these challenges as well as others, but there is no formal mechanism, such as a web-based database, within DOD to capture this type of information. Without a repository or method to record and share lessons learned, installation personnel charged with implementing cleanup efforts are missing opportunities to share lessons learned about how various locations have successfully addressed cleanup challenges and may therefore be at risk of duplicating errors made in the past by others who faced the same kind of cleanup issues. Environmental cleanup is costly, and DOD estimates that it will need about $3.4 billion in addition to the approximately $11.5 billion it has already spent to manage and complete environmental cleanup of installations closed under all BRAC rounds. Without including such information in its annual report, DOD has not provided Congress full visibility over the expected increase in costs and the necessary information to make more-informed funding decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide Congress with better visibility over the costs for the environmental cleanup of properties from all BRAC rounds to inform future funding decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the military departments to include in future annual reports to Congress that environmental cleanup costs will increase due to the cleanup of perfluorinated compounds and other emerging contaminants, and to include best estimates of these costs as additional information becomes available. In its written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress in capturing and reporting environmental cleanup costs at installations closed under all prior Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds, we collected cost data from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health’s Knowledge-Based Corporate Reporting System as of September 30, 2015. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
The environmental cleanup of bases closed under the BRAC process has historically been an impediment to the expeditious transfer of unneeded property to other federal and nonfederal parties. While DOD is obligated to ensure that former installation property is cleaned up to a level that is protective of human health and the environment, the cleanup process can delay redevelopment in communities affected by the BRAC process.
The House Report accompanying the fiscal year 2016 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill includes a provision for GAO to update its 2007 report on the environmental cleanup and transfer of installations closed under BRAC. This report addresses the extent to which DOD has made progress in: (1) capturing and reporting environmental cleanup costs at installations closed under BRAC and (2) transferring excess property and mitigating any challenges. GAO reviewed DOD guidance, cost data, and property transfer data; visited installations selected from among those with the highest cleanup costs, as well as other factors; and interviewed DOD and service officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has captured and reported more comprehensive cost information in its environmental cost reporting for installations closed under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process since GAO last reported on the issue in 2007. For example, GAO reported in 2007 that the costs DOD reported for environmental cleanup for installations closed under the 2005 BRAC round were not complete; however, since fiscal year 2009, DOD's annual reports to Congress on environmental cleanup have included cleanup costs for all identified munitions and contaminants. For example, DOD estimated as of September 30, 2015, that it will need about $3.4 billion to complete environmental cleanup for installations closed under all BRAC rounds, in addition to the approximately $11.5 billion it has already spent. Despite this improvement in reporting, DOD has not reported to Congress in its annual report that the removal of certain emerging contaminants (i.e., contaminants that have a reasonable possible pathway to enter the environment, present a potential unacceptable human health or environmental risk, and do not have regulatory standards based on peer-reviewed science) will be significant. Without DOD including in its annual report to Congress its best estimate of these increased costs, Congress will not have visibility into the significant costs and efforts associated with the cleanup of emerging contaminants on BRAC installations and therefore will not have the necessary information to make more informed funding decisions.
DOD has used a variety of methods since GAO's 2007 report to continue to make progress in transfers of unneeded BRAC property. For example, as of September 30, 2015, DOD reported that it had transferred about 85 percent of its unneeded property identified in all BRAC rounds (see figure below). Despite this progress, installation officials stated that they continue to face challenges, such as navigating multiple regulatory agencies or disposing of radiological contamination, that increased the time it takes to clean up and transfer property. Installation officials GAO spoke with stated that they periodically reach out to officials at other installations, and across services, for help in learning how to expedite or resolve challenges, but there is no formal mechanism within DOD to capture and share this type of information. Installation officials further stated that a system to capture lessons learned would assist them in this effort. Without a mechanism to record and share lessons learned, installation personnel charged with implementing cleanup efforts are missing opportunities to share information and could duplicate errors made in the past.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) DOD include in future reports to Congress that the cleanup of emerging contaminants will increase cleanup costs, and estimate such costs, and (2) share best practices on mitigating cleanup and property transfer challenges. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-256T | gao_GAO-10-256T_0 | Information on Employment Litigation, Housing and Civil Enforcement, Voting, and Special Litigation Sections’ Enforcement Efforts from Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007
Employment Litigation Section
From fiscal years 2001 through 2007, the Employment Litigation Section initiated more than 3,200 matters and filed 60 cases as plaintiff under federal statutes prohibiting employment discrimination. Most of the 11 pattern or practice cases involved claims of discrimination in hiring (9 of 11) and the most common protected class was race (7 of 11), with four cases filed on behalf of African Americans, two on behalf of whites, and one on behalf of American Indians or Alaska Natives. Housing and Civil Enforcement Section
From fiscal years 2001 through 2007, the Housing and Civil Enforcement Section initiated 947 matters and participated in 277 cases under federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in housing, credit transactions, and certain places of public accommodation (e.g., hotels). The Section initiated nearly 90 percent of the FHA matters (456 of 517) under its pattern or practice authority; these primarily alleged discrimination on the basis of race or disability and involved land use/zoning/local government or rental issues. The majority (250 of 269) of the cases that the Section filed as plaintiff included a claim under the FHA. The FHA cases primarily involved rental issues (146). Most of the FHA cases alleged discrimination on the basis of disability (115) or race (70)—66 of which involved racial discrimination against African Americans. Voting Section
From fiscal years 2001 through 2007, the Voting Section initiated 442 matters and filed 56 cases to enforce federal statutes that protect the voting rights of racial and language minorities, disabled and illiterate persons, and overseas and military personnel, among others. Special Litigation Section
From fiscal years 2001 through 2007, the Special Litigation Section initiated 693 matters and filed 31 cases as plaintiff to enforce federal civil rights statutes in four areas––institutional conditions (e.g., protecting persons in nursing homes), conduct of law enforcement agencies (e.g., police misconduct), access to reproductive health facilities and places of worship, and the exercise of religious freedom of institutionalized persons. Of the matters initiated and closed (544 of 693), most involved institutional conditions (373) and conduct of law enforcement agencies (129). By Requiring Sections to Collect Data on Protected Class, Subject, and Reasons for Closing Matters in Its Case Management System, the Division Could Provide Better Accountability to Congress on Its Enforcement Efforts
As previously discussed, information regarding the specific protected classes and subjects related to matters and cases and the reasons for closing matters were not systematically maintained in ICM because the Division did not require Sections to capture these data. As a result, the availability and accuracy of protected class and subject data—information that is key to ensuring that the Division executes its charge to enforce statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of protected class—varied among the sections. By collecting additional data on protected class and subject in ICM, the Division could strengthen its ability to account for the four sections’ enforcement efforts. In contrast, according to the Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, it requires that protected class and subject data be recorded in ICM for all matters and cases, and we found that these data were consistently recorded in ICM. Additionally, congressional committees have requested information regarding reasons the Division did not pursue matters, including instances in which Division managers did not approve a section’s recommendation to proceed with a case. However, ICM does not include a discrete field for capturing the reasons that matters are closed and Division officials we interviewed could not identify instances in which Division managers did not approve a section’s recommendation to proceed with a case. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Civil Rights Division (Division) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) is the primary federal entity charged with enforcing federal statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion, and national origin (i.e., protected classes). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to review the Division's enforcement efforts and its Interactive Case Management System (ICM). This testimony addresses (1) the activities the Division undertook from fiscal years 2001 through 2007 to implement its enforcement responsibilities through its Employment Litigation, Housing and Civil Enforcement, Voting, and Special Litigation sections, and (2) additional data that could be collected using ICM to assist in reporting on the four sections' enforcement efforts. This statement is based on GAO products issued in September and October 2009.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2001 through 2007, the Civil Rights Division initiated matters and filed cases to implement its enforcement responsibilities through the four sections. The Employment Litigation Section initiated 3,212 matters and filed 60 cases as plaintiff under federal statutes prohibiting employment discrimination. Most matters (3,087) were referred by other agencies. Of the 11 pattern or practices cases--cases that attempt to show that the defendant systematically engaged in discriminatory activities--9 involved claims of discrimination in hiring and the most common protected class was race (7). The Housing and Civil Enforcement Section initiated 947 matters and participated in 277 cases under federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in housing, credit transactions, and certain places of public accommodation. Most (456 of 517) Fair Housing Act (FHA) matters were initiated under its pattern or practice authority, primarily alleging discrimination on the basis of race or disability and involving land use/zoning/local government or rental issues. Most (250 of 269) cases filed as plaintiff included an FHA claim. The FHA cases primarily involved rental issues (146) and alleged discrimination on the basis of disability (115) or race (70). The Voting Section initiated 442 matters and filed 56 cases to enforce federal statutes that protect the voting rights of racial and language minorities, and disabled and illiterate persons, among others. The Section initiated most matters (367) and filed a majority of cases (39) as plaintiff under the Voting Rights Act, primarily on behalf of language minority groups (246 and 30). The Special Litigation Section initiated 693 matters and filed 31 cases as plaintiff to enforce federal civil rights statutes on institutional conditions (e.g., protecting people in nursing homes), the conduct of law enforcement agencies, access to reproductive health facilities and places of worship, and the exercise of religious freedom of institutionalized persons. The largest number of matters initiated and closed (544 of 693) involved institutional conditions (373), as did the cases filed (27). Information on the specific protected classes and subjects related to matters and cases and the reasons for closing matters were not systematically maintained in ICM because the Division did not require sections to capture these data. As a result, the availability and accuracy of these data varied among the sections. For example, the Employment Litigation Section did not capture protected class and subject data for more than 80 percent of its matters. In contrast, these data were consistently recorded in ICM for the Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, which requires that protected class and subject data be recorded in ICM. In addition, congressional committees have requested information on reasons the Division did not pursue matters, including instances in which Division managers did not approve a section's recommendation to proceed with a case. However, ICM does not include a discrete field for capturing the reasons that matters are closed and Division officials we interviewed could not identify instances in which Division managers did not approve a section's recommendation to proceed with a case. By requiring sections to record such information, the Division could strengthen its ability to account for its enforcement efforts. |
gao_GAO-15-543 | gao_GAO-15-543_0 | In addition, we found that DOD does not have a policy in place for military personnel and DOD affiliated-contractors to provide guidance on when it would be appropriate to report to base security officials when an individual is observed carrying a weapon on an installation, especially into a work environment. However, DOD has not consistently shared information about these actions throughout the department because DOD personnel have not consistently used existing mechanisms. Other Actions Taken. Such actions include using random antiterrorism measures, installing installation mass notification systems, and piloting a workplace violence risk assessment program. DOD Has Not Consistently Shared Actions to Protect against Insider Threats
While the U.S. installations we visited have taken actions to protect against insider threats, military services have not consistently shared this information across the department because DOD officials are not consistently using existing information sharing mechanisms. Such mechanisms include working groups, conferences, lessons-learned information systems, and antiterrorism web portals. DOD guidance and recommendations issued after the 2009 Fort Hood shooting state that DOD should identify and share leading practices to enhance the department’s ability to protect the force. Unless the military services share information across the department on insider threats by consistently using existing mechanisms, U.S. installations may miss opportunities to enhance the department’s ability to protect the force against such threats. DOD Is in the Process of Implementing Recommendations from the 2009 and 2013 Official Reviews, but Inconsistent Reporting and Limited Monitoring Prevent Status Assessment
DOD has taken actions to implement the recommendations from the official reviews of the 2009 Fort Hood and 2013 Washington Navy Yard shootings; however, we were unable to identify the number of Fort Hood recommendations fully implemented because DOD and the military services had inconsistently reported this information and have conducted limited monitoring of recommendation implementation. In September 2014, as part of its effort to address a recommendation that DOD integrate its disparate efforts to defend against internal threats, DOD established policy and assigned responsibilities for a DOD insider threat program. For example, service headquarters officials from three services told us that they generally do not monitor implementation of the recommendations from the reviews of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting at the installation level. Further, until the Mission Assurance Coordination Boards and military services consistently monitor Fort Hood recommendation implementation at the service and installation level, DOD will be unable to know whether the deficiencies identified in the independent review of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting have been addressed on U.S. installations. DOD Has Taken Initial Actions to Implement Washington Navy Yard Recommendations
In response to the official reviews from the 2013 Washington Navy Yard shootings, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy issued memorandums directing DOD components to implement the recommendations and provide progress reports on the status of the recommendations. For example, in June 2014, DOD issued an implementation plan that lays out major milestones, timelines, responsibilities, and resource requirements needed to address the findings and four recommendations. While we found that 3 of the 10 key force protection policy and guidance documents do not address insider threat considerations, DOD is taking steps to update these documents. In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the DOD leaders on the Mission Assurance Coordination Boards and the military services to take steps to improve the consistency of reporting and monitoring of the implementation of recommendations, DOD stated that the Mission Assurance Senior Steering Group will monitor the status of Fort Hood recommendations at the military service level to ensure full implementation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report evaluates the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has (1) reflected insider threat considerations in its force protection policies and other guidance, (2) shared actions that U.S. installations have taken to protect against insider threats, and (3) implemented recommendations from the official reviews of the 2009 Fort Hood and 2013 Washington Navy Yard shootings. We reviewed the key policies and other guidance documents to determine whether DOD had reviewed and updated them to incorporate recommendations from the independent review of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting that directed the department to integrate force protection efforts, such as developing policy and procedures to defend against insider threats; insider threat considerations based on annual review requirements outlined in DOD Instruction 5025.01, DOD Issuances Program; and requirements for four minimum training topics addressing insider threat awareness: the importance of detecting potential insider threats by cleared employees and reporting suspected activity to insider threat personnel or other designated officials; methodologies of adversaries to recruit trusted insiders and collect classified information; indicators of insider threat behavior and procedures to report such behavior; and counterintelligence and security reporting requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The attacks at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009, and at the Washington Navy Yard, D.C., on September 16, 2013, drew nationwide attention to insider threats at DOD installations. DOD defines an insider threat as the threat that an insider will use her or his authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States.
House report 113-446 included a provision that GAO review DOD's antiterrorism and force protection efforts to address insider threats. This report evaluates the extent to which DOD has (1) reflected insider threat considerations in its force protection policies and other guidance, (2) shared actions that U.S. installations have taken to protect against insider threats, and (3) implemented recommendations from the official reviews of the 2009 Fort Hood and 2013 Washington Navy Yard shootings. GAO reviewed official reviews from the shootings, DOD force protection–related policies, interviewed agency officials, and visited eight nongeneralizable U.S. installations representing all four military services, a joint base, and different geographic locations.
What GAO Found
Since the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, the Department of Defense (DOD) has made efforts to update 7 of 10 key force protection–related policy and guidance documents and is taking steps to revise the remaining 3 to incorporate insider threat considerations. DOD's Fort Hood independent review recommended that the department develop policy and procedures to integrate disparate efforts to protect DOD resources and people against internal threats. GAO also found that DOD does not have a policy for when it would be appropriate for DOD military and contractor personnel to report to DOD base security officials when an individual is observed carrying a weapon on an installation, especially into a work environment. Senior DOD officials acknowledged this policy gap and agreed to take steps to address the issue.
Officials from the eight U.S. installations GAO visited identified actions taken to protect against insider threats. However, DOD has not consistently shared information across the department about the actions it has taken. DOD has issued guidance and recommendations addressing the 2009 Fort Hood shooting stating that DOD should identify and share leading practices to enhance the department's ability to protect the force. For example, installation officials have trained response personnel on active shooter training and piloted a workplace violence risk assessment program. However, DOD is not sharing all the information about such actions because DOD officials are not consistently using existing mechanisms to share information, such as lessons-learned information systems and antiterrorism web portals. Unless the military services consistently use existing mechanisms to share information on insider threats, U.S. installations may miss opportunities to enhance the department's ability to protect the force against such threats.
DOD has taken actions to implement the recommendations from the official reviews of the 2009 Fort Hood and 2013 Washington Navy Yard shootings. However, GAO was unable to identify the number of the 79 Fort Hood recommendations that were fully implemented because DOD has received inconsistent information from the military services and has conducted limited monitoring of recommendation implementation. For example, DOD and military service officials provided differing responses to a questionnaire on the implementation status of some Fort Hood recommendations. In addition, officials from three military services stated that they generally do not monitor the implementation of the recommendations from the Fort Hood independent review at the installation level. Until DOD and the military services improve the consistency of reporting and monitoring of the implementation of recommendations, DOD will be unable to know whether the deficiencies identified in the official review of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting have been addressed. With regard to the official reviews from the 2013 Washington Navy Yard shooting, DOD has taken initial actions towards implementing the four recommendations prioritized by the Secretary of Defense. For example, DOD issued an implementation plan that identifies milestones, timelines, and resource requirements needed to address the four recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD consistently use existing mechanisms to share information about actions taken to protect against threats, and take steps to improve the consistency of reporting and monitoring of the implementation of the recommendations from the 2009 Fort Hood review. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and cited related actions planned or under way. |
gao_GAO-06-963 | gao_GAO-06-963_0 | The group of schools using the exemption reviewed a draft of this report and stated it was a careful and objective report, but raised concerns about the data used in our econometric analysis and the report’s tone and premise. Legal History of Antitrust Exemption for Higher Education Institutions
In the early 1990’s the U.S. Department of Justice (Justice) sued nine universities and colleges, alleging that their practice of collectively making financial aid decisions for students accepted to more than one of their schools restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act. 1)
While the federal methodology is used to determine a student’s eligibility for federal aid, some institutions use this methodology to award their own institutional aid. Twenty-Eight Schools Used the Antitrust Exemption to Develop a Common Methodology for Assessing a Family’s Financial Need
Twenty-eight schools formed a group under the antitrust exemption and engaged in one of the four activities allowable under the exemption. In developing the common methodology, called the consensus approach, schools modified an existing need analysis methodology and reached agreement on how to treat each element of the methodology. Members of the group are all private 4-year schools that have highly selective admissions policies. As the Cost of Attendance at Schools Using the Exemption Rose, the Amount of Institutional Grant Aid They Provided to Students Increased at a Slower Rate
The cost to attend the schools participating under the exemption rose over the past 5 years by over 10 percent while cost increases at all other private schools rose at about half that rate. Cost of Attendance Increased at Schools Using the Exemption Corresponding to Increases at Other Private Schools
During the past 5 years, the cost of attendance—tuition, fees, room, and board—at schools using the exemption increased by approximately 13 percent from $38,319 in school year 2000-2001 to $43,164 in school year 2004-2005, a faster rate than other schools. Overall, the average total institutional grant aid awarded to students, which included both need and non-need-based aid, increased from $18,675 in 2000-01 to $19,901 in 2005-06, or 7 percent. Students Accepted to Both Schools Using the Exemption and Comparable Schools Had No Appreciable Difference in the Amount They Would Be Expected to Contribute Towards College
There was virtually no difference in the amounts students and their families were expected to pay between schools using the exemption and similar schools not using the exemption. Although officials from schools using the exemption expected that students accepted at several of those schools would experience less variation in the amounts they were expected to pay, none of our analyses confirmed this. The lack of consistency in EFCs among schools using the exemption may be explained by the varied implementation of the consensus approach. As previously mentioned, not all schools using the consensus approach chose to adopt all the elements of the methodology. Implementation of a Common Methodology Has Not Significantly Affected Affordability or Enrollment at Schools Using the Exemption
Based on our econometric analysis, schools’ use of the consensus approach did not have a significant impact on affordability, nor did it cause significant changes in the likelihood of student enrollment at schools using the consensus approach compared to schools that were not using the consensus approach. As shown in table 5, while we found that the consensus approach resulted in higher need-based grant aid awards for some student groups (middle income, Asian students, and Hispanic students) compared to similar students at schools that were not using the consensus approach, this increase was likely offset by decreases in non- need-based grant aid, such as academic or athletic scholarships. In particular, the consensus approach did not significantly increase the likelihood of enrollment of low-income or minority students or any student group. Appendix I: Statistical Analysis of Expected Family Contributions at Schools Using the Exemption and Comparable Schools
We compared variation in expected family contributions (EFCs) between students who were admitted to both schools using the exemption and comparable schools that did not. Students accepted to only schools not using the exemption (type 3 students). Compared to the schools that did not use the consensus approach, we expected that the implementation of the consensus approach would have a significantly greater impact on the schools using the consensus approach because its use has potential implications for affordability and enrollment of students in these schools. Similarly, the effects of the student-level variables would depend on the theories of the effects of the exemption. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1991 the U.S. Department of Justice sued nine colleges and universities, alleging that they had restrained competition by making collective financial aid determinations for students accepted to more than one of these schools. Against the backdrop of this litigation, Congress enacted a temporary exemption from antitrust laws for higher education institutions in 1992. The exemption allows limited collaboration regarding financial aid practices with the goal of promoting equal access to education. The exemption applies only to institutional financial aid and can only be used by schools that admit students without regard to ability to pay. In passing an extension to the exemption in 2001, Congress directed GAO to study the effects of the exemption. GAO examined (1) how many schools used the exemption and what joint practices they implemented, (2) trends in costs and institutional grant aid at schools using the exemption, (3) how expected family contributions at schools using the exemption compare to those at similar schools not using the exemption, and (4) the effects of the exemption on affordability and enrollment. GAO surveyed schools, analyzed school and student-level data, and developed econometric models. GAO used extensive peer review to obtain comments from outside experts and made changes as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Twenty-eight schools--all highly selective, private 4-year institutions--formed a group to use the antitrust exemption and developed a common methodology for assessing financial need, which the group called the consensus approach. The methodology used elements already a part of another need analysis methodology; schools modified this methodology and reached agreement on how to define those elements. By the 2004-2005 school year, 25 of 28 schools in the group were using the consensus approach. Schools' implementation of the approach varied, however, with officials from 12 of the 25 schools reporting that they partially implemented it, in part because they believed it would be costly to do so. Over the last 5 years, tuition, room, and board costs among schools using the antitrust exemption increased by 13 percent compared to 7 percent at all other private 4-year schools not using the exemption. While the amount of institutional aid at schools using the exemption also increased--it did so at a slower rate. The average institutional grant aid award per student increased by 7 percent from $18,675 in 2000-2001 to $19,901 in 2005-2006. There was virtually no difference in the amount students and their families were expected to pay between schools using the exemption and similar schools not using the exemption. While officials from schools using the exemption expected that students accepted to several of their schools would experience less variation in the amount they were expected to pay, GAO found that students accepted to schools using the exemption and comparable schools not using the exemption experienced similar variation in the amount they were expected to pay. Not all schools using the consensus approach chose to adopt all the elements of the methodology, a factor that may account for the lack of consistency in expected family contributions among schools using the exemption. Based on GAO's analysis, schools' use of the consensus approach did not have a significant impact on affordability--the amount students and families paid for college--or affect the likelihood of enrollment at those schools to date. While GAO found that the use of the consensus approach resulted in higher amounts of need-based grant aid awarded to some student groups compared to their counterparts at schools not using the consensus approach, the total amount of grant aid awarded was not significantly affected. It was likely that grant aid awards shifted from non-need-based aid, such as academic and athletic scholarships, to aid based on a student's financial need. Finally, implementing the consensus approach did not increase the likelihood of low-income or minority students enrolling at schools using the consensus approach compared to schools that did not. The group of schools using the exemption reviewed this report and stated it was a careful and objective report. However, they had concerns about the data used in GAO's econometric analysis, which GAO believes were reliable. |
gao_GAO-10-916 | gao_GAO-10-916_0 | Specifically, this program is to include periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; risk-based policies and procedures that cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices that include testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems; security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. The processes and criteria established by this guidance are often similar to those required by NIST guidance for non-national security systems. Progress Is Being Made to Harmonize IT Security Guidance
A task force consisting of representatives from civilian, defense, and intelligence agencies has made progress in establishing a unified information security framework for national security and non-national security systems. Specifically, NIST has published three initial documents developed by a task force working group to harmonize information security standards for national security and non-national security systems, and is scheduled to publish two more by early 2011. While much has been accomplished, differences remain between the guidance for the two types of systems, and significant work remains to implement the harmonized guidance on national security systems, such as developing supporting agency-specific guidance and establishing specific time frames and performance measures for implementation. According to officials involved in the task force, harmonized security guidance is expected to result in less duplication of effort, lower maintenance costs, and more effective implementation of controls across multiple interconnected systems. These include differences in system categorization, selection of security controls, and use of program management controls. Additional Supporting Guidance Is Being Developed for National Security Systems, but Detailed Time Frames for Implementation Have Not Been Established
While much of the harmonized guidance is already in use for non-national security systems, significant work remains to implement the new guidance on national security systems. Once DOD issues guidance for implementing the joint task force’s harmonized guidance, officials said that it will take several more years to incorporate the security controls into the systems’ security plans. The task force has proposed two additional publications for consideration and acknowledged the possibility of future areas for collaboration, but plans for additional activities have yet to be finalized. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct CNSS to collaborate with NIST to complete plans to identify future areas for harmonization efforts; collaborate with its member organizations, including both DOD and the intelligence community, to include milestones and performance measures in their plans to implement the harmonized CNSS policies and guidance; and collaborate with NIST to consider how implementing elements of key collaborative practices, such as documenting roles and responsibilities, needs, resources, and monitoring and reporting mechanisms, may serve to sustain and enhance the harmonization effort. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Secretary of Commerce concurred with our conclusions that the Departments of Commerce and Defense update plans for future collaboration, establish timelines for implementing revised guidance, and fully implement key practices for interagency collaboration in the harmonization effort. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to assess the progress of federal efforts to harmonize policies and guidance for national security systems and non- national security systems. To do this, we reviewed program plans, schedules, and performance measures related to the harmonization efforts. We also obtained and reviewed current information technology security policies, guidance, and other documentation for national security systems and non-national security systems and then conducted interviews with officials from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), Department of Defense (DOD), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), National Security Agency (NSA), and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to identify differences in existing guidance and plans to resolve these differences. | Why GAO Did This Study
Historically, civilian and national security-related information technology (IT) systems have been governed by different information security policies and guidance. Specifically, the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) established policies and guidance for civilian non-national security systems, while other organizations, including the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the U.S. intelligence community, have developed policies and guidance for national security systems. GAO was asked to assess the progress of federal efforts to harmonize policies and guidance for these two types of systems. To do this, GAO reviewed program plans and schedules, analyzed policies and guidance, assessed program efforts against key practices for cross-agency collaboration, and interviewed officials responsible for this effort.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have made progress in harmonizing information security policies and guidance for national security and non-national security systems. Representatives from civilian, defense, and intelligence agencies established a joint task force in 2009, led by NIST and including senior leadership and subject matter experts from participating agencies, to publish common guidance for information systems security for national security and non-national security systems. The harmonized guidance is to consist of NIST guidance applicable to non-national security systems and authorized by CNSS, with possible modifications, for application to national security systems. This harmonized security guidance is expected to result in less duplication of effort and more effective implementation of controls across multiple interconnected systems. The task force has developed three initial publications. These publications, among other things, provide guidance for applying a risk management framework to federal systems, identify an updated catalog of security controls and guidelines, and update the existing security assessment guidelines for federal systems. CNSS has issued an instruction to begin implementing the newly developed guidance for national security systems. Two additional joint publications are scheduled for release by early 2011, with other publications under consideration. Differences remain between guidance for national security and non-national security systems in such areas as system categorization, selection of security controls, and program management controls. NIST and CNSS officials stated that these differences may be addressed in the future but that some may remain because of the special nature of national security systems. While progress has been made in developing the harmonized guidance, additional work remains to implement it and ensure continued progress. For example, task force members have stated their intent to develop plans for future harmonization activities, but these plans have not yet been finalized. In addition, while much of the harmonized guidance incorporates controls and language previously developed for use for non-national security systems, significant work remains to implement the guidance for national security systems. DOD and the intelligence community are developing agency-specific guidance and transition plans for implementing the harmonized guidance, but, according to officials, actual implementation could take several years to complete. Officials stated that this is primarily due to both the large number and criticality of the systems that must be reauthorized under the new guidance. Further, the agencies have yet to fully establish implementation milestones and lack performance metrics for measuring progress. Finally, the harmonization effort has been managed without full implementation of key collaborative practices, such as documenting identified needs and leveraging resources to address those needs, agreed-to agency roles and responsibilities, and processes to monitor and report results. Task force members stress that their informal, flexible approach has resulted in significant success. Nevertheless, further implementation of key collaborative practices identified by GAO could facilitate further progress.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Defense, among other things, update plans for future collaboration, establish timelines for implementing revised guidance, and fully implement key practices for interagency collaboration in the harmonization effort. In comments on a draft of this report, Commerce and DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-841T | gao_GAO-15-841T_0 | Decades of industrial activity in the region have left a legacy of contamination, such as from polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), in the sediments that make up the beds of rivers and harbors in the Great Lakes Basin. EPA Made Funding Available to a Range of Recipients, Guided Activities through a GLRI Action Plan, Created a Monitoring Process, and Issued Accomplishment Reports
When Congress made funds available for the GLRI in fiscal year 2010, the conference report accompanying the appropriations act directed EPA to develop a comprehensive, multiyear restoration action plan for fiscal years 2011 through 2014, to establish a process to ensure monitoring and reporting on the progress of the GLRI, and to provide detailed, yearly program accomplishments beginning in 2011. GLRI Funding
As discussed in our July 2015 report, in fiscal years 2010 through 2014, $1.68 billion of federal funds was made available for the GLRI, and as of January 2015, EPA had allocated nearly all of the funds, about $1.66 billion. Also, as of January 2015, Task Force agencies had expended $1.15 billion for 2,123 projects (see fig. Task Force agencies conduct GLRI work themselves or by awarding funds to recipients through financial agreements, such as grants, cooperative agreements, or contracts. Potential recipients of GLRI funds include federal entities; state, local, or tribal entities; nongovernmental organizations; academic institutions; and others, such as for-profit entities, agricultural producers, or private landowners. Monitoring and Reporting on Progress
In response to the conference report’s direction to establish a process to ensure monitoring and reporting on the progress of the GLRI, EPA created the Great Lakes Accountability System (GLAS) in 2010 to collect information for monitoring GLRI projects and progress. Task Force’s Process for Identifying GLRI Work and Each Agency’s Share of Funding Has Evolved to Emphasize Interagency Discussion
The process for identifying each agency’s GLRI work and share of GLRI funding has evolved since fiscal year 2010 to emphasize interagency discussion. Task Force agreement on scope and funding for agencies’ work. The three priority issues, which aligned with three of the five focus areas in the 2010-2014 Action Plan, were (1) cleaning up and delisting Areas of Concern located entirely or partially in the United States, (2) preventing and controlling invasive species, and (3) reducing phosphorus runoff that contributes to harmful algal blooms. For 2015, EPA officials said that the Task Force began creating additional subgroups to identify work and funding for all five of the focus areas in the 2015-2019 Action Plan, not just the three priority issues. Information on GLRI Project Activities and Results Is Available from Individual Agencies
In July 2015, we reported that the Task Force, as part of its oversight of GLRI, makes some information on GLRI projects available for Congress and the public in two ways: annual accomplishment reports and the GLRI website. Each of the five Task Force agencies we reviewed collected information on its projects, including activities and results of the projects they funded, although this information is not collected and reported by EPA. For another project, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission reported results in the form of improved methods for capturing sea lamprey, an invasive species, which is a parasite that was a major cause of the collapse of lake trout, whitefish, and chub populations in the Great Lakes during the 1940s and 1950s. For example, a single lamprey can kill up to about 40 pounds of fish in its lifetime. For the 11 remaining projects, recipients reported results that can be indirectly linked to restoration; that is, the results may contribute to restoration over time. These included results such as simulations and data for helping decision makers make better restoration decisions in light of climate change, as well as education and outreach tools to increase awareness of invasive species. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Great Lakes, which contain much of North America's freshwater supply, provide economic and recreational benefits to millions of people. They face significant stresses, however, that have caused ecological and economic damage. Decades of industrial activity in the region, for example, left a legacy of contamination that resulted in the United States and Canada identifying, since 1987, 43 Areas of Concern.
The GLRI was created in 2010 to, according to EPA, accelerate efforts to protect and restore the Great Lakes. It is overseen by a Task Force of 11 federal agencies that is chaired by the EPA. EPA was directed, in a conference report, to develop a restoration action plan, establish a process to ensure monitoring and reporting on progress, and provide detailed yearly accomplishments.
This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in September 2013 and July 2015. It focuses on (1) GLRI funding, action plans, and reports; (2) the process used to identify GLRI work and funding; and (3) information available about GLRI project activities and results. For the 2015 report, GAO reviewed a sample of 19 GLRI projects funded by the five Task Force agencies that received the majority of GLRI funds, among other things.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in July 2015, of the $1.68 billion in federal funds made available for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI) in fiscal years 2010 through 2014, nearly all had been allocated as of January 2015. Of the $1.66 billion allocated, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the other 10 Great Lakes Interagency Task Force (Task Force) agencies expended $1.15 billion for 2,123 projects (see fig.).
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Status of GLRI Funds, FY 2010-2014
Task Force agencies can either conduct work themselves or enter into financial agreements, such as grants, cooperative agreements, or contracts with others, such as federal entities; state, local, and tribal entities; nongovernmental organizations; and academic institutions. To guide restoration work, EPA and the Task Force have developed two consecutive multiyear restoration action plans. EPA also created a process to ensure monitoring and reporting on the progress of the GLRI, and EPA and the Task Force issued three accomplishment reports.
The process to identify each agency's GLRI work and funding has evolved to emphasize interagency discussion. In fiscal year 2012, the Task Force created subgroups to discuss and identify work on three issues: cleaning up severely degraded locations, called Areas of Concern; preventing and controlling invasive, aquatic species that cause extensive ecological and economic damage; and reducing nutrient runoff from agricultural areas. EPA officials said that the Task Force created additional subgroups to identify all GLRI work and funding in 2015.
In July 2015, GAO found that the Task Force has made some information about GLRI project activities and results available to Congress and the public in three accomplishment reports and on its website. In addition, the individual Task Force agencies collect information on activities and results, although this information is not collected and reported by EPA. Of the 19 projects GAO reviewed, 8 reported results directly linked to restoration, such as improved methods for capturing sea lamprey, an invasive species that can kill up to about 40 pounds of fish in its lifetime. The remaining 11 reported results that can be indirectly linked to restoration; that is, the results may contribute to restoration over time. These included results such as simulations and data for helping decision makers make better restoration decisions in light of climate change, as well as education and outreach tools to increase awareness of invasive species.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended in 2013 that EPA improve assessments of GLRI progress, among other things. EPA agreed and has taken several actions. GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-13-736 | gao_GAO-13-736_0 | Many Major Cities Assessed the Risk of RDD and IND Attacks as Lower Than Other Hazards They Face, and Few Had Developed Specific Response Plans
Many major city emergency managers, although not all, responded to our questionnaire that their city had assessed the risks of RDD and IND attacks and had ranked the risk of these attacks as lower than the risk of other hazards their city faces. Most of the major cities that reported having RDD and IND response plans also reported having conducted exercises to validate those plans. Of the 27 major cities that responded to our questionnaire, 11 (41 percent) of the emergency managers reported that their city had completed RDD response plans, and 8 (30 percent) had completed IND response plans. Some emergency managers for cities that did not have specific RDD and IND response plans reported that they would rely on other plans in the event of such an attack, including their city’s emergency operations plan or hazard management plan. Major Cities Vary Widely in Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond within 24 Hours of RDD and IND Attacks, but Perceive More Ability to Respond to an RDD Attack
Our analysis of the questionnaire responses from major city emergency managers showed a wide variation in their perceptions regarding their cities’ abilities to respond within the first 24 hours to the RDD or IND attack depicted in the National Planning Scenarios, but most perceived that their city has more ability to conduct the early response for an RDD attack than for an IND attack. We also asked them to consider mutual aid from other jurisdictions in estimating their early response abilities, but not to consider assistance from federal sources. For example, 7 of 27 cities were perceived by their emergency managers as being able to conduct all of the activities needed for early response to an RDD attack without federal assistance—such as treating casualties—while 2 cities were perceived as being able to conduct all of the activities needed for an IND attack, without federal assistance. According to FEMA and NNSA officials, additional federal guidance may not be necessary because they expect major cities to have the abilities to respond to a more likely smaller scale RDD attack than the large RDD attack, as they would a hazardous materials spill. Without greater awareness of and additional federal guidance on the capabilities needed by cities for early response to both RDD and IND attacks, cities may not have the information they need to adequately prepare for and respond to them. Any gaps in response capabilities could lead to complications that result in greater loss of life and economic impacts. Major Cities Reported Need for Guidance on the Type and Timing of Federal Technical and Resource Assistance for Early Response to RDD and IND Attacks
Most emergency managers from major cities responding to our questionnaire reported that they need federal technical and resource assistance to support their early response to RDD and IND attacks, but federal guidance on the type and timing of this assistance is not found in a single document and may not be well understood by emergency managers. Almost all emergency managers (24 of 27 cities for RDD and 23 of 27 cities for IND) indicated that their city needs federal funding to maintain current early response capabilities. According to the 2008 National Response Framework, response capabilities are developed within the national preparedness system through effective planning, coordinating, training, equipping, and exercising activities. These activities are essential elements of an integrated, capability-based approach to preparedness. More federal planning guidance applicable to major cities has been developed for IND response, primarily based on the event depicted in the National Planning Scenarios, but this guidance does not detail the early response capabilities needed by major cities in relation to other sources of assistance. Lack of adequate response planning could lead to complications that result in greater loss of life and economic impacts. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide assistance to major cities in planning for early response to RDD and IND attacks, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency to promote greater awareness of existing federal guidance and develop additional guidance where appropriate to clarify the capabilities needed by cities for these attacks, including the planning assumptions for an RDD attack and the type and timing of federal assistance for early response. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In our review, we examined major cities’ (1) assessment of the risks of RDD and IND attacks and the extent to which they have developed plans for responding to them, (2) perceptions of their abilities to respond to RDD and IND attacks in the first 24 hours (early response), and (3) perceptions of their need for federal support in the early response to RDD and IND attacks. We also reviewed relevant federal guidance documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
A terrorist attack in a major city using an RDD or an IND could result not only in the loss of life but also have enormous psychological and economic impacts. Major cities are assumed to be preferred targets of such attacks, and local governments, along with their states, have primary responsibilities for early response (within the first 24 hours), with assistance from federal sources, as necessary, coming later. A disjointed or untimely response could increase the impact and undermine public confidence in federal, state and local governments' ability to respond to an attack.
GAO was asked to review issues related to response preparedness for RDD and IND attacks. This report examines major cities' (1) assessment of RDD and IND risks and development of response plans, (2) perceptions of their abilities to respond within the first 24 hours, and (3) perceptions of the need for federal support in early response to these attacks. GAO primarily relied on questionnaire responses from emergency managers of 27 of the 31 major cities that the Department of Homeland Security considers to be at high risk for terrorist attack, the review of pertinent federal guidance, and interviews with FEMA officials and others.
What GAO Found
Many emergency managers from the 27 major cities responding to GAO's questionnaire, although not all, reported that their city had assessed the risks of a terrorist attack using a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND) and had ranked the risk of these attacks as lower than the risk of other hazards they face. Also, 11 of the 27 reported that they had completed RDD response plans, and 8 of the 27 reported that they had completed IND response plans. Some emergency managers for cities without specific RDD and IND response plans reported that they would rely on their city's all hazards emergency operations plan or hazard management plan if attacked. Most cities that had RDD and IND response plans reported conducting exercises to validate the plans based on federal guidance.
Major cities varied widely in perceptions of their abilities to respond within the first 24 hours of RDD and IND attacks (early response). For example, all 27 cities were perceived by their emergency managers as being able to conduct at least a few of the early response activities after an RDD attack, such as treating casualties, with assistance from other jurisdictions but not federal assistance. Ten of those cities were perceived as not being able to conduct any of the response activities for an IND attack without federal assistance. GAO analysis found that these perceptions were not necessarily related to a city having RDD and IND response plans but rather related to their understanding of nuclear and radiological incidents and the capabilities needed for response according to information obtained from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials. GAO found limited federal planning guidance related to the early response capabilities needed by cities for the large RDD attack depicted in the national planning scenarios. Federal guidance may not be needed, according to FEMA officials, because they expect cities to address a more likely but smaller RDD attack--as they would a hazardous materials spill--with limited federal assistance. More federal planning guidance applicable to cities has been developed for IND response, but this guidance does not detail the early response capabilities needed by cities in relation to other sources of assistance. Without greater awareness of and additional federal guidance on the capabilities needed by cities for early response to these attacks, cities may not have the information they need to adequately prepare for and respond to them. This could lead to complications that result in greater loss of life and economic impacts.
Most emergency managers reported perceived needs for federal technical and resource assistance to support their cities' early response to RDD (19 of 27 cities) and IND (21 of 27 cities) attacks. However, GAO found that federal guidance on the type and timing of such assistance is not readily available or understood by all emergency managers. This condition could lead to a disjointed and untimely response that might increase the consequences of either kind of attack. Emergency managers also reported a need for improved procedures and more information that FEMA is addressing. In addition, most emergency managers reported their city needed federal funding to maintain current capabilities to respond to RDD and IND attacks. According to DHS guidance, response capabilities are developed through planning, training, equipping, and exercising, which are essential elements of an integrated, capability-based approach to preparedness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA develop guidance to clarify the early response capabilities needed by cities for RDD and IND attacks. FEMA did not concur with this recommendation. GAO believes that gaps in early response abilities warrant federal attention and has clarified its recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-179 | gao_GAO-13-179_0 | The Army’s agile process involves seven phases and three decision points intended to identify proposed solutions that can be evaluated for feasibility to address an identified need and can be deployed to the field. Through these initiatives, the Army has developed preliminary plans to address the areas of cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness. The Army has identified near-term funding needs for network investments and established a process for screening proposed networking capabilities before they are tested. The Army is also attempting to align network capability fielding with its relatively fixed schedule for deploying forces to ensure soldiers are trained with new equipment prior to deployment. Army Executing Network Strategy and Implementing Agile Process
The Army is beginning to execute its network strategy and implement its agile process. However, the network strategy is still evolving, implementation has only recently started, and the Army has not yet executed one full cycle of the agile process. The Army is using the agile process to quickly evaluate emerging networking capabilities. However, those costs will be substantial— at an estimated $3 billion annually, this level of effort could total in excess of $60 billion over a 20-year period. Vendors understand that they need to secure certification from the National Security Agency, and the Army has a customer service advocate to help in this regard. In the future, the challenge for the Army will be to ensure that the network equipment to be sent to operating units has been thoroughly demonstrated and integrated in advance, that fielding decisions are not made solely to accommodate the deployment schedule, and that the process is delivering mature and militarily useful capabilities. Army’s Network Modernization Strategy and Agile Process Face Other Risks and Challenges
The Army’s network strategy and agile process face several other risks and challenges as implementation continues. The network strategy also presents oversight challenges in that the Army has not yet (1) fully defined performance metrics that would allow decision makers to gauge progress in the portfolio and make informed investment decisions and (2) created a consolidated reporting and budgeting framework for the network portfolio. However, the Army noted that acquiring such a capability without adequate evaluation and testing adds risk that it will not work properly in a combat environment. The COE, which includes the current network architecture, is intended to reduce duplication and redundancy. In that review and subsequent collaboration with the Army, the USD(AT&L) officials and staff have (1) provided extensive technical input on the soundness of individual network components and whether they are in synch with the rest of the capability set and the existing network as a whole, and (2) reviewed the acquisition schedules of all the network programs of record within the capability set to ensure that they are properly aligned. DOD’s directive, issued in 2005, calls for responsible authorities to “measure actual contributions of the portfolio against established outcome-based performance measures to determine improved capability as well as to support adjustments to the mix of portfolio investments, as necessary.”
The Army and DOD consider the fielding of capability set 13 as the initial output from the Army’s network modernization portfolio but have yet to fully define outcome-based performance measures to evaluate the actual contributions of the capability set. For the fiscal year 2013 request, the network portfolio was made up of over 50 research and development and procurement budget elements. A consolidated reporting and budgeting framework for all of the programs that are part of the tactical network portfolio could yield more consistency and clarity in the justifications for Army network initiatives as well as facilitate oversight of the strategy’s affordability. The size and scope of the Army’s modernization investment deserves high-level oversight attention by both the Army and DOD. However, if the Army can find a way to procure and field new technologies within 2 to 3 years, that is still considerably better than a typical development effort that in the past has taken a decade or longer. Recommendations
In order to enhance oversight of Army network initiatives by the Army, DOD, and Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to define an appropriate set of quantifiable outcome-based performance measures to evaluate the actual contributions of capability set 13 and future components under the network portfolio, and develop and implement a plan for future NIEs to provide the necessary information and insights to determine if those performance measures have been met. As additional information is provided, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense identify an oversight body to determine how capability set 13—as fielded in operational units—has actually impacted overall network performance, capability gaps, and essential network capabilities and make recommendations for adjustments, as may be necessary, and determine how well the Army is rapidly fielding mature and militarily useful network capabilities to its operating forces and maintaining robust industry participation in the process. To facilitate congressional oversight of the overall affordability of this important Army initiative, we also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to consolidate tactical network budget elements and justifications into a single area of the Army budget submittal. To examine the extent to which the Army’s agile process addresses cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness, we interviewed officials from the Army’s System of Systems Integration Directorate; the Army Training and Doctrine Command; the Army’s Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications—Tactical; the Army’s Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors; Communications—Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center; Army G-8; and the Army Test and Evaluation Command. | Why GAO Did This Study
For nearly 20 years, the Army has had limited success in developing an information network--sensors, software, and radios--to give soldiers the exact information they need, when they need it, in any environment. Such a network is expected to improve situational awareness and decision making in combat. Under its network modernization strategy, the Army is implementing a new agile process intended to leverage industry technology solutions. The Army estimates that it will require about $3.8 billion in fiscal 2013. As requested, this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Army's network strategy and agile process addresses cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness; and (2) the Army's strategy faces other risks and challenges. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed key documents, observed testing activities, and interviewed acquisition officials.
What GAO Found
The Army has taken a number of steps to begin executing its network strategy and agile process, including establishing a baseline network architecture for Army communications. The Army's agile process involves seven phases and three decision points to allow officials to quickly evaluate emerging networking technologies to determine if they address capability gaps and can be deployed to the field. However, the network strategy is still evolving and the Army has not yet executed one full cycle of the agile process. The Army's strategy addresses some aspects of cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness, but as implementation is still under way, data for assessing progress are not available at this time. Nevertheless, the Army is beginning to spend billions of dollars netting together dozens of disparate systems to form a network that is intended to enhance warfighter effectiveness and survivability. Specifically, the Army has identified that over $3 billion will be needed each year on an indefinite basis for investments in networking capabilities, potentially making it one of the Army's most costly investments. To help determine that technologies meet prescribed levels of technical maturity, the Army has established a laboratory-based screening process for evaluating technologies, and those that show promise move to evaluations in a realistic environment with soldiers and testers. To help provide security and information assurance, the Army is working with contractors and the National Security Agency to obtain appropriate certifications prior to fielding new networking technologies. Furthermore, the Army is attempting to align the procurement and fielding of networking systems with the relatively fixed schedules for equipping and training units before they are deployed. The challenge will be to ensure that the equipment being sent to the field has been thoroughly demonstrated and that fielding decisions are not made solely to accommodate deployment cycles.
The overall scope and cost of the Armys new network strategy, as well as other factors unique to the strategy, present significant risks and challenges and deserve high-level oversight attention by both the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD). For example, the Army wants to field smaller quantities with greater frequency to be able to take advantage of new and improved capabilities as they become available, thus avoiding long-term procurements of outdated technology and potentially helping to realize savings in development, testing, and maintenance costs. However, the Army is still weighing funding and contracting options that would allow it to accomplish this goal while adhering to established acquisition and budget processes that may require long lead time to acquire these technologies. DOD guidance calls for measuring actual contributions of information technology portfolios, which includes the Army network, against established outcome-based performance measures to determine improved capability and allow for adjustments in the mix of portfolio investments. Senior DOD officials provided extensive input on the soundness of individual network components and the schedule for fielding equipment and have offered that future evaluations in an operational environment present a good opportunity to evaluate the overall performance of the network. However, the Army and DOD have not yet fully defined quantifiable network performance measures or plans to periodically review and evaluate the actual effectiveness of new Army network capabilities. Inadequate oversight of the portfolio could put the investment at risk. Finally, budget justification and other planning materials for network equipmentover 50 research and development and procurement budget elementsare not organized to provide insight into the budget for and affordability of the entire network. Given the magnitude and financial commitment envisioned, a consolidated reporting and budgeting framework could yield more consistency and clarity in the justifications for Army network initiatives and facilitate congressional oversight.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure adequate oversight, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) define quantifiable outcome-based performance metrics for network equipment; (2) develop a plan for future network evaluations to determine if those measures have been met; and (3) evaluate fielded network performance and make recommendations for adjustments, as necessary. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Defense consolidate Army tactical network budget elements and justifications into a single area of the Army budget submittal. DOD generally concurred with these recommendations and stated that it has initiated actions to address several of the challenges identified in the report. |
gao_GAO-02-574 | gao_GAO-02-574_0 | Water Resources Projects Authorized Since the 1986 Act That Required a Fish and Wildlife Mitigation Plan
Of the 47 Civil Works projects authorized since the 1986 act that required a fish and wildlife mitigation plan and that received construction appropriations, 28 projects completed less than 50 percent of the mitigation before project construction began, according to the Corps. Of the remaining 19 projects, 7 completed at least 50 percent of mitigation before initiating construction; 2 had not started construction but had done some mitigation; and 10 had not started construction or mitigation. As of September 30, 2001, 16 of the 34 projects where construction had begun had completed 100 percent of the mitigation. Based on the guidance alone, panelists expressed concerns about their ability to reliably estimate the percent of success mitigation projects would have in restoring the natural hydrology and native vegetation and in supporting native fish and wildlife species. Panelists said factors other than guidance, such as major storms that are difficult to control or manage or invasive weeds or wildlife species that dominate the site unexpectedly, affect the success of mitigation projects. Some panelists, however, were critical of the three programs’ guidance overall, noting that the guidance emphasizes the early determination and design stages to the detriment of the monitoring and evaluation stages, emphasizes wetlands to the detriment of uplands or adjacent lands, or fails to require corrective actions in those instances where projects do not succeed. In discussions with the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, we agreed to (1) determine the number of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Civil Works projects for which less than 50 percent of mitigation was completed before the start of project construction and (2) establish a panel of scientific experts to compare the Corps’ Civil Works Program’s national guidance on fish and wildlife mitigation activities with the mitigation guidance for the Corps’ Regulatory Program and with the guidance for the Federal Highway Administration’s Federal-aid Highway Program. | What GAO Found
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers must mitigate potential damage to fish and wildlife caused by dam construction, harbor dredging, and other projects. In the past, the Corps has acquired lands to replace lost habitat, created wetlands, or planted vegetation to stabilize soil and prevent erosion. The Corps' Civil Works Program deals with commercial navigation and flood damage, while its Regulatory Program oversees privately financed projects that affect water and land resources. According to Corps engineers, 28 of the 47 water resources projects authorized since enactment of the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 required a fish and wildlife mitigation plan. For projects that received funding, less than half of the mitigation was completed before construction began. Of the remaining 19 projects, seven completed at least half of mitigation before initiating construction; two had not started construction but had done some mitigation; and 10 had not begun construction or mitigation. As of September 2001, 16 of the 34 projects where construction had begun had completed all of the mitigation. A panel of scientific experts similarly rated the overall quality of the national fish and wildlife mitigation by the Corps and the Federal Highway Administration's Federal-aid Highway Program. Although some panelists commended the program guidance for its clarity, currency, and inclusion of ample technical guidance, other panelists were more critical, noting that the guidance emphasized the determination and design stages to the detriment of the monitoring and evaluation stages, emphasized wetlands to the detriment of other lands, or failed to require corrective actions when projects did not succeed. On the basis of the guidance alone, panelists expressed concerns about estimating the success of the mitigation projects in restoring the natural hydrology and native vegetation and in supporting native fish and wildlife species. Furthermore, factors other than guidance affect mitigation projects, such as major storms that are difficult to control, or invasive weeds or wildlife species that unexpectedly dominate the site. |
gao_GAO-05-790 | gao_GAO-05-790_0 | ISC has a range of governmentwide responsibilities related to protecting nonmilitary facilities. Despite these improvements, security at Mt. Leveraging Limited Resources for Security Improvements Is Viewed by Interior Officials as a Challenge
In addition to the range of challenges with protecting icons and monuments, Interior officials were also concerned about the department’s ability to leverage limited resources for its protection initiatives in terms of security staffing and funding. GSA was focused on security at the federal building before the September 11 terrorist attacks. In addition, Interior has made management changes, including creating a central security office, intended to enhance its homeland security initiatives, and has recently developed a uniform risk management methodology for national icons and monuments. These actions should help Interior address the major challenges it faces—which include balancing security and Interior’s mission related to access and education; addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues; securing icons and monuments in rugged, remote areas; and leveraging limited staff and funding resources. As Interior moves forward, it could link the results of its risk assessments and related risk rankings to its security funding priorities. Also, a set of guiding principles for balancing security with its core cultural and educational mission—which Interior lacks but other organizations with complex environments have developed—could help in addressing the challenges. These challenges include balancing security and public access, addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues, securing federally leased space, and adjusting to the transfer of FPS to DHS. These actions have included working with ISC to develop security standards, continuing with upgrades that GSA began implementing after the Oklahoma City bombing, and establishing a memorandum of agreement with DHS related to FPS. Regarding GSA, we recommend that the Administrator establish a mechanism—such as a chief security officer position or formal point of contact—that could serve in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the challenges GSA faces related to security in buildings it owns and leases, and enable GSA to define its overall role in security given the transfer of FPS to DHS. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that the Department of the Interior (Interior) faces in protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism, as well as related actions intended to address these challenges, and similarly, (2) determine any challenges the General Services Administration (GSA) faces related to the protection of federal office buildings it owns or leases and the actions that have been taken. | Why GAO Did This Study
The threat of terrorism has made physical security for federal real property assets a major concern. Protecting these assets can be particularly complex and contentious for agencies whose missions include ensuring public access such as the Department of the Interior (Interior) and the General Services Administration (GSA). GAO's objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that Interior faces in protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism, as well as related actions intended to address these challenges; and similarly, (2) determine any challenges GSA faces related to the protection of federal office buildings it owns or leases and actions that have been taken.
What GAO Found
Interior faces a range of major challenges in protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism--these include balancing security and public access; addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues; and securing assets in rugged, remote areas. In addition, there was concern among Interior officials about the department's ability to leverage limited resources for security. Since September 11, 2001, Interior has improved security at high-profile sites, created a central security office to oversee its security efforts, developed physical security plans required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, and developed a uniform risk management and ranking methodology. As Interior moves forward, linking the results of its risk rankings to security funding priorities at national icons and monuments is an important next step. Also, given Interior's complex and often contentious environment, setting forth the guiding principles by which the department balances its core mission with security could have benefits. Other organizations have used guiding principles to foster greater transparency in complex environments. GSA also faces a range of major challenges, some similar to Interior's, that include balancing security and public access, addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues, securing federally leased space, and adjusting to the transfer of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) from GSA to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Actions GSA has taken to address the challenges include working to develop security standards for securing leased space and establishing a memorandum of agreement with DHS on security at GSA's facilities. However, despite these actions, GSA lacks a mechanism--such as a chief security officer position or formal point of contact--that could serve in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the challenges GSA faces related to security at its buildings, and enable GSA to better define its overall role in security given the transfer of FPS to DHS. |
gao_GAO-14-10 | gao_GAO-14-10_0 | DFAS Did Not Fully Implement Its Contract Pay FIP in Compliance with the FIAR Guidance
DFAS recognized the importance of implementing a FIP to improve its contract pay processes, systems, and controls, and performed steps required by the FIAR Guidance, such as performing internal control, information technology (IT), and substantive testing. Further, the deficiencies noted will affect the components’ ability to rely on DFAS’s controls over contract pay, ultimately increasing the risk that DOD’s goal for an auditable SBR will not be achieved in its planned time frame. However, we found that DFAS did not (1) adequately perform the required planning activities for its contract pay FIP, such as assessing the materiality of its processes and systems; (2) adequately perform the required testing; and (3) properly classify the identified deficiencies. Specifically, based on our review of the contract pay FIP, DFAS did not: prepare a memorandum of understanding for each of the DOD components that documented roles and responsibilities for transactions, supporting documentation retention, and audit readiness activities; prepare detailed flowcharts and narratives for three of the seven key processes: (1) reporting of disbursements to Treasury, (2) accounting and reconciliation of contract pay disbursements to the components’ general ledgers, and (3) contract closeout; and assess the materiality of its processes and systems based on dollar activity and risk factors. These processes excluded by DFAS from its FIP are intended to help ensure that the contract disbursements processed by DFAS are accurately recorded and maintained in the components’ general ledgers and that the status of DOD’s contract obligations is accurate and up-to- date. As a result, even though DFAS has already asserted audit readiness, DFAS does not have assurance that its FIP will satisfy the needs of the components or provide the expected benefits to the department-wide efforts to assert audit readiness for contract pay as a key element of the SBR. In response to our inquiries, DFAS officials stated that they had validated the populations and provided to us a copy of a data reliability assessment. However, because DFAS did not validate the population used to perform internal control and substantive testing, additional deficiencies may exist in DFAS’s contract pay controls and errors may exist in the recorded transactions activity and balances. Further, as stated earlier, DFAS did not perform sufficient testing of its entity-level controls. Of these 25 deficiencies, we found that DFAS had adequately developed and implemented the necessary corrective action plans for 7. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that control activities such as reconciliations are an integral part of an entity’s planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving effective results. In addition, DFAS did not provide support that a corrective action had been tested and had successfully remediated the deficiency, and for another deficiency the test results showed that it had not been successfully remediated by the implemented corrective action. However, we found that in 3 of the 18 instances, corrective actions had not been taken as required by the FIAR Guidance and that the documentation provided by DFAS for the other 15 deficiencies was insufficient. However, DFAS did not fully comply with the requirements in the FIAR Guidance for the Discovery and Corrective Action Phases; therefore, the FIP did not support DFAS’s October 2013 assertion that its contract pay controls were suitably designed and operating effectively. For example, DFAS did not perform adequate planning and testing activities for the Discovery Phase of its FIP. Until DFAS does so, its ability to properly process, record, and maintain accurate and reliable contract pay transaction data is questionable. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that DFAS is able to obtain the necessary assurance that its contract pay end-to-end process can produce, maintain, and sustain accurate, complete, and timely information in support of the components’ and DOD-wide financial improvement and audit readiness efforts, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer direct the Director of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to take the following nine actions: Address deficiencies in its Discovery Phase planning activities for contract pay by performing the following:
Document its contract pay end-to-end process by developing the necessary flowcharts and narratives for those processes excluded from the FIP. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) implemented its contract pay Financial Improvement Plan (FIP) in accordance with the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance, we compared DFAS’s contract pay FIP with the FIAR Guidance to determine if the FIP contained all steps and supporting documentation that the FIAR Guidance requires the components to complete. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that DOD's FIAR Plan include the goal of validating that DOD's Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) is audit ready by no later than September 30, 2014. DOD identified contract pay as one of the key elements of its SBR. DFAS, the service provider responsible for the department's contract pay, asserted that its processes, systems, and controls over contract pay were suitably designed and operating effectively to undergo an audit.
DOD's FIAR Guidance provides a methodology DOD components are required to follow to develop and implement FIPs to improve financial management and assert audit readiness. The FIP is a framework for planning, executing, and tracking the steps and supporting documentation necessary to achieve auditability.
GAO is mandated to audit the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements, including activities of executive branch agencies such as DOD. This report discusses the extent to which DFAS implemented its contract pay FIP in accordance with the FIAR Guidance. GAO reviewed the FIP and related work products, such as process flowcharts, test plans, and test results, and interviewed DFAS and DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is responsible for processing and disbursing nearly $200 billion annually in contract payments (contract pay) for the Department of Defense (DOD). DFAS recognized the importance of implementing a Financial Improvement Plan (FIP) to improve its contract pay processes, systems, and controls, and performed steps required by DOD's Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance, such as performing testing of internal controls, and substantive processes. However, GAO found that DFAS did not fully implement the steps required by the FIAR Guidance. GAO found numerous deficiencies in the implementation of DFAS's contract pay FIP, including the following:
DFAS did not adequately perform certain planning activities for its contract pay FIP as required by the FIAR Guidance. For example, DFAS did not assess the dollar activity and risk factors of its processes, systems, and controls, which resulted in the exclusion of three key processes from the FIP, including the reconciliation of its contract pay data to the components' general ledgers. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that control activities such as reconciliations are an integral part of an entity's planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving effective results. As result, DFAS did not obtain sufficient assurance that the contract disbursements are accurately recorded and maintained in the components' general ledgers, and that the status of DOD's contract obligations is accurate and up-to-date.
DFAS did not adequately perform required testing of its contract pay controls, processes, and balances. For example, DFAS did not adequately validate the populations used to perform substantive and internal control testing as required by the FIAR Guidance. DFAS officials stated that they validated that the population that was tested; however, GAO found that the process followed by DFAS for validating the population did not include a reconciliation of the population to the components' general ledgers. As a result, additional deficiencies may exist in DFAS's contract pay controls and additional errors may exist in the recorded transactions activity and balances, which affects the components' ability to rely on DFAS's controls over contract pay.
DFAS did not provide adequate documentation to support that it had remediated all of the identified control deficiencies that DFAS stated had been corrected. GAO's review of a nongeneralizable sample of 25 of these deficiencies found that in 3 instances, corrective actions had not been taken as required, and in 15 other instances, the documentation provided by DFAS did not sufficiently support that the identified deficiencies were remediated. DFAS had adequately developed and implemented the necessary corrective action plans for 7 of the deficiencies GAO reviewed.
Although DFAS has asserted audit readiness, until it corrects the deficiencies and fully implements its FIP in accordance with the FIAR Guidance, its ability to process, record, and maintain accurate and reliable contract pay transaction data is questionable. Therefore, DFAS does not have assurance that its FIP will satisfy the needs of the components or provide the expected benefits to department-wide audit readiness efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making nine recommendations for DFAS to fully implement the requirements in the FIAR Guidance in the areas of planning, testing, and corrective actions. DOD concurred with the recommendations and described its actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-10-32 | gao_GAO-10-32_0 | Little Information Is Available on the Condition of School Facilities in Districts That Receive Impact Aid for Students Living on Indian Lands, but Data from Selected States Indicate Conditions Ranged from Good to Poor
Limited independent information is available about the physical condition of public school facilities that receive Impact Aid funding for students living on Indian lands. Data from 3 States Indicated Condition of School Facilities at Indian Impact Aid School Districts Ranged from Good to Poor
Montana
Montana’s assessment data showed that most of its Indian Impact Aid school districts’ facilities were in good condition, although a larger proportion of other school districts—that is, those that do not receive Impact Aid for students residing on Indian lands—had facilities in good condition. After making these adjustments, the analysis of New Mexico’s data indicated that all of the Indian Impact Aid school districts had facilities that were in either good or fair condition. Based on this scoring table, the state’s data showed that 4 Indian Impact Aid school districts were in fair condition and 5 were in poor condition. Washington’s data indicated that none of the 9 Indian Impact Aid school districts and about 14 percent of the other school districts had building systems in good condition. Some Research Suggests That Better School Facilities Are Associated with Better Student Outcomes, and School District Officials Agreed, but There Is Little Evidence of a Causal Relationship
The research studies we reviewed on the relationship between the condition of school facilities and student outcomes often showed that better facilities were associated with better student outcomes; however, there is not necessarily a direct causal relationship, and the associations were often weak compared with their associations with other factors. A majority of these studies indicated that better school facilities were associated with better student outcomes—such as higher scores on achievement tests or higher student attendance rates. Most of the studies measured the extent to which better school facilities were associated with better outcomes after taking into account the impact of other factors that can affect student outcomes, such as poverty and other demographic characteristics. None of the studies we examined was able to conclusively determine how much school facility conditions contribute to student outcomes relative to other factors, such as the educational achievement of students’ parents or teachers’ qualifications. We received technical clarifications from Education’s Impact Aid Program within the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine what information is available about the physical condition of school facilities in Indian Impact Aid school districts and what is known about how the condition of school facilities affects student outcomes, we interviewed officials from state and federal agencies, and associations and reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. Because of these differences, facility condition measures are not strictly comparable across states. Appendix III: Examples of Studies Examining School Facilities and Student Outcomes
Table 5 provides summary information about selected studies on broad measures of school facilities and student achievement. | Why GAO Did This Study
State and local governments spend billions of dollars annually on the construction, renovation, and maintenance of public school facilities, yet concerns persist about the condition of some school facilities, particularly in school districts serving students residing on Indian lands. The Department of Education's (Education) Impact Aid Program provides funding to school districts that are adversely impacted by a lack of local revenue because of the presence of federal land, which is exempt from local property taxes. Impact Aid can be used for school expenses, such as facilities and teacher salaries. In response to concern about school facility conditions and concern that these conditions can affect student outcomes, GAO was asked to describe (1) the physical condition of schools in districts receiving Impact Aid because of students residing on Indian lands and (2) what is known about how school facilities affect student outcomes. GAO interviewed federal, state, and local officials; analyzed available independent school facility assessment data for three states; visited eight school districts that receive Impact Aid; and analyzed studies examining the relationship between school facilities and student outcomes. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Education provided technical clarifications, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Limited nationwide data are available about the physical condition of public school facilities in school districts that receive Impact Aid funding for students living on Indian lands, although data from three states indicate the conditions range from good to poor. Montana's assessment data showed that the majority (39 of 60) of Indian Impact Aid school districts had facilities in good condition. New Mexico's data showed that all 19 Indian Impact Aid school districts had facilities in either good or fair condition. Washington's data--based on assessments from 9 of 29 Indian Impact Aid school districts--indicated about half (4 of 9) of the Indian Impact Aid school districts had facilities in fair condition and about half (5 of 9) had facilities in poor condition. Facility assessments are not comparable across states. School district officials from 8 districts told GAO their facility conditions are affected by factors such as fiscal capacity, the age of buildings, and remote locations. The research studies GAO reviewed on the relationship between the condition of school facilities and student outcomes often indicated that better facilities were associated with better student outcomes, but there is not necessarily a direct causal relationship and the associations were often weak compared with those of other factors, such as the prevalence of poverty or other student characteristics. A majority of the studies GAO reviewed indicated that better school facilities were associated with better student outcomes--such as higher scores on achievement tests or higher student attendance rates. Most of the studies measured the extent to which better school facilities were associated with better outcomes, after taking into account the impact of other factors. None of the studies examined was able to conclusively determine how much school facility conditions contribute to student outcomes relative to other factors, such as student demographics, and none proved a causal relationship between school facilities and student outcomes. |
gao_GAO-07-847 | gao_GAO-07-847_0 | These changes have added to the complexity of consular workload and have increased the amount of time needed to adjudicate a visa. State’s Recent Data Show Wait Time Trends Have Improved, but Some Applicants Continue to Face Extensive Delays for Visa Interviews
According to State, wait times for visa interviews have improved at many overseas consular posts in the past year. However, despite recent improvements—such as those at posts in India, Mexico, and Brazil—a number of posts reported long waits at times during the past year. Believing the waits at some posts are excessive, in February of this year, State announced its goal of providing all applicants an interview within 30 days. For example, in reviewing visa waits data provided to us by the Bureau of Consular Affairs for the period of September 2006 to February 2007, we found that 53 of State’s 219 visa-issuing posts had reported maximum wait times of 30 or more days in at least 1 month—44 fewer posts than had reported this figure when we reviewed the same period during the previous year (see fig. We determined that State’s data are sufficiently reliable for providing a broad indication of posts that have had problems with wait times over a period of time and for general trends in the number of posts that have had problems with wait times over the period we reviewed; however, the data were not sufficiently reliable to determine the exact magnitude of the delays because the exact number of posts with a wait of 30 days or more at any given time could not be determined. However, despite the measures State has taken to address staffing, facilities, and other constraints at some posts, State’s current efforts are generally temporary, nonsustainable, and are insufficient to meet the expected increases in demand at some posts. State acknowledges that the repositioning of consular staff, while necessary, may not adequately address the increasing demand for visas worldwide. State Lacks a Strategy to Address Projected Long-term Growth in Visa Demand
With worldwide nonimmigrant visa demand rising closer to pre-9/11 levels, and current projections showing a dramatic increase in demand over time, State will continue to face challenges in managing its visa workload and maintaining its goal of keeping interview wait times under 30 days at all posts. State has not developed a strategy for addressing increasing visa demand that balances such factors as available resources and the need for national security in the visa process against its goal that visas are processed in a reasonable amount of time. Although the visa improvement plan can assist State in improving the visa process, and State has taken some steps to address wait times at a number of overseas posts, State has not determined how it will keep pace with continued growth in visa demand over the long term. Alternatively, State could require consular officers to process applicants more efficiently and quickly. Clearly we agree that in developing a strategy, State must maintain its security responsibilities while also facilitating legitimate travel to the United States. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We reviewed (1) Department of State (State) data on the amount of time visa applicants were waiting to obtain a visa interview, (2) actions State has taken to address visa wait times, and (3) State’s strategy for dealing with projected increases in visa demand. GAO Comments
1. Our report acknowledges that visa issuances have increased over the last several years. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress and the Department of State (State) initiated changes to the visa process to increase security, but these changes also increased the amount of time needed to adjudicate a visa. Although maintaining security is of paramount importance, State has acknowledged that long waits for visas may discourage legitimate travel to the United States, potentially costing the country billions of dollars in economic benefits over time, and adversely influencing foreign citizens' opinions of our nation. GAO testified in 2006 that a number of consular posts had long visa interview wait times. This report examines (1) State's data on visa interview wait times, (2) actions State has taken to address wait times, and (3) State's strategy for dealing with projected growth in visa demand.
What GAO Found
According to State, the amount of time that applicants must wait for a visa interview has generally decreased over the last year; however, some applicants continue to face extensive delays. State's data showed that between September 2005 and February 2006, 97 consular posts reported maximum wait times of 30 or more days in at least 1 month, whereas 53 posts reported such waits for the same period 1 year later. However, despite recent improvements, at times during the past year, a number of posts reported long wait times, which could be expected to reoccur during future visa demand surges. In 2007, State announced a goal of providing applicants an interview within 30 days. Although State's data is sufficiently reliable to indicate that wait times continue to be a problem at some posts, GAO identified shortcomings in the way the data is developed that could mask the severity of the problem. State has implemented steps to reduce wait times at several posts including using temporary duty employees to fill staffing gaps at some posts and repositioning some consular positions to better utilize its current workforce. However, these measures are not permanent or sustainable solutions and may not adequately address the increasing demand for visas worldwide. In addition, State has made improvements to several consular facilities and has identified plans for improvements at several other posts with high workload. Some posts have utilized procedures that enable them to process applications more efficiently. However, not all of these procedures are shared among posts in a systematic way and, therefore, not all posts are aware of them. State has not determined how it will keep pace with growth in visa demand over the long-term. State contracted for a study of visa demand, in select countries, over a 15-year period beginning in 2005, which projected that visa demand will increase dramatically at several posts. However, at some posts, demand has already surpassed the study's projected future demand levels. State has not developed a strategy that considers such factors as available resources and the need for maintaining national security in the visa process, along with its goal that visas are processed in a reasonable amount of time. Given dramatic increases in workload expected at many posts, without such a strategy State will be challenged in achieving its current goal for wait times. |
gao_NSIAD-96-262 | gao_NSIAD-96-262_0 | Aviation Security System and Its Vulnerabilities
Even though FAA has increased security procedures as the threat has increased, the domestic and international aviation systems continue to have numerous vulnerabilities. Providing effective security is a complex problem because of the size of the U.S. aviation system, the differences among airlines and airports, and the unpredictable nature of terrorism. In 1993, the Department of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector General also reported weaknesses in security measures dealing with (1) access to restricted airport areas by unauthorized persons and (2) carry-on baggage. Explosives Detection Technology Can Improve Security but Has Limitations
New explosives detection technology will play an important part in improving security, but it is not a panacea. The need to rely on operators to resolve false alarms is a primary reason for this. Although the Gore Commission made recommendations on September 9, no agreement currently exists among all the key players, namely, the Congress, the administration—specifically FAA and the intelligence community, among others—and the aviation industry, on the steps necessary to improve security in the short and long term to meet the threat. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed aviation security, focusing on: (1) vulnerabilities in the aviation security system; (2) the availability and limitations of explosives detection technology; and (3) efforts under way to improve aviation security.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has mandated additional aviation security procedures; (2) effective security is limited by the size of the aviation system, differences among airlines and airports, and the unpredictable nature of terrorism; (3) specific unclassified aviation security weaknesses include unauthorized access to restricted areas of airports and carry-on baggage; (4) explosives detection technology is becoming more widely available, but has limitations, including variable effectiveness, false alarms, the need for human intervention, and decreased performance under field conditions; and (5) Congress, FAA, the intelligence community, and the aviation industry are working together to take action to meet the terrorist threat to aviation security. |
gao_NSIAD-98-218 | gao_NSIAD-98-218_0 | In total, the schedule contains 73 initiatives aimed at improving DLA’s inventory management operations. The schedule, however, does not (1) contain information on the extent to which the initiatives cover each supply category, (2) establish key performance indicators to measure the overall impact the initiatives will have on logistics costs and efficiency of operations, and (3) provide criteria and plans for expanding or fully implementing the initiatives to cover the entire supply category. In no case did the schedule contain information on the percentage of a supply category that will be affected by an initiative, key indicators that could be used to determine if the initiatives are achieving the desired results, or milestones necessary to measure progress toward covering the entire supply category by the implementation date. The schedule provided planned contract award dates for these initiatives. The schedule information consisted of the fiscal year that contracts were awarded for seven electronic catalogs. In addition, DLA does not have the authority to require the military services to participate in these programs. Conclusions
Although DLA’s best practices implementation schedule identifies a variety of initiatives, it does not contain the information necessary to assess implementation progress, the initiatives’ use in any particular supply category, or the results of the initiatives as measured in terms of cost, service, and readiness. Such information is essential for oversight by Congress and DOD managers as they seek to determine whether the initiatives are being implemented in a timely manner over the desired scope of operations and are achieving the intended results. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) schedule for implementing best commercial practices for inventory management, focusing on whether the schedule: (1) described the extent to which the initiatives cover each supply category; (2) established key performance indicators to measure the overall impact the initiatives will have on logistics costs and efficiency of operations; and (3) provided criteria and plans for expanding or fully implementing the initiatives to cover the entire supply category.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DLA's schedule provides information on 73 initiatives it identified as best practices for improving the acquisition and distribution of certain categories of consumable supplies; (2) although GAO is encouraged that DLA has established these initiatives, the schedule does not provide adequate information to assess whether it effectively provides for the implementation of these practices to be completed by November 2000, as required by the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Act; (3) specifically, the schedule does not contain information on the percentage of a supply category that will be affected by the initiatives; (4) consequently, users of the schedule are unable to determine the magnitude of impact the initiatives are intended to have; (5) also, the schedule does not present metrics or indicators that will be used to determine whether the initiatives are achieving the desired results; (6) this information is critical to determine whether readiness and sustainability goals are being met and cost goals are being achieved; and (7) in addition, the schedule does not provide milestones necessary to measure progress toward covering the entire supply category by the implementation date. |
gao_GAO-05-760T | gao_GAO-05-760T_0 | Background
To be prepared for major public health threats such as an influenza pandemic, public health agencies need several basic capabilities, including disease surveillance systems. One action the department has taken is the development of a draft national pandemic influenza plan, titled “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan.”
CDC is charged with protecting the nation’s public health by directing efforts to prevent and control diseases and responding to public health emergencies. Existing Influenza Surveillance System and Enhancements Would Be Used to Identify an Influenza Pandemic
Surveillance is a key component in planning for an influenza pandemic, and federal public health officials plan to rely on the nation’s existing annual influenza surveillance system and enhancements to identify an influenza pandemic. Federal public health officials have undertaken several initiatives that are intended to enhance influenza surveillance capabilities. These initiatives have been undertaken both through programs specific to influenza as well as through programs focused more generally on increasing preparedness for bioterrorism and other emerging infectious disease health threats. Federal officials have also implemented initiatives designed to improve public health communications and have undertaken initiatives intended to improve the coordination of zoonotic surveillance efforts. Data submitted on influenza activity in the United States include data from more than 120 laboratories and 2,000 health care providers and mortality reports from 122 cities. Federal Agencies Have Undertaken Initiatives to Enhance Influenza Surveillance
CDC has undertaken several initiatives that are intended to enhance influenza surveillance capabilities in preparation for an influenza pandemic. Also, when concerns were raised over recent influenza seasons that the avian influenza A (H5N1) could become the next influenza pandemic, CDC led a variety of efforts with its international partners to plan for and address threats of increased influenza activity worldwide. For example, CDC worked collaboratively with WHO to conduct investigations of avian influenza A in Vietnam and to provide laboratory testing. CDC also provided training assistance and has implemented an initiative to improve influenza surveillance in Asia. Moreover, recent outbreaks of human disease caused by avian influenza strains in Asia and Europe highlight the potential for new strains to be introduced into the population. Despite Efforts by Federal Officials, Challenges Remain regarding Preparedness for and Response to an Influenza Pandemic
Challenges regarding the nation’s preparedness for and response to an influenza pandemic remain. For example, some decisions yet to be made include determining the public- versus private-sector roles in the purchase and distribution of pandemic influenza vaccines; the division of responsibility between the federal government and the states for vaccine distribution; and how population groups will be prioritized and targeted to receive limited supplies of vaccines. Challenges Persist in Ensuring an Adequate and Timely Influenza Vaccine Supply
Challenges persist in ensuring an adequate and timely influenza vaccine supply. Implementation of Control Measures to Prevent Spread of Pandemic Influenza Presents Difficulties
Another challenge in responding to an influenza pandemic involves implementing certain control measures to prevent the spread of the disease. Most Hospitals Lack the Capacity to Respond to Large-Scale Infectious Disease Outbreaks
A challenge identified during the SARS outbreak that may also affect response efforts during an influenza pandemic is lack of sufficient hospital and workforce capacity. The steps HHS is taking to address vaccine production capacity and stockpiling of antiviral drugs may not be in place in time to fill the current gaps in preparedness should an influenza pandemic occur in the next several years. Since 2000, we have been urging the department to complete its pandemic plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Vaccine shortages and distribution problems during the 2004-2005 influenza season raised concerns about the nation's ability to respond to a worldwide influenza epidemic--or influenza pandemic--which many experts believe to be inevitable. Some experts believe that the next pandemic could be spawned by the recurring avian influenza in Asia. If avian influenza strains directly infect humans and acquire the ability to be readily transmitted between people, a pandemic could occur. Modeling studies suggest that its effect in the United States could be severe, with one estimate from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) ranging from 89,000 to 207,000 deaths and from 38 million to 89 million illnesses. GAO was asked to discuss surveillance systems in place to identify and monitor an influenza pandemic and concerns about preparedness for and response to an influenza pandemic. This testimony is based on GAO's 2004 report on disease surveillance; reports and testimony on influenza outbreaks, influenza vaccine supply, and pandemic planning that GAO has issued since October 2000; and work GAO has done in May 2005 to update key information.
What GAO Found
Federal public health officials plan to rely on the nation's existing influenza surveillance system and enhancements to identify an influenza pandemic. CDC currently collaborates with multiple public health partners, including the World Health Organization (WHO), to obtain data that provide national and international pictures of influenza activity. Federal public health officials and health care organizations have undertaken several initiatives that are intended to enhance influenza surveillance capabilities. While some of these initiatives are focused more generally on increasing preparedness for bioterrorism and other emerging infectious disease health threats, others have been undertaken in preparation for an influenza pandemic. For example, in response to concerns over the past few years about the potential for avian influenza to become the next influenza pandemic, CDC implemented an initiative in cooperation with WHO to improve influenza surveillance in Asia. CDC has also implemented initiatives to improve the communications systems it uses to collect and disseminate surveillance information. In addition, CDC, the Department of Agriculture, and the Food and Drug Administration have made efforts to enhance their coordination of surveillance efforts for diseases that arise in animals and can be transferred to humans, such as SARS and certain strains of influenza with the potential to become pandemic. While public health officials have undertaken several initiatives to enhance influenza surveillance capabilities, challenges remain with regard to other aspects of preparedness for and response to an influenza pandemic. In particular, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has not finalized planning for an influenza pandemic. In 2000, GAO recommended that HHS complete the national plan for responding to an influenza pandemic, but the plan has been in draft format since August 2004. Absent a completed federal plan, key questions about the federal role in the purchase, distribution, and administration of vaccines and antiviral drugs during a pandemic remain unanswered. Other challenges with regard to preparedness for and response to an influenza pandemic exist across the public and private sectors, including challenges in ensuring an adequate and timely influenza vaccine and antiviral supply; addressing regulatory, privacy, and procedural issues surrounding measures to control the spread of disease, for example, across national borders; and resolving issues related to an insufficient hospital and health workforce capacity for responding to a large-scale outbreak such as an influenza pandemic. |
gao_NSIAD-97-230 | gao_NSIAD-97-230_0 | However, according to many of the firms we surveyed, markets still exist where they are unable to obtain private finance or insurance services. Globally, public providers have increased investor coverage. Thus, if foreign export credit agencies provide the support, U.S. suppliers could be excluded. OPIC’s Revenues Have Exceeded Its Losses, but Global Changes May Present Opportunities for OPIC to Further Reduce Portfolio Risk
Historically, OPIC has been self-sustaining, generating substantial revenues from its finance and insurance programs and its investments that together have been sufficient to cover actual losses. Possible Options to Reduce the Risks Associated With OPIC’s Insurance Portfolio
The private sector’s willingness to have greater involvement in some emerging markets has created opportunities for OPIC to further reduce risks in its insurance program. However, OPIC’s efforts to support U.S. foreign policy objectives, which promote investment in risky markets, present challenges for OPIC when considering ways to reduce the risks associated with its insurance portfolio. OPIC currently offers standard 20-year insurance with 90 percent coverage of the value of the insured assets.One potential option would be that OPIC could insure less than 90 percent of the value of each investment. However, since a reduction in coverage is likely to come with a reduction in price, U.S. investors might continue to seek OPIC coverage. U.S. Foreign Policy Encourages OPIC to Invest in More Risky Markets
The U.S. foreign policy objective of promoting private investment in developing countries encourages OPIC to take risks that the private sector may not take without public support. According to OPIC officials, OPIC’s goal is to support deals that would not be made without its support, and OPIC as an agency of the U.S. government has access to risk mitigation tools, including advocacy and intervention to avert claims, that are not available to the private sector. 4). According to a recent study, a privatization of OPIC’s current assets could only be accomplished at a discount. If existing economic and political trends continue in the markets where OPIC currently operates, OPIC’s portfolio may become less risky. Scope and Methodology
To identify trends in private sector investment in developing markets and the public sector’s role in these markets, we focused on various characteristics. To determine OPIC’s risk management strategy and the steps that OPIC may take, if it is reauthorized, to further reduce portfolio risks while pursuing its objectives, we obtained and reviewed documents on OPIC’s risk assessment policies and financial reports that detailed the condition of OPIC’s portfolio. To determine the issues that would need to be addressed and the time it would take to phase out OPIC if it is not reauthorized, we reviewed laws and regulations and discussed applicable policies and practices with officials from the Office of Personnel Management, the General Services Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget. 15 years extendable to 20. 20 years. GAO Comments
1. 2. The report also includes a discussion of OPIC’s pre-approval review process and underwriting guidelines. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) trends in private sector investment in developing markets and the role of the public sector in these markets; (2) the Overseas Private Investment Corporation's (OPIC) risk management strategy and the steps that OPIC may take, if it is reauthorized, to further reduce portfolio risks while pursuing U.S. foreign policy objectives; and (3) the issues to be addressed and the time it would take to phase out OPIC if it is not reauthorized.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) improvements in economic and political conditions in many developing countries have led to a reduction in investors' perception of risk and a dramatic increase in private investment in these markets since the late 1980s; (2) however, according to most of the 34 firms GAO surveyed, risky markets still exist where the private sector stated they are reluctant to invest or operate without public guarantees or insurance; (3) in high-risk markets, U.S. investors GAO spoke with have sought public finance or insurance from OPIC, the Export-Import Bank, or other public institutions; (4) in risky markets where OPIC services are not available, U.S. investors tended to use other public support; (5) if foreign export credit agencies provide the support, U.S. suppliers could be excluded; (6) OPIC has historically been self-sustaining by generating revenues from its insurance and finance programs to cover actual losses; (7) OPIC's risk mitigation strategy includes maintaining reserves, limiting its exposure in any one country, requiring pre-approval reviews, and establishing underwriting guidelines; (8) nonetheless, the private sector's willingness to have greater involvement in some emerging markets has created opportunities for OPIC to further reduce portfolio risks, while continuing to pursue U.S. foreign policy objectives; (9) possible ways for OPIC to minimize the risks associated with its insurance portfolio include obtaining to a greater extent reinsurance from or coinsuring with other insurance providers, insuring less than 90 percent of the value of each investment, and offering insurance at less than a 20-year term; (10) while OPIC officials agree that these are good risk mitigation techniques, they cautioned that these strategies should be employed on a case-by-case basis so as to enable OPIC to continue to meet U.S. foreign policy objectives and the needs of its customers; (11) if Congress decides not to reauthorize OPIC, an orderly phaseout of the agency would require specific legislative action; (12) an important issue that would need to be addressed is who would manage the existing portfolio; (13) also, given that OPIC issues insurance policies with 20-year coverage, it could take up to 20 years for OPIC's existing obligations to expire; (14) the government has the option to sell OPIC's portfolio to the private sector before its expiration; (15) however, a recent study suggests that disposal of OPIC's assets could only be accomplished at a discounted price; and (16) if the risk of the remaining portfolio decreases over time, opportunities for asset disposal may arise. |
gao_GAO-17-84 | gao_GAO-17-84_0 | In the post-9/11 environment, the movement of cargo shipments throughout the global supply chain from foreign manufacturers, suppliers, or vendors to retailers or other end users in the United States is inherently vulnerable to terrorist actions. CBP Is Taking Steps to Resolve Data System Problems, but Could Take Additional Steps to Ensure Staff Meet Security Validation Responsibilities
Data System Problems Have Led to Challenges in Identifying and Completing C-TPAT Member Security Validations
C-TPAT staff have faced challenges in meeting C-TPAT security validation responsibilities in an efficient and timely manner because of problems with the functionality of C-TPAT’s data management system (Portal 2.0). In particular, while the intended purpose of transitioning from Portal 1.0 to Portal 2.0 in August 2015 was to improve functionality and facilitate communication between security specialists and C-TPAT members, a series of problems arose as a result of this transition that have impaired the ability of C-TPAT staff to identify and complete required C-TPAT member certification procedures and security profile reviews in a timely and efficient manner. For example, TASPD staff cited unclear requirements for the Portal 2.0 system and its user needs as a factor that likely contributed to inadequate system testing and continued problems. As part of the root cause analysis, TASPD staff have outlined recommended actions for addressing causal factors that led to the Portal 2.0 problems, along with the associated timeframes for completing these actions. While TASPD and C-TPAT staff have already implemented some actions, such as establishing a new team structure, the staff stated that they will continue to work on identifying and addressing potential root causes of the Portal 2.0 problems and noted that this process will likely continue through 2017. Issuing Standardized Guidance to Field Offices Could Better Assure Data on Security Validations Are More Consistent and Reliable
Despite the Portal 2.0 problems, C-TPAT headquarters officials and field office directors we met with told us that they are assured that required security validations are being identified and completed in a timely manner because the field offices keep records on required and completed security validations apart from data recorded in Portal 2.0. While the current validation tracking processes used by field offices do account for security validations conducted over the year, standardizing the process used by field offices to track required security validations could strengthen C-TPAT management’s assurance that its field offices are identifying and completing the required security validations in a consistent and reliable manner. CBP Cannot Determine the Extent to Which C-TPAT Members Are Receiving Benefits Because of Data Concerns
CBP Staff Have Concerns Regarding the Accuracy of C-TPAT Member Benefit Data
Since 2012, CBP has compiled data on certain events or actions it has taken regarding arriving shipments—such as examinations, holds, and processing times—for both C-TPAT and non-C-TPAT members through its C-TPAT Dashboard. However, based on GAO’s preliminary analyses of data contained in the Dashboard, and data accuracy and reliability concerns cited by C-TPAT program officials, we concluded that CBP staff are not able to determine the extent to which C-TPAT members are receiving benefits, such as reduced likelihood of examinations of their shipments and expedited shipment processing, compared to non- members. It is too soon for us to assess whether this process will fully address the Dashboard accuracy and reliability issues. CBP has likely relied on such questionable data since it developed the Dashboard in 2012, and, thus, cannot be assured that C-TPAT members have consistently received the benefits that CBP has publicized. Trade industry officials we met with generally spoke positively of the C-TPAT program and of CBP staffs’ efforts in sharing information and listening to their concerns and suggestions for enhancing the program. Conclusions
CBP’s risk-informed approach to supply chain security focuses on ensuring the expeditious flow of millions of cargo shipments into the United States each year, while also managing security concerns. Further, to ensure the availability of complete and accurate data for managing the C-TPAT program and establishing and maintaining reliable indicators on the extent to which C-TPAT members receive benefits, we recommend that the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection determine the specific problems that have led to questionable data contained in the Dashboard and develop an action plan, with milestones and completion dates, for correcting the data so that the C- TPAT program can produce accurate and reliable data for measuring C- TPAT member benefits. 1. The report may include recommendations to improve security practices, as well as any required actions the member is to take to conform to CBP’s minimum security criteria. | Why GAO Did This Study
The economic well-being of the United States depends on the movement of millions of cargo shipments throughout the global supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers or other end users. However, cargo shipments can present security concerns. CBP is responsible for administering cargo security and facilitating the flow of legitimate commerce. CBP has implemented several programs as part of a risk-based approach to supply chain security. One such program, C-TPAT, is a voluntary program in which CBP staff validate that members' supply chain security practices meet minimum security criteria. In return, members are eligible to receive benefits, such as a reduced likelihood their shipments will be examined.
This report assesses the extent to which (1) CBP is meeting its security validation responsibilities, and (2) C-TPAT members are receiving benefits. GAO reviewed information on security validations, member benefits, and other program documents. GAO also interviewed officials at CBP headquarters and three C-TPAT field offices chosen for their geographical diversity; as well as select C-TPAT members and trade industry officials.
What GAO Found
Staff from U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program have faced challenges in meeting C-TPAT security validation responsibilities because of problems with the functionality of the program's data management system (Portal 2.0). In particular, since the system was updated in August 2015, C-TPAT staff have identified instances in which the Portal 2.0 system incorrectly altered C-TPAT members' certification or security profile dates, requiring manual verification of member data and impairing the ability of C-TPAT security specialists to identify and complete required security validations in a timely and efficient manner. While the focus of CBP's staff was initially on documenting and addressing Portal 2.0 problems as they arose, the staff have begun to identify root causes that led to the Portal 2.0 problems. For example, CBP staff cited unclear requirements for the system and its users' needs, coupled with inadequate testing, as factors that likely contributed to problems. In response, CBP staff have outlined recommended actions, along with timeframes for completing the actions. The staff stated that they will continue to work on identifying and addressing potential root causes of the Portal problems through 2017. C-TPAT officials told us that despite the Portal 2.0 problems, they have assurance that required security validations are being tracked and completed as a result of record reviews taking place at field offices. However, these field office reviews were developed in the absence of standardized guidance from C-TPAT headquarters. While the current validation tracking processes used by field offices do account for security validations conducted over the year, standardizing the process used by field offices for tracking required security validations could strengthen C-TPAT management's assurance that its field offices are identifying and completing the required security validations in a consistent and reliable manner.
CBP cannot determine the extent to which C-TPAT members are receiving benefits because of data problems. Specifically, since 2012, CBP has compiled data on certain events or actions it has taken regarding arriving shipments—such as examination and hold rates and processing times—for both C-TPAT and non-C-TPAT members through its Dashboard data reporting tool. However, on the basis of GAO's preliminary analyses and subsequent data accuracy concerns cited by C-TPAT program officials, GAO determined that data contained in the Dashboard could not be relied on for accurately measuring C-TPAT member benefits. Also, CBP has likely relied on such questionable data since it developed the Dashboard in 2012, and, thus, cannot be assured that C-TPAT members have consistently received the benefits that CBP has publicized. C-TPAT officials stated that they are analyzing the Dashboard to finalize an action plan to correct the data concerns. It is too soon to tell, though, whether this process will fully address the accuracy and reliability issues. Despite these issues, C-TPAT officials are exploring new member benefits, and industry officials we met with generally spoke positively of the C-TPAT program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that CBP develop (1) standardized guidance for field offices regarding the tracking of information on security validations, and (2) a plan with milestones and completion dates to fix the Dashboard so the C-TPAT program can produce accurate data on C-TPAT member benefits. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-152 | gao_GAO-04-152_0 | The cases of inhalational anthrax in Florida, the first epicenter, were thought to have resulted from proximity to opened letters containing anthrax spores, which were never found. Local and State Public Health Officials Identified Strengths in Their Responses as Well as Areas for Improvement
Local and state public health officials across the epicenters emphasized the benefits of their planning efforts for promoting a rapid and coordinated response, stressed the importance of effective communication throughout the incidents, and reported that their response capacity was strained and the response would have been difficult to sustain if the incidents had been more extensive. Epicenters Had Engaged in Some Response Planning but Had Not Anticipated the Full Extent of Coordination That Would Be Needed
Local and state public health officials reported that they had typically planned for coordination of their emergency response but had not fully anticipated the extent to which they would have to coordinate with a wide range of both public and private entities involved in the response to the anthrax incidents, both locally and in other jurisdictions. They also reported that dealing with the media and communicating messages to the public were also challenging. Experience Showed Aspects of Federal Preparedness That Could Be Improved
CDC led the federal public health response to the anthrax incidents, and the experience showed aspects of federal preparedness that could be improved. While local and state officials reported that CDC’s support of their responses to the rapidly unfolding anthrax incidents at the local and state levels was generally effective, CDC acknowledged that it was not fully prepared for the challenge of coordinating the public health response across the federal agencies. In addition to straining CDC’s resources, the anthrax incidents highlighted shortcomings in the clinical tools available for responding to anthrax, such as vaccines and drugs, and a lack of training for clinicians on how to recognize and respond to anthrax. CDC Provided Support to Meet Heavy Resource Demands from Local and State Officials
CDC effectively responded to heavy resource demands from state and local officials to support the local responses. In addition, NIH provided scientific expertise on anthrax. CDC received a tremendous amount of information via e-mail, phone, fax, and news media reports from such sources as the agencies and organizations in the epicenters of the incidents, public health departments not in the epicenters, other federal agencies, and international public health organizations. The lessons identified fall into three general categories: the benefits of planning and experience; the importance of effective communication, both among those involved in the response efforts and with the general public; and the critical importance of a strong public health infrastructure to serve as the foundation from which response efforts can be mounted for bioterrorism or other public health emergencies. The agency has taken steps to improve future performance, including creating the Office of Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response within the Office of the Director, building and staffing an emergency operations center, enhancing the agency’s communication infrastructure, and developing and maintaining databases of information and expertise on the biological agents the federal government considers most likely to be used in a terrorist attack. DOD highlighted that lessons learned from its support of the public health response could aid in the development of expanded capabilities within the civilian sector to improve the nation’s public health preparedness. Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in Public Health Protection. Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the fall of 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to news media personnel and congressional officials, leading to the first cases of anthrax infection related to an intentional release of anthrax in the United States. Outbreaks of anthrax infection were concentrated in six locations, or epicenters, in the country. An examination of the public health response to the anthrax incidents provides an important opportunity to apply lessons learned from that experience to enhance the nation's preparedness for bioterrorism. Because of its interest in bioterrorism preparedness, Congress asked GAO to review the public health response to the anthrax incidents. Specifically, GAO determined (1) what was learned from the experience that could help improve public health preparedness at the local and state levels and (2) what was learned that could help improve public health preparedness at the federal level and what steps have been taken to make those improvements.
What GAO Found
Local and state public health officials in the epicenters of the anthrax incidents identified strengths in their responses as well as areas for improvement. These officials said that although their preexisting planning efforts, exercises, and previous experience in responding to emergencies had helped promote a rapid and coordinated response, problems arose because they had not fully anticipated the extent of coordination needed among responders and they did not have all the necessary agreements in place to put the plans into operation rapidly. Officials also reported that communication among response agencies was generally effective but public health officials had difficulty reaching clinicians to provide them with guidance. In addition, local and state officials reported that the capacity of the public health workforce and clinical laboratories was strained and that their responses would have been difficult to sustain if the incidents had been more extensive. Officials identified three general lessons for public health preparedness: the benefits of planning and experience; the importance of effective communication, both among responders and with the general public; and the importance of a strong public health infrastructure to serve as the foundation for responses to bioterrorism or other public health emergencies. The experience of responding to the anthrax incidents showed aspects of federal preparedness that could be improved. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was challenged to both meet heavy resource demands from local and state officials and coordinate the federal public health response in the face of the rapidly unfolding incidents. CDC has said that it was effective in its more traditional capacity of supporting local response efforts but was not fully prepared to manage the federal public health response. CDC experienced difficulty in managing the voluminous amount of information coming into the agency and in communicating with public health officials, the media, and the public. In addition to straining CDC's resources, the anthrax incidents highlighted both shortcomings in the clinical tools available for responding to anthrax, such as vaccines and drugs, and a lack of training for clinicians in how to recognize and respond to anthrax. CDC has taken steps to implement some improvements. These include creating the Office of Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response within the Office of the Director, creating an emergency operations center, enhancing the agency's communication infrastructure, and developing databases of information and expertise on the biological agents considered likely to be used in a terrorist attack. CDC has also been working with other federal agencies and private organizations to develop better clinical tools and increase training for medical care professionals. |
gao_GAO-14-566 | gao_GAO-14-566_0 | Figure 2 shows NOAA’s aircraft flight hours and associated costs for fiscal years 2004 to 2013. NOAA officials also told us that they expect the line offices’ missions will expand in the future, thereby increasing their need for aircraft services. NOAA Has Numerous Efforts to Improve Aircraft Asset Planning and Management, but It Is Too Early to Determine Whether They Reflect Leading Practices
NOAA has 34 efforts aimed at improving its aircraft asset planning and management, according to agency officials, some of which are ongoing while others are under way or planned; however, because most of these efforts are not yet fully implemented, it is too early to determine whether they will reflect OMB leading practices in capital asset programming. NOAA expects to complete all 34 efforts by fiscal year 2017. NOAA Faces Challenges in Improving Its Aircraft Asset Planning and Modernizing Its Fleet
In its efforts to improve aircraft asset planning and management, NOAA faces challenges related to the development of a comprehensive and integrated capital asset plan, and decisions regarding the modernization of its fleet. As noted, NOAA does not currently have a capital asset plan for aircraft even though leading practices OMB has identified encourage agencies to have capital asset plans as a part of their strategic planning efforts. As noted, NOAA is working to develop a capital asset plan through an approach under which it is creating multiple stand-alone plans that together are intended to serve as the agency’s capital asset plan for aircraft. In addition, critical planning information and analysis on different types of assets will be spread across different documents, which may add to NOAA’s challenge of ensuring that information is sufficiently linked and integrated to serve as a single comprehensive plan. NOAA is in the early stages of some of these planning efforts and has not yet determined how, or whether, it will link and integrate the plans with one another. NOAA faced challenges in finalizing a planning effort in the past; in 2009, OMAO developed a draft “aircraft recapitalization plan” intended to address the agency’s future aircraft needs. The agency began its current planning effort 4 years later, in 2013. For example, NOAA’s two operational P-3 Orion planes are in high demand for hurricane work. Because large capital assets such as aircraft may take many years to acquire, NOAA faces decisions about whether to invest in additional costly service life extensions or replace the two operational P-3 Orions and another aging plane in its fleet, one of its de Havilland Twin Otter aircraft. Linking and integrating its multiple planning efforts could help NOAA demonstrate that it has a capital asset plan consistent with these leading practices. Without such a plan, NOAA risks making decisions that will make it difficult for the agency to effectively address future challenges. NOAA’s complex approach to developing a capital asset plan presents challenges. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that NOAA has sufficient information and analysis to guide long-term decisions regarding its aircraft, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to ensure that the agency links and integrates its multiple planning efforts as it finalizes a capital asset plan for aircraft. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the status of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) efforts to improve its aircraft asset planning and management and the extent to which these efforts reflect leading practices and (2) the challenges NOAA faces in improving its aircraft asset planning and management. To determine the extent to which NOAA’s efforts reflect applicable guidance and leading practices, we reviewed Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance to identify leading practices that are important for effective asset planning and management. In these interviews, we discussed NOAA’s long-term strategic planning and management for aircraft, NOAA’s previous efforts to issue an aircraft capital asset plan, and NOAA’s work to complete and implement the 34 aircraft planning and management efforts, among other things. | Why GAO Did This Study
NOAA's aircraft play a critical role in collecting scientific data to help NOAA advance understanding of changes in the environment and manage ocean and coastal resources. NOAA uses its aircraft for a wide range of scientific missions. In fiscal year 2013, NOAA's aircraft flew hundreds of flights and logged about 3,900 flight hours. NOAA officials predict that expanding mission needs will lead to increased demand for aircraft services. To address such challenges, NOAA has been working to improve its capital asset planning and management for aircraft.
A House committee report on the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, mandated GAO to examine various issues regarding NOAA's aircraft. This report examines (1) the status of NOAA's efforts to improve its aircraft planning and management and the extent to which these efforts reflect leading practices and (2) challenges NOAA faces in improving its aircraft asset planning and management. GAO analyzed aircraft cost and flight hour data from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2013, reviewed agency planning and management documents, and interviewed agency officials. GAO reviewed capital asset planning guidance from OMB to identify leading practices.
What GAO Found
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the Department of Commerce has 34 efforts aimed at improving its aircraft asset planning and management, some of which are ongoing, while others are under way or planned; however, because these efforts are not yet fully implemented, it is too early to determine whether they will reflect the leading practices in capital asset management that have been identified by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Among NOAA's initiatives are efforts to enhance its process for scheduling aircraft use among NOAA offices and to develop new aircraft performance metrics. NOAA's efforts also include the development of multiple long-term plans that together are intended to constitute a capital asset plan for aircraft. OMB leading practices encourage agencies to have capital asset plans—which help provide agencies with information and analysis to make long-term decisions about acquiring and managing capital assets—as a part of their strategic planning efforts, but NOAA currently does not have such a plan for its aircraft. NOAA expects to complete its various improvement efforts related to aircraft asset planning and management by fiscal year 2017.
NOAA faces challenges in improving its aircraft asset planning and management. NOAA's complex approach to creating a capital asset plan for aircraft may present challenges because it will comprise multiple stand-alone plans, and critical planning information and analysis on different types of assets will be spread across different documents. NOAA is in the early stages of some of these planning efforts and has not yet determined how, or whether, it will link and integrate the plans with one another to ensure that they will serve as a comprehensive plan. NOAA has faced challenges in finalizing a capital planning effort in the past. In 2009, NOAA leadership suspended a planning effort intended to address the agency's future aircraft needs in order to incorporate additional aircraft-related information, according to NOAA officials; the agency subsequently began its current planning effort 4 years later, in 2013. The importance of a capital asset plan is underscored by the significant decisions NOAA faces regarding its aircraft fleet, particularly its two operating P-3 Orion aircraft that are in high demand for hurricane work (see fig.). For example, given that the P-3 Orion aircraft are nearly 40 years old, NOAA faces decisions on whether to invest in additional costly service life extensions or replace the aircraft. Linking and integrating its multiple planning efforts could help NOAA demonstrate that it has a capital asset plan consistent with OMB guidance. Without a capital asset plan in place, NOAA risks making decisions that will not allow the agency to effectively address future challenges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the NOAA Administrator ensure that the agency links and integrates its multiple planning efforts as it finalizes a comprehensive capital asset plan for aircraft. NOAA concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-171 | gao_T-AIMD-00-171_0 | The damage resulting from this particular hybrid— which includes overwhelmed e-mail systems and lost files–is limited to users of the Microsoft Windows operating system. ILOVEYOU typically comes in the form of an e-mail message from someone the recipient knows with an attachment called LOVE-LETTER- FOR-YOU.TXT.VBS. The attachment is a Visual Basic Script (VBS) file.As long as recipients do not run the attached file, their systems will not be affected and they need only to delete the e-mail and its attachment. Most agencies do not develop security plans for major systems based on risk, have not formally documented security policies, and have not implemented programs for testing and evaluating the effectiveness of controls they rely on. These are fundamental activities that allow an organization to manage its information security risks cost-effectively rather than by reacting to individual problems ad hoc. Second, agencies often lack effective access controls to their computer resources (data, equipment, and facilities) and, as a result, are unable to protect these assets against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure. These controls would normally include physical protections such as gates and guards and logical controls, which are controls built into software that (1) require users to authenticate themselves through passwords or other identifiers and (2) limit the files and other resources that an authenticated user can access and the actions that he or she can take. For example, testing procedures are undisciplined and do not ensure that implemented software operates as intended, and access to software program libraries is inadequately controlled. We commonly find that computer programmers and operators are authorized to perform a wide variety of duties, such as independently writing, testing, and approving program changes. This, in turn, provides them with the ability to independently modify, circumvent, and disable system security features. Fifth, our reviews frequently identify systems with insufficiently restricted access to the powerful programs and sensitive files associated with the computer system’s operation, e.g., operating systems, system utilities, security software, and database management system. Such free access makes it possible for knowledgeable individuals to disable or circumvent controls. Sixth, we have found that service continuity controls are incomplete and often not fully tested for ensuring that critical operations can continue when unexpected events (such as a temporary power failure, accidental loss of files, major disaster such as a fire, or malicious disruptions) occur. Actions Needed to Prepare for Future Computer Attacks
Agencies can act immediately to address the weaknesses I just described and thereby reduce their vulnerability to computer attacks, including the ILOVEYOU worm/virus. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the "ILOVEYOU" computer virus, focusing on the need for agency and governmentwide improvements in information security.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) ILOVEYOU is both a virus and a worm; (2) the damage resulting from this particular hybrid is limited to users of the Microsoft Windows operating system; (3) ILOVEYOU typically comes in the form of an electronic mail (e-mail) message from someone the recipient knows; (4) as long as recipients do not run the attached file, their systems will not be affected and they need only to delete the e-mail and its attachment; (5) if opened, the ILOVEYOU can spread and infect systems by sending itself to everyone in the recipient's address book; (6) there are areas of management and general control that are integral to improving problems in information security; (7) most agencies do not develop security plans for major systems based on risk, have not formally documented security policies, and have not implemented programs for testing and evaluating the effectiveness of controls they rely on; (8) these are fundamental activities that allow an organization to manage its information security risks cost-effectively rather than by reacting to individual problems ad hoc; (9) agencies often lack effective access controls to their computer resources and, as a result, are unable to protect these assets against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure; (10) these controls would normally include physical protections such as gates and guards and logical controls, which are controls built into software that: (a) require users to authenticate themselves through passwords or other identifiers; and (b) limit the files and other resources that an authenticated user can access and the actions that he or she can take; (11) testing procedures are undisciplined and do not ensure that implemented software operates as intended, and access to software program libraries is inadequately controlled; (12) GAO found that computer programmers and operators are authorized to perform a wide variety of duties; (13) this, in turn, provides them with the ability to independently modify, circumvent, and disable system security features; (14) GAO's reviews frequently identify systems with insufficiently restricted access to the powerful programs and sensitive files associated with the computer system's operation; (15) such free access makes it possible for knowledgeable individuals to disable or circumvent controls; (16) service continuity controls are incomplete and often not fully tested for ensuring that critical operations can continue when unexpected events occur; and (17) agencies can act immediately to address computer weaknesses and reduce their vulnerability to computer attacks. |
gao_GAO-03-440 | gao_GAO-03-440_0 | The effect of not describing a neutral rating in the solicitation was mitigated in most of these cases, however. The 12 procurements that were based on a tradeoff source selection process generally complied with FAR requirements on proposal evaluations. DSCP has employed several techniques to promote compliance with best value contracting procedures. First, to provide its contracting personnel with detailed procedures for competitive negotiated procurements, DSCP developed and published in 1996 its own Guiding Principles for Best Value Source Selection, known as the “Best Value Handbook.” The handbook outlines the functions and responsibilities of key personnel in the best value source selection process as well as various approaches to source selection that are available for use. DLA Views Clothing and Textile Supplier Base as Uncertain
DLA officials view the future of the clothing and textile supplier base as uncertain. They noted that the Berry Amendment, which requires DOD to purchase certain items such as food, clothing, and textiles from domestic sources, helps maintain a domestic supplier base to meet some of DOD’s unique military requirements. However, they stated that this increase in competition among domestic suppliers is the “last gasp of a dying industry.” An increasing number of domestic suppliers are competing for DSCP’s clothing and textile contracts for a variety of reasons as the industry copes with a decline in employment and production, consolidations and bankruptcies, increased imports, and domestic suppliers moving overseas. According to DSCP officials, the implementation of free trade agreements and the removal of the quotas may threaten second- and third-tier suppliers. In those situations that involve critical military clothing and textile items, DSCP officials said that DLA, in the future, could strengthen the supplier base by increasingly providing contracts to a number of suppliers for national defense purposes to achieve industrial mobilization. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP) Directorate of Clothing and Textiles complied with selected statutory and regulatory guidance for best value contracting, including the use of past performance as an evaluation factor, we took a random sample of 15 of the 142 competed clothing and textile procurements in fiscal year 2001, each exceeding $100,000. Finally, we reviewed DSCP’s 1996 Guiding Principles for Best Value Source Selection, known as the “Best Value Handbook.”
To obtain DLA’s views on the domestic supplier base for clothing and textiles, we contacted DLA officials from DSCP. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supplies the nation's military services and certain civilian agencies with critical resources needed to accomplish their worldwide missions. During fiscal year 2001, DLA contracts totaled $14.8 billion--$1.2 billion of which was for clothing and textiles. The House Committee on Armed Services directed GAO to determine whether DLA is properly implementing applicable statutory and regulatory guidance for "best value" purchases--those that in the federal government's view provide the greatest overall benefits, not just the lowest price. GAO was also asked to obtain DLA officials' views on the domestic supplier base for key clothing and textile items.
What GAO Found
Based on a random sample of clothing and textile procurements conducted in fiscal year 2001 by DLA's Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP), GAO estimates that DSCP generally complied with statutory and regulatory requirements for best value contracting. For example, all of the procurements in GAO's sample considered past performance as an evaluation factor in the source selection process. While GAO noted some discrepancies in several of these procurements, mitigating circumstances lessened the impact of the discrepancies in most cases. DSCP has employed several techniques to promote compliance with best value contracting procedures. For example, in 1996, DSCP published Guiding Principles for Best Value Source Selection, a handbook that outlines the functions and responsibilities of key personnel in the best value source selection process, as well as various approaches to source selection. According to DLA officials at DSCP, the ability of the domestic clothing and textile supplier base to meet future military requirements is uncertain. The officials said that, at present, DLA's domestic supplier base for clothing and textiles is more robust than ever, as numerous domestic suppliers who did not traditionally do business with DSCP are now competing for its contracts. However, they characterized this increased competition as the "last gasp of a dying industry." Domestic clothing and textile suppliers are competing for DSCP's business as the industry copes with a decline in employment and production and as the supplier base increasingly moves overseas. DSCP officials fear that as the clothing and textile industry faces increased imports, second- and third-tier suppliers that provide input to domestic producers of end items may go out of business, thus eroding the domestic supplier base for these items. They stated, however, that the "Berry Amendment," which requires DOD to purchase certain items such as food, clothing, and textiles from domestic sources, is helping to maintain the domestic supplier base at present. |
gao_GGD-99-291 | gao_GGD-99-291_0 | This original budget request reflected the bureau’s plan to gather information based in part on using statistical estimation for nonresponding households and to adjust for undercounting and other coverage errors. Key Assumption—Increased Workload
An assumed increase in workload substantially increased costs in the fiscal year 2000 amended budget request for enumerator and support salaries, benefits, travel, data capture requirements, infrastructure, and supplies. Because of the increased workload and reduced productivity, the bureau increased the total number of temporary field positions from the 780,000 estimated in the original budget to 1,350,000. Components of the $1.7 Billion Increase Related and Unrelated to the Sampling Issue
According to the bureau, about $1.6 billion of the $1.7 billion requested increase is related to the inability to use statistical sampling, and the remaining $104 million is not related. Unrelated items include costs not included in the original budget request and revisions of prior estimates. Process Used to Develop the Fiscal Year 2000 Amended Budget Request
To develop the amended fiscal year 2000 budget request, the bureau used a model that consisted of an extensive set of interrelated software spreadsheets. Both the original and amended budget requests were developed with this cost model, with each estimate being developed independently using different versions of the cost model. As shown in table 1, the bureau derived the $1.7 billion requested increase by calculating the net difference between the original budget request of $2.8 billion and the amended budget request of $4.5 billion. Because the reported productivity rate from the 1990 census was 1.56 and the assumption used in the original budget was 1.28, we conclude that the 1.03 assumption used in the amended budget request, which covers not only the additional 16 million housing units now planned to be enumerated but also the 30 million housing units to be enumerated in the original budget, is very conservative—or a “worst case scenario.” Should the bureau’s productivity assumption prove to be more or less than 1.03 housing units per hour, the bureau’s fiscal year 2000 amended budget request could differ substantially from the bureau’s needs. Objectives
Provide an overall analysis of the key changes in assumptions resulting in the $1.7 billion requested increase. Provide details on the components of the $1.7 billion requested increase and which changes, according to the bureau, are related and which are not related to the inability to use statistical sampling. The net $1.7 billion requested increase in the bureau’s original fiscal year 2000 budget request resulted primarily from changes in assumptions relating to reduced employee productivity, and increased advertising. Of the 16 million additional visits
12 million are for following up on nonresponding households, and
4 million are for housing units the bureau plans to visit because the Postal Service believes they are vacant or nonexistent. According to the bureau, this advertising is intended to increase public awareness of the census and hopefully increase the mail response rate. Most of this increase relates to visiting households that did not mail back a census questionnaire. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Bureau of the Census' fiscal year (FY) 2000 budget, focusing on: (1) an overall analysis of the key changes in assumptions resulting in the $1.7 billion request increase; (2) details on the components of this increase and which changes, according to the bureau, are related and which are not related to the inability to use statistical sampling; and (3) the process the bureau used for developing the increase in the original FY 2000 budget request and the amended budget request.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO found that the net $1.7 billion requested increase in the original FY 2000 budget request of $2.8 billion resulted primarily from changes in assumptions relating to a substantial increase in workload, reduced employee productivity, and increased advertising; (2) under the nonsampling design, census costs will increase because the bureau expects to follow up on more nonresponding households than for a sampling-based census and plans to use additional programs to improve coverage because it cannot rely on statistical methods to adjust for undercounting and other coverage errors; (3) the bureau assumes an increased workload because the housing units that the bureau expects to visit have increased from an estimated 30 million to 46 million; (4) the 16 million increase includes visiting 12 million additional nonresponding housing units and 4 million additional housing units that the Postal Service says are vacant or nonexistent; (5) this increased workload, which increased costs for most bureau program activities, relates primarily to additional salaries, benefits, travel, data processing, infrastructure, and supplies; (6) another key factor substantially increasing the FY 2000 budget request is that the bureau reduced the assumed productivity of its temporary enumerator employees; (7) because of the assumed increase in workload and reduction in productivity, the total number of temporary field positions increased from 780,000 in the original budget to 1,350,000 in the amended budget request; (8) the bureau also included nearly $72 million of advertising in the amended budget request to increase public awareness and hopefully increase response rates for mailed questionnaires; (9) according to the bureau, about $1.6 billion of this increase is related and $100 million is not related to the inability to use statistical sampling; (10) the items unrelated to the sampling issue include costs not included in the original budget and revisions of prior estimates; (11) the bureau developed its $4.5 billion amended budget request for FY 2000 using a cost model consisting of a series of interrelated software spreadsheets; (12) the original and amended budget requests were developed using this cost model, with each estimate being developed independently using different versions of the cost model; and (13) the bureau derived the $1.7 billion requested increase by calculating the net difference between the original budget request of $2.8 billion and the amended budget request of $4.5 billion. |
gao_GGD-95-156 | gao_GGD-95-156_0 | Since then, the suspicious transaction reports have taken on a number of different formats that are filed with various law enforcement and regulatory agencies at both the state and federal levels. Although the implementing regulations of the act require four types of reports, the report filed most frequently is the Currency Transaction Report (CTR). CTRs are filed on an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) form 4789, which is to be sent to the IRS Detroit Computing Center in Michigan. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were requested by the then Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, to review the manner in which suspicious activities that relate to possible money laundering are reported by determining how banks and other financial institutions report suspicious transactions, to whom the transactions are reported, the volume of reports made, how the reports are used, and whether the process can be improved. Consequently, there is no way to determine why the transaction was considered suspicious. However, table 2.3 provides additional information concerning these institutions. 1, p. 14)
Each of the financial regulatory agencies requires its own form be used for the report. IRS Has Had Success in Using Reports of Suspicious Transactions
As discussed in chapter 2, district offices of IRS’ Criminal Investigation Division receive reports of suspicious transactions in several different ways. IRS does not keep records on how useful suspicious transaction reports have been in this regard. Consequently, states can use the data only on a reactive basis—that is, when they already have the name of a suspect. Nine of these states said they use the information to initiate criminal investigations. However, the lack of overall direction and control over the reporting of suspicious transactions has led to a situation where reports are filed with different agencies on different forms that vary as to the amount of useful information they contain. Because IRS cannot be certain the information is used and managed consistently, it has no assurance that the information is being used to its full potential throughout the Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on money laundering activities, focusing on: (1) how suspicious transactions are reported; (2) how currency transactions reports are used by law enforcement agencies; and (3) whether the reporting process can be improved.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) financial institutions file reports of suspicious transactions each year on various forms to various agencies, leading to the initiation of major investigations into various types of criminal activity; (2) there is no way of ensuring that the information is being used to its full potential, since there is no overall control or coordination of the reports; (3) the form that is filed most frequently is filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and kept on a centralized database, but the form is only useful in providing additional information on an investigation that has already been initiated; (4) other forms used to report suspicious transactions contain more useful information but, since they are filed with six different agencies and are not kept on a centralized database, they cannot be used on a reactive basis; (5) IRS has not developed agencywide procedures for managing suspicious transaction reports, resulting in varied use of the reports among 35 district offices; (6) 9 of the 15 states that receive copies of suspicious transaction reports use the information to initiate criminal investigations; and (7) the Department of the Treasury and IRS have agreed to substantial changes regarding how suspicious transactions are to be reported, how the information is to be used, and how to improve the reports' contributions at both the federal and state levels. |
gao_AIMD-95-8 | gao_AIMD-95-8_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether loan loss reserve methodologies used by insured depository institutions resulted in reserve amounts that were justified by supporting analysis and comparable among institutions and accounting standards provided by FASB and regulatory guidance provided by OCC, FRB, FDIC, and OTS were sufficient to promote fair and consistent financial reporting of loan loss reserves among depository institutions. Loan Loss Reserves Were Incomparable and Included Large Unjustified Amounts
The 12 depository institutions we reviewed used markedly different methods to establish their loan loss reserves, which resulted in incomparable reserves, and, in most cases, significant portions of their reserves were not justified by supporting analyses. Loan loss reserves that cannot be compared or that misrepresent risks in loan portfolios impede investors, creditors, depositors, regulators, and other users of financial reports from understanding the true financial condition of depository institutions. All of the institutions used historical losses to establish reserves for loans that were not individually assessed. Thus, significant amounts of the reserves of most of the institutions were based on historical losses. However, because the methods used to determine and apply these historical losses varied widely the resultant reserve amounts were not comparable among the institutions. The build-up of the supplemental reserve not only masks the improvement in the condition of the loan portfolio during years 1 through 3, but also enables the institution to conceal the significant increase in loss exposure which occurs during years 4 and 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the methods that federally insured depository institutions used to establish loan loss reserves, focusing on whether: (1) the reserve amounts were justified by supporting analysis and comparable among institutions; and (2) accounting standards and regulatory guidance were sufficient to promote fair and consistent financial reporting of loan loss reserves among depository institutions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) case studies showed that the depository institutions maintained significant amounts of unsupported loan loss reserves, particularly large supplemental reserves that were not linked to loss exposure; (2) most of the institutions' loan loss reserves were not justified by supporting analysis and were not comparable among institutions; (3) the institutions' reserving methods varied greatly regarding the use of individual loan assessment results, determination and use of historical loss experience, and the inclusion of supplemental reserves; (4) financial report users could not compare the adequacy of the institutions' reserves or judge the quality of their loan portfolios; (5) unjustified supplemental reserves could cushion changes in the condition of the loan portfolio and mask the institutions' true financial status, which in turn could impede regulators' oversight; and (6) there was no regulatory guidance for establishing loan loss reserves, which gave the institutions excessive flexibility in how they calculated their loss reserves. |
gao_GAO-06-676 | gao_GAO-06-676_0 | Contractors and Medicaid Agencies Commonly Outsource Domestically; Some Vendors Outsource Offshore, but Full Extent of Offshoring Is Unknown
A majority of the federal contractors and state Medicaid agencies we surveyed engage domestic vendors to perform services involving personal health information, but rarely transfer personal health information directly offshore. No Medicare FFS contractors or TRICARE contractors reported direct offshore outsourcing. Some Domestic Vendors Outsource Offshore, but Full Extent of Data Transfers Is Unknown
Although only one federal contractor and one state Medicaid agency reported transferring personal health information directly to an offshore vendor, contractors and Medicaid agencies also reported offshore outsourcing through the activities of their domestic vendors. No TRICARE contractors reported offshore outsourcing by their domestic vendors. When asked about their three largest domestic vendors, 57 percent of Medicare Advantage contractors reported that they did not know whether these vendors further transferred personal health information. TMA requires reports of privacy breaches from all of its contractors. Many Federal Contractors and State Medicaid Agencies Reported a Breach of Data Privacy
In responding to our survey, over 40 percent of federal contractors and state Medicaid agencies indicated that they, or one of their vendors, experienced a privacy breach involving personal health information in 2004 or 2005. Among Medicare Advantage contractors, 47 percent reported recent privacy breaches, as did 42 percent of Medicare FFS contractors, 44 percent of Medicaid agencies, and 38 percent of TRICARE contractors. TMA officials said that the agency analyzes trends in the monthly reports and follows up with federal contractors that report recurring lapses in privacy. In May 2005, CMS began requiring Medicare FFS contractors—but not Medicare Advantage contractors or Medicaid agencies—to report privacy breaches. In this report we (1) examined the extent to which the Medicare and TRICARE federal contractors and state Medicaid agencies outsource—domestically or offshore—services involving the use of personal health information; (2) identified measures recommended by privacy experts for safeguarding outsourced personal information and examined use of these measures by the federal contractors and state Medicaid agencies; and (3) determined whether the federal contractors and state Medicaid agencies have experienced privacy breaches and whether the federal agencies that oversee Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE require notice from them when privacy breaches occur. The federal contractors included in our survey were all those that held contracts with the Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Department of Defense’s TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) to participate in these programs at the national level, as of January 2005. Survey response rates ranged from 69 percent (Medicare Advantage contractors) to 80 percent (state Medicaid agencies). To obtain information on federal agencies’ requirements for notification of privacy breaches experienced by the federal contractors and state Medicaid agencies, we interviewed officials at TMA and CMS—the federal agency with oversight responsibility for Medicare and Medicaid. We did not provide a definition of privacy breach in the survey. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal contractors and state Medicaid agencies are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE programs. Because these entities may contract with vendors to perform services involving the use of personal health data, outsourcing and privacy protections are of interest. GAO surveyed all federal Medicare and TRICARE contractors and all state Medicaid agencies (a combined total of 378 entities) to examine whether they (1) outsource services--domestically or offshore--and (2) must notify federal agencies when privacy breaches occur. Survey response rates ranged from 69 percent for Medicare Advantage contractors to 80 percent for Medicaid agencies. GAO interviewed officials at the Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees Medicare and Medicaid, and the Department of Defense's TRICARE Management Activity (TMA), which oversees TRICARE.
What GAO Found
Federal contractors and state Medicaid agencies widely reported domestic outsourcing of services involving the use of personal health information but little direct offshore outsourcing. Among those that completed GAO's survey, more than 90 percent of Medicare contractors and state Medicaid agencies and 63 percent of TRICARE contractors reported some domestic outsourcing in 2005. Typically, survey groups reported engaging from 3 to 20 U.S. vendors (commonly known as subcontractors). One federal contractor and one state Medicaid agency reported outsourcing services directly offshore. However, some federal contractors and state Medicaid agencies also knew that their domestic vendors had initiated offshore outsourcing. Thirty-three Medicare Advantage contractors, 2 Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) contractors, and 1 Medicaid agency indicated that their domestic vendors transfer personal health information offshore, although they did not provide information about the scope of personal information transferred offshore. Moreover, the reported extent of offshore outsourcing by vendors may be understated because many federal contractors and agencies did not know whether their domestic vendors transferred personal health information to other locations or vendors. In responding to GAO's survey, over 40 percent of the federal contractors and state Medicaid agencies reported that they experienced a recent privacy breach involving personal health information. (The frequency or severity of these breaches was not reported.) By survey group, 47 percent of Medicare Advantage contractors reported privacy breaches within the past 2 years, as did 44 percent of Medicaid agencies, 42 percent of Medicare FFS contractors, and 38 percent of TRICARE contractors. TMA and CMS differ in their requirements for notification of privacy breaches. TMA requires monthly reports on privacy breaches from its TRICARE contractors and follows up with contractors that report recurring lapses in privacy. While CMS requires Medicare FFS contractors to report privacy breaches within 30 days of discovery, such oversight is lacking for privacy breaches that may occur with personal health information held by state Medicaid agencies and Medicare Advantage contractors, as CMS does not require reports of privacy breaches from these entities. |
gao_GAO-06-862 | gao_GAO-06-862_0 | An Estimated 13 Percent of Medicaid Beneficiaries Have Private Health Coverage
On the basis of self-reported health coverage information from the Census Bureau’s annual CPS covering the 2002 through 2004 time period, an average of 13 percent of respondents who reported having Medicaid coverage for the entire year also reported having private health coverage at some time during the same year. Most often, the source of private health coverage was an employer or union. States Face Problems in Verifying Coverage and in Collecting from Third Parties
Problems states face in ensuring that Medicaid is the payer of last resort fall into two broad categories: problems verifying whether beneficiaries have private health coverage and problems collecting payments (or “paying and chasing”) when such coverage exists. Third-party liability provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act could help address some of these problems, although two issues require resolution in order to aid states as they implement the act. Nevertheless, state officials often told us, one of the top three problems they faced in ensuring that Medicaid was the payer of last resort was related to verifying beneficiaries’ other coverage. For example, the new law adds to the existing list of entities that may be considered third parties certain entities that were previously not specifically listed, including “self-insured plans”; “managed care organizations”; “pharmacy benefit managers”; and “other parties that are, by statute, contract, or agreement, legally responsible for payment of a claim for a health care item or service.” In addition, the law requires states to have in effect laws requiring certain specified entities, as a condition of doing business in their state, to provide the state, upon request, with coverage and other data, including information on the nature of coverage and the periods of time during which individuals or their spouses or dependents were covered; accept the states’ right of recovery for services and assignment of a Medicaid enrollee’s right to payment by those entities or organizations; respond to inquiries by the state regarding a claim for payment submitted within 3 years after the date a service was provided; and agree not to deny a claim submitted by the state solely on the basis of the date of submission of the claim, the type or format of the claim form, or failure to provide proper documentation at the time of service, as long as the claim is submitted by the state within 3 years of the service date and the state enforces its rights with respect to the claim within 6 years of submitting it. Because the Deficit Reduction Act requires states to have legislation in effect to implement the new provisions, it is too soon to assess the extent to which the act will address the problems that states reported to us. Further, we identified two issues that require resolution in order to aid states in complying with the act’s requirements: First, the time frame by which states must have their laws in effect is uncertain because of an apparent inconsistency within the Deficit Reduction Act concerning the effective date of that provision. With regard to both provisions, in June 2006, CMS officials said that they were determining how best to help states implement the new requirements. States have a key role in Medicaid’s successful administration, including efforts to ensure, as Congress intended, that Medicaid does not pay for services when other sources of health care coverage are available. With an estimated 13 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries having private health coverage available to them, significant savings can accrue to both the federal government and the states when states are able to avoid costs and recover payments from liable third parties. In addition, CPS underreports Medicaid coverage compared with enrollment and participation data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, jointly funded by the federal government and the states, finances health care for about 56 million low-income people at an estimated total cost of about $298 billion in fiscal year 2004. Congress intended Medicaid to be the payer of last resort: if Medicaid beneficiaries have another source of health care coverage--such as private health insurance or a health plan purchased individually or provided through an employer--that source, to the extent of its liability, should pay before Medicaid does. This concept is referred to as "third-party liability." When such coverage is used, savings accrue to the federal government and the states. Using data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the states, GAO examined (1) the extent to which Medicaid beneficiaries have private health coverage and (2) problems states face in ensuring that Medicaid is the payer of last resort, including the extent to which the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 may help address these problems.
What GAO Found
On the basis of self-reported health coverage information from the Census Bureau's annual Current Population Surveys covering the 2002 through 2004 time period, an average of 13 percent of respondents who reported having Medicaid coverage for the entire year also reported having private health coverage at some time during the same year. This coverage most often was obtained through employment rather than purchased by individuals directly from an insurer: employment-based coverage averaged 11 percent nationwide, while individual coverage averaged 2 percent. Problems states have faced in ensuring that Medicaid is the payer of last resort fall into two general categories: verifying Medicaid beneficiaries' private health coverage and collecting payments from third parties. Officials from 27 of 39 states responding to GAO's request for information about the top three problems they faced reported problems in verifying beneficiaries' private health coverage--a key step states must take to avoid paying claims for which a third party is liable. In cases where states have paid claims before identifying that other coverage was available, states must seek payment for the claims they have already paid. Officials from 35 responding states had problems collecting such payments. Provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 require states to have laws in effect that could help address some of the reported problems, but it is too soon to assess the extent to which the problems will be addressed. Further, GAO identified two issues that require resolution in order to aid states in complying with the Deficit Reduction Act's requirements, specifically, (1) the time frame by which states must have their laws in effect, and (2) which entities are subject to certain of the act's requirements. Regarding both issues, officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees Medicaid, said in June 2006 that they were considering how to interpret the law and how to best provide guidance to states to help them implement the requirements. |
gao_GAO-06-482T | gao_GAO-06-482T_0 | For each program and activity agencies identify as susceptible, the act requires them to estimate the annual amount of improper payments and submit those estimates to the Congress. A-136 includes requirements for agencies to report on their risk assessments; annual improper payment estimates; corrective action plans; and recovery auditing efforts, including the amounts recovered in the current year. Specifically, we reported that while progress had been made to reduce improper payments, significant challenges remain to effectively achieve the goals of IPIA. Some Agencies Still Have Not Assessed All Programs and Activities for Risk of Improper Payments
We reviewed the fiscal year 2005 PARs or annual reports for 32 of the 35 federal agencies that the Treasury determined to be significant to the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements. This was the second consecutive year that the auditor reported IPIA noncompliance for DHS. This represents almost a $7 billion, or 16 percent, decrease in the amount of improper payments reported by 17 agencies in fiscal year 2004. However, the magnitude of the governmentwide improper payment problem remains unknown. This is because, in addition to not assessing all programs, some agencies had not yet prepared estimates of significant improper payments for all programs determined to be at risk. Specifically, of the 32 agency PARs included in our review, 18 agencies reported improper payment estimates totaling in excess of $38 billion for some or all of their high-risk programs. Of the remaining 14 agencies that did not report estimates, 8 said they did not have any programs susceptible to significant improper payments, 5 were silent about whether they had programs susceptible to significant improper payments, and the remaining 1 identified programs susceptible to significant improper payments and said it plans to report an estimate by fiscal year 2007. Therefore, the federal government’s progress in reducing improper payments may be exaggerated because the reported improper payments decrease in the Medicare program accounts for the bulk of the overall reduction in the governmentwide improper payments estimate. Agency auditors have reported major management challenges related to agencies’ improper payment estimating methodologies and highlighted internal control weaknesses that continue to plague programs susceptible to significant improper payments. Specifically, in addition to the prior year requirements, agencies that entered into contracts with a total value exceeding $500 million annually were required to discuss any contract types excluded from review and justification for doing so. From these reviews, agencies reported identifying about $557 million in improper payments for recovery and reported actually recovering about $467 million, as shown in table 2. Federal Agency Improper Payment Estimate Reporting in Fiscal Year 2005
Improper Payment Estimates Reported in Agency Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 PARs or Annual Reports
Programs that the agency reported were not susceptible to significant improper 38. Financial Management: Challenges in Meeting Requirements of the Improper Payments Information Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improper payments are a longstanding, widespread, and significant problem in the federal government. The Congress enacted the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) to address this issue. Fiscal year 2005 marked the second year that federal agencies governmentwide were required to report improper payment information under IPIA. One result of IPIA has been increased visibility over improper payments by requiring federal agencies to identify programs and activities susceptible to improper payments, estimate the amount of their improper payments, and report on the amounts of improper payments and their actions to reduce them in their annual performance and accountability reports (PAR). GAO was asked to testify on the progress being made by agencies in complying with requirements of IPIA and the magnitude of improper payments. As part of the review, GAO looked at (1) the extent to which agencies have performed risk assessments, (2) the annual amount of improper payments estimated, and (3) the amount of improper payments recouped through recovery audits.
What GAO Found
The federal government continues to make progress in identifying programs susceptible to the risk of improper payments in addressing the new IPIA requirements. At the same time, significant challenges remain to effectively achieve the goals of IPIA. The 32 fiscal year 2005 PARs GAO reviewed show that some agencies still have not instituted systematic methods of reviewing all programs and activities, have not identified all programs susceptible to significant improper payments, or have not annually estimated improper payments for their high-risk programs as required by the act. The full magnitude of the problem remains unknown because some agencies have not yet prepared estimates of improper payments for all of their programs. Of the 32 agencies reviewed, 18 reported over $38 billion of improper payments in 57 programs. This represented almost a $7 billion, or 16 percent, decrease in the amount of improper payments reported by 17 agencies in fiscal year 2004. However, the governmentwide improper payments estimate does not include 7 major agency programs with outlays totaling about $228 billion. Further, agency auditors have identified major management challenges related to agencies' improper payment estimating methodologies and significant internal control weaknesses for programs susceptible to significant improper payments. In addition, two agency auditors cited noncompliance with IPIA in their annual audit reports. For fiscal year 2005 PARs, agencies that entered into contracts with a total value exceeding $500 million annually were required to report additional information on their recovery audit efforts. Nineteen agencies reported reviewing over $300 billion in vendor payments, identifying approximately $557 million to be recovered, and actually recovering about $467 million. |
gao_GAO-14-546 | gao_GAO-14-546_0 | International Civil Service Commission (ICSC). Joint Staff Pension Fund Board. While the UN and the U.S. Government Offer Generally Similar Benefits and Allowances, Each Provides Certain Benefits and Allowances with Higher Monetary Values than the Other
Benefits and allowances offered by the UN and the U.S. government are generally similar, and each provides certain benefits or allowances with greater monetary value than the other. Similar UN and U.S. benefits include retirement plans and health insurance for staff and retirees, while similar allowances include hardship pay and education grants. Where comparable data were available, our comparisons of UN and U.S. government benefits and allowances show that each entity provided some benefits or allowances of greater monetary value than those provided by the other. Second, UN staff generally earn higher salaries than U.S. civil service employees in comparable jobs. The UN Has Begun to Address Concerns about the Long-Term Sustainability of Rising Compensation Costs, but Its Review of Total Compensation Does Not Incorporate Key Elements
The UN has begun to take action to address concerns about the long- term sustainability of its rising total compensation costs, but its ongoing effort to review total compensation does not incorporate the costs of key elements, such as pensions and health insurance. According to budget data provided by the UN Secretariat, staff-related expenditures rose steadily from $1.95 billion in 2002-2003 to $2.98 billion in 2010-2011, at an average rate of about 7 percent per 2-year budget, when adjusted for inflation. We previously reported that the margin between UN and U.S. civil service salaries increased from 109.3 percent in 2002 to 116.9 percent in 2012.again to 119.6 percent, also raising the 5-year average above 115 percent to 115.7 percent. For instance, to address the rising costs of salaries and allowances, the General Assembly and the ICSC have taken steps such as freezing allowance amounts for at least 1 year, freezing the post adjustment for New York in 2014, raising the retirement age for new hires from 62 to 65, and conducting a review of the UN total compensation package for professional staff. In addition, the UN has initiated a review of its total compensation package. The study is scheduled for completion in 2015. The General Assembly’s 2013 resolution commenting on the ICSC’s total compensation review noted that the ICSC should review all elements of total compensation holistically, including both monetary and nonmonetary elements. ICSC officials told us that their review will focus only on the elements of compensation—salary and allowances—that are within their area of responsibility. Until all aspects of UN total compensation have been reviewed by the ICSC and other relevant entities, the General Assembly and member states will not have a comprehensive set of information with which to make fully informed decisions about proposed changes to address concerns about the compensation system. For example, the unfunded liability of the UN’s retiree health insurance plan was estimated in 2012 to be almost $4 billion. Recommendation for Executive Action
To assist member states in their oversight of the budgetary implications and financial sustainability of UN total compensation, the Secretary of State should work with other member states to ensure that the costs of key elements of total compensation are reviewed to address rising staff costs and sustainability. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to review the structure of United Nations (UN) total compensation, including benefits and allowances, and how it compares with that of U.S. government employees. In this report, we (1) examine similarities between the UN and U.S. government benefits and allowances and compare their monetary values, and (2) examine UN efforts to address concerns about the sustainability of total compensation costs. Appendix II: Additional Information on GAO’s Estimates of Income Replacement Rates for United Nations Staff and U.S. Federal Civilian Employees
To compare the UN and U.S. government retirement systems, we estimated income replacement rates for UN staff and U.S. federal civilian employees at various salary levels and under different scenarios, including varying years of UN or U.S. government employment and retirement contribution rates for U.S. federal civilian employees. See “Serving in a hardship duty station” above. | Why GAO Did This Study
The UN General Assembly has expressed concerns about the relatively large and growing portion of the UN budget spent on total compensation. The United States contributes 22 percent of the UN's regular budget.
UN total compensation consists of salary, benefits, and allowances. Since its inception in 1945, the UN has based salaries for its professional employees on salaries for the U.S. civil service. In 2013, GAO reported that the UN sets its salaries between 110 to 120 percent of U.S. civil service salaries, and that UN salaries were 116.9 percent of U.S. civil service salaries in 2012. UN salaries increased to 119.6 percent in 2013. GAO also recommended that the UN clarify its process for comparing salaries for UN professional staff with U.S. civil service salaries.
GAO was asked to review the structure of UN total compensation and how it compares with that of U.S. federal employees. This report (1) examines similarities between UN and U.S. government benefits and allowances and compares their monetary values, and (2) examines UN efforts to address concerns about the sustainability of total compensation costs. GAO reviewed UN and U.S. government documents and data, and interviewed UN and U.S. officials.
What GAO Found
Benefits and allowances offered by the United Nations (UN) and the U.S. government are generally similar, and GAO found that each provided certain benefits or allowances with greater monetary value than the other. Similar UN and U.S. benefits include retirement plans and health insurance, while similar allowances include hardship and danger pay. Where comparable data were available, GAO found that each organization provided some benefits or allowances of greater monetary value than the other. For example, under a scenario where UN and U.S. staff retire at 62 with 20 years of service, the U.S. Federal Employees Retirement System replaces a higher percentage of pre-retirement salary than the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund. However, when these staff retire with 30 years of service, similar percentages of pre-retirement salary are replaced. In contrast, the UN allowance for staff serving in dangerous duty stations with families at separate locations had a higher average monetary value per recipient in 2012 than the comparable U.S. allowance.
The UN has begun to address concerns about the sustainability of its rising total compensation costs, including initiating a review of total compensation, but that review does not include key elements. GAO analysis of UN data shows that staff-related expenditures rose steadily from $1.95 billion in 2002-2003 to $2.98 billion in 2010-2011, at an average rate of about 7 percent per 2-year budget, when adjusted for inflation. To help address costs, the UN raised its retirement age from 62 to 65 for new hires and froze rates paid for allowances for at least 1 year. In addition, the UN's International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) began a review of UN compensation, to be completed in 2015. The UN General Assembly requested that the ICSC review consider all elements of UN total compensation holistically, including both monetary and non-monetary elements. However, according to ICSC officials and documents, the review focuses only on elements within the ICSC's area of administrative responsibility, such as salary and allowances. Other key elements with significant costs, such as pensions and retiree health insurance, fall outside the ICSC's authority and therefore the study's focus. For example, the unfunded liability of the UN's retiree health insurance plan was estimated in 2012 at almost $4 billion. Without including all elements of total compensation in its review, member states will not have a complete set of information with which to make fully informed decisions about changes to the compensation system.
What GAO Recommends
The State Department (State) should work with other UN member states to ensure that the costs of key elements of UN total compensation are reviewed to address rising staff costs and sustainability. State concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-635T | gao_GAO-10-635T_0 | VA appointed fiduciaries who are not dependents or close family members can collect a fee for their services (generally up to 4 percent of a beneficiary’s annual benefit amount) and can oversee multiple beneficiaries. Inconsistent Compliance with Some Policies and Weaknesses in Others Hinder VA’s Ability to Safeguard Beneficiary Assets
Our February 2010 report noted that VA Fiduciary Program staff did not always take required actions within established time frames or document in the case files that the required actions were taken. Below are four areas where program staff did not always comply with program policies and, per our recommendations, how VA plans to address them. Initial Visits to Beneficiaries and Fiduciaries. Follow-Up Visits to Beneficiaries and Fiduciaries. In about 18 percent of the cases, however, VA did not conduct these required follow-up visits on time or provided insufficient documentation to show whether these visits were conducted at all. Annual Financial Reports. When fiduciaries do not submit their financial reports on time, staff are required to follow-up with them and document such actions in the beneficiaries’ files. The file did not indicate that any follow-up actions had occurred, although the case is now being investigated for possible misuse of funds. Surety Bonds. For example, VA stated that it would roll out additional training for staff in March of this year and expects to hold a manager’s training conference later in the year. The agency also intends to revise the program’s policy manual this year to clarify existing guidance, establish new policies and procedures, and enhance oversight of fiduciary activities. In addition to compliance issues, we identified weaknesses in VA’s policy for conducting periodic on-site reviews of professional fiduciaries who manage funds for multiple beneficiaries. This computer match is based on a fiduciary’s name, rather than a unique identifier, such as the fiduciary’s Social Security number (SSN) or tax identification number (TIN). We also found that VA lacks a nationwide quality review process to ensure that on-site reviews are conducted properly and consistently. While VA has quality review processes to ensure that actions—such as conducting initial visits and obtaining financial reports and bonds—are carried out in accordance with VA policies, Central Office managers acknowledged that VA lacks a similar process for on-site reviews. In addition, although VA policy requires that at least 25 percent of a fiduciary’s beneficiary case files (or up to 25 case files) be examined during the on-site reviews, we found that this threshold was not met in four instances. System Limitations and Insufficient Training Hamper Program Performance and Oversight; However, VA Is Taking Steps That May Help
We identified two key challenges that limit VA’s ability to improve Fiduciary Program performance and oversight. First, VA’s electronic fiduciary case management system does not provide sufficient information to managers and staff about their cases, and it is cumbersome to use. Second, some managers and staff may not have received sufficient training to ensure that they have the necessary expertise to effectively monitor individual fiduciaries and oversee the program. VA is taking steps to build expertise about the case management system and the program itself by developing additional standardized training and piloting a consolidated Fiduciary Program unit covering 14 western VA regional offices. The Fiduciary Beneficiary System (FBS), VA’s electronic fiduciary case management system, does not provide sufficient data to effectively manage the Fiduciary Program. Managers and staff in all three regional offices we visited said the Fiduciary Program is complex and requires a great deal of specialized knowledge to effectively monitor fiduciaries and provide program oversight. Central Office managers and staff also said that they hold monthly teleconferences and conduct periodic visits to individual Fiduciary Program units to discuss selected topics. Conclusions
One of VA’s most vulnerable populations—beneficiaries who are unable to manage their own financial affairs—rely on VA’s Fiduciary Program to ensure that their benefits are safeguarded. To better serve beneficiaries and protect their benefits, VA has taken or plans to take a number of actions intended to increase staff understanding and compliance with polices as well as enhance program oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) pays billions of dollars in compensation and pension benefits to disabled veterans and their dependents. For those beneficiaries who are unable to manage their own affairs, VA appoints a third party, called a fiduciary, to manage their VA funds. Congress, VA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) and GAO have noted that VA does not always have, or adhere to, effective policies for selecting and monitoring fiduciaries and therefore, does not fully safeguard the assets of beneficiaries in the Fiduciary Program. GAO was asked to discuss the Fiduciary Program and possible ways that it could be improved to better serve veterans, their families, and survivors. This statement is based on GAO's February 2010 report (GAO-10-241), which examined (1) VA policies and procedures for monitoring fiduciaries and safeguarding beneficiary assets and (2) challenges VA faces in improving program performance and oversight. To conduct that work, GAO reviewed program policies and relevant federal laws and regulations, analyzed a nationally representative random sample of case files, interviewed Central Office managers and staff, and conducted three site visits to Fiduciary Program offices, which accounted for 25 percent of program beneficiaries.
What GAO Found
Inconsistent staff compliance with some Fiduciary Program policies and weaknesses in others hinder VA's ability to effectively safeguard beneficiary assets; however, per GAO's recommendations, VA plans to take steps to improve the program. GAO found that VA did not always take required actions to monitor fiduciaries within established time frames or document in the beneficiary's case file that these actions were taken. Inconsistent staff compliance occurred in four areas: (1) initial visits to beneficiaries and fiduciaries, (2) follow-up visits to beneficiaries and fiduciaries, (3) follow up to obtain annual financial reports, and (4) oversight of surety bonds. For example, in about 18 percent of the cases GAO reviewed, VA was late in conducting required follow-up visits to monitor fiduciaries or did not provide sufficient documentation to show whether these visits were conducted. Similarly, while GAO estimated that about 39 percent of fiduciaries did not submit required annual financial reports on time, VA staff did not consistently follow-up with fiduciaries or failed to document actions that were taken. In addition to compliance issues, VA's policies for conducting on-site reviews of professional fiduciaries who manage funds for multiple beneficiaries do not ensure that these fiduciaries are effectively identified and monitored. For example, the agency's case management system uses the fiduciary's name - which may be entered inconsistently - to match them to beneficiaries, rather than requiring a unique identifier, such as a Social Security number. As a result, VA cannot always identify the fiduciaries that need to be reviewed. Moreover, VA does not have a nationwide quality review process to ensure that on-site reviews are conducted properly and consistently. Per GAO's February 2010 report recommendations, VA agreed to revise its Fiduciary program policies in an effort to enhance its oversight role, increase staff understanding and staff compliance, and better safeguard beneficiary assets. Two key challenges hinder VA's ability to improve Fiduciary Program performance and oversight, but VA has plans to address these challenges. First, managers and staff said that limitations with VA's electronic fiduciary case management system hinder their ability to capture key information. Per GAO's recommendation, VA has established a work group to evaluate alternative system modifications to meet the program's case management needs. Second, managers and staff indicated that training may not be sufficient to ensure that they have the expertise to properly carry out program responsibilities, as many of them had less than 2 years of program experience. In its response to GAO's recommendations, VA stated that it would begin providing additional standardized training for managers and staff this year. VA is also piloting a consolidated Fiduciary Program unit covering 14 VA regional offices to improve program performance and oversight. VA encountered a number of challenges during the pilot's implementation and has not yet evaluated it, but per our recommendation, plans to do so by September of this year. |
gao_GAO-15-589 | gao_GAO-15-589_0 | Services Have Opened Selected Positions and Occupations to Women, Are Determining Whether to Integrate Direct Ground-Combat Occupations, and Are Taking Steps to Identify and Mitigate Potential Challenges
The military services and SOCOM have opened selected positions and occupations to women since January 2013, and are in the process of determining whether to open the remaining direct ground-combat positions and occupations. The services and SOCOM also provided quarterly progress reports on their efforts to open closed positions and occupations to women, starting with the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. The services are working on integration plans for these positions and occupations that have been opened to women. Services and SOCOM Permitted to Recommend an Exception to Policy to Keep Positions Closed to Women
As an alternative to opening a position or occupation, the Secretary of Defense has permitted the services to recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense approve an exception As of May to policy to keep positions or occupations closed to women.2015, the Secretary of the Navy was the only military department Secretary to have recommended approval of an exception to policy. This study is scheduled to be completed by June 30, 2015. We compared the five elements to the services’ and SOCOM’s planned steps and methodologies in their studies and determined that their study plans contained steps that, if carried out as planned, potentially address all five elements, as summarized in figure 5. DOD Is Providing Oversight of Integration Efforts, but Has Not Developed Plans to Monitor Long-Term Progress in Integrating Women into Combat Positions
DOD has been tracking, monitoring, and providing oversight over the services’ and SOCOM’s efforts to integrate women into ground-combat positions, but has not developed plans to monitor long-term integration progress. Without ongoing monitoring of the services’ and SOCOM’s implementation progress in integrating previously closed positions and occupations, it will be difficult for DOD to have visibility over the extent to which the services and SOCOM are overcoming potential obstacles to integration and DOD will not have information for congressional decision makers about the department’s integration progress. In 2012, we assessed the military necessity of the Selective Service System and examined alternatives to its current structure. In our 2012 report, we recommended that DOD (1) evaluate DOD’s requirements for the Selective Service System in light of recent strategic guidance and report the results to Congress; and (2) establish a process of periodically reevaluating DOD’s requirements for the Selective Service System in light of changing threats, operating environments, and strategic guidance. Regarding the second recommendation, DOD had not taken action as of June 2015, but agreed that a thorough assessment of the issue was merited, and should include a review of the statutes and policies surrounding the current registration process and the potential to include the registration of women. Thus, we continue to believe that our 2012 recommendation has merit—that DOD should take the lead in conducting an evaluation of requirements for the Selective Service System and should establish a process of periodically reevaluating DOD’s requirements for the Selective Service System in light of changing threats, operating environments, and strategic guidance. Although OUSD(P&R) and Joint Staff have been tracking, monitoring, and providing oversight of the services’ and SOCOM’s integration efforts, they do not have plans to monitor the services’ implementation progress after January 2016, as newly opened positions are integrated. To determine the extent to which service efforts to validate gender-neutral occupational standards are consistent with statutory requirements and Joint Staff guidance, we identified requirements from statutes and Joint Staff guidance and compared these requirements against service plans for studies. However, the results from these studies are not yet completed; therefore, we could not assess the extent to which the completed studies will follow the planned steps and methodologies or report how results of the studies will be implemented. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 2001 more than 300,000 women have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, where more than 800 women have been wounded and more than 130 have died. A 1994 rule prohibited women from being assigned to many direct ground-combat units, but on January 24, 2013, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rescinded the rule and directed the military services to open closed positions and occupations to women by January 1, 2016.
Senate Report 113-176 had a provision for GAO to review the services' progress in opening closed positions and occupations to women. This report assesses the (1) status of service efforts to open positions and occupations to women, including steps to identify and mitigate potential challenges; (2) extent the services' efforts to validate gender-neutral occupational standards are consistent with statutory and Joint Staff requirements; and (3) extent DOD is tracking, monitoring, and providing oversight of the services' integration plans. GAO analyzed statutes, DOD guidance, and service reports and plans, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The military services and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have opened selected positions and occupations to women since January 2013, as shown in the table below, and are determining whether to open the remaining closed positions and occupations. The services and SOCOM also are conducting studies to identify and mitigate potential integration challenges in areas such as unit cohesion, women's health, and facilities. As of May 2015, the Secretary of the Navy was the only military department Secretary to recommend an exception to policy to keep positions closed to women on three classes of ships that are scheduled to be decommissioned, due in part to high retrofit costs.
The services and SOCOM are working to address statutory and Joint Staff requirements for validating gender-neutral occupational standards. GAO identified five elements required for standards validation. GAO compared these elements to the services' and SOCOM's planned methodologies and determined that their study plans contained steps that, if carried out as planned, potentially address all five elements. However, the services' and SOCOM's efforts are still underway; therefore, GAO could not assess the extent that the studies will follow the planned methodologies or report how the study results will be implemented.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been tracking, monitoring, and providing oversight of the services' and SOCOM's integration efforts, but does not have plans to monitor the services' implementation progress after January 2016 in integrating women into newly opened positions and occupations. While DOD requires the services and SOCOM to submit quarterly progress reports, this requirement ends in January 2016. Without ongoing monitoring of integration progress, it will be difficult for DOD to help the services overcome potential obstacles. Further, when opening positions to women, DOD must analyze the implications for how it meets certain resource needs. In 2012, GAO assessed the military necessity of the Selective Service System and examined alternatives to its structure. GAO recommended in 2012 that DOD establish a process of periodically reevaluating its requirements in light of changing threats, operating environments, and strategic guidance. DOD has not taken action to do this, but agreed that a thorough assessment of the issue was merited, and should include a review of the statutes and policies surrounding the registration process and the potential to include the registration of women. GAO continues to believe that DOD should establish a process of periodically reevaluating DOD's requirements for the Selective Service System.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop plans to monitor integration progress after January 2016. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation. GAO previously recommended that DOD establish a process of periodically reevaluating DOD's requirements for the Selective Service System. DOD has not taken action but GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid. |
gao_GAO-13-558 | gao_GAO-13-558_0 | In response to the earthquake, Congress provided more than $1.14 billion in reconstruction funds for Haiti in the Fiscal Year 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act. The Act required State to provide periodic reports to Congress on the program. Specifically, the Act required State to submit five reports to the Senate Committee on Appropriations, beginning in October 2010 and every 180 days thereafter until September 2012, on funding obligations and disbursements and program outputs and outcomes. Most of USAID’s 2010 Supplemental Funds Have Not Been Obligated or Disbursed, and State’s Reports to Congress Generally Met Requirements but Were Incomplete and Not Timely
As of March 31, 2013, the majority of supplemental funding for USAID’s program sector activities had not been obligated or disbursed. Of the $651 million in funding from the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act that USAID has allocated for bilateral earthquake reconstruction activities, USAID had obligated about $293 million (45 percent) and disbursed about $204 million (31 percent). In its periodic reports to Congress, State reported on the general amounts of supplemental funding obligated and disbursed, as required in the Act. State also included some anecdotal information on program outputs and outcomes, which the Act also required. However, State’s reports did not include, among other things, (1) a detailed program-by-program description of USAID’s activities; (2) a description, by goal and objective, and an assessment of the progress of U.S. programs; and (3) amounts of funding obligated and disbursed on the programs during the preceding 6 months, as directed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations in its report accompanying the Act. USAID Completed the Power Plant for Less Than Allocated but the Port Was Delayed; Their Sustainability Depends on the CIP’s Success
USAID has committed $170.3 million to construct a power plant and port to support the newly developed CIP, with mixed results to date. In June 2012, the USAID mission completed the first phase of the CIP power plant for $17.0 million, 11 percent less than the $19.1 million allocated, and in time to supply the first CIP tenant with power. Planning for the port is behind schedule and will result in port construction beginning at least 2 years later than initially planned. The mission has had a vacant port engineer position for more than 2 years, having made one unsuccessful attempt to fill this position prior to May 2013 when it issued a second solicitation to fill the position. The lack of port expertise at the mission has contributed to (1) unrealistic initial time frames, (2) delays in awarding the contract for a feasibility study, and (3) incomplete information in the feasibility study. According to initial estimates of port construction costs, USAID funding will be insufficient to cover approximately $117 million to $189 million of projected costs, and it is unclear whether the Haitian government will be able to find a private sector company willing to finance the remainder of the project. 2). In January 2011, the mission in Haiti put out a solicitation to fill the vacant port engineer position. As a result, as of June 18, 2013, the position remains unfilled. USAID’s Development of New Housing Settlements in Haiti Has Been More Costly and Slower Than Expected; Sustainability Challenges Remain
Since its initial planning and cost estimating began in 2010, USAID’s funding for the New Settlements program has significantly increased, while the number of permanent houses USAID projects will be completed has been reduced by over 80 percent. USAID underestimated construction costs at the time the New Settlements program was developed, and construction costs further increased after the Haitian government requested design changes that included larger houses with features such as flush toilets. USAID experienced problems securing clear land title for the new housing sites and in coordinating with NGOs and other partner donors. All together USAID increased program funding to approximately $97 million, about a 65- percent increase. Therefore, the estimated number of houses and completion dates may vary from current projections. USAID also reduced the total number of projected beneficiaries from an original estimate of 75,000 to 90,000 to its current estimate of approximately 13,200 to 15,900. The agency has dedicated some funding to help ensure sustainability through the development of community support mechanisms; however, it is unclear if funding for these support mechanisms will be available for each new settlement. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To ensure that Congress has current information on the status of Haiti earthquake reconstruction activities and is able to provide appropriate oversight at a time when most funding remains to be disbursed, Congress should consider requiring State to reinstitute the requirement to provide it with periodic reports until most of the funds in each sector are disbursed. USAID agreed with both of our recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We reviewed infrastructure-related post-earthquake reconstruction efforts in Haiti undertaken by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This report addresses (1) USAID’s progress in obligating and disbursing program allocations and the Department of State’s (State) periodic reporting to Congress on the status of the U.S. reconstruction efforts; (2) USAID’s progress in planning and constructing two activities related to the Caracol Industrial Park (CIP)—a power plant and port; and (3) USAID’s progress in planning and constructing permanent housing. We met in Washington, D.C., and in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, with officials from USAID and State. | Why GAO Did This Study
On January 12, 2010, an earthquake in Haiti caused about 230,000 deaths, resulted in 300,000 injuries, and displaced about 2 million persons. Following immediate relief efforts, Congress provided $1.14 billion for reconstruction in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010. USAID is responsible for implementing $651 million of this amount, and it has allocated about $268 million of this and other funding to construct a power plant and port to support the CIP in northern Haiti and permanent housing in several locations. The Act required State to report periodically to Congress on funding obligated and disbursed and program outputs and outcomes. GAO was asked to review USAID's efforts in Haiti. This report examines USAID's (1) funding obligations and disbursements and State's reports to Congress on funding and progress; (2) USAID's progress in two CIP-related activities--a power plant and port; and (3) USAID's progress in constructing permanent housing. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and Haiti, and visited planned and active sites.
What GAO Found
As of March 31, 2013, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had obligated $293 million (45 percent) and disbursed $204 million (31 percent) of $651 million in funding for Haiti from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 (the Act). The Department of State (State) submitted four of five periodic reports to Congress, as required by the Act. The reports included information on funding obligated and disbursed and anecdotal information on outputs and outcomes of some activities, as the Act required. The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its Committee Report accompanying the Act, had also directed State to report more detailed information on funding and sector activities in Haiti, which State did not include in the reports. Although most funds have not been disbursed, State's reporting requirement ended in September 2012. As a result, Congress lacks information on the amounts of funds obligated and disbursed and program-by-program progress of U.S. reconstruction activities.
USAID has allocated $170.3 million to construct a power plant and port to support the newly developed Caracol Industrial Park (CIP), with mixed results. According to USAID documents and external studies, the sustainability of the CIP, power plant, and port are interdependent; each must be completed and remain viable for the others to succeed. USAID completed the power plant's first phase with less funding than allocated and in time to supply power to the first CIP tenant. Port construction will not begin until at least 2 years later than originally planned due in part to a lack of USAID expertise in port planning in Haiti. In January 2011, the mission made an unsuccessful attempt to solicit a person to fill a vacant port engineer position but made no additional attempts prior to May 2013 and this position currently remains unfilled. As a result, planning has been hindered by (1) unrealistic initial timeframes, (2) delays in awarding the contract for a feasibility study, and (3) incomplete information in the feasibility study. According to initial estimates of port construction costs, USAID funding will be insufficient to cover a majority of projected costs. The estimated gap of $117 million to $189 million is larger than initially estimated, and it is unclear whether the Haitian government will be able to find a private sector company willing to finance the remainder of the project.
USAID has reduced its permanent housing construction targets in Haiti. USAID initially underestimated the funding needed for its New Settlements housing program. As a result, the agency increased the amount allocated by 65 percent, from $59 million to $97 million, and decreased the projected number of houses to be built by over 80 percent, from 15,000 to 2,649. The estimated number of beneficiaries was reduced from 75,000 to 90,000 to its current estimates of approximately 13,200 to 15,900. Cost increases resulted from inaccurate original estimates that used inappropriate cost comparisons and from the Haitian government's request for larger houses with improvements such as flush toilets. USAID currently estimates construction will be completed almost 2 years later than initially scheduled. Delays occurred due to the difficulties of securing land titles and coordination issues with partner donors. USAID is attempting to mitigate potential sustainability risks, such as the possible lack of economic opportunities, affordability of housing and services, and community cohesion, but gaps in the support of community development mechanisms may increase these risks.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring State to provide it with periodic reports on reconstruction progress, funding, and schedules until most funding for each program sector has been disbursed. Also, GAO is recommending USAID (1) hire a port engineer to oversee port planning and construction and (2) provide timely community support mechanisms for each new settlement to help ensure sustainability of its permanent housing program. USAID agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-166 | gao_T-HEHS-96-166_0 | Labor’s Wage Determination Process Based on Voluntary Survey Participation
In setting prevailing wages, Labor’s task is to determine and issue prevailing wage rates in a wide range of job classifications in each of four types of construction (building, residential, heavy, and highway) in more than 3,000 counties or groups of counties. Labor’s process for determining the wage rates is based primarily on a survey of the wages and fringe benefits paid to workers in similar job classifications on comparable construction projects in the particular area. This information is submitted voluntarily by employers and third parties. These weaknesses include limitations in the degree to which Labor verifies the accuracy of the survey data it receives, limited computer capability to review wage data before calculating prevailing wage rates, and an appeals process that may not be well publicized to make it accessible to all interested parties. Lack of Awareness of the Appeals Process May Limit Its Effectiveness
Labor’s appeals process could provide an important safeguard against reliance on inaccurate data in that it allows any interested party to question the validity of the determinations. Consequences of Wage Determinations Based on Erroneous Data
Wage determinations based on erroneous data could result in workers being paid higher or lower wages and fringe benefits than those prevailing on federal construction projects. One recent change improves the verification process for data submitted by third parties. Labor has also proposed a long-term strategy to review the entire Davis-Bacon wage determination process. Specifically, Labor needs to move ahead immediately to improve its verification of wage data submitted by employers. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the vulnerabilities in the Department of Labor's prevailing wage determination process under the Davis-Bacon Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Labor sets prevailing wage rates for numerous job classifications in about 3,000 geographic areas; (2) Labor's wage determination process depends on employers' and third parties' voluntary participation in a survey that reports wage and fringe benefits paid for similar jobs on comparable construction projects in a given area; (3) due to limited resources, Labor concentrates on those geographical areas most in need of wage rate revisions; (4) Labor wage determinations can be appealed by any interested party; (5) process weaknesses include limited data verification, limited computer capabilities to detect erroneous data, and the lack of awareness of the appeals process; (6) erroneous data could result in setting the wage rate too low so that construction workers are underpaid or setting the wage rate too high so that the government incurs excessive construction costs; (7) Labor initiatives to improve its rate-setting process include having employers verify certain third-party data, informing survey respondents of the serious consequences of willfully falsifying wage data, and proposing a long-term strategy to review the entire wage determination process; and (8) Labor should immediately improve its verification of employer wage data and make the appeals process more effective. |
gao_GAO-12-901 | gao_GAO-12-901_0 | Individual Practices Used to Identify and Apply Lessons Learned Can Frame an Overall Lessons- Learned Process Applicable to Federal Facility Security
We identified eight individual practices that can be used to identify and apply lessons learned. We combined and ordered these practices to develop an overall, eight-step, lessons-learned process—that is, a systematic means for agencies to learn from an event and make decisions about when and how to use that knowledge to change behavior. Not all agencies used all practices, and the application of the practices varied among agencies. Examples of agencies collecting information as a step toward deriving lessons from incidents include the following: In the Knowledge from the Field initiative, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security collects incident reports submitted by regional security officers and footage from security cameras, and also interviews witnesses directly. The Los Angeles Police Department produces a formal document after a critical incident that captures lessons learned and best practices that the department would like to sustain or improve. The department disseminates this document to its units for use in planning, preparing, and coordinating exercises. However, ISC officials cited a number of current initiatives that could support a more comprehensive lessons-learned effort. ISC provides forums for its members to collect and disseminate physical security information and best practices through its quarterly meetings and annual classified briefings. ISC uses the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)information. ISC Is Developing a Lessons-Learned Process, but Whether It Can Be Implemented Is Unclear
In response to a February 2012 request from the Internal Revenue Service, ISC initiated a working group to explore the idea of creating a systematic, governmentwide lessons-learned process for physical security. The working group is a first step toward establishing a more deliberate lessons-learned process, but it remains at its early stages. It is not clear if the new program will include all of the practices that we have identified within a lessons-learned process. Developing a lessons-learned process for the security of federal facilities that does not incorporate all eight practices, as appropriate, could result in a less effective ISC lessons- learned effort and fail to maximize the value of the lessons learned to the ISC’s membership. Agencies Have Mitigated Some Challenges to Establishing a Governmentwide Lessons-Learned Process
Law enforcement agency officials we interviewed cited challenges specific to implementing a successful governmentwide lessons-learned process for physical security, including the need to (1) create a culture that encourages information sharing, (2) address the concerns about safeguarding sensitive security information, (3) determine how to disseminate lessons in a timely and formalized manner, and (4) overcome the constraints of limited human and financial resources. Agencies we met with had found ways to mitigate these challenges using strategies consistent with a lessons-learned process. For example, U.S. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the federal government’s ability to learn from and disseminate physical security lessons, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct ISC to:
Develop a lessons-learned process for physical security that will (1) leverage the lessons-learned practices it already employs and (2) incorporate the full range of lessons-learned practices identified in our report. DHS agreed with our recommendations. We interviewed officials from 4 federal agencies with responsibilities for developing physical security standards and guides: Interagency Security Committee (ISC): ISC produces Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities, which establishes a baseline set of physical security measures to be applied to all federal facilities and provides a framework for the customization of security measures to address unique risks at a facility;
General Services Administration (GSA): As the federal government’s landlord, GSA designs, builds, manages, and, with the help of the Federal Protective Service, safeguards buildings to support the needs of other federal agencies. To determine the actions that ISC has taken to learn lessons from attacks on federal facilities, we interviewed officials from ISC and some of its member agencies, obtained and analyzed documents, and attended two quarterly meetings held for its member agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Attacks on federal facilities in the U.S. have highlighted the need to identify lessons learned from prior security incidents and apply that knowledge to security procedures governmentwide. Dozens of federal law enforcement agencies provide physical security services for domestic nonmilitary federal facilities. The ISC is responsible for developing governmentwide physical security standards and coordinating agencies to improve the protection of federal facilities. As requested, this report examines (1) the practices used to identify and apply lessons learned and how agencies have used these practices, (2) actions ISC has taken to identify and apply lessons learned from attacks on federal facilities, and (3) challenges to developing a governmentwide lessons-learned process and the strategies agencies have used to mitigate those challenges. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from 35 security and law enforcement agencies with experience protecting selected tourist sites in cities in Greece, Israel, Italy, and the United States. GAO also interviewed officials from ISC and agencies known to apply lessons-learned practices.
What GAO Found
Based on GAOs previous work and the information obtained from other agencies, GAO identified eight individual practices that can be combined and considered steps within an overall lessons-learned processthat is, a systematic means for agencies to learn from an event and make decisions about when and how to use that knowledge to change behavior. Not all of the agencies with which GAO spoke used all of the practices, and the application of the practices varied among agencies. For example, to collect information about an incidentthe first step of the processthe Bureau of Diplomatic Security within the Department of State collects incident reports, footage from security cameras, and interviews witnesses. To disseminate lessons learnedthe fifth stepthe Los Angeles Police Department produces a formal document after a critical incident that captures the lessons learned and disseminates the document to its units for use in planning, preparation, and coordination exercises.
The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), which is led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), currently does not have a systematic, comprehensive lessons-learned process for physical security, but the ISC does have a number of current initiatives that could support a more comprehensive lessons-learned effort. For example, ISC collects and analyzes information to update its physical security standards, captures and disseminates best practices to its members through its quarterly meetings, and archives information in the Homeland Security Information Network. ISC has initiated a working group to explore the idea of creating a systematic, governmentwide lessons-learned process. But the working group is at an early stage, and it is not clear if the new effort will include all of the lessons-learned practices that GAO identified. Not incorporating all eight practices could result in a less effective effort and fail to maximize the value of the lessons learned to ISCs membership. ISC derives its authority from an executive order. However, it depends on its member agencies to take the initiative to share information and it is unclear that ISCs current authority over its members is sufficient to implement a governmentwide lessons-learned process, which will rely on members to openly share informationincluding mistakes.
Law enforcement officials cited various challenges to establishing a governmentwide lessons-learned process, including the need to create a culture that encourages information sharing, address the concerns about safeguarding sensitive security information, disseminate information in a timely manner, and overcome resource constraints. Agencies GAO met with had found ways to mitigate these challenges using strategies consistent with a lessons-learned process.
What GAO Recommends
ISC should (1) incorporate the practices of a lessons-learned process as it develops its own process and (2) determine if its existing authority is sufficient to effectively implement a governmentwide lessons-learned process. DHS agreed with our findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-154 | gao_GAO-05-154_0 | If the SSN and name on an earnings report submitted by the employer do not match information in SSA’s Master Earnings File (MEF), the reported earnings are placed in the ESF, which is a repository for earnings reports for unidentified workers. SSA Uses Electronic and Manual Processes to Match Earnings Reports to Appropriate Records
SSA uses various processes to post reported workers’ earnings to valid Social Security records. Over the past several years, such routines have allowed SSA to post an annual average of 15 million earnings reports to individual MEF records, rather than to the ESF. SSA then attempts to find the W-2 in the ESF and validate the corrected name and SSN that IRS provides against SSA’s records; when both conditions are met, SSA accepts IRS’s corrections and reinstates the item to the worker’s record. Other types of correspondence involve Young Child Earnings Records and Earnings After Death, for which SSA sends letters to employers and/or the persons whose SSNs appear on the reports; SSA automatically posts such earnings reports to the ESF because the persons named in the reports are, respectively, either (a) 6 years of age or younger (thus unlikely to have earnings through employment) or (b) have a date of death recorded on their Numident record for a year prior to the tax year for which earnings on Form W-2 have been reported. ESF Earnings Reports Frequently Include Inaccurate and Missing Information
Earnings reports in the ESF have serious data problems. In addition, a small portion of employers account for a disproportionate number of ESF reports, and employers in certain industry categories are more likely than others to submit reports with invalid worker identity information. Between 1985 and 2000, about 61,000 employers used one SSN for more than one worker in multiple tax years. In contrast, while only about 8,900 employers (0.2 percent of all employers with reports recorded in the ESF for tax years 1985-2000) had 1,000 or more reports in the ESF, they accounted for over 30 percent of the total number of ESF reports (see shaded area of table 6). Earnings from Frequently Used SSNs Are Often Reinstated and Increasingly Belong to Foreign- Born Workers
SSA successfully reinstates a substantial number of earnings reports associated with frequently used SSNs in the ESF. Overall, the majority of reinstated earnings we examined were posted to the Social Security records of U.S.-born workers. In recent years, however, the number of foreign-born workers receiving reinstatements from these SSNs has significantly grown. Of the reports associated with these SSNs since 1937, SSA reinstated 13.1 million to the records of about 11.7 million individuals. SSA maintains limited data on the characteristics of persons who receive reinstatements. Employers do not have to show that they attempted to corroborate this information with SSA. DHS also requires employers to solicit key information from workers to prevent unauthorized employment. 3). 4). However, DHS reported that it has made little use of this information in its worksite enforcement efforts. Voluntary Employee Verification Services Have Some Limitations and Are Underutilized
Employers do not widely use worker verification services offered by both SSA and DHS. In fact, millions of earnings reports are submitted each year with erroneous or missing SSN and name information, and the same employers often file substantial numbers of such reports year after year, creating administrative problems for SSA and IRS and the possibility that Social Security benefits to such workers will not be accurately calculated. Other major contributors are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To obtain information describing the various electronic processes that the Social Security Administration (SSA) uses to post earnings reports to worker records and resolve errors in reported worker names and Social Security Numbers (SSN), we reviewed numerous SSA Office of the Inspector General, GAO, and contractor reports on the Earnings Suspense File (ESF). To identify factors that contribute to ESF postings, we examined provisions of law that authorize (1) penalties for employers who file earnings reports with inaccurate SSNs and hire workers who are not authorized to work in the United States and (2) the disclosure of information on persons with nonwork SSNs to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the Social Security Administration (SSA) receives millions of employer-submitted earnings reports (Form W-2s) that it is unable to place in an individual Social Security record. If the Social Security number (SSN) and name on a W-2 do not match SSA's records, the W-2 is retained in the Earnings Suspense File (ESF). SSA's ability to match earnings reports is essential to calculating Social Security benefits. Because of concerns about the size of the ESF, GAO was asked to determine (1) how SSA processes workers' earnings reports, (2) the types of errors in ESF reports and the characteristics of employers whose reports are in the ESF, (3) how often earnings from repeatedly used SSNs have been reinstated and who receives the earnings from theses reports, and (4) what key factors contribute to ESF postings.
What GAO Found
Upon receiving over 250 million earnings reports annually from employers, SSA uses various processes to post such reports to workers' Social Security records. For reports in which worker names and SSNs exactly match SSA's information, the earnings are credited to the appropriate Social Security record. When SSA encounters earnings reports that do not match its records, SSA attempts to make a match through various automated processes. Such processes have allowed SSA to identify valid records for an average of 15 million reports annually. However, about 4 percent of the reports still remain unmatched and are retained in the ESF. SSA uses additional automated and manual processes to continue to identify valid records. The most recent data show that SSA posted ("reinstated") over 2 million earnings reports in the ESF to valid records from such processes. Earnings reports in the ESF have serious data problems and are particularly likely to be submitted by certain categories of employers. Such problems include missing SSNs and employer use of the same SSN for more than one worker in the same tax year. Additional problems include missing surnames or names that include nonalphabetic characters. Forty-three percent of employers associated with earnings reports in the ESF are from only 5 of the 83 broad industry categories. Among these industry categories, a small portion of employers account for a disproportionate number of ESF reports. SSA has reinstated a substantial number of earnings reports with SSNs that appear repeatedly in the ESF. We analyzed the most frequently occurring 295 SSNs, which appeared in ESF 1,000 times or more between tax years 1985 and 2000. Of the earnings reports associated with these SSNs, SSA reinstated 13.1 million to the records of about 11.7 million workers. Although most reinstatements were for U.S.-born workers, in recent years the percentage of reinstatements to foreign-born workers has markedly increased. Also increasing is the percentage of foreign-born workers that received reinstatements for earnings in years prior to receiving a valid SSN--a potential indicator of unauthorized employment. Three major factors contribute to ESF postings. Under IRS regulations, employers must ask new hires to provide their name and SSN, but are not required to independently corroborate this information with SSA. DHS requires employers to visually inspect new workers' identity and work authorization documents, but employers do not have to verify these documents, and they can be easily counterfeited. Further, IRS regulations are minimal; IRS has no record of assessing a penalty for filing inaccurate earnings reports; and DHS enforcement efforts against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers has been limited in recent years because of shifting priorities following the events of September 11, 2001. Last, although SSA and DHS offer employers verification free of charge, these services are voluntary, have some limitations, and remain underutilized. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-138 | gao_T-HEHS-96-138_0 | Private payers, including large employers, use an aggressive management approach to control health care costs. Smaller categories of services, however, have displayed much more rapid growth through the 1990s, helping to drive total Medicare spending to double-digit inflation. HCFA has been aware of the rehabilitation therapy overcharging problem since 1990. This situation is consistent with HCFA’s past experience of taking years to adjust excessively high payment rates. Medicare Program Overdue for Change
Because of strict statutory constraints and its own burdensome regulatory and administrative procedures, HCFA is slow to address overpricing and overutilization problems. Not surprisingly, Medicare’s ability to emphasize cost efficiency in its dealings with suppliers, physicians, and institutions that habitually provide excessive services is limited, and for certain services Medicare pays higher prices than its private sector counterparts. The recognition that Medicare needs to change its role from largely a claims processor to prudent manager is beginning to take shape in HCFA itself as well as in pending legislation passed by the House of Representatives last month. Medicare Spending: Modern Management Strategies Needed to Curb Billions in Unnecessary Payments (GAO/HEHS-95-210, Sept. 19, 1995)
Recommendations to the Secretary of HHS
We recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the HCFA Administrator to develop policies and revise practices so that Medicare can (1) price services and procedures more competitively, (2) manage payments through state-of-the-art data analysis methods and use of technology, and (3) better scrutinize the credentials of vendors seeking to bill the program; examine the feasibility of allowing Medicare’s commercial contractors to adopt for their Medicare business such managed care features as preferred provider networks, case management, and enhanced utilization review; and seek the authority necessary from the Congress to carry out these activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed strategies to curb Medicare spending, which has grown by over 10 percent a year since 1989, twice the rate of the national economy.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Medicare has not used tools used by private health care payers to manage and improve its utilization, reimbursement, and claims policies and procedures; (2) Medicare's smaller categories of services, which are typically less managed and monitored, have displayed much higher growth than its larger categories of services; (3) the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has been slow to address overpricing and overutilization problems, sometimes taking years to adjust excessively high payment rates; (4) strict statutory constraints and its own burdensome regulatory and administrative procedures hinder HCFA from using such private-sector management tools as case management, preferred providers, or discount negotiation; (5) in an effort to change its role from claims processor to prudent manager, HCFA has initiated demonstrations to explore its use of competitive bidding for certain supplies, case management, and preferred providers; and (6) proposed legislation could give HCFA the funding and flexibility it needs to better manage its contractors and services. |
gao_GAO-08-959T | gao_GAO-08-959T_0 | DHS Is in the Early Stages of Testing Technologies to Screen and Secure Air Cargo
DHS has taken some steps to develop and test technologies for screening and securing air cargo, but has not yet completed assessments of the technologies TSA plans to approve for use as part of the CCSP. Although TSA is moving forward with its plans to implement a system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, the agency has not completed all of its assessments of air cargo screening technologies. GAO will likely review this issue as part of our planned review of TSA’s efforts to meet the requirement to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. According to TSA officials, the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement any of these technologies to screen or secure cargo. TSA Plans to Revise and Eliminate Screening Exemptions for Some Categories of Air Cargo, but Has Not Completed Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessments to Inform Its Efforts
TSA plans to revise and eliminate current exemptions for some categories of cargo, thereby reducing the percentage of cargo transported on passenger aircraft that is subject to alternative methods of screening. TSA Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Air Cargo Compliance Inspections, but More Resources May Be Needed to Ensure CCSP Participants Are Meeting TSA Screening Requirements
To ensure that existing air cargo security requirements are being implemented as required, TSA inspects air carriers and freight forwarders that transport cargo. These compliance inspections range from an annual comprehensive review of the implementation of all air cargo security requirements to a more frequent review of at least one security requirement by an air carrier or freight forwarder. In October 2005, we reported that TSA had conducted compliance inspections on less than half (49 percent) of the estimated 10,000 freight forwarder facilities nationwide, and of those freight forwarders they had inspected, the agency found violations in over 40 percent of them. We also reported that TSA had not determined what constitutes an acceptable level of performance related to compliance inspections, or compared air carriers’ and freight forwarders’ performance against this standard; analyzed the results of inspections to systematically target future inspections on those entities that pose a higher security risk to the domestic air cargo system; or assessed the effectiveness of its enforcement actions taken against air carriers and freight forwarders to ensure that they are complying with air cargo security requirements. However, in recent discussions with TSA officials regarding their plans to implement the CCSP, they stated that there may not be enough compliance inspectors to conduct compliance inspections of all the entities that could be a part of the CCSP, which TSA officials told us could number in the thousands, once the program is fully implemented by August 2010. As a result, TSA is anticipating requesting an additional 150 cargo Transportation Security Inspectors for fiscal year 2010 to supplement its existing allocation of 450 Transportation Security Inspectors. However, TSA officials stated that they have not formally assessed the number of Transportation Security Inspectors the agency will need. Without such an assessment, TSA may not be able to ensure that entities involved in the CCSP are meeting TSA requirements to screen and secure cargo. TSA Has Not Identified a Strategy for Securing Inbound Air Cargo
We reported in April 2007 that more work remains in order for TSA to strengthen the security of inbound cargo. As previously stated, TSA is currently taking steps to develop a system of screening 100 percent of domestic and outbound cargo transported on passenger aircraft. TSA officials acknowledge that vulnerabilities to inbound cargo exist, but stated that each foreign country has its own security procedures for flights coming into the United States, and further stated that TSA does not impose its security requirements on foreign countries. Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged that vulnerabilities to inbound cargo exist and that these vulnerabilities are in some cases similar to those facing the domestic and outbound air cargo supply chain. However, TSA has yet to address our recommendation for assessing inbound air cargo screening exemptions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to implement a system to physically screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft by August 2010. To fulfill these requirements, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) TSA is developing the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), which would allow the screening of cargo to occur prior to placement on an aircraft. This testimony addresses four challenges TSA may face in developing a system to screen 100 percent of cargo: (1) deploying effective technologies; (2) changing TSA air cargo screening exemptions; (3) allocating compliance inspection resources to oversee CCSP participants; and (4) securing cargo transported from a foreign nation to the United States. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from October 2005 through February 2008, including selected updates conducted in July 2008.
What GAO Found
DHS has taken steps to develop and test technologies for screening and securing air cargo; however, TSA has not completed assessments of the technologies it plans to use as part of the CCSP. TSA has reported that there are several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement any of these technologies, including the nature, type, and size of cargo to be screened and the location of air cargo facilities. In addition, the air cargo industry voiced concern about the costs associated with purchasing the screening equipment. GAO will likely review this issue in future work. TSA plans to revise and eliminate screening exemptions for some categories of air cargo, thereby reducing the percentage of cargo transported on passenger aircraft that is subject to alternative methods of screening. However, TSA plans to continue to exempt some types of domestic and outbound cargo (cargo transported by air from the United States to a foreign location) after August 2010. TSA based its determination regarding the changing of exemptions on professional judgment and the results of air cargo vulnerability assessments. However, TSA has not completed all of its air cargo vulnerability assessments, which would further inform its efforts. TSA officials stated there may not be enough compliance inspectors to oversee implementation of the CCSP and is anticipating requesting an additional 150 inspectors for fiscal year 2010. They further stated that they have not formally assessed the number of inspectors the agency will need. Without such an assessment, TSA may not be able to ensure that CCSP entities are meeting TSA requirements to screen and secure cargo. To ensure that existing air cargo security requirements are being implemented as required, TSA conducts audits, referred to as compliance inspections, of air carriers that transport cargo. The compliance inspections range from a comprehensive review of the implementation of all security requirements to a review of at least one security requirement by an air carrier or freight forwarder (which consolidates cargo from many shippers and takes it to air carriers for transport). GAO reported in October 2005 that TSA had conducted compliance inspections on fewer than half of the estimated 10,000 freight forwarders nationwide and, of those, had found violations in over 40 percent of them. GAO also reported that TSA had not analyzed the results of compliance inspections to systematically target future inspections. GAO reported in April 2007 that more work remains for TSA to strengthen the security of cargo transported from a foreign nation to the United States, referred to as inbound air cargo. Although TSA is developing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic and outbound cargo, TSA officials stated that it does not plan to include inbound cargo because it does not impose its security requirements on foreign countries. TSA officials said that vulnerabilities to inbound air cargo exist and that these vulnerabilities are in some cases similar to those of domestic air cargo, but stated that each foreign country has its own security procedures for flights coming into the United States. |
gao_GAO-13-175 | gao_GAO-13-175_0 | Best Available Data Cannot Be Used to Make Insights about Spillover Crime but Show a General Decline in Reported Crime Rates in Counties with Sufficiently Complete Data along the Southwest Border
UCR SRS data provide the best available information on crime levels and crime trends in southwest border counties. Further, the SRS does not collect enough information, such as a motivation for committing a crime, to identify a link between violent or property crime rates and crimes associated with spillover from Mexico, such as drug trafficking. The violent crime rate in border counties in New Mexico was lower by 8 percent in 2011 than in 2005, and in nonborder counties the decrease was 19 percent. Few Law Enforcement Agencies Track Spillover Crime along the Southwest Border
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies
Federal law enforcement agencies have few efforts under way to track what might be considered to be spillover crime, including violence, for several reasons. First, while several federal components established a definition of spillover crime, there is no common government definition of such crime. Second, DHS and DOJ components, including those that have a formal definition of spillover crime, either do not collect data for the purposes of tracking spillover crime, or do not maintain such data in an automated format that can be readily retrieved and analyzed. As discussed previously in this report, the Texas Department of Public Safety and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis are leading an effort by select state and local law enforcement agencies to propose new terms and definitions and identify metrics for various facets of border-related crime and violence by March 2013. However, officials stated that spillover incidents reported by the department cannot be used to analyze trends over time because they are not collected systematically and may be incomplete. Specifically, officials from 22 out of 37 state and local agencies stated that they have limited technological, financial, and human resources to collect additional data. Law Enforcement Agencies Have Varying Concerns about Potential Effects of Violent Crime in Mexico on Border Communities
Federal Concerns
Officials from all of the DHS and DOJ components we interviewed stated that while they do not believe that spillover violence has been a significant problem, they expressed concerns about the potential for it to occur in the future because drug cartels employ increasingly violent methods to interact with rivals and law enforcement agencies in Mexico. State and Local Concerns
Officials from 37 state and local law enforcement agencies and four Chambers of Commerce we interviewed expressed varying concerns regarding the extent to which violent crime from Mexico spills into and potentially affects their border communities. Officials in 31 of the 37 state and local law enforcement agencies stated that they have not observed violent crime from Mexico regularly spilling into their counties; nonetheless, officials from 33 of the 37 agencies said they are at least somewhat concerned about the potential for spillover crime to occur. Law Enforcement Agencies Have Initiatives that Target Border-related Crime, Including a Federal Contingency Plan to Address Violent Crime Spilling Over from Mexico
At the federal level, officials from DOJ and DHS and their components stated that they have undertaken a number of efforts, both individually and through interagency partnerships, related to drug smuggling and cartel activity with a focus on the southwest border; however, all but one of these efforts do not specifically target spillover crime. DHS developed the Operations Plan for Southwest Border Violence in October 2008 to address the possibility that spillover crime, such as a significant violent and spontaneous event that results in unintended cascading effects spilling over the border, may exceed DHS’s assets to respond in those locations. At the state and local levels, officials from all law enforcement agencies that we spoke with stated that their agencies had undertaken some efforts, either individually or in partnership with other agencies, to combat criminal activities often associated with spillover crime, such as drug and human smuggling. Arizona
California
New Mexico
Texas
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following questions: (1) What information do reported crime rates in southwest border communities provide on spillover crime and what do they show? (2) What efforts, if any, have federal, state, and select local law enforcement agencies made to track spillover crime along the southwest border? (3) What concerns, if any, do these agencies have about spillover crime? (4) What steps, if any, have these agencies taken to address spillover crime? To address the first question, we analyzed Summary Reporting System (SRS) data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program—the government’s centralized repository for crime data—from January 2004 through December 2011 for the four southwest border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas). For the border counties in each of the other states, we found that the violent crime rate was lower in 2011 than in 2004, and the rate in the border counties decreased more than in the nonborder counties. For border counties, the rate was 26 percent lower in 2011 than in 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drug-related homicides have dramatically increased in recent years in Mexico along the nearly 2,000-mile border it shares with the United States. U.S. federal, state, and local officials have stated that the prospect of crime, including violence, spilling over from Mexico into the southwestern United States is a concern. GAO was asked to review crime rates and assess information on spillover crime along the border. Specifically, this report addresses: (1) What information do reported crime rates in southwest border communities provide on spillover crime and what do they show? (2) What efforts, if any, have federal, state, and select local law enforcement agencies made to track spillover crime along the southwest border? (3) What concerns, if any, do these agencies have about spillover crime? (4) What steps, if any, have these agencies taken to address spillover crime?
GAO analyzed crime data from all of the 24 southwest border counties from 2004 through 2011 and federal documentation, such as threat assessments and DHS's plans for addressing violence along the southwest border. GAO interviewed officials from DHS and DOJ and their components. GAO also interviewed officials from 37 state and local law enforcement agencies responsible for investigating and tracking crime in the border counties in the four southwest border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas). While the results of the interviews are not generalizable, they provided insights. GAO is not making any recommendations. DHS provided comments, which highlighted border-related crime initiatives recognized by GAO.
What GAO Found
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, the government's centralized repository for crime data, provides the only available standardized way to track crime levels in border counties over time. However, UCR data lack information on whether reported offenses are attributable to spillover crime, and have other limitations, such as underreporting to police. Also, UCR data cannot be used to identify links with crimes often associated with spillover from Mexico, such as cartel-related drug trafficking. Cognizant of these limitations, GAO's analysis of data for southwest border counties with sufficiently complete data show that, generally, both violent and property crimes were lower in 2011 than in 2004. For example, the violent crime rate in three states' border counties was lower by at least 26 percent in 2011 than in 2004 and in one other state lower by 8 percent in 2011 than in 2005.
Law enforcement agencies have few efforts to track spillover crime. No common federal government definition of such crime exists, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) components, including those with a definition, either do not collect data to track spillover crime, or do not maintain such data that can be readily retrieved and analyzed. However, several components collect violent incident data that could serve as indirect indicators of spillover crime. For example, GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data show that, generally, assaults on agents between southwest border ports of entry were about 25 percent lower in 2012 than in 2006. State and local law enforcement agencies, except for one state agency, do not track what might be considered to be spillover crime because they lack a common definition and do not systematically collect these crime data in a way that can be used to analyze trends. Officials from 22 of 37 state and local agencies told GAO that they have limited resources to collect additional data. Since April 2012, DHS and the Texas Department of Public Safety have coled an effort to propose definitions and metrics for border-related crime by March 2013.
Law enforcement agencies have varying concerns regarding the extent to which violent crime from Mexico spills into southwest border communities. While DHS and DOJ threat assessments indicate that violent infighting between drug cartels has remained largely in Mexico, DHS assessments also show that aggressive tactics used by traffickers to evade capture demonstrate an increasing threat to U.S. law enforcement. Also, officials in 31 of the 37 state and local agencies stated that they have not observed violent crime from Mexico regularly spilling into their counties; nonetheless, officials in 33 of the 37 agencies were at least somewhat concerned, for example, for the safety of their personnel or residents.
Law enforcement agencies have undertaken initiatives to target border-related crime, including one effort to address violent crime spilling over from Mexico. For example, in October 2008, DHS developed a contingency plan for the possibility that a significant southwest border violence escalation may exceed DHS assets' ability to respond. In addition, officials from all state and local law enforcement agencies that GAO spoke with said their agencies had undertaken some efforts, either individually or in partnership with others, to combat criminal activities often associated with spillover crime, such as drug and human smuggling. |
gao_GAO-17-415 | gao_GAO-17-415_0 | Specifically, DOD has not fully resolved the operational challenges related to moving Marine units to Guam; limited training facilities in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI; the runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility; and challenges for operating in Australia. According to DOD’s Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, in the context of developing installation master plans, mission requirements—which would include the capabilities needed to fulfill the mission—largely determine land and facility support requirements. As of December 2016, DOD has not resolved selected identified capability deficiencies in the four areas noted above. If DOD does not resolve the identified capability deficiencies in these four areas, the Marine Corps may be unable to maintain its capabilities or face much higher costs to do so. DOD Has Taken Steps to Develop Infrastructure Plans and Schedules for Its Relocation but Did Not Develop a Reliable Schedule for Guam and Has Not Completed Risk Planning in Guam and Okinawa
DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans and schedules for the proposed locations for the relocation of Marines from Okinawa; however, we found that the Marine Corps’ schedule for Guam did not meet the characteristics of a reliable schedule identified in the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide. Moreover, DOD has developed plans for infrastructure requirements that will support the planned relocation to Hawaii and rotational presence of Marines in Australia. However, a lower- level construction schedule examined was not fully resource loaded; in addition, the integrated master schedule includes a majority of activities unrelated to construction efforts, such as information technology and design activities. Limited Risk Planning for Identified Construction Risks in Guam
Marine Corps officials have conducted limited risk planning and have not completed a risk-management plan that identifies a strategy to address construction risks that may affect the cost and schedule for infrastructure in Guam. The Marine Corps has not completed its risk-management plan for Guam infrastructure. Without a risk-management plan that identifies the Marine Corps’ strategy for addressing risks to the infrastructure buildup in Guam, DOD may not have complete information to address risks to the design and construction of its infrastructure that may result in cost overruns and schedule delays related to the relocation of Marines. However, DOD did not identify its short- or long-term sustainment needs for the Marine Corps’ infrastructure in its master plan. DOD Has Made Progress in Developing Its Infrastructure Cost Estimates for Guam, Hawaii, and Australia but Its Estimates Partially Met Best Practices for a Reliable Cost Estimate
DOD Has Made Progress in Developing Its Cost Estimates for Guam but Partially Met Best Practices for a Reliable Cost Estimate
DOD improved its cost estimates for Guam since our June 2013 report by adding a documented technical baseline description and clear documentation of ground rules and assumptions for its military construction cost estimates, and including life-cycle costs for its nonmilitary construction cost estimates. Without a revision of cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia to include all of the best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide for the comprehensive characteristic, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost information to inform their funding decisions regarding infrastructure for Hawaii and Australia and to help them determine the viability of the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. DOD has developed a high-level synchronization plan and organized working groups that coordinate the relocation of Marines to Okinawa, but DOD has not fully resolved selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation of Marines. For example, the update to the schedule should include resources for nonconstruction activities. To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to revise the DOD cost estimates for Hawaii to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure and revise the DOD cost estimates for Australia to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure. In written comments, DOD concurred with two recommendations, partially concurred with six recommendations, and nonconcurred with one recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to examine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has (1) coordinated its efforts and resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marines from Okinawa, (2) developed infrastructure plans and schedules for its relocation efforts and completed risk planning for its infrastructure that will support the relocation, and (3) developed reliable cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation to Guam and Hawaii and for the rotational presence in Australia. | Why GAO Did This Study
For two decades, DOD has planned to realign its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Marine Corps has plans to consolidate bases in Okinawa, relocating 4,100 Marines to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii, 800 to the continental United States, and a rotational presence of 1,300 to Australia.
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, included a provision that GAO study the realignment initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) coordinated its efforts and resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marines, (2) developed infrastructure plans and schedules and completed risk planning for its infrastructure that will support the relocation, and (3) developed reliable cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation of Marines to Guam and Hawaii and the rotational presence in Australia. GAO reviewed relevant policies and plans; analyzed cost documents; interviewed DOD officials; and visited U.S. military installations in the Asia-Pacific region.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has coordinated the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to other locations in the Asia-Pacific region through developing a synchronization plan and organizing working groups. However, DOD has not resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marine units; training needs in the region; the reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility in Okinawa; and challenges for operating in Australia. DOD guidance indicates that mission requirements—which would include the capabilities needed to fulfill the mission—largely determine land and facility support requirements. If DOD does not resolve the selected identified capability deficiencies in its infrastructure plans, DOD may be unable to maintain its capabilities or face much higher costs to do so.
DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans and schedules for its relocation efforts, but it did not develop a reliable schedule for the Marine relocation to Guam and has not completed its risk planning for infrastructure in Guam. DOD developed plans that will support construction efforts in Guam and Japan, and developed some initial infrastructure plans for Hawaii and Australia. However, GAO found the Marines Corps' integrated master schedule for Guam did not fully meet the comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. For example, the schedule does not include resources needed for nonconstruction activities, such as information technology and design activities. Additionally, the Marine Corps has not completed its risk-management plan for infrastructure construction in Guam. Specifically, the Marine Corps has not identified its strategy to address construction risks including labor shortages and endangered-species protection. If DOD does not have a reliable schedule or has not completed risk planning for Guam, it may not have complete information to identify and address risks that may result in cost overruns and schedule delays.
DOD has made progress in developing cost estimates for Guam, but its estimates partially met GAO best practices for reliable cost estimates for the relocations to Guam and Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. For cost estimates related to Guam military construction activities, DOD included ground rules and assumptions, but did not include some elements of a reliable cost estimate, such as a risk analysis. Additionally, DOD developed cost estimates for nonmilitary construction activities that provide a high-level planning overview of the requirements, but they did not incorporate several other best practices, including a unifying Work Breakdown Structure that defines in detail the work necessary to accomplish a program's objectives. For Hawaii and Australia, the cost estimates are not considered reliable because they did not include all life-cycle costs or a Work Breakdown Structure. If DOD does not revise the cost estimates for these locations, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost information to inform funding decisions and to help them determine the viability of relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD resolve capability deficiencies in the four selected identified areas, update its schedule for Guam infrastructure, complete a risk-management plan for Guam infrastructure, and revise its three cost estimates. DOD concurred with two recommendations, partially concurred with six, and did not concur with one. GAO continues to believe its recommendations are valid, as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-09-570 | gao_GAO-09-570_0 | Local: Donor-financed purchases of food aid in countries affected by disasters and food crises. Despite these benefits, donors face challenges in making local and regional procurements, including insufficient logistics capacity that can contribute to delays in delivery, and weak legal systems that can limit buyers’ ability to enforce. Besides the benefit of reducing costs and delivery time, locally and regionally procured food may have the added benefit of being more culturally acceptable to recipients. While local procurement in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia cost much less than U.S. in- kind food aid, we found that in Latin America, the cost of WFP LRP was comparable to the cost of food aid shipped from the United States. According to WFP officials in South Africa, these requirements can take an additional 2 to 3 weeks. Timing and restrictions on donor funding. Local and Regional Procurement of Food Aid Has Potential for Adverse Market Impacts That Can Be Mitigated by Better Market Intelligence
Local and regional procurement (LRP) has the potential to make food more costly to consumers in areas from which food is procured by increasing demand and driving up prices. In particular, lack of reliable market intelligence—such as market prices, production levels, and trade patterns—makes it difficult to determine the extent to which LRP can be increased without causing adverse market impacts. Legal Requirements for U.S. Food Aid May Constrain U.S. Agencies’ Use of Local and Regional Procurement
Certain legal requirements to procure U.S.-grown agricultural commodities for food aid and to transport up to 75 percent of them on U.S.-flag vessels may constrain agencies’ use of local and regional procurement (LRP). While the United States has primarily provided in-kind food aid for over 50 years, it has been exploring expanded use of LRP. To fully realize this potential, however, challenges to its effective implementation must be addressed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the impact that LRP can have on the efficiency of food aid delivery and the economies of countries where food is purchased, we recommend that the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Secretary of Agriculture take the following three actions: systematically collect evidence on LRP’s adherence to quality standards and product specifications to ensure food safety and nutritional content; work with implementing partners to improve the reliability and utility of market intelligence in areas where the U.S.-funded LRP occurs, thereby ensuring that U.S.-funded LRP practices minimize adverse impacts and maximize potential benefits; and work with the Secretary of Transportation and relevant parties to expedite updating the MOU between U.S. food assistance agencies and the Department of Transportation, consistent with our 2007 recommendation, to minimize the cost impact of cargo preference regulations on food aid transportation expenditures and to resolve uncertainties associated with the application of cargo preference to regional procurement. The recommendation does not preclude such coordination among the agencies. DOT stated that additional analysis may be warranted before concluding that LRP offers a tool to reduce costs and shorten delivery time. For example, local procurement in sub-Saharan Africa cost about 34 percent less than USAID commodities procured at around the same time and delivered to the same country. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the impact of local and regional procurement (LRP) on the efficiency of food aid delivery, (2) the impact of LRP on economies where food is procured, and (3) U.S. legal requirements that could affect U.S. agencies’ use of LRP. The data cover the period from 2004 to 2008. As shown in figure 10, international in-kind donations took the longest time, averaging 147 days. Governance. Contract default is a major risk of LRP. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
While the U.S. approach of providing in-kind food aid has assisted millions of hungry people for more than 50 years, in 2007 GAO reported limitations to its efficiency and effectiveness. To improve U.S. food assistance, Congress has authorized some funding for local and regional procurement (LRP)--donors' purchase of food aid in countries affected by food crises or in a country within the same region. Through analysis of agency documents, interviews with agency officials, experts, and practitioners, and fieldwork in four African countries, this requested report examines (1) LRP's impact on the efficiency of food aid delivery; (2) its impact on economies where food is procured; and (3) U.S. legal requirements that could affect agencies' use of LRP.
What GAO Found
LRP offers donors a tool to reduce food aid costs and delivery time, but multiple challenges to ensuring cost-savings and timely delivery exist. GAO found that local procurement in sub-Saharan Africa cost about 34 percent less than similar in-kind food aid purchased and shipped from the United States to the same countries between 2001 and 2008. However, LRP does not always offer cost-savings potential. GAO found that LRP in Latin America is comparable in cost to U.S. in-kind food aid. According to World Food Program (WFP) data, from 2004 to 2008, in-kind international food aid delivery to 10 sub-Saharan African countries took an average of 147 days, while local procurement only took about 35 days and regional about 41 days. Donors face challenges with LRP, including (1) insufficient logistics capacity that can contribute to delays in delivery, (2) donor funding restrictions, and (3) weak legal systems that can limit buyers' ability to enforce contracts. Although LRP may have the added benefit of providing food that may be more culturally appropriate to recipients, evidence has yet to be systematically collected on LRP's adherence to quality standards and product specifications, which ensure food safety and nutritional content. LRP has the potential to make food more costly to consumers in areas where food is procured by increasing demand and driving up prices, but steps can be taken to reduce these risks. As GAO's review of WFP market analyses and interviews with WFP procurement officers confirmed, a lack of accurate market intelligence, such as production levels, makes it difficult to determine the extent to which LRP can be scaled up without causing adverse market impacts. Although LRP does have the potential to support local economies, for example by raising farmers' incomes, data to demonstrate that these benefits are sustainable in the long term are lacking. U.S. legal requirements to procure U.S.-grown agricultural commodities for food aid and to transport up to 75 percent of those commodities on U.S.-flag vessels may constrain agencies' use of LRP. Although Congress has appropriated funding for some LRP, agencies disagree on the applicability of certain cargo preference provisions to LRP food aid that may require ocean shipping. The 1987 interagency MOU that governs the administration of cargo preference requirements and could clarify areas of disagreement among the agencies is outdated and does not address the issues arising from LRP. |
gao_GAO-17-716 | gao_GAO-17-716_0 | According to this sense of Congress, such committee should 1. be chaired by a Department of State employee of Assistant Secretary rank or higher, concurrent with that employee’s other duties; 2. include representatives of the Smithsonian and federal agencies with responsibility for the preservation and protection of international cultural property; 3. consult with governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including the United States Committee of the Blue Shield, museums, educational institutions, and research institutions, and participants in the international art and cultural property market on efforts to protect and preserve international cultural property; and 4. coordinate core U.S. interests in—(A) protecting and preserving international cultural property; (B) preventing and disrupting looting and illegal trade and trafficking in international cultural property, particularly exchanges that provide revenue to terrorist and criminal organizations; (C) protecting sites of cultural and archaeological significance; and (D) providing for the lawful exchange of international cultural property. The CHCC has also established three working groups, as follows: 1. DHS and DOJ Take a Number of Actions to Enforce Laws and Regulations Related to Restricted Iraqi and Syrian Cultural Property
DHS and DOJ take actions in five key areas to enforce laws and regulations related to restricted Iraqi and Syrian cultural property: (1) monitoring of shipments; (2) detention, seizure, and taking forfeiture actions on items; (3) investigation of objects; (4) repatriation of cultural property; and (5) prosecution of criminal violations to enforce laws and regulations related to restricted Iraqi and Syrian cultural property. CBP and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) detain, seize, and obtain forfeiture of suspected items; and ICE-HSI conducts investigations, pursues prosecutions through state and federal courts, and repatriates cultural property to rightful owners. DHS actions to detain, seize, and pursue forfeiture of items that are suspected to be in violation of U.S. cultural property laws have led to the rescue and return of cultural property to Iraq. Investigation of objects. For example, ICE-HSI opened an investigation in January 2011 after receiving a tip about an Iraqi ceremonial sword for sale at an auction in the United States (see fig. DOJ considers prosecution for criminal violations relating to investigations involving Iraqi and Syrian cultural property. The FBI obtained forfeiture of the items and repatriated them to Iraq in 2013. In Its First Year, the Cultural Heritage Coordinating Committee Has Followed Several Key Collaboration Practices but Has Not Fully Demonstrated Others
The CHCC’s activities during its first year of formation reflected several key practices that can enhance and strengthen collaboration but did not demonstrate others. CHCC participants have demonstrated progress in the key areas of identifying leadership; including relevant participants; bridging organizational cultures, including developing ways to operate across agency boundaries and agreeing on common terminology; and addressing issues related to resources, including funding, staffing, and technology. However, CHCC participants could enhance their collaboration by implementing other key collaboration practices, such as developing goals, clarifying participants’ roles and responsibilities, and documenting agreements within the CHCC and its working groups. Furthermore, most participants reported that the committee was a helpful forum for collaborating on international cultural property protection efforts. Without such clarity, CHCC participants could encounter barriers in organizing their joint and individual efforts on the committee and its working groups as the CHCC continues to operate beyond its first year of formation. Participants have not documented their agreement regarding how the CHCC will be collaborating, including the short-term and long-term goals of the committee and its working groups, as well as members’ roles and responsibilities on the committee and its working groups. To protect cultural property from Iraq and Syria at risk of looting and smuggling, the U.S. government has imposed import restrictions, and DHS and DOJ have taken a number of actions to enforce the laws and regulations on restricted cultural property from these countries. Further, a law passed to protect and preserve international cultural property included a sense of Congress that the President should establish an interagency coordinating committee to coordinate the efforts of the executive branch. (Recommendation 2)
The Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs should work with other U.S. federal entities participating in the CHCC to document agreement about how the CHCC and its working groups will collaborate, such as their goals and participants’ roles and responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The conflicts in Iraq and Syria that began in 2003 and 2011, respectively, have led to the destruction, looting, and trafficking of cultural property by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and others. The United Nations called these events the worst cultural heritage crisis since World War II and reported that ISIS has used the sale of looted Iraqi and Syrian cultural property to support its terrorist activities. Congress authorized and the President imposed import restrictions on archaeological or ethnological material of Iraq in 2008 and Syria in 2016. The act directing Syrian restrictions also includes a sense of Congress that the President should establish an interagency committee to coordinate executive branch efforts on international cultural property protection.
GAO was asked to review U.S. efforts to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property. This report examines (1) actions DHS and DOJ have taken to enforce U.S. laws and regulations involving restrictions on such property and (2) the extent to which CHCC participants collaborate to protect cultural property. GAO reviewed documents related to 17 DHS- or DOJ-led cultural property investigations, interviewed officials, and assessed the extent of CHCC collaboration using GAO's key practices.
What GAO Found
GAO's examination of 17 cultural property investigations shows that the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) have taken a number of actions to enforce laws and regulations related to restricted Iraqi and Syrian cultural property. DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken actions such as monitoring shipments and detaining and seizing suspected items of restricted cultural property. CBP coordinates with DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which investigates objects; detains, seizes, and obtains forfeiture of items found to be in violation of U.S. law; and repatriates cultural property to its rightful owner. For example, ICE conducted an investigation into an Iraqi ceremonial sword for sale at an auction in the United States and then seized, obtained forfeiture of, and repatriated it to Iraq in July 2013 (see fig.). DOJ actions to address restricted Iraqi and Syrian cultural property include activities by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DOJ attorneys to investigate and prosecute criminal violations, as well as actions related to the forfeiture and repatriation of cultural property items.
Ceremonial Sword Repatriated to Iraq by Department of Homeland Security in 2013
The Cultural Heritage Coordinating Committee (CHCC), established in November 2016 with nine participating federal entities and led by the Department of State (State), has followed several of the key collaboration practices identified by GAO but has not demonstrated others. GAO has previously identified key practices for organizations to enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts. The CHCC has followed key practices of identifying leadership; including relevant participants; bridging organizational cultures, such as agreeing on common terminology; and addressing resource issues. Most participants also reported that the CHCC was a helpful forum for sharing information. However, the CHCC has not fully demonstrated other key practices for enhancing collaboration. First, the CHCC and two of its three working groups have not developed short- and long-term goals. Moreover, the CHCC has not clarified participants' roles and responsibilities on the committee or its working groups. Finally, CHCC participants have not documented agreements related to collaboration, such as developing written materials to articulate common objectives. Incorporating these practices could help participants work collectively, focus on common goals, and organize joint and individual efforts to protect cultural property as the CHCC continues its efforts beyond its first year.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State work with other CHCC participants to (1) develop goals, (2) clarify participants' roles and responsibilities, and (3) document collaborative agreement in the CHCC and its working groups. State concurs with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-369 | gao_GAO-12-369_0 | As a result, our 2009 report included a total of 47 recommendations for corrective action. on the Academy identified numerous internal control Of the 47 recommendations, we made 1 overarching recommendation concerning actions needed for the Academy to establish effective overall internal control. Specifically, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of MARAD, in coordination with the Superintendent of the Academy, to establish a comprehensive, risk- based internal control system to address the core causes of the control deficiencies identified in our 2009 report, including delineating the roles and responsibilities of management and employees to establish and maintain a positive and supporting attitude toward internal control and conscientious management, and the responsibility of managers to monitor control activities. Actions Taken to Address Prior Recommendations
Our review of the Academy’s and MARAD’s efforts to address the issues reported in our 2009 report found that the Academy and MARAD had not yet established a comprehensive, risk-based system of internal control at the Academy. Despite these completed actions, until Academy and MARAD officials take additional actions to fully address our recommendation in this area, their ability to ensure that Academy and MARAD management’s objectives are carried out, including proactively identifying and correcting control deficiencies in a timely fashion, will continue to be impaired. Actions Taken to Address Many of Our Prior Recommendations Related to Specific Control Activities
As of September 30, 2011, Academy and MARAD officials had taken sufficient actions to address 32 of our 46 prior recommendations intended to address specific deficiencies in the Academy’s control activities. However, because GMATS NAFI operations have not yet been terminated or reestablished, our two recommendations in this area remain open. Financial reporting. Further Enhancements to Capital Improvement Program Oversight Are Needed
Although the Academy and MARAD have taken steps to improve oversight of the Academy’s CIP, the Academy does not have a current comprehensive plan for capital improvements to provide the basis for oversight of CIP planning and implementation. The Academy also established and filled a new position for an Assistant Superintendent for Capital Improvements and Facilities Maintenance in 2010, designating the new position’s responsibilities to include oversight of the Academy’s Departments of Capital Improvements and Facilities Maintenance and the Office of Safety and Environmental Protection. For example, the implementation plan did not present a long-range phased investment plan and detailed cost estimates. Further, the Academy has not yet aligned its capital improvement priorities with the organization’s strategic objectives, a critical factor in providing effective oversight. However, it is too soon to determine the extent to which the new CIP addresses the three specific elements that our recommendation provided as minimum attributes for a comprehensive capital improvement plan: an inventory of long-range capital improvements that align with the Academy’s strategic objectives, reliable cost estimates specific to each capital improvement, and a phased investment approach for prioritizing capital improvement needs. Merchant Marine Academy (Academy) and Maritime Administration (MARAD); and laws and regulations governing Academy operations. We evaluated corrective actions taken through September 30, 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Academy, a component of the Department of Transportations (DOT) MARAD, was established in 1938 and built during World War II to provide undergraduate education programs for midshipmen to become shipboard officers and leaders in the maritime transportation field. DOT allocated $80 million to the Academy for fiscal year 2011 for its operations, CIP, and facilities maintenance.
In August 2009, GAO issued a report that identified numerous internal control deficiencies and made 47 recommendations for corrective action. This report provides the results of GAOs assessment of (1) the extent to which the Academy has taken actions to address the prior recommendations and (2) the Academys CIP oversight. To address these objectives, GAO evaluated corrective actions and supporting documentation; interviewed Academy, MARAD, and DOT officials; and performed walk-throughs of several processes revised in response to GAOs prior recommendations.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (Academy) has made progress in improving its internal control since GAOs August 2009 report, but has not yet fully addressed one key recommendation related to fundamental weaknesses in its overall internal control system. GAO found that while the Academy had appointed an Internal Control Officer responsible for coordinating reviews of internal controls, it had not yet established a comprehensive risk-based internal control system to ensure effective and efficient operations, reliable financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations, including a monitoring system to help ensure that control deficiencies are proactively identified and promptly corrected. Maritime Administration (MARAD) officials stated that their strategy had been to focus on the deficiencies that could be readily resolved. As of September 30, 2011, Academy and MARAD officials had addressed 32 of the other 46 prior recommendations regarding control activity deficiencies.
Importantly, for many of the specific control-related recommendations that remained open, the Academy and MARAD had not yet identified the cause of the related internal control deficiencies, a critical step for designing effective controls.
GAO also found that the Academy and MARAD have taken steps to improve Capital Improvement Program (CIP) oversight. For example, the Academy filled a new Assistant Superintendent position responsible for oversight of the Academys capital improvements and facilities maintenance. However, the Academy did not yet have an up-to-date, comprehensive plan for capital improvements to provide a basis for oversight. Specifically, the Academy did not have a capital improvement plan that identified long-term capital improvement needs aligned with the Academys strategic objectives, reliable cost estimates for planned improvements, and a phased implementation approach for prioritizing capital improvement needs. Such plan elements are consistent with Office of Management and Budget guidance and GAO-identified leading practices.
What GAO Recommends
In addition to reiterating the need to fully implement the remaining open recommendations, GAO is making one new recommendation directed at updating the Academys capital improvement plan to include reliable cost estimates and phased investment priorities aligned with the Academys strategic objectives in accordance with leading practices. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOT stated that it had recently established a comprehensive plan to manage CIP, and plans to keep GAO apprised as it completes actions addressing other GAO open recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-90 | gao_GAO-05-90_0 | Experts Identified Nine Diversity Management Practices as Leading
Of the experts in the field of diversity management we spoke with or whose publications we reviewed, the majority cited nine practices as leading. These practices are (1) commitment to diversity as demonstrated and communicated by an organization’s top leadership; (2) the inclusion of diversity management in an organization’s strategic plan; (3) diversity linked to performance, making the case that a more diverse and inclusive work environment could help improve productivity and individual and organizational performance; (4) measurement of the impact of various aspects of a diversity program; (5) management accountability for the progress of diversity initiatives; (6) succession planning; (7) recruitment; (8) employee involvement in an organization’s diversity management; and (9) training for management and staff about diversity management. Experts and the literature generally agree that some combination of these identified practices should be considered when an organization is developing and implementing diversity management. According to diversity management literature, accountability is also a key element for organizations to ensure the success of a diversity management effort by providing a means for ensuring that managers at all levels are made responsible for diversity in their organizations and evaluated on their progress toward achieving their diversity goals and their ability to manage a diverse group of employees. Recruitment
Recruitment, a key process by which federal agencies attract a supply of qualified, diverse applicants for employment, is the first step toward establishing a diverse workforce. Employee Involvement
According to the literature, involving employees in diversity management helps them contribute to driving diversity throughout an organization. It also can help identify and develop high-potential employees, improve employee productivity and performance, and promote retention and diversity. Agency Comments
On November 10, 2004, we provided a draft of this report to EEOC and OPM for review and comment. In written comments, the Director of EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations generally agreed with the findings of the draft report and stated that expanding agency knowledge of the available tools to achieve diversity is critical to the government’s success in maintaining a workplace that is inclusive and responsive to the needs of an increasingly diverse workforce (see app. Objective 2: Identifying Examples of Leading Diversity Management Practices in the Federal Government
To identify agency examples of leading practices in the federal government, we reviewed diversity management literature and met with officials from NAPA and others who directed us to agencies that may have implemented some of the expert-identified practices. Of the organizations responding to the governmentwide survey, 138, or 86 percent, returned usable questionnaires. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, and the Corporate Leadership Council. A future report might provide a discussion of the means through which agencies can determine how the multitude of similarities and differences that individuals bring to the workplace are important to creating a “high performance organization” with “a positive work environment where . . . all can reach their potential and maximize their contributions to an organization's strategic goals and objectives.”
Such a study would be a valuable supplement to this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
A high-performance organization relies on a dynamic workforce with the requisite talents, multidisciplinary knowledge, and up-to-date skills to ensure that it is equipped to accomplish its mission and achieve its goals. Such organizations typically (1) foster a work environment in which people are enabled and motivated to contribute to mission accomplishment and (2) provide both accountability and fairness for all employees. To accomplish these objectives, high-performance organizations are inclusive, drawing on the strengths of employees at all levels and of all backgrounds--an approach consistent with diversity management. For purposes of our review, diversity management is defined as a process intended to create and maintain a positive work environment where the similarities and differences of individuals are valued, so that all can reach their potential and maximize their contributions to an organization's strategic goals and objectives. As part of a request that GAO report on the federal government's performance in managing its diverse workforce, GAO was asked to identify (1) leading diversity management practices and (2) examples of the identified practices in the federal government. This report contains no recommendations.
What GAO Found
Of the experts in the field of diversity management we spoke with or whose publications we reviewed to identify leading diversity management practices, a majority cited the following nine practices as leading. Top leadership commitment--a vision of diversity demonstrated and communicated throughout an organization by top-level management. Diversity as part of an organization's strategic plan--a diversity strategy and plan that are developed and aligned with the organization's strategic plan. Diversity linked to performance--the understanding that a more diverse and inclusive work environment can yield greater productivity and help improve individual and organizational performance. Measurement--a set of quantitative and qualitative measures of the impact of various aspects of an overall diversity program. Accountability--the means to ensure that leaders are responsible for diversity by linking their performance assessment and compensation to the progress of diversity initiatives. Succession planning--an ongoing, strategic process for identifying and developing a diverse pool of talent for an organization's potential future leaders. Recruitment--the process of attracting a supply of qualified, diverse applicants for employment. Employee involvement--the contribution of employees in driving diversity throughout an organization. Diversity training--organizational efforts to inform and educate management and staff about diversity. Experts and the literature generally agree that a combination of the identified practices should be considered when an organization is developing and implementing diversity management. We selected 10 agencies with the highest summary rankings from a 1999 governmentwide survey of federal agencies' diversity management programs to review for examples of the implementation of the identified practices. The implementation of the leading practices by these agencies may provide insights to other agencies as they undertake or attempt to strengthen or improve their own diversity management initiatives. We provided a draft of this report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management for review and comment. In their comments, agency officials generally agreed with the findings of the draft report. |
gao_GAO-03-51 | gao_GAO-03-51_0 | Hence, U.S. suppression aircraft focus on trying to neutralize, degrade, or destroy the enemy’s air defense radar equipment. High demand for the aircraft has exacerbated current wing and engine problems, and the Navy has been unable to meet its overall requirements. Finally, to the extent there are gaps in suppression capabilities, U.S. fighter aircraft and helicopters must rely on self-protection equipment to suppress enemy air defenses, but some of this equipment has been proven to be unreliable. In response to our previous report, DOD stated that its Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives would provide the basis for such a strategy. The Analysis of Alternatives Did Not Provide the Basis for a Comprehensive Strategy for the Suppression Mission
In fiscal year 2000, Congress expressed concerns that DOD did not have a serious plan for a successor to the EA-6B aircraft and directed DOD to conduct the Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives for replacing the EA-6B. DOD indicated in its response to our January 2001 report that the analysis would lead to a DOD-wide strategy and balanced set of acquisition programs to address the overall gaps between suppression needs and capabilities. However, it was only intended to address the airborne electronic attack aspect of the suppression mission and therefore did not address the acknowledged problems with aircraft self-protection systems or the technical and funding challenges of other service programs such as the Navy’s ITALD program, the Air Force’s MALD program, and the Air Force’s EC-130 modifications. In June 2002, the services presented their proposals for follow-on capabilities to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, the service proposals that are currently being considered by DOD do not provide an integrated, comprehensive solution to the overall suppression needs. DOD has recognized a gap exists in suppression capabilities but has made little progress in closing it. Recommendations for Executive Action
To close the gap between enemy air defense suppression needs and capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a coordinating entity and joint comprehensive strategy to address the gaps that need to be filled in the enemy air defense suppression mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. military aircraft are often at great risk from enemy air defenses, and the services use specialized aircraft to neutralize or destroy them. In January 2001, GAO reported that a gap existed between the services' suppression capabilities and their needs and recommended that a comprehensive strategy was needed to fix the situation. In response to GAO's report, DOD emphasized that a major study underway at the time would provide the basis for a Department-wide strategy and lead to a balanced set of acquisition programs between the services. This report updates our previous work and assesses actions that DOD has taken to improve its suppression capabilities.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense continues to face a gap between its need to suppress enemy air defenses and its capabilities to do so, despite some progress in upgrading its capabilities. There are not enough existing suppression aircraft to meet overall requirements, some aircraft are experiencing wing and engine problems, and improvements are needed to counter evolving threats. DOD's primary suppression aircraft, the EA-6B, is also reaching the end of its life cycle and a replacement is needed as early as 2009. Furthermore, some aircraft self-protection equipment, which provide additional suppression capabilities, have also been found to be unreliable. DOD has not yet developed an integrated, comprehensive approach to the U.S. air defense suppression mission but has recently completed an Analysis of Alternatives that presented the services with 27 options for replacing the aging EA-6B. The services formed a coordinating group to assess the options, and in June 2002 presented service-specific proposals to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for analysis and consideration in the 2004 budget. However, the Analysis of Alternatives did not provide the basis for a comprehensive strategy to address the department's overall suppression needs. It only analyzed the airborne electronic attack portion of the mission and did not address needed improvements in aircraft self-protection systems or the technical and funding challenges of other service programs such as the Navy's and Air Force's air-launched decoy programs. |
gao_GAO-12-815T | gao_GAO-12-815T_0 | Leadership Commitment, Improved Timeliness, and Development of Metrics Were Key to Removal of DOD’s Security Clearance Program from GAO’s High-Risk List
Since we identified DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance program as a high-risk area, DOD, in conjunction with Congress and other executive agency leadership, took actions that resulted in significant progress toward resolving problems we identified with the security clearance program. In 2011, we removed DOD’s personnel security clearance program from our high-risk list because of the agency’s progress in improving timeliness and the development of tools and metrics to assess quality, as well as DOD’s commitment to sustaining progress. Importantly, congressional oversight and the committed leadership of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (Performance Accountability Council) –which has been responsible for overseeing security clearance reform efforts since 2008—greatly contributed to the progress of DOD and the governmentwide security clearance reform. Top Leadership Demonstrated Commitment and Collaboration in Reforming Security Clearance Process
Leadership in Congress and the executive branch demonstrated commitment to reforming the security clearance process to address longstanding problems associated with the personnel security clearance program. Figure 1 illustrates key events related to the Suitability and Personnel Security Clearance Reform Effort. Congressional legislation and oversight has helped focus attention and sustain momentum to improve the processing of security clearances not only for DOD but governmentwide. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) established, among other things, milestones for reducing the time to complete initial clearances. security clearance reform efforts. DOD Developed Assessment Tools and Performance Metrics and Improved Timeliness to Demonstrate Progress
One of DOD’s key actions that led to the removal of its personnel security clearance program from our high-risk list was that DOD was able to demonstrate its progress in having implemented corrective measures. Longstanding backlogs and delays in the clearance process led to our initial designation of this area as high risk. In 2011, we reported that DOD processed 90 percent of initial clearances in an average of 49 days for federal civilians, military, and industry personnel and met the 60-day statutory timeliness objective for processing all initial clearances in fiscal year 2010. Subsequently, DOD developed two quality tools to evaluate completeness of documentation used to determine clearance eligibility. In addition to these assessment tools, in 2010 DOD, OMB, ODNI, and OPM developed 15 metrics that assess the timeliness and quality of investigations, adjudications, reciprocity, and automation. These metrics represented positive developments that could contribute to greater visibility over the clearance process. Building on the factors for reforming the security process that we have reported in the past, continued leadership and attention, such as continuing to monitor and update outcome-focused performance measures, seeking opportunities to enhance efficiency and managing costs, and ensuring a strong requirements determination process, may enhance the security clearance reform effort. We have also previously reported on the importance of continually assessing and evaluating programs as a good business practice, including evaluating metrics to help ensure that they are effective and updated when necessary.the reform and that DOD and OPM complete implementation of the As a result, it is important to sustain the momentum of quality tools and metrics so that the executive branch can demonstrate progress in improving the quality of investigations and adjudications. We found that agencies do not consistently document the additional steps they have taken prior to granting a reciprocal clearance. Given current fiscal constraints, identifying the long-term costs is critical for decision-makers to compare and prioritize alternative proposals for completing the transformation of the security clearance process. We most recently reported on two areas of opportunity for which the executive branch may be able to identify efficiencies: information technology and investigation and adjudication case management and processes. Specifically, a sound requirements determination process may help ensure that workload and costs are not higher than necessary. Further, the Performance Accountability Council’s reformed security clearance process identified determining if a position requires a security clearance as the first step of the process. As of October 2010, the Director of National Intelligence reported that 3.9 million federal employees (military and civilian) and contractors hold security clearances. A change in the higher level of clearances being requested also increases the investigative and adjudicative workloads. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of October 2010, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that 3.9 million federal employees (military and civilians) and contractors hold security clearances. DOD comprises the vast majority of government security clearances. Longstanding backlogs and delays in the security clearance process led GAO to place the DODs Personnel Security Clearance Program on its high-risk list in 2005. Delays in issuing clearances can result in millions of dollars of additional cost to the federal government and could pose a national security risk. DOD and others have taken steps to address these issues and additional concerns with clearance documentation used to determine eligibility for a clearance. As a result, in 2011, GAO removed the program from its high-risk list.
This testimony addresses (1) the key actions that led GAO to remove DODs security clearance program from its high-risk list and (2) the additional actions that can enhance the security clearance reform efforts. This statement is based on prior GAO reports and testimonies on DODs personnel security clearance program and governmentwide suitability and security clearance reform efforts.
What GAO Found
Since GAO first identified the Department of Defenses (DOD) Personnel Security Clearance Program as a high-risk area, DOD, in conjunction with Congress and executive agency leadership, took actions that resulted in significant progress toward improving the processing of security clearances. Congress held more than 14 oversight hearings to help oversee key legislation, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which helped focus attention and sustain momentum of the governmentwide reform effort. In addition, the committed and collaborative efforts of DOD, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as leaders of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (Performance Accountability Council) demonstrated commitment to and created a vision for the reform effort, which led to significant improvements in the timeliness of processing security clearances. As a result, in 2011, GAO removed DODs Personnel Security Clearance Program from its high-risk list because of the agencys progress in improving timeliness, development of tools and metrics to assess quality, and commitment to sustaining progress. Specifically, GAO found that DOD met the 60-day statutory timeliness objective for processing initial clearances in fiscal year 2010 by processing 90 percent of its initial clearances in an average of 49 days. In addition, DOD developed two quality tools to evaluate completeness of investigation documentation and agencies' adjudication process regarding the basis for granting security clearances. Moreover, DOD, ODNI, OMB, and OPM developed and are in the process of implementing 15 metrics that assess the timeliness and quality of investigations, adjudications, reciprocity and automation of security clearances.
Even with the significant progress in recent years, sustained leadership attention to the following additional actions, on which GAO has previously reported, can enhance the security clearance reform efforts of executive branch agencies and the Performance Accountability Council:
Continue to implement, monitor, and update outcome-focused performance measures. The development of tools and metrics to monitor and track quality are positive steps, but full implementation of these tools and measures will enable the executive branch to demonstrate progress in quality improvements and contribute to greater visibility over the clearance process.
Seek opportunities to enhance efficiencies and manage costs related to the reform effort. Given the current fiscal constraints, identifying long-term funding requirements for the security clearance process is critical for the executive branch to sustain the reform effort. Further, the reform efforts are a venue to facilitate the identification of efficiencies in areas including information technology and investigation and adjudication case management processes.
Create a sound requirements process for determining which positions require clearances and level of clearances. A sound requirements determination process may help ensure that workload and costs are not higher than necessary by ensuring that clearances are only requested for positions when needed and that the appropriate clearance level is requested. |
gao_GAO-02-13 | gao_GAO-02-13_0 | Each agency collected different kinds of measures, which varied in terms of whether they focused on detection and monitoring or on drug seizures and whether or not they focused specifically on the agency’s activities in the transit zone. All results data are classified. We identified two interagency databases—the FDSS, and the Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB)—which were designed, among other things, to improve the accuracy of cocaine seizure data when multiple agencies participate in the seizures. These seizures ultimately contributed to the totals reported by the two agencies as measures of their effectiveness in drug interdiction. Customs’ role in these seizures included participating in drug-smuggling investigations that resulted in a number of the seizures; detecting, monitoring, and tracking drug-smuggling aircraft or vessels; and searching vessels that had been apprehended by the Coast Guard. Although the FDSS has controls to prevent the same seizures from being counted more than once, FDSS was not designed to prevent individual agencies from reporting the same seizures in their own databases. Quarterly CCDB Meetings May Help Verify the Details of Transit Zone Cocaine Seizures
The CCDB contains information on nearly all air and maritime cocaine seizures made in the transit zone and is used by DOD, the Coast Guard, and Customs as a check on the accuracy of their agencies’ cocaine seizure data. To determine the extent to which we could identify the funds obligated and assets used for transit zone drug interdiction activities of DOD, the Coast Guard, and Customs, we interviewed agency and ONDCP budget officials, reviewed agency budget documents, and reviewed data on flight hours and ship days from agency data systems. Federal-Wide Drug Seizure System Federal Drug Identification Number (FDIN). Customs Service: Drug Interdiction Efforts (GAO/GGD-96-189BR, Sept. 26, 1996). | What GAO Found
The Defense Department (DOD), the Coast Guard, and the Customs Service all interdict illegal drugs--primarily cocaine--from South America. DOD is the lead agency, but all three agencies play a role in monitoring and detecting shipments of illegal drugs. The Coast Guard is the lead agency for apprehending ships that are smuggling drugs, with Customs providing help as needed. The Coast Guard and Customs share responsibility for apprehending aircraft involved in drug-smuggling. GAO could not identify the funds obligated and the number of flight hours and ship days used for drug interdiction in the drug transit zone because the three agencies do not routinely track this information. The results tracked by the three agencies to demonstrate their effectiveness of their drug interdiction efforts in the transit zone varied according to whether they focused on drug seizures or results of detection and monitoring and whether they were specific to the transit zone. Agencies can use several controls to ensure the accuracy of their own cocaine seizure data, such as assigning unique identification numbers to each seizure and headquarters review of data from field units. Although two interagency data systems have been developed to ensure the accuracy of governmentwide cocaine seizure data when multiple agencies participate in a seizure, the two systems do not prevent agencies from counting cocaine seizures in their own databases and annual counts when more than one agency participates in the seizure. |
gao_GAO-08-246T | gao_GAO-08-246T_0 | Progress on UN Management Reform Efforts Has Varied and Various Factors Have Slowed the Pace of the Reform Efforts
Since our October 2006 report, the progress of UN management reform efforts has varied in the five areas we reviewed—ethics, oversight, procurement, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of programs and activities (known as mandates). Various factors, such as member state disagreements on the priorities and importance of the remaining reform efforts, have slowed the pace of the UN’s efforts to improve the management of the Secretariat, and a number of reforms cannot move forward until these factors are addressed. Progress on UN Management Reform Efforts Has Varied
Since our October 2006 report, the UN has taken steps to improve ethics. The ethics office has made substantial progress in increasing staffing and in enforcing a whistleblower protection policy. The UN has taken steps to improve its procurement process, but some reform issues have not moved forward since October 2006. However, the UN has made little or no progress in establishing an independent bid protest system and creating a lead agency concept, whereby specialist UN organizations would handle certain procurements in order to enhance division of labor, reduce duplication, and reduce costs. Despite some limited initial actions, the UN’s review of all UN mandates has not advanced, due in part to a lack of support by many member states. Oversight and Accountability in Selected UN Organizations Could Be Strengthened by Further Instituting International Best Practices
Although the six UN internal audit offices we reviewed have made progress in implementing international auditing standards, they have not fully implemented key components of the standards. In addition, while the six UN evaluation offices we reviewed are working toward implementing UN evaluation standards, they have not fully implemented them. Moreover, the governing bodies responsible for oversight of the six UN organizations we reviewed lack full access to internal audit reports and most lack direct information from the audit offices about the sufficiency of their resources and capacity to conduct their work. We earlier reported that UNDP and WFP rely on their oversight staff to self-report any conflicts of interest, though WFP’s investigative unit was developing a conflict of interest policy to cover investigations staff in fall 2006, and none of the six organizations we examined require their internal oversight staff to disclose their financial interests, a practice that could help to ensure that employees are free from conflicts of interest. International Organizations’ Assistance Programs Have Been Constrained in Burma
We found that the military regime that rules Burma has blocked or significantly impeded UN and other international organizations’ efforts to address human rights concerns and to help people living in areas affected by ethnic conflict. The regime has also, to a lesser degree, impeded UN food, development, and health programs. Nonetheless, several UN and other international organization officials told us they are still able to achieve meaningful results in their efforts to mitigate some of Burma’s humanitarian, health, and development problems. Burmese Regime Has Blocked or Impeded Human Rights Programs and Programs in Conflict Areas
Burma’s military regime has blocked international efforts to monitor prison conditions, and, until recently, forced labor in Burma. Our report on Burma included no recommendations. For example, the UN has worked to improve oversight by establishing an IAAC, but funding arrangements within the Secretariat’s internal audit office continue to constrain the office’s operational independence and its ability to audit high-risk areas. 2007). | Why GAO Did This Study
Longstanding problems in United Nations (UN) management underscore the pressing need to reform and modernize the United Nations in areas ranging from management, oversight, and accountability to operational activities in specific countries. The United States has strongly advocated the reform of UN management practices and has also been critical of the restrictions Burma's military regime has imposed on many international organizations in Burma over the past 3 years. This testimony, based on recent GAO reports, discusses (1) management reform efforts at the UN Secretariat since 2006; (2) oversight and accountability in selected UN organizations; and (3) UN and other international organizations' activities in Burma.
What GAO Found
GAO's report on UN management reform efforts notes that (1) progress has varied in the five areas GAO examined--ethics, oversight, procurement, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of programs and activities (mandates)--and (2) various factors, such as disagreements among member states, have slowed the pace of progress. The UN ethics office has taken steps to improve organizational ethics, including implementing a whistleblower protection policy, but GAO identified issues that may limit the impact of the policy. The UN has taken steps to improve oversight, including establishing an Independent Audit Advisory Committee. However, UN funding arrangements continue to constrain the independence of the Secretariat's internal audit office and its ability to audit high-risk areas. The UN has taken steps to improve certain procurement practices, but has not implemented an independent bid protest system or approved a lead agency concept, which could improve procurement services. The UN has taken steps to improve certain management operations of the Secretariat, but has made little or no progress in others. Despite some limited initial actions, the UN's review of mandates has not advanced, due in part to a lack of support by many member states. Finally, the pace of UN management reforms has been slowed by member states' disagreements on reform efforts, lack of comprehensive implementation plans, administrative issues that complicate certain internal processes, and competing UN priorities. GAO's report on oversight and accountability of selected UN organizations notes that, although the six UN internal audit offices GAO reviewed have made progress in implementing international auditing standards, they have not fully implemented key components of the standards. None of these six organizations require their internal oversight staff to disclose their financial interests. However, GAO found that five of the six organizations have made efforts to increase accountability by establishing whistleblower protection policies and one was developing such a policy. GAO also reported that while the six UN evaluation offices GAO reviewed are working toward implementation of UN evaluation standards, they have not fully implemented them. Finally, GAO reported that the governing bodies responsible for oversight of the six organizations lack full access to internal audit reports. GAO's report on Burma notes that Burma's military regime has blocked or significantly impeded UN and other international organizations' efforts to address human rights concerns and to help people living in areas affected by ethnic conflict. The regime frustrated international organizations' efforts to monitor forced labor for years before signing an agreement in early 2007; restricted their efforts to assist populations living in conflict areas; and blocked their efforts to monitor prison conditions and conflict situations. The regime has, to a lesser degree, impeded UN food, development, and health programs. However, several UN and other international organization officials told GAO they are still able to achieve meaningful results in their efforts to mitigate some of Burma's humanitarian, health, and development problems. |
gao_AIMD-99-7 | gao_AIMD-99-7_0 | The National Weather Service has consistently refused to deal openly with the health issue raised by siting the radar in a residential area.”
In November 1997, the NWS responded to the Rose Institute report and stated that it was “replete with misinformation concerning weather radars, weakly supported opinions, and several paradoxical conclusions.”
Subsequent to that response, the Rose Institute issued another report in May 1998 that expanded on some of the issues raised in its November report, while also raising additional concerns, including whether the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD coverage is needed since “ninety percent of the area that the Sulphur Mountain tower was installed to cover is covered by other NEXRAD stations.”
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine whether the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD (1) can provide timely and accurate information for warning of flash floods and (2) is intended to provide low-level data necessary to predict wind shear for Los Angeles International Airport. compared the timeliness of the flash flood warning lead times to the requirement specified in Commerce’s 1999 Annual Performance Plan, obtained and reviewed Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD availability data from the Engineering Management Reporting System for the period from October 1995 through March 1998 to determine if the Sulphur Mountain radar was meeting the 96 percent availability requirement, reviewed three flash flood events that occurred on February 3, 6, and 23, 1998, to determine how data from the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD is used in combination with rain gage information to issue flash flood warnings, and interviewed the following users to obtain their views of the quality, timeliness, and utility of the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD data: officials from the Flood Control Department of the Ventura County Public Works Agency; the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works; Point Mugu Naval Air Warfare Center; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles District, Reservoir Regulation Section; Ventura County Sheriff’s Department; the Assistant City Administrator from the Emergency Preparedness Division, City of Los Angeles; weathercasters from KCBS-TV and KCAL-TV; and the director of Fox Weather, a private meteorological service. From January 1992 through December 1994, 18 flash flood events were reported in Ventura and Los Angeles counties. However, from January 1995 through February 1998, advanced warnings were issued for 17 of the 22 reported events; and the average warning lead time for these was just over 2 hours. Although NEXRAD is not the only source of data on which storms are tracked, Los Angeles/Oxnard WFO officials told us that the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD is the primary reason for the increase in advanced warning lead time because it provides advanced warning of heavy precipitation oftentimes before severe weather hits the California coast. NWS headquarters officials acknowledged the availability shortfalls and stated that they are monitoring the failure rates of parts and are attempting to reduce the failure rates or to more quickly replace the parts that fail most often. FAA uses three different systems, either singly or in tandem, to predict wind shear at airports — Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR), Weather Systems Processor (WSP), and Low Level Wind Shear Alert System (LLWAS). WSP is a modification to FAA’s air traffic control airport surveillance radar (ASR-9) that is to provide FAA with 80 to 95 percent of the capability of TDWR. WSP is to be installed at high to moderate traffic airports that experience limited severe weather. LLWAS is used to supplement TDWR at nine high-traffic airports at greatest risk of severe weather and it is used at other airports that will not get TDWR or WSP—typically lower traffic airports. Los Angeles International currently has LLWAS and since it is an airport designated as having high to moderate traffic that typically experiences limited severe weather, it is scheduled to get WSP in 2001. Conclusions
The accuracy and timeliness of flash flood warning lead times has improved since the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD was commissioned in December 1994. However, the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD is not consistently meeting its availability requirement, thus increasing the risk that NWS and other users will not always have the data needed to accurately and quickly predict flash floods and other severe weather. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Rose Institute of Claremont McKenna College's study on the National Weather Service's (NWS) Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) located on Sulphur Mountain, California, focusing on whether the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD: (1) can provide timely and accurate information for warning of flash floods; and (2) is intended to provide low-level data necessary to predict wind shear for Los Angeles International Airport.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD was commissioned in December 1994, the accuracy and timeliness of flash flood warnings has improved for Ventura and Los Angeles counties; (2) from January 1992 through December 1994, 18 flash flood events were reported in Ventura and Los Angeles counties; (3) however, from January 1995 through February 1998, advanced warnings were issued for 17 of the 22 reported events; (3) although the Sulphur Mountain radar is not the only source of data on which flash flood warnings are issued, NWS officials believe that the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD is the primary reason for the increase in advanced warning lead time because it provides advanced warning of heavy precipitation, often before severe weather hits the California coast; (4) users of the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD data told GAO that the information it provides is valuable, accurate, and timely; (5) despite the improvements in flash flood warning lead time and user satisfaction, NWS data show that the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD is not consistently meeting its 96-percent availability requirement; (6) from October 1995 through March 1998, the Sulphur Mountain NEXRAD was available as required for 20 months; for the other 10 months, availability ranged between 79 to 95 percent; (7) if the NEXRAD is not available as required, it increases the risk that NWS will not have the data it needs to accurately and quickly predict flash floods and other severe weather; (8) NWS headquarters officials acknowledged the availability shortfalls and stated that they are monitoring the failure rates of parts and are attempting to reduce the failure rates or to more quickly replace the parts that fail most often; (9) predicting wind shear at Los Angeles International Airport is not part of NEXRAD's mission; (10) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses three different systems to predict wind shear at airports--Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR), Weather Systems Processor (WSP), and Low Level Wind Shear Alert System (LLWAS); (11) TDWR is being deployed at high traffic airports that experience severe weather; (12) WSP is an enhancement to an existing air traffic control surveillance radar that is to provide FAA with 80 to 95 percent of the capability of TDWR; (13) WSP is to be installed at high to moderate traffic airports that experience limited severe weather; (14) LLWAS is used to supplement TDWR at nine high traffic airports at greatest risk of severe weather and it is used at other airports that will not get TDWR or WSP; and (15) Los Angeles International Airport currently has LLWAS and is scheduled to get WSP in 2001. |
gao_GAO-12-729 | gao_GAO-12-729_0 | 1). The federal government gives private, voluntary agencies responsibility to determine where refugees will live in the United States, with approval from the Department of State. In making these assessments, local voluntary agency affiliates typically consider both their own internal capacity and the capacity of the community, with different For example, when determining levels of emphasis on one or the other.how many refugees their community can accommodate, local affiliates in one community told us that they primarily consider their internal capacity—such as staffing levels, staff skills, long-term funding needs, the number of refugees they have served in the past, and success in meeting refugee employment goals in the previous year. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, states that it is the intent of Congress that local voluntary agency activities should be conducted in close cooperation and advance consultation with and the cooperative agreements that the state and local governments,Department of State enters into with national voluntary agencies require the agencies to conduct their reception and placement activities in this manner. Refugees Bring Benefits to Communities but Can Pose Challenges for Service Providers
Refugees Bring Diversity and Can Help Stimulate Development, but Can Stretch Resources and Affect Program Outcomes
Communities can benefit socially and economically from refugee resettlement. In addition, in some communities we visited, school district officials and health care providers said that locating interpreters for certain languages can be difficult. In addition to stretching school district resources, refugee students can also negatively affect district performance outcomes. Capacity Challenges Can Lead Communities to Request Restrictions or Temporary Moratoriums on Refugee Resettlement
Some communities that face challenges in serving additional refugees have requested restrictions or even temporary moratoriums on refugee resettlement. According to ORR, its focus on employment outcomes as a measure of effectiveness is based on the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, which requires ORR to help refugees attain economic self- sufficiency as soon as possible. Little Is Known about the Extent of Refugee Integration, but Studies Offer a Framework for Assessing Integration
Federal Agencies Promote but Do Not Currently Measure Refugee Integration
While federal refugee resettlement programs generally provide only short- term assistance, PRM and ORR both aim to prepare refugees for long- term integration into their communities. For example, ORR’s social services grant program funds employment services and other support services to refugees for up to 5 years after arrival, but communities may choose to provide these services for a shorter period of time due to local resource constraints. While refugee integration is part of ORR’s mission and overall goal, ORR officials said they have not measured it because there is no clear definition of integration, because it is unclear when integration should be measured, and because the Refugee Act focuses on self- sufficiency outcomes related to employment. Studies Offer a Framework for Measuring and Facilitating Integration
Studies on refugee resettlement do not offer a broad assessment of how well refugees have integrated into the United States. Of the 13 studies we identified that addressed refugee integration, almost all were limited in scope in that they focused on particular refugee groups in specific geographic locations.of specific refugee groups, including factors that help refugees successfully integrate into their communities. While most of the communities we visited had not established formal goals or strategies to facilitate refugee integration, two of the eight communities had developed formal plans to promote integration. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following four recommendations based on our review: To help ensure that state and local stakeholders have the opportunity to provide input on the number of refugees resettled in their communities, we recommend that the Secretary of State provide additional guidance to resettlement agencies and state coordinators on how to consult with local stakeholders prior to making placement decisions, including with whom to consult and what should be discussed during the consultations; and the Secretaries of State and of Health and Human Services collect and disseminate best practices related to refugee placement decisions, specifically on working with community stakeholders, as well as other promising practices from communities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To identify the factors resettlement agencies consider when deciding where refugees are initially placed, we reviewed relevant federal and state laws and regulations and other relevant documents, and conducted interviews with federal agency officials and national voluntary agency staff. We interviewed officials from the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), as well as representatives from several national voluntary resettlement agencies. To determine what is known about refugees’ integration into the United States, we conducted a literature review of academic research on this topic. We also obtained secondary migration data from ORR’s annual report. 2 (2011). 3-4 (2008). | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2011, the United States admitted more than 56,000 refugees under its refugee resettlement program. Upon entry, a network of private, nonprofit voluntary agencies (voluntary agencies) selects the communities where refugees will live. The Department of State's PRM and the Department of Health and Human Services' ORR provide funding to help refugees settle in their communities and obtain employment and monitor implementation of the program. Congress has begun to reexamine the refugee resettlement program, and GAO was asked to examine (1) the factors resettlement agencies consider when determining where refugees are initially placed; (2) the effects refugees have on their communities; (3) how federal agencies ensure program effectiveness and integrity; and (4) what is known about the integration of refugees. GAO reviewed agency guidance, monitoring protocols, reports, and studies; conducted a literature review; reviewed and analyzed relevant federal and state laws and regulations; and met with federal and state officials, voluntary agency staff, and local stakeholders in eight selected communities.
What GAO Found
Voluntary agencies consider various factors when determining where refugees will be placed, but few agencies we visited consulted relevant local stakeholders, which posed challenges for service providers. When deciding how many refugees to place in each community, some voluntary agencies prioritize local agency capacity, such as staffing levels, while others emphasize community capacity, such as housing availability. Although the Immigration and Nationality Act states that it is the intent of Congress for voluntary agencies to work closely with state and local stakeholders when making these decisions, the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) offers limited guidance on how this should occur. Some communities GAO visited had developed formal processes for obtaining stakeholder input after receiving an overwhelming number of refugees, but most had not, which made it difficult for health care providers and school systems to prepare for and properly serve refugees.
State and local stakeholders reported that refugees bring cultural diversity and stimulate economic development, but serving refugees can stretch local resources, including safety net services. In addition, refugee students can negatively affect performance outcomes for school districts because they often have limited English proficiency. Furthermore, some refugees choose to relocate after their initial placement, and this secondary migration may stretch communities that do not have adequate resources to serve them. In fact, capacity challenges have led some communities to request restrictions or temporary moratoriums on resettlement.
PRM and the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) monitor their refugee assistance programs, but weaknesses in performance measurement may hinder effectiveness. Although refugees are eligible for ORR services for up to 5 years, the outcome data that ORR collects focuses on shorter-term employment outcomes. ORR officials said that their performance measurement reflects the goals outlined by the Immigration and Nationality Act--to help refugees achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. However, the focus on rapid employment makes it difficult to provide services that may increase refugees' incomes, such as helping them obtain credentials to practice their professions in the United States.
Little is known about the extent of refugee integration into U.S. communities, but research offers a framework for measuring and facilitating integration. PRM and ORR both promote refugee integration, but neither agency currently measures integration as a program outcome. While integration is part of ORR's mission, ORR officials said one of the reasons they have not measured it is that there is no clear definition of integration. In addition, research on refugee resettlement does not offer an overall assessment of how well refugees have integrated into the United States. Most of the 13 studies GAO reviewed were limited in scope and focused on particular refugee groups in specific geographic locations. However, these studies identified a variety of indicators that can be used to assess integration as well as factors that can facilitate integration, such as English language acquisition, employment, and social support from other refugees. Despite limited national information, some U.S. communities have developed formal plans for refugee integration.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes several recommendations to the Secretaries of State and Health and Human Services to improve refugee assistance programs in the United States. HHS and State generally concurred with the recommendations and each identified efforts they have under way or plan to undertake to address them. |
gao_GAO-05-656 | gao_GAO-05-656_0 | For example, the on-site inspections are used to check the compliance with the standards for whether the supplier: has a physical facility on an appropriate site that is accessible to beneficiaries and to CMS, with a clearly visible sign with hours posted; has its own inventory in stock on site, off site at another location, or has a contract with another company for the purchase of inventory; maintains records that document delivery of items to beneficiaries and information provided to beneficiaries on warranties, including how repairs and exchanges will be handled, and how to contact the supplier in case of questions or problems; and has a written beneficiary complaint resolution policy and maintains records on beneficiary complaints and their resolution. NSC’s Efforts Are Insufficient to Verify Suppliers’ Compliance with the 21 Standards
NSC’s verification procedures have weaknesses that leave the Medicare program without assurance that suppliers billing the program are meeting the 21 standards, and thus, are qualified and legitimate. Further, although on-site inspections play a key role in verifying suppliers’ compliance with the 21 standards, we estimate that NSC did not conduct more than 600 required on-site inspections and its inspection procedures have limitations. In total, these suppliers were paid almost $6 million by Medicare. In addition, we verified licensure with the respective states for a sample of the suppliers that had disclosed to NSC their intention to bill for oxygen and had been paid at least $1,000 by Medicare for this service. Through this process, we identified 7 more suppliers that did not have the required state license to provide oxygen services in 2004. NSC’s procedures suggest, but do not require, its site inspectors to verify off-site inventory locations. Medicare’s Standards Are Too Weak to be Used Effectively to Screen DMEPOS Suppliers
Medicare’s standards are currently too weak to be used effectively for screening DMEPOS suppliers that want to enroll in the program. However, they do not include standards related to supplier integrity and capability analogous to those that federal agencies generally apply to prospective contractors or those used by at least two state Medicaid programs for their suppliers. In addition, after a contract is awarded, federal agencies can terminate the contract for default or convenience. For example, in sworn testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance in April 2004, a witness who pleaded guilty to fraud explained her part in a $25 million fraud scheme that she and a group of 19 others committed against the Medicare program. During this period, if the provider fails to meet state requirements, the state agency disenrolls the provider from Medicaid. However, in contrast to California and Florida Medicaid, if a supplier can demonstrate compliance with the 21 standards, CMS readmits it into Medicare unless it has been otherwise excluded from participating in the program. CMS’s Oversight Is Insufficient to Determine Whether NSC Screens and Monitors Suppliers Effectively
CMS’s oversight has not been sufficient to determine whether NSC is meeting its responsibilities in screening, enrolling, and monitoring DMEPOS suppliers. CMS was unaware—until we informed the agency— that NSC had not conducted all required on-site inspections of suppliers. Finally, while CMS has established performance goals in NSC’s contract related primarily to processing supplier applications and managing other aspects of NSC’s workload—such as handling inquiries—it has not established performance goals connected to effectiveness of the screening or fraud prevention efforts. In response to four of these recommendations, CMS stated that it has revised the statement of work for fiscal year 2006 to require NSC to: check suppliers’ licenses and liability insurance each year, rather than every 3 years at reenrollment, and compare suppliers’ billing histories to the licenses they provide at that time; provide on-site inspectors with the billing histories of DMEPOS suppliers conduct site inspections of suppliers’ off-site inventory storage locations and of businesses that provide them with inventory through contracts; and conduct out-of-cycle inspections, the number of which CMS will manage based on NSC’s workload and budgetary constraints. For custom- fabricated orthotics and prosthetics, we were not able to confirm whether the suppliers that had not disclosed to NSC that they would be providing these items and were paid at least $1,000 for such claims in 2004 in Florida, Illinois, and Texas had the proper state licenses, because those states license individuals to be allowed to supply these items, not companies. Appendix II: Medicare’s 21 Standards for Suppliers and NSC’s Procedures to Verify Their Compliance
Suppliers of durable medical equipment (DME), prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies must meet 21 standards in order to obtain and retain their Medicare billing privileges. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2004, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) estimated that Medicare improperly paid $900 million for durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies--in part due to fraud by suppliers. To deter such fraud, CMS contracts with the National Supplier Clearinghouse (NSC) to verify that suppliers meet 21 standards before they can bill Medicare. NSC verifies adherence to the standards through on-site inspections and document reviews. Recent prosecutions of fraudulent suppliers suggest that there may be weaknesses in NSC's efforts to screen suppliers or in the standards. In this report, GAO evaluated: 1) NSC's efforts to verify suppliers' compliance with the 21 standards, 2) the adequacy of the standards to screen suppliers, and 3) CMS's oversight of NSC's efforts.
What GAO Found
NSC's efforts to verify compliance with the 21 standards are insufficient because of weaknesses in two key screening procedures--checking state licensure and conducting on-site inspections. NSC's licensure check is ineffective because it relies on self-reported information about the items suppliers intend to provide to beneficiaries and does not match this against actual billing later. We found a total of 22 suppliers in Florida, Louisiana, and Texas that had each been paid at least $1,000 by Medicare in 2004 for providing oxygen services, but did not have the required state license. Further, more than half of the almost $107 million paid by Medicare for custom-fabricated orthotics and prosthetics in Florida in 2004 went to suppliers that had not had their licenses checked. At least 46 of these suppliers were under investigation for fraud as of April 2005. NSC's on-site inspections also have weaknesses that limit their effectiveness. We estimate that NSC did not conduct required on-site inspections of 605 suppliers. Further, when conducting on-site inspections, NSC does not require its inspectors to examine beneficiary files to assess whether suppliers are meeting the standard to maintain proof of delivery or check whether suppliers have a real source of inventory, as required by Medicare. Medicare's 21 standards are currently too weak to be used effectively to screen medical equipment suppliers. Although Medicare paid suppliers about $8.8 billion in fiscal year 2004, the program's 21 standards do not include measures related to supplier integrity and capability analogous to those that federal agencies generally apply to prospective contractors or those used by at least two state Medicaid programs for their suppliers. For example, in sworn testimony before the Committee on Finance in April 2004, an individual who pleaded guilty to Medicare fraud described how she was able to open a sham business with $3,000--despite lacking the experience and the financial, technical, and managerial resources to operate a legitimate supply company. If an agency finds a company does not meet federal contracting standards for integrity and capability, the agency may decline to award it a contract. If a contractor performs inadequately, the agency can terminate the contract. Further, agencies may disqualify a contractor from competing for other federal contracts. In addition, a California supplier that is disenrolled from Medicaid for failing to meet state requirements cannot reenroll for 3 years. In contrast, if a Medicare supplier can later demonstrate compliance with the 21 standards, CMS readmits it into the program. CMS's oversight has not been sufficient to determine whether NSC is meeting its responsibilities in screening and enrolling DMEPOS suppliers. For example, CMS was unaware--until we informed the agency--that NSC had not conducted all required on-site inspections for suppliers. Moreover, while CMS has established performance goals for NSC related primarily to processing applications, it has not established a method to evaluate NSC's success in identifying noncompliant and fraudulent suppliers and recommending that they be removed from the program. |
gao_GAO-07-734 | gao_GAO-07-734_0 | The Most Common Medicare Ultrasound Procedures in 2005 Were Echocardiograms and Noninvasive Vascular Studies
Echocardiograms and noninvasive vascular procedures accounted for about three-fourths of the approximately 41 million ultrasound procedures provided to Medicare beneficiaries in 2005 in any setting. Nearly all of the ultrasound exams paid under Part B were performed in physician offices and hospital outpatient departments. Among other conditions, noninvasive vascular ultrasounds are used to monitor the blood flow through veins and arteries and to detect blockage, or blood clots. Thus, having a sonographer provide these procedures could be appropriate for mobile services provided in a SNF or home even if a physician was not present. However, because these revised payment policies could affect the use of these services, the actual financial impacts could differ from our estimates. Part B Equipment Transportation Payments Would Likely Increase Expenditures and Beneficiary Cost Sharing
Paying to transport ultrasound equipment for the 129,000 exams done in SNFs during noncovered SNF stays in 2005 could have increased Medicare expenditures by an estimated $9.8 million and beneficiary cost sharing by an estimated $2.6 million, assuming the number and location of exams would not have changed in response to this policy. Some of the exams conducted for beneficiaries in noncovered SNF stays likely were conducted in other sites of service (for example, physicians’ offices or hospital outpatient departments) but did not involve Medicare-covered ambulance services to transport the beneficiary there. Paying Separately for Ultrasound Services during Part A-Covered SNF Stays Would Likely Increase Part B Expenditures, Beneficiary Cost Sharing, and Service Use
Paying separately under Part B for ultrasound exams and associated equipment and ambulance transportation during Part A-covered SNF stays, as opposed to bundling these services into the Part A PPS payment as is done now, could have increased Medicare Part B payments in 2005 by an estimated $22.0 million and caused beneficiary cost sharing to rise by about $13.4 million, assuming that this policy would not affect service use. Evidence and Variation in Federal Requirements Are Among Factors to Consider in Determining Whether to Establish Credentialing or Other Qualification Requirements for Sonographers
Factors for CMS to consider in determining whether to establish credentialing or other qualification requirements for sonographers include findings about the value of credentialing from peer-reviewed studies, MedPAC, and ultrasound-related organizations, coupled with variation in federal requirements and lack of state requirements for sonographers. Representatives from ultrasound-related professional organizations described ultrasound procedures as highly operator dependent. Two studies have shown that poor quality images can lead to misdiagnosis or unnecessarily repeated exams. Maintaining the status quo of allowing Medicare carriers to have different requirements for sonographer qualifications in different states undermines the assurance that beneficiaries are receiving consistently high-quality services. Such requirements, that sonographers paid by Medicare either be credentialed or work in an accredited facility, would help to promote the quality of ultrasound procedures across states and sites of service where consistent policy is currently lacking. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix explains the methodology that we used to address our reporting objectives on (1) the types of ultrasound procedures commonly used to diagnose medical conditions of Medicare beneficiaries, particularly those in skilled nursing facilities (SNF); (2) the financial impact of changing how Medicare pays for ultrasound exams and associated equipment and ambulance transportation for beneficiaries receiving care in a SNF; and (3) the factors to consider in determining whether the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) should establish credentialing or other qualification requirements for sonographers that provide diagnostic ultrasound procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare spending on imaging services, among which are ultrasound procedures that use sound waves to facilitate diagnosis, nearly doubled from 1999 to 2004. The Congress required GAO to examine Medicare's payment methods for ultrasound procedures and whether the technicians that conduct them--called sonographers--should be subject to qualification standards, such as having to undergo a certification process called credentialing. This report addresses (1) the ultrasound procedures commonly used to diagnose medical conditions of Medicare beneficiaries, particularly for beneficiaries in a skilled nursing facility (SNF), (2) the financial impact of changing how Medicare pays for ultrasound exams and associated equipment and ambulance transportation for beneficiaries in a SNF, and (3) the factors for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to consider in determining whether to establish credentialing or other requirements for sonographers. For this review, GAO analyzed Medicare claims data and conducted interviews and literature reviews.
What GAO Found
Three-fourths of the approximately 41 million ultrasound procedures provided to Medicare beneficiaries in 2005 in any setting were one of two types: (1) echocardiograms to diagnose heart conditions or (2) noninvasive vascular procedures used to monitor blood flow and detect blockage or injury in veins and arteries. Ultrasound procedures consist of the ultrasound exam itself and the physician's interpretation of the exam. Nearly all of the ultrasound exams provided under Medicare Part B, which covers physician, hospital outpatient, diagnostic testing, and certain other services, were performed in physicians' offices and hospital outpatient departments. Of these exams, less than 1 percent were conducted in SNFs or homes, generally using ultrasound equipment that was transported to these settings by a mobile provider. Among beneficiaries in SNF stays not covered by Medicare who received ultrasound exams in SNFs, noninvasive vascular exams were the most prevalent type performed. Two ultrasound procedure payment changes affecting SNF beneficiaries that GAO examined would likely increase expenditures and beneficiary cost sharing. If CMS had paid to transport ultrasound equipment to beneficiaries in SNF stays not covered by Medicare, which is not currently done, Medicare expenditures could have increased by an estimated $9.8 million and beneficiary cost sharing could have been about $2.6 million higher in 2005, assuming the number and location of services would not change in response to this policy. Moreover, paying separately for ultrasound exams and related transportation during beneficiaries' Medicare-covered SNF stays, as opposed to bundling these and other services into a single daily payment as CMS currently does, could have increased Medicare payments by about $22.0 million and beneficiary cost sharing by about $13.4 million in 2005, assuming no change in service use due to the revised policy. The actual financial impact for Medicare could differ from these estimates if, for example, providers increased their service provision due to these policy changes. Factors for CMS to consider in determining whether to establish credentialing or other qualification requirements for sonographers include the evidence of the value of setting such requirements and variation in federal requirements for sonographers. The skill of the sonographer conducting an ultrasound is critical for its use to support a physician's correct diagnosis; poorly captured images can lead to misdiagnoses or unnecessarily repeated exams. Findings from several peer-reviewed studies, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, and ultrasound-related professional organizations support requiring that sonographers either have credentials or operate in facilities that are accredited, where specific quality standards apply. In some localities and practice settings, CMS or its contractors have required that sonographers either be credentialed or work in an accredited facility. Medicare's inconsistent requirements undermine assurance that beneficiaries are receiving high-quality services across the country. |
gao_GAO-07-1256T | gao_GAO-07-1256T_0 | While Efforts Are Under Way to Respond to Both Army-Specific and Systemic Problems, Challenges Are Emerging
While the Army took near-term actions to respond to reported deficiencies in care for its returning servicemembers, and the Senior Oversight Committee is undertaking efforts to address more systemic problems, challenges remain to overcome long-standing problems and ensure sustainable progress. Case management—a process intended to assist returning servicemembers with management of their clinical and nonclinical care throughout recovery, rehabilitation, and community reintegration—is important because servicemembers often receive services from numerous therapists, providers, and specialists, resulting in differing treatment plans as well as receiving prescriptions for multiple medications. Within each unit, the servicemember is assigned to a team of three key staff and this team is responsible for overseeing the continuum of care for the servicemember. The Army refers to this team as a “triad,” and it consists of a (1) primary care manager—usually a physician who provides primary oversight and continuity of health care and ensures the quality of the servicemember’s care; (2) nurse case manager—usually a registered nurse who plans, implements, coordinates, monitors, and evaluates options and services to meet the servicemember’s needs; and (3) squad leader—a noncommissioned officer who links the servicemember to the chain of command, builds a relationship with the servicemember, and works along side the other parts of the triad to ensure the needs of the servicemember and his or her family are met. As the Army has sought to fill its Warrior Transition Units, challenges to staffing key positions are emerging. For example, many locations have significant shortfalls in registered nurse case managers and non- commissioned officer squad leaders. As of mid-September, 17 of the 32 units had less than 50 percent of staff in place in one or more critical positions. The Senior Oversight Committee’s approach for providing a continuum of care includes establishment of recovery coordinators and recovery plans, as recommended by the Dole-Shalala Commission. This approach is intended to complement the military services’ existing case management approaches and place the recovery coordinators at a level above case managers, with emphasis on ensuring a seamless transition between DOD and VA. At the time of our review, the committee was determining the details of the program. Efforts Are Under Way to Improve Disability Evaluation Processes, but Challenges Remain in Transforming the Overall System
As we have previously reported, providing timely and consistent disability decisions is a challenge for both DOD and VA. These initiatives include reducing the caseloads of evaluation board liaisons who help servicemembers navigate the disability evaluation system. In addition, the Army developed and conducted the first certification training for evaluation board liaisons. To address more systemic concerns about the timeliness and consistency of DOD’s and VA’s disability evaluation systems, DOD and VA are planning to pilot a joint disability evaluation system. DOD and VA are reviewing multiple options that incorporate variations of the following three elements: (1) a single, comprehensive medical examination to be used by both DOD and VA in their disability evaluations; (2) a single disability rating performed by VA; and (3) incorporating a DOD-level evaluation board for adjudicating servicemembers’ fitness for duty. See table 5 for selected efforts under way by the Army and Senior Oversight Committee to improve data sharing between DOD and VA.
As part of the Army Medical Action Plan, the Army has taken steps to facilitate the exchange of data between its military treatment facilities and VA. For example, the Army Medical Department is developing a memorandum of understanding between the Army and VA that would allow VA access to data on severely injured servicemembers who are being transferred to a VA polytrauma center. A Senior Oversight Committee workgroup on data sharing has also been coordinating with other committee workgroups on their information technology needs. Concluding Observations
Our preliminary observations are that fixing the long-standing and complex problems spotlighted in the wake of Walter Reed media accounts as expeditiously as possible is critical to ensuring high-quality care for our returning servicemembers, and success will ultimately depend on sustained attention, systematic oversight by DOD and VA, and sufficient resources. Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of Defense. | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2007, a series of Washington Post articles disclosed troublesome deficiencies in the provision of outpatient services at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, raising concerns about the care for returning servicemembers. These deficiencies included a confusing disability evaluation system and servicemembers in outpatient status for months and sometimes years without a clear understanding about their plan of care. The reported problems at Walter Reed prompted broader questions about whether the Department of Defense (DOD) as well as the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) are fully prepared to meet the needs of returning servicemembers. In response to the deficiencies reported at Walter Reed, the Army took a number of actions and DOD formed a joint DOD-VA Senior Oversight Committee. This statement provides information on the near-term actions being taken by the Army and the broader efforts of the Senior Oversight Committee to address longer-term systemic problems that impact health care and disability evaluations for returning servicemembers. Preliminary observations in this testimony are based largely on documents obtained from and interviews with Army officials, and DOD and VA representatives of the Senior Oversight Committee, as well as on GAO's extensive past work. We discussed the facts contained in this statement with DOD and VA.
What GAO Found
While efforts are under way to respond to both Army-specific and systemic problems, challenges are emerging such as staffing new initiatives. The Army and the Senior Oversight Committee have efforts under way to improve case management--a process intended to assist returning servicemembers with management of their care from initial injury through recovery. Case management is especially important for returning servicemembers who must often visit numerous therapists, providers, and specialists, resulting in differing treatment plans. The Army's approach for improving case management for its servicemembers includes developing a new organizational structure--a Warrior Transition Unit, in which each servicemember would be assigned to a team of three key staff--a physician care manager, a nurse case manager, and a squad leader. As the Army has sought to staff its Warrior Transition Units, challenges to staffing critical positions are emerging. For example, as of mid-September 2007, over half the U.S. Warrior Transition Units had significant shortfalls in one or more of these critical positions. The Senior Oversight Committee's plan to provide a continuum of care focuses on establishing recovery coordinators, which would be the main contact for a returning servicemember and his or her family. This approach is intended to complement the military services' existing case management approaches and place the recovery coordinators at a level above case managers, with emphasis on ensuring a seamless transition between DOD and VA. At the time of GAO's review, the committee was still determining how many recovery coordinators would be necessary and the population of seriously injured servicemembers they would serve. As GAO and others have previously reported, providing timely and consistent disability decisions is a challenge for both DOD and VA. To address identified concerns, the Army has taken steps to streamline its disability evaluation process and reduce bottlenecks. The Army has also developed and conducted the first certification training for evaluation board liaisons who help servicemembers navigate the system. To address more systemic concerns, the Senior Oversight Committee is planning to pilot a joint disability evaluation system. Pilot options may incorporate variations of three key elements: (1) a single, comprehensive medical examination; (2) a single disability rating done by VA; and (3) a DOD-level evaluation board for adjudicating servicemembers' fitness for duty. DOD and VA officials hoped to begin the pilot in August 2007, but postponed implementation in order to further review options and address open questions, including those related to proposed legislation. Fixing these long-standing and complex problems as expeditiously as possible is critical to ensuring high-quality care for returning servicemembers, and success will ultimately depend on sustained attention, systematic oversight by DOD and VA, and sufficient resources. |
gao_GAO-07-331 | gao_GAO-07-331_0 | Background
Disability Determination and Administrative Appeals
In fiscal year 2005, the Social Security Administration (SSA) paid approximately $128 billion in cash benefits to about 12.8 million beneficiaries through the two largest federal programs available to persons with disabilities and their families: the Disability Insurance (DI) program and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. How Federal Court Decisions May Affect SSA Policy
SSA is not obligated to follow a district court decision that conflicts with agency policies beyond that specific case. Court Reviews and Remands Have Increased in Recent Years with Remands Often Resulting in SSA’s Subsequently Awarding Benefits
Between fiscal years 1995 and 2005, the number of disability appeals reviewed by the courts and decisions to remand these cases increased, and in the majority of remanded cases, claimants were subsequently granted benefits by SSA. As shown in figure 7, the proportion of allowances for remanded cases ranged from 62 percent to 72 percent by circuit—relative to a national average of 66 percent. Remands Have Been Attributed to a Range of Errors Caused by Heavy Workloads, but SSA Data That Could Shed More Light on the Problem Are Inadequate
According to agency officials and stakeholders, a range of errors precipitated by heavy workloads is responsible for court remands of SSA’s disability determinations, but SSA data that would confirm or clarify reasons for remands are incomplete and not well managed. SSA has acknowledged the need to reduce remands and in 2006, along with other initiatives, introduced a new writing tool for ALJs in order to improve efficiency and better document decisions. SSA Has Taken Several Steps Since 1990 to Align Its Policies Nationally with Court Decisions
SSA officials have a process in place for determining whether appellate court decisions conflict with the agency’s interpretation of disability statutes or regulations, and the agency has taken steps in recent years to align its policies nationally with appellate court decisions. In those cases where the agency acceded to certain appellate court rulings by issuing acquiescence rulings, we found that about half of the rulings were eventually replaced with national policy. Moreover, we found that the timeliness of acquiescence rulings had improved since 1998, when SSA established a timeliness goal of 120 days. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
We designed our study to obtain information on (1) the trends of the past decade in the number of appeals reviewed by the district courts and their decisions; (2) the reasons for court remands and factors that may contribute to the incidence of those remands; and (3) SSA’s process for responding to appellate court decisions that conflict with agency policy and the agency’s response in recent years. In addition, we interviewed SSA officials and reviewed previously issued agency reports and data manuals to assess the reliability of these data. We compared the data to determine how and what SSA is reporting on reasons for remands within the agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Administration's (SSA) Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income programs provided around $128 billion to about 12.8 million persons with disabilities and their families in fiscal year 2005. Claimants who are denied benefits by SSA may appeal to federal courts. Through current initiatives, SSA is attempting to reduce the number of cases appealed to courts and remanded back to SSA for further review. In addition, there have been long-standing concerns about how SSA responds to court decisions that conflict with its policies. GAO was asked to examine: (1) trends over the past decade in the number of appeals reviewed by the courts and their decisions, (2) reasons for court remands and factors contributing to them, and (3) SSA's process for responding to court decisions that conflict with agency policy. GAO reviewed SSA data and documents on court decisions, remands and SSA's processes and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders on data trends, reasons for remands, and SSA processes.
What GAO Found
Between fiscal years 1995 and 2005, the number of disability appeals reviewed by the federal district courts increased, along with the proportion of decisions that were remanded. More disability claims were remanded than affirmed, reversed, or dismissed over the period, and the proportion of total decisions that were remands ranged from 36 percent to 62 percent, with an average of 50 percent. Remanded cases often require SSA to re-adjudicate the claim, with the result that--along with the passage of time and new medical evidence--the majority of remanded cases result in allowances. According to SSA officials and outside observers, a range of errors prompted by heavy workloads is responsible for court remands of SSA's disability determinations, but data that would confirm or clarify the issue are incomplete and not well-managed. SSA has only recently begun collecting data on remands, and we found these data to be incomplete. Additionally, this information is collected by two different offices that have created somewhat different categories for the data, making some of the information inconsistent and possibly redundant. Meanwhile, SSA has acknowledged the need to reduce remands and, in 2006 along with other initiatives, introduced new decision-writing templates to improve efficiency and reduce errors. SSA has a process in place for determining whether appellate court decisions conflict with the agency's interpretation of disability statutes or regulations and has taken steps in recent years to align its national policies with appellate court decisions. For example, officials and stakeholders attributed a downward trend in appellate court decisions that conflict with agency policy to significant policy changes instituted by SSA in the mid-1990s. In addition, for those cases where the agency acceded to conflicting appellate court decisions by issuing acquiescence rulings within the related circuits, we found that about half of the rulings issued were eventually replaced with national policy. Moreover, GAO found that the timeliness of acquiescence rulings had improved since 1998, when SSA established a timeliness goal of 120 days. |
gao_GAO-14-370 | gao_GAO-14-370_0 | Background
Under NEPA, federal agencies generally are to evaluate the likely environmental effects of projects they are proposing by preparing either an Environmental Assessment (EA) or a more detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), assuming no Categorical Exclusion (CE) applies. Agencies may prepare an EA to determine whether a proposed project is expected to have a potentially significant impact on the human environment. If a proposed project fits within a category of activities that an agency has already determined normally does not have the potential for significant environmental impacts—a CE—and the agency has established that category of activities in its NEPA implementing procedures, then it generally need not prepare an EA or EIS. Data on the Number and Type of Most NEPA Analyses Are Not Readily Available
Governmentwide data on the number and type of most NEPA analyses are not readily available, as data collection efforts vary by agency (see app. Many Agencies Do Not Routinely Track the Number of EAs or CEs, but CEQ Estimates That EAs and CEs Comprise Most NEPA Analyses
Many agencies do not routinely track the number of EAs or CEs. However, based on information provided to CEQ by federal agencies, CEQ estimates that about 95 percent of NEPA analyses are CEs, less than 5 percent are EAs, and less than 1 percent are EISs. Projects requiring an EIS are a small portion of all projects but are likely to be high-profile, complex, and expensive. As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted in its 2011 report on NEPA, determining the total number of federal actions subject to NEPA is difficult, since most agencies track only the number of actions requiring an EIS. Little Information Exists on the Costs and Benefits of Completing NEPA Analyses
Little information exists at the agencies we reviewed on the costs and benefits of completing NEPA analyses. Complicating matters, agency activities under NEPA are hard to separate from other environmental review tasks under federal laws, such as the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act; executive orders; agency guidance; and state and local laws. EPA officials also told us that there is no governmentwide mechanism to track the costs of completing EISs. However, DOE tracks limited cost data associated with NEPA analyses. According to DOE data, the average payment to a contractor to prepare an EIS from calendar year 2003 through calendar year 2012 was $6.6 million, with the range being a DOE’s median EIS contractor low of $60,000 and a high of $85 million. For context, a 2003 task force report to CEQ—the only available source of governmentwide cost estimates—estimated that an EIS typically cost from $250,000 to $2 million. Information on the Benefits of Completing NEPA Analyses Is Largely Qualitative
According to agency officials, information on the benefits of completing NEPA analyses is largely qualitative. According to studies and agency officials, some of the qualitative benefits of NEPA include its role as a tool for encouraging transparency and public participation and in discovering and addressing the potential effects of a proposal in the early design stages to avoid problems that could end up taking more time and being more costly in the long run. Agency data, interviews with agency officials, and available studies indicate that most NEPA analyses do not result in litigation, although the impact of litigation could be substantial if a lawsuit affects numerous federal decisions or actions in several states. The federal government prevails in most NEPA litigation, according to CEQ and NAEP data, and legal studies. In 2011, the most recent data available, CEQ reported 94 NEPA cases, down from the average of 129 cases filed per year from 2001 through 2008. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the scope of work and the methodology used to collect information on how we described the (1) number and type of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analyses, (2) costs and benefits of completing those analyses, and (3) frequency and outcomes of related litigation. We included available information on both costs and benefits to be consistent with standard economic principles for evaluating federal programs and generally accepted government auditing standards. To assess the availability of information to respond to these objectives, we (1) conducted a literature search and review with the assistance of a technical librarian; (2) reviewed our past work on NEPA and studies from the Congressional Research Service; (3) obtained documents and analyses from federal agencies; and (4) interviewed officials who oversee federal NEPA programs from the Departments of Defense, Energy, the Interior, Justice, and Transportation; the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) within the Executive Office of the President; and individuals with expertise from academia and the National Association of Environmental Professionals (NAEP)—a professional association representing private and government NEPA practitioners. | Why GAO Did This Study
NEPA requires all federal agencies to evaluate the potential environmental effects of proposed projects--such as roads or bridges--on the human environment. Agencies prepare an EIS when a project will have a potentially significant impact on the environment. They may prepare an EA to determine whether a project will have a significant potential impact. If a project fits within a category of activities determined to have no significant impact--a CE--then an EA or an EIS is generally not necessary. The adequacy of these analyses has been a focus of litigation.
GAO was asked to review various issues associated with completing NEPA analyses. This report describes information on the (1) number and type of NEPA analyses, (2) costs and benefits of completing those analyses, and (3) frequency and outcomes of related litigation. GAO included available information on both costs and benefits to be consistent with standard economic principles for evaluating federal programs, and selected the Departments of Defense, Energy, the Interior, and Transportation, and the USDA Forest Service for analysis because they generally complete the most NEPA analyses. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed individuals from federal agencies, academia, and professional groups with expertise in NEPA analyses and litigation. GAO's findings are not generalizeable to agencies other than those selected.
This report has no recommendations. GAO provided a draft to CEQ and agency officials for review and comment, and they generally agreed with GAO's findings.
What GAO Found
Governmentwide data on the number and type of most National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analyses are not readily available, as data collection efforts vary by agency. NEPA generally requires federal agencies to evaluate the potential environmental effects of actions they propose to carry out, fund, or approve (e.g., by permit) by preparing analyses of different comprehensiveness depending on the significance of a proposed project's effects on the environment--from the most detailed Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) to the less comprehensive Environmental Assessments (EA) and Categorical Exclusions (CE). Agencies do not routinely track the number of EAs or CEs, but the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)--the entity within the Executive Office of the President that oversees NEPA implementation--estimates that about 95 percent of NEPA analyses are CEs, less than 5 percent are EAs, and less than 1 percent are EISs. Projects requiring an EIS are a small portion of all projects but are likely to be high-profile, complex, and expensive. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains governmentwide information on EISs. A 2011 Congressional Research Service report noted that determining the total number of federal actions subject to NEPA is difficult, since most agencies track only the number of actions requiring an EIS.
Little information exists on the costs and benefits of completing NEPA analyses. Agencies do not routinely track the cost of completing NEPA analyses, and there is no governmentwide mechanism to do so, according to officials from CEQ, EPA, and other agencies GAO reviewed. However, the Department of Energy (DOE) tracks limited cost data associated with NEPA analyses. DOE officials told GAO that they track the money the agency pays to contractors to conduct NEPA analyses. According to DOE data, its median EIS contractor cost for calendar years 2003 through 2012 was $1.4 million. For context, a 2003 task force report to CEQ--the only available source of governmentwide cost estimates--estimated that a typical EIS cost from $250,000 to $2 million. EAs and CEs generally cost less than EISs, according to CEQ and federal agencies. Information on the benefits of completing NEPA analyses is largely qualitative. According to studies and agency officials, some of the qualitative benefits of NEPA include its role in encouraging public participation and in discovering and addressing project design problems that could be more costly in the long run. Complicating the determination of costs and benefits, agency activities under NEPA are hard to separate from other required environmental analyses under federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act; executive orders; agency guidance; and state and local laws.
Some information is available on the frequency and outcome of NEPA litigation. Agency data, interviews with agency officials, and available studies show that most NEPA analyses do not result in litigation, although the impact of litigation could be substantial if a single lawsuit affects numerous federal decisions or actions in several states. In 2011, the most recent data available, CEQ reported 94 NEPA cases filed, down from the average of 129 cases filed per year from calendar year 2001 through calendar year 2008. The federal government prevails in most NEPA litigation, according to CEQ and legal studies. |
gao_GAO-04-1024 | gao_GAO-04-1024_0 | Additionally, current monitoring efforts of federal and state organizations do not, by design, provide comprehensive information on the overall conditions of the Great Lakes. Most of the information collected under these monitoring activities is designed to meet specific program objectives or is limited to specific geographic areas as opposed to providing an overall assessment of the Great Lakes Basin. This program, however, has not been fully developed. 2). Multiple Goals Exist for Monitoring Restoration Progress
Multiple restoration goals have been proposed by EPA and other organizations that could be a basis for monitoring restoration progress. EPA developed basin-wide goals in its Great Lakes Strategy 2002 and goals for individual lakes in LaMPs. Other organizations concerned with Great Lakes restoration, such as the Council of Great Lakes Governors, have also identified basin-wide restoration goals and priorities. Monitoring progress toward achieving goals is generally limited to tracking specific action items contained in the Great Lakes Strategy 2002; other proposed goals do not have associated monitoring activities or monitoring plans to determine progress. Significant Challenges Exist for Setting Basin-Wide Goals and Developing a Monitoring System for the Great Lakes
Coordinating the establishment of measurable goals and developing a monitoring system for tracking progress in the Great Lakes are difficult tasks that face significant challenges. Second, the restoration goal setting and monitoring efforts ongoing by numerous governmental and nongovernmental organizations in the United States and Canada will create a challenge for coordinating within and between the two countries. The lack of a centralized repository of monitoring information makes it difficult to assess restoration progress. The leadership to coordinate goal setting efforts has not yet materialized. 3.) Matter for Congressional Consideration
In light of the uncertainty regarding how GLNPO’s responsibilities fit with the newly created Great Lakes Interagency Task Force and to help ensure the coordination of U.S. efforts in developing basin-wide measurable restoration goals for the Great Lakes, as well as the development of a joint monitoring system based on those goals, the Congress may want to consider clarifying whether GLNPO or the task force should lead the U.S. efforts in restoring the Great Lakes and requiring this entity, in consultation with Canada, the governors of the Great Lakes states, federal agencies, and other organizations, to develop and prioritize specific measurable restoration goals for the Great Lakes Basin within a certain time frame; and requiring the entity to develop and implement monitoring activities to measure progress toward attaining goals and identify actions that could assist in achieving these goals. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which information derived from monitoring is useful for assessing overall conditions in the Great Lakes Basin, we gathered and analyzed information on efforts to develop indicators through the State of the Lakes Ecosystem Conferences (SOLEC), which is a jointly sponsored effort by EPA’s Great Lakes National Program Office (GLNPO) and Environment Canada (EC). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Great Lakes remain environmentally vulnerable, prompting the United States and Canada to agree on actions to preserve and protect them. As requested, this report (1) determines the extent to which current EPA monitoring efforts provide information for assessing overall conditions in the Great Lakes Basin, (2) identifies existing restoration goals and whether monitoring is done to track goal progress, and (3) identifies the major challenges to setting restoration goals and developing a monitoring system.
What GAO Found
Current Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) monitoring does not provide the comprehensive information needed to assess overall conditions in the Great Lakes Basin because the required coordinated joint U.S./Canadian monitoring program has not been fully developed. Information collected from monitoring by other federal and state agencies does not, by design, provide an overall assessment of the Great Lakes because it is collected to meet specific program objectives or limited to specific geographic areas. Multiple restoration goals have been proposed through efforts by EPA and other organizations. EPA developed basin-wide goals through its Great Lakes Strategy 2002 and goals for plans addressing individual lakes. Other organizations have also identified basin-wide restoration goals and priorities. Monitoring of progress toward goals is generally limited to tracking specific action items proposed in the Great Lakes Strategy 2002; other proposed goals are generally not monitored to determine progress. Efforts to coordinate basin-wide goals and a monitoring system face several challenges. The lack of clearly defined organizational leadership poses a major obstacle. Both EPA's Great Lakes National Program Office (GLNPO) and a newly created interagency task force have coordination roles raising uncertainty as to how leadership and coordination efforts will be exercised in the future. Second, coordinating existing restoration goals and monitoring activities among the many participating organizations within the United States, and between the United States and Canada is a significant challenge. Third, centralized information from monitoring activities is not yet available, making it difficult to assess restoration progress. In addition, an inventory system developed by EPA and Canada may not have adequate controls on voluntarily provided information. |
gao_GAO-10-567T | gao_GAO-10-567T_0 | More generally, now that the census has moved to the operational phase, it will be important for the Bureau to stay on schedule. Key IT Systems Continue to Experience Significant Performance Issues
Although the Bureau has made progress in testing and deploying IT systems for the 2010 Census, significant performance issues need to be addressed with both PBOCS, the work flow management system, and DAPPS, the automated system the Bureau is using to process applicants and handle the payroll of the more than 600,000 temporary employees who are to work on the census during peak operations. The limited amount of time to resolve what are, in certain cases, significant performance issues creates a substantial challenge for the Bureau. Those activities include procedures for fingerprinting temporary employees; the rollout of key marketing efforts aimed at improving the participation of hard-to-count populations; the Bureau’s plans for mailing a second, follow-up questionnaire and the removal of late mail returns; activities aimed at including the homeless and people residing in nonconventional dwellings; and the Bureau’s plans to secure a complete count of those in the hurricane-affected areas along the Gulf Coast. Bureau Has Taken Steps to Reduce the Number of Unclassifiable Fingerprints of Temporary Workers
The Bureau plans to fingerprint its temporary workforce for the first time in the 2010 Census to better conduct background security checks on its workforce of hundreds of thousands of temporary census workers. Under the revised policy, the Bureau plans, wherever operationally feasible, to digitally capture a third and fourth set of fingerprints if the FBI cannot classify the first two sets. Further, the Bureau targeted the paid advertising messages based on market and attitudinal research. Also, the Bureau plans to mail approximately 12 million replacement questionnaires to nonresponding households in other census tracts that had low-to- moderate response rates in 2000 (known as targeted replacement). To help ensure that these individuals are counted, the Bureau plans to employ several initiatives. For example, Service Based Enumeration (SBE) is designed to count people who lack permanent shelter at soup kitchens, regularly scheduled mobile food vans, and other locations where they receive services. Moreover, the Bureau’s Be Counted program is designed to reach those who may not have received a census questionnaire, including people who do not have a usual residence, such as transients, migrants, and seasonal farm workers. 2). To ensure a quality count in the hurricane-affected areas, the Bureau is hand delivering an estimated 1.2 million census questionnaires in these areas through the Update Leave operation, where census workers update addresses and provide a mailback census questionnaire to each living quarters in their assigned areas. 3). The Bureau Has Revised Its Cost Estimate for Nonresponse Follow- up but Needs to Complete Additional Updates as Planned
In 2008, we reported that the Bureau had not carried out the necessary analyses to demonstrate that the then life-cycle cost estimate of about $11.5 billion for the 2010 Census was credible, and we recommended that the Bureau better document and update the estimate, to which it generally agreed. Although we have not fully assessed the Bureau’s analysis, our preliminary review shows that the Bureau provided a range of possible NRFU cost estimates, with $2.3 billion being the midpoint. According to the Bureau, two cost drivers—workload, based on the mail response rate, and productivity—are uncertain and could have a significant effect on the ultimate cost of NRFU. However, the Bureau’s analyses of cost are not complete. Concluding Observations
Mr. Chairman, with a week remaining until Census Day, the Bureau’s readiness for the headcount is mixed. On the one hand, with data collection already under way, the ability of key IT systems to function under full operational loads has not yet been demonstrated. On the other hand, certain operations, such as the communications campaign and efforts to enumerate group quarters, generally appear to be on track and more robust compared to similar efforts for the 2000 Census, better positioning the Bureau for a complete and accurate headcount. 2010 Census: Census Bureau Continues to Make Progress in Mitigating Risks to a Successful Enumeration, but Still Faces Various Challenges. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of information technology (IT) shortcomings and uncertainty over the ultimate cost of the census, now estimated at around $15 billion. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has since made improvements to various IT systems and taken other steps to mitigate the risks to a successful census. However, last year, GAO noted that a number of challenges and uncertainties remained, and much work remained to be completed under very tight time frames. As requested, this testimony provides an update on the Bureau's readiness for an effective headcount, covering (1) the reliability of key IT systems; (2) a broad range of activities critical to an effective headcount, some of which were problematic in either earlier 2010 operations or in the 2000 Census, and (3) the quality of the Bureau's cost estimates. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work.
What GAO Found
Overall, the Bureau's readiness for a successful headcount is mixed. On the one hand, performance problems continue to plague a work flow management system essential for the Bureau's field operations and a payroll processing system that will be used to pay more than 600,000 temporary workers. Both systems have not yet demonstrated the ability to function reliably under full operational loads, and the limited amount of time that remains to address their shortcomings creates a substantial challenge for the Bureau. Aside from the mail response, which is outside of the Bureau's direct control, the difficulties facing these two automated systems represent the most significant risk, jeopardizing the cost and quality of the enumeration. On the other hand, the rollout of other key enumeration activities is generally on track, and the Bureau has taken action to address some previously identified problems. For example, the Bureau has taken steps to reduce the number of temporary workers with unreadable fingerprint cards, a problem that affected an earlier field operation. Among other actions, the Bureau plans to digitally capture a third and fourth set of fingerprints if the first two sets cannot be read for background security checks. The Bureau's 2010 Census communications campaign is also more robust than the one used in the 2000 Census. Key differences from the 2000 campaign include increased partnership staffing, expanded outreach to partner organizations, targeted paid advertising based on market and attitudinal research, and a contingency fund to address unexpected events. To increase participation rates, the Bureau plans to mail a second, replacement questionnaire to census tracts that had low or moderate response rates in the 2000 Census. To help ensure that hard-to-count populations are enumerated, the Bureau plans to employ several initiatives. For example, Service Based Enumeration is designed to count people who lack permanent shelter at soup kitchens, mobile food vans, and other locations where they receive services. The Be Counted program is designed to reach those who may not have received a census questionnaire. To help ensure a complete count of areas along the Gulf Coast, the Bureau is hand delivering an estimated 1.2 million census forms in areas that were devastated by hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Ike. In addition, the Bureau re-examined its cost estimate for Nonresponse Follow-up, the largest and most costly field operation where census workers follow up in person with nonresponding households. The Bureau provided a range of estimates, with $2.3 billion as the mid-point. However, the Bureau's analyses of cost are not complete. According to the Bureau, it continues to reexamine the cost of two other operations related to nonresponse follow-up. Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to quickly identify the problems affecting key IT systems and test solutions. Further, given the complexity of the census and the likelihood that other glitches might arise, it will be important for the Bureau to stay on schedule, monitor operations, and have plans and personnel in place to quickly address operational issues. |
gao_GAO-01-684 | gao_GAO-01-684_0 | The Department's policy is for its military members to rely on the private sector first for housing. Of those living in civilian or military family housing, about 619,000 personnel (67 percent) live in civilian housing, while about 300,000 personnel (33 percent) live in military housing. Housing Allowance Increase Will Better Satisfy Preference for Civilian Housing
According to DOD's 1999 Survey of Active Duty Personnel, 72 percent of military personnel would prefer civilian housing if costs were equal (see fig. And about 130,000 of those that prefer military housing now live in civilian housing. Department officials anticipate that increasing the housing allowance will decrease demand for military housing. On the basis of our analysis of specific attributes of military housing, personnel living in military housing were more satisfied than dissatisfied with all of the measured characteristics. Only about 26 percent of those receiving housing allowances were satisfied, while 57 percent were dissatisfied. DOD did not raise any questions or concerns about our conclusion that higher housing allowances should increase the demand for civilian housing by military personnel. We stated that “DOD should not expect a substantial increase in personnel retention solely from its initiative to increase the housing allowance.” While we agree that increasing compensation may have a positive effect on the overall level of retention and stated so in our report, DOD does not have a problem with overall retention. | What GAO Found
Increasing the housing allowance should help satisfy servicemembers' demand for civilian housing. Of those servicemembers who receive an allowance or live in military housing, about 72 percent said that they would prefer civilian housing if the costs were the same, but only about two-thirds now live in civilian housing. Thus, if military members' housing preferences were satisfied, thousands of additional personnel would be in civilian housing instead of military housing. As the Department of Defense (DOD) increases the housing allowance during the next five years, the overall demand for civilian housing should increase, while the demand for military housing should decline. As a result, DOD should be in a better position to implement its stated policy of relying on the private sector first for housing. DOD cannot expect a substantial increase in retention solely as a result of higher housing allowances. Together, housing and housing allowances were cited by less than one percent of those surveyed as reasons for leaving the military. Overall, of those living in military housing, more were satisfied than dissatisfied. Of those living in civilian housing, a high proportion were satisfied with the homes they chose. However, 57 percent were dissatisfied with their housing allowance. |
gao_RCED-95-108 | gao_RCED-95-108_0 | 1). Poor, Dysfunctional Families and Deteriorating Neighborhoods Impact on Young At-Risk Teen Girls
In neighborhoods with high concentrations of poor families, many 10- to 15-year-old girls have multiple problems. In our interviews with service providers and our reviews of recent studies, we found (1) high rates of substance abuse among the parents of young teen girls, (2) widespread physical and sexual abuse of teen girls, and (3) many young girls that were left unattended for long periods of time and who often assumed adult responsibilities in their homes. Young Girls in These Neighborhoods Are at Risk for Multiple Problems
The interplay of family poverty—often with parental substance abuse and child neglect and abuse—and neighborhoods with few resources leaves young teen girls at risk for many problems and dangerous behaviors. The few services for these girls and their families are typically offered only when problems reach the crisis state. According to providers, parents are often unaware of their children’s activities; may condone early sexual activity and childbearing; and give little attention and support to their children. New Service Approaches Depend on Increased Community Leadership and Involvement
A community’s ability to address the problems of at-risk teen girls depends on more than a collection of programs and service providers. Local providers also found that they have to coordinate community activities with one another as well as with other entities in the community. Because this report focuses on local responses to at-risk teens and their families, we did not obtain agency comments. We visited three urban neighborhoods for close review—Ward 7 in Washington, D.C.; Boyle Heights in Los Angeles, California; and West Oakland in Oakland, California—to document the availability of human services for at-risk teen girls; the barriers to serving this population; and how communities are responding to this population’s service needs. 4, 1994). Additional copies are $2 each. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on teenage girls who may be at risk for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) dependency, focusing on: (1) the health and well being of at-risk teenage girls, their families, and their urban neighborhoods' conditions; (2) local service providers' perspectives on these girls' needs and how they are addressing those needs; and (3) how communities respond to these girls' service needs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) local AFDC service providers have characterized many of the 10- to 15-year old girls they serve as detached from their families and communities, sexually abused, neglected, and threatened by violence; (2) economic and social conditions such as poverty, deteriorating neighborhoods, dysfunctional families, and a poor self-image have created a population of teen girls who are at-risk for long-term AFDC dependency; (3) services for at-risk teen girls are limited and are often unavailable until after a crisis, uncoordinated, and are not readily accessible; (4) teenage girls receive a lower level of services than other at-risk groups and are offered few preventive services; (5) some neighborhoods are organizing coalitions to better serve these girls; (6) some providers have expanded their community roles to better integrate services for at-risk teens and their families; and (7) new service delivery strategies include identifying and providing multiple preventive services and activities, encouraging parents to become involved in their children's activities, and increasing the community's participation and commitment to the initiative. |
gao_GAO-02-58 | gao_GAO-02-58_0 | Variations in Programs’ Financial Eligibility Rules Stem Primarily From Federal Statutes and Regulations
Substantial variations exist in the financial eligibility rules across selected means-tested federal programs. Rules About Types and Amounts of Income Limits Vary Across Programs
The first and most basic difference among programs is the variation in type of income limits used for determining program eligibility. Variations in Financial Rules and Other Factors Contribute to Administrative Duplication and Client Burden
Variations in financial eligibility rules and the multiplicity of agencies that administer programs at the state and local level have contributed to the formation of administrative processes that involve substantial complexity and duplication of staff efforts. (How these states have used computer systems to establish joint application processes is discussed later in the report.) Some Progress Has Been Made to Streamline or Coordinate Eligibility Determination Processes
Overall, federal, state, and local entities have made limited progress in simplifying or coordinating eligibility determination processes. Several of the states we visited realigned some of the financial rules, yet this approach has been used to a limited extent. One study found that primary responsibility for most of the approximately 80 major programs that assist low-income families and individuals resides in 19 congressional committees and 33 subcommittees. Many federal, state, and local officials recognize that additional efforts to simplify or coordinate eligibility determination processes are needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 80 means-tested federal programs assisted low-income people in 1998. GAO reviewed 11 programs that assisted families and individuals with income, food, medical assistance, and housing.
What GAO Found
Despite substantial overlap in the populations they serve, the 11 programs varied significantly in their financial eligibility rules. At the most basic level, the dollar levels of the income limits--the maximum amounts of income an applicant can have and still be eligible for a program--vary across programs. Beyond this, differences exist in the income rules, such as whose income and what types of income are counted. The variations and complexity of the federal financial eligibility rules, along with other factors, have led to processes that are often duplicative and cumbersome for both caseworkers and applicants. Overall, federal, state, and local entities have made little progress in simplifying or coordinating eligibility determination processes. States realigned some of the financial rules, but only to a limited extent. Another approach uses computer systems to establish joint eligibility determination processes that a single caseworker can administer. Efforts to simplify or better coordinate eligibility determination processes confront many obstacles, including restrictive federal program statutes and regulations. In addition, program costs may rise if financial eligibility rules are changed. |
gao_GAO-12-1045T | gao_GAO-12-1045T_0 | MA Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration
CMS’s quality bonus payment demonstration includes several key changes from the quality bonus system established by PPACA. In contrast, the demonstration significantly increases the number of plans eligible for a bonus, enlarges the size of payments for some plans, and accelerates payment phase-in. In announcing the demonstration, CMS stated that the demonstration’s research goal is to test whether scaling bonus payments to the number of stars MA plans receive under the quality rating system leads to larger and faster annual quality improvement for plans at various star rating levels compared with what would have occurred under PPACA. In March 2012, we reported that CMS’s Office of the Actuary (OACT) estimated that the demonstration would cost $8.35 billion over 10 years— an amount that is at least seven times larger than that of any other Medicare demonstration conducted since 1995 and greater than the combined budgetary effect of all those demonstrations. Plans are required to use these payments to provide their enrollees enhanced benefits, lower premiums, or reduced cost-sharing.We also found that the additional Medicare spending will mainly benefit average-performing plans—those receiving 3 and 3.5-star ratings—and that about 90 percent of MA enrollees in 2012 and 2013 would be in plans eligible for a bonus payment. Our March 2012 report also identified several shortcomings of the demonstration’s design that preclude a credible evaluation of its effectiveness in achieving CMS’s stated research goal. Given the findings from our program review of the demonstration’s features, we recommended in our March 2012 report that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), who heads the agency of which CMS is a part, cancel the demonstration and allow the MA quality bonus payment system authorized by PPACA to take effect. HHS did not agree. In addition to our March 2012 report, we sent a letter on July 11, 2012, to HHS regarding CMS’s authority to conduct the demonstration. In our letter, we stated that CMS had not established that the demonstration met the criteria set forth in the Social Security Amendments of 1967, as amended—the statute under which CMS is conducting the demonstration. The approximately 9 million dual-eligible beneficiaries are particularly costly to both Medicare and Medicaid in part because they are more likely than other Medicare beneficiaries to be disabled, report poor health status, and have limitations in activities of daily living. In September 2012, we reported that the 2012 D-SNP contracts with state Medicaid agencies that we reviewed varied considerably in their provisions for integration of benefits. Two-thirds of the 124 contracts between D-SNPs and state Medicaid agencies that were submitted to CMS for 2012 did not expressly provide for the integration of any benefits. Like other MA plans, D-SNPs must cover all the benefits of fee-for- service, with the exception of hospice, and may offer supplemental benefits, such as vision and dental care. In our September 2012 report, we examined the supplemental benefits offered by D-SNPs and found that D-SNPs provided fewer supplemental benefits than other MA plans. We could not report on the extent to which benefits specific to D-SNPs and described in the model of care were actually provided to beneficiaries because CMS did not collect the information. We found that plans do not use standardized performance measures in their models of care, limiting the amount of comparable information available to CMS. HHS agreed with our recommendations and in its comments on a draft of our report, said that it plans to obtain more information from D-SNPs. Medicare Cost Plans
In contrast to MA plans, which have a financial incentive to control their costs, a small number of Medicare private health plans—called cost plans—are paid on the basis of their reasonable costs incurred delivering Medicare-covered services. For example, cost plans, unlike MA plans, allow beneficiaries to disenroll at any time. As part of our 2009 report on cost plans we also described the concerns of officials from Medicare cost plans about converting to MA plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of August 2012, approximately 13.6 million Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in MA plans or Medicare cost planstwo private health plan alternatives to the original Medicare fee-for-service program. This testimony discusses work GAO has done that may help inform the Congress as it examines the status of the MA program and the private health plans that serve Medicare beneficiaries. It is based on key background and findings from three previously issued GAO reports on (1) the MA quality bonus payment demonstration, (2) D-SNPs, and (3) Medicare cost plans. This information on cost plans was updated, based on information supplied by CMS, to reflect the status of cost plans in March 2012.
What GAO Found
In March 2012, GAO issued a report on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare Advantage (MA) quality bonus payment demonstrationa demonstration CMS initiated rather than implementing the quality bonus program established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Compared to the PPACA quality bonus program, CMSs demonstration increases the number of plans eligible for a bonus, enlarges the size of payments for some plans, and accelerates payment phase-in. CMS stated that the demonstrations research goal is to test whether scaling bonus payments to quality scores MA plans receive increases the speed and degree of annual quality improvements for plans compared with what would have occurred under PPACA. GAO reported that CMSs Office of the Actuary estimated that the demonstration would cost $8.35 billion over 10 yearsan amount greater than the combined budgetary impact of all Medicare demonstrations conducted since 1995. In addition, GAO also found several shortcomings of the demonstration design that preclude a credible evaluation of its effectiveness in achieving CMSs stated research goal. In July 2012, GAO sent a letter to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), the head of the agency of which CMS is a part, stating that CMS had not established that its demonstration met the criteria in the Social Security Act of 1967, as amended, under which the demonstration is being performed.
In September 2012, GAO issued a report on Medicare dual-eligible special needs plans (D-SNP), a type of MA plan exclusively for beneficiaries that are eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. Dual-eligible beneficiaries are costly to Medicare and Medicaid in part because they are more likely than other beneficiaries to be disabled, report poor health status, and have limitations in activities of daily living. GAO found that two-thirds of 2012 D-SNP contracts with state Medicaid agencies that it reviewed did not expressly provide for the integration of Medicare and Medicaid benefits. Additionally, GAO found that compared to other MA plans, D-SNPs provided fewer, but more comprehensive supplemental benefits, such as vision, and were less likely to use rebatesadditional Medicare payments received by many MA plansfor reducing beneficiary cost-sharing. GAO could not report on the extent to which benefits specific to D-SNPs were actually provided to beneficiaries because CMS did not collect the information. GAO also found that plans did not use standardized performance measures, limiting the amount of comparable information available to CMS.
In December 2009, GAO issued a report on Medicare cost plans, which, unlike MA plans, are paid based on their reasonable costs incurred delivering Medicare-covered services and allow beneficiaries to disenroll at any time. GAO found that the approximately 288,000 Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in cost plans as of June 2009 had multiple MA options available to them. GAO updated this work using March 2012 data and found that enrollment in cost plans had increased to approximately 392,000 and that 99 percent of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in cost plans had at least one MA option available to them, although generally fewer options than in 2009.
What GAO Recommends
In a March 2012 report on the MA quality bonus payment demonstration, GAO recommended that HHS cancel the MA quality bonus demonstration. HHS did not concur with this recommendation. In a September 2012 report on D-SNPs, GAO recommended that D-SNPs improve their reporting of services provided to beneficiaries and that this information be made public. HHS agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-741 | gao_GAO-02-741_0 | Principles for Using Tied Aid
In setting up the Tied Aid Capital Projects Fund, Ex-Im Bank and Treasury agreed on a set of broadly stated principles that would guide its use. Ex-Im Bank and Treasury Place Different Emphases on Tied Aid Principles
While Ex-Im Bank and Treasury both seek to help U.S. exporters, they place different emphases on the principles used for matching foreign tied aid financing, based on their differing missions and perspectives. Treasury, which takes the lead in negotiating and policing the OECD tied aid rules, takes a strategic approach to financing tied aid. Ex-Im Bank, which works directly with exporters, takes a transactional approach to financing tied aid, placing emphasis on helping U.S. exporters match foreign tied aid offers that would disadvantage their competitive position for future commercial sales. Appendix I: Activity under the Tied Aid Program
Tied aid is government-to-government concessional financing of public- sector capital projects in developing countries that is linked to the procurement of goods and services from the donor country. Once the U.S. exporter notifies Ex-Im Bank of the foreign tied aid offer and requests matching tied aid financing, the application process starts with a determination by Ex-Im Bank of whether the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been notified of the foreign tied aid offer. | What GAO Found
The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) uses tied air to support U.S. exporters facing foreign competitors. Tied aid is government-to-government concessional financing of public sector capital projects in developing countries that is linked to the procurement of goods and services from the donor country. Through the Tied Aid Capital projects fund, Ex-Im Bank may provide financing to support the negotiations and policing of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) tied aid rules and to match foreign aid offers to level the playing field for U.S. exporters. Under the tied aid program legislation, the Department of the Treasury has the authority to direct and control the use of Ex-Im Bank's Tied Aid Capital Projects Fund. This allows Treasury to veto individual tied aid proposals. Ex-Im Bank and Treasury have agreed on a set of broadly stated principles for decisions on the Tied Aid Capital Projects Fund. Although Ex-Im Bank and Treasury both seek to help U.S. exporters, they have different missions and perspectives. Treasury takes a strategic approach to financing tied aid. Ex-Im Bank takes a transactional approach, placing emphasis on helping U.S. exporters by matching foreign tied aid offers that would disadvantage their competitive position for future commercial-term sales. |
gao_NSIAD-97-156 | gao_NSIAD-97-156_0 | In February 1997, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology approved the Air Force’s proposed plan to restructure the F-22 program based on the results of the JET’s review. We have not reviewed the basis for the revised savings estimates that are now being devised by the team. The planned reductions in F-22 production unit costs are greater than achieved on prior fighter programs, and the initiatives to reduce the production costs are not fully developed. The planned reductions in F-22 production unit costs are greater than have been experienced by prior fighter programs. Our comparison of the planned reductions in F-22 production unit costs with the historical unit costs of the F-15, F-16, and F-18 programs indicates that the projected reduction in the unit cost of the F-22 exceeds the reductions that have been achieved on these other programs. Reducing Aircraft Performance
Although JET members told us they considered performance reductions in their study as a means of reducing costs, no such reductions were made. Benefits of Initiatives Are Not Planned to Be Realized Until After Fiscal Year 2003
The restructuring plan recognized substantial cost growth in the LRIP phase of the program. Therefore, to achieve the overall cost avoidance projected by JET, the unit cost of full-rate aircraft must be reduced by 54 percent from the unit cost of the LRIP aircraft instead of by 27.9 percent, as projected before the program restructure. Revised Exit Criteria Resulted From Restructuring
The program exit criteria that were required to be met before awarding contracts for F-22 production aircraft have been revised in the restructured program. The Air Force established exit criteria for each lot of LRIP aircraft and the first lot of full-rate production aircraft. Air Force and DOD officials noted that key aircraft performance parameters are routinely reported in periodic Air Force and DOD reports, such as the Selected Acquisition Report, to acquisition and other executives. Because of the potential for cost growth in the F-22 program, we also recommend that the Secretary reconsider the potential savings that can be achieved by reducing the performance requirements of the F-22, as previously suggested by the Defense Science Board. Recommendations of the Joint Estimate Team
The Joint Estimate Team recommended that the Air Force slow the manufacturing of development aircraft to ensure an efficient transition from development to low-rate initial production; increase the time available for avionics software development and integration; develop a more effective avionics ground test capability; implement revised avionics flight test processes; extend the flight test schedule by 9 months to allow additional time to identify, analyze, and resolve avionics anomalies; extend the development program by 12 months to accommodate a 9-month flight test extension; finish development of a baseline capability before beginning dedicated initial operational test and evaluation; delete the plans to produce preproduction aircraft and conduct dedicated initial operational test and evaluation with two refurbished development aircraft and the first two production aircraft; delay initiation of full-rate production by 10 months; slow the rates of low-rate initial production to make funds available for development activities and increase system maturity; and deliver a mature avionics capability before initial operational capability planned for November 2004. 5, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Air Force's February 1997 plans to restructure the F-22 program, focusing on the: (1) estimated cost of the restructured program and viability of cost reduction initiatives; (2) planned timing for realization of benefits from initiatives; and (3) criteria for approving initiation and continuation of production.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's reviews of various weapon system acquisitions have shown that initial program schedules and cost estimates have historically been optimistic and have not often been achieved; (2) the F-22 program is not an exception; (3) further, GAO believes the February 1997 restructuring plan reflects revised cost goals that may be optimistic because: (a) the planned reductions in F-22 production unit costs are greater than those experienced by prior fighter programs; and (b) actions intended to reduce production costs have not been fully defined and validated; (4) GAO's comparison of the projected reduction in F-22 production unit costs with the historical unit costs of the F-15, F-16, and F-18 programs indicates that the F-22 reductions exceed those that have been achieved on these other programs; (5) also, to achieve the overall cost avoidance projected by the Joint Estimate Team, the unit cost of full-rate aircraft must be reduced by 54 percent from the unit cost of the low-rate initial production (LRIP) aircraft instead of by 27.9 percent, as projected before the program restructure; (6) an aspect of cost reduction that has been previously reviewed and should continue to be considered is the potential savings from reducing F-22 performance requirements; (7) Joint Estimate Team members told GAO that, although they considered performance reductions in the study as a means of reducing costs, and that potential reductions had been considered in at least a dozen past reviews, no performance reductions were made as a result of their study; (8) the cost reduction initiatives are not planned to achieve significant net savings until F-22 full-rate production, now planned to begin in fiscal year (FY) 2004; (9) the F-22 cost estimate developed by the Joint Estimate Team and endorsed by the Air Force recognizes unit cost increases of 40 percent in F-22 LRIP aircraft through FY 2003; (10) the program exit criteria that were required before awarding each lot of LRIP aircraft and the first full-rate production contract have been revised as part of the program restructuring; and (11) although aircraft performance parameters are reported in the Selected Acquisition Report and other Air Force and Department of Defense reports, GAO believes specific aircraft performance parameters should be included in the exit criteria for each low-rate initial production lot to: (a) maintain visibility of aircraft performance as production rates are accelerated; and (b) ensure that adequate progress is being made to fully demonstrate the aircraft's capabilities. |
gao_GAO-10-663 | gao_GAO-10-663_0 | This report is to 1. describe actions taken and planned for meeting the act’s requirements, a) specific milestones and actual performance against specified performance measures and any revision of such milestones and performance measures and b) specific actions on the defense business system modernizations submitted for certification under such subsection; 2. discuss specific improvements in business operations and cost savings resulting from successful defense business systems modernization efforts; 3. identify the number of defense business system modernizations certified; and 4. identify any defense business system modernization with an obligation in excess of $1 million during the preceding fiscal year that was not certified as required, and the reasons for the waiver. Business system investments costing more than $1 million continue to be certified and approved, but these decisions were not always based on complete information. To its credit, DOD’s annual report includes milestones, performance against milestones, and milestone revisions for 76 programs. However, other important performances measures, which typically include measures associated with determining progress against program cost, capability, and benefit commitments, are not included in the report. Further, they said they focused on program milestones because most of the investments covered by the report have not progressed far enough in their life cycles to measure cost, capability, and benefit performance. Nevertheless, the report includes descriptions of a number of programs that have progressed to the point where DOD reports on actual operational efficiencies and dollar savings that have accrued, which, in turn, means that these programs have progressed to the point that DOD can report on progress against defined performance commitments, such as the costs that have been incurred, the capabilities that have been delivered, and benefits that have been realized. Moreover, the programs that have not yet delivered capabilities or realized benefits have incurred costs, which DOD can report relative to expected costs. DOD’s Annual Report Does Not Describe Certification Actions for All Systems, and Justification of Reported Certification Actions Is Limited
Among other things, the act requires DOD’s annual report to describe specific actions the department has taken on each business system modernization investment submitted for certification. However, certification actions associated with 40 other investments are not included. Further, the bases for several of the fiscal year 2009 system certification actions and subsequent approvals are limited because program weaknesses and issues that our prior work has raised about, for example, the systems’ economic analyses and BEA compliance determinations, are not reflected in the reported certification actions. According to BTA officials, only new certifications are included in the report, even though DOD guidance states that recertifications are also certification actions. Moreover, DOD guidance defines a recertification as a type of certification action, thus making it subject to the act’s reporting requirements. Conclusions
DOD’s latest annual report on its business systems modernization program complies with statutory requirements pertaining to the report’s content, but the scope and completeness of key information that is provided in the report is otherwise limited. Collectively, this means that DOD’s annual report does not provide congressional committees with the full range of information necessary to permit meaningful and informed oversight of DOD’s business systems modernization program. As a result, these certification and approval decisions may not be sufficiently justified. Recommendations for Executive Action
To facilitate congressional oversight and promote departmental accountability, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as the chair of the DBSMC, to ensure that the scope and content of future DOD annual reports to Congress on compliance with section 332 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, as amended, be expanded to include: Cost, capability, and benefit performance measures for each business system modernization investment and actual performance against these measures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1995, GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) multibillion dollar business systems modernization program as high risk, and it continues to do so today. To assist in addressing DOD's modernization challenges, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (the act) requires the department to, among other things, report specific information about business system investments, including (1) milestones and actual performance against specified measures and any revisions and (2) actions taken to certify that a modernization investment involving more than $1 million meets defined conditions before obligating funds. The act also directs GAO to review each report. As agreed, GAO focused on the fiscal year 2010 report's compliance with, among other things, these provisions of the act. To do so, GAO compared DOD's report to the act's reporting requirements, interviewed DOD officials, analyzed relevant documentation, and leveraged prior GAO reports.
What GAO Found
DOD's fiscal year 2010 report to Congress on its business systems modernization program complies with key provisions in the act, but its scope and content are nevertheless limited. Specifically, (1) The report includes milestones, performance against milestones, and milestone revisions for specific investments. However, other important performance measures, such as measures of progress against program cost, capability, and benefit commitments are not included in the report. DOD officials attributed the missing performance-related information to various factors, including that most of the investments addressed in the report have not progressed far enough in their life cycles to measure cost, capability, and benefit performance. However, the report also cites a number of investments that have produced business improvements and cost savings, and thus it follows that performance-related information about investment costs incurred, capabilities delivered, and benefits realized is available and can be reported relative to program expectations. Moreover, programs that have not yet delivered capabilities or realized benefits have nevertheless incurred costs, which DOD can report relative to expected costs. (2) The report identifies certification actions associated with 116 business system modernization investments. However, the report omits certification actions for 40 other investments. According to DOD officials, the omitted actions are not new certifications, but rather are recertifications that were intentionally excluded from the report. However, certification memoranda show this is not the case for four of the actions and DOD guidance defines a recertification as a type of certification action. Further, the underlying bases for a number of reported actions are limited because program weaknesses that GAO's prior work has raised, such as the reliability of the systems' economic analyses and the sufficiency of business enterprise architecture compliance determinations, are not reflected in the reported certification actions. DOD's guidance does not require that certification submissions disclose program weaknesses that GAO has raised, and DOD officials stated that reviews are limited to the information that is submitted. As a result, DOD's annual report does not provide the full range of information that is needed to permit meaningful and informed congressional oversight of the department's business systems modernization efforts. Moreover, the bases for some certification actions exclude relevant information about known investment weaknesses, and thus these actions may not be sufficiently justified. |
gao_GAO-08-154T | gao_GAO-08-154T_0 | Medicare Advantage ACRP and Bid Process and Related Audit Requirements
Before 2006, companies choosing to participate in the Medicare Advantage program were required to annually submit an ACRP to CMS for review and approval for each plan they intended to offer. The ACRP consisted of two parts—a plan benefit package and the adjusted community rate (ACR). On the bid forms, MA organizations include an estimate of the per-person cost of providing Medicare-covered services. BBA requires CMS to annually audit the submissions of one-third of MA organizations. CMS contracts with accounting and actuarial firms to perform these audits. GAO Analysis Shows CMS Did Not Meet the Audit Requirement
According to our analysis of available CMS data, CMS did not meet the statutory requirement to audit the financial records of at least one-third of the participating MA organizations for contract years 2001 through 2005, nor has it done so yet for the 2006 bid submissions. They explained that they plan to conduct other reviews of the financial records of MA organizations and prescription drug plans to meet the requirement for 2006. Further, CMS is not likely to complete these other financial reviews until almost 3 years after the bid submission date (see figure 1) for each contract year, in part because it must first reconcile payment data that prescription drug plans are not required to submit to CMS until 6 months after the contract year is over. CMS’ Audit Process Was of Limited Value
In its audits for contract years 2001-2005, CMS did not consistently ensure that the audit process provided information needed for assessing the potential impact of errors on beneficiaries’ benefits or payments to the MA organizations. CMS did not initiate any actions to attempt to determine such impact until after the contract year 2003 audits were completed. CMS took steps to determine such impact and identified a net of about $35 million from the contract year 2003 audits that beneficiaries could have received in additional benefits. In CMS’ audits of the 2006 bid submissions, 18 (or about 23 percent) of the 80 organizations audited had material findings that have an impact on beneficiaries or plan payments approved in bids. CMS officials told us they do not plan to pursue financial recoveries from MA organizations based on the results of ACR or bid audits because the agency does not have the legal authority to do so. According to our assessment of the statutes, CMS has the authority to pursue financial recoveries, but its rights under contracts for 2001 through 2005 are limited because its implementing regulations did not require that each contract include provisions to inform organizations about the audits and about the steps that CMS would take to address identified deficiencies, including pursuit of financial recoveries. Regarding the bid process that began in 2006, our assessment of the statutes is that CMS has the authority to include terms in bid contracts that would allow it to pursue financial recoveries based on bid audit results. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2006, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) estimated it spent over $51 billion on the Medicare Advantage program, which serves as an alternative to the traditional feefor- service program. Under the Medicare Advantage program, CMS approves private companies to offer health plan options to Medicare enrollees that include all Medicare-covered services. Many plans also provide supplemental benefits. The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 requires CMS to annually audit the financial records supporting the submissions (i.e., adjusted community rate proposals (ACRP) or bids) of at least onethird of participating organizations. BBA also requires that GAO monitor the audits. This testimony provides information on (1) the ACRP and bid process and related audit requirement, (2) CMS' efforts related to complying with the audit requirement, and (3) factors that cause CMS' audit process to be of limited value.
What GAO Found
Before 2006, companies choosing to participate in the Medicare Advantage program were annually required to submit an ACRP to CMS for review and approval. In 2006, a bid submission process replaced the ACRP process. The ACRPs and bids identify the health services the company will provide to Medicare members and the estimated cost for providing those services. CMS contracted with accounting and actuarial firms to perform the required audits. According to our analysis, CMS did not meet the requirement for auditing the financial records of at least one-third of the participating Medicare Advantage organizations for contract years 2001-2005. CMS is planning to conduct other financial reviews of organizations to meet the audit requirement for contract year 2006. However, CMS does not plan to complete the financial reviews until almost 3 years after the bid submission date each contract year, which will affect its ability to address any identified deficiencies in a timely manner. CMS did not consistently ensure that the audit process for contract years 2001-2005 provided information to assess the impact on beneficiaries. After contract year 2003 audits were completed, CMS took steps to determine such impact and identified an impact on beneficiaries of about $35 million. CMS audited contract year 2006 bids for 80 organizations, and 18 had a material finding that affected amounts in approved bids. CMS officials took limited action to follow up on contract year 2006 findings. CMS officials told us they do not plan to sanction or pursue financial recoveries based on these audits because the agency does not have the legal authority to do so. According to our assessment of the statutes, CMS had the authority to pursue financial recoveries, but its rights under contracts for 2001-2005 were limited because its implementing regulations did not require that each contract include provisions to inform organizations about the audits and about the steps that CMS would take to address identified deficiencies. Further, our assessment of the statute is that CMS has the authority to include terms in bid contracts that would allow it to pursue financial recoveries. Without changes in its procedures, CMS will continue to invest resources in audits that will likely provide limited value. |
gao_OSI-98-9 | gao_OSI-98-9_0 | VA OIG’s Conclusion Regarding Alleged Cover-Up Is Misleading
The title and text of the Special Inquiry report suggest that allegations of a cover-up had been investigated. Although the Assistant IG stated that there was no intent to mislead, the report title—Special Inquiry: Alleged Cover-up of an Unexplained Increase in Deaths, Harry S. Truman Memorial VA Medical Center, Columbia, Missouri—and two of the report’s three major sections—“Alleged Cover-up by Medical Center and Central Region Officials Subsequent to the Criminal Investigation” and “Alleged Cover-up by the Office of Inspector General”—specifically refer to the cover-up allegations. Review Planned and Executed From a Management Perspective
We determined that the OIG did not plan or conduct its Special Inquiry in a manner to determine if improper acts pertaining to a cover-up had occurred. OIG Noncompliance With Policies, Report Inaccuracies, and Unsupported Statements
In conducting the Special Inquiry, the OIG failed to follow its own policies concerning completeness and accuracy of its reports. As a result, the OIG’s Special Inquiry report contained statements that were either inconsistent with or unsupported by the evidence contained in the OIG’s files. The OIG’s Special Inquiry report issued in September 1995, attributed the delay to administrative error. The Special Inquiry review looked at whether the OIG protected the complainant’s right to confidentiality. OIG Comments and Our Evaluation
The Department of Veterans Affairs’ Office of Inspector General provided written comments on a draft of this report. In a February 1993 letter, the staff physician who conducted the statistical study at the Hospital alleged to the OIG that both the Hospital and VA Central Region management had covered up the increase in patient deaths on Ward 4 East. In the letter, the staff physician requested confidentiality. GAO Comments
1.Despite how the OIG may characterize its work, we determined that its review was not planned or executed in a manner that would support the conclusion that it had found “no conclusive proof of an intentional cover-up” by Hospital and Central Region officials and “no evidence of criminal misconduct by top management.” The work done, as described by those who did it and as reflected in the workpapers, did not include collecting and analyzing evidence to identify intentional cover-up efforts. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General's (OIG) Special Inquiry into the alleged cover-up of an unexplained increase in deaths at the Harry S Truman Memorial Veterans Medical Center, Columbia, Missouri, focusing on: (1) whether the Special Inquiry report represents the results of OIG's review; (2) whether OIG complied with its policies in conducting the Special Inquiry; (3) why a delay occurred between receipt of the cover-up allegations in February 1993 and the beginning of the Special Inquiry in January 1995; (4) whether OIG protected the confidentiality of the staff physician who made the allegations of a cover-up; and (5) if OIG processes and procedures are adequate for ensuring confidentiality.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the VA OIG conducted the Special Inquiry as a management review to determine how hospital and VA Central Region management had responded to an out-of-norm situation regarding unexplained deaths at the Hospital; (2) GAO determined that OIG did not collect or analyze evidence in a manner that would identify intentional cover-up efforts; (3) thus, the Special Inquiry's conclusion that no evidence of an intentional cover-up had been found was not consistent with the inquiry conducted and was misleading; (4) OIG failed to comply with its own reporting policies concerning completeness and accuracy by presenting statements that were not supported by the evidence contained in OIG files, including reference to a discussion that the Special Inquiry never verified; (5) OIG attributed the delay in acting upon the cover-up allegations received in February 1993 to administrative error; (6) the confidentiality of the staff physician who had made the allegations of a cover-up was breached on at least three occasions; and (7) OIG's current policies and procedures on confidentiality are adequate. |
gao_GAO-04-888T | gao_GAO-04-888T_0 | In addition, if a drug is susceptible to deterioration and must, for example, be maintained in a temperature-controlled environment, it must be packaged and labeled in accordance with regulations and manufacturer standards. FDA-approved drugs manufactured in foreign countries, including those sold over the Internet, are subject to the same requirements as domestic drugs. Most of the Targeted Prescription Drugs Were Purchased from Multiple Internet Pharmacies Without Providing A Prescription
We obtained 1 or more samples of 11 of the 13 drugs we targeted, both with and without a patient-provided prescription. Drug samples we received from other foreign pharmacies came from Argentina, Costa Rica, Fiji, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey. Most of the drugs—45 of 68—were obtained without a patient-provided prescription. Five U.S. and all 18 Canadian pharmacies from which we obtained drug samples required the patient to provide a prescription. The remaining 24 U.S. pharmacies generally provided a prescription based on a general medical questionnaire filled out online by the patient. Most Problems Identified among Drug Samples Received from Other Foreign Internet Pharmacies
None of the 21 prescription drug samples we received from other foreign Internet pharmacies included a dispensing pharmacy label that provided patient instructions for use, and only 6 of these samples came with warning information. Among the 21 drug samples from other foreign pharmacies, manufacturers determined that 19 were not approved for the U.S. market for various reasons, including that the labeling or the facilities in which they were manufactured had not been approved by FDA. In all but 4 instances, however, manufacturers determined that the chemical composition of the samples we received from other foreign Internet pharmacies was comparable to the chemical composition of the drugs we had ordered. Two samples of one drug were found by the manufacturer to be counterfeit and contained a different chemical composition than the drug we had ordered. In both instances the manufacturer reported that samples had less quantity of the active ingredient, and the safety and efficacy of the samples could not be determined. In contrast to the drug samples received from other foreign Internet pharmacies, all 47 of the prescription drug samples we received from Canadian and U.S. Internet pharmacies included labels from the dispensing pharmacy that generally provided patient instructions for use and 87 percent of these samples (41 of 47) included warning information. Manufacturers reported that 16 of the 18 samples from Canadian Internet pharmacies were unapproved for sale in the United States, citing for example unapproved labeling and packaging. However, the samples were all found to be comparable in chemical composition to the products we ordered. Table 4 summarizes the problems we identified among the 68 samples we received. Some Internet Pharmacies Were Not Reliable in Their Business Practices
We observed questionable characteristics and business practices of some of the Internet pharmacies from which we received drugs. We ultimately did not receive six of the orders we placed and paid for, suggesting the potential fraudulent nature of some Internet pharmacies or entities representing themselves as such. Finally, the return addresses on samples of Humulin N and Zoloft were found to be private residences in Lahore, Pakistan. About 21 percent of the Internet pharmacies from which we received drugs (14 of 68) were under investigation by regulatory agencies. The reasons for the investigations by DEA and FDA include allegations of selling controlled substances without a prescription; selling adulterated, misbranded, or counterfeit drugs; selling prescription drugs where no doctor-patient relationship exists; smuggling; and mail fraud. Concluding Observations
Consumers can readily obtain many prescription drugs over the Internet without providing a prescription—particularly from certain U.S. and foreign Internet pharmacies outside of Canada. Drugs available include those with special safety restrictions, for which patients should be monitored for side effects, and narcotics, where the potential for abuse is high. In addition to the lack of prescription requirements, some Internet pharmacies can pose other safety risks for consumers. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the demand for and the cost of prescription drugs rise, many consumers have turned to the Internet to purchase them. However, the global nature of the Internet can hinder state and federal efforts to identify and regulate Internet pharmacies to help assure the safety and efficacy of products sold. Recent reports of unapproved and counterfeit drugs sold over the Internet have raised further concerns. This testimony summarizes a GAO report: Internet Pharmacies: Some Pose Safety Risks for Consumers, GAO-04-820 (June 17, 2004). GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which certain drugs can be purchased over the Internet without a prescription; (2) whether the drugs are handled properly, approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and authentic; and (3) the extent to which Internet pharmacies are reliable in their business practices. GAO attempted to purchase up to 10 samples of 13 different drugs, each from a different pharmacy Web site, including sites in the United States, Canada, and other foreign countries. GAO assessed the condition of the samples it received and forwarded the samples to their manufacturers to determine whether they were approved by FDA, safe, and authentic. GAO also confirmed the locations of several Internet pharmacies and undertook measures to examine the reliability of their business practices.
What GAO Found
GAO obtained most of the prescription drugs it sought from a variety of Internet pharmacy Web sites without providing a prescription. GAO obtained 68 samples of 11 different drugs--each from a different pharmacy Web site in the United States, Canada, or other foreign countries, including Argentina, Costa Rica, Fiji, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey. Five U.S. and all 18 Canadian pharmacy sites from which GAO received samples required a patient-provided prescription, whereas the remaining 24 U.S. and all 21 foreign pharmacy sites outside of Canada provided a prescription based on their own medical questionnaire or had no prescription requirement. Among the drugs GAO obtained without a prescription were those with special safety restrictions and highly addictive narcotic painkillers. GAO identified several problems associated with the handling, FDA-approval status, and authenticity of the 21 samples received from Internet pharmacies located in foreign countries outside of Canada. Fewer problems were identified among pharmacies in Canada and the United States. None of the foreign pharmacies outside of Canada included dispensing pharmacy labels that provide instructions for use, few included warning information, and 13 displayed other problems associated with the handling of the drugs. For example, 3 samples of a drug that should be shipped in a temperature-controlled environment arrived in envelopes without insulation. Manufacturer testing revealed that most of these drug samples were unapproved for the U.S. market because, for example, the labeling or the facilities in which they were manufactured had not been approved by FDA; however, manufacturers found the chemical composition of all but 4 was comparable to the product GAO ordered. Four samples were determined to be counterfeit products or otherwise not comparable to the product GAO ordered. Similar to the samples received from other foreign pharmacies, manufacturers found most of those from Canada to be unapproved for the U.S. market; however, manufacturers determined that the chemical composition of all drug samples obtained from Canada were comparable to the product GAO ordered. Some Internet pharmacies were not reliable in their business practices. Most instances identified involved pharmacies outside of the United States and Canada. GAO did not receive six orders for which it had paid. In addition, GAO found questionable entities located at the return addresses on the packaging of several samples, such as private residences. Finally, 14 of the 68 pharmacy Web sites from which GAO obtained samples were found to be under investigation by regulatory agencies for reasons including selling counterfeit drugs and providing prescription drugs where no valid doctor-patient relationship exists. Nine of these were U.S. sites, 1 a Canadian site, and 4 were other foreign Internet pharmacy sites. |
gao_GAO-09-448T | gao_GAO-09-448T_0 | The IRB review process is intended to assure, both in advance and by periodic review, that appropriate steps are taken to protect the rights and welfare of humans participating as subjects in the research. Figure 1 below provides a simplified illustration of the IRB approval process for human subjects research protocols. IRBs also play a central role in the process by which entities apply for federal funding for human subjects research. To obtain an assurance, HHS requires an entity to declare to HHS that its activities related to human subjects are guided by ethical principles and federal regulations—the Common Rule—and to designate one or more IRBs to review the research covered by the assurance. The company that sent materials to us was seeking our bogus IRB’s approval to add one of the company’s clinics as a new test site for ongoing human trials involving invasive surgery. Our bogus IRB could have authorized human subjects testing to begin at this new test site—even though it was a fictitious IRB, with no medical research expertise whatsoever. Moreover, because this transaction involved a company conducting private (i.e., not federally funded) research, and did not involve any FDA-regulated products, our bogus IRB could have approved the research to begin without needing to register with any federal agency. All IRBs that review federally funded human subjects research are required to be registered with HHS. As mentioned above, in evaluating an application to determine whether or not to approve an assurance, HHS is required to consider the adequacy of any IRB designated on the application, as the IRB will be responsible for overseeing the research activities of the entity that submitted the assurance application. In addition, we used the assurance approval to boost the credibility of our fictitious medical device company by posting our assurance number on the fictitious medical device company’s Web site. Each of these assurances is a first step for the medical researcher to apply for federal funding for human subjects research, with this IRB formally designated to oversee the research. IRBs’ Research Protocol Approval Process
We were able to get an actual IRB to approve a fictitious protocol for human subjects research, which raises concerns that other IRBs may conduct protocol reviews without exercising due diligence, thereby exposing research volunteers to significant risk. For this test, we created a research protocol for a fictitious medical device with no proven test history and bogus specifications, and sent the protocol to three actual, independent IRBs under the guise of the medical device company we created for obtaining an assurance from HHS in our second test, as mentioned above. We succeeded in getting our fictitious protocol approved by an IRB, even though we were a bogus company with falsified credentials and an unproven medical device. If we had been a real medical device company, we could have begun testing our “significant risk” experimental device on actual human subjects. We also could have used our bogus IRB mentioned above to approve our fictitious protocol. This shows the potential for unethical manipulation in the IRB system. For example, we provided IRB 1 with bogus information that FDA had already cleared our device for marketing because our device was found to be substantially equivalent to an existing, legally marketed device. IRB 1’s board meeting minutes indicate that it believed our device was “probably very safe,” as shown in figure 2 above. Our contacts with IRB 2 and IRB 3, during their review of our protocol, were done entirely by e-mail. Briefing with HHS
We briefed HHS officials on the results of our investigation. According to HHS officials, the department does not review IRB registrations or assurance applications to assess whether the information submitted is factual. Moreover, although HHS is required by law to consider the adequacy of IRBs listed on assurance applications when reviewing applications, the director of OHRP stated that his office would require more staff to do so. HHS officials stated that the assurance process is not a meaningful protection against unethical manipulation. For example, representatives from one of the IRBs that rejected our protocol stated that the HHS assurance number listed on our bogus medical device company’s Web site gave our company credibility because it meant that HHS had recognized our company. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of Americans enroll in clinical studies of experimental drugs and medical devices each year. Many of these studies are meant to demonstrate that products are safe and effective. The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are responsible for overseeing aspects of a system of independent institutional review boards (IRB). IRBs review and monitor human subjects research, with the intended purpose of protecting the rights and welfare of the research subjects. GAO investigated three key aspects of the IRB system: (1) the process for establishing an IRB, (2) the process through which researchers wishing to apply for federal funding assure HHS their human subjects research activities follow ethical principles and federal regulations, and (3) the process that medical research companies follow to get approval for conducting research on human subjects. GAO investigated these three aspects of the IRB system by creating two fictitious companies (one IRB and one medical device company), phony company officials, counterfeit documents, and a fictitious medical device.
What GAO Found
The IRB system is vulnerable to unethical manipulation, which elevates the risk that experimental products are approved for human subject tests without full and appropriate review. GAO investigators created fictitious companies, used counterfeit documents, and invented a fictitious medical device to investigate three key aspects of the IRB system. These are the results: Establishing an IRB. GAO created a Web site for a bogus IRB and advertised the bogus IRB's services in newspapers and online. A real medical research company contacted the bogus IRB to get approval to join ongoing human trials involving invasive surgery--even though GAO's investigators had no medical expertise whatsoever. Since the transaction involved privately funded human subjects research and did not involve any FDA-regulated drugs or devices, GAO's bogus IRB could have authorized this testing to begin without needing to register with any federal agency. Obtaining an HHS-approved assurance. GAO also registered its bogus IRB with HHS, and used this registration to apply for an HHS-approved assurance for GAO's fictitious medical device company. An assurance is a statement by researchers to HHS that their human subjects research will follow ethical principles and federal regulations, which is required before researchers can receive federal funding for the research. On its assurance application, GAO designated its bogus IRB as the IRB that would review the research covered by the assurance. Even though the entire process was done online or by fax--without any human interaction--HHS approved the assurance for GAO's fictitious device company. With an HHS-approved assurance, GAO's device company could have applied for federal funding for human subjects research. Obtaining IRB approval for human testing. GAO succeeded in getting approval from an actual IRB to test a fictitious medical device on human subjects. GAO's fictitious device had fake specifications and matched several examples of "significant risk" devices from FDA guidance. The IRB did not verify the information submitted by GAO, which included false information that FDA had already cleared GAO's device for marketing. Although records from this IRB indicated that it believed GAO's bogus device was "probably very safe," two other IRBs that rejected GAO's protocol cited safety concerns with GAO's device. No human interaction with these IRBs was necessary as the entire process was done through e-mail or fax. GAO's bogus IRB mentioned above also could have approved the fictitious protocol, which shows the potential for unethical manipulation in the IRB system. GAO briefed HHS officials on the results of its investigation. The director of OHRP stated that, when reviewing assurance applications, HHS does not consider whether IRBs listed on the applications are adequate--even though HHS is required to do so by law. In addition, HHS officials stated that the department does not review assurance applications to determine whether the information submitted by applicants is factual. |
gao_GAO-04-90 | gao_GAO-04-90_0 | 3.) 5.) In fiscal year 1996, the program had its first accumulated surplus, and by fiscal year 2000, the accumulated surplus had increased to almost $10 billion, in 2002 dollars. Termination of Severely Underfunded Plans Was Primary Factor in Financial Decline of Single- Employer Program
The financial condition of the single-employer pension insurance program returned to an accumulated deficit in 2002 largely due to the termination, or expected termination, of several severely underfunded pension plans. For example, in December 2002, PBGC involuntarily terminated an underfunded Bethlehem Steel Corporation pension plan, which resulted in the single-employer program assuming responsibility for about $7.2 billion in PBGC-guaranteed liabilities, about $3.7 billion of which was not funded at termination. Plan Unfunded Liabilities Were Increased by Stock Market and Interest Rate Declines
The termination of underfunded plans in 2002 occurred after a sharp decline in the stock market had reduced plan asset values and a general decline in interest rates had increased plan liability values, and the sponsors did not make the contributions necessary to adequately fund the plans before they were terminated. 6.) PBGC Faces Long- Term Financial Risks from a Potential Imbalance of Assets and Liabilities
Two primary risks threaten the long-term financial viability of the single- employer program. The greater risk concerns the program’s liabilities: large losses, due to bankrupt firms with severely underfunded pension plans, could continue or accelerate. On the asset side, PBGC also faces the risk that it may not receive sufficient revenue from premium payments and investments to offset the losses experienced by the single-employer program in 2002 or that this program may experience in the future. Particularly troubling may be structural weaknesses in certain industries with large underfunded defined-benefit plans. 9.) Nevertheless, because of serious risks to the program’s viability, we have placed the PBGC single-employer insurance program on our high-risk list. Several Reforms Might Reduce the Risks to the Program’s Financial Viability
Several types of reforms might be considered to reduce the risks to the single-employer program’s long-term financial viability. These reforms could be made to strengthen funding rules applicable to poorly funded plans; improve the availability of information about plan investments, termination funding status, and program guarantees. Shutdown benefits provide additional benefits, such as significant early retirement benefit subsidies to participants affected by a plant closing or a permanent layoff. Expand restrictions on unfunded benefit increases. Various actions could be taken to reduce guaranteed benefits. Disclose benefit guarantees to additional participants. Conclusion
While the recent decline in the single-employer program’s financial condition is not an immediate crisis, threats to the program’s long-term viability should be addressed. PBGC estimates that, collectively, the plans represented over $4 billion in losses to the program at plan termination. 1. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 34 million participants in 30,000 single-employer defined benefit pension plans rely on a federal insurance program managed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to protect their pension benefits, and the program's long-term financial viability is in doubt. Over the last decade, the program swung from a $3.6 billion accumulated deficit (liabilities exceeded assets), to a $10.1 billion accumulated surplus, and back to a $3.6 billion accumulated deficit, in 2002 dollars. Furthermore, despite a record $9 billion in estimated losses to the program in 2002, additional severe losses may be on the horizon. PBGC estimates that financially weak companies sponsor plans with $35 billion in unfunded benefits, which ultimately might become losses to the program.
What GAO Found
The single-employer pension insurance program returned to an accumulated deficit in 2002 largely due to the termination, or expected termination, of several severely underfunded pension plans. Factors that contributed to the severity of the plans' underfunded condition included a sharp stock market decline, which reduced plan assets, and an interest rate decline, which increased plan termination costs. For example, PBGC estimates losses to the program from terminating the Bethlehem Steel pension plan, which was nearly fully funded in 1999 based on reports to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), at $3.7 billion when it was terminated in 2002. The plan's assets had decreased by over $2.5 billion, while its liabilities had increased by about $1.4 billion since 1999. The single-employer program faces two primary risks to its long-term financial viability. First, the large losses in 2002 could continue or accelerate if, for example, structural problems in particular industries result in additional bankruptcies. Second, revenue from premiums and investments might be inadequate to offset program losses. Participant-based premium revenue might fall, for example, if the number of program participants decreases. Because of these risks, GAO has recently placed the single-employer insurance program on its high-risk list of agencies with significant vulnerabilities to the federal government. While the recent decline in the single-employer program's financial condition is not an immediate crisis, the threats to the program's long-term viability should be addressed. Several reforms might be considered to reduce the risks to the program's long-term financial viability. These include strengthening funding rules applicable to poorly funded plans, modifying program guarantees, restructuring premiums, and improving the availability of information about plan investments, termination funding, and program guarantees. Under each reform, several possible actions could be taken. For example, one way to modify program guarantees is to phase-in certain unfunded benefits, such as "shutdown benefits," which may provide significant early retirement benefit subsidies to participants affected by a plant closing or a permanent layoff. |
gao_HEHS-96-130 | gao_HEHS-96-130_0 | Labor collects wage and fringe benefit data through voluntary participation in a wage survey. 500) would repeal the Davis-Bacon Act. This information is collected through the voluntary submission of data from employers and third parties on construction projects surveyed for each wage determination. These weaknesses include limitations in the degree to which Labor verifies the accuracy of the survey wage and fringe benefit data it receives, limited computer capabilities and safeguards to review wage data before calculating prevailing wage rates, and an appeals process that may not be well publicized. For example, Labor offices do not have computer software that could detect grossly inaccurate data reported in Labor’s surveys. In response, in its fiscal year 1997 budget request, Labor asked for about $4 million to develop, evaluate, and implement alternative reliable methodologies or procedures that will yield accurate and timely wage determinations at reasonable cost. Because Labor’s appeals process can serve as an additional internal control to guard against the use of fraudulent or inaccurate data in the wage determination process, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor require the Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards to inform employers, unions, and other interested parties of their rights to request summary information on a wage determination and of the agency’s procedures for initiating an appeal of a wage determination. II.2, II.4, and II.5.) These determinations are final. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Labor's efforts to prevent the use of inaccurate wage data for Davis-Bacon Act wage rate determinations, focusing on: (1) the steps Labor follows in collecting and reporting wage data; and (2) weaknesses in Labor's wage determination process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Labor's wage determinations are based on voluntary submissions of wage and benefit data from employers and third parties; (2) such internal control weaknesses as inaccurate wage and fringe benefit data, limited computer capability, and an inaccessible appeals process often lead to increased government construction costs or lower wages and fringe benefits for construction workers; (3) Labor began requiring its regional staff to verify third-party wage survey data in August 1995, but the verification does not address erroneous employer-reported data; (4) Labor does not have sufficient computer resources to automate data collection and verification; and (5) Labor requested $4 million in its fiscal year 1997 budget to develop, evaluate, and implement alternative reliable methodologies that will provide accurate and timely wage determinations at a reasonable cost. |
gao_GAO-06-465T | gao_GAO-06-465T_0 | Past experience has also underscored the importance of strong oversight of the census to (1) inform congressional decision making on budgetary and operational matters, (2) raise Congress’s confidence that the Bureau has chosen an optimum design and will manage operations and control costs effectively, and (3) help ensure the progress the Bureau has made thus far in refining, planning, and testing census-taking activities, continues as the Bureau shifts into the operational phases of the decennial. Bureau officials estimate the total life-cycle cost of the 2010 Census will be around $11.3 billion, which would make it the most expensive census in our country’s history, even after adjusting for inflation. 1). The Bureau’s Preparations for 2010 Are Progressing but Certain Challenges Will Need to Be Addressed
The Bureau’s preparations for the 2010 Census appear to be further along than at a similar point during the planning cycle for the 2000 Census. For example, the fundamental design of the 2010 Census has the potential to contain costs and improve coverage and accuracy, and the Bureau’s planning process for 2010 is generally more thorough than was the case for the 2000 Census. Moreover, the Bureau has taken steps to resolve the issues that have surfaced. What will be important is how effectively the Bureau manages those risks. The Unreliability of Mobile Computing Devices Has Been Problematic
Of particular concern is the previous unreliability of the MCDs the Bureau plans to use for its address canvassing and nonresponse follow-up operations (see fig. The move from paper to digital was a very positive step. The Bureau has acknowledged that the MCD’s performance is an issue, but believes it will be addressed as part of its contract for the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program, which is aimed at automating the Bureau’s field data collection efforts, and is scheduled to be awarded later this month (the MCDs used for the 2006 test are off-the-shelf purchases that were customized by the Bureau). In our June 2005 report, we noted that the Bureau has projected that 45 percent of its workforce will be eligible to retire by 2010. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Highlight the Importance of Disaster Preparedness
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the coastal communities of Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama. Consequently, a key question is whether the Bureau’s existing operations are adequate for capturing the migration that has taken place along the Gulf Coast, the various types of dwellings in which people live, and the changes to roads and other geographic features that have occurred, or does the Bureau need to develop enhanced and/or additional procedures to account for them? 2. 3. Thus, in looking toward the future, as the planning and testing phases of the 2010 Census begin to wind down, it will be important for Congress to monitor the Bureau’s progress in (1) identifying and diagnosing problems, (2) devising cost-effective solutions, and (3) integrating refinements and fixes in time to be evaluated during the Dress Rehearsal in 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rigorous planning is key to a successful census as it helps ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates the 2010 Census will cost around $11.3 billion, which would make it the most expensive census in our country's history, even after adjusting for inflation. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the Bureau's progress in preparing for the 2010 Census, (2) the challenges that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita might pose for the Bureau's future activities, and, (3) more broadly, the importance of planning for a range of events that could severely disrupt the census.
What GAO Found
The Bureau's preparations for the 2010 Census are making progress along several fronts. Of particular note is (1) the re-engineered design of the census, which holds promise for controlling costs and maintaining accuracy; (2) the Bureau's early planning process which was more rigorous than for the 2000 Census; and (3) the Bureau's greater willingness to outsource key census-taking operations that would be difficult for it to carry out on its own. At the same time, it will be important for the Bureau to resolve issues that pose a risk to a successful census. For example, the Bureau plans to use hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD) to develop the census address list and collect data from millions of households that do not respond to the initial census questionnaire. The MCDs are an important step forward because they are designed to replace many of the paper questionnaires and maps that were used in past censuses, and are a key element of the Bureau's Field Data Collection Automation program. The Bureau has never before used the devices in a decennial. In tests held in 2004 and 2006 to date, census workers found the MCDs easy to use, but sometimes unreliable, which reduced efficiency. Some workers also deviated from prescribed procedures which points to the need for better training. The Bureau has taken steps to address these issues and future tests will help determine the effectiveness of the Bureau's actions. The Bureau also faces a possible brain drain, as 45 percent of its workforce will be eligible to retire by 2010. Although the Bureau has taken preventative measures, it could improve those efforts by, among other actions, strengthening the monitoring of its mission-critical workforce. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlight the importance of contingency planning and examining whether the Bureau's existing operations are adequate for capturing the demographic and physical changes that have occurred along the Gulf Coast. Overall, as the Bureau's preparations for 2010 continue, it will be important for Congress to monitor the Bureau's progress in (1) identifying and diagnosing problems, (2) devising solutions, and (3) integrating refinements in time to be evaluated during the Census Dress Rehearsal scheduled for 2008. |
gao_GAO-03-998T | gao_GAO-03-998T_0 | Background
In seeking to provide their hospital customers with medical-surgical products at favorable prices, GPOs engage with manufacturers in certain contracting processes and sometimes use certain strategies to obtain price discounts. Key contracting strategies include the following: Sole-source contracts give one of several manufacturers of comparable products an exclusive right to sell a particular product through a GPO. Bundling links price discounts to purchases of a specified group of products. When used by GPOs with a large market share, these contracting strategies have the potential to reduce competition. GPOs Reported Modifying Contracting Processes When Desirable and Receiving Administrative Fees That Were Generally Consistent with Federal Regulations
In recent years, some manufacturers of medical-surgical products have contended that GPOs employ a slow product selection process and set high administrative fees that have made it difficult for some firms to obtain GPO contracts. The GPOs we studied were able to alter the duration of their process for selecting products to place on contract, particularly when they considered these products to be innovative. Five out of seven GPOs reported that the maximum contract administrative fee received from manufacturers in 2002 did not exceed the 3-percent-of-purchase-price threshold contained in federal regulations established by HHS. Seven National GPOs Varied in the Extent to Which They Used Certain Contracting Strategies
GPOs use certain contracting strategies—which include sole-source contracts, product bundling, and extended contract duration—to obtain discounts from manufacturers in exchange for providing the manufacturer with increased sales from an established customer base. For example, while all study GPOs reported using sole-source contracts, some GPOs, including one of the two largest GPOs, used it extensively, whereas others used it on a more limited basis. Most GPOs Use Some Form of Bundling, and the Two Largest GPOs Use It for a Notable Portion of Their Business
All but one of the GPOs in our study reported using some form of bundling, including the bundling of complementary products, bundling several unrelated products from one manufacturer, and bundling several products for which there are commitment-level requirements. GPOs Have Taken Initiatives to Address Concerns about Business Practices, but It Is Too Early to Evaluate Their Efforts
In response to congressional concerns raised in 2002 about GPOs’ potentially anticompetitive business practices, the group purchasing industry’s trade association established a code of conduct that directs member GPOs to, among other things, address their contracting processes. The seven GPOs we studied drafted or revised their own codes of conduct, but the conduct codes are not uniform in how they address GPO business practices. Moreover, some GPOs’ conduct codes include exceptions and qualified language that can limit the potential of the conduct codes to effect change. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hospitals have increasingly relied on purchasing intermediaries--GPOs--to keep the cost of medical-surgical products in check. By pooling purchases for their hospital customers, GPOs'in awarding contracts to medical-surgical product manufacturers--may negotiate lower prices for these products. Some manufacturers contend that GPOs are slow to select products to place on contract and establish high administrative fees that make it difficult for some firms to obtain a GPO contract. The manufacturers also express concern that certain contracting strategies to obtain better prices have the potential to limit competition when practiced by GPOs with a large share of the market. GAO was asked to examine certain GPO business practices. It focused on seven large GPOs serving hospitals nationwide regarding (1) their processes to select manufacturers' products for their hospital customers and the level of administrative fees they receive from manufacturers, (2) their use of contracting strategies to obtain favorable prices from manufacturers, and (3) recent initiatives taken to respond to concerns about GPO business practices.
What GAO Found
The seven GPOs we studied varied in how they carried out their contracting processes. The GPOs were able to expedite their processes for selecting products to place on contract, particularly when they considered these products to be innovative. The GPOs also reported receiving from manufacturers administrative fees in 2002 that were generally consistent with the 3-percent-of-purchase-price threshold in regulations established by the Department of Health and Human Services. However, for certain products, they reported receiving higher fees--in one case, nearly 18 percent. The seven GPOs also varied in the extent to which they used certain contracting strategies as leverage to obtain better prices. For example, some GPOs, including one of the two largest, used sole-source contracting (giving one of several manufacturers of comparable products an exclusive right to sell a particular product through the GPO) extensively, whereas others used it on a more limited basis. Most GPOs used some form of product bundling (linking price discounts to purchases of a specified group of products), and the two largest GPOs used bundling for a notable portion of their business. In response to congressional concerns raised in 2002 about GPOs' potentially anticompetitive business practices, the Health Industry Group Purchasing Association (HIGPA) and GPOs individually established codes of conduct. The conduct codes are not uniform in how they address GPO business practices. In addition, some GPOs' conduct codes include exceptions and qualified language that could limit their potential to effect change. |
gao_GAO-10-761T | gao_GAO-10-761T_0 | Background
The Recovery Act appropriated $4 billion for the Clean Water SRF program. In addition to providing increased funds, the Recovery Act included some new requirements for the SRF programs. Further, states were required to use at least 50 percent of Recovery Act funds to provide assistance in the form of, for example, principal forgiveness or grants. Despite Challenges, States Met Recovery Act Requirements for the SRFs
The 14 states we reviewed for the Clean Water SRF program met all Recovery Act requirements specific to the Clean Water SRF. Specifically, the states we reviewed had all projects under contract by the 1-year deadline and also took steps to give priority to projects that were ready to proceed to construction within 12 months of enactment of the Recovery Act. In addition, the 14 Clean Water SRFs we reviewed exceeded the 20 percent green reserve requirement, using 29 percent of Recovery Act SRF funds in these states to provide assistance for projects that met EPA criteria for the green reserve. These states also met or exceeded the 50 percent additional subsidization requirement; overall, the 14 states distributed a total of 79 percent of Recovery Act Clean Water SRF funds as additional subsidization. SRF officials in most of the states we reviewed said that they faced challenges in meeting Recovery Act requirements, especially the 1-year contracting deadline. According to SRF officials in some states, new applicants and subrecipients required additional support in complying with SRF program and Recovery Act requirements. In the states we reviewed, nearly half of Clean Water SRF subrecipients had not previously received assistance through that program. Recovery Act Funds Went to Many Disadvantaged Communities and New Recipients
The 14 states we reviewed distributed nearly $2 billion in Recovery Act funds among 890 water projects through their Clean Water SRF program. Overall, these 14 states distributed approximately 79 percent of Clean Water SRF Recovery Act funds as additional subsidization, with most of the remaining funds provided as low- or no- interest loans that will recycle back into the programs as subrecipients repay their loans. States we reviewed used at least 40 percent of Recovery Act Clean Water SRF project funds ($787 million) to provide assistance for projects that serve disadvantaged communities. Of the 890 projects awarded Recovery Act funds by the Clean Water SRF programs in the states we reviewed, more than one-third (312) address the green reserve requirement. Of these green projects, 289 (93 percent) were awarded additional subsidization. Although EPA and States Have Expanded Existing Oversight Procedures to Address Recovery Act Requirements, the Procedures May Not Ensure Adequate Oversight
EPA has modified its existing oversight of state SRF programs by planning additional performance reviews beyond the annual reviews it is already conducting, but these reviews do not include an examination of state subrecipient monitoring procedures. In terms of state oversight of subrecipients, EPA has not established new subrecipient monitoring requirements for Recovery Act-funded projects, according to EPA officials. Under the base Clean Water SRF program, EPA gives states a high degree of flexibility to operate their SRF programs based on each state’s unique needs and circumstances in accordance with federal and state laws and requirements. However, the oversight procedures may not be sufficient given that (1) federal funds awarded to each state under the Recovery Act have increased as compared with average annually awarded amounts; (2) all Recovery Act projects had to be ready to proceed to construction more quickly than projects funded with base SRF funds; and (3) EPA and states had little previous experience with some of the Recovery Act’s new requirements, such as Buy American provisions, according to EPA officials. In summary, EPA and the states successfully met the Recovery Act deadlines for having all projects under contract by the 1-year deadline, and almost all Clean Water SRF projects were under construction by that date as well. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) included $4 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Clean Water State Revolving Fund (SRF). This testimony--based on GAO's report GAO-10-604 , issued on May 26, 2010, in response to a mandate under the Recovery Act--addresses (1) state efforts to meet requirements associated with the Recovery Act and SRF program, (2) the uses of Recovery Act funds, and (3) EPA's and states' efforts to oversee the use of these funds. GAO's review of the Clean Water SRF program focused on 14 states and selected localities--known as subrecipients--in each of these states. These 14 states received approximately 50 percent of the total appropriated under the Recovery Act for the Clean Water SRF. GAO obtained data from EPA and the 14 states, including the amounts and types of financial assistance each SRF program provided, which subrecipients were first-time recipients of Clean Water SRF funding, and which projects serve disadvantaged communities.
What GAO Found
The 14 states we reviewed for the Clean Water SRF program had all projects under contract by the 1-year, February 17, 2010, deadline and also took steps to give priority to projects that were ready to proceed to construction by that same date. Eighty-seven percent of Clean Water SRF projects were under construction within 12 months of enactment of the Recovery Act. In addition, the 14 Clean Water SRFs exceeded the 20 percent green reserve requirement, using 29 percent of SRF funds to provide assistance for projects that met EPA criteria for being "green," such as water or energy efficiency projects; these states also met or exceeded the requirement to use at least 50 percent of Recovery Act funds to provide additional subsidization in the form of, for example, principal forgiveness or grants. SRF officials in most of the states we reviewed said that they faced challenges in meeting Recovery Act requirements, including the increased number of applications needing review and the number of new subrecipients requiring additional support in complying with the SRF program and Recovery Act requirements. States used a variety of techniques to address these concerns to meet the 1-year deadline, such as hiring additional staff to help administer the SRF program. The 14 states we reviewed distributed nearly $2 billion in Recovery Act funds among 890 water projects through their Clean Water SRF program. Overall, these 14 states distributed about 79 percent of their funds as additional subsidization, with most of the remaining funds provided as low- or zero-interest loans that will recycle back into the programs as subrecipients repay their loans. In addition, states we reviewed used at least 40 percent of Clean Water SRF Recovery Act project funds ($787 million) to provide assistance for projects that serve disadvantaged communities, and almost all of this funding was provided in the form of additional subsidization. Almost half of the Clean Water SRF subrecipients had never previously received assistance through that program. Of the 890 projects awarded Recovery Act Clean Water SRF program funds in these states, more than one-third are for green projects, and almost all of these (93 percent) were awarded additional subsidization. EPA has modified its existing oversight of state SRF programs by planning additional performance reviews beyond the annual reviews it already conducts, but these reviews do not include an examination of state subrecipient monitoring procedures. According to EPA officials, EPA has not established new subrecipient monitoring requirements for Recovery Act-funded projects and has given states a high degree of flexibility to operate their SRF programs based on each state's unique needs. Although many states have expanded their existing monitoring procedures, the oversight procedures in some states may not be sufficient given that (1) federal funds awarded to each state under the Recovery Act have increased as compared with average annual awards; (2) all Recovery Act projects had to be under contract within 1 year; and (3) EPA and states had little experience with some new Recovery Act requirements, such as the Buy American requirements. For example, some projects have been completed before any site inspection has occurred. |
gao_GAO-17-502 | gao_GAO-17-502_0 | The CFATS program is intended to ensure the security of the nation’s chemical infrastructure by identifying, assessing the risk posed by, and requiring the implementation of measures to protect high-risk chemical facilities. For expedited facilities that receive a letter of acceptance, ISCD does not conduct an authorization inspection because the CFATS Act of 2014 does not provide for this inspection at expedited facilities. Regarding the EAP, the CFATS Act of 2014 states that, among other things, DHS is to issue guidance for EAP facilities not later than 180 days after enactment of the act that identifies specific security measures sufficient to meet Risk-Based Performance Standards; approve a facility’s expedited security plan if it is not facially deficient based upon a review of the expedited plan; verify a facility’s compliance with its expedited security plan through a compliance inspection; require the facility to implement additional security measures or suspend the facility’s certification if, during or after a compliance inspection, security measures are insufficient to meet Risk-Based Performance Standards based on misrepresentation, omission, or an inadequate description of the site; and conduct a full evaluation of the EAP and submit a report on the EAP not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of the act to Congress. DHS Has Fully Implemented the EAP and Reported to Congress on Its Assessment of the Program
DHS Has Issued Guidance for the EAP and Fully Implemented the Program
On May 12, 2015, DHS issued EAP guidance for eligible facilities to use to prepare their expedited plans. ISCD officials told us that, in developing prescriptive security measures for the EAP, they considered various sources, including: lessons learned from approving prior standard security plans and Alternative Security Programs for tier 3 and tier 4 facilities and conducting inspections at these facilities;
Risk-Based Performance Standards used to develop a standard security plan or Alternative Security Program; and relevant academic literature, and security directives, guidelines, standards, and regulations issued by other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Army and the Department of Labor. The CFATS Act of 2014 allows facilities to submit only one expedited plan to DHS. Officials we interviewed at the three coordinating councils confirmed that DHS had contacted them about the EAP. DHS’s Report on the EAP Discussed All Statutory Elements
DHS’s report to Congress on the EAP, issued on August 2, 2016, discussed all elements listed in the CFATS Act of 2014, but did not quantify costs associated with the EAP because most of DHS’s initial costs were for salary and benefits and DHS did not require its employees to track the hours they worked on the EAP. Assess the number of eligible facilities that used the EAP versus the standard process to develop and submit a site security plan. ISCD officials told us that if enough facilities use the EAP in the future, DHS would evaluate the EAP’s effect on its CFATS operations. DHS reported that it is difficult to assess the impact of the EAP on the security of chemical facilities because only one facility submitted an expedited security plan. Low EAP Participation May Be Due to Various Factors
Two Chemical Facilities Have Used the EAP since Its Inception
According to DHS, as of April 2017, 2 of the 2,496 eligible facilities had used the EAP since ISCD implemented it; however, one of the two facilities was no longer in the EAP because ISCD no longer considers the facility to be high risk. ISCD had approved both facilities’ expedited security plans—one before DHS issued the aforementioned report to Congress and one after the report. They also said that the EAP is one of three options—the expedited security plan, the standard security plan, and the Alternative Security Program—that tier 3 and tier 4 facilities can use. Officials from both facilities also stated that the EAP’s prescriptive nature helped them to quickly determine the security measures required to be in their site security plans. ISCD officials and officials from 6 of the 11 industry organizations we interviewed stated that the prescriptive security measures required in the expedited security plan likely deterred some facilities from using the EAP. This was consistent with the views of the officials representing the two facilities that submitted EAPs, as discussed earlier. The Effect of Recent Changes to the CFATS Program on Future Use of the EAP Is Uncertain
Two other factors that could influence facilities’ participation in the EAP are the introduction of revised processes for (1) facilities to provide information to ISCD and (2) ISCD to determine the risk tier for each facility. If the updated tool proves easier to use, it could affect future interest in using the expedited program. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or [email protected]. | Why GAO Did This Study
Facilities that produce, use, or store hazardous chemicals could be of interest to terrorists intent on using them to inflict mass casualties in the United States. DHS established the CFATS program to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS places high-risk facilities into one of four risk-based tiers and inspects them to ensure compliance with DHS standards. The CFATS Act of 2014 created the Expedited Approval Program as an option for the two lower-risk tier facilities (tiers 3 and 4) to reduce the burden and expedite the processing of security plans. The act further required that DHS report on its evaluation of the expedited program to Congress.
The CFATS Act of 2014 also included a provision for GAO to assess the expedited program. This report discusses (1) DHS's implementation of the expedited program and its report to Congress and (2) the number of facilities that have used the program and factors affecting participation in it. GAO reviewed laws and DHS guidance, analyzed DHS's report to Congress, and interviewed DHS officials. GAO also received input from officials with three industry groups that represented the most likely candidates to use the program, and officials representing eight of their member organizations. The results of this input are not generalizable, but provide insights about the expedited program.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
For more information, contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or [email protected] .
[ This page was updated to delete a typo .]
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) fully implemented the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Expedited Approval Program in June 2015 and reported to Congress on the program in August 2016, as required by the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014 (CFATS Act of 2014). DHS's expedited program guidance identifies specific security measures that eligible (i.e., tiers 3 and 4) high-risk facilities can use to develop expedited security plans, rather than developing standard (non-expedited) security plans. Standard plans provide more flexibility in securing a facility, but are also more time-consuming to process. DHS's report to Congress on the expedited program discussed all required elements. For example, DHS was required to assess the impact of the expedited program on facility security. DHS reported that it was difficult to assess the impact of the program on security because only one facility had used it at the time of the report. DHS officials stated that they would further evaluate the impact of the program on security if enough additional facilities use it in the future.
As of April 2017, only 2 of the 2,496 eligible facilities opted to use the Expedited Approval Program; various factors affected participation. Officials from the two facilities told GAO they used the program because its prescriptive nature helped them quickly determine what they needed to do to implement required security measures and reduced the time and cost to prepare and submit their security plans to DHS. According to DHS and industry officials GAO interviewed, low participation to date could be due to several factors:
DHS implemented the expedited program after most eligible facilities already submitted standard (non-expedited) security plans to DHS;
the expedited program's security measures may be too strict and prescriptive, not providing facilities the flexibility of the standard process; and
DHS conducts in-person authorization inspections to confirm that security plans address risks under the standard process, but does not conduct them under the expedited program. DHS officials noted that some facilities may prefer having this inspection because it provides them useful information.
Recent changes in the CFATS program could also affect future use of the expedited program. In fall 2016, DHS updated its online tool for gathering data from facilities. Officials at DHS and 5 of the 11 industry organizations GAO contacted stated that the revised tool is more user-friendly and less burdensome than the previous one; however, it is unclear how the new tool might affect future use of the expedited program. Also, in fall 2016, DHS revised its methodology for determining the level of facility risk, and one of the two facilities that participated in the expedited program is no longer |
gao_GAO-01-624 | gao_GAO-01-624_0 | Manufacturing Problems Caused Temporary Shortages and Spikes in Price
Overall, manufacturing problems led to vaccine production and distribution delays of about 6-8 weeks in 2000-01. Two main factors contributed to the delay. Providers of flu vaccine also represent a diverse group. When the supply of vaccine was delayed in the fall of 2000, the manufacturers and distributors we interviewed reported that it was difficult to determine which of their purchasers should receive priority vaccine deliveries in response to the ACIP’s July and October 2000 recommendations to vaccinate high-risk groups first. For example, although one manufacturer shipped available vaccine to the nursing homes it could identify in its customer base as first priority, this did not ensure that all nursing homes received vaccine for their high-risk patients on a priority basis. HHS Has Initiatives Under Way to Prepare for Future Vaccine Delays and Shortages
While HHS has no direct control over how influenza vaccine is purchased and distributed by the private sector and local governments during the annual influenza season, it has several initiatives under way to help mitigate the adverse effects of any future shortages and delays. As shown in table 5, these initiatives include (1) conducting clinical trials on the feasibility of using smaller doses of vaccine for healthy 18- to 49-year-olds, (2) working with public and private sector entities involved in vaccine distribution to explore ways of better targeting vaccine to high-risk groups, (3) recommending state and local health department actions to prepare for a vaccine delay or shortage, and (4) revising guidelines to expand the recommended timing of influenza immunizations. Conclusions
The circumstances that led to the delay and early shortage of flu vaccine during the 2000-01 flu season could repeat themselves in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
Until the 2000-2001 flu season, the production and the distribution of flu vaccine generally went smoothly. In the fall of 2000, however, stories began to circulate about delays in obtaining flu vaccines. GAO reviewed (1) the circumstances that contributed to the delay and the effects the delay had on prices paid for vaccine, (2) how effectively current distribution channels ensure that high-risk populations receive vaccine on a priority basis, and (3) what the federal government is doing to better prepare for possible disruptions of influenza vaccine supply.
What GAO Found
GAO found that manufacturing difficulties resulted in an overall delay of about 6-8 weeks in shipping vaccine to most customers and a temporary price spike. Manufacturers experienced unprecedented problems growing a new viral strain, while two of four manufacturers halted production--one permanently--to address safety and quality control concerns. There is currently no system to ensure that high-risk patients have priority when the supply of vaccine is short. Although the federal government has no direct control over how influenza vaccine is purchased and distributed by the private sector and state and local governments, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has several efforts underway to help cope with future influenza vaccine shortages and delays. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) revised guidelines to extend the recommended timeframe for receiving immunizations. CDC is also helping to bring together manufacturers, distributors, providers, and others in the private and public sectors to explore ways to improve distribution to high-risk individuals. |
gao_GAO-08-552T | gao_GAO-08-552T_0 | Space Acquisition Problems Persist
The majority of major acquisition programs in DOD’s space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and increased technical risks. At times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing DOD to nearly double its investment in the face of technical and other problems without realizing a better return on investment. Along with the increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays—as much as 7 years—postponing delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the same, or less, capability. Causes of Acquisition Problems in Space Programs
Our work has identified a variety of reasons for this cost growth, most notably that weapons programs are incentivized to produce and use optimistic cost and schedule estimates in order to successfully compete for funding. We have also tied acquisition problems in space to inadequate contracting strategies; contract and program management weaknesses; the loss of technical expertise; capability gaps in the industrial base; tensions between labs that develop technologies for the future and current acquisition programs; divergent needs in users of space systems; diffuse leadership; and other issues that have been well documented in DOD and GAO studies. DOD has taken a number of actions to address the problems that we have reported on. These include initiatives at the department level that will affect its major weapons programs, as well as changes in course within specific Air Force programs. Although these actions are a step in the right direction, additional leadership and support are still needed to ensure that reforms that DOD has begun will take hold. These include shortages of staff with science and engineering backgrounds as well as staff with program-management and cost- estimating experience. Our past work has also pointed to capacity shortfalls that go beyond workforce. In fact, the back to basics approach that was adopted by the Air Force has not been incorporated into DOD’s space acquisition policy. We relied on our best practices studies, which comment on the persistent problems affecting space acquisitions, the actions DOD has been taking to address these problems, and what remains to be done. At the same time, program managers are incentivized to succeed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars to acquire space-based capabilities to support current military and other government operations as well as to enable DOD to transform the way it collects and disseminates information, gathers data on adversaries, and attacks targets. In fiscal year 2009 alone, DOD expects to spend over $10 billion to develop and procure satellites and other space systems. At the same time, however, DOD's space system acquisitions have experienced problems over the past several decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars; stretched schedules by years; and increased performance risks. In some cases, capabilities have not been delivered to the warfighter after decades of development. This testimony relies on the extensive body of work GAO has produced reviewing DOD space acquisitions. It comments on the persistent problems affecting space acquisitions, the actions DOD has been taking to address these problems, and what remains to be done.
What GAO Found
The majority of major acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and increased technical risks. At times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing DOD to nearly double its investment in the face of technical and other problems without realizing a better return. Along with the increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays--as much as 7 years--postponing delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the same, or less, capability. Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost growth and related problems. These include: optimistic cost and schedule estimating; the tendency to start programs with too many unknowns about technology; inadequate contracting strategies; contract and program management weaknesses; the loss of technical expertise; capability gaps in the industrial base; tensions between labs that develop technologies for the future and acquisition programs; divergent needs in users of space systems; and diffuse leadership. DOD has taken a number of actions to address the problems that GAO has reported on. These include initiatives at the department level that will affect all major weapons programs, as well as changes in course within specific Air Force programs. Most notable, the Air Force has sustained its commitment to reduce technology risks in programs and acted to restructure new programs so that its space portfolio can be more affordable. These actions are a step in the right direction and will be effective, particularly if they are complemented by more accurate cost estimating; continued prioritization of investments; actions to address capacity shortfalls, such as low-cost launch and shortages of staff in program offices; and changes to acquisition policies to reflect the best practices the Air Force is committing to. |
gao_GAO-01-918T | gao_GAO-01-918T_0 | Medicare Could Benefit from Open Competition and Increased Flexibility
Medicare could benefit from various contracting reforms. Freeing the program to directly choose contractors on a competitive basis from a broader array of entities able to perform needed tasks would enable Medicare to benefit from efficiency and performance improvements related to competition. Authorizing Medicare to pay contractors based on how well they perform rather than simply reimbursing them for their costs, as well as allowing the program to terminate contracts more efficiently when program needs change or performance is inadequate, could also result in better program management. Subsequent regulations and decades of the agency’s own practices have further limited how the program contracts for claims administration services. Concluding Observations
Removing the contracting limitations imposed at Medicare’s inception to promote full and open competition and increase flexibility could help to modernize the program and lead to more efficient and effective management. | What GAO Found
Discussions about how to reform and modernize the Medicare Program have, in part, focused on whether the structure that was adopted in 1965 is optimal today. Questions have been raised about whether the program could benefit from changes to the way that Medicare's claims processing contractors are chosen and the jobs they do. Medicare could benefit from full and open competition and its relative flexibility to promote better performance and accountability. If the current limits on Medicare contracting authority are removed, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services could (1) select contractors on a competitive basis from a broader array of entities capable of performing needed program activities, (2) issue contracts for discrete program functions to improve contractor performance through specialization, (3) pay contractors based on how well they perform rather than simply reimbursing them for their costs, and (4) terminate poor performers more efficiently. |
gao_GAO-11-69 | gao_GAO-11-69_0 | The Integrated Disability Evaluation System
In November 2007, DOD and VA began piloting the IDES, a joint disability evaluation system to eliminate duplication in their separate systems and to expedite receipt of VA benefits for wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers. Pilot Evaluation Results Are Promising, but the Degree of Improvement Achieved Is Unknown
DOD and VA’s Evaluation Shows That the Pilot Is Achieving Some of Its Goals
In their planning documents for the IDES pilot, DOD and VA stated that they were basing their evaluation of the effectiveness of the IDES pilot on whether it has achieved three key goals relative to the legacy process: increased servicemember satisfaction, improved case-processing time, and a reduction in servicemember appeal rates. In this report, the agencies concluded that servicemembers who went through the IDES pilot were more satisfied than those who went through the legacy system, and that the IDES process met the agencies’ goals of delivering VA benefits to active duty servicemembers within 295 days and to reserve component servicemembers within 305 days. However, while the agencies have largely met their overall goal to increase servicemember satisfaction and met their timeliness goal as of February 2010, since that time, case processing times have been steadily increasing as the caseload has increased. I for further information). Among these were insufficient staffing, challenges in conducting the single exams, logistical challenges related integrating VA staff, as well as housing and managing servicemembers going through the IDES. Officials at most of the 1 pilot sites we visited said they have experienced staffing shortages to a t least some extent, with a few sites—Fort Ca particular—experiencing severe shortages. For example, as of August 2010, exams at Fort Carson have taken an average of 140 days to complete for active duty servicemembers, according to the agencies’ data, far from achieving their goal to complete single medical exams within 45 days (see fig. II for processing times for reserve component members). As a result, they lacked key information, such as the servicemember’s medical history and results of laboratory tests. DOD and VA Expansion Plans Address Some Though Not All Challenges
DOD and VA Have Incorporated Many Lessons Learned into Their Planning for Worldwide Expansion of the IDES but Lack Concrete Plans for Addressing Some Challenges
DOD and VA plan to expand the IDES to sites worldwide on an ambitious timetable—to 113 sites during fiscal year 2011, a pace of about 1 site every 3 days. However, piloting of the system at 27 sites has revealed several significant challenges that require careful management attention and oversight before DOD and VA expand the system military-wide. DOD and VA currently have mechanisms to track numbers of cases processed, timeliness, and servicemember satisfaction, but they do not routinely monitor factors—such as staffing levels relative to caseload, disagreements about diagnoses, and insufficient exam summaries—that can delay the process. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the IDES is sufficiently staffed and that military treatment facilities are prepared to house personnel in the IDES, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to conduct thorough assessments prior to each site’s implementation of the IDES of the following three issues: the adequacy of staffing of military physicians for completing MEB determinations at military treatment facilities; contingency plans should be developed to address potential staffing shortfalls, for example, due to staff turnover or caseload surges; the availability of housing for servicemembers in the IDES at military facilities; alternative housing options should be identified if sites do not have adequate capacity; and the capacity of organizational units to absorb servicemembers undergoing the disability evaluation; plans should be in place to ensure servicemembers are appropriately and constructively engaged. DOD and VA generally concurred with our recommendations. Each agency also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Staff members who made key contributions in this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In conducting our review of the integrated disability evaluation system (IDES) piloted by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA), our objectives were to examine (1) the results of DOD and VA’s evaluation of the IDES pilot, (2) challenges in implementing the piloted system to date, and (3) DOD and VA plans to expand the piloted system and whether those plans adequately address potential challenges. We also reviewed the relevant requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 as it pertains to this review. We also analyzed Army data on appeals in order to illustrate the limitations of DOD’s plan to compare only appeals to the informal PEB in the pilot and legacy systems and not take into account appeals of rating decisions to VA. We conducted this analysis using the legacy data and pilot case data as of early 2010, since DOD and VA’s weekly reports do not contain information on appeals to VA.
Identifying Challenges in Implementing the IDES at Pilot Sites
To identify challenges in implementing the IDES during the pilot phase, we visited 10 of the 27 military treatment facilities participating in the pilot. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2007, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) have been testing a new disability evaluation system designed to integrate their separate processes and thereby expedite veterans' benefits for wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers. Having piloted the integrated disability evaluation system (IDES) at 27 military facilities, they are now planning for its expansion military-wide. Part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required GAO to report on DOD and VA's implementation of policies on disability evaluations. This report examines: (1) the results of the agencies' evaluation of the IDES pilot, (2) challenges in implementing the IDES pilot to date, and (3) whether DOD and VA's plans to expand the IDES adequately address potential future challenges. GAO analyzed data from DOD and VA, conducted site visits at 10 military facilities, and interviewed DOD and VA officials.
What GAO Found
In their evaluation of the IDES pilot as of February 2010, DOD and VA concluded that it had improved servicemember satisfaction relative to the existing "legacy" system and met their established goal of delivering VA benefits to active duty and reserve component servicemembers within 295 and 305 days, respectively, on average. While these results are promising, average case processing times have steadily increased since the February 2010 evaluation. At 296 days for active duty servicemembers, as of August 2010, processing time for the IDES is still an improvement over the 540 days that DOD and VA estimated the legacy process takes to deliver VA benefits to members. However, the full extent of improvement of the IDES over the legacy system is unknown because (1) the 540-day estimate was based on a small, nonrepresentative sample of cases and (2) limitations in legacy case data prevent a comprehensive comparison of timeliness, as well as appeal rates. Piloting of the IDES has revealed several implementation challenges that have contributed to delays in the process, the most significant being insufficient staffing by DOD and VA. Staffing shortages were severe at a few pilot sites that experienced caseload surges. For example, at one of these sites, due to a lack of VA medical staff, it took 140 days on average to complete one of the key features of the pilot--the single exam--compared with the agencies' goal to complete this step of the process in 45 days. The single exam posed other challenges that contributed to process delays, such as exam summaries that did not contain sufficient information for VA to determine the servicemember's benefits and disagreements between DOD and VA medical staff about diagnoses for servicemembers' medical conditions. Cases with these problems were returned for further attention, adding time to the process. Pilot sites also experienced logistical challenges, such as incorporating VA staff at military facilities and housing and managing personnel going through the process. As DOD and VA prepare to expand the IDES worldwide, they have made preparations to address a number of these challenges, but these efforts have yet to be tested, and not all challenges have been addressed. To address staffing shortages and ensure timely processing, VA is developing a contract for additional medical examiners, and DOD and VA are requiring local staff to develop written contingency plans for handling surges in caseloads. However, the agencies lack strategies for meeting some key challenges, such as ensuring enough military physicians to handle anticipated workloads. They also do not have a comprehensive monitoring plan for identifying problems as they occur--such as staffing shortages and insufficiencies in medical exams--in order to take remedial actions as early as possible.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making several recommendations to improve DOD and VA's planning for expansion of the new disability evaluation system, including developing a systematic monitoring process and ensuring that adequate staff is in place. DOD and VA generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated into the report as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-17-369 | gao_GAO-17-369_0 | DOD Has Made Progress Addressing Key Challenges in Accomplishing Its Mission, but Significant Work Remains
DOD faces five key challenges that significantly affect the department’s ability to accomplish its mission—specifically the need for DOD to (1) rebalance forces and rebuild readiness in an evolving global security environment; (2) mitigate threats in cyberspace and expand cyber capabilities; (3) control the escalating costs of programs, such as certain weapon systems acquisitions and military health care, and manage its finances; (4) strategically manage its human capital; and (5) achieve greater efficiencies in defense business operations. DOD has demonstrated progress addressing each of these challenges, but significant work remains. Rebalance Forces and Rebuild Readiness in an Evolving Global Security Environment
The military services are generally smaller and less combat ready today than they have been in many years, and each military service has been forced to cut critical needs in areas such as training, maintenance, and modernization due to budget constraints, according to DOD. Officials said that the result of the current state of readiness is that military forces are not strong enough to protect vital U.S. national security interests from worldwide threats. For example, despite an increase in resources and a sustained high deployment level for special operations forces, DOD has not taken steps to examine whether additional opportunities exist to reduce the high demand on these forces by sharing some of their responsibilities with conventional forces. We also identified areas where DOD and the military services have not determined whether plans to rebalance the capabilities of U.S. military forces will meet the needs of global commanders. By determining the most appropriate forces and training to meet the demands of its combatant commanders, ensuring policy makers have information to make well-informed weapon system modernization choices, and developing a comprehensive plan to rebuild readiness with methods for evaluating outcomes, DOD and decision makers would be better positioned to evaluate whether U.S. military forces have the capacity and capabilities to prevail across a full range of potential contingencies. Since 2011, we have directed 39 recommendations to DOD in this area, of which 35 remain open, including 5 priority recommendations. A 2016 Federal Information Security Management Act report noted that more than 30,000 data security incidents compromised federal information systems during fiscal year 2016—16 of which were categorized as major incidents that needed to be reported to Congress. Recognizing this strategic challenge, in February 2016 the Director of National Intelligence identified cyber threats as first among strategic threats to the United States, surpassing terrorism. DOD has become increasingly reliant on the Internet and other networks, which are central to the department’s operations and enable essential services including logistics, budgeting, personnel, and policymaking. Our work has found that DOD must address weaknesses in (1) its planning for the continuity of operations in a degraded cyber environment, (2) the protection of classified information and systems from insider threats, and (3) the visibility and oversight of its capabilities that could be used during a cyber incident. DOD has made progress in developing cyber capabilities that are needed to simultaneously defend its networks, systems, and information; protect the nation from cyber attacks of significant consequence; and work with other departments and branches of the federal government to address cyber-related issues. Since 2011, we have directed 33 recommendations to DOD in unclassified and sensitive but unclassified reports, of which 14 remain open, including 5 priority recommendations. Control Escalating Costs and Manage Finances
DOD’s $580 billion fiscal year 2016 budget accounts for nearly half of the federal government’s discretionary spending, and DOD’s costs are growing. For example, DOD plans to invest $574 billion in future funding to develop and acquire major acquisition programs, and the department’s annual military health care costs are expected to increase from about $60 billion in fiscal year 2017 to about $70 billion by fiscal year 2028. Given these constrained budgetary resources and DOD’s recognition that there are opportunities to be more efficient in the department’s operations, the department has undertaken a series of reform initiatives to control costs for programs that make up a significant portion of DOD’s budget and improve DOD’s financial management operations. DOD has expressed a commitment to holding itself accountable for the funding it receives and is taking actions to allow for an annual financial statement audit, but it continues to remain one of the few federal entities that cannot demonstrate an ability to accurately account for and reliably report on its spending or assets. DOD has also taken steps to modernize the military health system and control health care costs. Among other issues, DOD’s financial management problems have contributed to (1) inconsistent and sometimes unreliable reports to Congress on weapon system operating and support costs, limiting the visibility that Congress needs to effectively oversee weapon system programs and (2) an impaired ability to make cost-effective choices, such as deciding whether to outsource specific activities or how to improve efficiency through technology. Since 2011, we have directed 79 recommendations to DOD in this area, of which 72 remain open, including 52 priority recommendations. DOD estimates that it will spend nearly $180 billion in fiscal year 2017 on pay and benefits for military personnel and about $70 billion for its civilian employees. Taken together, funding for military and civilian pay and benefits represented nearly 50 percent of DOD’s budget in fiscal year 2016 (see fig. DOD estimates that it spent about $115 billion on its contractor workforce in fiscal year 2015, although we have raised questions regarding the reliability of the department’s information on this workforce. Current budget and long-term fiscal pressures on the department only increase the importance of strategically managing human capital. For example, DOD has not followed our leading practices for cost estimation and it likely underestimated certain costs, such as those for training, which prevents the department from making cost-effective comparisons and decisions regarding the use of its military, civilian, and contractor workforces. Since 2011, we have directed 67 recommendations to DOD in this area, of which 64 remain open. Achieve Greater Efficiencies in Defense Business Operations
DOD spends billions of dollars each year acquiring business systems and contractor-provided services that provide fundamental support to the warfighter in the areas of health care; logistics; personnel; and financial management, among other areas. In fiscal year 2014 alone, DOD obligated $85 billion to its three largest types of contractor-provided services: knowledge-based, facility-related, and research and development services. This amount is more than double the amount that DOD obligated to purchase aircraft, land vehicles, and ships. DOD senior leaders have prioritized defense institutional reform, and have emphasized the need to improve business practices and reduce overhead as a means to achieve greater efficiencies and free up resources for higher priorities. By effectively monitoring department-wide business transformation efforts, establishing management controls for its business system investments, developing guidance to monitor service acquisitions, and improving the reliability of its headquarters data, DOD will be better positioned to identify opportunities to gain additional efficiencies in its business operations. Since 2011, we have directed 49 recommendations to DOD in this area, of which 38 recommendations remain open, including 8 priority recommendations. Four Cross-Cutting Factors Have Affected DOD’s Ability to Address Key Mission Challenges
Our body of work at DOD has identified four cross-cutting factors that have affected DOD’s ability to address its key mission challenges: (1) the lack of sustained leadership involvement, (2) a misalignment between programs and budgets and resources, (3) ineffective strategic planning and performance monitoring, and (4) an ineffective management control system. Nine years after the creation of the CMO and DCMO positions, all of DOD’s business functions remain on our High-Risk List. Congress has remained concerned about DOD’s leadership challenges and, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, established a new CMO position and replaced the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. These new positions provide an opportunity to enhance the department’s leadership focus on its key mission challenges, but DOD will need to clearly define key responsibilities and authorities to help ensure that these positions can effectively drive transformation efforts. Misalignment between programs and resources and budgets: In January 2017, we reported that the federal government faces an unsustainable long-term fiscal path and that the Congress and the new administration will need to consider difficult policy choices in the short term regarding federal spending. However, since 2005, we have reported that DOD’s approach to planning and budgeting often results in a mismatch between the department’s programs and available resources. Ineffective strategic planning and performance monitoring: For more than a decade we have reported on strategic planning and performance monitoring challenges that have affected the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s operations both at the strategic readiness level and across all of DOD’s major business areas–including contract management, financial management, and supply chain management. We have also reported that in its performance monitoring efforts DOD has missed opportunities to hold officials accountable for progress made toward DOD-identified goals and milestones, to make timely and well- informed actions to address identified challenges, and to encourage continuous improvements in performance across its major business functions. However, we have also reported since 2011 that DOD does not have quality information on costs related to mission critical programs, the department’s headquarters functions, and the department’s major business areas. Without quality information regarding the costs associated with DOD’s mission-critical weapon systems, for example, DOD will be unable to effectively assess the affordability of the programs that support them. We have reported that DOD also faces long-standing challenges in implementing an effective management control system to improve accountability and effectively and efficiently achieve its mission. We have issued hundreds of reports and made thousands of recommendations to DOD to help position it to address its challenges. In its comments, reproduced in appendix III, DOD stated that although this report is a review of progress made of previous GAO audits and no new recommendations were issued, the department stands by its responses and concurrence to taking the requisite actions needed to address all previous recommendations. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Chief Management Officer. Appendix I: Actions That the Department of Defense (DOD) Needs to Take to Address Our 78 Priority Open Recommendations
Appendix II: Our Work Related to the Department of Defense’s Key Mission Challenges
Our work identified five key challenges that impact Department of Defense’s (DOD) ability to accomplish its mission–specifically, the need for DOD to (1) rebalance forces and rebuild readiness in an evolving global security environment; (2) mitigate threats to cyberspace and expand cyber capabilities; (3) control the escalating costs of programs, such as certain weapon systems acquisitions and military health care, and manage its finances; (4) strategically manage its human capital; and (5) achieve greater efficiencies in defense business operations. F-35 Sustainment: Need for Affordable Strategy, Greater Attention to Risks, and Improved Cost Estimates. DOD Financial Management: Significant Improvements Needed in Efforts to Address Improper Payment Requirements. Military Compensation: Additional Actions Are Needed to Better Manage Special and Incentive Pay Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States faces a complex national security environment, to include strategic challenges presented by traditional state actors and destabilizing nonstate actors, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Recognizing these challenges, DOD has emphasized the importance of providing forces that are capable of performing a full range of missions. GAO has issued hundreds of reports that bring greater attention to areas where DOD can strengthen its operations to more efficiently and effectively meet its mission.
This report identifies (1) key challenges affecting DOD's ability to accomplish its mission, progress made on these challenges, and work remaining; and (2) factors that have affected DOD's ability to address these key challenges. This report builds on GAO's past work with an emphasis on reports issued since 2011. GAO also analyzed DOD information on recent actions taken in response to GAO's prior work.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) faces five key challenges that significantly affect the department's ability to accomplish its mission. These include the need to (1) rebalance forces and rebuild readiness; (2) mitigate threats to cyberspace and expand cyber capabilities; (3) control the escalating costs of programs, such as certain weapon systems acquisitions and military health care, and better manage its finances; (4) strategically manage its human capital; and (5) achieve greater efficiencies in defense business operations. DOD has demonstrated progress addressing challenges, but significant work remains. Specifically:
Rebalance forces and rebuild readiness : The military services today are generally smaller and less combat ready than they have been in many years, and each military service has been forced to cut critical needs in areas such as training, maintenance, and modernization due to budgetary constraints, according to DOD. Officials said that the result of the current state of readiness is that military forces are not strong enough to protect vital U.S. national security interests from worldwide threats. DOD has pursued plans to strengthen military capabilities, but must take key actions to rebalance, rebuild, and modernize the capabilities of U.S. military forces. For example, DOD needs to take further steps to meet the demands of geographic commanders and examine whether there are opportunities to reduce the high demand on special operations forces. DOD also needs to provide decision makers with complete and accurate budget and cost information to make well-informed decisions on weapon systems modernization investments and mitigate potential risks to certain modernization initiatives, including regarding the F-35 aircraft—a program on which DOD plans to spend over $1 trillion to operate and sustain over its life cycle. The military services have plans underway to rebuild readiness for portions of their military forces, but these initiatives are at risk without more comprehensive planning and an approach to measure progress in attaining goals (see table). Since 2011, GAO has directed 39 recommendations to DOD in this area, of which 35 remain open, including 5 priority recommendations.
Mitigate threats to cyberspace and expand cyber capabilities : In February 2016, the Director of National Intelligence identified cyber threats as first among strategic threats to the United States, surpassing terrorism. According to the 2016 Federal Information Security Management Act report, more than 30,000 data security incidents compromised federal information systems during fiscal year 2016, 16 of which were categorized as major incidents. DOD has become increasingly reliant on the Internet and other networks, which are central to its military operations and enable essential services. At the same time, the vulnerability of its cyber networks has grown significantly, due in part to the increase in the severity of cyber attacks. DOD has made progress in developing a cyber strategy to defend its networks and protect the nation from cyber attacks, but needs to take additional actions to improve its planning for the continuity of operations in a degraded cyber environment, such as providing defense organizations with guidance and training to practice responses during exercises. DOD also needs to take further action to strengthen its insider threat awareness program to address the increased risk of the unauthorized disclosure of classified information from defense information systems and to improve the visibility and oversight of the cyber capabilities of all National Guard units, such as computer network defense teams that could be used during a cyber incident. Since 2011, GAO has directed 33 recommendations to DOD in unclassified and sensitive but unclassified reports, of which 14 remain open, including 5 priority recommendations.
Control escalating costs and manage finances : DOD's $580 billion fiscal year 2016 budget accounts for nearly half of the federal government's discretionary spending, and DOD's costs are growing. DOD plans to invest $574 billion to develop and acquire 78 major acquisition programs through fielding, such as the F-35 and the Littoral Combat Ship, while annual military health care costs are expected to increase from about $60 billion in fiscal year 2017 to about $70 billion by fiscal year 2028. Further, DOD remains one of the few federal entities that cannot demonstrate an ability to accurately account for and reliably report its spending or assets. DOD has undertaken a series of reform initiatives to control costs and improve its financial management, but needs to more consistently implement leading acquisition practices to manage the costs of its weapon systems. DOD also needs to better address improper payments to control rising costs in the military health system, which has experienced a 217 percent increase in costs since 2001 (see fig.). Further, DOD should take steps to identify underutilized space in its facilities to reduce its reliance on costly leased facilities. Finally, DOD needs to remediate financial management deficiencies, which prevent it from producing auditable financial statements and result in inadequate financial and other information available to DOD to manage its operations. Since 2011, GAO has directed 79 recommendations to DOD in this area, of which 72 remain open, including 52 priority recommendations.
Strategically manage human capital : DOD estimates that it will spend nearly $180 billion in fiscal year 2017 on pay and benefits for its military personnel and about $70 billion for its civilian employees. Taken together, funding for military and civilian pay and benefits represents nearly 50 percent of DOD's budget in fiscal year 2016 (see fig.). DOD also estimates that it spent about $115 billion on certain contractor-provided services in fiscal year 2015, although we have raised questions regarding the reliability of DOD's information on its contractor workforce. Current budget and long-term fiscal pressures on the department increase the importance of strategically managing DOD's human capital. DOD has taken steps to develop better information about the skill sets possessed and needed within the department's military, civilian, and contractor workforces, but needs to take further actions to complete a workforce mix assessment, improve the methodology for estimating workforce costs, and address skill gaps in critical workforces. DOD should also establish a comprehensive compensation strategy for its military personnel to help achieve its recruiting and retention goals, including a cost-effective approach for managing the $3.4 billion the department spent in fiscal year 2015 on special and incentive pays for active-duty service members. Since 2011, GAO has directed 67 recommendations to DOD in this area, of which 64 remain open.
Achieve greater efficiencies in defense business operations : DOD spends billions of dollars each year acquiring business systems and contractor-provided services to support the warfighter. In 2014 alone, DOD obligated $85 billion on three types of contractor-provided services—including an amount obligated for knowledge-based and research and development services that was more than double what the department spent to purchase aircraft, land vehicles, and ships. DOD has emphasized the need to improve its business practices and reduce overhead and free up resources for higher priorities, but needs to take additional actions to drive business transformation efforts, implement management controls for its business systems investments, and develop guidance to manage the acquisition of contracted services. DOD also needs to improve the reliability of its data to enable it to properly size its headquarters organizations, which have experienced significant growth; to accomplish missions; and identify potential cost savings. Since 2011, GAO has directed 49 recommendations to DOD in this area, of which 38 remain open, including 8 priority recommendations.
GAO's prior work identified four cross-cutting factors that have affected DOD's ability to address the department's key challenges. Specifically:
Lack of sustained leadership involvement: More than 9 years after Congress designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the Chief Management Officer and created the Deputy Chief Management Officer position to provide leadership over the department's business functions, all of DOD's business areas remain on our High-Risk List—areas that are vulnerable to waste, fraud, or mismanagement (see fig.). In December 2016, Congress established a separate Chief Management Officer position from the Deputy Secretary of Defense and replaced the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with two new Under Secretary positions to further address DOD's leadership challenges. These new positions provide an opportunity to enhance DOD's leadership focus on DOD's key challenges, but DOD will need to clearly define the key responsibilities and authorities for these positions to help ensure that they can effectively drive transformation efforts.
Misalignment between programs and resources and budgets: The federal government faces an unsustainable long-term fiscal path, and the Congress and the new administration will need to consider difficult policy choices in the short term regarding federal spending. However, since 2005, GAO has reported that DOD's approach to planning and budgeting often results in a mismatch between the department's programs and available resources. As a result, DOD faces significant affordability challenges for some of its major acquisition programs that have unsustainable cost estimates and that will vie for significant funding commitments.
Ineffective strategic planning and performance monitoring: GAO has reported since 2005 on strategic planning and performance monitoring challenges that have affected the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's operations, both at the strategic readiness level and across all of DOD's major business areas–including contract management, financial management, and supply chain management. DOD has missed opportunities to hold officials accountable for progress made toward meeting goals and milestones, make timely and well-informed actions to address identified challenges, and encourage continuous improvements in performance across its major business functions.
Ineffective management control system: DOD has not addressed long-standing challenges in implementing an effective management control system to improve accountability and effectively and efficiently achieve its mission. DOD does not have quality information on costs related to mission critical programs, such as weapon systems, and the department is unable to effectively assess the affordability of the programs that support them. Since 2005, GAO has reported on internal control deficiencies with DOD's financial management that have contributed to inconsistent and sometimes unreliable reports to Congress on weapon system operating and support costs, among other areas. This inconsistent and unreliable reporting limits the visibility that Congress needs to effectively oversee defense programs, and impairs its ability to make cost-effective choices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made approximately 3,100 recommendations to DOD since 2006. Of these, about 1,037 remain open, including 78 priority recommendations that, if implemented, could significantly improve DOD's operations. In commenting on this report, DOD stated that although the report made no new recommendations, the department stands by its responses and concurrence to taking the requisite actions needed to address all previous recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-275 | gao_GAO-10-275_0 | Increasing security at DOE sites since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been costly and challenging. On the basis of this review, DOE has sought to transform DOE’s protective forces who safeguard special nuclear material into an “elite force”—a TRF—with training and capabilities similar to military units. These differences occur because protective forces operate under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements at each site and because of DOE’s long-standing contracting approach of defining desired outcomes instead of detailed, prescriptive guidance on how to achieve those outcomes. Tactical Response Force Implementation Varies and Has Raised Concerns about the Longevity of Protective Forces Careers
Sites are at different stages in the implementation of TRF requirements. However, TRF implementation, coupled with broader DOE efforts to limit postretirement and pension liabilities, has raised concerns with DOE security officials, protective force contractors, and protective force unions about the longevity of protective forces’ careers and the adequacy of their personnel systems. TRF Implementation Varies
DOE has identified the following important TRF requirements for protective forces: Improved tactical skills, so that protective forces “move, shoot, and communicate” as a unit. Also, according to NNSA’s fiscal year 2010 budget submission, NNSA does not expect its sites to complete TRF activities until the end of fiscal year 2011. TRF Implementation Has Raised Concerns
Since its inception in 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE security organizations, among protective force contractors, and in protective force unions about the ability of protective forces—especially older individuals serving in protective forces—to continue meeting DOE’s weapons, physical fitness, and medical qualifications. Adding to these concerns are DOE’s broader efforts to manage its long-term postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors, which could have a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for protective forces. Under the 2003 DBT, most DOE sites are required to maintain denial protection strategies for Category I SNM. In contrast, the protective forces at six sites have decentralized management and are overseen by one of three DOE organizations. Either of the Two Principal Options DOE Has Considered Could Result in More Uniform Management of Protective Forces
To manage its protective forces more effectively and uniformly, DOE has considered two principal options—improving elements of the existing contractor system or creating a federal protective force. Either option could result in effective and more uniform security if well-managed. They concluded that, among other things, the transition to a federal force would be costly and would be likely to provide little, if any, increase in security effectiveness. However, these officials recognized that the current contractor system could be improved by addressing some of the issues that federalization might have resolved. Other recommendations focus on providing training and planning assistance for retirement and job transitions. I.) Appendix I: Recommendations from the Protective Force Career Options Initiative Study Group
In March 2009, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Chief Health, Safety and Security (HSS) Officer commissioned a study to examine “realistic and reasonable options for improving the career opportunities and retirement prospects of protective force (PF) members while maintaining, within current and anticipated budgetary constraints, a robust and effective security posture.” Under the leadership of HSS and with input from protective force contractors, a study group was formed consisting of senior leaders of the National Council of Security Police and senior technical staff from the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Environmental Management, the Office of Nuclear Energy, and the Office of Fossil Energy. 1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised concerns about the security of Department of Energy's (DOE) sites with weapons-grade nuclear material, known as Category I Special Nuclear Material (SNM). To better protect these sites against attacks, DOE has sought to transform its protective forces protecting SNM into a Tactical Response Force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the U.S. military. DOE also has considered whether the current system of separate contracts for protective forces at each site provides sufficiently uniform, high-quality performance across its sites. Section 3124 of PL 110-181, the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, directed GAO to review protective forces at DOE sites that possess Category I SNM. Among other things, GAO (1) analyzed information on the management and compensation of protective forces, (2) examined the implementation of TRF, and (3) assessed DOE's two options to more uniformly manage DOE protective forces.
What GAO Found
Over 2000 contractor protective forces provide armed security for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at six sites that have long-term missions to store and process Category I SNM. DOE protective forces at each of these sites are covered under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements between contractors and protective force unions. As a result, the management and compensation--in terms of pay and benefits--of protective forces vary. Sites vary in implementing important TRF requirements such as increasing the tactical skills of protective forces so that they can better "move, shoot, and communicate" as a unit. While one site has focused on implementing TRF requirements since 2004, other sites do not plan to complete TRF implementation until the end of fiscal year 2011. In addition, broader DOE efforts to manage postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors have raised concerns about a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for protective forces. Specifically, protective force contractors, unions, and DOE security officials are concerned that the implementation of TRF's more rigorous requirements and the current protective forces' personnel systems threaten the ability of protective forces--especially older members--to continue their careers until retirement age. Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on either reforming the current contracting approach or creating a federal protective force (federalization). Either approach might provide for managing protective forces more uniformly and could result in effective security if well-managed. Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009 because it believed that the transition would be costly and would yield little, if any, increase in security effectiveness, the department recognized that the current contracting approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing personnel system issues. As a result, NNSA began a standardization initiative to centralize procurement of equipment, uniforms, and weapons to achieve cost savings. Under a separate initiative, a DOE study group developed a number of recommendations to enhance protective forces' career longevity and retirement options, but DOE has made limited progress to date in implementing these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-194T | gao_GAO-10-194T_0 | LSC Has Made Improvements in its Governance and Management Practices But Key Actions Still Need to Be Completed
While LSC’s board and management have taken actions to improve its governance and accountability practices towards fully implementing the recommendations from our August 2007 report additional actions to fully implement the other key recommendations are needed. As the board transitions to new board members, it will be important for the new board to provide priority focused attention on fully implementing the other five of our recommendations. Governance Practices
In August 2007 we reported that the governance practices of LSC’s board fell short of the modern practices employed by boards of nonprofit corporations and public companies. Although the board members had demonstrated active involvement in LSC through their regular board meeting attendance and participation, we pointed out several areas where LSC’s governance practices could be strengthened. Management Practices
In August 2007, we reported that LSC’s management practices did not reflect current practices in the areas of risk assessment, internal control, and financial reporting. We pointed out areas where management’s practices could be strengthened. LSC management fully implemented two of our December 2007 report recommendations, including following up on identified improper or potentially improper uses of grants funds. However, LSC has only partially implemented three key recommendations, including limited action on implementing an approach for selecting grantees for review using consistently applied, risk-based criteria. Full implementation of all of the remaining recommendations is needed in order to ensure that LSC management has effective control over its mission-critical grantees. Our December 2007 review of grants management and oversight at LSC identified weaknesses in LSC’s internal controls over grants management and oversight that negatively affected LSC’s ability to monitor and oversee grants and left grant funds vulnerable to misuse. As a result of our follow-up work conducted between May 2009 and October 2009, we determined that LSC management had fully implemented two of the four recommendations we made to management. Further, although the board has implemented the key recommendation of establishing an audit committee, the board must continue its efforts to implement another key recommendation of developing and implementing procedures to periodically evaluate management processes, including risk assessment, mitigation, internal control and financial reporting. Fully implementing the remaining recommendations, will enable the board and management to achieve the level of governance and internal control needed to provide adequate assurance that LSC’s governance and internal control structures are effective, and that grant funds are being used as intended and in accordance with laws and regulations. | Why GAO Did This Study
In August 2007, GAO reported (GAO-07-993) that Legal Services Corporation (LSC) had not kept up with evolving reforms aimed at strengthening governance, accountability and internal controls. In December 2007, GAO reported (GAO-08-37) weaknesses in LSC's internal controls over grants management and oversight of grantees. GAO was asked to testify on the status of accountability practices of the LSC. GAO's testimony is primarily a summary of our prior reporting, but includes follow up work conducted between May and October 2009 to obtain information on the status of our prior recommendations.
What GAO Found
In August 2007, GAO reported that the governance practices of LSC's board fell short of the modern practices employed by other nonprofit corporations and public companies. Although the board members had demonstrated active involvement in LSC through regular board meeting attendance and participation, we pointed out several areas where LSC's governance practices could be strengthened. LSC's management practices had also not kept up with the current practices for key processes in risk assessment, internal control, and financial reporting. We pointed out certain areas where management's practices could be strengthened. GAO concluded that a properly implemented governance and accountability structure might have prevented incidents, such as compensation rates in excess of statutory caps, questionable expenditures, and potential conflicts of interest. GAO made 12 recommendations - 8 to the board and 4 to management. LSC's management has implemented all 4 recommendations to improve its management practices. The board has fully implemented 3 recommendations, but it needs to take additional actions to fully implement the other 5 recommendations. For example, LSC's board has fully implemented the key recommendation to establish an audit committee. However, another key recommendation for the board to implement procedures to periodically evaluate key management processes has not yet been fully implemented. LSC told GAO that it plans to take additional actions to more fully address the five recommendations. In December 2007, GAO reported weaknesses in LSC's internal controls over grants management and oversight of grantees that negatively affected LSC's ability to provide assurance that grant funds were being used for their intended purposes in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Effective internal controls over grants and grantee oversight are critical to accomplishing LSC's mission because it relies extensively on grantees to provide legal services to individuals who otherwise could not afford to pay for legal counsel. GAO made 5 recommendations to address these issues. LSC management fully implemented two of our report recommendations, including following up on identified improper or potentially improper uses of grants funds. However, LSC has only partially implemented three key recommendations, including only limited action to implement an approach for selecting grantees for review using consistently applied, risk-based criteria. In order to improve LSC's board and management's ability to maintain accountability over LSC's mission, it will be critical for LSC's board and management to maintain priority focus on fully implementing all remaining GAO recommendations. |
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